Defunct NameTheTrait V1

Ask Yourself claims NTT is an argument for veganism that requires only logical consistency and a personal belief in human moral value, independent of any other substantive ethical premises

Note: This article is a work in progress

To jump to the proof of logical invalidity see Proof of Invalidity in First Order Logic

[DrSinger: I moved a load of stuff here (NTT to be revised), to be revised and added back in.]

Name The Trait, or #NameTheTrait is an argument for veganism formulated by vegan Youtuber Ask Yourself in 2015, and popularized during a series of Youtube debates in 2017 by Ask Yourself and Vegan Gains a vegan bodybuilder and Youtuber. Loosely speaking, NTT seeks to establish veganism from a personal belief in human moral value, similar to the well known argument from marginal cases (or Less Able Humans). Some street activists claim to have found the argument effective, when presented informally. However as we will see in this article, it is logically invalid, and Ask Yourself's attempts to make it valid defend have led to an alternative version of the argument that is question-begging. Furthermore, it is often combined with extraordinary claims which are defended with the use of invalid generalizations. These drawbacks can make the argument confusing and unconvincing.

The formal, premise-conclusion presentation of #NameTheTrait is as follows:

Argument for animal moral value:
P1 - Humans are of moral value
P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless.
C - Therefore without establishing the absence of such a trait in animals, we contradict ourselves by deeming animals valueless
Argument for veganism from animal moral value:
P1 - Animals are of moral value.
P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to consider anything short of non-exploitation to be an adequate expression of respect for human moral value.
C - Therefore without establishing the absence of such a trait in animals, we contradict ourselves by considering anything short of non-exploitation(veganism) to be an adequate expression of respect for animal moral value.

This article discusses the three primary issues with NTT. Firstly, it discusses its logical invalidity, and how its invalidity can create problems. Secondly, it discusses problems with the justifications used by Ask Yourself to defend the premises of the first, "for animal moral value" argument validity of the argument. And thirdly, the article discusses various problems with the second, less widely discussed "for veganism from animal moral value" argument, which suggests a potentially dubious, unclear, and rigid commitment to non-exploitation.

[Please put large comments on the talk page]

NTT's Invalidity

Summary of Issues

The Importance of logical validity

The main reason it helps to know whether an argument is logically valid is that it helps us to clarify if we have identified all of the substantive assumptions behind its conclusion. If we can see that an argument is valid, then we know that its conclusion follows from its premises simply because of their form, so we have identified and listed all of its substantive assumptions in its premises. If we can see that an argument is invalid, this helps us to know that it must be making further assumptions in order to be a good, rationally compelling argument. Knowing that an argument is making such assumptions, and determining what they are, can help us to understand why certain individuals may not find it compelling, and can spare us the confusion of failing to understand this. It can also put us in a better position to defend those assumptions forthrightly to those who might be inclined to challenge or fail initially to accept them.

As we will see below, NTT is invalid. Seeing why it is helps us to see how certain very plausible substantive assumptions can be added to its premises to make it valid. The making of these tacit assumptions by the presenter of NTT and the audience very likely explains why it is often a compelling argument. But as we will see below, the failure to acknowledge these assumptions can cause confusion, and inhibit a persuasive defense of its premises. As we will also see, the fact that to be compelling the argument must make such assumptions may help to dash certain hopes about the minimality of the argument’s assumptions (e.g. about the nature of value and ethics). Seeing that NTT is invalid will thus help us to appreciate the argument’s limits, and how other approaches may be helpful in defending the substantive ethical views that stand behind arguments like NTT.

Logical Validity

What it is for arguments to be logically valid and invalid is the following:

• Valid: No possible case has the premises all true and the conclusion false, due simply to the structure of the premises and the conclusion
• Invalid: Some possible case has the premises all true and the conclusion false, due simply to the structure of the premises and the conclusion

In other words, for an argument to be logically valid is for the truth of its conclusion to be guaranteed by the truth of its premises due to their logical form. For instance, an argument of the form

(P1) If consuming animal products causes unnecessary suffering, then we should not consume animal products,

(P2) Consuming animal products causes unnecessary suffering,

Therefore, (C) we should not consume animal products

is logically valid. This is because it has the logical form:

(P1) If U then V

(P2) U

Therefore (C) V

Here, C follows from P1 and P2 simply due to their logical form, whatever the content of U and V may be (this particular way of a conclusion following from its logical form and that of the premises is known as "modus ponens").

Thus if we can show a case where the logical form of the premises and conclusion of NTT allow the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false, we will have shown that the argument is invalid. Such a case is referred to as a counterexample.

To see how to formally prove an argument is valid see Proving Formal Arguments (still a WIP).

Overview: NTT is Either Importantly Invalid or Question-Begging

It will be most helpful to put the basic reasoning of the first part of NTT in its simplest form. Without any commitment to what it is for us to think that an entity has moral value (for discussion of this see Defense of the First Part's Premises), the argument invites us to reason essentially as follows:

(P1) All sentient humans (or even just you) have moral value

(P2) There is no trait absent in sentient non-human animals which is such that, if the trait were absent in sentient humans (or you), then they would be not have moral value.

Therefore, (C) All sentient non-human animals have moral value

For more on how this portrays the basic reasoning of the first part of NTT, see getting to the steel-manned version.

Now, an ambiguity arises in the interpretation of (P2) about what might happen if certain traits were absent from sentient humans – or ourselves. Plausibly, there are some traits or properties without which an entity cannot count as human, or us. These might be having human DNA, originating from certain parents, or originating with an initial set of experiences. Now we need to ask whether the traits spoken of in P2 are supposed to be allowed to include one’s essential properties (or the properties essential to being human).

The Natural / Original Version: The natural and original version of the argument clearly intends P2 to speak of traits that do not include such essential properties: we are envisioning humans like oneself losing traits that one has and non-human animals lack (like abstract reasoning ability, moral agency, etc.) and still retaining one’s status as oneself. After all, it says "there are no traits absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless" - the entities losing the traits are clearly supposed still to be us. But in this case the argument is invalid, because one could hold the view that we might call

Value Narcissism: one’s essential properties (or the essential properties of being human) are what give one moral value – or are such that, if one lost them, one would lose moral value.

A value narcissist could hold that although humans like oneself (or just oneself) have moral value, and one would retain this value if one lost the non-essential properties that one has and sentient non-humans lack, non-human animals still lack moral value. She could thus accept P1 and P2 but reject C.

The Alternative Version: Now one can re-interpret P2 in such a way that the traits to which it refers are allowed to include one’s essential properties. Indeed, Ask Yourself has more recently suggested exactly such a re-interpretation. Then what P2 is really saying then is that, if we take (or hypothetically imagine) all of the properties away from humans like oneself that one has and sentient non-humans lack, including one's essential properties (and one's not having the essential properties of non-human animals), then the resulting entity - which is not necessarily oneself - still has moral value. Ask Yourself has argued that if one were to lose all of the traits that distinguish one from each other non-human animal, then the resulting entity would be identical to that non-human animal, so P1 and P2 so interpreted entail C.

The problem with the validity of the argument even so understood is that this inference presupposes something like the identity of indiscernibles: that if two entities have all of the same properties, then they must be the self-same object. This is a substantive metaphysical thesis, to which certain philosophers have objected (for discussion see [1]).

But as we will see below, the much greater problem with this re-interpretation of NTT is that it has essentially no rational force. The re-interpretation of P2 is essentially just asserting that all sentient beings, human and non-human, have moral value. The argument thus offers little if any reason to change the mind of someone who does not already find this view plausible, and the defense of its premises offers no guidance on how to persuade such an individual.

The main importance of appreciating the invalidity of NTT and exploring what we need to do to make it valid is thus to (i) distinguish the formulation in which P2 excludes essential properties from that in which it includes them, which enables us to (ii) see that the formulation that excludes them presupposes the rejection of a substantive ethical view, and finally to also (iii) see that the formulation that includes essential properties, while being such that it can easily be made technically valid, has (like the argument ‘(P1) we should be vegan; therefore (C) we should be vegan') essentially no persuasive force.

[Margaret: I believe that the above is a much clearer overview of the issues and how the rest of this entry will proceed than what we had here before old summary of issues, and propose that we replace the old summary with the above].

---

In what follows we will consider a version of the argument's second premise which allows us to talk about the entity that would result from humans like oneself losing various traits, without any explicit assumption about whether that individual would actually be oneself. We will thus use the notion of a counterpart of humans like oneself, which is the entity that would result if one lost various traits (understood broadly to include absences of other traits). This has the advantage of allowing us to consider different possible entities within the language of first order logic, which refers simply to how things are in a model (by including counterparts of us, our models will in essence refer to both actual and non-actual entities).

We will first formalize the first part of NTT in first order logic. We will then show that it is invalid by providing a counterexample in which the premises are true and the conclusion false. In essence, this is a model where all sentient humans (or oneself) have moral value, all of their trait-adjusted counterparts have moral value, but non-human animals lack moral value. The counterexample shows how, on the natural interpretation, one can accept P1 and P2 but reject the conclusion by accepting something like value narcissism.

We will then discuss the alternative interpretation of the argument, according to which this counterexample is impossible. Ask Yourself has invoked a principle about traits and identity to argue that for every sentient non-human animal, one has a fully trait-adjusted counter-part which is identical to that animal. We will comment on how this principle is substantive, but can be easily added to the premises of NTT. We will then comment, however, on how the notion of full-trait adjustment in premise 2 makes the argument essentially assume rather than independently establish the moral value of sentient non-humans.

[Margaret: I believe that this explanation about counterparts, in conjunction with the foregoing explanation of the layout of the section, incorporates everything that we need from the old steel-manning and interpreting section.

Proof of Invalidity in First Order Logic

In order to show the logical form of NTT, we will use what is known as First order logic. The sort of logic used to display the logical form of the argument above '(P1) If U then V; (P2) U; therefore, (C) V' is known as propositional logic, since it replaces full propositions flanking logical connectives like 'if...then', 'and' and 'or' with abstract symbols. First order logic goes inside the logical structure of propositions, and replaces predicates like 'is a sentient human' and 'is a sentient non-human animal' with abstract symbols. First order logic also considers variables for things to which those predicates are ascribed, and quantification over them (e.g. 'for all x, if x is a sentient human, then x has moral value').

[Margaret: I don't think we actually need a section on logical connectives in the main entry]

Displaying the Logical Form of NTT in FOL

Symbols

• ∀ (for all)
• ⇒ (if, then; e.g. A ⇒ B means 'if A then B')
• ⇔ (if and only if; e.g. A ⇔ B means 'if A then B and if B then A')
• ¬ (negation i.e. not)
• ∃ (there exists)
• ∧ (and)
• V (or)

Definitions

H(x) means 'x is a sentient human'

A(x) means 'x is a sentient non-human animal'

M(x) means 'x has moral value'

CP(x) means 'x is a counterpart of a sentient human'

T(x) means 'x is a trait'

P(x,y) means 'x has y; e.g. if x is a sentient human and t is a trait, P(x,t) means 'human x has trait t', or 'a property of x is t'

RNE(x) means 'we a morally required to not exploit x'

The Logical Form of Part 1 of NTT

---

(P1) ∀x ( H(x) ⇒ M(x) )

(P2) ¬∃t ( T(t) ∧ ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ¬P(x,t) ) ∧ ∀y ( ( CP(y) ∧ ¬P(y,t) ) ⇒ ¬ M(y) ) )

Therefore, (C) ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ M(x) )

In English

(P1) for all x, if x is a sentient human, then x has moral value

(P2) It is not the case that there exists a thing, t, such that t is a trait; and for all x, if x is a sentient non-human animal, then x does not have t; and for all y, if y is a counterpart of a sentient human, and y does not have t, then it is not the case that y has moral value;

Therefore, (C) For all x, if x is a sentient non-human animal, then x has moral value

The Logical Form of Part 2 of NTT

---

(P1) ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ M(x) )

(P2) ¬∃t ( T(t) ∧ ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ¬P(x,t)) ∧ ∀y ( (CP(y) ∧ M(y) ∧ ¬P(y,t)) ⇒ ¬RNE(y) ) )

Therefore, (C) ∀x ( ( (A(x) ∧ M(x) ) ⇒ RNE(x) )

In English:

(P1) For all x, if x is a sentient non-human animal, then x has moral value.

(P2) It is not the case that there exists something, t, which is such that t is a trait; and for all x, if x is a sentient non-human : animal, then x does not have t; and for all y, if y is a counterpart of a sentient human, and y has moral value, and y does not have t, then it is not the case that we’re required not to exploit t.

Therefore (C) for all x, if x is a sentient non-human animal, and x has moral value, then we’re morally required not to exploit x.

[old section getting to the steel-manned version.]

Showing NTT is Logically Invalid

The standard way of showing that an argument is invalid is to construct a counterexample, or a model, which is allowed by the logical form of the premises and the conclusion, in which the premises are true and the conclusion is false. For both Part 1 & 2 of NTT, we will show the argument is invalid by constructing a case, allowed by its logical form as displayed above, in which P1 & P2 are true but C is not.

Part 1 Counterexample

To show Part 1 is invalid we can pose a counterexample in which sentient humans have moral value, a sentient nonhuman animal does not have moral value (or even: all sentient non-human animals do not have moral value), and for all traits there exists a counterpart of a sentient human without the trait that has moral value. So in this model the following three statements are true:

• ∀x ( H(x) ⇒ M(x) )
  
• ∃x ( A(x) ∧ ¬ M(x) )
  
• ∀t ( ( T(t) ∧ ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ¬P(x,t) ) ) ⇒ ∃y ( CP(y) ∧ ¬P(y,t) ∧ M(y) ) )
  

In English

• all sentient humans have moral value
  
• there exists a sentient nonhuman animal that lacks moral value; we could even make this ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ¬ M(x) ) i.e. all sentient non-human animals lack moral value
  
• for all traits that sentient non-human animals lack, there exists a counterpart to a human, without the trait, that has moral value
  

Now we check this against the argument;
P1 is clearly true

Now to check against P2. We know that for all traits that sentient non-human animals lack there exists a replica without the trait, that has moral value. Hence the statement

∃t ( T(t) ∧ ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ¬P(x,t) ) ∧ ∀y ( ( CP(y) ∧ ¬P(y,t) ) ⇒ ¬ M(y) ) )

becomes false. i.e. the statement 'there is a trait absent in sentient nonhuman animals such that, if it were if absent in a counterpart of a sentient human, then the counterpart of the sentient human is valueless' is false.

So the negation of the statement becomes true (i.e. 'there is no trait ...' becomes true). Hence we have

Now C is clearly false because in this case there exists a nonhuman animal that does not have moral value (or even: all sentient non-human animals lack moral value). Hence we have a case, allowed by the logical form of P1, P2, and C, where P1 and P2 are true, but C is not. Thus the argument is logically invalid.

---

The Relevance of the Counterexample: On the natural version of NTT, P2 holds that if one (or other sentient humans) lost traits that one has and sentient non-human animals lack (like abstract reasoning ability, moral agency, etc.), and still retained one’s status as oneself, one would still have moral value. On this interpretation the counterexample is perfectly coherent: one can without any logical confusion hold that as long as sentient humans like oneself retain their identities, they have moral value, while sentient non-human animals lack it. One can coherently (if implausibly) embrace the value narcissist view that one has one's value in virtue of one's essential properties, which non-human animals lack, but which one cannot come to lack while retaining one's status as oneself.

Some individuals faced with arguments for veganism like NTT may well be tempted to embrace something like value narcissism. For instance, in Ask Yourself's debates / discussions with the Warskis, Friend Ed, and Patty Politics, Ask Yourself's conversants seemed tempted to the view that being human (which, if understood as originating from human gametes and such, is plausibly an essential property of humans like oneself) is necessary to for a being to have moral value - at least independent of other considerations like membership in a human community [citations needed]. It is certainly true that Ask Yourself argued substantively against this view by reference to aliens (see below). But if NTT is interpreted in the natural way, on which P2 cannot consider one's losing one's essential properties like species membership, it is difficult to see exactly which premise of NTT this aliens-response is defending. Moreover, some of these interlocutors seemed tempted to something like the following response, which seems reasonable unless much more is filled in about the psychology of the aliens (or more is done to show why membership in any species should be considered morally irrelevant):

"Humans have a moral value that other humans should respect in virtue of their essential properties such as being human, and non-human animals lack such value. It is true that humans should not want to be killed by aliens and resist this, but this is perfectly consistent with non-human animals lacking moral value and has no clear bearing on why that view is untenable" [citations needed].

Although this view may not have been clearly articulated in the debates, Ask Yourself's response seems to be to insist that it is logically inconsistent, which it is not. In this way the invalidity of the coherence of the counterexample to NTT seems to interact with the problems with Ask Yourself's defenses of P1 and P2 to make the argument much more confusing and much less convincing than an argument of this sort should be.

Part 2 Counterexample

Similarly to Part 1, to show Part 2 is invalid we can pose a counterexample in which sentient nonhuman animals have moral value, there exists a sentient nonhuman animal we are not required to not exploit, and for all traits there exists a counterpart of a sentient human without the trait that has moral value and we are required to not exploit. So in this model the following three statements are true:

• ∀x ( (A(x) ⇒ M(x) )
  
• ∃x ( A(x) ∧ M(x) ∧ ¬RNE(x) )
  
• ∀t ( (T(t) ∧ ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ¬P(x,t) ) ) ⇒ ∃y ( CP(y) ∧ M(y) ∧ ¬P(y,t) ∧ RNE(y) ) )
  

In English

• all sentient non-human animals have moral value
  
• there is a non-human animal with moral value whom we are NOT morally required to not exploit (we could even make this ∀x ( (A(x) ∧ M(x) ) ⇒ ¬RNE(x) ); i.e. all sentient non-human animals are such that we are NOT morally required to not exploit them)
  
• for all traits which sentient non-human animals lack, there is a counterpart of a sentient human who lacks the trait whom we ARE morally required to not exploit
  

Now if we check this against the argument:

P1 is true

Now since for all traits that sentient nonhuman animals lack there exists a counterpart without the trait who we are required to not exploit. The statement

∃t ( T(t) ∧ ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ¬P(x,t)) ∧ ∀y ( (CP(y) ∧ M(y) ∧ ¬P(y,t)) ⇒ ¬RNE(y) ) )

is false. So the negation of the statement (P2) becomes true.

Now C is false since there exists a sentient nonhuman animal who we are not required to not exploit. Hence the argument is invalid.

[old section Getting to the most charitable version]

Additional Problems with Quantification

Another issue with the NTT argument is that even if NTT did establish that

(i) there is no moral value giving trait absent in all sentient nonhuman animals

that would only imply

(ii) there is at least one sentient nonhuman animal with the moral value giving trait

not that

(iii) all sentient nonhuman animals have the moral value giving trait (which is the conclusion).

This is simple enough to understand in English. However we can show this in FOL via the relation:

¬∀x (P(x) ⇒ Q(x)) ⇔ ∃x (P(x) ∧ ¬Q(x)) [2]

So the statement

(iv) it is not the case that all sentient non human animals lack moral value (or lack the moral value giving trait)

is equivalent to

(v) there exists a sentient nonhuman animal with moral value (or with the moral value giving trait)

or in FOL

¬∀x (A(x) ⇒ ¬M(x)) ⇔ ∃x (A(x) ∧ M(x))

Note this is something that is easy to correct. However it is important to recognise the importance of quantification in logical arguments.

---

[Margaret: So, if we're now agreed on your LF for the alternative version, I assume that this section is about the LF of the natural reading, which we've agreed to leave as largely as we have it (i.e. without biconditionals about all same triats and such). SO, since WE are the ones translating English generics into FOL existential and universal quantification, how about we fix this (since it's OUR responsibility to fix it and since as you say it should be EASY to fix) by making premise 2:

In part 1 (P2)* ¬∃t ( T(t) ∧ ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ¬P(x,t) ) ∧ ∃y ( CP(y) ∧ ¬P(y,t) ∧ ¬ M(y) ) )

In part 2 (P2)* ¬∃t ( T(t) ∧ ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ¬P(x,t)) ∧ ∃y ( CP(y) ∧ M(y) ∧ ¬P(y,t) ∧ ¬RNE(y) ) )

[DrSinger: I don't think either of these solve it, you would have to change it to something like this for it to avoid the issue
∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ( ∃y ( CP(y) ∧ M(y) ∧ ∀t ( T(t) ⇒ ( P(x,t) ⇔ P(y,t) ) ) ) ) ),
which is straying from the written form ]

[Margaret: sorry, wait, what even is it to "solve it"? We KNOW the argument is invalid, because we've just provided counterexamples. You are trying to raise some additional issue here which I still don't understand. I thought that I understood it in the context of the alternative version. But now that it's clear that it's supposed to be for the natural version, I really do not understand what is going on here. Can you please help me? Can you please clarify what this additional problem is supposed to be?

Even if you are right that P2* doesn't work (for whatever you do mean by doesn't work), and this thing is needed, it isn't obvious to me. Can you provide an explanation of why adding P2* doesn't work in the relevant sense (after explaining what working in the relevant sense would be)?

Even if you are right I don't think that it will be straying too much if it really is demanded to capture the English gist of the argument, which uses generics and I should also point out counterfactuals, in a FOL that has only existential and universal quantification and is kind of brute-forcing counterfactual stuff by including possible objects in the domain of quantification. Of course if there's another way to capture it that sounds more obviously like the English that's great too. But once more: I think that the key problem is that I do not understand what this additional problem with the natural reading, beyond being invalid for the reasons we've explained, is supposed to be. Please help.].

---

[DrSinger: added a new section for discussing these issues Developing the Alternate version in FOL, I'll look through it and give my thoughts]

The Alternative Interpretation of NTT

Ask Yourself explains his interpretation of P2 with an animation

In the video to the right Ask Yourself explains his interpretation of NTT and why he believes it to be valid. The claim made is that, paraphrasing, all objects are constellations of traits, and that if the traits of the two objects are equalized, then the objects become the same object, and furthermore, to resist this is to deny the very first law of logic, which is the law of identity. This assumes a number of substantive metaphysical premises, which are outlined below:

Bundle Theory

The first claim, that objects are constellations of traits is not built into logic, it is a form of bundle theory which states :

Substances are in fact no more than bundles of properties conceived of as universals.[3]

This is a substantive metaphysical premise that needs to be stated if it's to be used as part of an argument. It is even contended amongst philosophers.

Identity of Indescernibles

The claim that two objects with the same traits are the same object is a principle known as the identity of indiscernibles, which says: if for every property P, object x has P if and only if object y has P, then x is identical to y. Or in the notation of symbolic logic:

(∀P)(P(x) ⇔ P(y)) ⇒ x=y.

In the notation we have been using, this could be expressed as

∀x ∀y ∀t ( ( T(t) ∧ ( P(x,t) ⇔ P(y,t) ) ) ⇒ x = y)

i.e. for all things x, y, and t, if t is a trait, and x has t if and only if y has t, then x and y are the self-same thing.

The identity of indiscernibles is not simply a fact about the logical form of propositions or their components - it is instead a metaphysical thesis about the conditions under which entities are identical. Thus, an argument the conclusion of which follows only from its premises together with the identity of identity of indiscernibles in virtue of their logical form is not logically valid. To be logically valid, such an argument must include the statement of the identity of indiscernibles among its premises. In contrast, the law of identity, understood simply as 'x is identical to x for each x' or ∀x (x = x), is a fact about the logical form of the identity relation (so it does not need to be stated among the premises of an argument that involves propositions that employ the identity relation).

Alternate Version in FOL

With the addition of the identity of indiscernibles and fixing the quantification issue associated with P2, we can present a logically valid alternative version of NTT, as shown below:

(P1) ∀x ( H(x) ⇒ M(x) )

(P2) ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ ( ∃y ( CP(y) ∧ M(y) ∧ ∀t ( T(t) ⇒ ( P(x,t) ⇔ P(y,t) ) ) ) ) )

(P3) ∀x ∀y ∀t ( ( T(t) ∧ ( P(x,t) ⇔ P(y,t) ) ) ⇒ x = y)

Therefore (C) ∀x ( A(x) ⇒ M(x) )

In English

In the following take human to mean sentient human & animal to mean sentient nonhuman animal

(P1) humans are of moral value
(P2) for all animals there exists the counterpart to a human that has moral value and has all the same traits as the animal
(P3) All things with the same traits are the same thing.
Therefore (C) Animals are of moral value

Problems with Defending NTT's Premises

Invalid Generalizations

Ask Yourself makes an invalid generalisation regarding the trait 'my group' given by FriendEd.

In defending P2 proponents of NTT often use invalid generalisations such as that given in the video to the right. The claim being made by Ask Yourself is that FriendEd is contradicting himself by holding the following three statements.

1. It is wrong to kill humans because they are part of my group
2. It is not wrong to kill animals because they are not part of my group
3. It is wrong for someone to murder me because I am not part of their group

His reasoning is that by rejecting (3) you reject the justification group membership justifies killing/murder, in all cases, and as such you cannot deploy it in (1). This is incorrect, by rejecting (3), you only reject the statement

• It is wrong for someone to murder me because I am not part of their group

which does not logically entail rejecting the statement

• group membership justifies killing/murder

in all cases. Someone can reject the justification in one context (e.g. when applied to themselves) and deploy it in another context (e.g. when applied to animals), without contradicting themselves.

(1) & (2) would only create a contradiction if combined with either of the following two statements

• It is not wrong to kill humans because they are part of my group
• It is wrong to kill animals because they are not part of my group

---

In the notation of FOL the generalization being made takes the form

∀x ( H(x) ⇒ ¬ K(x) ) ⊢ ∀x ( ¬K(x) )

where:
H(x) means x is human
K(x) means ok to kill x based on <insert any justification here>
⊢ means logically entails

That is to say, for all x, if x is human then it is not okay to kill x based on some justification, entails for all x it is not okay to kill x based on the same justification. You can't generalize the statement because it has been constrained to humans.

Conclusion

Note how the corrected argument establishes the necessary meta-ethical assumptions to make the argument itself valid (Rejects subjectivism, establishes Universalism based on the Golden Rule, rooted in behavioral qualities to avoid existential ambiguity or dependence on subjective value claims).

Naturally for every premise introduced the potential audience the argument can appeal to is reduced (because they have more premises to reject), but failing to do so creates a non sequitur which reduces the audience of competent logicians to zero.

A bad argument for veganism can occasionally trick reluctant people into temporarily accepting it, but this only works as long as that person is under your control (in a cult setting this can be effective). As soon as the person shares these reasons with friends and family, it becomes vulnerable to any number of counterarguments which demonstrate the holes in its logic. For a bad argument, being shared more broadly makes it less effective rather than more.

The apparent strength of #NameTheTrait is that it is worded in such a confusing way using double negatives and a conclusion which isn't straight forward (rather than saying animals have moral value, it makes redundant claims about contradiction) that it's difficult for most people to immediately recognize the fallacious logic. However, most people don't have to recognize the problems: one person has to. At this point, dozens have, independently citing different problems with the argument. An invalid argument is never a strong argument in a free speech environment. Just as bad theistic arguments come on the internet to die, so do bad arguments like these. The end result is only to make vegans look irrational and/or dishonest in a way comparable to theistic apologists who make poor arguments for god (such as the ontological argument).

Debunking bad arguments for veganism helps to make sure vegans are using good arguments that will stand the test of time and reduce recidivism, as well as buys good will from carnists who may be encouraged to reconsider their beliefs that vegans are dishonest and take into consideration the good arguments for veganism and may move them to reducetarian practices.