Latest revision as of 18:14, 13 December 2020

Ask Yourself claims NTT is an argument for veganism that requires only logical consistency and a personal belief in human moral value.

The Name The Trait argument has been officially updated/revised, and is now formally valid. See NameTheTrait 2.0 (official) for details and discussion on its uses and limitations. This article will remain online for reference and academic interest.

To jump to the proof of logical invalidity see Proof of Invalidity in First Order Logic

Name The Trait, or #NameTheTrait is an argument for veganism formulated by vegan Youtuber Ask Yourself in 2015, and popularized during a series of Youtube debates in 2017 by Ask Yourself and Vegan Gains, a vegan bodybuilder and Youtuber. Loosely speaking, NTT seeks to establish veganism from a personal belief in human moral value, similar to the well known argument from marginal cases. Some street activists claim to have found the argument effective, when presented informally. However as we will see in this article, it is logically invalid, and Ask Yourself's attempts to make it valid have led to an alternative version of the argument that is question-begging or that achieves possible validity only by the Principle of Explosion due to Internal-Contradiction. Furthermore, it is often combined with false claims such as "animal rights follow logically from human rights" which are defended with the use of invalid generalizations. These drawbacks can make the argument confusing and unconvincing. However the argument can be corrected by modifying its first premise to require human moral value to be based on a trait and by adding a premise that rejects double standards (or by framing things more directly around the challenge to name a good justification for according important moral status to all sentient humans but virtually no moral status to non-human animals), preserving the original intention of the argument.

The formal, premise-conclusion presentation of #NameTheTrait is as follows:

Argument for animal moral value:
P1 - Humans are of moral value
P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless.
C - Therefore without establishing the absence of such a trait in animals, we contradict ourselves by deeming animals valueless
Argument for veganism from animal moral value:
P1 - Animals are of moral value.
P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to consider anything short of non-exploitation to be an adequate expression of respect for human moral value.
C - Therefore without establishing the absence of such a trait in animals, we contradict ourselves by considering anything short of non-exploitation(veganism) to be an adequate expression of respect for animal moral value.

This article discusses the three primary issues with NTT. Firstly, it discusses its logical invalidity, and how its invalidity can create problems. Secondly, it discusses problems with the justifications used by Ask Yourself to defend the premises of the first, "for animal moral value" argument validity of the argument. And thirdly, the article discusses various problems with the second, less widely discussed "for veganism from animal moral value" argument, which suggests a potentially dubious, unclear, and rigid commitment to non-exploitation.

NTT's Invalidity

The Importance of logical validity

The main reason it helps to know whether an argument is logically valid is that it helps us to clarify if we have identified all of the substantive assumptions behind its conclusion. If we can see that an argument is valid, then we know that its conclusion follows from its premises simply because of their form, so we have identified and listed all of its substantive assumptions in its premises. If we can see that an argument is invalid, this helps us to know that it must be making further assumptions in order to be a good, rationally compelling argument. Knowing that an argument is making such assumptions, and determining what they are, can help us to understand why certain individuals may not find it compelling, and can spare us the confusion of failing to understand this. It can also put us in a better position to defend those assumptions forthrightly to those who might be inclined to challenge or fail initially to accept them.

As we will see below, NTT is invalid. Seeing why it is helps us to see how certain very plausible substantive assumptions can be added to its premises to make it valid. The making of these tacit assumptions by the presenter of NTT and the audience very likely explains why it is often a compelling argument. But as we will see below, the failure to acknowledge these assumptions can cause confusion, and inhibit a persuasive defense of its premises. As we will also see, the fact that to be compelling the argument must make such assumptions may help to dash certain hopes about the minimality of the argument’s assumptions (e.g. about the nature of value and ethics). Seeing that NTT is invalid will thus help us to appreciate the argument’s limits, and how other approaches may be helpful in defending the substantive ethical views that stand behind arguments like NTT.

Logical Validity

What it is for arguments to be logically valid and invalid is the following:

Valid: It is impossible for all of the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false, due simply to the structure of the premises and the conclusion
Invalid: The structure of the premises and the conclusion leave open the possibility that the premises are true but the conclusion is false

(This is not to be confused with sound which means an argument is both valid and its premises are true)

In other words, for an argument to be logically valid is for the truth of its conclusion to be guaranteed by the truth of its premises due to their logical form (that is, the validity of an argument depends on the syntactic form of the argument, not the semantic meaning of the argument [1]). For instance, an argument of the form

(P1) If consuming animal products causes unnecessary suffering, then we should not consume animal products,

(P2) Consuming animal products causes unnecessary suffering,

Therefore, (C) we should not consume animal products

is logically valid. This is because it has the logical form:

(P1) If U then V

(P2) U

Therefore (C) V

Here, C follows from P1 and P2 simply due to their logical form, whatever the content of U and V may be (this particular way of a conclusion following from its logical form and that of the premises is known as "modus ponens" [2]).

This means that for NTT to be valid, we must be able to replace its premises and conclusion with sentences that mean different things but have the same logical form, and so long as we preserve this logical form, it must remain valid (note: it would not have to remain sound). Hence the following must be valid if NTT is valid:

P1 - Humans are of moral value

P2 - There is no eye colour absent in cows which if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless.

C - Therefore without establishing the absence of such an eye colour in cows, we contradict ourselves by deeming cows valueless

Which is clearly invalid as there is no premise to say moral value must be based on eye colour. But likewise, in NTT there is no premise to say moral value must be based on a trait. Moreover, there is no special logical significance to the notion of a trait that allows a valid argument to omit stating such a premise (unless perhaps if "trait" is interpreted as referring in an all-encompassing way to any predicate, but this results in contradiction in P2).

The standard way to show an argument is invalid is to show a case where the logical form of the premises and conclusion allow the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false. Such a case is referred to as a counterexample.

To learn how to formally prove that an argument is valid, see Paul Teller's A Modern Formal Logic Primer[3].

Semantic Issues

The argument as presented by Ask Yourself contains a number of semantic issues that make it hard to evaluate. That is, the words used and their meanings don't obviously line up, and what is being said may not be coherent.

This isn't a trivial nitpick: while the problems may be able to be fixed pretty easily, without doing so the argument may not make any sense. Semantic problems can cause serious issues, such as fallacies of ambiguity which create the illusion of a valid logical form without really being valid. For example:

P1. Really exciting novels are rare.
P2. But rare books are expensive.
C. Therefore, Really exciting novels are expensive.[4]

Or:

P1. Nothing is better than a good lesson.
P2. A poor lesson is better than nothing.
C. A poor lesson is better than a good lesson.[5]

It's obvious here that despite being the same words, in natural language the instances of "rare" and "nothing" in the first and second premises of these arguments have different meanings.

When we fail to scrutinize the wording and meanings of words in arguments like Name The Trait these subtle differences may ignored, but just because it feels convincing it does not make the argument valid. Semantic messes like these can hide fallacies that not only make the argument fail the test of being valid, but may compromise the underlying reasoning at its core.

Deeming vs Being

The first premise (P1) suggests a state of being, while the second premise (P2) talks about what would be "deemed"

P1 - Humans are of moral value
P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless.

The reasoning attempted by the argument seems to be trying to draw from an existential claim of fact (are) and an apparently subjective evaluation ("deem" which refers to judgement of opinion[6]) as if they were categorically the same type of statement.
The hidden premise here appears to be that "deeming" and being are the same thing: if something is then you deem it, or perhaps if you deem something it is so. This hidden premise is either a very substantial claim of Factual Relativism, or a rejection of moral realism/moral objectivism. The latter interpretation might make sense given the author's identification as an "ontological moral subjectivist" and his views about objective morality. But whatever the reasoning such substantial assumptions must be stated as a premise. It is not enough just to expect that whoever you are talking to will implicitly agree that being and deeming are the same thing. As such, the argument in its current form is invalid.

This might work to resolve the difference:

P1 - Humans are of moral value
P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless.
P3- Being of (or lacking) moral value and being deemed to have (or lack) moral value are the same thing (respectively).

However, this would also weaken the argument in terms of practical application. Most people are not moral subjectivists of this radical sort and do not agree that having an opinion about something having or lacking moral value is that same thing as that thing actually having or lacking moral value. Most people believe that there IS a fact of the matter about which moral views are correct, and in cases of disagreement one party is just mistaken about that fact (much as virtually nobody considers any two views about the shape of the Earth to be equally correct, justified, or "just a matter of opinion, man").

While it would be an option for making the argument more comprehensible, baking radical moral subjectivism into the argument as a requirement to be convinced by it is a bad idea that severely limits its persuasive force. It's probably a better idea to just change some of the words: either changing "are" to "Are deemed to be" or change "deem ourselves" to "be". We can talk about deeming in all premises and conclusion, or we can talk about being in all premises and conclusion. Which we choose has its own implications, though.

Deeming Only

Changing all terms to "Deem" means modifying the first premise. For example:

P1 - We Deem Humans to have moral value
P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless.
C - Therefore without establishing the absence of such a trait in animals, we contradict ourselves by deeming animals valueless

However, this creates another problem: why are different deemings in different contexts or at different times considered logical contradictions if made without justification? This seems to be confusing the notion of a double standard (which is NOT a logical contradiction) with legitimate logical contradictions.

Unlike matters of fact in objective physical reality, the matter of deeming is a subjective issue like with taste: one where we accept that people can deem Tacos or Burritos delicious or not at a whim from situation to situation, or day to day, with no reason other than they feel like it. There's no reason presented in the argument to believe that personal moral feelings or preferences, if that's what morality is based on, should be subject to any more scrutiny (or accusation of contradiction) than personal taste preferences which can vary at a whim.

In order to establish shifting moral whims without trait justification as a contradiction (rather than the logically permissible unjustified double standards they are) we would would need to establish yet another premise which demands that morality be based on a consistent value system requiring justification based on traits.

P1 - We Deem Humans to have moral value
P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless.
P3 - Moral deeming must be based on a consistent system of moral evaluation, which requires naming trait differences to justify different treatment.
C - Therefore without establishing the absence of such a trait in animals, we contradict ourselves by deeming animals valueless

This important premise must be stated, and can not be hidden or merely assumed. Without it, the argument fails (although changing this alone is probably not sufficient to make the argument valid since there are still questions of the meaning of "trait", it's one step closer).

Adding such a premise resolves the issues with deeming, but of course also makes apparent a point of potential disagreement in P3; while the majority may agree, not all people believe morality works that way. Overall, this P3 is a useful addition which strengthens the argument substantially. Of course there are other options:

Being Only

Converting the rest of the argument from deeming to being requires more substantial change of P2 and the conclusion:

P1 - Humans are of moral value
P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would make us valueless.
C - Therefore*, animals are not valueless.

*The "without establishing the absence of such a trait in animals" part was superfluous; you can leave it in, but it doesn't mean anything anymore

Even this one change simplifies the argument greatly and brings it closer to validity, but not quite there; there are still serious issues about what "trait" means, and potential contradictions it generates:

Meaning of "Trait"

Broadly speaking, there are two ways "trait" can be interpreted"

1. An all-encompassing interpretation which includes essential properties as traits
2. A limited version, which excludes essential properties (or other properties that would yield contradiction).

When "trait" is all encompassing (and this is what Ask Yourself has claimed in response to criticism), then P2 has self-contradictory implications.

P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would make us valueless.

While it is coherent to speak of certain traits (like "intelligence") being absent in humans, it is not coherent to speak of all important traits being absent in humans. Most importantly, consider the trait of being human itself - which actually is commonly thought to be a relevant factor in these discussions. Consider what happens when we try to evaluate what P2 says about this trait:

The trait of "being or having ever been human" is a trait absent in animals. But a human who lacked the trait "being or having ever been human" would not be valueless.

This doesn't make any sense, because being human or at least having been human at some point (so we can identify former humans) is an essential property of the subject being discussed.

Speaking of a human who is not human and never has been human is a contradiction; it's logically incoherent, and it makes the whole argument an appeal to a nonsensical premise. (That said, in light of the logical principle of explosion[7], according to which literally anything follows from a logically inconsistent set of premises, there is a technical sense in which the conclusion of NTT could be said to follow from its premises and it could thus be valid if P2 is interpreted so as to be logically inconsistent. But this would not be a sense of validity in which NTT would be a good or rationally compelling argument).

Because the semantic structure of the argument makes it impossible to coherently consider essential traits, or traits that beings cannot lack and remain the self-same entities, these traits must be excluded from the definition of "trait" in order for the argument to be coherent.

By changing the wording of the argument to talk about Counterparts to Humans rather than humans themselves, this resolves the contradiction and allows an all-encompassing definition to be used. However, as explained here this alternative version of NTT begs the question.

The limited version of the definition of "trait" (which at the very least excludes essential properties like being or having been human that would create an internal contradiction in P2) makes more sense, but yields an invalid argument without additional premises that rule out investing the forbidden properties with crucial moral significance. Without an additional premise, the argument can be easily shown to be invalid by considering the coherence of value narcissism, which some individuals are initially tempted to embrace, as explained here.

Steel-manning NTT

Before proceeding we will rephrase the argument in the following way, to capture its essential reasoning

Part 1

(P1) All sentient humans have moral value

(P2) If an individual is a sentient nonhuman animal, then there is no trait absent the individual, which is such that, if the trait were absent in a sentient human, then the human would not have moral value

Therefore, (C) All sentient non-human animals have moral value

Part 2

(P1) All sentient non-human animals have moral value

(P2) If an individual is a sentient non-human animal, then there is no trait absent the individual, which is such that, if the trait were absent in a sentient human who has moral value, then we would not be morally required to not exploit the human

Therefore, (C) We are morally required to not exploit sentient non-human animals who have moral value

Summary of Issues

As we will see below, the reason NTT is logically invalid because its logical form allows for a counterexample in which sentient humans have moral value, sentient non-human animals that lacks moral value, and for all traits that sentient non-human animals lack, humans possess moral value with the traits removed. The reason we can pose such a counterexample is because there is nothing in the logical form of the argument that says moral value must be based on a trait (as is the case for the NTT2.0 correction) nor is there anything to say humans lacking certain traits are animals (as is the case for the alternative interpretation).

Ask Yourself has argued that if one were to lose all of the traits that distinguish one from a non-human animal, then the resulting entity would be identical to that non-human animal, so P1 and P2 so interpreted [logically] entail C. The problem with this claim is that it presupposes something like the identity of indiscernibles: that if two entities have all of the same properties, then they must be the self-same object. This is a substantive metaphysical thesis, to which certain philosophers have objected (for discussion see [8]), so it must be added as an additional premise for the argument to be logically valid.

But as we will see below, the much greater problem with the argument so interpreted is that it has essentially no rational force. P2 so interpreted is essentially just asserting that beings with all and only the traits of sentient non-human animals have moral value. The argument thus offers little if any reason to change the mind of someone who does not already find this view plausible, and the defense of its premises offers no guidance on how to persuade such an individual, see how this version of the argument begs the question.

Proof of Invalidity in First Order Logic

In order to show the logical form of NTT, we will use what is known as first order logic or predicate logic. The sort of logic used to display the logical form of the argument above '(P1) If U then V; (P2) U; therefore, (C) V' is known as propositional logic or sentence logic, since it replaces full propositions or sentences flanking logical connectives like 'if...then', 'and' and 'or' with abstract symbols. First order logic goes inside the logical structure of propositions, and replaces predicates like 'is a sentient human' and 'is a sentient non-human animal' with abstract symbols. First order logic also considers variables for things to which those predicates are ascribed, and quantification over them (e.g. 'for all x, if x is a sentient human, then x has moral value'). For more on propositional logic and first order logic, see Paul Teller's A Modern Formal Logic Primer[9].

Displaying the Logical Form of NTT in FOL

Symbols

∀ (for all)
⇒ (if, then; e.g. A ⇒ B means 'if A then B')
⇔ (if and only if; e.g. A ⇔ B means 'if A then B and if B then A')
¬ (negation i.e. not)
∃ (there exists)
∧ (and)
∨ (or)

Definitions

H(x) means 'x is a sentient human'

A(x) means 'x is a sentient non-human animal'

M(x) means 'x has moral value'

T(x) means 'x is a trait'

P(x,y) means 'x has y; e.g. if x is a sentient human and t is a trait, P(x,t) means 'human x has trait t', or 'a property of x is t'

RNE(x) means 'we a morally required to not exploit x'

Note we will also use the shorthand Hx to represent H(x), Px,y or Pxy to represent P(x,y) etc.

The Logical Form of Part 1 of NTT

(P1) ∀x ( Hx ⇒ Mx )

(P2) ∀x ( Ax ⇒ ¬∃t ( Tt ∧ ¬Pxt ∧ ∀y ( Hy ⇒ ( ¬Pyt ⇒ ¬My ) ) ) )

Therefore, (C) ∀x ( Ax ⇒ Mx )

In English

(P1) for all x, if x is a sentient human, then x has moral value

(P2) for all x, if x is a sentient nonhuman animal, then there does not exist t, such that t is a trait, and x lacks t, and for all y, if y is a human, then if y lacks t, then y does not have moral value.

Therefore, (C) For all x, if x is a sentient non-human animal, then x has moral value

The Logical Form of Part 2 of NTT

(P1) ∀x ( Ax ⇒ Mx )

(P2) ∀x ( Ax ⇒ ¬∃t ( Tt ∧ ¬Pxt ∧ ∀y ( Hy ∧ My ⇒ ( ¬Pyt ⇒ ¬RNEy ) ) ) )

Therefore, (C) ∀x ( (Ax ∧ Mx) ⇒ RNEx )

In English:

(P1) For all x, if x is a sentient nonhuman animal, then x has moral value.

(P2) For all x, if x is a sentient nonhuman animal, then there does not exist t, such that t is a trait, and x lacks t, and for all y, if y is a human, and y has moral value, then if y lacks t, then we are not morally required to not exploit y.

Therefore (C) for all x, if x is a sentient non-human animal, and x has moral value, then we are morally required not to exploit x.

Showing NTT is Logically Invalid

The standard way of showing that an argument is invalid is to construct a counterexample, or a model, which is allowed by the logical form of the premises and the conclusion, in which the premises are true and the conclusion is false.Since Part 1 and Part 2 follow the same basic structure, we will only show a counterexample for Part 1.

Part 1 Counterexample

In the following counterexample, we will imagine a case in which, sentient humans have moral value, sentient non-human animals do not have moral value, and for all traits that sentient nonhuman animals lack, humans retain moral value with the trait removed.

In FOL

(E1) ∃x ( Hx ) ∧ ∀x ( Hx ⇒ ( Mx ∧ ¬Ax ∧ ¬Tx) )

(E2) ∃x ( Ax ) ∧ ∀x ( Ax ⇒ ( ¬Mx ∧ ¬Hx ∧ ¬Tx ∧ ( ∃y ( Hy ∧ ∀t (Tt ∧ ( ¬Pxt ⇒ ¬Pyt ) ) ) ) )

(E3) ∀x ( Tx ⇒ ( ¬Ax ∧ ¬Hx ∧ ¬ Mx) )

In English

(E1) there is a sentient human, and all sentient humans have moral value, are not sentient non-human animals, are not traits

(E2) there is a sentient non-human animal, and all sentient non-human animals do not have moral value, are not sentient humans, are not traits, and are such that there exists a human that lacks all the same traits as the non-human animal

(E3) all traits are not sentient non-human animals, are not sentient humans, and do not have moral value

Proving the Counterexample renders NTT invalid

If NTT is invalid, then the formula

( E1 ∧ E2 ∧ E3 ) ⇒ ( P1 ∧ P2 ∧ ¬C )

should be valid. That is to say, if NTT is invalid, and we have chosen our counterexample correctly, then if the counterexample is true, then the premises of NTT should be true and its conclusion false. We can check this using a logical proof generator, with the input

(\existsx (Hx) \land \forallx (Hx \to ( \negAx \land \negTx \landMx))) \land (\existsx (Ax) \land \forallx(Ax\to (\negHx \land \negTx \land \negMx\land( \existsy (Hy\land \forallt (\negPxt \to \negPyt)))))) \land (Tx\to( \negAx \land\negHx\land\negMx))\to(\forallx ( Hx \to Mx ) \land \forallx ( Ax \to \neg \existst ( Tt \land \neg Pxt \land ( \forally (Hy \to ( \neg Pyt \to \neg My ) ) ) ) ) \to\neg\forallx (Ax \to Mx))

which gives us valid. Hence we have demonstrated that NTT is invalid.

Checking the Validity Directly

We can also use the logical proof generator to directly show the argument is invalid by checking the formula

P1 ∧ P2 ⇒ C

We can do this with the input (for part 1)

(P1) \forallx (Hx \to Mx)

(P2) \forallx ( Ax \to \neg \exists t (Tt \land \neg Pxt \land ( \forally (Hy \to ( \neg Pyt \to \neg My ) ) ) ) )

(C) \forallx ( Ax \to Mx )

Or all together (P1 ∧ P2 ⇒ C)

\forallx ( Hx \to Mx ) \land \forallx ( Ax \to \neg \existst ( Tt \land \neg Pxt \land ( \forally (Hy \to ( \neg Pyt \to \neg My ) ) ) ) ) \to\forallx (Ax \to Mx)

which yields invalid. This is unlike the NTT2.0 correction which gives valid.

The Alternative Interpretation of NTT

Ask Yourself explains his interpretation of P2 with an animation

In the video to the right Ask Yourself explains his interpretation of NTT and why he believes it to be valid. The claim made is that, paraphrasing, all objects are constellations of traits, and that if the traits of the two objects are equalized, then the objects become the same object, and furthermore, to resist this is to deny the very first law of logic, which is the law of identity.

The basic idea of this alternative interpretation of NTT seems to be this. The conclusion

(C) All sentient non-human animals have moral value

follows simply from the premises

(P1) All sentient humans have moral value, and

(P2) There is no trait absent in sentient non-human animals which if absent in sentient humans would result in sentient humans not having moral value

because if a given sentient human were to lose (or never have) any of the traits that distinguish her from any given sentient non-human animal, she would become (or have been) literally identical to that non-human animal. If she is literally identical to that non-human animal and she retained her moral value in the course of losing (or never having) any of the traits that distinguish her from the non-human animal, then, because P1 says that she has moral value as she actually is, P1 would entail that the non-human animal has moral value. Moreover, P2 says that she would not lose (or fail to have had) her moral value no matter which traits she lost (or never had) which distinguish her from any sentient non-human animal. So P1 and P2 together suffice to ensure that humans have moral value when they become (or in the event that they had been) identical to non-human animals, and thus, that non-human animals have moral value.

This reasoning seems extremely strange and difficult to follow. One small reason is that one might think that simply losing the traits that distinguish one from a given non-human animal (including originating in a body with human DNA from the gametes of one’s human biological parents) would not make one that non-human animal, since non-human animals have many traits that one does not have (such as originating in a body with bovine DNA from the gametes of her biological bovine parents). But we can charitably understand this line of reasoning as using ‘traits’ extremely broadly to include ‘negative traits’ such as lacking the positive trait of originating form bovine parents, which, when lost, involve one gaining the positive trait of originating from bovine parents. Another small reason is that talk of humans ‘losing’, ‘changing’, or ‘switching’ their traits might suggest an adjustment that takes place in time, but we must be able to think about what would have happened had historical traits (such as originating from human vs. bovine gametes) been different. Charitable interpretation entails that these are not problems for the reasoning as intended, but these are hardly the sorts of things that one wants to have to explain to an interlocutor in the course of trying to convince her of the strength of the moral case for being vegan.

The real conceptual problem with this line of reasoning concerns how to make sense of its talk about what would happen if individual humans were to lose (or never have had) their essential properties, or the properties which they must have in order to count as the self-same individuals. It seems difficult to make sense of scenarios in which humans lose or never had such properties and thus are not or were not themselves, which arguably include the property of originating from human DNA or the gametes of a given set of human parents (and the negative trait of not originating from bovine DNA or the gametes of a given set of bovine parents). But this alternative version of NTT’s P2 requires that we must make sense of such scenarios, since, for the conclusion to follow simply from it and P1, P2 must be talking about humans not losing (or not having not had) their moral value as they lose (or are imagined never to have had) their essential traits, gain (or are imagined to instead have had) the essential traits of given non-human animals, and become (or are imagined to have instead been) those given non-human animals.

In talking about humans in scenarios in which they are not themselves but are rather non-human animals, we cannot really refer to them as the humans they are. We must instead somehow imagine them as themselves in an alternate scenario but not really themselves. Whether or not this makes any conceptual sense, the idea can be formalized using a philosophical device for talking about what is true of an entity in an alternative scenario by talking about what is true of the "counterpart" of the entity in that scenario.[10]. So understood, what the second premise is claiming on the alternative interpretation of NTT is that there is no trait absent in sentient non-human animals but present in sentient humans that, if absent in a counterpart of a sentient human would not result in that counterpart lacking moral value. What is supposed to make this argument valid is that ‘traits’ are being understood broadly to include negative traits, so this entails that for each sentient non-human animal there is a counterpart of a sentient human with all of the same traits as the non-human animal that has moral value.

With this we can get an inkling of why Ask Yourself believes that this Alternative version of NTT is valid. Unfortunately, as we have seen it involves reasoning that is difficult to follow, requires charitable clarification, and makes obscure and dubiously coherent reference to humans who lack their essential properties but have the essential properties of other individuals and are identical to these other individuals rather than themselves. It also makes an additional substantive metaphysical assumption, namely that of

Bundle Theory

The first claim, that objects are constellations of traits is not built into logic, it is a form of bundle theory which states :

Substances are in fact no more than bundles of properties conceived of as universals.[11]

This is a substantive metaphysical premise that needs to be stated if it's to be used as part of an argument. It's worth noting that the identity of indiscernibles would follow from such a premise, as correctly identified by Ask Yourself. This is one of the reasons why many philosophers have raised objections to such a premise.

Identity of Indescernibles

The claim that two objects with the same traits are the same object is a principle similar to the the identity of indiscernibles, which says: if for every property P, object x has P if and only if object y has P, then x is identical to y. Or in the notation of symbolic logic:

(∀P)(Px ⇔ Py) ⇒ x=y.

In the notation we have been using, this could be expressed as

∀x ∀y ∀t ( Px,t ⇔ Py,t ) ⇒ x = y)

(for all things x, y, and t, if x has t if and only if y has t, then x and y are the self-same thing. )

Or in that case that we are only considering traits, that may or may not refer to all properties, the principle would be expressed as

∀x ∀y ∀t ( Tt ∧ ( Px,t ⇔ Py,t ) ) ⇒ x = y)

i.e. for all things x, y, and t, if t is a trait, and x has t if and only if y has t, then x and y are the self-same thing.

The identity of indiscernibles is not simply a fact about the logical form of propositions or their components - it is instead a metaphysical thesis about the conditions under which entities are identical. Thus, an argument the conclusion of which follows only from its premises together with the identity of identity of indiscernibles in virtue of their logical form is not logically valid. To be logically valid, such an argument must include the statement of the identity of indiscernibles among its premises. In contrast, the law of identity, understood simply as 'x is identical to x for each x' or ∀x (x = x), is a fact about the logical form of the identity relation (so it does not need to be stated among the premises of an argument that involves propositions that employ the identity relation).

Alternative Version in FOL

With the addition of the identity of indiscernibles we can present a logically valid alternative version of NTT, as shown below:

(P1) ∀x ( Hx ⇒ Mx )

(P2) ∀x ( Ax ⇒ ( ∃y ( CPy ∧ My ∧ ∀t ( Tt ⇒ ( Px,t ⇔ Py,t ) ) ) ) )

(P3) ∀x ∀y ∀t ( ( Tt ∧ ( Px,t ⇔ Py,t ) ) ⇒ x = y)

Therefore (C) ∀x ( Ax ⇒ Mx )

In English

(P1) sentient humans are of moral value
(P2) for all sentient nonhuman animals there exists a counterpart to a sentient human that has moral value and has all the same traits as a sentient nonhuman animal
(P3) All things with the same traits are the same thing.
Therefore (C) Animals are of moral value

Here we have introduced the notion of a counterpart to a human, to mean a being that can take on all the traits of a non-human animal, and can become a sentient non-human animal.

This Alternative Version of NTT Begs the Question

With the addition of the identity of indiscernibles as P3, this alternative version of NTT becomes logically valid. However, the validity of this version of the argument comes at a very high price. The "counterparts" to sentient humans spoken of P2 are allowed to lack the essential properties of humans - like originating from human gametes - and to have the essential properties of non-human animals - like originating from bovine gametes. Hence, these "counterparts" need not be human, or us, at all. The only requirement of these entities is that they (i) have moral value, and (ii) have all and only the properties of sentient non-human animals. So in asserting that, for each sentient non-human animal, there is a "counterpart" that has moral value and has all and only the properties of the non-human animal, P2 is essentially just asserting that sentient beings with the properties of non-human animals have moral value. In doing so P2 assumes the substance of what the argument is supposed to prove, namely that sentient beings like non-human animals have moral value, thus rendering the argument question-begging.

To see how unconvincing this version of NTT really is, note that P1, about human moral value, really plays no role at all in deriving the conclusion of this version of NTT. The conclusion follows from simply P2, which asserts that for each sentient non-human animal, there is a being that has moral value and has all and only the same traits as the non-human animal, and P3, which entails that if the being with moral value has all and only the same traits as the non-human animal, then the being is identical to the non-human animal. But clearly, the argument that:

(P2) For each non-human animal, there is an entity with all and only the same traits that has moral value

(P3) If two entities have all and only the same traits, then they are the self-same entity

Therefore, (C) All non-human animals have moral value

is not a very compelling argument for the moral value of non-human animals at all. Anyone not inclined to accept the conclusion will have no more inclination at all to accept P2. Moreover, the structure of this version of the argument offers no guidance as to how to convince someone not inclined to accept the conclusion of the truth of the argument's premises, since it seems just as difficult to convince someone of the truth of P2 as to convince them of the truth of C directly.

Excluding Essential Properties

Based on the written version, P2 seems clearly to speak of traits that do not include essential properties and include only accidental properties. The distinction is that

An essential property of an object is a property that it must have [in order to count as the same object], while an accidental property of an object is one that it happens to have but that it could lack [and still count as the same object]. [12]

If the traits spoken of in P2 include only accidental properties, we are envisioning humans like oneself losing accidental properties that one has and non-human animals lack (like abstract reasoning ability, moral agency, etc.) and still retaining one’s status as oneself. The original written version of NTT seems to require this interpretation, since it says

"there are no traits absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless,"

so the entities losing the traits are clearly supposed still to be us after losing them.

This interpretation of P2 as speaking only of accidental traits is not question begging. But it is is clearly invalid, as one could hold the view that we might call

Value Narcissism: one’s essential properties (or the essential properties of being human) are what give one moral value – or are such that, if one lost them, one would lose moral value.

A value narcissist could hold that although humans like oneself (or just oneself) have moral value, and one would retain this value if one lost the accidental properties that one has and sentient non-humans lack, non-human animals still lack moral value. They could thus accept P1 and P2 but reject C.

Some individuals faced with arguments for veganism like NTT may well be tempted to embrace something like value narcissism. For instance, in Ask Yourself's debates / discussions with the Warskis, Friend Ed, and Patty Politics, Ask Yourself's conversants seemed tempted to the view that being human (i.e. possessing the essential properties of a human) is necessary to have moral value - at least independent of other considerations like membership in a human community (the trait named by FriendEd). It is certainly true that Ask Yourself argued substantively against this view, although in doing so he unfortunately seemed to make invalid generalizations about the ways in which species membership might matter morally. But it seems quite possible that addition confusion in debates may stem from the fact that, on the natural interpretation of P2 as restricted to accidental traits, the argument simply invalidly overlooks the option of value narcissism, and makes it unclear how a substantive attack on the plausibility of value narcissism is needed for the argument to establish its conclusion.

Problems with Part 2 of NTT

Commitment to Non-exploitation

Vegan Gains defends his use of supposedly exploitative products

Part 2 of the NTT argument requires a deontological commitment to non-exploitation as P2 states:

P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to consider anything short of non-exploitation to be an adequate expression of respect for human moral value.

That is to say, to agree with P2 is to agree that exploitation of humans is always wrong. This is not an issue with the validity of the argument, but an issue with the soundness, as most people will be unwilling to agree with the premise, including Ask Yourself and Vegan Gains.

These issues have actually been problematic for Vegan Gains in debates (who has claimed to agree with NTT), when posed with questions such as

"Was exploitation involved in the production of your phone, if yes, why do you not boycott such products?",

his answer usually takes the form;

yes exploitation was involved, but I need them for my activism, income and youtube videos, and is not immoral for me to do so.

All of these are good reasons, however it shows that he does not consider the absolute of nothing short of non-exploitation to be an adequate expression for human moral value, as pragmatic considerations take precedence. And if pragmatic considerations take precedence, then it's an empirical cost-benefit analysis, and not an absolutist argument like this that is useful.

An example of this was during the Warski debate, in which, on the subject of technology Vegan Gains stated

"you can justify some amount of exploitation in that sort of area of your life"

Ask Yourself was Vegan Gains's partner in this debate and it's fair to say that he agreed. A similar issue arises when posed with questions such as "Do you avoid all things produced using animal products, or products that may contain trace animal products e.g. glues etc.?". Again the answer is no, and it that it is not immoral for me to do so. Which, similarly, means that he does not consider the absolute of 'non-exploitation' to be an adequate expression for animal moral value.

It's worth noting the definition of veganism used by most vegans, including Vegan Gains, is

'A philosophy and way of living which seeks to exclude—as far as is possible and practicable—all forms of exploitation of, and cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any other purpose; and by extension, promotes the development and use of animal-free alternatives for the benefit of humans, animals and the environment. In dietary terms it denotes the practice of dispensing with all products derived wholly or partly from animals.'

which is not absolutist in nature.

Fans of Ask Yourself may think you can resolve such issues using the golden-rule, by answering yes to the question "would you accept the exploitation if you were the victim in these cases?". However this would not be relevant, as the argument as framed requires the absolute of non-exploitation.

Corrections

It is possible to correct the NTT argument and preserve its persuasive force by adding a premise that rejects double standards and changing the first premise to require human moral value (or some other moral consideration) to be based on a trait. This makes NTT valid, and allows it to be presented in the same way as it was intended. We can call this NameTheTrait 2.0. It is also possible to more clearly and directly frame the argument around the core idea that, on reflection, there does not seem to be a good justification for thinking that all sentient humans have an important moral status while sentient non-human animals lack moral status so entirely that it is morally fine to treat them in the ways that consuming animal products treats them. We can call this NameTheJustification.

In the following 'x has non-trivial moral status' means at least that we are morally required not to treat x in the ways that consuming animal products treats non-human animals - for instance, x is such that we are morally required not to inflict enormous suffering upon and / or kill x for relatively trivial reasons (like taste-pleasure).

Having such non-trivial moral status could be one way of understanding what it is to have "moral value" or what is minimally required by "an adequate expression of respect for our value" so long as we are sentient. More ambitious arguments could replace 'non-trivial moral status' in what follows by something stronger, such as having the right to the equal consideration of one's interests, etc. But because the argument for veganism requires only that sentient non-human animals have non-trivial moral status, for arguments to be as convincing as possible to as many interlocutors as possible they should, like that below, focus only the grounds for non-trivial moral status. The argument below and its conclusion are entirely consistent with humans having greater moral status than sentient non-human animals, beyond the mere non-trivial moral status that it seeks to show sentient non-human animals to share with humans.

NameTheTrait 2.0

For more on this, see NameTheTrait 2.0.

(P1) Humans have non-trivial moral status just in case and because they have a certain trait.

Where "a certain trait" is interpreted broadly so as to include sets of more particular traits, some of which may be sufficient but not necessary for non-trivial moral status.

(P2) If humans have non-trivial moral status just in case and because they have a certain trait, then all beings have non-trivial moral status just in case and because they have that trait.

(P3) There is no trait absent in non-human animals, which, if absent in a human, would cause the human to fail to have non-trivial moral status.

or equivalently

(P3) Sentient non-human animals have the trait that gives non-trivial moral status to humans.

Therefore

(C) Sentient non-human animals have non-trivial moral status

which, given what non-trivial moral status amounts to, entails that we are morally required to go vegan.

In First Order Logic

Definitions

H(x) means 'x is a human'

SNA(x) means 'x is a sentient non-human animal'

R(x) means 'we are moral required not to treat x in the ways that consuming animal products treats non-human animals; or x has non-trivial moral status'

T(x) means 'x is a trait'

P(x,y) means 'x has y'

In First Order Logic

(P1) ∃t ( Tt ∧ ∀x ( Hx ⇒ ( Rx ⇔ Pxt ) ) )

(P2) ∀t ( Tt ∧ ( ∀x ( Hx ⇒ ( Rx ⇔ Pxt ) ) ⇒ ∀x ( Rx ⇔ Pxt ) ) )

(P3) ∀x( SNAx ⇒ ¬∃t ( Tt ∧ ¬Pxt ∧ ∀y ( Hy ⇒ ( ¬Pyt ⇒ ¬Ry ) ) ) )

or equivalently (without the negatives)

(P3) ∀x( SNAx ⇒ ∀t ( Tt ∧ ∀y ( Hy ⇒ ( Ry ⇒ Pyt ) ) ⇒ Pxt ) )

Therefore (C) ∀x ( SNAx ⇒ Rx )

Proof of Validity

For a natural deduction proof of this argument's validity, see NameTheTrait_2.0#Natural_Deduction. We quickly check that this argument is validby using a logical proof generator, to prove the formula

P1 ∧ P2 ∧ P3 ⇒ C

with the input

(P1) \existst ( Tt \land \forallx (Hx \to ( Rx \leftrightarrow Pxt ) ) )

(P2) \forallt (Tt \land ( \forallx (Hx \to ( Rx \leftrightarrow Pxt ) ) \to \forallx ( Rx \leftrightarrow Pxt ) ) )

(P3) \forallx ( Ax \to \neg \existst ( Tt \land \negPxt \land( \forally (Hy \to ( \negPyt \to \negRy ) ) ) ) )

or equivalently

(P3) \forallx( Ax \to \forallt ( Tt \land \forally ( Hy \to ( Ry \to Pyt ) ) \to Pxt ) )

(C) \forallx ( Ax \to Rx )

Or all together (P1 ∧ P2 ∧ P3 ⇒ C)

\existst ( Tt \land \forallx (Hx \to (Rx \leftrightarrow Pxt ) ) ) \land \forallt ( Tt \land ( \forallx (Hx \to ( Rx \leftrightarrow Pxt)) \to \forallx (Rx \leftrightarrow Pxt))) \land \forallx (Ax \to \neg \existst (Tt \land \negPxt \land (\forally (Hy \to ( \negPyt \to \negRy))))) \to \forallx ( Ax \to Rx )

which yields valid

NameTheJustification

For more on this, see NameTheJustification.

(P1) All sentient humans have non-trivial moral status.

(P2) If all sentient humans have non-trivial moral status but sentient farmed (and wild) animals lack this status, then there must be some morally relevant difference between all sentient humans and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in moral status.

(P3) There is no morally relevant difference between all sentient humans and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in moral status.

Therefore

(C) Sentient farmed (and wild) animals have non-trivial moral status.

In Propositional Logic

One nice thing about this argument is that its logical form and validity can be very simply and easily explained using only sentential or propositional logic (one does not have to get into predicate or first order logic). The logical form is:

(P1) A

(P2) (A ∧ ¬B) ⇒ C

(P3) ¬C

Therefore, (C) B

Where:

A = "All Sentient humans have non-trivial moral status"

B = "Sentient farmed (and wild) animals have non-trivial moral status"

C = "There is some morally relevant difference between all sentient humans and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in moral status"

The validity of the argument can be easily shown as follows:

1. A; premise

2. (A ∧ ¬B) ⇒ C; premise

3. ¬C; premise

4. ¬(A ∧ ¬B); 2,3, modus tollens [i.e. X ⇒ Y, ¬Y Ⱶ ¬X]

5. ¬A V B; 4, De Morgan's law [i.e. ¬(X ∧ Y) if and only if ¬X V ¬Y], double negation elimination [i.e. if ¬¬X then X]

6. B; 1, 5, disjunctive syllogism [i.e. X or Y, ¬X Ⱶ Y] (and double negation introduction [i.e. if X then ¬¬X], since in our case the inference is ¬A or B, A Ⱶ B)

Conclusion

As we have shown, there are numerous issues with the NTT argument, which can make it unconvincing and can cause it to reflect poorly on veganism as a whole, particularly when it is combined with false claims such as "veganism follows logically from human rights". Its merits can be summed up in the following question, one which activists who like NTT use;

Can you point to a difference between animals and humans that would justify treating humans the same way if we were in their hooves?

Which is in essence, the golden rule. And if framing a question in this way makes people who otherwise wouldn't consider applying the golden rule to non-human animals do so, then that is all for the better. However when posed formally it should be posed in a way that is valid and convincing, like the NTT2.0 correction or NameTheJustification.

Demonstrating the issues of arguments such as NTT helps to ensure vegans are using good arguments that will stand the test of time and reduce recidivism, as well as buys good will from carnists who may be encouraged to reconsider their beliefs that vegans are dishonest and take into consideration the good arguments for veganism and may move them to reducetarian practices.

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
-'''Note: This article is a work in progress'''
+[[File:AY_Extraordinary_Claims.mp4|thumb|Ask Yourself claims NTT is an argument for veganism that requires only logical consistency and a personal belief in human moral value.]]
-Name The Trait, or #NameTheTrait is a logically valid argument for veganism created by vegan Youtuber Isaac Brown a.k.a. "Ask Yourself" in 2015, and popularized during a series of Youtube debates in 2017 by Richard Burgess a.k.a. "Vegan Gains" a vegan bodybuilder and Youtuber.
+'''The Name The Trait argument has been officially updated/revised, and is now formally valid. See [[NameTheTrait 2.0 (official)]] for details and discussion on its uses and limitations.'''
+'''This article will remain online for reference and academic interest.'''
-The #NameTheTrait argument was developed as an attempted improvement on the argument from [[Marginal Cases]] (created by philosopher Peter Singer), removing the empirical aspects of human variation that demonstrates the titular "marginal cases"[http://www.iep.utm.edu/anim-eth/#SSH3ai], and is in practice combined with a hidden Categorical Imperative-like premise yielding a [[deontological]] form of argument (Singer is [[consequentialist]], a position Isaac [[##Personal_Contradictions|rejects]]).
+'''To jump to the proof of logical invalidity see [[#Logical Validity|Proof of Invalidity in First Order Logic]] '''
-The Phantom Menace was a good movie.
+Name The Trait, or #NameTheTrait is an argument for veganism formulated by vegan Youtuber ''Ask Yourself'' in 2015, and popularized during a series of Youtube debates in 2017 by Ask Yourself and ''Vegan Gains'', a vegan bodybuilder and Youtuber. Loosely speaking, NTT seeks to establish veganism from a personal belief in human moral value, similar to the well known argument from [[Marginal_Cases|marginal cases]]. Some street activists claim to have found the argument effective, when presented informally. However as we will see in this article, it is [[#Summary of Issues|logically invalid]], and Ask Yourself's attempts to make it valid have led to an [[#The_Alternative_Interpretation_of_NTT| alternative version]] of the argument that is [[#This_Alternative_Version_of_NTT_Begs_the_Question|question-begging]] or that achieves possible validity only by the Principle of Explosion due to [[#Meaning_of_.22Trait.22|Internal-Contradiction]]. Furthermore, it is often combined with [[#Extraordinary Claims|false claims]] such as "''animal rights follow logically from human rights''" which are defended with the use of [[#Invalid Generalizations|invalid generalizations]]. These drawbacks can make the argument confusing and unconvincing. However the argument '''[[#Corrections| can be corrected]]''' by [[NameTheTrait_2.0|modifying its first premise to require human moral value to be based on a trait and by adding a premise that rejects double standards]] (or by [[NameTheJustification|framing things more directly around the challenge to name a good justification for according important moral status to all sentient humans but virtually no moral status to non-human animals]]), preserving the original intention of the argument.
-The formal argument is structured as such:
+The formal, premise-conclusion presentation of #NameTheTrait is as follows:
 <blockquote>
@@ Line 20: / Line 21: @@
 </blockquote>
-= Summary =
+This article discusses the three primary issues with NTT. Firstly, it discusses its [[#Logical Validity|logical invalidity]], and how its invalidity can create problems. Secondly, it discusses problems with the justifications used by Ask Yourself to defend the premises of the first, "for animal moral value" argument validity of the argument. And thirdly, the article discusses various problems with the second, less widely discussed "for veganism from animal moral value" argument, which suggests a potentially dubious, unclear, and rigid commitment to ''non-exploitation''.
-Informally, the "Name The Trait" argument can be a useful tool in starting discussions, a use where it acts very similarly to Marginal Cases.
-Its greatest strength is the interactivity and thought provoking nature of asking the discussion opponent for a specific response, the titular "trait". <br>
+= NTT's Invalidity =
-However, the attempt to create a ''formal'' argument from this conversation starter (where deontological value systems were baked in, and numerous hidden premises conspicuously left out) resulted in fallacy which undermines the utility of the argument to any intelligent opponent and instead creates the appearance of dogma and dishonesty.
-The argument creates the appearance of the simple syllogism, but the logic is not valid: it is a non sequitur.
+==The Importance of logical validity==
-To explain the primary non sequitur fallacy simply: C does not follow from P1 and P2 because nothing in the argument asserts that moral value must be based on a material trait as P2 implies.  You can agree with P1 and agree with P2 and still reject the suggested conclusion (that animals are of moral value) without any contradiction.
+The main reason it helps to know whether an argument is [[Proving Formal Arguments| logically valid]] is that it helps us to clarify if we have identified all of the substantive assumptions behind its conclusion. If we can see that an argument is valid, then we know that its conclusion follows from its premises simply because of their form, so we have identified and listed all of its substantive assumptions in its premises. If we can see that an argument is invalid, this helps us to know that it must be making further assumptions in order to be a good, rationally compelling argument. Knowing that an argument is making such assumptions, and determining what they are, can help us to understand why certain individuals may not find it compelling, and can spare us the confusion of failing to understand this. It can also put us in a better position to defend those assumptions forthrightly to those who might be inclined to challenge or fail initially to accept them.
-Beyond that primary issue, even were the argument corrected by adding in necessary hidden premises and fixing other fallacies and ambiguities (All outlined below) it would still be a bad argument.
+As we will see below, NTT is invalid. Seeing why it is helps us to see how certain very plausible substantive assumptions can be added to its premises to make it valid. The making of these tacit assumptions by the presenter of NTT and the audience very likely explains why it is often a compelling argument. But as we will see below, the failure to acknowledge these assumptions can cause confusion, and inhibit a persuasive defense of its premises. As we will also see, the fact that to be compelling the argument must make such assumptions may help to dash certain hopes about the minimality of the argument’s assumptions (e.g. about the nature of value and ethics). Seeing that NTT is invalid will thus help us to appreciate the argument’s limits, and how other approaches may be helpful in defending the substantive ethical views that stand behind arguments like NTT.
-At its core, there is a serious meta-ethical problem in that the argument presents and requires a deontological perspective on veganism which is innately anti-pragmatic and rife with internal contradiction or arbitrary resolution in actual practice.
-The argument CAN be corrected ([[#correction|see correction]]) by adding in missing premises and clarifying the meanings of certain terms, but the second deontological half must also be completely replaced by an alternative argument (such as an empirical weighing of cost vs. benefit) to create anything potentially more useful than it is harmful to the vegan cause.<br>
+== Logical Validity ==
-Unfortunately, as seen in the correction, the argument remains confusing and cumbersome due to the workarounds needed for its central premise. Luckily, there are better and simpler arguments for animal moral value available which should be preferred. And given that most people already accept that animals have some moral value (making arguments for that superfluous) there are also much better arguments for veganism.<br>
+What it is for arguments to be logically valid and invalid is the following: <br>
-Obviously nothing in this article is such an argument for veganism: the purpose of this page is not to outline good arguments for veganism, but debunk a bad one to prevent it from supplanting better arguments already in use.
-In the future, see [[Arguments for veganism]] for outlines of better arguments.
+*'''Valid''': It is impossible for all of the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false, ''due simply to the structure of the premises and the conclusion''
+*'''Invalid''': The structure of the premises and the conclusion leave open the possibility that the premises are true but the conclusion is false
-= Burden of Proof =
+(This is not to be confused with '''sound''' which means an argument is both valid and its premises are true)
-This article should not be necessary, because the burden of proof to demonstrate how #NameTheTrait is logically valid should fall on Isaac.  This is true of any argument short of support for the laws of thought themselves (the basis of argumentation which are the minimum necessary assumptions), but much more true for a logical argument.<br>
+In other words, for an argument to be logically valid is for the truth of its conclusion to be guaranteed by the truth of its premises due to their logical form (that is, the validity of an argument depends on the syntactic form of the argument, '''not''' the semantic meaning of the argument [https://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~kyledewey/cs162w15/handouts/handout1-FOL.pdf]). For instance, an argument of the form <br>
-Beyond the simple "what can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence" (and Isaac has provided no evidence, and only assertions that his argument is valid), in logical argumentation it's very difficult to prove an argument to be ''false'' (this comes down to the difficulty of proving a negative), but relatively easy to prove it true if it's actually true, thus making the burden of proof by practical necessity rest on the advocates claiming it is true.
+: (P1) If consuming animal products causes unnecessary suffering, then we should not consume animal products, <br>
+: (P2) Consuming animal products causes unnecessary suffering, <br>
+: Therefore, (C) we should not consume animal products
-If he were serious about this argument, Isaac could select a formal system, translate his argument (as we attempt to do [[#In_Chinese|here]]) use the rules of deduction to clearly derive his conclusion (or contradiction) and share it with the audience for criticism.
+is logically valid. This is because it has the logical form:
-See [[Proving Formal Arguments]] for more details on this.
-As long as he didn't set out to reinvent logic as he seems to be [[##Logical_Contradiction_Meaning|trying to do]], for the most part Isaac could just learn and follow established rules (no need to reinvent the wheel), which are generally far less complicated than most fields of mathematics.  An intelligent person could figure out the minimum in a couple days given any interest in philosophical argumentation, and Isaac has also had many standing offers for help on this issue for free which he has rejected.
+: (P1) If U then V
+: (P2) U
+: Therefore (C) V
+Here, C follows from P1 and P2 simply due to their logical form, whatever the content of U and V may be (this particular way of a conclusion following from its logical form and that of the premises is known as "modus ponens" [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modus_ponens]).
-Unfortunately, Isaac has consistently failed to engage with formal and symbolic examinations of his argument, instead trying to shift the burden of proof away from himself by calling the latter equivalent to "Chinese" and insisting on blind faith that they have been translated incorrectly without understanding them.  It must be stressed that his inability to back up his argument and respond to criticism is not an excuse for failing in his obligation to do so.<br>
+This means that for NTT to be valid, we must be able to replace its premises and conclusion with sentences that mean different things but have the same logical form, and so long as we preserve this logical form, it must remain valid (note: it would not have to remain sound). Hence the following must be valid if NTT is valid:
-Beyond that, he has also engaged in blocking critics and misrepresenting arguments presented in the "plain English" he asks for against #NameTheTrait, responding selectively when he does by dismissing them as "retards" or just by repeating the same arguments that those critics have already addressed as fallacious.  That is, he is doing the exact opposite from what one would expect if his argument were valid and he could back it up.
-Even in merely practical terms as an outreach argument, the burden of proof for answering criticism from a growing number of vegans and non-vegans and demonstrating how this argument is sound falls upon Isaac.<br>
+: P1 - Humans are of moral value
-If people perceive the argument as invalid (or even tricky/deceptive), it fails at its goal regardless of its validity: that is if the argument's purpose is to convince people to go vegan.<br>
+: P2 - There is no eye colour absent in cows which if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless.
+: C - Therefore without establishing the absence of such an eye colour in cows, we contradict ourselves by deeming cows valueless
-Unfortunately, the outreach purpose seems less and less to be the case, as when challenged with  criticism of his off-putting and alienating behavior (which may prevent people from going vegan) Isaac has even stated that he doesn't care if people go vegan and that he is not an activist but an entertainer (he earns an income for his videos from Patreon, and claims they are his intended audience).  This convenient deflection is reminiscent of the claims by charlatans like Uri Gellar or John Edwards to defend themselves against allegations of fraud.
+Which is clearly invalid as there is no premise to say moral value must be based on eye colour. But likewise, '''in NTT there is no premise to say moral value must be based on a trait'''. Moreover, there is no special logical significance to the notion of a ''trait'' that allows a valid argument to omit stating such a premise (unless perhaps if "trait" is interpreted as referring in an all-encompassing way to any predicate, but this results in [[#Meaning_of_.22Trait.22|contradiction in P2]]).
-If the intention of #NameTheTrait is providing the basis for operating a cult, then as with internal theistic arguments it does not need to be sound, it only needs to be confusing enough for people to convince themselves it is sound if they want to believe it in order to establish the necessary self-congratulatory in-group who sees "the truth", and an out-group of deniers.  In that case, likewise, Isaac does not need to provide arguments against it, he only needs to disparage people who disagree and insult their intelligence for being able to see what is so obvious (which is in practice what he does).<br>
+The standard way to show an argument is invalid is to show a case where the logical form of the premises and conclusion allow the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false. Such a case is referred to as a ''counterexample''. <br>
-This is what seems to be happening with Isaac's fan-base; an eerie echo of the Raw til' 4 and 30 Bananas a day cult of Durianrider and Freelee that recently collapsed. This is what happens when people suspend skepticism and critical thinking, and let charismatic personalities pass the burden of proof elsewhere and substitute arguments with insults.<br>
-If you are a follower or fan of Isaac: Be the needle that pops that echo chamber, and hold him to the same standards of proof that he demands from others.  Ask that he address these arguments properly, and provide evidence that his argument is valid. For example, if his argument is a valid syllogism, ask him to #NameTheSyllogism[http://markmcintire.com/phil/validforms.html], if it isn't, ask him to rewrite it so that he can name the valid form it takes.  This kind of proof would not be difficult, even in "English".
+To learn how to formally prove that an argument is valid, see Paul Teller's ''A Modern Formal Logic Primer''[http://tellerprimer.ucdavis.edu/pdf].
-== Extraordinary Claims ==
+==Semantic Issues==
-[[File:AY_Extraordinary_Claims.mp4|thumb|Ask Yourself makes extraordinary claims as part of his skeptic community challenge]]
+The argument as presented by Ask Yourself contains a number of semantic issues that make it hard to evaluate. That is, the words used and their meanings don't obviously line up, and what is being said may not be coherent.
-"Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence"
+This isn't a trivial nitpick: while the problems may be able to be fixed pretty easily, without doing so the argument may not make any sense.
+Semantic problems can cause serious issues, such as fallacies of ambiguity which create the illusion of a valid logical form without really being valid. For example:
-Any argument needs to be supported with valid logic and empirical evidence, but one making extraordinary claims even more so.
+<blockquote>
+P1. Really exciting novels are rare.<br>
+P2. But rare books are expensive.<br>
+C. Therefore, Really exciting novels are expensive.[http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/e06c.htm]
+</blockquote>
+Or:
+<blockquote>
+P1. Nothing is better than a good lesson.<br>
+P2. A poor lesson is better than nothing.<br>
+C. A poor lesson is better than a good lesson.[http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/four_fall.html]
+</blockquote>
-In defending #NameTheTrait Isaac makes a number of extraordinary claims which make his arguments less plausible and increase the need for evidence (extraordinary evidence) that these arguments are valid beyond what would be required for more modest arguments which would be more reasonable to accept based on appearances.
+It's obvious here that despite being the same words, in natural language the instances of "rare" and "nothing" in the first and second premises of these arguments have different meanings.
-Isaac believes that he, as somebody not educated in philosophy (and who doesn't understand the meanings of philosophical terms like "contradiction"), has at the age of 24 after recently going vegan come up with the best argument ever conceived for veganism, and so has done what no other professional philosopher in thousands of years of history has been able to do (from Pythagoras to Voltaire to Singer).<br>
+When we fail to scrutinize the wording and meanings of words in arguments like Name The Trait these subtle differences may ignored, but just because it feels convincing it does not make the argument valid. Semantic messes like these can hide fallacies that not only make the argument fail the test of being valid, but may compromise the underlying reasoning at its core.
-A critical part of this purported superiority is the argument's claimed meta-ethical independence.
-According to Isaac, it doesn't matter if somebody is a realist, an irrealist, a subjectivist, a relativist: his argument purports to work no matter your assumptions as long as you believe humans (or even just yourself; you can substitute "I have moral value" in P1) have moral value, and by that in practice he means that as long as you would protest or resist somebody killing you (this is not something he defined in the argument, but an assumption he sneaks in during debate).
+===Deeming vs Being===
+[[File:Deem.PNG|thumb]]
+The first premise (P1) suggests a state of being, while the second premise (P2) talks about what would be "deemed"
-If true, this would be the the most revolutionary philosophical argument in history of any kind, not just for veganism, and would send shockwaves around the world.  The equivalent of building a perpetual motion machine in physics (Interestingly, the people claiming to have built them are, like Isaac, almost never experienced in the field).
+<blockquote>
+P1 - Humans '''are''' of moral value<br>
+P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to '''deem''' ourselves valueless.
+</blockquote>
-As it turns out, his confidence and confusion are a product of his ignorance (via the Dunning Kruger effect) because he confuses "double standard" in the colloquial sense with "logical contradition" in the philosophical sense, among a series of other mistakes as laid out [[#Issues|here (below)]].
+The reasoning attempted by the argument seems to be trying to draw from an existential claim of fact (are) and an apparently subjective evaluation ("deem" which refers to judgement of ''opinion''[http://www.dictionary.com/browse/deem]) as if they were categorically the same type of statement.<br>
+The hidden premise here appears to be that "deeming" and being are the same thing: if something is then you deem it, or perhaps if you deem something it is so. This hidden premise is either a very substantial claim of [[Factual Relativism]], or a rejection of moral realism/moral objectivism. The latter interpretation might make sense given the author's identification as an "ontological moral subjectivist" and his [[Objective-subjective_distinction#William_Lane_Craig_.26_Skeptic_Community_Strawman|views about objective morality]]. But whatever the reasoning such substantial assumptions must be stated as a premise. It is not enough just to expect that whoever you are talking to will implicitly agree that being and deeming are the same thing. As such, the argument in its current form is invalid.
-To be clear, ''within'' a specific and defined meta-ethical foundation from deontological to consequentialist frameworks, realist, irrealist, naturalist and not, such arguments are relatively common and can be compelling.<br>
+This might work to resolve the difference:
-Where the nature of moral properties and action is delineated through a number of mutual assumptions, strong arguments can be made leveraging those assumptions and building on them to show either through duty or outcome with the addition of empirical data that veganism is beneficial and morally preferable to certain alternatives.
-What is extraordinary about #NameTheTrait is not a claim to be an irrefutable argument for veganism within such a context, but its claim to validity despite a paucity of premises that provide the meta-ethical context to give it weight and make the conclusion follow from the empirical premise, and its attempt to address all actors regardless of their beliefs of morality beyond the assertions of P1: that humans, or that they specifically (as a self-focused alternative P1), have moral value.
+<blockquote>
+P1 - Humans are of moral value<br>
+P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless.<br>
+'''P3- Being of (or lacking) moral value and being deemed to have (or lack) moral value are the same thing (respectively).'''
+</blockquote>
-= Symbolic Logic =
+However, this would also weaken the argument in terms of practical application. Most people are not moral subjectivists of this radical sort and do not agree that having an opinion about something having or lacking moral value is that same thing as that thing actually having or lacking moral value. Most people believe that there IS a fact of the matter about which moral views are correct, and in cases of disagreement one party is just mistaken about that fact (much as virtually nobody considers any two views about the shape of the Earth to be equally correct, justified, or "just a matter of opinion, man").
-The use of propositional logic is motivated by the fact that the English language (or any other spoken language) contains inconsistency and ambiguous propositions. The use of predicate logic is motivated by the fact that propositional logic is not capable of using quantifiers (for all, there exists etc.). So to translate the argument in a formal way, we decided to use first order logic.
+While it would be an option for making the argument more comprehensible, baking radical moral subjectivism into the argument as a requirement to be convinced by it is a bad idea that severely limits its persuasive force. It's probably a better idea to just change some of the words: either changing "are" to "Are deemed to be" or change "deem ourselves" to "be". We can talk about deeming in all premises and conclusion, or we can talk about being in all premises and conclusion. Which we choose has its own implications, though.
-It is crucial in any form of argument to be able to translate it in a formal way (see below).
+====Deeming Only====
-== In Chinese ==
+Changing all terms to "Deem" means modifying the first premise. For example:
-'''Symbols'''<br>
+<blockquote>
-*∀ (for all)
+'''P1 - We Deem Humans to have moral value'''<br>
-* ⇒ (implies i.e. 'if, then')
+P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless.<br>
-* ¬ (negation i.e. not)
+C - Therefore without establishing the absence of such a trait in animals, we contradict ourselves by deeming animals valueless
-* ∃ (there exists)
+</blockquote>
-* ∈ (element of)
-* ∉ (not an element of)
-* ∧ (and)
-* \ (without)
-* { , } (set of)
-* :⇔ (defined as)
-<br>
-'''Definitions''' <br>
+However, this creates another problem: why are different deemings in different contexts or at different times considered logical contradictions if made without justification? This seems to be confusing the notion of a double standard (which is NOT a logical contradiction) with legitimate logical contradictions.
-: H(x) is true ⇔ x is a human being<br>
-: A(x) is true ⇔ x is an animal <br>
-: M(x) is true ⇔ x has moral value <br>
-: T(x):⇔ The set of traits belonging to x <br><br>
-'''NTT Part 1 Translation to FOL'''<br>
+Unlike matters of fact in objective physical reality, the matter of deeming is a subjective issue like with taste: one where we accept that people can deem Tacos or Burritos delicious or not at a whim from situation to situation, or day to day, with no reason other than they feel like it. There's no reason presented in the argument to believe that personal moral feelings or preferences, if that's what morality is based on, should be subject to any more scrutiny (or accusation of contradiction) than personal taste preferences which can vary at a whim.
-: P1:⇔ ∀x: H(x) ⇒ M(x) <br>
+In order to establish shifting moral whims without trait justification as a ''contradiction'' (rather than the logically permissible unjustified double standards they are) we would would need to establish yet another premise which demands that morality be based on a consistent value system requiring justification based on traits.
-: P2:⇔ ¬ ( ∃t: ( ∀x: A(x) ⇒ t ∉ T(x) ) ∧ ( ∀y: H(y) ⇒ ( t ∈ T(y) ∧ ( ∀q: ( T(q) = T(y) \ { t } ) ⇒ ¬ M(q) ) )<br>
-: C:⇔ ∀x: A(x) ⇒ M(x)<br> <br>
-=== In English ===
+<blockquote>
+P1 - We Deem Humans to have moral value<br>
+P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless.<br>
+'''P3 - Moral deeming must be based on a consistent system of moral evaluation, which requires naming trait differences to justify different treatment.'''<br>
+C - Therefore without establishing the absence of such a trait in animals, we contradict ourselves by deeming animals valueless
+</blockquote>
-: P1: for all x, if x is human then x has moral value <br>
+This important premise must be stated, and can not be hidden or merely assumed. Without it, the argument fails (although changing this alone is probably not sufficient to make the argument valid since there are still questions of the meaning of "trait", it's one step closer).
-: P2: There is no trait absent in animals and present in humans that if absent in a replica of a human without the trait, would make the replica valueless <br>
-: C: For all x, if x is an animal then x has moral value <br><br>
-Note : It is up to Isaac or any other supporter of the argument to demonstrate that C follows from the premises or that the negation of C leads to a contradiction. It is also preferable to have the deduction system clearly specified. Until this has been demonstrated, the argument should not be taken as valid.
+Adding such a premise resolves the issues with deeming, but of course also makes apparent a point of potential disagreement in P3; while the majority may agree, not all people believe morality works that way. Overall, this P3 is a useful addition which strengthens the argument substantially. Of course there are other options:
-The above formalization of the argument also deals with the two issues regarding the use of "us" (See [[#Existential_Meaning|existential meaning]]).
+====Being Only====
-#When we are talking about the set of humans, by removing a trait we are no longer talking about a human anymore. When Isaac uses hypothetical situations (What if your brain is transferred to a computer, would it be ok to kill you? etc. ), in a correct sense we are not talking about a human anymore. So we can just admit that "us" is the product of whatever is left after removing the trait.
-#If we consider the product of the human without the trait to be a human, then P2 is rendered vacuously true (formal derivation not provided but can be provided on demand). This is due to the fact that by P1 a human cannot be valueless, so that in P2 a human cannot be considered valueless.
-#This is to say; if P1 tells us that any x that is human has moral value, in order to conclude in P2 that 'us' or 'ourselves' can ever be valueless, the removal of the trait MUST cause us to no longer be human.
-#It's worth noting that there is nothing in the argument that forbids applying completely different moral standards to the set of humans than to the set of animals.
-=== Steel-Manning P2 ===
+Converting the rest of the argument from deeming to being requires more substantial change of P2 and the conclusion:
-In the above translation we are steel-manning P2 of the original argument by not requiring 'us/ourselves' to be human. Since P2 becomes vacuously true if the 'us/ourselves' represents humans (see below). And if P2 is vacuously true, then P2 can be removed with no effect on the argument, which simply leaves<br>
+<blockquote>
+P1 - Humans are of moral value<br>
+'''P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would make us valueless.'''<br>
+'''C - Therefore*, animals are not valueless.'''
+</blockquote>
-P1:⇔ ∀x: H(x) ⇒ M(x)<br>
+&#42;The "without establishing the absence of such a trait in animals" part was superfluous; you can leave it in, but it doesn't mean anything anymore
-C:⇔ ∀x: A(x) ⇒ M(x)<br>
-i.e. <br>
+Even this one change simplifies the argument greatly and brings it closer to validity, but not quite there; there are still serious issues about what "trait" means, and potential contradictions it generates:
-P1: Humans are of moral value  <br>
+===Meaning of "Trait"===
-C: Animals are of moral value <br>
-An obvious non sequitur.
+Broadly speaking, there are two ways "trait" can be interpreted"
+. An all-encompassing interpretation which includes essential properties as traits<br>
+. A limited version, which [[#Excluding_Essential_Properties|excludes essential properties]] (or other properties that would yield contradiction).
-'''P2 is vacuously true if "us" represent humans'''<br>
+When "trait" is all encompassing (and this is what Ask Yourself has claimed in response to criticism), then P2 has self-contradictory implications.
+<blockquote>P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would make us valueless.</blockquote>
-P2 would have the  following form if "us" represents humans :
+While it is coherent to speak of certain traits (like "intelligence") being absent in humans, it is not coherent to speak of all important traits being absent in humans. Most importantly, consider the trait of being human itself - which actually is commonly thought to be a relevant factor in these discussions. Consider what happens when we try to evaluate what P2 says about this trait:
-P2:⇔ ¬ ( ∃t: ( ∀x: A(x)  ⇒ t ∉ T(x)  ) ∧ ( ∀y: H(y) ⇒ ( t ∈ T(y) ∧ ( ∀q: ( T(q)  = T(y) \ { t } ) ∧ H(q) ⇒ ¬ M(q) ) )
+<blockquote>The trait of "being or having ever been human" is a trait absent in animals. But '''a human who lacked the trait "being or having ever been human"''' would not be valueless.</blockquote>
-Note the addition of "∧H(q)" in the last part of the sentence. The sentence has the form ¬(A ∧ (B ⇒ C ∧ (D⇒ E))) with :
+This doesn't make any sense, because being human or at least having been human at some point (so we can identify former humans) is an essential property of the subject being discussed.<br>
-* A :⇔  ∃t: ( ∀x: A(x) ⇒ t ∉ T(x) )
-* B :⇔  H(y)
-* C :⇔  t ∈ T(y)
-* D :⇔ ( T(q)  = T(y) \ { t } ) ∧ H(q)
-* E :⇔ ¬ M(q)
-# Now in D we can instantiate q to be a human. D⇒ E take the form "true => false" for a trait of our choosing and using P1. This makes D⇒ E False, which in turn makes C ∧ (D⇒ E) False.
+Speaking of a human who is not human and never has been human is a contradiction; it's logically incoherent, and it makes the whole argument an appeal to a nonsensical premise. (That said, in light of the logical principle of explosion[https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion], according to which literally anything follows from a logically inconsistent set of premises, there is a technical sense in which the conclusion of NTT could be said to follow from its premises and it could thus be valid if P2 is interpreted so as to be logically inconsistent. But this would not be a sense of validity in which NTT would be a good or rationally compelling argument).
-# We apply the same trick in  B ⇒ C ∧ (D⇒ E) by instantiating y to be human, which makes B ⇒ C ∧ (D⇒ E) False.
-# Then by conjunction A ∧ (B ⇒ C ∧ (D⇒ E)) is False.
-# Applying the last negation make the whole sentence True.
-Since the choice of trait and human instance is arbitrary, the statement is vacuously True, meaning it can't be False in any structure that fulfils our mentioned predicates.
+Because the semantic structure of the argument makes it impossible to coherently consider essential traits, or traits that beings cannot lack and remain the self-same entities, these traits must be excluded from the definition of "trait" in order for the argument to be coherent.
+By changing the wording of the argument to talk about [[#Alternative_Version_in_FOL|Counterparts to Humans]] rather than humans themselves, this resolves the contradiction and allows an all-encompassing definition to be used. However, [[#This_Alternative_Version_of_NTT_Begs_the_Question|as explained here]] this alternative version of NTT begs the question.
-'''P2 is vacuously true for broad definition of 'trait' (not to be taken as correct yet, still a WIP)''' <br>
+The limited version of the definition of "trait" (which at the very least excludes essential properties like being or having been human that would create an internal contradiction in P2) makes more sense, but yields an invalid argument without additional premises that rule out investing the forbidden properties with crucial moral significance. Without an additional premise, the argument can be easily shown to be invalid by considering the coherence of value narcissism, which some individuals are initially tempted to embrace, as [[#Excluding_Essential_Properties|explained here]].
-If we allow the definition of trait to be so broad that it includes the trait of 'being part of the set of humans', and we allow for this 'trait' to not be absent in animals (i.e. to be present in animals), then P2 becomes vacuously true. This is because it would imply there can be animal which is human i.e. ∃x:(A(x) ∧ H(x)) (there exists an x that is both human and animal). Subsequently there would be no trait that can satisfy both being absent in all animals and present in all humans. i.e. there is no 't' that can satisfy both '∀x: A(x) ⇒ t ∉ T(x)' and '∀y: H(y) ⇒ t ∈ T(y)'<br>
+==Steel-manning NTT==
-This leaves us with a negated series of conjunctions of which at least one conjunction will be false. This makes the series of conjunctions false, and the negation true, hence P2 becomes vacuously true. <br>
-This is not an issue introduced by the FOL translation, it is present in the original argument itself by the requirement that the trait can be absent of humans, which of course 'being human' cannot. <br>
+Before proceeding we will rephrase the argument in the following way, to capture its essential reasoning
-To show this more formally, we can define the trait of 'being part of the set of humans' to be 'h' with, <br>
+'''Part 1'''
-∀x: (H(x) ⇔ h ∈ T(x))
+:(P1) All sentient humans have moral value
+:(P2) If an individual is a sentient nonhuman animal, then there is no trait absent the individual,  which is such that, if the trait were absent in a sentient human, then the human would not have moral value
+:Therefore, (C) All sentient non-human animals have moral value
-i.e. for all x if x is human then x possesses the trait of being human, and if x possesses the trait of being human then x is human <br>
+'''Part 2'''
-Now the statement 'h is absent in humans' would be <br>
+:(P1) All sentient non-human animals have moral value
+:(P2) If an individual is a sentient non-human animal, then there is no trait absent the individual,  which is such that, if the trait were absent in a sentient human who has moral value, then we would not be morally required to not exploit the human
+:Therefore, (C) We are morally required to not exploit sentient non-human animals who have moral value
-∀x: (H(x) ⇒ h ∉ T(x)) <br>
+==Summary of Issues==
-which of course would be false, by the definition. <br>
+As we will see below, the reason NTT is logically invalid because its logical form allows for a counterexample in which sentient humans have moral value, sentient non-human animals that lacks moral value, and for all traits that sentient non-human animals lack, humans possess moral value with the traits removed. The reason we can pose such a counterexample is because '''there is nothing in the logical form of the argument that says moral value must be based on a trait''' (as is the case for the [[#NameTheTrait_2.0|NTT2.0]] correction) '''nor is there anything to say humans lacking certain traits are animals''' (as is the case for the [[#The Alternative Interpretation of NTT|alternative interpretation]]).
-Note we could provide a very similar proof that P2 is vacuously true if 'moral value is allowed to be a trait' since by P1, it is also something a human cannot lack.
+Ask Yourself has argued that if one were to lose all of the traits that distinguish one from a non-human animal, then the resulting entity would be identical to that non-human animal, so P1 and P2 so interpreted [logically] entail C. The problem with this claim is that it presupposes something like [[#Identity of Indescernibles| the identity of indiscernibles]]: that if two entities have all of the same properties, then they must be the self-same object. This is a substantive metaphysical thesis, to which certain philosophers have objected (for discussion see [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/]), so it must be added as an additional premise for the argument to be logically valid.
-'''Separating humans and nonhuman animals ''' <br>
+But as we will see below, the much greater problem with the argument so interpreted is that it has essentially no rational force. P2 so interpreted is essentially just asserting that beings with all and only the traits of sentient non-human animals have moral value. The argument thus offers little if any reason to change the mind of someone who does not already find this view plausible, and the defense of its premises offers no guidance on how to persuade such an individual, see [[#This_Alternative_Version_of_NTT_Begs_the_Question|how this version of the argument begs the question]].
-To avoid the above scenario we must change P2 such that we are now talking about humans and nonhuman animals (which is arguably implicit from the way Isaac presents his argument).
+==Proof of Invalidity in First Order Logic==
-P2:⇔ ¬ ( ∃t: ( ∀x: (A(x) ∧ ¬H(x)) ⇒ t ∉ T(x) ) ∧ ( ∀y: H(y) ⇒ ( t ∈ T(y) ∧ ( ∀q: ( T(q) = T(y) \ { t } ) ⇒ ¬ M(q) ) )
+In order to show the logical form of NTT, we will use what is known as '''first order logic''' or predicate logic. The sort of logic used to display the logical form of the argument above '(P1) If U then V; (P2) U; therefore, (C) V' is known as '''propositional logic''' or sentence logic, since it replaces full propositions or sentences flanking logical connectives like 'if...then', 'and' and 'or' with abstract symbols. First order logic goes inside the logical structure of propositions, and replaces predicates like 'is a sentient human' and 'is a sentient non-human animal' with abstract symbols. First order logic also considers variables for things to which those predicates are ascribed, and quantification over them (e.g. 'for all x, if x is a sentient human, then x has moral value'). For more on propositional logic and first order logic, see Paul Teller's ''A Modern Formal Logic Primer''[http://tellerprimer.ucdavis.edu/pdf].
-note the addition of '∧ ¬H(x)'. Now by P1, we know that the only trait that if present in animals (or if not absent in animals), that would give animals moral value, is the trait of 'being human', which is not possible here. This is because for a nonhuman to possess the trait 'human' the statement <br>
-∃x(¬ H(x) ∧ h ∈ H(x) ) <br>
+=== Displaying the Logical Form of NTT in FOL ===
-Must be true. But it of course is false because ∀x: (h ∈ T(x) ⇔ H(x)) <br>
+'''Symbols'''<br>
+*∀ (for all)
+* ⇒ (if, then; e.g. A ⇒ B means 'if A then B')
+* ⇔ (if and only if; e.g. A ⇔ B means 'if A then B and if B then A')
+* ¬ (negation i.e. not)
+* ∃ (there exists)
+* ∧ (and)
+* ∨ (or)
-Hence there is nothing in P2 to give all animals the trait 'human' nor is there anything to give animals moral value, so the argument is a non sequitur.
+'''Definitions''' <br>
+: H(x) means 'x is a sentient human' <br>
+: A(x) means 'x is a sentient non-human animal' <br>
+: M(x) means 'x has moral value' <br>
+: T(x) means 'x is a trait'
+: P(x,y) means 'x has y; e.g. if x is a sentient human and t is a trait, P(x,t) means 'human x has trait t', or 'a property of x is t'<br>
+: RNE(x) means 'we a morally required to not exploit x'
-'''Showing the argument is a non sequitur '''<br>
+Note we will also use the shorthand Hx to represent H(x), Px,y or Pxy to represent P(x,y) etc.
-It is easy to show the argument is a non sequitur by imagining a moral system where P1 & P2 are true but C is not.
+====The Logical Form of Part 1 of NTT====
-To do this we propose a moral system where humans have moral value, nonhuman animals do not have moral value, and 'replicas' with all the traits of a human except 'being human' have moral value (this is a logical possibilty if we allow 'being human' to be a trait, and traits to be independent). So the axioms of our moral system are
+: (P1) ∀x ( Hx ⇒ Mx )<br>
+: (P2) ∀x ( Ax ⇒ ¬∃t ( Tt ∧ ¬Pxt ∧ ∀y ( Hy ⇒ ( ¬Pyt ⇒ ¬My ) ) ) )
+: Therefore, (C)  ∀x ( Ax ⇒ Mx )
-(1) ∀x: H(x) ⇒ M(x) <br>
+'''In English''' <br>
-(2) ∀x: (A(x)∧ ¬ H(x)) ⇒ ¬ M(x) <br>
-(3) ∀y: H(y) ⇒ ( ∀q: ( T(q) = T(y) \ {h} ) ⇒ M(q) ) <br>
-Now we check this against the argument; <br>
+: (P1) for all x, if x is a sentient human, then x has moral value <br>
+:(P2) for all x, if x is a sentient nonhuman animal, then there does not exist t, such that t is a trait, and x lacks t, and for all y, if y is a human, then if y lacks t, then y does not have moral value.
+: Therefore, (C) For all x, if x is a sentient non-human animal, then x has moral value <br>
-P1 is clearly true.<br>
+====The Logical Form of Part 2 of NTT====
-Now to check against P2. We know that if h ∈ T(q) then q is a human and by P1 has moral value. So the only trait that if absent in a replica could lead to the replica having no moral value is 'h'. But in our moral system this is not the case because of (3). Hence the statement <br>
+: (P1) ∀x ( Ax ⇒ Mx )
+: (P2) ∀x ( Ax ⇒ ¬∃t ( Tt ∧ ¬Pxt ∧ ∀y ( Hy ∧ My ⇒ ( ¬Pyt ⇒ ¬RNEy ) ) ) )
+: Therefore, (C)    ∀x ( (Ax ∧ Mx) ⇒ RNEx )<br>
-∃t: ( ∀x: (A(x)∧ ¬ H(x)) ⇒ t ∉ T(x) ) ∧ ( ∀y: H(y) ⇒ ( t ∈ T(y) ∧ ( ∀q: ( T(q) = T(y) \ { t } ) ⇒ ¬ M(q) )
+'''In English:'''<br>
-becomes false. i.e. the statement 'there is a trait absent in nonhuman animals and present in humans that if absent in a replica of a human without the trait, would make the replica valueless' is false <br>.
+: (P1) For all x, if x is a sentient nonhuman animal, then x has moral value.
+: (P2) For all x, if x is a sentient nonhuman animal, then there does not exist t, such that t is a trait, and x lacks t, and for all y, if y is a human, and y has moral value, then if y lacks t, then we are not morally required to not exploit y.
+: Therefore (C) for all x, if x is a sentient non-human animal, and x has moral value, then we are morally required not to exploit x.
-So the negation of the statement becomes true (i.e. 'there is no trait ...' becomes true). Hence P2 becomes true.
+=== Showing NTT is Logically Invalid ===
-Now C is clearly false because in the moral system nonhuman animals do not have moral value. Hence it is possible to create a moral system where P1 and P2 are true, but C is not. Thus the argument is a non-sequitur
+The standard way of showing that an argument is invalid is to construct a ''counterexample'', or a model, which is allowed by the logical form of the premises and the conclusion, in which the premises are true and the conclusion is false.Since Part 1 and Part 2 follow the same basic structure, we will only show a counterexample for Part 1.
+====Part 1 Counterexample====
-''' Showing NTT fails for disjoint sets in general'''<br>
+In the following counterexample, we will imagine a case in which, sentient humans have moral value, sentient non-human animals do not have moral value, and for all traits that sentient nonhuman animals lack, humans retain moral value with the trait removed.
-Suppose we have two sets, set A (S<sub>A</sub>) and set B (S<sub>B</sub>), and suppose that they are disjoint i.e. their intersection is the empty set i.e. S<sub>A</sub> ∩ S<sub>B</sub> = ∅ <br>
+=====In FOL=====
-Now we make the definitions <br>
+:(E1) ∃x ( Hx ) ∧ ∀x ( Hx ⇒ ( Mx ∧ ¬Ax ∧ ¬Tx) )
+:(E2) ∃x ( Ax ) ∧ ∀x ( Ax ⇒ ( ¬Mx ∧ ¬Hx ∧ ¬Tx ∧ ( ∃y ( Hy ∧ ∀t (Tt ∧ ( ¬Pxt ⇒ ¬Pyt ) ) ) ) )
+:(E3) ∀x ( Tx ⇒ ( ¬Ax ∧ ¬Hx ∧ ¬ Mx) )
-: A(x) is true ⇔ x is a member of set A <br>
+'''In English'''
-: B(x) is true ⇔ x is a member of set B <br>
-: P(x) is true ⇔ x has property P (e.g. moral value) <br>
-: T(x):⇔ The set of traits belonging to x  <br>
-We can note that the sets being disjoint is equivalent to ∄x (A(x) ∧ B(x)) i.e. there is no x that is a member of set A and set B <br>
+:(E1) there is a sentient human, and all sentient humans have moral value, are not sentient non-human animals, are not traits <br>
+:(E2) there is a sentient non-human animal, and all sentient non-human animals do not have moral value, are not sentient humans, are not traits, and are such that there exists a human that lacks all the same traits as the non-human animal <br>
+:(E3) all traits are not sentient non-human animals, are not sentient humans, and do not have moral value
-The NTT argument is equivalent to the following <br>
+=====Proving the Counterexample renders NTT invalid=====
-: P1:⇔ ∀x: A(x) ⇒ P(x) <br>
+If NTT is invalid, then the formula
-(All members of set A have property P) <br>
-: P2:⇔ ¬ ( ∃t: ( ∀x: B(x) ⇒ t ∉ T(x) ) ∧ ( ∀y: A(y) ⇒ ( t ∈ T(y) ∧ ( ∀q: ( T(q) = T(y) \ { t } ) ⇒ ¬ P(q) ) ) <br>
-(There is no trait absent in a members of set B and present in members of set A, that if absent in a replica of a member of set A, that is not in set A, would make the replica not have property P)<br>
-: C:⇔ ∀x: B(x) ⇒ P(x) <br>
-(All members of set B have property P) <br>
-To show this is a non sequitur we present the following case where the following three statements are true <br>
+( E1 ∧ E2 ∧ E3 ) ⇒ ( P1 ∧ P2 ∧ ¬C )
-: (1) ∀x: A(x) ⇒ P(x)    (members of set A have property P) <br>
+should be valid. That is to say, if NTT is invalid, and we have chosen our counterexample correctly, then if the counterexample is true, then the premises of NTT should be true and its conclusion false. We can check this using a [https://www.umsu.de/logik/trees/ logical proof generator], with the input
-: (2) ∀x: B(x) ⇒ ¬ P(x)    (members of set B do not have property P) <br>
-: (3) ∀t (∀y: A(y) ⇒ ( ∃q: ( T(q) = T(y) \ {t} ) ⇒ P(q) ))    (for all traits, there exists a replica of a member of set A, without the trait, who has property P)<br>
-Now if we define the trait 'a' with ∀x: (A(x) ⇔ a ∈ T(x)) (for all x, if x is a member of set A then x has trait 'a' and if x has trait 'a' then x is a member of set A). And likewise the trait 'b' with ∀x: (B(x) ⇔ b ∈ T(x)). Now we know since the sets are disjoint  ∀x: (A(x) ⇒ b ∉ T(x)) and ∀x: (B(x) ⇒ a ∉ T(x)). Essentially, 'a' is the trait of 'being in set A' and 'b' is the trait of 'being in set B' .<br>
+: <span style="color:#008080; background:#FFFFFF"> (\existsx (Hx) \land \forallx (Hx \to ( \negAx \land \negTx \landMx))) \land (\existsx (Ax) \land \forallx(Ax\to (\negHx \land \negTx \land \negMx\land( \existsy (Hy\land \forallt (\negPxt \to \negPyt)))))) \land (Tx\to( \negAx \land\negHx\land\negMx))\to(\forallx ( Hx \to Mx ) \land \forallx ( Ax \to \neg \existst ( Tt \land \neg Pxt \land ( \forally (Hy \to ( \neg Pyt \to \neg My ) ) ) ) ) \to\neg\forallx (Ax \to Mx))</span>
-So we know when we consider the statement <br>
+which gives us '''valid'''. Hence we have demonstrated that '''NTT is invalid'''.
-∀y: A(y) ⇒ ( ∃q: ( T(q) = T(y) \ {t} ) ⇒ P(q) ) <br>
+====Checking the Validity Directly====
-we know T(q) = T(y) \ {t} is a subset of T(y) i.e. T(q) ⊆ T(y). So 'b' cannot be contained in T(q) since it is not contained in T(y), so the replica cannot be in set B.
+We can also use the [https://www.umsu.de/logik/trees/ logical proof generator] to directly show the argument is invalid by checking the formula
+: P1 ∧ P2 ⇒ C
-Now if we check these statements against the argument we have <br>
+We can do this with the input (for part 1)
-P1: Clearly true <br>
+:(P1) <span style="color:#008080; background:#FFFFFF">\forallx (Hx \to Mx)</span>
-P2: We know that by (3) all replicas (who cannot be in set B) have property P. Hence the statement <br>
+:(P2) <span style="color:#008080; background:#FFFFFF">\forallx ( Ax \to \neg \exists t (Tt \land \neg Pxt \land ( \forally (Hy \to ( \neg Pyt \to \neg My ) ) ) ) )</span>
-∃t: ( ∀x: B(x) ⇒ t ∉ T(x) ) ∧ ( ∀y: A(y) ⇒ ( t ∈ T(y) ∧ ( ∀q: ( T(q) = T(y) \ { t } ) ⇒ ¬ P(q) ) <br>
+:(C) <span style="color:#008080; background:#FFFFFF">\forallx ( Ax \to Mx )</span>
-becomes false. And P2 becomes true by negation.  <br>
+Or all together (P1 ∧ P2 ⇒ C)
-C: Now since q is not a member of set B, the statement (2) still holds true, and C becomes false.<br>
+:<span style="color:#008080; background:#FFFFFF">\forallx ( Hx \to Mx ) \land \forallx ( Ax \to \neg \existst ( Tt \land \neg Pxt \land ( \forally (Hy \to ( \neg Pyt \to \neg My ) ) ) ) ) \to\forallx (Ax \to Mx)</span>
-Thus we can show a case where P1 & P2 are true and C is false. So the argument is a non sequitur.
+which yields '''invalid'''. This is unlike the [[#NameTheTrait_2.0|NTT2.0]] correction which gives '''valid'''.
-== Failure to engage with formal logic ==
+==The Alternative Interpretation of NTT ==
-[[File:Defense_of_Ignorance.png|thumb| Ask Yourself thinks it's adequate to dismiss criticisms of his argument made in formal logic  ]]
-This is not in any way an attempt to  obscure the reasoning by using a different language. Isaac responded to the youtuber 'non-ethical vegan' (who tried to provide him with a proof that the NTT argument is a non sequitur by using propositional logic) by claiming that 'This is like Chinese to me, please explain in English'. It is not our task to validate or invalidate such proofs, instead  we should recognize the failure of Isaac to accept the validity of the approach. The English language is not suitable to prove or disprove formal arguments. It is however more than enough for informal ones. We already know that FOL (first order logic) is complete and sound, so it is a good candidate for exposing any expressive argument. Failure to translate into FOL will not convince anyone serious about the matter. This also applies for mathematical theorems, most of them are stated in an informal way, but if a peer is not convinced, the job of the mathematician is to dissect the theorem and eventually translate it into FOL. Granted this is not often done (Major theorems would be pages long ...), but in the case of Isaac's NTT argument it is easy to do so.
-= Issues =
+[[File:NTT_animation.webm|thumb| Ask Yourself explains his interpretation of P2 with an animation]]
-== With the argument itself ==
+In the video to the right Ask Yourself explains his interpretation of NTT and why he believes it to be valid. The claim made is that, paraphrasing, ''all objects are constellations of traits'', and that ''if the traits of the two objects are equalized, then the objects become the same object'', and furthermore, ''to resist this is to deny the very first law of logic, which is the law of identity''.
-=== All Humans ===
+The basic idea of this alternative interpretation of NTT seems to be this. The conclusion
-P1 only says humans have moral value (implicitly all humans), not that only some humans do.
-<blockquote>P1 - Humans are of moral value.</blockquote>
+:(C) All sentient non-human animals have moral value
-Human may range from vegetative states to a fertilized egg, and for "conservatives" who believe those have intrinsic value there's common disagreement that violent criminals have moral value (still human).<br>
+follows simply from the premises
-This in itself seems to contradict the notion of a value giving trait other than the arbitrary "human" status.<br>
-If you want value to be based on another trait, your first premise can't make that impossible.<br>
-Isaac has permitted that other premises be substituted in for P1 (such as "I am of moral value") and maintained that the same conclusions can be reached.  This premise is easy enough to correct, although the argument still fails even when limited to personal moral value.
-=== P2 Inconsequential ===
+:(P1) All sentient humans have moral value, and
-P2 says there is no trait of such description:
+:(P2) There is no trait absent in sentient non-human animals which if absent in sentient humans would result in sentient humans not having moral value
-<blockquote>P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless.</blockquote>
+because if a given sentient human were to lose (or never have) any of the traits that distinguish her from any given sentient non-human animal,  she would become (or have been) literally identical to that non-human animal. If she is literally identical to that non-human animal and she retained her moral value in the course of losing (or never having) any of the traits that distinguish her from the non-human animal, then, because P1 says that she has moral value as she actually is, P1 would entail that the non-human animal has moral value. Moreover, P2 says that she would not lose (or fail to have had) her moral value no matter which traits she lost (or never had) which distinguish her from any sentient non-human animal. So P1 and P2 together suffice to ensure that humans have moral value when they become (or in the event that they had been) identical to non-human animals, and thus, that non-human animals have moral value.
-But even if so, there is no ''premise'' that says moral value must be based on such a (implicitly natural) trait at all or that it can not be an arbitrary one (if one chose to name a trait).  Moral value could just be fiat, or the tautological and irreducible non-natural trait "moral value" itself.<br>
+This reasoning seems extremely strange and difficult to follow. One small reason is that one might think that simply losing the traits that distinguish one from a given non-human animal (including originating in a body with human DNA from the gametes of one’s human biological parents) would not make one that non-human animal, since non-human animals have many traits that one does not have (such as originating in a body with bovine DNA from the gametes of her biological bovine parents). But we can charitably understand this line of reasoning as using ‘traits’ extremely broadly to include ‘negative traits’ such as lacking the positive trait of originating form bovine parents, which, when lost, involve one gaining the positive trait of originating from bovine parents. Another small reason is that talk of humans ‘losing’, ‘changing’, or ‘switching’ their traits might suggest an adjustment that takes place in time, but we must be able to think about what would have happened had historical traits (such as originating from human vs. bovine gametes) been different. Charitable interpretation entails that these are not problems for the reasoning as intended, but these are hardly the sorts of things that one wants to have to explain to an interlocutor in the course of trying to convince her of the strength of the moral case for being vegan.
-P2 can be variously ignored or rejected in many ways.
-A perfect logician could accept that P1 humans are of moral value AND P2 that there is no such trait, but ''still'' reject the implicit concluion: that animals are of moral value.
+The real conceptual problem with this line of reasoning concerns how to make sense of its talk about what would happen if individual humans were to lose (or never have had) their [[#Excluding_Essential_Properties|essential properties]], or the properties which they must have in order to count as the self-same individuals. It seems difficult to make sense of scenarios in which humans lose or never had such properties and thus are not or were not themselves, which arguably include the property of originating from human DNA or the gametes of a given set of human parents (and the negative trait of not originating from bovine DNA or the gametes of a given set of bovine parents). But this alternative version of NTT’s P2 requires that we must make sense of such scenarios, since, for the conclusion to follow simply from it and P1, P2 must be talking about humans not losing (or not having not had) their moral value as they lose (or are imagined never to have had) their essential traits, gain (or are imagined to instead have had) the essential traits of given non-human animals, and become (or are imagined to have instead been) those given non-human animals.
-<br>
-As such, the conclusion does not follow from the premises; the argument is a non sequitur, chiefly because P2 fails to do what Isaac thinks it does.<br>
-==== Isaac's first defense ====
+In talking about humans in scenarios in which they are not themselves but are rather non-human animals, we cannot really refer to them as the humans they are. We must instead somehow imagine them as themselves in an alternate scenario but not really themselves. Whether or not this makes any conceptual sense, the idea can be formalized using a philosophical device for talking about what is true of an entity in an alternative scenario by talking about what is true of the "counterpart" of the entity in that scenario.[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/david-lewis/#6.4]. So understood, what the second premise is claiming on the alternative interpretation of NTT is that there is no trait absent in sentient non-human animals but present in sentient humans that, if absent in a counterpart of a sentient human would not result in that counterpart lacking moral value. What is supposed to make this argument valid is that ‘traits’ are being understood broadly to include negative traits, so this entails that for each sentient non-human animal there is a counterpart of a sentient human with all of the same traits as the non-human animal that has moral value.
-Isaac's first defense asserts, in a manner indicating that he doesn't understand literally the first thing about logical arguments (the function of premises), that "arbitrary" can be eliminated as a possibility by (paraphrasing)"feeding it back through the argument" or "trying to plug arbitrary justifications into the argument".
-While this may follow from his tricky usage of [[#Invalid_Generalizing|invalid generalizations]], or simply his misunderstanding of what a [[#Logical_Contradiction_Meaning|"logical contradiction" means]] (he thinks it means a double standard), this defense appears to be a form of circular reference, where he tries to support a failed premise by appealing to another unstated variation on that premise (or another version of the argument in entirety) to provide the support it needs.<br>
-See [[#Circular_References|Circular References Here]] for more explanation of this issue.
+With this we can get an inkling of why Ask Yourself believes that this Alternative version of NTT is valid. Unfortunately, as we have seen it involves reasoning that is difficult to follow, requires charitable clarification, and makes obscure and dubiously coherent reference to humans who lack their essential properties but have the essential properties of other individuals and are identical to these other individuals rather than themselves. It also makes an additional substantive metaphysical assumption, namely that of<br>
-====The Brick Analogy====
+===Bundle Theory===
-(defending against non sequitur criticism)'''<br>
-The "Brick" analogy is one he gives as a defense, attempting to show how the need for his version of consistency is grounded in objective reality and doesn't need to be supported by a premise.<br>
-It goes as follows:<br>[[File:AY_Brick_Analogy.mp4|thumb|Ask Yourself attempts to explain why his argument is not a non sequitur|start=35]]
+The first claim, ''that objects are constellations of traits''  is not built into logic, it is a form of bundle theory which states :
-<blockquote>
-If you're saying that a creature has moral value and you can't distinguish that creature from can't distinguish another creature from that creature in a way that would if true of the first cause you to say it doesn't deserve to have moral value then you're contradicting yourself by actually suggesting that that second creature does not deserve value as well. So if that's too complicated for you to understand you can just do it with physical objects, OK so: I can(n't) lift brick A um there's no difference between or no trait you know present in uh brick B which if true of brick A would make it possible for me to lift brick A so therefore it's contradictory to suggest that I can lift brick B. Well of course that's true. And if there were such a trait if brick B could be lifted then whatever makes it liftable if you map those traits over to brick A then you could lift Brick A too. So this is just a basic formula to discover contradiction.</blockquote>
-. Comparisons with physical reality and contradictions in physics only makes sense because forces like gravity apply the same universally, something you cannot just assume for morality or moral standards.  If forces like gravity could be regarded as subjective, the whole brick lifting issue would become much more complicated.  By making these physical analogies Isaac is committing the argument to hidden meta-ethical premises of some form of naturalistic moral realism (a good position to commit to, but it must be stated in the premises to make the argument valid).<br>
+: ''Substances are in fact no more than bundles of properties conceived of as universals.''[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#BunTheVerSubThiPar]
-. Also, it's trivial to name the trait in the brick too if you don't require it to be a natural "mind-independent" one, for example:<br><br>
+This is a substantive metaphysical premise that needs to be stated if it's to be used as part of an argument. It's worth noting that the identity of indiscernibles would follow from such a premise, as correctly identified by Ask Yourself. This is one of the reasons why many philosophers have raised objections to such a premise.
-"I'm unable to lift that brick because I don't want to. I'm unable to lift things I don't want to lift because I lack the motivation and motivation is necessary for lifting things. '''The trait is that I want/don't want to lift it.'''"<br><br>
-In essence, arbitrary whim is just as adequate an explanation  to differentiate Brick A and B as any UNLESS as explained above you make certain meta-ethical commitments against arbitrary answers and establish some form of moral realism and reject any subjective factors (a.k.a. actual moral objectivism, not Isaac's false dichotomy version).  Again, these are good premises to establish and that can create strong arguments, but Isaac has consistently rejected the need for them while presenting analogies to justify that lack in #NameTheTrait that also fail without such premises.
-==== Earlier Informal Versions ====
+===Identity of Indescernibles===
-It's important to note that in an earlier informal version of this argument, Isaac used to premise the argument with a claim like "Either you believe actions must be justified, or you don't", allowing that his argument only applies in the former case: this served as an appropriate premise (given a reasonable definition of justification) grounding morality in that justification and functionally forbidding arbitrary standards. It was a much better argument in the past. The formalized version he later presented discards this essential premise in an ill-conceived attempt to make the argument apply to subjectivists and relativists as well, but breaking the argument in the process; for more on this see [[#Meta-Ethical_Independence|Meta-Ethical Independence Here]].
-It's not clear if the fact that earlier and less formal versions were logically superior is some kind of vindication of Isaac, or actually makes this all the more ridiculous because he supposedly spent time and effort changing these arguments to make them logically invalid.  Is Isaac the vegan youtube version of M. Night Shyamalan, starting out good and then failing more spectacularly with each new undertaking[http://www.yourmoviesucks.org/2013/03/blog-post.html]? And why does that profound and growing failure correlate to his creative freedom and the amount of his own ideas he has integrated into his <s>movies</s> arguments?<br>
+The claim that two objects with the same traits are the same object is a principle similar to the [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/ the identity of indiscernibles], which says: ''if for every property P, object x has P if and only if object y has P, then x is identical to y''. Or in the notation of symbolic logic:  <br>
-Something to think about, but it was important to note that this was not always the case and why.
+: (∀P)(Px ⇔ Py) ⇒ x=y.<br>
-=== Existential Meaning ===
+In the notation we have been using, this could be expressed as <br>
-"Human" and "us/ourselves" in this argument has no clear meaning:
-<blockquote>"P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in '''humans''' would cause '''us''' to deem '''ourselves''' valueless."</blockquote>
+: ∀x ∀y ∀t ( Px,t ⇔ Py,t ) ⇒ x = y) <br>
-Any example of a trait applied to you (like having your consciousness transferred into a biologically non-human body) might just cause us to change our understanding of what human means (anything with a human consciousness) to maintain consistency so that nothing could cause you to stop being human, even "once human always human" (even the trait "Having been human at some point"), thus making "human" an unfalsifiable answer for moral value, or the change may cause us to reject the application of "we" to the new entities (e.g. reduced to the intelligence and capacity of a cow, we may consider what makes us ourselves to be gone and this to be equivalent to death anyway), such that the opponent need take no issue with the loss of moral value making P2 false.<br>
+(for all things x, y, and t, if x has t if and only if y has t, then x and y are the self-same thing.
-Isaac is concerned with the "hard problem" of consciousness, so he probably isn't prepared to tackle this issue.  The easiest way to fix this problem is to avoid references to "us" by defining clearly the behavioral implications of "lacking moral value", or just scratch this confusing wording and substitute in directly the golden rule.  Unfortunately, this runs into the next problem which Isaac is unwilling to address:
+)
-=== Meaning of "moral value" ===
+Or in that case that we are only considering traits, that may or may not refer to all properties, the principle would be expressed as
-"Moral value" has no clear meaning or material implications. This is easy to fix, as noted above: it just needs to be grounded in some meta-ethical premise.<br>
-Unfortunately, Isaac is unwilling to do this (and has even removed grounding from previous informal versions of his argument) seemingly because he believes it is the subjectivity of this provision that makes the argument work for subjectivists.  He thinks it's up to whatever "you" think gives moral value, and you just have to be "logically consistent" with that. And if he actually abided by that, his argument would have no normative persuasive power at all.<br>In practice, it's this ambiguity in the argument he uses to manipulate his opponents, supplanting his own unique definition of consistency/contradiction to relate to ''double standards'' in imposing your will upon others in ways you wouldn't want to be imposed on. Instead of being honest enough to just put that in the argument as a premise (as recommended above) he changes the rules of logic itself and the very definition of "logical contradiction" to suit his agenda.
+: ∀x ∀y ∀t ( Tt ∧ ( Px,t ⇔ Py,t ) ) ⇒ x = y)
-Obviously, in philosophy a "logical contradiction" is not the same thing as a double standard. See [[#Logical_Contradiction_Meaning|Logical Contradiction Meaning]] for more info on this.
+i.e. for all things x, y, and t, if t is a trait, and x has t if and only if y has t, then x and y are the self-same thing.
+The identity of indiscernibles is not simply a fact about the logical form of propositions or their components - it is instead a metaphysical thesis about the conditions under which entities are identical. Thus, an argument the conclusion of which follows only from its premises ''together with'' the identity of identity of indiscernibles in virtue of their logical form is not logically valid. To be logically valid, such an argument must include the statement of the identity of indiscernibles among its premises. In contrast, the law of identity, understood simply as 'x is identical to x for each x' or ∀x (x = x), is a fact about the logical form of the identity relation (so it does not need to be stated among the premises of an argument that involves propositions that employ the identity relation).
-=== All/Some Animals ===
+===Alternative Version in FOL===
-Given the qualifier "All" for animals (there is no trait absent in all animals which if absent in humans) P2 is trivially true, because humans are by definition included in the group "all animals".
-Given the qualifier "some", P2 is clearly false when non-sentient animals are included (assuming the premise about human value were corrected).  Animals range from sponges to humans, and do not broadly share any trait beyond phylogeny (like with "humans" as a blind category).<br>
-Isaac means the argument to prove moral value for all animals that lack moral value giving traits, but the argument does not do this. If he wanted to do this, the argument should be formed very differently.<br>
+With the addition of the identity of indiscernibles we can present a logically valid alternative version of NTT, as shown below:
-This specific problem in the argument could also be corrected by specifying it should be applied to individual animals, or those in like groups based on the evaluative trait.<br>
-Like the issue with "human" in P1, this is not a difficult issue, but the lack of rigor here generates ambiguities and contradictions in the argument.  Of course, this may seem like a rather minor issue after point #4, but no fallacy is too small.
-Even correcting for this point, the argument fails as a non sequitur due to the lack of premises to support P2 and other issues as explained at length under other points.
-=== Part 2 Same Problems ===
+: (P1) ∀x ( Hx ⇒ Mx )<br>
-The second part of the argument fails in the same ways the first part does, in addition to:
+: (P2) ∀x ( Ax ⇒ ( ∃y ( CPy ∧ My ∧ ∀t ( Tt ⇒ ( Px,t ⇔ Py,t ) ) ) ) )<br>
+: (P3) ∀x ∀y ∀t ( ( Tt ∧ ( Px,t ⇔ Py,t ) ) ⇒ x = y) <br>
+: Therefore (C) ∀x ( Ax ⇒ Mx )<br>
-=== Value Spectrum ===
+'''In English'''
-The first part of the argument, if corrected, might establish animals have some value, but does not establish equal value in part one.
-Part two then attempts to take that spectrum of value and convert it into an absolute: non-exploitation.
-It should convert a spectrum of value into a spectrum of acceptable exploitation, from no value = total exploitation fine to fully functioning human level value = no exploitation acceptable.
-Logically, animals like cows would lie somewhere in between where some exploitation would be acceptable, while their interests would also have to be considered somewhat to limit that exploitation (i.e. animal welfare, which already exists and does not necessarily conclude in veganism).
-=== Pt2 P2 Empirically False ===
+(P1) sentient humans are of moral value<br>
-P2 in the second part is also just outright empirically false for the vast majority of people in two ways, and in addition causes issues in debates due to perceived hypocrisy, depending on how you look at "[[exploitation]]":
+(P2) for all sentient nonhuman animals there exists a counterpart to a sentient human that has moral value and has all the same traits as a sentient nonhuman animal <br>
+(P3) All things with the same traits are the same thing. <br>
+Therefore (C) Animals are of moral value <br>
-<blockquote>The action or fact of treating someone unfairly in order to benefit from their work.
+Here we have introduced the notion of a counterpart to a human, to mean a being that can take on all the traits of a non-human animal, and can become a sentient non-human animal.
--Oxford English Dictionary[https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/exploitation]</blockquote>
-The distinction hinges on "[[fairness]]"; in a general universal sense of denying the fairness of bad luck or ensuring the arrangement is legitimately in the interest of all of those being used, or based merely on the rules laid out in law by society?
+===This Alternative Version of NTT Begs the Question===
-====A. In the general sense====
+With the addition of the identity of indiscernibles as P3, this alternative version of NTT becomes logically valid. However, the validity of this version of the argument comes at a very high price. The "counterparts" to sentient humans spoken of P2 are allowed to lack the [[#Excluding Essential Properties| essential properties]] of humans - like originating from human gametes - and to have the essential properties of non-human animals - like originating from bovine gametes. Hence, these "counterparts" need not be human, or us, at all. The only requirement of these entities is that they (i) have moral value, and (ii) have all and only the properties of sentient non-human animals. So in asserting that, for each sentient non-human animal, there is a "counterpart" that has moral value and has all and only the properties of the non-human animal, P2 is essentially just asserting that sentient beings with the properties of non-human animals have moral value. In doing so P2 assumes the substance of what the argument is supposed to prove, namely that sentient beings like non-human animals have moral value, thus rendering the argument question-begging.
-''Nothing'' short of non-exploitation is considered adequate? Incorrect.<br>
-<blockquote>P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to '''consider anything short of non-exploitation to be an adequate''' expression of respect for human moral value.</blockquote>
+To see how unconvincing this version of NTT really is, note that P1, about human moral value, really plays no role at all in deriving the conclusion of this version of NTT. The conclusion follows from simply P2, which asserts that for each sentient non-human animal, there is a being that has moral value and has all and only the same traits as the non-human animal, and P3, which entails that if the being with moral value has all and only the same traits as the non-human animal, then the being is identical to the non-human animal. But clearly, the argument that:
-The absolutist language is a serious problem here, but it's also the only thing that ties in strict veganism without taking the care to present any empirical argument.<br>
+:(P2) For each non-human animal, there is an entity with all and only the same traits that has moral value
-Only a minority of people (largely Marxists) oppose ''any'' measure of human exploitation in principle, and people (even most Marxists) certainly don't show agreement in actual practice - we literally consider it an adequate (not ideal, even if just tolerable for some) compromise every day we ''accept'' it and function in society rather than abstaining in protest.
+:(P3) If two entities have all and only the same traits, then they are the self-same entity
+:Therefore, (C) All non-human animals have moral value
-If you want to dilute the definition of "inadequate" to include some far-off goal of changing it without any meaningful abstention in the present, then most meat-eaters are already vegan by the same standard that armchair Marxists are already political revolutionaries despite eating meat and working an ordinary 9-5 respectively.
+is not a very compelling argument for the moral value of non-human animals at all. Anyone not inclined to accept the conclusion will have no more inclination at all to accept P2. Moreover, the structure of this version of the argument offers no guidance as to how to convince someone not inclined to accept the conclusion of the truth of the argument's premises, since it seems just as difficult to convince someone of the truth of P2 as to convince them of the truth of C directly.
-Is that the standard we're after?<br>
+=== Excluding Essential Properties===
-Is all you have to do to be vegan is find animal agriculture troubling in some abstract way, imagine some day it will all be different, and post a couple things on Facebook about it?
-If not, obviously P2 fails by virtually any trait, because we already DO consider something "short of non-exploitation to be [...] adequate".
+Based on the written version, P2 seems clearly to speak of traits that '''do not''' include '''essential properties''' and include only '''accidental properties'''. The distinction is that
-You could argue that it's more practical to go vegan than to abstain from capitalism, but some rare people can and DO make efforts to do the latter so it's obviously not impossible to work at it.
+: An '''essential property''' of an object is a property that it '''must have''' [in order to count as the same object], while an '''accidental property''' of an object is one that it '''happens to have but that it could lack''' [and still count as the same object]. [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/essential-accidental]
-However, this argument is not about practicality at all: it's about extremes.  It's about non-exploitation, not ''limited'' exploitation to the extent we find acceptable because it benefits society as a whole (like regulated capitalism, for those of us non-Marxists) -- that would come back to the welfare issue and lead into an empirical argument about whether the exploitation of animals is justified by the overall benefit to society (I don't think it is, but nothing in the #NameTheTrait argument presents that and Isaac doesn't even think it's a valid question to ask).
-It's not clear if Isaac (a vehement "anti-SJW") would be personally willing to bite the bullet on that one and accept Marxism and radical Social Justice as co-implications of making this premise work, and admit that they are equally necessary along side veganism.<br>Given how often he has spoken against hitching veganism to social justice, it seems unlikely he would switch sides on that one and take the intersectional approach just to defend this formulation of #NameTheTrait.
+If the traits spoken of in P2 include only accidental properties, we are envisioning humans like oneself losing accidental properties that one has and non-human animals lack (like abstract reasoning ability, moral agency, etc.) and still retaining one’s status as oneself. The original written version of NTT seems to require this interpretation, since it says
-Either way, even if all of the other problems in this argument were fixed or ignored, the inclusion of this premise inherently excludes all but Socialist Social Justice advocates.  And given Isaac's primary audience and outreach is to "anti-SJWs", it's a fatal flaw in the argument's utility.
+: "''there are no traits absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause '''us''' to deem '''ourselves''' valueless'',"
+so the entities losing the traits are clearly supposed still to be '''us''' after losing them.
-====B. In the narrow sense====
+This interpretation of P2 as speaking only of accidental traits is not question begging. But it is is clearly invalid, as one could hold the view that we might call
-'''(The narrow sense of playing by the rules of society)'''
-Some of these rules ''are'' absolute and we do not accept violations of them, but they are based on social contract, NOT on expression of human moral value.
+:'''Value Narcissism''': one’s essential properties (or the essential properties of being human) are what give one moral value – or are such that, if one lost them, one would lose moral value.<br>
-For example: According to social rules, it's wrong to steal a million dollars from a billionaire who hoards or wastes it (which would be an "exploitation" the billionaire didn't consent to) in order to save the lives of hundreds of people.<br>
+A value narcissist could hold that although humans like oneself (or just oneself) have moral value, and one would retain this value if one lost the accidental properties that one has and sentient non-humans lack, non-human animals still lack moral value. They could thus accept P1 and P2 but reject C.<br>
-It's even wrong to harvest the organs of a dead person who no longer needs them to save a dozen lives unless the person consented to be an organ donor.<br>
-It's also perfectly acceptable to target people you know are not financially responsible to offer them credit cards, and then garnish their wages to milk them indefinitely for the minimum payment on that TV they didn't need.<br>
-All in the rules of the game.
-Exploitation only occurs in this sense when a contract is violated or laws are broken.<br>
+Some individuals faced with arguments for veganism like NTT may well be tempted to embrace something like value narcissism. For instance, in Ask Yourself's debates / discussions with the Warskis, Friend Ed, and Patty Politics, Ask Yourself's conversants seemed tempted to the view that being human (i.e. possessing the essential properties of a human) is necessary to have moral value - at least independent of other considerations like membership in a human community (the trait named by FriendEd). It is certainly true that Ask Yourself argued substantively against this view, although in doing so he unfortunately seemed to make [[#Invalid Generalizations|invalid generalizations]] about the ways in which species membership might matter morally. But it seems quite possible that addition confusion in debates may stem from the fact that, on the natural interpretation of P2 as restricted to accidental traits, the argument simply invalidly overlooks the option of value narcissism, and makes it unclear how a substantive attack on the plausibility of value narcissism is needed for the argument to establish its conclusion.<br>
-Rules of legal justice are not there because they are morally right in every instance, but because of the social utility; because we, as members of the social contract, value our own consent and property rights over total harm.  They're ultimately self interested.
-These bounds are not there because people don't want to be unduly exploited, e.g. contract law, no human trafficking, etc.<br>
+=Related Problems=
-Isaac would argue that if you don't want to be bought and sold (by somebody from another culture where you're in the out-group, or an alien), that creates a contradiction if you would permit others to be (based on #NameTheTrait) unless there's a trait that separates you and the others that if true of you would make you OK with being bought and sold.<br>
+==False Claims==
-Again, #NameTheTrait is not a valid argument.  It doesn't contain premises that forbid arbitrary distinctions, and it doesn't contain premises that necessitate naming traits (it only meaninglessly claims there isn't one). Appealing to another iteration of a broken argument in order to fix holes in the same broken argument doesn't work. Just saying there isn't a trait is fundamentally different from claiming moral value must be justified by such a trait, and different again from claiming that behavior like this which isn't even linked to moral value must be justified by one regardless of moral value.<br>
-If an alien bought and sold you, then of course that would be against your social rules which are engaged in to protect humans, and human society would fight the aliens because humanity is self interested.  Not wrong, just against the rules of human society.
+[[File:False_Claim.png|thumb|Ask Yourself proposes "veganism follows logically from universal human rights"]]
-The alien society and the human society might, by treaty, come to terms where they agree not to buy and sell each other, and by this means the social contracts would be unified and it would become a violation of the rule (exploitation) to use an alien like that.
-The idea that two distinct social contracts (not morality) could be at odds with each other when they serve different populations is not a contradiction.
-While there are some vegans involved in an intersectional vegan form of social justice who would disagree (And I would be surprised to learn that after all of his criticism of "SJW"s Isaac is one), the fact of people buying and selling cows does not seem in any readily apparent way to increase the chances of ''you'' being bought and sold. Empirically, justice does not seem to be an every sentient being or none game, and at least most people don't think it is one.<br>
+Proponents of NTT such as Ask Yourself claim that "''veganism follows logically from universal (sentient) human rights''" or that "''(sentient nonhuman) animal rights follow logically from (sentient) human rights''", which is false. For such a claim to be true human rights must logically entail animal rights, meaning the following must be true;
-This would make the second part of P2 irrelevant:
+: (P1) Sentient humans deserve rights <br>
-<blockquote>P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to consider anything short of non-exploitation '''to be an adequate expression of respect for human moral value'''.</blockquote>
+: Therefore (C) Sentient nonhuman animals deserve rights. <br>
-And it would either mean that animal agriculture is not exploitative because it is permitted by the arbitrary rules of society with certain limits on welfare (just as slavery would not have been exploitation before abolition; it was your bad luck to be born a cow or a slave), or outside of legal bounds it would mean "exploitation" of animals is meaningless because they have no status in the game by which to evaluate whether they are or are not being exploited according to the narrow definition of social contract.
+Or in the notation we have been using.
-Either way (ignoring the fact that the whole argument is a non sequitur), if the trait being asked for is meant to justify why forms of exploitation that would not be acceptable for humans are acceptable for animals in the general sense or why the same actions ARE exploitation for humans and not for animals, the social understanding would provide just such a trait P2 claims doesn't exist: Societal Membership Status.
+:∀x ( Hx ⇒ Rx ) ⊢ ∀x (Ax ⇒ Rx)
-This is not a basis for morality or moral value at, but it is the basis of societal rules and if that's what you're basing actions on then none of this is even a double standard.
+where ⊢ denotes ''logically entails'' and R(x) denotes x deserves rights.
---
+Which is clearly invalid, since the following statements are not contradictory.
-This is obviously not an issue with the validity of the argument (a false premise doesn't mean the logic is wrong), but it is a serious issue with the soundness. Also, when a premise is this obviously incorrect for the vast majority who don't hold absolute views it creates problems for the perception of the argument (you might as well include a premise about the Earth being flat).<br>
+: (i) Sentient humans deserve rights
-If Isaac were willing to embrace intersectional social justice, he might actually get pretty far with this argument within that limited circle, but it's counterproductive for the internet and society at large where people don't generally agree with the politics.
+: (ii) Sentient nonhuman animals do not deserve rights
-But even if we restricted the argument to social justice advocates who will be most inclined to agree on those points of justice, and even if we added in the necessary premises to make this P2 and the P2 from the first argument function, and fixed all of the other problems, you're still left with the fact mentioned above of the gradient of moral value.  The only "fixing" of this argument to avoid that is to either normalize moral value by somehow asserting all beings of moral consideration have the ''same'' moral value, or by ignoring it completely and normalizing outcome despite drastic differences in moral value (which obviously makes the spectrum of "moral value" irrelevant).<br>
+It's possible this is an ill-thought-out claim, not meant in a strict logical sense, used to promote the idea that veganism follows from logical consistency and a personal belief in human moral value. However such claims are likely to be taken in the strict logical sense, in which case, they are false and reflect poorly on veganism as a whole, particularly in the long-term.
-Neither of those outcomes are desirable unless you're trying to create an army of fundamentalists who consider exploitation or murder of an insect as severe an infraction as that for a human being because they both have an interests.
-====C. Issues in debates====
+==Invalid Generalizations==
-Hypocrisy does not mean somebody's point is wrong, but it does in practice makes people unlikely to consider the advice or condemnation of an apparent hypocrite due to the seeming dishonesty and lack of sincerity suggested by actions at odds with claimed beliefs.
+[[File:AY NTT First Response.png|thumb| Part of [https://twitter.com/askyourself92/status/914994192157478912 Ask Yourself's first response] to [https://philosophicalvegan.com/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=3456| criticisms from Philosophical Vegan] ]]
-[[File:VG_Human_Exploitation.webm|thumb|Vegan Gains defends his use of supposedly exploitative products]]
+[[File:AY_Invalid_Generalization.webm|thumb| Ask Yourself makes an invalid generalisation regarding the trait 'my group' given by FriendEd.]]
-These issues have actually been problematic for Richard (Vegan Gains) in debates, who has professed to agree with NTT. When posed with questions such as 'Was exploitation involved in the production of your phone, if yes, why do you not boycott such products?', his answer usually takes the form; yes exploitation was involved, but I need them for my activism, income and youtube videos, and is not immoral for me to do so. All of these are good reasons, however it shows that he does not consider the absolute of 'nothing short of non-exploitation' to be an adequate expression for human moral value, as pragmatic considerations take precedence. And if pragmatic considerations take precedence, then it's an empirical cost-benefit analysis, and not an absolutist argument like this that is useful.<br>
-An example of this was during the Warski debate, in which, on the subject of technology Richard stated 'you can justify some amount of exploitation in that sort of area of your life'. Isaac was Richard's partner in this debate and it's fair to say that he agreed.
+In defending P2 proponents of NTT often use invalid generalisations that take the form
+''If you reject being discriminated against for a certain reason then you contradict yourself by accepting it for someone else ''
-A similar issue arises when posed with questions such as 'Do you avoid all things produced using animal products, or products that may contain trace animal products e.g. glues etc.?'. Again the answer is no, and it that it is not immoral for me to do so. Which, similarly, means that he does not consider the absolute of 'non-exploitation' to be an adequate expression for animal moral value. <br>
+i.e. the claim is that the following is a contradiction
+# It is wrong to discriminate against me for X reason
+# It is not wrong to discriminate against others for X reason
-It's worth noting the definition of veganism used by most vegans, including Richard, is <br>
+Such claims indicate double standards, not logical contradictions. For such statements to produce a logical contradiction, one statement would have do be the direct negation of the other (i.e. p ∧ ¬p). An example of this was during a series of debates with FriendEd, in which Ask Yourself claims the that FriendEd is contradicting himself by holding the following three statements.
-'A philosophy and way of living which seeks to exclude—'''as far as is possible and practicable'''—all forms of exploitation of, and cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any other purpose; and by extension, promotes the development and use of animal-free alternatives for the benefit of humans, animals and the environment. In dietary terms it denotes the practice of dispensing with all products derived wholly or partly from animals.'<br>
+# It is wrong to kill humans because they are part of my group
+# It is not wrong to kill animals because they are not part of my group
+# It is wrong for someone to murder me because I am not part of their group
-which is not absolutist in nature. <br>
+His reasoning is that by rejecting (3) you reject the justification ''group membership justifies killing/murder'', in all cases, and as such you cannot deploy it in (1). This is incorrect, by rejecting (3), you only reject the statement
-Fans of Isaac may think you can resolve such issues using the golden-rule, by answering 'yes' to the question 'would you accept the exploitation if you were the victim in these cases?'. There are two issues with this:
+* It is wrong for someone to murder me because I am not part of their group''
-I. This would not be relevant, as the argument as framed requires the absolute of non-exploitation.  The argument could be rewritten (and Isaac seems to think other variations can be substituted on the fly in discussion) to separate various categories of exploitation (for food, for other products, etc.), but even if so:
+which does not logically entail rejecting the statement
-II. It seems at least very unlikely that people would be willing to be killed to make glue to bind books, etc. When in practice Isaac demands this kind of assent to validate any action, it fails because nothing is likely to justify requiring our deaths short of some dramatic heroic sacrifice (some people ''might'' be willing to die to cure cancer, although it seems unlikely that a cow would be concerned with this and be willing to make that noble sacrifice).<br>
+* group membership justifies killing/murder
-Isaac or Richard can try to make the distinction between products (for which the animal was actually killed) and byproducts (for which the animal was not killed), and claim the latter is not exploitation because the animal has already been killed and a corpse can not care.  Again, there are two issues with this:<br>
-. It would mean that once the primary product was identified (e.g. beef), all other products would be vegan, from gelatin to leather to brain, organ meats, bone broth, etc. Possibly even quite a few processed meats, all of which are to various degrees byproducts.<br>
-. The product-byproduct distinction is actually a spectrum, not a dichotomy.  All products that are sold contribute to the profit motive to raise and kill the animal; they are all reasons to do so, and use of byproducts subsidizes the primary products to make them cheaper and push them into the market just as consumption of primary products subsidize the byproducts. There's no fundamental, categorical difference between use of glue as a binder and eating a steak; they're differences of degree of exploitation.<br>
-Given these considerations, it's clear that Isaac's answers don't resolve the absolutism demanded by this argument.  In accordance with this, ''everybody'' would be engaged in "logical contradiction" (if the argument were valid).
+in all cases. Someone can reject the justification in one context (e.g. when applied to themselves) and deploy it in another context (e.g. when applied to animals), without contradicting themselves.
-And because logical contradiction itself is not a spectrum (see principle of explosion), either you're logically consistent or you have a contradiction, and that makes everybody equal with respect to the only normative compulsion of this argument (for those who want to avoid "contradiction"), from the most obsessive of personal purity vegans to the most ravenous carnist.  If there is no distinction between the two, the argument has no normative force at all, and it has no utility to anybody (even if we fixed all of the other problems).
-== In practice, and with the defense of the argument ==
+(1) & (2) would only create a contradiction if combined with either of the following two statements
-Most of these issues have been covered in brief above, but since they're tucked into the discussion of Isaacs claims about the problems (which are very limited to a few brief assertions, and otherwise must be derived implicitly from his arguments in practice) this section will outline them openly and in more detail
-=== Circular References ===
+* It is not wrong to kill humans because they are part of my group
-(Or infinite regress)
+* It is wrong to kill animals because they are not part of my group
-[[File:AY_NTT_Mods.webm|thumb|Ask Yourself attempts to explain why his argument does not require improvements or modifications|start=0]][[file:Circular2.png|thumb|Of course not all Christians use circular arguments like this, but it's common enough to make a useful analogy to Isaac's reasoning]]
-NameTheTrait is a non-sequitur as stated, but rather than correct the argument Isaac has employed some very bad arguments supporting it which only commit him more strongly to a varied assortment of fallacies.<br>
-None are more transparent or easy for the layman to grasp than his seeming circular references.<br>
-In short, Isaac claims you don't need any additional premises to require justification at all, much less to require justification by a non-arbitrary trait for P2, because P2 creates those premises:
+In the notation of FOL the generalization being made takes the form
-<blockquote>P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless.</blockquote>
+: ∀x ( Hx ⇒ ¬ Kx ) ⊢ ∀x ( ¬Kx )
-And according to him, this is because you can take something like "arbitrary value" or "fiat" and just (paraphrasing)"feed it through the argument" to show a contradiction.  "You wouldn't accept arbitrary so you can't use arbitrary" (something he only allows if you would [[#Dissonant_Actions|"accept" it]])<br>
+where:<br>
-In this way, by referring to an alternative version of the failed premise itself, this is comparable to the common theological circular reference to prove god from scripture and scripture from god, e.g. justifying the existence of God by referring to the Bible, and giving the Bible authority because it's God's word as demonstrated by the Bible. (#NotAllChristians, of course)<br>
+H(x) means x is human <br>
-A more precise analogy that indicates more clearly the absurdity of the #NameTheTrait claim is this one:<br>
+K(x) means ok to kill x based on X justification <br>
+⊢ means logically entails <br>
-{| class="wikitable"
+That is to say, for all x, if x is human then it is not okay to kill x based on some justification, entails for all x it is not okay to kill x based on the same justification. Which is incorrect, the statement cannot be generalized because it has been constrained to only apply to humans.
-|+#NameTheTrait vs. #NameTheVerse*
-|-
-|Argument:
-|#NameTheTrait
-|#NameTheVerse
-|-
-|Formula:
-|P1 - Humans are of moral value<br>
-P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless<br>
-C - Therefore without establishing the absence of such a trait in animals, we contradict ourselves by deeming animals valueless<br>
-|P1 - Humans are of moral value<br>
-P2 - There is no verse absent in the Bible needed to deem God's exclusive right to dictate infallible moral law<br>
-C - Therefore without establishing the absence of such a verse in the Bible, we contradict ourselves by deeming Christianity untrue.<br>
-|-
-|Missing Premises:
-|P3 - Such a trait can not be arbitrary<br>
-P4 - Moral value must be justified by such a trait.
-|P3 - A moral-giving God actually exists<br>
-P4 - The Bible is the infallible word of said God
-|-
-|Response:
-|No you f*cking retard, just feed it back trough the argument.
-There's no trait absent in animals that would let you use arbitrary to devalue them that if absent in humans would make you accept arbitrary devaluation.
-It's so obvious you idiot.
-|You're mistaken beloved friend, just feed it back through the argument.
-There's no verse absent in the Bible that would be needed to prove it deems God's moral giving nature, existence, and infallible word as the Bible.
-Please join us in prayer.
-|}
-*Note that no Christians actually use a #NameTheVerse argument, this level of transparently bad logic is not to be found among even the worst apologists.
-If Isaac was trying to write P2 in a way that made it recursive and generalized the rule by removing it from subjective context, he failed at doing so.  This is NOT how the premise is written, and it obviously does not achieve this if you plug in arbitrary traits provided they are worded clearly; it's still a non-sequitur, and doesn't provide an out to arbitrary answers to the claim there's no trait allowing arbitrary (a potential infinite regress).<br>
+=Problems with Part 2 of NTT=
-It's also important to note that IF the premise actually were written like this, it would be a lot easier for people to disagree with directly. As it is, like in the theist example, P2 is relatively non-controversial for most people because it's merely a fact statement (for example, about what is written in the Bible, or about animal physiology).
+==Commitment to Non-exploitation==
-The issue with the theological version is probably more obvious: in order to be true, a claim about the Bible being true or saying anything with absolute credibility (like that god wrote it) must be ''premised'' by an assumption that such a God exists and actually wrote the bible in the first place (and didn't lie, and knew what he was talking about, etc.).  Without that premise to start with, the argument fails and can not substantiate itself (i.e. by referring back to the existing unfounded assertion that the Bible is true).<br>
+[[File:VG_Human_Exploitation.webm|thumb|Vegan Gains defends his use of supposedly exploitative products]]
-With #NameTheTrait, likewise, in order to function in the first place P2 must be premised by certain claims that we need to justify moral claims at all (to stop it from being a non sequitur) and further that they should be justified by non-arbitrary traits (to make dismissal non-trivial).<br>
+Part 2 of the NTT argument requires a deontological commitment to non-exploitation as P2 states:
-If such premises were included (as in the corrected versions), the argument would not need to be self-referential for support, and without them it can't provide that support to itself because this golden rule/anti-double standard aspect Isaac claims never manifests. As it stands, the argument only makes the assertion that you ''wouldn't'' consider yourself valueless if you lacked a trait lacking in animals, which is not relevant. This may create a double standard, but a double standard in itself is not a logical contradiction, and nothing in the argument establishes the meta-ethical relevance of that (such as by making assertions of fairness or justice in morality). To equate a double standard to "logical contradiction" is an extreme misunderstanding of the meaning of logical contradiction [[#Logical_Contradiction_Meaning|explained here.]]<br>
-Isaac Claims that is it not the specific arbitrary claim that must be compatible with P2, but a generalized form, as such this fallacy could be partially explained by his [[#Invalid_Generalizing|invalid generalizing]], but this does not seem to be the whole of the story because these self-referential claims go beyond that to dismiss the need for the supporting premises necessary to make P2 function at all (although this could in part be explained by his radical misunderstanding of the [[#Logical_Contradiction_Meaning|Meaning of "logical contradiction"]]).
+: P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to '''consider anything short of non-exploitation to be an adequate expression of respect for human moral value'''.
-Given the sum of his other fallacies, his dismissal of criticism with apparent circular references may seem superfluous, but it's a good example of the standards of argument he employs.
+That is to say, to agree with P2 is to agree that exploitation of humans is always wrong. This is not an issue with the validity of the argument, but an issue with the soundness, as most people will be unwilling to agree with the premise, including Ask Yourself and Vegan Gains.
-=== Meta-Ethical Independence ===
+These issues have actually been problematic for Vegan Gains in debates (who has claimed to agree with NTT), when posed with questions such as
-Isaac claims this argument works in any meta-ethical system (subjectivist, objectivist, whatever), because it's just a "consistency test".<br>
-If true, that would make it the best argument to ever be created for anything in philosophy, let alone veganism.  As is often the case, if something seems too good to be true it probably is.<br>
-Unfortunately this desire for a one-size-fits-all argument has led him to an argument that fails in so many ways it achieves a state of fractal wrongness -- outlined in [[#Issues|issues]].  The attempt to dispense with meta-ethical dependence found in other normative arguments in order to create the ''best'' argument ever has instead resulted (perhaps ironically) in the worst argument ever, and his rejection of corrections and insistence in his argument's rightness also seems to be a consequence of that monomaniacal focus on meta-ethical independence.<br>
-However, calling something independent doesn't make it so.  The way he uses this argument and the way it's *supposed to* work (despite its non sequitur and other fallacies) demonstrates a series of hidden premises.  And while some of these hidden premises Isaac agrees with -- even claiming a few are just definitions -- he doesn't realize the meta-ethical implications of these hidden premises, and how they contradict his own claimed positions.<br>
+: "''Was exploitation involved in the production of your phone, if yes, why do you not boycott such products?''",
-For his part, on a personal level Isaac He claims to be a moral [[subjectivist]] (specifically an "ontological subjectivist, and an epistemological objectivist"), his definition of these terms is colloquial and incorrect in the context of philosophy because it generates contradictions and false dichotomies of its own (see [[objective-subjective distinction]]), but where it really stands out as a problem is its conflict with the meta-ethics necessitated by #NameTheTrait (if it is to function in any capacity the way he believes it does), and more specifically a conflict with his own [[#Personal_Contradictions|deontological views]] as presumably derived from #NameTheTrait as his Categorical Imperative (deontological views which are ontologically [[objective]]).
+his answer usually takes the form;
-Brief outline of necessary meta-ethical assumptions:<br>
+:''yes exploitation was involved, but I need them for my activism, income and youtube videos, and is not immoral for me to do so''.
-#Rejection of moral relativism by denying arbitrary traits. Obviously P2 needs another premise to function, although Isaac believes some kind of [[#Circular_References|circular reference]] is adequate instead.
-#Assertion of moral realism through a Categorical Imperative (or minimally the application of the Golden Rule). This may be functionally because he believes a double standard is a [[#Logical_Contradiction_Meaning|"logical contradiction"]]
-#Assertion of naturalistic moral objectivism through behavioral demands as a result of valueless status. In practice, this may be due to his denial of valid [[#Dissonant_Actions|dissonant actions]], but can also be derived from his [[#The_Brick_Analogy|brick analogy]].
-#Assertion of deontological moral evaluation due to [[#Pt2_P2_Empirically_False|assertions of P2]] in the second part of the argument.
-Beyond his actions and claims which clearly indicate these positions, the mere fact that Isaac believes that it is ''possible'' to construct any kind of persuasive and logically valid normative argument outside a specified meta-ethical system should be demonstration enough.
+All of these are good reasons, however it shows that he does not consider the absolute of ''nothing short of non-exploitation'' to be an adequate expression for human moral value, as pragmatic considerations take precedence. And if pragmatic considerations take precedence, then it's an empirical cost-benefit analysis, and not an absolutist argument like this that is useful.<br>
-=== Logical Contradiction Meaning ===
+An example of this was during the Warski debate, in which, on the subject of technology Vegan Gains stated
-Isaac seems to believe "logical contradiction" means the same thing as a double standard. His followers have claimed this more explicitly, and he regularly uses this example to dispute claims like "human" as the source of moral value (paraphrasing):<br>
-"What if aliens came to Earth to eat Humans because they aren't aliens, would that be OK? Would you give in and let them eat you, or resist them? If you would resist, you're contradicting yourself."<br>
-Claims like these indicate double standards, but they do not indicate contradictions:
+: "''you can justify some amount of exploitation in that sort of area of your life''"
-: It is wrong to kill a human<br>
+Ask Yourself was Vegan Gains's partner in this debate and it's fair to say that he agreed. A similar issue arises when posed with questions such as "''Do you avoid all things produced using animal products, or products that may contain trace animal products e.g. glues etc.?''". Again the answer is no, and it that it is not immoral for me to do so. Which, similarly, means that he does not consider the absolute of 'non-exploitation' to be an adequate expression for animal moral value. <br>
-: It is not wrong to kill an animal<br>
-: It is wrong for an alien to kill a human<br>
-Doing something to others based an an arbitrary reason (like your species) and opposing others doing that based on a similar reason is a double standard, but it is not a logical contradiction.  A logical contradiction requires a direct negation.  For example, any of these claims would create a contradiction with the set above:
+It's worth noting the definition of veganism used by most vegans, including Vegan Gains, is <br>
-. It is right to kill a human<br>
+: 'A philosophy and way of living which seeks to exclude—'''as far as is possible and practicable'''—all forms of exploitation of, and cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any other purpose; and by extension, promotes the development and use of animal-free alternatives for the benefit of humans, animals and the environment. In dietary terms it denotes the practice of dispensing with all products derived wholly or partly from animals.'<br>
-. It is wrong to kill an animal<br>
-. It is right for an alien to kill a human<br>
+which is not absolutist in nature. <br>
-An arbitrary moral assertion without objective substantiation can easily promote double standards because most people don't like being treated like that, and while it is without substantiation it is not a ''logical contradiction''; you can even arbitrarily assert a moral system AND further assert that it's the only true moral system and all others are false.  Is this unreasonable? Yes.  But is it a logical contradiction? No.
+Fans of Ask Yourself may think you can resolve such issues using the golden-rule, by answering ''yes'' to the question "''would you accept the exploitation if you were the victim in these cases?''". However this would not be relevant, as the argument as framed requires the absolute of non-exploitation.
-<br>To put this in context of the alien example Isaac likes to use: "If aliens came to the Earth and killed you based on their arbitrary morality, would you be OK with that?" the response it simple, "No, because they are wrong and I am right.  My arbitrary morality is absolute true universal law, and theirs' is false."<br>
-Ridiculous? Yes! A logical contradiction? No.
-Isaac either does not understand the definition of a logical contradiction, or he chooses to ignore the actual definition substituting in his folk definition instead. Isaac believes, or claims to believe, that folk definitions of technical vernacular are perfectly fine to use in a philosophical context even if they completely rewrite the rules of logic and argumentation in the process; if that's the case with this substitution, this is not only malpractice, it's transparent intellectual dishonesty; a pseudo-philosophy of the worst kind, a conscious twisting of definitions as incredible as the pseudo-scientific machinations of Deepak Chopra. <br>Once you have so flippantly thrown out the fundamental rules and definitions in philosophy and substituted in your own custom "logic" for the real thing, there's just no arguing the case.  Isaac wholly rejects logic and supplants his own creation to justify his fallacious arguments, and intentional or not, the result is deception.
+=Corrections=
+It is possible to correct the NTT argument and preserve its persuasive force by adding a premise that rejects double standards and changing the first premise to require human moral value (or some other moral consideration) to be based on a trait. This makes NTT valid, and allows it to be presented in the same way as it was intended. We can call this [[NameTheTrait 2.0]]. It is also possible to more clearly and directly frame the argument around the core idea that, on reflection, there does not seem to be a good justification for thinking that all sentient humans have an important moral status while sentient non-human animals lack moral status so entirely that it is morally fine to treat them in the ways that consuming animal products treats them. We can call this [[NameTheJustification]].
-What's worse is that beyond holding these incoherent folk definitions, Isaac also commits straw-man fallacies and mischaracterizes his opponent's argument by generalizing claims like "humans" vs. "animals" to "species" to make them appear more in contradiction, but this is not valid:
+In the following 'x has non-trivial moral status' means at least that we are morally required not to treat x in the ways that consuming animal products treats non-human animals - for instance, x is such that we are morally required not to inflict enormous suffering upon and / or kill x for relatively trivial reasons (like taste-pleasure).
-=== Invalid Generalizing ===
+Having such non-trivial moral status could be one way of understanding what it is to have "moral value" or what is minimally required by "an adequate expression of respect for our value" so long as we are sentient. More ambitious arguments could replace 'non-trivial moral status' in what follows by something stronger, such as having the right to the equal consideration of one's interests, etc. But because the argument for veganism requires only that sentient non-human animals have non-trivial moral status, for arguments to be as convincing as possible to as many interlocutors as possible they should, like that below, focus only the grounds for non-trivial moral status. The argument below and its conclusion are entirely consistent with humans having greater moral status than sentient non-human animals, beyond the mere non-trivial moral status that it seeks to show sentient non-human animals to share with humans.
-In practice the way Isaac tricks some people in debates is by taking what they say and twisting the wording just enough to seem to mean the same thing, but slyly generalizing it so as to create the appearance of not being a trait exception.<br>
-For example, by replacing an arbitrary fiat of human value with something about the victim of an offense being of a different species: "Are you OK with being eaten by aliens?" is a common reply.
-Isaac is either ignoring or not understanding that the claim that the value is "humanity" is absolute; the aliens are wrong according to that, the value given is not "is a different species". He tries to generalize the statements like that, by saying "species" instead of specifically "human species", to create the appearance of a contradiction where none existed (because it was only double standard, not a logical contradiction)
+==NameTheTrait 2.0==
-The deformation of arguments committed by Isaac is a form of straw manning.<br>
+For more on this, see [[NameTheTrait 2.0]].
-When an opponent says:<br>
-. It is wrong to kill a human based on species<br>
-. It is right to kill an animal based on species.<br>
-This is a double standard, but it is not a logical contradiction. Isaac follows this by asserting something like: "You contradict yourself by saying it is not ok to kill Y based on X and then deploy it as ok to kill Y based on X", and he is making a generalization of the argument that is nowhere to be justified. It is not allowed to have a deduction rule of the type:<br>
-∀x: H(x) -> ¬K(x) ⊢ ∀x: ¬K(x)<br>
+'''(P1)''' Humans have non-trivial moral status just in case and because they have a certain trait.
-∀ : for all <br>
+: ''Where "a certain trait" is interpreted broadly so as to include sets of more particular traits, some of which may be sufficient but not necessary for non-trivial moral status.''
-H(x) : x is human <br>
-¬ : not <br>
-K(x) : ok to kill x based on <insert any justification here> <br>
-⊢: entails <br>
-That is to say, you cannot have a deduction rule of the type; for all x, if x is human then it is not okay to kill x based on some justification, entails for all x it is not okay to kill x based on the same justification. You can't generalize the argument because it has been constrained to the set of humans. And the follow up argument of " please differentiate human and animal ... " doesn't apply because nowhere in the argument is it said that if you can't differentiate then the treatment should be the same.<br>
+'''(P2)''' If humans have non-trivial moral status just in case and because they have a certain trait, then all beings have non-trivial moral status just in case and because they have that trait.
-It's possible that in doing this Isaac knows what he's doing and is trying to play word games and misrepresent people's answers to trick them, but whether he's doing it accidentally or intentionally the outcome is the same: it's intellectually dishonest, and he continues the practice despite being alerted to these problems.
+(P3) There is no trait absent in non-human animals, which, if absent in a human, would cause the human to fail to have non-trivial moral status.
-=== Dissonant Actions ===
+or equivalently
-In practice, Isaac demands certain responses (on pain of being accused of [[#Logical_Contradiction_Meaning|"logical contradiction"]]) must result from considering oneself to have no moral value.  He demands such specific responses that he thinks permits him to accuse people of contradiction on the basis that they might dare to defend their own lives if (for example) attacked by aliens.<br>
-However, this is not necessarily the only viable outcome from "lacking moral value", and as explained above under [[#Meta-Ethical_Independence|Meta-Ethical Independence]] it has some serious implications.<br>
-In a logical argument, all potentially controversial terms and claims must be properly established by premises, not hidden. Moral value only equates to self defense if you link it to personal value in general by definition, which is begging the question.<br>
-It's possible that Isaac doesn't even understand that people can accept something as ethical but still not do it (as though ethical normative forces were absolute).  This is ALSO not a "logical contradiction"; it means people have multiple values that compete for behavior, and the most ethical option doesn't always win.<br>
+'''(P3)''' Sentient non-human animals have the trait that gives non-trivial moral status to humans.
-Even if we believed aliens were in the right to come to Earth and eat us, that doesn't mean we wouldn't try to save our lives despite that. Even if we believed resisting were morally wrong, resisting would not be a contradiction: it would only indicate what most people will already admit: we are not 100% moral with no regard for self preservation.  Most people will do some otherwise pretty immoral things by their own admission to save their own lives.<br>
-It also doesn't mean we'd be in the wrong to save our own lives. People usually don't claim farmed animals are in the wrong for resisting, so these actions may not even be dissonant at all based on a more complex definition of moral action (one that nothing in the argument's premises rebuts).  This doesn't even require a double standard.<br>
-To make that line of "would you resist the aliens?" reasoning work and accuse contradiction with carnism if people answered in the affirmative, a premise would have to be added to alter the argument, defining "consider ourselves valueless" clearly in behavioral terms as "not try to defend our own interests".  And of course that really narrows down the meta-ethics the argument applies to, and from there is is by no means [[#Meta-Ethical_Independence|meta-ethically independent]].
-=== Personal Contradictions ===
+Therefore
-[[File:The_infamous.png|thumb|Herein Isaac rejects Utilitarianism and by implication consequentialism generally, asserts deontological rights-based moral reasoning]]Isaac's deontological arguments in #NameTheTrait and his recent deontological claims are at odds with his personal claims to believe in a value spectrum.
-He has for some time claimed to believe that animals exist on a spectrum of moral value from the least to the most, which could be plotted on a rising curve relative to sentience (or something like that). He has claimed that the vegans who assert equal value for all animals are irrational and make other vegans look bad. Both of these are sensible claims, and the images he has produced to illustrate these claims are clear and depict a moral system that very much favors rational value-based calculations.
+'''(C)''' Sentient non-human animals have non-trivial moral status
-[[File:Hierarchy2up.png|600px]]
+:''which, given what non-trivial moral status amounts to, entails that we are morally required to go vegan.''
-However, recent comments and the second half of the #NameTheTrait argument indicate a very different perspective on moral evaluation.
+===In First Order Logic===
-The problem people typically have with consequentialism is usually in being short-sighted: they have looked at some of the immediate consequences, but have ignored systemic and long-term consequences.<br>
+'''Definitions'''
-When it comes to harvesting organs (beyond the practical problems of incompatibility), obviously we don't accept a numbers reasoning for humans due to the greater consequences of violating social contract, the utility of rights agreements between human beings, and the aspect of personal risk (which is selfish and not moral in nature); All things non-human animals are not part of. For animals, it's pure moral consideration in terms of net violation of interest, which is why we can and must look at numbers of comparable instances of harm (not for lack of considering quality as well).<br>
-The issue is that, due to those perceived problems (which are not actually problems) Isaac has thrown out consequential reasoning in favor of the deontological rights-based approach to morality.<br>
+: H(x) means 'x is a human' <br>
+: SNA(x) means 'x is a sentient non-human animal' <br>
+: R(x) means 'we are moral required not to treat x in the ways that consuming animal products treats non-human animals; or x has non-trivial moral status' <br>
+: T(x) means 'x is a trait' <br>
+: P(x,y) means 'x has y'
-It's hard to justify saying this is a sound basis for preferential moral action:<br>
+'''In First Order Logic'''
-human > 1 pig<br>
+: (P1) ∃t ( Tt ∧ ∀x ( Hx ⇒ ( Rx ⇔ Pxt ) ) )
-Or:<br>
-pig > 1 dog<br>
-dog > 1 mouse<br>
-Or even:<br>
-human > 1 mouse<br>
-When you reject this as a sound basis for preferential moral action:<br>
+: (P2) ∀t ( Tt ∧ ( ∀x ( Hx ⇒ ( Rx ⇔ Pxt ) ) ⇒ ∀x ( Rx ⇔ Pxt ) ) )
-humans > 1 human<br>
+: (P3) ∀x( SNAx ⇒ ¬∃t ( Tt ∧ ¬Pxt ∧ ∀y ( Hy ⇒ ( ¬Pyt ⇒ ¬Ry ) ) ) )
-Once you throw out numbers, you are throwing out the most meaningful part of value quantification; Isaac may claim it's a spectrum, but he's acting as if it's a straight line.<br>
+or equivalently (without the negatives)
-There is a strain of deontological reasoning which resolves these contradictions by claiming hierarchies where value differences are absolute, but that within a single level comparisons can't be made.<br>
+: (P3) ∀x( SNAx ⇒ ∀t ( Tt ∧ ∀y ( Hy ⇒ ( Ry ⇒ Pyt ) ) ⇒ Pxt ) )
-For example, they would claim that a single human is worth more than an infinite number of lower value animals, and in this case that a pig is worth more than an infinite number of animals lower than it.<br>
-However, this makes relative value meaningless (it's of no use to say a being is half as valuable compared to another: it is infinitely less valuable), and if you recognize value spectrum among humans (as Isaac likely does since he rejects arbitrary species boundaries) you also have to recognize that one human with an iota more moral value than another due to slightly higher sentience is worth more than an infinite number of all humans with an iota less value.  This is a position Isaac probably doesn't hold, thus thus the contradiction with his own beliefs.
+: Therefore (C) ∀x ( SNAx ⇒ Rx ) <br>
-= Correction =
+'''Proof of Validity'''
-WIP
+For a natural deduction proof of this argument's validity, see [[NameTheTrait_2.0#Natural_Deduction]]. We quickly check that this argument is validby using a [https://www.umsu.de/logik/trees/ logical proof generator], to prove the formula
-<blockquote>
-'''Argument for sentient animal moral value:'''<br>
-P1 - Sentient Humans are of moral value<br>
-P3 - Arbitrary assertions of moral value are not acceptable, moral value must be justified by some relevant non-arbitrary trait. (I.E. rejection of moral relativism)<br>
-P4 - In order to be relevant, a trait must be one that would cause us to deem ourselves valueless if we lacked it. (I.E. The Golden Rule, an assertion of Universalism/Moral Realism)<br>
-P2 - There is no trait absent in sentient non-human animals which if absent in sentient humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless.<br>
-P5 - Any attempted defense of personal interests is an indication of self-value.
-(I.E. Rejection of subjectivism through objective behavioral indication of value)<br>
-C - Sentient non-human animals are of ''some'' moral value (not necessarily equal to humans)<br>
-'''Argument for veganism from animal moral value:'''<br>
-P1 - Sentient Animals are of moral value.<br>
-P2 - Current animal agriculture practices are harmful to their moral interests.<br>
-P3 - Current animal agriculture practices are also harmful to human moral interests:
-Environmental harm (which harms humans too)
-Resource waste (in developed countries)
-Zoonotic plague source
-Antibiotic resistant bacteria<br>
-P4 - Benefits of current animal agriculture practices are small and limited to avoiding short term inconvenience in the developed world. (Markets adapt, tastes change)<br>
-P5 - The morality of actions is dependent on the consequences of those actions in terms of the moral harms and benefits that result. (I.E. consequentialism)<br>
-P6 - Morality is other directed, not selfish (I.E. Altruistic) Personal pleasure is not a moral justification for causing harm to others.<br>
-P7 - In the developed world, purchasing and supporting the production of most animal products has net negative consequences for others.<br>
-P8 - Nobody is perfect, but a good person is the kind of person who aspires to do better and works on becoming a better person day by day.<br>
-C - Therefore, if you are a moral person, it is a moral imperative to work on moving away from consumption of most animal products and toward plant based staples (with the ultimate and non-exclusive consumer goal of going "vegan" or "ostrovegan")
-</blockquote>
-= Conclusion =
-Note how the corrected argument establishes the necessary meta-ethical assumptions to make the argument itself valid (Rejects subjectivism, establishes Universalism based on the Golden Rule, rooted in behavioral qualities to avoid existential ambiguity or dependence on subjective value claims).
+: P1 ∧ P2 ∧ P3 ⇒ C
-Naturally for every premise introduced the potential audience the argument can appeal to is reduced (because they have more premises to reject), but failing to do so creates a non sequitur which reduces the audience of competent logicians to zero.
+with the input
-A bad argument for veganism can occasionally trick reluctant people into temporarily accepting it, but this only works as long as that person is under your control (in a cult setting this can be effective).  As soon as the person shares these reasons with friends and family, it becomes vulnerable to any number of counterarguments which demonstrate the holes in its logic.  For a bad argument, being shared more broadly makes it less effective rather than more.
+: (P1) <span style="color:#008080; background:#FFFFFF">\existst ( Tt \land \forallx (Hx \to ( Rx \leftrightarrow Pxt ) ) ) </span>
-The apparent strength of #NameTheTrait is that it is worded in such a confusing way using double negatives and a conclusion which isn't straight forward (rather than saying animals have moral value, it makes redundant claims about contradiction) that it's difficult for most people to immediately recognize the fallacious logic.
+: (P2) <span style="color:#008080; background:#FFFFFF">\forallt (Tt \land ( \forallx (Hx \to ( Rx \leftrightarrow Pxt ) ) \to \forallx ( Rx \leftrightarrow Pxt ) ) )</span>
-However, ''most people'' don't have to recognize the problems: one person has to. At this point, dozens have, independently citing different problems with the argument.
-An invalid argument is never a strong argument in a free speech environment.  Just as bad theistic arguments come on the internet to die, so do bad arguments like these.  The end result is only to make vegans look irrational and/or dishonest in a way comparable to theistic apologists who make poor arguments for god (such as the ontological argument).
-Debunking bad arguments for veganism helps to make sure vegans are using good arguments that will stand the test of time and reduce recidivism, as well as buys good will from carnists who may be encouraged to reconsider their beliefs that vegans are dishonest and take into consideration the good arguments for veganism and may move them to reducetarian practices.
+: (P3) <span style="color:#008080; background:#FFFFFF">\forallx ( Ax \to \neg \existst ( Tt \land \negPxt \land( \forally (Hy \to ( \negPyt \to \negRy ) ) ) ) )</span>
-= Criticism of Criticism =
+or equivalently
-To date, no credible or coherent criticism has been offered against the logical problems with #NameTheTrait (some have been offered against the correction, which has been updated to incorporate it).
+: (P3) <span style="color:#008080; background:#FFFFFF"> \forallx( Ax \to \forallt ( Tt \land \forally ( Hy \to ( Ry \to Pyt ) ) \to Pxt ) ) </span>
-Isaac's own responses have been preemptively incorporated into and debunked in the arguments in this article.  Any future responses from Isaac will be incorporated if they contain new arguments.
+: (C) <span style="color:#008080; background:#FFFFFF">\forallx ( Ax \to Rx )</span>
-None the less, there are some concerns indirectly related to the issue:
+Or all together (P1 ∧ P2 ∧ P3 ⇒ C)
-== These discussions should be private ==
+: <span style="color:#008080; background:#FFFFFF">\existst ( Tt \land \forallx (Hx \to (Rx \leftrightarrow Pxt ) ) ) \land \forallt ( Tt \land ( \forallx (Hx \to ( Rx \leftrightarrow Pxt)) \to \forallx (Rx \leftrightarrow Pxt))) \land \forallx (Ax \to \neg \existst (Tt \land \negPxt \land (\forally (Hy \to ( \negPyt \to \negRy))))) \to \forallx ( Ax \to Rx )</span>
-It's common for vegans to claim disagreements between vegans should be worked out privately to present a united front, and that public bickering is bad for veganism.
+which yields '''valid'''
-This is a dubious claim, since a unified front despite ridiculous arguments and bad behavior from some vegans can appear cult-like.  Compare to the criticism that more Muslims aren't vocal against terrorism, or that Catholics aren't vocal enough against bad practices in Africa.  Criticism of particularly bad arguments or pseudo-scientific claims of vegans FROM vegans can buy good will from carnists and help dispel notions that we're all dishonest or crazy.<br>
+==NameTheJustification==
-[[File:Askyourselfblockprivateconv.png|thumb|Left: Isaac demonstrates his short fuse and trigger happy blocking of criticism. Right: Isaac charges $100 to have a private conversation with him.]]
-That said, we would love to have settled this privately, but Isaac refused after a couple relatively short exchanges with one member (Isaac has ignored a request to make public an email exchange, so that will not be shared), claiming we're "not worth his time", and further expressing his certainty that he's right and that he charges people for tutoring sessions with him (as though the discussion is a request for ''him'' to teach ''us'' how to use logic).
-We are unwilling to pay Isaac $100 (possibly an hour, it's not clear how long the talk is supposed to be) to attempt to teach him philosophy 101, and attempt to convince him of the many obvious problems with his argument that he insists with such absolute certainty is valid.
+For more on this, see [[NameTheJustification]].
-Isaac has made very clear that he does not respect the intelligence of anybody who disagrees with him; he blocks them and brands them "retards" when they don't assent to what he calls his "murkage".
+'''(P1)''' All sentient humans have non-trivial moral status.
-Diplomacy was attempted, but this is not somebody with whom one can engage in productive private dialogue (or public dialogue), we know he will not change his mind, but the hope is that those he influences can be persuaded to abandon the argument and think twice about his credibility.
+'''(P2)''' If all sentient humans have non-trivial moral status but sentient farmed (and wild) animals lack this status, then there must be some morally relevant difference between all sentient humans and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in moral status.
-== It's wrong to bully the young/mentally ill ==
+'''(P3)''' There is no morally relevant difference between all sentient humans and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in moral status.
-We agree, to an extent, but this isn't bullying.
+Therefore
-Analogies of this issue can made to infamous examples like the internet bullying of autistic Christian Weston Chandler of Sonichu fame, who has been broadly criticized for his copyright infringement while promoting misunderstandings of copyright, racist remarks, and other hostile behavior in response to criticism. We generally ''agree'' that such bullying is wrong; it serves nobody but the entertainment of the bullies, and causes harm (we don't agree that it's possible to ''deserve'' to be harmed due to bad behavior).
+'''(C)''' Sentient farmed (and wild) animals have non-trivial moral status.
-There are several key differences:<br>
+===In Propositional Logic===
-'''1.''' While it is widely ''believed'' that Isaac suffers from narcissistic personality disorder, we are not aware of any professional diagnosis, and there is no evidence that he suffers from social disability on the level of Christian Chandler. We don't believe he's autistic, and to a significant degree "narcissist" is just the professional diagnosis of being on the jerk spectrum (you can label every aspect of personality as a disorder, but it doesn't make criticism of that behavior unfair). And in terms of age, Isaac is 24 (as of writing), he is not a minor and he is responsible for his highly public actions online regardless of how immature they are. He will likely come to regret his past behavior as he matures, and at such time we'd be glad to update this article, but none of this is just about Issac's ''behavior''.<br>
-'''2.''' While, as in the case of Chandler, we agree the hostility Isaac displays (or the implicitly racist or homophobic remarks he makes) is not a justification in itself to publicly criticize him, there are '''serious''' reasons to address this criticism.  The broad promotion of his arguments by his pupil Richard Burgess to his sizable platform and in debates with carnists to even larger audiences is significant a way Sonichu comics and a little internet trolling are not. It's something that demanded debunking because this was how veganism was being promoted on youtube, and it was what people were seeing as '''The''' logical argument for veganism (a problem, given its obvious failings).<br>
-'''3.''' This article is primarily focused on the arguments themselves, attempting only to address Isaac's behavior and other claims (including those of aberrant definitions) where useful for context.  If you see anything in this article you think is too personal, seems too mean, or should be reworded please let us know on [[The Philosophical Vegan Forum]]!<br>
-However, keep in mind the importance of context: with respect to the extraordinary nature of his claim, for example, his age and complete inexperience IS relevant to the probability of the legitimacy of his discovery and does not constitute an appeal to unqualified authority when noting the improbability of professional philosophers not having formulated an argument like this in the past if it were valid.  This is just as how the inventors of perpetual motion machines are never physicists and you do not need to be well versed in physics to be skeptical of such a claim from somebody of that level of experience; it's not surprising that a person inventing such an argument as #NameTheTrait would be a victim of the Dunning Kruger effect, and this is the more reasonable assumption particularly given the state of his experience even without having to understand the argument or its flaws. Because of the poor general understanding of logic and critical thinking, which is something needed to understand the flaws in the argument, it's important for the layman to learn why the burden of proof rests with Isaac (even more so than with any philosophical argument) because of the nature of his claims. This article shouldn't even need to exist, it's only the unfortunate fact of the gullibility of people who want strongly to believe something that makes that necessary (the same kind of gullibility that a few years ago convinced over 30,000 people against all credible science that eating 30 bananas a day was a good idea and that unlimited calories is a good weight loss strategy).
-== It's not a formal argument ==
+One nice thing about this argument is that its logical form and validity can be very simply and easily explained using only sentential or propositional logic (one does not have to get into predicate or first order logic). The logical form is:
-[[file:Perception_versus_Reality.png|thumb|How Ask Yourself perceives those who expect logical validity versus reality.]]
+: (P1) A
+: (P2) (A ∧ ¬B) ⇒ C
+: (P3) ¬C
+: Therefore, (C) B
-A.K.A. "this is semantic nitpicking"
+Where:
+:A = "All Sentient humans have non-trivial moral status"
+:B = "Sentient farmed (and wild) animals have non-trivial moral status"
+:C = "There is some morally relevant difference between all sentient humans and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in moral status"
-The rules for formal arguments are very strict, and a single fallacy invalidates an argument.  The beliefs represented by this kind of criticism is either a dismissal of the importance of rigorous argument in general (which is a rejection of the importance of logic in discourse), or the belief that informal arguments are exempt from that rigor (which in practice they may well be).
+The validity of the argument can be easily shown as follows:
+: 1. A; premise
+: 2. (A ∧ ¬B) ⇒ C; premise
+: 3. ¬C; premise
+: 4. ¬(A ∧ ¬B); 2,3, modus tollens [i.e. X ⇒ Y, ¬Y Ⱶ ¬X]
+: 5. ¬A V B; 4, De Morgan's law [i.e. ¬(X ∧ Y) if and only if ¬X V ¬Y], double negation elimination [i.e. if ¬¬X then X]
+: 6. B; 1, 5, disjunctive syllogism [i.e. X or Y, ¬X Ⱶ Y] (and double negation introduction [i.e. if X then ¬¬X], since in our case the inference is ¬A or B, A Ⱶ B)
-'''In terms of this not being a formal argument:'''
+= Conclusion =
-It takes the form of a formal argument, using philosophical vernacular and labeling propositions/premises and conclusion, P1, P2, C.
-If it's not a formal argument, it's masquerading as one, and that's another form of dishonesty.
-Consider how you would react if presented with what appeared to be an agreement, printed in legal vernacular, and with two signature lines at the bottom for each party.  Now consider how you would react to being told that this is not a legal contract, and in fact it's just a casual informal sort of flexible understanding, not to be strictly enforced.
-This is what's being done here.
-Either it's a failed attempt at a formal argument in which case Isaac should have the courage to be honest about that, admit the mistake, and then either correct it or stop using it, or it's something worse: a dishonest piece of intentional nonsense meant to confuse people, and then allow the creator to slither out of admitting the fallacies by claiming it's not meant to be a formal argument.
-== Strawman of Criticism's purpose ==
-[[file:Strawmanmeme.jpg|thumb|What Isaac's fans think we're doing vs. what we're doing.]]
-Isaac has apparently convinced his followers that our goal is -- despite regular statements here, on the forum, on twitter, and elsewhere indicating to the contrary -- to advocate formal logic (even abstracted symbolic logic) as vegan ''outreach''.
-We don't know how to make it more clear that this is not our goal, particularly when it comes to outreach to the general public.<br>
+As we have shown, there are numerous issues with the NTT argument, which can make it unconvincing and can cause it to reflect poorly on veganism as a whole, particularly when it is combined with false claims such as "''veganism follows logically from human rights''". Its merits can be summed up in the following question, one which activists who like NTT use;
-The logical arguments presented here in various forms are meant only to serve as reference for others who are interested to understand why #NameTheTrait is a bad argument.  Our goal here is to debunk it first (as vegans, sympathetic to the message itself) so it will not be used among carnists where it will represent veganism poorly and lead people to believe that we are all illogical and dishonest dogmatists.
-When veganism is represented by obviously illogical and intellectually dishonest arguments like #NameTheTrait is makes it much easier for people to reject veganism as a whole without considering other, better, arguments.<br>
+: ''Can you point to a difference between animals and humans that would justify treating humans the same way if we were in their hooves?''
-The sooner #NameTheTrait can be put to rest and no longer be represented as ''the'' logical argument for veganism, along with other bad arguments for veganism like appeals to nature or unlimited calories for weight loss of Raw til' 4, the sooner good arguments (that already exist) can rise to the top and start representing veganism properly.<br>
-The thing holding veganism back is not a lack of good arguments that appeal to people (there's no need to reinvent the wheel here), but the proliferation of terrible ones that alienate people and motivate opposition due to reliance on pseudoscience and logical fallacies.
-We stand against the intellectual dishonesty of arguments like #NameTheTrait for likely the same reasons Isaac has been critical of attempts to link veganism to a broader social justice movement or Marxism and deny a place for political conservatives and capitalists in veganism (the latter of which are arguably quite essential for veganism to go mainstream).
+Which is in essence, the golden rule. And if framing a question in this way makes people who otherwise wouldn't consider applying the golden rule to non-human animals do so, then that is all for the better. However when posed formally it should be posed in a way that is valid and convincing, like the [[NameTheTrait_2.0|NTT2.0]] correction or [[NameTheJustification]].<br>
-This is not vegan outreach, it is damage control.
+Demonstrating the issues of arguments such as NTT helps to ensure vegans are using good arguments that will stand the test of time and reduce recidivism, as well as buys good will from carnists who may be encouraged to reconsider their beliefs that vegans are dishonest and take into consideration the good arguments for veganism and may move them to reducetarian practices.

Difference between revisions of "Defunct NameTheTrait V1"

Latest revision as of 18:14, 13 December 2020

Contents

NTT's Invalidity

The Importance of logical validity

Logical Validity

Semantic Issues

Deeming vs Being

Deeming Only

Being Only

Meaning of "Trait"

Steel-manning NTT

Summary of Issues

Proof of Invalidity in First Order Logic

Displaying the Logical Form of NTT in FOL

The Logical Form of Part 1 of NTT

The Logical Form of Part 2 of NTT

Showing NTT is Logically Invalid

Part 1 Counterexample

In FOL

Proving the Counterexample renders NTT invalid

Checking the Validity Directly

The Alternative Interpretation of NTT

Bundle Theory

Identity of Indescernibles

Alternative Version in FOL

This Alternative Version of NTT Begs the Question

Excluding Essential Properties

Related Problems

False Claims

Invalid Generalizations

Problems with Part 2 of NTT

Commitment to Non-exploitation

Corrections

NameTheTrait 2.0

In First Order Logic

NameTheJustification

In Propositional Logic

Conclusion

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