NameTheTrait 2.0

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This entry discusses a way of revising the original NameTheTrait argument in order to make it logically valid. It is possible to correct the NTT argument and preserve its persuasive force by adding a premise that rejects double standards and by changing the first premise to require human moral value (or some other moral consideration) to be based on a trait. This makes NTT valid, and allows it to be presented in the same way as it was intended. The article also contains a constructive discussion of the justification of the argument's premises and how it can be presented and defended, both philosophically and in practice.

For an alternative way of framing the core idea of arguments like NTT and that from less able humans or "marginal cases" more directly around the challenge to provide a good justification for according important moral status to all sentient humans but virtually no moral status to non-human animals, see the entry on NameTheJustification.


NTT 2.0 In English

In the following 'x has non-trivial moral status' means at least that we are morally required not to treat x in the ways that consuming animal products treats non-human animals - for instance, x is such that we are morally required not to inflict enormous suffering upon and / or kill x for relatively trivial reasons (like taste-pleasure).

Having such non-trivial moral status could be one way of understanding what it is to have "moral value" or what is minimally required by "an adequate expression of respect for our value" so long as we are sentient. More ambitious arguments could replace 'non-trivial moral status' in what follows by something stronger, such as having the right to the equal consideration of one's interests, etc. But because the argument for veganism requires only that sentient non-human animals have non-trivial moral status, for arguments to be as convincing as possible to as many interlocutors as possible they should, like that below, focus only upon the grounds for non-trivial moral status. The argument below and its conclusion are entirely consistent with humans having greater moral status than sentient non-human animals, beyond the mere non-trivial moral status that they contend sentient non-human animals share with humans.


(P1) Humans have non-trivial moral status just in case and because they have a certain trait.

Where "a certain trait" is interpreted broadly so as to include sets of more particular traits, some of which may be sufficient but not necessary for non-trivial moral status. This premise is also consistent with some humans not having non-trivial moral status (e.g. brain-dead humans or human embryos).

(P2) If humans have non-trivial moral status just in case and because they have a certain trait, then all beings have non-trivial moral status just in case and because they have that trait.

If having the trait is the full explanation non-trivial moral status and why humans have it when they do, then possession of the trait must give non-trivial moral status to other beings that have the trait. To think otherwise would be to embrace a double-standard as arbitrary as that involved in thinking that traits that give moral status to members of one ethnicity or sex fail to give the same moral status to members of another ethnicity or sex, even when the traits are just as present in both cases.

(P3) There is no trait absent in non-human animals, which, if absent in a human, would cause the human to not have non-trivial moral status.

or equivalently

(P3) Sentient non-human animals have the trait that gives non-trivial moral status to humans.

When we consider such things as sentient but intellectually less able humans in various circumstances, various ways in which intellectual ability is vs. is not morally relevant, and what bare-biological species membership amounts to, it seems clear that sentience is sufficient for non-trivial moral status in humans and non-human animals.

Therefore

(C) Sentient non-human animals have non-trivial moral status

which, given what non-trivial moral status amounts to, entails that we are morally required to go vegan.

Defense of Premises

Premise 1

All that is necessary here is to convince one's interlocutor that humans who have non-trivial moral status have that status in virtue of some trait that they possess - where again "the trait" can be a set of more particular traits, some of which may be sufficient but not necessary for non-trivial moral status. It is not necessary at this stage to specify what trait this is. But the following are examples of what an interlocutor may take the non-trivial-moral-status conferring trait to be: sentience, or the ability to experience pleasure or enjoyment and pain or suffering; the potential to become sentient; high intellectual ability; rational agency, or being able to deliberate about and act for what one takes to be good reasons; and moral agency, or the ability to act for moral reasons and owe moral consideration to others. Note that for this trait to be the full explanation of the non-trivial moral status of the humans that one's interlocutor thinks have non-trivial moral status, the trait is going to have to be present in all but only all of these humans.

Premise 2

As most interlocutors will reject such arbitrary moral double standards once they clearly discern that they would be arbitrary moral double standards, it is unlikely that one would face much resistance on this premise.

What resistance might be faced can likely be dealt with by helping one's interlocutor to specify a more complex trait that she thinks confers non-trivial moral status consistent with both premise 1 and premise 2. This might involve some real clarification and change in view on the part of one's interlocutor. For instance, one's interlocutor might want to say something like "sentience gives humans non-trivial moral status, but it doesn't give non-human animals non-trivial moral status because no rational agents have implicitly made a contract to treat them as if they had non-trivial moral status." One could then ask one's interlocutor if she thinks that what fully explains the presence or absence of non-trivial moral status in humans - and all other entities as well - is that an entity has non-trivial moral status just in case and because it is either (i) a rational agent, or (ii) such that rational agents have contracted to treat it as if it has non-trivial moral status (and the humans who are rational agents have made a contract to treat sentient humans but not non-human animals as if they have non-trivial moral status). If so then one's interlocutor can accept premises 1 and 2 with this complex trait in mind.

On the other hand, one's interlocutor might be hesitant to accept this view, on the grounds that she thinks non-rational but sentient (e.g. severely intellectually disabled) humans have non-trivial moral status independent of whether the rational agent humans have contracted to treat them as if they had it (making it wrong to kill or torture severely intellectually disabled humans for relatively trivial reasons like taste pleasure even in societies that accepted this). If so then one can ask her why she thinks that these sentient humans have contract-independent non-trivial moral status but sentient non-human animals lack such status. In response she might say that the rational human agents owe it to the severely intellectually disabled humans to treat them as though they had non-trivial moral status because they are members of the same species. In this case she might, consistent with premises 1 and 2, accept as the moral-value conferring trait being either (i) a rational agent, or (ii) a member of a biological species (most? many? some?) members of which are rational agents.

Premise 3

If one can convince an interlocutor that sentience, or the potential for sentience, or something similar gives humans non-trivial moral status, then they must accept this premise, as sentient non-human animals possess these traits. It is important to bear in mind that it is mere non-trivial moral status that is at issue here. It may well be that certain traits beyond sentience justify various moral differences between how we should treat at least typical human adults and how we should treat non-human animals - for instance death may be a greater harm to typical human adults than it is to at least most non-human animals. What is at issue here is simply whether something like sentience is sufficient to give humans non-trivial moral status, or the sort of status that makes it wrong to harm them in the way that non-vegan consumption harms non-human animals.

As such, it is most helpful here to consider sentient humans who lack the psychological abilities that are often thought to give typical human adults greater moral status than non-human animals. These humans include infants and especially (because they are comparable in terms of future prospects and potential) severely intellectually disabled humans. In this respect the argument is quite similar to that from less able humans or "marginal cases". Moreover, one can, as Ask Yourself often does, make the consideration of these intellectually less able humans particularly vivid by considering the case of one's interlocutor becoming one or having been born as one.

If an interlocutor is inclined to think that traits like high intellectual ability or moral agency are what give humans non-trivial moral status, then one can point out that, since she accepts premise 2 (rejects double standards), this view would commit her to thinking that the sentient humans who lack these abilities also lack non-trivial moral status. But most interlocutors are unlikely to accept this conclusion, and will consequently feel compelled to search for another trait on which to base sentient humans' non-trivial moral status. Especially if it is observed that sentience or the potential for sentience is what makes a being capable of being harmed and benefited in a literal, morally important sense, and that all denials of basic moral consideration to beings who can be so harmed and benefited look indefensibly arbitrary, it will seem clear that mere sentience is sufficient to give non-trivial moral status to intellectually less able humans, and thus, given premise 2, sufficient to give non-trivial moral status to non-human animals.

As suggested by the above discussion of the defense of premise 2, there are some views against which more counter-argument is necessary. The most common are those that involve some version of speciesism, or the view that bare biological species membership is part of what gives an entity moral status. Another important class of views involve some version of the idea that rationality or moral agency are necessary for moral patiency, or being owed moral consideration by others.

Speciesism

For more on this see the entry on speciesism.

The crudest such speciesist view is simply that

The trait that grants humans moral status or non-trivial moral status is the trait of being human.

However, on reflection, most interlocutors will find such a view very implausible. It is important to distinguish bare biological species membership from things with which it is often correlated, like having the intellectual abilities of typical human adults, and to focus upon what biological species membership really is: something like the genetic potential to interbreed and produce fertile offspring, psychology-independent morphology, phenotype-independent genotype, and / or history of phylogenetic descent. Once this is clear, bare biological species membership seems obviously to be a very implausible or arbitrary basis for moral status - as implausible or arbitrary as the view that moral status is affected by other bare biological traits like sex (e.g. relative gamete size or X-Y chromosomal configuration) or race / ethnicity (e.g. superficial facial and skin morphology related to continent of recent ancestry). As Peter Singer puts the analogy in terms of implausiblity or arbitrariness between speciesism on the one hand and certain forms of racism and sexism on the other:

the racist violates the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of his own race, when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of another race. Similarly the speciesist allows the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of members of other species. The pattern is the same in each case. (Singer 1974: 108) [1]

Rationality, Moral Agency, and Moral Patiency

For more on this see the entry on moral patiency

Informal Presentation

In the case of making informal arguments, which rely on implicit agreements and assumptions between interlocutors, such as when presenting arguments to friends, family or strangers in the course of street activism etc., it is not necessary to present the argument in full detail. One way to present the argument, which is used by activists, is the following:

vegan : Can you name a trait present or absent in animals that justifies treating them the way we do?
interlocutor : moral agency, (low) intelligence etc.
vegan : What about humans who lack moral agency or have (low) intelligence etc. such as the mentally disabled and infants, would it be justified to treat them in this way?
interlocutor : That's different, they are not human.
vegan : Do you think simply being human grants humans special consideration? Isn't that a lot like other forms of discrimination, like being white is what grants whites special consideration?
interlocutor : Yes I suppose it is.
vegan : Personally, I believe it's the capacity to experience well-being, happiness, and suffering (sentience) that gives a being moral status, and means we shouldn't harm them for our taste pleasure. Would you agree with that?
interlocutor : Yes, I suppose I would. Perhaps going vegan would be the right thing to do.

In First Order Logic

Definitions

H(x) means 'x is a human'
SNA(x) means 'x is a sentient non-human animal'
R(x) means 'we are moral required not to treat x in the ways that consuming animal products treats non-human animals; or x has non-trivial moral status'
T(x) means 'x is a trait'
P(x,y) means 'x has y'

In First Order Logic

(P1) ∃t ( Tt ∧ ∀x ( Hx ⇒ ( Rx ⇔ Pxt ) ) )
(P2) ∀t ( Tt ∧ ( ∀x ( Hx ⇒ ( Rx ⇔ Pxt ) ) ⇒ ∀x ( Rx ⇔ Pxt ) ) )
(P3) ∀x( SNAx ⇒ ¬∃t ( Tt ∧ ¬Pxt ∧ ∀y ( Hy ⇒ ( ¬Pyt ⇒ ¬Ry ) ) ) )

or equivalently

(P3) ∀x( SNAx ⇒ ∀t ( Tt ∧ ∀y ( Hy ⇒ ( Ry ⇒ Pyt ) ) ⇒ Pxt ) )
Therefore (C) ∀x ( SNAx ⇒ Rx )

Direct Translation

(P1) there exists t, such that t is a trait, and for all x, if x is a human, then x has R, if and only if x has t
(P2) for all t, t is a trait, and if for all x, if x is a human, then x has R if and only if x has t, then for all x, x has R if and only if x has t
(P3) for all x, if x is a sentient nonhuman animal, then there does not exist t, such that, t is a trait and, x lacks t, and for all y, if y is a human, then if y lacks t, then y does not have R

or equivalently

(P3) for all x, if x is a sentient non-human animal, then for all t, if t is a trait, and, for all y, if y is a human, then, if y has R then y has t, then x has t
Therefore (C) for all x, if x is a sentient nonhuman animal then x has R

Proof of Validity

Logical Proof Generator

We can show this is valid argument by using a logical proof generator, to prove the formula

P1 ∧ P2 ∧ P3 ⇒ C

with the input

(P1) \existst ( Tt \land \forallx (Hx \to ( Rx \leftrightarrow Pxt ) ) )
(P2) \forallt (Tt \land ( \forallx (Hx \to ( Rx \leftrightarrow Pxt ) ) \to \forallx ( Rx \leftrightarrow Pxt ) ) )
(P3) \forallx ( Ax \to \neg \existst ( Tt \land \negPxt \land( \forally (Hy \to ( \negPyt \to \negRy ) ) ) ) )

or equivalently

(P3) \forallx( Ax \to \forallt ( Tt \land \forally ( Hy \to ( Ry \to Pyt ) ) \to Pxt ) )
(C) \forallx ( Ax \to Rx )

Or all together (P1 ∧ P2 ∧ P3 ⇒ C)

\existst ( Tt \land \forallx (Hx \to (Rx \leftrightarrow Pxt ) ) ) \land \forallt ( Tt \land ( \forallx (Hx \to ( Rx \leftrightarrow Pxt)) \to \forallx (Rx \leftrightarrow Pxt))) \land \forallx (Ax \to \neg \existst (Tt \land \negPxt \land (\forally (Hy \to ( \negPyt \to \negRy))))) \to \forallx ( Ax \to Rx )

which yields valid

Note that without the modification of premise 1 to require human moral value to be based on trait, and the addition of the premise to forbid double standards, the argument would not be even close to valid, which is the case for the original NTT formulation. Note also how much less confusing and question-begging this argument is in comparison to the Ask Yourself's alternative formulation of NTT which tacitly assumes the Identity of Indiscernibles and, in order to achieve validity, must speak in a strange and hard-to-follow way of what would happen if humans lost their essential properties, gained new essential properties, and became identical to non-human animals instead of themselves (see the discussion of this Alternative version of NTT in the entry on NTT).

Natural Deduction

First we will prove the following to make our proof simpler:

∀x( SNAx ⇒ ¬∃t ( Tt ∧ ¬Pxt ∧ ∀y ( Hy ⇒ ( ¬Pyt ⇒ ¬Ry ) ) ) ) ⇔ ∀x( SNAx ⇒ ∀t ( Tt ∧ ∀y ( Hy ⇒ ( Ry ⇒ Pyt ) ) ⇒ Pxt ) )

Starting with the left-hand-side (LHS)

LHS ⇔ ∀x( SNAx ⇒ ¬∃t ( Tt ∧ ¬Pxt ∧ ∀y ( Hy ⇒ ( ¬Pyt ⇒ ¬Ry ) ) ) )
⇔ ∀x( SNAx ⇒ ∀t ¬( Tt ∧ ¬Pxt ∧ ∀y ( Hy ⇒ ( ¬Pyt ⇒ ¬Ry ) ) ) ) (¬∃x Px) ⇔ (∀x ¬Px)
⇔ ∀x( SNAx ⇒ ∀t( Tt ∧ ¬Pxt ⇒ ¬∀y ( Hy ⇒ ( ¬Pyt ⇒ ¬Ry ) ) ) ) ¬(p∧q) ⇔ (p⇒¬q)
⇔ ∀x( SNAx ⇒ ∀t( Tt ∧ ¬Pxt ⇒ ¬∀y ( Hy ⇒ ( Ry ⇒ Pyt ) ) ) ) (p⇒q) ⇔ (¬q⇒¬p)
⇔ ∀x( SNAx ⇒ ∀t( Tt ∧ ∀y ( Hy ⇒ ( Ry ⇒ Pyt ) ) ⇒ Pxt) ) (p⇒q) ⇔ (¬q⇒¬p)
⇔ RHS

Hence we have shown the equivalency.

Now we can prove the validity of the argument using natural deduction.

Natural Deduction Proof of Validity
1 ∃t ( Tt ∧ ∀x ( Hx ⇒ ( Rx ⇔ Pxt ) ) ) assumption (P1)
2 ∀t ( Tt ∧ ( ∀x ( Hx ⇒ ( Rx ⇔ Pxt ) ) ⇒ ∀x ( Rx ⇔ Pxt ) ) ) assumption (P2)
3 ∀x( SNAx ⇒ ∀t ( Tt ∧ ∀y ( Hy ⇒ ( Ry ⇒ Pyt ) ) ⇒ Pxt ) ) assumption (P3)
4 Ts ∧ ∀x ( Hx ⇒ ( Rx ⇔ Pxs ) ) existential elimination 1
5 Ts ∧ ( Ha ⇒ ( Ra ⇔ Pas ) ) universal elimination 4
6 Ts ∧ ( ( Ha ⇒ ( Ra ⇔ Pas ) ) ⇒ ( Rb ⇔ Pbs ) ) universal elimination 2
7 SNAb ⇒ ( Ts ∧ ( Ha ⇒ ( Ra ⇒ Pas ) ) ⇒ Pbs ) universal elimination 3
8 ¬ ( SNAb ∧ ¬ ( Ts ∧ ( Ha ⇒ ( Ra ⇒ Pas ) ) ⇒ Pbs ) ) ( p ⇒ q ) ⇔ ¬( p ∧ ¬q ) 7
9 ¬ ( SNAb ∧ ¬ ¬( Ts ∧ ( Ha ⇒ ( Ra ⇒ Pas ) ) ∧ ¬ Pbs ) ) (p ⇒ q) ⇔ ¬(p ∧ ¬q) 8
10 ¬ ( SNAb ∧ ( Ts ∧ ( Ha ⇒ ( Ra ⇒ Pas ) ) ∧ ¬ Pbs ) ) negation elimination 9
11 ¬ ( SNAb ∧ ¬ Pbs ∧ ( Ts ∧ ( Ha ⇒ ( Ra ⇒ Pas ) ) ) ) ∧ commutivity 10
12 SNAb ∧ ¬ Pbs ⇒ ¬ ( Ts ∧ ( Ha ⇒ ( Ra ⇒ Pas ) ) ) ¬( p ∧ q) = (p ⇒ ¬q) 11
13 ¬ (SNAb ⇒ Pbs) ⇒ ¬ ( Ts ∧ ( Ha ⇒ ( Ra ⇒ Pas ) ) ) ¬(p ⇒ q) ⇔ (p ∧ ¬q) 12
14 ( Ts ∧ ( Ha ⇒ ( Ra ⇒ Pas ) ) ) ⇒ (SNAb ⇒ Pbs) (¬p ⇒ ¬q) ⇔ (q ⇒ p) 13
15 Ts ∧ ¬( Ha ∧ ¬ ( Ra ⇔ Pas ) ) (p⇒q) ⇔ ¬(p∧¬q) 5
16 Ts ∧ ¬( Ha ∧ ¬ ( (Ra ⇒ Pas) ∧ (Pas ⇒ Ra) ) ) biconditional elimination 15
17 Ts ∧ ¬ ( Ha ∧ (¬ (Ra ⇒ Pas) ∨ ¬(Pas ⇒ Ra) ) ) ¬(p ∧ q) = ¬p ∨ ¬q 16
18 Ts ∧ ¬ ( (Ha ∧ ¬ (Ra ⇒ Pas) ) ∨ (Ha ∧ ¬( Pas ⇒ Ra ) ) ) p ∧ (q ∨ r ) = (p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ r) 17
19 Ts ∧ ¬ (Ha ∧ ¬ (Ra ⇒ Pas) ) ∧ ¬ (Ha ∧ ¬( Pas ⇒ Ra ) ) ¬ (p ∨ q) = (¬p ∧ ¬q) 18
20 Ts ∧ (Ha ⇒ (Ra ⇒ Pas)) ∧ (Ha ⇒ (Pas ⇒ Ra) ) ( p ⇒ q ) ⇔ ¬ ( p ∧ ¬q ) 19
21 Ts ∧ (Ha ⇒ (Ra ⇒ Pas)) ∧ elimination 20
22 SNAb ⇒ Pbs Modus Ponens 14, 21
23 Rb ⇔ Pbs Modus Ponens 6, 5
24 (Rb ⇒ Pbs) ∧ (Pbs ⇒ Rb) biconditional elimination 23
25 Pbs ⇒ Rb ∧ elimination 24
26 SNAb ⇒ Rb transitivity 22, 25
27 ∀x (SNAx ⇒ Rx) universal introduction (C) 26