The Argument from Companion Animals

An important line of reasoning that leads many to appreciate the moral importance of the well-being of farmed and wild animals, and thus the moral importance of becoming vegan, compares the moral importance of these animals' well-being with that of members of companion animal species. The argument from companion animals for the moral importance of farmed and wild animals and veganism begins with the contention that we should be morally concerned enough with members of companion animal species not to treat them in the sorts of ways that consuming animal products treats farmed and wild animals. It proceeds to contend that there are no morally important differences between farmed and wild animals on the one hand and members of companion animal species on the other which are important enough to justify this level of moral concern for members of companion animal species without also justifying a similar level of moral concern for farmed and wild animals. It concludes that we should have this level of moral concern for farmed and wild animals.

This argument from companion animals has been presented by animal advocates like Melanie Joy, for instance in her talk, Toward Rational, Authentic Food Choices, and Vegan Gains in his video, Speciesism Explained. Tough Brooklyn construction contractor Eddie Lama credits this line of reasoning with first convincing him to care about non-human animals and eventually become a vegan and animal advocate in the Tribe of Heart documentary The Witness. This argument is also a leading idea of Alastair Norcross's important philosophical paper, "Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases".

The Argument from Companion Animals

(P1) We should not inflict massive suffering upon or kill sentient companion animals (e.g. dogs and budgies) for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure.

(P2) If we should not inflict massive suffering upon or kill sentient companion animals for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure, but it's OK to (i.e. it isn't true that we should not) inflict massive suffering upon or killing sentient farmed (and wild) animals for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure, then there must be some morally relevant difference between sentient companion animals and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in how it is OK to treat them.

(P3) There is no morally relevant difference between sentient companion animals and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in how it is OK to treat them.

Therefore

(C1) We should not inflict massive suffering upon or kill sentient farmed (and wild) animals for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure.

(P4) Consuming animal products instead of being vegan does inflict massive suffering upon and kill sentient farmed (and wild) animals for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure.

Therefore

(C2) We should not consume animal products; we should instead be vegan.

Objections to and Defenses of the Premises

Premise 1: Moral Concern for Companion Animals

Some interlocutors may well object to the idea that it would actually be wrong to treat members of companion animal species in the sorts of ways that consuming animal products treats farmed and wild animals. They may, for instance, want to say that we may feel averse to treating members of companion animal species in these ways simply because (i) we have emotional attachments to companion animals, (ii) it would wrong the human guardians of actual companion animals if we were to treat their animal companions in these ways without the consent of their human guardians, and perhaps (iii) as Kant speculated, personally harming members of companion animal species in these ways might make us more likely to be violent to humans. But they might insist that there is nothing apart from these considerations that makes it important in itself, or itself, or owed to the companion animals that makes it wrong to inflict suffering upon or kill them for relatively trivial reasons.

<<Notes: denying any non-trivial moral status to actual companions vs. members of companion animal species & special obligations, moral agency & moral patiency, also death vs. suffering>>

Premise 2: The Need for Sufficiently Important Morally Differences

There a tendency by some interlocutors to object to the second premise on the grounds that neither companion animals nor farmed or wild animals have non-trivial moral status independent of humans' arbitrarily granting it to them. This might, however, be most helpfully re-interpreted as an objection to the third premise. For instance one might ask an interlocutor who voices such hesitancy with premise 2: "isn't it that you think that there is an important difference, namely whether humans have "granted" non-trivial moral status to one but not the other?" If she responds, "sure," then one can interpret this as a challenge to premise 3, and go on to begin to question that defense: "Cool, so can you say a bit more about what you mean by humans granting this status?" and so on. Alternatively, one might ask if one's interlocutor means to challenge the first premise in the following sort of way "well, do you really mean that companion animals have non-trivial moral status in the sense that it would be wrong to harm them for trivial reasons even if this didn't upset other humans, etc.?" If she responds "No," then one can interpret this as a challenge to the first premise, and go on to defend that premise: "Cool. So do you really think that it is OK to torture your pet dog just for fun even if no one ever finds out about it?", and so on.

Premise 3: The Absence of Sufficiently Important Moral Differences

There are likely to be two main sorts of challenges to the third premise. The first focuses upon on whether humans have special obligations to members of companion animal species in virtue of their potential for relationship or history of interaction with members of the species <<note: actual companions vs. members of companion species>>.

The second focuses upon the alleged moral relevance of an actual or hypothetical social contract according to which the interests of members of companion animal species are given a different sort of weight than those of farmed and wild animals. An issue here of course is that which species are companion species differs from social group to social group (and there may be some social groups where members of some species are both companion animals and killed / tortured for food or entertainment - perhaps even the same ones at different times). Interlocutors may differ in terms of how conventional they are likely to be about non-trivial moral status for members of companion animal species. For instance, some may be more willing than others that it's OK for individuals in certain Asian societies to kill / torture dogs and cats for taste-pleasure but that it is wrong for us to do this because we are subject to different morally relevant contracts.

Premise 4: The Massive Harms and Trivial Benefits of Consuming Animal Products

<<notes: Farming conditions, ecology, health>>

The Logical Form and Validity of the Argument

One nice thing about the argument from P1, P2, and P3 to C is very simple and easily explained using only sentential or propositional logic. Its logical form is:

(P1) A

(P2) (A ∧ ¬B) ⇒ C

(P3) ¬C

Therefore, (C) B

Where:

A = "We should not inflict massive suffering upon or kill sentient companion animals (e.g. dogs and budgies) for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure."

B = "We should not inflict massive suffering upon or kill sentient farmed (and wild) animals for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure."

C = "There is some morally relevant difference between sentient companion animals and sentient farmed (and wild) animals that is important enough to justify this radical difference in how it is OK to treat them [i.e. that we should not inflict massive suffering upon or kill the former but not the latter for reasons as trivial as taste pleasure]."

The validity of the argument can be easily shown as follows:

1. A; premise

2. (A ∧ ¬B) ⇒ C; premise

3. ¬C; premise

4. ¬(A ∧ ¬B); 2,3, modus tollens [i.e. X ⇒ Y, ¬Y Ⱶ ¬X]

5. ¬A V B; 4, De Morgan's law [i.e. ¬(X ∧ Y) if and only if ¬X V ¬Y], double negation elimination [i.e. if ¬¬X then X]

6. B; 1, 5, disjunctive syllogism [i.e. X or Y, ¬X Ⱶ Y] (and double negation introduction [i.e. if X then ¬¬X], since in our case the inference is ¬A or B, A Ⱶ B)

<<Notes: add logical form & validity of inference from C1 & P4 to C2>>