Isaac Brown
There was various material in an earlier version of the entry on #NameTheTrait which does not seem really to be about the argument, or even the ways in which it has been defended, but seems primarily to be about the behavior of its originator, Isaac Brown, himself. I am thus moving that content here. I believe that much of this material which is relevant to the #NameTheTrait argument itself is already incorporated into other sections, but I will try to return to this material to make sure.
Contents
- 1 Another Deleted Paragraph
- 2 Deleted Paragraph
- 3 Burden of Proof
- 4 Summary
- 5 Criticism of Criticism
Another Deleted Paragraph
Now if we consider the case as proposed by Isaac in the picture, P2 would become
- P2 - A trait-adjusted clone of me rendered identical to Bessie is of moral value
So in this case we have two beings, a trait-adjusted clone of you, which we will call Daisy, and Bessie. Now it is Isaac's assertion that it would be a contradiction to claim Bessie is not of moral value. However this is untrue, we could assert
- Daisy is of moral value
- Bessie is not of moral value
It does not matter if they are identical, so long as they are two distinct beings (as specified by Isaac), there is no contradiction in claiming Bessie does not have moral value. This would be a double standard, but certainly no logical contradiction. A contradiction would be
- Daisy is of moral value
- Daisy is not of moral value
Deleted Paragraph
The #NameTheTrait argument is related to the argument from Less Able Humans (aka "marginal cases," perhaps most famously articulated by philosopher Peter Singer), which seeks to defend the moral importance of the well-being of sentient non-human animals by reference to our commitment to the moral importance of the well being of sentient humans whose intellectual abilities do not surpass those of non-human animals (such as profoundly intellectually disabled humans). Brown does, however, report developing #NameTheTrait independently, and has noted that the idea of something like the argument from less able humans or #NameTheTrait is quite natural and has occurred to various thinkers throughout history (noting as an example remarks by the ancient Greek philosopher Porphyry, to which one might add remarks by the 18th and 19th century English philosopher Jeremy Bentham [citations needed]). For a comparison of the arguments see the comparison in the entry on the Argument from Less Able Humans.
This entry also considers the extent to which these philosophical problems with #NameTheTrait are practically important, especially those concerning the logical invalidity of the argument. It considers the criticisms that (i) worries about #NameTheTrait's logical invalidity are a form of pointless or counterproductive nit-picking, (ii) advocates using the first, most widely discussed "for animal moral value" part of the argument do more good than harm, and (iii) criticisms of the logical invalidity of the argument (and perhaps other aspects of the argument as well) are unhelpful unless they are accompanied by an explanation to vegan advocates of (a) why they should care about such technical features of the argument (especially since, as this entry discusses, the argument can be made logically valid by adding additional premises that are extremely plausible and likely implicitly accepted by those to whom #NameTheTrait is offered as an argument for veganism), and / or (b) how they can do better by employing alternative arguments.
Burden of Proof
The main editors of the article on NameTheTrait feel that the sections on the deductive invalidity of the argument should not be necessary, because the burden of proof to demonstrate how #NameTheTrait is logically valid should fall on Brown. This is true of any argument short of support for the laws of thought themselves (the basis of argumentation which are the minimum necessary assumptions), but much more true for a logical argument. [The alternative editors feel that these sections are very helpful for those who are actually interested in the issues, because very few of them, including Brown, know about deductive validity or what is at issue with it, and the sections on the invalidity of the argument have the potential to enable them to understand why the argument is not deductively valid. Even if Brown is not sufficiently interested or able to learn from this, many others may be]
Beyond the simple "what can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence" (and Brown has provided no evidence, and only assertions that his argument is valid), in logical argumentation it is very difficult to prove an argument to be invalid (this comes down to the difficulty of proving a negative [providing a counterexample?]), but relatively easy to prove it valid if it is actually valid, thus making the burden of proof by practical necessity rest on the advocates claiming it is valid. [Q: is it always that hard to provide counterexamples / models where the premises hold and the conclusion doesn't? Can you elaborate?]
Some are of the view that, he were serious about this argument, Brown could select a formal system, translate his argument (as is attempted to do here) use the rules of deduction to clearly derive his conclusion (or contradiction) and share it with the audience for criticism.
Summary
Many observers would agree that, informally, the "Name The Trait" argument can be a useful tool in starting discussions, a use where it acts very similarly to that from Less Able Humans / "Marginal Cases."
Its greatest strength is the interactivity and thought provoking nature of asking the discussion opponent for a specific response, the titular "trait".
Most of the editors of this entry ['the main editors'] worry, however, that the attempt to create a formal argument from this conversation starter has resulted in a fallacious argument and has undermined its utility when used against any intelligent opponent, as numerous hidden premises are conspicuously left out. Moreover, they worry that, especially the second (less frequently discussed) part of the argument, "for veganism from animal moral value" is particularly unconvincing, as it may appear to bake in dubious deontological assumptions about the inability of benefits to justify inflicting harms - and perhaps even more dubious Marxist-sounding concerns about 'exploitation', made yet further dubious by their application to a context where the beings in question cannot in principle give informed consent. The main editors worry that this may create the appearance of confused thinking and dogma (or perhaps even dishonesty).
The argument creates the appearance of simple syllogisms, but the logic is not deductively valid. What it is for an argument to be deductively valid is for the truth of the conclusion to be guaranteed by the truth of the premises simply in virtue of the logical form (or syntactic structure of the content) of the premises and the conclusion. For instance, an argument of the form
(P1) If consuming animal products causes unnecessary suffering, then we should not consume animal products,
(P2) Consuming animal products causes unnecessary suffering,
Therefore, (C) we should not consume animal products
is deductively valid. This is because it has the (sentential) logical form:
(P1) If U then V
(P2) U
Therefore (C) V
Here, C follows from P1 and P2 simply from this abstract logical form whatever the specific content of U and V may be (this particular way of a conclusion following from its logical form and that of the premises is known as "modus ponens").
One of the main things that this entry shows below is why #NameTheTrait (and in particular its much discussed first part, "for animal moral value") is not deductively valid - the truth of its conclusion is not guaranteed by the truth of its premises simply in virtue of the logical form of the premises and the conclusion. (To show this requires not only looking at its sentential logical form, like that in the above argument, which replaces whole sentences flanking logical connectives like 'if...then', 'and' and 'or' with abstract symbols, but looking at its predicate-logical form, which replaces the predicates within these sentences with abstract symbols, and quantification over entities that can have the properties signified by those predicates, like 'for all x' and 'for some x', as will be seen below).
The main editors are concerned that the deductive invalidity of #NameTheTrait is a significant problem; they consequently call #NameTheTrait a non sequitur and accuse it of committing a fallacy. To explain the primary non sequitur fallacy simply: in the first part of #NameTheTrait, C does not follow from P1 and P2 because nothing in the argument asserts that moral value must be based on the material traits mentioned in P2. One can thus agree with P1 and agree with P2 and still reject the suggested conclusion (that animals are of moral value) without any logical contradiction. That is, one can accept the premises and reject the conclusion without believing any set of things that cannot all be true simply in virtue of their logical form.
That this lack of deductive validity is actually a significant problem is something that has been challenged by others [who some pejoratively call 'apologists' but might be more neutrally termed 'the alternative editors']. For their views, see sections on criticism of criticism below.
As this entry also shows, the #NameTheTrait argument CAN be made deductively valid, or "corrected" (see correction) by adding in missing premises and clarifying the meanings of certain terms. Most observers would agree that this is a useful exercise, since showing how the argument can be made deductively valid plays an important role in explaining both the views of the main editors as to why its deductive invalidity is a serious problem, and those of the alternative editors who do not share this view. The view of the main editors is that, unfortunately, as seen in the correction, the argument remains confusing and cumbersome due to the workarounds needed to articulate its central idea. The main editors are also of the view that apart from the issue of deductive invalidity, even were the argument corrected by adding in necessary hidden premises and fixing other fallacies and ambiguities (All outlined below) #NameTheTrait would still be a bad argument.
While the main editors and the (so far existent) alternative editors disagree about the extent to which it matters that #NameTheTrait is not deductively valid, they agree that there are two other deep problems regarding the argument. First, they agree that there are serious problems with the justification of P1 and P2 (in the first, "for animal moral value" part of the argument) that has been offered by certain proponents of #NameTheTrait such as Brown. These proponents are mistaken that one's simply having a propensity to resist being harmed or a desire not to be harmed in a situation commits one to thinking that one would be of moral value in that situation. But one's resisting or being averse to being harmed is actually consistent with one's not having moral value in a sense that entails that others have moral reasons not to harm one, or would not be justified in harming one.
The main editors and the (so far existent) alternative editors also agree that the second part of the #NameTheTrait argument, "for veganism from animal moral value," has serious substantive problems. It appears to require dubious deontological assumptions about the irrelevance of the possible benefits of inflicting harm (or even just harmlessly using someone, if 'exploitation' can be harmless) to the justification of inflicting harm (or 'exploiting'), as well as poorly thought out ideas regarding "exploitation," which have dubious Marxist connotations and seem in any event dubiously applicable to the case of our treatment of beings who cannot give informed consent. As such, the current editors are all of the view that a much more philosophically sound and convincing argument from the moral considerability of non-human animals to the case for veganism will look very unlike that employed in #NameTheTrait, and will for instance involve some empirical weighing of cost vs. benefit (although it need not commit to consequentialism, or the view one is always permitted and required to bring about the most good for all concerned). The main editors at least are of the view that vegan advocates making the second part of the #NameTheTrait argument, for veganism from non-human animal value, actually does more harm than good to the vegan cause.
The main editors do not feel that anything in this article constitutes an argument for veganism that is superior to #NameTheTrait: in their view, the purpose of this page is not to outline good arguments for veganism, but to debunk a bad one to prevent it from supplanting better arguments already in use. In the future, see Arguments for veganism for outlines of better arguments. The main editors will also in the future include a page on ideas about the optimal role of philosophical arguments in vegan advocacy. While the views of the alternative editors will be discussed more below, it should be noted that they think it will be unclear to vegan advocates how this page contains any useful criticisms of #NameTheTrait - or at least the deductive invalidity of its more widely discussed first part, "for non-human animal moral value" - unless it says something about why technical deductive invalidity is supposed to be such a serious problem in practice and how vegan advocates are supposed to give better (including more effective and more compelling) arguments. Absent such an explanation and set of alternatives, the alternative editors do not feel that anything about the more widely discussed first part of the argument has been "debunked" in virtue of showing it to be invalid (except perhaps one interpretation of claims that #NameTheTrait is 'valid', or that accepting its premises but denying its conclusion involves accepting a 'contradiction' when made by people who do not understand what philosophers and logicians mean by 'deductively valid' and 'contradiction'. The value of such "debunking" is one thing that is challenged by the alternative editors). The alternative editors therefore endeavor to say something in this entry about why any of this should matter to vegan advocates, how sound and rationally compelling are various of the alternatives discussed, and even what evidence we may have about the possible effectiveness of various strategies for arguing for veganism (or reducing the consumption of animal products more generally). See Proving Formal Arguments for more details on this.
As long as he didn't set out to reinvent logic as he seems to be trying to do, for the most part Brown could just learn to follow established rules (no need to reinvent the wheel), which are generally far less complicated than most fields of mathematics. An intelligent person could figure out the minimum in a couple days given any interest in philosophical argumentation, and Brown has also had many standing offers for help on this issue for free which he has rejected.
Unfortunately, Brown has consistently failed to engage with formal and symbolic examinations of his argument, instead trying to shift the burden of proof away from himself by calling the latter equivalent to "Chinese" and insisting on blind faith that they have been translated incorrectly without understanding them. It must be stressed that his inability to back up his argument and respond to criticism is not an excuse for failing in his obligation to do so.
Beyond that, he has also engaged in blocking critics and misrepresenting arguments presented in the "plain English" he asks for against #NameTheTrait, responding selectively when he does by dismissing them as "retards" or just by repeating the same arguments that those critics have already addressed as fallacious. That is, he is doing the exact opposite from what one would expect if his argument were valid and he could back it up.
Even in merely practical terms as an outreach argument, the burden of proof for answering criticism from a growing number of vegans and non-vegans and demonstrating how this argument is sound falls upon Brown.
If people perceive the argument as invalid (or even tricky/deceptive), it fails at its goal regardless of its validity: that is if the argument's purpose is to convince people to go vegan.
[this is challenged by the alternative editors in the sections on criticism of criticism in the entry of NameTheTrait]
Unfortunately, the outreach purpose seems less and less to be the case, as when challenged with criticism of his off-putting and alienating behavior (which may prevent people from going vegan) Brown has even stated that he doesn't care if people go vegan and that he is not an activist but an entertainer (he earns an income for his videos from Patreon, and claims they are his intended audience). This convenient deflection is reminiscent of the claims by charlatans like Uri Gellar or John Edwards to defend themselves against allegations of fraud. [A more pressing concern for some, who are interested in promoting veganism as effectively as possible, is simply that having someone who lacks concern for the effectiveness of advocacy for veganism do a lot of advocacy and spread methods of advocacy to others might not result in the most effective advocacy]
If the intention of #NameTheTrait is providing the basis for operating a cult, then as with internal theistic arguments it does not need to be sound, it only needs to be confusing enough for people to convince themselves it is sound if they want to believe it in order to establish the necessary self-congratulatory in-group who sees "the truth", and an out-group of deniers. In that case, likewise, Brown does not need to provide arguments against it, he only needs to disparage people who disagree and insult their intelligence for being able to see what is so obvious (which is in practice what he does).
This is what seems to be happening with Brown's fan-base; an eerie echo of the Raw til' 4 and 30 Bananas a day cult of Durianrider and Freelee that recently collapsed. This is what happens when people suspend skepticism and critical thinking, and let charismatic personalities pass the burden of proof elsewhere and substitute arguments with insults.
If you are a follower or fan of Brown: Be the needle that pops that echo chamber, and hold him to the same standards of proof that he demands from others. Ask that he address the arguments presented in the entry on #NameTheTrait properly, and provide evidence that his argument is valid. For example, if his argument is a valid syllogism, ask him to #NameTheSyllogism[1], if it isn't, ask him to rewrite it so that he can name the valid form it takes. This kind of proof would not be difficult, even in "English".
Extraordinary Claims
"Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence"
Any argument needs to be supported with valid logic and empirical evidence, but one making extraordinary claims even more so.
In defending #NameTheTrait Brown makes a number of extraordinary claims which make his arguments less plausible and increase the need for evidence (extraordinary evidence) that these arguments are valid beyond what would be required for more modest arguments which would be more reasonable to accept based on appearances.
Brown believes that he, as someone not educated in philosophy (and who doesn't understand the meanings of philosophical terms like "contradiction"), has at the age of 24 after recently going vegan come up with the best argument ever conceived for veganism, and so has done what no other professional philosopher in thousands of years of history has been able to do (from Pythagoras to Voltaire to Singer).[see McStravick video: include clip if possible]
[citation needed? Also would it be that strange if his argument was rhetorically best for a certain social media environment, in which Pythagoras, Voltaire, and Singer never participated? I would have thought that this sort of innovation in terms of effectively and convincingly getting out the vegan message in a new context was exactly the sort of thing that we would want and reasonably hope to see young vegan advocates, who are digital / social media natives, to be doing?]
As Brown has indicated [see his first video response: find clip when possible], a critical part of this purported superiority is the argument's claimed independence from substantive ethical issues.
According to Brown, it doesn't just not matter if somebody is a realist, an irrealist, a subjectivist, a relativist [which the alternative editors think is probably true]], he goes on to claim that his argument works no matter your assumptions are as long as you believe humans - or even just yourself; you can substitute "I have moral value" in P1 - have moral value, and by that in practice he means that as long as you would protest or resist somebody killing you (this is not something he defined in the argument, but an assumption he sneaks in during debate), and that this value would not be lost if one lost the traits that one has and (sentient) non-human animals lack.
If the latter following of a seriously distinct ethical commitment from a single substantive ethical premise (or indeed, from a mere behavioral tendency or desire were) true, this would be the most revolutionary philosophical argument in history of any kind, not just for veganism, and would send shockwaves around the world. [It should probably be noted that some Kantian or neo-Kantian arguments, like those of Kristine Korsgaard [citation needed] to the effect that we are committed to valuing others simply by the act of deliberating, are quite a bit like this. But almost everyone agrees that they clearly do not work, so for any argument like this working (be it Brown's or Korsgaard's) it would be fair to say of that it was the most revolutionary philosophical argument of any kind.]. The equivalent of building a perpetual motion machine in physics (Interestingly, the people claiming to have built them are, like Brown, almost never experienced in the field). [The fact that Kantians / neo-Kantians are extremely experienced in the field, and sometimes do excellent other kinds of work (like Korsgaard, is not only a serious scholar but has it should be mentioned also done a great job arguing that Kantian position should support veganism [citations needed]) but still seem to present arguments like this seems to be some evidence against this. But there probably are a ton of neophytes like Brown making such claims; academics tends to get unsolicited e-mailed tracts and book manuscripts from them...]
As it turns out, Brown's confidence and confusion are a product of his ignorance (via the Dunning Kruger effect) because he confuses "double standard" in the colloquial sense with "logical contradition" in the philosophical sense, among a series of other mistakes as laid out here (below).
To be clear, within a specific and defined normative ethical or meta-ethical foundation from deontological to consequentialist frameworks, realist, irrealist, naturalist and not, such arguments are relatively common and can be compelling.
Where the nature of moral properties and action is delineated through a number of mutual assumptions, strong arguments can be made leveraging those assumptions and building on them to show either through duty or outcome with the addition of empirical data that veganism is beneficial and morally preferable to certain alternatives.
What is extraordinary about #NameTheTrait is not a claim to be an irrefutable argument for veganism within such a context, but its claim to validity despite a paucity of premises that provide the meta-ethical context to give it weight and make the conclusion follow from the empirical premise, and its attempt to address all actors regardless of their beliefs of morality beyond the assertions of P1: that humans, or that they specifically (as a self-focused alternative P1), have moral value. [a lot of these last two paragraphs will come back into the section on defending the premises]
Criticism of Criticism
To date, no credible or coherent criticism has been offered against the logical problems with #NameTheTrait (some have been offered against the correction, which has been updated to incorporate it).
Isaac's own responses have been preemptively incorporated into and debunked in the arguments in this article. Any future responses from Isaac will be incorporated if they contain new arguments.
None the less, there are some concerns indirectly related to the issue:
These discussions should be private
It's common for vegans to claim disagreements between vegans should be worked out privately to present a united front, and that public bickering is bad for veganism.
This is a dubious claim, since a unified front despite ridiculous arguments and bad behavior from some vegans can appear cult-like. Compare to the criticism that more Muslims aren't vocal against terrorism, or that Catholics aren't vocal enough against bad practices in Africa. Criticism of particularly bad arguments or pseudo-scientific claims of vegans FROM vegans can buy good will from carnists and help dispel notions that we're all dishonest or crazy.
That said, we would love to have settled this privately, but Isaac refused after a couple relatively short exchanges with one member (Isaac has ignored a request to make public an email exchange, so that will not be shared), claiming we're "not worth his time", and further expressing his certainty that he's right and that he charges people for tutoring sessions with him (as though the discussion is a request for him to teach us how to use logic).
We are unwilling to pay Isaac $100 (possibly an hour, it's not clear how long the talk is supposed to be) to attempt to teach him philosophy 101, and attempt to convince him of the many obvious problems with his argument that he insists with such absolute certainty is valid.
Isaac has made very clear that he does not respect the intelligence of anybody who disagrees with him; he blocks them and brands them "retards" when they don't assent to what he calls his "murkage".
Diplomacy was attempted, but this is not somebody with whom one can engage in productive private dialogue (or public dialogue), we know he will not change his mind, but the hope is that those he influences can be persuaded to abandon the argument and think twice about his credibility.
[From Margaret Hayek, moving this here (have not edited it yet)] Another concern is, however, that much of the confrontation with Isaac and other proponents of NTT has not only been nit-picking (see below), but counterproductive, bringing out the worst tendencies of those on all sides. Some hold the view that Isaac is doing a very helpful and effective job reaching an audience of bight young individuals like himself with something like the essence of the argument from less able humans / "marginal cases." But clearly he and his audience can, like many bright young individuals (and indeed it seems these days entire electorates) get extremely defensive and triablistic in the face of criticism - particularly criticism much of which comes from a perspective of formal philosophy which they do not understand - and moreover the point of which they do not understand, and have interpreted as purporting to show there to be something just generally bad or unconvincing about the argument, to which they have responded with anger. They have thus learned nothing positive from the exchange. Sadly, this exchange also seems to have caused others who do have philosophical backgrounds to get defensive and abrasive towards Isaac and other proponents of NTT. This is extremely sad because it is important to cultivate patience, open mindedness, and strategic communication among all vegan advocates, including especially bright and promising young advocates like Isaac and the proponents of NTT. One of the best ways to do this is through good role-modelling, but it seems that the role-modelling here has been very poor. It seems that Isaac and proponents of NTT feel that those talking to them about the logical invalidity of NTT are simply trying to come across as smarter and more knowledgeable than them by lodging complaints the content and point of which they cannot understand. A case can be made that this is highly understandable, especially if, as it appears, the best reason offered to engage in all of this apparently nit-picking criticism is the unsubstantiated and to the minds of some individuals extremely dubious assertion that "the argument is purporting to be deductively valid when it isn't, and that that's bad for veganism" (see below).
It's wrong to bully the young/mentally ill
One view is that this is true, to an extent, but that responses to NTT by contributors to Philosophical Vegan do not constitute bullying.
Analogies of this issue can made to infamous examples like the internet bullying of autistic Christian Weston Chandler of Sonichu fame, who has been broadly criticized for his copyright infringement while promoting misunderstandings of copyright, racist remarks, and other hostile behavior in response to criticism. We generally agree that such bullying is wrong; it serves nobody but the entertainment of the bullies, and causes harm (we don't agree that it's possible to deserve to be harmed due to bad behavior).
There are several key differences:
1. While it is widely believed that Isaac suffers from narcissistic personality disorder, we are not aware of any professional diagnosis, and there is no evidence that he suffers from social disability on the level of Christian Chandler. We don't believe he's autistic, and to a significant degree "narcissist" is just the professional diagnosis of being on the jerk spectrum (you can label every aspect of personality as a disorder, but it doesn't make criticism of that behavior unfair). And in terms of age, Isaac is 24 (as of writing), he is not a minor and he is responsible for his highly public actions online regardless of how immature they are. He will likely come to regret his past behavior as he matures, and at such time we'd be glad to update this article, but none of this is just about Issac's behavior.
2. While, as in the case of Chandler, we agree the hostility Isaac displays (or the implicitly racist or homophobic remarks he makes) is not a justification in itself to publicly criticize him, there are serious reasons to address this criticism. The broad promotion of his arguments by his pupil Richard Burgess to his sizable platform and in debates with carnists to even larger audiences is significant a way Sonichu comics and a little internet trolling are not. It's something that demanded debunking because this was how veganism was being promoted on youtube, and it was what people were seeing as The logical argument for veganism (a problem, given its obvious failings).
3. This article is primarily focused on the arguments themselves, attempting only to address Isaac's behavior and other claims (including those of aberrant definitions) where useful for context. If you see anything in this article you think is too personal, seems too mean, or should be reworded please let us know on The Philosophical Vegan Forum!
However, keep in mind the importance of context: with respect to the extraordinary nature of his claim, for example, his age and complete inexperience IS relevant to the probability of the legitimacy of his discovery and does not constitute an appeal to unqualified authority when noting the improbability of professional philosophers not having formulated an argument like this in the past if it were valid. This is just as how the inventors of perpetual motion machines are never physicists and you do not need to be well versed in physics to be skeptical of such a claim from somebody of that level of experience; it's not surprising that a person inventing such an argument as #NameTheTrait would be a victim of the Dunning Kruger effect, and this is the more reasonable assumption particularly given the state of his experience even without having to understand the argument or its flaws. Because of the poor general understanding of logic and critical thinking, which is something needed to understand the flaws in the argument, it's important for the layman to learn why the burden of proof rests with Isaac (even more so than with any philosophical argument) because of the nature of his claims. This article shouldn't even need to exist, it's only the unfortunate fact of the gullibility of people who want strongly to believe something that makes that necessary (the same kind of gullibility that a few years ago convinced over 30,000 people against all credible science that eating 30 bananas a day was a good idea and that unlimited calories is a good weight loss strategy).
It has also been claimed that is it unfair to dismiss as 'obviously illogical' the ampliative reasoning (whether it actually is ampliative is contentious and addressed elsewhere) of someone who does not even know about the formal distinctions made in philosophy between such things as deductive validity and whether, if one rejects a conclusion, one is not in a good position to defend a premise.
However, these things have been explained to Isaac, and he is thus far unwilling to budge on the smallest of errors.
Isaac has presented this argument publicly, and his ignorance is no more an excuse and defense for his mistakes than is President Trump's. In both cases, these men have put themselves in positions of authority (via platform and following, in the latter case elected office), and abstaining from criticism because they are ignorant is not only an unreasonable request but would be irresponsible.
It's not a formal argument
A.K.A. "this is semantic nitpicking"
In Philosophy, the rules for formal deductive arguments are very strict, and a single fallacy invalidates an argument. The beliefs represented by this kind of criticism is either a dismissal of the importance of rigorous argument in general (which is a rejection of the importance of logic in discourse), or the belief that informal arguments are exempt from that rigor (which in practice they may well be).
Inductive style arguments, such as ampliative arguments, are not deductively valid and do not prove the conclusions in the way Isaac believes #NameTheTrait does, or indicate any measure of actual "logical contradiction" from their rejection.
[Video clip: Isaac's insistence that proof by contradiction is always valid in ANY logical system]
Isaac can not defend his behavior on the grounds of using these kinds of arguments, because his claims preclude them.
However, nothing in this article is to suggest that such arguments can not at times be compelling, or lead to conclusions people find credible.
Context, however, is essential -- and so is being upfront about the kind of argument being made.
In the colloquial sense of 'formal', inductive arguments may be seen as sufficiently persuasive, and many people may not care or understand if arguments are deductively valid: particularly those who are inclined to the conclusions already. It is not uncommon to "formalize" in premise-conclusion form without any suggestion that they are bad arguments provided there is no suggestion that they are actually valid (which in Isaac's case is an insistence on that validity - although this is arguably complicated by his instance on using 'valid' in an informal sense and his refusal to entertain a formal logical sense of the conclusion's truth being guaranteed by the truth of the premises simply in virtue of the logical form of the premises and the conclusion).
In such cases it is important to state the conclusion as something like 'It is most reasonable to believe that C' rather than simply 'C', and it is of course never acceptable to state the conclusion in a way that uses phrases like 'contradict ourselves', particularly when coupled in practice with an insistence that it is a logical contradiction (as opposed to a in colloquial senses that mean something other than 'say things that can't both be true simply in virtue of their logical form').
It is also often helpful to think about how such arguments can be made deductively valid, as is done in the correction section above. But there may be a sense of 'formal' which covers ampliative arguments stated in premise-conclusion form which ought not to be dismissed as fallacious simply because they are not deductively valid as long as the goal of the argument is clear.
Arguments so stated by young individuals without formal philosophical training in the course of communicating with an audience of other individuals almost all of whom have not had formal philosophical training in order to present their arguments in the clearest way they can, using their native language to communicate their ideas to the best of their abilities, could still be useful as long as they don't claim to be something they are not.
In terms of this not being a formal argument:
There is no reason to believe it is not meant to be a formal argument, though, since Isaac himself has confirmed this and insisted upon its validity; that the conclusion absolutely follow form the premise, and that it is proved by contradiction (although again this is arguably complicated by his insistence on using 'validity', 'follows from' and 'contradiction' in colloquial senses, and his refusal to entertain formal logical senses).
Beyond that indication, is that the version of the argument under discussion (i.e. that presented at the outset of this article, not just the informal versions used in discussions and debates or his prior version) takes the form of a formal argument, using philosophical vernacular and labeling propositions/premises and conclusion, P1, P2, C.
If Isaac is mistaken about the intent of his own argument (or perhaps as others use it) if this version of NTT is not meant to be a formal argument, it's masquerading as one, and that's another way in which the argument is misleading.
Consider how you would react if presented with what appeared to be an agreement, printed in legal vernacular, and with two signature lines at the bottom for each party. Now consider how you would react to being told that this is not a legal contract, and in fact it's just a casual informal sort of flexible understanding, not to be strictly enforced.
This is what's being done here.
Either it's a failed attempt at a formal argument in which case Isaac should have the courage to be honest about that, admit the mistake, and then either correct it or stop using it, or it's something worse: a dishonest piece of intentional nonsense meant to confuse people, and then allow the creator to slither out of admitting the fallacies by claiming it's not meant to be a formal argument.
Some consider NTT to be an ampliative argument which has been formalized in premise-conclusion form by a young individual without formal philosophical training in order to communicate his ideas in the clearest way he can to an audience of other individuals almost all of whom have not had formal philosophical training. Were this the case, this would be some defense of the misleading phrasing and vindicate the intention of its author based on its reception by its audience.
As an inductive argument, observation of the interaction of Isaac and other proponents of NTT with other individuals suggest that the the intended audience feels the force of the argument, in part because they implicitly accept something like premises P3 and P4 in the correction. One can interpret Isaac and other proponents' responses to the argument as in part showing them that if they want to accept P1 and P2 without accepting the conclusion, they must accept very implausible things (perhaps because they go against the plausibility of P3 and P4) or undermine their justification for believing in P1.
Thus, even without the benefit of an explicit formalization along the lines of the above correction that makes the argument deductively valid, proponents of NTT and their audience are doing much good ethical reasoning through informal intuition.
Unfortunately in terms of outreach and debate practice, the positive effects are probably limited to the informal presentations of the argument.
The way in which Isaac and other proponents of NTT have used the written, premise-conclusion form of the argument in videos and online text is evidently misleading to those who actually know about formal logic (which in fairness excludes almost all members of his audience): whether it's an inductive argument which confusingly claims validity and force of asset on pains of "logical contradiction" only in colloquial senses, or a failed deductive argument employing tricky wording and manipualtive debate practices to hide evident fallacies.
The confusing nature of the argument's attempted formulation is undeniable, but if you believe the argument is doing more good than the potential harm to vegan credibility in a consequentialist assessment, it may make sense to tolerate it anyway.
However, barring proof of this we always err on the side of technical correctness and clarity: It is our belief that unclarity and error are not good outreach, and while we strive to be fair to the motives of those who lie for veganism, we don't promote apologia for unclarity and error in argumentation. [Who exactly is 'we'? Do any other wikis take that sort of tone?]
Strawman of Criticism's purpose
Isaac has apparently convinced his followers that our goal is -- despite regular statements here, on the forum, on twitter, and elsewhere indicating to the contrary -- to advocate formal logic (even abstracted symbolic logic) as vegan outreach (see image).
We don't know how to make it more clear that this is not our goal, particularly when it comes to outreach to the general public.
The logical arguments presented here in various forms are meant only to serve as reference for others who are interested to understand why #NameTheTrait is a bad argument. Our goal here is to debunk it first (as vegans, sympathetic to the message itself) so it will not be used among carnists where it will represent veganism poorly and lead people to believe that we are all illogical and dishonest dogmatists.
When veganism is represented by obviously illogical and intellectually dishonest arguments like #NameTheTrait is makes it much easier for people to reject veganism as a whole without considering other, better, arguments.
The sooner #NameTheTrait can be put to rest and no longer be represented as the logical argument for veganism, along with other bad arguments for veganism like appeals to nature or unlimited calories for weight loss of Raw til' 4, the sooner good arguments (that already exist) can rise to the top and start representing veganism properly.
The thing holding veganism back is not a lack of good arguments that appeal to people (there's no need to reinvent the wheel here), but the proliferation of terrible ones that alienate people and motivate opposition due to reliance on pseudoscience and logical fallacies.
We stand against the intellectual dishonesty of arguments like #NameTheTrait for likely the same reasons Isaac has been critical of attempts to link veganism to a broader social justice movement or Marxism and deny a place for political conservatives and capitalists in veganism (the latter of which are arguably quite essential for veganism to go mainstream).
This is not vegan outreach, it is damage control.
Apologia of Logical Imperfection and Accusations of Intellectual Dishonesty
Whether Isaac is certainly intellectually dishonest in his self promotion or under the influence of the Dunning-Kruger effect is hard to assess.
There is some evidence weighing on the side of him being overtly intellectually dishonest:
- Blocking critics
- Promotion of Humpty Dumptyism
- Pressing for self promotion (by spamming larger youtubers for debate while refusing debate and discussion with others)
Whether any of these is a smoking gun depends to a large degree on the precise definition of intellectual honesty at hand.
However, any intelligent person promoting this argument who knows its problems is undoubtedly guilty of intellectual dishonesty.
Is It Always Important to Root Out Logical Imperfection?
There is a "The ends justify the means" argument to be made in favor of tolerating logical imperfection of any kind if it yields better results.
The position that we must, for example, lie to a murderer about the location of his victim (contra what Kant indicated) is reasonable and broadly accepted (and one of the easiest intuitive arguments against absolutist deontology).
It may be a good thing for bright young individuals without formal philosophical training to do their best to think for themselves and present the most rationally compelling arguments they can think of in favour of veganism. It would of course be best if they were mature enough to be able to then take criticism and improve their arguments, but the world is an imperfect place.
In the context of those arguments maturing, it is possible that there are benefits of leaving those who make logically imperfect arguments alone despite their flaws -- perhaps like telling a child that his or her drawings are good (or at least not telling him or her that they are trash, on complex aesthetic grounds that he or she does not understand). Such promotion or at least tolerance could build confidence and inspire others to join in, while excessive criticism can be stifling.
Some are of the view, however, that when there is a failure to improve those arguments and poor reaction to criticism, the benefit of that learning and experimentation is lost and the potential development that may once have justified the confidence building "white omission to criticize / continue criticism" is lost with it. A failure to recognize when this has occurred and when an argument has taken on a toxic life of its own results in a buildup of these ego driven fallacy cults and a serious signal to noise ratio issue where bad arguments become more prominent because they are easy and over hyped by their advocates (Contrary to popular belief, good arguments do not always rise to the top: note cult personalities like Stefan Molyneux, and their various arguments for their pet ethical systems). There is a very real danger of creating monsters with good intentions and a failure of honesty.
Outside of a reasonable learning curve, actually promoting - or even just tolerating? - arguments that are obviously wrong on the internet where intelligent carnists can get to them and discredit veganism as a whole by association is deeply problematic (Consider something like Pascal's wager, and how many new Atheists are sure there is no god because some poor arguments for theism are flawed).
We would need strong evidence, and evidence that looks at not just the immediate consequences but also the knock-on effects, that the good of bad arguments outweighs the harm they do to the credibility of the movement. Raw Til' 4 was superficially very popular, but it also did a lot of damage: it's hard to assess the real outcome of these pseudophilosophical and pseudoscientific forms of advocacy.
As such, even if there may be some conceivable benefit to tolerating logical imperfection, it is appropriate to err on the side of logical perfection.
Some apologists of this particular kind of pro-vegan logical imperfection believe the interaction of Isaac and other proponents of NTT with their intended audience suggest that the weighty force of arguments like that from less able humans (or 'marginal cases') is indeed being communicated in these discussions, despite the deductive invalidity of its form. They are not convinced that the fact that NTT is not deductively valid has proven to be a serious impediment in these discussions.
One interpretation is that, lacking evidence to prove #NameTheTrait is more harmful than beneficial, these apologists err on the side of anybody making a vegan argument no matter if it is honest or not, valid or not, or science or pseudoscience.
The failure to recognize a bias here is probably in itself a form of intellectual dishonesty (of course, depending on the nuance of the definition).
We can't prove they are wrong, obviously, because the evidence just isn't in for this particular case; but we can make a compelling inductive case against it: look at the history of religion, or any other "bullshit" on the internet. Anchoring veganism to an argument like this, even just on youtube, and even if it has short term benefit, is likely to be extremely harmful due to the general distaste for dishonesty and how adeptly opponents of the cause can use those arguments against us.
If these people wish to err on the side of using their energy to defend those making arguments that some feel are bad and offer an alternative perspective to those who are criticizing them, that is their prerogative. But on this wiki it is our policy to always err on the side of logical perfection.
In response, those who wish to share an alternative perspective might worry about the extent to which they ipso facto get labeled as 'apologists' and are accused of 'attacking' those who have a different view. They also might not understand why there is such worry about a cult and hijacking of vegan youtube by someone who has only 13,000 followers.
They might also be fine with the idea that discussions of where the burden of proof should lie as to whether the use of NTT by Isaac and other proponents of it does more good than harm should be moved to a Philosophical Vegan forum post. They might, however, also be glad to make an initial attempt to shoulder this burden. On the good side of the ledger, they might refer the reader to such things as videos of debates between individuals like Isaac, Richard, and OGMIzen, in which they use NTT against carnists. They might also note that some of these debates seem to have originated from the viewing of written versions of NTT (in which it is not only spoken but laid out in premise-conclusion form). They might note such things as the overwhelming positive reception of the arguments of the proponents of NTT in the comments sections of these videos, even by carnists, the number of individuals saying that they are now going vegan, the number of individuals saying that they are followers of the carnist debate opponents but conceding that they could not adequately respond to the argument, which they found forceful, and so on. It is of course true that comments on Youtube videos are not always sincere, but this still seems to have direct evidentiary force, especially if there is little or no evidence on the other side. Those who share the alternative perspective on the value / disvalue of bright young people without formal philosophical training using NTT in discussions with other bright young people without formal philosophical training who are open to the force of compelling arguments (for instance in the "skeptic" and "anti-SJW" communities), and should thus be good audiences for vegan outreach, might also observe that there does not appear to be any such direct evidence of any harmful effects from discussions of NTT among bright, young individuals who lack formal philosophical backgrounds. They might moreover argue that the analogies to Raw Til 4 are not compelling, because if someone can actually understand why NTT is not deductively valid, she will ispo facto be in a position to see just how substantively unreasonable one would have to be to accept the premises and deny the conclusion. There was no such similarity with Raw Til 4, in that understanding why it was pseudoscience did not ipso facto make one aware of an even more rigorously well grounded argument for veganism. On the strength of this, and foregoing observations about the extent to which in practice presentations of NTT (including presentations of it in writing in premise-conclusion form) communicate something like the strong rational force of the argument from less able humans / marginal cases, they might conclude that lumping the sincere efforts of non-formally-philosophically-trained young people which carry the force of other sound arguments should not be lumped in with pseudoscience, religion, or other "bullshit on the internet". They might agree the entire set of vegan advocates, and especially those with philosophical training, can of course do better by not "anchoring" veganism to NTT, but observe that there is no direct evidence of this happening, and there are no reasons to suspect that this could happen. They might also make the point that those who are concerned about the number of young vegan advocates using NTT rather than what they regard as better arguments for the purpose in question should do more to help bring these arguments to young people and make it clear to them why these are better arguments for their purposes (see below). Those of this perspective on the value / disvalue of young people using NTT might agree that this article - at least if put in a less hostile tone, and the links to candidates for better such arguments that are under development - are a good place to start. But they might observe that if young people are out there trying to advocate for veganism with their fellows, it does not seem helpful to them simply to chastise them (especially for failing to abide by technical logical principles of which they are aware, and the point of which they do not initially see) without doing more to foreground how they are supposed to do better and explain to them why what what one proposes as better arguments for their purposes really are better for their purposes.
You should Present your own argument
Some who hold this view also feel that, if others are concerned that there is a better argument that can be used for purposes similar to those for which Isaac and others have used NTT (e.g. a version of the argument from less able humans / 'marginal cases'), and they are concerned that the cause of veganism could be better championed by making this argument instead, that they should attempt to reach a broad audience using that argument. From this perspective, much of the effort spent criticizing the attempts of young individuals (who incidentally are clearly not interested in such criticism) to do effective vegan outreach in the best way that they can might be better spent doing even more effective outreach of the kind that said young individuals have been attempting.
As we have explained to those who are reading this wiki, these arguments already exist. Our goal here is to ensure they are preferred.
It is a naively optimistic assumption that people can just throw ideas out there and the best will win. The best will not win: the laziest and most emotionally appealing to activists who make assumptions of their efficacy based on their own bases will win.
If there aren't any vegans present to debunk these bad arguments, we lose the ability to act as a counter-point to the carnist perspective on them; and that is already growing as #NameTheTrait is catching on, and it won't always come with a "but there are good vegan messages too" caveat.
We will ultimately be presenting arguments here, and we already have an article outlining some Arguments for veganism. But it's much more urgent to put out a fire in the village square than to work on building new houses. If we wait too long, it could be too late.
As already explained, extensive effort was already made at private discourse.
However, if anybody has had more success and can extract some concessions from Isaac, we would be glad to hear that the fire is under control and that we can devote effort elsewhere.
Those who hold the view that concerns about NTT's deleterious effects are exaggerated might be very glad that information is being shared about its logical shortcomings and that the text of arguments without those shortcomings is in the process of being linked to these discussions. But they might attempt to clarify that, if critics are so concerned about NTT being popularized on Youtube at the expense of better arguments for the same purpose, it would be nice if these critics would undertake some popularization of these better arguments, perhaps on Youtube. They might agree that it would be naive to think that the sheer superior rational force of better arguments would cause them to spread - but that this is all the more reason for those who find it dangerous that NTT is being used in the place of them to do more to actively spread the better arguments, beyond begin the task of explaining why they are better on this wiki. This is sincere - it seems for instance that in an early debate Vegan Gains took the wording of NTT from Isaac in the comments section, not only because he's a long-time supporter of Isaac, but because he really was looking for a short convincing ethical argument that gets the rational force across quickly and efficiently. It at the very least had the practical drawback of the second premise being pretty difficult for many people to comprehend on the fly. If there was something better to offer (and proponents of this view would be inclined to agree that there is) it really would be good to make it available to people for such contexts.
