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− | #title Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans
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− | #author US Senate
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− | #date 1976
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− | #source Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, S. Rep. No. 755, Book ll, 94th Congress, Second Session.
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− | #lang en
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− | #pubdate 2024-06-22T18:01:14
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− | #topics Ted’s reading interests & influences
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− | #notes Footnote 94 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "Ordering Field Offices to gather information".
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− | <br>Footnote 51 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "Additional telegrams expressing approval of".
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− | <br>Footnote 232 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "In fact, the FBI had already used".
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− | <br>Endnote 77 was missing from the source PDF after endnote 76 ending with "There had been rumors about a "peace ticket" headed by Dr. King and Benjamin Spock.".
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− | <br>Footnote 402 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "Reports on all Key Black Extremists were to be".
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− | <br>Footnotes 481 & 482 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "Informants were used to gather more information".
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− | <br>Footnote 34 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "Warrantless mail opening and surreptitious".
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− | <br>Footnote 514 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "In February 1965, President Johnson asked Attorney".
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− | <br>Footnote 664 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "The FBI recently abolished completely the administrative index".
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− | <br>Footnote 35 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "program came up because if you have anything in the FBI".
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− | <br>Footnote 42 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "You are also cautioned that the nature of this new".
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− | * Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans
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− | <center>
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− | <strong>BOOK II</strong>
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− | </center>
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− | <center>
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− | FINAL REPORT
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− | </center>
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− | OF THE
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− | <center>
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− | SELECT COMMITTEE
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− | <br>TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
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− | </center>
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− | WITH RESPECT TO
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− | <center>
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− | INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
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− | <br>UNITED STATES SENATE
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− | </center>
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− | TOGETHER WITH
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− | <center>
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− | ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE
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− | <br>VIEWS
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− | </center>
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− | APRIL 26 (legislative day, April 14), 1976
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− | SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
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− | <br>WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
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− | <center>
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− | FRANK CHURCH, Idaho, <em>Chairman
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− | <br></em> JOHN G. TOWER, Texas, <em>Vice Chairman</em>
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− | </center>
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− | <br>
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− | <center>
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− | William G. Miller, <em>Staff Director
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− | <br></em> Fbbdebick A O. Schwarz, Jr., <em>Chief Counsel
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− | <br></em> Curtis R. Smothers, <em>Counsel to the Minority
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− | <br></em> Audrey Hatby, <em>Clerk of the Committee</em>
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− | </center>
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− | (n>
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− | * Letter of Transmittal
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− | On behalf of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, and pursuant to the mandate of Senate Resolution 21, I am transmitting herewith to the Senate the volume of the Committee’s Final Report which presents the results of the Committee’s investigation into Federal domestic intelligence activities.
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− | The Committee’s findings and conclusions concerning abuses in intelligence activity and weaknesses in the system of accountability and control are amply documented. I believe they make a compelling case for substantial reform. The recommendations section of this volume sets forth in detail the Committee’s proposals for reforms necessary to protect the right of Americans. The facts revealed by the Committee’s inquiry into the development of domestic intelligence activity are outlined in the balance of the volume.
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− | I would add one principal comment on the results of the Committee’s inquiry: The root cause of the excesses which our record amply demonstrates has been failure to apply the wisdom of the constitutional system of checks and balances to intelligence activities. Our experience as a nation has taught us that we must place our trust in laws, and not solely in men. The founding fathers foresaw excess as the inevitable consequence of granting any part of government unchecked power. This has been demonstrated in the intelligence field where, too often, constitutional principles were subordinated to a pragmatic course of permitting desired ends to dictate and justify improper means.
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− | Our recommendations are designed to place intelligence activities within the constitutional scheme for controlling government power.
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− | The members of this Committee have served with utmost diligence and dedication. We have had 126 Full Committee meetings, scores of other sessions at which Senators presided at depositions for the taking of testimony, and over 40 subcommittee meetings devoted to drafting the two volumes of our final report. I thank each and everyone of my colleagues for their hard work and for their determination that the job be done fully and fairly.
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− | John Tower’s service as Vice Chairman was essential to our effectiveness from start to finish. This inquiry could have been distracted by partisan argument over allocating the blame for intelligence excesses. Instead, we have unanimously concluded that intelligence problems are far more fundamental. They are not the product of any single administration, party, or man.
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− | At the outset of this particular volume, special mention is also due to Senator Walter F. Mondale for his chairmanship of the subcommittee charged with drafting the final report on domestic intelligence activity. During our hearings, Senator Mondale helped to bring into focus the threats posed to the rights of American citizens. He and his
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− | <center>
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− | (hi)
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− | </center>
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− | domestic subcommittee colleagues—Senator Howard Baker, as ranking Minority member, and Senators Philip Hart, Robert Morgan and Richard Schweiker—deserve great credit for the complete and compelling draft which they presented to the Full Committee.
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− | The staff of the Committee has worked long, hard and well. Without their work over the past year—and during many long nights and weekends—the Committee could not have come close to coping with ’ its massive job. I commend and thank them all. The staff members whose work was particularly associated with this volume and its supplementary detailed reports are listed in Appendix C.
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− | <center>
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− | Frank Church,
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− | </center>
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− | <center>
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− | <em>Chairman.</em>
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− | </center>
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− | <br>
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− | * Preface
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− | In January 1975, the Senate resolved to establish a Committee to: conduct an investigation and study of governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities and the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government.[1]
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− | This Committee was organized shortly thereafter and has conducted a year-long investigation into the intelligence activities of the United States Government, the first substantial inquiry into the intelligence community since World War II.
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− | The inquiry arose out of allegations of substantial wrongdoing by intelligence agencies on behalf of the administrations which they served. A deeper concern underlying the investigation was whether this Government’s intelligence activities were governed and controlled consistently with the fundamental principles of American constitutional government—that power must be checked and balanced and that the preservation of liberty requires the restraint of laws, and not simply the good intentions of men.
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− | Our investigation has confirmed that properly controlled and lawful intelligence is vital to the nation’s interest. A strong and effective intelligence system serves, for example, to monitor potential military threats from the Soviet Union and its allies, to verify compliance with international agreements such as SALT, and to combat espionage and international terrorism. These, and many other necessary and proper functions are performed by dedicated and hard working employees of the intelligence community.
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− | The Committee’s investigation has, however, also confirmed substantial wrongdoing. And it has demonstrated that intelligence activities have not generally been governed and controlled in accord with the fundamental principles of our constitutional system of government.
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− | The task faced by this Committee was to propose effective measures to prevent intelligence excesses, and at the same time to propose sound guidelines and oversight procedures with which to govern and control legitimate activities.
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− | Having concluded its investigation, the Committee issues its reports[2] for the purposes of:
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− | providing a fair factual basis for informed Congressional and public debate on critical issues affecting the role of governmental intelligence activities in a free society; and recommending such legislative and executive action as, in the judgment of the Committee, is appropriate to prevent recurrence of past abuses and to insure adequate coordination, control and oversight of the nation’s intelligence resources, capabilities, and activities.
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− | <right>
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− | f
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− | </right>
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− | ** A. The Committee’s Mandate -
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− | In elaboration of the broad mandate set forth at the outset of this Report, the Senate charged the Committee with investigating fourteen specific “matters or questions” and with reporting the “full facts” on them. The fourteen enumerated matters and questions concern: (i) what kind of activities have been—and should be—undertaken by intelligence agencies; (ii) whether those activities conform to law and the Constitution; and (iii) how intelligence agencies have been— and should be—coordinated, controlled and overseen.[3]
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− | In addition to investigating the “full facts” with respect to such matters, the Committee was instructed to determine:
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− | Whether any of the existing laws of the United States are inadequate, either in their provisions or manner of enforcement, to safeguard the rights of American citizens, to improve executive and legislative control of intelligence and related activities and to resolve uncertainties as to the authority of United States intelligence and related agencies. [Id., Sec. 2 (12)]
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− | ** B. The Major Questions
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− | Our investigation addressed the structure, history, activities and policies of America’s most important intelligence agencies. The Committee looked beyond the operation of individual agencies to examine common themes and patterns inherent in intelligence operations. In the course of its investigation, the Committee has sought to answer three broad questions:
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− | First, whether domestic intelligence activities have been consistent with law and with the individual liberties guaranteed to American citizens by the Constitution.
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− | Second, whether America’s foreign intelligence activities have served the national interest in a manner consistent with the nation’s ideals and with national purposes.
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− | Third, whether the institutional procedures for directing and controlling intelligence agencies have adequately ensured their compliance with policy and law, and whether those procedures have been based upon the system of checks and balances among the branches of government required by our Constitution.
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− | .. The Committee fully subscribes to the premise that intelligence agencies perform a necessary and proper function. The Preamble to the Constitution states that our government was created, in part, to <em>i</em> “insure domestic tranquility [and] provide for the common defense.” Accurate and timely intelligence can and does help meet those goals. The Committee is also mindful, however, of the danger which intelligence collection, and intelligence operations, may pose for a society grounded in democratic principles. The Preamble to our Constitution also declares that our government was created to “secure the blessings of liberty” and to “establish justice”. If domestic intelligence agencies ignore those principles, they may threaten the very values that form the foundation of our society. Similarly, if the government conducts foreign intelligence operations overseas which are inconsistent with our national ideals, our reputation, goals, and influence abroad may be undercut.
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− | ** C. The Nature of the Committee’s Investigation
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− | *** 1. Selection of Agencies, Programs and Cases To Emphasize
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− | Necessarily, the Committee had to be selective. To investigate everything relevant to intelligence—and even everything relevant to the fundamental issues on which we had decided to focus—would take forever. Our job was to discover—and suggest solutions for—the major problems “at the earliest practical date”.[4]
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− | Accordingly, the Committee had to choose the particular Governmental entities upon which we would concentrate and then further had to choose particular cases to investigate in depth.
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− | Many agencies, departments or bureaus of the Federal Government have an intelligence function. Of these, the Committee spent the overwhelming preponderance of its energies on five:
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− | The Federal Bureau of Investigation; The Central Intelligence Agency; The National Security Agency; The national intelligence components of the Defense Department (other than NS A); and The National Security Council and its component parts.[5]
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− | The agencies upon which the Committee concentrated are those whose powers are so great and whose practices were so extensive that they must be understood in order fairly to judge whether the intelligence system of the United States needs reform and change.
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− | Having selected the agencies to emphasize, the Committee also had to select representative programs and policies on which to concentrate. There were many more possible issues and allegations to investigate than could be covered fully and fairly. The principles which guided our choices were:
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− | (1) More is learned by investigating tens of programs and incidents in depth rather than hundreds superficially. Our goal was to understand causes and, where appropriate, to suggest solutions.
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− | (2) Cases most likely to produce general lessons should receive the most attention.
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− | (3) Programs were examined from each administration beginning with Franklin Roosevelt’s. This assured understanding of the historical context within which intelligence activities have developed. Fundamental issues concerning the conduct and character of the nation deserve nonpartisan treatment. It has become clear from our inquiry, moreover, that intelligence excesses, at home and abroad, have been found in every administration. They are not the product of any single party, administration, or man.
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− | *** 2. Limitations and Strengths
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− | (a) <em>The Focus on Problem Areas</em>
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− | The intelligence community has had broad responsibilitv for activities beyond those which we investigated as possibly “illegal, improper, or unethical”. Our reports primarily address problem areas and the command and control question generallv. However, the intelligence community performs vital tasks outside the areas on which our investigation concentrated. This point must be kept in mind in fairness to the agencies, and to their employees who have devoted their careers to the nation’s service. Moreover, one of many reasons for checking intelligence excesses is to restore the confidence, good name, and effectiveness of intelligence agencies so that they may better serve the nation in the future.[6]
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− | (5) <em>Caution on Questions of Individual “Guilt" or “Innocence”</em>
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− | A Senate Committee is not a prosecutor, a grand jury or a court. It is far better suited to determine how things went wrong and what can be done to prevent their going wrong again, than to resolve disputed questions of individual “guilt” or “innocence”. For the resolution of those questions we properly rely on the courts.
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− | Of course, to understand the past in order to better propose guidance for the future, the Committee had to investigate the facts underlying charges of wrongdoing. Facts involve people. Therefore, the Committee has necessarily had to determine what particular individuals appear to have done and, on occasion, to make judgments on their responsibility. We have, however, recognized our limitations and attempted to be cautious in reaching those judgments; the reader should be similarly cautious in evaluating our judgments.
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− | The Committee’s hope is that this report will provoke a national debate not on “Who did it?”, but on “How did it happen and what can be done to keep it from happening again ?”
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− | <br>
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− | (c) <em>Ability to See the Full Scope of the Problem</em>
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− | This Committee examined a very broad range of issues and compiled a hughe factual record [7] which covers:
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− | (i) the origins and development of intelligence programs over seven administrations;
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− | ’ (ii) intelligence activities both at home and abroad; and
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− | (111) the programs and practices of the several most important intelligence agencies.
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− | ( Thus, for the first time, based upon the Committee’s investigation, it is possible to examine the patterns of intelligence activity and not! merely isolated incidents.
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− | The issues for the country to resolve are best posed by looking, as we have done, at the aggregate, rather than at particular incidents in isolation. Neither the dangers, nor the causes, nor the possible solutions can be fairly evaluated without considering both the broad patterns of intelligence activity which emerge from examining particular cases over the past several decades, and the cumulative effect of activities of different agencies. For example, individual cases or programs of governmental surveillance may constitute interference with constitutionally protected rights of privacy and dissent. But only by examining the cumulative impact of many such programs can the danger of “Big Brother Government” be realistically assessed. Only by understanding the full breadth of governmental efforts against dissenters can one weigh the extent to which those efforts may chill lawful assembly and free expression.
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− | ** D. The Purpose of the Committee’s Findings and Recommendations
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− | The central goal of the Committee is to make informed recommendations—based upon a detailed and balanced factual investigation—about:
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− | (1) which intelligence activities ought to be permitted, and which should be restricted or prohibited; and
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− | (2) what controls and organizational structure are needed to keep intelligence operations both effective and consistent with this country’s most basic values and fundamental interests.
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− | The first step for this Committee, its successor oversight Committees and the Congress as a whole is to devise the legal framework within which intelligence agencies can, in the future, be guided, checked and operate both properly and efficiently. A basic law—a charter of powers, duties, and limitations—does not presently exist for some of the most important intelligence activities <em>(e.g.,</em> FBI’s domestic intelligence or NSA) or, where it does exist, as with CIA, it is vague, conflicting and incomplete.
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− | The absence of laws and the lack of clarity in those that exist has had the effect, if not the intention, of keeping vital issues of national importance away from public debate.
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− | This Committee’s job was to pose the issues that have been ignored for decades. The technique for doing so was to investigate and then to propose basic laws and other rules as to what can and cannot be done, and on the appropriate command and control structure for intelligence activities.
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− | There are many other questions, such as the efficiency, cost and quality of intelligence, which are also of vital national importance. We have also examined these matters and consider them in this report. But, the main emphasis of our investigation was on what should be done and not on how it should be done. We seek in our recommendations to lay the underlying legal foundation, and the control and oversight structure for the intelligence community. If these are sound, then we have faith that the other questions will be answered correctly in the future. But if the foundation is unsound or remains unfinished—or if intelligence agencies continue to operate under a structure in which executive power is not effectively checked and examined—then we will have neither quality intelligence nor a society which is free at home and respected abroad.
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− | [1] Senate Resolution 21, January 27, 1975, Sec. 1. The full text of S. Res. 21 is printed at Appendix A.
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− | [2] The Committee’s final report is divided into two main volumes. The balance of this volume covers domestic activities of intelligence agencies and their activities overseas to the extent that they affect the constitutional rights of Americans. The other volume covers all other activities of United States foreign and military intelligence agencies.
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− | <br>
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− | <br>The Committee has previously issued the reports and hearing records set forth in Appendix B.
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− | [3] S. Res. 21, Sec. 2. Examples of the “matters or questions” include:
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− | <br>
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− | <br>“The conduct of domestic intelligence or counterintelligence operations against United States citizens” by the FBI or other agencies. [Sec. 2(2)];
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− | <br>
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− | <br>“The violation or suspected violation of law” by intelligence agencies [Sec. 2(10)];
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− | <br>
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− | <br>Allegations of CIA “domestic” activity, and the relationship between CIA responsibility to protect sources and methods and the prohibition of its exercising law enforcement powers or internal security functions [Sec. 2(1), (6)];
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− | <br>
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− | <br>“The origin and disposition of the so-called Huston Plan” [Sec. 2(7) (9)];
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− | <br>
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− | <br>“The extent and necessity’ of “covert Intelligence activities abroad [Sec. 2(14)];
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− | <br>
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− | <br>Whether there is excessive duplication or inadequate coordination among intelligence agencies [Sec. 2(4) (13)] and
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− | <br>
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− | <br>The “nature and extent” of executive oversight [Sec. 2(7) (9)] and the “need for improved, strengthened or consolidated’ Congressional oversight [Sec. 2(7)(9)(11)].
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− | [4] S. Res. 21; Sec. 5.
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− | [5] Substantial work was also done on intelligence activities of the Internal Revenue Service and the State Department.
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− | [6] Indeed, it is likely that in some cases the high priority given to activities that appear questionable has reduced the attention given to other vital matters. Thus, the FBI, for example, has placed more emphasis on domestic dissent than on organized crime and, according to some, let its efforts against foreign spies suffer because of the amount of time spent checking up on American protest groups.
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− | [7] Some 800 witnesses were examined, approximately 250 under oath in executive sessions, 50 in public sessions, and the balance in interviews. The aggregate number of transcript pages is almost 30,000. Approximately 110,000 document pages were obtained from the various intelligence agencies (still more were preliminarily reviewed at the agencies), as well as from the White House, presidential libraries, and other sources.
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− | <br>
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− | <br>Over the course of its investigation the Committee has had generally good cooperation in obtaining information from the intelligence agencies and the Administration. Of course, there were problems, particularly at the outset—compliance took too long; bureaucratic rules such as the “third agency rule” (which required agencies other than the custodian of the document to review it if they were mentioned) were frustrating. But our experience suggests that those problems can be worked out.
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− | <br>
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− | <br>The most important lesson to be derived from our experience is that effective oversight is impossible without regular access to the underlying working documents of the intelligence community. Top level briefings do not adequately describe the realities. For that the documents are a necessary supplement and at times the only source.
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− | <br>
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− | * Contents
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− | <right>
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− | Page
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− | </right>
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− | Letter of Transmittal
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− | Preface
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− | 1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY________________________ 1
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− | A. Intelligence Activity: A New Form of Governmental Power to Impair Citizens’ Rights___________________________________________________ 2
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− | B. The Questions_________________________________________ 4
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− | C. Summary of the Main Problems___________________________ 5
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− | 1. The Number of People Affected by Domestic Intelligence Activity 6
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− | 2. Too Much Information Is Collected For Too Long-- 7
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− | 3. Covert Action and the Use of Illegal or Improper Means_ 10
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− | a. Covert Action___________________________ 10
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− | (1) The FBI’s COINTELPRO____________ 10
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− | (2) Martin Luther King, Jr_______________ 11
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− | b. Illegal or Improper Means__________________ 12
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− | (1) Mail Opening______________________ 12
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− | (2) NSA Monitoring___________________ 12
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− | (3) Electronic Surveillance______________ 12
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− | (4) Political Abuse_____________________ 13
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− | (5) Surreptitious Entries_________________ 13
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− | (6) Informants________________________ 13
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− | 4. Ignoring the Law________________________________ 13
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− | 5. Deficiencies in Accountability and Control____________ 14
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− | 6. The Adverse Impact of Improper Intelligence Activity__ 15
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− | a. General Efforts to Discredit_________________ 15
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− | b. Media Manipulation_______________________ 15
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− | c. Distorting Data to Influence Government Policy and Public Perceptions______________________________________ 16
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− | d. “Chilling” First Amendment Rights___________ 17
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− | e. Preventing the Free Exchange of Ideas_________ 17
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− | 7. Cost and Value_________________________________ 18
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− | <right>
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− | 11. THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE, 1936 to 1976: A. Summary 21
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− | </right>
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− | 1. The Lesson: History Repeats Itself_______________ 21
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− | 2. The Pattern: Broadening Through Time___________ 21
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− | 3. Three Periods of Growth for Domestic Intelligence—. 22
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− | 8. Establishing a Permanent Domestic Intelligence Structure: 1936-1945 23
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− | 1. Background: The Stone Standard___________________ 23
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− | 2. Main Developments of the 1936-1945 Period_________ 24
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− | <right>
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− | . 3. Domestic Intelligence Authority: Vague and Conflicting Executive Orders 24
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− | </right>
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− | a. The Original Roosevelt Orders_____ L_________ 25
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− | b. Orders in 1938-39: The Vagueness of “Subversive Activities” and “Potential” Crimes. 25
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− | c. Orders 1940-43: The Confusion Continues______ 27
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− | 4. The Role of Congress_________________________ 28
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− | a. Executive Avoidance of Congress_________ 28
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− | b. Congress Declines to Confront the Issue------------ 29
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− | (xi)
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− | <br>
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− | xn
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− | <br>
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− | <right>
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− | II. THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE—Continued B. Establishing a Permanent Domestic Intelligence Structure— 1936-1945 Continued
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− | </right>
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− | 5. Scope of Domestic Intelligence----------------------
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− | a. Beyond Criminal Investigations-------------
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− | b. “Infiltration” Investigations------------------
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− | c. Partisan Use___________________ ------
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− | d. Centralized Authority: FBI and Military
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− | <right>
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− | Intelligence -
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− | </right>
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− | <right>
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− | 6. Control by the Attorney General: Compliance and Resistance_________________________ — -------
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− | </right>
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− | <right>
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− | 7. Intrusive Techniques: Questionable Authorization — a. Wiretaps: A Strained Statutory Interpretation_____
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− | </right>
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− | <right>
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− | b. Bugging, Mail Opening, and Surreptitious Entry_______________________________
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− | </right>
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− | <right>
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− | C. Domestic Intelligence in the Cold War Era: 1946-1963
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− | </right>
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− | 1. Main Developments of the 1946-1963 Period-------
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− | 2. Domestic Intelligence Authority---------------------
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− | a. Anti-Communist Consensus-----------------
| |
− | | |
− | b. The Federal Employee Loyalty-Security Pro
| |
− | | |
− | |
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− | | |
− | <br>
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− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | <right>
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− | gram___________________________
| |
− | </right>
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− | | |
− | <right>
| |
− | (1) Origins of the Program
| |
− | </right>
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− | | |
− | <right>
| |
− | (2) Breadth of Investigations
| |
− | </right>
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− | | |
− | <right>
| |
− | (3) FBI Control of Loyalty-Security Investigations____________________
| |
− | </right>
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− | | |
− | <right>
| |
− | c. Executive Directives: Lack of Guidance and
| |
− | </right>
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− | | |
− | |
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− | <br>
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− | 3.
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− | | |
− | |
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− | <br>
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− | | |
− | | |
− | Controls____________________________
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− | | |
− | |
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− | | |
− | <br>
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− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | Scope of Domestic Intelligence, a. “Subversive Activities”
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− | | |
− | |
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− | | |
− | <br>
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− | | |
− | | |
− | 4.
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− | |
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− | | |
− | <br>
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− | | |
− | 5.
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− | | |
− | |
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− | | |
− | <br>
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− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | (1) The Number of Investigations------
| |
− | | |
− | (2) Vague and Sweeping Standards----
| |
− | | |
− | (3) COMINFIL____________ .____
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− | | |
− | <right>
| |
− | (4) Exaggeration of Communist Influence________________________
| |
− | </right>
| |
− | | |
− | b. “Racial Matters” and “Hate Groups”----- ..
| |
− | | |
− | c. FBI Political Intelligence for the White
| |
− | | |
− | <right>
| |
− | House______________________
| |
− | </right>
| |
− | | |
− | d. IRS Investigation of Political Organizations. .
| |
− | | |
− | Accountability and Control--------------------------
| |
− | | |
− | a. Emergency Detention Act_____________
| |
− | | |
− | b. Withholding Information---------------------
| |
− | | |
− | c. CIA Domestic Activity-----------------------
| |
− | | |
− | (1) Vague Controls on CIA-------------
| |
− | | |
− | (2) Drug Testing and Cover Programs..
| |
− | | |
− | Intrusive Techniques---------------------------------
| |
− | | |
− | a. Communication Interception: CIA and NSA.
| |
− | | |
− | b. FBI Covert Techniques----------------------
| |
− | | |
− | (1) Electronic Surveillance-------------
| |
− | | |
− | (2) “Black Bag” Jobs--------------------
| |
− | | |
− | (3) Mail Opening________________
| |
− | | |
− | c. Use of FBI Wiretaps_________________
| |
− | | |
− | |
| |
− | | |
− | <br>
| |
− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | 6. Domestic Covert Action------------------------------
| |
− | | |
− | a. COINTELPRO: Communist Party_______
| |
− | | |
− | b. Early Expansion of COINTELPRO./--------
| |
− | | |
− | <right>
| |
− | D. Intelligence and Domestic Dissent: 1964-1976--------------
| |
− | </right>
| |
− | | |
− | 1. Main Points During the 1964-1976 Period----------
| |
− | | |
− | 2. Scope of Domestic Intelligence----------------------
| |
− | | |
− | a. Domestic Protest and Dissent: FBI_______
| |
− | | |
− | |
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− | | |
− | <br>
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− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | <right>
| |
− | Page
| |
− | </right>
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− | 30
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− | 65
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− | 67
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− | 67
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− | 70
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− | | |
− | |
| |
− | | |
− | <br>
| |
− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | (1) Racial Intelligence____________
| |
− | | |
− | (2) “New Left” Intelligence________
| |
− | | |
− | b. FBI Informants_____________________
| |
− | | |
− | (1) Infiltration of the Klan_________
| |
− | | |
− | |
| |
− | | |
− | <br>
| |
− | | |
− | | |
− | | |
− | 72
| |
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− | 74
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− | 74
| |
− | | |
− | |
| |
− | | |
− | <br>
| |
− | | |
− | <br>
| |
− | | |
− | II. THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE—Continued
| |
− | | |
− | D. Intelligence and Domestic Dissent: 1964-1976—Continued
| |
− | | |
− | 2. Scope of Domestic Intelligence—Continued
| |
− | <br>b. FBI Informants—Continued
| |
− | | |
− | • (2) “Listening Posts” in the Black Com- <em>'Page</em>
| |
− | | |
− | munity__________________________ 75
| |
− | | |
− | (3) Infiltration of the “New Left”-------------- 76
| |
− | | |
− | c. Army Surveillance of Civilian Political Activity_ 77
| |
− | | |
− | d. Federal Encouragement of Local Police Intelligence 77
| |
− | | |
− | e. The Justice Department’s Interdivision Information Unit (IDIU) 78
| |
− | | |
− | f. COMINFIL Investigations: Overbreadth________ 81
| |
− | | |
− | 3. Domestic Intelligence Authority____________________ 82
| |
− | | |
− | a. FBI Intelligence___________________________ 82
| |
− | | |
− | b. Army Intelligence_________________________ 84
| |
− | | |
− | c. FBI Interagency Agreements_________________ 85
| |
− | | |
− | 4. Domestic Covert Action__________________________ 86
| |
− | | |
− | a. COINTELPRO___________________________ 86
| |
− | | |
− | (1) Klan and “White Hate”---------------------- 86
| |
− | | |
− | (2) “Black Nationalist” COINTELPRO. 87
| |
− | | |
− | (3) “New Left” COINTELPRO__________ 88
| |
− | | |
− | b. FBI Target Lists__________________________ 89
| |
− | | |
− | (1) “Rabble Rouser/Agitator” Index_______ 89
| |
− | | |
− | (2) “Key Activist” Program--------------------- 90
| |
− | | |
− | (3) “Key Black Extremist” Program_______ 91
| |
− | | |
− | (4) Security Index_____________________ 91
| |
− | | |
− | c. Internal Revenue Service Programs------------- 93
| |
− | | |
− | (1) Misuse by FBI and CIA__________ 93
| |
− | | |
− | (2) The Special Service Staff: IRS Targeting of Ideological Groups ____________________________ 94
| |
− | | |
− | 5. Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Dissent________ 96
| |
− | | |
− | a. Origins of CIA Involvement in “Internal Se
| |
− | | |
− | curity Functions”___ 96
| |
− | | |
− | b. CIA Intelligence About Domestic Political Groups 98
| |
− | | |
− | (1) CIA Response to FBI Requests__ 98
| |
− | | |
− | (2) Operation CHAOS 99
| |
− | | |
− | c. CIA Security Operations Within the United
| |
− | | |
− | States: Protecting “Sources” and “Methods”. 102
| |
− | | |
− | d. NSA Monitoring 104
| |
− | | |
− | ' 6. Intrusive Techniques______ 104
| |
− | | |
− | a. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance---------------- 105
| |
− | | |
− | (1) Executive Branch Restrictions on Electronic Surveillance: 1965-68... 105
| |
− | | |
− | (2) Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968. 106
| |
− | | |
− | (3) Supreme Court Restrictions on National Security Electronic Surveillance: 1972_____________________ 107
| |
− | | |
− | b. CIA Mail Opening_______________________ 107
| |
− | | |
− | c. Expansion of NSA Monitoring______________ 108
| |
− | | |
− | d. FBI Cutbacks___________________________ 109
| |
− | | |
− | (1) The Long Subcommittee Investigation_ 109
| |
− | | |
− | (2) Director Hoover’s Restrictions________ 110
| |
− | | |
− | 7. Accountability and Control_______________________ 111
| |
− | | |
− | a. The Huston Plan: A Domestic Intelligence Network 111
| |
− | | |
− | (1) Intelligence Community Pressures_____ 112
| |
− | | |
− | (2) The Interagency Committee Report.. 113
| |
− | | |
− | (3) Implementation___________________ 115
| |
− | <br>
| |
− | | |
− | II. THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE—Continued
| |
− | | |
− | D. Intelligence and Domestic Dissent: 1964-1976—Continued
| |
− | | |
− | 7. Accountability and Control—Continued <sup>Pu</sup>^<sup>e</sup>
| |
− | | |
− | b. Political Intelligence_____________________ 116
| |
− | | |
− | (1) Name Check Requests______________ 116
| |
− | | |
− | (2) Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, 1964 117
| |
− | | |
− | (3) By-Product of Foreign Intelligence Coverage 119
| |
− | | |
− | (4) The Surveillance of Joseph Kraft (1969) 121
| |
− | | |
− | (5) The “17” Wiretaps________________ 122
| |
− | | |
− | c. The Justice Department’s Internal Security Division 1_ 122
| |
− | | |
− | (1) The “new” Internal Security Division- 123
| |
− | | |
− | (2) The Sullivan-Mardian Relationship.. 124
| |
− | | |
− | d. The FBI’s Secret “Administrative Index”______ 125
| |
− | | |
− | 8. Reconsideration of FBI Authority 127
| |
− | | |
− | a. Developments in 1972-1974________________ 128
| |
− | | |
− | b. Recent Domestic Intelligence Authority_______ 131
| |
− | | |
− | 111. FINDINGS__________________________ 137
| |
− | | |
− | A. Major Finding: Violating and Ignoring the Law------------------- 137
| |
− | | |
− | Subfindings:
| |
− | | |
− | (a) Violating Statutory Law and Constitutional Rights 139
| |
− | | |
− | (b) Ignoring Illegal Issues______________________ 140
| |
− | | |
− | (c) Continuing Legal Activities----------------------------- 141
| |
− | | |
− | (d) Tightening Security for Illegal Activities------------- 146
| |
− | | |
− | (e) Concealing Illegal Activities_________________ 149
| |
− | | |
− | (f) Weakness of Internal Inspection_______________ 152
| |
− | | |
− | (g) Weakness of Oversight by Senior Administration Officials 157
| |
− | | |
− | III. FINDINGS—Continued: '<sup>P8ge</sup>
| |
− | | |
− | F. Major Finding: Inadequate Controls on Dissemination and Retention 253
| |
− | | |
− | Subfindings:
| |
− | | |
− | (a) Volunteering Irrelevant Information and responding Unquestioningly to Requests--------------------------------------------------------------- 254
| |
− | | |
− | (b) Excessive Dissemination____________________ 259
| |
− | | |
− | (c) Federal Employee Security Program------------------ 261
| |
− | | |
− | (d) FBI Retention of Sensitive, Derogatory, and
| |
− | | |
− | Illegally Obtained Information______________ 262
| |
− | | |
− | G. Major Finding: Deficiencies in Control and Accountability-- 265 Subfindings:
| |
− | | |
− | (a) Presidential Failure to Limit and Control Intelligence Activities 267
| |
− | | |
− | (b) Attorneys General Failure to Limit and Control FBI Intelligence Activities 270
| |
− | | |
− | (c) Encouraging Political Intelligence--------------------- 274
| |
− | | |
− | (d) Executive Failures to Inquire_________________ 275
| |
− | | |
− | (e) Congressional Failure to Oversee Intelligence Activity and Exert Legislative Control--------------- 277
| |
− | | |
− | (f) Intelligence Agencies Act with Insufficient Authorization 281
| |
− | | |
− | (g) Termination of Abusive Operations____________ 284
| |
− | | |
− | IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS------------------------------ 289
| |
− | | |
− | A. Conclusions 289
| |
− | | |
− | B. Principles Applied in Framing Recommendations and the
| |
− | | |
− | Scope of Recommendations___________________________ 292
| |
− | | |
− | C. Recommendations____________________________________ 296
| |
− | | |
− | 1. Intelligence Agencies Are Subject to the Rule of Law (Recommendations 1-3) 296
| |
− | | |
− | 2. United States Foreign and Military Agencies Should Be Precluded From Domestic Security Activities (Recommendations 4-27)---------- 297
| |
− | | |
− | a. Central Intelligence Agency (Recommendations 4-13) . 297
| |
− | | |
− | b. National Security Agency (Recommendations 14-19) 308
| |
− | | |
− | c. Military Service and Defense Department Investigative Agencies (Recommendations 20-26)______________ 310
| |
− | | |
− | 3. Non-Intelligence Agencies Should Be Barred From Domestic Security Activity (Recommendations 27-37)_________________ ---- 313
| |
− | | |
− | a. Internal Revenue Service (Recommendations 27-35) 313
| |
− | | |
− | b. Post Office (U.S. Postal Service) (Recommendations 36-37) 315
| |
− | | |
− | 4. Federal Domestic Security Activities Should Be Limited and Controlled to Prevent Abuses Without Hampering Criminal Investigations or Investigations of Foreign Espionage (Recommendations 38-69)_________ 316
| |
− | | |
− | a. Centralize Supervision, Investigative Responsibility, and the Use of Covert Techniques (Recommendations 38-39)----------- 316
| |
− | | |
− | b. Prohibitions (Recommendations 40-41)------------ 317
| |
− | | |
− | c. Authorized Scope of Domestic Security In
| |
− | | |
− | vestigations (Recommendations 42-49)---------- 318
| |
− | | |
− | d. Authorized Investigative Techniques (Recommendations 50-63) 324
| |
− | | |
− | e. Maintenance and Dissemination of Information (Recommendations 64-68) 330
| |
− | | |
− | f. Attorney General Oversight of the FBI, Including Termination of Investigations and Covert Techniques (Recommendation 69)-- 332
| |
− | | |
− | IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS—Continued <sup>Pa</sup>s<sup>e</sup>
| |
− | | |
− | C. Recommendations—Continued
| |
− | | |
− | 5. The Responsibility and Authority of the Attorney General for Oversight for Federal Domestic Security Activities must be clarified and General Counsel and Inspectors General of Intelligence Agencies Strengthened (Recommendations 70-86)__________________________________ 332
| |
− | | |
− | a. Attorney General Responsibility and Rela- ship With Other Intelligence Agencies (Recommendations 70-74)---------- 333
| |
− | | |
− | b. General Counsel and Inspectors General of Intelligence Agencies (Recommendations 75-81)______________ 333
| |
− | | |
− | c. Office of Professional Responsibility (Recommendation 82) 335
| |
− | | |
− | d. Director of the FBI and Assistant Directors
| |
− | | |
− | of the FBI (Recommendations 83-85)_____ 335
| |
− | | |
− | 6. Administrative Rulemaking and Increased Disclosure Should Be Required (Recommendations 86-89)________________ 336
| |
− | | |
− | a. Administrative Rulemaking (Recommendations 86-88) 336
| |
− | | |
− | b. Disclosure (Recommendations 89-90)_______ 336
| |
− | | |
− | 7. Civil Remedies Should Be Expanded (Recommendation 91) 336
| |
− | | |
− | 8. Criminal Penalties Should Be Enacted (Recommendation 92) 338
| |
− | | |
− | 9. The Smith Act and the Voorhis Act Should Either Be Repealed or Amended (Recommendation 93)________________________ 339
| |
− | | |
− | 10. The Espionage Statute Should Be Modernized (Recommendation 94) 339
| |
− | | |
− | 11. Broaden Access to Intelligence Agency Files Should Be Provided to GAO, as an Investigative Arm of the Congress (Recommendation 95) 339
| |
− | | |
− | 12. Congressional Oversight Should Be Intensified (Recommendation 96) 339
| |
− | | |
− | 13. Definitions____________________________________ 339
| |
− | | |
− | Appendix A: Senate Resolution 21__________________________________ 343
| |
− | | |
− | Appendix B: Previously Issued Hearings and Reports of Senate Select
| |
− | | |
− | <right>
| |
− | Committee________________________________________ 355
| |
− | </right>
| |
− | | |
− | Appendix C: Staff Acknowledgments_______________________________ 357
| |
− | | |
− | Additional Views:
| |
− | | |
− | Philip A. Hart_______________________________________________ 359
| |
− | | |
− | Robert Morgan______________________________________________ 363
| |
− | | |
− | Introduction to Separate Views of Senators John G. Tower, Howard
| |
− | | |
− | H. Baker, Jr., and Barry Goldwater____________________________ 367
| |
− | | |
− | John G. Tower______________________________________________ 369
| |
− | | |
− | Howard H. Baker, Jr__________________________________________ 373
| |
− | | |
− | Barry Goldwater_____________________________________________ 389
| |
− | | |
− | Charles McC. Mathias, Jr______________________________________ 395
| |
− | | |
− | <br>
| |
− | | |
− | * I. Introduction and Summary
| |
− | | |
− | The resolution creating this Committee placed greatest emphasis on whether intelligence activities threaten the "rights of American citizens."[1]
| |
− | | |
− | The critical question before the Committee was to determine how the fundamental liberties of the people can be maintained in the course of the Government's effort to protect their security. The delicate balance between these basic goals of our system of government is often difficult to strike, but it can, and must, be achieved. We reject the view that the traditional American principles of justice and fair play have no place in our struggle against the enemies of freedom. Moreover, our investigation has established that the targets of intelligence activity have ranged far beyond persons who could properly be characterized as enemies of freedom and have extended to a wide array of citizens engaging in lawful activity.
| |
− | | |
− | Americans have rightfully been concerned since before World War II about the dangers of hostile foreign agents likely to commit acts of espionage. Similarly, the violent acts of political terrorists can seriously endanger the rights of Americans. Carefully focused intelligence investigations can help prevent such acts. But too often intelligence has lost this focus and domestic intelligence activities have invaded individual privacy and violated the rights of lawful assembly and political expression. Unless new and tighter controls are established by legislation, domestic intelligence activities threaten to undermine our democratic society and fundamentally alter its nature.
| |
− | | |
− | We have examined three types of "intelligence" activities affecting the rights of American citizens. The first is intelligence collection -- such as infiltrating groups with informants, wiretapping, or opening letters. The second is dissemination of material which has been collected. The third is covert action designed to disrupt and discredit the activities of groups and individuals deemed a threat to the social order. These three types of "intelligence" activity are closely related in the practical world. Information which is disseminated by the intelligence community[2] or used in disruptive programs has usually been obtained through surveillance. Nevertheless, a division between collection, dissemination and covert action is analytically useful both in understanding why excesses have occurred in the past and in devising remedies to prevent those excesses from recurring.
| |
− | | |
− | <em>A.</em> <em>Intelligence Activity: A New Form of Governmental Power to Impair Citizens' Rights</em>
| |
− | | |
− | A tension between order and liberty is inevitable in any society. A Government must protect its citizens from those bent on engaging in violence and criminal behavior, or in espionage and other hostile foreign intelligence activity. Many of the intelligence programs reviewed in this report were established for those purposes. Intelligence work has, at times, successfully prevented dangerous and abhorrent acts, such as bombings and foreign spying, and aided in the prosecution of those responsible for such acts.
| |
− | | |
− | But, intelligence activity in the past decades has, all too often, exceeded the restraints on the exercise of governmental power which are imposed by our country's Constitution, laws, and traditions.
| |
− | | |
− | Excesses in the name of protecting security are not a recent development in our nation's history. In 1798, for example, shortly after the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution, the Allen and Sedition Acts were passed. These Acts, passed in response to fear of proFrench "subversion", made it a crime to criticize the Government.[3] During the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus. Hundreds of American citizens were prosecuted for anti-war statements during World War I, and thousands of "radical" aliens were seized for deportation during the 1920 Palmer Raids. During the Second World War, over the opposition of J. Edgar Hoover and military intelligence,[4] 120,000 Japanese-Americans were apprehended and incarcerated in detention camps.
| |
− | | |
− | Those actions, however, were fundamentally different from the intelligence activities examined by this Committee. They were generally executed overtly under the authority of a statute or a public executive order. The victims knew what was being done to them and could challenge the Government in the courts and other forums. Intelligence activity, on the other hand, is generally covert. It is concealed from its victims[5] and is seldom described in statutes or explicit executive orders. The victim may never suspect that his misfortunes are the intended result of activities undertaken by his government, and accordingly may have no opportunity to challenge the actions taken against him.
| |
− | | |
− | It is, of course, proper in many circumstances -- such as developing a criminal prosecution - - for the Government to gather information about a citizen and use it to achieve legitimate ends, some of which might be detrimental to the citizen. But in criminal prosecutions, the courts have struck a balance between protecting the rights of the accused citizen and protecting the society which suffers the consequences of crime. Essential to the balancing process are the rules of criminal law which circumscribe the techniques for gathering evidence[6] the kinds of evidence that may be collected, and the uses to which that evidence may be put. In addition, the criminal defendant is given an opportunity to discover and then challenge the legality of how the Government collected information about him and the use which the Government intends to make of that information.
| |
− | | |
− | This Committee has examined a realm of governmental information collection which has not been governed by restraints comparable to those in criminal proceedings. We have examined the collection of intelligence about the political advocacy and actions and the private lives of American citizens. That information has been used covertly to discredit the ideas advocated and to "neutralize" the actions of their proponents. As Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone warned in 1924, when he sought to keep federal agencies from investigating "political or other opinions" as opposed to "conduct . . . forbidden by the laws":
| |
− | | |
− | When a police system passes beyond these limits, it is dangerous to the proper administration of justice and to human liberty, which it should be our first concern to cherish.
| |
− | | |
− | . . . There is always a possibility that a secret police may become a menace to free government and free institutions because it carries with it the possibility of abuses of power which are not always quickly apprehended or understood.[7]
| |
− | | |
− | Our investigation has confirmed that warning. We have seen segments of our Government, in their attitudes and action, adopt tactics unworthy of a democracy, and occasionally reminiscent of the tactics of totalitarian regimes. We have seen a consistent pattern in which programs initiated with limited goals, such as preventing criminal violence or identifying foreign spies, were expanded to what witnesses characterized as "vacuum cleaners",[8] sweeping in information about lawful activities of American citizens.
| |
− | | |
− | The tendency of intelligence activities to expand beyond their initial scope is a theme which runs through every aspect of our investigative findings. Intelligence collection programs naturally generate ever-increasing demands for new data. And once intelligence has been collected, there are strong pressures to use it against the target.
| |
− | | |
− | The pattern of intelligence agencies expanding the scope of their activities was well described by one witness, who in 1970 had coordinated an effort by most of the intelligence community to obtain authority to undertake more illegal domestic activity:
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− | The risk was that you would get people who would be susceptible to political considerations as opposed to national security considerations, or would construe political considerations to be national security considerations, to move from the, kid with a bomb to the kid with a picket sign, and from the kid with the picket sign to the kid with the bumper sticker of the opposing candidate.
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− | In 1940, Attorney General Robert Jackson saw the same risk. He recognized that using broad labels like "national security" or "subversion" to invoke the vast power of the government is dangerous because there are "no definite standards to determine what constitutes a 'subversive activity, such as we have for murder or larceny." Jackson added:
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− | Activities which seem benevolent or helpful to wage earners, persons on relief, or those who are disadvantaged in the struggle for existence may be regarded as 'subversive' by those whose property interests might be burdened thereby. Those who are
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Round I Below is a glimpse into the lives of active longtime EF!ers and instrumental people who have moved on. Some names might be new to the whippersnappers, some may have been heard before (some you might wish you never had!)—what we lovingly refer to as the old guard of our movement, with some mid-guard in the mix. We asked the following questions: name, age, residency; first and last EF! Rendezvous; what you’re most known for; your wildest memory; what you’ve been doing lately; message to younger generations; if you’ll be coming to another Rondy; and any pseudonyms you wanna divulge. The following are excerpts from some of the answers we received. There were more responses than we had space for and they kept coming in past our deadline, so we chose a sampling. We will continue this feature into future issues throughout the year. Randall Restless Bozeman, Greater Yellowstone. First Rondy: 1986. Last: 1996. Helped to start the Cove/Mallard campaign, in opposing tion to a massive roadless area timber sale on the Nez Perce National Forest. “We mostly won that one.” Wildest memories? “Dang, where to begin? Maybe body-shots at the RRR in the Sanjuan Mountains. Or naked amoebas at the 1990 RRR in Montana. Or locking my neck with a U-lock to the axle of a loading machine in Murrelet Grove during Redwood Bummer... Or erecting North America’s first-ever tripod road blockade at Cove/Mallard, only to have the loggers light it on fire.” Lately: “Guiding touristas in Yellowstone. On the eco-front, working to stop the invasion of public lands by motorized morons, by documenting and exposing the damage these losers do to our public heritage.” Coming to another Rondy? “Probably not, but you never know where I might appear.” Message to the youth: “Fuck shit up.” Peggy Sue McRae Friday Harbor, Washington. First Rondy?, “mmm where was that?” Last: ’96. “I was proud of the Ecofeminist insert I put together and the Mona the Monkey-wrencher cover I designed for that issue. I wrote a “pagan blurb” for the Journal for a few years and did a lot of pen & ink drawings but I also held the record for jail time served on the Cove/Mallard Front...” Wildest memory? “After the initial 28 days the Noble Road Seven spent in jail, we arrived back at the Cove/Mallard basecamp to a full blown riot.” Lately, “blogging, painting, working at The Whale Museum in Friday Harbor and looking after my Mom.” To the youth: “Keep it nonviolent.” Coming to another Rbndy? “Not sure, but it could happen.” Gnome Wolf Spirals Aka “Nome Ansland,” 39, living in Austin, Texas. First Rondy: 1995. Last: 2002. “Poet and orator, and perhaps the ‘missing link’ between the old and young guards. I am from an anarcho-punk background in my youth but have the values of a ‘misanthropic” deep ecologist in many ways.’ Lately? “Working as a youth counselor. I was always an avid social worker/crisis counselor through the ‘90s... perhaps a closeted Humanist with a misanthropic image. Environmental work has been sporadic, but I am still there in my heart.” Wildest memory? “Sequoia lifting her shirt and cackling ‘I’ve killed these!’ in 1995.” Mike Mease Montana. On Rondies: "Never Simmers are my vacation, last thing I want to do is hang out with a bunch of hippies!” Known for: “Depends on how old you are”; founded Cold Mountain, Cold Rivers, guerilla media; occupied Paul Watson’s ship, in “revenge of the lily-livered banner hangers” action. Co-founded Buffalo Field Campaign ... has spent last 13 years “living on the frontlines with the buffalo.” Wildest memory: “Police brutality in Cove/Mallard, security guards playing Russian roulette with detained activists.” To the youth: “I’m not into breeding, but we need to be more tribal in how we relate to parents and families... [also] we gotta remember, government did this [Green Scare] to make us paranoid and to close us off to each other.” Last comment “Thanks for your work. The Journal is a real important piece of this movement." Greta Grizz California, 41, Aka “Fire Gruz.” “First Rondy: 1990, last: 2002. for: “Probably for my medical and organizational support at EF! actions.... Also helping start Greater Gila Biodiversity Project and what is now the Center for Biological Diversity.” Wildest memory: “You can’t put that shit in print! It’s either illegal or something you don’t want your children reading about! Find me around a campfire, put a bottle in my hand and maybe I’ll spin a wild yarn or two about the roaring ‘90s and the benefits of being able to run fast.” Lately: “Health care: working as massage therapist and clinical herbalist with focus of work on activist health, teaching and running low-income herbal wellness clinics, raising two children, milking goats, homesteading.” To the youth: “Hike and run a lot.... Learn GIS mapping. Get out in the woods monitoring timber sales, learn to write really well so you can help with appeals, grants and endangered species listing petitions. Get focused defending and creating Wilderness, or start your take baths, dress in the costumes of modern day Amerika, and slip into boardrooms easier. Washing your hands is cool, taking care of your body is cool, eating protein is cool. Eating soybeans as your main protein source will get you in trouble with your thyroid.... You are Gaia’s antibody, the warrior T-cells, and you need to be as effective as possible right now....” Coming to a Rondy again? “Probably not... the last one I went to was decidedly not focused on defending biodiversity, the only reason I became involved with EF!—in 1980 when I was 10 years old defending Jack Creek Road near Big Sky, Montana.” Gigi Tucson, Arizona, 48. First Rondy: Oregon Regional around ’92, last: 2001. “What am I known for, I don’t know... 1 was booted from a lot of fires for causing chaos. I’m not the queen of chaos, I mean I wouldn’t take on that title, but I’ve been called that... without drinking! But it always turned into fun.” Memories: “So many totally fucked up actions that we had to laugh about later... I was a main jail support person in Colorado (after the Rondy), people were getting arrested, and Agent Apple took my car Jto pie Barry) Clausen, leaving me with no fucking car for jail support, But people thought it was great cause he got pied right in front of the Jail.” Lately, “I’ve been finding myself, redefining my self... I think its called midlife crisis. I had to take a few years off ’cause I crashed... Can you make up something more glorious?!” Next Rondy: “I made a commitment to help Crusty with the rendezvous next year. I’m bringing my cats.” Mitch Friedman Bellingham, Washington, 47. First Rondy: ’85, last: ’89. One of the first treesifters, organized the first spotted owl protests, Ancient Forest Rescue Expedition, creative director for the Mudhead Kachinas. Wildest memories: “Some heavy Stumps Suck protest moments at the Gifford Pinchot and Okanogan National Forest headquarters.” Lately: “I’ve directed Conservation Northwest (originally Greater Ecosystem Alliance) since ’89.” He’s received conservation awards from Society for Conservation Biology, The Wilderness Society, Washington Environmental Council, and Northwest Jewish Environmental Project. Named by Washington Law and Politics Magazine as one of the “25 smartest people in Washington” in 2003. To the youth: “Eschew dogma.” Will you be coming to a Rondy: “Hard to say.” Mysterious. Our sources tell us that Mitch has “gone conservative,” but maybe we’ll get to see for ourselves. Gary Lawless Nobleboro, Maine, 59, “Only Rondy was a million years ago in southern Colorado... Art Goodtimes got the poets together to read, before the Warrior Poets had a name....’ Later I was poetry editor of Wild Earth magazine, also Jasper Carlton and I created the National Grizzly Growers Organization.” Today: “I co-own a bookstore, write poems for the lynx, the loon, the herring—try to speak for the critters. The poet Gary Snyder sent me a postcard, here in Maine, saying there’s this new bunch of folks you ought to know about—I wrote to Dave Foreman and got a stapled, mimeographed newsletter in return—the early beginnings of the EF! Journal. Because of that postcard I met Dave and Nancy, Jamie Sayen, Jasper Carlton, Walkin’ Jim Stoltz and John Davis... I’m getting older, but still trying to give voice to those critters through poems, through the books we make available at our bookstore, and through the way I live my life. To the youth: “Thank you for your hearts, your spirit, for what you do. Stay strong, and don’t compromise in your defense of Mother Earth.” Jean Crawford Albuquerque, New Mexico, 48. First Rondy: 1987, attended straight through 1997, last: 2005. Aka “Loose Hip Circles, my nom-de-plume for the Journal, lived several road crossings from the nearest convenience store.” Known for: “Most of the things 1 did were in the background. I might be remembered as a mouthy, feisty, funny woman who could keep a rowdy meeting flowing, and was the harmless looking one sent to deal with the unsuspecting public. Some of what seems significant to me: I kept the Aryans off the stage at the 1989 Jemez RRR (Ha to you, Lone Wolf Circles); signing the tax forms for the Journal because I was the only board member with an address.” Wildest memory: “Being a part of the Wild Women’s Circle that evicted the guy from the 1990 RRR in Montana for sexual harassment. That was the most empowering thing I’ve ever been part of.” Lately: “I used to run with the wolves, then I napped with the cats, now I’m dancing with trees....” To the youth: “Take all rumors, attitudes and stories with a big grain of salt. We may never know how much damage the FBI really did. But I suspect it was considerable... 1 have always believed that the work of protecting the Wild is more important than what name the work is done under... Evolution is healthy and inevitable; rigidity is dangerous.” Coming to a Rondy again? “Probably not, I have to camp with a 301b battery, and that’s a lot of extra weight for me to carry. But I’d love to have an Old Guard Rendezvous some day for the sheer pleasure of seeing old friends. But give me lots of early warning, money is hard to come by, I miss EF!'s place in my life.” Paloma Galindo Just moved from Knoxville, Tennessee to Boise, Idaho. First Rondy: ’95, but before that had participated in smaller regional gatherings; most recent Rondy, 2005. Co-founder of United Mountain Defense, a nonprofit dedicated to halting mountaintop removal coal mining in TN. Wild memories: “shutting down logging roads on Olympic peninsula, all night in the rain and cold; living in a tipi on Karen and Asante’s land; u-locked to truck attached to a tripod in Cove/Mallard; run-in with angry logger with gun while I was lost in Warner Creek and convinced him a whole group with cameras were surrounding us; going to Yukon, in 40-degrees-below weather to stop the wolf kill in ’96; falling in love with mountains, campfires and guitars; Casey Neill singing “Dancing on the Ruins”; the kind of moments where you said “yes, I am alive!”‘Yeah, she’ll be at the next RRR. Rain Sanchez Tucson, Arizona, 41. First Rondy: ’95, last: “regional in AZ a few years ago.” Known as “Always gung-ho, I’m gonna be there in the front, like ‘to the barricade!’” Craziest memory: “Bullets flying by my head, hearing them fly by my ears in Headwaters. I got dropped off at the wrong spot apparently.” Lately: “For five years I’ve been teaching a free self-defense class at Dry River anarchist community center,” often attended by us Journal folks. “Also working on the Border Opposition Action Fund and Autonomous Sustainability Project.” To younger generations: “Study the path, not only of direct action, but of revolutionary insurgents around the world. Learn from the past, try not to reinvent the wheel, don’t make the same mistakes, listen to your heart, listen to the Earth, and take care of each other.” You’ll see him around. Editor’s Note: In Volume II of the 30th Anniversary edition of the Earth First! Journal; John Davis, Karen Coulter, Mike Petersen, Dennis Fritzinger, Laura B, Art Goodtimes, Garlic, Peg Millett, Dirt, Daniel Barron, Slugthang, Dave Foreman and Christopher Manes. Some other folks we’ve contacted: Mike Jakubal, Mike Howell, Jeanette Russel, Neal Tuttrup, Dana Stoltzman, Sasha Coulter, Michael Donnelly, Kelpie Wilson, Karen Wood, Kimberely Dawn, John Green, lagoff Kreilik, Tracy Bartlett, Faith Walker, Dana Lyons, Michael Robinson, John Johnson, Dave Parks, Dennis Davey, David Cross, George Wuerthner, Mark Williams, Phil Knight, Danny Dolinger, Roger Featherstone, Bob Kaspar, Andy Caffrey, Bill Oliver, Marc Baker, Alicia Littletree, Ron Kezar, Bart Koeler, Gary MacFarlane, Ivan Maluski, Doug, Frog, Theresa Kintz, Jesse White, Kris Maenz, Kim Marks, Laren Linder, Tracy Catelman... If you know any of them, ot others, please encourage them to take part in this effort to reconnect the Earth First! generation gaps. Round II As we promised in Voulme I of the 30th Anniversary edition, below is another glimpse into the lives of active longtime EF!ers and instrumental people who have moved on. Again, some names might be new, some may have been heard before (some you might wish you never had!) These are what we lovingly refer to as the old guard of our movement, along with some “mid-guard” in the mix. The questions: name, age, residency; first and last EF! Round River Rendezvous (RRR); what you’re most known for; your wildest memory; what you’ve been doing lately; message to younger generations; if you’ll be coming to another Rondy; and any pseudonyms you wanna divulge. If we get more responses, we may continue this feature into future issues of the Journal. So keep ‘em coming! Christopher Manes Palm Springs, California, 53. First and last Rondy: 1985 and 1987. “I was the self-proclaimed ‘pseudo-intellectual’ of the movement.” Wildest memory: “At the Colorado RRR back in 87, Wolf arrived with a 5th of vodka, some grapefruit juice and a hankering to get mightily drunk. So he, Bill Turk, the much under-appreciated Roger Candee, and I joined him, and plied with liquor, we decided that EF! had become too soft. So we wandered the area shouting “Fuck Humanity!” and “No Man’s Land!” with Turk cracking his bull whip for emphasis. (Yes, he carried a bull whip). At one point we almost fell into the Grand Canyon, which would have been an appropriate demise for us indeed. Now (stay with me here), unbeknownst to us, earlier that day, before we arrived, Ed Abbey had gotten into some kind of verbal altercation with some anarchists. Fair enough. However, when darkness fell and they heard some drunken men cracking a bull whip and making vague threats and apparently prowling the area looking for victims, they thought Abbey had somehow sent out his “shock troops” (their words not mine) to hunt them down for the ideological heresies. Shortly thereafter, the incident was printed in an anarchist journal as evidence of the “fascist” nature of Earth Firstl’s old guard, with the bull whip playing a major role in the narrative... But it was just us all along. After that the rift between the old guard (or as Roselle likes to call them the “buckaroos”), and the more traditional leftists widened. It was of course inevitable. But I think it all started with Turk’s bull whip and too many greyhounds.” Lately: “I wrote a couple books, and became an attorney.” To younger generation EF!ers? “Only young people can change things. It’s your world. The rest of us are just commentators now.” Pseudonyms: “Oh, I used many, which has caused a lot of confusion about who wrote what. Best to leave it at that.” Coming to a Rondy again? “I hadn’t given it any thought. It might be fun. As long as there are no bull whips present.” Karen Coulter Age 52; used psuedonyms in both the Journal and in the Earth First! Campfire Poetry Book (to shift the focus off a personality onto the ideas); residency: Cascadia—divided between a mountainside in eastern Oregon from late spring through fall, and Portland, Oregon for winter. First RRR: 1988 (involved since 1984), last: 2009. Most known for: “my ongoing legal forest defense in eastern Oregon and helping organize the End Corporate Dominance Conference and related workshops.” Wildest memories: “... the all night torch-lit building of the immense Jack Road blockades in the Cove Mallard sales area of Idaho, using nothing but our hands and cooperation; the hunt sabotage against the hunting of endangered Big Hom sheep in the Mojave, experiencing the diverse unique rock formations there and seeing Big Hom sheep rams standing on peaks against the blue sky; the first wild tribal dance at the Rendezvous in 1989... There’s too many wild memories to limit it to just one.” Lately: “struggling to keep Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project going financially, field-checking proposed timber sales in eastern Oregon with wonderful volunteers each summer, working on a book about the foundations of corporate rule in 19 Century US history, writing biocentric poems, making wine, dancing, hiking, hanging out with my son, friends, cats, dogs and wildlife.” To younger generations: “Really plan out a long-term strategy for meeting your goals as a group. Don’t stay in tactical ruts or be an exclusive clique. Don’t let your group die due to a few disruptive people. Read Brian Glick’s handbook for dealing with infiltrators: The War at Home. Keep developing a movement culture of resistance—with art, music, poetry, dance theater... Really get to know the wild and wildlife—ground yourself in wild nature. Don’t wait for a campaign, an action, or a group to come to you: start one. Follow your passion to find your focus. Ask me or other ‘old guard’ folks what else we’ve learned that might help your situation. We too were young and still are radical. I’m an anarchist too...” Another Rondy? “Of course... see you this year in Idaho.” Ilse Asplund Currently living in Cascadia and Atzlan. First Rondy: ’87; most recent: ’02. “Recently dealing with some health challenges, finding plants to be wonderful allies in healing.” Favorite EF! Memory: “Sending the KUTV News car back to Salt Lake City after the North Rim Rondy (-400 mile journey) with a new bumper sticker, Another Mormon on Drugs. To younger generations: “You are the present upwelling of life’s fierce impulse to renew itself once again. Humans and other critters have come to certain crossroads over the millennia and it is always the willingness to act against impossible odds that brought them through the breach... As bad as things are, we’re just a small part of the picture and we only have partial knowledge. Anyway, it’s arrogant to think otherwise.” Coming to another Rondy? “Is there a geriatric rendezvous planned? No, seriously, a token out of the way shtetl within the larger rendezvous for the old pre-post-modem relics of ancient times (the 1980s). No running water or flush toilets required, just a place where we can wear our red bandanas. We don’t really want to contaminate the minds of the young with our unpurged droppings of memory and experience, but we are always in danger of doing so if left on the loose! Was that a yes or no question?” Dirt Living in Olympia, WA, 42. First, EF! Rondy, 1994 Western Regional Lake Davis, Oregon; most recent, 2009 RRR, Umpqua, OR. Known for rigging tree sits in Luna, Fall Creek and two dozen other similar campaigns in 1990’s. Wildest memory. “Real Rendezvous’ with wild raucous and mostly naked drunken behavior around the campfire. Including side-splitting hilarious music with too many talented musicians trying to get a single song squeezed into a very musical campfire that went till nearly sunrise...” Lately? “Building an EF! Warrior Poets website... doing lots of environmental activism with mainstreamers too. Also earned a grad degree (Master’s Public Administration.}” To the youth: “Why don’t y’all smile? You smile at people who are the same age as you, why not the rest of us? Do you think older EF!ers are the enemy or something? Rendezvous’ used to be a place where we knew solidarity and trust and we smiled and said hi to everyone we passed on the trail. What made y’all so cruel, elitist and cold? Do you think because I don’t dress like you and am older than you that I’m not worthy of a smile back? You think I’m not down with your cause? The lack of respect for diversity from your generation is abysmal.” John Davis Westport, NY, 47. First Rondy 1986; last: 1990. Editedjoumalforafewyears with Dave Foreman. Wildest memories: “Camping in Sonoran desert with AZ EF! friends; glimpsing a wolverine as I took a hike at Rendezvous in Idaho; raft trips down Sanjuan and Green Rivers; Actions in the woods best kept as inside memories.” Lately? “On various conservation boards of directors, including Wildlands Network, Restore: The North Woods, Champlain Valley Conservation Partnership and Heron Dance. I serve as Conservation Director of the Adirondack Council.” To the Youth: “No matter how diverse your interests and causes, keep wild nature foremost in mind. Boldly confront its greatest threats: human population and over-consumption.” Coming to a Rondy again? “Not likely, as I attend too many meetings already, and I’m too old now to keep up with you young folks! May you succeed wildly in putting Earth first!” Peg Millett Bradshaw Mountains, central AZ, 57; used to be called Gristle, back in the ‘80s. First Rondy, 1985 Uncompodray Plateau CO; Last, Wyoming I think. I went to the AZ Winter Rondy in ’08. Known for “Dancing, singing, AZ 5, doing fed time (20 years ago), Woo Woo Queen.” Lately: “Playing with horses, going on a few river trips with the Usual Suspects.” To younger generations: “Learn from herstory, smile fiercely, live from a spiritual perspective, learn from the earth and the animals, celebrate.” Coming to another Rondy: “Probably.” Dennis Fritzinger Bay Area Bioregion, CA, 67. First RRR: Kalmiopsis, Oregon 1983; most Recent RRR: 2009. Most known for: “At rallies: the tea song. At campfires: my poem “Donuts Galore”. In the Journal: Editor of Armed With Visions. At OCs: the Night to Howl.” Wildest memory? “Seeing a mountain lion on the way to the 1987 RRR on the North Rim of the Grand Canyon. The funniest memory was being part of a herd of caribou at our post-rondy demo in Albany, NY in 1991.” Lately: “Writing stuff to send in for the 30th Anniversary issue.” To younger generation: “Don’t get burned out. Taking time to go camping, hiking, river-rafting and just getting out in nature is a good antidote to living in cities and working on campaigns. Do your homework. It’s important to understand the science. Learn basic survival skills so you can be self-sufficient when you need to. Keep a sense of humor.” Coming to a Rondy again? “Definitely. I plan to go to next year’s and as many as I can after that.” Mike Petersen Spokane, WA, 57. First: 1986 in Idaho; last Rondy: maybe 2000? Organized 1988 RRR and the follow-up Okanogan Highlands Action. Wildest memory: “Going to northern BC in the middle of winter to stop the aerial wolf kill, setting up road blockades during Redwood Summer. Other things I can’t talk about.” Lately? “Executive Director of The Lands Council, and on many Boards.” To younger generations: “In my mind EF! inspired environmental activism in a unique way that was focused on direct action. The focus has been diffused by others wanting to capture some of that spirit, whether it be anarchism, prison activism, or any of the other isms that can be good causes, but not earth centered.” Any pseudonyms? “Better not, since I am unsure if the statute of limitations has run out...” Coming to a Rondy again? “Possible. I still get the Journal.” Daniel Barron Oakland CA, 48. First Rondy: Colorado 1985; last: Oregon 1998. Most known as: main San Francisco EF! contact 1986–1990; action with Mike Roselle & Helen to kick off part 2 of Kalmiopsis campaign (April 1987); organizer of EF! whitewater trips.” Wildest memory: “post-Rondy action 1988 at Okanogan Nat’l Forest HQ, a hundred of us shut down Freddie office for the day, blockaded the entrances, occupied the roof, put cowpies in the air conditioning intakes, played music, danced, yelled, drew chalk murals on sidewalks. Freddies brought in every law enforcement officer in 3-county area resulting in over 20 arrests, 3 days in jail, and jail solidarity on hunger strike so that all arrestees were released with equal minimum fine... shook the Forest Service nationwide.” Lately: “Disappearing into obscurity.” To younger generations: “think long and hard about appropriate tactics for each situation, study the history of the movement and of all eco-social change, learn from the successes and failures of your elders.” Coming to a Rondy again? “No. Some of my best memories are from past Rondys; I remember past years by where the Rondy took place and who was there; but I’ve passed the torch on to others who can make their own memories.” Angela Wartes Kahl “Been Garlic for the last 14 years”, 35, Alsea, OR. “First Rondy was Twin Lakes in 1997 or 1999, don’t remember the year but the hike in was a nightmare.” Last Rondy: 2010, in the North Woods of Maine. “We drove all the way from Oregon with a three year old, that’s dedication folks...” Known for? “Jail and Legal support of the Headwaters Forest Campaign in Northern California, WTO, and volunteering with lawyer teams that represented the pepper spray plaintiffs and Gypsy’s family.” Wildest memories: “Fall of ’96 in Headwaters. The legal team saw more than 300 arrests in two months, every other day there was an action— tripods in the road, sleeping dragons, endless lockdowns, so many lock boxes and bags of concrete, I lost count. I felt like we were surviving off air, no sleep and pure adrenaline. All the old guards were firecrackers. Judi was still alive and very much involved. It was an incredible time to be in EF!” Lately, “Garth and I have an organic farm called Common Treasury. Recently I have been working on going back to college in the textile field, essentially working on sustainable fiber manufacturing. Joined the Seeds of Peace Collective after the RNC in St. Paul and enjoy cooking meals for 5,000.” To younger generations: “I am so happy you are here. Please stick around but breaks from activism are necessary no matter what.people tell you. Always be honest and open to new ideas, it is the only way we are going to succeed.” Coming to a Rondy again? “I’m helping organize the 2011 Rondy—Idaho! See you there!” Art Goodtimes Norwood, CO. A former poetry editor for Earth First! Journal and Wild Earth, Ed Abbey mentions Art by name in the 1987 Rondy scene from Hayduke Lives. He’s now a 4-term Commissioner in San Miguel County, with the Green Party. According to famed author Terry Tempest Williams, “If there’s hope in the American West, it’s that Art Goodtimes is one of our county commissioners.” He didn’t respond to our questions, but in another interview he said this of Earth First!, “It’s become a warrior clan whose effectiveness is limited...Every tribe needs its warriors, but their anger wasn’t always targeted very well. And (direct action), that’s dangerous and scary.” I guess that’s what the voters wanted to hear. Laura B. Eugene, Oregon, 29. “Can’t remember the first, late 90s, early 2000s? It was probably a regional affair. The last was the one in the Mount Hood area. Was that 2005?” (little young to be losing memory, no?) Known for: “Tree-sitting in Oregon. Biscuit fire campaign. Northwest Ecosystem Survey Team (NEST).” Wildest memory: “Getting arrested twice in three days at the Biscuit fire campaign trying to protect the Fiddler Timber Sale area. The second time, they weren’t as keen to let me out of jail.” Lately: “Law school. Finishing up my last year, then I’m going after the federal land management and wildlife management agencies in their own courts of law.” To the youth: “Keep on fighting, but don’t get stuck in a mt. Be creative in your tactics. Some of our most successful work came from someone’s random idea, thinking out of the box. Like, ‘Hey, I know, why don’t we try conducting our own surveys for red tree voles?’” Coming to a Rondy again? “If the Rondy and myself are in the same area at the same time, I would love to. People will probably judge me for being all old and normal, though.” Dave Foreman Lives in New Mexico, co-founded Earth First! and the Journal. Left the movement in 1990 to found Wild Earth, a magazine which has since folded, and The Rewilding Institute, which, among legitimate wildlands advocacy, also advocates for bringing elephants, lions and camels back to North America (yes, really). Foreman is, sadly, also now a leading voice in Apply The Brakes, a newly formed anti-immigrant coalition under the white supremacist network of John Tanton. He did not respond to us. Slugthang The following are excerpts from a poem sent by “Sluggo” in response to our Old Guard questionnaire: Now I was a radical once I ran with the forest loving crew To demos downtown Portland we would go Region 6 Forest Service bureau Logs exports, spotted owl, denied native rights Had us uptight so it was Consensus meetings all day And parties every night We had a group house phone ringing with eco emergency calls A few of us puked red white and blue at shopping malls Undercover agents where knocking at our door We fed the homeless from the dumpster store We drove to Actions and Rendezvous For this we had a ravenous thirst We started to call ourselves 1–5 Earth First! There was drama, more than we could possibly use We watched ourselves eagerly on the evening news ... We spawned a culture of music Wild music the best kind We howled at the moon Round campfires that burned out too soon I watched successful comrades form non-profits groups sustaining I taught many workshops on non-violence training And as the years drug on, the banner was passed on Strangers’ voices began the angry shout As the years drug on my friends one by one began to bum out For the movement mutated and is unforgiving The movement is not friendly to making a living And the “more radical” started to bum things down Which in turn made things more difficult all over town So began much consternation That tactic I always considered a lack of imagination So now every day I work for change in subtler ways Now every day I focus on proactive and kind I engage others as a way to change their minds But the greenfire still bums bright And sometimes I can still hear the howling in the night Ah, the work is endless and of constant variety Earth lovers stay alert! Ain’t nothing wrong with sobriety