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title Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans
author US Senate
date 1976
source Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, S. Rep. No. 755, Book ll, 94th Congress, Second Session.
lang en
pubdate 2024-06-22T18:01:14
topics Ted’s reading interests & influences
notes Footnote 94 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "Ordering Field Offices to gather information".

Footnote 51 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "Additional telegrams expressing approval of".
Footnote 232 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "In fact, the FBI had already used".
Endnote 77 was missing from the source PDF after endnote 76 ending with "There had been rumors about a "peace ticket" headed by Dr. King and Benjamin Spock.".
Footnote 402 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "Reports on all Key Black Extremists were to be".
Footnotes 481 & 482 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "Informants were used to gather more information".
Footnote 34 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "Warrantless mail opening and surreptitious".
Footnote 514 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "In February 1965, President Johnson asked Attorney".
Footnote 664 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "The FBI recently abolished completely the administrative index".
Footnote 35 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "program came up because if you have anything in the FBI".
Footnote 42 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "You are also cautioned that the nature of this new".

Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans

BOOK II

FINAL REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS

WITH RESPECT TO

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES SENATE

TOGETHER WITH

ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE
VIEWS

APRIL 26 (legislative day, April 14), 1976

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

FRANK CHURCH, Idaho, Chairman
JOHN G. TOWER, Texas, Vice Chairman

William G. Miller, Staff Director
Fbbdebick A O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel
Curtis R. Smothers, Counsel to the Minority
Audrey Hatby, Clerk of the Committee

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Letter of Transmittal

On behalf of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, and pursuant to the mandate of Senate Resolution 21, I am transmitting herewith to the Senate the volume of the Committee’s Final Report which presents the results of the Committee’s investigation into Federal domestic intelligence activities.

The Committee’s findings and conclusions concerning abuses in intelligence activity and weaknesses in the system of accountability and control are amply documented. I believe they make a compelling case for substantial reform. The recommendations section of this volume sets forth in detail the Committee’s proposals for reforms necessary to protect the right of Americans. The facts revealed by the Committee’s inquiry into the development of domestic intelligence activity are outlined in the balance of the volume.

I would add one principal comment on the results of the Committee’s inquiry: The root cause of the excesses which our record amply demonstrates has been failure to apply the wisdom of the constitutional system of checks and balances to intelligence activities. Our experience as a nation has taught us that we must place our trust in laws, and not solely in men. The founding fathers foresaw excess as the inevitable consequence of granting any part of government unchecked power. This has been demonstrated in the intelligence field where, too often, constitutional principles were subordinated to a pragmatic course of permitting desired ends to dictate and justify improper means.

Our recommendations are designed to place intelligence activities within the constitutional scheme for controlling government power.

The members of this Committee have served with utmost diligence and dedication. We have had 126 Full Committee meetings, scores of other sessions at which Senators presided at depositions for the taking of testimony, and over 40 subcommittee meetings devoted to drafting the two volumes of our final report. I thank each and everyone of my colleagues for their hard work and for their determination that the job be done fully and fairly.

John Tower’s service as Vice Chairman was essential to our effectiveness from start to finish. This inquiry could have been distracted by partisan argument over allocating the blame for intelligence excesses. Instead, we have unanimously concluded that intelligence problems are far more fundamental. They are not the product of any single administration, party, or man.

At the outset of this particular volume, special mention is also due to Senator Walter F. Mondale for his chairmanship of the subcommittee charged with drafting the final report on domestic intelligence activity. During our hearings, Senator Mondale helped to bring into focus the threats posed to the rights of American citizens. He and his

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domestic subcommittee colleagues—Senator Howard Baker, as ranking Minority member, and Senators Philip Hart, Robert Morgan and Richard Schweiker—deserve great credit for the complete and compelling draft which they presented to the Full Committee.

The staff of the Committee has worked long, hard and well. Without their work over the past year—and during many long nights and weekends—the Committee could not have come close to coping with ’ its massive job. I commend and thank them all. The staff members whose work was particularly associated with this volume and its supplementary detailed reports are listed in Appendix C.

Frank Church,

Chairman.

Preface

In January 1975, the Senate resolved to establish a Committee to: conduct an investigation and study of governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities and the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government.[1]

This Committee was organized shortly thereafter and has conducted a year-long investigation into the intelligence activities of the United States Government, the first substantial inquiry into the intelligence community since World War II.

The inquiry arose out of allegations of substantial wrongdoing by intelligence agencies on behalf of the administrations which they served. A deeper concern underlying the investigation was whether this Government’s intelligence activities were governed and controlled consistently with the fundamental principles of American constitutional government—that power must be checked and balanced and that the preservation of liberty requires the restraint of laws, and not simply the good intentions of men.

Our investigation has confirmed that properly controlled and lawful intelligence is vital to the nation’s interest. A strong and effective intelligence system serves, for example, to monitor potential military threats from the Soviet Union and its allies, to verify compliance with international agreements such as SALT, and to combat espionage and international terrorism. These, and many other necessary and proper functions are performed by dedicated and hard working employees of the intelligence community.

The Committee’s investigation has, however, also confirmed substantial wrongdoing. And it has demonstrated that intelligence activities have not generally been governed and controlled in accord with the fundamental principles of our constitutional system of government.

The task faced by this Committee was to propose effective measures to prevent intelligence excesses, and at the same time to propose sound guidelines and oversight procedures with which to govern and control legitimate activities.

Having concluded its investigation, the Committee issues its reports[2] for the purposes of:

providing a fair factual basis for informed Congressional and public debate on critical issues affecting the role of governmental intelligence activities in a free society; and recommending such legislative and executive action as, in the judgment of the Committee, is appropriate to prevent recurrence of past abuses and to insure adequate coordination, control and oversight of the nation’s intelligence resources, capabilities, and activities.

- A. The Committee’s Mandate -

In elaboration of the broad mandate set forth at the outset of this Report, the Senate charged the Committee with investigating fourteen specific “matters or questions” and with reporting the “full facts” on them. The fourteen enumerated matters and questions concern: (i) what kind of activities have been—and should be—undertaken by intelligence agencies; (ii) whether those activities conform to law and the Constitution; and (iii) how intelligence agencies have been— and should be—coordinated, controlled and overseen.[3]

In addition to investigating the “full facts” with respect to such matters, the Committee was instructed to determine:

Whether any of the existing laws of the United States are inadequate, either in their provisions or manner of enforcement, to safeguard the rights of American citizens, to improve executive and legislative control of intelligence and related activities and to resolve uncertainties as to the authority of United States intelligence and related agencies. [Id., Sec. 2 (12)]

- B. The Major Questions

Our investigation addressed the structure, history, activities and policies of America’s most important intelligence agencies. The Committee looked beyond the operation of individual agencies to examine common themes and patterns inherent in intelligence operations. In the course of its investigation, the Committee has sought to answer three broad questions:

First, whether domestic intelligence activities have been consistent with law and with the individual liberties guaranteed to American citizens by the Constitution.

Second, whether America’s foreign intelligence activities have served the national interest in a manner consistent with the nation’s ideals and with national purposes.

Third, whether the institutional procedures for directing and controlling intelligence agencies have adequately ensured their compliance with policy and law, and whether those procedures have been based upon the system of checks and balances among the branches of government required by our Constitution.

.. The Committee fully subscribes to the premise that intelligence agencies perform a necessary and proper function. The Preamble to the Constitution states that our government was created, in part, to i “insure domestic tranquility [and] provide for the common defense.” Accurate and timely intelligence can and does help meet those goals. The Committee is also mindful, however, of the danger which intelligence collection, and intelligence operations, may pose for a society grounded in democratic principles. The Preamble to our Constitution also declares that our government was created to “secure the blessings of liberty” and to “establish justice”. If domestic intelligence agencies ignore those principles, they may threaten the very values that form the foundation of our society. Similarly, if the government conducts foreign intelligence operations overseas which are inconsistent with our national ideals, our reputation, goals, and influence abroad may be undercut.

- C. The Nature of the Committee’s Investigation

- - 1. Selection of Agencies, Programs and Cases To Emphasize

Necessarily, the Committee had to be selective. To investigate everything relevant to intelligence—and even everything relevant to the fundamental issues on which we had decided to focus—would take forever. Our job was to discover—and suggest solutions for—the major problems “at the earliest practical date”.[4]

Accordingly, the Committee had to choose the particular Governmental entities upon which we would concentrate and then further had to choose particular cases to investigate in depth.

Many agencies, departments or bureaus of the Federal Government have an intelligence function. Of these, the Committee spent the overwhelming preponderance of its energies on five:

The Federal Bureau of Investigation; The Central Intelligence Agency; The National Security Agency; The national intelligence components of the Defense Department (other than NS A); and The National Security Council and its component parts.[5]

The agencies upon which the Committee concentrated are those whose powers are so great and whose practices were so extensive that they must be understood in order fairly to judge whether the intelligence system of the United States needs reform and change.

Having selected the agencies to emphasize, the Committee also had to select representative programs and policies on which to concentrate. There were many more possible issues and allegations to investigate than could be covered fully and fairly. The principles which guided our choices were:

(1) More is learned by investigating tens of programs and incidents in depth rather than hundreds superficially. Our goal was to understand causes and, where appropriate, to suggest solutions.

(2) Cases most likely to produce general lessons should receive the most attention.

(3) Programs were examined from each administration beginning with Franklin Roosevelt’s. This assured understanding of the historical context within which intelligence activities have developed. Fundamental issues concerning the conduct and character of the nation deserve nonpartisan treatment. It has become clear from our inquiry, moreover, that intelligence excesses, at home and abroad, have been found in every administration. They are not the product of any single party, administration, or man.

- - 2. Limitations and Strengths

(a) The Focus on Problem Areas

The intelligence community has had broad responsibilitv for activities beyond those which we investigated as possibly “illegal, improper, or unethical”. Our reports primarily address problem areas and the command and control question generallv. However, the intelligence community performs vital tasks outside the areas on which our investigation concentrated. This point must be kept in mind in fairness to the agencies, and to their employees who have devoted their careers to the nation’s service. Moreover, one of many reasons for checking intelligence excesses is to restore the confidence, good name, and effectiveness of intelligence agencies so that they may better serve the nation in the future.[6]

(5) Caution on Questions of Individual “Guilt" or “Innocence”

A Senate Committee is not a prosecutor, a grand jury or a court. It is far better suited to determine how things went wrong and what can be done to prevent their going wrong again, than to resolve disputed questions of individual “guilt” or “innocence”. For the resolution of those questions we properly rely on the courts.

Of course, to understand the past in order to better propose guidance for the future, the Committee had to investigate the facts underlying charges of wrongdoing. Facts involve people. Therefore, the Committee has necessarily had to determine what particular individuals appear to have done and, on occasion, to make judgments on their responsibility. We have, however, recognized our limitations and attempted to be cautious in reaching those judgments; the reader should be similarly cautious in evaluating our judgments.

The Committee’s hope is that this report will provoke a national debate not on “Who did it?”, but on “How did it happen and what can be done to keep it from happening again ?”

(c) Ability to See the Full Scope of the Problem

This Committee examined a very broad range of issues and compiled a hughe factual record [7] which covers:

(i) the origins and development of intelligence programs over seven administrations;

’ (ii) intelligence activities both at home and abroad; and

(111) the programs and practices of the several most important intelligence agencies.

( Thus, for the first time, based upon the Committee’s investigation, it is possible to examine the patterns of intelligence activity and not! merely isolated incidents.

The issues for the country to resolve are best posed by looking, as we have done, at the aggregate, rather than at particular incidents in isolation. Neither the dangers, nor the causes, nor the possible solutions can be fairly evaluated without considering both the broad patterns of intelligence activity which emerge from examining particular cases over the past several decades, and the cumulative effect of activities of different agencies. For example, individual cases or programs of governmental surveillance may constitute interference with constitutionally protected rights of privacy and dissent. But only by examining the cumulative impact of many such programs can the danger of “Big Brother Government” be realistically assessed. Only by understanding the full breadth of governmental efforts against dissenters can one weigh the extent to which those efforts may chill lawful assembly and free expression.

- D. The Purpose of the Committee’s Findings and Recommendations

The central goal of the Committee is to make informed recommendations—based upon a detailed and balanced factual investigation—about:

(1) which intelligence activities ought to be permitted, and which should be restricted or prohibited; and

(2) what controls and organizational structure are needed to keep intelligence operations both effective and consistent with this country’s most basic values and fundamental interests.

The first step for this Committee, its successor oversight Committees and the Congress as a whole is to devise the legal framework within which intelligence agencies can, in the future, be guided, checked and operate both properly and efficiently. A basic law—a charter of powers, duties, and limitations—does not presently exist for some of the most important intelligence activities (e.g., FBI’s domestic intelligence or NSA) or, where it does exist, as with CIA, it is vague, conflicting and incomplete.

The absence of laws and the lack of clarity in those that exist has had the effect, if not the intention, of keeping vital issues of national importance away from public debate.

This Committee’s job was to pose the issues that have been ignored for decades. The technique for doing so was to investigate and then to propose basic laws and other rules as to what can and cannot be done, and on the appropriate command and control structure for intelligence activities.

There are many other questions, such as the efficiency, cost and quality of intelligence, which are also of vital national importance. We have also examined these matters and consider them in this report. But, the main emphasis of our investigation was on what should be done and not on how it should be done. We seek in our recommendations to lay the underlying legal foundation, and the control and oversight structure for the intelligence community. If these are sound, then we have faith that the other questions will be answered correctly in the future. But if the foundation is unsound or remains unfinished—or if intelligence agencies continue to operate under a structure in which executive power is not effectively checked and examined—then we will have neither quality intelligence nor a society which is free at home and respected abroad.

[1] Senate Resolution 21, January 27, 1975, Sec. 1. The full text of S. Res. 21 is printed at Appendix A.

[2] The Committee’s final report is divided into two main volumes. The balance of this volume covers domestic activities of intelligence agencies and their activities overseas to the extent that they affect the constitutional rights of Americans. The other volume covers all other activities of United States foreign and military intelligence agencies.

The Committee has previously issued the reports and hearing records set forth in Appendix B.

[3] S. Res. 21, Sec. 2. Examples of the “matters or questions” include:

“The conduct of domestic intelligence or counterintelligence operations against United States citizens” by the FBI or other agencies. [Sec. 2(2)];

“The violation or suspected violation of law” by intelligence agencies [Sec. 2(10)];

Allegations of CIA “domestic” activity, and the relationship between CIA responsibility to protect sources and methods and the prohibition of its exercising law enforcement powers or internal security functions [Sec. 2(1), (6)];

“The origin and disposition of the so-called Huston Plan” [Sec. 2(7) (9)];

“The extent and necessity’ of “covert Intelligence activities abroad [Sec. 2(14)];

Whether there is excessive duplication or inadequate coordination among intelligence agencies [Sec. 2(4) (13)] and

The “nature and extent” of executive oversight [Sec. 2(7) (9)] and the “need for improved, strengthened or consolidated’ Congressional oversight [Sec. 2(7)(9)(11)].

[4] S. Res. 21; Sec. 5.

[5] Substantial work was also done on intelligence activities of the Internal Revenue Service and the State Department.

[6] Indeed, it is likely that in some cases the high priority given to activities that appear questionable has reduced the attention given to other vital matters. Thus, the FBI, for example, has placed more emphasis on domestic dissent than on organized crime and, according to some, let its efforts against foreign spies suffer because of the amount of time spent checking up on American protest groups.

[7] Some 800 witnesses were examined, approximately 250 under oath in executive sessions, 50 in public sessions, and the balance in interviews. The aggregate number of transcript pages is almost 30,000. Approximately 110,000 document pages were obtained from the various intelligence agencies (still more were preliminarily reviewed at the agencies), as well as from the White House, presidential libraries, and other sources.

Over the course of its investigation the Committee has had generally good cooperation in obtaining information from the intelligence agencies and the Administration. Of course, there were problems, particularly at the outset—compliance took too long; bureaucratic rules such as the “third agency rule” (which required agencies other than the custodian of the document to review it if they were mentioned) were frustrating. But our experience suggests that those problems can be worked out.

The most important lesson to be derived from our experience is that effective oversight is impossible without regular access to the underlying working documents of the intelligence community. Top level briefings do not adequately describe the realities. For that the documents are a necessary supplement and at times the only source.

Contents

Letter of Transmittal

Preface

1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY________________________ 1

A. Intelligence Activity: A New Form of Governmental Power to Impair Citizens’ Rights___________________________________________________ 2

B. The Questions_________________________________________ 4

C. Summary of the Main Problems___________________________ 5

1. The Number of People Affected by Domestic Intelligence Activity 6

2. Too Much Information Is Collected For Too Long-- 7

3. Covert Action and the Use of Illegal or Improper Means_ 10

a. Covert Action___________________________ 10

(1) The FBI’s COINTELPRO____________ 10

(2) Martin Luther King, Jr_______________ 11

b. Illegal or Improper Means__________________ 12

(1) Mail Opening______________________ 12

(2) NSA Monitoring___________________ 12

(3) Electronic Surveillance______________ 12

(4) Political Abuse_____________________ 13

(5) Surreptitious Entries_________________ 13

(6) Informants________________________ 13

4. Ignoring the Law________________________________ 13

5. Deficiencies in Accountability and Control____________ 14

6. The Adverse Impact of Improper Intelligence Activity__ 15

a. General Efforts to Discredit_________________ 15

b. Media Manipulation_______________________ 15

c. Distorting Data to Influence Government Policy and Public Perceptions______________________________________ 16

d. “Chilling” First Amendment Rights___________ 17

e. Preventing the Free Exchange of Ideas_________ 17

7. Cost and Value_________________________________ 18

<right> 11. THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE, 1936 to 1976: A. Summary 21 </right>

1. The Lesson: History Repeats Itself_______________ 21

2. The Pattern: Broadening Through Time___________ 21

3. Three Periods of Growth for Domestic Intelligence—. 22

8. Establishing a Permanent Domestic Intelligence Structure: 1936-1945 23

1. Background: The Stone Standard___________________ 23

2. Main Developments of the 1936-1945 Period_________ 24

<right> . 3. Domestic Intelligence Authority: Vague and Conflicting Executive Orders 24 </right>

a. The Original Roosevelt Orders_____ L_________ 25

b. Orders in 1938-39: The Vagueness of “Subversive Activities” and “Potential” Crimes. 25

c. Orders 1940-43: The Confusion Continues______ 27

4. The Role of Congress_________________________ 28

a. Executive Avoidance of Congress_________ 28

b. Congress Declines to Confront the Issue------------ 29

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xn

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<right> II. THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE—Continued B. Establishing a Permanent Domestic Intelligence Structure— 1936-1945 Continued </right>

5. Scope of Domestic Intelligence----------------------

a. Beyond Criminal Investigations-------------

b. “Infiltration” Investigations------------------

c. Partisan Use___________________ ------

d. Centralized Authority: FBI and Military

<right> Intelligence - </right>

<right> 6. Control by the Attorney General: Compliance and Resistance_________________________ — ------- </right>

<right> 7. Intrusive Techniques: Questionable Authorization — a. Wiretaps: A Strained Statutory Interpretation_____ </right>

<right> b. Bugging, Mail Opening, and Surreptitious Entry_______________________________ </right>

<right> C. Domestic Intelligence in the Cold War Era: 1946-1963 </right>

1. Main Developments of the 1946-1963 Period-------

2. Domestic Intelligence Authority---------------------

a. Anti-Communist Consensus-----------------

b. The Federal Employee Loyalty-Security Pro

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<right> (1) Origins of the Program </right>

<right> (2) Breadth of Investigations </right>

<right> (3) FBI Control of Loyalty-Security Investigations____________________ </right>

<right> c. Executive Directives: Lack of Guidance and </right>

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3.

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Controls____________________________

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Scope of Domestic Intelligence, a. “Subversive Activities”

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4.

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5.

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(1) The Number of Investigations------

(2) Vague and Sweeping Standards----

(3) COMINFIL____________ .____

<right> (4) Exaggeration of Communist Influence________________________ </right>

b. “Racial Matters” and “Hate Groups”----- ..

c. FBI Political Intelligence for the White

<right> House______________________ </right>

d. IRS Investigation of Political Organizations. .

Accountability and Control--------------------------

a. Emergency Detention Act_____________

b. Withholding Information---------------------

c. CIA Domestic Activity-----------------------

(1) Vague Controls on CIA-------------

(2) Drug Testing and Cover Programs..

Intrusive Techniques---------------------------------

a. Communication Interception: CIA and NSA.

b. FBI Covert Techniques----------------------

(1) Electronic Surveillance-------------

(2) “Black Bag” Jobs--------------------

(3) Mail Opening________________

c. Use of FBI Wiretaps_________________

|

6. Domestic Covert Action------------------------------

a. COINTELPRO: Communist Party_______

b. Early Expansion of COINTELPRO./--------

<right> D. Intelligence and Domestic Dissent: 1964-1976-------------- </right>

1. Main Points During the 1964-1976 Period----------

2. Scope of Domestic Intelligence----------------------

a. Domestic Protest and Dissent: FBI_______

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31

33

34

36

38

40

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

53

54

55

56

58

60

61

62

65

67

70

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(1) Racial Intelligence____________

(2) “New Left” Intelligence________

b. FBI Informants_____________________

(1) Infiltration of the Klan_________

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72

74

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II. THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE—Continued

D. Intelligence and Domestic Dissent: 1964-1976—Continued

2. Scope of Domestic Intelligence—Continued
b. FBI Informants—Continued

• (2) “Listening Posts” in the Black Com- 'Page

munity__________________________ 75

(3) Infiltration of the “New Left”-------------- 76

c. Army Surveillance of Civilian Political Activity_ 77

d. Federal Encouragement of Local Police Intelligence 77

e. The Justice Department’s Interdivision Information Unit (IDIU) 78

f. COMINFIL Investigations: Overbreadth________ 81

3. Domestic Intelligence Authority____________________ 82

a. FBI Intelligence___________________________ 82

b. Army Intelligence_________________________ 84

c. FBI Interagency Agreements_________________ 85

4. Domestic Covert Action__________________________ 86

a. COINTELPRO___________________________ 86

(1) Klan and “White Hate”---------------------- 86

(2) “Black Nationalist” COINTELPRO. 87

(3) “New Left” COINTELPRO__________ 88

b. FBI Target Lists__________________________ 89

(1) “Rabble Rouser/Agitator” Index_______ 89

(2) “Key Activist” Program--------------------- 90

(3) “Key Black Extremist” Program_______ 91

(4) Security Index_____________________ 91

c. Internal Revenue Service Programs------------- 93

(1) Misuse by FBI and CIA__________ 93

(2) The Special Service Staff: IRS Targeting of Ideological Groups ____________________________ 94

5. Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Dissent________ 96

a. Origins of CIA Involvement in “Internal Se

curity Functions”___ 96

b. CIA Intelligence About Domestic Political Groups 98

(1) CIA Response to FBI Requests__ 98

(2) Operation CHAOS 99

c. CIA Security Operations Within the United

States: Protecting “Sources” and “Methods”. 102

d. NSA Monitoring 104

' 6. Intrusive Techniques______ 104

a. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance---------------- 105

(1) Executive Branch Restrictions on Electronic Surveillance: 1965-68... 105

(2) Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968. 106

(3) Supreme Court Restrictions on National Security Electronic Surveillance: 1972_____________________ 107

b. CIA Mail Opening_______________________ 107

c. Expansion of NSA Monitoring______________ 108

d. FBI Cutbacks___________________________ 109

(1) The Long Subcommittee Investigation_ 109

(2) Director Hoover’s Restrictions________ 110

7. Accountability and Control_______________________ 111

a. The Huston Plan: A Domestic Intelligence Network 111

(1) Intelligence Community Pressures_____ 112

(2) The Interagency Committee Report.. 113

(3) Implementation___________________ 115

II. THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE—Continued

D. Intelligence and Domestic Dissent: 1964-1976—Continued

7. Accountability and Control—Continued ^Pu^^e

b. Political Intelligence_____________________ 116

(1) Name Check Requests______________ 116

(2) Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, 1964 117

(3) By-Product of Foreign Intelligence Coverage 119

(4) The Surveillance of Joseph Kraft (1969) 121

(5) The “17” Wiretaps________________ 122

c. The Justice Department’s Internal Security Division 1_ 122

(1) The “new” Internal Security Division- 123

(2) The Sullivan-Mardian Relationship.. 124

d. The FBI’s Secret “Administrative Index”______ 125

8. Reconsideration of FBI Authority 127

a. Developments in 1972-1974________________ 128

b. Recent Domestic Intelligence Authority_______ 131

111. FINDINGS__________________________ 137

A. Major Finding: Violating and Ignoring the Law------------------- 137

Subfindings:

(a) Violating Statutory Law and Constitutional Rights 139

(b) Ignoring Illegal Issues______________________ 140

(c) Continuing Legal Activities----------------------------- 141

(d) Tightening Security for Illegal Activities------------- 146

(e) Concealing Illegal Activities_________________ 149

(f) Weakness of Internal Inspection_______________ 152

(g) Weakness of Oversight by Senior Administration Officials 157

III. FINDINGS—Continued: '^P8ge

F. Major Finding: Inadequate Controls on Dissemination and Retention 253

Subfindings:

(a) Volunteering Irrelevant Information and responding Unquestioningly to Requests--------------------------------------------------------------- 254

(b) Excessive Dissemination____________________ 259

(c) Federal Employee Security Program------------------ 261

(d) FBI Retention of Sensitive, Derogatory, and

Illegally Obtained Information______________ 262

G. Major Finding: Deficiencies in Control and Accountability-- 265 Subfindings:

(a) Presidential Failure to Limit and Control Intelligence Activities 267

(b) Attorneys General Failure to Limit and Control FBI Intelligence Activities 270

(c) Encouraging Political Intelligence--------------------- 274

(d) Executive Failures to Inquire_________________ 275

(e) Congressional Failure to Oversee Intelligence Activity and Exert Legislative Control--------------- 277

(f) Intelligence Agencies Act with Insufficient Authorization 281

(g) Termination of Abusive Operations____________ 284

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS------------------------------ 289

A. Conclusions 289

B. Principles Applied in Framing Recommendations and the

Scope of Recommendations___________________________ 292

C. Recommendations____________________________________ 296

1. Intelligence Agencies Are Subject to the Rule of Law (Recommendations 1-3) 296

2. United States Foreign and Military Agencies Should Be Precluded From Domestic Security Activities (Recommendations 4-27)---------- 297

a. Central Intelligence Agency (Recommendations 4-13) . 297

b. National Security Agency (Recommendations 14-19) 308

c. Military Service and Defense Department Investigative Agencies (Recommendations 20-26)______________ 310

3. Non-Intelligence Agencies Should Be Barred From Domestic Security Activity (Recommendations 27-37)_________________ ---- 313

a. Internal Revenue Service (Recommendations 27-35) 313

b. Post Office (U.S. Postal Service) (Recommendations 36-37) 315

4. Federal Domestic Security Activities Should Be Limited and Controlled to Prevent Abuses Without Hampering Criminal Investigations or Investigations of Foreign Espionage (Recommendations 38-69)_________ 316

a. Centralize Supervision, Investigative Responsibility, and the Use of Covert Techniques (Recommendations 38-39)----------- 316

b. Prohibitions (Recommendations 40-41)------------ 317

c. Authorized Scope of Domestic Security In

vestigations (Recommendations 42-49)---------- 318

d. Authorized Investigative Techniques (Recommendations 50-63) 324

e. Maintenance and Dissemination of Information (Recommendations 64-68) 330

f. Attorney General Oversight of the FBI, Including Termination of Investigations and Covert Techniques (Recommendation 69)-- 332

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS—Continued ^Pas^e

C. Recommendations—Continued

5. The Responsibility and Authority of the Attorney General for Oversight for Federal Domestic Security Activities must be clarified and General Counsel and Inspectors General of Intelligence Agencies Strengthened (Recommendations 70-86)__________________________________ 332

a. Attorney General Responsibility and Rela- ship With Other Intelligence Agencies (Recommendations 70-74)---------- 333

b. General Counsel and Inspectors General of Intelligence Agencies (Recommendations 75-81)______________ 333

c. Office of Professional Responsibility (Recommendation 82) 335

d. Director of the FBI and Assistant Directors

of the FBI (Recommendations 83-85)_____ 335

6. Administrative Rulemaking and Increased Disclosure Should Be Required (Recommendations 86-89)________________ 336

a. Administrative Rulemaking (Recommendations 86-88) 336

b. Disclosure (Recommendations 89-90)_______ 336

7. Civil Remedies Should Be Expanded (Recommendation 91) 336

8. Criminal Penalties Should Be Enacted (Recommendation 92) 338

9. The Smith Act and the Voorhis Act Should Either Be Repealed or Amended (Recommendation 93)________________________ 339

10. The Espionage Statute Should Be Modernized (Recommendation 94) 339

11. Broaden Access to Intelligence Agency Files Should Be Provided to GAO, as an Investigative Arm of the Congress (Recommendation 95) 339

12. Congressional Oversight Should Be Intensified (Recommendation 96) 339

13. Definitions____________________________________ 339

Appendix A: Senate Resolution 21__________________________________ 343

Appendix B: Previously Issued Hearings and Reports of Senate Select

<right> Committee________________________________________ 355 </right>

Appendix C: Staff Acknowledgments_______________________________ 357

Additional Views:

Philip A. Hart_______________________________________________ 359

Robert Morgan______________________________________________ 363

Introduction to Separate Views of Senators John G. Tower, Howard

H. Baker, Jr., and Barry Goldwater____________________________ 367

John G. Tower______________________________________________ 369

Howard H. Baker, Jr__________________________________________ 373

Barry Goldwater_____________________________________________ 389

Charles McC. Mathias, Jr______________________________________ 395

I. Introduction and Summary

The resolution creating this Committee placed greatest emphasis on whether intelligence activities threaten the "rights of American citizens."[1]

The critical question before the Committee was to determine how the fundamental liberties of the people can be maintained in the course of the Government's effort to protect their security. The delicate balance between these basic goals of our system of government is often difficult to strike, but it can, and must, be achieved. We reject the view that the traditional American principles of justice and fair play have no place in our struggle against the enemies of freedom. Moreover, our investigation has established that the targets of intelligence activity have ranged far beyond persons who could properly be characterized as enemies of freedom and have extended to a wide array of citizens engaging in lawful activity.

Americans have rightfully been concerned since before World War II about the dangers of hostile foreign agents likely to commit acts of espionage. Similarly, the violent acts of political terrorists can seriously endanger the rights of Americans. Carefully focused intelligence investigations can help prevent such acts. But too often intelligence has lost this focus and domestic intelligence activities have invaded individual privacy and violated the rights of lawful assembly and political expression. Unless new and tighter controls are established by legislation, domestic intelligence activities threaten to undermine our democratic society and fundamentally alter its nature.

We have examined three types of "intelligence" activities affecting the rights of American citizens. The first is intelligence collection -- such as infiltrating groups with informants, wiretapping, or opening letters. The second is dissemination of material which has been collected. The third is covert action designed to disrupt and discredit the activities of groups and individuals deemed a threat to the social order. These three types of "intelligence" activity are closely related in the practical world. Information which is disseminated by the intelligence community[2] or used in disruptive programs has usually been obtained through surveillance. Nevertheless, a division between collection, dissemination and covert action is analytically useful both in understanding why excesses have occurred in the past and in devising remedies to prevent those excesses from recurring.

A. Intelligence Activity: A New Form of Governmental Power to Impair Citizens' Rights

A tension between order and liberty is inevitable in any society. A Government must protect its citizens from those bent on engaging in violence and criminal behavior, or in espionage and other hostile foreign intelligence activity. Many of the intelligence programs reviewed in this report were established for those purposes. Intelligence work has, at times, successfully prevented dangerous and abhorrent acts, such as bombings and foreign spying, and aided in the prosecution of those responsible for such acts.

But, intelligence activity in the past decades has, all too often, exceeded the restraints on the exercise of governmental power which are imposed by our country's Constitution, laws, and traditions.

Excesses in the name of protecting security are not a recent development in our nation's history. In 1798, for example, shortly after the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution, the Allen and Sedition Acts were passed. These Acts, passed in response to fear of proFrench "subversion", made it a crime to criticize the Government.[3] During the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus. Hundreds of American citizens were prosecuted for anti-war statements during World War I, and thousands of "radical" aliens were seized for deportation during the 1920 Palmer Raids. During the Second World War, over the opposition of J. Edgar Hoover and military intelligence,[4] 120,000 Japanese-Americans were apprehended and incarcerated in detention camps.

Those actions, however, were fundamentally different from the intelligence activities examined by this Committee. They were generally executed overtly under the authority of a statute or a public executive order. The victims knew what was being done to them and could challenge the Government in the courts and other forums. Intelligence activity, on the other hand, is generally covert. It is concealed from its victims[5] and is seldom described in statutes or explicit executive orders. The victim may never suspect that his misfortunes are the intended result of activities undertaken by his government, and accordingly may have no opportunity to challenge the actions taken against him.

It is, of course, proper in many circumstances -- such as developing a criminal prosecution - - for the Government to gather information about a citizen and use it to achieve legitimate ends, some of which might be detrimental to the citizen. But in criminal prosecutions, the courts have struck a balance between protecting the rights of the accused citizen and protecting the society which suffers the consequences of crime. Essential to the balancing process are the rules of criminal law which circumscribe the techniques for gathering evidence[6] the kinds of evidence that may be collected, and the uses to which that evidence may be put. In addition, the criminal defendant is given an opportunity to discover and then challenge the legality of how the Government collected information about him and the use which the Government intends to make of that information.

This Committee has examined a realm of governmental information collection which has not been governed by restraints comparable to those in criminal proceedings. We have examined the collection of intelligence about the political advocacy and actions and the private lives of American citizens. That information has been used covertly to discredit the ideas advocated and to "neutralize" the actions of their proponents. As Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone warned in 1924, when he sought to keep federal agencies from investigating "political or other opinions" as opposed to "conduct . . . forbidden by the laws":

When a police system passes beyond these limits, it is dangerous to the proper administration of justice and to human liberty, which it should be our first concern to cherish.

. . . There is always a possibility that a secret police may become a menace to free government and free institutions because it carries with it the possibility of abuses of power which are not always quickly apprehended or understood.[7]

Our investigation has confirmed that warning. We have seen segments of our Government, in their attitudes and action, adopt tactics unworthy of a democracy, and occasionally reminiscent of the tactics of totalitarian regimes. We have seen a consistent pattern in which programs initiated with limited goals, such as preventing criminal violence or identifying foreign spies, were expanded to what witnesses characterized as "vacuum cleaners",[8] sweeping in information about lawful activities of American citizens.

The tendency of intelligence activities to expand beyond their initial scope is a theme which runs through every aspect of our investigative findings. Intelligence collection programs naturally generate ever-increasing demands for new data. And once intelligence has been collected, there are strong pressures to use it against the target.

The pattern of intelligence agencies expanding the scope of their activities was well described by one witness, who in 1970 had coordinated an effort by most of the intelligence community to obtain authority to undertake more illegal domestic activity:

The risk was that you would get people who would be susceptible to political considerations as opposed to national security considerations, or would construe political considerations to be national security considerations, to move from the, kid with a bomb to the kid with a picket sign, and from the kid with the picket sign to the kid with the bumper sticker of the opposing candidate.

And you just keep going down the line.[9]

In 1940, Attorney General Robert Jackson saw the same risk. He recognized that using broad labels like "national security" or "subversion" to invoke the vast power of the government is dangerous because there are "no definite standards to determine what constitutes a 'subversive activity, such as we have for murder or larceny." Jackson added:

Activities which seem benevolent or helpful to wage earners, persons on relief, or those who are disadvantaged in the struggle for existence may be regarded as 'subversive' by those whose property interests might be burdened thereby. Those who are in office are apt to regard as 'subversive' the activities of any of those who would bring about a change of administration. Some of our soundest constitutional doctrines were once punished as subversive. We must not forget that it was not so long ago that both the term 'Republican' and the term 'Democrat' were epithets with sinister meaning to denote persons of radical tendencies that were 'subversive' of the order of things then dominant.[10]

This wise warning was not heeded in the conduct of intelligence activity, where the "eternal vigilance" which is the "price of liberty" has been forgotten.

B. The Questions

We have directed our investigation toward answering the, following questions:

Which governmental agencies have engaged in domestic spying?

How many citizens have been targets of Governmental intelligence activity?

What standards have governed the opening of intelligence investigations and when have intelligence investigations been terminated?

Where have the targets fit on the spectrum between those who commit violent criminal acts and those who seek only to dissent peacefully from Government policy?

To what extent has the information collected included intimate details of the targets' personal lives or their political views, and has such information been disseminated and used to injure individuals?

What actions beyond surveillance have intelligence agencies taken, such as attempting to disrupt, discredit, or destroy persons or groups who have been the targets of surveillance?

Have intelligence agencies been used to serve the political aims of Presidents, other high officials, or the agencies themselves?

How have the agencies responded either to proper orders or to excessive pressures from their superiors? To what extent have intelligence agencies disclosed, or concealed them from, outside bodies charged with overseeing them?

Have intelligence agencies acted outside the law? What has been the attitude of the intelligence community toward the rule of law?

To what extent has the Executive branch and the Congress controlled intelligence agencies and held them accountable?

Generally, how well has the Federal system of checks and balances between the branches worked to control intelligence activity?

C. Summary of the Main Problems

The answer to each of these questions is disturbing. Too many people have been spied upon by too many Government agencies and to much information has been collected. The Government has often undertaken the secret surveillance of citizens on the basis of their political beliefs, even when those beliefs posed no threat of violence or illegal acts on behalf of a hostile foreign power. The Government, operating primarily through secret informants, but also using other intrusive techniques such as wiretaps, microphone "bugs" surreptitious mail opening, and break-ins, has swept in vast amounts of information about the personal lives, views, and associations of American citizens. Investigations of groups deemed potentially dangerous -- and even of groups suspected of associating with potentially dangerous organizations -- have continued for decades, despite the fact that those groups did not engage in unlawful activity. Groups and individuals have been harassed and disrupted because of their political views and their lifestyles. Investigations have been based upon vague standards whose breadth made excessive collection inevitable. Unsavory and vicious tactics have been employed -- including anonymous attempts to break up marriages, disrupt meetings, ostracize persons from their professions, and provoke target groups into rivalries that might result in deaths. Intelligence agencies have served the political and personal objectives of presidents and other high officials. While the agencies often committed excesses in response to pressure from high officials in the Executive branch and Congress, they also occasionally initiated improper activities and then concealed them from officials whom they had a duty to inform.

Governmental officials -- including those whose principal duty is to enforce the law --have violated or ignored the law over long periods of time and have advocated and defended their right to break the law.

The Constitutional system of checks and balances has not adequately controlled intelligence activities. Until recently the Executive branch has neither delineated the scope of permissible activities nor established procedures for supervising intelligence agencies. Congress has failed to exercise sufficient oversight, seldom questioning the use to which its apropriations were being put. Most domestic intelligence issues have not reached the courts, and in those cases when they have reached the courts, the judiciary has been reluctant to grapple with them.

Each of these points is briefly illustrated below, and covered in substantially greater detail in the following sections of the report.

1. The Number of People Affected by Domestic Intelligence Activity

United States intelligence agencies have investigated a vast number of American citizens and domestic organizations. FBI headquarters alone has developed over 500,000 domestic intelligence files,[11] and these have been augmented by additional files at FBI Field Offices. The FBI opened 65,000 of these domestic intelligence files in 1972 alone.[12] In fact, substantially more individuals and groups are subject to intelligence scrutiny than the number of files would appear to indicate, since typically, each domestic intelligence file contains information on more than one individual or group, and this information is readily retrievable through the FBI General Name Index.

The number of Americans and domestic groups caught in the domestic intelligence net is further illustrated by the following statistics:

- - Nearly a quarter of a million first class letters were opened and photographed in the United States by the CIA between 1953-1973, producing a CIA computerized index of nearly one and one-half million names.[13]

- - At least 130,000 first class letters were opened and photographed by the FBI between 1940-1966 in eight U.S. cities.[14]

- - Some 300,000 individuals were indexed in a CIA computer system and separate files were created on approximately 7,200 Americans and over 100 domestic groups during the course of CIA's Operation CHAOS (1967-1973).[15]

- - Millions of private telegrams sent from, to, or through the United States were obtained by the National Security Agency from 1947 to 1975 under a secret arrangement with three United States telegraph companies.[16]

- - An estimated 100,000 Americans were the subjects of United States Army intelligence files created between the mid 1960's and 1971.[17]

- - Intelligence files on more than 11,000 individuals and groups were created by the Internal Revenue Service between 1969 and 1973 and tax investigations were started on the basis of political rather than tax criteria.[18]

- - At least 26,000 individuals were at one point catalogued on an FBI list of persons to be rounded up in the event of a "national emergency".[19]

2. Too Much Information Is Collected For Too Long

Intelligence agencies have collected vast amounts of information about the intimate details of citizens' lives and about their participation in legal and peaceful political activities. The targets of intelligence activity have included political adherents of the right and the left, ranging from activitist to casual supporters. Investigations have been directed against proponents of racial causes and women's rights, outspoken apostles of nonviolence and racial harmony; establishment politicians; religious groups; and advocates of new life styles. The widespread targeting of citizens and domestic groups, and the excessive scope of the collection of information, is illustrated by the following examples:

(a) The "Women's Liberation Movement" was infiltrated by informants who collected material about the movement's policies, leaders, and individual members. One report included the name of every woman who attended meetings,[20] and another stated that each woman at a meeting bad described "how she felt oppressed, sexually or otherwise".[21] Another report concluded that the movement's purpose was to "free women from the humdrum existence of being only a wife and mother", but still recommended that the intelligence investigation should be continued.[22]

(b) A prominent civil rights leader and advisor to Dr. Martin Luther ing, Jr., was investigated on the suspicion that he might be a Communist " sympathizer". The FBI field office concluded he was not.[23] Bureau headquarters directed that the investigation continue using a theory of "guilty until proven innocent:"

The Bureau does not agree with the expressed belief of the field office that -----------[24] is not sympathetic to the Party cause. While there may not be any evidence that ----------- is a Communist neither is there any substantial evidence that he is anti-Communist.[25]

(c) FBI sources reported on the formation of the Conservative American Christian Action Council in 1971.[26] In the 1950's, the Bureau collected information about the John Birch Society and passed it to the White House because of the Society's "scurillous attack" on President Eisenhower and other high Government officials.[27]

(d) Some investigations of the lawful activities of peaceful groups have continued for decades. For example, the NAACP was investigated to determine whether it "had connections with" the Communist Party. The investigation lasted for over twenty-five years, although nothing was found to rebut a report during the first year of the investigation that the NAACP had a "strong tendency" to "steer clear of Communist activities."[28] Similarly, the FBI has admitted that the Socialist Workers Party has committed no criminal acts. Yet the Bureau has investigated the Socialist Workers Party for more than three decades on the basis of its revolutionary rhetoric-which the FBI concedes falls short of incitement to violence-and its claimed international links. The Bureau is currently using its informants to collect information about SWP members' political views, including those on "U.S. involvement in Angola," "food prices," "racial matters," the "Vietnam War," and about any of their efforts to support non-SWP candidates for political office.[29]

(e) National political leaders fell within the broad reach of intelligence investigations. For example, Army Intelligrnce nee maintained files on Senator Adlai Stevenson and Congressman Abner Mikva because of their participation in peaceful political meetings under surveillance by Army agents.[30] A letter to Richard Nixon, while he was a candidate for President in 1968, was intercepted under CIA's mail opening program.[31] In the 1960's President Johnson asked the FBI to compare various Senators' statements on Vietnam with the Communist Party line[32] and to conduct name checks on leading antiwar Senators.[33]

(f) As part of their effort to collect information which "related even remotely" to people or groups "active" in communities which had "the potential" for civil disorder, Army intelligence agencies took such steps as: sending agents to a Halloween party for elementary school children in Washington, D.C., because they suspected a local "dissident" might be present; monitoring protests of welfare mothers' organizations in Milwaukee; infiltrating a coalition of church youth groups in Colorado; and sending agents to a priests' conference in Washington, D.C., held to discuss birth control measures.[34]

(g) In the, late 1960's and early 1970s, student groups were subjected to intense scrutiny. In 1970 the FBI ordered investigations of every member of the Students for a Democratic Society and of "every Black Student Union and similar group regardless of their past or present involvement in disorders."[35] Files were opened on thousands of young men and women so that, as the former head of FBI intelligence explained , the information could be used if they ever applied for a government job.[36]

In the 1960's Bureau agents were instructed to increase their efforts to discredit "New Left" student demonstrators by tactics including publishing photographs ("naturally the most obnoxious picture should be used"),[37] using "misinformation" to falsely notify members events had been cancelled,[38] and writing "tell-tale" letters to students' parents.[39]

(h) The FBI Intelligence Division commonly investigated any indication that "subversive" groups already under investigation were seeking to influence or control other groups.[40] One example of the extreme breadth of this "infiltration" theory was an FBI instruction in the mid-1960's to all Field Offices to investigate every "free university" because some of them had come under "subversive influence."[41]

(i) Each administration from Franklin D. Roosevelt's to Richard Nixon's permitted, and sometimes encouraged, government agencies to handle essentially political intelligence. For example:

- - President Roosevelt asked the FBI to put in its files the names of citizens sending telegrams to the White House opposing his "national defense" policy and supporting Col. Charles Lindbergh.[42]

- - President Truman received inside information on a former Roosevelt aide's efforts to influence his appointments,[43] labor union negotiating plans,[44] and the publishing plans of journalists.[45]

- - President Eisenhower received reports on purely political and social contacts with foreign officials by Bernard Baruch,[46] Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt,[47] and Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas.[47]

- - The Kennedy Administration had the FBI wiretap a Congressional staff member,[48] three executive officials,[49] a lobbyist,[50] and a, Washington law firm.[51] Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy received the fruits of a FBI "tap" on Martin Luther King, Jr.[52] and a "bug" on a Congressman both of which yielded information of a political nature.[53]

- - President Johnson asked the FBI to conduct "name checks" of his critics and of members of the staff of his 1964 opponent, Senator Barry Goldwater.[54] He also requested purely political intelligence on his critics in the Senate, and received extensive intelligence reports on political activity at the 1964 Democratic Convention from FBI electronic surveillance.[55]

-- President Nixon authorized a program of wiretaps which produced for the White House purely political or personal information unrelated to national security, including information about a Supreme Court justice.[56]

3. Covert Action and the Use of Illegal or Improper Means

(a) Covert Action. -- Apart from uncovering excesses in the collection of intelligence, our investigation has disclosed covert actions directed against Americans, and the use of illegal and improper surveillance techniques to gather information. For example:

(i) The FBI's COINTELPRO -- counterintelligence program -- was designed to "disrupt" groups and "neutralize" individuals deemed to be threats to domestic security. The FBI resorted to counterintelligence tactics in part because its chief officials believed that the existing law could not control the activities of certain dissident groups, and that court decisions had tied the hands of the intelligence community. Whatever opinion one holds about the policies of the targeted groups, many of the tactics employed by the FBI were indisputably degrading to a free society. COINTELPRO tactics included:

- - Anonymously attacking the political beliefs of targets in order to induce their employers to fire them;

- - Anonymously mailing letters to the spouses of intelligence targets for the purpose of destroying their marriages;[57]

- - Obtaining from IRS the tax returns of a target and then attempting to provoke an IRS investigation for the express purpose of deterring a protest leader from attending the Democratic National Convention;[58]

- - Falsely and anonymously labeling as Government informants members of groups known to be violent, thereby exposing the falsely labelled member to expulsion or physical attack;[59]

- - Pursuant to instructions to use "misinformation" to disrupt demonstrations, employing such means as broadcasting fake orders on the same citizens band radio frequency used by demonstration marshalls to attempt to control demonstrations,[60] and duplicating and falsely filling out forms soliciting housing for persons coming to a demonstration, thereby causing "long and useless journeys to locate these addresses";[61]

- - Sending an anonymous letter to the leader of a Chicago street gang (described as "violence-prone") stating that the Black Panthers were supposed to have "a hit out for you". The letter was suggested because it "may intensify . . . animosity" and cause the street gang leader to "take retaliatory action".[62]

(ii) From "late 1963" until his death in 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr., was the target of an intensive campaign by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to "neutralize" him as an effective civil rights leader. In the words of the man in charge of the FBI's "war" against Dr. King, "No holds were barred."[63]

The FBI gathered information about Dr. King's plans and activities through an extensive surveillance program, employing nearly every intelligence-gathering technique at the Bureau's disposal in order to obtain information about the "private activities of Dr. King and his advisors" to use to "completely discredit" them.[64]

The program to destroy Dr. King as the leader of the civil rights movement included efforts to discredit him with Executive branch officials, Congressional leaders, foreign heads of state, American ambassadors, churches. universities, and the press.[65]

The FBI mailed Dr. King a tape recording made from microphones hidden in his hotel rooms which one agent testified was an attempt to destroy Dr. King's marriage.[66] The tape recording was accompanied by a note which Dr. King and his advisors interpreted as threatening to release the tape recording unless Dr. King committed suicide.[67]

The extraordinary nature of the campaign to discredit Dr. King is evident from two documents:

-- At the August 1963 March on Washington, Dr. King told the country of his "dream" that:

all of God's children, black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles, Protestants and Catholics, will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old Negro spiritual, "Free at last, free at last, thank God Almighty, I'm free at last."

The Bureau's Domestic Intelligence Division concluded that this "demagogic speech" established Dr. King as the "most dangerous and effective Negro leader in the country."[68] Shortly afterwards, and within days after Dr. King was named "Man of the Year" by Time magazine, the FBI decided to "take him off his pedestal," reduce him completely in influence," and select and promote its own candidate to "assume the role of the leadership of the Negro people."[69]

-- In early 1968, Bureau headquarters explained to the field that Dr. King must be destroyed because he was seen as a potential "messiah" who could "unify and electrify" the "black nationalist movement". Indeed, to the FBI he was a potential threat because he might "abandon his supposed 'obedience' to white liberal doctrines (non-violence)."[70] In short, a non-violent man was to be secretly attacked and destroyed as insurance against his abandoning non-violence.

(b) Illegal or Improper Means. -- The surveillance which we investigated was not only vastly excessive in breadth and a basis for degrading counterintelligence actions, but was also often conducted by illegal or improper means. For example:

(1) For approximately 20 years the CIA carried out a program of indiscriminately opening citizens' first class mail. The Bureau also had a mail opening program, but cancelled it in 1966. The Bureau continued, however, to receive the illegal fruits of CIA's program. In 1970, the heads of both agencies signed a document for President Nixon, which correctly stated that mail opening was illegal, falsely stated that it had been discontinued, and proposed that the illegal opening of mail should be resumed because it would provide useful results. The President approved the program, but withdrew his approval five days later. The illegal opening continned nonetheless. Throughout this period CIA officials knew that mail opening was illegal, but expressed concern about the "flap potential" of exposure, not about the illegality of their activity.[71]

(2) From 1947 until May 1975, NSA received from international cable companies millions of cables which had been sent by American citizens in the reasonable expectation that they would be kept private.[72]

(3) Since the early 1930's, intelligence agencies have frequently wiretapped and bugged American citizens without the benefit of judicial warrant. Recent court decisions have curtailed the use of these techniques against domestic targets. But past subjects of these surveillances have included a United States Congressman, a Congressional staff member, journalists and newsmen, and numerous individuals and groups who engaged in no criminal activity and who posed no genuine threat to the national security, such as two White House domestic affairs advisers and an anti Vietnam War protest group. While the prior written approval of the Attorney General has been required for all warrantless wiretaps since 1940, the record is replete with instances where this requirement was ignored and the Attorney General gave only after-the-fact authorization.

Until 1965, microphone surveillance by intelligence agencies was wholly unregulated in certain classes of cases. Within weeks after a 1954 Supreme Court decision denouncing the FBI's installation of a microphone in a defendant's bedroom, the Attorney General informed the Bureau that he did not believe the decision applied to national security cases and permitted the FBI to continue to install microphones subject only to its own "intelligent restraint".[73]

(4) In several cases, purely political information (such as the reaction of Congress to an Administration's legislative proposal) and purely personal information (such as coverage of the extra-marital social activities of a high- level Executive official under surveillance) was obtained from electronic surveillance and disseminated to the highest levels of the federal government.[74]

(5) Warrantless break-ins have been conducted by intelligence agencies since World War II. During the 1960's alone, the FBI and CIA conducted hundreds of break-ins, many against American citizens and domestic organizations. In some cases, these break-ins were to install microphones; in other cases, they were to steal such items as membership lists from organizations considered "subversive" by the Bureau.[75]

(6) The most pervasive surveillance technique has been the informant. In a random sample of domestic intelligence cases, 83% involved informants and 5% involved electronic surveillance.[76] Informants have been used against peaceful, law-abiding groups; they have collected information about personal and political views and activities.[77] To maintain their credentials in violence- prone groups, informants have involved themselves in violent activity. This phenomenon is well illustrated by an informant in the Klan. He was present at the murder of a civil rights worker in Mississippi and subsequently helped to solve the crime and convict the perpetrators. Earlier, however, while performing duties paid for by the Government, he had previously "beaten people severely, had boarded buses and kicked people, had [gone] into restaurants and beaten them [blacks] with blackjacks, chains, pistols."[78] Although the FBI requires agents to instruct informants that they cannot be involved in violence, it was understood that in the Klan, "he couldn't be an angel and be a good informant."[79]

4. Ignoring the Law

Officials of the intelligence agencies occasionally recognized that certain activities were illegal, but expressed concern only for "flap Potential." Even more disturbing was the frequent testimony that the law, and the Constitution were simply ignored. For example, the author of the so-called Huston plan testified:

Question. Was there any person who stated that the activity recommended, which you have previously identified as being illegal opening of the mail and breaking and entry or burglary -- was there any single person who stated that such activity should not be done because it was unconstitutional?

Answer. No.

Question. Was there any single person who said such activity should not be done because it was illegal?

Answer. No.[80]

Similarly, the man who for ten years headed FBI's Intelligence Division testifed that:

... never once did I hear anybody, including myself, raise the question: "Is this course of action which we have agreed upon lawful, is it legal, is it ethical or moral." We never gave any thought to this line of reasoning, because we were just naturally pragmatic.[81]

Although the statutory law and the Constitution were often not "[given] a thought",[82] there was a general attitude that intelligence needs were responsive to a higher law. Thus, as one witness testified in justifying the FBI's mail opening program:

It was my assumption that what we were doing was justified by what we had to do . . . the greater good, the national security.[83]

5. Deficiencies in Accountability and Control

The overwhelming number of excesses continuing over a prolonged period of time were due in large measure to the fact that the system of checks and balances -- created in our Constitution to limit abuse of Governmental power -- was seldom applied to the intelligence community. Guidance and regulation from outside the intelligence agencies -- where it has been imposed at all -- has been vague. Presidents and other senior Executive officials, particularly the Attorneys General, have virtually abdicated their Constitutional responsibility to oversee and set standards for intelligence activity. Senior government officials generally gave the agencies broad, general mandates or pressed for immediate results on pressing problems. In neither case did they provide guidance to prevent excesses and their broad mandates and pressures themselves often resulted in excessive or improper intelligence activity.

Congress has often declined to exercise meaningful oversight, and on occasion has passed laws or made statements which were taken by intelligence agencies as supporting overly- broad investigations.

On the other hand, the record reveals instances when intelligence agencies have concealed improper activities from their superiors in the Executive branch and from the Congress, or have elected to disclose only the less questionable aspects of their activities.

There has been, in short, a, clear and sustained failure by those responsible to control the intelligence community and to ensure its accountability. There has been an equally clear and sustained failure by intelligence agencies to fully inform the proper authorities of their activities and to comply with directives from those authorities.

6. The Adverse Impact of Improper Intelligence Activity

Many of the illegal or improper disruptive efforts directed against American citizens and domestic organizations succeeded in injuring their targets. Although it is sometimes difficult to prove that a target's misfortunes were caused by a counter-intelligence program directed against him, the possibility that an arm of the Untied States Government intended to cause the harm and might have been responsible is itself abhorrant.

The Committee has observed numerous examples of the impact of intelligence operations. Sometimes the harm was readily apparent -- destruction of marriages, loss of friends or jobs. Sometimes the attitudes of the public and of Government officials responsible for formulating policy and resolving vital issues were influenced by distorted intelligence. But the most basic harm was to the values of privacy and freedom which our Constitution seeks to protect and which intelligence activity infringed on a broad scale.

- a) General Efforts to Discredit. -- Several efforts against individuals and groups appear to have achieved their stated aims. For example:

- - A Bureau Field Office reported that the anonymous letter it had sent to an activist's husband accusing his wife of infidelity "contributed very strongly" to the subsequent breakup of the marriage.[84]

- - Another Field Office reported that a draft counsellor deliberately, and falsely, accused of being an FBI informant was "ostracized" by his friends and associates.[85]

- - Two instructors were reportedly put on probation after the Bureau sent an anonymous letter to a university administrator about their funding of an anti-administration student newspaper.[86]

- - The Bureau evaluated its attempts to "put a stop" to a contribution to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference as "quite successful."[87]

- - An FBI document boasted that a "pretext" phone call to Stokeley Carmichael's mother telling her that members of the Black Panther Party intended to kill her son left her "shocked". The memorandum intimated that the Bureau believed it had been responsible for Carmichael's flight to Africa the following day.[88]

- b) Media Manipulation. -- The FBI has attempted covertly to influence the public's perception of persons and organizations by dissemminating derogatory information to the press, either anonymously or through "friendly" news contacts. The impact of those articles is generally difficult to measure, although in some cases there are fairly direct connections to injury to the target. The Bureau also attempted to influence media reporting which would have any impact on the public image of the FBI. Examples include:

- - Planting a series of derogatory articles about Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Poor People's Campaign.[89]

For example, in anticipation of the 1968 "poor people's march on Washington, D.C.," Bureau Headquarters granted authority to furnish "cooperative news media sources" an article "designed to curtail success of Martin Luther King's fund raising."[90] Another memorandum illustrated how "photographs of demonstrators" could be used in discrediting the civil rights movement. Six photographs of participants in the poor people's campaign in Cleveland accompanied the memorandum with the following note attached: "These [photographs] show the militant aggressive appearance of the participants and might be of interest to a cooperative news source."[91] Information on the Poor People's Campaign was provided by the FBI to friendly reporters on the condition that "the Bureau must not be revealed as the source."[92]

- - Soliciting information from Field Offices "on a continuing basis" for "prompt . . . dissemination to the news media . . . to discredit the New Left movement and its adherents." The Headquarters directive requested, among other things, that:

specific data should be furnished depicting the scurrilous and depraved nature, of many of the characters, activities, habits, and living conditions representative of New Left adherents.

Field Offices were to be exhorted that: "Every avenue of possible embarrassment must be vigorously and enthusiastically explored."[93]

- - Ordering Field Offices to gather information which would disprove allegations by the "liberal press, the bleeding hearts, and the forces on the left"[94] that the Chicago police used undue force in dealing with demonstrators at the 1968 Democratic Convention.[95]

- - Taking advantage of a close relationship with the Chairman of the Board -- described in an FBI memorandum as "our good friend"-- of a magazine with national circulation to influence articles which related to the FBI. For example, through this relationship the Bureau: "squelched" an "unfavorable article against the Bureau" written by a free-lance writer about an FBI investigation; "postponed publication" of an article on another FBI case; "forestalled publication" of an article by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; and received information about proposed editing of King's articles.[96]

(c) Distorting Data to Influence Government Policy and Public Perceptions

Accurate intelligence is a prerequisite to sound government policy. However, as the past head of the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division reminded the Committee:

The facts by themselves are not too meaningful. They are something like stones cast into a heap.[97]

On certain crucial subjects the domestic intelligence agencies reported the "facts" in ways that gave rise to misleading impressions.

For example, the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division initially discounted as an "obvious failure" the alleged attempt's of Communists to influence the civil rights movement.[98] Without any significant change in the factual situation, the Bureau moved from the Division's conclusion to Director Hoover's public congressional testimony characterizing Communist influence on the civil rights movement as "vitally important."[98]

FBI reporting on protests against the Vietnam War provides another example, of the manner in which the information provided to decision-makers can be skewed. In acquiescence with a judgment already expressed by President Johnson, the Bureau's reports on demonstrations against the War in Vietnam emphasized Communist efforts to influence the anti-war movement and underplayed the fact that the vast majority of demonstrators were not Communist controlled.[99]

(d) "Chilling" First Amendment Rights. -- The First Amendment protects the Rights of American citizens to engage in free and open discussions, and to associate with persons of their choosing. Intelligence agencies have, on occasion, expressly attempted to interfere with those rights. For example, one internal FBI memorandum called for "more interviews" with New Left subjects "to enhance the paranoia endemic in these circles" and "get the point across there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox."[100]

More importantly, the government's surveillance activities in the aggregate -- whether or not expressly intended to do so -- tends, as the Committee concludes at p. 290 to deter the exercise of First Amended Rights by American citizens who become aware of the government's domestic intelligence program.

(e) Preventing the Free Exchange of Ideas. -- Speakers, teachers, writers, and publications themselves were targets of the FBI's counterintelligence program. The FBI's efforts to interfere with the free exchange of ideas included:

- - Anonymously attempting to prevent an alleged "Communist-front" group from holding a forum on a midwest campus, and then investigating the judge who ordered that the meeting be allowed to proceed.[101]

- - Using another "confidential source" in a foundation which contributed to a local college to apply pressure on the school to fire an activist professor.

- - Anonymously contacting a university official to urge him to "persuade" two professors to stop funding a student newspaper, in order to "eliminate what voice the New Left has" in the area.

- - Targeting the New Mexico Free University for teaching "confrontation politics" and "draft counseling training".[102]

7. Cost and Value

Domestic intelligence is expensive. We have already indicated the cost of illegal and improper intelligence activities in terms of the harm to victims, the injury to constitutional values, and the damage to the democratic process itself. The cost in dollars is also significant. For example, the FBI has budgeted for fiscal year 1976 over $7 million for its domestic security informant program, more than twice the amount it spends on informants against organized crime.[103] The aggregate budget for FBI domestic security intelligence and foreign counterintelligence is at least $80 million.[104] In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the Bureau was joined by the CIA, the military, and NSA in collecting information about the anti-war movement and black activists, the cost was substantially greater.

Apart from the excesses described above, the usefulness of many domestic intelligence activities in serving the legitimate goal of protecting society has been questionable. Properly directed intelligence investigations concentrating upon hostile foreign agents and violent terrorists can produce valuable results. The Committee has examined cases where the FBI uncovered "illegal" agents of a foreign power engaged in clandestine intelligence activities in violation of federal law. Information leading to the prevention of serious violence has been acquired by the FBI through its informant penetration of terrorist groups and through the inclusion in Bureau files of the names of persons actively involved with such groups.[105] Nevertheless, the most sweeping domestic intelligence surveillance programs have produced surprisingly few useful returns in view of their extent. For example:

- - Between 1960 and 1974, the FBI conducted over 500,000 separate investigations of persons and groups under the "subversive" category, predicated on the possibility that they might be likely to overthrow the government of the United States.[106] Yet not a single individual or group has been prosecuted since 1957 under the laws which prohibit planning or advocating action to overthrow the government and which are the main alleged statutory basis for such FBI investigations.[107]

- - A recent study by the General Accounting Office has estimated that of some 17,528 FBI domestic intelligence investigations of individuals in 1974, only 1.3 percent resulted in prosecution and conviction, and in only "about 2 percent" of the cases was advance knowledge of any activity -- legal or illegal -- obtained.[108]

- - One of the main reasons advanced for expanded collection of intelligence about urban unrest and anti-war protest was to help responsible officials cope with possible violence. However, a former White House official with major duties in this area under the Johnson administration has concluded, in retrospect, that "in none of these situations . . . would advance intelligence about dissident groups [have] been of much help," that what was needed was "physical intelligence" about the geography of major cities, and that the attempt to "predict violence" was not a "successful undertaking"[109]

- - Domestic intelligence reports have sometimes even been counterproductive. A local police chief, for example, described FBI reports which led to the positioning of federal troops near his city as:

. . . almost completely composed of unsorted and unevaluated stories, threats,
and rumors that had crossed my desk in New Haven. Many of these had long

before been discounted by our Intelligence Division. But they had made their way from New Haven to Washington, had gained completely unwarranted credibility, and had been submitted by the Director of the FBI to the President of the United States. They seemed to present a convincing picture of impending holocaust.[110]

In considering its recommendations, the Committee undertook an evaluation of the FBI's claims that domestic intelligence was necessary to combat terrorism, civil disorders, "subversion," and hostile foreign intelligence activity. The Committee reviewed voluminous materials bearing on this issue and questioned Bureau officials, local police officials, and present and former federal executive officials.

We have found that we are in fundamental agreement with the wisdom of Attorney General Stone's initial warning that intelligence agencies must not be "concerned with political or other opinions of individuals" and must be limited to investigating essentially only "such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States." The Committee's record demonstrates that domestic intelligence which departs from this standard raises grave risks of undermining the democratic process and harming the interests of individual citizens. This danger weighs heavily against the speculative or negligible benefits of the ill-defined and overbroad investigations authorized in the past. Thus, the basic purpose of the recommendations contained in Part IV of this report is to limit the FBI to investigating conduct rather than ideas or associations.

The excesses of the past do not, however, justify depriving the United States of a clearly defined and effectively controlled domestic intelligence capability. The intelligence services of this nation's international adversaries continue to attempt to conduct clandestine espionage operations within the United States.[111] Our recommendations provide for intelligence investigations of hostile foreign intelligence activity.

Moreover, terrorists have engaged in serious acts of violence which have brought death and injury to Americans and threaten further such acts. These acts, not the politics or beliefs of those who would commit them, are the proper focus for investigations to anticipate terrorist violence. Accordingly, the Committee would permit properly controlled intelligence investigations in those narrow circumstances.[112]

Concentration on imminent violence can avoid the wasteful dispersion of resources which has characterized the sweeping (and fruitless) domestic intelligence investigations of the past. But the most important reason for the fundamental change in the domestic intelligence operations which our Recommendations propose is the need to protect the constitutional Rights of Americans.

In light of the record of abuse revealed by our inquiry, the Committee is not satisfied with the position that mere exposure of what has occurred in the past will prevent its recurrence. Clear legal standards and effective oversight and controls are necessary to ensure that domestic intelligence activity does not itself undermine the democratic system it is intended to protect.

[1] S. Res. 21, see. 2 (12). The Senate specifically charged this Committee with investigating "the conduct of domestic intelligence, or counterintelligence operations against United States citizens." (See. 2(2) ) The resolution added several examples of specific charges of possible "illegal, improper or unethical" governmental intelligence activities as matters to be fully investigated (See. (2) (1)-CIA domestic activities; See. (2) (3)-Huston Plan: See. (2) (10)-surreptitous entries, electronic surveillance, mail opening.)

[2] Just as the term "Intelligence activity" encompasses activities that go far beyond the collection and analysis of information, the term "intelligence community" includes persons ranging from the President to the lowest field operatives of the intelligence agencies.

[3] The Alien Act provided for the deportation of all aliens judged "dangerous to the peace and safety" of the nation. (1 Stat. 570, June 25, 1798) The Sedition Act made it a federal crime to publish "false, scandalous and malicious writing" against the United States government, the Congress, or the President with the intent to "excite against them" the "hatred of the good people of the United States" or to "encourage or abet any hostile designs of any foreign nation against the United States." (1 Stat. 596, July 14, 1798) There were at least 25 arrests, 15 indictments, and 10 convictions under the Sedition Act. (See James M. Smith, Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1956).)

[4] Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority (Garden City; Doubleday, 1962), p. 224; Roger Daniels, Concentration Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War II (New York: Holt, Rinehart. and Winston, 1971), p. 66.

[5] Many victims of intelligence activities have claimed in the past that they were being subjected to hostile action by their government. Prior to this investigation, most Americans would have dismissed these allegations. Senator Philip Hart aptly described this phenomenon in the course of the Committee's public hearings on domestic intelligence activities:

"As I'm sure others have, I have been told for years by, among others, some of my own family, that this is exactly what the Bureau was doing all of the time, and in my great wisdom and high office, I assured them that they were [wrong]-it just wasn't true. it couldn't happen. They wouldn't do it. What you have described is a series of illegal actions intended squarely to deny First Amendment rights to some Americans. That is what my children have told me was going on. Now I did not believe it.

"The trick now, as I see it, Mr. Chairman, is for this committee to be able to figure out how to persuade the people of this country that indeed it did go on. And how shall we insure that it will never happen again? But it will happen repeatedly unless we can bring ourselves to understand and accept that it did go on." Senator Philip Hart, 11/18/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 41.

[6] As the Supreme court noted in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 483. 486 (1966), even before the Court required law officers to advise criminal suspects of their constitutional rights before custodial interrogation, the FBI had "an exemplary record" in this area-a practice which the Court said should be emulated by state and local law enforcement agencies." This commendable FBI tradition in the general field of law enforcement presents a sharp contrast to the widespread disregard of individual rights in FBI domestic intelligence operations examined in the balance of this Report.

[7] New York Times, 5/13/24.

[8] Mary Jo Cook testimony, 12/2/75), Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 111; James B. Adams testimony, 12/2/75. Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 135.

[9] Tom Charles Huston testimony, 9/23/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 45.

[10] "The Federal Prosecutor", Journal of the American Judicature Society (June, 1940), p. 18.

[11] Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 10/6/75.

[12] Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 10/6/75.

[13] James Angleton testimony, 9/17/75, p. 28.

[14] See Mail Opening Report: Section IV, "FBI Mail Openings."

[15] Chief, International Terrorist Group testimony, Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, 3/10/75, pp. 1485-1489.

[16] Statement by the Chairman, 11/6/75; re: SHAMROCK, Hearings, Vol, 5, pp. 57-60.

[17] See Military Surveillance Report: Section 11, "The Collection of Information about the Political Activities of Private Citizens and Private Organizations."

[18] See IRS Report: Section II, "Selective Enforcement for Non-tax Purposes."

[19] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, 12/8/54. Many of the memoranda cited in this report were actually written by FBI personnel other than those whose names were indicated at the foot of the document as the author. Citation in this report of specific memoranda by using the names of FBI personnel which so appear is for documentation purposes only and is not intended to presume authorship or even knowledge in all cases.

[20] Memorandum from Kansas City Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/20/70. (Hearings, Vol. 6, Exhibit 543)

[21] Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/28/69, P. 2. (Hearings, Vol. 6, Exhibit 54--1)

[22] Memorandum from Baltimore Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/11/70, P. 2.

[23] Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/14/64.

[24] Name deleted by Committee to protect privacy.

[25] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Meld Office 4/24/64, re CPUSA, Negro question.

[26] James Adams testimony, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 137.

[27] Memorandum from F. T. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 5/29/6.3.

[28] Memorandum from Oklahoma City Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 9/19/41. See Development of FBI Domestic Intelligence Investigations: Section IV, "FBI Target Lists."

[29] Chief Robert Shackleford testimony, 2/6/76, p. 91.

[30] Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. Report. 1973. p. 57.

[31] Senate Select Committee Staff summary of HTLINGUAL File Review, 9/5/75.

[32] FBI Summary Memorandum, 1/31/75, re: Coverage of TX. Presentation.

[33] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Marvin Watson, 7/15/66.

[34] See Military Report: See. II, "The Collection of information About the Political Activities of Private citizens and Private Organizations."

[35] Memorandum from FBI headquarters to all SAC's, 11/4/70.

[36] Charles Brennan testimony, 9/25/75, Hearings, vol. 2 p. 117.

[37] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 7/5/68.

[38] Abstracts of New Left Documents #161, 115, 43. Memorandum from Washington Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/21/69.

[39] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 11/29/68.

[40] FBI manual of Instructions, See. 87, B (2-f).

[41] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 7/23/69.

[42] Memorandum from Stephen Early to J. Edgar Hoover, 5/21/40; 6/17/40.

[43] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to George Allen, 12/3/46.

[44] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Maj. Gen. Harry Vaughn, 2/15/47.

[45] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to M. T. Connelly, 1/27/50.

[46] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Dillon Anderson, 11/7/55.

[47] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler, 2/13/58.

[47] Letters from T. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler, 4/21/53-4/27/53.

[48] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/16/61.

[49] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/14/61.

[50] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/16/61.

[51] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 6/26/62.

[52] Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 12/19/66.

[53] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/18/61.

[54] Memorandum from T. Edgar Hoover to Bill Moyers, 10/27/64.

[55] Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to John Mohr, 8/29/64.

[56] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to H.R. Haldeman, 6/25/70.

[57] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters, to San Francisco Field Office, 11/26/68.

[58] Memorandum from [Midwest City] Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/l/68; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to [Midwest City] Field Office, 8/6/68.

[59] Memorandum from Columbia Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/4/70, re: COINTELPRO-New Left.

[60] Memorandum from Cbarles Brennan to William Sullivan. 8/15/68.

[61] Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/9/68.

[62] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 1/30/69 re: COINTELPRO, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups.

[63] William C. Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, p. 49.

[64] memorandum from Baumgardner to Sullivan, 2/4/64.

[65] Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/16/68; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 1/30/69, re: COINTELPRO, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups.

[66] William C. Sullivan, 11/1/75, pp. 104-105.

[67] Andrew Young testimony, 2/19/76. p. 8.

[68] Memorandum from Sullivan to Belmont, 8/30/63.

[69] Memorandum from Sullivan to Belmont, 1/8/64.

[70] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 3/4/68.

[71] See Mail Opening Report: Section II, "Legal Considerations and the 'Flap' Potential."

[72] See NSA Report: Section I. "Introduction and Summary."

[73] Memorandum from Attorney General Brownell to J. Edgar Hoover, 5/20/54.

[74] See finding on Political Abuse. To protect the privacy of the targeted individual, the Committee has omitted the citation to the memorandum concerning the example of purely personal information.

[75] Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach 7/19/66, p. 2.

[76] General Accounting Office Report on Domestic intelligence Operations of the FBI. 9/75.

[77] Mary Jo Cook testimony. 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6. p. 111.

[78] Gary Rowe deposition, 10/17/75, p. 9.

[79] Special Agent No. 3 deposition, 11/21/75, p. 12.

[80] Huston testimony 9/23/75, Hearings, Vol. 2,1).

[81] William Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, pp. 92-93.

[82] The quote is from a Bureau official who had supervised for the "Black Nationalist Hate. Group" COINTELPRO.

"Question. Did anybody at any time that you remember during the course of the program, discuss the Constitutionality or the legal authority, or anything else like that?

"Answer. No, we never gave it a thought. As far as I know, nobody engaged or ever had any idea that they were doing anything other than what was the policy of the Bureau which had been policy for a long time." (George Moore deposition, 11/3/75, p. 83.)

[83] Branagan, 10/9/75, p. 41.

[84] Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/19/70.

[85] Memorandum from 'San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/30/69.

[86] Memorandum from Mobile Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/9/70.

[87] Memorandum from Wick to DeLoach, 11/9/66.

[88] Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/9/68.

[89] See King Report: Sections V and VII.

[90] Memorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 10/26/68.

[91] Memorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 5/17/68.

[92] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Miami Field Office, 7/9/68.

[93] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/22/68.

[94] omitted in original.

[95] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 8/28/68.

[96] Memorandum from W. H. Stapleton to DeLoach, 11/3/64.

[97] Sullivan. 11/1/75, p. 48.

[98] Memorandum from Baumgardner to Sullivan. 8/26/63 p. 1. Hoover himself construed the initial Division estimate to mean that Communist influence was "infinitesimal."

[98] See Finding on Political Abuse, p. 225.

[99] See Finding on Political Abuse. p. 225.

[100] "New Left Notes -- Philadelphia." 9/16/70, Edition #1.

[101] Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters 10/26/60; Memorandum from P13T Headquarters to Detroit Field Office 10/27, 28, 31/60; Memorandum from Baumgardner to Belmont, 10/26/60.

[102] See COINTELPRO Report: Section 111. "The Goals of COINTELPRO: Preventing or disrupting the exercise of First Amendment Rights."

[103] The budget for FBI informant programs includes not only the payments to informants for their services and expenses, but also the expenses of FBI personnel who supervise informants, their support costs, and administrative overhead. (Justice Department letter to Senate Select Committee, 3/2/76).

[104] The Committee is withholding the portion of this figure spent on domestic security intelligence (informants and other investigations combined) to prevent hostile foreign intelligence services from deducing the amount spent on counterespionage. The $80 million figure does not include all costs of separate FBI activities which may be drawn upon for domestic security intelligence purposes. Among these are the Identification Division (maintaining fingerprint records), the Files and Communications Division (managing the storage and retrieval of investigative and intelligence files), and the FBI Laboratory.

[105] Examples of valuable informant reports include the following: one informant reported a plan to ambush police officers and the location of a cache of weapons and dynamite; another informant reported plans to transport illegally obtained weapons to Washington. D.C.: two informants at one meeting discovered plans to dynamite two city blocks. All of these plans were frustrated by further investigation and protective measures or arrest. (FBI memorandum to Select Committee, 12/10/75; Senate Select Committee Staff memorandum: Intelligence Cases in Which the FBI Prevented Violence, undated.)

One example of the use of information in Bureau files involved a "name check" at Secret Service request on certain persons applying for press credentials to cover the visit of a foreign head of state. The discovery of data in FBI files indicating that one such person bad been actively involved with violent groups led to further investigation and ultimately the issuanoe of a search warrant. The search produced evidence, including weapons, of a plot to assassinate the foreign head of state. (FBI memorandum to Senate Select Committee, 2/23/76)

[106] This figure is the number of "investigative matters" handled by the FBI in this area, including as separate items the investigative leads in particular cases which are followed up by various field offices. (FBI memorandum to Select Committee, 10/6/75.)

[107] Schackelford 2/13/76, p. 32. This official does not recall any targets of "subversive" investigations having been even referred to a Grand Jury under these statutes since the 1950s.

[108] FBI Domestic Intelligence Operations -- Their Purpose and Scope: Issues That Need To Be Resolved," Report by the Comptroller General to the House Judiciary Committee, 2/24/76, pp. 138-147. The FBI contends that these statistics may be unfair in that they concentrate on investigations of individuals rather than groups. (Ibid., Appendix V) In response, GAO states that its "sample of organization and control files was sufficient to determine that generally the FBI did not report advance knowledge of planned violence." In most of the fourteen instances where such advance knowledge was obtained, it related to "such activities as speeches, demonstrations or meetings-all essentially nonviolent." (Ibid.. p, 144)

[109] Joseph Califano testimony. 1/27/76, pp. 7-8.

[110] James Ahern testimony, 1/20/76, pp. 16, 17.

[111] An indication of the scope of the problem is the increasing number of official representatives of communist governments in the United States. For example the number of Soviet officials in this country has increased from 333 in 1961 to 1,079 by early 1975. There were 2,683 East-West exchange visitors and 1,500 commercial visitors in 1974. (FBI Memorandum, "Intelligence Activities Within the United States by Foreign Governments," 3/20/75.)

[112] According to the FBI, there were 89 bombings attributable to terrorist activity in 1975, as compared with 45 in 1974 and 24 in 1973. Six persons died in terrorist-claimed bombings and 76 persons were injured in 1975. Five other deaths were reported in other types of terrorist incidents. Monetary damage reported in terrorist bombings exceeded 2.7 million dollars. It should be noted, however, that terrorist bombings are only a fraction of the total number of bombings in this country. Thus, the 89 terrorist bombings in 1975 were among a total of over 1,900 bombings, most of which were not, according to the FBI , attributable clearly to terrorist activity. (FBI memorandum to Senate Select Committee, 2/23/76.)

II. The Growth of Domestic Intelligence: 1936 To 1976

- A. Summary

1. The Lesson: History Repeats Itself

During and after the First World War, intelligence agencies, including the predecessor of the FBI, engaged in repressive activity.[1]

A new Attorney General, Harlan Fiske Stone, sought to stop the investigation of "political or other opinions."[2] This restraint was embodied only in an executive pronouncement, however. No statutes were passed to prevent the kind of improper activity which had been exposed. Thereafter, as this narrative will show, the abuses returned in a new form. It is now the responsibility of all three branches of government to ensure that the pattern of abuse of domestic intelligence activity does not recur.

2. The Pattern: Broadening Through Time

Since the re-establishment of federal domestic intelligence programs in 1936, there has been a steady increase in the government's capability and willingness to pry into, and even disrupt, the political activities and personal lives of the people. The last forty years have witnessed a relentless expansion of domestic intelligence activity beyond investigation of criminal conduct toward the collection of political intelligence and the launching of secret offensive actions against Americans.

The initial incursions into the realm of ideas and associations were related to concerns about the influence of foreign totalitarian powers.

Ultimately, however, intelligence activity was directed against domestic groups advocating change in America, particularly those who most vigorously opposed the Vietnam war or sought to improve the conditions of racial minorities. Similarly, the targets of intelligence investigations were broadened from groups perceived to be violence prone to include groups of ordinary protesters.

3. Three Periods of Growth for Domestic Intelligence

The expansion of domestic intelligence activity can usefully be divided into three broad periods: (a) the pre-war -and World War II period; (b) the Cold War era, and (c) the period of domestic dissent beginning in the mid-sixties. The main developments in each of these stages in the evolution of domestic intelligence may be summarized as follows:

a. 1936-1945

By presidential directive -- rather than statute -- the FBI and military intelligence agencies were authorized to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. These investigations included a vaguely defined mission to collect intelligence about "subversive activities" which were sometimes unrelated to law enforcement. Wartime exigencies encouraged the unregulated use of intrusive intelligence techniques; and the FBI began to resist supervision by the Attorney General.

b. 1946-1963

Cold War fears and dangers nurtured the domestic intelligence programs of the FBI and military, and they became permanent features of government. Congress deferred to the executive branch in the oversight of these programs. The FBI became increasingly isolated from effective outside control, even from the Attorneys General. The scope of investigations of "subversion" widened greatly. Under the cloak of secrecy, the, FBI instituted its COINTELPRO operations to "disrupt" and "neutralize" "subversives". The National Security Agency, the FBI, and the CIA re-instituted instrusive wartime surveillance techniques in contravention of law.

c.1964-1976

Intelligence techniques which previously had been concentrated upon foreign threats and domestic groups said to be under Communist influence were applied with increasing intensity to a wide range of domestic activity by American citizens. These techniques were utilized against peaceful civil rights and antiwar protest activity, and thereafter in reaction to civil unrest, often without regard for the consequences to American liberties. The intelligence agencies of the United States -- sometimes abetted by public opinion and often in response to pressure from administration officials or the Congress -- frequently disregarded the law in their conduct of massive surveillance and aggressive counterintelligence operations against American citizens. In the past few years, some of these activities were curtailed, partly in response to the moderation of the domestic crisis; but all too often improper programs were terminated only in response to exposure, the threat of exposure, or a change in the climate of public opinion, such as that triggered by the Watergate affair.

- B. Establishing a Permanent Domestic Intelligence Structure:

1936-1945

1. Background. -- The Stone Standard

The first substantial domestic intelligence programs of the federal government were established during World War I.

The Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation (as the FBI was then known), military intelligence, other federal investigative agencies, and the volunteer American Protective League were involved in these programs.[3] In the period immediately following World War I, the Bureau of Investigation took part in the notorious Palmer Raids and other activities against persons characterized as "subversive."[4]

Harlan Fiske Stone, who became Attorney General in 1924, described the conduct of Justice Department and the Bureau of Investigation before he took office as "lawless, maintaining many activities which were without any authority in federal statutes, and engaging in many practices which were brutal and tyrannical in the extreme."[5]

Fearing that the investigative activities of the Bureau could invade privacy and inhibit political freedoms, Attorney General Stone announced:

There is always the posibility that a secret police may become a menace to free government and free institutions, because it carries with it the possibility of abuses of power which are not always quickly apprehended or understood. ... It is important that its activities be strictly limited to the performance of those functions for which it was created and that its agents themselves be not above the law or beyond its reach. ... The Bureau of Investigation is not concerned with political or other opinions of individuals. It is concerned only with their conduct and then only with such conduct -as is forbidden by the laws of the United States. When a police system passes beyond these limits, it is dangerous to the proper administration of justice and to human liberty, which it should be our first concern to cherish.[6]

When Stone appointed J. Edgar Hoover as Acting Director of the Bureau of Investigation, he instructed Hoover to adhere to this standard:

The activities of the Bureau are to be limited strictly to investigations of violations of law, under my direction or under the direction of an Assistant Attorney General regularly conducting the work of the Department of Justice.[7]

Nevertheless, beginning in the mid-thirties, at White House direction, the FBI reentered the realm of collecting intelligence about ideas and associations.

2. Main Developments of the 1936-1945 Period

In the years preceding World War II, domestic intelligence activities were reinstituted, expanded, and institutionalized. Based upon vague and conflicting orders to investigate the undefined areas of "subversion" and "potential crimes" related to national security, the FBI commenced a broad intelligence program. The FBI was authorized to preempt the field, although the military engaged in some investigation of civilians.

The FBI's domestic intelligence jurisdiction went beyond investigations of crime to include a vague mandate to investigate foreign involvement in American affairs. In the exercise of this jurisdictional authority, the Bureau began to investigate law abiding domestic groups and individuals; its program was also open to misuse for political purposes. The most intrusive intelligence techniques -- initially used to meet wartime exigencies -- were based on questionable statutory interpretation, or lacked any formal legal authorization.

The executive intentionally kept the issue of domestic intelligence-gathering away from the Congress until 1939, and thereafter the Congress appears to have deliberately declined to confront the issue. The FBI generally complied with the Attorney General's policies, but began to resist Justice Department review of its activities. On one occasion, the Bureau appears to have disregarded an Attorney General's policy directive.

However important these developments were in themselves, the enduring significance of this period is that it opened the institutional door to greater excesses in later years.

3. Domestic Intelligence Authority: Vague and Conflicting Executive Orders

The executive orders upon which the Bureau based its intelligence activity in the decade before World War II were vague and conflicting. By using words like "subversion" -- a term which was never defined -- and by permitting the investigation of "potential" crimes, and matters "not within the specific provisions of prevailing statutes," the foundation was laid for excessive intelligence gathering about Americans.

a. The Original Roosevelt Orders

In 1934, according to a memorandum by J. Edgar Hoover, President Roosevelt ordered an investigation of "the Nazi movement in this country." In response, the FBI conducted a onetime investigation, described by FBI Director Hoover as "a so-called intelligence investigation." It concentrated on "the Nazi group," with particular reference to "anti-racial" and "anti-American" activities having "any possible connection with official representatives of the German government in the United States."[8]

Two years later, in August 1936, according to a file memorandum of Director Hoover, President Roosevelt asked for a more systematic collection of intelligence about:

subversive activities in the United States, particularly Fascism and Communism.

Hoover indicated further that the President wanted:

a broad picture of the general movement and its activities as [they] may affect the economic and political life of the country as a whole.

The President and the FBI Director discussed the means by which the Bureau might collect "general intelligence information" on this subject.[9] The only record of Attorney General Homer Cummings' knowledge of, or authorization for, this intelligence assignment is found in a memorandum from Director Hoover to his principal assistant.[10]

b. Orders in 1938-39: The Vagueness of "Subversive Activities" and "Potential" Crimes

In October 1938, Director Hoover advised President Roosevelt of the "present purposes and scope" of FBI intelligence investigations, "together with suggestions for expansion." His memorandum stated that the FBI was collecting:

information dealing with various forms of activities of either a subversive or so-called intelligence type.[11]

Despite the references in Director Hoover's 1938 memorandum to "subversive-type" investigations, an accompanying letter to the President from Attorney General Homer Cummings made no mention of "subversion" and cited only the President's interest in "the so-called espionage situation."[12] Cummings' successor, Attorney General Frank Murphy, appears to have abandoned the term "subversive activities."[13] Moreover, when Director Hoover provided Attorney General Frank Murphy a copy of his 1938 plan, he described it, without mentioning "subversion," as a program "intended to ascertain the identity of persons engaged in espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage of a nature not within the specific provisions of prevailing statutes."[14] [Emphasis added.] Murphy thereafter recommended to the President that he issue an order concentrating "investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters" in the FBI and military intelligence.[15]

President Roosevelt agreed and issued an order which, like Murphy's letter, made no mention of "subversive," or general intelligence:

It is my desire that the investigation of all espionage, counter espionage, and sabotage matters be controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the Office of Naval Intelligence in the Navy

Department. The directors of these three agencies are to function as a committee to coordinate their activities.

No investigations should be conducted by any investigative agency of the Government into matters involving actually or potentially any espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage, except by the three agencies mentioned above. [Emphasis added.][16]

Precisely what the President's reference to "potential" espionage or sabotage was intended to cover was unclear. Whatever it meant, it was apparently intended to be consistent with Director Hoover's earlier description of the FBI program to Attorney General Murphy.[17]

Three months later, after the outbreak of war in Europe, Director Hoover indicated his concern that private citizens might provide information to the "sabotage squads" which local police departments were creating rather than to the FBI. Hoover urged the Attorney General to ask the President to request local officials to give the FBI all information concerning "espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and neutrality regulations."[18]

The President immediately issued a statement which continued the confusing treatment of the breadth of the FBI's intelligence authority. On the one hand, the statement began by noting that the FBI had been instructed to investigate:

matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations.

On the other hand, the President concluded by adding "subversive activities" to the list of information local law enforcement officials should relay to the FBI.[19]

c. Orders 1940-43: The Confusion Continues

President Roosevelt used the term "subversive activities" in a secret directive to Attorney General Robert Jackson on wiretapping in 1940. Referring to activities of other nations engaged in "propaganda of so-called 'fifth columns" and "preparation for sabotage." He directed the Attorney General to authorize wiretaps "of persons suspected of subversive activities against the Government of the United States, including suspected spies." The President instructed that such wiretaps be limited "insofar as possible" to aliens.[20] Neither the President nor the Attorney General subsequently clarified the scope of the FBI's authority to investigate "subversive activity."

The confusion as to the breadth of President Roosevelt's authorization reappeared in Attorney General Francis Biddle's description of FBI jurisdiction in 1942 and in a new Presidential statement in 1943.

Biddle issued a lengthy order defining the duties of the various parts of the Justice Department in September 1942. Among other things, the FBI was charged with a duty to "investigate" criminal offenses against the United States. In contrast, the FBI was to function as a "clearing house" with respect to "espionage, sabotage, and other subversive matters."[21]

Four months later, President Roosevelt renewed his public appeal for cooperation by police and other "patriotic organizations" with the FBI. In this statement, he described his September 1939 order as granting "investigative" authority to the FBI for "espionage, sabotage, and violation of the neutrality regulations." The President did not adopt Attorney General Biddle's "clearing-house" characterization, nor did he mention "subversion."[22]

4. The Role of Congress

a. Executive Avoidance of Congress

In 1938, the President, the Attorney General, and the FBI Director explicitly decided not to seek legislative authorization for the expanding domestic intelligence program.

Attorney General Cummings cautioned that the plan for domestic intelligence "should be held in the strictest confidence."[23] Director Hoover contended that no special legislation should be sought "in order to avoid criticism or objections which might be raised to such an expansion by either ill-informed persons or individuals with some ulterior motive." [Emphasis added.] Hoover thought it "undesirable to seek any special legislation which would draw attention to the fact that it was proposed to develop a special counterespionage drive of any great magnitude" because the FBI's intelligence activity was already "much broader than espionage or counterespionage."[24]

Director Hoover contended that the FBI had authority to engage in intelligence activity beyond investigating crimes at the request of the Attorney General or the Department of State. He relied on an amendment to the FBI Appropriations Act, passed before World War I, authorizing the Attorney General to appoint officials not only to "detect and prosecute" federal crimes but also to:

conduct such other investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Department of Justice, or the Department of State, as may be directed by the Attorney General.[25]

After conflicts with the State Department in 1939, however, the FBI no longer relied upon this vague statute for its authority to conduct intelligence investigations, instead relying upon the Executive orders.[26]

b. Congress Declines to Confront the Issue

Even though Executive officials originally avoided Congress to prevent criticism or objections, after the President's proclamation of emergency in 1939 they began to inform Congress of FBI intelligence activities In November 1939, Director Hoover told the House Appropriations Committee that the Bureau had set up a General Intelligence Division, "by authority of the President's proclamation."[27] And in January 1940, he told the same Committee that the FBI had authority, under the President's September 6, 1939 statement to investigate espionage, sabotage, neutrality violations, and "any other subversive activities."[28]

There is no evidence that the Appropriations Committee objected or inquired further into the meaning of that last vague term, although members did seek assurance that FBI intelligence could be curtailed when the wartime emergency ended.[29]

In 1940, a joint resolution was introduced by New York City Congressman Emmanuel Celler which would have given the FBI broad jurisdiction to investigate, by wiretapping or other means, or "frustrate" any "interference with the national defense" due to certain specified crimes (sabotage, treason, seditious conspiracy, espionage, and violations of the neutrality laws) or "in any other manner."[30] Although the resolution failed to reach the House floor, it seems likely that, rather than opposing domestic intelligence investigations, Congress was simply choosing to avoid the issue of defining the FBI's intelligence jurisdiction. This view is supported by Congress' passage in 1940 and 1941 of two new criminal statutes: the Smith Act made it a crime to advocate the violent overthrow of the Government;[31] and the Voorhis Act required "subversive" organizations advocating the Government's violent overthrow and having foreign ties to register or be subject to criminal penalties.[32]

Although, as indicated, the Executive branch disclosed the fact that the FBI was doing intelligence work and Congress generally raised no objection, there was one occasion when an Executive description of the Bureau's work was less than complete. Following Director Hoover's testimony about the establishment of an Intelligence Division and some public furor over the FBI arrest of several Communist Party members in Detroit, Senator George Norris (R. Neb.) asked whether the Bureau was violating Attorney General Stone's assurance in 1924 that it would conduct only criminal investigations. Attorney General Jackson replied:

Mr. Hoover is in agreement with me that the principles which Attorney General Stone laid down in 1924 when the Federal Bureau of Investigation was reorganized and Mr. Hoover appointed as Director are sound, and that the usefulness of the Bureau depends upon a faithful adherence to these limitations.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation will confine its activities to the investigation of violation of Federal statutes, the collecting of evidence in cases in which the United States is or may be a party in interest, and the service of process issued by the courts.[33]

The FBI was, in fact, doing much more than that and had informed the Appropriations Committee of its practice in general terms. Attorney General Jackson himself stated later that the FBI was conducting "steady surveillance" of persons beyond those who had violated federal statutes, including persons who were a "likely source" of federal law violation because the were "sympathetic with the systems or designs of foreign dictators."[34]

5. Scope of Domestic Intelligence

a. Beyond Criminal Investigations

According to Director Hoover's account of his meeting with President Roosevelt in 1936, the President wanted "a broad picture" of the impact of Communism and Fascism on American life.[35] Similarly, the FBI Director described his 1938 plan as "broader than espionage" and covering "in a true sense real intelligence."[36] Thus it appears that one of the first purposes of FBI domestic intelligence was to perform the "pure intelligence" function of supplying executive officials with information believed of value for making policy decisions. This aspect of the assignment to investigate "subversion" was entirely unrelated to the enforcement of federal criminal laws. The second purpose of FBI domestic intelligence gathering was essentially "preventive," in compliance with the President's June 1939 directive to investigate "potential" espionage or sabotage.[37] As war moved closer, preventive intelligence investigations focused on individuals who might be placed on a Custodial Detention List for possible internment in case of war.[38]

Both pure intelligence about "subversion" and preventive intelligence about "potential" espionage or sabotage involved investigations based on political affiliations and group membership and association. The relationship to law enforcement was often remote and speculative; the Bureau did not focus its intelligence gathering solely on tangible evidence of preparation for crime.

Directives implementing the general preventive intelligence instruction to investigate "potential" espionage or sabotage were vague and sweeping. In 1939, for instance, field offices were told to investigate persons of German, Italian, and Communist "sympathies" and any other persons "whose interests may be directed primarily to the interest of some other nation than the United States." FBI offices were directed to report the names of members of German and Italian societies, "whether they be of a fraternal character or of some other nature," and members of any other groups "which might have pronounced Nationalistic tendencies." The Bureau sought lists of subscribers and officers of German, Italian, and Communist foreign language newspapers, as well as of other newspapers with "notorious Nationalistic sympathies."[39] The FBI also made confidential inquiries regarding "various so-called radical and fascist organizations" to identify their "leading personnel, purposes and aims, and the part they are likely to play at a time of national crisis."[40]

The criteria for investigating persons for inclusion on the Custodial Detention List was similarly vague. In 1939, the FBI said its list included persons with "strong Nazi tendencies" and "strong Communist tendencies."[41] FBI field offices were directed in 1940 to gather information on individuals who would be considered for the list because of their "Communistic, Fascist, Nazi, or other nationalistic background."[42]

b. "Infiltration," Investigations The FBI based its pure intelligence investigations on a theory of subversive "infiltration" which remained an essential part of the rationale for domestic intelligence after the war: anyone who happened to associate with Communists or Fascists or was simply alleged to have such associations became the subject of FBI intelligence reports.[43] Thus, "subversive" investigations produced intelligence about a wide variety of lawful groups and law-abiding citizens. By 1938, the FBI was investigating alleged subversive infiltration of:

the maritime industry;

the steel industry;

the coal industry;

the clothing, garment, and fur industries;

the automobile industry;

the newspaper field;

educational institutions;

organized labor organizations;

Negroes;

youth groups;

Government affairs;

and the armed forces.[44]

This kind of intelligence was transmitted to the White House. For example, in 1937 the Attorney General sent the President an FBI report on a proposed pilgrimage to Washington to urge passage of legislation to benefit American youth. The report stated that the American Youth Congress, which sponsored the pilgrimage, was understood to be strongly Communistic.[45] Later reports in 1937 described the Communist Party's role in plans by the Workers Alliance for nationwide demonstrations protesting the plight of the unemployed, as well as the Alliance's plans to lobby Congress in support of the federal relief program.[46]

Some investigations and reports (which went into Justice Department and FBI permanent files) covered entirely legal political activities. For example, one local group checked by the Bureau was called the League for Fair Play, which furnished "speakers to Rotary and Kiwanis Clubs and to schools and colleges." The FBI reported in 1941 that:

the organization was formed in 1937, apparently by two Ministers and a businessman for the purpose of furthering fair play, tolerance, adherence to the Constitution, democracy, liberty, justice, understanding 'and good will among all creeds, races and classes of the United States.

A synopsis of the report stated, "No indications of Communist activities."[47]

In 1944, the FBI prepared an extensive intelligence report on an active political group, the Independent Voters of Illinois, apparently because it was considered a target for Communist "infiltration." The Independent Voters group was reported to have been formed:

for the purpose of developing neighborhood political units to help in the reelection of President Roosevelt, and the election of progressive congressmen. Apparently, IVI endorsed or aided Democrats for the most part, although it was stated to be "independent." It does not appear that it entered its own candidates or that it endorsed any Communists. IVI sought to help elect those candidates who would favor fighting inflation, oppose race and class discrimination, favor international cooperation, support a "full employment" program, oppose Facism, etc.[48]

Thus, in its search for subversive "influence," the Bureau gathered extensive information about the lawful activities of left-liberal political groups. At the opposite end of the political spectrum, the activities of numerous right-wing groups like the Christian Front and Christian Mobilizers (followers of Father Coughlin), the American Destiny Party, the American Nationalist Party, and even the less extreme "America First" movement were reported by the FBI.[49]

c. Partisan Use

The collection of pure intelligence and preventive intelligence about "subversives" led to the inclusion in FBI files of political intelligence about the President's partisan critics. In May 1940, President Roosevelt's secretary sent the FBI Director hundreds of telegrams received by the White House. The attached letter stated:

As the telegrams all were more or less in opposition to national defense, the President thought you might like to look them over, noting the names and addresses of the senders.[50]

Additional telegrams expressing approval of a speech by one of the President's leading critics, Colonel Charles Lindbergh, were also referred to the FBI.[51][52] A domestic intelligence program without clearly defined boundaries almost invited such action.

d. Centralized Authority: FBI and Military Intelligence

The basic policy of President Roosevelt and his four Attorneys General was to centralize civilian authority for domestic intelligence in the FBI. Consolidation of domestic intelligence was viewed as a means of protecting civil liberties. Recalling the hysteria of World War I, Attorney General Frank Murphy declared:

Twenty years ago, inhuman and cruel things were done in the name of justice; sometimes vigilantes and others took over the work. We do not want such things done today, for the work has now been localized in the FBI.[53]

Centralization of authority for domestic intelligence also served the FBI's bureaucratic interests. Director Hoover complained about attempts by other agencies to "literally chisel into this type of work."[54] He exhorted: "We don't want to let it slip away from us."[55]

Pursuant to President Roosevelt's 1939 directive authorizing the FBI and military intelligence to conduct all investigations of "potential" espionage and sabotage, an interagency Delimitation Agreement in June 1940 assigned most such domestic intelligence work to the FBI. As revised in February 1942, the Agreement covered "investigation of all activities coming under the categories of espionage, subversion and sabotage." The FBI was responsible for all investigations "involving civilians in the United States" and for keeping the military informed of "the names of individuals definitely known to be connected with subversive activities."[56]

The military intelligence agencies were interested in intelligence about civilian activity. In fact, they requested extensive information about civilians from the FBI. In May 1939, for instance, the Army G-2 Military Intelligence Division (MID) transmitted a request for the names and locations of "citizens opposed to our participation in war and conducting antiwar propaganda."[57] Despite the Delimitation Agreement, the MID's Counterintelligence Corps collected intelligence on civilian "subversive activity" as part of a preventive security program using volunteer informers and investigators.[58]

6. Control by the Attorney General: Compliance and Resistance

The basic outlines of the FBI's domestic intelligence program were approved by Attorney General Cummings in 1938 and Attorney General Murphy in 1939.[59] Director Hoover also asked Attorney General Jackson in 1940 for policy guidance concerning the FBI's "suspect list of individuals whose arrest might be considered necessary in the event the United States becomes involved in war."[60]

The FBI Director initially opposed, however, Attorney General Jackson's attempt to require more detailed supervision of the FBI's role in the Custodial Detention Program. To oversee this program and others, Jackson created a Neutrality Laws Unit (later renamed the Special War Policies Unit) in the Justice Department. When the Unit proposed to review FBI intelligence, reports on individuals, Director Hoover protested that turning over the FBI's confidential reports would risk the possibility of "leaks." He argued that if the identity of confidential informants became known, it would endanger their "life and safety" and thus the Department would "abandon" the "subversives field."[61]

After five months of negotiation, the FBI was ordered to transmit its "dossiers" to the Justice Department Unit.[62] To satisfy the FBI's concerns, the Department agreed to take no formal action against an individual if it "might interfere with sound investigative techniques" and not to disclose confidential informants without the Bureau's "prior approval."[63] Thus, from 1941 to 1943, the Justice Department had the machinery to oversee at least this aspect of FBI domestic intelligence.[64]

In 1943, however, Attorney General Biddle ordered that the Custodial Detention List should be abolished as "impractical. unwise, and dangerous." His directive stated that there was "no statutory authority or other present justification" for keeping the list. The Attorney General concluded that the system for classifying "dangerous" persons was "inherently unreliable;" the evidence used was "inadequate;" and the standards applied were "defective."[65] Biddle observed:

the notion that it is possible to make a valid determination as to how dangerous a person is in the abstract and without reference to time, environment, and other relevant circumstances, is impractical, unwise, and dangerous.

Returning to the basic standard espoused by Attorney General Stone, Attorney General Biddle declared:

The Department fulfills its proper function by investigating the activities of persons who may have violated the law. It is not aided in this work by classifying persons as to dangerousness.[66]

Upon receipt of this order, the FBI Director did not in fact abolish its list. The FBI continued to maintain an index of persons "who may be dangerous or potentially dangerous to the public safety or internal security of the United States." In response to the Attorney General's order, the FBI merely changed the name of the list from Custodial Detention List to Security Index. Instructions to the field stated that the Security Index should be kept "strictly confidential," and that it should never be mentioned in FBI reports or "discussed with agencies or individuals outside the Bureau" except for military intelligence agencies.[67]

This incident provides an example of the FBI's ability to conduct domestic intelligence operations in opposition to the policies of an Attorney General. Despite Attorney General Biddle's order, the "dangerousness" list continued to be kept, and investigations in support of that list continued to be a significant part of the, Bureau's work.

7. Intrusive Techniques: Questionable Authorization

a. Wiretaps: A Strained Statutory Interpretation

In 1940, President Roosevelt authorized FBI wiretapping against "persons suspected of subversive activities against the United States, including suspected spies," requiring the specific approval of the Attorney General for each tap and directing that they be limited "insofar as possible to aliens. "[68]

This order was issued in the face of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, which had prohibited wiretapping.[69] However, the Attorney General interpreted the Act of 1934 so as to permit government wiretapping. Since the Act made it unlawful to "intercept and divulge" communications, Attorney General Jackson contended that it did not apply if there was no divulgence, outside the Government. [Emphasis added][70] Attorney General Jackson's questionable Interpretation was accepted by succeeding Attorneys General (until 1968) but never by the courts.[71]

Jackson informed the Congress of his interpretation. Congress considered enacting an exception to the 1934 Act, and held hearings in which Director Hoover said wiretapping was "of considerable importance" because of the "gravity" to "national safety" of such offenses as espionage and sabotage.[72] Apparently relying upon Jackson's statutory interpretation, Congress then dropped the matter, leaving the authorization of wiretaps to Executive discretion, without either statutory standards or the requirement of a judicial warrant.[73]

The potential for misuse of wiretapping was demonstrated during this period by several FBI wiretaps approved by the, Attorney General or by the White House. In 1941, Attorney General Biddle approved a wiretap on the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce with the caveat:

There is no record of espionage at this time; and, unless within a month from today there is some evidence connecting the Chamber of Commerce with espionage, I think the surveillance should be discontinued.[74]

However, in another case Biddle disapproved an FBI request to wiretap a Philadelphia bookstore "engaged in the sale of Communist literature" and frequented by "important Communist leaders" in 1941.[75]

Materials located in Director Hoover's "Official and Confidential" file indicate that President Roosevelt's aide Harry Hopkins asked the FBI to wiretap his own home telephone in 1944. Additional reports from "technical" surveillance of all unidentified target were sent to Hopkins in May and July 1945, when he served as an aide to President Truman.[76]

In 1945 two Truman White House aides, E. D. McKim and General H. H. Vaughn, received reports of electronic surveillance of a high executive official. One of these reports included "transcripts of telephone conversations between [the official] and Justice Felix Frankfurter and between [the official] and Drew Pearson."[76]

From June 1945 until May 1948, General Vaughn received reports from electronic surveillance of a former Roosevelt White House aide. A memorandum by J. Edgar Hoover indicates that Attorney General Tom Clark "authorized the placing of a technical surveillance" on this individual and that, according to Clark, President Truman "was particularly concerned" about the activities of this individual "and his associates" and wanted "a very thorough investigation" so that "steps might be taken, if possible, to see that such activities did not interfere with the proper administration of government." Hoover's memorandum did not indicate what these "activities" were.[76]

b. Bugging, Mail Opening and Surreptitious Entry.

Intrusive techniques such as bugging, mail opening and surreptitious entry were used by the FBI without even the kind of formal Presidential authorization and requirement of Attorney General approval that applied to warrantless wiretapping.

During the war, the FBI began "chamfering" or surreptitious mail opening, to supplement the overt censorship of international mail authorized by statute In Wartime.[77] The practice of surreptitious entry - or breaking-and-entering - was also used by the FBI in wartime intelligence operations.[78] The Bureau continued or resumed the use of these techniques after the war without explicit outside authorization.

Furthermore, the installation of microphone surveillance ("bugs"), either with or without trespass, was exempt from the procedure for Attorney General approval of wiretaps. Justice Department records indicate that no Attorney General formally considered the question of microphone surveillance involving trespass, except on a hypothetical basis, until 1952.[79]

- C. Domestic Intelligence in the Cold War Era: 1946-1963

1. Main Developments of the 1946-1963 Period

The domestic intelligence programs of the FBI and the military intelligence agencies, which were established under presidential authority before World War II, did not cease with the end of hostilities. Instead, they set the pattern for decades to come.

Despite Director Hoover's statement that the intelligence structure could be "discontinued or very materially curtailed" with the termination of the national emergency, after the war intelligence operations were neither discontinued nor curtailed.[80] Congressional deference to the executive branch, the broad scope of investigations, the growth of the FBI's power, and the substantial immunity of the Bureau from effective outside supervision became increasingly significant features of domestic intelligence in the United States. New domestic intelligence functions were added to previous responsibilities. No attempt was made to enact a legislative charter replacing the wartime emergency orders, as was done in the foreign intelligence field in 1947.

The main developments during the Cold War era may be summarized as follows:

a. Domestic Intelligence Authority

During this period there was a national consensus regarding the danger to the United States from Communism; little distinction was made between the threats posed by the Soviet Union and by Communists within this country. Domestic intelligence activity was supported by that consensus, although not specifically authorized by the Congress.

Formal authority for FBI investigations of "subversive activity" and for the agreements between the FBI and military intelligence was explicitly granted in executive directives from Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, the National Security Council, and Attorney General Kennedy. These directives provided no guidance, however, for controlling such investigations.

b. Scope of Domestic Intelligence

The breadth of the FBIs investigation of "subversive infiltrationcontinued to produce intelligence reports and massive files on lawful groups and law-abiding citizens who happened to associate, even unwittingly, with Communists or with socialists unconnected with the Soviet Union who used revolutionary rhetoric. At the same time, the scope of FBI intelligence expanded to cover civil rights protest activity as well as violent "Klan-type" and "hate' " groups, vocal anticommunists, and prominent opponents of racial integration. The vagueness of the FBI's investigative mandate and the overbreadth of its collection programs also placed it in position to supply theh White House with numerous items of domestic political intelligence apparently desired by Presidents and their aides.

In response to White House and congressional interest in right-wing organizations, the Internal Revenue Service began comprehensive investigations of right-wing groups in 1961 and later expanded to left-wing organizations. This effort was directed at identifying contributions and ascertaining whether the organizations were entitled to maintain their exempt status.

c. Accountability and Control

Pervasive secrecy enabled the FBI and the Justice Department to disregard as "unworkable" the Emergency Detention Act intended to set standards for aspects of domestic intelligence. The FBI's independent position also allowed it to withhold significant information from a Presidential commission and from every Attorney General, and no Attorney General inquired fully into the Bureau's operations.

During the same period, apprehensions about having a "security police" influenced Congress to prohibit the Central Intelligence Agency from exercising law enforcement powers or performing "internal security functions." Nevertheless, in secret and without effective internal controls, the CIA undertook programs for testing chemical and biological agents on unwitting Americans, sometimes with tragic consequences. The CIA also used American private institutions as "cover" and used intrusive techniques affecting the rights of Americans.

d. Intrusive Techniques

The CIA and the National Security Agency illegally instituted programs for the interception of international communications to and from American citizens, primarily first class mail and cable traffic.

During this period, the FBI also used intrusive intelligence gathering techniques against domestic "subversives" and counterintelligence targets. Sometimes these techniques were covered by a blanket delegation of authority from the Attorney General, as with microphone surveillance; but frequently they were used without outside authorization, as with mail openings and surreptitious entry. Only conventional wiretaps required the Attorney General's approval in each case, but this method was still misused due to the lack of adequate standards and procedural safeguards.

e. Domestic Covert Action

In the mid-fifties, the FBI developed the initial COINTELPRO operations, which used aggressive covert actions to disrupt and discredit Communist Party activities. The FBI subsequently expanded its COINTELPRO activities to discredit peaceful protest groups whom Communists had infiltrated but did not control, as well as groups of socialists who used revolutionary rhetoric but had no connections with a hostile foreign power.

Throughout this period, there was a mixture of secrecy and disclosure. Executive action was often substituted for legislation, sometimes with the full knowledge and consent. of Congress and on other occasions without informing Congress or by advising only a select group of legislators. There is no question that Congress, the courts, and the public expected the FBI to gather domestic intelligence about Communists. But the broad scope of FBI investigations, its specific programs for achieving "pure intelligence" and "preventive intelligence" objectives, and its use of intrusive techniques and disruptive counterintelligence measures against domestic "subversives" were not fully known by anyone outside the Bureau.

2. Domestic Intelligence Authority

a. Anti-Communist Consensus

During the Cold War era, the strong consensus in favor of governmental action against Communists was reflected in decisions of the Supreme Court and acts of Congress. In the Korean War period, for instance, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of domestic Communist Party leaders under the Smith Act for conspiracy to advocate violent overthrow of the government. The Court pinned its decision upon the conspiratorial nature of the Communist Party of the United States and its ideological links with the Soviet Union at a time of stress in Soviet-American relations.[81]

Several statutes buttressed the FBI's claim of legitimacy for at least some aspects of domestic intelligence. Although Congress never directly authorized Bureau intelligence operations, Congress enacted the Internal Security Act of 1950 over President Truman's veto. Its two main provisions were: the Subversives Activities Control Act, requiring the registration of members of communist and communist "front" groups; and the Emergency Detention Act, providing for the internment in an emergency of persons who might engage in espionage or sabotage. In this Act, Congress made findings that the Communist Party was "a disciplined organization" operating in this nation "under Soviet Union control" with the aim of installing "a Soviet style dictatorship."[82] Going even further in 1954, Congress passed the Communist Control Act, which provided that the Communist Party was "not entitled to any of the rights, privileges, and immunities attendant upon legal bodies created under the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States."[83]

In 1956, the Supreme Court recognized the existence of FBI intelligence aimed at "Communist seditious activities."[84] The basis for Smith Act prosecutions of "subversive activity" was narrowed in 1957, however, when the Court overturned the convictions of second-string Communist leaders, holding that the government must show advocacy "of action and not merely abstract doctrine."[85] In 1961. the Court sustained the constitutionality under the First Amendment of the requirement that the Communist Party register with the Subversive Activities Control Board.[86]

The consensus should not be portrayed as monolithic. President Truman was concerned about risks to constitutional government posed by the zealous anti-Communism in Congress. According to one White House staff member's notes during the debate over the Internal Security Act:

The President said that the situation . . . was the worst it had been since the Alien and Sedition Laws of 1798, that a lot of people on the Hill should know better but had been stampeded into running with their tails between their legs.

Truman announced that he would veto the Internal Security Act "regardless of how politically unpopular it was -- election year or no election year."[87] But President Truman's veto was overridden by an overwhelming margin.

b. The Federal Employee Loyalty-Security Program

(1) Origins of the Program. -- President Truman established a federal employee loyalty program in 1947.[88] Its basic features were retained in the federal employee security program authorized by President Eisenhower in public Executive Order 10450, which, with some modifications, still applies today.[89]

Although it had a much broader reach, the program originated out of well-founded concern that Soviet intelligence was then using the Communist Party as a vehicle for the recruitment of espionage agents.[90] President Truman appointed a Temporary Commision on Employee Loyalty in 1946 to examine the problem. FBI Director Hoover submitted a memorandum on the types of activities of "subversive or disloyal persons" in government service which would constitute a "threat" to security. As Hoover saw it, however, the danger was not limited to espionage or recruitment for espionage. It extended to "influencing" government policies in favor of "the foreign country of their ideological choice." Consequently, he urged that attention be given to the associations of government employees with "front" organizations, including "temporary organizations, 'spontaneous' campaigns, and pressure movements so frequently used by subversive groups."[91]

The President's Commission accepted Director Hoover's broad view of the threat, along with the view endorsed by a Presidential Commission on Civil Rights that there also was a danger from "those who would subvert our democracy by ... destroying the civil rights of some groups."[92] Consequently, the Executive Order included, as an indication of disloyalty, membership in or association with groups designated on an "Attorney General's list" as:

<quote> totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force, or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.[93] </quote>

The Executive Order was used to provide a legal basis for the FBI's investigation of allegedly "subversive" organizations which might fall within these categories.[94] Such investigations supplied a body of intelligence data against winch to check the names of prospective federal employees.[95]

(2) Breadth of the Investigations. -- By the mid-1950s, the Bureau believed that the Communist Party was no longer used for Soviet espionage; it represented only a "potential" recruiting ground for spies.[96] Thereafter, FBI investigations of Communist organizations and other groups unconnected to espionage but falling within the standards of the Attorney General's list frequently became a means for monitoring the political background of prospective federal employees by means of the "name check" of Bureau files. These investigations also served the "pure intelligence" function of informing the Attorney General of the influence and organizational affiliations of socalled "subversives."[97]

No organizations were formally added to the Attorney General's list after 1955.[98] However, the FBI's "name check" reports on prospective employees were never limited to information about listed organizations. The broad standards for placing a group on the Attorney General's list were used to evaluate an employee's background, regardless of whether or not lie was a member of a group on the list.[99] If a "name check" uncovered information about a prospective employee's association with a group which might come within those standards, the FBI would report the data and attach a "characterization" of the organization relating tothe standards.[100]

(3) FBI Control of Loyalty-Security Investigations -- President Eisenhower's 1953 order specifically designated the FBI as responsible for "a full field investigation" whenever a "name check" or a background investigation by the Civil Service Commission or any other agency uncovered information indicating a potential security risk.[101] President Truman had refused to give the Bureau this exclusive power initially, but he fought a losing battle.[102]

Director Hoover had objected that President Truman's order did not give the FBI exclusive power and threatened "to withdraw from this field of investigation rather than to engage in a tug of war with the Civil Service Commission."[103] President Truman was apprehensive about the FBI's growing power. The notes of one presidential aide on a meeting with the President reflect that Truman felt "very strongly anti-FBI" on the issue and wanted "to be sure and hold FBI down, afraid of 'Gestapo.' "[104]

Presidential assistant Clark Clifford reviewed the situation and came down on the side of the FBI as "better qualified" than the Civil Service Commission.[105] But the President insisted on a compromise which gave Civil Service "discretion" to call on the FBI "if it wishes."[106] Director Hoover protested this "confusion" about the FBI's jurisdiction.[107] When Justice Department officials warned that Congress would "find flaws" with the compromise, President Truman noted on a memorandum from Clifford:

J. Edgar will in all probability get this backward looking Congress to give him what he wants. It's dangerous.[108]

President's Truman's prediction was correct. His budget request of $16 million for Civil Service and $8.7 million for the FBI to conduct loyalty investigations was revised by Congress to allocate $7.4 million to the FBI and only $3 million to Civil Service.[109] The issue was finally resolved to the FBI's satisfaction when the President issued a statement declaring that there were "to be no exceptions" to the rule that the FBI would make all loyalty investigations."[110]

c. Executive Directives: Lack of Guidance and Controls

Two public presidential statements on FBI domestic intelligence authority -- by President Truman in 1950 and by President Eisenhower in 1953 -- specifically declared that the FBI was authorized to investigate "subversive activity," electing the broader interpretation of the directive of conflicting Roosevelt directives. Moreover, a confidential directive of the National Security Council in 1949 granted authority to the FBI and military intelligence for investigation of "subversive activities." In 1962 President Kennedy issued a confidential order shifting supervision of these investigations from the NSC to the Attorney General, and the NSC's 1949 authorizations were reissued by Attorney General Kennedy in 1964.

As with the earlier Roosevelt directives, these statements, orders and authorizations failed to provide guidance on conducting or controlling "subversive" investigations.

Under President Truman, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC)[111] was formally authorized in 1949 to supervise coordination between the FBI and the military of "all investigation of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion, and other related intelligence matters affecting internal security."[112] [Emphasis added.]

The confidential Delimitations Agreement between the FBI and the military intelligence agencies was also revised In 1949 to require greater exchange of "information of mutual interest" and to require the FBI to advise military intelligence of developments concerning "subversive" groups who were "potential" dangers to the security of the United States.[113]

In 1050, after the outbreak of the Korean war and in the midst of Congressional consideration of new internal security legislation, Director Hoover recommended that Attorney General J. Howard McGrath[114] and the NSC draft a statement which President Truman issued in July 1950 providing that the FBI:

<quote> should take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters.[115] [Emphasis added.] </quote>

Despite concern among his assistants,[115] President Truman's statement clearly placed him on the record as endorsing FBI investigations of "subversive activities." The statement said that such investigations had been authorized initially by President Roosevelt's "directives" of September 1939 and January 1943. However, those particular directives had not used this precise language.[116]

Shortly after President Eisenhower took office in 1953, the FBI advised the White House that its "internal security responsibility" went beyond "statutory" authority. The Bureau attached a copy of the Truman statement, but not the Roosevelt directive. The FBI again broadly interpreted the Roosevelt directive by saving that it had authorized "investigative work" related to "subversive activities."[117]

In December 1953 President Eisenhower issued a statement reiterating President Truman's "directive" and extending the FBI's mandate to investigations under the Atomic Energy Act.[118]

President Kennedy issued no public statement comparable to the Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower "directives." However, in 962 he did transfer the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference to "the supervision of the Attorney General;"[119] and in 1964 Attorney General Robert Kennedy reissued the IIC charter, citing as authority the President's 1962 order and retaining the term "subversion." The 'charter added that it did not "modify" or "affect" the previous "Presidential Directives" relating to the duties of the FBI, and that the Delimitations Agreement between the FBI and military intelligence "shall remain in full force and effect."[120]

None of the directives, orders, or charters provided any definition of the broad and loose terms "subversion" or "subversive activities;" and none of the administrations provided effective controls over the FBI's investigations in this area.

3. Scope of Domestic Intelligence

a. "Subversive Activities"

The breadth of the FBI's investigations of "subversive activity" led to massive collection of information on law abiding citizens. FBI domestic intelligence investigations extended beyond known or suspected Communist Party members. They included other individuals who regarded the Soviet Union as the "champion of a superior way of life" and "persons holding important positions who have shown sympathy for Communist objectives and policies." Members of "non-Stalinist" revolutionary socialist groups were investigated because, even though they opposed the Soviet regime, the FBI viewed them as regarding the Soviet Union "as the center for world revolution."[121] Moreover, the FBI's concept of "subversive Infiltration" was so broad that it permitted the investigation for decades of peaceful protest groups such as the NAACP.

(1) The Number of Investigations. -- By 1960 the FBI had opened approximately 432,000 files at headquarters on individuals and groups in the "subversive" intelligence field. Bet Between 1960 and 1963 an additional 9,000 such files were opened.[122] An even larger number of investigative files were maintained at FBI field offices.[123] Under the Bureau's filing system, a single file on a group could include references to hundreds or thousands of group members or other persons associated with the group in any way; and such names were indexed so that the information was readily retrievable.

(2) Vague and Sweeping Standards.--The FBI conducted continuing investigations of persons whose membership in the Communist Party or in "a revolutionary group" had "not been proven," but who had "anarchistic or revolutionary beliefs" and had "committed past acts of violence during strikes, riots. or demonstrations." Persons not currently engaged in "activity of a subversive nature" were still investigated if they had engaged in such activity "several years ago"' and there was no "positive indication of disaffection."[124]

The FBI Manual stated that it was "not possible to formulate any hard-and-fast standards for measuring "the dangerousness of individual members or affiliates of revolutionary organizations." Persons could be investigated if they were "espousing the line" of "revolutionary movements". Anonymous allegations could start an investigation if they were "sufficiently specific and of sufficient weight." The Manual added,

Where there is doubt an individual may be a current threat to the internal security of the nation, the question should be resolved in the interest of security and investigation conducted.[125]

The FBI Manual did not define "subversive" groups in terms of their links to a foreign government. Instead, they were "Marxist revolutionary-type" organizations "seeking the overthrow of the U. S. Government."[126] One purpose of investigation was possible prosecution under the Smith Act. But no prosecutions were initiated under the Act after 1957.[127] The Justice Department advised the FBI in 1956 that such a prosecution required "an actual plan for a violent revolution."[128] The Department's position in 1960 was that "incitement to action in the foreseeable future" was needed.[129] Despite the strict requirements for prosecution, the FBI continued to investigate "subversive" organizations "from an intelligence viewpoint" to appraise their "strength" and "dangerousness."[130]

(3) COMINFIL. -- The FBI's broadest program for collecting intelligence was carried out under the heading COMINFIL, or Communist infiltration.[131] The FBI collected intelligence about Communist "influence" under the following categories:

Political activities

Legislative activities

Domestic administration issues

Negro question

Youth matters

Women's matters

Farmers' Matters

Cultural activities

Veterans' matters

Religion

Education

Industry[132]

FBI investigations covered "the entire spectrum of the social and labor movement in the country."[133] The purpose -- as publicly disclosed in the Attorney General's Annual Reports -- was pure intelligence: to "fortify" the Government against "subversive pressures,"[134] or to "strengthen" the Government against "subversive campaigns."[135]

In other words, the COMINFIL program supplied the Attorney General and the President with intelligence about a wide range of groups seeking to influence national policy under the rationale of determining whether Communists were involved.[136] The FBI said it was not concerned with the "legitimate activities" of "nonsubversive groups," but only with whether Communists were "gaining a dominant role."[137] Nevertheless, COMINFIL reports inevitably described "legitimate activities" totally unrelated to the alleged "subversive activity." This is vividly demonstrated by the COMINFIL reports on American's leading civil rights group in this period, the NAACP.[138] The investigation continued for at least twenty-five years in cities throughout the nation, although no evidence was ever found to rebut the observation that the NAACP had a "strong tendency" to "steer clear of Communist activities."[139]

(4) Exaggeration of Communist Influence. -- The FBI and the Justice D partment justified the continuation of COMINFIL investigations, despite the Communist Party's steady decline in the fifties and early sixties, on the theory that the Party was "seeking to repair its losses" with the "hope" of being able to "move in" on movements with "laudable objectives."[140]

The FBI reported to the White House in 1961 that the Communist Party had "attempted" to take advantage of "racial disturbances" in the South and had "endeavored" to bring "pressure to bear" on government officials "through the press, labor unions, and student groups." At that time the FBI was investigating "two hundred known or suspected communist front and communist-infiltrated organizations. "[141] By not stating how effective the "attempts" and "endeavors" of the Communists were, and by not indicating whether they were becoming more or less successful, the FBI offered a deficient rationale for its sweeping intelligence collection policy.

William C. Sullivan, a former head of the FBI Intelligence Division, has testified that such language was deliberately used to exaggerate the threat of Communist influence. "Attempts" and "influence" were "very significant words" in FBI reports, he said. These terms obscured what he felt to be the more significant criterion - the degree of Communist success. The Bureau "did not discuss this because we would have to say that they did not hit the target, hardly any."[142]

A distorted picture of Communist "infiltration" later served to justify the FBI's intensive investigations of the groups involved in protests against the Vietnam War and the civil rights movement, including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

b. "RacialMatters"and "Hate Groups"

In the 1950s, the FBI also developed intelligence programs to investigate "Racial Matters" and "hate organizations" unrelated to "revolutionary-type" subversives. "Hate organizations" were investigated if they had "allegedly adopted a policy of advocating, condoning, or inciting the use of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution." Like the COMINFIL program, however, the Bureau used its "established sources" to monitor the activities of "hate groups" which did not "qualify" under the "advocacy of violence" standard.[143]

In 1963, FBI field offices were instructed to report "the formation and identities" of "rightist or extremist groups" in the "anticommunist field." Headquarters approval was needed for investigating "groups in this field whose activities are not in violation of any statutes."[144]

Under these, programs, the FBI collected and disseminated intelligence about the John Birch Society and its founder, Robert Welch, in 1959.[145] The activities of another rightwing spokesman, Gerald L. K. Smith, who headed the Christian Nationalist Crusade, were the subject of FBI reports even after the Justice Department had concluded that the group had not violated federal law and that there was no basis for including the group on the "Attorney General's list."[146]

The FBI program for collecting intelligence on "General Racial Matters" was even broader. It went beyond "race riots" to include "civil demonstrations" and "similar developments." These "developments" included:

proposed or actual activities of individuals, officials, committees, legislatures, organizations, etc., in the racial field.[147]

The FBI's "intelligence function" was to advise "appropriate" federal and local officials of "pertinent information" about "racial incidents."[148]

A briefing of the Cabinet by Director Hoover in 1956 illustrates the breadth of collection and dissemination under the racial matters program. The briefing covered not only incidents of violence and the "efforts" and "plans" of Communists to "influence'" the civil rights movement, but also the legislative strategy of the NAACP and the activities of Southern Governors and Congressmen on behalf of groups opposing integration peacefully.[149]

C. FBI Political Intelligence for the White House

Numerous items of political intelligence were supplied by the FBI to the White House in each of the three administrations during the Cold War era, apparently satisfying the desires of Presidents and their staffs.[150]

President Truman and his aides received regular letters from Director Hoover labeled "Personal and Confidential" containing tidbits of political intelligence. The letters reported on such subjects as: inside information about the negotiating position of a non-Communist labor union;[151] the activities of a former Roosevelt aide who was trying to influence the Truman administration's appointments;[152] a report from a "confidential source" that a "scandal" was brewing which would be "very embarrassing" to the Democratic administration;[153] a report from a "very confidential source" about a meeting of newspaper representatives in Chicago to plan publication of stories exposing organized crime and corrupt politicians;[154] the contents of an in-house communication from Newsweek magazine reporters to their editors about a story they had obtained from the State Department,[155] and criticism of the government's internal security programs by a former Assistant to the Attorney General.[156]

Letters discussing Communist "influence" provided a considerable amount of extraneous information about the legislative process, including lobbying activities in support of civil rights legislation[157] and the political activities of Senators and Congressmen.[158]

President Eisenhower and his aides received similar tid-bits of political intelligence, including an advance text of a speech to be delivered by a prominent labor leader,[159] reports from Bureau "sources" on the meetings of an NAACP delegation with Senators Paul Douglas and Everett Dirksen of Illinois;[160] the report of an "informant" on the role of the United Auto Workers Union at an NAACP conference,[161] summaries of data in FBI files on thirteen persons (including Norman Thomas, Linus Pauling, and Bertrand Russell) who had filed suit to stop nuclear testing,[162] a report of a "confidential source" on plans of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt to hold a reception for the head of a civil rights group,[163] and reports on the activities of Robert Welch and the John Birch Society.[164]

The FBI also volunteered to the White House information from its most "reliable sources" On purely political or social contacts with foreign government officials by a Deputy Assistant to the President,[165] Bernard Baruch,[166] Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas,[167] and Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt.[168]

Director Hoover sent to the White House a report from a "confidential informant" on the lobbying activities of a California group called Women for Legislative Action because its positions "paralleled" the Communist line.[169]

As in the prior administrations, requests also flowed from the Eisenhower White House to the FBI.[170] For example, a presidential aide asked the FBI to check its files on Rev. Carl McIntyre of the International Council of Christian Churches.[171]

The pattern continued during the Kennedy administration. A summary of material in FBI files on a prominent entertainer was volunteered to Attorney General Kennedy because Hoover thought it "may be of interest."[172] Attorney General Kennedy sent to the President an FBI memorandum on the purely personal life of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.[173] Director Hoover supplied Attorney General Kennedy with background information on a woman who told an Italian newspaper that she had once been engaged to marry President Kennedy[174] and on the husband of a woman who was reported in the press to have stated that the President's daughter would enroll in a cooperative nursery with which she was connected.[175] The FBI Director also passed on information from a Bureau "source" r egarding plans of a group to publish allegations about the President's personal life.[176]

In 1962 the FBI complied unquestioningly with a request from Attorney General Kennedy to interview a Steel Company executive and several reporters who had written stories about the Steel executive. The interviews were conducted late at night and early in the morning because, according to the responsible FBI official, the Attorney General indicated the information was needed for a White House meeting the next day.[177]

Throughout the period, the Bureau also disseminated reports to high executive officials to discredit its critics. The FBI's Inside information on plans of the Lawyers Guild to denounce Bureau surveillance in 1949 gave the Attorney General the opportunity to prepare a rebuttal well in advance of the expected criticism.[178] When the Knoxville Area Human Relations Council charged in 1960 that the FBI was practicing racial discrimination, the FBI did "name checks" on members the Council's board of directors and sent the results to the Attorney General. The name checks dredged up derogatory allegations from as far back as the late thirties and early forties.[179]

d. IRS Investigations of Political Organizations

The IRS program that came to be used against the domestic dissidents of the 1960s was first used against Communists in the 1950s. As part of its COINTELPRO against the Communist Party, the FBI arranged for IRS investigations of Party members, and obtained their tax returns.[180] In its efforts against the Communist Party, the FBI had unlimited access to tax returns: it never told the IRS why it wanted them, and IRS never attempted to find out.[181]

In 1961, responding to White House and congressional interest in right-wing organizations, the IRS began comprehensive investigation of right-wing groups to identify contributors and ascertain whether or not some of them were entitled to their tax exempt status.[182] Left-wing groups were later added, in an effort to avoid charges that such IRS activities were all aimed at one part of the political spectrum. Both right- and left-wing groups were selected for review and investigation because of their political activity and not because of any information that they had violated the tax laws.[183]

While the IRS efforts begun in 1961 to investigate the political activities of tax exempt organizations were not as extensive as later programs in 1969-1973, they were a significant departure by the IRS from normal enforcement criteria for investigating persons or groups on the basis of information indicating noncompliance. By directing tax audits at individuals and groups solely because of their political beliefs, the Ideological Organizations Audit Project (as the 1961 program was known)[184] established a precedent for a far more elaborate program of targeting "dissidents."[185] @@@@@@@ During the Cold War period, there were serious weaknesses in the system of accountability and control of domestic intelligence activity. On occasion the executive chose not to comply with the will of Congress with respect to internal security policy, and the Congressiona attempt to exclude U.S. foreign intelligence agencies from domestic activities was evaded. Intelligence agencies also conducted covert programs in violation of laws protecting the rights of Americans. Problems of accountability were compounded by the lack of effective congressional oversight and the vagueness of executive orders, which allowed intelligence agencies to escape outside scrutiny.

a. The Emergency Detention Act

In 1946, four years before the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 was passed, the FBI advised Attorney General Clark that it had secretly compiled a security index of "potentially dangerous" persons.[186] The Justice Department then made tentative plans for emergency detention based on suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.[187] Department officials deliberately avoided going to Congress, advising the FBI in a "blind memorandum:"

The present is no time to seek legislation. To ask for it would only bring on a loud and acrimonious discussion.[188]

In 1950, however, Congress passed the Emergency Detention Act which established standards and procedures for the detention, in the event of war, invasion or insurrection "in aid of a foreign enemy," of any person:

as to whom there is reasonable ffround to believe that such person probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to engage in, acts of espionage or sabotage.

The Act did not authorize the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and it provided that detained persons could appeal to a review board and to the courts.[189]

Shortly after passage of the Detention Act, according to a Bureau document, Attorney General J. Howard McGrath told the FBI to isregard it and to "Proceed with the program as previously outlined." Department officials stated that the Act was "in conflict with" their plans, and was "unworkable." FBI officials agreed that the statutory procedures - such as "recourse to the courts" instead of suspension of habeas corpus - would "destroy" their program.[190] Moreover, the Security Index used broader standards to determine "potential dangerousness" than those prescribed in the statute; and, unlike the Act, Department plans provided for issuing a Master Search Warrant and a Master Arrest Warrant.[191] Two subsequent Attorneys General endorsed the decision to ignore the Emergency Detention Act.[192]

b. Withholding Information

Not only did the FBI and the Justice Department jointly keep their noncompliance with the Detention Act secret from Congress, but the FBI withheld important aspects of its program from the Attorney General. FBI personnel had been instructed in 1949 that :

no mention must be made in any investigative report relating to the

classifications of top functionaries and key figures, nor to the Detcom and Comsab Programs, nor to the Security Index or the Communist Index. These investigative procedures and administrative aides are confidential and should not be known to any outside agency.[193]

FBI documents indicate that only the Security Index was made known to the Justice Department.

In 1955, the FBI tightened formal standards for the Security Index, reducing its size from 26,174 to 12,870 by 1958.[194] However, there is no indication that the FBI told the Department that it kept the names of persons taken off the Security Index on a Communist, Index, because the Bureau believed such persons remained "potential threats."[194] The secret Communist Index was renamed the Reserve Index in 1960 and expanded to include "influential" persons deemed likely to "aid subversive elements" in an emergency because of their "subversive associations and ideology." Such individuals fell under the following categories:

Professors, teachers, and educators, labor union organizers and leaders; writers, lecturers, newsmen and others in the mass media field; lawyers, doctors, and scientists; other potentially influential persons on a local or national level; individuals who could potentially furnish financial or material aid.

Persons on the Reserve Index would receive "priority consideration" for "action" after detention of Security Index subjects. The breadth of this list is illustrated by the inclusion of the names of author Norman Mailer and a professor who merely praised the Soviet Union to his class.[195]

In addition to keeping these programs secret, the FBI withheld information about espionage from the Justice Department on at least two occasions. In 1946 the FBI had "identified over 100 persons" whom it "suspected of being in the Government Communist Underground." Neither this number nor any names from this list were given to the Department because Director Hoover feared "leaks," and because the Bureau conceded in its internal documents that it did "not have evidence, whether admissible or otherwise, reflecting actual membership in the Communist Party."[196] Thus the Bureau's "suspicions" were not tested by outside review by the Justice Department and the investigations could continue. In 1951 the FBI again withheld from the Department names of certain espionage subjects "for security reasons," since disclosure "would destroy chances of penetration and control."[197]

Even the President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty could not get highly relevant information from the Bureau. FBI Assistant Director D.M. Ladd told the Commission in 1946 that there was a "substantial" amount of Communist "infiltration of the government." But Ladd declined to answer when Commission members asked for more details of FBI intelligence operations and the information which served as the basis for his characterization of the extent of infiltration.[198] The Commission prepared a list of questions for the FBI and asked that Director Hoover appear in person. Instead, Attorney General Clark made an "informal" appearance and supplied a memorandum stating that the number of "subversives" in government had "not yet reached serious proportions," but that the possibility of "even one disloyal person" in government service constituted a "serious threat."[199] Thus, the President's Commission chose not to insist upon making a serious evaluation of FBI intelligence operations or the extent of the danger.

The record suggests that executive officials were forced to make decisions regarding security policy without full knowledge. They had to depend on the FBI's estimate of the problem, rather than being able to make their own assessment on the basis of complete information. It is also apparent that by this time outside officials were sometimes unwilling to oppose Director Hoover or to inquire fully into FBI operations.[200]

c. CIA Domestic Activity

(1) Vague Controls on CIA. -- The vagueness of Congress's prohibitions of "internal security functions" by the CIA left room for the Agency's subsequent domestic activity. A restriction against "police, law enforcement or internal security functions" first appeared in President Truman's order establishing the Central Intelligence Group in 1946.[201]

General Vandenburg, then Director of Central Intelligence, testified in 1947 that this restriction was intended to "draw the lines very sharply between the CIG and the FBI" and to "assure that the Central Intelligence Group can never become a Gestapo or security police."[202] Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal testified that the CIA would be "limited definitely to purposes outside of this country, except the collection of information gathered by other government agencies." The FBI would be relied upon "for domestic activities."[203]

In the House floor debate Congressman Holifield stressed that the work of the CIA:

is strictly in the field of secret foreign intelligence -- what is known as clandestine intelligence. They have no right in the domestic field to collect information of a clandestine military nature. They can evaluate it; yes.[204]

Consequently, the National Security Act of 1947 provided specifically that the CIA

shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions.[205]

However, the 1947 Act also contained a vague and undefined duty to protect intelligence "sources and methods" which later was used to justify domestic activities ranging from electronic surveillance and break-ins to penetration of protest groups.[206]

(2) Drug Testing and Cover Programs. -- In the early 1950s, the CIA began a program of surreptitiously testing, chemical and biological materials, which included drug testing on unwitting Americans. The existence of such a program was kept secret because, as the CIA's Inspector General wrote 1957, it, was necessary to "protect operations from exposure" to "the American public" as well as "enemy forces." Public knowledge of the CIA's "unethical and illicit activities" was thought likely to have serious "political repercussions."[207] CIA drug experimentors disregarded instructions of their superiors within the Agency and failed to take "reasonable precautions" when they undertook the test which resulted in the death of Dr. Frank Olsen.[208]

The CIA made extensive use of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in conducting its program of drug testing on unwitting subjects.

Military intelligence also administered drugs to volunteer subjects who were unaware of the purpose or nature of the tests in which they were participating.[209]

The CIA's drug research was conducted in part through arrangements with universities, hospitals, and "private research organizations" in a manner which concealed "from the institution the interests of the CIA," although "key individuals" were made witting of Agency sponsorship.[210] There were similar covert relationships with American private institutions in other CIA intelligence activities.[211]

5. Intrusive Techniques

Throughout the cold war period, the intelligence agencies used covert techniques which invaded personal privacy to execute their vague, uncontrolled, and overly broad mandate to collect intelligence. Intelligence techniques were not properly controlled by responsible authorities; some of the techniques were misused by senior administration officials. On the other hand, the nature of the programs -- and, in some cases, their very existence -- was often concealed from those authorities.

a. Communications Interception: CIA and NSA

During the 1950s the Central Intelligence Agency instituted a major program for opening mail between the United States and the Soviet Union as it passed through postal facilities in New York City.[212] Two other short-term CIA projects in the fifties also involved the opening of international mail within the United States, through access to Customs Service facilities.[213] Moreover, in the late 1940s the Department of Defense made arrangements with several communications companies to receive international cable traffic, reinstating a relationship that had existed during World War II.[214] These prorams violated not only the ban on internal security functions by foreign intelligence agencies in the 1947 Act, but also specific statutes protecting the privacy of the mails and forbidding the interception of Communications.[215]

While their original purpose was to obtain foreign intelligence, the programs frequently did not distinguish between the messages of foreigners and of Americans.[216] Furthermore, by the late fifties and early sixties, the CIA and NSA were sharing the "take" with the FBI for domestic intelligence purposes.[217]

In this period, the CIA opened mail to and from the Soviet Union largely at random, intercepting letters of Americans unrelated to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence.[218] After the FBI learned of the CIA program, it levied requests in certain categories. Apart from foreign counterintelligence criteria, the Bureau expressed interest in letters from citizens professing "pro-Communist sympathies"[219] and "data re U.S. peace groups going to Russia."[220]

The secret arrangements with cable companies to obtain copies of international traffic were initially authorized by Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and Attorney General Tom Clark, although it is not clear that they knew of the interception of American as well as foreign messages.[221] They developed no formal legal rationale, and their later successors were never consulted to renew the authorization.[222]

The CIA sought no outside authorization before instituting its mail opening program. Several Post Office officials were misled into believing that the CIA's request for access to the mail only involved examining the exterior of the envelopes.[223] President Kennedy's Postmaster General, J. Edward Day, testified that he told CIA Director Allen Dulles he did not want to "know anything about" what the CIA was doing.[224] Beyond undocumented assumptions by CIA officials, there is no evidence that the President or the Attorney General was ever informed about any aspect of CIA mail-opening operations in this period.[225]

b. FBI Covert Techniques

(1) Electronic Surveillance.

(a) The Question of Authority: In 1946 Attorney General Toni Clark asked President Truman to renew the authorization for warrantless wiretapping issued by President Roosevelt in 1940. Clark's memorandum, however, did not refer to the portion of the Roosevelt directive which said wiretaps should be limited "insofar as possible to aliens." It stressed the danger from "subversive activity here at home," and requested authority to wiretap "in cases vitally affecting the domestic security."[226] The President gave his approval. Truman's aides later discovered Attorney General Clark's omission and the President considered, but decided against, returning to the terms of Roosevelt's authorization.[227]

In 1954 the Supreme Court denounced the Fourth Amendment violation by police who placed a microphone in a bedroom in a local gambling case.[228]

Soon thereafter, despite this decision -- and despite his predecessor's ruling that trespassory installation of bugs was in the "area" of the Fourth Amendment -- Attorney General Herbert Brownell authorized the "unrestricted use" in the "national interest" of "trespass in the installation of microphones."[229]

From 1954 until 1965, when Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach reconsidered the policy and imposed stricter regulations,[230] the FBI bad unsupervised discretion to use microphone surveillance and to conduct surreptitious entries to install microphones. Thus, the safeguard of approval by the Attorney General for each wiretap had been undercut by the FBI's ability to intrude into other, often more intimate conversations by microphone "bugging."

(b) Extensive Bugging: In May 1961, Director Hoover advised Deputy Attorney General Byron White that the FBI was using "microphone surveillances" involving "trespass" for "intelligence purposes" in the "internal security field." He called White's attention to the 1954 Brownell memorandum, although he said microphones were used "on a restricted basis" and cited as examples only "Soviet intelligence agents and Communist Party leaders."[231]

In fact, the FBI had already used microphone surveillance for broader coverage than Communists or spies. Indeed, it had "bugged" a hotel room occupied by a Congressman in February 1961. There is no evidence that Attorney General Kennedy or Deputy Attorney General White were specifically informed of this surveillance. But the Attorney General received information which came from the "bug" and authorized a wiretap of the Congressman's secretary.[232][233]

Furthermore, FBI records disclose that the FBI conducted warrantless microphone surveillances in 1960-1963 directed at a "black separatist group," "black separatist group functionaries" and a "(white) racist organization."[234] There may have been others for purely domestic intelligence purposes.[235]

The FBI maintained no "central file or index" to record all microphone surveillances in this period, and FBI records did not distinguish "bugs" involving trespass.[236]

(2) "Black Bag Jobs." -- There is no indication that any Attorney General was informed of FBI "black bag" jobs, and a "Do Not File" procedure was designed to preclude outside discovery of the FBI's use of the technique.

No permanent records were kept for approvals of "black bag jobs," or surreptitious entries conducted for purposes other than installing a "bug". The FBI has described the procedure for authorization of surreptitious entries as requiring the approval of Director Hoover or his Assistant Clyde Tolson. The authorizing memorandum was filed in the Director's office under a "Do Not File" procedure, and thereafter destroyed. In the field office, the Special Agent in Charge maintained a record of approval in his office safe. At the next yearly field office inspection, an Inspector would review these records to ensure that the SAC had secured FBI headquarters approval in conducting surreptitious entries. Upon completion of the review, these records were destroyed.[237]

The only internal FBI memorandum found discussing the policy for surreptitious entries confirms that this was the procedure and states that "we do not obtain authorization from outside the Bureau" because the technique was "clearly illegal." The memorandum indicates that "black bag jobs" were used not only "in the espionage field" but also against "subversive elements" not directly connected to espionage activity. It added that the techniques resulted "on numerous occasions" in obtaining the "highly secret and closely guarded" membership and mailing lists of "subversive" groups.[238]

(3) Mail Opening. -- The FBI did not seek outside authorization when it reinstituted mail opening programs in the fifties and early sixties. Eight programs were conducted for foreign intelligence and counterespionage purposes, and Bureau officials who supervised these programs have testified that legal considerations were simply not raised at the time.[239]

Beyond their original purpose, the FBI mail opening programs produced some information of an essentially domestic nature. For example, during this period one program supplied "considerable data" about American citizens who expressed pro-Communist sympathies or made "anti-U.S. statements."[240] Some of the mail-opening by-product regarding Americans was disseminated to other agencies for law enforcement purposes, with the source disguised.[241]

c. Use of FBI Wiretaps

The authorization for wiretapping issued by President Truman in 1946 allowed the Attorney General to approve wiretaps in the investigation of "subversive activity" to protect the "domestic security."[242]

A wiretap on an official of the Nation of Islam, originally authorized by Attorney General Herbert Brownell in 1957, continued thereafter without re-authorization until 1965.[243] Attorney General Robert Kennedy approved FBI requests for wiretaps on an Alabama Klan leader in 1963[244] and on black separatist group leader Malcolm X in 1964.[245] Kennedy also authorized wiretap coverage requested by the Warren Commission in 1964.[246] Kennedy's approval of FBI requests for wiretaps on Dr. Martin Luther King and several of his associates are discussed in greater detail elsewhere in the Committee's report.[247]

In addition, Attorney General Kennedy approved wiretaps on four American citizens during investigations of "classified information leaks." The taps failed to discover the sources of the alleged "leaks" and involved procedural irregularities. In 1961 Attorney General Kennedy told Director Hoover that the President wanted the FBI to determine who was responsible for an apparent "leak" to Newsweek reporter Lloyd Norman, author of an article about American military plans in Germany.[248] But the Attorney General was not asked to approve a wiretap on Norman's residence until after it was installed.

According to contemporaneous Bureau memoranda, wiretaps in 1962 on the residence of New York Times reporter Hanson Baldwin and his secretary to determine the source of an article about Soviet missile sites were also instituted without prior written approval of the Attorney General; and one of them - the tap on the secretary - was instituted without the Attorney General's prior knowledge.[249] Kennedy's written approval was obtained, however, three days after the Baldwin tap was installed and four days after the tap on the secretary was installed.[250]

The pattern, including ex post facto approval, was repeated for wiretaps of a former FBI agent who disclosed "confidential" Bureau information in a public forum. The first tap lasted for eight days in 1962, and it was reinstituted in 1963 for an undetermined period.[251] Attorney General Kennedy was advised that the FBI desired to place the initial coverage; but he was not informed that it had been effected the day before, and he did not grant written approval until the day it was terminated.[252] It appears that only oral authorization was obtained for reinstituting the tap in 1963.[253]

In February 1961, Attorney General Kennedy requested the FBI to initiate an investigation for the purpose of developing:

intelligence data which would provide President Kennedy a picture of what was behind pressures exerted on behalf of [a foreign country] regarding sugar quota deliberations in Congress . . . in connection with pending sugar legislation.[254]

This investigation lasted approximately nine weeks, and was reinstituted for a three-month period in mid-1962.

According to an FBI memorandum, the Attorney General authorized the wiretaps in 1961 on the theory that "the administration has to act if money or gifts are being passed by the [representatives of a foreign country]."[255] Specifically, he approved wiretaps on several American citizens: three officials of the Agriculture Department (residences only);[256] the clerk of the House Committee on Agriculture who was also secretary to the chairman (residence only);[257] and a registered agent of the foreign country (both residence and business telephones).[258] After passage of the Administration's own sugar bill in April 1961, these wiretaps were discontinued.[259]

The investigation was reinstituted in June 1962, when the Bureau learned that representatives of the same foreign country again might be influencing congressional deliberations concerning an amendment to the sugar quota legislation.[260] Attorney General Kennedy approved wiretaps on the office telephone of an attorney believed to be an agent of the foreign country and, again, on the residence telephone of the Clerk of the House, Agriculture Committee.[261] The latter tap continued for one month, but the former apparently lasted for three months.[262]

These wiretaps in 1961 and 1962 were arguably related to "foreign intelligence" -- but not to "subversive activity" unless that term is interpreted beyond its conventional meaning.[263] More important, they generated information which was potentially useful to the Kennedy administration for purely political purposes relating to the legislative process.[264]

The wiretap authorized by Attorney General Kennedy on another high executive official in this period did not relate to political considerations, but to concern about possible disclosure of classified information to a foreign government.[265] There is no indication that the wiretap authorized by Attorney General Katzenbach in 1965 on the editor of an anticommunist newsletter was related in any way to the book he had written in 1964 alleging personal impropriety by Attorney General Kennedy.[266]

6. Domestic Covert Action

In its COINTELPRO operation, the FBI went beyond excessive information-gathering and dissemination to the use of secret tactics designed to "disrupt" and "neutralize" domestic intelligence targets. At the outset, the target was the Communist Party, U.S.A. But, consistent with the pattern revealed in other domestic intelligence activities, the program widened to other targets, increasingly concentrating on domestic dissenters. The expansion of COINTELPRO began in the Cold War period and accelerated in the latter part of the 1960s.

a. COINTELPRO: Communist Party

The COINTELPRO program, authorized by Director Hoover against the Communist Party in 1956, had its roots in two lines of Bureau policy going back to the 1940s. The first was the accepted FBI practice of attempting to disrupt "subversive" organizations. A former head of the FBI Intelligence Division has testified:

We were engaged in COINTELPRO tactics, to divide, confuse, weaken, in diverse ways, an organization. We were engaged in that when I entered the Bureau in 1941.[267]

The memorandum recommending the institution of COINTELPRO stated that the Bureau was already seeking to "foster factionalism" and "cause confusion" within the Communist Party.[268]

The second line of pre-existing Bureau policy involved propaganda to discredit the Communist Party publicly. For example, in 1946, an earlier head of the FBI Intelligence Division proposed that efforts be made to release "educational material" through "available channels" to influence "public opinion." The "educational" purpose was to undermine Communist support among "labor unions," "persons prominent in religious circles," and "the Liberal elements," and to show "the basically Russian nature of the Communist Party in this country."[269] By 1956, a propaganda effort was underway to bring the Party and its leaders "into disrepute before the American public."[270]

The evidence indicates that the FBI did not believe that the Communist Party, when the COINTELPRO program was formalized in 1956, constituted as serious a threat in terms of actual espionage as it had in the 1940s.[271] Nevertheless, the FBI systematized its covert action program against the Communist Party in part because the surfacing of informants in legal proceedings had somewhat limited the Bureau's coverage of Party activities, and also to take advantage of internal conflicts within the Party.[272] Covert "disruption" was also designed to make sure that the Party would not reorganize under a new label and thus would remain an easier target for prosecution.[273]

In the years after 1956, the purpose of the Communist Party COINTELPRO changed somewhat. Supreme Court decisions substantially curbed criminal prosecution of Communists.[274] Subsequently, the FBI "rationale" for COINTELPRO was that it had become "impossible to prosecute Communist Party members" and some alternative was needed "to contain the threat."[275]

b. Early Expansion of COINTELPRO

From 1956 until 1960, the COINTELPRO program was primarily aimed at the Communist Party organization. But, in March 1960, participating FBI field offices were directed to make efforts to prevent Communist "infiltration" of "legitimate mass organizations, such as Parent-Teacher Associations, civil organizations, and racial and religious groups." The initial technique was to notify a leader of the organization, often by "anonymous communications," about the alleged Communist in its midst.[276] In some cases, both the Communist and the "infiltrated" organization were targeted.

This marked the beginning of the progression from targeting Communist Party members, to those allegedly under Communist "influence," to persons taking positions supported by the Communists. For example, in 1964 targets under the Communist Party COINTELPRO label included a group with some Communist participants urging increased employment of minorities[277] and a non-Communist group in opposition to the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities.[278]

In 1961, a COINTELPRO operation was initiated against the Socialist Workers Party. The originating memorandum said it was not a "crash" program; and it was never given high priority.[279] The SWP's support for "such causes as Castro's Cuba and integration problems arising in the South" were noted as factors in the FBI's decision to target the organization. The Bureau also relied upon its assessment that the SWP was "not just another socialist group but follows the revolutionary principles of Marx, Lenin, and Engels as interpreted by Leon Trotsky" and that it was "in frequent contact with international Trotskyite groups stopping short of open and direct contact with these groups.[280] The SWP had been designated as "subversive" on the "Attorney General's list" since the 1940s.[281]

- D. Intelligence and Domestic Dissent: 1964-1976

1. Main Developments of the 1964-1976 Period

Beginning in the mid-sixties, the United States experienced a period of domestic unrest and protest unparalleled in this century. Violence erupted in the poverty-stricken urban ghettos, and opposition to American intervention in Vietnam produced massive demonstrations.

A small minority deliberately used violence as a method for achieving political goals -ranging from the brutal murder and intimidation of black Americans in parts of the South to the terrorist bombing of office buildings and government-supported university facilities. But three Presidential commissions found that the larger outbreaks of violence in the ghettos and on the campuses were most often spontaneous reactions to events in a climate of social tension and upheaval.[282]

During this period, thousands of young Americans and members of racial minorities came to believe in civil disobedience as a vehicle for protest and dissent.

The government could have set an example for the nation's citizens and prevented spiraling lawlessness by respecting the law as it took steps, to predict or prevent violence. But agencies of the United States, sometimes abetted by public opinion and government officials, all too often disregarded the Constitutional rights of American in their conduct of domestic intelligence operations.

The most significant developments in domestic intelligence activity during this period may be summarized as follows:

a. Scope of Domestic Intelligence

FBI intelligence reports on protest activity and domestic dissent accumulated massive information on lawful activity and law-abiding citizens for vaguely defined "pure intelligence" and "preventive intelligence" purposes related only remotely or not at all to law enforcement or the prevention of violence. The FBI exaggerated the extent of domestic Communist influence, and COMINFIL investigations improperly included groups with no significant connections to Communists.

The FBI expanded its use of informers for gathering intelligence about domestic political groups, sometimes upon the urging of the Attorney General. No significant limits were placed on the kind of political or personal information collected by informers, recorded in FBI files, and often disseminated outside the Bureau.

Army intelligence developed programs for the massive collection of information about, and surveillance of, civilian political activity in the United States and sometimes abroad.

In contrast to previous policies for centralizing domestic intelligence investigations, the Federal Government encouraged local police to establish intelligence programs both for their own use and to feed into the Federal intelligence-gathering process. This greatly expanded the domestic intelligence apparatus, making it harder to control.

The Justice Department established a unit for storing and evaluating intelligence about civil disorders which was designed to use non-intelligence agencies as regular sources of information, which, in fact, drew on military intelligence as well as the FBI, and which transmitted its computer list of citizens to the CIA and the IRS.

b. Domestic Intelligence Authority Intelligence gathering related to protest activity was generally increased in response to vague requests by Attorneys General or other officials outside the intelligence agencies; such increases were sometimes ratified retroactively by such officials.

The FBIs exclusive control over civilian domestic intelligence at the Federal level was consolidated by formal agreements with the Secret Service regarding protective intelligence and with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms regarding terrorist bombings.

c. Domestic Covert Action

The FBI developed new covert programs for disrupting and discrediting domestic political groups, using the techniques originally applied to Communists. The most intensive domestic intelligence investigations, and frequently COINTELPRO operations, were targeted against persons identified not as criminals or criminal suspects, but as "rabble rousers," "agitators," "key activists," or "key black extremists" because of their militant rhetoric and group leadership. The Security Index was revised to include such persons.

Without imposing adequate safeguards against misuse, the Internal Revenue Service passed tax information to the FBI and CIA, in some cases in violation of tax regulations. At the urging of the White House and a Congressional Committee, the IRS established a program for investigating politically active groups and individuals, which included auditing their tax returns.

d. Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Dissent

A 1966 agreement concerning "coordination" between the CIA and the FBI permitted CIA involvement in internal security functions. Under pressure from the Johnson and Nixon White Houses to determine whether there was "foreign influence" behind anti-war protests and black militant activity, the CIA began collecting intelligence about domestic political groups.

The CIA also conducted operations within the United States under overly broad interpretations of responsibility to protect the physical security of its facilities and to protect intelligence "sources" and "methods." These operations included surreptitious entry, recruitment of informers in domestic political groups, and at least one instance of warrantless wiretapping approved by the Attorney General.

In the same period, the National Security Agency monitored international communications of Americans involved in domestic dissent despite the fact that its mission was supposed to be restricted to collecting foreign intelligence and monitoring only foreign communications.

e. Intrusive Techniques

As domestic intelligence operations broadened and focused upon dissenters, the Government increased the use of many of its most intrusive surveillance techniques. During the period from 1964 to 1972, the standards and procedures for warrantless electronic surveillance were tightened, but actual practice was sometimes at odds with the articulated policy. Also during these years, CIA mail opening expanded at the Bureau's request, and NSA monitoring expanded to target domestic dissenters. However, the FBI cut back use of certain techniques under the pressure of Congressional probes and changing public opinion.

f. Accountability and Control

During this period several sustained domestic intelligence efforts illustrated deficiencies in the system for controlling intelligence agencies and holding them accountable for their actions.

In 1970, presidential approval was temporarily granted for a plan for interagency coordination of domestic intelligence activities which included several illegal programs. Although the approval was subsequently revoked, some of the programs were implemented separately by various agencies.

Throughout the administrations of Presidents Johnson and Nixon, the investigative process was misused as a means of acquiring political intelligence for the White House. At the same time, the Justice Department's Internal Security Division, which should have been a check against the excesses of domestic intelligence, generally failed to restrain such activities. For example, as late as 1971-1973, the FBI continued to evade the will of Congress, partly with Justice Department approval, by maintaining a secret "Administrative Index" of suspects for round-up in case of national emergency.

g. Reconsideration of FBI Authority

Partly in reaction to congressional inquiries, the FBI in the early 1970s began to reconsider the extent of its authority to conduct domestic intelligence activities and requested clarification from the Attorney General and an executive mandate for intelligence investigations of "terrorists" and "revolutionaries".

In the absence of any new standards imposed by statute, or by the Attorney General, the FBI continued to collect domestic intelligence under sweeping authorizations issued by the Justice Department in 1974 for investigations of "subversives," potential civil disturbances, and "potential crimes". These authorizations were explicitly based on broad theories of inherent executive power. Attorney General Edward H. Levi recently promulgated guidelines which represent the first significant attempt by the Justice Department to set standards and limits for FBI domestic intelligence investigations.

2. Scope of Domestic Intelligence

During this period the FBI continued the same broad investigations of the lawful activities of Americans that were based on the Bureau's vague mandate to collect intelligence about "subversion."

In addition, the Bureau -- joined by CIA, NSA, and military intelligence agencies -- took on new and equally broad assignments to investigate "racial matters," the "New Left," "student agitation," and alleged "foreign influence" on the antiwar movement.

a. Domestic Protest and Dissent: FBI

"We are an intelligence agency," stated a policy directive to all FBI offices in 1966, "and as such are expected to know what is going on or is likely to happen."[283] Written in the context of demonstrations over the Vietnam war and civil rights, this order illustrates the general attitude among Bureau officials and high administration officials who established intelligence policy: in a country in ferment, the FBI could, and should, know everything that might someday be useful in some undefined manner.

(1) Racial Intelligence. -- During the 1960s, the FBI, partly on its own and partly in response to outside requests, developed sweeping programs for collecting domestic intelligence concerning racial matters. These programs had roots in the late 1950s.[284] By the early 1960s, they had grown to the point that the Bureau was gathering intelligence about proposed "civil demonstrations" and the related activities of "officials, committees, legislatures, organizations, etc.," in the "racial field."[285]

In 1965, FBI field offices were directed to supply "complete," information (including "postponement or cancellation") :

regarding planned racial activity, such as demonstrations, rallies, marches, or threatened opposition to activity of this kind.

Field offices reported their full "coverage" of "meetings" and "any other pertinent information concerning racial activities."[286]

In late 1966, field offices were instructed to begin preparing semi monthly summaries of "existing racial conditions in major urban areas," relying upon "established sources," and "racial," "criminal," and security informants." These reports were to describe the "general programs" of all "civil rights organizations" and "black nationalist organizations" as well as subversive or "hate-type" groups. The information to be gathered was to include: "readily available personal background data" on "leaders and individuals in the civil rights movement" and other "leaders and individuals involved," as well as any data in Bureau files on "subversive associations" they might have; the "objectives sought by the minority community;" the community reaction to "minority demands;" and "the number, character, and intensity of the techniques used by the minority community, such as picketing or sit-in demonstrations, to enforce their demands."[287]

Thus, the FBI was mobilized to used all its available resources to discover everything it could about "general racial conditions." While the stated objective was to arrive at an "evaluation" of potential for violence, the broad sweep of the directives issued to the field resulted in the collection and filing of vast amounts of information unrelated to violence.

Some programs concerning "general racial matters" were directed to concentrate on groups with a "propensity for violence and civil disorder."[288] But even these programs were so overbroad in their application as to include Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and his non-violent Southern Christian Leadership Conference in the "radical and violence-prone" "hate group" category. The stated justification, unsupported by any facts, was that Dr. King might "abandon his supposed 'obedience' to 'white, liberal doctrines' (nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism."[289]

Another leading civil rights group, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), was investigated under the "Racial Matters" Program because the Bureau concluded that it was moving "away from a legitimate civil rights organization" and "assuming a militant black nationalist posture." The FBI reached this conclusion on the grounds that "some leaders in their public statements" had condoned "violence as a means of attaining Negro rights." The investigation was intensified, even though it was recognized there was no information that its members "advocate violence" or "participate in actual violence."[290]

The same overbreadth characterized the FBI's collection of intelligence about "white militant groups." Among the groups investigated were those "known to sponsor demonstrations against integration and against the busing of Negro students to white schools." As soon as a new organization of this sort was formed, the Bureau used its informants and "established sources" to determine "the aims and purposes of the organization, its leaders, approximate membership," and other "background data" bearing upon "the militancy" of the group.[290]

(2) "New Left" Intelligence. -- The FBI collected intelligence under its VIDEM (Vietnam Demonstration) and STAG (Student Agitation) Programs on "anti-Government demonstrations and protest rallies" which the Bureau considered "disruptive." Field offices were warned against "incomplete and nonspecific reporting" which neglected such details as "number of protesters present, identities of organizations, and identities of speakers and leading activists."[291]

The FBI attempted to define the "New Left," but with little success. The Bureau agent who was in charge of New Left intelligence conceded that:

It has never been strictly defined, as far as I know.... It's more or less an attitude, I would think.

He also stated that the definition was expanded continually.[292]

Field offices were told that the New Left was a "subversive force" dedicated to destroying our "traditional values." Although it had "no definable ideology," it was seen as having "strong Marxist, existentialist, nihilist and anarchist overtones." Field offices were instructed that "proper areas of inquiry" regarding the subjects of "New Left" investigations were "public statements, the writings and the leadership activities" which might establish their "rejection of law and order" and thus their "potential" threat to security. Such persons would also be placed on the Security Index (for detention in a time of emergency) because of these "anarchistic tendencies," even if the Bureau could not prove "membership in a subversive organization."[293]

A Bureau memorandum which recommended the use of disruptive techniques against the "New Left" paid particular attention to one of its "anarchistic tendencies":

the New Left has on many occasions viciously and scurrilously attacked the Director and the Bureau in an attempt to hamper our investigations and drive us off the college campuses.[294]

Later instructions to the field stated that the term "New Left" did not refer to "a definite organization," but to a "loosely bound, freewheeling, college-oriented movement" and to the "more extreme and militant anti-Vietnam war and antidraft protest organizations." These instructions directed a "comprehensive study of the whole movement" for the purpose of assessing its "dangerousness." Quarterly reports were to be prepared, and "subfiles" opened, under the following headings:

Organizations ("when organized, objectives, locality which active, whether part

of a national organization")

Membership (and "sympathizers" -- use "best available informants and sources")

Finances (including identity of "angels" and funds from "foreign sources")

Comunist Influence

Publications ("describe publications, show circulation and principal members of editorial staff"']

Violence

Religion ("support of movement by religious groups or individuals")

Race Relations

Political Activities ("details relating to position taken on political matters including efforts to influence public opinion, the electorate and Government bodies")

Ideology

Education ("courses given together with any educational outlines and assigned or suggested reading")

Reform ("demonstrations aimed at social reform")

Labor ("all activity in the labor field")

Public Appearances of Leaders ("on radio and television" and "before groups, such as labor, church and minority groups," including "summary of subject matter discussed")

Factionalism

Security Measures

International Relations ("travel in foreign countries," "attacks on United States foreign policy")

Mass Media ("indications of support of New Left by mass media")

Through these massive reports, the FBI hoped to discover "the true nature of the New Left movement."[295] Few Bureau programs better reflect "pure intelligence" objectives which extended far beyond even the most generous definition of "preventive intelligence."[296]

Apart from the massive general reports required on the "New Left," examples of particular investigations included: a stockholders group planning to protest their corporation's war production at the annual stockholders meeting;[297] a university professor who was "an active participant in New Left demonstrations," publicly surrendered his draft card, and had been arrested in antiwar demonstrations, but not convicted;[298] and two university instructors who helped support a student "underground" newspaper whose editorial policy was described as "left-of-center, anti- establishment, and opposed [to] the University administration."[299]

The FBI also investigated emerging "New Left" groups, such as "Free Universities" attached to various college campuses, to determine whether they were connected "in any way" with "subversive groups." For example, when an article appeared in a newspaper stating that one "Free University" was being formed and that it was "anti- institutional," the FBI sought to determine its "origin," the persons responsible for its "formation," and whether they had "subversive backgrounds."[300] The resulting report described in detail the formation, curriculum content, and associates of the group. It was disseminated to military intelligence and Secret Service field offices and headquarters in Washington as well as to the State Department and the Justice Department.[301]

b. FBI Informants

The FBI Manual has never significantly limited informant reporting about the lawful political activities or personal lives of American citizens, except for prohibiting reports about legal defense "plans or strategy," "employer-employee relationships" connected with labor unions, and "legitimate campus activities."[302] In practice, FBI agents imposed no other limitations on the informants they handled and, on occasion, disregarded the prohibitions of the Manual.[303]

(1) Infiltration of the Klan. -- In mid-1964, Justice Department officials became increasingly concerned about the spread of Ku Klux Klan activity and violence in the Deep South. Attorney General Kennedy advised President Johnson that, because of the "unique difficulty" presented by a situation where "lawless activities" had the "sanction of local law enforcement agencies," the FBI should apply to the Klan the same "techniques" used previously "in the infiltration of Communist groups."[304]

Former Attorney General Katzenbach, under whose tenure FBI activities against the Klan expanded, vigorously defended this decision as necessary to "deter violence" by sowing "deep mistrust among Klan members" and making them aware that they were "under constant observation."[305] The FBI Manual did, in fact, advise Bureau agents against "wholesale investigations" of persons who "merely attend meetings on a regular basis. "[306] But FBI intelligence officials chafed under this restriction and sought expanded informant coverage.[307] Subsequently, the Manual was revised in 1967 to require the field to furnish the "details" of Klan "rallies" and "demonstrations."[308] By 1971, the Special Agents in Charge of field offices had the discretion to investigate not only persons with "a potential for violence," but also anyone else who in the SAC's "judgment" was an "extremist."[309]

(2) "Listening Posts" in the Black Community. -- Two special informant programs illustrate the breadth of the Bureau's infiltration of the black community. In 1970, the FBI used its "established informants" to determine the "background, aims and purposes, leaders and Key Activists" in every black student group in the country, "regardless of [the group's] past or present involvement in disorders."[310] Field offices were instructed to "target informants" against these groups and to "develop such coverage" where informants were not already available."[311]

In response to Attorney General Clark's instructions regarding civil disorders intelligence in 1967, the Bureau launched a "ghetto informant program" which lasted until 1973.[312] The number of ghetto informants expanded rapidly: 4,067 in 1969 and 7,402 by 1972.[313] The original concept was to establish a "listening post"[314] by recruiting a person "who lives or works in a ghetto area" to provide information regarding the "racial situation" and "racial activities."[315] Such information could include "the proprietor of a candy store or barber shop." As the program developed, however, ghetto informants were:

utilized to attend public meetings held by extremists, to identify extremists passing through or locating in the ghetto area, to identify purveyors of extremist literature as well as given specific assignments where appropriate.[316]

Material to be furnished by ghetto informants included names of "Afro-American type book stores" and their "owners, operators and clientele."[317]

(3) Infiltration of the "New Left". -- The FBI used its "security" informant program to report extensively on all activities relating to opposition to the Vietnam war. Moreover, informants already in groups considered "subversive" by the FBI also reported on the activities of other organizations and their members, if the latter were being "infiltrated" by the former groups.[318]

The agent who handled one informant in an antiwar group believed to be infiltrated by "subversive groups and/or violent elements" testified that the informant told him "everything she knew" about the chapter she joined.[319] Summaries of her reports indicate that she reported extensively about personal matters and lawful political activity.[320] This informant estimated that her reports identified as many as 1,000 people to the FBI over an 18-month period. The vast majority of these persons were members of peaceful and lawabiding groups, including the United Church for Christ, which were engaged in joint social welfare projects with the antiwar group which the informant had infiltrated.[321]

Other FBI informants reported, for example, on the Women's Liberation 'Movement, identifying its members at several mid-western universities[322] and reporting statements made by women concerning their personal reasons for participating in the women's movement.[323]

Moreover, as in the case of informants in the black community, efforts were made to greatly increase the number of informants who could report on antiwar and related groups. In 1969, the Justice Department specifically asked the FBI to use not only "existing sources," but also "any other sources you may be able to develop" to collect information about "serious campus disorders."[324] The Bureau ordered its field offices in 1970 to "make every effort" to obtain "informant coverage" of every "New Left commune."[325] Later that year, after Director Hoover lifted restrictions against recruiting 18 to 21-year-old informants, field offices were urged to take advantage of this "tremendous opportunity" to expand coverage of New Left "collectives, communes, and staffs of their underground newspapers."[326]

c. Army Surveillance of Civilian Political Activity

In the early 1960s, after several commitments of troops to control racial disturbances and enforce court orders in the South, Army intelligence began collecting information on civilian political activity in all areas where it believed civil disorders might occur. The growth of the Army's domestic intelligence program typifies, once again, the general tendency of information-gathering operations to continually broaden their coverage.

Shortly after the Army was called upon to quell civil disorders in Detroit and to cope with an antiwar demonstration at the Pentagon in 1967, the Army Chief of Staff approved a recommendation for "continuous counterintelligence investigations" to obtain information on "subversive personalities, groups or organizations" and their "influence on urban populations" in promoting civil disturbances.[327] The Army's "collection plan" for civil disturbances specifically targeted as "dissident elements" (without further definition) the "civil rights movement" and the "anti-Vietnam/anti-draft movements."[328] As revised later, Army intelligence-gathering extended beyond "subversion" and "dissident groups" to "prominent persons" who were "friendly" with the "leaders of the disturbance" or "sympathetic with their plans."[329]

d. Federal Encouragement of Local Police Intelligence

In reaction to civil disorders in 1965-1966, Attorney General Katzenbach turned for advice to the newly created President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. After holding a conference with police and National Guard officials, the President's Commission urged police not to react with too much force to disorder "in the course of demonstrations," but to make advance plans for "a true riot situation." This meant that police should establish "procedures for the acquisition and channeling of intelligence" for the use of "those who need it."[330] Former Assistant Attorney General Vinson recalled the Justice Department's concern that local police did not have "any useful intelligence or knowledge about ghettos, about black communities in the big cities."[331]

During the winter of 1967-1968, the Justice Department and the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders reiterated the message that local police should establish "intelligence units" to gather and disseminate information on "potential" civil disorders. These units would use "undercover police personnel and informants" and draw on "community leaders, agencies, and organizations in the ghetto."[332] The Commission also urged that these local units be linked to "a national center and clearinghouse" in the Justice Department.[333] One consequence of these recommendations was that the FBI, because of regular liaison with local police, became a channel and repository for much of this intelligence data.

Local police intelligence provided a convenient manner for the FBI to acquire information it wanted while avoiding criticism for using covert techniques such as developing campus informants. For example, in 1969, Director Hoover decided "that additional student informants cannot be developed" by the Bureau.[334] Field offices were instructed, however, that one way to continue obtaining intelligence on "situations having a potential for violence" was to develop "in-depth liaison with local law enforcement agencies. "[335] Instead of recruiting student informants itself, the FBI would rely on local police to do so.

These Federal policies contributed to the proliferation of local police intelligence activities, often without adequate controls. One result was that still more persons were subjected to investigation who neither engaged in unlawful activity, nor belonged to groups which might be violent. For example, a recent state grand jury report on the Chicago Police Department's "Security Section" described its "close working relationship" with Federal intelligence agencies, including Army intelligence and the FBI. The report found that the police intelligence system produced "inherently inaccurate, and distortive data" which contaminated Federal intelligence. One police officer testified that he listed "any person" who attended two "public meetings" of a group as a "member." This conclusion was forwarded "as a fact" to the FBI. Subsequently, an agency seeking, "background information" on that person from the Bureau in an employment investigation or for other purposes would be told that the individual was "a member." The grand jury stated:

Since federal agencies accepted data from the Security Section without questioning the procedures followed, or methods used to gain information, the federal government cannot escape responsibility for the harm done to untold numbers of innocent persons.[336]

e. The Justice Department's Interdivision Information Unit (IDIU)

Joseph Califano, President Johnson's assistant in 1967, testified that the Newark and Detroit riots were a "shattering experience" for Justice Department officials and "for us in the White House." They were concerned about the "lack of intelligence" about "black groups." Consequently, "there was a desire to have the Justice Department have better intelligence, for lack of a better term, about dissident groups." This desire "precipitated the intelligence unit" established by Attorney General Ramsey Clark in late 1967. According to Califano, the President and the White House staff were insisting: "There must be a way to predict violence. We've got to know more about this."[337]

In September 1967 Attorney Genera I Clark asked Assistant Attorney General John Doar to review the Department's "facilities" for civil disorders intelligence.[338] Doar recommended creating a Departmental "intelligence unit" to analyze FBI information about "certain persons and groups" (without further definition) in the urban ghettos. He proposed that its "scope be very broad initially" so as to "measure the influence of particular groups." Doar recommended that, in addition to the FBI, agencies who should "funnel information" to the unit should include:

Community Relations Service

Poverty Programs

Neighborhood Legal Services

Program Labor Department Programs

Intelligence Unit of the Internal Revenue Service

Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Division of the Treasury Department

Narcotics Bureau (then in the Treasury Department)

Post Office Department

Doar recognized that the Justice Department's Community Relations Service, designed to conciliate racial conflicts, risked losing its "credibility" and thereby its ability to help prevent riots, but he assured the Attorney General that the "confidentiality" of its information could be protected.[339]

A later study for Attorney General Clark -added the following agencies to Doar's list:

President's Commission on Civil Disorders

New Jersey Blue Ribbon Commission (and similar state-agencies)

State Department Army Intelligence Office of Economic Opportunity

Department of Housing and Urban Development (surveys and Model City applications)

Central Intelligence Agency

National Security Agency

This study recommended that FBI reports relating "to the civil disturbance problem" under the headings "black power, new left, pacifist, pro-Red Chinese, anti-Vietnam war, proCastro, etc." be used to develop "a master index on individuals, or organizations, and by cities."[340]

Attorney General Clark approved these recommendations and established the Interdivision Information Unit (IDIU) for:

reviewing and reducing to quickly retrievable form all information that may come to this Department relating to organizations and individuals who may play a role, whether purposefully or not, either in instigating or spreading civil disorders, or in preventing or checking them.[341]

In early instructions, Clark had stated that the Department must "endeavor to increase" such intelligence from "external sources."[342]

In fact, according to its first head, the IDIU did use intelligence from the Army, the Internal Revenue Service, and "other investigative agencies." Sometimes IDIU information was used to "determine whether or not" the Community Relations Service should "mediate" a dispute.[343] The Unit developed a computer system which could generate lists of all "members or affiliates" of an organization, their location and travel, "all incidents" relating to "specific issues", and "all information" on a "planned specific demonstration."[344]

By 1970, the IDIU computer was receiving over 42,000 "intelligence reports" a year relating to "civil disorders and campus disturbances" from:

the FBI, the U.S. Attorneys, Bureau of Narcotics, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Division of the Treasury Department and other intelligence gathering bodies within the Executive Branch.[345]

IDIU computer tapes, which included 10-12,000 entries on "numerous anti-war activists and other dissidents," were provided to the Central Intelligence Agency in 1970 by Assistant Attorney General Jerris Leonard, then the Attorney General's Chief of Staff for Civil Disturbance and head of the Civil Rights Division.[346] This list of persons was sent to the Internal Revenue Service where the Special Services staff opened intelligence files on all persons and organizations listed. Many of them were later investigated or audited, in some cases merely because they were on the list.

In 1971, the IDIU computer included data on such prominent persons as Rev. Ralph Abernathy, Caesar Chavez, Bosley Crowther (former New York Times film critic), Sammy Davis, Jr., Charles Evers, James Farmer, Seymour Hersh, and Coretta King. Organizations on which information had been collected included the NAACP, the Congress of Racial Equality, the Institute for Policy Studies, VISTA, United Farm Workers of California, and the Urban League. Ordinary private citizens who were not nationally prominent were also included. One was described as "a local civil rights worker," another as a "student at Merritt College and a member of the Peace and Freedom Party as of mid-68," and another as "a bearded militant who writes and recites poetry."[347]

Thus, beginning in 1967-1968, the IDIU was the focal point of a massive domestic intelligence apparatus established in response to ghetto riots, militant black rhetoric, antiwar protest, and campus disruptions. Through IDIU, the Attorney General received the benefits of information gathered by numerous agencies, without setting limits to intelligence reporting or providing clear policy guidance. Each component of the structure FBI, Army, IDIU, local police, and many others -- set its own generalized standards and priorities, resulting in excessive collection of information about law abiding citizens.

f. COMINFIL Investigations: Overbreadth

In the late 1960's the Communist infiltration or association concept continued to be used as a central basis for FBI intelligence investigations. In many cases it led to the collection of information on the same groups and persons who were swept into the investigative net by the vague missions to investigatie such subjects as "racial matters" or the "New Left." As it had from its beginning, theCOMINFIL concept produced investigations of individuals and groups who were not Communists. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. is the best known example.[348] But the lawful activities of many other persons were recorded in FBI files and reports, because they associated in some wholly innocent way with Communists, a term which the Bureau required its agents to "interpret in its broad sense" to include "splinter" and "offshoot" groups.[349]

During this period, when millions of Americans demonstrated in favor of civil rights and against the Vietnam war, many law-abiding citizens and groups came under the scrutiny of intelligence agencies. Under the COMINFIL program, for example, the Bureau compiled extensive reports on moderate groups, like the NAACP.[350]

The FBI significantly impaired the democratic decisionmaking process by its distorted intelligence reporting on Communist infiltration of and influence on domestic political activity. In private remarks to Presidents and in public statements, the Bureau seriously exaggerated the extent of Communist influence in both the civil rights and anti- Vietnam war movements.[351]

3. Domestic Intelligence Authority

During this period there were no formal executive directives outlining the scope of authority for domestic intelligence activity of the sort previously issued by Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy.[352] However, there was a series of high-level requests for intelligence concerning racial and urban unrest directed to the FBI and military intelligence agencies. As with the earlier formal Presidential directives on subjects like "subversion," these instructions provided no significant guidelines or controls.

a. FBI Intelligence

Since the early 1960s, the Justice Department had been making sporadic requests for intelligence related to specific racial events. For example, the FBI was requested to provide a tape recording of a speech by Governor-elect George Wallace of Alabama in late 1962[353] and for "photographic coverage" of a civil rights demonstration on the 100th anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation.[354] On its own initiative, the FBI supplied the Civil Rights Division with information from a "confidential source" about plans for a demonstration in Virginia, including background data on its "sponsor" and the intention to make "a test case."[355] The Civil Rights Division prepared regular summaries of information from the Bureau on "demonstrations and other racial matters."[356]

A formal directive, for a similar purpose, was sent by Attorney General Kennedy to U.S. Attorneys throughout the South in May 1963. It instructed them to "make a survey" to ascertain "any places where racial demonstrations are expected within the next 30 days" and to make "assessments of situations" in their districts. The FBI was "asked to cooperate. "[357]

President Johnson ordered the FBI to investigate and report on the origins and extent of the first small-scale Northern ghetto disturbances in the summer of 1964.[358] After the FBI submitted a report on the Watts riot in Los Angeles in 1965, however, Attorney General Katzenbach advised President Johnson that the FBI should investigate "directly" only the possible "subversive involvement." Katzenbach did not believe that the FBI should conduct a "general investigation" of "other aspects of the riot," since these were local law enforcement matters. The President approved this "limited investigation."[359] Nonetheless, internal Bureau instructions in 1965 and 1966 went far beyond this limitation.[360] By 1967 new Attorney General Ramsey Clark reversed the Department's position on such limitations.

After the riots in Newark and Detroit in the summer of 1967, President Johnson announced that the FBI had "standing instructions" for investigating riots "to search for evidence on conspiracy."[361] This announcement accompanied the creation of a National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders to investigate the "basic factors and causes leading to" the riots, including the "influence" of groups or persons "dedicated to the incitement or encouragement of violence." The President ordered the FBI in particular to "provide investigative information and assistance" to the Commission.[362] Director Hoover also agreed to investigate "allegations of subversive influence, involvement of out-of-state influences, and the like. "[363]

In September 1967, Attorney General Clark directed the FBI to:

use the maximum resources, investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing upon the question as to whether there has been or is a scheme or conspiracy by any group of whatever size, effectiveness or affiliation, to plan, promote or aggravate riot activity.[364]

Justice Department executives were generally aware of, and in some cases sought to widen, the scope of FBI intelligence collection. In a lengthy review of Bureau reports, John Doar, Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, expressed concern that the FBI had not "taken a broad spectrum approach" to intelligence collection, since it had "focused narrowly" on "traditional subversive groups" and on persons suspected of "specific statutory violations."[365]

Reiterating this viewpoint, Attorney General Clark told Director Hoover that "existing intelligence sources" may not have "regularly monitored" possible riot conspirators in "the urban ghetto." He added that it was necessary to conduct a "broad investigation" and that

sources or informants in black nationalist organizations, SNCC (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee) and other less publicized groups should be developed and expanded to determine the size and purpose of these groups and their relationship to other groups . . .[366]

Clark described his directive as setting forth "a relatively new area of investigation and intelligence reporting for the FBI."[367]

In response to the Attorney General's instructions, the FBI advised its field offices of the immediate "need to develop additional penetrative coverage of the militant black nationalist groups and the ghetto areas."[368]

b. Army Intelligence

On January 10, 1968, a meeting took place at the White House for the purpose of "advance planning for summer riots." The White House memorandum of the meeting reported:

The Army has undertaken its own intelligence study, and has rated various cities as to their riot potential. They are making contingency plans for troop movements, landing sites, facilities, etc.

It added that the Attorney General and the Deputy Secretary of Defense "had agreed to coordinate their efforts."[369] The Army General Counsel's memorandum of the meeting stated that Attorney General Clark had "stressed the difficulty of the intelligence effort," especially because there were "only 40 Negro FBI agents" out of the total of about 6,300. Clark added that "every resource" was needed in "the intelligence collection effort," although he asked the Defense Department to "screen" its "incoming intelligence" and send "only key items" to the Justice Department.[370]

There is no record that at this or any other similar meeting in this period the Attorney General or White House aides explicitly ordered the Army to conduct intelligence investigations using infiltration or other covert surveillance techniques. However, even though Army collection plans which were circulated to the Justice Department and the FBI[371] did not mention techniques of collection, the information they described could only be obtained by covert surveillance. No objections were voiced by the Justice Department.

Not until 1969 was there a formal civilian decision specifically authorizing Army surveillance of civilian political activity. At that time, Attorney General John Mitchell and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird considered the matter and over the objections of the Army General Counsel, decided that the Army would participate in intelligence collection concerning civil disturbances.[372] The Army's collection plan was not rescinded until June 1970, after public exposure and congressional criticism.[373]

c. FBI Interagency Agreements

After the assassination of President Kennedy, the FBI and the rot Service negotiated an - agreement which recognized that the Bureau had "general jurisdiction" over "subversion." The term was more narrowly than it had been defined by practice in the past, knowingly or wilfully advocat[ing]" overthrow of the Government by "force or violence" or by "assassination." Except for "temporary" action to "neutralize" -a threat to the President, the Secret Service agreed to "conduct no investigation" of "members of subversive WU without notifying the FBI. The Bureau, on the other hand, would not investigate individuals "solely" to determine their "dangerousness to the President."[374]

After Congress enacted antibombing legislation in 1970, the FBI was assigned primary responsibility for investigating "offenses perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups."[375] When these guidelines were developed, the FBI shifted supervision of bombing cases from its General Investigative Division to the Intelligence Division because, as one official put it, the specific criminal investigations were "so interrelated with the gathering of intelligence in the racial and security fields that overlap constantly occurs."[376]

The agreement with Secret Service and the "guidelines" covering bombing investigations did not give the FBI any additional domestic intelligence-gathering authority. They simply provided for dissemination of information to Secret Service and allocated criminal investigative jurisdiction between the FBI and the Alcohol, Firearms, and Tobacco Division. Nevertheless, both presupposed that the FBI had broad authority to investigate "subversives" or "terrorist/revolutionary groups."

4. Domestic Covert Action

a. COINTELPRO

The FBI's initiation of COINTELPRO operations against the Ku Klux Klan, "Black Nationalists" and the "New Left" brought to bear upon a wide range of domestic groups the techniques previously developed to combat Communists and persons who happened to associate with them.

The start of each program coincided with significant national events. The Klan program followed the widely-publicized disappearance in 1964 of three civil rights workers in Mississippi. The "Black Nationalist" program was authorized in the aftermath of the Newark and Detroit riots in 1967. The "New Left" program developed shortly after student disruption of the Columbia University campus in the spring of 1968. While the initiating memoranda approved by Director Hoover do not refer to these specific events, it is clear that they shaped the context for the Bureau's decisions.

These programs were not directed at obtaining evidence for use In possible criminal prosecutions arising out of those events. Rather, they were secret programs -- "under no circumstances" to be "made known outside the Bureau"[377] -- which used unlawful or improper acts to "disrupt" or "neutralize" the activities of groups and individuals targeted on the basis of imprecise criteria.

(1) Klan and "White Hate" COINTELPRO. -- The expansion of Klan investigations, in response to pressure from President Johnson and Attorney General Kennedy,[378] was accompanied by an internal Bureau decision to shift their supervision from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence Division. One internal FBI argument for the transfer was that the Intelligence Division was "in a position to launch a disruptive counterintelligence program" against the Klan with the "same effectiveness" it had against the Communist Party.[379]

Accordingly, in September 1964 a directive was sent to seventeen field offices instituting a COINTELPRO against the Klan and what considered to be other "White Hate" organizations (e.g., American Nazi Party, National States Rights Party) "to expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize" the activities of the groups, "their leaders, and adherents."[380]

During the 1964-1971 period, when the program was in operation, 287 proposals for COINTELPRO actions against Klan and "White Hate" groups were authorized by FBI headquarters.[381] Covert techniques used in this COINTELPRO included creating new Klan chapters to be controlled by Bureau informants and sending an anonymous letter designed to break up a marriage.[382]

(2) "Black Nationalist" COINTELPRO. -- The stated strategy of the "Black Nationalist" COINTELPRO instituted in 1967 was "to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize" such groups and their "leadership, spokesmen, members, and supporters." The larger objectives were to "counter" their "propensity for violence" and to "frustrate" their efforts to "consolidate their forces" or to "recruit new or youthful adherents." Field offices were instructed to exploit conflicts within and between groups; to use news media contacts ridicule and otherwise discredit groups; to prevent "rabble rousers" from spreading their "philosophy" publicly; and to gather information on the "unsavory backgrounds" of group leaders.[383]

In March 1968, the program was expanded from twenty-three to forty-one field offices and the following long-range goals were set forth:

(1) prevent the "coalition of militant black nationalist groups;"

(2) prevent the rise of a "messiah" who could "unify and electrify" the movement, naming specifically Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Stokely Carmichael, and Elijah Muhammed;

(3) prevent violence by pinpointing "potential troublemakers" and "neutralizing" them before they "exercise their potential for violence;"

(4) prevent groups and leaders from gaining "respectabily by discrediting them to the "responsible" Negro community, the "responsible" white community, "liberals" with "vestiges of sympathy" for militant black nationalists, and "Negro radicals;" and

(5) "prevent these groups from recruiting young people."[384]

After the Black Panther Party emerged as a group of national stature, FBI field offices were instructed to develop "imaginative and hard-hitting counterintelligence measures aimed at crippling the BPP." Particular attention was to be given to aggravating conflicts between the Black Panthers and rival groups in a number of cities where such conflict had already taken on the character of "gang warfare with attendant threats of murder and reprisals."[385]

During 1967-1971, FBI headquarters approved 379 proposals for COINTELPRO actions against "black nationalists."[386] These operations utilized dangerous and unsavory techniques which gave rise to the risk of death and often disregarded the personal rights and dignity of the victims.

(3) "New Left" COINTELPRO. -- The most vaguely defined and haphazard of the COINTELPRO operations was that initiated against the "New Left" in May 1968. It was justified to the FBI Director by his subordinates on the basis of the following considerations:

The nation was "undergoing an era of disruption and violence" which was "caused to a large extent" by individuals "generally connected with the New Left."

Some of these, "activists" were urging "revolution" and calling for "the defeat of the United States in Vietnam."

The problem was not just that they committed "unlawful acts," but also that they "falsely" alleged police brutality, and that they "scurrilously attacked the Director and the Bureau" in an attempt to "hamper" FBI investigations and to "drive us off the college campuses."[387]

Consequently, the COINTELPRO was intended to "expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize" the activities of "this group" and "persons connected with it."[388] The lack of any clear definition of "New Left" meant, as an FBI supervisor testified, that "legitimate" and nonviolent antiwar groups were targeted because they were "lending aid and comfort" to more disruptive groups.[389]

Further directives issued soon after initiation of the program urged field offices to "vigorously and enthusiastically" explore "every avenue of possible embarrassment" of New Left adherents. Agents were instructed to gather information on the "immorality" and the "scurrilous and depraved" behavior, "habits, and living conditions" of the members of targeted groups.[390] This message was reiterated several months later, when the offices were taken to task for their failure to remain alert for and seek specific data depicting the "depraved nature and moral looseness of the New Left" and to "use this Material in a vigorous and enthusiastic approach to neutralizing them."[391]

In July 1968, the field offices were further prodded by FBI headquarters to:

(1) prepare leaflets using "the most obnoxious pictures" of New Left leaders at various universities;

(2) instigate "personal conflicts or animosities" between New Left leaders;

(3) create the impression that leaders are "informants for the Bureau or other law enforcement agencies" (the "snitch jacket" technique) ;

(4) send articles from student or "underground" newspapers which show "depravity" ("use of narcotics and free sex") of New Left leaders to university officials, donors, legislators, and parents;

(5) have members arrested on marijuana charges;

(6) send anonymous letters about a student's activities to parents, neighbors, and the parents' employers;

(7) send anonymous letters about New Left faculty members (signed "A Concerned Alumni" or "A Concerned Taxpayer") to university officials, legislators, Board of Regents, and the press;

(8) use "cooperative press contacts;"

(9) exploit the "hostility" between New Left and Old Left groups;

(10) disrupt New Left coffee houses near military bases which are attempting to "influence members of the Armed forces;"

(11) use cartoons, photographs, and anonymous letters to "ridicule" the New Left;

(12) use "misinformation" to "confuse and disrupt" New Left activities, such as by notifying members that events have been cancelled.[392]

During the period 1968-1971, 291 COINTELPRO actions against the "New Left" were, approved by headquarters.[393] Particular emphasis was placed upon preventing the targeted individuals from public speaking or teaching and providing "misinformation" to confuse demonstrators.

b. FBI Target Lists

The FBI's most intensive domestic intelligence investigations and COINTELPRO operations were directed against persons identified, not as criminals or criminal suspects, but in vague terms such as "rabble rouser," "agitators," "key activists," or "key black extremists." The Security Index for detention in time of national emergency was revised to include such persons.

(1) "Rabble Rouser/Agitator" Index. -- Following a meeting with the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders in August 1967, Director Hoover ordered his subordinates to intensify collection of intelligence about "vociferous rabble-rousers."[393] He also directed a "Key Black Extremist" "that an index be compiled of racial agitators and individuals who have demonstrated a potential for fomenting racial discord."[394]

The already vague standards for the Rabble Rouser Index were broadened in November 1967 to cover persons with a "propensity for fomenting" any disorders affecting the "internal security" -- as opposed to only racial disorders -- and to include persons of local as well as national interest. This included "black nationalists, white supremacists, Puerto Rican nationalists, anti-Vietnam demonstration leaders, and other extremists." A rabble rouser was defined as:

a person who tries to arouse people to violent action by appealing to their emotions, prejudices, etcetera; a demagogue.[395]

In March 1968, the Rabble Rouser Index was renamed the Agitator Index and field offices were ordered to obtain a photograph of each person on the Index.[396] However, expanding the size of the Agitator Index lessened its value as an efficient target list for FBI intelligence operations. Consequently, the Bureau developed a more refined tool for this purpose-the Key Activist Program.

(2) "Key Activist" Program. -- Instructions were issued to ten major field offices in January 1968 to designate certain persons as "Key Activists," who were defined as

individuals in the Students for Democratic Society and the anti-Vietnam war groups [who] are extremely active and most vocal in their statements denouncing the United States and calling for civil disobedience and other forms of unlawful and disruptive acts.

There was to be an "intensive investigation" of each Key Activist, which might include "high-level informant coverage" and "technical surveillances and physical surveillances."[397]

The "New Left" COINTELPRO was designed in part to "neutralize" the Key Activists, who were "the moving forces behind the New Left.[398] One of the first techniques employed in this program was to obtain the Federal income tax returns of Key Activists for use in disrupting their activities.[399] In October 1968, the Key Activist Program was expanded to virtually all field offices. The field agents were instructed to recommend additional persons for the program and to "consider if the individual was rendered ineffective would it curtail [disruptive] activity in his area of influence." While the FBI considered Federal prosecution a "logical" result of these investigations and "the best deterrent," Key Activists were not selected because they were suspected of committing or planning to commit any specific Federal crime.[400]

(3) "Key Black Extremist" Program. -- A "Key Black Extremist" target list for concentrated investigation and COINTELPRO actions was instituted in 1970. Key Black Extremists were defined as

leaders or activists [who] are particularly extreme, agitative, anti-Government, and vocal in their calls for terrorism and violence.[401]

Field offices were instructed to place all Key Black Extremists in the to priority category of the Security Index and in the Black Nationalist Photograph Album, which concentrated on "militant black nationalists" who traveled extensively. In addition, the following steps were to be taken:

(1) All aspects of the finances of a KBE must be determined. Bank accounts must be monitored. . . .

(2) Continuing consideration must be given by each office to develop means to neutralize the effectiveness of each KBE. . . .

(3) Obtain suitable handwriting specimens. . . .

(4) Particular efforts should be made to obtain records of and/or reliable witnesses to, inflammatory statements. . . .

(5) Where there appears to be a possible violation of a statute within the investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau, [it should be] vigorously investigated. ...

(6) Particular attention must be paid to travel by a KBE and every effort made to determine financial arrangements for such travel. . . .

(7) The Federal income tax returns of all KBEs must be checked annually. . . .

Reports on all Key Black Extremists were to be submitted every ninety days, and the field was urged to use "initiative and imagination" to achieve "the desired results."[402][403] Once again, the "result" was not limited to prosecution of crimes and the targets were not chosen because they were suspected of committing crimes.

(4) Security Index. -- The Agitator Index was abolished in 1971 because "extremist subjects" were "adequately followed" through the Security Index.[404] In contrast to the other indices, the Security Index was not reviewed by the FBI alone. It had, from the late 1940's, been largely a joint FBI-Justice Department program based on the Department's plans for emergency detention.[405] According to FBI memoranda, moreover, President Johnson was directly involved in the updating of emergency detention plans.[406]

After a large-scale march on the Pentagon against the Vietnam War in October 1967, President Johnson ordered a comprehensive review of the government's emergency plans. Attorney General Clark was appointed chairman of a committee to review the Presidential Emergency Action Documents (PEADs) prepared under the Emergency Detention Program. One result of this review, in which the FBI took Part, was a decision to bring the Detention Program into line with the Emergency Detention Act of 1950, reversing the previous decision to "disregard" as "unworkable" the procedural requirements of the Act, which were tighter than the standards which had been applied by FBI and Justice.[407]

The Bureau also had to revise its criteria for inclusion of names on the Security Index, which since 1950 had disregarded the statutory standards. However, the definition chosen of a "dangerous individual" was so broad that it enabled the Bureau to add persons not previously eligible. A "dangerous individual" was defined as a

person as to whom there is reasonable ground to believe that such person probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to engage in, acts of espionage and sabotage, including acts of terrorism or assassination and any interference with or threat to the survival of and effective operation of the national, state, and local governments and of the national defense effort. [Emphasis added.][408]

The emphasized language greatly broadened the Security Index standards. It gave FBI intelligence officials the opportunity to include on the Security Index "racial militants", "black nationalists", and individuals associated with the "New Left" who were not affiliated with the "basic revolutionary organizations" as the Bureau characterized the Communist Party, which had previously been the focus of the Security Index.[409] Once again, the limitations which a statute was intended to impose were effectively circumvented by the use of elastic language in a Presidential directive.

Moreover, the Bureau adopted a new "priority" ranking for apprehension in case of an emergency. Top priority was now given not only to leaders of "basic subversive organizations," but also to "leaders of anarchistic groups."[410] It was said to be the "anarchistic tendencies" of New Left and racial militants that made them a "threat to the internal security."[411]

Initially, the Justice Department approved informally these changes in the criteria for "the persons listed for apprehension."[412] After several months of "study," the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel formally approved the new Security Index criteria. This was the first time since 1955 that the Department had fully considered the matter, and the previous policy of disregarding the procedures of the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 was formally abandoned. If an emergency occurred, the Attorney General would abide by "the requirement that any person actually detained will be entitled to a hearing at which time the evidence will have to satisfy the standards of [the Act]." However, the Office of Legal Counsel declared that the Security Index criteria themselves could be - as they were - less precise than those of the Act because of the "needed flexibility and discretion at the operating level in order to carry on an effective surveillance program."[413] Thus while the plan to ignore Congress' procedural limitations was abandoned, Congress' substantive standards were disregarded as insufficiently "flexible."

c. Internal Revenue Service Program

(1) Misuse by FBI and CIA. -- IRS information was used as an instrument of domestic intelligence mainly by the FBI. For example, in 1965, the Bureau obtained the tax returns of Ku Klux Klan members in order to develop "discrediting or embarrassing" information as part of the Bureau's COINTELPRO against the Klan.[414] The procedure by which FBI obtained access to tax returns and related information held by IRS was deemed "illegal" when it was discovered by the Chief of the IRS Disclosure Branch in 1968.[415] The FBI had not followed the procedures for obtaining returns which required written application to the IRS Disclosure Branch. Instead the Bureau had arranged to obtain the returns and information surreptitiously through contacts inside the IRS Intelligence Division. The procedure for FBI access was regularized by the IRS after 1968: a formal request on behalf of the Bureau was made to the IRS Disclosure Branch, by the internal Security Division of the Justice Department.

During this same period, the CIA was obtaining tax returns in a similar manner to the FBI, although in much smaller numbers. Yet even after procedures were changed for the FBI's access to tax information in 1968, the IRS did not re-examine the CIA's practices.[416] Therefore, CIA continued to receive tax return information without filing requests as required by the regulations.

Between 1968 and 1974, either directly or through the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department, the FBI requested at least 130 tax returns for domestic intelligence purposes. This included the returns of 46 "New Left activists" and 74 "black extremists,"[417] as part of Bureau COINTELPRO operations to "neutralize" these individuals.[418] These requests were not predicated upon any specific information suggesting delinquency in fulfilling tax obligations.

Even after a formal request was required before supplying the FBI with tax returns, the IRS accepted the Justice Department's undocumented assertions that tax information was "necessary" in connection with an "official matter" involving "internal security."[419] Yet in making such assertions, the Justice Department's Internal Security Division relied entirely on the Bureau's judgment. Thus, while the IRS is required by the statute to release tax information only where necessary, it in effect delegated its responsibility to the Internal Security Division which in turn delegated the decision to the FBI. Although most FBI requests for tax information were for targets of various COINTELPRO operations, the Justice Department official who made the requests on behalf of the Bureau said he was never informed of the existence of COINTELpRo.[420]

Even after 1968, the Bureau sometimes used tax information in improper or unlawful ways. For example, the Bureau attempted to use such information to cause IRS to audit a midwestern college professor associated with "new left" activities at the time he was planning to attend the 1968 Democratic Party National Convention in Chicago. The FBI agent in charge of the operation against the professor explained its purpose in a memorandum:

if IRS contact with [the Professor] can be arranged within the next two weeks their demands upon him may be a source of distraction during the critical period when he is engaged in meetings and plans for disruption of the Democratic National Convention. Any drain upon the time and concentration which [the Professor], a leading figure in Demcon planning, can bring to bear upon this activity can only accrue to the benefit of the Government and general public.[421]

Among the tax returns which the CIA obtained informally from IRS in an informal and illegal manner were those of the author of a book, the publication of which the CIA sought to prevent,[422] and of Ramparts magazine which had exposed the CIA's covert use of the National Student Association.[423] In the latter case, CIA memoranda indicate that its officials were unwilling to risk a formal request for tax information without first learning through informal disclosure whether the tax returns contained any information that would be helpful in their effort to deter this "attack on the CIA" and on "the administration in general."[424]

(2) The Special Service Staff. -- IRS Targeting of Ideological Groups. -- In 1969, the IRS established a Special Service Staff to gather intelligence on a category of taxpayers defined essentially by political criteria. The SSS attempted to develop tax cases against the targeted taxpayers and initiated tax fraud investigations against some who would otherwise never have been investigated.

The SSS originated as a result of pressure from the permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations[425] and from President Nixon, acting through White House assistants Tom Charles Huston and Dr- Arthur Burns.[426] According to the IRS Commissioner's memorandum, Dr. Burns expressed to him the President's concern

over the fact that tax-exempt funds may be supporting activist groups engaged in stimulating riots both on the campus and within our inner cities.[427]

The administration did not supply any facts to support the assertion that such groups were violating tax laws.

After the SSS was established, the FBI and the Justice Department's Inter di visional Information Unit (IDIU) became its largest sources of names. An Assistant IRS Commissioner requested the FBI to provide information regarding "various organizations of predominantly dissident or extremist nature and/or people prominently identified within those organizations."[428] The FBI agreed, believing, as one intelligence official put it, that SSS would "deal a blow" to "dissident elements."[429]

Among the material received by SSS from the FBI was a list of 2,300 organizations categorized as "Old Left," "New Left," and "Right Wing."[430] The SSS also received about 10,000 names on IDIU computer printouts.[431] SSS opened files on all these taxpayers, many of whom were later subjected to tax audits and some to tax fraud investigations. There is no reason to believe that the names listed by the FBI or the IDIU were selected on the basis of any probable noncompliance with the tax laws. Rather, these groups and individuals were targeted because of their political and ideological beliefs and activities.[432]

The SSS, by the time it was disbanded in 1973, had gone over approximately half of the IDIU index and established files on those individuals on whom it had no file. Names on the SSS list included Nobel Prize winner Linus Pauling, Senators Charles Goodell and Ernest Gruening, Congressman Charles Diggs, journalists Joseph Alsop and Jimmy Breslin. and attorney Mitchell Rogovin. Organizations on the SSS list included: political groups ranging from the John Birch Society to Common Cause; religious organizations such as the B'nai Brith Antidefamation League and the Associated Catholic Charities; professional associations such as the American Law Institute and the Legal Aid Society; private foundations such as the Carnegie Foundation; publications ranging from "Playboy" to "Commonwealth;" and government institutions including the United States Civil Rights Commission.[433]

SSS officials have conceded that some cases referred to the field for tax investigations would not have qualified for referral but for the ideological category in which they fell. While IRS field offices closed out many cases because, of the lack of tax grounds upon which legal action could be taken, referral from the SSS probably resulted in the examination of some cases despite the lack of adequate grounds. Interviews with IRS field personnel confirm that this did occur in several instances.[433]

Upon discovering that its functions were not tax-related, new IRS Commissioner Alexander ordered the Special Service Staff abolished. He testified:

Mr. ALEXANDER. I ordered the Special Service staff abolished. That order was given on August the 9th, 1973. It was implemented by manual supplements issued on August the 13th, 1973. We held the files. I ordered the files be held intact -- I'm not going to give any negative assurances to this Committee -- in order that this Committee and other Committees could review these files to see what, was in them, and see, what sort of information was supplied to us on this more than 11,000 individuals and organizations as to whom and which files were maintained.

I suggested, Mr. Chairman, that at the end of all of these inquiries, I would like to take those files to the Ellipse and have the biggest bonfire since 1814.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I concur in that judgment. I would only say this to you; in a way, it might be a more important bonfire than the Boston Tea Party when it comes to protecting individual rights of American citizens. I am glad you feel that way. I am glad you took that action.[434]

5. Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Dissent

In the late 1960's, CIA and NSA, acting in response to presidential pressure, turned their technological capacity and great resources toward spying on certain Americans. The initial impetus was to determine whether the antiwar movement -- and to a lesser extent the "black power" movement -- were controlled by foreigners. Despite evidence that there was no significant foreign influence, the intelligence gathering which culminated in CIA's "Operation CHAOS" followed the general pattern of broadening in scope and intensity. The procedure for one aspect of these programs was established by an informal agreement between the CIA and FBI in 1966, which permitted CIA to engage in "internal security" activities in the United States.

a. Origins of CIA Involvement in "Internal Security Functions"

The National Security Act of 1947 explicitly prohibited the CIA from exercising "police, subpoena, or law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions." But the Act did not address the question of the CIA's authority to conduct clandestine intelligence activity within the United States for what Secretary Forrestal called "purposes outside of this country."[435]

Under Director Hoover, the FBI interpreted the term "internal security functions" broadly to encompass almost "anything that CIA might be doing in the United States."[436] Throughout the 1950's and into the early 1960's, Director Hoover's position led to jurisdictional conflicts between the CIA and the FBI.

The Bureau insisted on being informed of the CIA's activity in the United States so that it could be coordinated with the Bureau. As the FBI liaison with the CIA in that period recalled, "CIA would take action, it would come to our attention and we would have a flap."[437]

In 1966 the FBI and CIA negotiated an informal agreement to regularize their coordination. This agreement was said to have "led to a great improvement" and almost eliminated the "flaps."[438]

Under the agreement, the CIA would "seek concurrence and coordination of the FBI" before engaging in clandestine activity in the United States and the FBI would "concur and coordinate if the proposed action does not conflict with any operation, current or planned, including active investigation of the FBI."[439] When an operative recruited by the CIA abroad arrived in the United States, the FBI would "be advised" and the two agencies would "confer regarding the handling of the agent in the United States." The CIA would continue its "handling" of the agent for "foreign intelligence" purposes. The FBI would also become involved where there were "internal security factors," although it was recognized that the CIA might continue to "handle" the agent in the United States and provide the Bureau with "information" bearing on "internal security matters."[440]

As part of their handling of "internal security factors," CIA operatives were used after 1966 to report on domestic "dissidents" for the FBI. There were infrequent instances in which, according to the former FBI liaison with CIA:

CIA had penetrations abroad in radical, revolutionary organizations and the individual was coming here to attend a conference, a meeting, and would be associating with leading dissidents, and the question came up, can he be of any use to us, can we have access to him during that period.

In most instances, because he was here for a relatively short period, we would levy the requirement or the request upon the CIA to find out what was taking place at the meetings to get his assessment of the individuals that he was meeting, and any other general intelligence that he could collect from his associations with the people who were of interest to us.[441]

The policies embodied in the 1966 agreement and the practice under 'it clearly involved the CIA in the performance of "internal security functions." At no time did the Executive branch ask Congress to amend the 1947 act to modify its ban against CIA exercising "internal security functions." Nor was Congress asked to clarify the ambiguity of the 1947 act about the CIA's authority to conduct clandestine foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities within the United States, a matter dealt with even today by Executive Order.[442]

Moreover, National Security Council Intelligence Directive 5 provided authority within the Executive Branch for the Director of Central Intelligence to coordinate, and for the CIA to conduct, counterintelligence activities abroad to protect the United States against not only espionage and sabotage, but also "subversion."[443] However, NSCID 5 did not purport to give the CIA authority for counterintelligence activities in the United States, as provided in the FBI-CIA agreement of 1966.

b. CIA Intelligence About Domestic Political Groups

In the late 1960s, the CIA increasingly was drawn into collecting intelligence about domestic political groups, particularly the anti-war movement, in response to FBI requests and to pressure from Presidents Johnson and Nixon. A principal assistant to President Johnson testified that high governmental officials could not believe that

a cause that is so clearly right for the country, as they perceive it, would be so widely attacked if there were not some [foreign] force behind it.[444]

The same pressures and beliefs led to CIA investigations of "militant black nationalists" and radical students.

(1) CIA Response to FBI Requests. -- The FBI was the main channel for mobilizing foreign intelligence resources and techniques against domestic targets. The FBI regularly notified the CIA that it wished coverage of Americans overseas.[444] Indeed, the CIA regarded the mention of a name in any of the thousands of reports sent to it by the FBI as a standing requirement from the FBI for information about those persons.[445] FBI reports flowed to the CIA at a rate of over 1,000 a month.[446] From 1967 to 1974, the CIA responded with over 5,000 reports to the FBI. These CIA disseminations included some reports of information acquired by the CIA in the course of its own operations, not sought in response to a specific FBI request.[447]

The FBI's broad approach to the investigations of foreign influence which it coordinated with the CIA is shown by a memorandum prepared in the Intelligence Division early in 1969 summarizing its "Coverage of the New Left:"

Foreign influence of the New Left movement offers us a fertile field to develop valuable intelligence data. To date there is no real cohesiveness between international New Left groups, but ... despite the factionalism and confusion now so prevalent, there is great potential for the development of an international student revolutionary movement. [Emphasis added.]

The memorandum expressed concern that "old line" leftist groups were

... making a determined effort to move into the New Left movement ... [and were] influencing the thinking of the against the police in general and the FBI in particular, to drive us off the campuses; as well as attacks against the new administration to degrade President Nixon.[448]

There was no mention of, or apparent concern for, direct influence or control of the "New Left" by agents of hostile foreign powers. Instead, the stress was almost entirely upon ideological links and similarities, and the threat of ideas considered dangerous by the FBI.

The enlistment of both CIA and NSA resources in domestic intelligence is illustrated by the "Black Nationalist" investigations. In 1967, FBI Headquarters instructed field offices that:

. . . penetrative investigations should be initiated at this time looking toward developing any information regarding contacts on the part of these individuals with foreign elements and looking toward developing any additional information having a bearing upon whether the individual involved is currently subjected to foreign influence or direction. . . .

During your investigative coverage of all militant black nationalists, be most alert to any foreign travel. Advise the Bureau promptly of such in order that appropriate overseas investigations may be conducted to establish activities and contacts abroad. [Emphasis added.][449]

The FBI passed such information to the CIA, which in turn began to place individual black nationalists on a "watch list" for the interception of international communications by the National Security Agency. After 1969, the FBI began submitting names of citizens engaged in domestic protest and violence to the CIA not only for investigation abroad, but also for placement on the "watch list" of the CIA's mail opening project. Similar lists of names went from the FBI to the National Security Agency, for use on a "watch list" for monitoring other channels of international communication.

(2) Operation CHAOS. -- The CIA did not restrict itself to servicing the FBI's requests. Under White House pressure, the CIA developed its own program -- Operation CHAOS -as an adjunct to the CIA's foreign counterintelligence activities, although CIA officials recognized from the outset that it bad "definite domestic counterintelligence aspects."[450]

Former CIA Director Richard Helms testified that he established the program in response to President Johnson's persistent interest in the extent of foreign influence on domestic dissidents. According to Helms, the President would repeatedly ask, "How are you getting along with your examination?" and "Have you picked up any more information on this subject?"[451]

The first CHAOS instructions to CIA station chiefs in August 1967 described the need for "keeping tabs on radical students and U.S. Negro expatriates as well as travelers passing through certain select areas abroad." The originally stated objective was "to find out [the] extent to which Soviets, Chicoms (Chinese Communists) and Cubans are exploiting our domestic problems in terms of espionage and subversion."[452]

Following the consistent pattern of intelligence activities, those original instructions gradually broadened without any precision in the kind of foreign contacts which were to be targeted by CIA operations. For example:

--President Johnson asked the CIA to conduct a study of "International Connections of the U.S. Peace Movement" following the October 1967 demonstration at the Pentagon.[453] In response, CIA headquarters sent a directive to CIA stations seeking information on "illegal and subversive" connections between U.S. activists and "communist, communist front, or other anti-American and foreign elements abroad. Such connections might range from casual contacts based merely on mutual interest to closely controlled channels for party directives." [Emphasis added.] [454]

--In mid-1968, the DDP described CHAOS to CIA stations as a "high priority program" concerning foreign "contacts" with the "Radical Left," which was defined as: "radical students, antiwar activists, draft resisters and deserters, black nationalists, anarchists, and assorted 'New Leftists.'"[455]

--In 1969, President Nixon's White House required the CIA to study foreign communist support of American protest groups and stressed that "support" should be "liberally construed" to include "encouragement" by Communist countries.[456]

--In the fall of 1969, CIA stations were asked to report on any foreign support, guidance, or "inspiration" to protest activities in the United States.[457]

Thus, this attempt to ascertain and evaluate "foreign links', was so broadly defined that it required much more than background information or investigation of a few individuals suspected of being agents directed by a hostile power. Instead, at a time when there was considerable international communication and travel by Americans engaged in protest and dissent, a substantial segment by American protest groups was encompassed by CIA collection requirements to investigate foreign "encouragement," "inspiration," "casual contacts" or "mutual interest." Once again, the use of elastic words in mandates for intelligence activity resulted in overbroad coverage and collection.

In addition to their intelligence activity directed at Americans abroad, CHAOS undercover agents, while in the United States in preparation for overseas assignment or between assignments, provided substantial information about lawful domestic activities of dissident American groups, as well as providing leads about possible foreign activities.[458] In a few instances, the CIA agents appear to have been encouraged to participate in specific protest activity or to obtain particular domestic information.[459] The CHAOS program also involved obtain inforination about Americans from the CIA mail opening project other domestic CIA components[460] and from a National Security Agency international communications intercept program.[461]

CIA officials recognized that the CIAs examination of domestic groups violated the Agency's mandate and thus accorded it a high degree of sensitivity. As CIA Director Richard Helms wrote in 1969, when he transmitted to the White House the CIA's study of "Restless Youth:"

In an effort to round out our discussion of this subject, we have included a section on American students. This is an area not within the charter of this Agency, so I need not emphasize how extremely sensitive this makes the paper. Should anyone learn of its existence, it would prove most embarrassing for all concerned.[462]

The reaction to such admissions of illegality was neither an instruction to stop the program or an attempt to change the Iaw. Rather, the White House continued to ask for more information and continued to urge the CIA to confirm the theory that American dissidents were under foreign control.[463]

Director Richard Helms testified that the only manner in which the CIA could support its conclusion that there was no significant foreign influence on the domestic dissent, in the face of incredulity at the White House, was to continually expand the coverage of CHAOS. Only by being able to demonstrate that it had investigated all anti-war persons and all contacts between them and any foreign person could CIA "prove the negative" that none were under foreign domination.[464]

In 1972, the CIA Inspector General found "general concern" among the overseas stations "over what appeared to constitute a monitoring of the political views and activities of Americans not known to be, or suspected of, being involved in espionage." Several stations had "doubts as to the nature and legitimacy of the program" because requests for reports on "prominent persons" were based on "nebulous" allegations of "subversion."[465] This led to "a reduction in the intensity of attention to political dissidents,"[466] although the program was not terminated until March 1974.[467]

By the end of the CHAOS program, 13,000 different files were accumulated, including more than 7,200 on American citizens. Documents in these files included the names of more than 300,000 persons and groups indexed by computer.[468] In addition to collecting information on an excessive number of persons, some of the kinds of information were wholly irrelevant to the legitimate interests of the CIA or any other government agency. For example, one CIA agent supplying information on domestic activities to Operation CHAOS submitted detailed accounts of the activities of women who were interested in "women's liberation."[469]

c. CIA Security Operations Within the United States: Protecting "Sources" and "Methods"

The National Security Act of 1947 granted the Director of Central Intelligence a vaguely- worded responsibility for "protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."[470] The legislative history of this provision suggests that it was initially intended to allay concerns of the military services that the new CIA would not operate with adequate safeguards to protect the military intelligence secrets which would be shared with the CIA.[471] However, this authority was later read by the CIA to authorize infiltration of domestic groups in order to protect CIA personnel and facilities from possibly violent public demonstrations. It was also read to permit electronic surveillance and surreptitious entry to protect sensitive information.

The CIA undertook a series of specific security investigations within the United States, in some cases to find the, source of news leaks and in others to determine whether government employees were involved in espionage or otherwise constituted "security risks." These investigations were directed at former CIA employees, employees of other government agencies, newsmen and other private, citizens in this country.[472] Among the techniques used were physical surveillance, mail and tax information coverage, electronic surveillance, and surreptitious entry. Attorney General Robert Kennedy appears to have authorized CIA wiretapping in one of these investigations. With this exception, however, there is no suggestion that the CIA's security investigations were specifically approved by the Attorney General.[473]

The CIA Office of Security established two programs directed at protest demonstrations which involved the CIA in domestic affairs on the theory that doing so was necessary to safeguard CIA facilities in the United States.[474] Project MERRIMACK (1967 to 1973) involved the infiltration by CIA agents of Washington-based peace groups and Black activist groups. The stated purpose of the program was to obtain early warning of demonstrations and other physical threats to the CIA. However, the collection requirements were broadened to include general information about the leadership, funding, activities, and policies of the targeted groups.

Project RESISTANCE (1967 to 1973) was a broad effort to obtain general background information about radical groups across the country, particularly on campuses. The CIA justified this program as a means of predicting violence which might threaten CIA installations, recruiters, or contractors, and gathering information with which to evaluate applicants for CIA employment. Much of the reporting by CIA field offices to headquarters was from open sources such as newspapers. But additional information was obtained from cooperating police departments, campus officials, and other local authorities, some of whom in turn were using collection techniques such as informants.

These programs illustrated fundamental weaknesses and contradictions in the statutory definition of CIA authority in the 1947 Act. While the Director of Central Intelligence is charged with responsibility to protect intelligence "sources and methods," the CIA is forbidden from exercising law enforcement and police powers and "internal security functions." The CIA never went to Congress for a clarification of this ambiguity, nor did it seek interpretation from the chief legal officer of the United States -- the Attorney General - - except on the rarest of occasions.[477]

d. NSA Monitoring

The National Security Agency was created by Executive Order in 1952 to conduct "signals intelligence," including the interception and analysis of messages transmitted by electronic means, such as telephone calls and telegrams.[478] In contrast to the CIA, there has never been a statutory "charter" for NSA.

The executive directives which authorize NSA's activities prohibit the agency from monitoring communication between persons within the United States and communication concerning purely domestic affairs. The current NSA Director testified:

[The] mission of NSA is directed to foreign intelligence obtained from foreign electrical communications . . . .[479]

However, NSA has interpreted "foreign communications" to include communication where one terminal is outside the United States. Under this interpretation, NSA has, for many years, intercepted communications between the United States and a foreign country even though the sender or receiver was an American. During the past decade, NSA increasingly broadened its interpretation of "foreign intelligence" to include economic and financial matters and "international terrorism."[480]

The overall consequence, as in the case of CIA activities such as Project CHAOS, was to break down the distinction between "foreign" and "domestic" intelligence. For example, in the 1960s, NSA began adding to its "watch lists," at the request of various intelligence agencies, the names of Americans suspected of involvement in civil disturbance or drug activity which had some foreign aspects. Second, Operation Shamrock, which began as an effort to acquire the telegrams of certain foreign targets, expanded so that NSA obtained from at least two cable companies essentially all cables to or from the United States, including millions of the private communications of Americans.

6. Intrusive Techniques

As domestic intelligence activity increasingly broadened to cover domestic dissenters under many different programs, the government intensified the use of covert techniques which intruded upon individual privacy.

Informants were used to gather more information about more Americans, often targeting an individual because of his political views and "regardless of past or present involvement in disorders."[481][482][483] The CIA's mail opening program increasingly focused upon domestic groups, including "protest and peace organizations" which were covered at the FBI's request.[484] Similarly, NSA-largely in response to Army, CIA, and FBI pressures -expanded its international interception program to include "information on U.S. organizations or individuals who are engaged in activities which may result in civil disturbances or otherwise subvert the national security of the United States."[485]

During this period, Director Hoover ordered cutbacks on the FBI's use of a number of intrusive techniques. Frustration with Hoover's cutbacks was a substantial contributing factor to the effort in 1970 -- coordinated by White House Aide Tom Charles Huston and strongly supported by CIA Director Helms, NSA Director Gaylor and Hoover's Intelligence Division subordinates -- to obtain Presidential authorization for numerous illegal or questionable intelligence techniques.

a. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance

(1) Executive Branch Restrictions on Electronic Surveillance: 1965-1968 -- In March 1965, Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach established a new requirement for the FBI's intelligence operations: the Bureau had to obtain the written approval of the Attorney General prior to the implementation of an microphone surveillance. He also imposed a six month limitation on both wiretaps and microphone surveillances, after which time new requests had to be submitted for the Attorney General's re-authorization.[486]

Upon Katzenbach's recommendation, President Johnson issued a directive in June 1965 forbidding all federal government wiretapping "except in conjunction with investigations related to national security."[487] This standard was reiterated by Attorney General Katzenbach, for both wiretapping and microphone surveillances three months later, and again in July 1966.[487]

While the procedures were tightened, the broad "national security" standard still allowed for questionable authorizations of electronic surveillance. In fact, Katzenbach told Director Hoover that he would "continue to approve all such requests in the future as I have in the past." He saw "no need to curtail any such activities in the national security field."[488]

In line with that policy, Katzenbach approved FBI requests for wiretaps on the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee,[489] Students for a Democratic Society,[490] the editor of an anti-communist newsletter,[491] a Washington attorney with whom the editor was in frequent contact,[492] a Klan official,[493] and a leader of the black Revolutionary Action Movement.[494] According to FBI records, Katzenbach also initialed three memoranda informing him of microphone surveillances of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.[495]

There were no similar electronic surveillance authorizations by Attorney General Ramsey

Clark in cases involving purely domestic "national security" considerations.[496] Clark has stated that his policy was "to confine the area of approval to international activities directly related to the military security of the United States.[497]

(2) Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968. -- In response to a 1967 Supreme Court decision that required judicial warrants for the use of electronic surveillance in criminal cases,[498] Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968. This Act established warrant procedures for wiretapping and microphone surveillances, but it included a provision that neither it nor the Federal Communications Act of 1934 "shall limit the constitutional power of the President."[499] Although Congress did not purport to define the President's power,[500] the Act suggested five broad categories in which warrantless electronic surveillance might be permitted. The first three categories related to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence matters:

(1) to protect the nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power;

(2) to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States; and

(3) to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.

The last two categories dealt with domestic intelligence interests:

(4) to protect the United States against overthrow of the government by force or other unlawful means, or

(5) against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the government.

Thus, although Congress suggested criteria for warrantless electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes, it left to the courts the task of defining the scope of the national security exception, if any, to the warrant requirement.

Between 1969 and 1972, the Nixon administration used these criteria to justify a number of questionable wiretaps. One New Left organization was tapped because, among other factors, its members desired to "take the radical politics they learned on campus and spread them among factory workers."[501] Four newsmen were wiretapped or bugged during this period, as were sixteen executive branch officials, one former executive official, and a relative of an executive official."[502] There were numerous wiretaps and some microphones used against the Black Panther Party and similar domestic groups.[503] Attorney Gen John Mitchell approved FBI requests for wiretaps on organizations involved in planning the November 1969 antiwar "March on Washington" including the moderate Vietnam Moratorium Committee.[503]

(a) Supreme Court Restrictions on National Security Electronic Surveillance: 1972. -- The issue of national security electronic surveillance was not addressed by the Supreme Court until 1972, when it held in the so-called Keith case that the President did not have the "constitutional power" to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance to protect the

security of the nation from "domestic" threats.[504] The Court remained silent, however, on the legality of warrantless electronic surveillance where there was a 'significant connection with a foreign power, its agents or agencies."[505] As a result of this decision, the Justice Department eliminated as criteria for the use of warrantless electronic surveillance the two categories, described by Congress in the 1968 Act, dealing with domestic intelligence interests.[506]

b. CIA Mail Opening

Although Director Hoover terminated the FBI's own mail opening programs in 1966, the Bureau's use of the CIA program continued. In 1969, uopn the recommendation of the official in charge of the CIA's CHAOS program, the FBI began submitting names of domestic political radicals and black militants to the CIA for inclusion on its mail opening "Watch List."[507] By 1972, the FBIs list of targets for CIA mail opening included:

New Left activists, extremists, and other subversives.

Extremist and New Left organizations.

Protest and peace organizations, such as People's Coalition for Peace and Justice National Peace Action Committee, and Women's Strike for Peace.

Subversive and extremist groups, such as the Black Panthers, White Panthers, Black Nationalists and Liberation Groups, Students for a Democratic Society, Resist, Revolutionary Union, and other New Left Groups.

Traffic to and from Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands showing anti-U.S. or subversive sympathies.[508]

Thus, the mail opening program that began fourteen years earlier as a means of discovering hostile intelligence efforts in the United States had expanded to encompass communications of domestic dissidents of all types.

c. Expansion of NSA Monitoring

Although NSA began to intercept and disseminate the communications of selected Americans in the early 1960s, the systematic inclusion of a wide range of American names on the "Watch List" did not occur until 1967.

The Army Chief of Staff for Intelligence requested "any information on a continuing basis" that NSA might intercept concerning:

A. Indications that foreign governments or individuals or organizations acting as agents of foreign governments are controlling or attempting to control or influence the activities of U.S. "peace" groups and "Black Power" organizations.

B. Identities of foreign agencies exerting control or influence on U.S. organizations.

C. Identities of individuals and organizations in U.S. in contact with agents of foreign governments.

D. Instructions or advice being given to U.S. groups by agents of foreign governments.[509]

Two years later, NSA issued an internal instruction intended to ensure the secrecy of the fact that it was monitoring and disseminating communications to and from Americans.[510] This memorandum described the "Watch List" program in terms which indicated that it had widened beyond its originally broad mandate. In addition to describing the program as covering foreigners who "are attempting" to "influence, coordinate or control" U.S. groups or individuals who "may foment civil disturbance or otherwise undermine the national security of the U.S.," the memorandum indicated that the program intercepted communications dealing with:

Information on U.S. organizations or individuals who are engaged in activities which may result in civil disturbances or otherwise subvert the national security of the U.S.[511]

This standard, which was clearly outside the foreign intelligence mandate of NSA, resulted in sweeping coverage. Communications such as the following were intercepted, disseminated. and stored in Government files: discussion of a peace concert, the interest of the wife of a U.S. Senator in peace causes; a correspondent's report from Southeast Asia to his magazine in New York; an anti-war activist's request for a speaker in New York.

According to testimony before the Committee, the material which resulted from the "Watch List" was of little intelligence value; most intercepted communications were of a private or personal nature or involved rallies and demonstrations that werepublic knowledge.[512]

d. FBI Cutbacks

The reasons for J. Edgar Hoover's cutback in 1966 on FBI use of several covert techniques are not clear. Hoover's former assistants have cited widely divergent factors.

Certainly by the mid-1960s, Hoover was highly sensitive to the possibility of damage to the FBI from public exposure of its most intrusive intelligence techniques. This sensitivity was reflected in a memorandum to Attorney General Katzenbach in September 1965, where Hoover referred to "the present atmosphere" of "Congressional and public alarm and opposition to any activity which could in any way be termed an invasion of privacy."[513] The FBI Director was particularly concerned about an inquiry by the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee chaired by Senator Edward Long.

(1) The Long Subcommittee Investigation. -- The Senate Subcommittee was primarily investigating electronic surveillance and mail cover. The Bureau was seen as a major subject of the inquiry, although the Internal Revenue Service and other Executive agencies also included.

In February 1965, President Johnson asked Attorney General Katzenbach to coordinate all matters relating to the investigation, and Katzenbach then met with senior FBI officials to discuss the problems it raised.[514][515] According to a memorandum by A. H. Belmont, one of the FBI Director's principal assistants, Katzenbach stated that he planned to see Senator Edward Long, the Subcommittee chairman, for the purpose of "impressing on him that the committee would not want to stumble by mistake into an area of extreme interest to the national security." According to Belmont, the Attorney General added that he "might have to resort to pressure from the President" and that he did not want the Subcommittee to "undermine the restricted and tightly controlled operations of the Bureau." FBI officials had assured Katzenbach that their activities were, indeed "tightly controlled" and restricted to "important security matters."[516]

The following note on the memorandum of this meeting provides a sign of Director Hoover's attitude at that time:

I don't see what all the excitement is about. I would have no hesitancy in discontinuing all techniques -- technical coverage, microphones, trash covers, mail covers, etc. While it might handicap us I doubt they are as valuable as some believe and none warrant the FBI being used to justify them.[517]

Several days later, according to a memorandum of the FBI Director, the Attorney General "advised that he had talked to Senator Long," and that the Senator "said he did not want to get into any national security area."[518] Katzenbach has confirmed that he "would have been concerned" in these circumstances about the Subcommittee's demands for information about "matters of a national security nature" and that he was "declining to provide such information" to Long.[519]

Again in 1966, the FBI took steps to, in the words of Bureau official Cartha DeLoach, "neutralize" the "threat of being embarrassed by the Long Subcommittee."[520] This time the issue involved warrantless electronic surveillance by the FBI, particularly in organized crime matters. DeLoach and another ranking Bureau official visited Senator Long to urge that he issue a statement that "the FBI had never participated in uncontrolled usage of wiretaps or microphones and that FBI usage of such devices had been completely justified in all instances."[521] The Bureau prepared such a statement for Senator Long to release as his own, which apparently was not used.[522] At another meeting with DeLoach, Senator Long agreed to make "a commitment that he would in no way embarrass the FBI." When the Subcommittee's Chief Counsel asked if a Bureau spokesman could appear and "make a simple statement," DeLoach replied that this would "open a Pandora's box, in so far as our enemies in the press were concerned." Senator Long then stated that he would call no FBI witnesses.[523]

(2) Director Hoover's Restriction. -- The Director subsequently issued instructions that the number of warrantless wiretaps installed at any one time be cut in half. One of his subordinates speculated that this was done out of a concern that the Subcommittee's "inquiry might get into the use of that technique by the FBI."[524]

In July 1966, after hundreds of FBI "black bag job" operations had been approved over many years, Director Hoover decided to eliminate warrantless surreptitious entries for purposes other than microphone installations.[525] In response to an Intelligence Division analysis that such break-ins were an "invaluable technique," although "clearly illegal," Hoover stated that "no more such techniques must be used."[526] Bureau subordinates took Hoover's "no more such techniques" language as an injunction against the Bureau's mail opening program as well.[527] Apparently, a termination order was issued to field offices by telephone. FBI mail-opening was suspended, although the Bureau continued to seek information from CIA's illegal mail-opening program until its suspension in 1973.

A year and a half before Hoover's cutbacks on wire-tapping, "black bag jobs," and mailopening, he prohibited the FBI's use of other covert techniques such as mail covers and trash covers.[528]

FBI intelligence officials persisted in requesting authority for "black bag" techniques. In 1967 Director Hoover ordered that "no such recommendations should be submitted."[529] At about this time, Attorney General Ramsey Clark was asked to approve a "breaking and entering" operation and declined to do so.[530] There was an apparently unauthorized surreptitious entry directed at a "domestic subversive target as late as April, 1968.[531] A proposal from the field to resume mail opening for foreign counterintelligence purposes was turned down by FBI officials in 1970.[532]

7. Accountability and Control

a. The Huston Plan: A Domestic Intelligence Network

In 1970, pressures from the White House and from within the intelligence community led to the formulation of a plan for coordination and expansion of domestic intelligence activity. The so-called "Huston Plan" called for Presidential authorization of illegal intelligence techniques, expanded domestic intelligence collection, and centralized evaluation of domestic intelligence. President Nixon approved the plan and then, five days later, revoked his approval. Despite the revocation of official approval, many major aspects of the plan were implemented, and some techniques which the intelligence community asked for permission to implement had already been underway.

In 1970, there was an intensification of the social tension in America that had provided the impetus in the 1960s for ever-widening domestic intelligence operations. The spring invasion of Cambodia by United States forces triggered the most extensive campus demonstrations and student "strikes" in the history of the war in Southeast Asia. Domestic strife heightened even further when four students were killed by National Guardsmen at Kent State University. Within one twenty-four hour period, there were 400 bomb threats in New York City alone. To respond, White House Chief of Staff, H. R. Haldeman, assigned principal responsibility for domestic intelligence planning to staff assistant Tom Charles Huston.[533]

Since June 1969, Huston had been in touch with the head of the FBI Domestic Intelligence Division, Assistant Director William C. Sullivan. Huston initially contacted Sullivan on President Nixon's behalf to request "all information possibly relating to foreign influences and financing of the New Left."[534] Huston also made similar requests to CIA, NSA, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The quality of the data provided by these agencies, especially the FBI, had failed to satisfy Huston and Presidential assistant John Ehrlichman.[535] Thereafter, Huston's continued discussions with Assistant Director Sullivan convinced him that the restraints imposed upon domestic intelligence techniques by Director Hoover impeded the collection of important information about dissident activity.[536]

(1) Intelligence Community Pressures. -- The interest of the White House in better intelligence about domestic protest activity coincided with growing dissatisfaction among the foreign intelligence agencies with the FBI Director's restrictions on their performance of foreign intelligence functions in America.[537]

The CIA's concerns crystallized in March 1970 when -- as a result of a "flap" over the CIA's refusal to disclose information to the FBI -- Hoover issued an order that "direct liaison" at FBI headquarters with CIA "be terminated" and that "any contact with CIA in the future" was to take place "by letter only."[538] This order did not bar interagency communication; secure telephones were installed and working-level contacts continued. But the position of FBI "liaison agent" with CIA was eliminated.[539]

CIA Director Helms subsequently attempted to reopen the question of FBI cooperation with CIA requests for installing electronic surveillances and covering mail.[540] Hoover replied that he agreed with Helms that there should be, expanded "exchange of information between our agencies concerning New Left and racial extremist matters." However, he refused the request for aid with electronic surveillance and mail coverage. Hoover cited the "widespread concern by the American public regarding the possible misuse of this type of coverage." Their use, in "domestic investigations" posed legal problems not encountered "in similar operations abroad." Hoover added, "The FBI's effectiveness has always depended in large measure on our capacity to retain the full confidence of the American people."[541]

(2) The Interagency Committee Report. -- In the following months, Tom Charles Huston arranged a meeting between President Nixon and the directors of the FBI, CIA, NSA, and DIA on June 5, 1970.[542] The President's emphasis was upon improved coordination among the agencies to strengthen their capabilities to collect intelligence about "revolutionary activism" and "the support -- ideological and otherwise -- of foreign powers" for these activities. The talking paper prepared by Huston for the President to read at the meeting declared, "We are now confronted with a new and grave crisis in our country -which we know too little about."[543]

From this meeting emanated the Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), prepared jointly by representatives of the FBI, CIA, NSA, and DIA, and submitted to the President a month later.[544] The report presented the President a series of options, and Huston recommended that the President approve the following:

(1) "coverage by NSA of the communications of U.S. citizens using international facilities;"

(2) "intensification" of "electronic surveillances and penetrations" directed at individuals and groups "who pose a major threat to the internal security" and at "foreign nationals" in the United States "of interest to the intelligence community;"

(3) removal of restrictions on "legal" mail coverage and relaxation of "restrictions on covert coverage" [mail opening] on "selected targets of priority foreign intelligence and internal security interest;"

(4) modification of "present restrictions" on "surreptitious entry" to allow "procurement of vitally needed foreign cryptographic material" and "to permit selective use" against "high priority internal security targets;"

(5) relaxation of "present restrictions" on the "development of campus sources" to permit "expanded coverage of violence-prone and student-related groups;'

(6) "increased" coverage by CIA "of American students (and others) traveling or living abroad;"

(7) appointment of a "permanent committee consisting of the FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies" to evaluate "domestic intelligence" and to carry out the other objectives specified in the report."[545]

Huston also raised and dismissed questions about the legality of two collection techniques in particular. "Covert [mail opening] coverage is illegal, and there are serious risks involved," he wrote. "However, the advantages to be derived from its use outweigh the risks."[546] As for surreptitious entry, Huston advised:

Use of this technique is clearly illegal: it amounts to burglary. It is also highly risky and could result in great embarrassment if exposed. However, it is also the most fruitful tool and can produce the type of intelligence which cannot be obtained in any other fashion."[547]

Huston testified that his recommendations "reflected what I understood to be the consensus of the working group" of intelligence officials on the interagency committee.[548]

Just over a week later, the FBI, CIA, NSA, and DIA were advised by Huston that "the President has ... made the following decisions"to adopt all of Huston's recommendations.[549] Henceforth, with Presidential authority, the intelligence community could intercept the international communications of Americans; eavesdrop electronically on anyone deemed a "threat to the internal security;" read the mail of American citizens; break into the homes of anyone regarded as a security threat; and monitor the activities of student political groups at home and abroad.

There is no indication that the President was informed at this time that NSA was already covering the international communications of Americans and had been doing so for domestic intelligence purposes since at least 1967. Nor is there any indication that he was told that the CIA was opening the mail of Americans and sharing the contents with the FBI and the military for domestic intelligence purposes. In effect, the "Huston plan" supplied Presidential authority for operations previously undertaken in secret without such authorization. For instance, the plan gave FBI Assistant Director Sullivan the "support" from "responsible quarters" which he had believed necessary to resume the "black bag jobs" and mail-opening programs Director Hoover had terminated in 1966.[550]

Nevertheless, the FBI Director was not satisfied with Huston's memorandum concerning the authorization of the plan.[551] Hoover went immediately to Attorney General Mitchell, who had not known of the prior deliberations or the President's "decisions."[552] In a memorandum, Director Hoover said he would implement the plan, but only with the explicit approval of the Attorney General or the President:

Despite my clear-cut and specific opposition to the lifting of the various investigative restraints referred to above and to the creation of a permanent interagency committee on domestic intelligence, the FBI is prepared to implement the instructions of the White House at your direction. Of course, we would continue to seek your specific authorization, where appropriate, to utilize the various sensitive investigative techniques involved in individual cases.[553]

CIA Director Helms shortly thereafter indicated his support for the to the Attorney General, telling him "we had put our backs into exercise."[554] Nonetheless, Mitchell advised the President to withdraw his approval.[555] Huston was told to rescind his memorandum, and the White House Situation Room dispatched a message requesting its return.[556]

(3) Implementation. -- The President's withdrawal of approval for the "Huston plan" did not, in fact, result in the termination of either the NS A program for covering the communications of Americans or the CIA mail-opening program. These programs continued withoutformal authorization which had been hoped for.[557] The directors of the CIA and NSA also continued to explore means of expanding their involvement in, and access to, domestic intelligence.[558] A new group, the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC), was created by Attorney General Mitchell within the Justice Department to consider such expansion.[559] NSA, CIA, Army counterintelligence, and the FBI each sent representatives to the IEC. NSA Director Gayler provided the IEC with a statement of NSA's capabilities and procedures for supplying domestic intelligence.[560] Although the IEC merely evaluated raw intelligence data, over 90 percent of which came to it through the FBI, it had access to domestic intelligence from NSA coverage and the CIA's mail-opening and CHAOS programs, which was channeled to the FBI.[561]

Two of the specific recommendations in the "Huston Plan" were thereafter implemented by the FBI -- the lowering of the age limit for campus informants from 21 to 18 and the resumption of "legal mail covers."[562] Two men who had participated in developing the "Huston Plan" were promoted to positions of greater influence within the Bureau.[563] More important the Bureau greatly intensified its domestic intelligence investigations in the fall of 1970 without using "clearly illegal" techniques. The Key Black Extremist Program was inaugurated and field offices were instructed to open approximately 10,500 new investigations, including investigations of all black student groups "regardless of their present or past involvement in disorders." All members of "militant New Left campus organizations" were also to be investigated even if they were not "known to be violence prone." The objective of these investigations was "to identify potential" as well as "actual extremists."[564]

The chief of the Domestic Intelligence Division in 1970 said the "Huston Plan" had "nothing to do" with the FBI's expanded intelligence activities. Rather, both the "Huston Plan" and the Bureau intensification represented the same effort by FBI intelligence officials "to recommend the types of action and programs which they thought necessary to cope with the problem."[565] Brennan admits that "the FBI was getting a tremendous amount of pressure from the White House," although he attributes this pressure to demands from "a vast majority of the American people" who wanted to know "why something wasn't being done" about violence and disruption in the country.[566]

b. Political Intelligence

The FBI practice of supplying political information to the White House and, on occasion, responding to White House requests for such information was established before 1964. However, under the administrations of President Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, this practice grew to unprecedented dimensions.[567]

(1) Name Check Requests. -- White House aides serving under Presidents Johnson and Nixon made numerous requests for "name checks" of FBI files to elicit all Bureau information on particular critics of each administration. Johnson aides requested such reports on critics of the escalating war in Vietnam.[568] President Johnson's assistants also requested name checks on members of the Senate staff of Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater in 1964,[569] on Justice and Treasury Department officials responsible for a phase of the criminal investigation of Johnson's former aide Bobby Baker,[569] on the authors of books critical of the Warren Commission report,[570] a nd on prominent newsmen.[571] President Nixon's aides asked for similar name checks on another newsman, the Chairman of Americans for Democratic Action, and the producer of a film critical of the President.[572]

According to a memorandum by Director Hoover, Vice President Spiro Agnew received ammunition from Bureau files that could be used in "destroying [the] credibility" of Southern Christian Leadership Conference leader Reverend Ralph Abernathy.[573]

(2) Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, 1964. -- On August 22, 1964, at the request of the White House, the FBI sent a "special squad" to the Democratic National Convention site in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The squad was assigned to assist the Secret Service in protecting President Lyndon Johnson and to ensure that the convention itself would not be marred by civil disruption.

But it went beyond these functions to report political intelligence to the White House. Approximately 30 Special Agents, headed by Assistant Director Cartha DeLoach, "were able to keep the White House fully apprised of all major developments during the Conventions' course" by means of "informant coverage, by use of various confidential techniques, by infiltration of key groups through use of undercover agents, and through utilization of agents using appropriate cover as reporters."[574] Among these "confidential techniques" were: a wiretap on the hotel room occupied by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and microphone surveillance of a storefront serving as headquarters for the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and another civil rights organization.[575]

Neither of the electronic surveillances at Atlantic City were specifically authorized by the Attorney General. At that time, Justice Department procedures did not require the written approval of the Attorney General for bugs such as the one directed against SNCC in Atlantic City. Bureau officials apparently believed that the wiretap on King was justified as an extension of Robert Kennedy's October 10, 1963, approval for surveillance of King at his then-current address in Atlanta, Georgia, or at any future address to which he might move.[576] The only recorded reason for instituting the wiretap on Dr. King in Atlantic City, however, was set forth in an internal memorandum prepared shortly before the Convention:

Martin Luther King, Jr., head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), an organization set up to promote integration which we are investigating to determine the extent of Communist Party (CP) influence on King and the SCLC, plans to attend and possibly may indulge in a hunger fast as a means of protest.[577]

Walter Jenkins, an Administrative Assistant to President Johnson who was the recipient of information developed by the Bureau, stated that he was unaware that any of the intelligence was obtained by wiretapping or bugging.[578] DeLoach, moreover, has testified that he is uncertain whether he ever informed Jenkins of these sources.[579]

Walter Jenkins, and presumably President Johnson, received a significant volume of information from the electronic surveillance at Atlantic City, much of it purely political and only tangentially related to possible civil disturbances. The most important single issue for President Johnson at the Atlantic City Convention was the seating challenge of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party to the regular Mississippi delegation.[580] From the electronic surveillances of King and SNCC, the White House was able to obtain the most intimate details of the plans of individuals supporting the MFDP's challenge unrelated to the possibility of violent demonstrations.

Jenkins received a steady stream of reports on political strategy in the struggle to seat the MFDP delegation and other political plans and discussions by the civil rights groups under surveillance.[581] Moreover, the 1975 Inspection Report stated that "several Congressmen, Senators, and Governors of States" were overheard on the King tap."[582]

According to both Cartha DeLoach and Walter Jenkins, the Bureau's coverage in Atlantic City was not designed to serve political ends. DeLoach testified:

I was sent there to provide information . . . which could reflect on the orderly progress of the convention and the danger to distinguished individuals, and particularly the danger to the President of the United States, as exemplified by the many, many references [to possible civil disturbances] in the memoranda furnished Mr. Jenkins . . . .[583]

Jenkins has stated that the mandate of the FBI's special unit did not encompass the gathering of political intelligence and speculated that the dissemination of any such intelligence was due to the inability of Bureau agents to distinguish dissident activities which represented a genuine potential for violence.[584] Jenkins did not believe the White House ever used the incidental political intelligence that was received. However, a document located at the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library suggests that at least one political use was made of Mr. DeLoach's reports.[585]

Thus, although it may have been implemented to prevent violence at the Convention site, the Bureau's coverage in Atlantic City -- which included two electronic surveillances -undeniably provided useful political intelligence to the President as well.[586]

(3) By-Product of Foreign Intelligence Coverage. -- Through the FBI's coverage of certain foreign officials in Washington, D.C., the Bureau was able to comply with President Johnson's request for reports of the contacts between members of Congress and foreign officials opposed to his Vietnam policy. According to a summary memorandum prepared by the FBI:

On March 14, 1966, then President Lyndon B. Johnson informed Mr. DeLoach [Cartha DeLoach, Assistant Director of the FBI] ... that the FBI should constantly keep abreast of the actions of [certain foreign officials] in making contact with Senators and Congressmen and any citizen of a prominent nature.

The President stated he strongly felt that much of the protest concerning his Vietnam policy, particularly the hearings in the Senate, had been generated by [certain foreign officials].[587]

As a result of the President's request, the FBI prepared a chronological summary -- apparently based in part on existing electronic surveillances of the contacts of each Senator, Representative, or legislative staff member who communicated with selected foreign officials during the period July 1, 1964, to March 17, 1966. This 67-page summary was transmitted to the White House on March 21, 1966, with a note that certain foreign officials were "making more contacts" with four named Senators "than with other United States legislators."[588] A second summary, prepared on further contacts between Congressmen and foreign officials, was transmitted to the White House on May 13, 1966. From then until the end of the Johnson Administration in January 1969, biweekly additions to the second summary were regularly disseminated to the White House.[589]

This practice was reinstituted during the Nixon Administration. On July 27, 1970, Larry Higby, Assistant to H. R. Haldeman, informed the Bureau that Haldeman "wanted any information possessed by the FBI relating to contacts between [certain foreign officials] and Members of Congress and its staff." Two days later, the Bureau provided the White House with a statistical compilation of such contacts from January 1, 1967, to the present. Unlike the case of the information provided to the Johnson White House, however, there is no indication in related Bureau records that President Nixon or his aides were concerned about critics of the President's policy. The Bureau's reports did not identify individual Senators; they provided overall statistics and two examples of foreign recruitment attempts (with names removed.[590]

In at least one instance the FBI, at the request of the President and with the approval of the Attorney General, instituted an electronic surveillance of a foreign target for the express purpose of intercepting telephone conversations of an American citizen. An FBI memorandum states that shortly before the 1968 Presidential election, President Johnson became suspicious that the South Vietnamese were trying to sabotage his peace negotiations in the hope that Presidential candidate Nixon would win the election and then take a harder line toward North Vietnam. To determine the validity of this suspicion, the White House instructed the FBI to institute physical surveillance of Mrs. Anna Chennault, a prominent Republican, as well as electronic surveillance directed against a South Vietnamese target.[591]

The electronic surveillance was authorized by Attorney General Ramsey Clark on October 29, 1968, installed the same day, and continued until January 6, 1969.[592] Thus, a "foreign" electronic surveillance was instituted to target indirectly an American citizen who could not be legitimately surveilled directly. Also as part of this investigation, President Johnson personally ordered a check of the long distance toll call records of Vice Presidential candidate Spiro Agnew.[593]

(4) The Surveillance of Joseph Kraft (1969). -- There is no substantial indication of any genuine national security rationale for the electronic surveillance overseas of columnist Joseph Kraft in 1969. John Erlichman testified before the Senate Watergate Committee that the national security was involved, but did not elaborate further.[594]

Beyond this general claim, however, there is little evidence that any national security issue was involved in the case. Former Deputy Attorney General and Acting FBI Director William Ruckelshaus testified that after reviewing the matter he "could never see any national security justification" for the surveillance of Kraft. Ruckelshaus stated that the Administration's "justification" for bugging Kraft's hotel room was that he was "asking questions of some members of the North Vietnamese Government." Ruckelshaus believed that this was not an adequate national security justification for placing "any kind of surveillance on an American citizen or newsman."[595] Mr. Kraft agreed he was in contact with North Vietnamese officials while he was abroad in 1969, but noted that this was a common practice among journalists and that "at the time" he never knowingly published any classified information.[596]

The documentary record also reveals no national security justification for the FBI's electronic surveillance of Mr. Kraft overseas. The one memorandum which referred to "Possible Leaks of Information" by Kraft does not indicate that there clearly was a leak of national security significance or that Mr. Kraft was responsible for such a leak if it occurred.[597] Furthermore, the hotel room bug did not produce any evidence that Kraft received or published any classified information.[598]

Similarly, there is no evidence of a national security justification for the physical surveillance and proposed electronic surveillance of Kraft in the fall of 1969. A Bureau memorandum suggests that the Attorney General requested some type of coverage of Kraft,[599] but the record reveals no purpose for this coverage. The physical surveillance was discontinued after five weeks because it had "not been productive." Apparently, the Attorney General himself was unconvinced that a genuine national security justification supported the Kraft surveillance: he refused to authorize the requested wiretap, and it was consequently never implemented.[600]

(5) The "17" Wiretaps. -- The relative ease with which high administration officials could select improper intelligence targets was demonstrated by the "17" wiretaps on Executive officials and newsmen installed between 1969-1971 under the rationale of determining the source of leaks of sensitive information.[600] In three cases no national security claim was even advanced. While national security issues were at least arguably involved in the initiation of the other taps, the program continued in two instances against persons who left the government and took positions as advisors to Senator Edmund Muskie, then the leading Democratic Presidential prospect.[601]

The records of these wiretaps were kept separate from the FBI's regular electronic surveillance files;[602] their duration in many cases went beyond the period then required for re-authorization by the Attorney General; and in some cases the Attorney General did not authorize the tap until after it had begun.[603] In 1971, the records were removed from the FBI's possession and sent to the White House.

Thus, misuse of the FBI had progressed by 1971 from the regular receipt by the White House of political "tid-bits" and occasional requests for name checks of Bureau files to the use of a full array of intelligence operations to serve the political interests of the administration. The final irony was that the Nixon administration came to distrust Director Hoover's reliability and, consequently, to develop a White House-based covert intelligence operation.[604]

c. The Justice Department's Internal Security Division

FBI intelligence reports flowed consistently to the Justice Department, especially to the IDIU established by Attorney General Clark in 1967 and to the Internal Security Division. Before 1971, the Justice Department provided little guidance to the FBI on the proper scope of domestic intelligence investigations.[605] For example, in response to a Bureau inquiry in 1964 about whether a group's activities came "within the criteria" of the employee security program or were "in violation of any other federal statute,"[606] the Internal Security Division replied that there was "insufficient evidence" for prosecution and that the group's leaders were "becoming more cautious in their utterances."[607] Nevertheless, the FBI continued for years to investigate the group with the knowledge and approval of the Division.

(1) The "New" Internal Security Division. -- When Robert Mardian was appointed Assistant Attorney General in late 1970, the Internal Security Division assumed a more active posture. In fact, one of the alternatives to implementation of the "Huston Plan" suggested to Attorney General John Mitchell by White House aide John Dean was the invigoration of the Division.[608] This included Mardian's establishment of the IEC to prepare domestic intelligence estimates. Equally significant, however, was Mardian's preparation of a new Executive Order on federal employee security. The new order assigned to the moribund Subversive Activities Control Board the function of designating groups for what had been the "Attorney General's list"[609] This attempt to assign broad new functions by Executive fiat to a Board with limited statutory responsibilities clearly disregarded the desires of the Congress.[610]

According to Mardian, there was a "problem" because the list had "not been updated for 17 years." He expected that the revitalized SACB would "deal specifically with the revolutionary/terrorist organizations which have recently become a part of our history."[611]

Assistant Attorney General Mardian's views coincided with those of FBI Assistant Director Brennan, who had seen a need to compile massive data on the "New Left" for future employee security purposes.[612] Since FBI intelligence investigations were based in part on standards for the "Attorney General's list," the new Executive Order substantially redefined and expanded FBI authority. The new order included groups who advocated the use of force to deny individual rights under the "laws of any State" or to overthrow the government of "any State or subdivision thereof."[613] The new order also continued to use the term "subversive," although it was theoretically more restrictive than the previous standard for the Attorney General's list because it required "unlawful" advocacy.

Mardian made it clear that, under the order, the FBI was to provide intelligence to the Subversive Activities Control Board:

We have a new brand of radical in this country and we are trying to address ourselves to the new situation. With the investigative effort of the FBI, we hope to present petitions to the Board in accordance with requirement of the Executive Order.[614]

FBI intelligence officials learned that the Internal Security Division intended to "initiate proceedings against the Black Panther Party, Progressive Labor Party, Young Socialist Alliance, and Ku Klux Klan." They also noted: "The language of Executive Order 11605 is very broad and generally coincides with the basis for our investigation of extremist groups."[615] Mardian had, in effect, provided a new and wider "charter" for FBI domestic intelligence.[616]

(2) The Sullivan-Mardian Relationship. -- In 1971, Director Hoover expressed growing concern over the close relationship developing between his FBI subordinates in the Domestic Intelligence Division and the Internal Security Division under Mardian. For example, when FBI intelligence officials met with Mardian's principal deputy, A. William Olsen, to discuss "proposed changes in procedure" for the Attorney General's authorization of electronic surveillance, Hoover reiterated instructions that Bureau officials be "very careful in our dealings" with Mardian. Moreover, to have a source of legal advice independent of the Justice Department, the FBI Director created a new position of Assistant Director for Legal Counsel and required that he attend "at any time officials of the Department are being contacted on any policy consideration which affects the Bureau."[617]

In the summer of 1971, William C. Sullivan openly challenged FBI Director Hoover, possibly counting on Mardian and Attorney General Mitchell to back him up and oust Hoover.[618] Sullivan charged in one memorandum to Hoover that other Bureau officials lacked "objectivity" and "independent thinking" and that "they said what they did because they thought this was what the Director wanted them to say."[619]

Shortly thereafter, Director Hoover appointed W. Mark Felt, formerly Assistant Director for the Inspection Division, to a newly created position as Sullivan's superior. Apparently realizing that he was on his way out, Sullivan gave Assistant Attorney General Mardian the FBI's documents recording the authorization for, and dissemination of, information from the "17" wiretaps placed on Exccutive officials and newsmen in 1969-1971. The absence of these materials was not discovered by other FBI officials until after Sullivan was forced to resign in September 1971.[620] Mardian eventually took part in the transfer of these records to the White House.[621]

Thus, the Attorney General's principal assistant for internal security collaborated with a ranking FBI official to conceal vital records, ultimately to be secreted away in the White House. This provides a striking example of the manner in which channels of legitimate authority within the Executive Branch can be abused.

d. The FBIs Secret "Administrative Index"

In the fall of 1971, the FBI confronted the prospect of the first serious Congressional curtailment of domestic intelligence investigations -- repeal of the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 -- and set a course of evasion of the will of Congress which continued, partly with justice Department approval, until 1973.

An FBI Inspection Report viewed the prospect of the repeal without great alarm. In the event the Act was repealed, the FBI intended to continue as before under "the Government's inherent right to protect itself internally."[622] After the repeal took place, Bureau officials elaborated the following rationale for keeping the Security Index of "potentially dangerous subversives:"

Should this country come under attack from hostile forces, foreign or domestic, there is nothing to preclude the President from going before a joint session of Congress and requesting necessary authority to apprehend and detain those who would constitute a menace to national defense. At this point, it would be absolutely essential to have an immediate list, such as the SI, for use in making such apprehensions.[623] [Emphasis added.]

Thus, FBI officials hoped there would be a way to circumvent the repeal "in which the essence of the Security Index and emergency detention of dangerous individuals could be utilized under Presidential powers."[624]

Assistant Director Dwight Dalbey, the FBI's Legal Counsel, recommended writing to the Attorney General for "a reassessment" in order to "protect" the Bureau in case "some spokesman of the extreme left" claimed that repeal of the Detention Act eliminated FBI authority for domestic intelligence activity. Dalbey agreed that, since the Act "could easily be put back in force should an emergency convince Congress of its need," the Bureau should "have on hand the necessary action information pertaining to individuals."[625] Thereupon, a letter was sent to Attorney General Mitchell proposing that the Bureau be allowed to "maintain an administrative index" of individuals who "pose a threat to the internal security of the country." Such an index would be an aid to the Bureau in discharging its "investigative responsibility." However, the letter made no reference to the theory prevailing within the FBI that the new "administrative index" would serve as the basis for a revived detention program in some future emergency.[625]

Thus, when the Attorney General replied that the repeal of the Act did not prohibit the FBI from compiling an "administrative index" to make "readily retrievable" the "results of its investigations," he did not deal with the question of whether the index would also serve as a round-up list for a future emergency. The Attorney General also stated that the Department did not "desire a copy" of the new index, abdicating even the minimal supervisory role performed previously by the Internal Security Division in its review of the names on the Security Index.[626] FBI officials realized that they were "now in a position to make a sole determination as to which individuals should be included in an index of subversive individuals."[627]

There were two major consequences of the new system. First, the new "administrative index" (ADEX) was expanded to include an elastic category: "the new breed of subversive."[628] Second, the previous Reserve Index, which had never been disclosed to the Justice Department, was incorporated into the ADEX. It included "teachers, writers, lawyers, etc." who did not actively participate in subversive activity "but who were nevertheless influential in espousing their respective philosophies." It was estimated that the total case load under the ADEX would be "in excess of 23,000."[629]

One of the FBI standards for placing someone on the ADEX list demonstrates the vast breadth of the list and the assumption that it could be used as the basis for detention in an emergency:

An individual who, although not a member of or participant in activities of revolutionary organizations or considered an activist in affiliated fronts, has exhibited a revolutionary ideology and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by national emergency to commit acts of espionage or sabotage, including acts of terrorism, assassination or any interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation of the national, state, and local governments and of the defense efforts. [Emphasis added.][630]

These criteria were supplied to the Justice Department in 1972, and the Attorney General did not question the fact that the ADEX was more than an administrative aid for conducting investigations, as he had previously been told.[631]

A Bureau memorandum indicates that "representatives of the Department" in fact agreed with the view that there might be "circumstances" where it would be necessary "to quickly identify persons who were a threat to the national security" and that the President could then go to Congress "for emergency legislation permitting apprehension and detention."[632]

Thus, although the Attorney General did not formally authorize the ADEX as a continuation of the previous detention list, there was informal Departmental knowledge that the FBI would proceed on that basis. One FBI official later recognized that the ADEX could be "interpreted as a means to circumvent repeal of the Emergency Detention Act."[633]

8. Reconsideration of FBI Authority

In February 1971, the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee began a series of hearings on federal data banks and the Bill of Rights which marked a crucial turning point in the development of domestic intelligence policy. The Subcommittee, chaired by Senator Sam J. Ervin of North Carolina, reflected growing concern among Americans for the protection of "the privacy of the individual against the 'information power' of government."[634]

Largely in response to this first serious Congressional inquiry into domestic intelligence policy, the Army curtailed its extensive surveillance of civilian political activity. The Senate inquiry also led, after Director Hoover's death in 1972, to reconsideration by the FBI of the legal basis for its domestic intelligence activities and eventually to a request to the Attorney General for clarification of its authority.[635]

a. Developments in 1972-1974

There is no indication that FBI "guidelines" material or the FBI Manual provisions themselves were submitted to, or requested by, the Justice Department prior to 1972.[636] Indeed, when Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst testified in February 1972 at the hearings on his nomination to be Attorney General, he stated that be was "not sure" what guidelines were used by the FBI. Kleindienst also stated that he believed FBI investigations were "restricted to criminal conduct or the likelihood of criminal conduct."[637] Director Hoover noted on a newspaper report of the testimony, "Prepare succinct memo to him on our guidelines."[638]

After Hoover's death in 1912, a sharp split developed within the Domestic Intelligence Division over whether or not the Bureau should continue to rely on the various Executive Orders as a basis for its authority.[639]

Acting Director Gray postponed making any formal decisions on this matter; he did not formally request advice from the Attorney General.[640] Meanwhile, the Domestic Intelligence Division proceeded on its own to revise the pertinent Manual sections and the ADEX standards.[641] The list was to be trimmed to those who were "an actual danger now," reducing the number of persons on the ADEX by two-thirds.[642]

A revision of the FBI Manual was completed by May 1973. It was described as "a major step" away from "heavy reliance upon Presidential Directives" to an approach "based on existing Federal statutes.[643] Although field offices were instructed to "close" investigations not meeting the new criteria, headquarters did not want "a massive review on crash basis" of all existing cases.[644]

After a series of regional conferences with field office supervisors, the standards were revised to allow greater flexibility.[645] For the first time in FBI history, a copy of the Manual section for "domestic subversive investigations" was sent to the Attorney General.[646]

After Clarence M. Kelley was confirmed as FBI Director, he authorized a request for guidance from Attorney General Elliot Richardson.[647] Kelley advised that it "would be folly" to limit the Bureau to investigations only when a crime "has been committed," since the government had to "defend itself against revolutionary and terrorist efforts to destroy it." Consequently, he urged that the President exercise his "inherent Executive power to expand by further defining the FBI's investigative authority to enable it to develop advance information" about the plans of "terrorists and revolutionaries who seek to overthrow or destroy the Government."[648] [Emphasis added.]

Director Kelley's request initiated a process of reconsideration of FBI intelligence authority by the Attorney General.[649]

The general study of FBI authority was superceded in December 1973 when Acting Attorney General Robert Bork, in consultation with Attorney General-designate William Saxbe, gave higher priority to a Departmental inquiry into the FBI's COINTELPRO practices. Responsibility for this inquiry was assigned to a committee headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Peterson.[650]

Even at this stage, the Bureau resisted efforts by the Department to look too deeply into its operations. Director Kelley advised the Acting Attorney General that the Department should exclude from its review the FBI's "extremely sensitive foreign intelligence collection techniques."[651]

As a result, the Petersen committee's review of COINTELPRO did not consider anything more than a brief FBI prepared summary of foreign counterintelligence operations.[652] Moreover, the inquiry into domestic COINTELPRO cases was based mainly on short summaries of each incident compiled by FBI agents, with Department attorneys making only spot-checks of the underlying files to assure the accuracy of the summaries. Thus, the inquiry was unable to consider the complete story of COINTELPRO as reflected in the actual memoranda discussing the reasons for adopting particular tactics and the means by which they were implemented.[653]

Thus, at the same time that the Bureau was seeking guidance and clarification of its authority, vestiges remained of its past resistance to outside scrutiny and its desire to rely on Executive authority, rather than statute, for the definition of its intelligence activities.

b. Recent Domestic Intelligence Authority

In the absence of any new standards imposed by statute, or by the Attorney General, the FBI continued to collect domestic intelligence under sweeping authorizations issued by the Justice Department in 1974 for investigations of "subversives," potential civil disturbances, and "potential crimes." These authorizations were explicitly based on conceptions of inherent Executive power, broader in theory than the FBI's own claim in 1973 that its authority could be found in the criminal statues. Attorney General Levi has recently promulgated guidelines which stand as the first significant attempt by the Justice Department to set standards and limits for FBI domestic intelligence investigations.[655]

(1) Executive Order 1045O, As Amended. -- The Federal employee security program continued to serve as a basis for FBI domestic intelligence investigations. An internal Bureau memorandum stated that the Justice Department's instruction regarding the program:

specifically requires the FBI to check the names of all civil applicants and incumbents of the Executive Branch against our records. In order to meet this responsibility FBIHQ records must contain identities of all persons connected with subversive or extremist activities, together with necessary identifying information.[656]

FBI field offices were instructed in mid-1974 to report to Bureau headquarters such data as the following:

Identities of subversive and/or extremist groups or movements (including front groups) with which subject has been identified, period of membership, positions held, and a summary of the type and extent of subversive or extremist activities engaged in by subject (e.g., attendance at meetings or other functions, fundraising or recruiting activities on behalf of the organization, contributions, etc.).[657]

In June 1974, President Nixon formally abolished the "Attorney General's list" upon the recommendation of Attorney General Saxbe. However, the President's order retained a revised definition of the types of organizations, association [with] which would still be considered in evaluating prospective federal employees.[658] The Justice Department instructed the FBI that it should "detect organizations with a potential" for falling within the terms of the order and investigate "individuals who are active either as members of or as affiliates of" such organizations. The Department instructions added:

It is not necessary that a crime occur before the investigation is initiated, but only that a reasonable evaluation of the available information suggests that the activities of the organization may fall within the prescription of the Order....

It is not possible to set definite parameters covering the initiation of investigations of potential organizations falling within the Order but once the investigation reaches a stage that offers a basis for determining that the activities are legal in nature, then the investigation should cease, but if the investigation suggests a determination that the organization is engaged in illegal activities or potentially illegal activities it should continue. [Emphasis added.]

The Department applied "the same yardstick" to investigations of individuals "when information is received suggesting their involvement."[659]

(2) Civil Disorders Intelligence. -- The Justice Department also instructed the FBI in 1974 that it should not, as the Bureau had suggested, limit its civil disturbance reporting "to those particular situations which are of such a serious nature that Federal military personnel may be called upon for assistance." The Department advised that this suggested "guideline" was "not practical" since, it "would place the burden on the Bureau" to make an initial decision as to "whether military personnel may ultimately be needed," and this responsibility rested "legally" with the President. Instead, the FBI was ordered to "continue" to report on

all significant incidents of civil unrest and should not be restricted to situations where, in the judgment of the Bureau, military personnel eventually may be used.[660]

Moreover, under this authority the Bureau was also ordered to "continue" reporting on

all disturbances where there are indications that extremist organizations such as the Communist Party, Ku Klux Klan, or Black Panther Party are believed to be involved in efforts to instigate or exploit them.

The instructions specifically declared that the Bureau "should make timely reports of significant disturbances, even when no specific violation of Federal law is indicated." This was to be done, at least in part, through "liaison" with local law enforcement agencies.[661]

Even after the Justice Department's IDIU dismantled its computerized data bank, its basic functions continued to be, performed by a Civil Disturbance Unit in the office of the Deputy Attorney General, and the FBI was under instructions to disseminate its civil disturbance reports to that Unit.[662]

FBI officials considered these instructions "significant" because they gave it "an official, written mandate from the Department." The Department's desires were viewed as "consistent with what we have already been doing for the past several years," although the Bureau Manual was rewritten to "incorporate into it excerpts from the Department's letter."[663]

(3) "Potential" Crimes. -- The FBI recently abolished completely the administrative index (ADEX) of persons considered "dangerous now." However, the Justice Department has advanced a theory to support broad power for the Executive Branch in investigating groups which represent a "potential threat to the public safety" or which have a "potential" for violating specific statutes. For example, the Department advised the FBI that the General Crimes Section of the Criminal Division had "recommended continued investigation" of one group on the basis of "potential violations" of the antiriot statutes.[664][665] These same instructions added that there need not be a "potential" for violation of any specific statute.[666]

(4) Claim of Inherent Executive Power. -- The Department's theory of executive power was set forth in 1974 testimony before the House Internal Security Committee. According to Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin Maroney, "the primary basis" for FBI domestic intelligence authority rests in "the constitutional powers and responsibilities vested in the President under Article II of the Constitution." These powers were specified as: the President's duty undertaken in his oath of office to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States;"[667] the Chief Executive's duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed:"[668] the President's responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief of the military; and his "power to conduct our foreign relations."[669]

The chairman of the Internal Security Committee, Rep. Richard H. Ichord, stated at that time that, except in limited areas, the Congress "has not directly imposed upon the FBI clearly defined duties in the acquisition, use, or dissemination of domestic or internal security intelligence."[670]

Subsequently, the FBI Intelligence Division revised its 1972-1973 position on its legal authority, and in a paper completed in 1975 it returned to the view "that the intelligencegathering activities of the FBI have had as their basis the intention of the President to delegate his Constitutional authority," as well as the statutes "pertaining to the national security."[671]

The Attorney General has continued to assert the claim of inherent executive power to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance of American citizens, although this power has been exercised sparingly.[672] The Justice Department has also claimed that this inherent executive power permits warrantless surreptitious entries.[673] However, the Executive Branch has recently joined a bipartisan group of Senators and Representatives in sponsoring a legislative proposal requiring judicial warrants for all electronic surveillance by the FBI.

(5) Attorney General Levi's Guidelines. -- During 1975, the Congress and the Executive Branch began major efforts to review the field of domestic intelligence. A Presidential commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller inquired into the CIA's improper surveillance of Americans.[674] Attorney General Edward H. Levi established a committee in the Justice Department to develop "guidelines" for the FBI,[675] and the Justice Department began to work on draft legislation to require warrants for national security electronic surveillance.[676]

These efforts have begun to bear fruit in recent months. President Ford has issued an Executive Order regulating foreign intelligence activities;[677] Attorney General Levi has promulgated several sets of "guidelines" for the FBI.[678] And the administration has endorsed a specific bill to establish a warrant procedure for all national security wiretaps and bugs in the United States.[679]

These Executive initiatives are a major step forward in creating safeguards and establishing standards, but they are incomplete without legislation.[680] Among the issues left open by the President's Executive Order, for example, are: (1) the definition of the term "foreign subversion" used to characterize the counter- intelligence responsibilities of the CIA and the FBI; and (2) clarification of the vague provisions in the National Security Act of 1947 relating to the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect "sources" and "methods;" and (3) amplification of the 1947 Act's prohibition against the CIA's exercise of "law enforcement powers" or "internal security functions."

Although they represent only a partial answer to the need for permanent restraints, the initiatives of the Executive Branch demonstrate a willingness to seriously consider the need for legislative action. The Attorney General has recognized that Executive "guidelines" are not enough to regulate, and authorize FBI intelligence activities.[681] The Committee's conclusions and recommendations in Part IV of this report indicate the areas most in need of legislative attention.

[1] Repressive practices during World War I included the formation of a volunteer auxiliary force, known as the American Protective League, which assisted the Justice Department and military intelligence in the investigation of "un American activities" and in the mass round-up of 50,000 persons to discover draft evaders. These so-called "slacker raids" of 1918 involved warrantless arrests without sufficient probable cause to believe that crime had been or was about to be committed (FBI intelligence Division memorandum, "An Analysis of FBI Domestic Security intelligence Investigations," 10/28/75.)

The American Protective League also contributed to the pressures which resulted in nearly 2,000 prosecutions for disloyal utterances and activities during World War I, a policy described by John Lord O'Brien, Attorney General Gregory's Special Assistant, as one of "wholesale repression and restraint of public opinion." (Zechariah Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941) p. 69,)

Shortly after the war the Justice Department and the Bureau of Investigation Jointly planned the notorious "Palmer Raids", named for Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer who ordered the overnight round-up and detention of some 10,000 persons who were thought to be "anarchist" or "revolutionary" aliens subject to deportation. (William Preston, Aliens and Dissenters (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1963), chs. 7-8: Stanley Cohen, A. Mitchell Palmer-, Politician (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), chs. 11-12.)

[2] See Attorney General Stone's full statement, p. 23.

[3] See Joan Jensen, The Price of Vigilance (Chicago: Rand McNally 1968). one FBI official recalled later, "There were probably seven or eight such active organizations operating at full force during war day,; and it was not an uncommon experience for an Agent of this Bureau to call upon an individual in the Course Of his investigation, to find out that six or seven other Government agencies had been around to interview the party about the same matter." (Memorandum of IF. X. O'Donnell, Subject: Operations During World War 1, 10/4/38).

[4] See footnote 1, p. 21.

[5] Letter from Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to Jack Alexander, 9/21/37, cited in Alpheus T. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law (New York, Viking, 1956) p 149.

[6] New York Times, 5/10/24.

[7] Stone to Hoover. 5/13/24, quoted in Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone, at p. 151. Although Hoover bad served as head of the General Intelligence Division of the Justice Department at the time of the "Palmer Raids" and became an Assistant Director of the Bureau in 1921, he persuaded Attorney General Stone and Roger Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union that he had played an "unwilling part" in the excesses of the past. and he agreed to disband the Bureau's "radical division." Baldwin advised Stone, "I think we were wrong in our estimate of his attitude." (Baldwin to Stone, 8/6/24, quoted in Donald Johnson, The Challenge to American Freedoms (University of Kentucky Press, 1963). pp, 174-175.)

In December 1924, Stone made Hoover Director of the Bureau of Investigation.

[8] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Mr. Cowley, 5/10/34.

[9] J. Edgar Hoover memorandum to the files, 8/24/36. This memorandum states that, earlier In the conversation, Director Hoover had told the President:

(i) Communists controlled or planned to take control of the West Coast longshoreman's union, the United Mine Workers Union and the Newspaper Guild (and using those unions would be "able at any time to paralyze the country");

(ii) "activities ... inspired by Communists" had recently taken place in the Government, "particularly in some of the Departments and the National Labor Relations Board"; and

(iii) The Communist Internationale had recently issued instructions for all Communists to "vote for President Roosevelt and against Governor Landon because of the fact that Governor Landon is opposed to class warfare."

These comments indicate that the Bureau had already begun some intelligence gathering on Communists and activities "inspired" by them prior to any Presidential order. In addition, Hoover's memorandum referred to prior intelligence collection on domestic right-wing figures Father Charles Coughlin and General Smedley Butler.

[10] Hoover stated that Secretary of State Hall "at the President's suggestion, requested of me, the representative of the Department of Justice, to have investigation made of the subversive activities in this country, including communism and fascism." He added that "the Attorney General verbally directed me to proceed with this Investigation." (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to E. A. Tamm, 9/10/36.)

[11] Memorandum on "domestic intelligence," prepared by J. Edgar Hoover. enclosed with letter from Attorney General Cummings to Roosevelt, 10/20/38. Director Hoover met with the President who, according to Hoover's memorandum, "approved the plan which I had prepared and which had been sent to him by the Attorney General." (Memorandum to the files from J. Edgar Hoover, 11/7/38.)

[12] Letter from Attorney General Cummings to the President, 10/20/38.

[13] On 2/7/39, the Assistant to the the Attorney General wrote letters to the Secret Service, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Narcotics Bureau, the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, and the Postal Inspection Service stating that the FBI and military intelligence had "undertaken activities to investigate matters relating to espionage and subversive activities." (Letter from J. B. Keenan. Assistant to the Attorney General, to F. J. Wilson, Chief, Secret Service, 2/7/39.)

A letter from Attorney General Murphy to the Secretary of the Treasury shortly thereafter also referred to "subversive activities." (Letter from Attorney General Murphy to the Secretary of the Treasury, 2/16/39.)

However, a similar letter two days later referred only to matters "involving espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage," without mentioning "subversive activities." (Letter from Attorney General Murphy to the Secretary of the Treasury, 2/18/39.) This may have reflected a decision by Murphy to cease using "subversive activities" to describe FBI investigations. The record does not clarify the reason for his deletion of the phrase.

[14] Memorandum from T. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Murphy, 3/16/39. Murphy was aware that the FBI contemplated investigations of subversive activities, since Hoover enclosed his 1938 plan with -this memorandum.

[15] Letter from Attorney General Murphy to the President, 6/17/39.

[16] Confidential Memorandum from the President to Department Heads, 6/26/39.

[17] Memorandum from Hoover to Murphy, 3/16/39, enclosing Hoover memorandum on "domestic intelligence," 10/20/38.

[18] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Murphy, 9/6/39.

[19] Statement of the President, 9/6/39.

President Roosevelt never formally defined "subversive activities" - a term whose vagueness has proven a problem throughout the FBI's history. However, a hint as to his definition is contained in his remarks at a press conference on September 9, 1939. A national emergency bad just been declared, and pursuant thereto, the President had issued an authorization for up to 150 extra FBI agents to handle "additional duties." In explaining that action, he stated he was concerned about "things that happened" before World War I, specifically "Sabotage" and "Propaganda by both belligerents" to "sway public opinion. . . . [I]t is to guard against that and the spread by any foreign nation of propaganda in this nation which would tend to he subversive - I believe that is the word - of our form of Government." (1939 Public Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt. pp. 495-496.)

[20] Confidential memorandum from President Roosevelt to Attorney General Jackson, 5/21/40. In May 1941, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy urged "a broadening of the investigative responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the fields of subversive control of labor." (Memorandum from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to the President, 5/29/41) The President replied that he was sending their letter to the Attorney General "with my general approval." (Memorandum from President Roosevelt to the Secretaries of War and Navy, 6/4/41.)

[21] Attorney General's Order No. 3732, 9/25/42, p. 19. But see Delimitation Agreement between the FBI and Military Intelligence, 2/9/42, at footnote 56.

[22] Statement of the President on "Police Cooperation," 1/8/43. A note in the President's handwriting added that the FBI was to receive information "relating to espionage and related matters." (Copy in FDR Library.)

[23] Cummings to Roosevelt, 10/20/38.

[24] Hoover memorandum, enclosed with letter from Cummings to Roosevelt, 10/20/38. Director Hoover's full point was that:

"In considering the steps to be taken for the expansion of the present structure of intelligence work, it is believed imperative that it be proceeded with, with the utmost degree of secrecy in order to avoid criticism or objections which might be raised to such an expansion by either ill-informed persons or individuals having some ulterior motive. The word 'espionage' has long been a word that has been repugnant to the American people and it is believed that the structure which is already in existence is much broader than espionage or counterespionage, but covers in a true sense real intelligence values to the three services interested, namely, the Navy, the Army, and the civilian branch of the Government - the Department of Justice. Consequently, it would seem undesirable to seek any special legislation which would draw attention to the fact that it was proposed to develop a special counterespionage drive of any great magnitude."

[25] 28 U.S.C. 533 (3).

[26] The conflicts between the FBI and the State Department in 1939 are discussed at footnote 54.

[27] Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Bill 1940, Hearings before the House Appropriations Committee, 11/30/39, pp. 303-307.

In fact, the FBI had established a General Intelligence Section in its Investigative Division shortly after the President's 1936 requests. Congress was not advised of the Bureau's activities undertaken prior to September 1939, nor of the President's earlier directives.

[28] Justice Department Appropriation Bill. 1941, Hearings before the House Appropriations committee, 1/5/40, p. 151. The President's 1939 statement did not specifically say that the FBI had authority to investigate "subversive activities."

[29] 1939 Hearings, p. 307; First Deficiency Appropriation Bill, 1941, Hearings before the House Appropriations Committee 2/19/41, pp. 189-189.

[30] H.J. Res. 571, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1940).

[31] 18 U.S.C. 2385,2387.

[32] 18 U. S.C. 2386.

[33] Letter from Attorney General Jackson to Senator Norris, 86 Cong. Rec. 5642-5643.

[34] Proeeedings of the Federal-State Conference on Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense, 8/5-6/40. Several months earlier, Attorney General Tnckqon had warned federal prosecutors about the dangers of prosecuting "subversives" because of the lack of standards and the danger of overbreadth. (Robert H. Jackson. "The Federal Prosecutor," Journal of the American Judicature Society, 6/40, p. 18.)

[35] Hoover memorandum to the files, 8/24/36.

[36] Hoover memorandum, enclosed with Cummings to Roosevelt, 10/20/38, see p. 28.

[37] Confidential memorandum from the President to Department heads, 6/26/39.

[38] See pp. 34-35.

[39] The above-mentioned directives were all contained in a memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to FBI Field Offices, 9/2/39.

[40] Memorandum from Clyde Tolson to J. Edgar Hoover, 10/30/39,

[41] Internal FBI memorandum of E. A. Tamm, 11/9/39.

[42] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to FBI Field Offices, 6/15/40.

[43] Director Hoover declared in 1940 that a advocates of foreign "isms" had "succeeded in boring into every phase of American life, masquerading behind 'front' organizations. (Proceedings of the Federal-State Conference on Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense, August 5-6,1940.) In his best-selling book on Communists, Hoover stated, "Infiltration is the method whereby Party members move into noncommunist organizations for the purpose of exercising influence for Communism. If control is secured, the organization becomes a communist front." (J. Edgar Hoover, Masters of Deceit (New York: Henry Holt, 1958), Ch. 16.)

[44] Hoover memorandum. enclosed with Cummings to Roosevelt, 10/20/38.

[45] Letter from Attorney General Cummings to the President (and enclosure), 1/30/37 (FDR Library).

[46] Letter from Attorney General Cummings to the President (and enclosure), 8/11/37 (FDR Library).

[47] Report of New York City field office. 10/22/41, summarized in Justice Department memorandum from S. Brodie to Assistant Attorney General Quinn, 10/10/47.

[48] Report of Chicago field office. 12/29/44, summarized in Justice Department memorandum from S. Brodie to Assistant Attorney General Quinn, 10/9/47.

[49] Justice Department memorandum re: Christian Front, 10/28/41.

[50] Letter from Stephen Early, Secretary to the President, to J. Edgar Hoover, 5/21/40 (FDR Library)

[51] omitted in original.

[52] Memorandum from Stephen Early, secretary to the President, to J. Edgar Hoover, 6/17/40.

[53] New York Times, 10/1/39, p. 38.

[54] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Murphy, 9/16/39. The "literally chisel" reference reflects concern with a State Department attempt to "coordinate" all domestic intelligence. It may explain why, after 1938, the FBI no longer relied for its intelligence authority on the statutory provision for FBI investigations of "official matters under control of . . . the Department of State." Director Hoover stated that the FBI required State Department authorization only where "the subject of a particular investigation enjoys any diplomatic status."

[55] Note attached to letter from Col. J. M. Churchill, Army G-2, to Mr. E. A. Tamm, FBI, 5/16/39.

[56] Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Division. 2/9/42.

[57] Memorandum from Colonel Churchill, Counter Intelligence Branch, MID, to E. A. Tamm, FBI, 5/16/39.

[58] Victor J. Johanson, "The Role of the Army in the Civilian Arena. 1920-1970," U.S. Army Intelligence Command Study (1971). The scope of wartime Army intelligence has been summarized as follows:

"It reported on radical labor groups, communists, Nazi sympathizers, and 'semi-radical' groups concerned with civil liberties and pacifism. The latter, well intentioned but impractical groups as one corps area intelligence officer labeled them, were playing into the hands of the more extreme and realistic radical elements. G-2 still believed that it had a right to investigate 'semi-radicals' because they undermined adherence to the established order by propaganda through newspapers, periodicals, schools, and churches." (Joan M. Jensen. "Military Surveillance of Civilians, 1917 1967," in Military Intelligence, Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (1974), pp. 174-175.)

[59] Letter from Attorney General Cumming,; to the President, 10/20/38; letter front Attorney General Murphy to the President. 6/17/39. The confusion as to whether Attorney General Murphy. Attorney General Jackson and Attorney General Biddle defined the FBI's duties to cover investigation of "subversive activities" is indicated at footnotes 13, 21 and 34.

[60] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Jackson, 10/16/40.

[61] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to L.M.C. Smith, Chief, Neutrality Law Unit, 11/28/40.

[62] Memorandum from M. F. McGuire, Assistant to the Attorney General, to J. Edgar Hoover and L. M. C. Smith, 4/21/41.

[63] Memorandum from M. F. McGuire, Assistant to the Attorney General, to ,I Edgar Hoover, 4/17/41.

[64] The Custodial Detention Program should not be confused with the internment of Japanese Americans in 1942. The mass detention of Americans solely on the basis of race was exactly what the Program was designed to prevent, by making it possible for the government to decide in individual cases whether a Person should be arrested in the event of war. When the Program was implemented after Pearl Harbor, it was limited to dangerous enemy aliens only. FBI Director Hoover opposed the mass round-up of Japanese Americans.

[65] Memorandum from Attorney General Biddle to Assistant Attorney General Cox and J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, 7/16/43.

[66] Memorandum for Attorney General Biddle to Assistant Attorney General Cox and J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, 7/16/43.

[67] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to FBI Field Offices, Re: Dangerousness Classification, 8/14/43. This is the only document pertaining to Director Hoover's decision which appears in the material provided by the FBI to the Select Committee covering Bureau policies for the "Security Index." The FBI interpreted the Attorney General's order as applying only to "the dangerous classifications previously made by the ... Special War Policies Unit" of the Justice Department. (The full text of the Attorney General's order and the FBI directive appear in Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 412-415.)

[68] Contidential memorandum from President Roosevelt to Attorney General Jackson. 5/21/40.

[69] 47 U.S.C. 605. The Supreme Court held that this Act made wiretap-obtained evidence or the fruits thereof inadmissible in federal criminal cases. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); 308 U.S. 338 (1939).

[70] Letter from Attorney General Jackson to Rep. Hatton Summers, 3/19/41.

[71] E.g., United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Ivanov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974). The Court of Appeals held in this case that warrantless wiretapping could only be justified on a theory of inherent Presidential power, and questioned the statutory interpretation relied upon since Attorney General Jackson's time. Until 1967, the Supreme Court did not rule that wiretapping violated the Fourth Amendment. [Olmstead v. United States, 275 U.S. 557 (1927) ; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).]

[72] Hearings before the House Judiciary Committee, To Authorize Wiretapping, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), p. 112.

[73] Congress continued to refrain from setting wiretap standards until 1968 when the Omnibus Crime Control Act was passed. The Act was limited to criminal ewes and, once again, avoided the issue of intelligence wiretaps. [18 U.S.C. 2511 (3).]

[74] Memorandum from Attorney General Biddle to J. Edgar Hoover, 11/19/41. Biddle advised Hoover that wiretaps (or "technical surveillances") would not be authorized unless there was "information leading to the conclusion that the activities of any particular individual or group are connected with espionage or are authorized sources outside of this country."

[75] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Biddle, 10/2/41; memorandum from Attorney General Biddle to J. Edgar Hoover, 10/22/41.

[76] Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 3/26/76 and enclosures.

[76] Memorandum from D. M. Ladd to Hoover, 5/23/45.

[76] Hoover memorandum, 11/15/45; a memorandum headed "Summaries Delivered to the White House," lists over 175 reports sent to General Vaughn from this surveillance; memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 3/26/76, and enclosures.

[77] FBI memorandum from C. E. Hennrich to A. H. Belmont, 9/7/51.

[78] Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 9/23/75.

[79] A 1944 Justice Department memorandum discussed the "admissibility of evidence obtained by trash covers and microphone surveillance," in response to a series of hypothetical questions submitted by the FBI. The memorandum concluded that evidence so obtained was admissible even if the microphone surveillance involved a trespass. (Memorandum front Alexander Holtzoff, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, to J. Edgar Hoover, 7/4/44; c.f., memorandum from Attorney General J. Howard McGrath to J. Edgar Hoover, 2/26/52.) See footnote 229 for the 1950s consideration of bugs by the Attorney General.

[80] In early 1941, Director Hoover had had the following exchange with members of the House Appropriations Committee:

"Mr. LUDLOW. At the close of the present emergency, when peace comes, it would mean that much of this emergency work necessarily will be discontinued."

"Mr. HOOVER. That is correct.... If the national emergency should terminate, the structure dealing with national defense can immediately be discontinued or very materially curtailed according to the wishes of Congress." (First Deficiency Appropriation Bill, 1941, Hearings before the House Committee on Appropriations, 3/19/41, pp. 188-189.)

[81] The Court held that the grave and probable danger posed by the Communist Party justified this restriction on free speech under the First Amendment:

"The formation by petitioners of such a highly organized conspiracy, with rigidly disciplined members subject to call when the leaders, these petitioners, felt that the time had come for action, coupled with the inflammable nature of world conditions, and the touch-and-go nature of our relations with countries with whom petitioners were in the very least ideologically attuned, convince us that their convictions were justified on this score." [Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 510-511).]

[82] 64 Stat. 987 (1950) The Subversive Activities Control Act's registration provision was held not to violate the First Amendment in 1961. (Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961).] However, registration of Communists under the Act was later held to violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. [Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 882 U.S. 70 (1965).] The Emergency Detention Act was repealed in 1971.

[83] 68 Stat. 775 (1954), 50 U. S.C. 841-844. The constitutionality of the Communist Control Act of 1954 has never been tested.

[84] In light of the facts now known, the Supreme Court seems to have overstated the degree to which Congress had explicitly "charged" the FBI with intelligence responsibilities:

"Congress has devised an all-embracing program for resistance to the various forms of totalitarian aggression.... It has charged the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency with responsibility for intelligence concerning Communist seditious activities against our Government, and has denominated such activities as part of a world conspiracy." [Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504-505 (1956).]

This decision held that the federal government had preempted state sedition laws, citing President Roosevelt's September 1939 statement on FBI authority and an address by FBI Director Hoover to state law enforcement officials in August 1940.

[85] Yates v United states, 354 U.S. 298, 325 (1957).

[86] Justice Douglas, who dissented on Fifth Amendment grounds, agreed with the majority on the First Amendment issue:

The Bill of Rights was designed to give fullest play to the exchange and dissemination of ideas that touch the politics, culture, and other aspects of our life. When an organization is used by a foreign power to make advances here, questions of security are raised beyond the ken of disputation and debate between the people resident here" [Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 174 (1961).]

[87] File memorandum of S. J. Spingarn, assistant counsel to the President, 7/22/50. (Spingarn Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.)

[88] Executive Order 9835. 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947).

[89] Executive Order 10450,18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953).

[90] A report by a Canadian Royal Commission in June 1946 greatly influenced United States government policy. The Royal Commission stated that "a number of young Canadians, public servants and others, who begin with a desire to advance causes which they consider worthy, have been induced into joining study groups of the Communist Party. They are persuaded to keep this adherence secret. They have been led step by step along the ingeneous psychological development course . . . until under the influence of sophisticated and unscrupuloos leaders they have been persuaded to engage in illegal activities directed against the safety and interests of their own society." The Royal Commission recommended additional security measures, "to prevent the infiltration into positions of trust under the Government of persons likely to commit" such acts of espionage. (The Report of the Royal Commission, 6/27/46, pp. 82-83, 686-689.)

[91] Memorandum from the FBI Director to the President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, 1/3/47.

[92] President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights (1947), p. 52.

[93] Executive order 9835, part 1, section 2; cf. Executive Order 10450, Section 8 (a) (5).

[94] In 1960, for instance, the Justice Department advised the FBI to continue investigating an organization not on the Attorney General's list in order to secure "additional information . . . relative to the criteria" of the employee security order. (memorandum from Assistant Attorney General I. Walter Yeagley to J. Edgar Hoover, 5/17/60.)

[95] FBI "name checks" are authorized as one of the, "national agencies checks" required by Executive order 10450, section 3 (a).

[96] FBI monograph, "The Menace of Communism in the United states Today", 7/29/55, pp. iv-v. See footnote 271.

[97] The FBI official in charge of the Internal Security section of the Intelligence Division in the fifties and early sixties testified that the primary purpose of FBI investigations of communist "infiltration" was to advise the Attorney General so that be could determine whether a group should go on the Attorney General's list. He also testified that investigations for this purpose continued after the Attorney General ceased adding names of groups to the list. (F. J. Baumgardner testimony, 10/8/75, pp. 48-49.) See pp. 49-49 for discussion of the FBI's COMINFIL program.

[98] Memoranda from the Attorney General to heads of Departments and Agencies, 4/29/53; 7/15/53; 9/28/53; 1/22/54. Groups designated prior to that time Included numerous defunct German and Japanese societies, Communist and Communist "front' organizations, the Socialist Workers Party, the Nationalist Party Of Puerto Rico, and several Ku Klux Klan organizations.

[99] Executive Order 10450, section 8 (a) (5).

[100] The FBI's field offices were supplied with such "thumb-nail sketches" or characterizations to supplement the Attorney General's list and the reports of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. (E.g., SAC Letter No. 60 34, 7/12/60.)

[101] Executive Order 10450, section 8 (d).

[102] The reference to a "full field investigation" where there was "derogatory information with respect to loyalty" did not, in the Truman order, say who would conduct the investigation. (Executive Order 9835, part I, section 4.)

[103] Memoranda from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Toni Clark, 3/1()/41 and 3/31/47.

[104] File memorandum of George 11. Elsey, 5/2/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)

[105] Memorandum from Clark Clifford to the 105 105 President, 5/7/47.

[106] Memorandum from Clark Clifford to the President, 5/9/47; letter from, President Truman to H. B. Mitchell, U.S. Civil Service Commission, 5/9/47, (Harry S. Truman Library.)

[107] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Clark, 5/12/47.

[108] Memorandum from Clark Clifford to the President, 5/9/47. (Harry Truman Library.)

[109] Eleanor Bontecou. The Federal Loyalty-Security Program (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1953), pp. 33-34.

[110] Memorandum from J. R. Steelman, Assistant to the President, to the Attorney General, 11/3/47.

[111] In a March 1949 directive on coordination of internal security President Truman approved the creation of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference ("IIC"). Memorandum by J. P. Coyne, Major Chronological Developments on the Subject of internal Security, 4/8/49 (Harry S.Truman Library), and NSC memorandum 17/4, 3/23/49.

[112] NSC Memorandum 17/5, 6/15/49. The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947, which authorized the NSC to advise the President with respect to "the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies" relating to the "national security." (section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947.) Under this authority, the NSC then approved a secret charter for the ICC, composed of the FBI Director (as chairman) and the heads of the three military intelligence agencies.

[113] Delimitation of investigative Duties and Agreement for coordination, 2/23/49. A supplementary agreement required FBI and military intelligence officials in the field to "maintain close personal liaison," particularly to avoid "duplication in ... the use of informers." Where there was "doubt" as to whether another agency was interested in information, it "should be transmitted." (Supplemental Agreement No. 1 to the Delimitation Agreement, 6/2/49.)

[114] Letter from Attorney General McGrath to Charles S. Murphy, Counsel to the President 7/11/50.

[115] Statement of President Truman, 7/24/50.

[115] One noted, "This is the most inscrutable Presidential statement I've seen in a long time." Another asked, "How in H-- did this get out?" A third replied, "Don't know -- I thought you were handling." Notes initialed D. Bell. SJS (S. J. Spingarn), and GWE (George W. Elsey), 7/24-25/50 (Elsey Papers, Harry S. Truman Library). Even before the statement was issued, one of these aides had warned the President's counsel that the Justice Department was attempting "an end run." [Memorandum from G. W. Elsey to Charles S. Murphy, Counsel to the President, 7/12/50. (Murphy Papers. Harry S. Truman Library .)]

[116] See footnotes 19 and 22.

[117] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President, 1/28/53, and attached memorandum on "FBI Liaison Activities," 1/26/53.

[118] Statement of President Eisenhower, 12/15/53.

[119] National Security Action Memorandum 161, Subject: U.S. Internal Security Programs, 6/9/62.

[120] Memorandum from Attorney General Kennedy to J. Edgar Hoover, Chairmail, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, 3/5/64.

[121] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Clark, 3/5/46.

[122] Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 10/28/75. An indication of the breadth of the investigations is illustrated by the fact that the number of files far exceeded the Bureau's estimate of the "all time high" in Communist Party membership which was 80,000 in 1944 and steadily declined thereafter. (William C. Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, pp. 33-34.)

[123] Report to the House Committee on the Judiciary by the Comptroller General of the United States, 2/24/76, pp. 118--119.

[124] Such investigations were conducted because the Communist Party had issued instructions that "sleepers" should leave the Party and go "underground," still maintaining secret links to the Party. (Memorandum from J. F. Bland to A. 11. Belmont, 7/30/58.)

"Refusal to cooperate" with an FBI agent's interview was "taken into consideration along with other facts" in determining whether to continue the investigation. (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Deputy Attorney General Peyton Ford, 6/28/51.)

[125] 1960 FBI Manual Section 87, p. 5.

[126] 1960 FBI Manual Section 87, p. 5.

[127] The Supreme Court's last decision upholding a Smith Act conviction was Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), which reiterated that there must be "advocacy of action." See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).

[128] Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Tompkins to Director, FBI, 3/15/56.

[129] Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley to Director, FBI, 5/17/60.

[130] 1960 FBI Manual Section 87, p. 5.

[131] 1960 FBI Manual Section 87, pp. 83-84.

[132] 1960 FBI Manual Section 87, pp. 5-11.

[133] Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1955, p. 195.

[134] Annual Report for 1958, p. 338.

[135] Annual Report for 1964, p. 375.

[136] (Examples of such reports to the White House are set forth later, pp. 5153.) The Chief of the Internal Security Section of the FBI Intelligence Division in 1948-1966 testified that the Bureau "had to be certain" that a group's position did not coincide with the Communist line "just by accident." The FBI would not "open a case" until it had "specific information" that "the Communists were there" and were "influencing" the group to "assist the Communist movement." (F. J. Baumgardner testimony, 10/8/75 p. 47.)

[137] Annual Report for 1955, p. 195.

[138] For more detailed discussion of the FBI investigations of the NAACP and other civil rights groups see the Report on the Development of FBI Domestic intelligence investigations.

[139] Report of Oklahoma City Field Office, 9/19/41. This report continued: "Nevertheless, there is a strong movement on the part of the Communists to attempt to dominate this group ... Consequently, the activities of the NAACP will be closely observed and scrutinized in the future." [Emphasis added.] This stress on Communist "attempts" rather than their actual achievements is typical of COMINFIL reports. The annual reports on the FBI's COMINFIL investigation of the NAACP indicate that the Communists consistently failed in these "attempts" at the national level, although the Bureau took credit for using covert tactics to prevent a Communist takeover of a major NAACP chapter. (Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General-elect Robert F. Kennedy, 1/10/61 attached memorandum, subject: Communist Party, USA -- FBI Counterattack.)

[140] Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1959, pp. 247-249.

[141] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security, 7/25/61, enclosing IIC Report, Status of Internal Security Programs.

[142] William C. Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, pp. 40-41.

[143] 1960 FBI Manual Section 122, p. 1.

[144] SAC Letter No. 63-27, 6/11/63.

[145] The FBI has denied that it ever conducted a "security-type investigation" of the Birch Society or Welch, but state the Boston field office "was instructed in 1959 to obtain background data" on Welch using public sources. (Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 2/10/76.) A 1963 internal FBI memorandum stated that the Bureau "checked into the background of the Birch Society because of its scurrilous attack on President Eisenhower and other high Government officials." (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 5/29/63.) Reports were sent to the White House, see footnote 164.

[146] Letter from Assistant Attorney General Tompkins to Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President, 11/22/54; letters from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President, 10/15/57, and 1/17/58. (Eisenhower Library.)

[147] 1960 FBI Manual Section 122, pp. 5--6.

[148] 1960 FBI 'Manual Section 122,pp. 5-6.

[149] "Racial Tensions and Civil Rights," 3/1/56, statement. used by the FBI Director at Cabinet briefing, 3/9/56.

[150] See p. 37 for discussion of White House wiretap requests in 1945-1948.

[151] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to George E. Allen, Director, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 12/13/46. (Harry S. Truman Library.)

[152] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Maj. Gen. Harry 14. Vaughn, Military Aide to the President, 2/15/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)

[153] Letter from Hoover to Vaughn, 6/25/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)

[154] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Matthew J. Connelly, Secretary to the President, 1/27/50. (Harry S. Truman Library.)

[155] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Clark, 4/1/46. (Harry S. Truman Library.)

[156] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to 'Maj. Gen. Harry H. Vaughn, Military Aide to the President, 11/13/47. (Harry Truman Library.)

[157] Letters from J. Edgar Hoover to Brig. Gen. Harry H. Vaughn, Military Aide to the President, 1/11/46 and 1/17/46. (Harry S. Truman Library.)

[158] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to George E. Allen, Director, Reconstruction Finance corporation, 5/29/49. (Harry S. Truman Library.)

[159] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President, 4/21/55. (Eisenhower Library.)

[160] Letter from Hoover to Anderson, 3/6/56. (Eisenhower Library.)

[161] Letter from Hoover to Anderson, 3/5/56. (Eisenhower Library.)

[162] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President, 4/11/58. (Eisenhower Library.)

[163] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President, 2/13/58. (Eisenhower Library.) The group was described as the "successor" to a group cited by the House Un-American Activities Committee as a "communist front."

[164] Letters from J. Edgar Hoover to Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President, 9/11/59 and 9/16/59.

[165] Letter from Hoover to Cutler, 6/6/58. (Eisenhower Library). This involved contact with a foreign official whose later contacts with U.S. official were reported by the FBI under the Kennedy Administration in connection with the "sugar lobby," see pp. 64-6.1.

[166] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President, 11/7/55. (Eisenhower Library.)

[167] Letters from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler, Administrative Assistant to the President, 4/21/53 and 4/27/53. (Eisenhower Library.)

[168] Letter from Hoover to Cutler, 10/1/57. (Eisenhower Library.)

[169] Letter from Hoover to Gray, 11/9/59. (Eisenhower Library.) Hoover added that membership in the group "does not, of itself, connote membership in or sympathy with the Communist Party."

[170] Requests under the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, including wiretap requests, are discussed at pp. 33 and 37.

[171] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Thomas E. Stephens, Secretary to the President, 4/13/54. (Eisenhower Library.)

[172] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to R. F. Kennedy, 2/10/61, "Personal." (John F. Kennedy Library.)

[173] Memorandum from the Attorney General to the President, 8/20/63, attaching memorandum from Hoover to Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach, 8/13/63. (John F. Kennedy Library.)

[174] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to R. F. Kennedy, 2/6/61, "Personal." John F. Kennedy Library.)

[175] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to R. F. Kennedy, 2/8/61, "Personal." John F. Kennedy Library.)

[176] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to R. F. Kennedy, 11/20/63. (John F. Kennedy Library.)

[177] Memorandum from Attorney General Kennedy to the President, 4/12/62 enclosing memorandum from Director, FBI. to the Attorney General. 4/12/62: testimony of Courtney Evans, former Assistant Director, FBI, 12/1/77, p. 39.

[178] Letter from Attorney General McGrath to President Truman, 12/7/49; letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Maj. Gen. Harry H. Vaughn, Military Aide to the President, 1/14/50

[179] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General William P. Rogers, 5/25/60.

[180] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, 8/28/56, p. 4.

[181] Leon Green testimony, 9/12/75, pp. 6-8.

[182] Memorandum, William Loeb, Assistant Commissioner, Compliance to Dem. J. Barron, Director of Audit, 11/30/61.

[183] Memorandum Attorney Assistant to Commission to Director, IRS Audit Division, 4/2/62.

[184] IRS referred to it as Tax Political Action Groups Project. It was apparently labeled as above by the Joint Committee on internal Revenue Taxation.

[185] See pp. for discussion of later IRS programs.

[186] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Clark, 3/8/46. See footnote 67 for the origins of the Security Index in contravention of Attorney General Biddle's policy.

[187] Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General T. L. Caudle to Attorney General Clark, 7/11/46.

[188] Quoted in internal FBI memorandum from D. M. Ladd to J. Edgar Hoover, 1/22/48.

[189] Internal Security Act of 1950, Title II -- Emergency Detention, 64 Stat. 987 (1950).

[190] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to D. 11. Ladd, 10/15/52.

[191] Memorandum from D. M. Ladd to J. Edgar Hoover, 11/13/52.

[192] Memorandum from Attorney General James McGranery to J. Edgar Hoover, 11/25/52; memorandum from Attorney General Herbert Brownell to J. Edgar Hoover, 4/27/53.

[193] SAC Letter No. 97, Series 1949, 10/19/49. Field offices gave special attention to "key figures" and "top functionaries" of the Communist Party. The "Comsab" Program concentrated on potential Communist saboteurs, and the "Detcom" program was the FBI's own "priority arrest" list. The Communist Index was "a comprehensive compilation of individuals of interest to the internal security."

[194] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Brownell, 3/9/55; memorandum from J. F. Bland to A. H. Belmont. 7/30/58.

[194] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, 1/14/55.

[195] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Parsons, 6/3/60.

[196] Memorandum from D. M. Ladd to J. Edgar Hoover, 9/5/46; memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Clark, 9/5/46.

[197] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to D. M. Ladd, 4/17/51.

[198] Minutes of the President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, 1/17/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)

[199] Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Mr. Vanech, Chairman, President's Temporary Commission, 2/14/47. ( Truman Library.)

[200] See finding (G) for a full discussion of the problem of FBI accountability.

[201] Presidential Directive, Coordination of Federal Foreign Intelligence Activities 1/22/46, 11 Fed. Reg. 1337. Fears that a foreign intelligence agency would intrude into domestic matters went back to 1944, when General William Donovan head of the Office of Strategic'Services (the CIA's wartime predecessor) proposed that OSS be transformed from a wartime basis to a permanent "central intelligence service." Donovan's plan was leaked to the Chicago Tribune, allegedly by FBI Director Hoover, and it was denounced as a "super spy system" which would "pry into the lives of citizens at home." [Corey Ford, Donovan of the OSS (Boston: Little Brown, 1970), pp. 303-304.]

[202] Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee on S. 758, 80th Cong. (1947), P. 497.

[203] Hearings before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments on H.R. 2319, 80th Cong. (1947), p. 127.

[204] 93 Cong. Rec. 9430 (1947).

[205] 50 U.S.C. 403 (d) (3).

[206] See pp. 102-103.

[207] Inspector General's Report on the Technical Services Division, Central Intelligence Agency, 1957.

[208] Memorandum from the CIA General Counsel to the Inspector General, 1/5/54.

[209] U.S. Army Intelligence Center Staff Study: Material Testing Program EA 1729, 10/15/59.

[210] CIA Inspector General's Report, 1963.

[211] This issue is examined more fully in the Committee's Report on Foreign and Military Intelligence Activities.

[212] Memorandum from James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, to Chief of Operations, 11/21/55 (attachment).

[213] CIA Memorandum re: Project SETTER, undated (New Orleans) Memorandum from "Identity #13" to Deputy Director of Security, 10/9/57 (New Orleans) ; Rockefeller Commission Staff Summary of CIA Office Officer Interview, 3/18/75 (Hawaii).

[214] Robert Andrews, Special Assistant to the General Counsel, Department Of Defense, testimony, 9/23/75, pp. 34- 40.

[215] 18 U.S.C. 1701-1703 (mail); 47 U.S.C. 605 (Federal Communications Act of 1934).

[216] CIA memorandum "For the Record" from Thomas B. Abernathy, 8/21/61; Dr. Louis Tordella, former Deputy Director, National Security Agency, testimony 10/21/75, pp. 17-20.

[217] High FBI officials decided to use the CIA mail opening program for "our internal security objectives" in 1958. They did not want the Bureau to "assume this coverage" itself because its "sensitive nature" created "inherent dangers" and due to its "complexity, size, and expense." Instead, the Bureau would hold CIA "responsible to share their coverage with us." (Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, 1/22/58.) The initial FBI request to NSA involved "commercial and personal communications between persons in Cuba and tile United States." (Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, Assistant Director, Domestic Intelligence Division, 5/18/62.)

[218] Abernathy memorandum, 8/21/61.

[219] Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan (attachment), 8/21/61.

[220] Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 2/15/62.

[221] Select Committee Memorandum, Subject: Review of Documents at DOD Regarding LP MEDLEY 9/17/75 . ("LP MEDLEY" was the CIA's codename for this Program; the NSA codename was SHAMROCK.)

[222] Secretary Forrestal's immediate successor, Louis Johnson, renewed the arrangement in 1949. To the knowledge of those interviewed by the Committee, this was the last instance in which the companies raised any question as to the authority for the arrangements. (Andrews, 9/23/75. pp. 34, 40.)

[223] Richard Helms Testimony, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 84. Memorandum from Richard Helms to Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, 5/17/54.

[224] J. Edward Day Testimony, 10/22/75, Hearings Vol 4, p. 45. However, a contemporaneous CIA memorandum stated that "no relevant details" were withheld from Day when he was briefed in 1961 by CIA officials. (Memorandum from Richard Helms to Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff, 2/16/61.)

[225] Helms, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, pp, 87-89.

[226] Letter from Attorney General Clark to President Truman, 7/17/46.

[227] Memorandum from G. M. Elsey, Assistant Counsel to the President, to S. J. Spingarn; memorandum from Elsey to the President, 2/2/50, (Spingarn Papers. Harry S. Truman Library).

[228] Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).

[229] Memorandum from Attorney General Brownell to J. Edgar Hoover, 5/20/54. In 1952 Attorney General J. Howard McGrath refused to authorize microphone surveillance involving trespass because it was "in the area of the Fourth Amendment." (Memorandum from Attorney General McGrath to J. Edgar Hoover, 2/26/52.)

[230] See p. 105. (The Chief Counsel to the 'Select Committee disqualified himself from participating in Committee deliberations concerning either Mr. Katzenbach or former Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall because of a previous attorney-client relationship with those two persons.)

[231] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Deputy Attorney General Byron White, 5/4/61.

[232] omitted in original.

[233] In the course of an investigation, authorized by Attorney General Kennedy, into lobbying efforts on behalf of a foreign country regarding sugar quota legislation, FBI determined that Congressman Harold D. Cooley, chairman of the House Agriculture Committee, planned to meet with representatives of a foreign country in a hotel room. (FBI memorandum, 2/15/61 ; Memorandum from W.R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 12/22/66.)

At the instruction of Director Hoover, the Bureau installed a microphone in the hotel room to record this meeting. (FBI memorandum, 2/15/61; Memorandum from D. E. Moore to A. 11. Belmont, 2/16/61.) The results of the meeting were subsequently disseminated to the Attorney General. (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 2/18/61.)

A review of this case by FBI officials in 1966 concluded that "our files, contain no clear Indication that the Attorney General was specifically advised that a microphone surveillance was being utilized. . ." (Memorandum from Wannall to Sullivan, 12/21/66.) It was noted, however, that on the morning of February 17,1961-- after the microphone was in place but all hour or two before the meeting actually occurred -Director Hoover spoke with Attorney General Kennedy and, according to Hoover's contemporaneous memorandum, advised him that the Cooley meeting was to take place that day and that "we are trying to cover" it. (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Parsons, Mohr, Belmont, and DeLoach, 2/17/61.)

[234] According to records compiled by the FBI, there was FBI microphone surveillance of one "black separatist group" in 1960; one "black separatist group" and one "black separatist group functionary" in 1961; two "black separatist groups," one "black separatist group functionary," and one "(white) racist organization" in 1962; and two "black separatist groups" and one "black separatist group functionary" in 1963. (Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 10/23/75.)

[235] The Select Committee has determined that the FBI, on at least one occasion, maintained no records of the approval of a microphone surveillance authorized by an Assistant Director. (FBI Memorandum, 1/30/75, Subject: Special Squad at Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey, 8/22-28/64.)

[236] Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 10/17/75. This memorandum also states that, on the basis of the recollections of agents and a review of headquarters files, the FBI has "been able to identify" the following number of "surreptitious entries for microphone installations" in "internal security intelligence, and counterintelligence" investigations: 1960: 49; 1961: 63; 1962: 75; 1963: 79; and the following number of such entries "in criminal investigations" (as opposed to intelligence) 1960: 11; 1961: 69; 1962: 106; 1963: 84.

[237] Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 9/23/75.

[238] Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 7/19/66. Subject: "Black Bag" Jobs. Initials on this memorandum indicate that it was prepared by F. J. Baumgardner, an FBI Intelligence Division Section Chief, and approved by J. A. Sizoo, principal deputy to Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan. This memorandum was located in Director Hoover's "Official and Confidential" files, and it appears that the memorandum was shifted from Hoover's "Personal Files" shortly before his death. (Helen Gandy deposition, 11/12/75, pp. 4-6.) The FBI compiled a list of the "domestic subversive" targets, based "upon recollections of Special Agents who have knowledge of such activities, and review of those files identified by recollection as being targets of surreptitious entries." The list states "at least fourteen domestic subversive targets were the subject of at least 238 entries from 1942 to April 1968. In addition, at least three domestic subversive targets were the subject of numerous entries from October 1952 to June 1966. . . . One white hate group was the target of an entry in March 1966." The Bureau admits that this list is "incomplete." (Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 9/23/75.)

[239] Deposition of William R. Branigan, Section Chief, FBI Intelligence Division, 10/9/75, pp. 13, 39, 40. Testimony of Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall, FBI Intelligence Division, 10/24/75, Hearings, vol. 4, pp. 148-9.

[240] Memorandum from San Francisco field office to FBI Headquarters, 3/11/60.

[241] Memorandum from S. B. Donahoe to W. C. Sullivan, 9/15/61 ; Memorandum from San Francisco field office to FBI headquarters, 7/28/61.

[242] Letter from Attorney General Clark to President Truman, 7/17/46.

[243] Memorandum from Hoover to Brownell, 12/31/56.

[244] Memorandum from Hoover to Kennedy, 10/9/63.

[245] Memorandum from Hoover to Kennedy, 4/1/64.

[246] Memorandum from Hoover to Kennedy, 2/24/64.

[247] See Findings C and G and Committee Report on the FBI and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

[248] Memorandum from R. D. Cotter to W. C. Sullivan, 12/15/66. On the same day, and without specific authorization from the Attorney General, the FBI Placed a wiretap on Norman's residence. Attorney General Kennedy was informed of the wiretap two days later, and approved it the following day. (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 6/29/61.) The tap continued for four days until Norman went on vacation. (Memorandum from S. B. Donahoe to W. C. Sullivan, 7/3/61.) At no time did this or any other aspect of the FBI's investigation produce any evidence that Norman had actually obtained classified information. An FBI summary stated: "The majority of those interviewed thought a competent, well-informed reporter could have written the article without having reviewed or received classified information." (Memorandum from Cotter to Sullivan, 12/15/66.)

[249] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 7/27/62.

[250] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 7/31/62. The tap on the secretary lasted three weeks, and the tap on Baldwin a month. Memoranda from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 8/13/62 and 8/28/62.

[251] Unaddressed memorandum from A. H. Belmont, 1/9/63.

[252] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 10/19/62.

[253] Unaddressed memorandum from "hwg" (Director Hoover's secretary was Helen W. Gandy), 1/9/63. This memorandum reads: "Mr. Belmont called to say (Courtney) Evans spoke to the Attorney General replacing the tech on [former FBI agent] again, and the Attorney General said by all means do this. Mr. Belmont has instructed New York to do so." (Assistant Director Courtney Evans was the FBI's normal liaison with Attorney General Kennedy.)

[254] Memorandum from W. R. Wanall to W. C. Sullivan, 12/22/66. The Sugar Lobby investigation is also discussed at footnote 233.

[255] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Parsons, 2/14/61.

[256] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 2/14/61.

[257] Memorandum from Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/16/61.

[258] Memorandum from Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/16/61.

[259] According to a memorandum of a meeting between Attorney General Kennedy and Courtney Evans, Kennedy stated that "now the law was passed he did not feel there was justification for continuing this extensive investigation." (Memorandum from C. A. Evans to Mr. Parsons 4/14/61.) The investigation did discover possibly unlawful influence was being exerted by representatives of the foreign country involved, but it did not reveal that money was actually being passed to any Executive or congressional official. (Memorandum from Wannall to Sullivan, 12/22/66.)

[260] FBI letterhead memoranda, 6/15, 18, 19/62.

[261] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 6/26/62.

[262] The wiretap on the House Committee Clerk had "produced no information of value." While there is no indication that the other wiretaps, including five directed at foreign targets, produced evidence of actual payoff.,;, they did reveal that possibly unlawful influence was again being exerted by the foreign government, and internal Bureau permission was obtained to continue them for sixty day.,; beyond the initial thirty-day period. (Memorandum from W. R. Wan nail to W. C. Sullivan, 8/16/62.)

[263] A White House "briefing paper," prepared in February 1961, stated, "It is thought by some informed observers that the outcome of the sugar legislation which comes up for renewal in the U.S. Congress in March 1961 will be all-important to the future of U.S./ (foreign country) relations." (Memorandum from Richard M. Bissell, Jr. to McGeorge Bundy, 2/17/61.) Another White House "briefing memorandum" in June 1962 stated, "The action taken by the House of Representatives in passing the House Agriculture Committee bill (The Cooley bill) has created a furor in the (foreign country) . . ." Officials of that country said that the legislation "would be disastrous" to its "economy." (Memorandum from William H. Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy and Myer Feldman, 6/23/62.) (JFK Library.)

[264] See Finding on Political Abuse, pp. 233, 234. The wiretapping of American citizens in these instances could only serve "intelligence," rather than law enforcement purposes, since any criminal prosecution (i.e., for bribery) would have been "tainted" by the warrantless wiretaps. [Coplon v. United States, 185 F. 2d 629 (1950), 191 F. 2d 749 (1951).]

[265] The circumstances indicating this possibility and the eventual determination that the allegation was unfounded are set forth in a memorandum from Director Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy in 1964. (Hoover to Kennedy, 5/4/64 and enclosure. (John F. Kennedy Library) )

[266] The FBI requested the wiretap on the editor and an accompanying tap on a Washington attorney in contact with the editor because of its concern about possible "leaks" of information about FBI loyalty-security investigations of government officials. Director Hoover advised that publication of this "classified information" constituted "a danger to the internal security of the United States." (Memorandum from Hoover to Katzenbach, 4/19/65.) However, in 1964 Director Hoover had volunteered to Attorney General Kennedy information about the Publication of the book alleging impropriety. The author himself had supplied information about the book to the FBI. (Memoranda from Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 7/8/64 and 7/15/64.)

[267] Testimony of William C. Sullivan, Assistant Director for the Domestic Intelligence Division (1961-1970) and Assistant to the Director (1970-1971), 11/1/75, pp. 42-43.

[268] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, 8/28/56.

[269] Memorandum from D. M. Ladd to J. Edgar Hoover, 2/27/46. According to this memorandum the underlying reason for such Bureau propaganda was to anticipate and counteract the "flood of propaganda from Leftist and so-called Liberal sources" which would "be encountered in the event of extensive arrests of Communists" if war with the Soviet Union broke out.

[270] Belmont to Boardman, 8/28/56.

[271] A Bureau monograph in mid-1955 "measured" the Communist Party threat as:

"Influence over the masses, ability to create controversy leading to confusion and disunity, penetration of specific channels in American life where public opinion is molded, and espionage and sabotage potential." [Emphasis supplied.] (Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President, 7/29/55, and enclosed FBI monograph, "The Menace of Communism in the United States Today," pp. iv-v.)

The FBI official who served as Director Hoover's liaison with the CIA in the 1950s stated that "the Communist Party provided a pool of talent for the Soviet [intelligence] services" in the "30s and into the 40s." During that period the Soviets recruited agents "from the Party" to penetrate "the U.S. Government" and "scientific circles." He added, however, that "primarily because of the action and counter-action taken by the FBI during the late 40s, the Soviet services changed their tactics and considerably reduced any programs or projects designed to recruit CP members, realizing or assuming that they were getting heavy attention from the Bureau." (Testimony of former FBI liason with CIA, 0/22/75, p. 32.)

[272] Belmont to Boardman, 8/28/65.

[273] Belmont to Boardman, 9/5/56; memorandum from FBI headquarters to SAC, New York, 9/6/56.

[274] E.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).

[275] Deposition of Supervisor, Internal Security Section, FBI Intelligence Division, 10/16/75, pp. 10, 14.

[276] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York field office, 3/31/60.

[277] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco field office. 4/16/64.

[278] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland field office, 11/6/64.

[279] Forty-five actions were approved by FBI Headquarters tinder the SWP COINTELPRO from 1961 until it was discontinued in 1969. The SWP program Was then subsumed under the New Left COINTELPRO, see pp. 88-89.

[280] Memorandum from Director, FBI, to New York field office, 10/12/61.

[281] Memorandum from the Attorney General to Heads of Departments and Agencies, 4/29/53.

[282] Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968), ch. 2; Report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (1969) ; Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest (1970).

[283] SAC letter 67-27, 5/3/66.

[284] See p. 50.

[285] 1964 FBI Manual section 122, p. 1.

[286] 1965 FBI Manual section 122, pp. 6-8.

[287] FBI Manual Section 122, revised 12/13/06, pp. 8-9.

[288] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 8/25/67.

[289] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 3/4/68.

[290] SAC Letter 68-16, 3/12/68, Subject: Congress of Racial Equality.

[290] SAC Letter 68-25, 4/30/68.

[291] SAC Memorandum 1-72; 5/23/72, Subject: Reporting of Protest Demonstrations

[292] Supervisor, FBI Intelligence Division, deposition, 10/28/75, pp. 7-8.

[293] SAC Letter 68-21, 4/2/68. This directive did caution that "mere dissent and opposition to Governmental policies pursued in a legal constitutional manner" was "not sufficient to warrant inclusion in the Security Index." Moreover, "anti-Vietnam or peace group sentiments" were not, in themselves, supposed to "justify an investigation." The failure of this admonition to achieve its stated objective is discussed in the findings on "Overbreadth" and "Covert Action to Disrupt."

[294] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/9/68.

[295] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 10/28/68, and enclosure, New Left Movement -Report outline.

[296] A further reason for collecting information on the New Left was put forward by Assistant Director] Brennan, head of the FBI intelligence Division in 1970-1971. Since New Left "leaders" had "publicly professed" their desire to overthrow the Government, the Bureau should file the names of anyone who 'joined in membership" for "future reference" in case they ever "obtained a sensitive Government position." (Charles Brennan testimony, 9/25/75, Hearings Vol. 2, pp. 116-117.)

[297] Memorandum from Minneapolis field office to FBI Headquarters, 4/1/70.

[298] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh field office, 5/1/70.

[299] Memorandum from Mobile field office to FBI Headquarters, 12/9/70.

[300] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit field offices, 2/17/66.

[301] Memorandum from Detroit field office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66.

[302] FBI Manual, Section 107.

[303] See Findings on use of informants in "Intrusive Techniques," p. 192.

[304] Memorandum from Attorney General Kennedy to the President, June 1964, quoted in Victor Navasky, Kennedy Justice (New York: Atheneum, 1971), pp. 105--106. The President asked former CIA Director Allen Dulles to evaluate tile situation in Mississippi. Upon his return from a survey of the state, Dulles endorsed the Attorney General's recommendation that the FBI be used to "control the terrorist activities." ("Dulles Requests More FBI Agents for Mississippi," New York Times, 6/27/64.)

[305] Testimony of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach 12/3/75. Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 207.

[306] 1965 FBI manual, section 122, pp. 1-2.

[307] FBI Executives conference memorandum, 3/24/66, Subject: Establishment of a Special Squad Against the Ku Klux Klan.

[308] 1967 FBI manual, Section 122, p. 2.

[309] 1971 FBI manual, Section 122, p. 2.

[310] Memorandum from FBI Executive Conference to Mr. Tolson, 10/29/70.

[311] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs. 11/4/70.

[312] Memorandum from G. C. Moore to William C. Sullivan, 10/11/67. For Attorney General Clark's order, see pp. 83-84.

[313] Memorandum from FBI to Select committee, 8/20/75 and enclosures.)

[314] Memorandum from G. C. Moore to E. S. Miller, 9/8/72.

[315] Memorandum from G. C. Moore to C. D. Brennan. 10/27/70.

[316] Memorandum from Moore to Miller, 9/27/72. This program continued until 1973, when the FBI decided to rely on its regular extremist informants "for 'by-product' information on civil unrest." The most "productive" ghetto informants were "converted" into regular informants. (FBI Inspection Division Memorandum, 11/24/72; Memorandum from Director Clarence M. Kelley to all SACs, 7/31/73.)

[317] Philadelphia Field Office memo 8/12/68, re Racial Informant.

[318] FBI Manual Section 87.

[319] Testimony of FBI Special Agent, 11/20/75, p. 55.

[320] Staff review of informant report summaries.

[321] Mary Jo Cook, testimony, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 111, 119-120.

[322] Report of Kansas City Field Office, 10/20/70.

[323] Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/28/69.

[324] Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley to J. Edgar Hoover, 3/3/69. This memorandum stated that the Department was considering "conducting a grand jury investigation" under the antiriot act and other statutes.

[325] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 4/17/70. This directive defined a "commune" as "a group of individuals residing in one location who practice communal living, i.e., they share income and adhere to the philosophy of a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-oriented violent revolution."

[326] SAC Letter 70-48, 9/15/70. This directive implemented one provision of the "Huston Plan," which had been disapproved as a domestic intelligence package. See pp. 113, 116.

[327] See Memorandum for the Record from Milton B. Hyman, Office of the General Counsel, to the Army General Counsel, 1/23/71, in Military Surveillance, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974), p. 203.

[328] Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights, Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (1971), at pp. 1120-1121.

[329] Federal Data Banks. Hearings, at pp. 1123-1138.

[330] President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967), pp. 118-119.

[331] Fred M. Vinson testimony, 1/27/76, p. 32.

[332] Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968), p. 487 (Bantam Books ed.).

[333] Report of the National Advisory Commission, p. 490.

[334] SAC Letter 69-16, 3/11/69 . This order "recognized that with the graduation of senior classes, you will lose a certain percentage of your existing student informant coverage." But this would "not be accepted as an excuse for not developing the necessary information."

[335] SAC Letter 69-44, 8/19/69.

[336] Improper Police Intelligence Activities, A Report by the Extended March 1975 Cook County (Illinois) Grand Jury, 11/10/75.

[337] Califano testimony, 1/27/76, pp. 6-9. Califano states in retrospect that the attempt to "predict violence" was "not a successful undertaking," that "advance intelligence about dissident groups" would not "have been of much help," and that what is "important" is "physical intelligence about geography, hospitals, power stations, etc." (Califano, 1/27/76, pp. 8, 11-12.)

[338] In 1966, the Justice Department had started an informal "Summer Project," staffed by a handful of law students, to pull together data from the newspapers, the U.S. Attorneys, and "some Bureau material" for the purpose, according to former Assistant Attorney General Fred Vinson, Jr., of finding out "what's going on in the black community." (Vinson, 1/27/76 p. 33.)

[339] Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General John Doar to Attorney General Clark, 9/27/67.

[340] Memorandum from Messrs. Maroney, Nugent, McTiernan, and Turner to Attorney General Clark, 12/6/67.

[341] Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Assistant Attorneys General John Doar, Fred Vinson, Jr., Roger W. Wilkins, and J. Walter Yeagley, 12/18/67.

[342] Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Kevin T. Maroney, et al., 11/9/67.

[343] Testimony of Kevin T. Maroney (Deputy Assistant Attorney General), 1/27/76, pp. 59-60.

[344] Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley to Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst, 2/6/69.

[345] Justice Department memorandum from James T. Devine, 9/10/70, Subject: Interdivisional Information Unit.

[346] Statement of Deputy Attorney General Laurence H. Silberman, Justice Department, 1/14/75. According to this statement, a Justice Department inquiry in 1975 concluded that Leonard "initiated the transaction by requesting the CIA to check against its own sources whether any of the Individuals on the IDIU list were engaged in foreign travel, or received foreign assistance or funding."

[347] Staff Memorandum for the Subcommittee on constitutional Rights, United States Senate, 9/14/71.

[348] See detailed report on Martin Luther King, Jr.

[349] Manual, Section 87.

[350] The Bureau frequently disseminated reports on the NAACP to military intelliegence because (as one report put it) of the latter's "interest in matters pertaining to infiltration of the NAACP." (Report from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/5/65.) All the national officers and board members were listed, and any data in FBI files on their past "association" with "subversives" was included. Most of this information went back to the 1940's. (Report from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/65.) When changes occurred in the NAACP's leadership and board, the Bureau once again went back to its files to dredge up "subversive" associations from the 1940's. (Report from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66.) Chapter member information was sometimes obtained by "pretext telephone call ... utilizing the pretext of being interested in joining that branch of the NAACP." (Memorandum from Los Angels field office to FBI Headquarters, 11/5/65.) As discussed previously, the Bureau never found that the NAACP had abandoned its consistent anti-Communist policy. (See p. 49).

[351] See examples of the exaggeration of Communist influence set forth in Findings on Political Abuse. Such distortion continues today. An FBI Intelligence Division Section Chief told the Committee that he could not "think of very many" major demonstrations in this country in recent years "that were not caused by" the Communist Party or the Socialist Workers Party. In response to questioning, the Section Chief listed eleven specific demonstrations since 1965. Three of these turned out to be principally SDS demonstrations, although some individual Communists did participate in one of them. Six others were organized by the National (or New) Mobilization Committee, which the Section Chief stated was subject to Communist and Socialist Workers Party "influence. " But the Section Chief admitted that the mobilization Committee "probably" included a wide spectrum of persons from all elements of American society. (R. L. Shackleford deposition, 2/13/76, pp. 3-8.) The FBI has not alleged that the Socialist Workers Party is dominated or controlled by any foreign government. (Shackelford testimony, 2/6/76, pp. 73-77, 114.)

[352] See Sections B-3 and C-2.

[353] Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall (Civil Rights Division), 12/4/62.

[354] Memorandum from St. J. B. (St. John Barrett) to Burke Marshall, 6/18/63.

[355] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, 7/11/63.

[356] Memorandum from Carl W. Gabel to Burke Marshall, 7/19/63. This memorandum described twenty-one such "racial matters" In ten states, including states outside the South such as Ohio, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Nevada. While some of the items in this and later summaries related to violent or potentially violent protest demonstrations, they went beyond those limits to include entirely peaceful protest activity and group activities (such as conferences, meetings, leadership changes) unrelated to demonstrations. (Memoranda from Gabel to Marshall, 7/22 and 7/25, 8/2 and 8/22/63.) The Justice Department's role in expanding FBI Intelligence operations against the Klan is discussed at pp.

[357] Telegram from Attorney General Kennedy to U.S. Attorneys, 5/27/63.

[358] The basis for the inquiry was explained in the most general terms: "Keeping the Peace In this country is essentially the responsibility of the state government. Where lawless conditions arise, however, with similar characteristics from coast to coast, the matter is one of national concern even though there is no direct connection between the events and even though no Federal law is violated." (Text Of FBI Report on Recent Racial Disturbances, New York Times, 9/27/64.)

[359] Memorandum from Attorney General Katzenbach to President Johnson, 8/17/65.

[360] See p.. 71.

[361] Remarks of the President, 7/29/67, in Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968), p. 537 (Bantam Books ed.)

[362] Executive Order 11365 7/29/67.

[363] Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Tolson, 8/1/67, Subject: Director's Testimony Before National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. This memorandum indicates that, following this testimony, Director Hoover ordered his subordinates to intensify their collection of intelligence about "vociferous rabble- rousers." The creation thereafter of a "Rabble Rouser Index" is discussed at pp. 89-90.

[364] Memorandum from Attorney General Ramsey Clark to J. Edgar Hoover, 9/14/67.

[365] Memorandum from Assistant Attorney 'General John Doar to Attorney General Clark, 9/27/67.

[366] Memorandum from Clark to Hoover, 9/14/67.

[367] Clark to Hoover, 9/14/67. The Department's establishment of a special unit for Intelligence evaluation Is discussed at pp. 115-116.

[368] SAC Letter 67-72, 10/17/67. The scope of the "ghetto informant program" Is described at pp. 75-76.

[369] Memorandum from Joseph Califano to the President, 1/18/68. Those present were Attorney General Clark, Deputy Attorney General Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, Acting Army General Counsel Robert Jordan, and Presidential assistants Matthew Nimetz and Califano.

[370] Memorandum from the Army General Counsel to the Under Secretary of the Army, 1/10/68. Former Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson has said that there were several other meetings at the White House where the Army was urged to take a greater role In the civil disturbance collection effort. (Staff summary Of Harold K. Johnson Interview, 11/18/75.)

[371] Federal Data Banks, Hearings, at p. 1137 on at least one occasion, Deputy Attorney General Warren Christopher thanked an Army intelligence officer for reports and daily summaries. (Letter from Deputy Assistant General Christopher to Maj. Gen. William P. Yarborough, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 5/15/68.) The Justice Department's intelligence analysis unit received "army intelligence reports" during 1968 on persons and groups involved in "racial agitation." (Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley to Duputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst. 2/6/69.)

[372] Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Attorney General John N. Mitchell to the President, 4/1/69, Subject: Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances. This reflected a failure on the part of the Army General Counsel to persuade the Justice Department to relieve the Army of HO domestic intelligence-gathering role. (Memorandum from Robert E. Jordan, Army General Counsel, to the Secretary of the Army, Subject: Review of Civil Disturbance Intelligence History, in Military Surveillance, Hearings, p. 296.)

[373] Letter from Robert E. Lynch, Acting Adjutant General of the Army, to subordinate commands, 6/9/70, Subject: Collection, Reporting, Processing, and Storage of Civil Disturbance information.

See discussion of the termination of this program in Section III ["Terminations" Sub-finding under "Accountability and Control"].

[374] Agreement Between the Federal Bureau of investigation and the Secret Service Concerning Presidential Protection, 2/3/65. The FBI was to report to Secret Service information about "subversives, ultra-rightists, racists and fascists" who expressed "strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiment" or made "statements indicating a propensity for violence and antipathy toward good order and government."

These reporting standards were modified in 1971 to require the FBI to refer to Secret Service: "Information concerning civil disturbances, anti-U.S. demonstrations or incidents or demonstrations against foreign diplomatic establishments;" and "Information concerning persons who may be considered potentially dangerous to individuals protected by the [Secret Service] because of their -- participation in groups engaging in activities inimical to the United States." With respect to organizations, the FBI reported information on their "officers," "size," "goals," "source of financial support," and other "background data." (Agreement Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Secret Service Concerning Protective Responsibilities, 11/26/71.)

[375] Investigative Guidelines: Title XI, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Regulation of Explosives.

[376] FBI Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, August 17-September 9, 1971, pp. 224-38.

[377] Memoranda from FBI headquarters to all SAC's, 9/2/64; 8/25/67; 5/9/68

[378] See pp. 74-75.

[379] Memorandum from J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson, 7/30/64 (Gale was Assistant Director for the Inspection Division).

[380] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 9/2/64.

[381] The average of 40 "White Hate" actions per year way be compared to an average of over 100 per year against the Communist Party from 1956-1971(totalling 1636). Exhibit 11, Hearings, vol. 6, p. 371.

[382] These techniques and those used against the other target groups referred to below are discussed in greater detail in the COINTELPRO detailed report and in the Covert Action section of the Findings, Part III, p. 211.

[383] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 8/25/67.

[384] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACS. 3/4/68.

[385] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to SACS. 11/25/68.

[386] The average was over 90 per year. (Exhibit 11. Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 371.)

[387] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/9/68.

[388] C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/9/68.

[389] Supervisor, FBI Intelligence Division, 10/28/75, p. 39.

[390] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACS, 5/23/68.

[391] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACS, 10/9/68.

[392] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACS, 7/6/68.

[393] Approximately 100 per year (Exhibit 11, Hearings, Vol. 6, P. 371.).

[393] Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Tolson, 8/1/67. (At the meeting, a Commission member had asked the Bureau to "identify the number of militant Negroes and whites.")

[394] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/3/67; SAC Letter 67-56, 9/12/67.

[395] SAC Letter No. 67-70, 11/28/67.

[396] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs. 3/21/68.

[397] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 1/30/68.

[398] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/9/68.

[399] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/24/68.

[400] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 10/24/68.

[401] Memorandum from G. C. Moore to C. D. Brennan, 12/22/70.

[402] omitted in original.

[403] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 12/23/70.

[404] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 4/30/68.

[405] See pp. 54-55.

[406] C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 4/30/68.

[407] See pp. 54-55 and Report on FBI Investigations.

[408] Presidential Emergency Action Document 6, as quoted in Brennan to Sullivan, 4/30/68.

[409] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 4/30/68.

[410] C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 4/30/68.

[411] C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 4/30/68.

[412] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to J. Walter Yeagley, 5/1/68; Yeagley to Hoover, 6/17/68.

[413] Among the criteria specifically approved by the Justice Department which Went beyond the statutory standard of reasonable likelihood of espionage and sabotage were the expanded references to persons who have "anarchistic or revolutionary beliefs" and are "likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency" to commit acts which constitute "interference with" the "effective operation of the national, state and local governments and of the defense effort." (Assistant Attorney General Frank M. Wozencraft, Office of Legal Counsel, to Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley, Internal Security Division, 9/9/68.) The standards as approved were transmitted to the FBI, and its Manual was revised accordingly. (Yeagley to Hoover, 9/19/68; Hoover to Yeagley, 9/26/68; FBI Manual, Section 87, p. 45, revised 10/14/68.) The FBI still maintained its Reserve Index, unbeknownst to the Department.

[414] One of the express purposes was to use tax information to "expose" the Klan Members "within the Klan organization for] publicly by showing Income beyond their means," (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 5/10/65.) Disclosure of tax Information "publicly" or "within the Klan organization" in is prohibited by statute.

[415] Memorandum from D. 0. Virdin to H. E. Snyder, 5/2/68. Subject: Inspection Of Returns by FBI

[416] Donald 0. Virdin testimony, 9/16/75, pp. 69-73.

[417] Staff Memorandum: Review of Materials in FBI Administrative File on "Income Tax Returns Requested."

[418] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 12/6/68.

[419] Leon Green deposition, 9/12/75, pp. 6-8.

[420] Statement of J. W. Yeagley to Senate Select Committee, September 1975.

[421] Memorandum from Midwest City Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/1/68.

[422] CIA memorandum, Subject: BUTANE-Victor Marchetti.

[423] CIA memorandum, Subject: IRS Briefing on Ramparts, 2/2/67.

[424] CIA memorandum. Subject: IRS Briefing on Ramparts, 2/2/67.

[425] Leon C. Green testimony, 9/12/75, p. 36.

[426] Investigation of the Special Service Staff of the IRS" by the staff of the Joint Committee on internal Revenue Taxation, 6/5/75, pp. 17-18.

[427] Memorandum of IRS Commissioner Thrower, 6/16/69.

[428] Memorandum from D. W. Bacon to Director, FBI, 8/8/69.

[429] Memorandum from D. J. Brennan, Jr., to W. C. Sullivan, 8/15/69.

[430] SSS Bi-weekly Report, 6/15/70.

[431] SSS Bi-weekly Report, 8/29/69.

[432] For a discussion of IDIU standards, see pp. 78-81, 122-123.

[433] Donald Alexander testimony, 10/2/25, Hearings, Vol. 3, pp. 29-30.

[433] Green. 9/12/75, pp. 65-456, 73-74; Statement of Auditor, San Francisco District, 7/30/75, p. 1 ; statement of Collector. Los Angeles District, 8/3/75.

[434] Donald Alexander testimony, 10/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 3, pp. 10-11.

[435] Hearings before the House Committee on Expenditures In the Executive Departments, on H.R. 2319 80th Cong. (1947), p. 127.

[436] Former FBI Liaison with CIA testimony, 9/22/75, p. 9.

[437] Former FBI liaison with CIA testimony, 9/22/75, pp, 9-11.

[438] Liaison, 9/22/75, p. 11. For a discussion of liaison problems between FBI and CIA In 1970. see pp. 112113.

[439] Liaison, 9/22/75, p. 52. "Central intelligence Agency operations in the United States,, FBI-CIA Memorandum of Understanding, 2/7/66.

[440] Liaison, 9/22/75, p, 55

[441] Liaison, 9/22/75, PI). *57-58. These "internal security" aspects of the 1966 FBI-CIA agreement were not the only pre-CHAOS arrangements bringing the CIA into liaison with the FBI. For example, as early as 1963 the FBI Manual was revised to state that information concerning "proposed travel abroad" by domestic "subversives" was to be "furnished by the Bureau to the Department Of State" and the "Central Intelligence Agency:" and field offices were advised to recommend the "extent of foreign investigation" which was required. (FBI Manual Section 87, p. 33a, revised 4/15/63.)

[442] President Ford's Executive Order 11905, 2/18/76. This order, discussed more fully in Part IV, Recommendations, in effect reinforces the 1966 FBI-CIA agreement and defines CIA counterintelligence duties abroad to include "foreign subversion" directed against the United States.

[443] The National Security Council Intelligence Directives, or NSCIDs, have been promulgated by the National Security Council to provide the basic organization and direction of the intelligence agencies.

[444] Joseph Califano testimony, 1/27/76, p. 70.

[444] Richard Ober testimony, 10/30/75, p. 88.

[445] Ober, 10/28/75, p. 45.

[446] Memorandum from Richard Ober to James Angleton, 6/9/70, p. 9.

[447] Letter from Director W. Colby to Vice President Rockefeller, 8/8/75, p. 6 of attachment.

[448] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan re New Left Movement, 2/3/69.

[449] SAC Letter No. 67--66,11/7/67.

[450] Memorandum from Thomas Karamessines to James Angleton, 8/15/67, p. 1.

[451] Helms, Rockefeller Commission, 4/28/75, pp. 2434-2435.

[452] CIA Headquarters cable to several field stations, August, 1967, p. 1.

[453] Memorandum from Richard Helms to President Johnson, 11/15/67.

[454] CIA Cable from Acting DDP to various field stations, November 1967, pp. 1-2.

[455] CIA Cable from Thomas Karamessines to various field stations, July 1968, P. 1.

[456] Memorandum from Tom Huston to the Deputy Director, CIA, 6/20/69, p. 1.

[457] Cable from CIA headquarters to stations, November 1969.

[458] Charles Marcules testimony, Rockefeller Commission, 3/10/75, pp. 1538-1547, 16566-1567; Ober, 9/24/75, p. 46. (For security reasons, the CHAOS agent case officer testified as "Charles Marcules".)

[459] Marcules Contact Report, 4/17/71; Marcules, Rockefeller Commission, 3/10/75 Jr. 1556-1558.

[460] Memorandum from Richard Ober to Chief, CI Project, 2/15/72.

[461] Ober, 10/30/75, pp. 16-17.

[462] Letter from Richard Helms to Henry Kissinger, 2/18/69.

[463] Richard Helms deposition, Rockefeller Commission, 4/24/75, p. 223.

[464] Helms deposition, Rockefeller Commission, 4/24/75, p. 234, Ober deposition, Rockefeller Commission, 3/28/75, pp. 137-138.

[465] memorandum from Inspector General to Executive Director-comptroller, 11/9/72, P. 1.

[466] Memorandum from Executive Director-Comptroller to DDP, 12/20/72.

[467] Cable from CIA Director William Colby to Field Stations, March 1974.

[468] Rockefeller Commission Report, p. 23.

[469] Agent 1. Contact Report, Volume 11, Agent 1 file.

[470] 50 U. S.C. 403 (d) (3).

[471] Lawrence Houston testimony, Rockefeller Commission, 3/17/75, pp. 1654-1655.

[472] Rockefeller Commission Report, pp. 162-166.

[473] According to a "memorandum for the record" sent by CIA General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston to Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers in 1954, an agreement was reached at that time allowing the CIA to investigate on its own any "actual or probable violation of criminal statutes" involving the CIA's "covert operations" and to determine for itself, without consulting the Justice Department, whether there were "possibilities for prosecution." The Justice Department would not be informed if the CIA decided that there should be no prosecution on the ground that it might lead to "revelation of highly classified information." (Memorandum from Houston to Rogers, 3/1/54, and enclosed memorandum from Houston to the Director of Central Intelligence, 2/23/54.)

This practice was reviewed and re-confirmed internally within the CIA on at least two subsequent occasions. (Memorandum from Houston to the Assistant to the Director, CIA, 1/6/60; memorandum from Houston to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. 6/10/64.) It was not terminated until 1975. (Memorandum from John S. Warner, CIA General Counsel, for the record. 1/31/75.)

[474] These CIA activities, Projects MERRIMACK and RESISTANCE, were described in great detail by the Rockefeller Commission. (Rockefeller Commission Report. Chg. 12 and 13.)

[477] The Rockefeller Commission Report describes two cases in which telephones of three newsmen were tapped ... [One] occurred in 1962, apparently with the knowledge and consent of Attorney General Kennedy." (Rockefeller Commission Report, p. 164.)

[478] Memorandum from President Truman to Secretary of Defense, 10/24/52.

[479] General Lew Allen testimony, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 6.

[480] Allen, 10/29/75, Hearings, vol. 2, p. 11. The programs of NSA are discussed further in the succeeding section, "Intrusive Techniques," p. 183.

[481] omitted in original.

[482] omitted in original.

[483] Memorandum from FBI Executive Conference to Mr. Tolson, 10/29/70. see pp. 74-76.

[484] Memorandum from Hoover to Angleton, 3/10/72.

[485] Memorandum from NSA MINARET Charter, 7/1/69.

[486] Memorandum from Hoover to Katzenbach, 3/30/65.

[487] Memorandum from President Johnson to Heads of Departments, 6/30/65.

[487] Memorandum from Katzenbach to Hoover, 9/27/65; Supplemental Memorandum to the Supreme Court in Black v. United States, July 13, 1966.

Katzenbach also stated to Hoover that while he believed such techniques could be properly used in cases involving organized crime, he would not approve such requests in the immediate future "in light of the present atmosphere."

[488] Memorandum from Katzenbach to Hoover, 9/27/65.

[489] Memorandum from Hoover to Katzenbach, 6/15/65.

[490] Memorandum from Hoover to Katzenbach, 5/25/65.

[491] Memorandum from Hoover to Katzenbach, 4/19/65, see footnote 266.

[492] Memorandum from Hoover to Katzenbach, 6/7/65, see footnote 266.

[493] Memorandum from Hoover to Katzenbach, 9/28/64.

[494] Memorandum from Hoover to Katzenbach, 3/3/65.

[495] Memoranda from Hoover to Katzenbach, 5/17/65,10/19/65, 12/1/65.

[496] For example, Clark turned down FBI requests to wiretap the National Mobilization Committee Office for Demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968. (Memoranda from Hoover to Clark 3/11/68, 3/22/68, 6/11/68). Clark decided that there wag not "an adequate demonstration of a direct threat to the national security." (Clark to Hoover, 3/12/68) (These memoranda appear at Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 740-755.

[497] Clark has stated that he denied requests "to tap Abba Eban when he was on a visit to this country, an employee of the United Nations Secretariat, the Organization of Arab Students in the U.S., the Tanzanian Mission to the U.N., the office of the Agricultural Counselor at the Soviet Embassy and a correspondent of TASS." [Statement of Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate (1974).]

[498] Katz v. United States, 397 U.S. 347 (1967). This case explicitly left open the question of warrantless electronic surveillance in "situation(s) involving the national security." (397 U.S., at 358 n. 23.)

[499] 19 U. S.C. 2511 (3).

[500] See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).

[501] Memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Mitchell, 3/16/70.

[502] See Findings C and E, pp. 183 and 225.

[503] For example, at one time in March 1971 the FBI was conducting one microphone surveillance of Black Panther Party leader Huey Newton, seven wiretaps of Black Panther Party offices including Newton's residence, one wiretap on another black extremist group, one wiretap on Jewish Defense League headquarters, one wiretap on a "New Left extremist group", and two wiretaps on "New Left extremist activities." (Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to C. D. Brennan, 3/29/71, printed in Hearings, Vol. II, pp. 270-271.)

[503] Memoranda from Hoover to Attorney General Mitchell, 11/5/69 and 11/7/69. This and other aspects of electronic surveillance in this period are discussed in Findings C and E in greater detail, pp. 183 and 225.

[504] United States v. United States District Court. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).

[505] United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S., at 309 (1972).

[506] Memorandum. from William Olson to Elliott Richardson, June 1973. Until 1975, however, the Justice Department stretched the term "connection with a foreign Power" to include domestic groups, such as the Jewish Defense League, whose protest actions against a foreign nation were believed to threaten the United States," relations with that nation. [Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F. 2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975).]

[507] Memorandum from FBI/CIA Liaison Agent to D. J. Brennan, 1/16/69.

[508] Routing Slip from J. Edgar Hoover to James Angleton (attachment), 3/10/72.

[509] DOD Cable, Yarborough to Carter, 10/20/67.

[510] NSA's name, for example, was to be kept off any of the disseminated "product."

[511] MINARET Charter, 7/1/69.

[512] W. R. Wannnall (FBI Assistant Director for Intelligence), 10/3/75, p. 13. "The feeling is that there was very little in the way of good product as a result of our having supplied names to NSA."

[513] Memorandum from Hoover to Katzenbach, 9/14/65. This memorandum dealt specifically with electronic surveillance and did not mention mail openings or "Black Bag Jobs." Hoover said the FBI bad "discontinued" microphone surveillances (bugs), a restriction which Attorney General Katzenbach said went too far. (Katzenbach to Hoover 9/27/65.)

[514] omitted in original.

[515] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Tolson, 2/27/65. Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/75. Hearings, Vol. 6. p. 204.

[516] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to C. Tolson, 2/27/65.

[517] Hoover Note on Belmont Memorandum to Tolson, 2/27/65.

[518] Memorandum from Hoover to Tolson, et al., 3/2/65.

[519] Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 205-206.

[520] Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 1/21/66.

[521] Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 1/10/66.

[522] Memorandum from M. A. Tones to Robert Wick, 1/11/66.

[523] Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 1/21/66.

[524] C. D. Brennan deposition, 9/23/75, p. 42.

[525] According to FBI records and the recollections of Bureau agents, the following number of microphone surveillances involving "surreptitious entry" were installed in "internal security, intelligence, and counterintelligence" investigations: 1964: 80; 1965: 59; 1966: 4; 1967: 0: 1968: 9; 1969: 8; 1970: 15: 1971: 6; 1972: 22: 1973: 18: 1974: 9; 1975: 13. The similar figures for "criminal investigations" (including installations authorized by judicial warrant after 1968) are: 1964: 83; 1965: 41; 1966: 0; 1967: 0: 1968: 0; 1969: 3: 1970: 8; 1971: 7; 1972: 19 ; 1973: 27; 1974: 22; 1975: 11. (Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 10/17/75.)

[526] Hoover note on memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach, 7/19/66. This memorandum cited as a "prime example" of the utility of a "black bag jobs" a break-in to steal records of three high-ranking Klan officials relating to finances and membership which "we have been using most effectively to disrupt the organization."

[527] Wannall, 10/13/75, pp. 45-46. There is to this day no formal order prohibiting FBI maiI-opening, although Assistant Director Wannall contended that general FBI Manual instructions now applicable forbid any unlawful technique.

[528] These techniques were not prohibited by law. Their use was banned in all cases, including serious criminal investigations and foreign counterintelligence matters. (memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. 11. Belmont, 9/30/64.) Mail covers, which may be used to identify from their exteriors certain letters which can then be opened with a judicial warrant, were reinstituted with Justice Department approval in 1971. (Memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell, 7/27/71; Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson to Hoover, 9/31/71.)

[529] Memorandum from Hoover to Tolson and DeLoach, 1/6/67.

[530] "Once Mr. Hoover, apparently at the request of the National Security Agency, bought approval to break and enter into a foreign mission at the United Nations to procure cryptographic materials to facilitate decoding of intercepted transmissions. The request was presented with some urgency, rejected and presented again on perhaps several occasions. it was never approved and constituted the only request of that kind." [Statement of former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, (1974).]

[531] Memorandum from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 2/23/75.

[532] Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 3/31/70.

[533] Memorandum from John R. Brown to H. R. Haldeman, 4/30/70.

[534] Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach, 6/20/69; Memorandum from Huston to Hoover, 6/20/69.

[535] Tom Charles Huston testimony, 5/23/75, p. 19.

[536] Huston, 5/23/75, pp. 23, 28.

[537] Helms deposition, 9/10/75, p. 3; Bennett deposition, 8/5/75, p. 12; Gayler deposition, 6/19/75, pp. 6-7. As early as 1963, the FBI Director had successfully opposed a proposal to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board by CIA Director John McCone for expanded domestic wiretapping for foreign Intelligence purposes. (Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 3/7/70). In 1969, CIA Director Richard Helms was told by the Bureau, when he asked it to institute electronic surveillance on behalf of the CIA, that he should "refer such requests directly to Attorney General for approval." (Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach, 3/30/70.) The administrators of NSA also failed to persuade Director Hoover to lift his restraints on foreign intelligence electronic surveillance. (Staff summary of Louis Tordella interview, 6/16/75.)

[538] Note by Hoover on letter from Helms to Hoover. 2/26/70.

[539] Former FBI Liaison with CIA testimony, 9/22/75, p. 3.

[540] Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach, 3/30/70, pp. 1-2, 4.

[541] Memorandum from Hoover to Helms, 3/31/70.

[542] Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 32.

[543] Presidential Talking Paper, 6/5/70, from the Nixon Papers.

[544] The report was written by the Research Section of the FBI Domestic Intelligence Division on the basis of committee decisions and FBI Director Hoover's revisions (Staff Summary of Richard Cotter interview, 9/15/75.)

[545] The seven recommendations were made in an attachment to a memorandum from Huston to Haldeman, 7/70.

[546] Memorandum from Huston to Haldeman, 7/70.

[547] Memorandum from Huston to Haldeman, 7/70. In using the word "burglary," Huston said he sought to "escalate the rhetoric ... to make it as bold as possible." He thought that, as a staff man, he should give the President "the worst possible interpretation of what the recommendation would result in." (Huston deposition. 5/22/75, p. 69.)

[548] Huston deposition. 5/22/75, p. 8.

[549] Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to Intelligence Directors, 7/23/70.

[550] Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach, 4/14/70.

[551] An assistant to the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency recalls agreeing with his superior that the memorandum from Huston to the intelligence directors showed that the White House had "passed that one down about as low as they could go" and that the absence of signatures by the President or his top aides indicated "what a hot potato it was." (Staff summary of James Stillwell interview, 5/21/75.)

[552] Mitchell testimony, 10/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 122.

[553] Memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell, 7/25/70.

[554] Helms memorandum for the record, 7/28/70.

[555] Mitchell, 10/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 123.

[556] Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 56; staff summary of David McManus interview, 7/1/75.

[557] Director Helms thinks he told Attorney General Mitchell about the CIA mail program. Helms also believes President Nixon may have known about the program although Helms did not personally inform him. (Helms, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, pp. 88-89.) Mitchell denied that Helms told him of a CIA mail opening program and testified that the President had no knowledge of the at least not as of the time we discussed the Huston Plan." (Mitchell, 9/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, pp. 120,138.)

[558] In March 1971, NSA Director Noel Gayler and CIA Director Helms met with. Attorney General Mitchell and Director Hoover. According to Hoover's memo of the meeting, it had been arranged by Helms to discuss "a broadening of operations, particularly of the very confidential type in covering intelligence both domestic and foreign." Hoover was again "not enthusiastic" because of "the hazards involved." Mitchell asked Helms and Gayler to prepare "an in-depth examination" of the collection methods they desired. (Memorandum for the files by J. Edgar Hoover, 4/12/71.) It was less than two months after this meeting that, according to a CIA memorandum, Director Helms briefed Mitchell on the program. (CIA memorandum for the record, 6/3/71.) Even before this meeting, NSA Director Gayler sent a memorandum to Attorney General Mitchell and Secretary Melvin Laird describing "NSA's Contribution to Domestic Intelligence." This memorandum refers to a discussion with both Mitchell and Laird on how NSA could assist with "intelligence bearing on domestic problems." The memorandum mentioned the monitoring of foreign support for subversive activities, as well as for drug trafficking, although it did not discuss specifically the NSA "Watch List" of Americans. (Memorandum from NSA Director Noel to the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General, January 26, 1971.) NSA official Benson Buffham recorded that he personally showed this memorandum to Mitchell and had been told by the Military Assistant to Secretary Laird that the Secretary had read and agreed with it. (Memorandum for the by Benson K. Buffham, 2/3/71.)

[559] Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian to Attorney Mitchell, 12/4/70.

[560] Memorandum from Gayler to Laird and Mitchell. 1/26/71.

[561] For a discussion of the FBI as "consumer," see pp. 107-109.

[562] The resumption of mail covers is discussed above at footnote 528. FBI field offices were instructed that they could recruit 18-21 year-old informers in September 1970. (SAC Letter No. 70-48, 9/15/70.) See. p. 76.

[563] The head of the FBI Domestic Intelligence Division, William C. Sullivan, was promoted to be Assistant to the Director for all investigative and intelligence activities. His successor in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division was Charles D. Brennan.

[564] Executives Conference to Tolson, 10/29/70; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 11/4/70.

[565] Brennan deposition, 9/23/75, pp. 29-31.

[566] Brennan testimony, 9/2.5/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 108.

[567] The involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in improper activities for the White House is described in the Rockefeller Commission Report, Ch. 14.

[568] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Marvin Watson, 6/4/65.

[569] Memorandum from Hoover to Moyers, 10/27/64, cited in FBI summary memorandum, subject: Senator Barry Goldwater, 1/31/75.

[569] Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 1/17/67.

[570] Memorandum from Hoover to Marvin Watson, 11/8/66.

[571] See Finding on Political Abuse, p. 225.

[572] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to John D. Ehrlichman, 10/6/69, House Judiciary Committee Hearings, Statement of Information (1974), Book VII, P. 1111; Book VIII, p. 183 Director Hoover volunteered information from Bureau files to the Johnson White House on the author of a play satirizing the President. (Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 1/9/67.)

[573] Memorandum from Hoover to Tolson, et al., 5/18/70. Agnew admits having received such information, but denies having asked for it. (Staff summary of Spiro Agnew interview, 10/15/75.)

[574] Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Mohr, 8/29/64.

[575] DeLoach memorandum, 8/29/64; Cartha DeLoach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 177. A 1975 FBI Inspection Report has speculated that the SNCC bug may have been planted because the Bureau had information in 1964 that "an apparent member of the Communist Party, USA, was engaging in considerable activity, much in a leadership capacity in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee." (FBI summary memorandum. 1/30/75.) It is unclear, however, whether this bug was even approved internally by FBI Headquarters, as ordinarily required by Bureau procedures. DeLoach stated in a contemporaneous memorandum that the microphone surveillance of SNCC was instituted "with Bureau approval." (Memorandum from DeLoach to Mohr, 8/29/64.) But the Inspection Report concluded that "a thorough review of Bureau records fails to locate any memorandum containing [internal] authorization for same." (FBI summary memorandum, 1/30/75.)

[576] Mr. DeLoach cited the fact that In the summer of 1964 "there was an ongoing electronic surveillance on Dr. Martin Luther King . . . as authorized by Attorney General Kennedy." (Cartha DeLoach testimony, 11/26/75, p. 110) The Inspection Report noted that the Special Agent in Charge of the Newark office was instructed to institute the wiretap on the ground that "the Bureau had authority from the Attorney General to cover any residences which King may use with a technical installation." (FBI summary memorandum 1/30/75, Subject: "Special Squad at Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey, August 22-28, 1964. ")

[577] Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, 8/21/64.

[578] Staff summary of Walter Jenkins interview, 12/1/75.

[579] DeLoach, 11/26/75. p. 114.

[580] Theodore White, Making of the President 1964 (New York: Athenium. 1965). pp. 277-280. Walter Jenkins also confirmed this characterization. (Staff summary of Jenkins interview, 12/1/75).

[581] Memorandum from DeLoach to Mohr, 8/29/64.

[582] Memorandum from H. N. Bassett to Mr. Callahan, 1/29/75.

[583] DeLoach, 11/26/75, p. 139.

[584] Staff summary of Jenkins interview, 1/21/75.

[585] Exhibit 68-2, Hearings, Vol. VI, p. 713.

[586] FBI memoranda indicate that in 1968 Vice President Hubert Humphrey's Executive Assistant, Bill Connell, asked the Bureau to send a "special team" to the forthcoming Democratic National Convention, since President Johnson "allegedly told the Vice President that the FBI had been of great service to him and he had been given considerable information on a timely basis throughout the entire convention." (Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 8/7/68). After talkIng with Connell, Director Hoover advised the SAC in Chicago that the Bureau was "not going to get into anything political but anything of extreme action or violence contemplated we want to let Connell know." (Memorandum from Hoover to Tolson, Pt al., 8/15/68.) Democratic Party Treasurer John Criswell made a similar request, stating that Postmaster General Marvin Watson "had informed him of the great service performed by the FBI during the last Democratic Convention." (Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 8/22/68.)

[587] FBI summary memorandum, 2/3/75.

[588] FBI summary memorandum, 2/3/75.

[589] FBI summary memorandum, 2/3/75.

[590] FBI summary memorandum, 2/3/75. See Findings on Political Abuse.

[591] FBI summary memorandum, 2/1/75.

[592] Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 10/29/68: memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 10/30/68; memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General. 3/27/69.

Attorney General Clark testified that he was unaware of any surveillance of Mrs. Chennault, (Clark, 12/3/75. Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 251-252.)

[593] See Findings on Political Abuse, p. 225.

[594] John Ehrlichman testimony, Senate Watergate Committee, 7/24/73, p. 2535. According to the transcript of the White House tapes, President Nixon stated to John Dean on April 16,1973:

"What I mean is I think in the case of the Kraft stuff what the FBI did, they were both fine. I have checked the facts. There were some done through private sources. Most of it was done through the Bureau after we got -Hoover didn't want to do Kraft. What it involved apparently, John, was this: the leaks from NSC [National Security Council]. They were in Kraft and others columns and we were trying to plug the leaks and we had to get it done and finally we turned it over to Hoover. And then when the hullabaloo developed we just knocked it off altogether. (Submission of Recorded Presidential Conversations to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives by President Richard Nixon, 4/30/74.) The President's statement was made in the context of 'coaching' John Dean on what to say to the Watergate Grand Jury.

[595] William Ruckleshaus testimony before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, 5/9/74, p. 320.

[596] Kraft testified that Henry Kissinger, then the President's Special Adviser National Security, informed him that he had no knowledge of either the wire or the hotel room bug. Kraft also stated that former Attorney General Elliot Richardson indicated to him that "there was no justification for these activities." (Joseph Kraft testimony, Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, 5/10/74, p. 381.)

[597] Letter from W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Hoover, 7/12/69.

[598] While the summaries sent to Hoover by Sullivan did show that Kraft contacted North Vietnamese officials (Letter from Sullivan to Hoover, 7/12/69), the Bureau did not discover any improprieties or indiscretions on his part. When Ruchelshaus was asked if his review of these summaries revealed to him that engaged in any conduct while abroad that posed a danger to the national security he replied: "Absolutely not." (Ruckelshaus testimony before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, 5/9/74, p. 320.)

[599] Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach, 11/4/69.

[600] Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach, 12/11/69.

[600] For discussion of dissemination of political intelligence from the "17" wiretaps, see Finding on Political Abuse, p. 22-5.

[601] Sen. Edmund Muskie testimony, Senate Foreign Relations committee, 9/10/73 Executive Session, pp. 5051.

[602] Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 5/11/69.

[603] Report of the House Judiciary Committee, 9/20/74. pp. 146-154.

[604] The creation of the "plumbers" unit in the White House led inexorably to Watergate. See Report of the House Judiciary Committee, 8/20/74, pp. 157-162, 166-170.

[605] An example of a generalized Departmental Instruction is Attorney General Clark's order of September 1967 (see p. 79) regarding civil disorders.

[606] Memorandum from FBI Director to Yeagley, 1/31/64.

[607] Memorandum from Yeagley to FBI Director, 3/3/64. There was no reauthorization of the continuing investigation between 1966 and 1974.

[608] Memorandum from Dean to Mitchell, 9/18/70.

[609] Executive order 11605, 7/71.

[610] By 1971, the SACB had the limited function of making findings that specific individuals and groups were Communist. Its registration of Communist had been declared unconstitutional. [Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965).]

[611] Robert C. Mardian, address before the Atomic Energy Commission Security Conference, Washington, D.C. 10/27/71. Mardian added that the "problem" was that without an updated, formal list of subversive organizations, federal agencies were required "to individually evaluate information regarding membership in allegedly subversive organizations based on raw data furnished by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or other governmental sources."

[612] Brennan testimony, 9/25/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, 116-117.

[613] Executive Order 11605, 7/71. By contrast, the prior order had been limited to groups seeking forcible violation of rights "under the Constitution of the United States" or seeking "to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means." Executive Order 10450 (1953).

[614] Hearings on the appropriation for the Department of Justice before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., (1972), p. 673

[615] Inspection Report, FBI Domestic Intelligence Division, August 17-September 9, 1971.

[616] The hostile Congressional reaction to this Order, which shifted duties by Executive flat to a Board created by statute for other purposes, led to the death of the SACB when no appropriation was granted in 1972.

[617] FBI Executives Conference Memorandum, 6/2/71. The first Assistant Director for Legal Counsel was Dwight Dalbey, who had for years been in charge of the legal training of Bureau agents. Dalbey's elevation early in 1971, and Hoover's requirement that he review all legal aspects of FBI policy, including intelligence matters, was a major change in Bureau procedure. (Memorandum from Hoover to All Bureau Officials and Supervisors, 3/8/71.)

[618] FBI Summary of Interview with Robert Mardian, 5/10/73, pp. 1-3.

[619] Memorandum from Sullivan to Hoover, 6/16/71.

[620] Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 5/13/73, pp. 1, 8.

[621] FBI Summary of Interview with Robert Mardian, 5/10/73, pp. 2-3. The Watergate Special Prosecutor investigated these events, and did not find sufficient evidence of criminal conduct to bring an indictment. However, they occurred at the time of intense White House pressure to develop a criminal prosecution against Daniel Ellsberg over the Pentagon Papers matter. The dismissal of charges against Ellsberg in 1973 was largely due to the belated discovery of the fact that Ellsberg had been overheard on a wiretap indicated in these records, which were withheld from the court, preventing its determination of the pertinency of the material to the Ellsberg case.

[622] Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-9/9/71, p. 98.

[623] Memorandum from R. D. Cotter to E. S. Miller, 9/21/71.

[624] Memorandum from Cotter to Miller, 9/17/71.

[625] Memorandum from D. J. Dalbey to C. Tolson, 9/24/71.

[625] Memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell, 9/30/71.

[626] Memorandum from Mitchell to Hoover, 10/22/71.

[627] Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 11/11/71. It was noted that in the past the Department had "frequently removed individuals" from the Security Index because of its strict "legal interpretation.

[628] This new breed was described as follows:

"He may adhere to the old-line revolutionary concepts but he is unaffiliated with any organization. He may belong to or follow one New Left-type group today and another tomorrow. He may simply belong to the loosely knit group of revolutionaries who have no particular political philosophy but who continuously plot the overthrow of our Government. He is the nihilist who seeks only to destroy America."

"On the other hand, he may be one of the revolutionary black extremists who, while perhaps influenced by groups such as the Black Panther Party, is also unaffiliated either permanently or temporarily with any black organization but with a seething hatred of the white establishment will assassinate, explode, or otherwise destroy white America." (T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 11/11/71.)

[629] Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 11/11/71.

[630] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 11/15/71.

[631] Memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell, 2/10/72; cf. memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell, 9/30/71 for the previous statement.

[632] Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 8/29/72.

[633] Memorandum from Domestic Intelligence Division, Position Paper: Scope of Authority, Jurisdiction and Responsibility in Domestic Intelligence Investigations, 7/31/72.

[634] Federal Data Banks, Hearings, Opening Statement of Senator Ervin, February 23, 1971, p. 1. Senator Ervin declared that a major objective of the inquiry was to look into "programs for taking official note of lawabiding people who are active politically or who participate in community activities on social and political issues." The problem, as Senator Ervin saw it, was that there were citizens who felt "intimidated" by these programs and were "fearful about exercising their rights under the First Amendment to sign petitions, or to speak and write freely on current issues of Government policy." The ranking minority member of the Subcommittee, Senator Roman Hruska, endorsed the need for a "penetrating and searching" inquiry. (Hearings, pp. 4, 7.)

[635] Also during March 1971, an FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania was broken into; a substantial number of documents were removed and soon began to appear In the press. One of these was captioned COINTELPRO. The Bureau reacted by ordering its field offices to "discontinue" COINTELPRO operations "for security reasons because of their sensitivity." It was suggested, however, that "counter-intelligence action" would be considered "in exceptional instances" so long as there were "tight procedures to insure absolute secrecy." (Memorandum from Brennan to Sullivan, 4/27/71 ; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 4/28/71.) For actions taken thereafter, see COINTELPRO report.

[636] After repeal of the Emergency Detention Act in the fall of 1971, the FBI's Assistant Director for Legal Counsel recommended that the Bureau's request for approval of its new ADEX also include a more general request for re-affirmation of FBI domestic intelligence authority to investigate "subversive activity." (Memorandum from D. J. Dalbey to Mr. Tolson, 9/24/71.) The letter to the Attorney General reviewed the line of "Presidential directives" from 1939 to 1951. (Memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell, 9/30/71.) The Attorney General replied with a general endorsement of FBI authority to investigate "subversive activities." (Memorandum from Mitchell to Hoover, 10/22/71.)

[637] Richard Kleindienst testimony, Senate Judiciary Committee, 2/24/72, p. 64

[638] FBI routing slip attached to Washington Post article, 2/24/72. The FBI's summary of its "guidelines," submitted to the Attorney General stated that its investigations were partly based on criminal statutes, but that "subversive activity . . . often does not clearly involve a specific section of a specific statute." Thus, investigations were also based on the 1939 Roosevelt directives which were said to have been "reiterated and broadened by subsequent Directives." (Attachment to Hoover memorandum to Kleindienst, 2/25/72.) (Emphasis added.)

[639] The background for this development may be summarized as follows: In May 1972, FBI intelligence officials prepared a "position paper" for Acting Director L. Patrick Gray. This paper merely recited the various Presidential directives, Executive Orders, delimitation agreements, and general authorizations from the Attorney General, with no attempt at analysis. (FBI Domestic Intelligence Division Position Paper: Investigations of Subversion, 5/19/72.) Assistant Director E. S. Miller, head of the Domestic Intelligence Division, withdrew this paper at a conference with Gray and other top Bureau officials; Miller then initiated work on a more extensive position paper, which was completed in July. It concluded that domestic intelligence investigations could practicably be based on the "concept" that their purpose was "to prevent a violation of a statute." The paper also indicated that the ADEX would be revised so that it could not be "interpreted as a means to circumvent repeal of the Emergency Detention Act." (FBI Domestic Intelligence Division: Position Paper: Scope of FBI Authority, 7/31/72; T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 8/1/72.)

[640] Gray did order that the Bureau should indicate its "jurisdictional authority" to investigate in every case, "by citing the pertinent provision of the U.S. Code. or other authority," and also that the Bureau should "indicate whether or not an investigation was directed by DJ (Department of Justice), or we opened it without any request from DJ." In the latter case, the Bureau was to "cite our reasons." (FBI routing slip, 8/27/72.)

[641] One official observed that there were "some individuals now included in ADEX even though they do not realistically pose a threat to the national security." He added that this would leave the Bureau "in a vulnerable position if our guidelines were to be scrutinized by interested Congressional Committees." (Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 8/29/72.)

[642] Memorandum from Smith to Miller. 8/29/72. The anticipated reduction was from 15,259 (the current figure) to 4,786 (the top two priority categories). The Justice Department was advised of this change. (Memorandum from Gray to Kleindienst, 9/18/72.)

[643] Draft copies were distributed to the field for suggestions. (E. S. Miller to Mr. Felt, 5/22/73.)

[644] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 6/7/73. The memorandum to the field stated, looking back on past Bureau policy, that since the FBI's authority to investigate "subversive elements" had never been "seriously challenged until recently," Bureau personnel (and "the general public") had accepted "the FBI's right to handle internal security matters and investigate subversive activities without reference to specific statutes." But the "rationale" based on "Presidential Directives" was no longer "adequate."

The field was advised that the "chief statutes" upon which the new criteria were based were those dealing with rebellion or insurrection (18 U.S.C. 2583), seditious conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 2584) and advocating overthrow of the government (18 U.S.C. 2528). The ADEX was to be "strictly an administrative device" and should play no part "in investigative decisions or policies." The revision also eliminated "overemphasis" on the Communist Party.

[645] For example, the field offices saw the need to undertake "preliminary inquiries" before it was known "whether a statutory basis for investigation exists." This specifically applied where a person had "contact with known subversive groups or subjects," but the Bureau did not know "the purpose of the contact." These preliminary investigations could go on for at least 90 days, to determine whether "a statutory basis for a full investigation exists." Moreover, at the urging of the field supervisors, the period for a preliminary investigation of an allegedly "Subversive organization" was expanded from 45 to 90 days. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 8/8/73.)

[646] This was apparently "in connection with" a request made earlier by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, who had requested to see this section at the time of the confirmation hearings for Attorney General Kleindienst in 1972. (Kleindienst, Senate Judiciary Committee, 2/24/72, p. 64; memorandum from Kelley to Richardson, 8/7/73.)

[647] In a memorandum to the Attorney General, Director Kelley cited Senator Sam J. Ervin's view that the FBI should be prohibited by statute "from investigating any person without the individual's consent, unless the Government has reason to believe that the person has committed a crime or is about to commit a crime." Kelley then summarized the position paper prepared by the Domestic Intelligence Division and the Bureau's current policy of attempting to rely on statutory authority. However, he observed that the statutes upon which the FBI was relying were either "designed for the Civil War era, not the Twentieth Century" (the rebellion and insurrection laws) or had been "reduced to a fragile shell by the Supreme Court" (the Smith Act dealing with advocacy of overthrow). Moreover, it was difficult to fit into the statutory framework groups "such as the Ku Klux Klan, which do not seek to overthrow the Government, but nevertheless are totalitarian in nature and seek to deprive constitutionally guaranteed rights."

Kelley stated that, while the FBI had "statutory authority," it still needed "a definite requirement from the President as to the nature and type of intelligence data he requires in the pursuit of his responsibilities based on our statutory authority." (Emphasis added.) While the statutes gave "authority," an Executive Order "would define our national security objectives." The FBI Director added:

"It would appear that the President would rather spell out his own requirements in an Executive Order instead of having Congress tell him what the FBI might do to help him fulfill his obligations and responsibilities as President."

[648] Memorandum from Kelley to Richardson, 8/7/73.

[649] Even before Kelley's request, Deputy Attorney General-Designate William Ruckelshaus (who had served for two months as Acting FBI Director between Gray and Kelley), sent a list of questions to the Bureau to begin "an in-depth examination of some of the problems facing the Bureau in the future." (Memorandum from Ruckelshaus to Kelley, 7/20/73.) The Ruckelshaus study was Interrupted by his departure in the "Saturday Night Massacre" of October 1973.

[650] Memorandum from Bork to Kelley, 12/5/73.

[651] These techniques were handled within the Bureau "on a strictly need-to-know basis" and Kelley believed that they should not be included in a study "which will be beyond the control of the FBI." (Memorandum from Kelley to Bork. 12/11/73.)

One Bureau memorandum to the Petersen committee even suggested that the Attorney General did not have authority over the FBI's foreign counterintelligence operations, since the Bureau was accountable in this area directly to the United States Intelligence Board and the National Security Council. (Petersen Committee Report, pp. 34-35.) The Petersen Committee sharply rejected this view, especially because the ad hoc equivalent of the U.S. Intelligence Board had approved the discredited "Huston plan" in 1970. The Committee declared: "There can be no doubt that in the area of foreign counterintelligence, as in all its other functions, the FBI is subject to the power and authority of the Attorney General." (Petersen Committee Report, p. 35.)

[652] FBI Memorandum, "Overall Recommendations -- Counterintelligence Activity," Appendix to Petersen Committee Report.

[653] Henry Petersen Testimony, 12/8/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 27O-71.

[655] Attorney General's Guidelines: "Domestic Security Investigations," "RIporting on Civil Disorders and Demonstrations Involving a Federal Interest," and "White House Personnel Security and Background Investigations."

[656] Memorandum from A. B. Fulton to Mr. Wannall, 7/10/74. See pp. 42-44 for discussion of the initiation of the program.

[657] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 8/16/74.

[658] Executive Order 11785, 6/4/74. The new standard: "Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons (hereinafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state, or which seeks to overthrow the Government of the United States or any State or subdivisions thereof by unlawful means." [Emphasis added.]

[659] Memorandum from Glen E. Pommerening, Assistant Attorney General for Administration, to Kelley, 11/17/74.

With respect to one organization, the Department advised the Bureau that "despite the abolition" of the Attorney General's list, the group "would still come within the criteria" of the employee security program if it "may have engaged in activities" of the sort proscribed by the revised executive order. (Memorandum from Henry E. Petersen to Clarence Kelley, 11/13/74.)

[660] "On the other hand," the instructions stated ambiguously, "the FBI should not report every minor local disturbance where there is no apparent interest to the President, the Attorney General or other Government officials and agencies." (Memorandum from Petersen to Kelley, 10/22/74.)

[661] Memorandum from Petersen to Kelley, 10/22/74. The FBI was expected to "be aware of disturbances and patterns of disorder," although it is not to report "each and every relatively insignificant incident of a strictly local nature."

[662] Memorandum from Petersen to Kelley, 10/22/74. Frank Nyland testimony, 1/27/76, pp. 46--58.

[663] Memorandum from J. G. Deegan to W. R. Wannall, 10/30/74. From a legal viewpoint, the Justice Department's instructors dealing with the collection of intelligence on potential civil disturbances were significant because they relied for authority on: (1) the President's powers under Article IV, section 4 of the Constitution to protect the states, upon application of the legislature or the executive, against "domestic violence;" (2) the statute (10 U.S.C. 331. et seq.) authorizing the use of troops; and (3) the Presidential directive of 1969 designating the Attorney General as chief civilian officer to coordinate the Government's response to civil disturbances. (Memorandum from Petersen to Kelley, 10/22/74; Memorandum from Melvin Laird and John Mitchell to the President, 4/1/69.)

[664] omitted in original.

[665] 18 U.S.C. 2101-2102.

[666] Memorandum from Petersen to Kelley, 11/13/74. This-memorandum added: "[W]ithout a broad range of intelligence information, the President and the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch could not properly and adequately protect our nation's security and enforce the numerous statutes pertaining thereto . . . [T]he Department, and in particular the Attorney General, must continue to be informed of those organizations that engage in violence which represent a potential threat to the public safety." [Emphasis added.]

[667] The opinion of the Supreme Court in the United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) -- the domestic security wiretapping case stated, "Implicit in that duty is the power to protect our Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means."

[668] A 19th century Supreme Court opinion was cited as having interpreted the word "laws" broadly to encompass not only statutes enacted by Congress, but also "the rights, duties, and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our international relations and all the protection implied by the nature of Government under the Constitution." [In Re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).]

[669] The latter power was said to relate "more particularly to the Executive's power to conduct foreign intelligence activities here and abroad." (Kevin Maroney testimony, "Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes," Hearings before the House Committee on Internal Security, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), pp. 3332-3335.) Mr. Maroney added:

"We recognize the complexity and difficulty of adequately spelling out the FBI's authority and responsibility to conduct domestic intelligence-type investigations. The concept national security is admittedly a broad one, while the term subversive activities is even more difficult to define."

Mr. Maroney also cited the following from the Supreme Court's opinion in the domestic security wiretapping case: "The gathering of security intelligence is often long-range and involves the interrelation of various sources and types of information. The exact targets of such surveillance may be more difficult to identify . . . Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity or the enhancement of the Government's preparedness for some possible future crisis or emergency. Thus, the focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than that directed against more conventional types of crime." [United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 21.97, 322 (1972).]

[670] House Committee on Internal Security Hearings, 1974, pp. 3330-3331.

[671] W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant Director for the Intelligence Division, Memorandum on the "Basis for FBI National Security Intelligence Investigations," 2/13/75.

[672] After several recent transformations, the policy of the Attorney General was established as authorizing warrantless surveillance "only when it is shown that its subjects are the active, conscious agents of foreign powers;" and this standard "is applied with particular stringency where the subjects are American citizens or permanent resident aliens." (Justice Department memorandum from Ron Carr, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, to Mike Shaheen, Counsel on Professional Responsibility, 2/26/76.)

[673] In May 1975, for the first time in American history, the Department of Justice publicly asserted the power of the Executive Branch to conduct warrantless surreptitious entries unconnected with the use of electronic surveillance. This occurred in a letter to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia concerning an appeal by John Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman was appealing a conviction arising from the break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist after publication of the "Pentagon Papers" in 1971.

The Justice Department's position was that "warrantless searches involving physical entries into private premises" can be "lawful under the Fourth Amendment" if they are "very carefully controlled:"

"There must be solid reason to believe that foreign espionage or intelligence is involved. In addition, the intrusion into any zone of expected privacy must be kept to the minimum and there must he personal authorization by the President or the Attorney General." (Letter from John C. Kenney, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Hugh E. Cline. Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 5/9/75.)

[674] Rockefeller Commission Report.

[675] Levi, 12/11/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 316-317.

[676] Levi. 11/6/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 90.

[677] Executive Order 11509, 2/19/76.

[678] Attorney General's Guidelines, "Domestic Security Investigations", "Whitehouse Personnel Security and Background Investigations", and "Reporting on Civil Disorders and Demonstrations Involving a Federal Interest", 3/10/76.

[679] S. 3197, introduced 3/23/76.

[680] The major questions posed by the President's Executive Order and the Attorney General's guidelines for the FBI are discussed in the recommendation section of this report, as are the problems with the national security electronic surveillance bill.

[681] Levi Testimony, 12/11/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 345.

III. Findings

The Committee makes seven major findings. Each finding is accompanied by subfindings and by an elaboration which draws upon the evidentiary record set forth in our historical narrative (Part II herein) and in the thirteen detailed reports which will be published as supplements to this volume. We have sought to analyze in our findings characteristics shared by intelligence programs, practices which involved abuses, and general problems in the system which led to those abuses.

The findings treat the following themes that run through the facts revealed by our investigation of domestic intelligence activity: (A) Violating and Ignoring the Law; (B) Overbreadth of Domestic Intelligence Activity; (C) Excessive Use of Intrusive Techniques; (D) Using Covert Action to Disrupt and Discredit Domestic Groups; (E) Political Abuse of Intelligence Information; (F) Inadequate Controls on Dissemination and Retention; (G) Deficiencies in Control and Accountability.

Viewed separately, each finding demonstrates a serious problem in the conduct and control of domestic intelligence operations. Taken together, they make a compelling case for the necessity of change. Our recommendations (in Part IV) flow from this analysis and propose changes which the Committee believes to be appropriate in light of the record.

- A. Violating and Ignoring the Law

MAJOR FINDING

The Committee finds that the domestic activities of the intelligence community at times violated specific statutory prohibitions and infringed the constitutional rights of American citizens.[1] The legal questions involved in intelligence programs were often not considered. On other occasions, they were intentionally disregarded in the belief that because the programs served the "national security" the law did not apply. While intelligence officers on occasion failed to disclose to their superiors programs which were illegal or of questionable legality, the Committee finds that the most serious breaches of duty were those of senior officials, who were responsible for controlling intelligence activities and generally failed to assure compliance with the law.

Subfindings

(a) In its attempt to implement instructions to protect the security of the United States, the intelligence community engaged in some activities which violated statutory law and the constitutional rights of American citizens.

(b) Legal issues were often overlooked by many of the intelligence officers who directed these operations. Some held a pragmatic view of intelligence activities that did not regularly attach sufficient significance to questions of legality. The question raised was usually not whether a particular program was legal or ethical, but whether it worked.

(c) On some occasions when agency officials did assume, or were told, that a program was illegal, they still permitted it to continue. They justified their conduct in some cases on the ground that the failure of "the enemy" to play by the rules granted them the right to do likewise, and in other cases on the ground that the "national security" permitted programs that would otherwise be illegal.

(d) Internal recognition of the illegality or the questionable legality of many of these activities frequently led to a tightening of security rather than to their termination. Partly to avoid exposure and a public "flap," knowledge of these programs was tightly held within the agencies, special filing procedures were used, and "cover stories" were devised.

(e) On occasion, intelligence agencies failed to disclose candidly their programs and practices to their own General Counsels, and to Attorneys General, Presidents, and Congress.

(f) The internal inspection mechanisms of the CIA and the FBI did not keep -- and, in the case of the FBI, were not designed to keep -- the activities of those agencies within legal bounds. Their primary concern was efficiency, not legality or propriety.

(g) When senior administration officials with a duty to control domestic intelligence activities knew, or had a basis for suspecting, that questionable activities had occurred, they often responded with silence or approval. In certain cases, they were presented with a partial description of a program but did not ask for details, thereby abdicating their responsibility. In other cases, they were fully aware of the nature of the practice and implicitly or explicitly approved it.

Elaboration of findings

The elaboration which follows details the general finding of the Committee that inattention to -- and disregard of -- legal issues was an all too common occurrence in the intelligence community. While this section focuses on the actions and attitudes of intelligence officials and certain high policy officials, the Committee recognizes that a pattern of lawless activity does not result from the deeds of a single stratum of the government or of a few individuals alone. The implementation and continuation of illegal and questionable programs would not have been possible without the cooperation or tacit approval of people at all levels within and above the intelligence community, through many successive administrations.

The agents in the field, for their part, rarely questioned the orders they received. Their often uncertain knowledge of the law, coupled with the natural desire to please one's superiors and with simple bureaucratic momentum, clearly contributed to their willingness to participate in illegal and questionable programs. The absence of any prosecutions for law violations by intelligence agents inevitably affected their attitudes as well. Under pressure from above to accomplish their assigned tasks, and without the realistic threat of prosecution to remind them of their legal obligations, it is understandable that these agents frequently acted without concern for issues of law and at times assumed that normal legal restraints and prohibitions did not apply to their activities.

Significantly, those officials at the highest levels of government, who had a duty to control the activities of the intelligence community, sometimes set in motion the very forces that permitted lawlessness to occur -- even if every act committed by intelligence agencies was not known to them. By demanding results without carefully limiting the means by which the results were achieved; by over-emphasizing the threats to national security without ensuring sensitivity to the rights of American citizens; and by propounding concepts such as the right of the "sovereign" to break the law, ultimate responsibility for the consequent climate of permissiveness should be placed at their door.[2]

Subfinding (a)

In its attempt to implement instructions to protect the security of the United States, the intelligence community engaged in some activities which violated statutory law and the constitutional rights of American citizens.

From 1940 to 1973, the CIA and the FBI engaged in twelve covert mail opening programs in violation of Sections 1701-1703 of Title 18 of the United States Code which prohibit the obstruction, interception, or opening of mail. Both of these agencies also engaged in warrantless "surreptitious entries" -- break-ins -- against American citizens within the United States in apparent violation of state laws prohibiting trespass and burglary. Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 was violated by NSA's program for obtaining millions of telegrams of Americans unrelated to foreign targets and by the Army Security Agency's interception of domestic radio communications.

All of these activities, as well as the FBI's use of electronic surveillance without a substantial national security predicate, also infringed the rights of countless Americans under the Fourth Amendment protection "against unreasonable searches and seizures."

The abusive techniques used by the FBI in COINTELPRO from 1956 to 1971 included violations of both federal and state statutes prohibiting mail fraud, wire fraud, incitement to violence, sending obscene material through the mail, and extortion. More fundamentally, the harassment of innocent citizens engaged in lawful forms of political expression did serious injury to the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and the right of the people to assemble peaceably and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. The Bureau's maintenance of the Security Index, which targeted thousands of American citizens for detention in the event of national emergency, clearly overstepped the permissible bounds established by Congress in the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 and represented, in contravention of the Act, a potential general suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus secured by Article 1, Section 9, of the Constitution.

A distressing number of the programs and techniques developed by the intelligence community involved transgressions against human decency that were no less serious than any technical violations of law. Some of the most fundamental values of this society were threatened by activities such as the smear campaign against Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the testing of dangerous drugs on unsuspecting American citizens, the dissemination of information about the sex lives, drinking habits, and marital problems of electronic surveillance targets, and the COINTELPRO attempts to turn dissident organizations against one another and to destroy marriages.

Subfinding (b)

Legal issues were often overlooked by many of the intelligence officers who directed these operations. Some held a pragmatic view of intelligence activities that did not regularly attach sufficient significance to questions of legality. The question raised was usually not whether a particular program was legal or ethical, but whether it worked.

Legal issues were clearly not a primary consideration -- if they were a consideration at all -in many of the programs and techniques of the intelligence community. When the former head of the FBI's Racial Intelligence Section was asked whether anybody in the FBI at any time during the 15-year course of COINTELPRO discussed its constitutionality or legal authority for example, he replied: "No, we never gave it a thought."[3] This attitude is echoed by other Bureau officials in connection with other programs. The former Section Chief of one of the FBI's Counterintelligence sections, and the former Assistant Director of the Bureau's Domestic Intelligence Division both testified that legal considerations were simply not raised in policy decisions concerning the FBI's mail opening programs.[4] Similarly, when the FBI was presented with the opportunity to assume responsibility for the CIA's New York mail opening operation, legal factors played no role in the Bureau's refusal; rather, the opportunity was declined simply because of the attendant expense, manpower requirements, and security problems.[5]

One of the most abusive of all FBI programs was its attempt to discredit Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Yet former FBI Assistant Director William C. Sullivan testified that he "never heard anyone raise the question of legality or constitutionality, never."[6]

Former Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms testified publicly that he never seriously questioned the legal status of the twenty-year CIA New York mail opening project because he assumed his predecessor, Allen Dulles, had "made his legal peace with [it]."[7]

"... [F]rom time to time," he said, "the Agency got useful information out of it,"[8] so he permitted it to continue throughout his sevenyear tenure as Director.

The Huston Plan that was prepared for President Richard Nixon in June 1970 constituted a virtual charter for the use of intrusive and illegal techniques against American dissidents as well as foreign agents. Its principal author has testified, however, that during the drafting sessions with representatives of the FBI, CIA, NSA, and Defense Intelligence Agency, no one ever objected to any of the recommendations on the grounds that they involved illegal acts, nor was the legality or constitutionality of any of the recommendations ever discussed.[9]

William C. Sullivan, who participated in the drafting of the Huston Plan and served on the United States Intelligence Board and as FBI Assistant Director for Intelligence for 10 years, stated that in his entire experience in the intelligence community he never heard legal issues raised at all:

We never gave any thought to this realm of reasoning, because we were just naturally pragmatists. The one thing we were concerned about was this: Will this course of action work, will it get us what we want, will we reach the objective that we desire to reach? As far as legality is concerned, morals, or ethics, [it] was never raised by myself or anybody else ... I think this suggests really in government that we are amoral. In government -- I am not speaking for everybody -- the general atmosphere is one of amorality.[10]

Subfinding (c)

On some occasions when agency officials did assume, or were told, that a program was illegal, they still permitted it to continue. They justified their conduct in some cases on the ground that the failure of "the enemy" to play by the rules granted them the right to do likewise, and in other cases on the ground that the "national security" permitted programs that would otherwise be illegal.

Even when agency officials recognized certain programs or techniques to be illegal, they sometimes advocated their implementation or permitted them to continue nonetheless.

This point is illustrated by a passage in a 1954 memorandum from an FBI Assistant Director to J. Edgar Hoover, which recommended that an electronic listening device be planted in the hotel room of a suspected Communist sympathizer: "Although such an installation will not be legal, it is believed that the intelligence information to be obtained will make such an installation necessary and desirable."[11] Hoover approved the installation.[12]

More than a decade later, a memorandum was sent to Director Hoover which described the current FBI policy and procedures for "black bag jobs" (warrantless break-ins for purposes other than microphone installation). This memorandum read in part:

Such a technique involves trespass and is clearly illegal; therefore, it would be impossible to obtain any legal sanction for it. Despite this, "black bag" jobs have been used because they represent an invaluable technique in combatting subversive activities . . . aimed directly at undermining and destroying our nation.[13]

In other words, breaking the law was seen as useful in combating those who threatened the legal fabric of society. Although Hoover terminated the general use of "black bag jobs" in July 1966, they were employed on a large scale before that time and have been used in isolated instances since then.

Another example of disregard for the law is found in a 1969 memorandum from William C.

Sullivan to Director Hoover. In June of that year, Sullivan was requested by the Director, apparently at the urging of White House officials to travel to France for the purpose of electronically monitoring the conversations of journalist Joseph Kraft.[14] With the cooperation of local authorities, Sullivan was able to have a microphone installed in Kraft's hotel room, and informed Hoover of his success. "Parenthetically," he wrote in his letter to the Director, "I might add that such a cover is regarded as illegal."[15]

The attitude that legal standards and issues of privacy can be overridden by other factors is further reflected in a memorandum written by Richard Helms in connection with the testing of dangerous drugs on unsuspecting American citizens in 1963. Mr. Helms wrote the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence:

While I share your uneasiness and distaste for any program which tends to intrude on an individual's private and legal prerogatives, I believe it is necessary that the Agency maintain a central role in this activity, keep current on enemy capabilities in the manipulation of human behavior, and maintain an offensive capability. I, therefore, recommend your approval for continuation of this testimony program . . .[15]

The history of the CIA's New York mail opening program is replete with examples of conscious contravention of the law. The original proposal for large-scale mail opening in 1955, for instance, explicitly recognized that "[t]here is no overt, authorized or legal censorship or monitoring of first class mails which enter, depart or transit the United States at the present time."[16] A 1962 memorandum on the project noted that its exposure could "give rise to grave charges of criminal misuse of the mails by Government agencies" and that "existing Federal statutes preclude the concoction of any legal excuse for the violation . . .[17] And again in 1963, a CIA officer wrote: "There is no legal basis for monitoring postal communications in the United States except during time of war or national emergency . . ."[18]

Both the former Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff and the former Director of Security - - who were in charge of the New York project -- testified that they believed it to be illegal.[19] One Inspector General who reviewed the project in 1969 also flatly stated: "[O]f course, we knew that this was illegal. [E]verybody knew that it was [illegal] ..."[20]

In spite of the general recognition of its illegality, the New York mail opening project continued for a total of 20 years and was not terminated until 1973, when the Watergate- created political climate had increased the risks of exposure.[21]

With the full knowledge of J. Edgar Hoover, moreover, the FBI continued to receive the fruits of this project for three years after the FBI Director informed the President of the United States that "the FBI is opposed to implementing any covert mail coverage because it is clearly illegal ..."[22] The Bureau's own mail opening programs had been terminated in 1966, but it continued intentionally and knowingly to benefit from the illegal acts of the CIA until 1973.

The Huston Plan is another disturbing reminder of the fact that intelligence programs and techniques may be advocated and authorized with the knowledge that they are illegal. At least two of the options that were presented to President Nixon were described as unlawful on the face of the Report. Of "covert mail coverage" (mail opening) it was written that "[t] his coverage, not having the sanction of law, runs the risk of any illicit act magnified by the involvement of a Government agency."[23] The Report also noted that surreptitious entry "involves illegal entry and trespass."[24] Thus, the intelligence community presented the nation's highest executive official with the option of approving courses of action described as illegal. The fact that President Nixon did authorize them, even if only for five days, is more disquieting still.[25]

When President Nixon eventually revoked his approval of the Huston Plan, the intelligence community nevertheless proceded to initiate some programs suggested in the Plan. Intelligence agencies also continued to employ techniques recommended in the Plan, such as mail opening which had been used previously without presidential approval.[26]

The recent history of Army intelligence provides an additional example of continuing an activity described as illegal. Beginning in 1967, the Army Security Agency monitored the radio communications of amateur radio operators in this country to determine if dissident elements planned disruptive activity at particular demonstrations and events. Because Army officials questioned whether such monitoring was legal under Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, they requested a legal opinion from the Federal Communications Commission. At a meeting held in August 1968, the FCC advised the Army that such monitoring was illegal under the Act. FCC representatives also stated that the matter had been raised with Attorney General Ramsey Clark and that he had disapproved the program.[27] The FCC agreed, however, to submit a written reply to the Army, stating only that it could not "Provide a positive answer to the Army's proposal."[28]

Despite having been told that their monitoring activity was illegal, and that the Attorney General himself disapproved it, the Army Security Agency continued to monitor the radio communications of American citizens for another two years.[29]

Several factors may explain the intelligence community's frequent disregard of legal issues.

Some intelligence officials expressed the view that the legal and ethical restraints that applied to the rest of society simply did not apply to intelligence activities. This concept is reflected in a 1959 memorandum on the Army's covert drug testing program: "In intelligence, the stakes involved and the interest of national security may permit a more tolerant interpretation of moral-ethical values . . ."[30]

As William C. Sullivan also pointed out, many intelligence officers had been imbued with a "war psychology." "Legality was not questioned," he said. "it was not an issue."[31] In war, one simply did what was "expected to do as a soldier."[32] "It was my assumption," said one FBI official connected with the Bureau's mail opening programs, "that what we were doing was justified by what we had to do."[33] Since the "enemy" did not play by the rules, moreover, intelligence officials often believed they could not afford to do so either.[34]

One FBI intelligence officer appeared to attribute the disregard of the law in the Bureau's C0INTELPRO operations to simple restlessness on the part of "action-oriented" FBI agents. George C. Moore, the Racial Intelligence Section Chief, testified that:

... the FBI's counterintelligence program came up because if you have anything in the FBI, you have an action oriented group of people who see something happening and want to do something to take its place.[35][36]

Others in the intelligence community have contended that questionable and illegal acts were justified by a law higher than the United States Code or the Constitution. An FBI Counterintelligence Section Chief, for example, stated the following reason for believing in the necessity of techniques such as mail opening:

The greater good, the national security, this is correct. This is what I believed in. Why I thought these programs were good, it was that the national security required this, this is correct.[37]

Similarly, when intelligence officials secured the cooperation of telegraph company executives for Project SHAMROCK, in which NSA received millions of copies of international telegraph messages without the sender's knowledge, they assured the executives that they would not be subjected to criminal liability because the project was "in the highest interests of the nation."[38]

Perhaps the most novel reason for advocating illegal action was proffered by Tom Charles Huston. Huston explained that he believed the real threat to internal security was potential repression by right-wing forces within the United States. He argued that the "New Left" was capable of producing a climate of fear that would bring forth every repressive demagogue in the country. Huston believed that the intelligence professionals, if given the chance, could protect the people from the latent forces of repression by monitoring the New Left, including by illegal means.[39] Illegal action directed against the New Left, in other words, should be used by the Government to forestall potential repression by the Right.

In attempting to explain why illegal activities were advocated and defended, the impact of the attitudes and actions of government officials in supervisory positions -- Presidents, Cabinet officers, and Congressmen -- should not be discounted. Their occasional endorsement of such activities, as well as the atmosphere of permissiveness created by their emphasis on national security and their demands for results, clearly contributed to the notion that strict adherence to the law was unimportant. So, too, did the concept, propounded by some senior officials, that a "sovereign" president may authorize violations of the law.

Whatever the reasons, however, it is clear that a number of intelligence officers acted in knowing contravention of the law.

Subfinding (d)

Internal recognition of the illegality or questionable legality of many of these activities frequently led to a tightening of security rather than to their termination. Partly to avoid exposure and a public "flap," knowledge of these programs was tightly held within the agencies, special filing procedures were used, and "cover stories" were devised.

When intelligence agencies realized that certain programs and techniques were of questionable legality, they frequently took special security precautions to avoid public exposure, criticism, and embarrassment. The CIA's study of student unrest throughout the world in the late 1960s, for example, included a section on student dissent in the United States, an area that was clearly outside the Agency's statutory charter. DCI's Richard Helms urged the President's national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, to treat it with extreme sensivity in light of the acknowledged jurisdictional violation:

"Herewith is a survey of student dissidence world-wide as requested by the President. In an effort to round out our discussion of this subject, we have included a section on American students. This is an area not within the charter of this Agency, so I need not emphasize how extremely sensitive this makes the paper. Should anyone learn of its existence, it would prove most embarrassing for all concerned."[40]

Concern for the FBI's public image prompted security measures which Protected numerous questionable activities. For example, in approving or denying COINTELPRO proposals, many of which were clearly illegal, a main consideration was preventing "embarrassment to the Bureau.[41] A characteristic caution to FBI agents appears in the letter which initiated the COINTELPRO against "Black Nationalists":

You are also cautioned that the nature of this new endeavor is such that under no circumstances should the existence of the program be made known outside the Bureau and appropriate within-office security should be afforded to sensitive operations and techniques considered under the program.

Examples of attention to such security are that anonymous letters had to be written on commercially purchased stationery; newsmen had to be so completely trustworthy that they were guaranteed not to reveal the Bureau's interest; and inquiries of law enforcement officials had to be made under the pretext of a criminal investigation. A similar preoccupation with security measures for improper activities affected both the NSA and the Army Security Agency.

NSA's guidelines for its watch list activity provided that NSA's name should not be on any of the disseminated watch list material involving Americans. The aim was to "restrict the knowledge that such information is being collected and processed" by NSA.[43]

The Army Security Agency's radio monitoring activity, which continued even after the Army was told that the FCC and the Attorney General regarded it as illegal, also had to be conducted in secrecy if a public outcry was to be avoided. When Army officials decided to permit radio monitoring in connection with the military's Civil Disturbance Collection Plan, their instruction provided that all ASA personnel had to be "disguised" either in civilian clothes or as members of regular military Units.[44]

The perceived illegality -- and consequent "flap potential" -- of the CIA's New York mail opening project led Agency officials to formulate a drastic strategy to follow in the event of public exposure. A review of the project by the Inspector General's Office in the early 1960s concluded that it would be desirable to fabricate a "cover story." A formal recommendation was therefore made that "[a]n emergency plan and cover story be prepared for the possibility that the operation might be blown."[45] In response to this recommendation, the Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff agreed that "a 'flap' will put us 'out of business' immediately and may give rise to grave charges of criminal misuse of the mails by government agencies," but he argued:

Since no good purpose can be served by an official admission of the violation, and existing Federal statutes preclude the concoction of any legal excuse for the violation, it must be recognized that no cover story is available to any Government Agency. Therefore, it is important that all Federal law enforcement and US Intelligence Agencies vigorously deny any association, direct or indirect, with any such activity as charged.... Unless the charge is supported by the presentation of interior items from the Project, it should be relatively easy to "hush up" the entire affair, or to explain that it consists of legal mail cover activities conducted by the Post Office at the request of authorized Federal agencies. Under the most unfavorable circumstances ... it might be necessary after the matter has cooled off during an extended period of investigation, to find a scapegoat to blame for unauthorized tampering with the mails. Such cases by their very nature do not have much appeal to the imagination of the public, and this would he an effective way to resolve the initial charge of censorship of the mails.[46]

This strategy of complete denial and transferring blame to a scapegoat was approved by the Director of Security in February 1962.[47]

Another extreme example of a security measure that was adopted because of the threat that illegal activity might be exposed was the outright destruction of files.

The FBI developed a special filing system -- or, more accurately, a destruction system -- for memoranda written about illegal techniques, such as break-ins,[48] and highly questionable operations, such as the microphone surveillance of Joseph Kraft.[49] Under this system -which was referred to as the "DO NOT FILE" procedure -- authorizing documents and other memoranda were filed in special safes at headquarters and field offices until the next annual inspection by the Inspection Division, at which time they were to be systematically destroyed.[50]

Subfinding (e)

On occasion, intelligence agencies failed to disclose candidly programs and practices to their own General Counsels, and to Attorney Generals, Presidents, and Congress.

(i) Concealment from Executive Branch Officials

Intelligence officers frequently concealed or misrepresented illegal activities to their own General Counsel and superiors within and outside the agencies in order to protect these activities from exposure.

For example, during the entire 20-year history of the CIA's mail opening project, the Agency's General Counsel was never informed of its existence. According to one Agency official, this knowledge was purposefully kept from him. Former Inspector General Gordon Stewart testified:

Well, I am sure that it was held back from [the General Counsel] on purpose. An operation of this sort in the CIA is run -- if it is closely held, it is run by those people immediately concerned, and to the extent that it is really possible, according to the practices that we had in the fifties and sixties, those persons not immediately concerned were supposed to be ignorant of it.[51]

The evidence also indicates that two Directors of Central Intelligence under whom the New York mail operations continued -- John McCone and Admiral Raborn-- were never informed of its existence.[52] In 1954, Postmaster General Arthur Summerfield was informed that the CIA operated a mail cover project in New York, but be was not told that the Agency opened or intended to open any mail.[53] In 1965, the CIA briefly considered informing Postmaster General John A. Gronouski about the project when its existence was felt to be jeopardized by a congressional subcommittee that was investigating the use of mail covers and other investigative techniques by federal agencies. According to an internal memorandum, however, the idea was quickly rejected "in view of various statements by Gronouski before this subcommittee."[54] Since Gronouski had agreed with the subcommittee that tighter administrative controls on mail covers were necessary and generally supported the principle of the sanctity of the mail, it is reasonable to infer that CIA officials assumed he would not be sympathetic to the technique of mail opening.[55]

The only claim that any President may have known about the project was made by Richard Helms, who testified that "there was a possibility" that he "mentioned" it to President Lyndon Johnson in 1967 or 1968.[56] No documentary evidence is available that either supports or refutes this statement. During the preparation of the Huston Plan, neither CIA nor FBI representatives informed Tom Charles Huston, President Nixon's representative, that the mail opening project existed. The final interagency report on the Huston Plan signed by Richard Helms and J. Edgar Hoover, was sent to the President with the statement, contrary to fact, that all mail opening programs by federal agencies had been discontinued.[57]

In connection with another CIA mail opening Project, middle-level Agency officials apparently did not even tell their own superiors within the CIA that they intended to open mail, as opposed to merely inspecting envelope exteriors. The ranking officials testified that they approved the project believing it to be a mail cover program only.[58] No Cabinet officials or President knew of this project and the approval of the Deputy Chief Postal Inspector (for what he also believed to be a mail cover operation) was secured through conscious deception.[59]

A pattern of concealment was repeated by the FBI in their mail opening programs. There is no claim by the Bureau that any Postmaster General, Attorney General, or President was ever advised of the true nature and scope of its mail projects. One FBI official testified that it was an unofficial Bureau policy not to inform postal officials with whom they dealt of the actual intention of FBI agents in receiving the mail, and there is no indication that this policy was ever violated.[60] At one point in 1965, Assistant Director Alan Belmont and Inspector Donald Moore apparently informed Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach that FBI agents received custody of the mail in connection with espionage cases on some occasions.[61] But Moore testified that the Attorney General was not told that mail was actually opened. When asked if he felt any need to hold back from Katzenbach the fact of mail openings as opposed to the fact that Bureau agents received direct access to the mail, Moore replied:

It is perhaps difficult to answer. Perhaps I could liken it to ... a defector in place in the KGB. You don't want to tell anybody his name, the location, the title, or anything like that. Not that you don't trust them completely, but the fact is that any time one additional person becomes aware of it, there is a potential for the information to . . . go further.[62]

Another Bureau agent speculated that the Attorney General was not told because, mail opening "was not legal, as far as I knew."[63]

Similarly, there is no indication that the FBI ever informed any Attorney General about its use of "black bag jobs" (illegal break-ins for purposes other than microphone installations) ; the full scope of its activities in COINTELPRO ; or its submission of names for inclusion on either the CIA's "Watch List" for mail opening or, before 1973, on the NSA's "Watch List" for electronic monitoring of international communications.[64]

After J. Edgar Hoover disregarded Attorney General Biddle's 1943 order to terminate the Custodial Detention List by merely changing its name to the Security Index moreover, Bureau headquarters instructed the field officers that the new list should be kept "strictly confidential" and that it should never be mentioned in FBI reports or "discussed with agencies or individuals outside the Bureau" except for military intelligence agencies. For several years thereafter, the Attorney General and the Justice Department were not informed of the FBI's decision.[65]

An incident which occurred in 1967 in connection with the Bureau's COINTELPRO operations is particularly illustrative of the lengths to which intelligence agencies would go to protect illegal programs from scrutiny by executive branch officers outside the intelligence community. As one phase of its disruption of the United Klans of America, the Bureau sent a letter to Klan officers purportedly prepared by the highly secret "National Intelligence Committee" (NIC) of the Klan.[66] The fake letter purported to fire the North Carolina Grand Dragon for personal misconduct and misfeasance in office, and to suspend Imperial Wizard Robert Shelton for his failure to remove the Grand Dragon. Shelton complained to the FBI and the Post Office about this apparent violation of the mail fraud statutes -- without realizing that the Bureau had in fact sent the letter.[67] The Bureau, after solemnly assuring Shelton that his complaint was not within the FBI's jurisdiction, approached the Chief Postal Inspector's office in Washington to determine what action the Post Office planned to take regarding Shelton's allegation. The FBI was advised that the matter had been referred to the Justice Department's Criminal Division.[68] At no time did the Bureau inform either the Post Office or the Justice Department that FBI agents had authored the letter. When no investigation was deemed to be warranted by the Criminal Division, FBI Headquarters directed the Bureau's Charlotte, North Carolina office to prepare a second phony NIC letter to send to Klan officials.[69] This letter was not mailed, however, because, the Charlotte office proposed and implemented a different idea -- the formation of an FBI-controlled alternative Klan organization, which eventually attracted 250 members.[70]

The Huston Plan itself was prepared without the knowledge of the Attorney General. Neither the Attorney General nor anyone in his office was invited to the drafting sessions at Langley or consulted during the proceedings. Huston testified that it never occurred to him to confer with the Attorney General before making the recommendations in the Report, in part because the plan was seen as an intelligence matter to be handled by the intelligence agency directors.[71]

Similarly, the CIA's General Counsel was not included or consulted in the formulation of the Huston Plan. As James Angleton testified, "the custom and usage was not to deal with the General Counsel, as a rule, until there were some troubles. He was not a part of the process of project approval."[73]

(ii) Concealment from Congress

At times, knowledge of illegal programs and techniques has been concealed from Congress as well as executive branch officials. On two occasions, for example, officials of the Army Security Agency ordered its units -- in apparent violation of that Agency's jurisdiction -- to conduct general searches of the radio spectrum without regard to the source or subject matter of the transmissions. ASA did not report these incidents to ranking Army officials, even when specifically asked to do so as part of the Army's preparation for the hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights in 1971.[74]

Events surrounding the 1965 and 1966 investigation by Senator Edward Long of Missouri into federal agencies' use of mail covers and other investigative techniques clearly showed the desire on the part of CIA and FBI officials to protect their programs from congressional review.[75] Fearing that the New York mail opening program might be discovered by this subcommittee, the CIA considered suspending the, operation until the investigation had been completed. An internal CIA memorandum dated April 23, 1965, reads in part:

Mr. Karamessines [Assistant Deputy Director for Plans] felt that the dangers inherent in Long's subcommittee activities to the security of the Project's operations in New York should be thoroughly studied in order that a determination can be made as to whether these operations should be partially or fully suspended until the subcommittee's investigations are completed.[76]

When it was learned that Chief Postal Inspector Henry Montague had been contacted about the Long investigation and believed that it would "soon cool off", however, it was decided to continue the operation without suspension.[77]

The FBI was also concerned that the subcommittee might expose its mail opening programs. Bureau memoranda indicate that the FBI intended to "warn the Long Committee away from those areas which would be injurious to the national defense."[78] J. Edgar Hoover personally contacted the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee,[79] and urged him "to see Long not later than Wednesday morning to caution him that [the Chief Counsel] must not go into the kind of question he made of Chief Inspector Montague of the Post Office Department"[80] -- questioning that had threatened to reveal the FBI's mail project the Previous week.[81]

When the Long subcommittee began to investigate electronic surveillance practices several months later, Bureau officials convinced Senator Edward Long that there was no need to pursue such an investigation since, they said, the FBI's operations were tightly controlled and properly implemented.[82] According to Bureau documents, FBI agents wrote a press release for the Senator from Missouri, with his approval, that stated his subcommittee had

conducted exhaustive research into the activities, procedures, and techniques of this agency [and] based upon careful study ... we are fully satisfied that the FBI has not participated in highhanded or uncontrolled usage of wiretaps, microphones, or other electronic equipment.[83]

Not only was this release written by the FBI itself, it was misleading. The "exhaustive research" apparently consisted of a ninety-minute briefing by FBI officials describing their electronic surveillance practices; neither the Senator nor the public learned of the instances of improper electronic surveillances that had been conducted by the FBI.[84] When Senator Edward Long later asked certain FBI officials to testify about the Bureau's electronic surveillance policy before the Subcommittee, they refused, arguing: ". . . to put an FBI

witness on the stand would be an attempt to open a Pandora's box, insofar as our enemies in the press were concerned ...."[85]

After the press release had been delivered to Senator Long and the refusal to testify had been accepted, one FBI official wrote to the Associate Director that while some problems still existed, "we have neutralized the threat of being embarrassed by the Long Subcommittee ..."[86]

@@@@@@@@@

Subfinding (f)

The internal inspection mechanisms of the CIA and the FBI did not keep -- and, in the case of the FBI, were not designed to keep -- the activities of those agencies within legal bounds. Their primary concern was efficiency, not legality or propriety.

The internal inspection mechanisms of the CIA and the FBI were ineffective in ensuring that the activities of these agencies were kept within legal bounds. This failure was sometimes due to structural deficiencies which kept knowledge of questionable programs tightly compartmented and shielded from those who could evaluate their legality.

As noted above, for example, the CIA's General Counsel was not informed about either the New York mail opening project or CIA's participation in the Huston Plan deliberations. The role of the CIA's General Counsel was essentially a passive one; he did not initiate inquiries but responded to requests from other Agency components. As James Angleton stated, the General Counsel was not a part of the normal project approval process and generally was not consulted until "something was going wrong."[87]

When the General Counsel was consulted, he often exerted a positive influence on the conduct of CIA activities. For example, the CIA stopped monitoring telephone calls to and from Latin America after the General Counsel issued an opinion describing the telephone intercepts as illegal.[88] But internal CIA regulations have never required employees who know of illegal, improper, or questionable activities to report them to the General Counsel; rather, employes with such knowledge are instructed to inform either the Director of Central Intelligence or, the Inspector General. The Director and the Inspector General may refer the matter to the General Counsel but until recently they were not obligated to do so.[88] As Richard Helms stated, "Somtimes we did [consult the General Counsel]; sometimes we did not. I think the record on that is rather spotty, quite frankly."[89]

Indeed, the record suggests that those programs that were most questionable -- such as the New York mail opening project and Project CHAOS -- were ]lot referred to the General Counsel because they were considered extremely sensitive.[90] Even when questionable activities re called to the attention of the General Counsel, moreover, the internal Agency regulations did not guarantee him unrestricted access all relevant information. Thus, the General Counsel was not in a position to conduct a complete evaluation of the propriety of particular programs.

Part of the failure of internal inspection to terminate improper programs and practices may be attributed to the fact that the primary focus of the CIA's Office of the Inspector General and the FBI's Inspection Division has been on efficiency and effectiveness rather than on propriety.

The CIA's Inspector General is charged with the responsibility, among other matters, of investigating activities which might be construed as "illegal, improper, and outside the CIA's legislative charter."[91] In at least one case, the Inspector General did force the suspension of a suspect activity: the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting, nonvolunteer, human subjects which was suspended in 1963.[92] An earlier Inspector General's review of the larger, more general program for the testing of behavorial control agents, however, had labeled that program "unethical and illegal" and it nonetheless continued for another seven years.[93] In general, as the Rockefeller Commission pointed out, "the focus of the Inspector General component reviews was on operational effectiveness. Examination of the legality or propriety of CIA activities was not normally a primary concern."[94] Two separate reviews of the New York mail opening projects by the Inspector General's office, for example, considered issues of administration and security at length but did riot even mention legal considerations.[95]

Internal inspection at the FBI has traditionally not encompassed legal or ethical questions at all. According to W. Mark Felt, the Assistant FBI Director in charge of the Inspection Division from 1964 to 1971, his job was to ensure that Bureau programs were being operated efficiently, not constitutionally: "There was no instruction to me," he stated, "nor do I believe there is any instruction in the Inspector's manuals, that inspectors should be on the alert to see that constitutional values are being protected."[96] He could not recall any program which was terminated because it might have been violating someone's civil rights.[97]

A number of questionable FBI programs were apparently never inspected. Felt could recall no inspection, for instance, of either the FBI mail opening programs or the Bureau's participation in the CIA's New York mail opening project.[98] Even when improper programs were inspected, the Inspection Division did not attempt to exercise oversight in the sense of looking for wrongdoing. Its responsibility was simply to ensure that FBI policy, as defined by J. Edgar Hoover was effectively implemented and not to question the propriety of the policy.[99] Thus, Felt testified that if, in the course of an inspection of a field office, he discovered a microphone surveillance on Martin Luther King, Jr., the only questions he would ask were whether it had been approved by the Director and whether the procedures had been properly followed.[100]

When Felt was asked whether the Inspection Division conducted any investigation into the propriety of COINTELPRO, the following exchange ensued:

Mr. FELT. Not into the propriety.

Q. So in the case of COINTELPRO, as in the case of NSA interceptions, your job as Inspector was to determine whether the program was being pursued effectively as opposed to whether it was proper?

Mr. FELT. Right, with this exception, that in any of these situations, Counterintelligence Program or whatever, it very frequently happened that the inspectors, in reviewing the files, would direct that a certain investigation be discontinued, that it was not productive, or that there was some reason that it be discontinued.

But I don't recall any cases being discontinued in the Counterintelligence

program.[101]

As a result of this role definition, the Inspection Division became an active participant in some of the most questionable FBI programs For example, it was responsible for reviewing on an annual basis all memoranda relating to illegal break-ins prior to their destruction under the "DO NOT FILE" procedure.

Improper programs and techniques in the FBI were protected not only by the Inspection Division's perception of its function, but also by the maxim that FBI agents should never "embarrass the Bureau." This standard, which served as a shield to outside scrutiny, was explicitly reflected in the FBI Manual:

Any investigation necessary to develop complete essential facts regarding any allegation against Bureau employees must be instituted promptly, and every logical lead which will establish the true facts should be completely run out unless such action would embarrass the Bureau ... in which event the Bureau will weigh the facts, along with the recommendations of the division head. [Emphasis added.][102]

Such an instruction, coupled with the Inspection Division's inattention to the law, could only inhibit or prevent the termination and exposure of illegal practices.

Subfinding (g)

When senior administration officials with a duty to control domestic intelligence activities knew, or had a basis for suspecting, that questionable activities had occurred, they often responded with silence or approval. In certain cases, they were presented with a partial description of a program but did not ask for details, thereby abdicating their responsibility. In other cases, they were fully aware of the nature of the practice and implicitly or explicitly approved it.

On several occasions, senior administration officials with a duty to control domestic intelligence activities were supplied with partial details about questionable or illegal programs but they did not ask for additional information and the programs continued.

Sometimes the failure to probe further stemmed from the administration official's assumption that an intelligence agency would not engage in lawless conduct. Former Chief Postal Inspector Henry Montague, for example, was aware that the FBI received custody of the mail in connection with several of its mail opening programs -- indeed, he had approved such custody in one case -- but he testified that he believed these were mail cover operations only.[103] Montague stated that he did not ask FBI officials if the Bureau opened mail because he

never thought that would be necessary .... I trusted them the same as I would another [Postal] Inspector. I would never feel that I would have to tell a Postal person that you cannot open mail. By the same token, I would not consider it necessary to emphasize it to any great degree with the FBI.[104]

A former FBI official has also testified, as noted above, that he informed Attorney General Katzenbach about selected aspects of the FBI mail opening programs. This official did not tell Katzenbach that mail was actually opened, but he testified that he "pointed out [to the Attorney General] that we do receive mail from the Post Office in certain sensitive areas."[105] While Katzenbach stated that he never knew mail was opened or that the FBI gained access to mail on a regular basis in large-scale operations,[106] the former Attorney General acknowledged that he did learn that "in some cases the outside of mail might have been examined or even photographed by persons other than Post Office employees".[107] However, neither at this time nor at any other time did the Justice Department make any inquiry to determine the full scope of the FBI mail operations.

Similarly, former Attorneys General Nicholas Katzenbach and Ramsey Clark testified that they were familiar with the FBI's efforts to disrupt the Ku Klux Klan through regular investigative techniques but said they were unaware of the offensive tactics that occurred in COINTELPRO. Katzenbach said he did not believe it necessary to explore possible irregularities since "[i]t never occurred to me that the Bureau would engage in the sort of sustained improper activity which it apparently did."[108]

Both Robert Kennedy and Nicholas Katzenbach were also aware of some aspects of the FBI's investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., yet neither ascertained the full details of the Bureau's campaign to discredit the civil rights leader. Kennedy intensified the original "communist influence" investigation in October 1963 by authorizing wiretaps on King's home and office telephones.[109] Kennedy requested that an evaluation of the results be submitted to him in thirty days in order to determine whether or not to maintain the taps, but the evaluation was never delivered to him and he did not insist on it.[110] Since he never ordered the termination of the wiretap, the Bureau could, and did, install additional wiretaps on King by invoking the original authorization.[111] According to Bureau memoranda apparently initialled by Attorney General Katzenbach, Katzenbach received after the fact notification in 1965 that three bugs had been planted in Dr. King's hotel rooms.[112] A transmittal memorandum written by Katzenbach also indicates that he may have instructed the FBI to be "very cautious" in conducting these surveillances.[113] There is no indication, however, that, he requested further details about any of them or prohibited the FBI from future use of this technique against Dr. King.

While there is no evidence that the full extent of the FBI's campaign to discredit Dr. King was authorized by or known to anyone outside of the Bureau, there is evidence that officials responsible for supervising the FBI received indications that some such efforts were being undertaken. For example, former Attorney General Katzenbach and former Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall both testified that in late 1964 they learned that the Bureau had offered tape recordings of Dr. King to certain newsmen in Washington, D.C. They further stated that they informed President Johnson of the FBI's offers.[114] The Committee has discovered no evidence, however, that the President or Justice Department officials made any further effort to halt the discrediting campaign at this time or at any other time; indeed, the Bureau's campaign continued for several years after this incident.

On some occasions, administration officials did not request further details about intelligence programs because they simply did not want to know. Former Postmaster General J. Edward Day testified that when Allen Dulles and Richard Helms spoke to him about a CIA project in 1961, he interrupted them before they could tell him the purpose of their visit (which Helms said was to say mail was being opened). Day stated:

... Mr. Dulles, after some preliminary visiting and so on, said that he wanted to tell me something very secret, and I said, "Do I have to know about it?" And he

said, "No."

I said, "My experience is that where there is something that is very secret, it is likely to leak out, and anybody that knew about it is likely to be suspected of having been part of leaking it out, so I would rather not know anything about it."

What additional things were said in connection with him building up to that, I don't know. But I am sure ... that I was not told anything about opening mail."[115]

By his own account, therefore, Mr. Day did not learn the true nature of this project because he "would rather not know anything about it." Although rarely expressed in such unequivocal terms, this attitude appears to have been all too common among senior government officials.

Even when administration officials were fully apprised of the illegal or questionable nature of certain programs and techniques, they sometimes permitted them to continue. An example of acquiescence is presented in the case of William Cotter, a former Chief Postal Inspector who knew that the CIA opened mail in connection with its New York project but took no direct action to terminate the project for a period of four years.[116] Cotter had learned of this project in his capacity as a CIA official in the mid-1950's and he knew that it was continuing when he was sworn in as Chief Postal Inspector in April 1969.[117] Because the primary responsibility of his position was to insure the sanctity of the mails, he was understandably "very, very uncomfortable with [knowledge of the New York] project,"[118] but he felt constrained by the letter and spirit of the secrecy oath which he had signed when he left the CIA in 1969 "attesting to the fact that I would not divulge secret information that came into my possession during the time that I was with the CIA."[119] Cotter stated: "After coming from eighteen years in the CIA, I was hypersensitive, perhaps, to the protection of what I believed to be a most sensitive project . . ."[120] For several years, he placed the dictate of the secrecy oath above that of the law he was charged with enforcing.

Former White House adviser John Ehrlichman also stated that he learned of a program of intercepting mail between the United States and Communist countries "because I had seen reports that cited those kinds of sources in connection with this, the bombings, the dissident activities."[121] Yet he cannot recall any White House inquiry that was made into such a program nor can he recall raising the matter with the President.[122]

When President Nixon learned of the illegal techniques that were recommended in the Huston Plan, he initially endorsed, rather than disavowed them. The former President stated that "[t]o the extent that I reviewed the Special Report of Interagency Committee on Intelligence, I would have been informed that certain recommendations or decisions set forth in that report were, or might be construed to be, illegal."[123] He nonetheless approved them, in part because they represented an efficient method of intelligence collection. As President Nixon explained, "[M]y approval was based largely on the fact that the procedures were consistent with those employed by prior administrations and had been found to be effective by the intelligence agencies."[124]

Mr. Nixon also apparently relied on the theory that a "sovereign" President can authorize the violation of criminal laws in the name of "national security" when the President, in his sole discretion, deems it appropriate. He recently stated:

It is quite obvious that there are certain inherently governmental actions which if undertaken by the sovereign in protection of the interest of the nation's security are lawful but which if undertaken by private persons are not. . . .

... [I]t is naive to attempt to categorize activities a President might authorize as "legal" or "illegal" without reference to the circumstances under which he concludes that the activity is necessary. . . .

In short, there have been -- and will be in the future -- circumstances in which Presidents may lawfully authorize actions in the interests of the security of this country, which if undertaken by other persons, or even by the President under different circumstances, would be illegal.[125]

As the former President described this doctrine, it could apply not only to actions taken openly, which are subject to later challenge by Congress and the courts, but also to actions such as those recommended in the Huston Plan, which are covertly endorsed and implemented. The dangers inherent in this theory are clear, for it permits a President to create exceptions to normal legal restraints and prohibitions, without review by a neutral authority and without objective standards to guide him.[126] The Huston Plan itself serves as a reminder of these dangers.

Significantly, President Nixon's revocation of approval for the Huston Plan was based on the possibility of "media criticism" if the use of these techniques was revealed. The former President stated:

Mr. Mitchell informed me that it was Director Hoover's opinion that initiating a program which would permit several government intelligence agencies to utilize the investigative techniques outlined in the Committee's report would significantly increase the possibility of their public disclosure. Mr. Mitchell explained to me that Mr. Hoover believed that although each of the intelligence gathering methods outlined in the Committee's recommendations had been utilized by one or more previous Administrations, their sensitivity would likely generate media criticism if they were employed. Mr. Mitchell further informed me that it was his opinion that the risk of disclosure of the possible illegal actions, such as unauthorized entry into foreign embassies to install a microphone transmitter, was greater than the possible benefit to be derived. Based upon this conversation with Attorney General Mitchell, I decided to revoke the approval originally extended to the Committee's recommendations.[127]

In more than one instance, administration officials outside the intelligence community have specifically requested intelligence agencies to undertake questionable actions. NSA's program of monitoring telephonic communications between New York City and a city in South America, for example, was undertaken at the specific request of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, a law enforcement agency.

BNDD officials had been concerned about drug deals that were apparently arranged in calls from public telephones in New York to South America, but they felt that they could not legally wiretap these telephone booths.[128] In order to avoid tapping a limited number of phones in New York, BNDD submitted the names of 450 American citizens for inclusion in NSA's Watch List, and requested NSA to monitor a communications link between New York and South America which necessitated the interception of thousands of international telephone calls.[129]

The legal limitations on domestic wiretapping apparently did not concern certain officials in the White House or Attorneys General who requested the FBI to do their bidding. In some instances, they specifically requested the FBI to institute wiretaps on American citizens with no substantial national security predicate for doing so.[130]

On occasion, Attorneys General have also encouraged the FBI to circumvent the will of both Congress and the Supreme Court. As noted above, after Congress passed the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 to regulate the FBI program for listing people to be detained in case of war or other emergency, Justice Department officials concluded that its procedural safeguards and substantive standards were "unworkable". Attorney General J. Howard McGrath instructed the FBI to disregard the statute and "proceed with the [Security Index] program as previously outlined."[131] Two subsequent Attorneys General -- James McGranery and Herbert Brownell endorsed the decision to ignore the Emergency Detention Act.[132]

In 1954, the Supreme Court denounced the use of microphone surveillances by local police in criminal cases;[133] the fact that a microphone had been installed in a defendant's bedroom particularly outraged the court. Within weeks of this decision, however, Attorney General Herbert Brownell reversed the existing Justice Department policy prohibiting trespassory microphone installations by the FBI, and gave the Bureau sweeping new authority to engage in bugging for intelligence purposes -- even when it meant planting microphones in bedrooms.[134] Brownell wrote J. Edgar Hoover:

Obviously, the installation of a microphone in a bedroom or in some comparably intimate location should be avoided whenever possible. It may appear, however, that important intelligence or evidence relating to matters connected with the national security can only be obtained by the installation of a microphone in such a location. . . .

... I recognize that for the FBI to fulfill its important intelligence function, considerations of internal security and the national safety are paramount and, therefore, may compel the unrestricted use of this technique in the national interest.[135]

Brownell did not even require the Bureau to seek the Attorney General's prior approval for microphone installations in particular cases.[136] In the face of the Irvine decision, therefore, he gave the FBI authority to bug whomever it wished wherever it wished in cases that the Bureau -- and not the Attorney General -- determined were "in the national interest."

In short, disregard of the law by intelligence officers was seldom corrected, and sometimes encouraged or facilitated, by officials outside the agencies. Whether by inaction or direct participation, these administration officials contributed to the perception that legal restraints did not apply to intelligence activities.

[1] This section discusses the legal issues raised by particular programs and activities only; a discussion of the aggregate effect upon constitutional rights of all domestic surveillance practices is at p.[[290] of the Conclusions section.

[2] The accountability of senior administration officials is noted here to place the details which follow in their proper context, and is developed at greater length in Finding G, p.[ 265.

[3] George C. Moore testimony, 11/3/75, p. 83.

[4] Branigan testimony, 10/9/75, pp. 13, 139, 140; Wannall testimony, 10/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 149.

[5] Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 89.

[6] William C. Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, pp. 49,50.

[7] Richard Helms, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 94. This testimony is partially contradicted, however, by the fact that in 1970 Helms signed the Huston Report. in which "covert mail coverage" -- defined as mail opening- was specifically described as illegal. (Special Report, June 1970, p. 30.)

[8] Helms, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 103.

[9] Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 21.

[10] Sullivan, 11/1/75, pp. 92, 93.

[11] Memorandum from Mr. Boardman to the Director, FBI, 4/30/54.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C.D. Deloach, 7/19/66.

[14] Report of the House Judiciary Committee, 8/20/74, p. 150.

[15] Memorandum from William C. Sullivan to J. Edgar Hoover, 6/30/69.

[15] Memorandum from Richard Helms to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 12/17/63.

[16] Blind memorandum, 11/7/55.

[17] Memorandum from Deputy Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, to Director, Offlee of Security, 2/1/62.

[18] Memorandum from Chief, CI/Project to Chief, Division, 9/26/63.

[19] Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 61; Howard Osborn, deposition, 8/28/75, p. 90.

[20] Gordon Stewart, 9/30/75, p. 28.

[21] See e.g., Howard Osborn deposition, 8/28/75. p. 89.

[22] Special Report, June 1970, p.[ 31.

[23] Special Report, June 1970, p.[ 30.

[24] Special Report, June 1970, p.[ 32.

[25] President Nixon stated that he approved these activities in part because they "had been found to be effective." (Response of Richard M. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatory 19, 3/9/76, p. 13.)

[26] For a description of the techniques which continued or were subsequently instituted, see pp.[ 115-116.

A memorandum from John Dean to John Mitchell suggests that, after President Nixon's revocation of approval for the Huston Plan, the White House itself supported the continued pursuit of some of the objectives of the Huston Plan, through an interagency unit known as the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. (Memorandum from John Dean to the Attorney General, 9/18/70.) In this memorandum, Dean suggested the creation of such a unit for "both operational and evaluation purposes." He wrote in part:

"[T]he unit can serve to make appropriate recommendations for the type of intelligence that should be immediately pursued by the various agencies. In regard to this . . . point, I believe we agreed that it would be inappropriate to have any blanket removal of restrictions; rather, the most appropriate procedure would be to decide on the type of intelligence we need, based on an assessment of the recommendations of this unit, and then to proceed to remove the restraints as necessary to obtain such intelligence." (Dean memorandum, 9/18/70.)

[27] Memorandum for the record by Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 8/16/68, Staff summary of Sol Lindenbaum (former Executive Assistant to the Attorney General) interview, 5/8/75.

[28] Memorandum for the record by Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.[ 8/16/68.

[29] The Army's general domestic surveillance program provides an example of evasion of a departmental order which had been issued out of concern with legal issues. The practice of collecting vast amounts of information on American citizens was terminated in 1971, when new Department of Defense restrictions came into effect calling for the destruction of all files on "unaffiliated" persons, and organizations. Rather than destroying the files, however, several Army intelligence units simply turned their intelligence files an dissident individuals and groups over to local police authorities; and one Air Force counterintelligence unit in San Diego began to create new files the next year. (Hearings before Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate.[ 92nd Congress, 1st session, 1971, p. 1297; "Ex-FBI Aid Accused in Police Spy Hearings" Chicago Tribune, 6/21/75. p. 3.)

[30] USAINTC Staff Study: Material Testing Program EA 1729.[ 10/15/59.

[31] Sullivan attributes much of this attitude to the molding influence of World War II upon young intelligence agents who later rose to positions of influence in the intelligence community. (Sullivan, 11/1/75, pp. 94-95.) Disregard of the "niceties of law," he stated, continued after the war had ended:

"Along came the Cold War. We pursued the same course in the Korean War, and the Cold War continued, then the Vietnam War. We never freed ourselves from that psychology that we were indoctrinated with, right after Pearl Harbor, you see. I think this accounts for the fact that nobody seemed to be concerned about raising the question is this lawful, is this legal, is this ethical? It was just like a soldier in the battlefield. When he shot down an enemy he did not ask himself is this legal or lawful, is it ethical? It is what he was expected to do as a soldier."

"We did what we were expected to do. It became part of our thinking, a part of our personality." (Sullivan. 11/1/75. pp. 95,96.)

Unfortunately, it made too little difference whether the "enemy" was a foreign spy, a civil rights leader, or a Vietnam protester.

[32] Sullivan, 11/1/75, P. 96.

[33] Branigan.[ 10/9/75, p. 41.

[34] Staff summary of William C. Sullivan interview, 6/10/75.

[35] omitted in original.

[36] Moore deposition, 11/3/75, p. 79.

[37] Branagan deposition, 1/9/75, p. 41. Richard Helms referred to another kind of "greater good" when asked to speculate about the possible motivation of a CIA scientist who did not heed President Nixon's directive to destroy all biological and chemical toxins. Noting that the scientist might have "had thoughts about immunization ... or treatment of disease where [the toxin he had developed might be useful," Helms said that the retention of this biological agent could be explained as "yielding to that human impulse of the greater good." (Richard Helm- testimony, 9/15/75, p. 96.)

[38] Robert Andrews testimony 9/23/75, p.[ 34; See NSA Report: "SHAMROCK." By cooperating with the Government in SHAMROCK, executives of three companies chose to ignore the advice of their respective legal counsels who had recommended against participation because they considered the program to be in violation of the law and FCC regulations. (Memorandum for the record, Armed Forces Security Agency, Subject: SHAMROCK Operation, 8/25/50.)

[39] Tom Charles Huston deposition, 5/22/75, p. 43; Staff Summary of Toni Charles Huston interview, 5/22/75.

[40] Letter from Richard Helms to Henry Kissinger, 2/18/69.

[41] See COINTELPRO Report: See. V, "Outside the Bureau" memorandum; from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 8/25/67.

[42] omitted in original.

[43] Buffham, 9/12/75, p. 20; MINARET Charter, 7/1/69.

At other times, however, NSA's special security measures were applied to Protect documents which concerned far more than NSA. Thus, at Richard Helms suggestion, Huston Plan working papers and documents were all stamped with legends designed to protect NSA's lawful communications activity, although only a small portion of the documents actually concerned NSA. (Unaddressed memorandum, Subject: "Interagency Committee on Intelligence, Working Subcommittee, Minutes of the First Meeting," 6/10/70.)

[44] Department of Army Message to Subordinate Commands, 3/31/68.

[45] CIA memorandum, Subject: Inspector General's Survey of the Office of Security, Annex II, undated.

[46] Memorandum from Deputy Chief, CI Staff, to Director Office of Security, 2/1/62.

[47] Memorandum from Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, to Deputy Director for Support, 2/21/62.

[48] Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 7/19/66. The same document that describes the application of the "DO NOT FILE" procedure to "black bag jobs" also notes that before a break-in could be approved within the FBI, the Special Agent in Charge of the field office had to assure headquarters that it could be accomplished without "embarrassment to the Bureau." (Sullivan memorandum, 7/19/66.)

An isolated instance of file destruction apparently occurred in the Los Angeles office of the Internal Revenue Service in December 1974, at a time when Congressional investigation of the intelligence agencies was imminent. This office had collected large amounts of essentially political information regarding black militants and political activists. In violation of internal document destruction procedures the files were destroyed prior to their proposed review by IRS authorities. See IRS Report; Sec. IV. "The Information Gathering and Retrieval System"; Staff Summary of interview with Chief, IRS Division, Los Angeles, 8/1/75.

[49] For example, letters from W. C. Sullivan to J. Edgar Hoover, 6/30/69, 7/2/69, 7 3/69, 7/7/69. These letters were sent to Hoover from Paris, where Sullivan coordinated the Kraft surveillance. All of them bear the notation "DO NOT FILE."

[50] Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 7/19/66.

[51] Gordon Stewart, 9/30/75, p. 29.

[52] McCone, 10/9/75, pp. 3-4; Angleton, 9/17/75, p. 20; Osborn, 10/21/75; Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 38.

[53] Memorandum from Richard Helms to Director of Security, 5/17/74; Helms, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 84. By the CIA's own account, moreover, at most only three Cabinet-level officials may have been told about the mail opening aspects of this project. Each of these three -- Postmasters General J. Edward Day and Winton M. Blount, and Attorney General John Mitchell -- dispute the Agency's claim. (Day, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 45; Blount, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 47; Mitchell, 10/2/75, pp. 13-14.)

[54] Blind memorandum from "CIA Officer,"[ 4/23/65.

[55] Ibid. Mr. Gronouski testified as follows about the CIA's successful attempt to keep knowledge of the New York project from him:

"When this news [about CIA mail opening) broke [in 19751, I thought it was incredible that a person in a top position of responsibility in Government in an agency should have something of this sort that is very illegal going on within his own agency and did not know about it. It is not that I did not try to know about these things. I think it is incumbent upon anybody at the top office to try to know everything that goes on in his organization." (Gronouski, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4 p. 44.)

[56] Helms, 10/23/75, pp. 28,30-31.

[57] Special Report, p.[ 29. Richard Helms testified as follows about this inaccurate statement:

". . . the only explanation I have for it was that this applied entirely to the FBI and had nothing to do with the CIA, that we never advertised to this Committee or told this Committee that this mail operation was going on, and there was no intention of attesting to a lie. . . ."

"And if I signed this thing, then maybe I didn't read it carefully enough."

"There was no intention to mislead or lie to the President." (Helms, 10/22/75, Hearings Vol. 4, p. 95).

[58] Howard Osborn, 8/28/75, pp. 58, 59; Thomas Karamessines, 10/8/75, p. 12; Richard Helms, 9/10/75, p. 127.

[59] For example, Chief, Security Support Division memorandum, 12/24/74; Memorandum from C/TSD/CCG/CRB to the file, 3/26/60; memorandum from C/TSD/CCG/CRB to the file, 9/15/69.

[60] Donald E. Moore, 10/1/75, p. 79.

[61] Moore, 10/1/75, p. 31; Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, vol. 6, pp. 204, 205.

[62] Moore 10/1/75, p.[ 48. See Mail Report: see. IV, "Nature and Value of the Product Received."

[63] FBI agent testimony, 10/10/75, p. 30.

[64] See NSA Report: See. II, "Summary of NSA Watch List Activity."

[65] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to FBI Field Offices, 8/14/43.

[66] Memorandum from Atlanta Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/7/67.

[67] Memorandum from Birmingham Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/14/67.

[68] Postal officials told Bureau liaison that since Shelton's allegations "appear to involve an internal struggle for control of Ku Klux Klan activities in North Carolina and since the evidence of mail fraud was somewhat tenuous in nature, the Post Office did not contemplate any investigation." (Memorandum from Special Agent to D. J. Brennan, 7/11/67.) Had the FBI informed the Post Office that Bureau agents had written the letter, it would have been apparent that Shelton's allegations were not based on an "internal struggle" within the KKK.

[69] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Charlotte Field Office, 8/21/67.

[70] Memorandum from Charlotte Field Office to FBI Headquarters 8/22/67.

[71] Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, Val. 2, p. 24.

When J. Edgar Hoover informed Attorney General John Mitchell about the Report on July 27, 1970, Mitchell objected to its proposals and influenced the President to withdraw his original approval.

According to John 'Mitchell, he believed that the proposals "were inimical to the best interests of the country and certainly should not be something that the President of the United States should be approving." (John Mitchell testimony, 10/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 23.)

[73] James Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 77.

[74] See Military Surveillance Report: Sec.[ 1, "Improper Surveillance of Private Citizens by the Military"; Inspector General Report, Department of the Army, 1/3/72.

[75] The Johnson Administration itself attempted to restrict the Long Subcommittee's investigation into national security matters, although there is no indication that this attempt was motivated by a desire to protect illegal activities. (E.g., Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Tolson, 2/27/65; memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Gale, Rosen, Sullivan, and DeLoach, 3/2/65.)

[76] Blind memorandum from "CIA Officer,"[ 4/23/65.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Tolson, 2/27/65.

[79] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Gale, Rosen, Sullivan, and DeLoach, 3/1/65.

[80] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Gale, Rosen, Sullivan, and DeLoach 3/1/65.

[81] Mail Report Part IV, See. VII, "Concern with Exposure." At the time of his testimony before the Long Subcommittee, Chief Postal Inspector Montague knew of ongoing FBI projects in which Bureau agents received custody of the mail, but he was apparently unaware that these projects involved mail openings.

[82] For example, Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Tolson, 1/10/66.

[83] Memorandum from M. A. Jones to Mr. Wick, Attachment, 1/11/66.

[84] See pp.[ 62--65, 105, 205-206 for a description of some of these improper surveillances.

[85] Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Tolson, 1/21/66.

[86] DeLoach memorandum, 1/21/66. This incident also illustrates that Congress has at times permitted itself to be "neutralized." The general reluctance of Congress to discharge its responsibilities toward intelligence agencies is discussed at pp. 277-281.

[87] James Angleton; 9/17/75. p. 48

[88] Memorandum from Lawrence Houston to Acting Chief, Division D, 1/29/73.

[88] Proposed regulations drafted in response to Executive Order 11905 (March 1976) require the Inspector General to refer "all legal matters" to the Office of General Counsel. (Draft Reg. HR 1-3.)

[89] Helms deposition, 9/10/75, P. 59.

[90] Gordon Stewart deposition, 4/30/75, p. 29; Rockefeller Commission Report, p. 146; Report on the Offices of the General Counsel and Inspector General: The General Counsel's Responsibilities, 9/30/75, p. 29.

[91] Regulation HR 7-1a (6).

[92] Memorandum for the Record by J. S. Earman, Inspector General, 11/29/63; Memorandum from Helms to DCI, 11/9/64.

[93] 1957 I.G. Inspection of the Technical Services Division.

[94] Rockefeller Commission Report, 6/6/75, p. 89.

[95] Memorandum from L. K. White, Deputy Director for Support, to Acting Inspector General, Attachment, 3/9/62; blind memorandum, undated (1969). The Inspector General under whose auspices the second review was conducted stated "[O]f course we knew that this was illegal," but he believed that it was "unnecessary" to raise the matter of its illegality with Director Helms "since everybody knew that it was [illegal] and it didn't seem ... that I would be telling Mr. Helms anything that he didn't know." (Gordon Stewart, 9/30/75, p. 32.)

[96] W. Mark Felt testimony, 2/3/75, p. 65.

[97] Felt, 2/3/75, p. 57.

[98] Felt, 2/3/75, pp. 54, 55.

[99] Felt, 2/3/75, pp. 59-60.

[100] Felt, 2/3/75, p. 60.

[101] Felt, 2/3/75, pp. 56, 57.

[102] When asked about this Manual provision, Attorney General Edward Levi stated:

"I do believe ... some further explanation is in order. First, the Bureau informs me that the provision has not been interpreted to mean that an investigation should not take place and that any interpretation that an investigation would not be instituted because of the possibility of embarrassment to the Bureau was never intended and, in fact, has never been the policy of this Bureau.' I am told that 'what was intended to be conveyed was that in such eventuality FBI Headquarters desired to be advised of the matter before investigation is instituted so that Headquarters would be on notice and could direct the inquiry, if necessary."'

"Second, the manual provision dates back to March 30, 1955."

"Third, I am informed by the Bureau that 'immediate steps are being taken to remove that phraseology from our Manual of Rules and Regulations.'"

(Letter from Attorney General Levi to Senator Richard Schweiker, 11/10/75.)

[103] Henry Montague testimony, 10/2/75, pp. 55, 71.

[104] Henry Montague, 10/2/75, pp. 15-16.

[105] Donald Moore, 10/1/75, p. 31.

[106] Nicholas Katzenbach, 10/11/75, p. 35.

[107] Katzenbach statement, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 205.

[108] Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 207; Ramsey Clark, 12/3/75; Hearings, Vol. 6 p. 235; Katzenbach's and Clark's knowledge of disruptive operations is discussed at greater length in Finding G: "Deficiences in Control and Accountability" p. 265.

[109] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 10/7/63; memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 16/18/63.

[110] Memorandum from C. A. Evans to Mr. Belmont 10/21/63.

In May 1961, Robert Kennedy also became aware of the CIA's use of organized crime figures in connection with "clandestine efforts" against the Cuban government. (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 5/22/61.) But he did not instruct the CIA to terminate its involvement with underworld figures either at that time or in May 1962, when he learned at a briefing by CIA officials that an assassination attempt had occurred. According to the CIA's General Counsel, who participated in the 1962 briefing, Kennedy only said if we were going to get involved with Mafia personnel again he wanted to be informed first." (Lawrence Houston deposition, 6/2/75, p. 14.)

The CIA's use of underworld figures clearly posed problems for the FBI's ongoing investigation of organized crime in the United States, which had in large part been initiated by Attorney General Kennedy himself. (Senate Select Committee, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders," pp. 125-129.)

[111] The FBI instituted additional wiretaps on King on four separate occasions between 1964 and 1965. Since Justice Department policy before March 1965 imposed no limit on the duration of wiretaps and they were approved by the Attorney General, the Bureau claimed that the King taps were justified as a continuation of the tap originally authorized by Kennedy in October 1963. (For example, memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Atlanta Field Office, 4/19/65; Martin Luther King Report: Sec. IC, "Wiretap Surveillance of Dr. King and the SCLC."

[112] Katzenbach's initials appear on memoranda addressed to the Attorney General advising him of these bugs, but he cannot recall seeing or initialing them. (Memoranda from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 5/17/65, 10/19/65, 12/1/65; Katzenbach, 12/1/75. Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 211, p. 46.) He stated, however, that if he had read these documents, he would have "done something about it." (Katzenbach, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 230.)

[113] A transmittal slip, which the FBI claims had been attached to the 12/1/65 memorandum, notes that "these are particularly delicate surveillances" and that "we should be very cautious in terms of the non-FBI people who may from time to time necessarily be involved in some aspect of installation." (Memorandum from Nicholas Katzenbach to J. Edgar Hoover, 12/10/65.) This message is signed by Katzenbach, but he testified that he is unsure it related to the King surveillances. (Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 229.)

[114] Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 210; Burke Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, pp. 3943.

[115] J. Edward Day testimony, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4. p. 45.

[116] In 1973, however, Mr. Cotter was instrumental in effecting the termination of the CIA's New York project. (Cotter, 8/7/75, p. 45.)

[117] Cotter, 8/7/75, p. 45.

[118] Ibid.

[119] Cotter 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol.[ 4, p. 74.

[120] Ibid.

[121] John Erlichman testimony, President's Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, 4/17/75, p. 98.

[122] Erlichman testimony, President's Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, 4/17/75, p. 98.

[123] Answer of Richard M. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatory 23, 3/9/76, p. 13.

[124] Answer of Richard M. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatory 19, 3/9/76, p. 13.

[125] Answer of Richard M. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatory 34, 3/9/76, pp. 16-17.

[126] President Ford has recently rejected this doctrine of Presidential power.

[127] Answer of Richard M. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatory 17, 8/9/76, pp. 11-12.

[128] Milton Iredell, 9/18/75, p. 99.

[129] Memorandum from Ingersoll to Gayler, 4/10/70.

[130] See Findings, "Political Abuse" and "Intrusive Techniques" for examples.

[131] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to D. M. Ladd, 10/15/52.

[132] Memorandum from Attorney General James McGranery to I. Edgar Hoover, 11/25/52; memorandum from Attorney General Herbert Brownell to J. Edgar Hoover, 4/27/53.

[133] Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).

[134] Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, 5/20/54.

[135] Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, 5/20/54.

[136] Ibid.

- B. The Overbreadth of Domestic Intelligence Activity

MAJOR FINDING

The Committee finds that domestic intelligence activity has been overbroad in that (1) many Americans and domestic groups have been subjected to investigation who were not suspected of criminal activity and (2) the intelligence agencies have regularly collected information about personal and political activities irrelevant to any legitimate governmental interest.

Subfindings

(a) Large numbers of law-abiding Americans and lawful domestic groups have been subjected to extensive intelligence investigation and surveillance.

(b) The absence of precise standards for intelligence, investigations of Americans contributed to overbreadth. Congress did not enact statutes precisely delineating the authority of the intelligence agencies or defining the purpose and scope of domestic intelligence activity. The executive branch abandoned the standard set by Attorney General Stone -- that the government's concern was not with political opinions but with "such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States." Intelligence agencies' superiors issued over-inclusive directives to investigate "subversion" (a term that was never defined in presidential directives) and "potential" rather than actual or likely criminal conduct, as well as to collect general intelligence on lawful political and social dissent.

(c) The intelligence agencies themselves used imprecise and overinclusive criteria in their conduct of intelligence investigations. Intelligence investigations extended beyond "subversive" or violent targets to additional groups and individuals subject to minimal "subversive influence" or having little or no "potential" for violence.

(d) Intelligence agencies pursued a "vacuum cleaner" approach to intelligence collection -drawing in all available information about groups and individuals, including their lawful political activity and details of their personal lives.

(e) Intelligence investigations in many cases continued for excessively long periods of time, resulting in sustained governmental monitoring of political activity in the absence of any indication of criminal conduct or "subversion."

Elaboration of Findings

The central problem posed by domestic intelligence activity has been its departure from the standards of the law. This departure from law has meant not only the violation of constitutional prohibitions and explicit statutes, but also the adoption of criteria unrelated to the law as the basis for extensive investigations of Americans.

In 1917-1924, the federal government, often assisted by the private vigilante American Protective League, conducted sweeping investigations of dissenters, war protesters, labor organizers, and alleged "anarchists" and "revolutionaries." These investigations led to massarrests of thousands of persons in the 1920 "Palmer raids." Reacting to these and other abuses of investigative power, Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone in 1924 confined the Bureau of Investigation in the Justice Department to the investigation of federal crimes. Attorney General Stone articulated a clear and workable standard:

The Bureau of Investigation is not concerned with political or other opinions of individuals. It is concerned only with their conduct and then only such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States.[1]

Nevertheless, his restriction lasted for little more than a decade.

In the mid-1930s the FBI resumed domestic intelligence functions, carrying out President Roosevelt's vague order to investigate "subversive activities." The President and the Attorney General authorized FBI and military intelligence investigations of conduct explicitly recognized as "not within the specific provisions of prevailing statutes." As a result, ideas and associations, rather than suspicion of criminal offenses, once again became the focus of federal investigations.

The scope of domestic intelligence investigations consistently widened in the decades after the 1930s, reaching its greatest extent in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Domestic intelligence investigations were permitted under criteria which more nearly resembled political or social labels than standards for governmental action. Rather than Attorney General Stone's standard of investigating "only such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States," domestic intelligence used such labels as the following to target intelligence investigations:

--"rightist" or "extremist" groups in the "anticommunist field

--persons with "anarchistic or revolutionary beliefs" or who were "espousing the line of revolutionary movements"

--"general racial matters"

--"hate organizations"

--"rabblerousers"

--"key activists"

--"black nationalists"

--"white supremacists"

--"agitators"

--"key black extremists"

These broad and imprecise labels reflect the ill-defined mission of domestic intelligence, which resulted from recurring demands for progressively wider investigations of Americans. Without the firm guidance provided by law, intelligence activities intruded into areas of American life which are protected from governmental inquiry by the constitutional guarantees of personal privacy and free speech and assembly.

Subfinding (a)

Large numbers of law-abiding Americans and lawful domestic groups have been subjected to extensive intelligence investigation and surveillance.

Some domestic intelligence activity has focused on specific illegal conduct or on instances where there was tangible evidence that illegal conduct was likely to occur. But domestic intelligence has gone far beyond such matters in collecting massive amounts of data on Americans. For example:

FBI Domestic Intelligence. -- The FBI has compiled at its headquarters over 480,000 files on its "subversion" investigations and over 33,000 files on its "extremism" investigations.[2] During the twenty years from 1955 to 1975, the FBI conducted 740,000 investigations of "subversive matters" and 190,000 investigations of "extremist matters."[3]

The targets for FBI intelligence collection have included:

- -the Women's Liberation Movement

- -the conservative Christian Front and Christian Mobilizers of Father Coughlin;

- -the conservative American Christian Action Council of Rev. Carl McIntyre;

- -a wide variety of university, church and political groups opposed to the Vietnam war;

--those in the non-violent civil rights movement, such as Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Council, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the Council on Racial Equality (CORE).

Army Surveillance of Civilians. -- The Army's nationwide intelligence surveillance program created files on some 100,000 Americans and an equally large number of domestic organizations, encompassing virtually every group seeking peaceful change in the United States including:

- -the John Birch Society;

- -Young Americans for Freedom;

- -the National Organization of Women;

- -the NAACP;

- -the Urban League;

- -the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith; and Business Executives to End the War in Vietnam.[4]

CIA's CHAOS Program. -- The CIA's extensive CHAOS program -- which compiled intelligence on domestic groups and individuals protesting the Vietnam war and racial conditions -- amassed some 10,000 intelligence files on American citizens and groups and indexed 300,000 names of Americans in CIA computer records.[5]

IRS Selective Tax Investigations of Dissenters. -- Between 1969 and 1973, the Internal Revenue Service, through a secret "Special Service Staff" (SSS), targeted more than 10,000 individuals and groups for tax examinations because of their political activity.[6] The FBI and the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department gave SSS lists of taxpayers deemed to be "activists" or "ideological organizations;" the FBI, in providing SSS with a list of over 2,000 groups and individuals classified as "Right Wing," "New Left," and "Old Left," expressed its hope that SSS tax examinations would "deal a blow to dissident elements."[7] A smaller though more intensive selective enforcement program, the "Ideological Organization Project," was established in November 1961 in response to White House criticism of "right-wing extremist" groups.[8] On the basis of such political criteria, 18 organizations were selected for special audit although there was no evidence of tax violation.[9] In 1964, the IRS proosed to expand its program to make "10,000 examinations of tax exempt organizations of all types including the extremist groups."[10] Although this program never fully materialized, the "Ideological Organizations Project" can be viewed as a precursor to SSS.

CIA and FBI Mail Opening. -- The 12 mail opening programs conducted by the CIA and FBI between 1940 and 1973 resulted in the illegal opening of hundreds of thousands of first-class letters. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the international correspondence of large numbers of Americans who challenged the condition of racial minorities or who opposed the war in Vietnam was specifically targeted for mail opening by both the CIA and FBI.

The overbreadth of the longest CIA mail opening program -- the 20 year (1953-1973) program in New York City -- is shown by the fact that of the more than 28 million letters screened by the CIA, the exteriors of 2.7 million were photographed and 214,820 letters were opened.[11] This is further shown by the fact that American groups and individuals placed on the Watch List for the project included:

- -The Federation of American Scientists;

- -authors such as John Steinbeck and Edward Albee;

--numerous American peace groups such as the American Friends Service Committee and Women's Strike for Peace; and

- -businesses, such as Praeger Publishers.[12]

By one CIA estimate, random selection accounted for 75 percent of the 200,000 letters opened, including letters to or from American political figures, such as Richard Nixon, while a presidential candidate in 1968, and Senators Frank Church and Edward Kennedy.[13]

IV NSA's Watch List and SHAMROCK Programs. -- The National Security Agency's SHAMROCK program, by which copies of millions of telegrams sent to, from, or through the United States were obtained between 1947 and 1973, involved the use of a Watch List 1967-1973. The watch list included groups and individuals selected by the FBI for its domestic intelligence investigations and by the CIA for its Operation CHAOS program. In addition, the SHAMROCK Program resulted in NSA's obtaining not only telegrams to an from certain foreign targets, but countless telegrams between Americans in the United States and American or foreign parties abroad.[14]

In short, virtually every element of our society has been subjected to excessive government- ordered intelligence inquiries. Opposition to government policy or the expression of controversial views was frequently onsidered sufficient for collecting data on Americans.

The committee finds that this extreme breadth of intelligence activity is inconsistent with the principles of our Constitution which protact the rights of speech, political activity, and privacy against un"Justified governmental intrusion.

Subfinding (b)

The absence of precise standards for intelligence investigations of Americans contributed to overbreadth. Congress did not enact statutes precisely delineating the authority of the intelligence agencies or defining the purpose and scope of domestic intelligence activity. The Executive branch abandoned the standard set by Attorney General Stone -- that the government's concern was not with political opinions but with "such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States." Intelligence agencies' superiors issued overinclusive directives to investigate "subversion" (a term that was never defined in presidential directives) and "potential" rather than actual or likely criminal conduct, as well as to collect general intelligence on lawful political -and social dissent.

Congress has never set out a specific statutory charter for FBI domestic intelligence activity delineating the standards for opening intelligence investigations or defining the purpose and scope of domestic intelligence activity.[15]

Nor have the charters for foreign intelligence agencies -- the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency -- articulated adequate standards to insure that those agencies did not become involved in domestic intelligence activity. While the 1947 National Security Act provided that the CIA shall have no "police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions,"[16] the Act was silent concerning whether the CIA was authorized to target Americans abroad or to gather intelligence in the United States on Americans or foreign nationals in connection with its foreign intelligence responsibilities. By classified presidential directive, the CIA was authorized to conduct counterintelligence operations abroad and to maintain central counterintelligence files for the intelligence community.[17] Counterintelligence activity was defined in the directive to include protection of the nation against "subversion," a term which, as in the directives authorizing FBI domestic intelligence activity, was not defined.

In the absence of specific standards for CIA activity and given the susceptibility of the term "subversion" to broad interpretation, the CIA conducted Operation CHAOS -- a large scale intelligence program involving the gathering of data on thousands of Americans and domestic groups to determine if they had "subversive connections"and illegally opened the mail of hundreds of thousands of Americans.

Moreover, the Act does not define the scope of the authority granted to CIA's Director to protect intelligence "sources and methods."[18] This authority has been broadly interpreted to permit surveillance of present and former CIA employees in the United States as well as domestic groups thought to be a threat to CIA installations in the United States.

No statute at all deals with the National Security Agency. That Agency -- one of the largest of the intelligence agencies -- was created by Executive Order in 1952. Although NSA's mission is to obtain foreign intelligence from "foreign" communications, this has been interpreted to permit NSA to intercept communications where one terminal -- the sender or receiver -- was in the United States. Consequently when an American has used telephone or telegraph facilities between this country and overseas, his message has been subject to interception by NSA. NSA obtained copies of millions of private telegrams sent from, to or through the United States in its SHAMROCK program and complied with requests to target the international communications of specific Americans through the use of a watch list.

In addition to the failure of Congress to enact precise statutory standards, members of Congress have put pressure on the intelligence agencies for the collection of domestic intelligence without adequate regard to constitutional interests.[19] Moreover, Congress has passed statutes, such as the Smith Act, which, although not directly authorizing domestic intelligence collection, had the effect of contributing to the excessive collection of intelligence about Americans.

Three functional policies, established by the Executive branch and acquiesced in by Congress, were the basis for the overbreadth of intelligence investigations directed at Americans. These policies centered on (1) so-called "subversion investigations" of attempts by hostile foreign governments and their agents in this country to influence the course of American life; (2) the investigation of persons and groups thought to have a "potential" for violating the law or committing violence; and (3) the collection of general intelligence on political and social movements in the interest of predicting and controlling civil disturbances.

Each of these policies grew out of a legitimate concern. Nazi Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union mounted intelligence efforts in this country before World War II; and Soviet operations continued after the war. In the 1960s and early 1970s, racist groups used force to deprive Americans of their civil rights, some American dissidents engaged in violence as a form of political protest, and there were large-scale protest demonstrations and major civil disorders in cities stemming from minority frustrations.

The Committee recognizes that the government had a responsibility to act in the face of the very real dangers presented by these developments. But appropriate restraints, controls, and prohibitions on intelligence collection were not devised; distinctions between legitimate targets of investigations and innocent citizens were forgotten; and the Government's actions were never examined for their effects on the constitutional rights of Americans, either when programs originated or as they continued over the years.

The policies of investigating Americans thought to have a "potential" for violence and the collection of general intelligence on political and social movements inevitably resulted in the surveillance of American citizens and domestic groups engaged in lawful political activity. "Subversive" was never defined in the presidential directives from Presidents Roosevelt to Kennedy authorizing FBI domestic intelligence activity. Consequently, "subversive" investigations did not focus solely on the activities of hostile foreign governments in this country. Rather, they targeted Americans who dissented from administration positions or whose political positions were thought to resemble those of "subversive" groups. An example of the ultimate result of accepting the concept of "subversive" investigations is the Johnson White House, instruction to the FBI to monitor public hearings on Vietnam policy and compare the extent to which Senators' views "followed the Communist Party line."[20]

Similarly, investigations of those thought to have the "potential" for violating laws or committing violence and the collection of general intelligence to prepare for civil disturbances resulted in the surveillance of Americans where there was not reasonable suspicion to believe crime or violence were likely to occur. Broad categories of American society -- conservatives, liberals, blacks, women, young people and churches -- were targeted for intelligence collection.

Domestic intelligence expanded to cover widespread political protest movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For example, in September 1967, Attorney General Ramsey Clark called for a "new area of investigation and intelligence reporting" by the FBI regarding the possibility of "an organized pattern of violence" by groups in the "urban ghetto." He Instructed FBI Director Hoover:

... we must make certain that every attempt is being made to get all information bearing upon these problems; to take every step possible to determine whether the rioting is preplanned or organized.... As apart of the broad investigation which must be conducted ... sources or informants in black nationalist organizations, SNCC and other less publicized groups should be developed and expanded to determine the size and purpose of these groups and their relationship to other groups.[21]

Such instructions did not limit investigation to facts pointing to particular criminal or violent activity but called for intensive intelligence surveillance of a broad category of black groups (and their connections with other groups) to determine their "size and purpose."

Similarly, the Army's broad domestic surveillance program reflected administration pressure on the Army for information on groups and individuals involved in domestic dissent.[22] As a former Assistant Secretary of Defense testified, the Army's sweeping collection plan "reflected the all-encompassing and uninhibited demand for information directed at the Department of the Army."[23]

Presidents Johnson and Nixon subjected the CIA to intensive pressure to find foreign influence on the domestic peace movements, resulting in the establishment of Operation CHAOS.[24] When the Nixon Administration called for an intensification of CIA's effort, the CIA was instructed to broaden its targeting criteria and strengthen its collection efforts. CIA was told that "foreign Communist support" should be "liberally construed."[25] The White House stated further that "it appears our present intelligence collection capabilities in this area may be inadequate" and implied that any gaps in CIA"s collection program resulting from "inadequate resources or a low priority of attention" should be corrected.[26]

In short, having abandoned Attorney General Stone's standard that restricted Government investigations to "conduct and then only such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States," the Government's far-reaching domestic intelligence policies inevitably, produced investigations and surveillance of large numbers of lawabiding Americans.

Subfinding (c)

The intelligence agencies themselves used imprecise and over-inclusive criteria in their conduct of intelligence investigations. Intelligence investigations extended beyond "subversive" or violent targets to additional groups and individuals subject to minimal "subversive influence" or having little or no "potential" for violence.

Having been given vague directions by their superiors and subjected to substantial pressure to report on a broad range of matters, the intelligence agencies themselves often established overinclusive targeting criteria. The criteria followed in the major domestic intelligence programs conducted in the 1960s and 1970s illustrate the breadth of intelligence targeting: @@@@@@ "*General Racial Matters*". -- The FBI gathered intelligence about proposed "civil demonstrations" and related activities of "officials, committees, legislatures, organizations, etc." in the "racial field."[27]

FBI Field Offices were directed to report the "general programs" of all "civil rights organizations" and "readily available personal background data" on leaders and individuals "in the civil rights movement," as well as any "subversive association" that might be recorded in Field Office files.[28] In addition, the FBI reported "the objectives sought by the minority Community."[29]

These broad criteria were also reflected in the FBI's targeting of "white militant groups" in the reporting of racial matters. Those who were "known to sponsor demonstrations against integration and against the busing of Negro students to white schools" were to be investigated.[30]

"New Left" Intelligence. -- In conducting a "comprehensive study of the whole New Left movement" (rather than investigating particular violations of law), the FBI defined its intelligence target as a "loosely-bound, free-wheeling, college-oriented movement."[31] Organizations to be investigated were those who fit criteria phrased as the "more extreme and militant anti-Vietnam war and antidraft organizations."[32]

The use of such imprecise criteria resulted in investigations of such matters as (1) two university instructors who helped support a student newspaper whose editorial policy was described by the FBI as "left-of-center, antiestablishment, and opposed to the University Administration";[33] (2) a dissident stockholder's group planning to protest a large corporation's war production at the annual stockholder's meeting;[34] and (3) "Free Universities" attached to college campuses, whether or not there were facts indicating any actual or potential violation of law.[35]

"Rabble Rouser" Index. -- Beginning in August 1967, the FBI conducted intensive intelligence investigations of individuals identified as "rabble rousers."" The program was begun after a member of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders asked the FBI at a meeting of the Commission "to identify the number of militant Negroes and Whites."[36] This vague reference was subsequently used by the FBI as the basis for instructions implementing a broad new program: persons were to be investigated and placed on the "rabble rouser" index who were "racial agitators who have demonstrated a potential for fomenting racial discord."[37] @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ Ultimately, a "rabble rouser" was defined as:

A person who tries to arouse people to violent action by appealing to their emotions, prejudices, et cetera; a demagogue.[38]

Thus, rather than collecting information on those who had or were likely to commit criminal or violent acts, a major intelligence program was launched to identify "demagogues."

Army Domestic Surveillance of "Dissidents." -- Extremely broad criteria were used in the Army's nationwide surveillance program conducted in the late 1960s. Such general terms as "the civil rights movement" and the "anti- Vietnam/anti-draft movements" were used to indicate targets for investigation.[39] In collecting information on these "Movements" and on the "cause of civil disturbances," Army intelligence was to investigate "instigators," "group participants" and "subversive elements" -- all undefined.

Under later revisions, the Army collection plan extended even beyond "subversion" and "dissident groups" to "prominent persons" who were "friendly" with the "leaders of the disturbance" or "sympathetic with their plans."[40]

These imprecise criteria led to the creation of intelligence files on nearly 100,000 Americans, including Dr. Martin Luther King, Major General Edwin Walker, Julian Bond, Joan Baez, Dr. Benjamin Spock, Rev. William Sloane Coffin, Congressman Abner Mikva, Senator Adlai Stevenson III,[41] as well as clergymen, teachers, journalists, editors, attorneys, industrialists, a laborer, a construction worker, railroad engineers, a postal clerk, a taxi driver, a chiropractor, a doctor, a chemist, an economist, a historian, a playwright, an accountant, an entertainer, professors, a radio announcer, athletes, business executives and authors -- all of whom became subjects of Army files simply because of their participation in political protests or their association with those who were engaged in such political activity.[42]

The IRS Computerized Intelligence Index. -- In 1973, IRS established a central computer index -- the "Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System" -- for general intelligence data, much of it unrelated to tax law enforcement. More than 465,000 Americans were indexed in the IRS computer system, including J. Edgar Hoover and the IRS Commissioner, as well as thousands of others also not suspected of tax violation. Names in newspaper articles and other published sources were indexed wholesale into the IRS computer. Under the system, intelligence gathering preceded any specific allegation of a violation, and possible "future value" was the sole criterion for inclusion of information into the Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System.

CIA's Operation CHAOS. -- In seeking to fulfill White House requests for evidence of foreign influence on domestic dissent, the CIA gave broad instructions to its overseas stations. These directives called for reporting on the "Radical Left" which included, according to the CIA, "radical students, antiwar activists, draft resisters and deserters, black nationalists, anarchists, and assorted 'New Leftists'."[43] CIA built its huge CHAOS data base on the assumption that to know whether there was significant foreign involvement in a domestic group "one has to know whether each and every one of these persons has any connection to foreigners."[44] CIA instructed its stations that even "casual contacts based merely on mutual interest" between Americans opposed to the Vietnam war and "foreign elements" were deemed to "casual contacts based merely on mutual interest" between Americans opposed to the Vietnam war and "foreign elements" were deemed to constitute "subversive connections."[45] Similarly, CIA's request to NSA for materials on persons targeted by the NSA Watch List called for all information regardless of how innocuous it may seem."[46]

The Committee's investigation has shown that the absence of precise statutory standards and the use of overbroad criteria for domestic intelligence activity resulted in the extension of intelligence investigations beyond their original "subversive" or violent targets. Intelligence investigations extended to those thought to be subject to "subversive influence." Moreover, those thought to have a "potential" for violence were also targeted and, in some cases, investigations extended even to those engaged in wholly non-violent lawful political expression.

FBI "COMINFIL" Investigations. -- Under the FBI's COMINFIL ("communist infiltration") program, large numbers of groups and individuals engaged in lawful political activity have been subjected to informant coverage and intelligence scrutiny. Although COMINFIL investigations were supposed to focus on the Communist Party's alleged efforts to penetrate domestic groups, in practice the target often became the domestic groups themselves.

FBI COMINFIL investigations reached into domestic groups in virtually every area of American political life. The FBI conducted COMINFIL investigations in such areas as "religion," "education," "veterans' matters," "women's matters," "Negro question," and "cultural activities."[47] The "entire spectrum of the social and labor movement" was covered.[48]

The overbreadth that results from the practice of investigating groups for indications of communist influence, or infiltration is illustrated by the following FBI COMINFIL intelligence investigations:

NAACP. -- An intensive 25 year long surveillance of the NAACP was conducted, ostensibly to determine whether there was Communist infiltration of the NAACP. This surveillance, however, produced detailed intelligence reports on NAACP activities wholly unrelated to any alleged communist "attempts" to infiltrate the NAACP, and despite the fact that no evidence was ever found to contradict the FBI's initial finding that the NAACP was opposed to communism.[48]

Northern Virginia Citizens Concerned About the ABM. -- In 1969, the FBI conducted an intelligence investigation and used informants to report on a meeting held in a public high school auditorium at which the merits of the Anti-Ballistic Missile System were debated by, among others, Department of Defense officials. The investigation was apparently opened because a communist newspaper had commented on the fact that the meeting was to be held.[49]

National Conference on Amnesty for Vietnam Veterans. -- In 1974, FBI informants reported on a national conference sponsored by church and civil liberties groups to support amnesty for Vietnam veterans. The investigation was based on a two-step "infiltration" theory. Other informants had reported that the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (which was itself the subject of an intelligence investigation because it was thought to be subject to communist or foreign influence) might try to "control" the conference.[50] Although the conference was thus twice removed from the original target, it was nevertheless subjected to informant surveillance.

FBI intelligence investigations to find whether groups are subject to communist or "subversive" influence result in the collection of information on groups and individuals engaged in wholly legitimate activity. Reports on the NAACP were not limited to alleged communist infiltration. Similarly, the investigation of the National Amnesty Conference produced reports describing the topics discussed at the conference and the organization of a steering committee which would include families of men killed in Vietnam and congressional staff aides.[51] The reports on the meeting concerning the ABM system covered the past and present residence of the person who applied to rent the high school auditorium, and plans for a future meeting, including the names of prominent political figures who planned to attend.[52]

The trigger for COMINFIL-type investigations -- that subversive attempts" to infiltrate groups were a substantial threat -- was greatly exaggerated. According to the testimony of FBI officials, the mention in a communist newspaper of the citizens' meeting to debate the ABM was sufficient to produce intelligence coverage of that meeting.[53] A large public teach-in on Vietnam, including representatives of Catholic, Episcopal, Methodist and Unitarian churches, as well as a number of spokesmen for antiwar groups, was investigated because a Communist Party official had "urged" party members to attend and one speaker representing the W. E. B. DuBois Club was identified as a communist.[54] The FBI surveillance of the teach-in resulted in a 41-page intelligence report based on coverage by 13 informants and sources.[55] And the FBI's investigation of all Free Universities near colleges and universities was undertaken because "several" allegedly had been formed by the Communist Party "and other subversive groups."[56]

Similarly, the FBI's broad COMINFIL investigations of the civiI rights movement in the South were based on the FBI's conclusion that the Communist Party had "attempted" to take advantage of racial unrest and had "endeavored" to pressure U.S. Government officials "through the press, labor unions and student groups.[57] [Emphasis supplied.] No mention was made of the general failure of these attempts."

The Committee finds that COMINFIL investigations have been based on an exaggerated notion of the threat posed by "subversives" and foreign influence on American political expression. There has been unjustified belief that Americans need informants and government surveillance to protect them from "subversive" influence in their unions, churches, schools, parties and political efforts.

Investigations of Wholly Non-Violent Political Expression. -- Domestic intelligence investigations have extended from those who commit or are likely to commit violent acts to those thought to have a "potential" for violence, and then to those engaged in purely peaceful political expression. This characteristic was graphically described by the White House official who coordinated the intelligence agencies' recommendations for "expanded" (and illegal) coverage in 1970. He testified that intelligence investigations risked moving

from the kid with a bomb to the kid with a picket sign, and from the kid with the picket sign to the kid with the bumper sticker of the opposing candidate.

And you just keep going down the line.[53]

Without precise standards to restrict their scope, intelligence investigations did move beyond those who committed or were likely to commit criminal or violent acts. For example:

--Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was targeted for the FBI's COINTELPRO operations against "Black Nationalist Hate Groups" on the theory, without factual justification, that Dr. King might "abandon" his adherence to nonviolence.[59]

--The intensive FBI investigation of the Women's Liberation Movement was similarly predicated on the theory that the activities of women in that Movement might lead to demonstrations and violence.[60]

--The FBI investigations of Black Student Unions proceeded from the concern of the FBI and its superiors over violence in the cities. Yet, the FBI opened intelligence investigations on "every Black Student Union and similar group regardless of their past or present involvement in disorders."[61] [Emphasis added.]

--The nationwide Army Intelligence surveillance of civilians was conducted in connection with civil disorders. However, the Army collection plan focused not merely on those likely to commit violence but was "so comprehensive . . . that any category of information related even remotely to people or organizations active in a community in which the potential for violence was present would fall within their scope."[62]

The Committee finds that such intelligence surveillance of groups and individuals has greatly exceeded the legitimate interest of the government in law enforcement and the prevention of violence. Where unsupported determinations as to "potential" behavior are the basis for surveillance of groups and individuals, no one is safe from the inquisitive eye of the intelligence agency.

Subfindings (d)

Intelligence agencies pursued a "vacuum cleaner" approach to intelligence collection -drawing in all available information about groups and individuals, including their lawful political activity and details of their personal lives.

Intelligence agencies collect an excessive amount of information by pursuing a "vacuum cleaner" approach that draws in all available information, including lawful political activity, personal matters, and trivia. Even where the theory of the investigation is that the subject is likely to be engaged in criminal or violent activity, the overbroad approach to intelligence collection intrudes into personal matters unrelated to such criminal or violent activity.

FBI officials conceded to the Committee that in conducting broad intelligence investigations to determine the "real purpose" of an organization, they sometimes gathered "too much information."[63]

The FBI's intelligence investigation of the "New Left," for example, was directed towards a "comprehensive study of the whole movement" and produced intensive monitoring of such subjects as "support of movement by religious groups or individuals," "demonstrations aimed at social reform," "indications of support by mass media," "all activity in the labor field," and "efforts to influence public opinion, the electorate and Government bodies."[64]

Similar overbreadth characterized the FBI's collection of intelligence on "white militant groups." In 1968 FBI field offices were instructed not to gather information solely on actual or potential violations of law or violence, but to use informants to determine the "aims and purposes of the organization, its leaders, approximate membership" and other "background data" relating to the group's "militancy." In 1971 the criteria for investigating individuals were widened. Special Agents in Charge of FBI field offices were instructed to investigate not only persons with "a potential for violence," but also anyone else "who in judgment of SAC should be subject of investigation due to extremist activities."[66]

Even in searching for indications of potential violence in black urban areas or in collecting information about violence prone Ku Klux Klan chapters, there was marked overbreadth. In black urban areas, for example, FBI agents were instructed to have their informants obtain the names of "Afro-American type bookstores" and their "owners, operators and clientele."[67] The activities of civil rights and black groups as well as details of the personal lives of Klan members, were reported on by an FBI intelligence informant in the Ku Klux Klan.[67] Under this approach, the average citizen who merely attends a meeting, signs a petition, is placed on a mailing list, or visits a book store, is subject to being recorded in intelligence files.

A striking example of informant reporting on all they touch was provided by an FBI informant in an antiwar group with only 55 regular members and some 250 persons who gave occasional support. The informant estimated she reported nearly 1,000 names to the FBI in an 18-month period -- 60-70 percent of whom were members of other groups (such as the United Church of Christ and the American Civil Liberties Union) which were engaging in peaceful, lawful political activity together with the antiwar group or who were on the group's mailing list.[68] Similarly in the intelligence investigation of the Women's Liberation Movement, informants reported the identities of individual women attending meetings (as well as reporting such matters as the fact that women at meetings had stated "how they felt oppressed, sexually or otherwise.").[69]

Such collection of "intelligence" unrelated to specific criminal or violent activity constitutes a serious misuse of governmental power. In reaching into the private lives of individuals and monitoring their lawful political activity -- matters irrelevant to any proper governmental interest -- domestic intelligence collection has been unreasonably broad.

Subfinding (e)

Intelligence investigations in many cases continued for excessively long periods of time, resulting in sustained governmental monitoring of political activity in the absence of any indication of criminal conduct or "subversion."

One of the most disturbing aspects of domestic intelligence investigations found by the Committee was their excessive length. Intelligence investigations often continued, despite the absence of facts indicating an individual or group is violating or is likely to violate the law, resulting in long-term government monitoring of lawful political activity. The following are examples:

(i) The FBI Intelligence Investigation of the NAACP (1941-1966). -- The investigation of the NAACP began in 1941 and continued for at least 25 years. Initiated according to one FBI report as an investigation of protests by 15 black mess attendants about racial discrimination in the Navy,[70] the investigation expanded to encompass NAACP chapters in cities across the nation. Although the ostensible purpose of this investigation was to determine if there was "Communist infiltration" of the NAACP, the investigation constituted a long-term monitoring of the NAACP's wholly lawful political activity by FBI informants. Thus:

--The FBI New York Field Office submitted a 137-page report to FBI headquarters describing the national office of the NAACP, its national convention, its growth and membership, its officers and directors, and its stand against Communism.[71]

--An FBI informant in Seattle obtained a list of NAACP branch officers and reported on a meeting where signatures were gathered on a "petition directed to President Eisenhower" and plans for two members to go to Washington, D.C., for a "Prayer Pilgrimage."[72]

--In 1966, the New York Field Office reported the names of all NAACP national officers and board members, and summarized their political associations as far back as the 1940s.[73]

--As late as 1966, the FBI was obtaining NAACP chapter membership figures by "pretext telephone call ... utilizing the pretext of being interested in joining that branch of the NAACP."[74]

--Based on the reports of FBI informants, the FBI submitted a detailed report of a 1956 NAACP-sponsored Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and described plans for a Conference delegation to visit Senators Paul Douglas, Herbert Lehman, Wayne Morse, Hubert Humphrey, and John Bricker.[75] Later reports covered what transpired at several of these meetings with Senators.[76] Most significantly, all these reports were sent to the White House.[77]

(ii) The FBI Intelligence Investigation of the Socialist Workers Party (1940 to date). -- The FBI has investigated the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) from 1940 to the present day on the basis of that Party's revolutionary rhetoric and alleged international links. Nevertheless, FBI officials testified that the SWP has not been responsible for any violent acts nor has it urged actions constituting an indictable incitement to violence.[77]

FBI informants have been reporting the political positions taken by the SWP with respect to such issues as the "Vietnam War," "racial matters," "U.S. involvement in Angola," "food prices," and any SWP efforts to support a non-SWP candidate for political office.[78]

Moreover, to enable the FBI to develop "background information" on SWP leaders, informants have been reporting certain personal aspects of their lives, such as marital status.[79] The informants also have been reporting on SWP cooperation with other groups who are not the subject of separate intelligence investigations.[80]

(iii) The Effort to Prove Negatives. -- Intelligence investigations and programs have also continued for excessively long periods in efforts to prove negatives. CIA's Operation CHAOS began in 1967. From that year until the program's termination in 1974,[81] the CIA repeatedly reached formal conclusions that there was negligible foreign influence on domestic protest activity. In 1967, the CIA concluded that Communist front groups did not control student organizations and that there were no significant links with foreign radicals;[82] in 1968, the CIA concluded that U.S. student protest was essentially homegrown and not stimulated by an international conspiracy;[83] and in 1971 the CIA found "there is no evidence that foreign governments, organizations, or intelligence services now control U.S. New Left Movements ... the U.S. New Left is basically self-sufficient and moves under its own impetus."[84]

The result of these repeated findings was not the termination of CHAOS's surveillance of Americans, but its redoubling. Presidents Johnson and Nixon pressured the CIA to intensify its intelligence effort, to find evidence of foreign direction of the U.S. peace movement. As Director Helms testified:

When a President keeps asking if there is any information, "how are you

getting along with your examination," "have you picked up any more information on this subject," it isn't a direct order to do something, but it seems to me it behooves the Director of Central Intelligence to find some way to im prove his performance, or improve his Agency's performance.[85]

In an effort to prove its negative finding to a skeptical White House -- and to test its validity each succeeding year -- CIA expanded its program, increasing its coverage of Americans overseas and building an ever larger "data base" on domestic political activity. Intelligence was exchanged with the FBI, NSA, and other agencies and eventually CIA agents who had infiltrated domestic organizations for other purposes supplied general information on the groups' activities.[86] Thus, the intelligence mission became one of continued surveillance to prove a negative, with no thought to terminating the program in the face of the negative findings.

As in the CHAOS operation, FBI intelligence investigations have often continued even in the absence of any evidence of "subversive" activities merely because the subjects of the investigation have not demonstrated their innocence to the FBI's satisfaction. The long term investigations of the NAACP and the Socialist Workers Party described above are typical examples.

A striking illustration of FBI practice is provided by the intelligence investigation of an advisor of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The advisor was investigated on the theory that he might be a communist "sympathizer." The Bureau's New York office concluded he was not.[87] Using a theory of "guilty until proven innocent," FBI headquarters directed that the investigation continue:

The Bureau does not agree with the expressed belief of the New York office that [ ] 88 is not sympathetic to the Party cause. While there may not be any evidence that [ ] is a Communist neither is there any substantial evidence that he is anti-Communist.[89]

Where citizens must demonstrate not simply that they have no connection with an intelligence target, but must exhibit "substantial evidence" that they are in opposition to the target, intelligence investigations are indeed open ended.

[1] New York Times, 5/10/24. Attorney General Stone implemented this policy by issuing a directive to Acting Director J. Edgar Hoover of the Bureau of Investigation: "The activities of the Bureau are to be limited strictly to investigations of violations of law, under my direction or under the direction of an Assistant Attorney General regularly conducting the work of the Department of Justice." (Memorandum from Attorney General Stone to J. Edgar Hoover, 5/13/24, cited in Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law [New York: Viking Press, 1956), p. 151.]

[2] Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 10/6/75.

[3] Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, Re: Investigative Matters, received 11/12/75. These statistics include as separate "matters" investigative leads pursued by different FBI offices in the same case.

[4] Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, "Federal Data Banks, Computers, and Bill of

Rights," 1971, p. 264.

[5] See CHAOS Report: See. II D, "Operation of the CHAOS Program and Related CIA Projects."

[6] See IRS Report: Part II, See. II, "Special Service Staff."

[7] Memorandum from D. J. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/15/69.

[8] Memorandum from William Loeb to Dean Barron, 11/30/61.

[9] Memorandum from Mitchell Rogovin to Dean Barron, 12/20/61.

[10] Memorandum from Commissioner, IRS to Myer Feldman, 7/11/63.

[11] See Mail Report: Part I, "Domestic CIA and FBI Mail Opening Programs."

[12] See Mail Report: Part II, See. II B (1), "Selection Criteria."

[13] See Mail Report: Part II, See. II B (1), "Selection Criteria."

[14] See "National Security Agency Surveillance Affecting Americans", NSA Report: Sec. II A, "Summary of NSA Watch List Activity".

[15] The FBI's statutory authority provides that the Attorney General may appoint officials: "(1) to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States; (2) to assist in the protection of the President; and (3) to conduct such investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Department of Justice and the Department of State as may be directed by the Attorney General." (28 U.S.C.[ 533.)

Attorney General Edward H. Levi told the Select Committee "that the statutory basis for the operations of the Bureau cannot be said to be fully satisfactory." (Edward H. Levi testimony, 12/11/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 313.)

[16] 50 U.S.C.[ 403 (d) (3).

[17] National Security Intelligence Directive No.[ 5.

[18] 50 U. S.C.[ 403 (d) (3).

[19] See Finding on Deficiencies in Control and Accountability, pp.[ 277-279.

[20] FBI summary memorandum, 1/31/75.

[21] Memorandum from Ramsey Clark to J. Edgar Hoover, 9/14/67.

[22] See Military Surveillance Report: See. II C.

[23] Robert F. Froehkle testimony, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, 1971, cited hereinafter as 1971 Hearings.

[24] See pp.[ 99-101.

[25] Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to Deputy Director of CIA, 6/20/69 p. 1.

[26] Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to Deputy Director of CIA, 6/20/69, p. 1.

[27] 1964 FBI Manual Section 122, p.[ 1.

[28] FBI Manual, Section 122, revised 12/13/66, p.[ 8-9.

[29] FBI Manual, Section 122, revised 12/13/66; p.[ 8-9.

[30] SAC Letter, 68-25,4/30/68.

[31] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 10/28/68.

[32] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's 10/28/68.

[33] Memorandum from Mobile Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/9/70.

[34] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office, 4/23/70.

[35] Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66.

[36] Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to Clyde Tolson, 8/1/67.

[37] Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 8/3/67; SAC Letter 67-56, 9/12/67.

[38] SAC Letter No.[ 67-70, 11/28/67.

[39] 1971 Hearings, pp.[ 1120-1121.

[40] 1971 Hearings, pp, 1123-1138.

[41] Stein testimony, 1971 Hearings, p. 266.

[42] "Military surveillance of Civilian Politics," Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on constitutional Rights Report, 1973, p. 57, cited hereafter as 1973 Report.

[43] Book cable from Thomas Karamessines to various European Stations, June 1968.

[44] Richard Ober testimony, Rockefeller Commission, 3/28/75, pp. 88-89.

[45] Cable from CIA Headquarters to field stations, November 1967, pp.[ 1-2.

[46] Memorandum from Richard Ober to NSA, 9/14/71.

[47] 1960 FBI Manual, Section 87, pp.[ 5-11.

[48] Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1955, p.[ 195.

[48] See History of Domestic Intelligence, Report, Part II at note 139.

[49] James Adams testimony, 11/19/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 137-138. FBI documents indicate that another factor in the opening of the investigation was the role of the wife of a Communist in assisting in publicity work for the meeting (Memorandum from Washington Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 5/28/69, memorandum from Alexandria Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/3/69) See Findings 6(a), p. 10, for the broad dissemination of reports that resulted from this inquiry.

[50] Raymond W. Wannall testimony, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 139.

[51] Memorandum from Louisville Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/21/74.

[52] Memoranda from Alexandria Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/5/69.

[53] Adams, 11/19/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 138.

[54] Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/2/66.

[55] Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/2/66.

[56] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 2/17/66.

[57] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental intelligence Conference, to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security, 7/25/61, enclosing IIC Report, Status of U.S. internal Security Programs. See Findings on Political Abuse, p. 225 for discussion on the larger impact of such FBI terminology.

[58] Tom Charles Huston testimony, 9/23/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 45.

[59] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 3/4/68.

[60] Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/28/69. (Hearings, Vol. 6, Exhibit 54.)

[61] Memorandum from Executives Conference to Tolson, 10/29/70.

[62] Froehlke, 1971 Hearings, p. 384.

[63] Adams, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 69 p. 135.

[64] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 10/28/68.

[65] SAC Letter 68-25, 4/30/68.

[66] 1971 Manual, Section 122.

[67] Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/12/68.

[67] Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 116.

[68] Mary Jo Cook testimony, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 112, 120.

[69] Memorandum from Kansas City Field Office, 10/20/70; memorandum New York Field Office, 5/28/69; memorandum from Baltimore Field Office, 5/11/70 to FBI Headquarters. CIA agents in the United States also reported on Women's Liberation activities in the course of their preparation for overseas duty in Operation cHaOS. (Agent 1, Contact Report, Vol. 11, Agent 1 file.)

[70] Memorandum from Washington Field Office to FBI headquarters, 3/11/41.

[71] Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/12/57.

[72] Memorandum from Seattle Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/1/57.

[73] Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/65.

[74] Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66.

[75] Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 3/5/56.

[76] Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 3/6/56.

[77] See Findings on "Political Abuse."

[77] Robert Shackelford testimony, 2/2/76; pp. 89-90.

[78] Shackelford, 2/2/76, p. 89.

[79] Shackelford, 2/2/76; p. 90.

[80] Shackleford, 2/2/76, p. 92.

[81] See Findings, "Deficiencies in Control and Accountability", p.[ 265.

[82] CIA memorandum, "Student Dissent and Its Techniques in the U.S.", 1/5/68.

[83] CIA Report, "Restless Youth," Conclusions, p.[ 1, 9/4/68.

[84] CIA Report, "Definition and Assessment of Existing Internal Security Threat-Foreign,"[ 1/5/71, pp. 1-3.

[85] Richard Helms testimony, Rockefeller Commission, 4/28/75, pp. 2434-2435. Helms further testified: "President Johnson was after this all the time ... this was something that came up almost daily and weekly." Helms, Rockefeller Commission, 1/13/75, pp. 163-164.

[86] See CHAOS Report: Section II D, "Operations of the CHAOS Program and Related CIA Projects," and II E, "1969 Expansion of CHAOS."

[87] Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/14/64.

[88] Name deleted by Committee to protect privacy.

[89] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 4/24/64.

- C. Excessive Use of Intrusive Techniques

MAJOR FINDING

The intelligence community has employed surreptitious collection techniques -- mail opening, surreptitious entries, informants, and "traditional" and highly sophisticated forms of electronic surveillance -- to achieve its overly broad intelligence targeting and collection objectives. Although there are circumstances where these techniques, if properly controlled, are legal and appropriate, the Committee finds that their very nature makes them a threat to the personal privacy and Constitutionally protected activities of both the targets and of persons who communicate with or associate with the targets. The dangers inherent in the use of these techniques have been compounded by the lack of adequate standards limiting their use and by the absence of review by neutral authorities outside the intelligence agencies. As a consequence, these techniques have collected enormous amounts of personal and political information serving no legitimate governmental interest.

Subfindings

(a) Given the highly intrusive nature of these techniques, the legal standards and procedures regulating their use have been insufficient. There have been no statutory controls on the use of informants; there have been gaps and exceptions in the law of electronic surveillance; and the legal prohibitions against warrantless mail opening and surreptitious entries have been ignored.

(b) In addition to providing the means by which the Government can collect too much information about too many people, certain techniques have their own peculiar dangers:

(i) Informants have provoked and participated in violence and other illegal activities in order to maintain their cover, and they have obtained membership lists and other private documents.

(ii) Scientific and technological advances have rendered traditional controls on electronic surveillance obsolete and have made it more difficult to limit intrusions. Because of the nature of wiretaps, microphones and other sophisticated electronic techniques, it has not always been possible to restrict the monitoring of communications to the persons being investigated.

(c) The imprecision and manipulation of labels such as "national security," "domestic security," "subversive activities," and "foreign intelligence" have led to unjustified use of these techniques.

Elaboration of Findings

The preceding section described how the absence of rigorous standards for opening, controlling, and terminating investigations subjected many diverse elements of this society to scrutiny by intelligence agencies, without their being suspected of violating any law. Once an investigation was opened, almost any item of information about a target's personal behavior or political views was considered worth collecting.

Extremely intrusive techniques -- such as those listed above -- have often been used to accomplish those overly broad targeting and collection objectives.

The paid and directed informant has been the most extensively used technique in FBI domestic intelligence investigations. Informants were used in 83% of the domestic intelligence investigations analyzed in a recent study by the General Accounting Office. 1a As of June 30, 1975, the FBI was using a total of 1,500 domestic intelligence informants.[2] In 1972 there were over 7,000 informants in the ghetto informant program alone. In fiscal year 1976, the Bureau has budgeted more than $7.4 million for its domestic intelligence informant program, more than twice the amount allocated for its organized crime informant program.[3]

Wiretaps and microphones have also been a significant means of gathering intelligence. Until 1972, the FBI directed these electronic techniques against scores of American citizens and domestic organizations during investigations of such matters as domestic "subversive" activities and leaks of classified information. The Bureau continues to use these techniques against foreign targets in the United States.

The most extensive use of electronic surveillance has been by the National Security Agency. NSA has electronically monitored (without wiretapping in the traditional sense) international communication links since its inception in 1952; because of its sophisticated technology, it is capable of intercepting and recording an enormous number of communications between the United States and foreign countries.[4]

All mail opening programs have now been terminated, but a total of twelve such operations were conducted by the CIA and the FBI in ten American cities between 1940 and 1973.[5] Four of these were operated by the CIA, whose most massive project involved the opening of more than 215,000 letters between the United States and the Soviet Union over a twentyyear period. The, FBI conducted eight mail opening programs, three of which included opening mail sent between two points in the United States. The longest FBI mail opening program lasted, with one period of suspension, for approximately twenty-six years.

The FBI has also cunducted hundreds of warrantless surreptitious entries -- break-ins -during the past twenty-five years. Often these entries were conducted to install electronic listening devices, at other times they involved physical searches for information. The widespread use of warrantless surreptitious entries against both foreign and domestic targets was terminated by the Bureau in 1966 but the FBI has occasionally made such entries against foreign targets in more recent years.

All of these techniques have been turned against American citizens its well as against certain foreign targets. On the theory that the executive's responsibility in the area of "national security" and "foreign intelligence" justified their use without the need of judicial supervision, the intelligence community believed it was free to direct these techniques against individuals and organizations whom it believed threatened the country's security. The standards governing the use of these techniques have been imprecise and susceptible to expansive interpretation and in the absence of any judicial check on the application of these vague standards to particular cases. it was relatively easy for intelligence agencies and their superiors to extend them to many cases where they were clearly inappropriate. Lax internal controls on the use of some of these techniques compounded the problem.

These intrusive techniques by their very nature invaded the private communications and activities both of the individuals they were directed against and of the persons, with whom the targets communicated or associated. Consequently. they provided the means by which all types of information -- including personal and political information totally unrelated to any legitimate governmental objective -- were collected and in some cases disseminated to the highest levels of the government.

Subfinding (a)

Given the highly intrusive nature of these techniques, the legal standards and procedures regulating their use have been insufficient. There have been no statutory controls on the use of informants; there have been gaps and exceptions in the law of electronic surveillance; and the legal prohibitions against warrantless mail opening and surreptitious entries have been ignored.

1. The Absense of Statutory Restraints on the Use of Information

There are no statutes or published regulations governing the use of informants.,, Consequently, the FBI is free to use informants, guided only by its own internal directives which can be changed at any time by FBI officials without approval from outside the Bureau.[7]

Apart from court decisions precluding the use of informants to entrap persons into criminal activity, there are few judicial opinions dealing with informants and most of those concern criminal rather than intelligence informants.[8] The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on whether the use of intelligence informants in the contexts revealed by the Committee's investigation offend First Amendment rights of freedom of expression and association.[9]

In the absence of regulation through statute, published regulation, or court, decision, the FBI has used informants to report on virtually every aspect of a targeted group or individual's activity, including lawful political expression, political meetings, the identities of group members and their associates, the "thoughts and feelings, intentions and ambitions," of members,[10] and personal matters irrelevant to any legitimate governmental interest. Informants have also been used by the FBI to obtain the confidential records and documents of a group.[11]

Informants could be used in any intelligence investigation. FBI directives have not limited informant reporting to actual or likely violence or other violations of law.[12] Nor has any determination been made concerning whether the substantial intrusion represented by informant coverage is justified by the government's interest in obtaining information, or whether less intrusive means would adequately serve the government's interest. There has also been no requirement that the decisions of FBI officials to use informants be reviewed by anyone outside the FBI. In short, intelligence informant coverage has not been subject to the standards which govern the use of other intrusive techniques such as electronic surveillance, even though informants can produce a far broader range of information.

2. Gaps and Exceptions in the Law of Electronic Surveillance

Congress and the Supreme Court have both addressed the legal issues raised by electronic surveillance, but the law has been riddled with gaps and exceptions. The Executive branch has been able to apply vague standards for the use of this technique to particular cases as it has seen fit, and, in the case of NSA monitoring, the standards and procedures for the use of electronic surveillance were not applied at all.

When the Supreme Court first considered wiretapping, it held that the warrantless use of this technique was constitutional because the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applied only to physical trespass and did not extend to the seizure of conversation. This decision, the 1928 case of Olmstead v. United States, involved a criminal prosecution, and left federal agencies free to engage in the unrestricted use of wiretaps in both criminal and intelligence investigations.[13]

Six years later, Congress enacted the Federal Communications Act of 1934, which made it a crime for "any person," without authorization, to intercept and divulge or publish the contents of wire and radio communications. The Supreme Court subsequently construed this section to apply to federal agents as well as to ordinary citizens, and held that evidence obtained directly or indirectly from the interception of wire and radio communications was not admissible in court.[14] But Congress acquiesed in the Justice Department's position that these cases prohibited only the divulgence of contents of wire communications outside the executive branch,[15] and Government wiretapping for intelligence purposes other than prosecution continued.

On the ground that neither the 1934 Act nor the Supreme Court decisions on wiretapping were meant to apply to "grave matters involving the defense of the nation," President Franklin Roosevelt authorized Attorney General Jackson in 1940 to approve wiretaps on "persons suspected of subversive activities against the Government of the United States, including suspected spies."[16] In the absence of any guidance from Congress or the Court for another quarter century, the executive branch first broadened this standard in 1946 to permit wiretapping in "cases vitally affecting the domestic security or where human life is in jeopardy,"[17] and then modified it in 1965 to allow wiretapping in "investigations related to the national security."[18] Internal Justice Department policy required the prior approval of the Attorney General before the FBI could institute wiretaps in particular cases,[19] but until the mid-1960's there was no requirement of periodic reapproval by the Attorney General.[20] In the absence of any instruction to terminate, them, some wiretaps remained in effect for years.[21]

In 1967, the Supreme Court reversed its holding in the Olmstead case and decided that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement did apply to electronic surveillances.[22] It expressly declined, however, to extend this holding to cases involving the "national security."[22] Congress followed suit the next year in the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968, which established a warrant procedure for electronic surveillance in criminal cases but included a provision that neither it nor the Federal Communications Act of 1934 "shall limit the constitutional power of the President."[23] Although Congress did not purport to define the President's power, the Act referred to five broad categories which thereafter served as the Justice Department's criteria for warrantless electronic surveillance. The first three categories related to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence matters:

(1) to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power;

(2) to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States; and

(3) to protect the national security information against foreign intelligence activities.

The last two categories dealt with domestic intelligence interests:

(4) to protect the United States against overthrow of the government by force or

other unlawful means, or

(5) against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the government.

In 1972, the Supreme Court held in United States v. United States District Court,[23] that the President did not have the constitutional power to authorize warrantless electronic surveillances to protect the nation from domestic threats.[24] The Court pointedly refrained, however, from any "judgment on the scope of the Presidents' surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within or without this country."[25] Only "the domestic aspects of national security" came within the ambit of the Court's decision.[26]

To conform with the holding in this case, the Justice Department thereafter limited warrantless wiretapping to cases involving a "significant connection with a foreign power, its agents or agencies."[27]

At no time, however, were the Justice Department's standards and procedures ever applied to NSA's electronic monitoring system and its "watch listing" of American citizens.[28] From the early 1960's until 1973, NSA compiled a list of individuals and organizations, including 1200 American citizens and domestic groups, whose communications were segregated from the mass of communications intercepted by the Agency, transcribed, and frequently disseminated to other agencies for intelligence purposes.[29]

The Americans on this list, many of whom were active in the antiwar and civil rights movements, were placed there by the FBI, CIA, Secret Service, Defense Department, and NSA itself without prior judicial warrant or even the prior approval of the Attorney General. In 1970, NSA began to monitor telephone communications links between the United States and South America at the request of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) to obtain information about international drug trafficking. BNDD subsequently submitted the names of 450 American citizens for inclusion on the Watch List, again without warrant or the approval of the Attorney General.[30]

The legal standards and procedures regulating the use of microphone surveillance have traditionally been even more lax than those regulating the use of wiretapping. The first major Supreme Court decision on microphone surveillance was Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), which held that such surveillance in a criminal case was constitutional when the installation did not involve a trespass. Citing this case, Attorney General McGrath prohibited the trespassory use of this technique by the FBI in 1952.[31] But two years later -a few weeks after the Supreme Court denounced the use of a microphone installation in a criminal defendant's bedroom 32 -- Attorney General Brownell gave the FBI sweeping authority to engage in bugging for intelligence purposes. ". . . (C)onsiderations of internal security and the national safety are paramount," he wrote, "and, therefore, may compel the unrestricted use of this technique in the national interest."[33]

Since Brownell did not require the prior approval of the Attorney General for bugging specific targets, he largely undercut the policy that had developed for wiretapping. The FBI in many cases could obtain equivalent coverage by utilizing bugs rather than taps and would not be burdened with the necessity of a formal request to the Attorney General.

The vague "national interest" standards established by Brownell, and the policy of not requiring the Attorney General's prior approval for microphone installations, continued until 1965, when the Justice Department began to apply the same criteria and procedures to both microphone and telephone surveillance.

3. Ignoring the Prohibitions Against Warrantless Mail Opening and Surreptitious Entries

Warrantless mail opening and surreptitious entries, unlike the use of informants and electronic surveillance, have been clearly prohibited by both statutory and constitutional law. In violation of these prohibitions, the FBI and the CIA decided on their own when and how these techniques should be used.[34][35]

Sections 1701 through 1973 of Title 18 of the United States Code forbid persons other than employees of the Postal Service "dead letter" office from tampering with or opening mail that is not addressed to them. Violations of these statutes may result in fines of up to $2000 and imprisonment for not more than five years. The Supreme Court has also held that both First Amendment and Fourth Amendment restrictions apply to mail opening.

The Fourth Amendment concerns were articulated as early as 1878, when the Court wrote:

The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and examined under like warrant . . . as is required when papers are subjected to search 'it one's own household.[36]

This principle was reaffirmed as recently as 1970 in United States v. Van Leeuwen, 396 U.S. 249 (1970). The infringement of citizens' First Amendment rights resulting from warrantless mail opening was first recognized by Justice Holmes in 1921. "The use of the mails," he wrote in a dissent now embraced by prevailing legal opinion, "is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues."[37] This principle, too, has been affirmed in recent years.[38]

Breaking and entering is a common law felony as well as a violation of state and federal statutes. When committed by Government agents, it has long been recognized as "the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed."[39]

In the one judicial decision concerning the legality of warrantless "national security" breakins for physical search purposes, United States District Court Judge Gerhard Gesell held such entries unconstitutional. This case, United States v. Ehrlichman,[40] involved an entry into the office of a Los Angeles psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding, to obtain the medical records of his client Daniel Ellsberg, who was then under federal indictment for revealing classified documents. The entry was approved by two Presidential assistants, John Ehrlichman and Charles Colson, who argued that it had been justified "in the national interest." Ruling on the defendants' discovery motions, Judge Gesell found that because no search warrant was obtained:

The search of Dr. Fielding's office was clearly illegal under the unambiguous mandate of the Fourth Amendment. . . [T]he Government must comply with the strict constitutional and statutory limitations on trespassory searches and arrests even when known foreign agents are involved.... To hold otherwise, except under the most exigent circumstances, would be to abandon the Fourth Amendment to the whim of the Executive in total disregard of the Amendment's history and purpose.[41]

In the appeal of this decision, the Justice Department has taken the position that a physical search may be authorized by the Attorney General without a warrant for "foreign intelligence" proposes.[42] The warrantless mail opening programs and surreptitious entries by the FBI and CIA did not even conform to the "foreign intelligence" standard, however, nor were they specifically approved in each case by the Attorney General. Domestic "subversives" and "extremists" were targeted for mail opening; and domestic "subversives" and "White Hate groups" were among those targeted for surreptitious entries. Until the Justice Department's recent statement in the Ehrlichman case, moreover, no legal justification had ever been advanced publicly for violating the statutory or constitutional prohibitions against physical searches or opening mail without a judicial warrant, and none has ever been officially advanced by any Administration to justify warrantless mail openings.

Subfinding (b)

In addition to providing the means by which the Government can collect too much information about too many people, certain techniques have their own peculiar dangers:

(i) Informants have provoked and participated in violence and other illegal activities in order to maintain their cover, and they have obtained membership lists and other private documents.

(ii) Scientific and technological advances have rendered obsolete traditional controls on electronic surveillance and have made it more difficult to limit intrusions. Because of the nature of wiretaps, microphones, and other sophisticated electronic techniques, it has not always been possible to restrict the monitoring of communications to the persons being investigated.

a. The Intrusive Nature of the Intelligence Informant Technique

The FBI employs two types of informants: (1) "intelligence informants" who are used to report on groups and individuals in the course of intelligence investigations, and (2) "criminal informants," who are used in connection with investigations of specific criminal activity. FBI intelligence informants are administered by the FBI Intelligence Division at Bureau headquarters through a centralized system that is separate from the administrative system for FBI criminal informants. For example, the FBI's large-scale Ghetto Informant Program was administered by the FBI Intelligence Division. The Committee's investigation centered on the use of FBI intelligence informants. The FBI's criminal informant program fell outside the scope of the Committee's mandate, and accordingly it was not examined.

The Committee recognizes that FBI intelligence informants in violent groups have sometimes played a key role in the enforcement of the criminal law. The Committee examined a number of such cases,[44] and in public hearings on the use of FBI intelligence informants included the testimony of a former informant in the Ku Klux Klan whose reporting and court room testimony was essential to the arrest and conviction of the murderers of Mrs. Viola Liuzzo, a civil rights worker killed in 1965.[45] Former Attorney General Katzenbach testified that informants were vital to the solution of the murders of three civil rights workers killed in Mississippi in 1964.[46]

FBI informant coverage of the Women's Liberation Movement resulted in intensive reporting on the identities and opinions of women who attended WLM meetings. For example, the FBI's New York Field Office summarized one informant's report in a memorandum to FBI Headquarters:

Informant advised that a WLM meeting was held on 47 Each woman at this meeting stated why she had come to the meeting and how she felt oppressed, sexually or otherwise.

According to this informant, these women are mostly concerned with liberating women from this "oppressive society." They are mostly against marriage, children, and other states of oppression caused by men. Few of them, according to the informant, have had political backgrounds.[48]

Individual women who attended WLM meetings at midwestern universities were identified by FBI intelligence informants. A report by the Kansas City FBI Field Office stated:

Informant indicates members of Women's Liberation campus group who are now enrolled as students at University of Missouri, Kansas City, are, , , , .[49] Informant noted that and 50 not currently students on the UMKC campus are reportedly roommates at.[51]

Informants were instructed to report "everything" they knew about a group to the FBI.

. . . to go to meetings, write up reports . . . on what happened, who was there . . . to try to totally identify the background of every person there, what their relationships were, who they were living with, who they were sleeping with, to try to get some sense of the local structure and the local relationships among the people in the organization.[52]

Another intelligence informant described his mission as "total reporting." Rowe testified that he reported "anything and everything I observed or heard" pertaining to any member of the group he infiltrated.[53]

Even where intelligence informants are used to infiltrate groups where some members are suspected of violent activity, the nature of the intelligence mission results in governmental intrusion into matters irrelevant to that inquiry. The FBI Special Agents who directed an intelligence informant in the Ku Klux Klan testified that the informant

. . . furnished us information on the meetings and the thoughts and feelings, intentions and ambitions, as best he knew them, of other members of the Klan, both the rank and file and the leadership.[54]

Intelligence informants also report on other groups -- not the subject of intelligence investigations -- which merely associate with, or are even opposed to, the targeted group. For example, an FBI informant in the VVAW had the following exchange with a member of the Committee:

Senator HART (Mich.). . . . did you report also on groups and individuals outside the [VVAW], such as other peace groups or individuals who were opposed to the war whom you came in contact with because they were cooperating with the [VVAW] in connection with protest demonstrations and petitions?

Ms. Cook. . . . I ended up reporting on groups like the United Church of Christ, American Civil Liberties Union, the National Lawyers Guild, liberal church organizations [which] quite often went into coalition with the VVAW.[55]

This informant reported the identities of an estimated 1,000 individuals to the FBI, although the local chapter to which she was assigned had only 55 regular members.[56] Similarly, an FBI informant in the Ku Klux Klan reported on the activities of civil rights and black groups that he observed in the course of his work in the Klan.[57]

In short, the intelligence informant technique is not a precise instrument. By its nature, it extends far beyond the sphere of proper governmental interest and risks governmental monitoring of the private lives and the constitutionally-protected activity of Americans. Nor is the intelligence informant technique used infrequently. As reflected in the statistics described above, FBI intelligence investigations are in large part conducted through the use of informants; and FBI agents are instructed to "develop reliable informants at all levels and in all segments" of groups under investigation.[58]

b. Other Dangers in the Intelligence Informant Technique

In the absence of clear guidelines for informant conduct, FBI paid and directed intelligence informants have participated in violence and other illegal activities and have taken membership lists and other private documents.

1. Participation in Violence and Other Illegal Activity

The Committee's investigation has revealed that there is often a fundamental dilemma in the use of intelligence informants in violent organizations. The Committee recognizes that intelligence informants in such groups have sometimes played essential roles in the enforcement of the criminal law. At the same time, however, the Committee has found that the intelligence informant technique carries with it the substantial danger that informants will participate in, or provoke, violence or illegal activity. Intelligence informants are frequently infiltrated into groups for long-term reporting rather than to collect evidence for use in prosecutions. Consequently, intelligence informants must participate in the activity of the group they penetrate to preserve their cover for extended periods. Where the group is involved in violence or illegal activity, there is a substantial risk that the informant must also become involved in this activity. As an FBI Special Agent who handled an intelligence informant in the Ku Klux Klan testified: "[you] couldn't be an angel and be a good informant."[59]

FBI officials testified that it is Bureau practice to instruct informants that they are not to engage in violence or unlawful activity and, if they do so, they may be prosecuted. FBI Deputy Associate Director Adams testified:

. . . we have informants who have gotten involved in the violation of the law, and we have immediately converted their status from an informant to the subject, and have prosecuted, I would say, offhand ... around 20 informants.[60]

The Committee finds, however, that the existing guidelines dealing with informant conduct do not adequately ensure that intelligence informants stay within the law in carrying out their assignments. The FBI Manual of Instructions contain no provisions governing informant conduct. While FBI employee conduct regulations prohibit an FBI agent from directing informants to engage in violent or other illegal activity, informants themselves are not governed by these regulations since the FBI does not consider them as FBI employees.

In the absence of clear and precise written provisions directly applicable to informants, FBI intelligence informants have engaged in violent and other illegal activity. For example, an FBI intelligence informant who penetrated the Ku Klux Klan and reported on its activities for over five years testified that on a number of occasions he and other Klansmen had "beaten people severely, had boarded buses and kicked people off; had went in restaurants and beaten them with blackjacks, chains, pistols."[61] This informant described how he had taken part in Klan attacks on Freedom Riders at the Birmingham, Alabama, bus depot, where "baseball bats, clubs, chains and pistols" were used in beatings.[62]

Although the FBI Special Agents who directed this informant instructed him that he was not to engage in violence, it was recognized that there was a substantial risk that he would become a participant in violent activity.

As one of the Agents testified:

... it is kind of difficult to tell him that we would like you to be there on deck, observing, be able to give us information and still keep yourself detached and uninvolved and clean, and that was the problem that we constantly had.[63]

In another example, an FBI intelligence informant penetrated "right wing" groups operating in California under the names "The Minutemen" and "The Secret Army Organization." The informant reported on the activities of these "right wing" paramilitary groups for a period of five years but was also involved in acts of violence or destruction. In addition, the informant actually rose to a position of leadership in the SAO and became an innovator of various harassment actions. For example, he admittedly participated in firebombing of an automobile and was present, conducting a "surveillance" of a professor at San Diego State University, when his associate and subordinate in the SAO took out a gun and fired into the home of the professor, wounding a young woman.[64]

An FBI intelligence informant in a group of antiwar protesters planning to break into a draft board claimed to have provided technical instruction and materials that were essential to the illegal breaktestified to the committee:

Everything they learned about breaking into a building or climbing a wall or cutting glass or destroying lockers, I taught them. I got sample equipment, the type of windows that we would go through, I picked up off the job and taught them how to cut the glass, how to drill holes in the glass so you cannot bear it and stuff like that, and the FBI supplied me with the equipment needed. The stuff I did not have, the [the FBI] got off their own agents.[65]

The Committee finds that where informants are paid and directed by a government agency, the government has a responsibility to impose clear restrictions on their conduct. Unwritten practice or general provisions aimed at persons other than the informants themselves are not sufficient. In the investigation of violence or illegal activity, it is essential that the government not be implicated in such activity.

2. Membership Lists and Other Private Documents Obtained by the Government Through Intelligence Informants

The Committee finds that there are inadequate guidelines to regulate the conduct of intelligence informants with respect to private and confidential documents, such as membership lists, mailing lists and papers relating to legal matters. The Fourth Amendment provides that citizens shall be "secure in their ... papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" and requires probable cause to believe there has been a violation of law before a search warrant may issue. Moreover the Supreme Court, in NAACP v. Alabama,[66] held that the First Amendment's protections of speech, assembly and group association did not permit a state to compel the production of the membership list of a group engaged in lawful activity. The Court distinguished the case where a state was able to demonstrate a "controlling justification" for such lists by showing a group's activities involved "acts of unlawful intimidation and violence."[66]

There are no provisions in the FBI Manual which preclude the FBI from obtaining private and confidential documents through intelligence informants. The Manual does prohibit informant reporting of "any information pertaining to defense plans or strategy," but the FBI interprets this as applying only to privileged communications between an attorney and client in connection with a specific court proceeding.[67]

The Committee's investigation has shown that, the FBI, through its intelligence informants and sources, has sought to obtain membership lists and other confidential documents of groups and individuals.[68] For example, one FBI Special Agent testified:

I remember one evening . . . [an informant] called my home and said I will meet you in a half an hour ... I have a complete list of everybody that I have just taken out of the files, but i have to have it back within such a length of time.

Well, naturally I left home and met him and had the list duplicated forthwith, and back in his possession and back in the files with nobody suspecting."[69]

Similarly, the FBI Special Agent who handled an intelligence informant in an antiwar group testified that he obtained confidential papers of the group which related to legal defense matters:

"She brought back several things . . . various position papers taken by various legal defense groups, general statements of . . . the VVAW, legal thoughts on various trials, the Gainesville (Florida) 8 . . . the Camden (New Jersey) 9 . . . various documents from all of these groups."[70]

This informant also testified that she took the confidential mailing list of the group she had penetrated and gave it to the FBI.[71]

She also gave the FBI a legal manual prepared by the group's attorneys to guide lawyers in defending the group's members should they be arrested in connection with antiwar demonstrations or other political activity.[72] Since this document was prepared as a general legal reference manual rather than in connection with a specific trial the FBI considered it outside the attorney-client privilege and not barred by the FBI Manual provision with respect to legal defense and strategy matters.

For the government to obtain membership lists and other private documents pertaining to lawful and protected activities covertly through intelligence informants risks infringing rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The Committee finds that there is a need for new guidelines for informant conduct with-respect to the private papers of groups and individuals.

c. Electronic Surveillance

In the absence of judicial warrant, both the "traditional" forms of electronic surveillance practiced by the FBI wiretapping and bugging -- and the highly sophisticated form of electronic monitoring practiced by NS A have been used to collect too much information about too many people.

1. Wiretapping and Bugging

Wiretaps and bugs are considered by FBI officials to be one of the most valuable techniques for the collection of information relevant to the Bureau's legitimate foreign counterintelligence mandate. W. Raymond Wannall, the former Assistant Director in charge of the FBI's Intelligence Division, stated that electronic surveillance assisted Bureau officials in making "decisions" as to operations against foreigners engaged in espionage. "It gives us leads as to persons ... hostile intelligence services are trying to subvert or utilize in the United States, so certainly it is a valuable technique."[73]

Despite its stated value in foreign counterintelligence cases, however, the dangers inherent in its use imply a clear need for rigorous controls. By their nature, wiretaps and bugs are incapable of a surgical precision that would permit intelligence agencies to overhear only the target's conversations. Since wiretaps are placed on particular telephones, anyone who uses a tapped phone -- including members of the target's family -- can be overheard. So, too, can everyone with whom the target (or anyone else using the target's telephone) communicates.[74] Microphones planted in the target's room or office inevitably intercept all conversations in a particular area: anyone confessing in the room or office, not just the target, is overheard.

The intrusiveness of these techniques has a second aspect as well. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to limit the interception to conversations that are relevant to the purposes for which the surveillance is placed. Virtually all conversations are overheard, no matter how trivial, personal, or political they might be. When the electronic surveillance target is a political figure who is likely to discuss political affairs, or a lawyer, who confers with his clients, the possibilities for abuse are obviously heightened.

The dangers of indiscriminate interception are perhaps most acute in the case of microphones planted in locations such as bedrooms. When Attorney General Herbert Brownell gave the FBI sweeping authority to engage in microphone surveillances for intelligence purposes in 1954, he expressly permitted the Bureau to plant microphones in such locations if, in the sole discretion of the FBI, the facts warranted the installation.[75] Acting under this general authority, for example, the Bureau installed no fewer than twelve bugs in hotel rooms occupied by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.[76]

The King surveillances which occurred between January 1964 and October 1965, were ostensibly approved within the FBI for internal security reasons, but they produced vast amounts of personal information that were totally unrelated to any legitimate governmental interest; indeed, a single hotel room bug alone yielded twenty reels of tape that subsequently provided the basis for the dissemination of personal information about Dr. King throughout the Federal establishment.[76] Significantly, FBI internal memoranda with respect to some of the installations make clear that they were planted in Dr. King's hotel rooms for the express purpose of obtaining personal information about him.[77]

Extremely personal information about the target, his family, and his friends, is easily obtained from wiretaps as well as microphones. This fact is clearly illustrated by the warrantless electronic surveillance of an American citizen who was suspected of leaking classified data to the press. A wiretap on this individual produced no evidence that he had in fact leaked any stories or documents, but among the items of information that the FBI did obtain from the tap (and delivered in utmost secrecy to the White House) were the following: that "meat was ordered [by the target's family] from a grocer;" that the target's daughter had a toothache; that the target needed grass clippings for a compost heap he was building; and that during a telephone conversation between the target's wife and a friend the "matters discussed were milk bills, hair, soap operas, and church."[78]

The so-called "seventeen" wiretaps on journalists and government employees, which collectively lasted from May 1969 to February 1971, also illustrate the intrusiveness of electronic surveillance. According to former President Nixon, these taps produced "just gobs of material: gossip and bull."[79] FBI summaries of information obtained from the wiretaps and disseminated to the White House suggest that the former President's private evaluation of them was correct. This wiretapping program did not reveal the source of any leaks of classified data, which was its ostensible purpose, but it did generate a wealth of information about the personal lives of the targets -- their social contacts, their vacation plans, their employment satisfactions and dissatisfaction, their marital problems, their drinking habits, and even their sex lives.[80]

Among those who were incidentally overheard on one of these wiretaps was a currently sitting Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, who made plans to review a manuscript written by one of the targets.[81] Vast amounts of political information were also obtained from these wiretaps.[82]

The "seventeen" wiretaps also exemplify the particularly acute problems of wiretapping when the targeted individuals are involved in the domestic political process. These wiretaps produced vast amounts of purely political information,[82] much of which was obtained from the home telephones of two consultants to Senator Edmund Muskie and other Democratic politicians.

The incidental collection of political information from electronic surveillance is also shown by a series of telephone and microphone surveillances conducted during the Kennedy administration. In an investigation of the possibly unlawful attempts of representatives of a foreign country to influence congressional deliberations about sugar quota legislation in the early 1960s, Attorney General Robert Kennedy authorized a total of twelve warrantless wiretaps on foreign and domestic targets. Among the wiretaps of American citizens were two on American lobbyists, three on executive branch officials, and two on a staff member of a House of Representatives' Committee.[83] A bug was also planted in the hotel room of a United States Congressman, the Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee, Harold D. Cooley.[84]

Although this investigation was apparently initiated because of the Government's concern about future relations with the foreign country involved and the possibility of bribery,[85] it is clear that the Kennedy administration was politically interested in the outcome of the sugar quota legislation as well.[86] Given the nature of the techniques used and of the targets they were directed against, it is not surprising that a great deal of potentially useful political information was generated from these "Sugar Lobby" surveillances.[87]

The highly intrusive nature of electronic surveillance also raises special problems when the targets are lawyers and journalists. Over the past two decades there have been a number of wiretaps placed on the office telephones of lawyers.[88] In the Sugar Lobby investigation, for example, Robert Kennedy authorized wiretaps on ten telephone lines of a single law firm.[90] All of these lines were apparently used by the one lawyer who was a target and presumably by other attorneys in the firm as well. Such wiretaps represent a serious threat to the attorney-client privilege, because once they are instituted they are capable of detecting all conversations between a lawyer and his clients, even those relating to pending criminal cases.

Since 1960, at least six American journalists and newsmen have also been the targets of warrantless wiretaps or bugs.[91] These surveillances were all rationalized as necessary to discover the source of leaks of classified information, but, since wiretaps and bugs are indiscriminate in the types of information collected, some of these taps revealed the attitudes of various newsmen toward certain politicians and supplied advance notice of forthcoming newspaper and magazine articles dealing with administration policies. The collection of information such as this, and the precedent set by wiretapping of newsmen, generally, inevitably tends to undermine the constitutional guarantee of a free and independent press.

2. NSA Monitoring

The National Security Agency (NSA) has the capability to monitor almost any electronic communication which travels through the air. This means that NSA is capable of intercepting a telephone call or even a telegram, if such call or telegram is transmitted at least partially through the air. Radio transmissions, a fortiori, are also within NSA's reach.

Since most communications today -- to an increasing extent even domestic communications -- are, at some point, transmitted through the air, NSA's potential to violate the privacy of American citizens is unmatched by any other intelligence agency. Furthermore, since the interception of electronic signals entails neither the installation of electronic surveillance devices nor the cooperation of private communications companies, the possibility that such interceptions will be undetected is enhanced.

NSA has never turned its monitoring apparatus upon entirely domestic communications, but from the early 1960s until 1973, it did intercept the international communications of American citizens, without a warrant, at the request of other federal agencies.

Under current practice, NSA does not target any American citizen or firm for the purpose of intercepting their foreign communications. As a result of monitoring international links of communication, however, it does acquire an enormous number of communications to, from, or about American citizens and firms.[93]

As a practical matter, most of the communications of American citizens or firms acquired by NSA as incidental to its foreign intelligencegathering process are destroyed upon recognition as a communication to or from an American citizen. But other such communications, which bear upon NSA's foreign intelligence requirements, are processed, and information obtained from them are used in NSA's reports to other intelligence agencies. Current practice precludes NSA from identifying American citizens and firms by name in such reports. Nonetheless, the practice does result in NSA's disseminating information derived from the international communications of American citizens and firms to the intelligence agencies and policymakers in the federal government.

In his dissent in Olmstead v. United States,[94] which held that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement did not apply to the seizure of conversations by means of wiretapping, Justice Louis D. Brandeis expressed grave concern that new technologies might outstrip the ability of the Constitution to protect American citizens. He wrote:

Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the government ... (and) the progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping.

Ways may some day be developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home .... Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual security?

The question posed by Justice Brandeis applies with obvious force to the technological developments that allow NSA to monitor an enormous number of communications each year. His fears were firmly based, for in fact no warrant was ever obtained for the inclusion of 1200 American citizens on NSA's "Watch List" between the early 1960s and 1973, and none is obtained today for the dissemination within the intelligence community of information derived from the international communications of American citizens and firms. In the face of this new technology, it is well to remember the answer Justice Brandeis gave to his own question. Quoting from *Boyd* v. *United States*, 116 U.S. 616, he wrote:

It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the essense of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property . . .[94]

D. Mail Opening

By ignoring the legal prohibitions against warrantless mail opening, the CIA and the FBI were able to obtain access to the written communications of hundreds of thousands of individuals, a large proportion of whom were American citizens. The intercepted letters were presumably sealed with the expectation that they would only be opened by the party to whom they were addressed, but intelligence agents in ten cities throughout the United States surreptitiously opened the seal and photographed the entire contents for inclusion in their intelligence files.

Mail opening is an imprecise technique. In addition to relying on a "Watch List" of names, the CIA opened vast numbers of letters on an entirely random basis; as one agent who opened mail in the CIA's New York project testified, "You never knew what you would hit."[95] Given the imprecision of the technique and the large quantity of correspondence that was opened, it is perhaps not surprising that during the twenty year course of the Agency's New York project, the mail that was randomly opened included that of at least three United States Senators and a Congressman, one Presidential Candidate, and numerous educational, business, and civil rights leaders.[96]

Several of the FBI programs utilized as selection criteria certain "indicators" on the outside of envelopes that suggested that the communication might be to or from a foreign espionage agent. These "indicators" were more refined than the "shotgun approach"[97] which characterized the CIA's New York project, and they did lead to the identification of three foreign spies.[98] But even by the Bureau's own accounting, it is clear that the mail of hundreds of innocent American citizens was opened and read for every successful counterintelligence lead that was obtained by means of "indicators."[99]

Large volumes of mail were also intercepted and opened in other FBI mail programs that were based not on indicators but on far less precise criteria. Two programs that involved the opening of mail to and from an Asian country, for example, used "letters to or from a university, scientific, or technical facility" as one selection criterion.[100] According to FBI memoranda, an average of 50 to 100 letters per day was opened and photographed during the ten years in which one of these two programs operated.[101]

E. Surreptitious Entries

Surreptitious entries, conducted in violation of the law, have also permitted intelligence agencies to gather a wide range of information about American citizens and domestic organization as well as foreign targets.[102] By definition this technique involves a physical entry into the private premises of individuals and groups. Once intelligence agents are inside, no "papers or effects" are secure. As the Huston Plan recommendations stated in 1970, "It amounts to burglary."[103]

The most private documents are rendered vulnerable by the use of surreptitious entries. According to a 1966 internal FBI memorandum, which discusses the use of this technique against domestic. organizations:

[The FBI has] on numerous occasions been able to obtain material held highly secret, and closely guarded by subversive groups and organizations which consisted of membership lists and mailing lists of these organizations.[104]

A specific example cited in this memorandum also reveals the types of information that this technique can collect and the uses to which the information thus collected may be put:

Through a "black bag" job, we obtained the records in the possession of three high-ranking officials of a Klan organization. These records gave us the complete membership and financial information concerning the Klan's operation which we have been using most effectively to disrupt the organization and, in fact, to bring about Its near disintegration.[105]

Unlike techniques such as electronic surveillance, government entries into private premises were familiar to the Founding Fathers. "Indeed," Judge Gesell wrote in the Ehrlichman case, "the American Revolution was sparked in part by the complaints of the colonists against the issuance of writs of assistance, pursuant to which the King's revenue officers conducted unrestricted, indiscriminate searches of persons and homes to uncover contraband."[106] Recognition of the intrusiveness of government break-ins was one of the primary reasons for the subsequent adoption of the Fourth Amendment in 1791,[107] and this technique is certainly no less intrusive today.

Subfinding (c)

The imprecision and manipulation of labels such as "national security," "domestic security," "subversive activities" and "foreign intelligence" have led to unjustified use of these techniques.

Using labels such as "national security" and "foreign intelligence", intelligence agencies have directed these highly intrusive techniques against individuals and organizations who were suspected of no criminal activity and who posed no genuine threat to the national security. In the absence of precise standards and effective outside control, the selection of American citizens as targets has at times been predicated on grounds no more substantial than their lawful protests or their non-conformist philosophies. Almost any connection with any perceived danger to the country has sufficed.

The application of the "national security" rationale to cases lacking a substantial national security basis has been most apparent in the area of warrantless electronic surveillance. Indeed, the unjustified use of wiretaps and bugs under this and related labels has a long history. Among the wiretaps approved by Attorney General Francis Biddle under the standard of "persons suspected of subversive activities," for example, was one on the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce in 1941.[108] This was approved in spite of his comment to J. Edgar Hoover that the target organization had "no record of espionage at this time."[109] In 1945, Attorney General Tom Clark authorized a wiretap on a former aide to President Roosevelt.[110] According to a memorandum by J. Edgar Hoover, Clark stated that President Truman wanted "a very thorough investigation" of the activities of the former official so that "steps might be taken, if possible, to see that [his] activities did not interfere with the proper administration of government."[111] The memorandum makes no reference to "subversive activities" or any other national security considerations.

The "Sugar Lobby" and Martin Luther King, Jr., wiretaps in the early 1960s both show the elasticity of the "domestic security" standard which supplemented President Roosevelt's "subversive activities" formulation. Among those wiretapped in the Sugar Lobby investigation, as noted above, was a Congressional staff aide. Yet the documentary record of this investigation reveals no evidence indicating that the target herself represented any threat to the "domestic security." Similarly, while the FBI may properly have been concerned with the activities of certain advisors to Dr. King, the direct wiretapping of Dr. King shows that the "domestic security" standard could be stretched to unjustified lengths.

The microphone surveillances of Congressman Cooley and Dr. King under the "national interest" standard established by Attorney General Brownell in 1954 also reveal the relative ease with which electronic bugging devices could be used against American citizens who posed no genuine "national security" threat. Neither of these targets advocated or engaged in any conduct that was damaging to the security of the United States.

In April, 1964, Attorney General Robert Kennedy approved "technical coverage (electronic surveillance)" of a black nationalist leader after the FBI advised Kennedy that he was "forming a new group" which would be "more aggressive" and would "participate in racial demonstrations and civil rights activities." The only indication of possible danger noted in the FBI's request for the wiretaps, however, was that this leader had "recommended the possession of firearms by members for their self-protection.[112]

One year later, Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach approved a wiretap on the offices of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee on the basis of potential communist infiltration into that organization. The request which was sent to the Attorney General noted that "confidential informants" described SNCC as "the principal target for Communist Party infiltration among the various civil rights organizations" and stated that some of its leaders had "made public appearances with leaders of communist-front organizations" and had "subversive backgrounds."[113] The FBI presented no substantial evidence however, that SNCC was in fact infiltrated by communists -- only that the organization was apparently a target for such infiltration in the future.

After the Justice Department adopted new criteria for the institution of warrantless electronic surveillance in 1968, the unjustified use of wiretaps continued. In November 1969, Attorney General John Mitchell approved a series of three wiretaps on organizations involved in planning the antiwar "March on Washington." The FBI's request for coverage of the first group made no claim that its members engaged or were likely to engage in violent activity; the request was simply based on the statement that the anticipated size of the demonstration was cause for "concern should violence of any type break out."[114]

The only additional justification given for the wiretap on one of the other groups, the Vietnam Moratorium Committee, was that it "has recently endorsed fully the activities of the [first group] concerning the upcoming antiwar demonstrations."[115]

In 1970, approval for a wiretap on a "New Left oriented campus group" was granted by Attorney General Mitchell on the basis of an FBI request which included, among other factors deemed relevant to the necessity for the wiretap, evidence that the group was attempting "to develop strong ties with the cafeteria, maintenance and other workers on campus" and wanted to "go into industry and factories and ... take the radical politics they learned on the campus and spread them among factory workers."[116]

This approval was renewed three months later despite the fact that the request for renewal made no mention of violent or illegal activity by the group. The value of the wiretap was shown, according to the FBI, by such results as obtaining "the identities of over 600 persons either in touch with the national headquarters or associated with" it during the preceding three months.[117] Six months after the original authorization the number of persons so identified had increased to 1,428; and approval was granted for a third three-month period."[118]

The "seventeen wiretaps" also show how the term "national security" as a justification for wiretapping can obscure improper use of this technique. Shortly after these wiretaps were revealed publicly, President Nixon stated they had been justified by the need to prevent leaks of classified information harmful to the national security.[119]

Wiretaps for this purpose had, in fact, been authorized under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. President Nixon learned of these and other prior taps and, at a news conference, sought to justify the taps he had authorized by referring to past precedent. He stated that in the:

period of 1961 to '63 there were wiretaps on news organizations, on news people, on civil rights leaders and on other people. And I think they were perfectly justified and I'm sure that President Kennedy and his brother, Robert Kennedy, would never have authorized them, unless he thought they were in the national interest. (Presidential News Conference, 8/22/73.)

Thus, questionable electronic surveillances by earlier administrations were put forward as a defense for improper surveillances exposed in 1973. In fact, however, two of these wiretaps were placed on domestic affairs advisers at the White House who had no foreign affairs responsibilities and apparently no access to classified foreign policy materialis.[121] A third target was a White House speech writer who had been overheard on an existing tap agreeing to provide a reporter with background information on a Presidential speech concerning domestic revenue sharing and welfare reform.[122] The reinstatement of another wiretap in this series was requested by H. R. Haldeman simply because "they may have a bad apple and have to get him out of the basket."[123] The last four requests in this series that were sent to the Attorney General (including the requests for a tap on the "bad apple") did not mention any national security justification at all. As former Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus has testified:

I think some of the individuals who were tapped, at least to the extent I have reviewed the record, had very little, if any, relationship to any claim of national security . . . I think that as the program proceeded and it became clear to those who could sign off on taps how easy it was to institute a wiretap under the present procedure that these kinds of considerations [i.e., genuine national security justifications] were considerably relaxed as the program went on.[124]

None of the "seventeen" wiretaps was ever reauthorized by the Attorney General, although 10 of them remained in operation for periods longer than 90 days and although President Nixon himself stated privately that "[t]he tapping was a very, very unproductive thing ... it's never been useful to any operation I've conducted . . ."[125]

In short, warrantless electronic surveillance has been defended on the ground that it was essential for the national security, but the history of the use of this technique clearly shows that the imprecision and manipulation of this and similar labels, coupled with the absence of any outside scrutiny, has led to its improper use against American citizens who posed no criminal or national security threat to the country.[126]

Similarly, the terms "foreign intelligence" and "counterespionage" were used by the CIA and the FBI to justify their cooperation in the CIA's New York mail opening project, but this project was also used to target entirely innocent American citizens.

As noted above, the CIA compiled a "Watch List" of names of persons and organizations whose mail was to be opened if it passed through the New York facility. In the early days of the project. the names on this list -- which then numbered fewer than twenty -- might reasonably have been expected to lead to genuine foreign intelligence or counterintelligence information. But as the project developed, the Watch List grew and its focus changed. By the late 1960s there were approximately 600 names on the list, many of them American citizens and organizations who were engaged in purely lawful and constitutionally protected forms of protest against governmental policies. Among the domestic organizations on the Watch List, which was supplemented by submissions from the FBI, were: Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam, the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Ramparts, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, the Center for the Study of Public Policy, and the American Friends Service Committee.[127]

The FBI levied more general requirements on the CIA's project as well. The focus of the original categories of correspondence in which the FBI expressed an interest was clearly foreign counterespionage, but subsequent requirements became progressively more domestic in their focus and progressively broader in their scope. The requirements that were levied by the FBI in 1972, one year before the termination of the project, included the following:

". . . [p]ersons on the Watch List; known communists, New Left activists, extremists, and other subversives . . .

Communist party and front organizations ... extremist and New Left organizations.

Protest and peace organizations, such as People's Coalition for Peace and Justice, National Peace Action Committee, and Women's Strike for Peace.

Communists, Trotskyites and members of other Marxist-Leninist, subversive and extremist groups, such as the Black Nationalists and Liberation groups ... Students for a Democratic Society ... and other New Left groups.

Traffic to and from Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands showing anti-U.S. or subversive sympathies."[128]

This final set of requirements evidently reflected the domestic turmoil of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The mail opening program that began as a means of collecting foreign intelligence information and discovering Soviet intelligence efforts in the United States had expanded to encompass detection of the activities of domestic dissidents of all types.

In the absence of effective outside control, highly intrusive techniques have been used to gather vast amounts of information about the entirely lawful activities -- and privately held beliefs -- of large numbers of American citizens. The very intrusiveness of these techniques demands the utmost circumspection in their use. But with vague or non-existent standards to guide them, and with labels such as "national security" and "foreign intelligence" to shield them, executive branch officials have been all too willing to unleash these techniques against American citizens with little or no legitimate justification.

[1] The techniques noted here do not constitute an exhaustive list of the surreptitious means by which intelligence agencies have collected information. The FBI, for example, has obtained a great deal of financial information about American citizens from tax returns filed with the Internal Revenue Service. (See IRS Report: Sec. I, "IRS Disclosures to FBI and CIA.") This section, however, is limited to problems raised by electronic surveillance, mail opening, surreptitious entries informants and electronic surveillances.

[1] Report to the House Committee on the Judiciary, by the Comptroller General of the United States, "FBI Domestic Intelligence Operations -- Their purpose and scope: Issues that Need to be Resolved,"[ 2/24/76, p. 96.

[2] FBI memorandum to the Select Committee, 11/28/75.

[3] Memorandum, FBI Overall Intelligence Program FY 1977 Compared to FY 1976 undated. The cost of the intelligence informant program comprises payments to informants for services and expense as well as the costs of FBI personnel. support and overhead.

[4] See NSA Report: Sec. I, "Introduction and Summary."

[5] See Mail Opening Reports: Sec. I, "Summary and Principal Conclusions."

[6] Title 28 of the United States Code provides only that appropriations for the Department of Justice are available for payment of informants.[ 28 U.S.C. ? 524.

[7] The Attorney General has announced that he will issue guidelines on the use of informants in the near future, and our recommendations provide standards for informant control and prohibitions on informant activity. (See pp.[ 328.) In addition, the Attorney General's recently promulgated guidelines on "Domestic Security Investigations" limit the use of informants at the early stages of such inquiries and provide for review by the Justice Department of the initiation of "full investigations" in which new informants may be recruited.

[8] In a criminal case involving charges of jury bribery, United States v. Hoffa, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), the Supreme Court ruled that an informant's testimony concerning conversations of a defendant could not be considered the product of a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment on the ground the defendant had consented to the presence of the informant. In another criminal case, Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966), the Court stated that "in the detection of many types of crimes, the Government is entitled to use decoys and to conceal the identity of its agents."

[9] In a more recent case, the California Supreme Court held that secret surveillance of classes and group meetings at a university through the use of undercover agents was "likely to pose a substantial restraint upon the exercise of First Amendment rights." White v. Davis, 533 Pac. Rep. 2d, 223 (1975) Citing a number of U.S. Supreme Court opinions, the California Supreme Court stated in its unanimous decision:

"In view of this significant potential chilling effect, the challenged surveillance activities can only be sustained if [the Government] can demonstrate a 'compelling' state interest which justifies the resultant deterrence of First Amendment rights and which cannot be served by alternative means less intrusive on fundamental rights." 533 Pac. Rep. 2d, at 232

[10] Gary Rowe testimony, 12/2/75 Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 111, 118.

[11] Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 111.

[12] The FBI Manual of Instructions proscribes only reporting of privileged communications between an attorney and client, legal "defense plans or strategy," "employer-employee relationships" (where an informant is connected with a labor union), and "legitimate institution or campus activities" at schools. (FBI Manual Section 107.)

[13] Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).

[14] Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 397 (1937); 308 U.S. 338 (1939).

[15] For example, letter from Attorney General Jackson to Rep. Hatton Summers, 3/19/41; See Electronic Surveillance Report: Sec. II.

[16] Memorandum from President Roosevelt to the Attorney General 5/21/40.

[17] Letter from Attorney General Tom C. Clark to President Truman, 7/17/46.

[18] Directive from President Johnson to Heads of Agencies, 6/30/65.

[19] President Roosevelt's 1940 order directed the Attorney General to approve wiretaps "after investigation of the need in each ease." (Memorandum from President Roosevelt to Attorney General Jackson, 5/21/40.) However, Attorney General Francis Biddle recalled that Attorney General Jackson "turned it over 'to Edgar Hoover without himself passing on each case" in 1940 and 1941, Biddle's practice beginning in 1941 conformed to the President's order. (Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority (Garden City: Doubleday, 1962), p. 167.)

Since 1965, explicit written authorization has been required. (Directive of President Johnson 6/30/65.) This requirement however, has often been disregarded. In violation of this requirement, for example, no written authorizations were obtained from the Attorney General -- or from any one else -- for a series of four wiretaps implemented in 1971 and 1972 on Yeoman Charles Radford, two of his friends, and his father-in-law. See Electronics Surveillance Report; Sec. VI. The first and third of these taps were implemented at the oral instruction of Attorney General John Mitchell. (Memorandum from T. J. Smith E. S. Miller 2/26/73.) The remaining taps were implemented at the oral request of David Young, an assistant to John Ehrlichman at the White House, who merely informed the Bureau that the requests originated with Ehrlichman and had the Attorney General's concurrence. (Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 6/14/73.

[20] Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach instituted this requirement in March 1965. (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 3/3/65.)

[21] The FBI maintained one wiretap on an official of the Nation of Islam that had originally been authorized by Attorney General Brownell in 1957 for seven years until 1964 without any subsequent re-authorization. (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 12/31/65, initialed "Approved: HB, 1/2/57.")

As Nicholas Katzenbach testified: "The custom was not to put a time limit on a tap, or any wiretap authorization. Indeed, I think the Bureau would have felt free in 1965 to put a tap on a phone authorized by Attorney General Jackson before World War Il." (Nicholas Katzenbach testimony, 11/12/75, p. 87.)

[22] Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

[22] The Court wrote: "Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a question not presented by this case."[ 389 U.S. at 358 n. 23

[23] 18 U.S. C.[ 2511 (3).

[23] 407 U.S.[ 297 (1972)

[24] At the same time, the Court recognized that "domestic security surveillance" may involve different policy and practical considerations apart from the surveillance of 'ordinary crime,' 407 U.S. at 321, and thus did not hold that "the same type of standards and procedures prescribed by Title III [of the 1968 Act] are necessarily applicable to this case." (407 U.S. at 321.) The Court noted:

"Given the potential distinctions between Title III criminal surveillances and those involving the domestic security, Congress may wish to consider protective standards for the latter which differ from those already prescribed for specified crime in Title III. Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment." (407 U.S. at 321.)

[25] 407 U.S. at 307.

[26] 407 U.S. at 320. United States v. United States District Court remains the only Supreme Court case dealing with the issue of warrantless electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes. Three federal circuit courts have considered this issue since 1972, however. The Third Circuit and the Fifth Circuit both held that the President may constitutionally authorize warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign counterespionage and foreign intelligence purposes. [United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Ivanov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974) ; and United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir., 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 960 (1974).] The District of Columbia Circuit held unconstitutional the warrantless electronic surveillance of the Jewish Defense League, a domestic organization whose activities allegedly affected U.S. Soviet relations but which was neither the agent of nor in collaboration with a foreign power. [Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir., 1975) (en banc).]

[27] Testimony of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin Maroney, Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedures, 6/29/72, p. 10. This language paralleled that of the Court in United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 309 it. 8.

[28] Although Attorney General John Mitchell and Justice Department officials on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee apparently learned that NSA was making a contribution to domestic intelligence in 1971, there is no indication that the FBI told them of its submission of names of Americans for inclusion on a NSA "watch list." When Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen learned of these practices in 1973, Attorney General Elliott Richardson ordered that they be terminated. (See Report on NSA: Sec. I, "Introduction and Summary.")

[29] See NSA Report: Sec. I, "Introduction and Summary."

[30] Memorandum from Iredell to Gayler, 4/10/70; See NSA Report: Sec. I. Introduction and Summary. BNDD originally requested NSA to monitor the South American link because it did not believe it had authority to wiretap a few public telephones in New York City from which drug deals were apparently being arranged. (Iredell testimony, 9/18/75, p. 99.)

[31] Memorandum from the Attorney General to Mr. Hoover, 2/26/52.

[32] Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).

[33] Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, 5/20/54.

[34] omitted in original.

[35] While such techniques might have been authorized by Attorneys General under expansive "internal security" or "national interest" theories similar to Brownell's authorization for installing microphones by trespass, the issue was never presented to them for decision before 1967, when Attorney General Ramsey Clark turned down a surreptitious entry request. There is no indication that the legal questions were considered in any depth in 1970 or 1971 at the time of the "Huston Plan" and its aftermath. See Huston Plan Report: See. III, Who, What, When and Where.

[36] Ex Parte Jackson, 96, U.S. 727, 733 (1878).

[37] Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (dissent).

[38] See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) ; Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1975).

[39] United States v. United States District Court, 407 US 297, 313 (1972).

[40] 376 F. Supp.[ 29, (D.D.C. 1974).

[41] 376 F. Supp. at 33.

[42] Letter from Acting Assistant Attorney General John C. Keeny to Hugh E. Kline. Clerk of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 5/9/75.

[43] The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. United States District Court.[ 407 U.S. 297 (1972), clearly established the principle that such warrantless invasions of the privacy of Americans are unconstitutional.

[44] In one case, an FBI informant involved in an intelligence investigation of the Detroit Black Panther Party furnished advance information regarding a planned ambush of Detroit police officers which enabled the Detroit Police Department to take necessary action to prevent injury or death to the officers and resulted in the arrest of eight persons and the seizure of a cache of weapons. The informant also furnished information resulting in the location and confiscation by Bureau agents of approximately fifty sticks of dynamite available to the Black Panther Party which likely resulted in the saving of lives and the prevention of property damage. (Joseph Deegan testimony, 2/13/76, p. 54)

[45] Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p, 115.

[46] Katzenbach testified that the case "could not have been solved without acquiring informants who were highly placed members of the Klan." (Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 215.)

[47] Date and address deleted at FBI request so as not to reveal informant's identity.

[48] Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, re: Women's Liberation Movement, 5/28/69, p. 2.

[49] Names deleted for security reasons.

[50] Names deleted for security reasons.

[51] Names and addresses deleted for security reasons.

[52] Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, P. Ill.

[53] Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 116.

[54] Special Agent, 11/21/75, p. 7.

[55] Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 119,120.

[56] Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 120.

[57] Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 116.

[58] FBI Manual, Section 10T c (3).

[59] Special Agent, 11/21/75, p. 12.

[60] Adams, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 150.

[61] Rowe deposition, 10/17/75, p. 12.

[62] Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6. p. 118.

[63] Special Agent, 11/21/75. pp. 16-17.

[64] Memorandum from the FBI to Senate Select Committee, 2/26/76, with enclosures.

[65] Hardy, 9/29/75, pp. 16-17.

[66] 357 U.S.[ 449 (1958). Similarly, in Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), the Supreme Court held compulsory disclosure of group membership lists was an unjustified interference with members' freedom of association.

[66] 361 U.S. at 465.

[67] FBI Manual of Instructions, Section 107.

[68] Surreptitious entry has also provided a means for the obtaining of such lists and other confidential documents.

[69] Special Agent, 11/19/75, pp. 10-11.

[70] Special Agent, 11/20/75, pp. 15-16,

[71] Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p.112.

[72] Cook deposition, 10/14/75, p. 36.

[73] W. Raymond Wannall testimony, 10/21/75, p.21.

[74] Under the Justice Department's procedures for Title III (court-ordered) wiretaps, however, the monitoring agent is obligated to turn off the recording equipment when certain privileged communications begin. Manual for conduct of Electronic Surveillance under Title III of Public Law 90--351, Sec.[ 8.1.

[75] Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, 5/20/54.

[76] Three additional bugs were planted in Dr. King's hotel rooms in 1965 after the standards for wiretapping and microphone surveillance became identical. According to FBI memoranda, apparently initiated by Katzenbach, Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach was given after the fact notification that these three surveillances of Dr. King had occurred. See p.[ 273, and the King Report, Sec. IV. for further details.

[76] Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardener to W. C. Sullivan, 3/26/64.

[77] For example, memorandum from Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 2/4/64.

[78] FBI memoranda. Identifying details are being withheld by the Select Committee because of privacy considerations. Even the FBI realized that this type of information was unrelated to criminal activity or national security: for the last four months of this surveillance, most of the summaries that were disseminated to the White House began, "The following is a summary of nonpertinent information concerning captioned individual as of . . ."

[79] Transcript of Presidential Tapes, 2/28/73 (House Judiciary Committee Statement of Information, Book VII, Part 4, p. 1754).

[80] For example, letters from Hoover to the Attorney General, 7/25/69, and 7/31/69: letters from Hoover to H. R. Haldeman, 6/25/70.

Letter from Hoover to Haldeman. 6/25/70.

Examples of such information are listed in the finding on Political Abuse, "The '17' wiretaps."

[83] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/14/61: Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/16/61: Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 6/26/62; Memorandum from Wannall to W. C. Sullivan. 12/22/66.

[84] Memorandum from D. E. Moore to A. H. Belmont, 2/16/61.

[85] Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 12/22/66; Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Parsons, 2/14/61. This investigation did discover that representatives of a foreign nation were attempting to influence Congressional deliberations, but it did not reveal that money was being passed to any member of Congress or Congressional staff aide.

[86] Memorandum from Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 12/22/66.

[87] See Finding on Political Abuse, p.[ 233.

[88] Electronic Surveillance Report: See. II, "Presidential and Attorney General Authorization."

[89] omitted in original.

[90] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 6/26/62.

[91] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 6/29/61; memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 7/31/62; memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 4/19/65; memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 6/4/69; memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 9/10/69; letter from W. C. Sullivan to J. Edgar Hoover 7/2/69.

[92] omitted in original.

[93] NSA has long asserted that it had the authority to do this so long as one of the parties to such communication was located in a foreign country.

[94] 277 U.S.[ 438, 473-474 (1928).

[94] 277 U.S. at 474-475.

[95] CIA Officer" testimony, 9/30/75, p. 15.

[96] Staff summary of "Master index." review, 9/5/75.

[97] James Angelton testimony, 9/17/75, p. 28.

[98] Wannall, 10/21/75, p. 5.

[99] In one of the programs based on "indicators" a participating agent testified that he opened 30 to 00 letters each day. (FBI agent statement, 9/10/75, p. 23.) In a second such program, a total of 1,011 letters were opened in one of the six cities In which it operated; statistics on the number of letters opened in the other live cities cannot be reconstructed. (W. Raymond Wannall testimony, 10/21/75, P. 5.) In a third such project, 2,350 letters were opened in one city and statistics for the other two cities in which it operated are unavailable. (Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/31/61; Memorandum from Mr. Branigan to Mr. Sullivan, 12/21/61; memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/5/62.)

[100] Letter from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 10/29/75. Six other criteria were used in these programs. See Mail Opening Report, Sec. IV.

[101] Memorandum from S. B. Donohoe to A. H. Belmont, 2/23/61: Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/11/60. Statistics relating to the number of letters opened in the other program which used this criterion cannot be reconstructed.

[102] According to the FBI, "there were at least 239 surreptitious entries (for purposes other than microphone installation) conducted against at least fifteen domestic subversive targets from 1942 to April 1968.... In addition, at least three domestic subversive targets were the subject of numerous entries from October 1952 to June 1966." (FBI memorandum to the Senate Select Committee, 10/13/76.) One target, the Socialist Workers Party, was the subject of possibly as many as 92 break-ins by the FBI, between 1960 and 1966 alone. The home of at least one SWP member was also apparently broken into. (Sixth Supplementary Response to Requests for Production of Documents of Defendant, Director of the FBI, Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 73 Civ. 3160, (SDNY), 3/24/76.) An entry against one "white hate group" was also reported by the FBI. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to the Senate Select Committee, 10/13/75.)

[103] Memorandum from Tom Huston to H. R. Haldeman, 7/70, p. 3.

[104] Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 7/19/66.

[105] Ibid.

[106] United States v. Ehrlichman, 376 F. Supp. 29,32 (D.D.C. 1974).

[107] See e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, (1928).

[108] Memorandum from Francis Biddle to Mr. Hoover, 11/19/41.

[109] Ibid.

[110] Unaddressed Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, 11/15/45, found in Director Hoover's "Official and Confidential" files.

[111] Ibid.

[112] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 4/1/64.

[113] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 6/15/65.

[114] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 11/5/69.

[115] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Mitchell.[ 11/7/69.

[116] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 3/16/70. The strongest evidence that this group's conduct was inimical to the national security was reported as follows:

"The [group) is dominated and controlled by the pro-Chinese Marxist Leninist (excised) ....

"In carrying out the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the (excised) members have repeatedly sought to become involved in labor disputes on the side of labor, join picket lines and engage in disruptive and sometimes violent tactics against industry recruiters on college campuses....

"This faction is currently very active in many of the major demonstrations and student violence on college campuses (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 3/16/70. The excised words have been deleted by the FBI.)

[117] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 6/16/70. The only other results noted by Hoover related to the fact that the wiretap had "obtained information concerning the activities of the national headquarters of [the group and] plans for [the group's] support and participation in demonstrations supporting antiwar groups and the (excised)." It was also noted that the wiretap "revealed ... contacts with Canadian student elements".

[118] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 9/16/70. The only other results noted by Hoover again related to obtaining information about the "plans and activities" of the group. Specifically mentioned were the "plans for the National Interim Committee (ruling body of [excised]) meeting which took place in New York and Chicago", and the plans "for demonstrations at San Francisco, Detroit, Salt Lake City, Minneapolis, and Chicago." There was no Indication that these demonstrations were expected to be violent. (The excised words have been deleted by the FBI).

[119] Public statement of President Nixon, 5/22/73.

[120] omitted in original.

[121] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 7/23/69; memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 12/14/70.

[122] Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 8/1/69.

[123] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Sullivan and D. C. Brennan, 10/15/70.

[124] Ruckelshaus testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, 5/9/74, pp. 311-12.

[125] Transcript of the Presidential Tapes, 2/28/73 (House Judiciary Committee Statement of Information Book VII, Part W, p. 1754.)

[126] The term "national security" was also used by John Ehrlichman and Charles Colson to justify their roles in the break in of Dr. Fielding's office in 1971. A March 21, 1973 tape recording of a meeting between President Nixon, John Dean, and H. R. Haldeman suggests, however, that the national security "justification" may have been developed long after the event for the purpose of obscuring its impropriety. When the President asked what could be done if the break-in was revealed publicly, John Dean suggested, "You might put it on a national security grounds basis." Later in the conversation. President Nixon stated "With the bombing thing coming out and everything coming out, the whole thing was national security," and Dean said, "I think we could get by on that." (Transcript of Presidential tapes, 3/21/73.)

[127] Staff summary of Watch List review, 9/5/75.

[128] Routing slip from J. Edgar Hoover to James Angelton (attachment), 3/10/72.

- D. Using Covert Action to Disrupt and Discredit Domestic

GROUPS

MAJOR FINDING

The Committee finds that covert action programs have been used to disrupt the lawful political activities of individual Americans and groups and to discredit them, using dangerous and degrading tactics which are abhorrent in a free and decent society.

Subfindings

(a) Although the claimed purposes of these action programs were to protect the national security and to prevent violence, many of the victims were concededly nonviolent, were not controlled by a foreign power, and posed no threat to the national security.

(b) The acts taken interfered with the First Amendment rights of citizens. They were explicitly intended to deter citizens from joining groups, "neutralize" those who were already members, and prevent or inhibit the expression of ideas.

(c) The tactics used against Americans often risked and sometimes caused serious emotional, economic, or physical damage. Actions were taken which were designed to break up marriages, terminate funding or employment, and encourage gang warfare between violent rival groups. Due process of law forbids the use of such covert tactics, whether the victims are innocent law-abiding citizens or members of groups suspected of involvement in violence.

(d) The sustained use of such tactics by the FBI in an attempt to destroy Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., violated the law and fundamental human decency.

Elaboration of the Findings

For fifteen years from 1956 until 1971, the FBI carried out a series of covert action programs directed against American citizens.[1] These "counterintelligence programs" (shortened to the acronym COINTELPRO) resulted in part from frustration with Supreme Court rulings limiting the Government's power to proceed overtly against dissident groups.[2]

They ended formally in 1971 with the threat of public exposure.[3] Some of the findings discussed herein are related to the findings on lawlessness, overbreadth, and intrusive techniques previously set forth. Some of the most offensive actions in the FBI's COINTELPRO programs (anonymous letters intended to break up marriages, or efforts to deprive people of their jobs, for example) were based upon the covert use of information obtained through overly-broad investigations and intrusive techniques.[4] Similarly, as noted above, COINTELPRO involved specific violations of law, and the law and the Constitution were "not [given] a thought" under the FBI's policies.[5]

But COINTELPRO was more than simply violating the law or the Constitution. In COINTELPRO the Bureau secretly 6 took the law into its own hands, going beyond the collection of intelligence and beyond its law enforcement function to act outside the legal process altogether and to covertly disrupt, discredit and harass groups and individuals. A law enforcement agency must not secretly usurp the functions of judge and jury, even when the investigation reveals criminal activity. But in COINTELPRO, the Bureau imposed summary punishment, not only on the allegedly violent, but also on the nonviolent advocates of change. Such action is the hallmark of the vigilante and has no place in a democratic society.

Under COINTELPRO, certain techniques the Bureau had used against hostile foreign agents were adoped for use against perceived domestic threats to the established political and social order.[7]

Some of the targets of COINTELPRO were law-abiding citizens merely advocating change in our society. Other targets were members of groups that had been involved in violence, such as the Ku Klux Klan or the Black Panther Party. Some victims did nothing more than associate with targets.[8]

The Committee does not condone acts of violence, but the response of Government to allegations of illegal conduct must comply with the due process of law demanded by the Constitution. Lawlessness by citizens does not justify lawlessness by Government.

The tactics which were employed by the Bureau are therefore unacceptable, even against the alleged criminal. The imprecision of the targeting compounded the abuse. Once the Government decided to take the law into its own hands, those unacceptable tactics came almost inevitably to be used not only against the "kid with the bomb" but also against the "kid with the bumper sticker."

Subfinding (a)

Although the claimed purposes of these action programs were to protect the "national security" and to prevent violence, many of the victims were concededly nonviolent, were not controlled by a foreign power, and posed no threat to the "national security."

The Bureau conducted five "counterintelligence programs" aimed against domestic groups: the "Communist Party, USA" program (1956-71); the "Socialist Workers Party" program (1961-69); the "White Hate" program (1964-1971); the "Black Nationalist-Hate Group" program (1967-71) ; and the "New Left" program (1968-71).

While the declared purposes of these programs were to protect the "national security" or prevent violence, Bureau witnesses admit that many of the targets were nonviolent and most had no connections with a foreign power. Indeed, nonviolent organizations and individuals were targeted because the Bureau believed they represented a "potential" for violence -- and nonviolent citizens who were against the war in Vietnam were targeted because they gave "aid and comfort" to violent demonstrators by lending respectability to their cause.[11]

The imprecision of the targeting is demonstrated by the inability of the Bureau to define the subjects of the programs. The Black Nationalist program, according to its supervisor, included "a great number of organizations that you might not today characterize as black nationalist but which were in fact primarily black."[12] Thus, the nonviolent Southern Christian Leadership Conference was labeled as a Black Nationalist-"Hate Group."

Furthermore, the actual targets were chosen from a far broader group than the titles of the programs would imply. The CPUSA program targeted not only Communist Party members but also sponsors of the National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee 14 and civil rights leaders allegedly under Communist influence or not deemed to be "anti-Communist".[15] The Socialist Workers Party program included non-SWP sponsors of antiwar demonstrations which were cosponsored by the SWP or the Young Socialist Alliance, its youth group.[16] The Black Nationalist program targeted a range of organizations from the Panthers to SNCC to the peaceful Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and included every Black Student Union and many other black student groups.[17] New Left targets ranged from the SDS 18 to the InterUniversity Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy,[19] from Antioch College ("vanguard of the New Left")[20] to the New

Mexico Free University and other "alternate" schools,[21] and from underground newspapers 22 to students protesting university censorship of a student publication by carrying signs with four-letter words on them.[23]

Subfinding (b)

The acts taken interfered with the First Amendment rights of citizens. They were explicitly intended to deter citizens from joining groups, "neutralize" those who were already members, and prevent or inhibit the expression of ideas.

In achieving its purported goals Of protecting the national security and preventing violence, the Bureau attempted to deter membership in the target groups. As the supervisor of the "Black Nationalist" COINTELPRO stated, "Obviously, you are going to prevent violence or a greater amount of violence if you have smaller groups. 4 The chief of the COINTELPRO unit agreed: "We also made an effort . . . to deter recruitment where we could. This was done with the view that if we could curb the organization, we could curb the action or the violence within the organization."[25] As noted above, many of the organizations "curbed" were not violent, and covert attacks on group membership contravened the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom to associate.

Nor was this the only First Amendment right violated by the Bureau. In addition to attempting to prevent people from joining or continuing to be members in target organizations, the Bureau tried to "deter or counteract" what it called "propaganda"[26] -- the expression of ideas which it considered dangerous. Thus, the originating document for the "Black Nationalist" COINTELPRO noted that "consideration should be given to techniques to preclude" leaders of the target organizations "from spreading their philosophy publicly or through various mass communication media."[27]

Instructions to "preclude" free speech were not limited to "black nationalists;" they occurred in every program. In the New Left program, for instance, approximately thirty-nine percent of all actions attempted to keep targets from speaking, teaching, writing, or publishing.[28]

The cases included attempts (sometimes successful) to prompt the firing of university and high school teachers;[29] to prevent targets from speaking on campus;[30] to stop chapters of target groups from being formed;[31] to prevent the distribution of books, newspapers, or periodicals;[32] to disrupt or cancel news conferences;[33] to interfere with peaceful demonstrations, including the SCLC's Poor People's Campaign and Washington Spring Project and most of the large anti-war marches;[34] and to deny facilities for meetings or conferences.[35]

As the above cases demonstrate, the FBI was not just "chilling" free speech, but squarely attacking it.

The tactics used against Americans often risked and sometimes caused serious emotional, economic, or physical damage. Actions were taken which were designed to break up marriages, terminate funding or employment, and encourage gang warfare between violent rival groups. Due process of law forbids the use of such covert tactics whether the victims are innocent law-abiding citizens or members of groups suspected of involvement in violence. The former head of the Domestic Intelligence Division described counterintelligence as a "rough, tough, dirty, and dangerous" business.[36] His description was accurate.

One technique used in COINTELPRO involved sending anonymous letters to spouses intended, in the words of one proposal, to "produce ill-feeling and possibly a lasting distrust" between husband and wife, so that "concern over what to do about it" would distract the target from "time spent in the plots and plans" of the organization.[37] The image of an agent of the United States Government scrawling a poison-pen letter to someone's wife in language usually reserved for bathroom walls is not a happy one. Nevertheless, anonymous letters were sent to, among others, a Klansman's wife, informing her that her husband had "taken the flesh of another unto himself," the other person being a woman named Ruby, with her "lust filled eyes and smart aleck figure;"[38] and to a "Black Nationalist's" wife saying that her husband "been maken it here" with other women in his organization "and than he gives us this jive bout their better in bed then you."[39] A husband who was concerned about his wife's activities in a biracial group received a letter which started, "Look man I guess your old lady doesn't get enough at home or she wouldn't be shucking and jiving with our Black Men" in the group.[40] The Field Office reported as a "tangible result" of this letter that the target and her husband separated.[41]

The Bureau also contacted employers and funding organizations in order to cause the firing of the targets or the termination of their support.[42] For example, priests who allowed their churches to be used for the Black Panther breakfast programs were targeted, and anonymous letters were sent to their bishops;[43] a television commentator who expressed admiration for a Black Nationalist leader and criticized heavy defense spending was transferred after the Bureau contacted his employer;[44] and an employee of the Urban League was fired after the FBI approached a "confidential source" in a foundation which funded the League.[45]

The Bureau also encouraged "gang warfare" between violent groups. An FBI memorandum dated November 25,1968 to certain Field Offices conducting investigations of the Black Panther Party ordered recipient offices to submit "imaginative and hard-hitting counterintelligence measures aimed at crippling the BPP." Proposals were to be received every two weeks. Particular attention was to be given to capitalizing upon differences between the Panthers and US, Inc. (an other "Black Nationalist" group), which had reached such proportions that "it is taking on the aura of gang warfare with attendant threats of murder and reprisals."[45] On May 26,1970, after U.S. organization members had killed four BPP members and members of each organization had been shot and beaten by members of the other, the Field Office reported:

Information received from local sources indicate[s] that, in general, the membership of the Los Angeles BPP is physically afraid of US members and take premeditated precautions to avoid confrontations.

In view of their anxieties, it is not presently felt that the Los Angeles BPP can be prompted into what could result in an internecine struggle between the two organizations. . . .

The Los Angeles Division is aware of the mutually hostile feelings harbored between the organizations and the first opportunity to capitalize on the situation will be maximized. It is intended that US Inc. will be appropriately and discreetly advised of the time and location of BPP activities in order that the two organizations might be brought together and thus grant nature the

opportunity to take'her due course.[46] [Emphasis added.]

A second Field Office noted:

Shootings, beatings and a high degree of unrest continues to prevail in the ghetto area of Southeast San Diego. Although no specific counterintelligence action can be credited with contributing to this overall situation, it is felt that a substantial amount of the unrest is directly attributable to this program.[47]

In another case, an anonymous letter was sent to the leader of the Blackstone Rangers (a group, according to the Field Offices' proposal, "to whom violent-type activity, shooting, and the like are second nature") advising him that "the brothers that run the Panthers blame you for blocking their thing and there's supposed to be a hit out for you." The letter was intended to "intensify the degree of animosity between the two groups" and cause "retaliatory action which could disrupt the BPP or lead to reprisals against its leadership."[48]

Another technique which risked serious harm to the target was falsely labeling a target an informant. This technique was used in all five domestic COINTELPROs. When a member of a nonviolent group was successfully mislabeled as an informant, the result was alienation from the group.[49] When the target belonged to a group known to have killed suspected informants, the risk was substantially more serious. On several occasions, the Bureau used this technique against members of the Black Panther Party; it was used at least twice after FBI documents expressed concern over the possible consequences because two members of the BPP had been murdered as suspected informants.[50]

The Bureau recognized that some techniques used in COINTELPRO were more likely than others to cause serious physical, emotional, or economic damage to the targets.[51] Any proposed use of such techniques -- for example, encouraging enmity between violent rival groups, falsely labeling group members as informants, and mailing anonymous letters to targets' spouses accusing the target of infidelity -- was scrutinized carefully by headquarters supervisory personnel, in an attempt to balance the "greater good" to be achieved by the proposal against the known or risked harm to the target. If the "good" was sufficient, the proposal was approved. For instance, in discussing anonymous letters to spouses, the agent who supervised the New Left COINTELPRO stated:

[Before recommending approval] I would want to know what you want to get out of this, who are these people. If it's somebody, and say they did split up, what would accrue from it as far as disrupting the New Left is concerned? Say they broke up, what then. . . .

[The question would be] is it worth it? 52

Similarly, with regard to causing false suspicions that an individual was an informant, the chief of the Racial Intelligence Section stated:

You have to be able to make decisions and I am sure that labeling somebody as an informant, that you'd want to make certain that it served a good purpose before you did it and not do it haphazardly.... It is a serious thing ... As far as I am aware, in the black extremist area, by using that technique, no one was

killed. I am sure of that.[52]

This official was asked whether the fact that no one was killed was the, result of "luck or planning." He answered: "Oh, it just happened that way, I am sure."[52]

It is intolerable in a free society that an agency of the Government should adopt such tactics, whether or not the targets are involved in criminal activity. The "greater good" of the country is in fact served by adherence to the rule of law mandated by the Constitution.

Subfinding (d)

The sustained use of such tactics by the FBI in an attempt to destroy Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., violated the law and fundamental human decency.

The Committee devoted substantial attention to the FBI's covert action campaign against Dr. Martin Luther King because it demonstrates just how far the Government could go in a secret war against one citizen. In focusing upon Dr. King, however, it should not be forgotten that the Bureau carried out disruptive activities against hundreds of lesser known American citizens. It should also be borne in mind that positive action on the part of high Government officials outside the FBI might have prevented what occurred in this case.[53]

The FBI's claimed justification for targeting Dr. King -- alleged Communist influence on him and the civil rights movement -- is examined elsewhere in this report.[54]

The FBI's campaign against Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. began in December 1963, four months after the famous civil rights March on Washington,[55] when a nine-hour meeting was convened at FBI Headquarters to discuss various "avenues of approach aimed at neutralizing King as an effective Negro leader."[56] Following the meeting, agents in the field were instructed to "continue to gather information concerning King's personal activities ... in order that we may consider using this information at an opportune time in a counterintelligence move to discredit him."[57]

About two weeks after that conference, FBI agents planted a microphone in Dr. King's bedroom at the Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C.[58] During the next two years, the FBI installed at least fourteen more "bugs" in Dr. King's hotel rooms across the country.[59] Physical and photographic surveillances accompanied some of the microphone, coverage.[60]

The FBI also scrutinized Dr. King's tax returns, monitored his financial affairs, and even tried to determine whether he had a secret foreign bank account.[61]

In late 1964, a "sterilized" tape was prepared in a manner that would prevent attribution to the FBI and was "anonymously" mailed to Dr. King just before he received the Nobel Peace Prize.[62] Enclosed in the package with the tape was an unsigned letter which warned Dr. King, "your end is approaching . . . you are finished." The letter intimated that the tape might be publicly released, and closed with the following message:

King, there is only one thing left for you to do. You know what it is. You have just 34 days in which to do (this exact number has been selected for a specific reason, it has definite practical significance). You are done. There is but one

way out for you . . .[63]

Dr. King's associates have said he interpreted the message as an effort to induce him to commit suicide.[64]

At about the same time that it mailed the "sanitized" tape, the FBI was also apparently offering tapes and transcripts to newsmen.[65] Later when civil rights leaders Roy Wilkins and James Farmer went to Washington to persuade Bureau officials to halt the FBI's discrediting efforts,[66] they were told that "if King want[s] war we [are] prepared to give it to him."[67]

Shortly thereafter, Dr. King went to Europe to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. The Bureau tried to undermine ambassadorial receptions in several of the countries he visited '68 and when he returned to the United States, took steps to diminish support for a banquet and a special "day" being planned in his honor.[69]

The Bureau's actions against Dr. King included attempts to prevent him from meeting with world leaders, receiving honors or favorable publicity, and gaining financial support. When the Bureau learned of a possible meeting between Dr. King and the Pope in August 1964, the FBI asked Cardinal Spellman to try to arrange a cancellation of the audience.[70] Discovering that two schools (Springfield College and Marquette University) were going to honor Dr. King with special degrees in the spring of 1964, Bureau agents tried to convince officials at the schools to rescind their plans.[71] And when the Bureau learned in October 1966 that the Ford Foundation might grant three million dollars to Dr. King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference, they asked a former FBI agent who was a high official at the Ford Motor Company to try to block the award.[72]

A magazine was asked not to publish favorable articles about him.[73] Religious leaders and institutions were contacted to undermine their support of him.[74] Press conference questions were prepared and distributed to "friendly" journalists.[75] And plans were even discussed for sabotaging his political campaign in the event he decided to run for national office.[76] An SCLC employee was "anonymously" informed that the SCLC was trying to get rid of her "so that the Bureau [would be] in a position to capitalize on [her] bitterness."[78] Bureau officials contacted members of Congress,[79] and special "off the record" testimony was prepared for the Director's use before the House Appropriations Committee.[80]

The "neutralization" program continued until Dr. King's death. As late as March 1968, FBI agents were being instructed to neutralize Dr. King because he might become a "messiah" who could "unify, and electrify, the militant black nationalist movement" if he were to "abandon his supposed 'obedience' to 'white liberal doctrines' (nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism."[81] Steps were taken to subvert the "Poor People's Campaign" which Dr. King was planning to lead in the spring of 1968.[82] Even after Dr. King's death, agents in the field were proposing methods for harassing his widow 83 and Bureau officials were trying to prevent his birthday from becoming a national holiday.[84]

The actions taken against Dr. King are indefensible. They represent a sad episode in the dark history of covert actions directed against law abiding citizens by a law enforcement agency.

[1] Before 1956 the FBI engaged in activities to disrupt and discredit Communists and (before World War II) Fascists, but not as part of a formal program. The Bureau is the only agency which carried on a sustained effort to "neutralize" domestic groups, although other agencies made sporadic attempts to disrupt dissident groups. (See Military Surveillance Report; IRS Report.)

[2] The Bureau personnel involved in COINTELPRO link the first formal counterintelligence program, against the Communist Party, USA, to the Supreme Court reversal of the Smith Act convictions, which "made it impossible to prosecute Communist Party members at the time". (COINTELPRO unit chief, 10/16/75, p. 14.) It should be noted, however, that the Court's reversal occurred In 1957, the year after the program was instituted. This belief in the deficiencies of the law was a major factor in the four subsequent programs as well: "The other COINTELPRO programs were opened as the threat arose in areas of extremism and subversion and there were not adequate statutes to proceed against the organization or to prevent their activities." (COINTELPRO Unit Chief, 10/16/75, p. 15.)

[3] For further information on the termination of each of the programs, see The Accountability and Control Findings, p.[ 265 and the detailed reports on the Black Panther Party and COINTELPRO.

Although the programs have been formally terminated, Bureau witnesses agree that there is a "grey area" between "counter-intelligence" and investigative activities which are inherently disruptive. These investigative activities, continue. (See COINTELPRO Report: "Command and Control -- The Problems of Oversight.")

[4] Information gained from electronic surveillance, informant coverage, burglaries, and confidential financial records was used in COINTELPRO. p.[ 275.)

[5] Moore, 11/3/75, p. 83.

[6] Field offices were instructed that no one outside the Bureau was to know that COINTELPRO existed, although certain persons in the executive branch and in Congress were told about -- and did not object to -efforts to disrupt the CPUSA and the Klan. However, no one was told about the other COINTELPRO programs, or about the more dangerous and degrading techniques employed. (See p.[ 275.)

[7] As the Chief of the Racial Intelligence Section put it:

"You can trace [the origins of COINTELPRO] up and back to foreign intelligence, particularly penetration of the group by the individual informant. Before you can engage in counterintelligence you must have intelligence. . . . If you have good intelligence and know what it's going to do, you can seed distrust, sow misinformation. The same technique is used, misinformation, disruption, is used in the domestic groups, although in the domestic groups you are dealing in '67 and '68 with many, many more across the country ... than you had ever dealt with as far as your foreign groups." (Moore, 11/3/75, pp. 32-33.)

Former Assistant Director William C. Sullivan also testified that the "rough, tough, dirty business" of foreign counterintelligence was "brought home against any organization against which we were targeted. We did not differentiate." (Sullivan, 11/1/75, pp. 97-98.)

[8] For example, parents and spouse, of targets received letters containing accusations of immoral conduct by the target. (Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/30/70; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office, 11/4/68.)

[9] Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 45.

[10] Moore, 11/8/75, p. 37.

[11] New Left supervisor, 10/28/75, p. 69.

[12] Black Nationalist Supervisor, 10/17/75, p. 12.

[13] omitted in original.

[14] For example, the entire Unitarian Society of Cleveland was targeted because the minister and some members circulated a petition calling for the abolition of HUAC, and because the Church gave office space to the "Citizens for Constitutional Rights". (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 11/6/64.)

[15] See Finding on "Overbreadth" p.[ 181.

[16] For instance, the Bureau targeted two non-member students who participated in an anti-war "hunger strike" at Oberlin, which was "guided and directed" by the Young Socialists Alliance. The students' parents received anonymous letters, purportedly from a friend of their sons. One letter expressed concern that a group of "left wing students" were "cynically using" the boy, which would lead to "injury" to his health and "damage to his academic standing". The other letter also stated that it was motivated by concern for "damage" to the student's "health and personal future" and "the belief that you may not be aware of John's current involvement in leftwing activities." (Memorandum from FBI headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 11/29/68.)

[17] One proposal sought to expose Black Student Union Chapters as "breeding grounds for racial militancy" by an anonymous mailing to "all institutions where there are BSU chapters or incipient chapters". (Memorandum from Portland Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/3/68.)

[18] For example Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 10/31/68.

[19] An anonymous letter was sent to "influential" Michigan political figures, the mass media, University of Michigan administrators, and the Board of Regents, in an attempt to "discredit and neutralize" the "communist activities" of the IUCDFP. The letter decried the "undue publicity" given anti-war protest activities which "undoubtedly give 'aid and comfort' to the enemy" and encourage the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese in "refusing to come to the bargaining table". The letter continued, "I wonder if the strategy is to bleed the United States white by prolonging the war in Vietnam and pave the way for a takeover by Russia?" (Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/11/66; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters, to Detroit Field Office 10/26/66.)

[20] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office, 6/18/68.

[21] The New Mexico Free University was targeted because it taught such courses as "confrontation politics" and "draft counselling". (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Albuquerque Field Office, 3/19/69.) In another case, an "alternate" school for students "aged five and beyond", which was co-sponsored by the ACLU, was targeted because "from the staff being assembled, it appears that the school will be a New Left venture and of a radical revolutionary nature". The Bureau contacted a confidential source in the bank financing the school so that he could "take steps to discourage its developments". (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 7/23/69.

[22] See e.g., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office, 11/14/69.

[23] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office, 11/4/68.

[24] Black Nationalist supervisor, 10/17/75, p. 24.

[25] COINTELPRO unit chief, 10/12/75, p. 54.

[26] COINTELPRO unit chief, 10/12/75, P. 54.

[27] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 8/25/67.

[28] The FBI was not the only intelligence agency to attempt to prevent the propagation of ideas with which it disagreed, but it was the only one to do so in any organized way. The IRS responded to Congressional and Administration pressure by targeting political organizations and dissidents for audit. The CIA Improperly obtained the tax returns of Ramparts magazine after it learned that the magazine intended to publish an article revealing Agency support of the National Student Association. The CIA saw the article as "an attack on CIA in particular and the Administration in general." (CIA memorandum re: "IRS Briefing on Ramparts,"[ 2/2/67.)

[29] For instance, a high school English teacher was targeted for inviting two poets to attend a class at his school. The poets were noted for their efforts in the draft resistance movement. The Bureau sent anonymous letters to two local newspapers, the Board of Education, and the school board. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office, 6/19/69.)

[30] In one case, the Bureau attempted to stop a "Communist" speaker from appearing on campus. The sponsoring organization went to court and won an order permitting the lecture to proceed as scheduled; the Bureau then investigated the judge who issued the order. (Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters.[ 10/26/60; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 10/27/60, 10/28/, 10/31/60; Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to A. H. Belmont, 10/26/60.)

[31] The Bureau tried on several occasions to prevent the formation of campus chapters of SDS and the Young Socialist Alliance. (See, e.g., Memorandum from San Antonio Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/1/69; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 5/1/69.)

[32] For example, an anonymous letter to a state legislator protested the distribution on campus of an underground newspaper's "depravity", (Memorandum from Newark Meld Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/23/69; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Newark Field Office, 6/4/69) and the Bureau anonymously contacted the landlady of premises rented by two "New Left" newspapers in an attempt to have them evicted. (Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/9/68; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office, 9/23/68.)

[33] For example, a confidential source in a radio station was contacted In two successful attempts to cancel news conferences. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 10/1/65; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office 10/4/65; Memorandum from Boston Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/5/64; Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 6/25/64.)

[34] For instance, the Bureau used the standard counterespionage technique of "disinformation" against demonstrators. In one case, the Chicago Field Office duplicated blank forms soliciting housing for demonstrators coming to Chicago for the Democratic National Convention, filled them out with fictitious names and addresses and sent them to the organizers. Demonstrators reportedly made "long and useless journeys to locate these addresses." (Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters.[ 9/9/68.) The same program was carried out by the Washington Field Office when housing forms were distributed for demonstrators coming to the 1969 Presidential inaugural ceremonies. (Memorandum from ]FBI Headquarters to Washington Field Office. 1/10/69.) Army Intelligence agents occasionally took similar, but wholly unauthorized action, see Military Surveillance Report: Section Ill: "Domestic Radio Monitoring by ASA: 1967-1970."

[35] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego field office, 9/11/69.

[36] Sullivan, 11/1/75, pp. 97-98.

[37] Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/14/69.

[38] Memorandum from Richmond Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/26/66.

[39] The wife who received this letter was described in the Field Office proposal as "faithful . . . an intelligent respectable young mother who is active in the AME Methodist Church." (Memorandum from St. Louis Meld Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/14/69.)

[40] Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/30/70.

[41] Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/19/70.

[42] When the targets were teachers, the intent was to prevent the propagation of ideas. In the case of other employer contacts, the purpose was to stop a source of funds.

[43] Memorandum from New Haven Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/12/69; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office, 9/9/69.

[44] memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office, 3/28/69.

[45] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office, 3/3/69.

[45] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Baltimore Field Office, 11/25/68.

[46] Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI headquarters, 5/26/70, pp. 1-2.

[47] Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI headquarters, 9/15/69.

[48] Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI headquarters, 1/12/69; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 1/30/69.

[49] See, e.g., Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/30/69.

[50] One proposal to label a BPP member a "pig informer" was rejected because the Panthers had recently murdered two suspected informers. The victims had not been targets of a Bureau effort to label them informants. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office, 2/18/71.) Nevertheless, two similar proposals were implemented a month later, (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Washington Field Office, 3/19/71; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Charlotte Field Office, 3/31/71.)

[51] At least four assaults -- two of them on women -- were reported as "results" of Bureau actions, (See COINTELPRO Report, Section IV: Wartimes Technique Brought Home.)

[52] New Left supervisor 10/28/75, pp.[ 72, 74.

[52] Moore, 11/3/75, p. 62.

[52] Moore, 11/3/75, p. 64.

[53] See pp.[ 275-277 and 205-206 of this Report for a detailed discussion of which officials were aware or should have been aware of what the Bureau was doing to Dr. King and how their action or inaction might have contributed to what went on.

[54] See Martin Luther King Report, Section III, "Concern in the FBI and the Kennedy Administration Over Allegations of Communist Influence in the Civil Rights Movement Increases, and the FBI Intensifies the Investigation: October 1962-October 1963." See generally, Finding on Overbreadth, p.[ 175.

[55] The August 1963 march on Washington was the occasion of Dr. Kings "I Have a Dream" speech, on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial. (See memorandum from William C. Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 8/30/63, characterizing the speech as "demagogic".)

[56] Memorandum from William C. Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 12/24/63. Although FBI officials were making derogatory references to Dr. King and passing personal information about Dr. King to their superiors. (Memorandum from Hoover to Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach, 8/13/63.) Prior to December 1963, the Committee had discovered no document reflecting a strategy to deliberately discredit him prior to the memorandum relating to the December 1963 meeting.

[57] Memorandum from William C. Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 12/24/63.

[58] The microphone was installed on January 5, 1964 (Memorandum from William C. Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 1/6/64.), just days after Dr. King's picture appeared on the cover of Time magazine as "Man of the Year." (Time Magazine, January 3, 1964.) Reading of the Time magazine award, the Director had written, "They had to dig deep in the garbage to come up with this one." (Note on UP release, 12/29/63.)

[59] FBI memoranda make clear that microphones were one of the techniques being used in the effort to obtain Information about Dr. King's private life. (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan 1/28/64.) The microphones were installed at the following places: Washington: Willard Hotel (Jan.[ 1964) ; Milwaukee: Shroeder Hotel (Jan. 1964) ; Honolulu: Hilton Hawaiian Village (Feb. 1964) ; Detroit: Statler Hotel (March 1964) ; Sacramento: Senator Motel (Apr. 1964) ; New York City: Park Sheraton Hotel (Jan. 1965), Americana Hotel (Jan. and Nov. 1965), Sheraton Atlantic Hotel (May 1965), Astor Hotel (Oct. 1965), New York Hilton Hotel (Oct. 1965).

[60] FBI summary memorandum, 10/3/75; memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 3/26/64; memorandum from William C. Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 2/22/64; and unsigned memorandum, 2/28/64.

[61] Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 3/27/64; memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/2/64; memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 7/14/65.

[62] Sullivan 11/1/75, pp.[ 104-105, staff summary of a special agent interview, 7/25/75. Three days before the tape was mailed, Director Hoover had publicly branded Dr. King "the most notorious liar in the country" and Dr. King had responded with a criticism of the Bureau. (Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 11/18/64; telegram from Martin Luther King to J. Edgar Hoover 11/19/64.)

[63] This paragraph appears in a document in the form of a letter which the FBI has supplied to the Committee and which the Bureau maintains was discovered in the files of former Assistant Director Sullivan. (FBI memorandum to the Select Committee, 9/18/75.) Sullivan stated that he did not recall the letter and suggested that it may have been "planted" in his files by his former colleagues. (Sullivan 11/1/75, p. 104.) Congressman Andrew Young has informed the Committee that an identical paragraph was contained in the letter which was actually received by Dr. King with the tape, and that the letter the committee had, supplied by the Bureau, appears to be an "early draft." (Young, 2/19/76, P. 36.)

Sullivan said that the purpose of sending the tape was "to blackmail King into silence . . . to stop him from criticising Hoover; . . . to diminish his stature. In other words, if it caused a break between Coretta and Martin Luther King, that would diminish his stature. It would weaken him as a leader." (Sullivan, 11/1/75, 11/26/75, p. 152.)

[64] Young, 2/19/76, p. 37, Time magazine had reported earlier in the year that Dr. King had attempted suicide twice as a child. [Time magazine, Jan. 4, 1964.]

[65] Several newsmen have informed the Committee that they were offered this kind of material or that they were aware that such material was available. Some have refused to Identify the individuals who made the offers and others have said they could not recall their identities. Former FBI officials have denied that tapes or transcripts were offered to the press (e.g., DeLoach testimony, 11/26/75, p. 152) and the Bureau maintains that their files contain no documents reflecting that this occurred.

[66] Staff interviews of Roy Wilkins, 11/23/75, and James Farmer, 11/13/75.

[67] Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 11/27/64; staff interview of James Farmer, 11/13/75. Three days after Wilkins' meeting with DeLoach, Dr. King asked to see the Director, telling the press "the time has come to bring this controversy to an end." (UPI release, 12/1/64) Dr. King and Hoover met the following day; the meeting was described as "amicable." (Memoranda from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 12/1/64 and 12/2/64.) Despite the "amicable" meeting, the Bureau's campaign against Dr. King continued.

[68] Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 11/30/64; memorandum from Legat to FBI

Headquarters, 12/10/64. Steps were also taken to thwart a meeting which Dr. King was planning to have with a foreign leader during this same trip (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 11/10/64; memorandum, from FBI Headquarters to Legat, 11/10/64), and to influence a pending USIA decision to send Dr. King on a ten-day lecture trip in Africa after receiving the Nobel Prize. (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 11/12/64.)

[69] The Bureau was in touch with Atlanta Constitution publisher Ralph McGill, and tried to obtain the assistance of the Constitution's editor, Eugene Patterson, to undermine the banquet. (Memorandum from William C. Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 12/21/64; staff summary of Eugene Patterson interview, 4/30/75.) A governor's assistance was sought in the effort to "water down" the "King day." (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 3/2/65.)

[70] The Bureau had decided it would be "astounding" for Dr. King to have an audience with the Pope and that plans for any such meeting should be "nipped In the bud." (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 8/31/64.) When the Bureau failed to block the meeting and the press reported that the audience was about to occur, the Director noted that this was "astounding." (FBI Director's notation on UPI release, 9/18/64). FBI officials took immediate steps to determine "if there could possibly have been a slipup" (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 9/17/64.)

[71] The Bureau had decided that it would be "shocking indeed that the possibility exists that King may receive an Honorary Degree from the same Institution (Marquette) which honored the Director with such a Degree in 1950." With respect to Springfield College, where the Director had also been offered an honorary degree, the Bureau's decision about whom to contact included the observation that "it would not appear to be prudent to attempt to deal with" the President of the college because he "is very close to Sargent Shriver." (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 3/4/64; and 4/2/64; memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 4/8/64.)

[72] Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to Clyde Tolson, 10/25/66 and 10/26/66. At about the same time, the Bureau leaked a story to the press about Dr. King's intention to seek financial assistance from Teamsters Union President James R. Hoffa because "[disclosure would be mutually embarrassing to both men and probably cause King's quest for badly needed funds to fail in this instance" (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 10/28/66.)

The Bureau also tried to block the National Science Foundation (NSF) from dealing with the SCLC. "It is incredible that an outfit such as the SCLC should be utilized for the purpose of recruiting Negroes to take part In the NSF program, particularly where funds of the U.S. Government are involved." (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 12/17/64.)

[73] Memorandum from Special Agent to Cartha DeLoach, 11/3/64.

[74] "It is shocking Indeed that King continues to be honored by religious groups." (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 2/1/65.) Contacts were made with representatives of the National Council of Churches of Christ, the Baptist World Alliance, the American Church in Paris, and Catholic Church, (Memoranda from William C. Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 6/12/64, 12/15/64 and 2/16/64; memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 2/18/66; memorandum from Chicago Meld Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/24/66, and memorandum from Legat, Paris, to FBI Headquarters, 4/14/66 and 5/9/66.) The Director did disapprove a suggestion that religious leaders be permitted "to listen to sources we have" (FBI Director's note on memorandum from Jones to Thomas Bishop, 12/8/64.)

[75] Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William C. Sullivan, 3/8/67. The Bureau also disseminated to "friendly media sources" a newspaper article which was critical of Dr. King's position on the Vietnam war. The stated purposes were to "publicize King as a traitor to his country and his race," and to "reduce his income," (memorandum from George C. Moore to William C. Sullivan, 10/18/67.) "Background information" was also given to at least one wire service (memorandum from Sizoo to William C. Sullivan, 5/24/65).

[76] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office 5/18/67. There had been rumors about a "peace ticket" headed by Dr. King and Benjamin Spock.

[77] [Footnote missing]

[78] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 4/13/64; memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/2/64.

[79] Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 8/14/65; memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 1/10/67.

[89] Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 1/22/64; memorandum from Nicholas Callahan to John Mohr, 1/31/64. On one occasion the testimony leaked to other members of Congress, prompting the Director to note, "Someone on Rooney's Committee certainly betrayed the secrecy of the 'off the record' testimony I gave re: King." (Director's note on memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 3/16/64.)

[81] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 3/4/68.

[82] Memorandum from George C. Moore to William C. Sullivan, 3/26/68.

[83] Memorandum from Atlanta Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/18/69.

[84] Memoranda: From George C. Moore to William C. Sullivan, 1/17/69; and from Jones to Thomas Bishop, 3/18/69. Steps were even taken to prevent the issuance of "commemorative medals." (Memorandum from Jones to Thomas Bishop, 5/22/68.)

- E. Political Abuse of Intelligence Information

MAJOR FINDING

The Committee finds that information has been collected and disseminated in order to serve the purely political interests of an intelligence agency or the administration, and to influence social policy and political action.

Subfindings

(a) White House officials have requested and obtained politically useful information from the FBI, including information on the activities of political opponents or critics.

(b) In some cases, political or personal information was not specifically requested, but was nevertheless collected and disseminated to administration officials as part of investigations they had requested. Neither the FBI nor the recipients differentiated in these cases between national security or law enforcement information and purely political intelligence.

(c) The FBI has also volunteered information to Presidents and their staffs, without having been asked for it, sometimes apparently to curry favor with the current administration. Similarly, the FBI has assembled intelligence on its critics and on political figures it believed might influence public attitudes or Congressional support.

(d) The FBI has also used intelligence as a vehicle for covert efforts to influence social policy and political action.

E laboration of Findings

The FBI's ability to gather information without effective restraints gave it enormous power. That power was inevitably attractive to politicians, who could use information on opponents and critics for their own advantage, and was also an asset to the Bureau, which depended on politicians for support. In the political arena, as in other facets of American life touched by the intelligence community, the existence of unchecked power led to its abuse.

By providing politically useful information to the White House and congressional supporters, sometimes on demand and sometimes gratuitously, the Bureau buttressed its own position in the political structure. At the same time, the widespread -- and accurate -belief in Congress and the administration that the Bureau had available to it, derogatory information on politicians and critics created what the late Majority Leader of the House of Representatives, Hale Boggs, called a "fear" of the Bureau:

Freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of action for men in public life can be compromised quite as effectively by the fear of surveillance as by the fact of surveillance.[1]

Information gathered and disseminated to the White House ranged from purely political intelligence, such as lobbying efforts on bills ail administration opposed and the strategy of a delegate challenge at a national political convention, to "tidbits" about the activities of politicians and public figures which the Bureau believed "of interest" to the recipients.

Such participation in political machinations by an intelligence agency is totally improper. Responsibility for what amounted to a betrayal of the public trust in the integrity of the FBI must be shared between the officials who requested such information and those who provided it.

The Bureau's collection and dissemination of politically useful information was not colored by partisan considerations; rather its effect was to entrench the Bureau's own position in the political structure, regardless of which party was in power at the time. However, the Bureau also used its powers to serve ideoIogical purposes, attempting covertly to influence social policy and and political action.

In its efforts to "protect society," the FBI engaged in activities which necessarily affected the processes by which American citizens make decisions. In doing so, it distorted and exaggerated facts, made use of the mass media, and attacked the leadership of groups which it considered threats to the social order.

Law enforcement officers are, of course, entitled to state their opinions about what choices the people should make on contemporary social and political issues. The First Amendment guarantees their right to enter the marketplace of ideas and persuade their fellow citizens of the correctness of those opinions by making speeches, writing books, and, within certain statutory limits, supporting political candidates. The problem lies not in the open expression of views, but in the covert use of power or position of trust to influence others. This abuse is aggravated by the agency's control over information on which the public and its elected representatives rely to make decisions.

The essence of democracy is the belief that the people must be free to make decisions about matters of public policy. The FBI's actions interfered with the democratic process, because attitudes within the Bureau toward social change led to the belief that such intervention formed a part of its obligation to protect society. When a governmental agency clandestinely tries to impose its views of what is right upon the American people, then the democratic process is undermined.

Subfinding (a)

White House officials have requested and obtained politically useful information from the FBI, including personal life information on the activities of political opponents or critics.

Presidents and White House aides have asked the FBI to provide political or personal information on opponents and critics, including "name checks" of Bureau files.[2] They have also asked the Bureau to conduct electronic surveillance or more limited investigations of such persons. The FBI appears to have complied unquestioningly with these requests, despite occasional internal doubts about their propriety.[3]

Precedents for certain political abuses go back to the very outset of the domestic intelligence program. In 1940 the FBI complied with President Roosevelt's request to file the names of people sending critical telegrams to the White House.[4] There is evidence of improper electronic surveillance for the White House in the 1940s.[5] And an aide to President Eisenhower asked the FBI to conduct a questionable name check.[6] In 1962, the FBI complied unquestioningly with a request from Attorney General Kennedy to interview a steel executive and several reporters who had written stories about a statement by the executive.[7] As part of an investigation of foreign lobbying efforts on sugar quota legislation in 1961 and 1962, Attorney General Kennedy requested wiretaps on a Congressional aide, three executive officials, and two American lobbyists, including a Washington law firm.[8]

Nevertheless, the political misuse of the FBI under the Johnson and Nixon administrations appears to have been more extensive than in previous years.

Under the Johnson administration, the FBI was used to gather and report political intelligence on the, administration's partisan opponents in the last days of the 1964 and 1968 Presidential election campaigns. In the closing days of the 1964 campaign, Presidential aide Bill Moyers asked the Bureau to conduct "name checks" on all persons employed in Senator Goldwater's Senate office, and information on two staff members was reported to the White House.[9] Similarly, in the last two weeks of the 1968 campaign, the Johnson White House requested an investigation (including indirect electronic surveillance and direct physical surveillance) of Mrs. Anna Chennault, a prominent Republican leader, and her relationships with certain South Vietnamese officials.[10] This investigation also included an FBI check of Vice Presidential candidate Spiro Agnew's long distance telephone call records, apparently at the personal request of President Johnson.[11]

Another investigation for the Johnson White House involved executive branch officials who took part in the criminal investigation of former Johnson Senate aide Bobby Baker. When Baker's trial began in 1967, it was revealed that one of the government witnesses had been "wired" to record his conversations with Baker. Presidential aide Marvin Watson told the FBI that Johnson was quite "exercised," and the Bureau was ordered to conduct a discreet "run down" on the former head of the Justice Department's Criminal Division and four Treasury Department officials who had been responsible for "wiring" the witness. The Bureau was specifically insisted to include any associations between those persons and Robert Kennedy.[12]

Several Johnson White House requests were directed at critics of the war in Vietnam, at newsmen, and at other opponents. According a Bureau memorandum, White House aide Marvin Watson attempted to disguise his, and the President's interest in such requests asking the FBI to channel its replies through a lower level White House staff member.[13]

In 1966, Watson asked the FBI to monitor the televised hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Vietnam policy and prepare a memorandum comparing statements of the President's Senate critics with "the Communist Party line."[14] Similarly, in 1967 when seven Senators made statements criticizing the bombing of North Vietnam, Watson requested (and the Bureau delivered) a "blind memorandum" setting forth information from FBI files on each of the Senators. Among the data supplied were the following items:

Senator Clark was quoted in the press as stating that the three major threats to America are the military-industrial complex, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Senator McGovern spoke at a rally sponsored by the Chicago, Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, a pacifist group. Senator McGovern stated that the "United States was making too much of the communist take-over of Cuba."

[Another Senator now deceased] has, on many occasions, publicly criticized United States policy toward Vietnam. He frequently speaks before groups throughout the United States on this subject. He has been reported as intentionally entering into controversial areas so that his services as a speaker for which he receives a fee, will be in demand.[15]

The Johnson administration also requested information on contacts between members of Congress and certain foreign officials known to oppose the United States presence in Vietnam. According to FBI records, President Johnson believed these foreign officials had generated "much of the protest concerning his Vietnam policy, particularly the hearings in the Senate."[16]

White House requests were not limited to critical Congressmen. Ordinary citizens who sent telegrams protesting the Vietnam war to the White House were also the subject of Watson requests for FBI name check reports.[17] Presidential aide Jake Jacobsen asked for name checks on persons whose names appeared in the Congressional Record as signers of a letter to Senator Wayne Morse expressing support for his criticism of U.S. Vietnam policy.[18] On at least one occasion, a request was channeled through Attorney General Ramsey Clark, who supplied Watson (at the latter's request) with a summary of information on the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy.[19]

Other individuals who were the subject of such name check requests under the Johnson Administration included NBC Commentator David Brinkley,[20] Associated Press reporter Peter Arnett,[21] columnist Joseph Kraft,[22] Life magazine Washington bureau chief Richard Stolley,[23] Chicago Daily News Washington bureau chief Peter Lisagor,[24] and Ben W. Gilbert of the Washington Post.[25] The Johnson White House also requested (and received) name check reports on the authors of books critical of the Warren Commission report; some of these reports included derogatory information about the personal lives of the individuals.[26]

The Nixon administration continued the practice of using the FBI to produce political information. In 1969 John Ehrlichman, counsel to President Nixon, asked the FBI to conduct a "name check" on Joseph Duffy, chairman of Americans for Democratic Action. Data in Bureau files covered Duffy's "handling arrangements" for an antiwar teach-in in 1965, his position as State Coordinator of the group "Negotiation Now" in 1967, and his activity as chairman of Connecticut Citizens for McCarthy in 1968.[26]

Presidential aide H. R. Haldeman requested a name check on CBS reporter Daniel Schorr. In this instance, the FBI mistakenly considered the request to be for a full background investigation and began to conduct interviews. These interviews made the inquiry public. Subsequently, White House officials stated (falsely) that Schorr was under consideration for an executive appointment.[27] In another case, a Bureau memorandum states that Vice President Agnew asked the FBI for information about Rev. Ralph David Abernathy, then head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, for use in "destroying Abernathy's credibility."[28] (Agnew has denied that he made such a request, but agrees that he received the information.)[29]

Several White House requests involved the initiation of electronic surveillance. Apparently on the instructions of President Nixon's aide John Ehrlichman and Director Hoover, FBI Assistant Director William C. Sullivan arranged for the microphone surveillance of the hotel, room of columnist Joseph Kraft while be was visiting a foreign country.[30] Kraft was also the target of physical surveillance by the FBI.[31] There is no record of any specific "national security" rationale for the surveillance.

Similarly, although the "17" wiretaps were authorized ostensibly to investigate national security "leaks," there is no record in three of the cases of any national security claim having been advanced in their support. Two of the targets were domestic affairs advisers at the White House, with no foreign affairs duties and no access to foreign policy materials.[32] A third was a White House speechwriter who had been overheard on an existing tap agreeing to provide a reporter with background on a presidential speech concerning, not foreign policy, but revenue sharing and welfare reform.[33]

Subfinding (b)

In some cases, political or personal information was not specifically requested, but was nevertheless collected and disseminated to administration officials as part of investigations they had requested. Neither the FBI nor the recipients differentiated in these cases between national security or law enforcement information and purely political intelligence.

In some instances, the initial request for or dissemination of information was premised upon law enforcement or national security purposes. However, pursuant to such a request, information was furnished which obviously could serve only partisan or personal interests. As one Bureau official summarized its attitude, the FBI "did not decide what was political or what represented potential strife and violence. We are an investigative agency and we passed on all data."[34]

Examples from the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations illustrate this failure to distinguish between political and nonpolitical intelligence. They include, the FBI's reports to the White House in 1956 on NAACP lobbying activities, the intelligence about the legislative process produced by the "sugar lobby" wiretaps in 1961-1962, the purely political data disseminated to the White House on the credentials challenge in the 1964 Democratic Convention, and dissemination of both political and personal information from the "leak" wiretaps in 1969-1972.

(i) The NAACP

In early 1956 Director Hoover sent the White House a memorandum describing the "potential for violence" in the current "racial situation".[35] Later reports to the White House, however, went far beyond intelligence about possible violence; they included extensive inside information about NAACP lobbying efforts, such as the following:

A report on "meetings held in Chicago" in connection with a planned Leadership Conference on Civil Rights to be held in Washington under the sponsorship of the NAACP.[36]

An extensive report on the Leadership Conference, based on the Bureau's "reliable sources" and describing plans of Conference delegations to visit Senators Paul Douglas, Herbert Lehman, Wayne Morse, Hubert Humphrey, and John Bricker. The report also summarized a speech by Roy Wilkins, other conference proceedings, and the report of "an informant" that the United Auto Workers was a "predominant organization" at the conference.[37]

Another report on the conference included an account of what transpired at meetings between conference delegations and Senators Paul Douglas and Everett Dirksen.[38]

A report including the information that two New Jersey congressmen would sign a petition to the Attorney General.[39]

A presidential aide suggested that Hoover brief the Cabinet on "developments in the South."[40] Director Hoover's Cabinet briefing also included political intelligence. He covered not only the NAACP conference, but also the speeches and political activities of Southern Senators and Governors and the formation of the Federation for Constitutional Government with Southern Congressmen and Governors on its advisory board.[41]

(ii) The Sugar Lobby

The electronic surveillance of persons involved in a foreign country's lobbying activities on sugar quota legislation in 1961-1962, authorized by Attorney General Robert Kennedy for the White House, also produced substantial political intelligence unrelated to the activities of foreign officiaIs.[42] Such information came from wiretaps both on foreign officials and on American citizens, as well as from the microphone surveillance of the chairman of the House Agriculture Committee when he met with foreign officials in a New York hotel room.[43] The following are examples of the purely political (and personal) by-product:

A particular lobbyist "mentioned he is working on the Senate and has the Republicans all lined up."[44]

The same lobbyist said that "he had seen two additional representatives on the House Agriculture Committee, one of whom was 'dead set against us' and who may reconsider, and the other was neutral and 'may vote for us.'"[45]

The Agriculture Committee chairman believed "he had accomplished nothing" and that "he had been fighting over the Rules Committee and this had interfered with his attempt to organize."[46]

The "friend" of a foreign official "was under strong pressure from the present administration, and since the 'friend' is a Democrat, it would be very difficult for him to present a strong front to a Democratic Administration."[47]

A lobbyist stated that Secretary of State Rusk "had received a friendly reception by the Committee and there appeared to be no problem with regard to the sugar bill."[48]

A foreign official was reported to be in contact with two Congressmen's secretaries "for reasons other than business." The official asked one of the secretaries to tell the other that he "would not be able to call her that evening" and that one of his associates "was planning to take [the two secretaries and another Congressional aide] to Bermuda."[49]

The FBI's own evaluation of these wiretaps indicates that they "undoubtedly ... contributed heavily to the Administration's success" in passing the legislation it desired.[50]

(iii) The 1964 Democratic Convention

Political reports were disseminated by the FBI to the White House from the 1964 Democratic convention in Atlantic City. These reports, from the FBI's "special squad" at the convention, apparently resulted from a civil disorders intelligence investigation which got out of hand because no one was willing to shut off the partisan by-product.[51] They centered on the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party's credentials challenge. Examples of the political intelligence which flowed from FBI surveillance at the 1964 convention include the following: 52

Dr. Martin Luther King and an associate "were drafting a telegram to President Johnson . . . to register a mild protest. According to King, the President pledged complete neutrality regarding the selecting of the proper Mississippi delegation to be seated at the convention. King feels that the Credentials Committee will turn down the Mississippi Freedom Party and that they are doing this because the President exerted pressure on the committee along this line."[53]

Another associate of Dr. King contacted a member of the MFDP who "said she thought King should see Governor Endicott Peabody of Massachusetts, Mayor Robert Wagner of New York City, Governor Edmund G. (Pat) Brown of California, Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago, and Governor John W. King of New Hampshire." The purpose was "to urge them to call the White House directly and put pressure on the White House in behalf of the MFDP."[54]

"MFDP leaders have asked Reverend King to call Governor Egan of Alaska and Governor Burns of Hawaii in an attempt to enlist their support. According to the MFDP spokesman, the Negro Mississippi Party needs these two states plus California and New York for the roll call tonight."[55]

An SCLC staff member told a representative of the MFDP: "Off the record, of course, you know we will accept the Green compromise proposed." This referred to "the proposal of Congresswoman Edith Green of Oregon."[56]

In a discussion between Dr. King and another civil rights leader, the question of "a Vice- Presidential nominee came up and King asked what [the other leader] thought of Hugh [sic] Humphrey, and [the other leader] said Hugh Humphrey is not going to get it, that Johnson needs a Catholic ... and therefore the VicePresident will be Muskie of Maine."[57]

An unsigned White House memorandum disclosing Dr. King's strategy in connection with a meeting to be, attended by President Johnson suggests that there was political use of these FBI reports.[58]

(iv) The ”17” Wiretaps.

The Nixon White House learned a substantial amount of purely political intelligence from wiretaps to investigate "leaks" of classified information placed on three newsmen and fourteen executive officials during 1969-1971.[59] The following illustrate the range of data supplied:

One of the targets "recently stated that he was to spend an hour with Senator Kennedy's Vietnam man, as Senator Kennedy is giving a speech on the 15th."[60]

Another target said that Senator Fulbright postponed congressional hearings on

Vietnam because he did not believe they would be popular at that time.[61]

A well-known television news correspondent "was very distressed over having been 'singled out' by the Vice President."[62]

A friend of one of the targets said the Washington Star planned to do an article critical of Henry Kissinger.[63]

One of the targets helped former Ambassador Sargent Shriver write a press release criticizing a recent speech by President Nixon in which the President "attacked" certain Congressmen.[64]

One of the targets told a friend it "is clear the Administration will win on the ABM by a two-vote margin. He said 'They've got [a Senator] and they've got [another Senator].'."[65]

A friend of one of the targets wanted to see if a Senator would "buy a new amendment" and stated that "they" were "going to meet with" another Senator.[66]

A friend of one of the targets described a Senator as "marginal" on the CooperChurch Amendment and stated that another Senator might be persuaded to support it.[67]

One of the targets said Senator Mondale was in a "dilemma" over the "trade bill."[68]

A friend of one of the targets said he had spoken to former President Johnson and "Johnson would not back Senator Muskie for the Presidency as he intended to stay out of politics."[69]

There is at least one clear example of the political use of such information. After the FBI Director informed the White House that former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford planned to write a magazine article criticizing President Nixon's Vietnam policy,[70] White House aide Jeb Stuart Magruder advised John Ehrlichman and H. R. Haldeman that "we are in a position to counteract this article in any number of ways."[71] It is also significant that, after May 1970, the FBI Director's letters summarizing the results of the wiretaps were no longer sent to Henry Kissinger, the President's national security advisor, but to the President's political advisor, H. R. Haldeman.[72]

These four illustrations from administrations of both political parties indicate clearly that direct channels of communication between top FBI officials and the White House, combined with the failure to screen out extraneous information, and coupled with overly broad investigations in the first instance, have been sources of flagrant political abuse of the intelligence process.[73]

Subfinding (c)

The FBI has also volunteered information to Presidents and their staffs, without having been asked for it, sometimes apparently to curry favor with the current administration. Similarly, the FBI has assembled information on its critics and on political figures it believed might influence public attitudes or Congressional support.

There have been numerous instances over the past three decades where the FBI volunteered to its superiors purely political or personal information believed by the FBI Director to be "of interest" to them.[74]

The following are examples of the information in Director Hoover's letters under the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations.[75]

To Major General Harry Vaughn, Military Aide to President Truman, a report on the activities of a former Roosevelt aide who was trying to influence the Truman administration's appointments.[76]

To Matthew J. Connelly, Secretary to President Truman, a report from a "very confidential source" about a meeting of newspaper representatives in Chicago to plan publication of stories exposing organized crime and corrupt politicians.[77]

To Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, the advance text of a speech to be delivered by a prominent labor leader.[78]

To Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, a report of a "confidential source" on plans of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt to hold a reception for the head of a civil rights group.[79]

To Attorney General Robert Kennedy, information from a Bureau "source" regarding plans of a group to publish allegations about the President's personal life.[80]

To Attorney General Kennedy, a summary of material in FBI files on a prominent entertainer which the FBI Director thought "may be of interest".[81]

To Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to President Johnson, a summary of data in Bureau files on the author of a play satirizing the President.[82]

As these illustrations indicate, the FBI Director provided such data to administrations of both political parties without apparent partisan favoritism.[83]

Additionally, during the Nixon Administration, the FBI's INLET (Intelligence Letter) Program for sending regular short summaries of FBI intelligence to the White House was used on one occasion to provide information on the purely personal relationship between an entertainer and the subject of an FBI domestic intelligence investigation.[84] SACs were instructed under the INLET program to submit to Bureau headquarters items with an "unusual twist" or regarding "prominent" persons.

One reason for the Bureau's volunteering information to the White House was to please the Administration and thus presumably to build high-level political support for the FBI. Thus, a 1975 Bureau report on the Atlantic City episode states:

One [agent said], "I would like to state that at no time did I ever consider (it) to be a political operation but it was obvious that DeLoach wanted to impress Jenkins and Moyers with the Bureau's ability to develop information which would be of interest to them." Furthermore, in response to a question as to whether the Bureau's services were being utilized for political reasons, [another] answered, "No. I do recall, however, that on one occasion I was present when DeLoach held a lengthy telephone conversation with Walter Jenkins. They appeared to be discussing the President's 'image.' At the end of the conversation DeLoach told us something to the effect, 'that may have sounded a little political to you but this doesn't do the Bureau any harm.'"[86]

In addition to providing information useful to superiors, the Bureau assembled information on its own critics and on political figures it believed might influence public attitudes or congressional support. FBI Director Hoover had massive amounts of information at his fingertips. As indicated above, he could have the Bureau's files checked on anyone of interest to him. He personally received political information and "personal tidbits" from the special agents in charge of FBI field offices.[87] This information, both from the files and Hoover's personal sources, was available to discredit critics.

The following are examples of how the Bureau disseminated information to discredit its opponents:

In 1949 the FBI provided Attorney General J. Howard McGrath and Presidential aide Harry Vaughn inside information on plans of the Lawyers Guild to denounce Bureau surveillance so they would have an opportunity to prepare a rebuttal well in advance of the expected criticism.[88]

In 1960, when the Knoxville Area Human Relations Council in Tennessee charged that the FBI was practicing racial discrimination, the Bureau conducted name checks on members of the Council's board of directors and sent the results to Attorney General William Rogers, including derogatory personal allegations and political affiliations from as far back as the late thirties and early forties.[89]

When a reporter wrote stories critical of the Bureau, he was not only refused any further interviews, but an FBI official in charge of press relations also spread derogatory personal information about him to other newsmen.[90]

The Bureau also maintained a "not to contact list' of "those individuals known to be hostile to the Bureau." Director Hoover specifically ordered that "each name" on the list "should be the subject of memo."[91]

This request for "a memo" on each critic meant that, before someone was placed on the list, the Director received, in effect, a "name check" report summarizing "what we had in our files" on the individual.[92]

In addition to assembling information on critics, name checks were run as a matter of regular Bureau policy on all "newly elected Governors and Congressmen." The Crime Records Division instructed the field offices to submit "summary memoranda" on such officials, covering both "public source information" and "any other information that they had in their files."[93] These "summary memoranda" were provided to Director Hoover and maintained in the Crime Records Division for use in "congressional liason" -- which the Division head said included "selling" hostile Congressmen on "liking the FBI."[94]

It has been widely believed among Members of Congress that the Bureau had information on each of them.[95] The impact of that belief led Congressman Boggs to state:

Our apathy in this Congress, our silence in this House, our very fear of speaking out in other forums has watered the roots and hastened the growth of a vine of tyranny which is ensnaring that Constitution and Bill of Rights which we are each sworn to uphold.

Our society can survive many challenges and many threats.

It cannot survive a planned and programmed fear of its own government bureaus and agencies.[96]

Subfinding (d)

The FBI has also used intelligence as a vehicle for covert efforts to influence social policy and political action.

The FBI's interference with the democratic process was not the result of any overt decision to reshape society in conformance with Bureau-approved norms. Rather, the Bureau's actions were the natural consequence of attitudes within the Bureau toward social change, combined with a strong sense of duty to protect society -- even from its own "wrong" choices.

The FBI saw itself as the guardian of the public order, and believed that it had a responsibility to counter threats to that order, using any means available.[97] At the same time, the Bureau's assessment of what constituted a "threat" was influenced by its attitude toward the forces of change. In effect, the Bureau chose sides in the major social movements of the last fifteen years, and then attacked the other side with the unchecked power at its disposal.

The clearest proof of the Bureau's attitude toward change is its own rhetoric. The language used in internal documents which were not intended to be disseminated outside the Bureau is that of the highly charged polemic revealing clear biases.

For example, in one of its annual internal reports on COINTELPRO, the Bureau took pride in having given "the lie" to what it called "the Communist canard" that "the Negro is downtrodden and has no opportunities in America." This was accomplished by placing a story in a newspaper in which a "wealthy Negro industrialist" stated that "the Negro will have to earn respectability and a responsible position in the community before he is accepted as an equal." It is significant that this view was expressed at about the same time as the civil rights movement's March on Washington, which was intended to focus public attention on the denial of opportunities to black Americans, and which rejected the view that inalienable rights have to be "earned."[98]

The rhetoric used in dealing with the Vietnam War and those in opposition to it is even more revealing. The war in Vietnam produced sharply divided opinions in the country; again, the Bureau knew which side it was on. For instance, fifty copies of an article entitled "Rabbi in Vietnam Says Withdrawal Not The Answer" were anonymously mailed by the FBI to members of the Vietnam Day Committee to "convince" the recipients "of the correctness of the U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam."[99]

The Bureau also ordered copies of a film called "While Brave Men Die" which depicted "communists, left-wing and pacifist activities associated with the so-called 'peace movement' or student agitational demonstrations in opposition to the United States position in Vietnam." The film was to be used for training Bureau personnel in connection with "increased responsibilities relating to communist inspired student agitational activities."[100]

In the same vein, a directive to the Chicago field office shortly after the 1968 Democratic Convention instructed it to "obtain all possible evidence" that would "disprove" charges that the Chicago police used undue force in dealing with antiwar demonstrations at the Convention:

Once again, the liberal press and the bleeding hearts and the forces on the left are taking advantage of the situation in Chicago surrounding the Democratic National Convention to attack the police and organized law enforcement agencies.... We should be mindful of this situation and develop all possible evidence to expose this activity and to refute these false allegations.[101]

The Bureau also attempted to enforce its view of sexual morality. For example, two students became COINTELPRO targets when they defended the use of a four-letter word, even though the demonstration in which they participated "does not appear to be inspired by the New Left," because it "shows obvious disregard for decency and established morality."[102] An anonymous letter purportedly from an irate parent and an article entitled "Free Love Comes to Austin" were mailed to a state senator and the chairman of the University of Texas Board of Regents to aid in "forcing the University to take action against those administrators who are permitting an atmosphere to build up on campus that will be a fertile field for the New Left."[103] And a field office was outraged at the distribution on campus of a newspaper called SCREW, which was described as "containing a type of filth that could only originate in a depraved mind. It is representative of the type of mentality that is following the New Left theory of immorality on certain college campuses."[104]

As these examples demonstrate, the FBI believed it had a duty to maintain the existing social and political order. Whether or not one agrees with the Bureau's views, it is profoundly disturbing that an agency of the government secretly attempted to impose its views on the American people.

(i) Use of the Media

The FBI attempted to influence public opinion by supplying information or articles to "confidential sources" in the news media. The FBI's Crime Records Division 105 was responsible for covert liaison with the media to advance two main domestic intelligence objectives: 106

(1) providing derogatory information to the media intended to generally discredit the activities or ideas of targeted groups or individuals; and (2) disseminating unfavorable articles, news releases, and background information in order to disrupt particular activities.

Typically, a local FBI agent would provide information to a "friendly news source" on the condition "that the Bureau's interest in these matters is to be kept in the strictest confidence."[107] Thomas E. Bishop, former Director of the Crime Records Division, testified that he kept a list of the Bureau's "press friends" in his desk.[108] Bishop and one of his predecessors indicated that the FBI sometimes refused to cooperate with reporters critical of the Bureau or its Director.[109]

Bishop stated that as a "general rule," the Bureau disseminated only "public record information" to its media contacts, but this category was viewed by the Bureau to include any information which could conceivably be obtained by close scrutiny of even the most obscure publications.[110]

Within these parameters, background information supplied to reporters "in most cases [could] include everything" in the Bureau files on a targeted individual; the selection of information for publication would be left to the reporter's judgment.[111]

There are numerous examples of authorization for the preparation and dissemination of unfavorable information to discredit generally the activities and ideas of a target;[112]

- - FBI headquarters solicited information from field offices "on a continuing basis" for "prompt ... dissemination to the news media ... to discredit the New Left movement and its adherents." Headquarters requested, among other things, that:

specific data should be furnished depicting the scurrilous and depraved nature of many of the characters, activities, habits and living conditions representative of New Left adherents.

Field Offices were to be exhorted that "Every avenue of possible embarrassment must be vigorously and enthusiastically explored."[113]

-FBI headquarters authorized a Field Office to furnish a media contact with "background information and any arrest record" on a man affiliated with "a radical New Left element" who had been "active in showing films on the Black Panthers and police in action at various universities during student rioting." The media contact had requested material from the Bureau which "would have a detrimental effect on [the target's] activities."[114]

- - Photographs depicting a radical group's apartment as "a shambles with lewd, obscene and revolutionary slogans displayed on the walls" were furnished to a free-lance writer. The directive from headquarters said: "As this publicity will be derogatory in nature and might serve to neutralize the group, it is being approved."[115]

- - The Boston Field Office was authorized to furnish "derogatory information about the Nation of Islam (NOI) to established source [name excised]":

Your suggestions concerning material to furnish [name] are good. Emphasize to him that the NOI predilection for violence, preaching of race hatred, and hypocrisy, should be exposed. Material furnished [name] should be either public source or known to enough people as to protect your sources. Insure the Bureau's interest in this matter is completely protected by [name].[116]

One Bureau-inspired documentary on the NOI reached an audience of 200,000.[117] Although the public was to be convinced that the NOI was "violent", the Bureau knew this was not in fact true of the organization as a whole.[118]

- - The Section which supervised the. COINTELPRO against the Communist Party intended to discredit a couple "identified with the Community Party movement" by preparing a news release on the drug arrest of their son, which was to be furnished to "news media contacts and sources on Capitol Hill." A Bureau official observed that the son's "arrest and the Party connections of himself and his parents presents an excellent opportunity for exploitation." The news release noted that "the Russian-born mother is currently under a deportation order" and had a former marriage to the son of a prominent Communist Party member. The release added: "the Red Chinese have long used narcotics to help weaken the youth of target countries."[119]

- - When the wife of a Communist Party leader purchased a new car, the FBI prepared a news item for distribution to "a cooperative news media source" mocking the leader's "prosperity" "as a disruptive tactic." The item commented sarcastically that "comrades of the self-proclaimed leader of the American working class should not allow this example of [the leader's] prosperity to discourage their continued contributions to Party coffers."[120]

- - After a public meeting in New York City, where "the handling of the [JFK assassination] investigation was criticized," the FBI prepared a news item for placement "with a cooperative news media source" to discredit the meeting on the grounds that "a reliable [FBI] source" had reported a "convicted perjurer and identified espionage agent as present in the audience."[121]

- - As part of the New Left COINTELPRO, the FBI sent a letter under a fictitious name to Life magazine to "call attention to the unsavory character" of the editor of an underground magazine, who was characterized as "one of the moving forces behind the Youth International Party, commonly known as the Yippies." To counteract a recent Life "article favorable" to the Yippie editor, the FBI's fictitious letter said that "the cuckoo editor of an unimportant smutty little rag" should be "left in the sewers."[122]

Much of the Bureau's use of the media to influence public opinion was directed at disrupting specific activities or plans of targeted groups or individuals:

- - In March 1968, FBI Headquarters granted authority for furnishing to a "cooperative national news media source" an article "designed to curtail success of Martin Luther King's fund raising" for the poor people's march on Washington, D.C. by asserting that "an embarrassment of riches has befallen King . . . and King doesn't need the money."[123] To further this objective, Headquarters authorized the Miami Office "to furnish data concerning money wasted by the Poor People's Campaign" to a friendly news reporter on the usual condition that "the Bureau must not be revealed as the source."[124]

The Section Chief in charge of the Black Nationalist COINTELPRO also recommended that "photographs of demonstrators" at the march should be furnished; he attached six photographs of Poor People's Campaign participants at a Cleveland rally, accompanied by the note: "These show the militant, aggressive appearance of the participants and might be of interest to a cooperative news source."[125]

- As part of the New Left COINTELPRO, authority was granted to the Atlanta Field Office to furnish a newspaper editor who had "written numerous editorials praising the Bureau" with "information to supplement that already known to him from public sources concerning subversive influences in the Atlanta peace movement. His use of this material in well-timed articles would be used to thwart the [upcoming] demonstrations."[126]

- - An FBI Special Agent in Chicago contacted a reporter for a major newspaper to arrange for the publication of an article which was expected to "greatly encourage factional antagonisms during the SDS Convention" by publicizing the attempt of "an underground communist organization" to take over SDS. This contact resulted in an article headlined "Red Unit Seeks SDS Rule."[127]

- - FBI Director Hoover approved a Field Office plan "to get cooperative news media to cover closed meetings of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and other New Left groups" with the aim of "disrupting them."[128]

- - Several months after COINTELPRO operations were supposed to have terminated, the FBI attempted to discredit attorney Leonard Boudin at the time of his defense of Daniel Ellsberg in the Pentagon Papers case. The FBI "called to the attention" of the Washington bureau chief of a major news service information on Boudin's alleged "sympathy" and "legal services" for "communist causes." The reporter placed a detailed news release on the wires which cited Boudin's "identification with Leftist causes" and included references to the arrest of Boudin's daughter, his legal representation of the Cuban government and "Communist sympathizer" Paul Robeson, and the statement that "his name also has been connected with a number of other alleged communist front groups." In a handwritten note, J. Edgar Hoover directed that copies of the news release be sent to "Haldeman, A. G., and Deputy."[129]

The Bureau sometimes used its media contacts to prevent or postpone the publication of articles it considered favorable to its targets or unfavorable to the FBI. For example, to influence articles which related to the FBI, the Bureau took advantage of a close relationship with a high official of a major national magazine, described in an FBI memorandum as "our good friend." Through this relationship, the FBI "squelched" an "unfavorable article against the Bureau" written by a free-lance writer about an FBI investigation; "postponed publication" of an article on another FBI case; "forestalled publication" of an article by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; and received information about proposed editing of King's articles.[130]

The Bureau also attempted to influence public opinion by using news media sources to discredit dissident groups by linking them to the Communist Party:

- - A confidential source who published a "self -described conservative weekly newspaper" was anonymously mailed information on a church's sponsorship of efforts to abolish the House Committee on Un-American activities. This prompted an article entitled "Locals to Aid Red Line," naming the minister, among others, as a local sponsor of what it termed a "Communist dominated plot" to abolish HUAC.[131]

- - The Bureau targeted a professor who had been the president of a local peace center, a "coalition of anti-Vietnam and anti-draft groups." In 1968, he resigned temporarily to become state chairman of Eugene McCarthy's presidential campaign organization. Information on the professor's wife, who had apparently associated with Communist Party members in the early 1950's, was furnished to a newspaper editor to "expose those people at this time when they are receiving considerable publicity in order" to "disrupt the members" of the peace organization.[132]

-- Other instances included an attempt to link a school boycott with the Communists by alerting newsmen to the boycott leader's plans to attend a literary reception at the Soviet mission;[133] furnishing information to the media on the participation of the Communist Party presidential candidate in the United Farm Workers' picket line;[134] "confidentially" informing established sources in three northern California newspapers that the San Francisco County Communist Party Committee had stated that civil rights groups were to "begin working" on the area's large newspapers "in an effort to secure greater employment of Negroes;"[135] and furnishing information to the media on Socialist Workers Party participation in the Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam to "discredit" the antiwar group.[136]

(ii) Attacks on Leaders

Through covert propaganda, the FBI not only attempted to influence public opinion on matters of social policy, but also directly intervened in the people's choice of leadership both through the electoral process and in other, less formal arenas.

For instance, the Bureau made plans to disrupt a possible "Peace Party" ticket in the 1968 elections. One field office noted that "effectively tabbing as communists or as communist- backed the more hysterical opponents of the President on the Vietnam question in the midst of the presidential campaign would be a real boon to Mr. Johnson."[137]

In the FBI's COINTELPRO programs, political candidates were targeted for disruption. The document which originated the Socialist Workers Party COINTELPRO noted that the SWP "has, over the past several years, been openly espousing its line on a local and national basis through running candidates for public office." The Bureau decided to "alert the public to the fact that the SWP is not just another socialist group but follows the revolutionary principles of Marx, Lenin, and Engels as interpreted by Leon Trotsky." Several SWP candidates were targeted, usually by leaking derogatory information about the candidate to the press.[138]

Other COINTELPRO programs also included attempts to disrupt campaigns. For example, a Midwest lawyer running for City Council was targeted because he and his firm had represented "subversives". The Bureau sent an anonymous letter to several community leaders which decried his "communist background" and labelled him a "Charlatan."[139] Under a fictitious name, the Bureau sent a letter to a television on which the candidate was to appear, enclosing a series of questions about his clients and his activities which it believed should be asked.[140] The candidate was defeated. He later ran (successfully, as it happened) for a judgeship. The Bureau attempted to disrupt this subsequent, successful campaign for a judgeship by using an anticommunist group to distribute fliers and write letters opposing his candidacy.[141]

In another instance, the FBI attempted to have a Democratic Party fundraising affair raided by the state Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission. The fund raiser was targeted because of two of the candidates who would be present. One, a state assemblyman running for reelection, was active in the Vietnam Day Committee; the other, the Democratic candidate for Congress, had been a sponsor of the National Committee to Abolish the House Committee on Un-American Activities and had led demonstrations opposing the manufacture of napalm bombs.[142]

Although the disruption of election campaigns is the clearest example, the FBI's interference, with the political process was much broader. For example, all of the COINTELPRO programs were aimed at the leadership of dissident groups.[143]

In one case, the Bureau's plans to discredit a civil rights leader included an attempt to replace him with a candidate chosen by the Bureau. During 1964, the FBI began a massive program to discredit Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and to "neutralize" his effectiveness as the leader of the civil rights movement.[144] On January 8, 1964, Assistant Director William C. Sullivan proposed that the FBI select a new "national Negro leader" as Dr. King's successor after the Bureau had taken Dr. King "off his pedestal":

When this is done, and it can and will be done . . . the Negroes will be left without a national leader of sufficiently compelling personality to steer them in the right direction. This is what could happen, but need not happen if the right kind of Negro leader could at this time be gradually developed so as to overshadow Dr. King and be in the position to assume the role of leadership of the Negro people, when King has been completely discredited.

I want to make it clear at once that I don't propose that the FBI in any way became involved openly as the sponsor of a Negro leader to overshadow Martin Luther King.... But I do propose that I be given permission to explore further this entire matter....

If this thing can be set up properly without the Bureau in any way becoming directly involved, I think it would not only be a great help to the FBI but would be a fine thing for the country at large. While I am not specifying at this moment, there are various ways in which the FBI could give this entire matter the proper direction and development. There are highly placed contacts of the FBI who might be very helpful to further such a step . . . .[145]

The Bureau's efforts to discredit Dr. King are discussed more fully elsewhere.[146] It is, however, important to note here that some of the Bureau's efforts coincided with Dr. King's activities and statements concerning major social and political issues.

(iii) Exaggerating The Threat

The Bureau also used its control over the infomiation-gathering process to shape the views of government officials and the public on the threats it perceived to the social order. For example, the FBI exaggerated the strength of the Communist Party and its influence over the civil rights and anti-Vietnam war movements.

Opponents of civil rights legislation in the early 1960s had charged that such legislation was "a part of the world Communist conspiracy to divide and conquer our country from within." The truth or falsity of these charges was a matter of concern to the administration, Congress, and the public. Since the Bureau was assigned to compile intelligence on Communist activity, its estimate was sought and, presumably, relied upon. Accordingly, in 1963, the Domestic Intelligence Division submitted a memorandum to Director Hoover detailing the CPUSA's "efforts" to exploit black Americans, which it concluded were an

"obvious failure."[147]

Director Hoover was not pleased with this conclusion. He sent a sharp message back to the Division which, according to the Assistant Director in charge, made it "evident that we had to change our ways or we would all be out on the street."[148] Another memorandum was 'therefore written to give the Director "what Hoover wanted to hear."[149]

The memorandum stated, "The Director is correct;" it called Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. "the most dangerous Negro of the future in this Nation from the standpoint of communism, the Negro, and national security;" and it concluded that it was "unrealistic" to "limit ourselves" to "legalistic proofs or definitely conclusive evidence" that the Communist Party wields "substantial influence over Negroes which one day could become decisive."[150]

Although the Division still had not said the influence was decisive, by 1964 the Director testified before the House Appropriations Subcommittee that the "Communist influence" in the "Negro movement" was "vitally important." "I Only someone with access to the underlying information would note that the facts could be interpreted quite differently.[151]

A similar exaggeration occurred in some of the Bureau's statements on communist influence on the anti-Vietnam war demonstrations.

In April 1965 President Johnson met with Director Hoover to discuss Johnson's "concern over the anti-Vietnam situation." According to Hoover, Johnson said he had "no doubt" that Communists were "behind the disturbances."[152] Hoover agreed, stating that upcoming demonstrations in eighty-five cities were being planned by the Students for a Democratic Society and that SDS was "largely infiltrated by communists and [it] has been woven into the civil rights situation which we know has large communist influence."[153]

Immediately after the meeting, however, Hoover told his associates that the Bureau might not be able to "technically state" that SDS was "an actual communist organization." The FBI merely knew that there were "communists in it." Hoover instructed, however, "What I want to get to the President is the background with emphasis upon the communist influence therein so that he will know exactly what the picture is." The Director added that he wanted "a good, strong memorandum" pinpointing that the demonstrations had been "largely participated in by communists even though they may not have initiated them;" the Bureau could "at least" say that they had "joined and forced the issue." According to the Director, President Johnson was "quite concerned" and wanted "prompt and quick action."[154]

Once again, the Bureau wrote a report which made Communist "efforts" sound like Communist success. The eight page memorandum detailed all of the Communist Party's attempts to "encourage" domestic dissent by "a crescendo of criticism aimed at negating every effort of the United States to prevent Vietnam from being engulfed by communist aggressors." Twice in the eight pages, for a total of two and a half sentences, it was pointed out that most demonstrators were not Party members and their decisions were not initiated or controlled by the communists. Each of these brief statements moreover, was followed by a qualification: (1) "however, the Communist Party, USA ... has vigorously supported these groups and exerted influence;" (2) "While the March [on Washington] was not Communist initiated ... Communist Party members from throughout the nation participated." [Emphasis added.][155]

The rest of the memorandum is an illustration of what former Assistant Director Sullivan called "interpretive" memo writing in which Communist efforts and desires are emphasized without an evaluation of whether they had been or were likely to be successful.

The exaggeration of Communist participation, both by the FBI and White House staff members relying on FBI reports,[156] could only have had the effect of reinforcing President Johnson's original tendency to discount dissent against the Vietnam War as "Communist inspired" -- a belief shared by his successor.[157] It is impossible to measure the full effect of this distorted perception at the very highest policymaking level.

[1] Remarks by Rep. Hale Boggs, 4/22/71, Congressional Record, Vol. 117, Part 9, P. 11565.

[2] A "name check" is not an investigation, but a search of existing FBI files through the use of the Bureau's comprehensive general name index. Requests for FBI "name checks" were peculiarly damaging because no new investigation was done to verify allegations stored away for years in Bureau files. A former FBI official responsible for compliance with such requests said that the Bureau "answered ... by furnishing the White House every piece of information in our files on the individuals requested." Deposition of Thomas E. Bishop, former Assistant Director, Crime Records Division, 12/2/75, p. 144.)

[3] Former FBI executive Cartha DeLoach, who was FBI liaison with the White House during part of the Johnson administration, has stated, "I simply followed Mr. Hoover's instructions in complying with White House requests and I never asked any questions of the White House as to what they did with the material afterwards." (DeLoach deposition, 11/25/75, p. 28.) On at least one occasion, when a White House aide indicated that President Johnson did not want any record made by the FBI of a request for a "run-down" on the links between Robert Kennedy and officials involved in the Bobby Baker investigation, the Bureau disregarded the order. DeLoach stated that he "ignored the specific instructions" in this instance because he "felt that any instructions we received from the White House should be a matter of record." (DeLoach deposition, 11/25/75, P. 89.)

Former Assistant Director Bishop stated, "Who am I to ask the President of the United States what statutory basis he has if he wants to know what Information is in the files of the FBI?" It was a "proper dissemination" because it was "not a dissemination outside the executive branch" and because there was "no law, no policy of the Department of Justice. . . . no statute of the United States that says that was not permissible." But even if there had been a statute laying down standards, Bishop said "it wouldn't have made a bit of difference . . . when the Attorney General or the President asks for it."

Bishop recalled from his "own knowledge" instances where President Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon had "called over and asked Mr. Hoover for a memo on certain people." (Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, pp. 153-154.)

[4] Memoranda from Stephen Early, Secretary to the President, to Hoover, 5/21/40 and 6/17/40.

[5] FBI memorandum to Senate Select Committee, 3/26/76; See pp. 36-37.

[6] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Thomas E. Stephens, Secretary to the President, 4/13/54.

[7] Courtney Evans deposition, 12/1/75, p. 39.

[8] See pp.[ 64-65. The tap authorized by Attorney General Kennedy on another high executive official was not related to political considerations, nor apparently was the tap authorized by Attorney General Katzenbach in 1965 on the editor of an anti-communist newsletter who had published a book alleging impropriety by Robert Kennedy a year earlier.

[9] Memorandum from Hoover to Moyers, 10/27/64, cited in FBI summary memorandum, 1/31/75.

[10] Bureau files indicate that the apparent "reason" for the "White House interest" was to determine "whether the South Vietnamese had secretly been in touch with supporters of Presidential candidate Nixon, possibly through Mrs. Chennault, as President Johnson was apparently suspicious that the South Vietnamese were trying to sabotage his peace negotiations in the hope that Nixon would win the election and then take a harder line towards North Vietnam." (FBI memorandum, subject: Mrs. Anna Chennault.[ 2/1/75.) The FBI has claimed that its investigation of Mrs. Chennault was "consistent with FBI responsibilities to determine if her activities were in violation of certain provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act and of the Neutrality Act."

Direct electronic surveillance of Mrs. Chennault was rejected, according to a contemporaneous FBI memorandum, because FBI executive Cartha DeLoach pointed out that "it was widely known that she was involved in Republican political circles and, if it became known that the FBI was surveilling her this would put us in a most untenable and embarrassing position." (Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 10/30/68.)

Electronic surveillance was, however, directed at the South Vietnamese officials and was approved by Attorney General Ramsey Clark. Clark has testified that he did not know of the physical surveillance aspect of the FBI's investigation, but that he did authorize the electronic surveillance of the South Vietnamese officials. (Clark testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 252.)

[11] FBI executive Cartha DeLoach has stated that a White House aide made the initial request for the check of telephone company records late one night. According to DeLoach, the request was "to find out who, either Mr. Agnew or Mr. Nixon, when they had been in Albuquerque (New Mexico) several days prior to that, had called from Albuquerque while they were there." When DeLoach refused to contact the telephone company "late in the evening," President Johnson "came on the phone and proceeded to remind me that he was Commander in Chief and he should get what he wanted, and he wanted me to do it immediately." DeLoach then talked with Director Hoover, who told him to "stand your ground." The next day, however, Hoover ordered that the records be checked, but the only calls identified were "made by Mr. Agnew's staff." These wore reported to the White House. (DeLoach Deposition.[ 11/25/75, pp. 74-7.5.) Agnew's arrival and departure times in and out of Albuquerque were also "verified at the request of the White House." (FBI summary memorandum. subject: Mrs. Anna Chennault, 2/1/75).

[12] FBI Director Hoover brought the matter to the attention of the White House in a letter describing why the FBI had refused to "wire" the witness (there was not adequate "security") and how the Criminal Division had then used the Bureau of Narcotics to do so. (Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 1/12/67.) This was the instance where FBI executive Cartha DeLoach made a record, after Watson told him that "the President does not want any record made." (Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 1/17/67; see also FBI summary memorandum, 2/3/75.)

[13] According to this memorandum, Watson told Cartha DeLoach in 1967 that "he and the President" wanted all "communications addressed to him by the Director" to be addressed instead to a lower level White House staff member. Watson told DeLoach that the "reason for this change" was that the staff member "did not have the direct connection with the President that he had and, consequently, people who saw such communications would not suspicion (sic) that Watson or the President had requested such information, nor were interested in such information." (memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 3/17/67.)

[14] FBI summary memorandum, subject: Coverage of Television Presentation, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1/31/75. Former FBI executive Cartha DeLoach has stated, regarding this incident. "We felt that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the FBI, but obviously Mr. Hoover felt that this was a request by the President and he desired it to be done." (DeLoach deposition, 11/25/75, P. 58.)

[15] Blind FBI memorandum, 2/10/67.

[16] President Johnson's request also went beyond "legislators," and included contacts by any "prominent U.S. citizens." (FBI summary memorandum, subject: Information Concerning Contacts Between [Certain Foreign officials] and Members or Staff of the United States Congress Furnished to the White House at the Request of the President, 2/3/75.) The FBI's reports indicated that its information came "through coverage" of the foreign officials and that the Bureau, in this case, had "conducted no investigation of members of Congress." (FBI summary memorandum, 2/3/75.) FBI "coverage" apparently included electronic surveillance.

President Nixon also requested information on contacts between foreign officials and Congressmen, but his request does not appear to have related to Presidential critics. Rather, the Nixon request grew out of concern about "an increase in [foreign] interest on Capitol Hill" which had been expressed to President Nixon by at least one Senator; and the FBI's report "included two examples of [foreign] intelligence initiatives directed against Capitol Hill without identifying the [foreigners] or American involved." (FBI summary memorandum, 2/3/75.)

[17] Memoranda from Hoover to Watson, 6/4/65 and 7/30/65.

[18] Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 7/15/66, citing Jacobsen request.

[19] Memorandum from Clark to Watson, 4/8/67, enclosing memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General. 4/7/67. (LBJ Library.)

[20] Memoranda from Hoover to Watson, 2/15/65 and 5/29/65.

[21] Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 7/22/65.

[22] Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 1/27/67.

[23] Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 4/6/66.

[24] Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 2/24/66.

[25] Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 4/6/66.

[26] Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 11/8/66; DeLoach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 180-182.

[26] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to John D. Ehrlichman, 10/6/69; letter from Clarence M. Kelly to Joseph Duffy, 7/14/75, enclosing FBI records transmitted under Freedom of Information Act.

[27] House Judiciary Committee Hearings, Book VII, White House Surveillance Activities (1974), p.[ 1111.

[28] According to Director Hoover's memorandum of the conversation, Agnew asked Hoover for "some assistance" in obtaining information about Rev. Abernathy. Hoover recorded: "The Vice President said he thought he was going to have to start destroying Abernathy's credibility, so anything I can give him would be appreciated. I told him I would be glad to." (Memorandum from Hoover to Tolson, et a], 5/18/70.) Subsequently, the FBI Director sent Agnew a report on Rev. Abernathy containing not only the by-product of Bureau investigations, but also derogatory public record information. (Letter from Hoover to Agnew, 5/19/70.)

[29] Staff summary of Spiro Agnew interview, 10/15/75.

[30] Memoranda from Sullivan to Hoover, 6/30/69 and 7/2/69.

[31] Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach, 11/5/69. The Kraft surveillance Is also discussed in Part II, pp. 121-122.

[32] Coverage in these two cases was requested by neither Henry Kissinger nor Alexander Haig (as most of the "17" were), but by other White House officials. Attorney General Mitchell approved the first at the request of "higher authority." (Memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell, 7/23/69.) The second was specifically requested by H. R. Haldeman. (Memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell, 12/14/70.

[33] This tap was also apparently requested by White House officials other than Kissinger or Haig.

(Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach, 8/1/69.) The "17" wiretaps are also discussed at p. 122.

[34] DeLoach, 12/3/75, Hearing-, Vol. 6. p. 180.

[35] Memorandum from Hoover to Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President.[ 1/3/56. This report was also provided to the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense. and military intelligence.

[36] Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 3/2/56.

[37] Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson.[ 3/5/56.

[38] Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 3/6/56.

[39] Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 3/7/56. A National Security Council staff member responsible for Internal security matters summarized these reports as providing information "regarding attempts being made by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People to send instructed delegations to high- ranking Government officials 'to tactfully draw out their positions concerning civil rights."' (Memorandum from J. Patrick Coyne to Anderson, 3/6/56.)

[40] After consulting the Attorney General, this aide advised the Secretary to the Cabinet that the FBI had "reported developments in recent weeks in several southern States, indicating a marked deterioration in relationships between the races, and in some instances fomented by communist or communist-front organizations." (Memorandum from Anderson to Maxwell Rabb, 1/16/56.) The Secretary to the Cabinet, who had "experience in handling minority matters" for the White House, agreed that "each Cabinet Member should be equipped with the plain facts." (Memorandum from Rabb to Anderson, 1/17/56.) A National Security Council staff member who handled internal security matters reported shortly thereafter that the FBI Director was "prepared to brief the Cabinet along the general lines" of his written communications to the White House. (Memorandum from J. Patrick Coyne to Anderson, 2/1/56.)

[41] Memorandum from Director, FBI, to the Executive Assistant to the Attorney General, 3/9/56, enclosing FBI memorandum described as the "basic statement" used by the Director "in the Cabinet Briefing this morning on Racial Tension and Civil Rights." For a further discussion of the exaggeration of Communist influence on the NAACP in this briefing, see pp. 250-257, note 151a.

[42] The electronic surveillances were generally related to foreign affairs concerns. See pp.[ 64 - 65.

[43] The Americans include three Agriculture Department officials, the secretary to the Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee, and two registered lobbying agents for foreign interests. For Attorney General Kennedy's relationship to the microphone surveillance of the Congressman, see p.[ 61, note 233. One of the wiretaps directed at a registered lobbying agent was placed on the office telephone of a Washington law firm. (See p. 201)

[44] FBI memorandum, 6/15/62.

[45] FBI memorandum, 6/15/62.

[46] Memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 2/18/61. This information came from the Bureau's "coverage" (by microphone surveillance) of the Congressman's hotel room meeting.

[47] FBI memorandum, 2/15/62.

[48] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Kennedy, 3/13/61.

[49] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Kennedy, 3/13/61.

[50] Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 12/22/66. According to a Bureau memorandum of a meeting between Attorney General Kennedy and FBI Assistant Director Courtney Evans, Kennedy stated in April 1961 that "now the law has passed he did not feel there was justification for continuing this extensive investigation." (Memorandum from Evans to Parsons, 4/15/61.)

[51] There is no clear evidence as to what President Johnson had in mind when, as a contemporaneous FBI memorandum indicates, he directed "the assignment of the special squad to Atlantic City." (DeLoach to Mohr 8/29/64) Cartha DeLoach has testified that Presidential aide Walter Jenkins made the original request to him, but that he said it should be discussed with Director Hoover and that "Mr. Jenkins or the President, to the best of my recollection, later called Mr. Hoover and asked that this be done." DeLoach claimed that the purpose was to gather "intelligence concerning matters of strife, violence, etc." which might arise out of the credentials challenge. (DeLoach, 12/3/75. hearings, Vol. 6, p. 175.)

[52] The operations of the FBI in Atlantic City are described in greater detail in Section II, pp.[ 117-119.

[53] Memorandum from DeLoach to Jenkins.[ 8/24/64.

[54] Memorandum from DeLoach to Jenkins, 8/25/64.

[55] Memorandum from DeLoach to Jenkins, 8/25/64.

[56] Memorandum from DeLoach to Jenkins, 8/25/64.

[57] Memorandum from DeLoach to Jenkins, 8/25/64.

[58] Blind memorandum from LBJ Library bearing handwritten date 8/26/64 and the typewritten date 8/19/64, Hearings, Vol.[ 6, Exhibit 68-2, p. 713.

[59] In at least two instances. the wiretaps continued on targets after they left the Executive Branch and became advisers to Senator Edmund Muskie, then the leading Democratic prospect for the Presidency. See Part II, p.[ 122.

[60] Memorandum from Hoover to Nixon, Kissinger, and Mitchell, 10/9/69.

[61] Memorandum from Hoover to Nixon and Kissinger, 12/3/69.

[62] Memorandum from Hoover to Nixon and Kissinger, 2/26/70.

[63] Memorandum from Hoover to H. R. Haldeman, 6/2/70.

[64] Memorandum from Hoover to Haldeman.[ 9/4/70.

[65] Memorandum from Hoover to Nixon and Kissinger, 7/18/69.

[66] Memorandum from Hoover to Haldeman, 5/18/70.

[67] Memorandum from Hoover to Haldeman, 6/23/70.

[68] Memorandum from Hoover to Haldeman, 11/24/70.

[69] Memorandum from Hoover to Haldeman, 12/22/70.

[70] Memorandum from Hoover to Nixon, Kissinger, and Mitchell, 12/29/69.

[71] Memorandum from Magruder to Haldeman and Ehrlichman, 1/15/70. Ehrlichman advised Haldeman, "This is the kind of early warning we need more ofyour game planners are now in an excellent position to map anticipatory action." (Memorandum from "E" (Ehrlichman) to "H" (Haldeman), undated.) Haldeman responded, "I agree with John's point. Let's get going." (Memorandum from "H" to "M" (Magruder), undated).

[72] Report of the House Judiciary Committee, 8/20/74, p. 147.

[73] It should be noted, however, that in at least one case the Bureau did distinguish between political and nonpolitical information. In 1968, when an aide to Vice President Humphrey asked that a "special squad" be sent to the Demoeratic National Convention in Chicago, Director Hoover not only declined, but he also specifically instructed the SAC in Chicago not "to get into anything political" but to confine his reports to "extreme action or violence." (Memorandum from Hoover to Tolson., et al, 8/15/68.) There were no comparable instructions at Atlantic City.

[74] Former Attorney General Francis Biddle recalled in his autobiography how J. Edgar Hoover shared with him some of the "intimate details" of what his fellow Cabinet members did and said, "their likes and dislikes, their weaknesses and their associations." Biddle confessed that he enjoyed hearing these derogatory and sometimes "embarrassing" tidbits and that Hoover "knew how to flatter his superior." (Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority [Garden City: Doubleday, 1962], pp. 258-259.)

A former FBI official has described one aspect of the Bureau's practice:

"Mr. Hoover would say what do we have in our files on this guy? Just what do we have? Not blind memorandum, not public source information, everything we've got. And we would maybe write a 25 page memo. When he got it and saw what's in it, he'd say we'd better send that to the White House and the Attorney General so they can have in one place everything that the FBI has now on this guy. . . . (Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, pp. 141-142.)"

[75] None of these letters indicate that they were in response to requests, as is the case with other similar letters examined by the Committee. All were volunteered as matters which Director Hoover considered to be "of interest" to the recipients.

[76] Memorandum from Hoover to Vaughn, 2/15/47.

[77] Memorandum from Hoover to Connelly, 1/27/50.

[78] Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 4/21/55.

[79] Memorandum from Hoover to Cutler, 2/13/58.

[80] Memorandum from Hoover to Robert Kennedy, 11/20/63.

[81] Memorandum from Hoover to Robert Kennedy, 2/10/61.

[82] Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 1/9/67.

[83] For additional examples, See Section II, pp.[ 51-53.

[84] Staff memorandum: Review of INLET letters, 11/18/75.

[85] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 11/26/69.

[86] Memorandum from Bassett to Callahan, 1/29/75.

[87] Former FBI official Mark Felt has stated that the SAC's could have sent personal letters to Hoover containing such "personal tidbits" "to curry favor with him," and on one occasion he did so himself with respect to a "scandalous" incident. (W. Mark Felt testimony, 2/3/76, p. 91.)

The following excerpt from one SAC's letter is an example of political information fed to the Director: "I have heard several comments and items which I wanted to bring to your attention. As I imagine is true in all States at this time, the political situation in [this state] is getting to be very interesting. As you know, Senator [deleted] is coming up for re-election as is Representative [deleted]. For a long time it appeared that [the Senator] would have no opposition amount to anything in his campaign for re-election. The speculation and word around the State right now is that probably [the Representative] will file for the U.S. Senate seat now held by [the Senator]. I have also been informed that [the Senator's] forces have offered [the Representative] $50,000 if he will stay out of the Senate race and run for re-election as Congressman." (Letter from SAC to Hoover, 5/20/64.)

[88] Letter from Attorney General McGrath to President Truman, 12/7/49; letter from Hoover to Vaughn, 1/14/50.

[89] Memorandum from Hoover to Rogers, 5/25/60.

[90] Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, p. 211. Bishop stated that he acted on his own, rather than at the direction of higher Bureau executives. However, Director Hoover did have a memorandum prepared on the reporter summarizing everything in the Bureau's files about him, which he referred to when he met with the reporter's superiors. (Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, p. 215.)

[91] Memorandum from Executives Conference to Hoover, 1/4/50. Early examples included historian Henry Steele Commager, "personnel of CBS," and former Interior Secretary Harold Ickes. (Memorandum from Mohr to Tolson, 12/21/49.) By the time it was abolished in 1972, the list included 332 names, including mystery writer Rex Stout, whose novel 'The Doorbell Rang" had "presented a highly distorted and most unfavorable picture of the Bureau." (Memorandum from M. A. Jones to Bishop, 7/11/72.)

[92] Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, p. 207.

[93] The field office was also expected to send to headquarters any additional allegations about the Congressman or Governor which might come to its attention in future investigations, even if the Congressman or Governor was not himself the "subject" of the investigation. (Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, pp. 194-200.)

[94] Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, pp. 206-7.

[95] The FBI is not the only agency believed to have files on Congressmen. According to Rep. Andrew Young, "in the freshman orientation" of new House members, "one of the things you are told is that there are seven agencies that keep files on private lives of Congressmen." (Rep. Andrew Young testimony, 2/19/76, P. 48.)

[96] Remarks by Rep. Hale Boggs, House of Representatives, 4/22/71, Congressional Record, Vol. 117, Part 9, p. 11562.

[97] The means used are discussed in the finding on "Covert Action to Disrupt and Discredit Domestic Groups", as well as the Detailed Reports on COINTELPRO, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Black Panther Party.

[98] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, et al., 8/13/63.

[99] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 11/11/65

[100] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office et al., 3/9/66.

[101] Memorandum from FBI headquarters to Chicago Field Office 8/28/68.

[102] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office, 11/4/68.

[103] Memorandum from San Antonio Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/12/68; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 8/27/68.

[104] The field office also disapproved of the "hippy types" distributing the newspaper, with their "unkempt clothes", "wild beards", and "other examples of their nonconformity". Accordingly, an anonymous letter was sent to a state legislator protesting the distribution of such "depravity" at a state university, noting that "this is becoming a way of campus life. Poison the minds of the young, destroy their moral being, and in less than one generation this country will be ripe for its downfall." (Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/23/69; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Newark Field Office, 1/69.

[105] The Crime Records Division also had responsibility for disseminating information to cultivate a favorable public image for the FBI -- a practice common to many government agencies. This objective was pursued in various ways. One section of the Crime Records Division was assigned to assemble "material that was needed for a public relations program." This section "developed information for television shows, for writers, for authors, for newspapermen, people who wanted in-depth information concerning the FBI." The section also "handled scripts" for public service radio programs produced by FBI Field Offices; reviewed scripts for television and radio shows dealing with the FBI; and handled the "public relations and publicity aspect" of the "ten most wanted fugitives program." The Bureau attempted to assert control over media presentations of information about its activities. For example, Director Hoover's approval was necessary before the Crime Records Division would cooperate with an author intending to write a book about the FBI (Bishop testimony, 12/2/75, pp. 6-8, 18.)

[106] Memoranda recommending use of the media for COINTELPRO purposes sometimes bore the designation "Mass Media Program," which appeared mereIy to signify the function of the Crime Records Division as a "conduit" for disseminating information at the request of the Domestic Intelligence Division. (Bishop testimony, 12/2/75, pp. 63, 68, 88.) The dissemination of derogatory information to the media was usually reviewed through the Bureau's chain of command and received final approval from Director Hoover. (Bishop testimony, 12/2/75, p. 89.)

[107] For example, Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Atlanta Field Office, 10/22/68.

[108] Bishop, 12/2/75, p. 33.

[109] Cartha DeLoach, who handled media contacts for several years, testified that this technique was not actually used as much as the Director desired:

If any unfair comment appeared in any segment of the press concerning Mr. Hoover or the FBI ... Mr. Hoover ... would say do not contact this particular newspaper or do not contact this person or do not cooperate with this person.... If I had complied strictly to the letter of the law to Mr. Hoover's instructions, I think I would be fair in saying that we wouldn't be cooperating with hardly a single newspaper in the United States.... The men down through the years had to overlook some of those instructions and deal fairly with all segments of the press. (DeLoach testimony, 11/25/75, pp. 213-214.)

[110] Bishop stated that the Crime Records Division was "scrupulous" in providing information which could be cited to a "page and paragraph" in a public source. (Bishop, 12/2/75, pp. 24, 177-178.)

[111] Bishop, 12/2/75, pp. 135-136.

[112] T. E. Bishop stated that from the FBI documents available to the Committee, it was impossible to determine whether an article was actually printed after a news release or a draft article had been supplied to a media source. (Bishop, 12/2/75, p. 86.)

[113] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/22/68.

[114] Memorandum to Director from SAC Miami, 3/10/70. Bishop testified that he "would hope" that in response to the directive to disseminate the target's "arrest record" the Division would have disseminated only conviction records. Bishop said that under the Attorney General's guidelines then in effect only conviction records or arrests which were a matter of public record in a particular jurisdiction were to be disseminated. Bishop stated that his policy was not to disseminate an arrest record "especially if that arrest record resulted in an acquittal or if the charge was never completed ... because that is not, to my mind, anything derogatory against a guy, until he actually gets convicted." (Bishop testimony, 12/2/75, pp. 163-167, 173.)

[115] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Boston Field Office, 1/13/68.

[116] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Boston Field Office, 2/27/68.

[117] Memorandurn from Tampa Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/7/69.

[118] Deposition of Black Nationalist COINTELPRO supervisor, 10/17/75, p, 21; Deposition of George C. Moore, Chief of the Racial Intelligence Section, 11/3/75. p. 36.

[119] Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 6/3/63.

[120] Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 8/9/65.

[121] Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 2/24/64.

[122] Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/16/68.

[123] Memorandum from G. C. 'Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 10/26/68.

[124] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Miami Meld Office, 7/9/68.

[125] Memorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 5/17/76.

[126] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Atlanta Field Office, 10/22/68.

[127] Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/18/69.

[128] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Indianapolis Field Office, 6/17/68.

[129] FBI Memorandum from Bishop to Mohr, 7/6/71; Bishop testimony, 12/2/75, pp.148-151.

Two years earlier the Crime Records Division prepared a sixteen-page memorandum containing information on "Leonard B. Boudin, Attorney for Dr. Benjamin Spock," written at the time of Spock's indictment for conspiring to violate the Selective Service Act. (FBI Memorandum from M. A. Jones to T. E. Bishop, 2/26/68) The memorandum described "alleged associations and activities of Boudin" related to organizations or individuals considered "subversive" by the FBI, (Bishop, 12/2/75, pp. 134-135) and included: names of many of Boudin's clients; citations to magazines and journals in which Boudin had published articles; references to petitions he had signed; and notes on rallies and academic conferences at which he had spoken. The memorandum indicated that "the White House and Attorney General have been advised" of the information on Boudin's background. Notations on the cover sheet of the memorandum by high Bureau officials indicate that approval was granted for "furnishing the attached information to one of our friendly news contacts" but the information was not used until after the "results of appeal in Spock's case." Bishop did not recall distributing the Boudin memorandum. (Bishop, 12/2/75, pp. 125-126)

The head of the Crime Records Division speculated that the memorandum was prepared at the request of a reporter because he did not remember a request from Hoover or from the Domestic Intelligence Division, which was the normal route for assignments to the Crime Records Division. Division Chief Bishop testified that he probably instructed the Division "to get up any public source information that we have concerning Boudin that shows his connection with the Communist Party or related groups of that nature." (Bishop, 12/2/75, pp. 131-133)

[130] Memorandum from W. H. Stapleton to C. D. DeLoach, 11/5/64.

[131] Memorandum from Cleveland Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/28/64; memorandum from FBI

Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 11/6/64.

[132] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Phoenix Field Office, 6/11/68.

[133] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 2/4/64.

[134] The target was not intended to be the United Farm Workers, but a local college professor expected to participate in the picket line. The Bureau had unsuccessfully directed "considerable efforts to prevent hiring" the professor. Apparently, the Bureau did not consider the impact of this technique on the United Farm Workers' efforts. (Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/12/68; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 9/13/68.)

[135] Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/16/64.

[136] Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/10/67.

[137] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 3/14/67.

[138] Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/1/67. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 10/12/61.

[139] Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/1/65; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 9/22/61,

[140] Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/28/65; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 10/1/65.

[141] Memorandum from Detroit Field Office, to FBI Headquarters, 1/19/67.

[142] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 11/14/66. The attempt was unsuccessful; a prior raid on a fire department's fund raiser had angered the local District Attorney, and the ABC decided not to raid the Democrats because of "political ramifications."

[143] The originating document for the "Black Nationalist" COINTELPRO ordered field offices to "expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize" the "leadership" and "spokesmen" of the target groups. The "New Left" originating memo called for efforts to "neutralize" the New Left and the "Key Activists," defined as "those individuals who are the moving forces behind the New Left;" the letter to field offices made it clear that the targets were the "leadership" of the "New Left" -- a term which was never defined. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all sAc's, 8/25/67.)

[144] Memorandum from Brennan to Sullivan, 5/9/68; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 5/10/68.

[145] Memorandum from Sullivan to Belmont, 1/8/64. Although this proposal was approved by Director Hoover, there is no evidence that any steps were taken to Implement the plan.

[146] See Martin Luther King, Jr. Report: Sec. V, The FBI's Efforts to Discredit Dr. Martin Luther King: 1964, Sec. VII, The FBI Program Against Dr. King: 1965-1968.

[147] Memorandum from Baumgardner to Sullivan, 8/23/63, p. 1.

[148] Sullivan deposition, 11/1/75, p. 20.

[149] Sullivan deposition, 11/1/75, p. 29.

[150] Memorandum from Sullivan to, Director, FBI, 8/30/63. Sullivan described this process of "interpretive" memo writing to lead a reader to believe the Communists were influential without actually stating they were in control of a movement: "You have to spend years in the Bureau really to get the feel of this.... You came down here to 'efforts', these 'colossal efforts'. That was a key word of ours when we are getting around the facts.... You will not find anywhere In the memorandum whether the efforts were successful or unsuccessful.... Here is another one of our words that we used to cover up the facts, 'efforts to exploit', that word 'exploit'. Nowhere will you find in some of these memos the results of the exploitation. [Like] 'planning to do all possible', you can search in vain for a statement to the effect that their plans were successful or unsuccessful, partly successful or partly unsuccessful." (Sullivan, 11/1/75, pp. 15-16.)

[151] Hearings before the House Appropriations Subcommittee, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), p. 309. Director Hoover's statement was widely publicized. (E.g., "Hoover Says Reds Exploit Negroes," New York Times, 4/22/64, p. 30) it caused serious concern among civil rights leaders who feared that it would hurt the prospects for passage of the 1964 civil rights bill.

[151] Director Hoover had included similar exaggerated statements about Communist influence in a briefing to the Eisenhower Cabinet in 1956. Hoover had stated, regarding an NAACP-sponsored conference:

"The Communist Party plans to use this conference to embarrass the Administration by causing a rift between the Administration and Dixiecrats who have supported it, by forcing the Administration to take a stand on civil rights legislation with the present Congress. The Party hopes through a rift to affect the 1956 elections." [Emphasis added.] (Memorandum from Director, FBI, to the Executive Assistant to the Attorney General, 3/9/56, and enclosure.)

Director Hoover did not include in his prepared briefing statement the information reported to the White House separately earlier that there was "no indication" the the NAACP had "allowed the Communist Party to infiltrate the conference." (Hoover to Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President, 3/5/56.) According to one historical account, Hoover's Cabinet briefing "reinforced the President's inclination to passivity" on civil rights legislation. (J. W. Anderson, Eisenhower, Brownell, and the Congress: The Tangled Origins of the Civil Rights Bill of 1956-57 [University of Alabama Press, 1964], p. 34.)

[152] Memorandum from Hoover to subordinate FBI officials, 4/28/65.

[153] Hoover memorandum, 4/28/65.

[154] Hoover memorandum, 4/28/65.

[155] Letter from Hoover to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President (National Security), 4/28/65, enclosing FBI memorandum, Subject: Communist Activities Relative to United States Policy on Vietnam.

[156] See, e.g., a memorandum from Marvin (Watson) to the President, 5/16/67, quoting from a Bureau report that: "the Communist Party and other organizations are continuing their efforts to force the United States to change its present policy toward Vietnam."

[157] The report prepared by the intelligence agencies as the basis for the 1970 "Huston Plan" included the following similar emphasis on the potential threat (and downplaying of the actual lack of success) :

"Leaders of student protest groups" who traveled abroad were "considered to have potential for recruitment and participation in foreign-directed intelligence activity."

"Antiwar activists" who had "frequently traveled abroad" were considered "as having potential for engaging in foreign directed intelligence collection."

The CIA was "of the view that the Soviet and bloc intelligence services are committed at the political level to exploit all domestic dissidents wherever possible."

Although there was "no hard evidence" of substantial foreign control of "the black extremist movement," there was "a marked potential" and the groups were "highly susceptible to exploitation by hostile foreign intelligence services." "Communist intelligence services are capable of using their personnel, facilities, and agent personnel to work in the black extremist field."

While there were "no substantial indications that the communist intelligence services have actively fomented domestic unrest," their "capability" could not "be minimized."

"The dissidence and violence in the United States today present adversary intelligence services with opportunities unparalleled for forty years." [Emphasis added.] (Special Report, Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), June 1970; substantial portions of this report appear in Hearings, Vol. 2, pp. 141-188.)

- F. Inadequate Controls on Dissemination and Retention

MAJOR FINDING

The Committee finds that the product of intelligence investigations has been disseminated without adequate controls. Reports on lawful political activity and law-abiding citizens have been disseminated to agencies having no proper reason to receive them. Information that should have been discarded, purged, or sealed, including the product of illegal techniques and overbroad investigations, has been retained and is available for future use.

Subfindings

(a) Agencies have volunteered massive amounts of irrelevant information to other officials and agencies and have responded unquestioningly in some instances to requests for data without assuring that the information would be used for a Iawful purpose.

(b) Excessive dissemination has sometimes contributed to the inefficiency of the intelligence process itself.

(c) Under the federal employee security program, unnecessary information about, the political beliefs and associations of prospective government employees has been disseminated.

(d) The FBI, which has been the "clearinghouse" for all domestic intelligence data, maintains in readily accessible files sensitive and derogatory personal information not relevant to any investigation, as well as information which was improperly or illegally obtained.

Elaboration of Findings

The adverse effects on privacy of the Overbreadth of domestic intelligence collection and of the use of Intrusive Techniques have been magnified many times over by the dissemination practices of the collecting agencies. Information which should not have been gathered in the first place has gone beyond the initial agency to numerous other agencies and officials, thus compounding the original intrusion. The amount disseminated within the Executive branch has often been so voluminous as to make it difficult to separate useful data from worthless detail.

The Committee's finding on Political Abuse describes dissemination of intelligence for the political advantage of high officials or the self-interest of an agency. The problems of excessive dissemination, however, include more than political use. Dissemination has not been confined to what is appropriate for law enforcement or other proper government purposes. Rather, any information which could have been conceived to be useful was passed on, and doubts were generally resolved in favor of dissemination. Until recently, none of the standards for the exchange of data among agencies has taken privacy interests into account. The same failure to consider privacy interests has characterized the retention of data by the original collecting agency.

Subfinding (a)

Agencies have volunteered massive amounts of irrelevant information to other officials and agencies and have responded unquestioningly in some instances to requests for data without assuring that the information would be used for a lawful purpose.

The following examples illustrate the extent of dissemination:

- - FBI reports on dissident Americans flowed to the CIA at a rate as high as 1,000 a month. CIA officials regarded any names in these reports as a standing requirement from the FBI for information about those persons.[1]

- - In 1967 the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department was receiving 150 reports and memoranda a day from the FBI on "organizations and individuals engaged in agitational activity of one kind or another."[2]

- - Attorney General Ramsey Clark could not "keep up with" the volume of FBI memoranda coming into him and to the Assistant Attorneys General on the 700,000 FBI investigations per year.[3]

- - The Justice Department's IDIU sent its computer list of 10,000 to 12,000 American dissidents to the CIA's Operation CHAOS (which apparently found it useless) and to the Special Service Staff of the Internal Revenue Service which did use it as part of its program of tax investigations).[4]

- - In fiscal year 1974 alone, the FBI, the Civil Service Commission, and military intelligence received over 367,000 requests for "national agency checks," or name checks of their files, on prospective federal government employees.[5]

The information disseminated to other agencies has often been considered useless by the recipients. FBI officials have said they received "very little in the way of good product" from the National Security Agency's interception of the international communications of Americans.[6] FBI officials also considered most of the material on "the domestic scene" sent to them from the CIA mail opening project to be irrelevant "junk."[6] The Secret Service destroyed over ninety percent of the information disseminated to it by the FBI without ever putting it in its own intelligence files.[7] Defense Department directives require the destruction of a great deal of information it receives from the FBI about civilians considered "threatening" to the military, including reports on civilian "subversion."[8]

Sometimes dissemination has become almost -air end in itself. The FBI would often anticipate what it considered to be the needs of other "appropriate agencies."[9] The Bureau has disseminated data to military intelligence agencies, regardless of whether or not there was likely to be serious violence requiring the dispatch of troops; the Bureau also disseminated information when there was no connection between the subject of the report and any military personnel or facility.[10] Consequently, the computerized and noncomputerized domestic intelligence data banks compiled by the Continental Army Command cited the FBI as "data source" for about 80 percent of the information where a source was identified.[11]

FBI dissemination to the military has shown how information can get into the hands of agencies which have no proper reason to receive it.[12]

The FBI disseminated a large volume of information on domestic political activities to the CIA, thus providing a substantial part of the data for the CHAOS program.[13] Much of this information was also furnished to the State Department." The FBI sometimes disseminated reports to the ClA and the State Department if the subject matter involved public discussion of national security policy and possible "subversive" influence.[15]

The FBI was also the largest source of political targets for tax investigations by the Special Service Staff of the Internal Revenue Service. While still in its formative days, SSS was placed on the FBI's distribution list in response to a request from an Assistant IRS Commissioner for information regarding:

various organizations of predominantly dissident or extremist nature and/or people prominently identified with those organizations.[16]

The FBI, perceiving that SSS would "deal a blow to dissident elements,"[17] decided to supply reports relating to this broad category of individuals and organizations.

The FBI did not select the reports it forwarded on the basis of the presence of a probable tax violation, but on the basis of the political and ideological criteria IRS had supplied-, yet the furnishing of the report resulted in establishment of an SSS file and, subject to resource limitations, to a review of possible tax liability.[18] Among the other lists of "extremists," "subversives" and dissidents SSS received was a list of 2,300 organizations the FBI categorized as "Old Left," "New Left," and "Right Wing."[19]

One reason for the Bureau's widespread dissemination of intelligence throughout the Executive branch was recalled by a former FBI official. In the late 1940s a sensitive espionage case involved a high government official. At that time the FBI held such information "very tightly," as it had during World War II. However, one item of information that "became rather significant" had allegedly "not been disseminated to the White House or the Secretary of State."

Mr. Hoover was criticized for that, and frankly, he never forgot it. From then on, you might say, the policy was disseminate, disseminate, disseminate.[20]

This testimony illustrates the dilemma of an agency which was blamed for inadequate dissemination, but never criticized for too much dissemination. In practice, this dilemma was resolved by passing on any information "which in any way even remotely suggested that there was a responsibility for another agency."[21]

The following are examples of excessive dissemination, drawn from a random sample of materials in FBI headquarters files:

- - In 1969 the FBI disseminated to Army and Air Force intelligence, Secret Service, and the IDIU a report on a Black Student Union; the report which discussed "a tea" sponsored by the group to develop faculty-student "dialogue" as a junior college and the plans of the college to establish a course on "The History of the American Negro." There was no indication of violence whatsoever. Dissemination to the military intelligence agencies and Secret Service took place both at the field level and at headquarters in Washington, D.C. The information came from college officials.[22]

- - In 1970 the FBI disseminated to military intelligence and the Secret Service (both locally and at Headquarters), as well as to the Justice Department (IDIU, Internal Security Division, and Civil Rights Division) a report received from a local police intelligence unit on the picketing of a local Industries of the Blind plant by "blind black workers" who were on strike. The sixteen-page report included a copy of a handbill distributed at a United Church of Christ announcing a meeting at the church to support the strike, as well as copies of "leaflets that had been distributed by the blind workers." The only hint of violence in this report was the opinion of a local police intelligence officer that "young black militants," who supported the strike by urging blacks to boycott white-owned stores in the community, might cause "confrontations that might result in violence."[23]

- - The FBI disseminated a report on Dr. Carl McIntyre's American Christian Action Council to the Secret Service in 1972. The cover memorandum to Secret Service indicated that the group fell within the category of the FBI-Secret Service agreement described as "potentially dangerous because of background, emotional instability or activity in groups engaged in activities inimical to U.S." The report itself reflected no "activities inimical to" the country, but only plans to hold peaceful demonstrations. The report also discussed policies and activities of the group unrelated to demonstrations, including plans to enter lawsuits in "school busing" cases, opposition to "Nixon's China trip" and support for a constitutional amendment for "public school prayer." This data came from a Bureau informant.[24]

- - In 1966 the FBI disseminated to the Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence divisions, to the Secret Service (locally and at Headquarters), to the Justice Department and to the State Department a ten-page report on a "Free University." The report described in detail the courses offered, including such subjects as "Modern Film," "Workshop on Art and Values," "Contemporary Music," "Poetry Now," and "Autobiography and the Image of Self." Over thirty "associates" were listed by name, although only one was identified as having "subversive connections" (and his course had been "dropped because not enough students had registered.") Others were identified as "involved in Vietnam protest activities" or as being known to officials of a nearby established university as "problem people." The information came from several FBI informants and a confidential source.[25]

- - In 1966 the FBI disseminated to "appropriate federal and local authorities," including military intelligence, Secret Service, the Department of State and Justice, and a campus security officers (who was a former FBI agent) a report on a group formed for "discussion on Vietnam." The "controlling influence" on the organization was said to be "the local Friends Meeting." Only one person characterized as "subversive" was active in the group. The report was devoted to describing a "speak out" demonstration attended by approximately 300 persons on a university campus. The gathering was entirely peaceful and included "speakers who supported U.S. policies in Viet Nam." The data came from two Bureau informants.[26]

- - In 1969 the FBI disseminated reports to the White House, the CIA, the State Department, the three military intelligence agencies, Secret Service, the IDIU, the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, and the Internal Security and Civil Rights Divisions on a meeting sponsored by a coalition of citizens concerned about the Anti Ballistic Missile. The only indication of "subversive" influence was that one woman married to a Communist was assisting in publicity work for the meeting. The reports described (from reliable FBI sources) the speakers, pro and con, including prominent scientists, academics, and a Defense Department spokesman.[27]

- - In 1974 the FBI disseminated to the State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Secret Service, the Internal Security Division, and the Civil Disturbance Unit (formerly IDIU), extensive reports on a national conference on amnesty for war resisters. One of the participants had "recently organized [a] nonviolent protest demonstration" during a visit by President Ford, two others were identified as draft evaders, and the Vietnam Veterans Against the War were active at the conference. But the report went much further to describe -- based on information from FBI informants -- the activities of religious, civil liberties, and student groups, as well as "families of men killed in Vietnam" and congressional staff aides.

28

- - In 1974 the FBI disseminated a report on a peaceful vigil in the vicinity of the Soviet Embassy in support of the rights of Soviet Jews, not just to the Secret Service and the Justice Department's Civil Disturbance Unit, but also to the CIA and the State Department.[29]

- - In 1972 the FBI disseminated a report to the CIA, Army and Navy intelligence, and an un-named "U.S. Government agency which conducts security-type investigations" in West Germany (apparently a military intelligence agency). The latter agency had asked the Bureau for information about an antiwar reservist group and a project to furnish "legal advice to GI's and veterans." The report described not only the reservists group, but also "a group dedicated to giving free legal aid to servicemen" and "an antiwar political group" which endorsed "political candidates for office who have a solid peace position and a favorable chance of being elected." The three groups "planned to share offices." This data came from a Bureau informant.[30]

The FBI does have an obligation to disseminate to local law enforcement agencies information about crimes within their jurisdiction. Nevertheless, there has been improper dissemination to local police under at least two Bureau programs. Such dissemination occurred under COINTELPRO, as part of the FBI's effort to discredit individuals or disrupt groups.[31] Others were in response to local police requests for "public source" information relating to "subversive matters."[32] Experienced police officials confirmed that the term "subversive" is so broad that it inevitably leads to dissemination about political beliefs.[33]

Other executive agencies have also engaged in excessive dissemination. The Justice Department's Inter-Division Information Unit (IDIU) sent its computerized data to the CIA, in order that the CIA could check its records on foreign travel of American dissidents.[34] The IDIU sent the same material to the Internal Revenue Service's Special Service Staff, which used the information as part of its program for initiating tax audits.[35] The Internal Revenue Service itself disseminated tax returns or related tax information to the CIA, the FBI, and the Justice Department's Internal Security Division (which also made requests on behalf of the FBI), without ascertaining whether there was a proper basis for the request or the purpose for which the information would be used.[36]

Subfinding (b)

Excessive dissemination has sometimes contributed to the inefficiency of the intelligence process itself.

The dissemination of large amounts of relatively useless or totally irrelevant information has reduced the efficiency of the intelligence process. It has made it difficult for decisionmakers to weigh the importance of reports.[37] Agencies such as the FBI have collected intelligence, not because of its own needs or desires, or because it had been requested to do so, but because the data was assumed to be of value to someone else. Units established to screen and evaluate intelligence have encouraged, rather than reduced, further dissemination.

In some instances the FBI has disseminated information to local police in a manner that was counterproductive to effective law enforcement. One former police chief has described how the Bureau, under "pressure" from the White House to prepare for a specific demonstration, "passed on information in such a way that it was totally useless" because it was not "evaluated" and thus exaggerated the dangers.[38] The need for prior evaluation of the significance of raw intelligence has not been fully recognized in the Bureau's policy for dissemination of data on protest demonstrations.[39]

The impediments to accurate intelligence collection have been augmented by the dissemination practices of some local law enforcement agencies. An example is the report oil the Chicago Police Department's Security Section, which has been described as having passed "inherently inaccurate and distortive data" to federal intelligence agericies.[40] The General Accounting Office has confirmed that this is a general problem.[41] While the Committee has not examined local law enforcement intelligence, the dissemination practices of such agencies require as much careful control as federal agencies.[42]

The assumption that some other agency might need information has not only produced excessive dissemination, but has also served as a specific rationale for collection of intelligence that was not otherwise within an agency's jurisdiction. The best example is the FBI's collection of intelligence on "general racial matters" for the military.[43]

One of the ironies in the recent history of domestic intelligence was that the Justice Department's IDIU, which was set up to collate and evaluate the massive amounts of data flowing to the Justice Department from the FBI, contributed to even more extensive collection and dissemination.[44] The IDIU encouraged numerous federal agencies (including many without regular investigative functions) to disseminate information to it about "organizations and individuals" who might "instigate" or "prevent" civil disorders.[45]

Subfinding (c)

Under the federal employee security program, unnecessary information about the political beliefs and associations of prospective government employees has been disseminated.

For nearly thirty years the federal employee security program has required a "national agency check" of the files of several government agencies, including the FBI, the Civil Service Commission, and military intelligence, on prospective employees.[46] Although there was often no information to report, federal agencies received "name check" reports on all candidates for employment. This appears to have been the single largest source of regular dissemination of data in intelligence files.

These name check reports have provided information from intelligence files not only about possible criminal activity or personal weaknesses of the individual, but also about lawful political activity and association. Until recently the Executive Order on employee security required reports on any "association" with a person or group supporting "subversive" views. These reports have been required for every federal employee, regardless of whether he or she holds a sensitive position or has access to classified information.[47]

It has been the policy of the FBI, and presumably other agencies as well, to disseminate via name check reports any information in its files -- no matter how old or how unreliable -which might relate to the standards of the Executive Order.[48] The current criteria have been substantially narrowed: the basic standards for reporting are group membership and potential criminal conduct.[49] However, the Justice Department has advised the FBI that "it is not possible to set definite parameters" for organizations and that the Bureau should include those with a "potential" for meeting the criteria.[50] The FBI does not determine whether or not the information it furnishes is decisive under these standards. Departmental instructions state:

It is not the Bureau's responsibility to determine whether the information is or is not of importance to the particular agency in the carrying out of its current activities and responsibilities, and whether or not any action is taken by the department or agency is not, of course, a principal concern of the Bureau.[51]

The FBI itself has expressed misgivings about the breadth of its responsibilities under the employee security program. It has continued to seek "clarification" from the Justice Department, and it has pointed out that there have been no "adverse actions" taken against current or prospective Federal employees under the loyalty and security provisions of the Executive Order "for several years." This has been due to the fact "that difficulties of proof imposed by the courts in loyalty and security cases have proved almost insurmountable."[52]

The employee security program has served an essential function in full background investigation and name checks for those having access to classified information. But its extension to vaguely-defined "subversives" in nonsensitive positions has gone beyond the Government's proper need for information on the suitability of persons for employment.[53]

Subfinding (d)

The FBI, which has been the "clearinghouse" for all domestic intelligence data, maintains in readily accessible files sensitive and derogatory personal information not relevant to any investigation, as well as information which was improperly or illegally obtained.

In recent years, the Secret Service, military intelligence, and other agencies have instituted significant programs for the destruction or purging of useless information.[54] However, the FBI has retained its vast general files, accumulated over the years under its duty to serve as a "clearinghouse" for domestic intelligence data.[55] There are over 6,500,000 files at FBI headquarters; and the data is retrievable through a general index consisting of over 58,000,000 index cards. Each Bureau Field Office has substantial additional information in its files. Domestic intelligence information included in the general index is described by the FBI as:

associates and relatives of the subject; members of organizations under investigation or deter-mined to be possible subversive individuals contributing funds to subversive-type activity; subversive or seditious publications; writers of articles in. subversive or seditious publications - bookstores specializing in subversive-type publications and related types of information.[56]

The Committee has found that there are massive amounts of irrelevant and trivial information in these files.[57] The FBI has kept such data in its filing system on the theory that they might he useful someday in the future to solve crimes, for employee background checks, to evaluate the reliability of the source, or to "answer questions or challenges" about the Bureau's conduct.[58]

The FBI has recently issued instructions to its Field Offices to take greater care in recording domestic intelligence information in its files. They are to exercise "judgment" as to whether or not the activity is "pertinent" to the Bureau's "legitimate investigative interest." 11 Nevertheless, current policies still allow the indexing of the names of persons who are not the subject of investigation but just attend meetings of a group under investigation.[60]

Finally, there is Information in FBI files which was collected by illegal or improper means. It ranges from the fruits of warrantless electronic surveillance, mail openings, and surreptitious entries, to the results of sweeping intelligence investigations which collected data about the lawful political activities and personal lives of Americans. Where such intelligence remain in the name-indexed files, it can be retrieved and disseminated along with other information, thus continuing indefinitely the potential for compounding the initial intrusion into constitutionally protected areas.

[1] Richard Ober testimony, 10/28/75, pp. 67, 68.

[2] Memorandum from Kevin Maroney, et al, to Attorney General Ramsey Clark, 12/6/67.

[3] Clark, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 249. This statistic refers to criminal investigations as well as intelligence investigations.

[4] See Part II, pp.[ 80. 95.

[5] Statement of Attorney General Edward H. Levi before House Judiciary Committee, February 1975.

[6] W. R. Wannall testimony, 10/3/75, p. 13.

[6] W. A. Branigan testimony, 10/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4,1). 168.

[7] GAO Report, p. 125.

[8] DOD Directive 5200.27, 3/1/71.

[9] For example, in 1966 before the FBI had received any specific instructions from the Attorney General to gather civil disturbance intelligence, Bureau Headquarters advised all Field Offices that "national, state, and local" government officials "rely on us" for information "so they can take appropriate action to avert disastrous outbreaks." Thus, FBI offices were told to "intensify and expand" their "coverage" of demonstrations opposing "United States foreign policy in Vietnam" or "Protests involving racial issues," in order to insure that "advance signs" of violence could be "disseminated to appropriate authorities." (SAC Letter 66-27, 5/2/66)

[10] These policies were part of the formal obligation of the FBI under the 1949 Delimitation Agreement with military intelligence. The Agreement itself required the FBI to keep military intelligence agencies advised of the activities of "civilian groups" classed as "subversive." (Delimitation Agreement, 2/23/49.) And a Supplementary Agreement said, "Where there is doubt as to whether or not one of the other agencies is interested in information collected, it should be transmitted to the other agency." (Supplemental Agreement No. 1 to the Delimitation Agreement, 6/2/49.)

[11] "Military Surveillance of Civilian Politics," Report of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (1973), p.[ 72.

[12] The Agreements between the FBI and military intelligence have not been revised to take account of the restrictions on Army surveillance imposed by the Department of Defense in 1971. See DOD Directive 5200.27, 3/1/71.

[13] Richard Ober, 10/28/75, pp. 67,68.

[14] The FBI Manual stated that information concerning "proposed travel abroad" by domestic "subversives" was to be furnished to the CIA and the State Department, and Bureau Field Offices were told to recommend the "extent of foreign investigation" required. (FBI Manual of Instructions, Section 87, p.[ 33a, revised 4/15/63.)

[15] For example, Reports on the ABM debate discussed on pp.[ 257-258.

[16] Memorandum from D. W. Bacon to Director, FBI, 8/8/69.

[17] FBI memorandum from D. J. Brennan, Jr., to W. C. Sullivan, 8/15/69.

[18] SSS Bi-weekly Reports, 6/15/70; from Donald Bacon, 9/15/75 pp. 91-05.

[19] SSS Bi-weekly Report, 8/29/69.

[20] Former FBI liaison with CIA deposition, 9/22/75, pp. 16-17.

[21] Former FBI liaison with CIA deposition, 9/22/75, pp. 16-17; Memorandum from Attorney General Tom Clark to J. Edgar Hoover, 12/5/47.

[22] Memorandum from Tampa Meld Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/29/69.

[23] Memorandum from Charlotte Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/10/70.

[24] Letter from Acting Director, FBI, to Director, United States Secret Service, 5/25/72.

[25] Memorandum from Detroit Field Office, to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66.

[26] Memorandum from Springfield Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/5/66.

[27] Memorandum from Washington Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/28/69; memorandum from Alexandria Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/3/69.

[28] Memorandum from Louisville Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/14/74, 11/15/74, 11/20/74.

[29] Memorandum from Washington Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/28/74.

[30] Memorandum from Legal Attache, Bonn, to FBI Headquarters, 1/11/72; memorandum from Boston Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/4/72.

[31] See COINTELPRO report: Sec. IV, for examples of FBI dissemination to local police of data on trivial offenses for the purpose of disruption.

[32] The FBI responds to such requests with "a blind memorandum" upon the condition that the Bureau's "identity as source of the information must be kept strictly confidential." Bureau regulations do not link this procedure to any specific criminal law enforcement function. (FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 5, p.[ 7.)

[33] Testimony of James F. Ahern (former New Haven police chief), Robert diGrazia (Boston chief of police), and Patrick V. Murphy (former New York police commissioner and President of the Police Foundation), 1/20/76, p. 44, These experienced law enforcement officials stated that local police do not need information from the FBI about "political beliefs."

[34] See CHAOS Report: Section III.

[35] See IRS Report: Section, "SSS."

[36] See IRS Report: Section, "Dissemination."

[37] On at least one occasion, Justice Department officials expressed concern that they had received a report from the FBI on an incident and then a second report from Army intelligence which appeared to confirm the Bureau's information, but the Army's report turned out to have been based on the FBI's information. This led to a Justice Department request that the Army "screen" its intelligence and send "only key items." (Memorandum for the Record General Counsel Robert E. Jordan to Under Secretary of the Army David McGiffert, 1/10/68.)

[38] Ahern, 1/20/76, p. 4.

[39] The FBI had adhered across-the-board to the position that its reports do not contain "conclusions," and Bureau rules have permitted the dissemination of data from "sources known to be unreliable" so long as "good judgment" is used. It has been up to the recipient agencies "to intelligently evaluate the information" on the basis of "descriptive information" about the Bureau's sources. (FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 5) Thus the FBI has not adequately distinguished between situations where evaluation is or is not necessary. More than just "descriptive information" about FBI sources is needed to help recipients of data on possible violent protest demonstration understand the likelihood of actual disorders.

[40] See Part 11, p.[ 78.

[41] The GAO has ranked the types of sources of information relied upon by the FBI in beginning domestic intelligence investigations according to whether the data initially supplied were "hard," "medium," or "soft." According to tile GAO, police and other state and local agencies were found to have provided tile lowest proportion of "hard" information and the highest proportion of "soft" information. (GAO Report, p.[ 106).

[42] Two major cities have made efforts recently to establish standards for police intelligence activities. (Los Angeles Police Department, Public Disorder Intelligence Division: Standards and Procedures, 4/10/75; New York City Police Department. Procedures: Public Security Activities of the Intelligence Division, House Internal Security Committee, Hearings, Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes, 1974.)

[43] The FBI Manual cited the needs of the military as a basis for its intelligencegathering on "general racial matters." The Manual stated that the Bureau did not itself have "investigative jurisdiction over such general racial matters," but that its "intelligence function" included advising "appropriate Government agencies" of information about "proposed or actual activities of individuals, officials, committees, legislatures, organizations, etc., in the racial field." The Manual based "Federal jurisdiction" on the military's responsibility:

"Insofar as Federal jurisdiction in general racial matters is concerned, U.S. Army regulations place responsibility upon the Army to keep advised of any developments of a civil disturbance nature which may require the rendering of assistance to civil authorities or the intervention of federal troops. OSI (Air Force) and ONI (Navy) have a collateral responsibility under Army in such matters and copies of pertinent documents disseminated to Army concerning such matters should be furnished to OSI and ONI." (1960 FBI Manual Section 122, pp. 5-6)

[44] For example, in addition to containing the names of known activists, the IDIU printouts supplied to IRS's SSS also contained the names of many prominent citizens whom the Justice Department thought could be of assistance in quelling a civil disturbance in a particular locality should one occur. SSS personnel were unaware that the IDIU printout contained the names of these persons and established files indiscriminately on them.

[45] Attorney General Clark to Maroney, et al, 11/9/67.

[46] Executive Order 10450, Section 3 (a). For a discussion of the origins and application of this order, pp.[ 4244.

[47] Executive Order 10450, Section 8 (a) (5).

[48] Memorandum from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 3/3/76.

[49] The current criteria are: "Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in, any foreign or domestic organization, association movement, group, or combination of persons (hereinafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State, or which seeks to overthrow the Government of the United States or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means." (Executive Order 11785, Section 3, June 4, 1974.) This order also abolished the "Attorney General's list."

[50] memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Glen E. Pommerening to FBI Director Clarence Kelley, 11/1/74.

[51] Letter from Attorney General Tom Clark to J. Edgar Hoover, 12/5/47. The FBI advises that it considers this directive still to be in effect. (Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 3/3/76.)

[52] Letter from Kelley to Pommerening, 12/11/74. The FBI has advised that federal employees are now evaluated according to "suitability" rather than "loyalty and security" criteria. (Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 3/3/76.)

[53] According to a 1974 Bureau memorandum and a confirming Justice Department memorandum, the purpose is to provide "information concerning possible subversive infiltration into the Executive Branch of Government." (Kelley to Pommerening, 8/14/74; Pommerening to Kelley, 8/26/74.) As indicated in the Committee's finding on overbreadth, the concept "subversion" is so vague and flexible as to invite excesses.

[54] Secret Service practices are described in Review of Secret Service Protective Measures, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), p. 16. Destruction of Army intelligence files is discussed in Report on Military Surveillance.

[55] For a discussion or the origins of this function, see p.[ 23.

[56] Memorandum from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 5/22/75.

[57] Current FBI policies modify past practice with respect to the indexing of unsolicited allegations, including those of "a personal nature," not requiring "investigative action." The Bureau no longer includes in its name index the name of the person about whom the information is volunteered where the Bureau has "no legitimate investigative interest." In the case of an unsolicited letter, for example, the name of the sender only is included in the index. The letter itself is also retained so the FBI "can retrieve" it via the index reference to the sender "should an occasion arise in the future when we need to refer back to it." (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 11/10/75.)

[58] Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 7/21/75. This memorandum states that the Bureau has adopted, under regulations of the National Archives, a program for destroying files which "no longer have contemporary value." The FBI has not included within this program most of the investigative and intelligence information in its files dating back as far as 1939.

[59] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 1/27/76. The Field Offices were given the following specific guidance:

"For example, the statement of a local leader of the Ku Klux Klan in which he advocates regular attendance at church would be merely an exercise of his right to free speech and, hence, maintenance of such a record would be prohibited. On the other hand, should this same individual stand up before a gathering and advocate the use of violence in furthering the organization's objectives, this obviously would be pertinent to our investigation."

Bureau headquarters recognized that these were "extreme" examples and that "Problems" were created in "those instances which are in the middle and which are not so clear." Thus, FBI agents were encouraged to consult Headquarters "to resolve any question concerning a specific problem."

[60] One Field Office has described regular Bureau procedures as follows:

"[Our] informants, after attending meetings of these organizations [under investigation], usually submit reports in which they describe briefly the activities and discussions which took place as well as listing those members and non members in attendance at such meetings. Copies of these informant reports are disseminated to various individuals' files and the names of those in attendance where no individuals file exists, are indexed to the organization's file." (Memorandum from SAC to FBI Headquarters, 12/1/75). [Emphasis added.]

FBI headquarters did not indicate that this practice was outside the "scope" of authorized "law enforcement activity." It is considered "pertinent" to the investigation "to maintain records concerning membership, public utterings, and/or other activities" of an organization under investigation. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 1/27/76.)

- G. Deficiencies in Control and Accountability

MAJOR FINDING

The Committee finds that those responsible for overseeing, supervising, and controlling domestic activities of the intelligence community, although often unaware of details of the excesses described in this report, made those excesses possible by delegating broad authority without establishing adequate guidelines and procedural checks; by failing to monitor and coordinate sufficiently the activities of the agencies under their charge; by failing to inquire further after receiving indications that improper activities may have been occurring; by exhibiting a reluctance to know about secret details of programs; and sometimes by requesting intelligence agencies to engage in questionable practices. On numerous occasions, intelligence agencies have, by concealment, misrepresentation, or partial disclosure, hidden improper activities from those to whom they owed a duty of disclosure. But such deceit and the improper practices which it concealed would not have been possible to such a degree if senior officials of the Executive Branch and Congress had clearly allocated responsibility and imposed requirements for reporting and obtaining prior approval for activities, and had insisted on adherence to those requirements.

Subfindings

(a) Presidents have given intelligence agencies firm orders to collect information concerning "subversive activities" of American citizens, but have failed until recently to define the limits of domestic intelligence, to provide safeguards for the rights of American citizens, or to coordinate and control the ever-expanding intelligence efforts by an increasing number of agencies.

(b) Attorneys General have permitted and even encouraged the FBI to engage in domestic intelligence activities and to use a wide range of intrusive investigative techniques -- such as wiretaps, microphones, and informants -- but have failed until recently to supervise or establish limits on these activities or techniques by issuing adequate safeguards, guidelines, or procedures for review.

(c) Presidents, White House officials, and Attorneys General have requested and received domestic political intelligence, thereby contributing to and profiting from the abuses of domestic intelligence and setting a bad example for their subordinates.

(d) Presidents, Attorneys General, and other Cabinet officers have neglected until recently to make inquiries in the face of clear indications that intelligence agencies were engaging in improper domestic activities.

(e) Congress, which has the authority to place restraints on domestic intelligence activities through legislation, appropriations, and oversight committees, has not effectively asserted its responsibilities until recently. It has failed to define the scope of domestic intelligence activities or intelligence collection techniques, to uncover excesses, or to propose legislative solutions. Some of its members have failed to object to improper activities of which they were aware and have prodded agencies into questionable activities.

(f) Intelligence agencies have often undertaken programs without authorization with insufficient authorization, or in disregard of express orders.

(g) The weakness of the system of accountability and control can be seen in the fact that many illegal or abusive domestic intelligence operations were terminated only after they had been exposed or threatened with exposure by Congress or the news media.

Elaboration of Findings

The Committee has found excesses committed by intelligence agencies -- lawless and improper behavior, intervention in the democratic process, overbroad intelligence targeting and collection, and the use of covert techniques to discredit and "neutralize" persons and groups defined as enemies by the agencies. But responsibility for those acts does not fall solely on the intelligence agencies which committed them. Systematic excesses would not have occurred if lines of authority had been clearly defined; if procedures for reporting and review had been established; and if those responsible for supervising the intelligence community had properly discharged their duties.

The pressure of events and the widespread confidence in the FBI help to explain the deficiencies in command and authorization discovered by the Committee. Most of the activities examined in this report occurred during periods of foreign or domestic crisis. There was substantial support from the public and all branches of government for some of the central objectives of domestic intelligence policy, including the search for "Fifth Columnists" before World War II; the desire to identify communist "influence" in the Cold War atmosphere of the 1950s; the demand for action against Klan violence in the early 1960s; and the reaction to violent racial disturbances and anti-Vietnam war activities in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It was in this heated environment that President and Attorneys General ordered the FBI to investigate "subversive activities". Further, the Bureau's reputation for effectiveness and professionalism, and Director Hoover's ability to cultivate political support and to inspire apprehension, played a significant role in shaping the relationship between the FBI and the rest of the Government.

With only a few exceptions, the domestic intelligence activities reviewed by the Committee were properly authorized within the intelligence agencies. The FBI epitomizes a smoothly functioning military structure: activities of agents are closedly supervised; programs are authorized only after they have traveled a well-defined bureaucratic circuit; and virtually all activities -- ranging from high-level policy considerations to the minutia of daily reports from field agencies -- are reduced to writing. These characteristics are commendable. All efficient law enforcement and intelligence-gathering machine, acting consistently with law, can greatly benefit the nation. However, when used for wrongful purposes, this efficiency can pose a grave danger.

It appears that many specific abuses were not known by the Attorney General, the President, or other Cabinet-level officials directly responsible for supervising domestic intelligence activities. But whether or not particular activities were authorized by a President or Attorney General, those individuals must -- as the chief executive and the principal law enforcement officer of the United States Government -- bear ultimate responsibility for the activities of executive agencies under their command. The President and his Cabinet officers have a duty to determine the nature of activities engaged in by executive agencies and to prevent undesired activities from taking place. This duty is particularly compelling when responsible officials have reason to believe that undesirable activity is occurring, as has often been the case in the context of domestic intelligence.

The Committee's inquiry has revealed a pattern of reckless disregard of activities that threatened our Constitutional system. Intelligence agencies were ordered to investigate "subversive activities," and were then usually left to determine for themselves which activities were "subversive" and how those activities should be investigated. Intelligence agencies were told they could use investigative techniques -- wiretaps, microphones, informants -- that permitted them to pry into the most valued areas of privacy and were then given in many cases the unregulated authority to determine when to use those techniques and how long to continue them. Intelligence agencies were encouraged to gather "pure intelligence," which was put to political use by public officials outside of those agencies. This was possibly because Congress had failed to pass laws limiting the areas into which intelligence agencies could legally inquire and the information they could disseminate.

Improper acts were often intentionally concealed from the Government officials responsible for supervising the intelligence agencies, or undertaken without express authority. Such behavior is inexcusable. But equally inexcusable is the absence of executive and congressional oversight that engendered an atmosphere in which the heads of those agencies believed they could conceal activities from their superiors. Attorney General Levi's recent guidelines and the recommendations of this Committee are intended to provide the necessary guidance.

Whether or not the responsible Government officials knew about improper intelligence activities, and even if the agency heads failed in their duty of full disclosure, it still follows that Presidents and the appropriate Cabinet officials should have known about those activities. This is a demanding standard, but one that must be imposed. The future of democracy rests upon such accountability.

Subfinding (a)

Presidents have given intelligence agencies firm orders to collect information concerning "subversive activities" of American citizens, but have failed until recently to define the limits of domestic intelligence, to provide safeguards for the rights of American citizens, or to coordinate and control the ever-expanding intelligence efforts by an increasing number of agencies.

As emphasized throughout this report, domestic intelligence activities have been undertaken pursuant to mandates from the Executive branch, generally issued during times of war or domestic crisis. The directives of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower to investigate "subversive activities," or other equally ill-defined targets, were echoed in various orders from Attorneys General, who themselves encouraged the FBI to undertake domestic intelligence activities with vague but vigorous commands.

Neither Presidents nor their chief legal officers, the Attorneys General, have defined the "subversive activities" which may be investigated or provided guidelines to the agencies in determining which individuals or groups were engaging in those activities. No reporting procedures were established to enable Cabinet-level officials or their designees to review the types of targets of domestic investigations and to exercise independent judgment concerning whether such investigations were warranted. No mechanisms were established for monitoring the conduct of domestic investigations or for determining if and when they should be terminated. If Presidents had articulated standards in these areas, or had designated someone to do the job for them, it is possible that many of the abuses described in this report would not have occurred.

Considering the proliferation of agencies engaging in domestic intelligence and the overlapping jurisdictional lines, it is surprising that no President has successfully designated one individual or body to coordinate and supervise the domestic intelligence activities of the various agencies. The half-hearted steps that were taken in that direction appear either to have been abandoned or to have resulted in the concentration of even more power in individual agency heads. For example, in 1949 President Truman attempted to establish a control mechanism -- the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference -- to centralize authority for supervising domestic intelligence activities of the FBI and military intelligence agencies in a committee chaired by the Director of the FBI. The Committee reported to the National Security Council, and an NSC staff member was assigned responsibility for internal security.[1] The practical effect of the IIC was apparently to increase the power of the FBI Director and to remove control further from the Cabinet level. In 1962, the functions of the IIC were transferred to the Justice Department, and the Attorney General was put in nominal charge of domestic intelligence.[2] While in theory supervision resided in the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department, that Division deferred in large part to the FBI and provided little oversight.[3] The top two executives of the Internal Security Division were former FBI officials. They appeared sympathetic to the Bureau, and like the Bureau, emphasized threats of Communist "influence" without mentioning actual results.[4]

Another opportunity to coordinate intelligence collection was missed in 1967, when Attorney General Ramsey Clark established the Interdivisional Intelligence Unit (IDIU) to draw on virtually the entire Federal Government's intelligence collecting capability for information concerning groups and individuals "who may play a role, whether purposefully or not, either in instigating or spreading civil disorders, or in preventing or checking them."[5] In the rush to obtain intelligence, no efforts were made to formulate standards or guidelines for controlling how the intelligence would be collected. In the absence of such guidelines and under pressure for results, the agencies undertook some of the most overly broad programs encountered by the Committee. For example, the FBI's "ghetto" informant program was a direct response to the Attorney General's broad requests for intelligence.

The need for centralized control of domestic intelligence was again given serious consideration during the vigorous demonstrations against the war in Vietnam in 1970. The intelligence community's program for dealing with internal dissent -- the Huston Plan -envisioned not only relaxing controls on surveillance techniques, but also coordinating intelligence collection efforts. According to Tom Charles Huston's testimony, the President viewed the suggestion of a coordinating body as the most important contribution of the plan.[8] Although the President quickly revoked his approval for the Huston Plan, the idea of a central domestic intelligence body had taken root. Two months later, with the encouragement of Attorney General John Mitchell, the Intelligence Evaluation Committee was established in the Justice Department. That Committee, like its precursor, the IDIU, compiled and evaluated raw intelligence; it did not exercise supervision.[9]

The growing sophistication of intelligence collection techniques underscores the present need for central control and coordination of domestic intelligence activities. Although the Executive Branch has recognized that need in the past, it has not, until recently, faced up to its responsibilities. President Gerald Ford's joint effort with members of Congress to place further restrictions on wiretaps is a welcome step in the right direction. Congress must act expeditiously in this area.

Subfinding (b)

Attorneys General have permitted and even encouraged the FBI to engage in domestic intelligence activities and to use a wide range of intrusive investigative techniques -- such as wiretaps, microphones, and informants -- but have failed until recently to supervise or establish limits on these activities or techniques by issuing adequate safeguards, guidelines, or procedures for review.

The Attorney General is the chief law enforcement officer of the United States and the Cabinet-level officer formally in charge of the FBI.[10] The Justice Department, until recently, has failed to issue directives to the FBI articulating the grounds for opening domestic intelligence investigations or the standards to be followed in carrying out those investigations. The Justice Department has neglected to establish machinery for monitoring and supervising the conduct of FBI investigations, for requiring approval of major investigative decisions, and for determining when an investigation should be terminated. Indeed, in 1972 the Attorney General said he did not even know whether the FBI itself bad formulated guidelines and standards for domestic intelligence activities, was not aware of the FBI's manual of instructions, and had never reviewed the FBI's internal guidelines.[11]

The Justice Department has frequently levied specific demands on the FBI for domestic intelligence, but has not accompanied these demands with restrictions or guidelines. Examples include the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division's requests for reports on demonstrations in the early 1960's (including coverage of a speech by Governor elect George Wallace 11a and coverage of a civil rights demonstration on the 100th anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation 12 ): Attorney General Kennedy's efforts to expand FBI infiltration of the Ku Klux Klan in 1964;[13] Attorney General Clark's sweeping instructions to collect intelligence about civil disorders in 1967;[14] and the Internal Security Division's request for more extensive investigations of campus demonstrations in 1969.[15] While a limited investigation into some of these areas may have been warranted, the improper acts committed in the course of those investigations were possible because no restraints had been imposed.

The Justice Department also cooperated with the FBI in defying the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 by approving the Bureau's Security Index criteria for the investigation of "potentially dangerous" persons.[16] Even after Congress repealed the Detention Act, the Justice Department allowed the Bureau to continue listing "potentially dangerous" persons on a new Administrative Index. The Department stopped reviewing the names on the FBI's index, and apparently endorsed the FBI's view that the list could, contrary to law, be used for detention purposes in an "emergency."

The FBI's autonomy has been a prominent and long-accepted feature of the Federal bureaucratic terrain. As early as the 1940s the FBI could oppose Justice Department inquiries into its internal affairs by raising the specter of "leaks."[17] The Department acquiesced in the Bureau's claim that it was entitled to withhold its raw files, conceal the identities of informants, and, in a number of cases, refuse to give the Justice Department evidence supporting broad allegations and characterizations. Former Attorney General Katzenbach has pointed out that there were both positive and negative sides to the Bureau's autonomy:

Keeping the Bureau free from political interference was a powerful argument against efforts by politically appointed officials, whatever their motivations, to gain a greater measure of control over operations of the Bureau.... [Director Hoover also] found great value in his formal position as subordinate to the Attorney General and the fact that the FBI was a part of the Department of Justice.... In effect, he was uniquely successful in having it both ways; he was protected from public criticism by having a theoretical superior who took responsibility for his work, and was protected from his superior by his public reputation.[18]

As a consequence of its autonomy, the Bureau could plan and implement many of the abusive operations described in this report. Former Attorneys General have told the Committee that they would never have permitted the more unsavory aspects of the New Left or Racial COINTELPROs if they had been aware of the Bureau's plans. To the extent that Attorneys General were ignorant of the Bureau's activities, it was the consequence not only of the FBI Director's independent political position, but also of the failure of the Attorneys General to establish procedures for finding out what the Bureau was doing and for permitting an atmosphere to evolve in which Bureau officials believed that they had no duty to report their activities to the Justice Department, and that they could conceal those activities with little risk of exposure.[20]

Attorneys General have not only neglected to establish procedures for reviewing FBI programs and activities, but they have at the same time granted the FBI authority to employ highly intrusive investigative techniques with inadequate guidelines and review procedures, and in some instances with no external restraints whatsoever. Before 1965, wiretaps required the approval of the Attorney General in advance, but once the Attorney General had authorized wiretap coverage of a subject, the Bureau could continue the surveillance for as long as it judged necessary.

This permissive policy was current in October 1963 when Attorney General Robert Kennedy authorized the FBI to wiretap the phones of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. "at his current address or at any future address to which he may move" and to wiretap the New York and Atlanta SCLC offices.[21] Reading the Attorney General's wiretap authorization broadly, the FBI construed Dr. King's "residence" so as to permit wiretaps on three\, of his hotel rooms and the homes of friends with whom he stayed temporarily.[22] The FBI was still relying on Attorney General Kennedy's initial authorization when it sought reauthorization for the King wiretaps in April 1965 in response to new procedures formulated by Attorney General Katzenbach. Although Attorney General Kennedy's authorizing memorandum in October 1963 said that the FBI should provide him with an evaluation of the wiretaps after 60 days, he failed to complain when the FBI neglected to send him the evaluation. Apparently the Attorney General never mentioned the wiretaps to the FBI again, even though he received FBI reports from the wiretaps until he resigned in September, 1964.[23]

The Justice Department's policy toward the use of microphones has been even more permissive than for wiretaps. Until 1965, the FBI was free to carry out microphone surveillance in national security cases without first seeking the approval of the Attorney General or notifying him afterward. The total absence of supervision enabled the FBI to hide microphones in Dr. Martin Luther King's hotel rooms for nearly two years for the express purpose of not only determining whether he was being influenced by allegedly communist advisers. but to "attempt" to obtain information about the private "activities of Dr. King and his associates" so that Dr. King could be "completely discredited."[21] Attorney General Kennedy was apparently never told about the microphone surveillances of Dr. King, although he did receive reports containing unattributed information from that surveillance from which he might have concluded that microphones were the source.[25]

The Justice Department imposed external control over microphones for the first time in March 1965, when Attorney General Katzenbach applied the same procedures to wiretaps and microphones, requiring not only prior authorization but also formal periodic review.[26] But irregularities were tolerated even with this standard. For example, the FBI has provided the Committee three memoranda from Director Hoover, initialed by Attorney General Katzenbach, as evidence that it informed the Justice Department of its microphone surveillance of Dr. King after the March 1965 policy change. These documents, however, show that Katzenbach was informed about the microphones only after they had already been installed.[27] Such after-the-fact approval was permitted under Katzenbach's procedures.[27] There is no indication that Katzenbach inquired further after receiving the notice.[28]

The Justice Department condoned, and often encouraged, the FBI's use of informants -- the investigative technique with the highest potential for abuse. However, the Justice Department imposed no restrictions on informant activity or reporting, and established no procedures for reviewing the Bureau's decision to use informants in a particular case.

In 1954 the Justice Department entered into an agreement with the CIA in which the CIA was permitted to withhold the names of employees whom it had determined were "almost certainly guilty of violations of criminal statutes" when the CIA could "devise no charge" under which they could be prosecuted that would not "require revelation of highly classified information."[29] This practice was terminated by the Justice Department in January, 1975.[29]

Despite the failure of Attorneys General to exercise the supervision that is necessary in the area of domestic intelligence, several Attorneys General have taken steps in the right direction. Of note were Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach's review procedures for electronic surveillance in 1965; Ramsey Clark's refusal to approve electronic surveillance of domestic intelligence targets and his rejection of repeated requests by the FBI for such surveillance; Acting Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus' inquiries into the Bureau's domestic intelligence program; Deputy Attorney General Laurence Silberman's inquiry into political abuses of the FBI in early 1975; and Attorney General Saxbe's decision to make the Justice Department's COINTELPRO report public.

During the past year, Attorney General Edward H. Levi has exercised welcome leadership by formulating guidelines for FBI investigations; developing legislative proposals requiring a judicial warrant for national security wiretaps and microphones; establishing the Office of Professional Responsibility to inquire into departmental misconduct; initiating investigations of alleged wrongdoing by the FBI; and cooperating with this Committee's requests for documents on FBI intelligence operations.[30] The Justice Department's concern in recent years is a hopeful sign, but long overdue.

Subfinding (c)

Presidents, White House officials, and Attorneys General have requested and received domestic political intelligence, thereby contributing to and profiting from the abuses of domestic intelligence and setting a bad example for their subordinates.

The separate finding on "political abuse" sets forth instances in which the FBI was used by White House officials to gather politically useful information, including data on administration opponents and critics. This misuse of the Bureau's powers by its political superiors necessarily contributed to the atmosphere in which abuses flourished.

If the Bureau's superiors were willing to accept the fruits of excessive intelligence gathering, to authorize electronic surveillance, for political purposes, and to receive reports on critics which included intimate details of their personal lives, they could not credibly hold the Bureau to a high ethical standard. If political expediency characterized the decisions of those expected to set limits on the Bureau's conduct, it is not surprising that the FBI considered the principle of expediency endorsed.

Subfinding (d)

Presidents, Attorneys General, and other cabinet officers have neglected, until recently, to make inquiries in the face of clear indications that intelligence agencies were engaging in improper domestic activities.

Executive branch officials contributed to an atmosphere in which excesses were possible by ignoring clear indications of excesses and failing to take corrective measures when directly confronted with improper behavior. The Committee's findings on "Violating and Ignoring the Law" illustrate that several questionable or illegal programs continued after higher officials had learned partial details and failed to ask for additional information, either out of the naive assumption that intelligence agencies would not engage in lawless conduct, or because they preferred not to be informed.[31]

Some of the most disturbing examples of insufficient action in the face of clear danger signals were uncovered in the Committee's investigation of the FBI's program to "neutralize" Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. as the leader of the civil rights movement. The Bureau informed the Committee that its files contain no evidence that any officials outside of the FBI "were specifically aware of any efforts, steps, or plans or proposals to 'discredit' or 'neutralize' King."[32] The relevant executive branch officials have told the Committee that they were, unaware of a general Bureau program to discredit King. Former Attorney General Katzenbach, however, told the Committee:

Nobody in the Department of Justice connected with Civil Rights could possibly have been unaware of Mr. Hoover's feelings [against Dr. King]. Nobody could have been unaware of the potential for disaster which those feelings embodied. But, given the realities of the situation, I do not believe one could have anticipated the extremes to which it was apparently carried.[34]

The evidence before the Committee confirms that the "potential for disaster" was indeed clear at the time. There is no question that officials in the White House and Justice Department, including President Johnson and Attorney General Katzenbach, knew that the Bureau was taking steps to discredit Dr. King, although they did not know the full extent of the Bureau's efforts.

- - In January 1964 the FBI gave Presidential Assistant Walter Jenkins an FBI report unfavorable to Dr. King. According to a contemporaneous FBI memorandum, Jenkins said that he "was of the opinion that the FBI could perform a good service to the country if this matter could somehow be confidentially given to members of the press." Jenkins, in a staff interview, denied having made such a suggestion.[35]

- - In February 1964 a reporter informed the Justice Department that the FBI had offered to "leak" information unfavorable to Dr. King to the press. The Justice Department's Press Chief, Edwin Guthman, asked Cartha DeLoach, the FBI's liaison with the press, about this allegation and DeLoach denied any involvement. The Justice Department took no further action.[36]

- - Bill Moyers, an Assistant to President Johnson, testified that he learned sometime in early 1964 that an FBI agent twice offered to play a tape recording for Walter Jenkins that would have been personally embarrassing to Dr. King and that Jenkins refused to listen to the tape on both occasions.[36] Moyers testified that he never asked the FBI why it had the tape or was offering to play it in the White House.[37] When asked if he had ever questioned the propriety of the FBI's disseminating information of a personal nature about Dr. King within the Government, he replied, "I never questioned it, no." When he was asked if he could recall anyone in the White House ever questioning the propriety of the FBI disseminating this type of material, Moyers testified. "I think . . . there were comments that tended to ridicule the FBI's doing this, but no."[38]

- - Burke Marshall, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division, testified that sometime in 1964 a reporter told him that the Bureau had offered information unfavorable to Dr. King. Marshall testified that he repeated this allegation to a Bureau official and asked for a report. The Bureau official subsequently informed him "The Director wants you to know that you're a . . . damned liar."[39]

- - In November 1964 the Washington Bureau Chief of a national news publication told Attorney General Katzenbach and Assistant Attorney General Marshall that one of his reporters had been approached by the FBI and offered the opportunity to hear some "interesting" tape recordings involving Dr. King. Katzenbach testified that, he had been "shocked," and that he and Marshall had informed President Johnson, who "took the matter very seriously" and promised to contact Director Hoover.[40] Neither Marshall nor Katzenbach knew if the President contacted Hoover.[41] Katzenbach testified that, during this same period, he learned of at least one other reporter who had been offered tape recordings by the Bureau, and that he personally confronted DeLoach, who was reported to have made the offers.[42] DeLoach told Katzenbach that be had never made such offers.[43] The only record of this episode in FBI files is a memorandum by DeLoach stating that Moyers had informed him that the newsman was "telling all over town" that the FBI was making allegations concerning Dr. King, and that Moyers had "stated that the President felt that [the newsman] lacked integrity...."[44] Moyers could not recall this episode, but told the Committee that it would be fair to conclude that the President had been upset by the fact that the newsman revealed the Bureau's conduct rather than by the Bureau's conduct itself.[45]

The response of top White House and Justice Department officials to strong indications of wrongdoing by the FBI was clearly inadequate. The Attorney General went no further than complaining to the President and asking a Bureau official if the charges were true. President Johnson apparently not only failed to order the Bureau to stop, but indeed warned it not to deal with certain reporters because they had complained about the Bureau's improper conduct.

In 1968 Attorney General Ramsey Clark asked Director Hoover if he had "any information as to how" facts about Attorney General Kennedy's authorization of the wiretap on Dr. King had leaked to columnists Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson. Clark requested the FBI Director to "undertake whatever investigation you deem feasible to determine how this happened.[45] Director Hoover's reply, drafted in the office of Cartha DeLoach, expressed "dismay" at the leak and offered no indication of the likely source.[45]

In fact, DeLoach had prepared a memorandum ten days earlier stating that a middle-level Justice Department official with knowledge of the King wiretap met with him and admitted having "discussed this matter with Drew Pearson." According to this memorandum, DeLoach attempted to persuade the official not to allow the story to be printed because "certain Negro groups would still blame the FBI, whether we were ordered to take such action or not."[45] Thus, DeLoach and Hoover deliberately misled Attorney General Clark by withholding their knowledge of the source of the "leak."

Subfinding (e)

Congress, which has the authority to place restraints on domestic intelligence activities through legislation, appropriations, and oversight committees, has not effectively asserted its responsibilities until recently. It has failed to define the scope of domestic intelligence activities or intelligence collection techniques, to uncover excesses, or to propose legislative solutions. Some of its members have failed to object to improper activities of which they were aware and have prodded agencies into questionable activities.

Congress, unlike the Executive branch, does not have the function of supervising the dayto-day activities of agencies engaged in domestic intelligence. Congress does, however, have the ability through legislation to affect almost every aspect of domestic intelligence activity: to erect the framework for coordinating domestic intelligence activities; to define and limit the types of activities in which executive agencies may engage; to establish the standards for conducting investigations; and to promulgate guidelines for controlling the use of wiretaps, microphones, and informants. Congress could also exercise a great influence over domestic intelligence through its power over the appropriations for intelligence agencies' budgets and through the investigative powers of its committees.

Congress has failed to establish precise standards governing domestic intelligence. No congressional statutes deal with the authority of executive agencies to conduct domestic intelligence operations, or instruct the executive in how to structure and supervise those operations. No statutes address when or under what conditions investigations may be conducted. Congress did not attempt to formulate standards for wiretaps or microphones until 1968, and even then avoided the issue of domestic intelligence wiretaps by allowing an exception for an undefined claim of inherent executive power to conduct domestic security surveillance, which was subsequently held unconstitutional.[45] No legislative standards have been enacted to govern the use of informants.

Congress has helped shape the environment in which improper intelligence activities were possible. The FBI claims that sweeping provisions in several vague criminal statutes and regulatory measures enacted by Congress provide a basis for much of its domestic intelligence activity.[45] Congress also added its voice to the strong consensus in favor of governmental action against Communism in the 1950's and domestic dissidents in the 1960's and 1970's.

Congress' failure to define intelligence functions has invited action by the executive. If the top officials of the executive branch are responsible for failing to control the intelligence agencies, that failure is in part due to a lack of guidance from Congress.

During most of the 40-year period covered in this report, congressional committees did not effectively monitor domestic intelligence activities. For example, in 1966, a Senate Judiciary subcommittee undertook an investigation of electronic surveillance and other intrusive techniques by Federal agencies. According to an FBI memorandum, its chairman told a delegation from the FBI that he would make "a commitment that he would in no way embarrass the FBI," and acceded in the FBI's request that the subcommittee refrain from calling FBI witnesses.[46]

Another example of the deficiencies in congressional oversight is seen in the House Appropriations Committee's regular approval of the FBI's requests for appropriations without raising objections to the activities described in the Director's testimony and off-the- record briefings. There is no question that members of a House Appropriations subcommittee were aware not only that the Bureau was engaged in broad domestic intelligence investigations, but that it was also employing disruptive tactics against domestic targets.

In 1958, Director Hoover informed the subcommittee that the Bureau had an "intensive program" to "disorganize and disrupt" the Communist Party, that the program had existed "for years" and that Bureau informants were used "as a disruptive tactic."[47] The next year, the Director informed the subcommittee that informants in 12 field offices

have been carefully briefed to engage in controversial discussions with the Communist Party so as to promote dissention, factionalism and defections from the communist cause. This technique has been extremely successful from a disruptive standpoint.

Under another phase of this program, we have carefully selected 28 items of anticommunist propaganda and have anonymously mailed it to selected communists, carefully concealing the identity of the FBI as its source. More than 2,800 copies of literature have been placed in the hands of active communists.[48]

Hoover described more aggressive "psychological warfare" techniques in 1962:

During the past year we have caused disruption at large Party meetings, rallies and press conferences through various techniques such as causing the last-minute cancellation of the rental of the hall, packing the audience with anticommunists, arranging adverse publicity in the press and making available embarrassing questions for friendly reporters to ask the Communist Party functionaries.

The Appropriations subcommittee was also told during this briefing that the FBI's operations included exposing and discrediting "communists who are secretly operating in legitimate organizations and employments, such as the Young Men's Christian Association, Boy Scouts, civic groups, and the like."[49]

In 1966 Director Hoover informed the Appropriations subcommittee that the disruptive program had been extended to the Ku Klux Klan.[50]

The present Associate Director of the FBI, Nicholas Callahan, who accompanied Director Hoover during several of his appearances before the Appropriations subcommittee, said that members of the subcommittee made "no critical comment" about "the Bureau's efforts to neutralize groups and associations."[51]

Subcommittee Chairman John Rooney's statements in a televised interview in 1971 regarding FBI briefings about Dr. Martin Luther King are indicative of the subcommittee's attitude toward the Bureau:

Representative ROONEY. Now you talk about the F.B.I. leaking something about Martin Luther King. I happen to know all about Martin Luther King, but I have never told anybody.

Interviewer. How do you know everything about Martin Luther King?

Representative ROONEY. From the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Interviewer. They've told you -- gave you information based on taps or other sources about Martin Luther King.

Representative ROONEY. They did.

Interviewer. Is that proper?

Representative ROONEY. Why not? 52

Former Assistant Attorney General Fred Vinson recalled that in 1967 the Justice Department averaged "fifty letters a week from Congress" demanding that "people like [Stokely] Carmichael be jailed." Vinson said that on one occasion when he was explaining First Amendment limits at a congressional hearing, a Congressman "got so provoked he raised his hand and said, 'to hell with the First Amendment."' Vinson testified that these incidents fairly characterized "the atmosphere of the time."[53]

The congressional performance has improved, however, in recent years. Subcommittees of the Senate Judiciary Committee have initiated inquiries into Army surveillance of domestic targets and into electronic surveillance by the FBI. House Judiciary Committee subcommittees commissioned a study of the FBI by the General Accounting Office and have inquired into FBI misconduct and surveillance activities. Concurrent with this Committee's investigations, the House Select Committee on Intelligence considered FBI domestic intelligence activities.

Our Constitution envisions Congress as a check on the Executive branch, and gives Congress certain powers for discharging that function. Until recently, Congress has not effectively fulfilled its constitutional role in the area of domestic intelligence. Although the appropriate congressional committees did not always know what intelligence agencies were, doing, they could have asked. The Appropriations subcommittee was aware that the FBI was engaging in activities far beyond the mere collection of intelligence, yet it did not inquire into the details of those programs.[54] If Congress had addressed the issues of domestic intelligence and passed regulatory legislation, and if it had probed into the activities of intelligence agencies and required them to account for their deeds, many of the excesses in this Report might not have occurred.

Subfinding (f)

Intelligence agencies have often undertaken programs without authorization, with insufficient authorization, or in defiance of express orders.

The excesses detailed in this report were due in part to the failure of Congress and the Executive branch to erect a sound framework for domestic intelligence, and in part to the dereliction of responsibility by executive branch officials who were in charge of individual agencies. Yet substantial responsibility lies with officials of the intelligence agencies themselves. They had no justification for initiating major activities without first seeking the express approval of their superiors. The pattern of concealment and partial and misleading disclosures must never again be allowed to occur.

The Committee's investigations have revealed numerous instances in which intelligence agencies have assumed programs or activities were authorized under circumstances where it could not reasonably be inferred that higher officials intended to confer authorization. Sometimes far-reaching domestic programs were initiated without the knowledge or approval of the appropriate official outside of the agencies. Sometimes it was claimed that higher officials had been "notified" of a program after they had been informed only about some aspects of the program, or after the program had been described with vague references and euphemisms, such as "neutralize," that carried different meanings for agency personnel than for uninitiated outsiders. Sometimes notice consisted of references to programs buried in the details of lengthy memoranda; and "authorization" was inferred from the fact that higher officials failed to order the agency to discontinue the program that had been obscurely mentioned.

The Bureau has made no claim of outside authorization for its COINTELPROs against the Socialist Workers Party, Black Nationalists, or New Left adherents. After 1960, its fragile claim for authorization of the COINTELPROs against the Communist Party USA and White Hate Groups was drawn from a series of hints and partial, obscured disclosures to the Attorneys General and the White House.

The first evidence of notification to higher government officials of the FBI's COINTELPRO against the Communist Party USA consists of letters from Director Hoover to President Eisenhower and Attorney General William Rogers in May 1958 informing them that "in August of 1956, this Bureau initiated a program designed to promote disruption within the ranks of the Communist Party (CP) USA."[55] There is no record of any reply to these letters.

Later that same year, Director Hoover told President Eisenhower and his Cabinet:

To counteract a resurgence of Communist Party influence in the United States, we have a ... program designed to intensify any confusion and dissatisfaction among its members.

During the past few years, this program has been most effective. Selected informants were briefed and trained to raise controversial issues within the Party.... The Internal Revenue Service was furnished names and addresses of Party functionaries who had been active in the underground apparatus ... ; Anticommunist literature and simulated Party documents were mailed anonymously to carefully chosen members . . . .[56]

The FBI's only claim to having notified the Kennedy Administration about COINTELPRO rests upon a letter written shortly before the inauguration in January 1961 from Director Hoover to Attorney General-designate Robert Kennedy, Deputy Attorney General-designate Byron R. White, and Secretary of State-designate Dean Rusk. One paragraph in the five- page letter stated that the Bureau had a "carefully planned program of counterattack against the CPUSA which keeps it off balance," and which was "carried on from both inside and outside the party organization." The Bureau claimed to have been "successful in preventing communists from seizing control of legitimate, mass organizations" and to have "discredited others who were secretly operating inside such organizations."[67] Specific techniques were not mentioned, and no additional notice was provided to the Kennedy Administration. Indeed, when the Kennedy White House formally requested of Hoover a report on "Internal Security Programs," the Director described only the FBI's "investigative program," and made no reference to disruptive activities.[58]

The only claimed notice of the COINTELPRO against the Ku Klux Klan was given after the program had begun and consisted of a partial description buried within a discussion of other subjects. In September 1965, copies of a two page letter were sent to President Johnson and Attorney General Katzenbach, describing the Bureau's success in solving a number of cases involving racial violence in the South. That report contained a paragraph stating that the Bureau was "seizing every opportunity to disrupt the activities of Klan organizations," and briefly described the exposure of a Klan member's "kickback" scheme involving insurance company premiums.[59] More questionable tactics, such as sending a letter to a Klansman's wife to destroy their marriage, were not mentioned. The Bureau viewed Katzenbach's reply to its letter -- which praises the investigative successes which are the focus of the FBI's letter -- as constituting authorization for the White Hate COINTELPRO.[60]

The claimed notification to Attorney General Ramsey Clark of the White Hate COINTELPRO consisted of a ten-page memorandum captioned "Ku Klux Klan Investigations -- FBI Accomplishments" with a buried reference to Bureau informants "removing" Klan officers and "provoking scandal" within the Klan organization 61, Clark told the Committee that he did not recall reading those phrases or interpreting them as notice that the Bureau was engaging in disruptive tactics.[62] Cartha DeLoach, Assistant to the Director during this period, testified that he "distinctly" recalled briefing Attorney General Clark "generally ... concerning COINTELPRO."[63] Clark denied havingbeen briefed.[64]

The letters and briefings described above, which constitute the Bureau's entire claim to notice and authorization for the CPUSA and White Hate COINTELPROs, failed to mention techniques which risked physical, emotional, or economic harm to their targets. In no case was an Attorney General clearly told the nature and extent of the programs and asked for his approval. In no case was approval expressly given.

Former Attorney General Katzenbach cogently described another misleading form of "authorization" relied on by the Bureau and other intelligence agencies:

As far as Mr. Hoover was concerned, it was sufficient for the Bureau if at any time any Attorney General had authorized [a particular] activity in any circumstances. In fact, it was often sufficient if any Attorney General had written something which could be construed to authorize it or had been informed in some one of hundreds of memoranda of some facts from which he could conceivably have inferred the possibility of such an activity. Perhaps to a permanent head of a large bureaucracy this seems a reasonable way of proceeding. However, there is simply no way an incoming Cabinet officer can or should be charged with endorsing every decision of his predecessor . . . .[65]

For example, the CPUSA COINTELPRO was substantially described to the Eisenhower Administration, obliquely to the Kennedy Administration designees, but continued -apparently solely on the strength of those assumed authorizations -- through the Johnson Administration and into the Nixon Administration. The idea that authority might continue from one administration to the next and that there is no duty to reaffirm authority inhibits responsible decision making. Circumstances may change and judgments may differ. New officials should be given -- and should insist upon -- the opportunity to review significant programs.

The CIA's mail opening project illustrates an instance in which an intelligence agency apparently received authorization for a limited program and then expanded that program into significant new areas without seeking further authorization. In May 1954, DCI Allen Dulles and Richard Helms, then Chief of Operations in the CIA's Directorate of Plans, briefed Postmaster General Arthur Summerfield about the CIA's New York mail project, which at that time involved only the examination of envelope exteriors. CIA memoranda indicate that Summerfield's approval was obtained for photographing envelope exteriors, but no mention was made of the possibility of mail opening.[66]

The focus of the CIA's project shifted to mail opening sometime during the ensuing year, but the CIA did not return to inform Summerfield and made no attempt to secure his approval for this illegal operation.

Intelligence officers have sometimes withheld information from their superiors and concealed programs to prevent discovery by their superiors. The Bureau apparently ignored the Attorney General's order to stop classifying persons as "dangerous" in 1943; unilaterally decided not to provide the Justice Department with information about communist espionage on at least two occasions "for security reasons;" and withheld similar information from the Presidential Commission investigating the government's security program in 1947.[67] More recently, CIA and NSA concealed from President Richard Nixon their respective mail opening and communications interception programs.

These incidents are not unique. The FBI also concealed its Reserve Index of prominent persons who were not included on the Security Index reviewed by the Justice Department; its other targeting programs against "Rabble Rousers," "Agitators," "Key Activists," and "Key Extremists;" and its use of intrusive mail opening and surrepititious entry techniques. Indeed, the FBI institutionalized its capability to conceal activities from the Justice Department by establishing a regular "Do Not File" procedure, which assured internal control while frustrating external accountability.

Subfinding (g)

The weakness of the system of accountability and control can be seen in the fact that many illegal or abusive domestic intelligence operations were terminated only after they had been exposed or threatened with exposure by Congress or the news media.

The lack of vigorous oversight and internal controls on domestic intelligence activity frequently left the termination of improper programs to the ad hoc process of public exposure or threat of exposure by Congress, the press, or private citizens. Less frequently, domestic intelligence projects were terminated solely because of an agency's internal review of impropriety.

The Committee is aware that public exposure can jeopardize legitimate, productive, and costly intelligence programs. We do not condone the extralegal activities which led to the exposure of some questionable operations.

Nevertheless two points emerge from an examination of the termination of numerous domestic intelligence activities: (1) major illegal or improper operations thrived in an atmosphere of secrecy and inadequate executive control; and (2) public airing proved to be the most effective means of terminating or reforming those operations.

Some intelligence officers and Executive branch administrators sought the termination of questionable programs as soon as they became aware of the nature of the operation -- the Committee praises their actions. However, too often we have seen that the secrecy that protected illegal or improper activities and the insular nature of the agencies involved prevented intelligence officers from questioning their actions or realizing that they were wrong.

There are several noteworthy examples of illegal or abusive domestic intelligence activities which were terminated only after the threat of public exposure:

- - The FBI's widesweeping COINTELPRO operations were terminated on April 27, 1971, in response to disclosures about the program in the press.[73]

- - IRS payments to confidential informants were suspended in March 1975 as a result of journalistic investigation of Operation Leprechaun.[74]

- - The Army's termination of several major domestic intelligence operations, which were clearly overbroad or illegal, came only after the programs were disclosed in the press or were scheduled as the subject of congressional inquiry.[75]

- - On one occasion, FBI Director Hoover insisted that electronic surveillance be discontinued prior to his appearance before the House Appropriations Committee so that he could report a relatively small number of wiretaps in place.[76] Contrary to frequent allegations, however, no general pattern of temporary suspensions or terminations during the Director's appearances before the House Appropriations Committee is revealed by Bureau records.

- - Following the report of a Presidential committee which had been established in response to news reports in 1967, the CIA terminated its covert relationship with a large number of domestically based organizations, such as academic institutions, student groups, private foundations, and media projects aimed at an international audience.[78]

Other examples of curtailment of domestic intelligence activity in response to the prospect of public exposure include: President Nixon's revocation of approval for the Huston Plan out of concern for the risk of disclosure of the possible illegal actions proposed and the fact that "their sensitivity would likely generate media criticism if they were employed;"[79] J. Edgar Hoover's cessation of the bugging of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s hotel rooms after the initiation of a Senate investigation chaired by Edward V. Long of Missouri;[80] and the CIA's consideration of suspending mail-opening until the Long inquiry abated and eventual termination of the program "in the Watergate climate."[81] More recently, several questionable domestic intelligence practices have been terminated at least in part as a result of Congressional investigation.[82]

There are several prominent instances of terminations which resulted from an internal review process:

- - In August 1973, shortly after taking office, Internal Revenue Service Commissioner Donald Alexander abolished the Special Service Staff upon learning that it was engaged in political intelligence activities which he considered "antithetical to proper tax administration."[83]

- - An internal legal review in 1973 prompted the termination of the joint effort by NSA and CIA to monitor United States - South American communications by individuals named on a drug traffic "watch list."[84]

- - On May 9, 1973, newly appointed CIA Director James Schlesinger requested from CIA personnel an inventory of all "questionable activities" which the Agency had undertaken. The 694 pages of memoranda received in response to this request -- which became known at the CIA as "The Family Jewels" -- prompted the termination or limitation of a number of programs which were in violation of the the Agency's mandate, notably the CHAOS project involving intelligence-gathering against American citizens.[85]

- - In the early 1960s, the CIA's MKULTRA testing program, which involved surreptitiously administering drugs to unwitting persons, was "frozen" after the Inspector General questioned the morality and lack of administrative control of the program.[85]

- - Several mail-opening operations were terminated because they lacked sufficient intelligence value, which was often measured in relation to the "flap potential" -- or risk of disclosure -- of an operation. However, both the CIA and the FBI continued other mailopening operations after these terminations.[86]

The Committee's examination of the circumstances surrounding terminations of a wide range of improper or illegal domestic intelligence activities clearly points to the need for more effective oversight from outside the agencies. In too many cases, the impetus for the termination of programs of obviously questionable propriety came from the press or the Congress rather than from intelligence agency administrators or their superiors in the Executive Branch. Although there were several laudable instances of termination as a responsible outgrowth of an agency's internal review process, the Committee's record indicates that this process alone is insufficient -- intelligence agencies cannot be left to police themselves.

[1] National Security Council memorandum 17/5,6/15/49.

[2] National Security Action memorandum 161, 6/9/62.

[3] For example, the FBI continued an investigation of one group in 1964 after the internal Security Division told the Bureau there was "insufficient evidence" of any legal violations. (Memorandum from Yeagley to Hoover, 3/3/64.) Two years later, an FBI intelligence official suggested that it would be "in the Bureau's best interest to put the Department on record again." The Department approved the FBI's request for permission to continue the investigation even though there had been "no significant changes as to the character and tactics of the organization." The FBI did not request further instructions in this investigation until 1973. (Memorandum from Baumgardner to Sullivan, 7/15/66; memorandum from Yeagley to Hoover, 7/28/66.)

[4] For example, the annual report of Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley for Fiscal Year 1959 emphasized Communist attempts to wield influence, without pointing out the lack of tangible results:

"Despite the 'thaw,' real or apparent, in the Cold War, and despite [its] losses, the [Communist] Party has continued as an organized force, constantly seeking to repair its losses and to regain its former position of influence. In a number of fields its activities are directed ostensibly toward laudable objectives, such as the elimination of discrimination by reason of race, low cost housing for the economically underprivileged, and so on. These activities are pursued in large part as a way of extending the forces and currents in American life, and with the hope of being able to 'move in' on such movements when the time seems propitious." [Emphasis added.] (Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1959, pp. 247-248.)

The same executives headed the Internal Security Division from 1959 until 1970, through the administrations of five Attorneys General and four Presidents. In 1971 a new Assistant Attorney General for the Internal Security Division, Robert Mardian, actively encouraged FBI surveillance and collaborated with FBI executive William C. Sullivan in transferring the records of the "17" wiretaps from the Bureau to the Nixon White House.

[5] Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Kevin Maroney, et al., 11/9/67.

[6] & 7 omitted in original.

[8] Tom Charles Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 32.

[9] Staff summary of interview of Colonel Werner E. Michel, 5/12/75.

[10] Despite the formal line of responsibility to the Attorney General, Director J. Edgar Hoover in fact developed an informal channel to the White House. During several administrations beginning with President Franklin Roosevelt the Director and the President circumvented the Justice Department and dealt directly with each other.

[11] Memorandum from St. John Barrett to Marshall, 6/18/63.

[11] Memorandum from Director, FBI to Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall, 12/4/62.

[12] Memorandum from Director, FBI to Assistant Attorney General Burke

[13] Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1965, pp.[ 185-186.

[14] Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Hoover, 9/14/67.

[15] Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley to Hoover, 3/3/69.

[16] Memorandum from Belmont to Ladd, 10/15/52.

[17] Memorandum from Hoover to L. M. C. Smith, Chief, Neutrality Laws Unit, 11/28/40.

[18] Nicholas Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 201.

[20] The Justice Department's investigation of the FBI's COINTELPRO illustrates the reluctance of the Justice Department to interfere in or even inquire about Internal Bureau matters. Although the existence of COINTELPRO was made public in 1971, the Justice Department did not initiate an investigation until 1974. The Department's Committee, headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen, which conducted the investigation, agreed to use only summaries of documents prepared by the Bureau instead of examining the Bureau documents themselves.

Those summaries were often extremely misleading. For example, one summary stated:

"it was recommended that an anonymous letter be mailed to the leader of the Blackstone Rangers, a black extremist organization in Chicago. The letter would hopefully drive a wedge between the Blackstone Rangers and the Black Panthers Party. The anonymous letter would indicate that the Black Panther Party in Chicago blamed the leader of the Blackstone Rangers for blocking their programs."

The document from which this summary was derived, however, stated that the Blackstone Rangers were prone to "violent type activity, shooting, and the like." The anonymous letter was to state that "the Panthers blame you for blocking their thing and there's supposed to be a hit out for you." The memorandum concluded that the letter "may intensify the degree of animosity between the two groups" and "lead to reprisals against its leadership." (Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/18/69.)

[21] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, 10/7/63; memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, 10/18/63.

[22] Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 7/24/75, pp. 4-5.

[23] See M. L. King Report: "Electronic Surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King and the Christian Leadership Conference." It should be noted, however, that President Kennedy was assassinated a month after the wiretap was installed which may account for Attorney General Kennedy's failure to inquire about the King wiretaps, at least for the first few months.

[24] Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 1/28/64.

[25] The FBI informed the Committee that it has no documents indicating that Attorney General Kennedy was told about the microphones. His associates in the Justice Department testified that they were never told, and they did not believe that the Attorney General had been told about the microphones. (See memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 12/19/66; Courtney Evans testimony, 12/1/75, p. 20; Burke Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, p. 43.)

The question of whether Attorney General Kennedy suspected that the FBI was using microphones to gather information about Dr. King must be viewed in light of the Attorney General's express authorization of wiretaps in the King case on national security grounds, and the FBI's practice -- known to the Attorney General -- of installing microphones in such national security cases without notifying the Department.

[26] Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 3/30/65, p. 2. The Attorney General's policy change occurred during a period of publicity and Congressional inquiry into the FBI's use of electronic surveillance.

[27] Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 5/17/65; Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Attorney General, 10/19/65; Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Attorney General, 12/1/65.

[27] Katzenbach advised Director Hoover in September 1965 that "in emergency situations [wiretaps and microphones] may be used subject to my later ratification." (Memorandum from Katzenbach to Hoover, 9/27/65.) Nevertheless, there is no indication that these microphone surveillances of Dr. King presented "emergency situations."

[28] Katzenbach testified that he could not recall having seen the notices, although he acknowledged the initials on the memoranda as in his handwriting and in the location where he customarily placed his initials. (Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 227.)

[29] Memorandum from Lawrence Houston to Deputy Attorney General, 3/1/54.

[29] Memorandum for the Record by General Counsel, CIA, 1/31/75.

[30] The Committee's requests also provided the Department of Justice with the opportunity to see most of these FBI documents for the first time.

[31] One cabinet official, when told that the CIA wanted to tell him something secret, replied, "I would rather not know anything about it." The "secret" matter was CIA's illegal mail opening program. (J. Edward Day testimony, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 45.)

[32] Letter from FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 11/6/75.

[34] Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 209.

[35] Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to J. Edgar Hoover, 1/14/64; Staff summary of Walter Jenkins Interview, 12/1/75, pp. 1-2. Mr. Jenkins subsequently said that he was unable to testify formally because of illness and has failed to answer written interrogatories submitted to him by the Committee for response under oath.

[36] Memorandum from John Mohr to Cartha DeLoach, 2/5/65; Edwin Guthman testimony, 3/16/76, pp. 20-23.

[36] Bill Moyers testimony, 3/2/76, p. 19.

[37] Bill Moyers testimony, 3/2/76, p. 19; staff summary of Bill Moyers interview, 11/24/75.

In an unsworn staff interview, Jenkins denied that he ever received an offer to listen to such tapes. (Staff summary of Walter Jenkins interview, 12/1/75.)

[38] Moyers, 3/2/76, pp. 17-18.

[39] Marshall, 3/8/76, pp. 4647.

[40] Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 210.

[41] Marshall, 3/3/76, p. 43; Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 210.

[42] Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 210.

[43] Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 210. DeLoach testified before the Committee that he did not recall conversations with reporters about tape recordings of Dr. King. (Cartha DeLoach testimony, 11/25/75, p. 156.)

[44] Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 12/1/64.

[45] Moyers, 3/2/76. p. 9.

[45] Memorandum from Clark to Hoover, 5/27/69. The story was published in the midst of Robert Kennedy's campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination.

[45] Memorandum from Hoover to Clark, 5/29/68.

[45] Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Tolson, 5/17/68. Four days later DeLoach had a phone conversation with Jack Anderson in which, according to partment [sic] official "had advised him concerning specific information involving an old wire tap on King." (Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Tolson, 5/21/68.) Both of these memoranda were initialed by Hoover.

[45] U.S. V. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).

[45] These include the Smith Act of 1940 and the Voorhis Act of 1941. In addition to reliance on these statutes to buttress its claim of authority for domestic intelligence operations, the FBI has also placed reliance on a Civil War seditious conspiracy statute and a rebellion and insurrection statute passed during the Whiskey Rebellion of the 1790's. FBI Director Clarence Kelley, in a letter to the Attorney General, stated that these later statutes were designed for past centuries, "not the Twentieth Century." (memorandum from Director, FBI, to Attorney General, Hearings, Vol.[ 6, Exhibit 53.) The Committee agrees.

[46] Memorandum from DeLoach to Clyde Tolson, 1/21/66.

[47] 1958 Fiscal Year Briefing Paper prepared by FBI for House Appropriations Committee.

[48] 1959 Fiscal Year Briefing Paper prepared by FBI for House Appropriations Committee.

[49] 1962 Fiscal Year Briefing Paper prepared by FBI for House Appropriations Committee.

[50] 1966 Fiscal Year Briefing Paper prepared by FBI for House Appropriations Committee.

[51] Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 1/12/76.

[52] Interview with Congressman Rooney, NBC News' "First Tuesday,"[ 6/1/71.

[53] Fred Vinson testimony, 1/27/76, p. 34.

[54] Director Hoover appears to have told the subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee more about COINTELPRO operations and techniques than he told the Justice Department or the White House.

[55] Memorandum from the Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 5/8/58.

[56] Excerpt from FBI Director's Briefing of Cabinet, 11/6/58.

[57] Memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, 1/10/61, copies to White and Rusk.

[58] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to McGeorge Bundy, 7/25/61, and attached I.I.C. Report: "Status of U.S. Internal Security Programs."

[59] Letters from Hoover to Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to the President, and Attorney General Katzenbach, 9/17/65.

[60] Memorandum from Katzenbach to Hoover, 9/3/65.

[61] Memorandum from Hoover to Clark, 12/18/67.

[62] Clark, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 235.

[63] DeLoach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 183.

[64] Clark, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 232.

[65] Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearing-, Vol. 6, p. 202.

[66] Memorandum from Richard. Helms, Chief of Operations, DDP, to Director of Security, 5/17/54.

[67] See Part II, pp.[ 35-36, 55-56.

68-72 omitted in original.

[73] Memorandum from Brennan to Sullivan, 4/27/71; letter from Director, FBI, to all Field Offices, 4/28/71. Even after the termination of COINTELPRO, it was suggested that "counterintelligence action" would be considered "in exceptional instances" so long as there were "tight procedures to insure absolute secrecy" (Sullivan memorandum, 4/27/71; letter from Director, FBI to all Field Offices, 4/28/71.)

[74] See IRS Report: "Operation Leprechaun."

[75] The Army made its first effort to curb its domestic collection of "civil disturbance" intelligence on the political activities of private citizens in June 1970, only after press disclosures about the program which prompted two Congressional committees to schedule hearings on the matter, (Christopher Pyle, "CONUS Intelligence: The Army Watches Civilian Politics" Washington Monthly, January 1970.) Despite legal opinions, both from inside and outside the Army, that domestic radio monitoring by the Army Security Agency was illegal, the Army did not move to terminate the program until after the media revealed that the Army Security Agency had monitored radio transmissions during the 1968 Democratic National Convention (Memorandum from Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence to the Army General Counsel re: UPASA Covert Activities in Civil Disturbance Control Operations.) Department of Defense controls on domestic surveillance were not imposed until March 1971, after NBC News reported that the Army had placed Senator Adlai Stevenson III and Congressman Abner Mikva under surveillance. (NBC News, "First Tuesday", 12/1/70.)

[76] This involved nine of the so-called "17" wiretaps in February 1971. (Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 8/20/75, pp. 148, 149.)

[77] omitted in original.

[78] This included nine of the so-called "17" wiretaps in February 1971. In response to the storm of public and congressional criticism engendered by a press account of CIA support for a student organization, President Johnson appointed a Committee, chaired by then Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, to review government activities that "endanger the integrity and independence" of United States educational and private voluntary organizations which operate abroad. In March 1967, the Committee recommended "that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations." The CIA responded with a major review of such projects.

The question of the nature and extent of the CIA's compliance with the Katzenbach guidelines is discussed in the Committee's Foreign Intelligence Report.

[79] Response by Richard Nixon to interrogatory Number 17 posed by Senate Select Committee.

[80] On January 7, 1966, in response to Associate Director Tolson's recommendation, Director Hoover "reserve [d] final decision" about whether to discontinue all microphone surveillance of Dr. King "until DeLoach sees [Senator Edward V.] Long." (Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach, 1/21/66.) The only occasion on which the FBI Director rejected a recommendation for bugging a hotel room of Dr. King's was January 21, 1966, the same day that Assistant Director DeLoach met with an aide to Senator Long to try to head off the Long Committee's hearings on the subject of FBI "bugs" and taps. (Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 1/21/66.) When DeLoach returned from the meeting, he reported:

"While we have neutralized the threat of being embarrassed by the Long Subcommittee, we have not yet eliminated certain dangers which might be created as a result of newspaper pressure on Long. We therefore must keep on top of this situation at all times." (Memorandum, Executives Conference to the Director, 1/7/66.) Another possible explanation for Hoover's cessation of the King hotel bugging is found in the impact of a memorandum from the Solicitor General in the Black case which Hoover apparently interpreted as a restriction upon the FBI's authority to conduct microphone surveillance. (Supplemental memorandum for the United States, U.S. v. Black, submitted by Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall, 7/13/66; Katzenbach, 10/11/75. p. 58.)

[81] In 1965, the Long Subcommittee investigation caused the CIA to consider whether its major mail opening "operations should be partially or fully suspended until the subcommittee's investigations are completed." When the CIA contacted Chief Postal Inspector Henry Montague and learned that he believed that the Long investigation would "soon cool off," it was decided to continue the operation. (Memorandum to the files by "CIA officer."[ 4/23/65.)

Despite continued apprehensions about the "flap potential" of exposure and repeated recognition of its illegality, the actual termination of the CIA's New York mail-opening project came, according to CIA Office of Security Director Howard Osborn because: "I thought it was illegal and in the Watergate climate we had absolutely no business doing this." (Howard Osborn deposition, 8/28/75, p. 89.) He discussed the matter with William Colby who agreed that the project was illegal and should not be continued, "particularly in a climate of that type." (Osborn deposition, 8/28/75, p. 90.)

[82] Shortly after the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities held hearings on the laxity of the system for disclosure of tax return information to United States attorneys, the practice was changed. In October 1975, U.S. Attorneys requesting tax return information were required by the IRS to provide a sufficient explanation of the need for the information and the intended use to which it would be put to enable IRS to ascertain the validity of the request. Operation SHAMROCK, NSA's program of obtaining millions of international telegrams, was terminated in May 1975, according to a senior NSA official, primarily because it was no longer a valuable source of foreign intelligence and because the Senate Select Committee's investigation of the program had increased the risk of exposure. (Staff summary of "senior NSA official" interview, 9/17/75, p. 3.)

[83] Donald Alexander testimony, 10/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 3, p. 8. Alexander testified, however, that in a meeting with IRS administrators on the day after he took office, the SSS was discussed, and "full disclosure" was not made to him. Prior to the Leprechaun revelations, Commissioner Alexander had also initiated a general review of IRS information-gathering and retrieval systems, and he had already suspended certain types of information-gathering due to discovery of vast quantities of non-tax-related material. (Alexander, 10/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 3, pp. 8-10.)

Another termination due to internal review took place at IRS in 1968. The Chief of the Disclosure Branch terminated what he considered the "illegal" provision of tax return information to the FBI by another IRS Division. (IRS Memorandum, D. O. Virdin to Harold Snyder, 5/2/68.) During this same period, the CIA was also obtaining returns in a manner similar to the FBI (though in much smaller numbers), yet no one in the Intelligence Division or elsewhere in the Compliance Division apparently thought to examine that practice in light of the change being made in the practice with respect to the FBI. (Donald 0. Virdin testimony, 9/16/75, pp. 69-73.)

[84] The CIA suspended its participation in the program as a result of an opinion by its General Counsel, Lawrence Houston, that the intercepts were illegal. (Memorandum from Houston to Acting Chief of Division, 1/29/73.) Shortly thereafter, NASA reviewed the legality and appropriateness of its own involvement in what was essentially a law enforcement effort by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs rather than a foreign intelligence program, which is the only authorized province for NSA operations. ("Senior NSA official deposition," 9/16/75, p. 10.) In June 1973 the Director of NSA terminated the drug watch list, several months after the CIA had terminated its own intercept program. NSA's drug watch list activity had been in operation since 1970. (Allen, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 23.)

In the fall of 1973, NSA terminated the remainder of its watch list activity, which had involved monitoring communications by individuals targeted for NSA by other agencies including CIA, FBI, and BNDD. In response to the Keith case and to another case which threatened to disclose the existence of the NSA watch list, NSA and the Justice Department had begun to reconsider the propriety of the program. The review process culminated in termination. See NSA Report: Termination of Civil Disturbance Watch List.

[85] Schlesinger described his review of "grey area activities" which were "perhaps legal, perhaps not legal" as a part of "the enhanced effort that came in the wake of Watergate" for oversight of the propriety of Government activities. (Schlesinger testimony. Rockefeller Commission, 5/5/75, pp. 114,116.) Schlesinger testified that his request for the reporting of "questionable activities" came after learning that "there was this whole set of relationships" between the CIA and White House "plumber" E. Howard Hunt, Jr., about which Schlesinger had not been briefed completely upon assuming his position. (Schlesinger, Rockefeller Commission testimony, p. 115.) "As a consequence," Schlesinger "insisted that all people come forward" with "anything to do with the Watergate affair" and any other arguably improper or illegal operations. (Schlesinger, Rockefeller Commission, 5/5/75, p. 116.)

[85] After the Inspector General's survey of the Technical Services Division, he recommended termination of the testing program. (Earman memorandum, 5/5/63.) The program was then suspended pending resolution at the highest levels within the CIA of the issues presented by the program -- "the risks of embarrassment to the Agency, coupled with the moral problem." (Memorandum from DDP Helms to DCI McCone, 9/4/65.) In response to the IG Report, DDP Helms recommended to DCI McCone that unwitting testing continue. Helms maintained that the program could be conducted in a "secure and effective manner" and believed it "necessary that the Agency maintain a central role in this activity, keep current on enemy capabilities in the manipulation of human behavior, and maintain an offensive capability." (Memorandum from Helms to DCI McCone, 8/19/63.) The Acting DCI deferred decision on the matter and directed TSD in the meantime to "continue the freeze on unwitting testing." (CIA memorandum to Senate Select Commitee, received 9/4/75.) According to a CIA report to the Select Committee:

"With the destruction of the MKULTRA files in early 1973, It is believed that there are no definitive records in CIA that would record the termination of the program for testing behavioral drugs on unwitting persons. . . . There is no record to our knowledge, that [the] freeze was ever lifted." (CIA memorandum to Senate Select Committee, received 9/4/75.)

Testimony from the CIA officials involved confirmed that the testing was not resumed. (See Foreign and Military Intelligence Report.)

[86] Two FBI mail-opening programs were suspended for security reasons involving changes in local postal personnel and never reinstituted, on the theory that the value of the programs did not justify the risk involved. (Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/19/66.) The CIA's San Francisco mailopening project "was terminated since the risk factor outweighed continuing an activity which had already achieved its objectives." (Memorandum to Chief, East Asia Division, June 1973.) The lack of any significant intelligence value to the CIA apparently led to the termination of the New Orleans mail-opening program. (Memorandum from "Identity 13" to Deputy Director of Security, 10/9/57.) Three other programs were terminated because they had produced no valuable counterintelligence information, while diverting manpower needed for other operations.

IV. Conclusions and Recommendations

- A. Conclusions

The findings which have emerged from our investigation convince us that the Government's domestic intelligence policies and practices require fundamental reform. We have attempted to set out the basic facts; now it is time for Congress to turn its attention to legislating restraints upon intelligence activities which may endanger the constitutional rights of Americans.

The Committee's fundamental conclusion is that intelligence activities have undermined the constitutional rights of citizens and that they have done so primarily because checks and balances designed by the framers of the Constitution to assure accountability have not been applied.

Before examining that conclusion, we make the following observations.

-While nearly all of our findings focus on excesses and things that went wrong, we do not question the need for lawful domestic intelligence. We recognize that certain intelligence activities serve perfectly proper and clearly necessary ends of government. Surely, catching spies and stopping crime, including acts of terrorism, is essential to insure "domestic tranquility" and to "provide for the common defense." Therefore, the power of government to conduct proper domestic intelligence activities under effective restraints and controls must be preserved.

-We are aware that the few earlier efforts to limit domestic intelligence activities have proven ineffectual. This pattern reinforces the need for statutory restraints coupled with much more effective oversight from all branches of the Government.

-The crescendo of improper intelligence activity in the latter part of the 1960s and the early 1970s shows what we must watch out for: In time of crisis, the Government will exercise its power to conduct domestic intelligence activities to the fullest extent. The distinction between legal dissent and criminal conduct is easily forgotten. Our job is to recommend means to help ensure that the distinction will always be observed.

-In an era where the technological capability of Government relentlessly increases, we must be wary about the drift toward "big brother government." The potential for abuse is awesome and requires special attention to fashioning restraints which not only cure past problems but anticipate and prevent the future misuse of technology.

-We cannot dismiss what we have found as isolated acts which were limited in time and confined to a few willful men. The failures to obey the law and, in the words of the oath of office, to "preserve, protect, and defend" the Constitution, have occurred repeatedly throughout administrations of both political parties going back four decades.

-We must acknowledge that the assignment which the Government has given to the intelligence community has, in many ways, been impossible to fulfill. It has been expected to predict or prevent every crisis, respond immediately with information on any question, act to meet all threats, and anticipate the special needs of Presidents. And then it is chastised for its zeal. Certainly, a fair assessment must place a major part of the blame upon the failures of senior executive officials and Congress.

In the final analysis, however, the purpose of this Committee's work is not to allocate blame among individuals. Indeed, to focus on personal culpability may divert attention from the underlying institutional causes and thus may become an excuse for inaction.

Before this investigation, domestic intelligence had never been systematically surveyed. For the first time, the Government's domestic surveillance programs, as they have developed over the past forty years, can be measured against the values which our Constitution seeks to preserve and protect. Based upon our full record, and the findings which we have set forth in Part III above, the Committee concludes that:

Domestic Intelligence Activity Has Threatened and Undermined The

Constitutional Rights of Americans to Free Speech, Association and Privacy. It Has Done So Primarily Became The Constitutional System for Checking Abuse of Power Has Not Been Applied.

Our findings and the detailed reports which supplement this volume set forth a massive record of intelligence abuses over the years. Through a vast network of informants, and through the uncontrolled or illegal use of intrusive techniques -- ranging from simple theft to sophisticated electronic surveillance -- the Government has collected, and then used improperly, huge amounts of information about the private lives, political beliefs and associations of numerous Americans.

Affect Upon Constitutional Rights. -- That these abuses have adversely affected the constitutional rights of particular Americans is beyond question. But we believe the harm extends far beyond the citizens directly affected.

Personal privacy is protected because it is essential to liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Our Constitution checks the power of Government for the purpose of protecting the rights of individuals, in order that all our citizens may live in a free and decent society. Unlike totalitarian states, we do not believe that any government has a monopoly on truth.

When Government infringes those rights instead of nurturing and protecting them, the injury spreads far beyond the particular citizens targeted to untold numbers of other Americans who may be intimidated.

Free government depends upon the ability of all its citizens to speak their minds without fear of official sanction. The ability of ordinary people to be heard by their leaders means that they must be free to join in groups in order more effectively to express their grievances. Constitutional safeguards are needed to protect the timid as well as the courageous, the weak as well as the strong. While many Americans have been willing to assert their beliefs in the face of possible governmental reprisals, no citizen should have to weigh his or her desire to express an opinion, or join a group, against the risk of having lawful speech or association used against him.

Persons most intimidated may well not be those at the extremes of the political spectrum, but rather those nearer the middle. Yet voices of moderation are vital to balance public debate and avoid polarization of our society. The federal government has recently been looked to for answers to nearly every problem. The result has been a vast centralization of power. Such power can be turned against the rights of the people. Many of the restraints imposed by the Constitution were designed to guard against such use of power by the government.

Since the end of World War II, governmental power has been increasingly exercised through a proliferation of federal intelligence programs. The very size of this intelligence system, multiplies the opportunities for misuse.

Exposure of the excesses of this huge structure has been necessary. Americans are now aware of the capability and proven willingness of their Government to collect intelligence about their lawful activities and associations. What some suspected and others feared has turned out to be largely true -- vigorous expression of unpopular views, association with dissenting groups, participation in peaceful protest activities, have provoked both government surveillance and retaliation.

Over twenty years ago, Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, previously an Attorney General, warned against growth of a centralized power of investigation. Without clear limits, a federal investigative agency would "have enough on enough people" so that "even if it does not elect to prosecute them" the Government would, he wrote, still "find no opposition to its policies". Jackson added, "Even those who are supposed to supervise [intelligence agencies] are likely to fear [them]." His advice speaks directly to our responsibilities today:

I believe that the safeguard of our liberty lies in limiting any national police or investigative organization, first of all to a small number of strictly federal offenses, and secondly to nonpolitical ones. The fact that we may have confidence in the administration of a federal investigative agency under its existing head does not mean that it may not revert again to the days when the Department of Justice was headed by men to whom the investigative power was a weapon to be used for their own purposes.[1]

Failure to Apply Checks and Balances. -- The natural tendency of Government is toward abuse of power. Men entrusted with power, even those aware of its dangers, tend, particularly when pressured, to slight liberty.

Our constitutional system guards against this tendency. It establishes many different checks upon power. It is those wise restraints which 'keep men free. In the field of intelligence those restraints have too often been ignored.

The three main departures in the intelligence field from the constitutional plan for controlling abuse of power have been:

(a) Excessive Executive Power. -- In a sense the growth of domestic intelligence activities mirrored the growth of presidential power generally. But more than any other activity, more even than exercise of the war power, intelligence activities have been left to the control of the Executive.

For decades Congress and the courts as well as the press and the public have accepted the notion that the control of intelligence activities was the exclusive prerogative of the Chief Executive and his surrogates. The exercise of this power was not questioned or even inquired into by outsiders. Indeed, at times the power was seen as flowing not from the law, but as inherent, in the Presidency. Whatever the theory, the fact was that intelligence activities were essentially exempted from the normal system of checks and balances.

Such Executive power, not founded in law or checked by Congress or the courts, contained the seeds of abuse and its growth was to be expected.

(b) Excessive Secrecy. -- Abuse thrives on secrecy. Obviously, public disclosure, of matters such as the names of intelligence agents or the technological details of collection methods is inappropriate. But in the field of intelligence, secrecy has been extended to inhibit review of the basic programs and practices themselves.

Those within the Executive branch and the Congress who would exercise their responsibilities wisely must be fully informed. The American public, as well, should know enough about intelligence activities to be able to apply its good sense to the underlying issues of policy and morality.

Knowledge is the key to control. Secrecy should no longer be allowed to shield the existence of constitutional, legal and moral problems from the scrutiny of all three branches of government or from the American people themselves.

(c) Avoidance of the Rule of Law. -- Lawlessness by Government breeds corrosive cynicism among the people and erodes the trust upon which government depends.

Here, there is no sovereign who stands above the law. Each of us, from presidents to the most disadvantaged citizen, must obey the law.

As intelligence operations developed, however, rationalizations were fashioned to immunize them from the restraints of the Bill of Rights and the specific prohibitions of the criminal code. The experience of our investigation leads us to conclude that such rationalizations are a dangerous delusion.

- B. Principles Applied in Framing Recommedations and The Scope of the Recommendations.

Although our recommendations are numerous and detailed, they flow naturally from our basic conclusion. Excessive intelligence activity which undermines individual rights must end. The system for controlling intelligence must be brought back within the constitutional scheme.

Some of our proposals are stark and simple. Because certain domestic intelligence activities were clearly wrong, the obvious solution is to prohibit them altogether. Thus, we would ban tactics such as those used in the FBI's COINTELPRO. But other activities present more complex problems. We see a clear need to safeguard the constitutional rights of speech, assembly, and privacy. At the same time, we do not want to prohibit or unduly restrict necessary and proper intelligence activity.

In seeking to accommodate those sometimes conflicting interests we have been guided by the earlier efforts of those who originally shaped our nation as a republic under law.

The Constitutional amendments protecting speech and assembly and individual privacy seek to preserve values at the core of our heritage, and vital to our future. The Bill of Rights, and the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting it suggest three principles which we have followed:

(1) Governmental action which directly infringes the rights of free speech and association must be prohibited. The First Amendment recognizes that even if useful to a proper end, certain governmental actions are simply too dangerous to permit at all. It commands that "Congress shall make no law" abridging freedom of speech or assembly.

(2) The Supreme Court, in interpreting that command, has required that any governmental action which has a collateral (rather than direct) impact upon the rights of speech and assembly is permissible only if it meets two tests. First, the action must be undertaken only to fulfill a compelling governmental need, and second, the government must use the least restrictive means to meet that need. The effect upon protected interests must be minimized.[2]

(3) Procedural safeguards -- "auxiliary precautions" as they were characterized in the Federalist Papers -- must be adopted along with substantive restraints. For example, while the Fourth Amendment prohibits only "unreasonable" searches and seizures, it requires a procedural check for reasonableness-the obtaining of a judicial warrant upon probable cause from a neutral magistrate. Our proposed procedural checks range from judicial review of intelligence activity before or after the fact, to formal and high level Executive branch approval, to greater disclosure and more effective Congressional oversight.

The Committee believes that its recommendations should be embodied in a comprehensive legislative charter defining and controlling the domestic security activities of the Federal Government. Accordingly, Part i of the, recommendations provides that intelligence agencies must be made subject to the rule of law. In addition, Part i makes clear that no theory, of "inherent constitutional authority" or otherwise, can justify the violation of any statute. Starting from the conclusion, based upon our record, that the Constitution and our fundamental values require a substantial curtailment of the scope of domestic surveillance, we deal after Part i with five basic questions:

1. Which agencies should conduct domestic security investigations?

The FBI should be primarily responsible for such investigations. Under the minimization principle, and to facilitate the control of domestic intelligence operations, only one agency should be involved in investigative activities which, even when limited as we propose, could give rise to abuse. Accordingly, Part ii of these recommendations reflects the Committee's position that foreign intelligence agencies (the CIA, NSA, and the military agencies) should be precluded from domestic security activity in the United States. Moreover, they should only become involved in matters involving the rights of Americans abroad where it is impractical to use the FBI, or where in the course of their lawful foreign intelligence operations they inadvertently collect information relevant to domestic security investigations. In Part iii the Committee recommends that non-intelligence agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service and the Post Office be required, in the course of any incidental involvement in domestic security investigations, to protect the privacy which citizens expect of first class mail and tax records entrusted to those agencies.

2. When should an American be the subject of an investigation at all; and when can particularly intrusive covert techniques, such as electronic surveillance or informants, be used?

In Part iv, which deals with the FBI, the Committee's recommendations seek to prevent the excessively broad, ill defined and open ended investigations shown to have been conducted over the past four decades. We attempt to change the focus of investigations from constitutionally protected advocacy and association to dangerous conduct. Part iv also sets forth specific substantive standards for, and procedural controls on, particular intrusive techniques.

3. Who should be accountable within the Executive branch for ensuring that intelligence agencies comply with the law and for the investigation of alleged abuses by employees of those agencies?

In Parts v and vi, the Committee recommends that these responsibilities fall initially upon the agency heads, their general counsel and inspectors general, but ultimately upon the Attorney General. The information necessary for control must be made available to those responsible for control, oversight and review; and their responsibilities must be made clear, formal, and fixed.

4. What is the appropriate role of the courts?

In Part vii, the Committee recommends the enactment of a comprehensive, civil remedy providing the courts with jurisdiction to entertain legitimate complaints by citizens injured by unconstitutional or illegal activities of intelligence agencies. Part viii suggests that criminal penalties should attach in cases of gross abuse. In addition, Part iv provides for judicial warrants before certain intrusive techniques can be used.

5. What is the appropriate role of Congress:

In Part xii the Committee reiterates its position that the Senate create a permanent intelligence oversight committee. The recommendations deal with numerous other issues such as the proposed repeal or amendment of the Smith Act, the proposed modernization of the Espionage Act to cover modern forms of espionage seriously detrimental to the national interest, the use of the GAO to assist Congressional oversight of the intelligence community, and remedial measures for past victims of improper intelligence activity.

Scope of Recommendations. -- The scope of our recommendations coincides with the scope of our investigation. We examined the FBI, which has been responsible for most domestic security investigations, as well as foreign and military intelligence agencies, the IRS, and the Post Office, to the extent they became involved incidentally in domestic intelligence functions. While there are undoubtedly activities of other agencies which might legitimately be addressed in these recommendations, the Committee simply did not have the time or resources to conduct a broader investigation. Furthermore, the mandate of Senate Resolution 21 required that the Committee exclude from the coverage of its recommendations those activities of the federal government which are directed at organized crime and narcotics.

The Committee believes that American citizens should not lose their constitutional rights to be free from improper intrusion by their Government when they travel overseas. Accordingly, the Committee proposes recommendations which apply to protect the rights of Americans abroad as well as at home.

1. Activities Covered

The Domestic Intelligence Recommendations pertain to: the domestic security activities of the federal government;[5] and any activities of military or foreign intelligence agencies which affect the rights of Americans 6 and any intelligence activities of any nonintelligence agency working in concert with intelligence agencies, which affect those rights.

2. Activities Not Covered

The recommendations are not designed to control federal investigative activities directed at organized crime, narcotics, or other law enforcement investigations unrelated to domestic security activities.

3. Agencies Covered

The agencies whose activities are specifically covered by the recommendations are:

(1) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (ii) the Central Intelligence Agency;

(111) the, National Security Agency and other intelligence agencies of the Department of Defense; (iv) the Internal Revenue Service; and (v) the United States Postal Service.

While it might be appropriate to provide similar detailed treatment to the activities of other agencies, such as the Secret Service, Customs Service, and Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division (Treasury Department), the Committee did not study these agencies intensively. A permanent oversight committee should investigate and study the intelligence functions of those agencies and the effect of their activities on the rights of Americans.

4. Indirect Prohibitions

Except as specifically provided herein, these Recommendations are intended to prohibit any agency from doing indirectly that which it would be prohibited from doing directly. Specifically, no agency covered by these Recommendations should request or induce any other agency, or any person, whether the agency or person is American or foreign, to engage in any activity which the requesting or inducing agency is prohibited from doing itself.

5. Individuals and Groups Not Covered

Except as specifically provided herein, these Recommendations do not apply to investigation of foreigners 7 who are officers or employees of a foreign power, or foreigners who, pursuant to the direction of a foreign power, are engaged in or about to engage in "hostile foreign intelligence activity" or "terrorist activity".[8]

6. Geographic Scope

These Recommendations apply to intelligence activities which affect the rights of Americans whether at home or abroad, including all domestic security activities within the United States.

7. Legislative Enactment of Recommendations

Most of these Recommendations are designed to be implemented in the form of legislation and others in the form of regulations pursuant to statute. (Recommendations 85 and 90 are not proposed to be implemented by statute.

- C. Recommendations

Pursuant to the requirement of Senate Resolution 21, these recommendations set forth the new congressional legislation [the Committee] deems necessary to "safeguard the rights of American citizens."[9] We believe these recommendations are the appropriate conclusion to a traumatic year of disclosures of abuses. We hope they will prevent such abuses in the future.

- - i. Intelligence Agencies Are Subject to the Rule of Law

Establishing a legal framework for agencies engaged in domestic security investigation is the most fundamental reform needed to end the long history of violating and ignoring the law set forth in Finding A. The legal framework can be created by a two-stage process of enabling legislation and administrative regulations promulgated to implement the legislation.

However, the Committee proposes that the Congress, in developing this mix of legislative and administrative charters, make clear to the Executive branch that it will not condone, and does not accept, any theory of inherent or implied authority to violate the Constitution, the proposed new charters, or any other statutes. We do not believe the Executive has, or should have, the inherent constitutional authority to violate the law or infringe the legal rights of Americans, whether it be a warrantless break-in into the home or office of an American, warrantless electronic surveillance, or a President's authorization to the FBI to create a massive domestic security program based upon secret oral directives. Certainly, there would be no such authority after Congress has, as we propose it should, covered the field by enactment of a comprehensive legislative charter.[10] Therefore statutes enacted pursuant to these recommendations should provide the exclusive legal authority for domestic security activities.

Recommendation 1. -- There is no inherent constitutional authority for the President or any intelligence agency to violate the law.

Recommendation 2. -- It is the intent of the Committee that statutes implementing these recommendations provide the exclusive legal authority for federal domestic security activities.

(a) No intelligence agency may engage in such activities unless authorized by statute, nor may it permit its employees, informants, or other covert human sources 11 to engage in such activities on its behalf.

(b) No executive directive or order may be issued which would conflict with such statutes.

Recommendation 3. -- In authorizing intelligence agencies to engage in certain activities, it is not intended that such authority empower agencies, their informants, or covert human sources to violate any prohibition enacted pursuant to these Recomendations or contained in the Constitution or in any other law.

- - ii. United States Foreign and Military Agencies Should Be Precluded from Domestic Security Activities

Part iv of these Recommendations centralizes domestic security investigations within the FBI. Past abuses also make it necessary that the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the military departments be preeluded expressly, except as specifically provided herein, from investigative activity which is conducted within the United States. Their activities abroad should also be controlled as provided herein to minimize their impact on the rights of Americans.

a. Central Intelligence Agency The CIA is responsible, for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. These recommendations minimize the impact of CIA operations on Americans. They do not affect CIA investigations of foreigners outside of the United States. The, main thrust is to prohibit past actions revealed as excessive, and to transfer to the FBI other activities which might involve the CIA in internal security or law enforcement matters. Those limited activities which the CIA retains are placed under tighter controls.

The Committee's recommendations on CIA domestic activities are similar to Executive Order 11905. They go beyond the Executive Order, however, in that they recommend that the main safeguards be made law. And, in addition, the Committee proposes tighter standards to preclude repetition of some past abuses.

General Provisions

The first two Recommendations pertaining to the CIA provide the context for more specific proposals. In Recommendation 4, the Committee endorses the prohibitions of the 1947 Act upon exercise by the CIA of subpoena, police or law enforcement powers or internal security functions. The Committee intends that Congress supplement, rather than supplant or derogate from the more general restrictions of the 1947 Act.

Recommendation 5 clarifies the role of the Director of Central Intelligence, in the protection of intelligence sources and methods. He should be charged with "coordinating" the protection of sources and methods -- that is, the development of procedures for the protection of sources and methods.[12] (Primary responsibility for investigations of security leaks should reside in the FBI.) Recommendation 5 also makes clear that the Director's responsibility for protecting sources and methods does not permit violations of law. The effect of the new Executive Order is substantially the same as Recommendation 5.

Recommendation 4 -- To supplement the prohibitions in the 1947 National Security Act against the CIA exercising "police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions," the CIA should be prohibited from conducting domestic security activities within the United States, except as specifically permitted by these recommendations.

Recommendation 5 -- The Director of Central Intelligence should be made responsible for "coordinating" the protection of sources and methods of the intelligence community. As head of the CIA, the Director should also be responsible in the first instance for the security of CIA facilities, personnel, operations, and information. Neither function, however, authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence to violate any federal or state law, or to take any action which is otherwise inconsistent with statutes implementing these recommendations.

CIA Activities Within the United States

1. Wiretapping, Mail Opening and Unauthorized Entry. -- The Committee's recommendations on CIA domestic activities apply primarily to actions directed at Americans. However, in Recommendation 6 the Committee recommends that the most intrusive and dangerous investigative techniques (electronic surveillance;[13] mail opening; or unauthorized entry 14) should be used in the United States only by the FBI and only pursuant to the judicial warrant procedures described in Recommendations 53, 54 and 55.

This approach is similar to the Executive order except that the Order permits the CIA to open mail in the United States pursuant to applicable statutes and regulations (i.e., with a warrant). The Committee's recommendations (see Parts iii and iv), places all three techniques -- mail opening, electronic surveillance and unauthorized entry -- under judicial warrant procedures and centralizes their use within the FBI under Attorney General supervision. The Committee sees no justification for distinguishing among these techniques, all of which represent an exercise of domestic police powers 15 which is inappropriate for a U.S. foreign intelligence agency within the United States and which inherently involve special dangers to civil liberties and personal privacy.

2. Other Covert Techniques. -- The use of other covert techniques by the CIA within the United States is sharply restricted by Recommendation 7 to specific situations.

The Committee would permit the CIA to conduct physical surveillance of persons on the premises of its own installations and facilities. Outside of its premises, the Committee would permit the CIA to conduct limited physical surveillance and confidential inquiries of its own employees 17 as part of a preliminary security investigation.

Although the Committee generally centralizes such investigations within the FBI, it would be too burdensome to require the Bureau to investigate every allegation that an employee has personal difficulties, which could make him a security risk, or allegations of suspicious behavior suggesting the disclosure of information. Before involving the FBI, the CIA could conduct a preliminary inquiry, which usually consists of nothing more than interviews with the subject's office colleagues, or his family, neighbors or associates, and perhaps confrontation of the subject himself. In some situations, however, limited physical surveillance might enable the CIA to resolve the allegation or to determine that there was a serious security breach involved.

Unlike the Executive Order, however, the Committee recommendations limit this authority to present CIA employees who are subject to summary dismissal. The only remedy available to the Government for security problems with past employees is criminal prosecution or other legal action. All security leak investigations for proposed criminal prosecution should be centralized in the FBI. Authorizing the use of any covert technique against contractors and their employees, let alone former employees of CIA contractors, as the Executive Order does, would authorize CIA surveillance of too large a number of Americans. The CIA can withdraw security clearances until satisfied by the contractor that a security risk has been remedied and, in serious cases, any investigations could be handled by the FBI.

The recommendation on the use of covert techniques within the United States also precludes the use of covert human sources such as undercover agents and informants," with one exception expressly stated to be limited to "exceptional" cases. The Committee would authorize the CIA to place an agent in a domestic group, but only for the purpose of establishing credible cover to be used in a foreign intelligence mission abroad and only when the Director of Central Intelligence finds it to be "essential" to collection of information "vital" to the United States and the Attorney General finds that the operation will be conducted tinder procedures designed to prevent misuse.[19]

Apart from this limited exception, the CIA could not infiltrate groups within the United States for any purpose, including, as was done in the, past, the purported protection of intelligence sources and methods or the general security of the CIA's facilities and personnel. (The Executive Order prohibits infiltration of groups within the United States "for purposes of reporting on or influencing its activities or members," but does not explicitly prohibit infiltration to protect intelligence sources and methods or the physical security of the agency.)

3. Collection of Information. -- In addition to limiting the use of particular covert techniques, the Committee limits, in Recommendation 8, the situations in which the CIA may intentionally collect, by any means, information within the United States concerning Americans. The recommendation permits the CIA to collect information within the United States about Americans only with-respect to persons working for the CIA or having some other significant affiliation or contact, with CIA. The CIA should not be in the business of investigating Americans as intelligence or counterintelligence targets within the United States -- a responsibility which should be centralized in the FBI and performed only under the circumstances proposed as lawful in Part iv.

The Executive Order only restricts CIA collection of information about Americans if the information concerns "the domestic activities of United States citizens." Unlike the Committee, the Order does not restrict CIA collection of information about foreign travel or wholly lawful international contacts and communication of Americans. As the Committee has learned from its study of the CIA's CHAOS operation, in the process of gathering information about the international travel and contacts of Americans, the CIA acquired within the United States a great deal of additional information about the domestic activities of Americans.

The Executive Order also permits collection within the United States of information about the domestic activities of Americans in several other instances not permitted under the Committee recommendations:

(a) Collection of "foreign intelligence or counterintelligence" about the domestic activity of commercial organizations. (The Committee's restrictions on the collection of information apply to investigations of organizations as well as individuals.) ;

(b) Collection of information concerning the identity of persons in contact with CIA employees or with foreigners who are subjects of a counterintelligence inquiry. (Within the United States, the Committee would require any investigations to collect such information to be conducted by the FBI, and only if authorized under Part iv, and subject to its procedural controls.) ;

(c) Collection of "foreign intelligence" from a cooperating source within the United States about the domestic activities of Americans. "Foreign intelligence," is an exceedingly broad and vague standard. The use of such a standard raises the prospect of another Project CHAOS. (The Committee would prohibit such collection by the CIA within the United States, except with respect to persons presently or prospectively affiliated with CIA.) ;

(d) Collection of information about Americans "reasonably believed" to be acting on behalf of a foreign power or engaging in international terrorist or narcotic activities. (The Committee would require investigations to collect,such information within the United States, to be conducted by the FBI, and only if authorized under Part iv.) ;

(e) Collection of information concerning persons considered by the CIA to pose a clear threat to intelligence agency facilities or personnel, provided such information is retained only by the "threatened" agency and that proper coordination is established with the FBI. (This was the basis for the Office of Security's RESISTANCE program investigating dissent throughout the country.) (The Committee would require any such "threat" collection outside the CIA be conducted by the FBI, and only if authorized by Part iv, or by local law enforcement.)

Recommendation 6. -- The CIA should not conduct electronic surveillance, unauthorized entry, or mail opening within the United States for any purpose.

Recommendation 7. -- The CIA should not employ physical surveillance, infiltration of groups or any other covert techniques against Americans within the United States except:

(a) Physical surveillance of persons on the grounds of CIA installations;

(b) Physical surveillance during a preliminary investigation of allegations an employee is a security risk for a limited period outside of CIA installations. Such surveillance should be conducted only upon written authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence and should be limited to the subject of the investigation and, only to the extent necessary to identify them, to persons with whom the subject has contact;

(c) Confidential inquiries, during a preliminary investigation of allegations an employee is a security risk, of outside sources concerning medical or financial information about the subject which is relevant to those allegations;[19]

(d) The use of identification which does not reveal CIA or government affiliation, in background and other security investigations permitted the CIA by these recommendations, and the conduct of checks, which do not reveal CIA or government affiliation for the purpose of judging the effectiveness of cover operations, upon the written authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence;

(e) In exceptional cases, the placement or recruitment of agents within an unwitting domestic group solely for the purpose of preparing them for assignments abroad and only for as long as is necessary to accomplish that purpose. This should take place only if the Director of Central Intelligence makes a written finding that it is essential for foreign intelligence collection of vital importance to the United States, and the Attorney General makes a written finding that the operation will be conducted under procedures designed to prevent misuse of the undisclosed participation or of any information obtained therefrom.[20] In the case of any such action, no information received by CIA from the agent as a result of his position in the group should be disseminated outside the CIA unless it indicates felonious criminal conduct or threat of death or serious bodily harm, in which case dissemination should be permitted to an appropriate official agency if approved by the Attorney General.

Recommendation 8. -- The CIA should not collect 21 information within the United States concerning Americans except:

(a) Information concerning CIA employees,[22] CIA contractors and their employees, or applicants for such employment or contracting;

(b) Information concerning individuals or organizations providing, or offering to provide,[23] assistance to the CIA;

(c) Information concerning individuals or organizations being considered by the CIA as potential sources of information or assistance;[24]

(d) Visitors to CIA facilities;[25]

(e) Persons otherwise in the immediate vicinity of sensitive CIA sites;[26] or

(f) Persons who give their informed written consent to such collection.

In (a), (b) and (c) above, information should be collected only if necessary for the purpose of determining the person's fitness for employment, contracting or assistance. If, in the course of such collection, information is obtained which indicates criminal activity, it should be transmitted to the FBI or other appropriate agency. When an American's relationship with the CIA is prospective, information should only be collected if there is a bona fide expectation the person might be used by the CIA.

CIA Activities Outside of the United States

The Committee would permit a wider range of CIA activities against Americans abroad than it would permit the CIA to undertake within the United States, but it would not permit the CIA to investigate abroad the lawful activities of Americans to any greater degree than the FBI could investigate such activities at home.

Abroad, the FBI is not in-a position to protect the CIA from serious threats to its facilities or personnel, or to investigate all serious security violations. To the extent it is impractical to rely on local law enforcement authorities, the CIA should be free to preserve its security by specified appropriate investigations which may involve Americans, including surveillance, of persons other than its own employees.

The Committee gives to the FBI the sole responsibility within the United States for authorized domestic security investigations of Americans. However, when such an investigation has overseas aspects, the FBI looks to the CIA as the overseas operational arm of the intelligence community. The recommendations would authorize the CIA to target Americans abroad as part of an authorized investigation initiated by the FBI.

The Committee does not recommend permitting the CIA itself to initiate such investigations of Americans overseas.[27] Present communications permit rapid consultation with the Department of Justice. Moreover, the lesson of CHAOS is that an American's activities abroad may be ambiguous, such as contact with persons who may be acting on behalf of hostile foreign powers at an international conference on disarmament. The question is who shall determine there is sufficient information to justify making an American citizen a target of his government's intelligence apparatus?

The limitations contained in Recommendation 9 only pertain to the CIA initiating investigations or otherwise intentionally collecting information on Americans abroad. The CIA would not be prohibited from accepting and passing on information on the illegal activities of Americans which the CIA acquires incidentally in the course of its other activities abroad.

The Committee believes that judgments should be centralized within the Justice Department to promote consistent, carefully controlled application of the appropriate standards and protection of Constitutional rights. This is the same position taken by Director Colby in setting current CIA policy for mounting operations against Americans abroad. In March 1974, Director Colby formally terminated the CHAOS program and promulgated new guidelines for future activity abroad involving Americans, which, in effect, transferred such responsibilities to the Department of Justice.[28]

The Committee is somewhat more restrictive than the Executive Order with respect to collection of information on Americans. As mentioned earlier, the Order only restricts CIA collection of information about the "domestic activities" of Americans and does not prohibit the collection of information regarding the lawful travel or international contacts of American citizens. This creates a particularly significant problem with respect to CIA activities directed against Americans abroad.

The Order permits the CIA wider latitude abroad than do the Committee's Recommendations in two other important respects. The Order permits collection of information if the American is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power. That exemption on its face would include Americans working for a foreign country on business or legal matters or otherwise engaged in wholly lawful activities in compliance with applicable registration or other regulatory statutes. More importantly, the Order permits the CIA to collect "foreign intelligence" or "counterintelligence" information abroad about the domestic activities of Americans. The Order then broadly defines "foreign intelligence" as information about the intentions or activities of a foreign country or person, or information about areas outside the United States. This would authorize the CIA to collect, abroad, for example, information about the domestic activities of American businessmen which provided intelligence about business transactions of foreign persons.

The CIA does not at present specifically collect intelligence on the economic activities of Americans overseas. The Committee suggests that appropriate oversight committees examine the question of the overseas collection of economic intelligence.

Use of Covert Techniques Against Americans Abroad

Recommendation 11 requires the use of all covert techniques be governed by the same standards, procedures, and approvals required for their use by the Justice Department against Americans within the United States. Thus, in the case of electronic surveillance, unauthorized entry, or mail opening, a judicial warrant would be required. As a matter of sound Constitutional principle, the Fourth Amendment protections enjoyed by Americans at home should also apply to protect them against their Government abroad. It would be just as offensive to have a CIA agent burglarize an American's apartment in Rome as it would be for the FBI to do so in New York.

Requirements that a warrant be obtained in the United States would not present an excessive burden. Electronic surveillance and unauthorized entries are not presently conducted against Americans abroad without prior consultation and approval from CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Moreover, the, present Deputy Director of CIA for Operations has testified that bona fide counterintelligence investigations are lengthy and time consuming and prior review within the United States, including consultation with the Justice Department, would not be a serious problem.[29] Indeed electronic surveillance of Americans abroad under present administration policy also requires approval by the Attorney General.

The Committee reinforces the general restrictions upon overseas targeting of Americans by recommending that the CIA be prohibited from requesting a friendly foreign intelligence service or other person from undertaking activities against Americans which the CIA itself may not do. This would not require that a foreign government's use of covert techniques be conducted under the same procedures, e.g., warrants, required by those Recommendations for the CIA and the FBI. It would mean that the CIA cannot ask a foreign intelligence service to bug the apartment of an American unless the circumstances would permit the United States Government to obtain a judicial warrant from a Federal Court in this country to conduct such surveillance of the American abroad.

The Committee places greater restrictions upon the CIA's use of covert techniques against Americans abroad than does the Executive Order. For example, the Order permits the CIA to conduct electronic surveillance and unauthorized entries under "procedures approved by the Attorney General consistent with the law." No judicial warrant procedure is required. In addition, the Order's restriction on CIA's opening mail of Americans is limited to mail "in the United States postal channels." In other words, under the Order the CIA is not prevented from intercepting abroad and opening a letter mailed by an American to his family, or sent to him from the United States.

The Order also contains no restrictions on the CIA infiltrating a group abroad, even if it were one composed entirely of Americans engaged in wholly lawful activities such as a political club of American students in Paris. Furthermore, the Order permits the CIA to conduct physical surveillance abroad of any American "reasonably believed to be" engaged in "activities threatening to the national security." On its face this language appears overly permissive and might be read to authorize a repetition of the CHAOS program in which Americans were targeted for surveillance because of their participation in international conferences critical of the U.S. role in Vietnam.

Recommendation 9. -- The CIA should not collect information abroad concerning Americans except:

(a) Information concerning Americans which it is permitted to collect within the United States;[30]

(b) At the request of the Justice Department as part of criminal investigations or an investigation of an American for suspected terrorist,[30] or hostile foreign intelligence 30b activities or security leak or security risk investigations which the FBI has opened pursuant to Part iv of those recommendations and which is conducted consistently with recommendations contained in Part iv.[31]

Recommendation 10. -- The CIA should be able to transmit to the FBI or other appropriate agencies information concerning Americans acquired as the incidental byproduct of otherwise permissible foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations,[32] whenever such information indicates any activity in violation of American law.

Recommendation 11. -- The CIA may employ covert techniques abroad against Americans:

(a) Under circumstances in which the CIA could use such covert techniques against Americans within the United States;[33] or

(b) When collecting information as part of Justice Department investigation, in which case the CIA may use a particular covert techniques under the standards and procedures and approvals applicable to its use against Americans within the United States by the FBI (See Part iv); or

(c) To the extent necessary to identify persons known or suspected to be Americans who come in contact with foreigners the CIA is investigating.

CIA Human Experiments and Drug Use

Recommendation 12 tracks similar restrictions in the Executive Order but proposes an additional safeguard -- giving the National Commission on Biomedical Ethics and Human Standards jurisdiction to review any testing on Americans.

Recommendation 12 -- The CIA should not use in experimentation on human subjects, any drug, device or procedure which is designed or intended to harm, or is reasonably likely to harm, the physical or mental health of the human subject, except with the informed written consent, witnessed by a disinterested third party, of each human subject, and in accordance with the guidelines issued by the National Cornmission for the Protection of Human Subjects for Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The jurisdiction of the Commission should be amended to include the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies of the United States Government.

Review and Certification

Recommendation 13 ensures careful monitoring of those CIA activities authorized in the recommendations which are directed at Americans.

Recommendation 13 -- Any CIA activity engaged in pursuant to Recommendations 7, 8, 9, 10, or 11 should be subject to periodic review and certification of compliance with the Constitution, applicable statutes, agency regulations and executive orders by:

(a) The Inspector General of the CIA;

(b) The General Counsel of the CIA in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence;

(c) The Attorney General; and

(d) The oversight committee recommended in Part xii.

All such certifications should be available for review by congressional oversight committees.

b. National Security Agency

The recommendations contained in this section suggest controls on the electronic surveillance activities of the National Security Agency insofar as they involve, or could involve, Americans. There is no statute which either authorizes or specifically restricts such activities. NSA was created by executive order in 1952, and its functions are described in directives of the National Security Council.

While, in practice, NSA's collection activities are complex and sophisticated, the process by which it produces foreign intelligence can be reduced to a few easily understood principles. NSA intercepts messages passing over international lines of communication, some of which have one terminal within the United States. Traveling over these lines of communication, especially those with one terminal in the United States, are the messages of Americans, most of which are irrelevant to NSA's foreign intelligence mission. NSA often has no means of excluding such messages, however, from others it intercepts which might be of foreign intelligence value. It does have, however, the capability to select particular messages from those it intercepts which are of foreign intelligence value. Most international communications of Americans are not selected, since they do not meet foreign intelligence criteria. Having selected messages of possible intelligence value, NSA monitors (reads) them, and uses the information it obtains as the basis for reports which it furnishes the intelligence agencies.

Having this process in mind, one will more readily understand the recommendations of the Committee insofar as NSA's handling of the messages of Americans is concerned. The Committee recommends first that NSA monitor only foreign communications. It should not monitor domestic communications, even for foreign intelligence purposes. Second, the Committee recommends that NSA should not select messages for monitoring, from those foreign communications it has intercepted, because the message is to or from or refers to a particular American, unless the Department of Justice has first obtained a search warrant, or the particular American has consented. Third, the Committee recommends that NSA be required to make every practicable effort to eliminate or minimize the extent to which the communications of Americans are intercepted, selected, or monitored. Fourth, for those communications of Americans which are nevertheless incidentally selected and monitored, the Committee recommends that NSA be prohibited from disseminating such communication, or information derived therefrom, which identifies an American, unless the communication indicates evidence of hostile foreign intelligence or terrorist activity, or felonious criminal conduct, or contains a threat of death or serious bodily harm. In these cases, the Committee recommends that the Attorney General approve any such dissemination as being consistent with these policies.

In summary, the Committee's recommendations reflect its belief that NSA should have no greater latitude to monitor the communications of Americans than any other intelligence agency. To the extent that other agencies are required to obtain a warrant before monitoring the communications of Americans, NSA should be required to obtain a warrant.[34]

Recommendation 14. -- NSA should not engage in domestic security activities. Its functions should be limited in a precisely drawn legislative charter to the collection of foreign intelligence from foreign communications.[35]

Recommendation 15. -- NSA should take all practicable measures consistent with its foreign intelligence mission to eliminate or minimize the interception, selection, and monitoring of communications of Americans from the foreign communications.[36]

Recommendation 16. -- NSA should not be permitted to select for monitoring any communication to, from, or about an American without his consent, except for the purpose of obtaining information about hostile foreign intelligence or terrorist activities, and then only if a warrant approving such monitoring is obtained in accordance with procedures similar[37] to those contained in Title Ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

(This recommendation would eliminate the possibility that NSA would re-establish its "watch lists" of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In that case, the names of Americans were submitted to NSA by other federal agencies and were used as a basis for selecting and monitoring, without a warrant, the international communications of those Americans.)

Recommendation 17. -- Any personally identifiable information about an American which NSA incidentally acquires, other than pursuant to a warrant, should not be disseminated without the consent of the American, but should be destroyed as promptly as possible, unless it indicates:

(a) Hostile foreign intelligence or terrorist activities; or

(b) Felonious criminal conduct for which a warrant might be obtained pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968; or

(c) A threat of death or serious bodily harm.

If dissemination is permitted, by (a), (b) and (c) above, it must only be made to an appropriate official and after approval by the Attorney General.

(This recommendation is consistent with NSA's policy prior to the Executive Order.[38] NSA's practice prior to the Executive Order was not to disseminate material containing personally identifiable information about Americans.)

Recommendation 18. -- NSA should not request from any commercial carrier any communication which it could not otherwise obtain pursuant to these recommendations.

(This recommendation is to ensure that NSA will not resume an operation such as SHAMROCK, disclosed during the Committee's hearings, whereby NSA received for almost 30 years copies of most international telegrams transmitted by certain international telegraph companies in the United States.)

Recommendation 19. -- The Office of Security at NSA should be permitted to collect background information on present or prospective employees or contractors of NSA, solely for the purpose of determining their fitness for employment. With respect to security risks or the security of its installations, NSA should be permitted to conduct physical surveillances, consistent with such surveillances as the CIA is permitted to conduct, in similar circumstances, by these recommendations.

c. Military Service and Defense Department Investigative Agencies

This section of the Committee's recommendations pertains to the controls upon the intelligence activities of the military services and Department of Defense insofar as they involve Americans who are not members of or affiliated with the armed forces.

In general, the restrictions seek to limit military investigations to activities in the civilian community which are necessary and pertinent to the military mission, and which cannot feasibly be accomplished by civilian agencies. In overseas locations where civilian agencies do not perform investigative activities to assist the military mission, military intelligence is given more latitude. Specifically, the Committee recommends that military intelligence be limited within the United States to conducting investigations of violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice; investigations for security clearances of Department of Defense employees and contractors; and investigations immediately before and during the deployment of armed forces in connection with civil disturbances. None of these investigations should involve the use of any covert technique employed against American civilians. In overseas locations, the Committee recommends that military intelligence have additional authority to conduct investigations of terrorist activity and hostile foreign intelligence activity. In these cases, covert techniques directed at Americans may be employed if consistent with the Committee's restrictions upon the use of such techniques in the United States in Part iv.

Recommendation 20. -- Except as specifically provided herein, the Department of Defense should not engage in domestic security activities. Its functions, as they relate to the activities of the foreign intelligence community, should be limited in a precisely drawn legislative charter to the conduct of foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence activities and tactical military intelligence activities abroad, and production, analysis, and dissemination of departmental intelligence.

Recommendation 21. -- In addition to its foreign intelligence responsibility, the Department of Defense has a responsibility to investigate its personnel in order to protect the security of its installations and property, to ensure order and discipline within its ranks, and to conduct other limited investigations once dispatched by the President to suppress a civil disorder. A legislative charter should define precisely -- in a manner which is not inconsistent with these recommendations -- the authorized scope and purpose of any investigations undertaken by the Department of Defense to satisfy these responsibilities.

Recommendation 22. -- No agency of the Department of Defense should conduct investigations of violations of criminal law or otherwise perform any law enforcement or domestic security functions within the United States, except on military bases or concerning military personnel, to enforce the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Control of Civil Disturbance Intelligence

The Department of the Army has executive responsibility for rendering assistance in connection with civil disturbances. In the late 1960s, it instituted a nationwide collection program in which Army investigators were dispatched to collect information on the political activities of Americans. This was done on the theory that such information was necessary to prepare the Army in the event that its troops were sent to the scene of civil disturbances. The Committee believes that the Army's potential role in civil disturbances does not justify such an intelligence effort directed against American civilians.

Recommendation 23. -- The Department of Defense should not be permitted to conduct investigations of Americans on the theory that the information derived therefrom might be useful in potential civil disorders. The Army should be permitted to gather information about geography, logistical matters, or the identity of local officials which is necessary to the positioning, support, and use of troops in an area where troops are likely to be deployed by the President in connection with a civil disturbance. The Army should be permitted to investigate Americans involved in such disturbances after troops have been deployed to the site of a civil disorder, (i) to the extent necessary to fulfill the military mission, and (ii) to the extent the information cannot be obtained from the FBI. (The FBI's responsibility in connection with civil disorders and its assistance to the Army is described in Part IV.)

Recommendation 24. -- Appropriate agencies of the Department of Defense should be permitted to collect background information on their present or prospective employees or contractors. With respect to security risks or the security of its installations, the Department of Defense should be permitted to conduct physical surveillance consistent with such surveillances as the CIA is permitted to conduct, in similar circumstances, by these recommendations.

Prohibitions and Limitations of Covert Techniques

During the Army's civil disturbance collection program of the late 1960s, Army intelligence agents employed a variety of covert techniques to gather information about civilian political activities. These included covert penetrations of private meetings and organizations, use of informants, monitoring amateur radio broadcasts, and posing as newsmen. This provision is designed to prevent the use of such covert techniques against American civilians. The Committee believes that none of the legitimate investigative tasks of the military within the United States justified the use of such techniques against unaffiliated Americans.

Recommendation 25. -- Except as provided in 27 below, the Department of Defense should not direct any covert technique (e.g., electronic surveillance, informants, etc.) at American civilians.

Limited investigations Abroad

The military services currently conduct preventive intelligence investigations within the United States where members of their respective services are agents of, or are collaborating with, a hostile foreign intelligence service. These investigations are coordinated with, and under the ultimate control of, the FBI. The Committee's recommendations are not intended to prevent the military services from continuing to assist the FBI with such investigations involving members of the armed forces. They are intended, however, to place responsibility for these investigations, insofar as they take place within the United States, in the FBI, and not in the military services themselves. The military services, on the other band, are given additional responsibility to conduct investigations of Americans who are suspected of engaging in terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity in overseas locations.

Recommendation 26. -- The Department of Defense should be permitted to conduct abroad preventive intelligence investigations of unaffiliated Americans as described in Part iv below, provided 'Such investigations are first approved by the FBI. Such investigations by the Department of Defense, including the use of covert techniques, should ordinarily be conducted in a manner consistent with the recommendations pertaining to the FBI, contained in Part iv; however, overseas locations, where U.S. military forces constitute the governing power, or where U.S. military forces are engaged in hostilities, circumstances may require greater latitude to conduct such investigations.

- - iii. Non-Intelligence Agencies Should Be Barred From Domestic Security Activity

a. Internal Revenue Service

The Committee's review of intelligence collection and investigative activity by IRS' Intelligence Division and of the practice of furnishing information in IRS files to the intelligence agencies demonstrates that reforms are necessary and appropriate. The primary objective of reform is to prevent IRS from becoming an instrumentality of the intelligence agencies, beyond the scope of what IRS, as the Federal tax collector, should be doing. Recommendations 27 through 29 are designed to achieve this objective by providing that IRS collection of intelligence and its conduct of investigations are to be confined strictly to tax matters. Moreover, programs of tax investigation, in which targets are selected partly because of indications of tax violations and partly because of reasons relating to domestic security, are prohibited where they would erode constitutional rights. Where otherwise appropriate, such programs must be conducted under special safeguards to prevent any adverse effect on the exercise of those rights.

These recommendations should prevent a recurrence of the excesses associated with the Special Services Staff and the Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System.

Targeting of Persons or Groups for Investigations or Intelligence-Gathering by IRS[39]

Recommendation 27. -- The IRS should not, on behalf of any intelligence agency or for its own use, collect any information about the activities of Americans except for the purposes of enforcing the tax laws.

Recommendation 28. -- IRS should not select any person or group for tax investigation on the basis of political activity or for any other reason not relevant to enforcement of the tax laws.

Recommendation 29. -- Any program of intelligence investigation relating to domestic security in which targets are selected by both tax and non-tax criteria should only be initiated:

(a) Upon the written request of the Attorney General or the Secretary of the Treasury, specifying the nature of the requested program and the need therefore; and

(b) After the written certification by the Commissioner of the IRS that procedures have been developed which are sufficient to prevent the infringement of the constitutional rights of Americans; and

(c) With congressional oversight committees being kept continually advised of the nature and extent of such programs.

Disclosure Procedures

The Committee's review of disclosure of tax information by IRS to the FBI and the CIA showed three principal abuses by those intelligence agencies: (1) the by-passing of disclosure procedures mandated by law, resulting in the agencies obtaining access to tax returns and tax-related information through improper channels, and, sometimes, without a proper basis; (2) the failure to state the reasons justifying the need for the information and the uses contemplated so that IRS could determine if the request met the applicable criteria for disclosure; and (3) the improper use of tax returns and information, particularly by the FBI in COINTELPRO. Recommendations 30 through 35 are designed to prevent these abuses from occurring again.

While general problems of disclosure are being studied by several different congressional committees with jurisdiction over IRS, these recommendations reflect this Committee's focus on disclosure problems seen in the interaction between IRS and the intelligence agencies.

Recommendation 30. -- No intelligence agency should request 40 from the Internal Revenue Service tax returns or tax related information except under the statutes and regulations controlling such disclosures. In addition, the existing procedures under which tax returns and tax-related information are released by the IRS should be strengthened, as suggested in the following five recommendations.

Recommendation 31. -- All requests from an intelligence agency to the IRS for tax returns and tax-related information should be in writing, and signed by the bead of the intelligence agency making the request, or his designee. Copies of such requests should be filed with the Attorney General. Each request should include a clear statement of:

(d) The purpose for which disclosure is sought;

(e) Facts sufficient to establish that the requested information is needed by the requesting agency for the performance of an authorized and lawful function;

(f) The uses which the requesting agency intends to make of the information;

(g) The extent of the disclosures sought;

(h) Agreement by the requesting agency not to use the documents or information for any purpose other than that stated in the request; and

(i) Agreement by the requesting agency that the information will not be disclosed to any other agency or person except in accordance with the law.

Recommendation 32. -- IRS should not release tax returns or taxrelated information to any intelligence agency unless it has received a request satisfying the requirements of Recommendation 31, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has approved the request in writing.

Recommendation 33. -- IRS should maintain a record of all such requests and responses thereto for a period of twenty years.

Recommendation 34. -- No intelligence agency should use the information supplied to it by the IRS pursuant to a request of the agency except as stated in a proper request for disclosure.

Recommendation 35. -- All requests for information sought by the FBI should be filed by the Department of Justice. Such requests should be signed by the Attorney General or his designee, following a determination by the Department that the request is proper under the applicable statutes and regulations.

b. Post Office (U.S. Postal Service)

These recommendations are designed to tighten the existing restrictions regarding requests by intelligence agencies for both inspection of the exteriors of mail ("mail cover") and inspection of the contents of first class mail ("mail opening"). As to mail cover, the Committee's recommendation is to centralize the review and approval of all requests by requiring that only the Attorney General may authorize mail cover, and to eliminate unjustified mail covers by requiring that the mail cover be found "necessary" to a domestic security investigation. With respect to mail opening, the recommendations provide that it can only be done pursuant to court warrant.

Recommendation 36. -- The Post Office should not Permit the FBI or any intelligence agency to inspect markings or addresses on first class mail, nor should the Post Office itself inspect markings or addresses on behalf of the FBI or any intelligence agency, on first class mail, except upon the written approval of the Attorney General or his designee. Where one of the correspondents is an American, the Attorney General or his designee should only approve such inspection for domestic security purposes upon a written finding that it is necessary to a criminal investigation or a preventive intelligence investigation of terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity.

Upon such a request, the Post Office may temporarily remove from circulation such correspondence for the purpose of such inspection of its exterior as is related to the investigation.

Recommendation 37. -- The Post Office should not transfer the custody of any first class mail to any agency except the Department of Justice. Such mail should not be transferred or opened except upon a judicial search warrant.

(a) In the case of mail where one of the correspondents is an American, the judge must find that there is probable cause to believe that the mail contains evidence, of a crime.[41]

(b) In the case of mail where both parties are foreigners:

l. ) The judge must find that there is probable cause to believe that both parties to such correspondence are foreigners, and one of the correspondents is an officer, employee or conscious agent of a foreign power; and

m. ) The Attorney General must certify that the mail opening is likely to reveal information necessary either (i) to the protection of the nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of force of a foreign power; (ii) to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States; or (iii) to protect national security information against hostile foreign intelligence activity.

- - iv. Federal Domestic Security Activities Should Be Limited and Controlled to Prevent Abuses Without Hampering Criminal Investigations or Investigations of Foreign Espionage

The recommendations contained in this part are designed to accomplish two principal objectives: (1) prohibit improper intelligence activities and (2) define the limited domestic security investigations which should be permitted. As suggested earlier, the ultimate goal is a statutory mandate for the federal government's domestic security function that will ensure that the FBI, as the primary domestic security investigative agency, concentrates upon criminal conduct as opposed to political rhetoric or association. Our recommendations would vastly curtail the scope of domestic security investigations as they have been conducted, by prohibiting inquiries initiated because the Bureau regards a group as falling within a vaguely defined category such as "subversive," "New Left," "Black Nationalist Hate Groups," or "White Hate Groups." The recommendations also ban investigations based merely upon the fact that a person or group is associating with others who are being investigated (e.g., the Bureau's investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference because of alleged "Communist infiltration").

The simplest way to eliminate investigations of peaceful speech and association would be to limit the FBI to traditional investigations of crimes which have been committed (including the crimes of attempt and conspiracy). The Committee found, however, that there are circumstances where the FBI should have authority to conduct limited "intelligence investigations" of threatened conduct (terrorism and foreign espionage) which is generally covered by the criminal law, where the conduct has not yet reached the stage of a prosecuteable act.

The Committee, however, found that abuses were frequently associated even with such intelligence investigations. This led us also to recommend: precise limitations upon the use of covert techniques (Recommendations 51 to 60) ; restrictions upon maintenance and dissemination of information gathered in such investigations (Recommendations 64 to 68) ; and a statutory requirement that the Attorney General monitor these investigations and terminate them as soon as practical (Recommendation 69).

a. Centralize Supervision, Investigative Responsibility, and the Use of Covert Techniques

Investigations should be centralized within the Department of Justice. It is the Committee's judgment that if former Attorneys General had been held accountable by the Congress for ensuring compliance by the FBI and the intelligence agencies with laws designed to protect the rights of Americans, the Department of Justice would have been more likely to discover and enjoin improper activities. Furthermore, centralizing domestic security investigations within the FBI will facilitate the Attorney General's supervision of them.

Recommendation 38. -- All domestic security investigative activity, including the use of covert techniques, should be centralized within the Federal Bureau of Investigation, except those investigations by the Secret Service designed to protect the life of the President or other Secret Service protectees. Such investigations and the use of covert techniques in those investigations should be centralized within the Secret Service.

Recommendation 39. -- All domestic security activities of the federal government and all other intelligence agency activities covered by the Domestic Intelligence Recommendations should be subject to Justice Department oversight to assure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States.

b. Prohibitions

The Committee recommends a set of prohibitions, in addition to its later recommendations limiting the scope of and procedural controls for domestic security investigations.

The following prohibitions cover abuses ranging from the political use of the sensitive information maintained by the Bureau to the excesses of COINTELPRO. They are intended to cover activities engaged in, by, or on behalf of, the FBI. For example, in prohibiting Bureau interference in lawful speech, publication, assembly, organization, or association of Americans, the Committee intends to prohibit a Bureau agent from mailing fake letters to factionalize a group as well as to prohibit an informant from manipulating or influencing the peaceful activities of a group on behalf of the FBI.

Subsequent recommendations limit the kinds of investigations which can be opened and provide controls for those investigations. Specifically, the Committee limits FBI authority to collect information on Americans to enumerated circumstances; limits authority to maintain information on political beliefs, political assocations, or private lives of Americans; requires judicial warrants for the most intrusive covert collection techniques (electronic surveillance, mail opening, and surreptitious entry); and proposes new restrictions upon the use of other covert techniques, particularly informants.

Recommendation 41. -- The FBI should be prohibited from engaging on its own or through informants or others, in any of the following activities directed at Americans:

(a) Disseminating any information to the White House, any other federal official, the news media, or any other person for a political or other improper purpose, such as discrediting an opponent of the administration or a critic of an intelligence or investigative agency.

(b) Interfering with lawful speech, publication, assembly, organizational activity, or association of Americans.

(c) Harassing individuals through unnecessary overt investigative techniques[42] such as interviews or obvious physical surveillance for the purpose of intimidation.

Recommendation 41. -- The Bureau should be prohibited from maintaining information on the political beliefs, political associations, or private lives of Americans except that which is clearly necessary for domestic security investigations as described in Part c.[43]

c. Authorized Scope of Domestic Security Investigations

The Committee sought three objectives in defining the appropriate jurisdiction of the FBI. First, we sought to carefully limit any investigations other than traditional criminal investigations to five defined areas: preventive intelligence investigations (in two areas closely related to serious criminal activity -- terrorist and hostile foreign intelligence activities), civil disorders assistance, background investigations, security risk investigations, and security leak investigations.

Second, we sought substantially to narrow, and to impose special restrictions on the conduct of, those investigations which involved the most flagrant abuses in the past: preventive intelligence investigations and civil disorders assistance. Third, we sought to provide a clear statutory foundation for those investigations which the Committee believes are appropriate to fill the vacuum in FBI legal authority.

Achieving the first and second objectives will have the most significant impact upon the FBI's domestic intelligence program and indeed, could eliminate almost half its workload. Recommendations 44 through 46 impose two types of restrictions upon the conduct of intelligence investigations and civil disorders assistance. First, the scope of intelligence investigations is limited to terrorist activities or espionage, and the scope of civil disorders assistance is limited to civil disorders which may require federal troops. Second, the Committee suggests that the threshold for initiation of a full intelligence investigation be "reasonable Suspicion."[44] Preliminary intelligence investigations -- limited in scope, duration, and investigative technique -- could be opened upon a "specific allegation or specific or substantiated information." A written finding by the Attorney General of a likely need for federal troops is required for civil disorders assistance.

The Committee's approach to FBI domestic security investigations is basically the same as that adopted by the Attorney General's guidelines for domestic security investigations. Both are cautious about any departures from former Attorney General Stone's maxim that the FBI should only conduct criminal investigations. For example, neither the Committee nor the Attorney General would condone investigations which are totally unrelated to criminal statutes (e.g., the FBI's 1970 investigation of all black student unions).

However, the Committee views its recommendations as a somewhat more limited departure from former Attorney General Stone's line than the present Attorney General's guidelines. First, the Committee would only permit intelligence investigations with respect to hostile foreign intelligence activity and terrorism. The Attorney General's guidelines have been read by FBI officials as authorizing intelligence investigations of "subversives" (individuals who may attempt to overthrow the government in the indefinite future). While the Justice Department, under its current leadership, might not adopt such an interpretation, a different Attorney General might. Second, the guidelines on their face appear to permit investigating essentially local civil disobedience (e.g., "use of force" to interfere with state or local government which could be construed too broadly).

There are two reasons why the Committee would prohibit intelligence investigations of "subversives" or local civil disobedience. First, those investigations inherently risk abuse because they inevitably require surveillance of lawful speech and association rather than criminal conduct. The Committee's examination of forty years of investigations into "subversion" has found the term to be so vague as to constitute a license to investigate almost any activity of practically any group that actively opposes the policies of the administration in power.

A second reason for prohibiting intelligence investigations of "subversion" and local civil disobedience is that both can be adequately handled by less intrusive methods without unnecessarily straining limited Bureau resources. Any real threats to our form of government can be best identified through intelligence investigations focused on persons who may soon commit illegal violent acts. Local civil disobedience can be best handled by local police. Indeed, recent studies by the General Accounting Office suggest that FBI investigations in these areas result in very few prosecutions and little information of help to authorities in preventing violence.

The FBI now expends more money in its domestic security program than it does in its organized crime program, and, indeed, twice the amount on "internal security" informant operations as on organized crime informant coverage. "Subversive investigations" and "civil disorders assistance" represent almost half the caseload of the FBI domestic security program. The national interest would be better served if Bureau resources were directed at terrorism, hostile foreign intelligence activity, or organized crime, all more serious and pressing threats to the nation than "subversives" or local civil disobedience.

For similar reasons, the Committee, like the Attorney General's guidelines, requires "reasonable suspicion" for preventive intelligence investigations which extend beyond a preliminary stage. Investigations of terrorism and hostile foreign intelligence activity which are not limited in time and scope could lead to the same abuses found in intelligence investigations of subversion or local civil disobedience. However, an equally important reason for this standard is that it should increase the efficiency of Bureau investigations. The General Accounting Office found that when the FBI initiated its investigations on "soft evidence" -- evidence which probably would not meet this "reasonable suspicion" standard - - it usually wasted its time on an innocent target. When it initiated its investigation on harder evidence, its ability to detect imminent violence improved significantly.

The Committee's recommendations limit preventive intelligence investigations to situations where information indicates that the prohibited activity will "soon" occur, whereas the guidelines do not require that the activity be imminent. This limit is essential to prevent a return to sweeping, endless investigations of remote and speculative "threats." The Committee's intent is that, to open or continue a full investigation, there should be a substantial indication of terrorism or hostile foreign intelligence activity in the near future.

The Committee's restrictions are intended to eliminate unnecessary investigations and to provide additional protections for constitutional rights. Shifting the focus of Bureau manpower in domestic security investigations from lawful speech and association to criminal conduct by terrorists and foreign spies provides further protection for constitutional rights of Americans as well as serving the nation's interest in security.

1. Investigations of Committed or Imminent Offenses

Recommendation 42. -- The FBI should be permitted to investigate a committed act which may violate a federal criminal statute pertaining to the domestic security to determine the identity of the perpetrator or to determine whether the act violates such a statute.

Recommendation 43. -- The FBI should be permitted to investigate an American or foreigner to obtain evidence of criminal activity where there is "reasonable suspicion" that the American or foreigner has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a specific act which violates a federal statute pertaining to the domestic security.[45]

2. Preventive Intelligence Investigations

Recommendation 44. -- The FBI should be permitted to conduct a preliminary preventive intelligence investigation of an American or foreigner where it has a specific allegation or specific or substantiated information that the American or foreigner will soon engage in terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity. Such a preliminary investigation should not continue longer than thirty days from receipt of the information unless the Attorney General or his designee finds that the information and any corroboration which has been obtained warrants investigation for an additional period which may not exceed sixty days. If, at the outset or at any time during the course of a preliminary investigation the Bureau establishes "reasonable suspicion" that an American or foreigner will soon engage in terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity, it may conduct a full preventive intelligence investigation. Such full investigation should not continue longer than one year except upon a finding of compelling circumstances by the Attorney General or his designee.

In no event should the FBI open a preliminary or full preventive intelligence investigation based upon information that an American is advocating political ideas or engaging in lawful political activities or is associating with others for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of grievances or other such constitutionally protected purpose.

The second paragraph of Recommendation 44 will serve as an important safeguard if enacted into any statute authorizing preventive intelligence investigations. It would supplement the protection that would be afforded by limiting the FBI's intelligence investigations to terrorist and hostile foreign intelligence activities. It re-emphasizes the Committee's intent that the investigations of peaceful protest groups and other lawful associations should not recur. It serves as a further reminder that advocacy of political ideas is not to be the basis for governmental surveillance. At the same time Recommendation 44 permits the initiation of investigations where the Bureau possesses information consisting of a "specific allegation or specific or substantiated information that [an] American or foreigner will soon engage in terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity."

This recommendation has been among the most difficult of the domestic intelligence recommendations to draft. It was difficult because it represents the Committee's effort to draw the fine line between legitimate investigations of conduct and illegitimate investigations of advocacy and association. Originally the Committee was of the view that a threshold of "reasonable suspicion" should apply to initiating even limited preliminary intelligence investigations of terrorist or hostile foreign intelligence activities. However, the Committee was persuaded by the Department of Justice that, having narrowly defined terrorist and hostile foreign intelligence activities, a "reasonable suspicion" threshold might be unworkable at the preliminary stage. Such a threshold might prohibit the FBI from investigating an allegation of extremely dangerous activity made by an anonymous source or a source of unknown reliability. The "reasonable suspicion" standard requires that the investigator have confidence in the reliability of the individual providing the information and some corroboration of the information.

However, the Committee is cautious in proposing a standard of "specific allegation or specific or substantiated information" because it permits initiation of a preliminary investigation which includes the use of physical surveillance and a survey of, but not targeting of, existing confidential human sources. The Committee encourages the Attorney General to work with the Congress to improve upon the language we recommend in Recommendation 44 before including it in any legislative charter. If adopted, both the Attorney General and the appropriate oversight committees should periodically conduct a careful review of the application of the standard by the FBI.

The ultimate goal which Congress should seek in enacting such legislation is the development of a standard for the initiation of intelligence investigations which permits investigations of credible allegations of conduct which if uninterrupted will soon result in terrorist activities or hostile foreign intelligence activities as we define them. It must not permit investigations of constitutionally protected activities as the Committee described them in the last paragraph of Recommendation 44. The following are examples of the Committee's intent.

Recommendation 44 would prohibit the initiation of an investigation based upon "mere advocacy:"

-An investigation could not be initiated, for example, when the Bureau receives an allegation that a member of a dissident group has made statements at the group's meeting that "America needs a Marxist-Leninist government and needs to get rid of the fat cat capitalist pigs."

The Committee has found serious abuses in past FBI investigations of groups. In the conduct of these investigations, the FBI often failed to distinguish between members who were engaged in criminal activity and those who were exercising their constitutional rights of association. The Committee's recommendations would only permit investigation of a group in two situations: first, where the FBI receives information that the avowed purpose of the group is "soon to engage in terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity"; or second, where the FBI has information that unidentified members of a group are "soon to engage in terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity". In both cases the FBI may focus on the group to determine the identity of those members who plan soon to engage in such activity. However, in both cases the FBI should minimize the collection of information about law-abiding members of the group or any lawful activities of the group.

-Where the FBI has information that certain chapters of a political organization had "action squads," the purpose of which was to commit terrrorist acts, the FBI could investigate all members of a particular "action squad" where it had an allegation that this "action squad" planned to assassinate, for example, Members of Congress.

-An investigation could be initiated based upon specific information obtained by the FBI that unidentified members of a Washington, D.C., group are planning to assassinate Members of Congress.

The Committee's recommendations would not permit investigation of mere association:

-The FBI could not investigate an allegation that a member of the Klan has lunch regularly with the mayor of a southern community.

-The FBI could not investigate the allegation that a U.S. Senator attended a cocktail party at a foreign embassy where a foreign intelligence agent was present.

However, when additional facts are added indicating conduct which might constitute terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity, investigation might be authorized:

-The FBI could initiate an investigation of a dynamite dealer who met with a member of the "action squad" described above.

-Likewise, the FBI could initiate an investigation of a member of the National Security Council staff who met clandestinely with a known foreign intelligence agent in an obscure Paris restaurant.

Investigations of contacts can become quite troublesome when the contact takes place within the context of political activities or association for the purpose of petitioning the government. Law-abiding American protest groups may share common goals with groups in other countries. The obvious example was the widespread opposition in the late 1960's, at home and abroad, to America's role in Vietnam.

Furthermore, Americans should be free to communicate about such issues with persons in other countries, to attend international conferences and to exchange views or information about planned protest activities with like-minded foreign groups. Such activity, in itself, would not be the basis for a preliminary investigation under these recommendations:

-The FBI could not open an investigation of an anti-war group because "known communists" were also in attendance at a group meeting even if it had reason to believe that the communists' instructions were to influence the group or that the group shared the goals of the Soviet Union on ending the war in Vietnam.

-The FBI could not open an investigation of an anti-war activist who attends an international peace conference in Oslo where foreign intelligence agents would be in attendance even if the FBI had reason to believe that they might attempt to recruit the activist. Of course, the CIA would riot he prevented from surveillance of the foreign agent's activities.

However, if the Bureau had additional information suggesting that the activities of the Americans in the above hypothetical cases were more than mere association to petition for redress of grievances, an investigation would be legitimate.

-Where the FBI had received information that the anti-war activist traveling to Oslo intended to meet with a person he knew to be a foreign intelligence agent to receive instructions to conduct espionage on behalf of a hostile foreign country, the FBI could open a preliminary investigation of the activist.

The Committee cautions the Department of Justice and FBI that in opening investigations of conduct occurring in the context of political activities, it should endeavor to ensure that the allegation prompting the investigation is from a reliable source.

Certainly, however, where the FBI has received a specific allegation or specific or substantiated information that an American or foreigner will soon engage in hostile foreign intelligence activity or terrorist activity, it may conduct an investigation. For example, it could do so:

-Where the FBI receives information that an American has been recruited by a hostile intelligence service;

-Where the FBI receives information that an atomic scientist has had a number of clandestine meetings with a hostile foreign intelligence agent.

Recommendation 45. -- The FBI should be permitted to collect information to assist federal, state, and local officials in connection with a civil disorder either

(i) After the Attorney General finds in writing that there is a clear and immediate threat of domestic violence or rioting which is likely to require implementation of 10 U.S.C. 332 or 333 (the use of federal troops for the enforcement of federal law or federal court orders), or likely to result in a request by the governor or legislature of a state pursuant to 140 U.S.C. 331 for the use of federal militia or other federal armed forces as a countermeasure;[45] or

(ii) After such troops have been introduced.

Recommendation 46. -- FBI assistance to federal, state, and local officials in connection with a civil disorder should be limited to collecting information necessary for

1) ) the President in making decisions concerning the introduction of federal troops;

2) ) military officials in positioning and supporting such troops; and

3) ) state and local officials in coordinating their activities with such military officials.

4) Background Investigations

Recommendation 47 -- The FBI should be permitted to participate in the federal government's program of background investigations of federal employees or employees of federal contractors. The authority to conduct such investigations should not, however, be used as the basis for conducting investigations of other persons. In addition, Congress should examine the standards of Executive Order 10450, which serves as the current authority for FBI background investigations, to determine whether additional legislation is necessary to:

(a) modify criteria based on political beliefs and associations unrelated to suitability for employment; such modification should make those criteria consistent with judicial decisions regarding privacy of political association,[46] and

(b) restrict the dissemination of information from name checks[47] of information related to suitability for employment.

5) Security Risk Investigations

Recommendation 48. -- Under regulations to be formulated by the Attorney General, the FBI should be permitted to investigate a specific allegation that an individual within the Executive branch with access to classified information is a security risk as described in Executive Order 10450. Such investigation should not continue longer than thirty days except upon written approval of the Attorney General or his designee.

6) Security Leak Investigations

Recommendation 49. -- Under regulations to be formulated by the Attorney General, the FBI should be permitted to investigate a specific allegation of the improper disclosure of classified information by employees or contractors of the Executive branch.[48] Such

investigation should not continue longer than thirty days except upon written approval of the Attorney General or his designee.

d. Authorized Investigative Techniques

The following recommendations contain the Committee's proposed controls on the use of investigative techniques in domestic security investigations which would be authorized herein. There are three types of investigative techniques: (1) overt techniques (e.g., interviews), (2) name checks (review of existing government files), and (3) covert techniques (which range, for example, from electronic surveillance and informants to the review of credit records).

The objective of these recommendations, like the Attorney General's domestic security guidelines, is to ensure that the more intrusive the technique, the more stringent the procedural checks that will be applied to it. Therefore, the recommendation would permit overt techniques and name checks in any of the investigative areas described above.

With respect to covert technique, the Committee decided upon procedures to apply to the use of a particular covert technique based upon three considerations: (1) its potential for abuse, (2) the practicability of applying the procedure to the technique, and (3) the facts and circumstances giving rise to the request for use of the technique (whether the facts warrant a full investigation or only a preliminary investigation). The most intrusive covert techniques (electronic surveillance, mail opening, and surreptitious entry) would be permissible only if a judicial warrant were obtained as required in Recommendations 51 through 54. FBI requests to target paid or controlled informants, to review tax returns, to use mail covers, or to use any other covert techniques in domestic security investigations would be subject to review and in some cases to prior approval by the Attorney General's office, as described in Recommendations 55 through 62.[49]

The judicial warrant requirement the Committee recommends for electronic surveillance is similar in many respects to the Administration's bill, which is a welcome departure from past practice. The Committee, like the Administration, believes that there should be no electronic surveillance within the United States which is not subject to a judicial warrant procedure. Both would also authorize warrants for electronic surveillance of foreigners who are officers, agents, or employees of foreign powers, even though the government could not point to probable cause of criminal activity.

However, while the constitutional issue has not been resolved, the Committee does not believe that the President has inherent power to authorize the targeting of an American for electronic surveillance without a warrant, as suggested by the Administration bill. Certainly, if Congress requires a warrant for the targeting of an American for traditional electronic surveillance or for the most sophisticated NSA techniques, at home or abroad, then the dangerous doctrine of inherent Executive power to target an American for electronic surveillance can be put to rest at last.[49] The Committee also would require that no American be targeted for electronic surveillance except upon a judicial finding of probable criminal activity. The Administration bill would permit electronic surveillance in the absence of probable crime if the American is engaged in (or aiding or abetting a person engaged in) "clandestine intelligence activity" (an undefined term) under the direction of a foreign power. Targeting an American for electronic surveillance in the absence of probable cause to believe he might commit a crime is unwise and unnecessary.

In Part X, the Committee recommends that Congress consider amending the Espionage Act to cover modern forms of industrial, technological, or economic espionage not now prohibited. At the same time, electronic surveillance targeted at an American should be authorized where there is probable cause to believe he is engaged in such activity. Thus, the Committee agrees with the Attorney General that such activity may subject an American to electronic surveillance. But, as a matter of principle, the Committee believes that an American ought not to be targeted for surveillance unless there is probable cause to believe he may violate the law. The Committee's record suggests that use Of undefined terms, not tied to matters sufficiently serious to be the subject of criminal statutes, is a dangerous basis for intrusive investigations.

The paid and directed informant was a principal source of excesses revealed in our record. However, we do not propose the application of a judicial warrant procedure to informants. Instead, we propose a requirement of approval by the Attorney General based upon a probable cause standard. Because of the potential for abuse, however, we believe the warrant issue should be thoroughly reviewed after two years' experience.

There are some differences between the Attorney General and the Committee on the use of informants.[50] The Attorney General would permit the FBI to make unrestricted use of existing informants in a preliminary intelligence investigation. The Committee recognizes the legitimacy of using existing informants for certain purposes -- for example, to identify a new subject who has come to the attention of the Bureau. However, the Committee believes there should be certain restrictions for existing informants. Indeed, almost all of the informant abuses -- overly broad reporting, the ghetto informant program, agents provocateur, etc. -- involved existing informants.

The real issue is not the development of new informants, but the sustained direction of informants, new or old, at a new target. Therefore, the restrictions suggested in Recommendations 55 through 57 are designed to impose standards for the sustained targeting of informants against Americans.

The Committee requires that before an informant can be targeted in an intelligence investigation the Attorney General or his designee must make a finding that he has considered and rejected less intrusive techniques and that targeting the informant is necessary to the investigation. Furthermore, the Committee would require that the informant cannot be targeted for more than ninety days[51] in the intelligence investigation unless the Attorney General finds that there is "probable cause" that the American will soon engage in terrorist or hostile foreign intelligence activity, except that if the Attorney General finds compelling circumstances he may permit an additional sixty days.

Other than the restrictions upon the use of informants, the Committee would permit basically the same techniques in preliminary and full investigations as the Attorney General's guidelines, although the Committee would require somewhat closer supervision by the Attorney General or his designee. Interviews (including interviews of existing informant's), name checks (including checks of local police intelligence files), and physical surveillance and review of credit and telephone records would be permitted during the preliminary investigation. The Attorney General or his designee would have to review that investigation within one month. Under the guidelines, preliminary investigations do not require approval by the Attorney General or his designee and can continue for as long as ninety days with an additional ninety-day extension. The remainder of the covert techniques would be permitted in full intelligence investigations. Under the Attorney General's guidelines, the Attorney General or his designee only become involved in the termination of such investigations (at the end of one year), while the Committee's recommendations would require the Attorney General or his designee to authorize the initiation of the full investigation and the use of covert techniques in the investigation.

1. Overt Techniques and Name Checks

Recommendation 50. -- Overt techniques and name checks should be permitted in all of the authorized domestic security investigations described above, including preliminary and full preventive intelligence investigations.

2. Covert Techniques

a. Covert Techniques Covered

This section covers the standards and procedures for the use of the following covert techniques in authorized domestic security investigations:

(i) electronic surveillance,

(ii) search and seizure or surreptitious entry;

(iii) mail opening;

(iv) informants and other covert human sources;

(v) mail surveillance;

(vi) review of tax returns and tax-related information;

(vii) other covert techniques -- including physical surveillance, photographic surveillance, use of body recorders and other consensual electronic surveillance, and use of sensitive records of state and local government, and other institutional records systems pertaining to credit, medical history, social welfare history, or telephone calls.[52]

b. Judicial Warrant Procedures (Electronic Surveillance, Mail Opening, Search and Seizure, and Surreptitious Entry)

The requirements for judicial warrants, set forth below, are not intended to cover NSA communication intercepts. Recommendations 14 through 18 contain the Committee's recommendations pertaining to NSA intercepts, the circumstances in which a judicial warrant is required and the standards applicable for the issuance of such a warrant.

Recommendation 51. -- All non-consensual electronic surveillance, mail-opening, and unauthorized entries should be conducted only upon authority of a judicial warrant.

Recommendation 52. -- All non-consensual electronic surveillance should be conducted pursuant to judicial warrants issued under authority of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

The Act should be amended to provide, with respect to electronic surveillance of foreigners in the United States, that a warrant may issue if

(a) There is probable cause that the target is an officer, employee, or conscious agent of a foreign power.

(b) The Attorney General has certified that the surveillance is likely to reveal information necessary to the protection of the nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of force of a foreign power; to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States; or to protect national security information against hostile foreign intelligence activity.

(c) With respect to any such electronic surveillance, the judge should adopt procedures to minimize the acquisition and retention of non-foreign intelligence information about Americans.

(d) Such electronic surveillance should be exempt from the disclosure requirements of Title III of the 1968 Act as to foreigners generally and as to Americans if they are involved in hostile foreign intelligence activity.[53]

As noted earlier, the Committee believes that the espionage laws should be amended to include industrial espionage and other modern forms of espionage not presently covered and Title III should incorporate any such amendment. The Committee's recomendation is that both that change and the amendment of Title III to require warrants for all electronic surveillance be promptly made.

Recommendation 53. -- Mail opening should be conducted only pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause of criminal activity as described in Recommendation 37.

Recommendation 54. -- Unauthorized entry should be conducted only upon judicial warrant issued on probable cause to believe that the place to be searched contains evidence of a crime, except unauthorized entry, including surreptitious entry, against foreigners who are officers, employees, or conscious agents of a foreign power should be permitted upon judicial warrant under the standards which apply to electronic surveillance described in Recommendation 52.

(e) Administrative Procedures (Covert Human Sources, Mail Surveillance, Review of Tax Returns and Tax-Related Information, and Other Covert Techniques)

Recommendation 55. -- Covert human sources may not be directed[54] at an American except:

(1) In the course of a criminal investigation if necessary to the investigation provided that covert human sources should not be directed at an American as a part of an investigation of a committed act unless there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the American is responsible for the act and then only for the purpose of identifying the perpetrators of the act.

(2) If the American is the target of a full preventive intelligence investigation and the

Attorney General or his designee makes a written finding that[55] (i) he has considered and rejected less intrusive techniques; and (ii) he believes that covert human sources are necessary to obtain information for the investigation.

Recommendation 56. -- Covert human sources which have been directed at an American in a full preventive intelligence Investigation should not be used to collect information on the activities of the American for more than 90 days after the source is in place and capable of reporting, unless the Attorney General or his designee finds in writing either that there are "compelling circumstances" in which case they may be used for an additional 60 days, or that there is probable cause that the American will soon engage in terrorist activities or hostile foreign intelligence activities.

Recommendation 57. -- All covert human sources used by the FBI should be reviewed by the Attorney General or his designee as soon as practicable, and should be terminated[56] unless the covert human source could be directed against an American in a criminal investigation or a full preventive intelligence investigation under these recommendations.

Recommendation 58. -- Mail surveillance and the review of tax returns and tax-related information should be conducted consistently with the recommendations contained in Part iii. In addition to restrictions contained in Part iii, the review of tax returns and tax-related information, as well as review of medical or social history records, confidential records of private institutions and confidential records of Federal, state, and local government agencies other than intelligence or law enforcement agencies may not be used against an American except:

(1) In the course of a criminal investigation if necessary to the investigation;

(2) If the American is the target of a full preventive intelligence investigation and the Attorney General or his designee makes a written finding that 57 (i) he has considered and rejected less intrusive techniques; and (ii) he believes that the covert technique requested by the Bureau is necessary to obtain information necessary to the investigation.

Recommendation 59. -- The use of physical surveillance and review of credit and telephone records and any records of governmental or private institutions other than those covered in Recommendation 58 should be permitted to be used against an American, if necessary, in the course of either a criminal investigation or a preliminary or full preventive intelligence investigation.

Recommendation 60. -- Covert techniques should be permitted at the scene of a potential civil disorder in the course of preventive criminal intelligence and criminal investigations as described above. Non-warrant covert techniques may also be directed at an American during a civil disorder in which extensive acts of violence are occurring and Federal troops have been introduced. This additional authority to direct such covert techniques at Americans during a civil disorder should be limited to circumstances where Federal troops are actually in use and the technique is used only for the purpose of preventing further violence.

Recommendation 61. -- Covert techniques should not be directed at an American in the course of a background investigation without the informed written consent of the American.

Recommendation 62. -- If Congress enacts a statute attaching criminal sanctions to security leaks, covert techniques should be directed at Americans in the course of security leak investigations only if such techniques are consistent with Recommendation 55 (1),[58] (1) or 59. With respect to security risks, Congress might consider authorizing covert techniques, other than those requiring a judicial warrant, to be directed at Americans in the course of security risk 58 investigations, but only upon a written finding of the Attorney General that (1) there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual is a security risk, (ii) he has considered and rejected less intrusive techniques, and (iii) he believes the technique requested is necessary to the investigation.

d) ) Incidental Overhears

Recommendation 63. -- Except as limited elsewhere in these recommendations or in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, information obtained incidentally through an authorized covert technique about an American or a foreigner who is not the target of the covert technique can be used as the basis for any authorized domestic security investigation.

e) Maintenance and Dissemination of Information

The following limitations should apply to the maintenance and dissemination Information collected as a result of domestic security investigations.

1. Relevance

Recommendation 64. -- Information should not be maintained except where relevant to the purpose of an investigation.

2. Sealing or Purging

Recommendation 65. -- Personally identifiable information on Americans obtained in the following kinds of investigations should be sealed or purged as follows (unless it appears on its face to be necessary for another authorized investigation):

(a) Preventive intelligence investigations of terrorist or hostile foreign intelligence activities -- as soon as the investigation is terminated by the Attorney General or his designee pursuant to Recommendation 45 or 69.

(b) Civil disorder assistance -- as soon as the assistance is terminated by the Attorney General or his designee pursuant to Recommendation 69, provided that where troops have been introduced such information need be sealed or purged only within a reasonable period after their withdrawal.

Recommendation 66. -- Information previously gained by the FBI or any other intelligence agency through illegal techniques should be sealed or purged as soon as practicable.

3. Dissemination

Recommendation 67. -- Personally identifiable information on Americans from domestic security investigations may be disseminated outside the Department of Justice as follows:

(a) Preventive intelligence investigations of terrorist activities -- personally identifiable information on Americans from preventive criminal intelligence investigations of terrorist activities may be disseminated only to:

(1) A foreign or domestic law enforcement agency which has jurisdiction over the criminal activity to which the information relates; or

(2) To a foreign intelligence or military agency of the United States, if necessary for an activity permitted by these recommendations; or

(3) To an appropriate federal official with authority to make personnel decisions about the subject of the information; or

(4) To a foreign intelligence or military agency of a cooperating foreign power if necessary for an activity permitted by these recommendations to similar agencies of the United States; or

(5) Where necessary to warn state or local officials of terrorist activity likely to occur within their jurisdiction; or

(6) Where necessary to warn any person of a threat to life or property from terrorist activity.

(b) Preventive intelligence investigations of hostile foreign intelligence activities -personally identifiable information on Americans from preventive criminal intelligence investigations of hostile intelligence activities may be disseminated only:

(1) To an appropriate federal official with authority to make personnel decisions about the subject of the information; or

(2) To the National Security Council or the Department of State upon request or where appropriate to their administration of U.S. foreign policy; or

(3) To a foreign intelligence or military agency of the United States, if relevant to an activity permitted by these recommendations; or

(4) To a foreign intelligence or military agency of a cooperating foreign power if relevant to an activity permitted by these recommendations to similar agencies of the United States.

(c) Civil disorders assistance -- personally identifiable information on Americans involved in an actual or potential disorder, collected in the course of civil disorders assistance, should not be disseminated outside the Department of Justice except to military officials and appropriate state and local officials at the scene of a civil disorder where federal troops are present.[59]

(d) Background investigations -- to the maximum extent feasible, the results of background investigations should be segregated within the FBI and only disseminated to officials outside the Department of Justice authorized to make personnel decisions with respect to the subject.

(e) All other authorized domestic security investigations -- to governmental officials who are authorized to take action consistent with the purpose of an investigation or who have statutory duties which require the information.

4. Oversight Access

Recommendation 68. -- Officers of the Executive branch, who are made responsible by these recommendations for overseeing intelligence activities, and appropriate congressional committees should have access to all information necessary for their functions. The committees should adopt procedures to protect the privacy of subjects of files maintained by the FBI and other agencies affected by the domestie intelligence recommendations.

f. Attorney General Oversight of the FBI, Including Termination of Investigations and Covert Techniques

Recommendation 69. -- The Attorney General should:

(a) Establish a program of routine and periodic review of FBI domestic security investigations to ensure that the FBI is complying with all of the foregoing recommendations; and

(b) Assure, with respect to the following investigations of Americans that:

(1) Preventive intelligence investigations of terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity are terminated within one year, except that the Attorney General or his designee may grant extensions upon a written finding of "compelling circumstances";

(2) Covert techniques are used in preventive intelligence investigations of terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity only so long as necessary and not beyond time limits established by the Attorney General except that the Attorney General or his designee may grant extensions upon a written finding of "compelling circumstances";

(3) Civil disorders assistance is terminated upon withdrawal of federal troops or, if troops were not introduced. within a reasonable time after the finding by the Attorney General that troops are likely to be requested, except that the Attorney General or his designee may grant extensions upon a written finding of "compelling circumstances;"

- - v. The Responsibility and Authority of the Attorney General for Oversight of Federal Domestic Security Activities Must Be Clarified and General Counsels and Inspectors General of Intelligence Agencies Strengthened

The Committee's Recommendations give the Attorney General broad oversight responsibility for federal domestic security activities. As the chief legal officer of the United States, the Attorney General is the most appropriate official to be charged with ensuring that the intelligence agencies of the United States conduct their activities in accordance with the law. The Executive Order, however, places primary responsibility for oversight of the intelligence agencies with the newly created Oversight Board.

Both the Recommendations and the Order recognize the Attorney General's primary responsibility to detect, or prevent, violations of law by any employee of intelligence agencies. Both charge the head of intelligence agencies with the duty to report to the Attorney General information which relates to possible violations of law by any employee of the respective intelligence agencies. The Order also requires the Oversight Board to report periodically, at least quarterly, to the Attorney General on its findings and to report, in a timely manner, to the Attorney General, any activities that raise serious questions about legality.

a. Attorney General Responsibility and Relationship With Other Intelligence Agencies

These recommendations are intended to implement the Attorney General's responsibility to control and supervise all of the domestic security activities of the federal government and to oversee activities of any agency affected by the Domestic Intelligence Recommendations:

Recommendation 70. -- The Attorney General should review the internal regulations of the FBI and other intelligence agencies engaging in domestic security activities to ensure that such internal regulations are proper and adequate to protect the constitutional rights of Americans.

Recommendation 71. -- The Attorney General or his designee (such as the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice) should advise the General Counsels of intelligence agencies on interpretations of statutes and regulations adopted pursuant to these recommendations and on such other legal questions as are described in b. below.

Recommendation 72. -- The Attorney General should have ultimate responsibility for the investigation of alleged violations of law relating to the Domestic Intelligence Recommendations.

Recommendation 73. -- The Attorney General should be notified of possible alleged violations of law through the Office of Professional Responsibility (described in c. below) by agency heads, General Counsel, or Inspectors General of intelligence agencies as provided in B. below.

Recommendation 74. -- The heads of all intelligence agencies affected by these recommendations are responsible for the prevention and detection of alleged violations of the law by, or on behalf of, their respective agencies and for the reporting to the Attorney General of all such alleged violations.[60] Each such agency head should also assure his agency's cooperation with the Attorney General in investigations of alleged violations.

b. General Counsel and Inspectors General of Intelligence

The Committee recommends that the FBI and each other intelligence agency should have a general counsel nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. There is no provision in the Executive Order making General Counsels of intelligence agencies subject to Senate confirmation. The Committee believes that the extraordinary responsibilities exercised by the General Counsel of these agencies make it very important that these officials are subject to examination by the Senate prior to their confirmation. The Committee further believes that making such positions subject to Presidential appointment and senatorial confirmation will increase the stature of the office and will protect the independence of judgment of the General Counsel.

The Committee Recommendations differ from the Executive Order in two other important respects. The Recommendations provide that the General Counsel should review all significant proposed agency activities to determine their legality. They also provide a mechanism whereby the Inspector General or General Counsel of an intelligence agency can, in extraordinary circumstances, and if requested by an employee of the Agency, provide information directly to the Attorney General or appropriate congressional oversight committees without informing the head of the agency.

The Committee Recommendations also go beyond the Executive Order in requiring agency heads to report to appropriate committees of the Congress and the Attorney General on the activities of the Office of the General Counsel and the Office of the Inspector General. The Committee believes that the reporting requirements will facilitate oversight of the intelligence agencies and of those important offices within them.

Recommendation 75. -- To assist the Attorney General and the agency heads in the functions described in a. above, the FBI and each other intelligence agency should have a General Counsel, nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and an Inspector General appointed by the agency bead.

Recommendation 76. -- Any individual having information on past, current, or proposed activities which appear to be illegal, improper, or in violation of agency policy should be required to report the matter immediately to the Agency head, General Counsel, or Inspector General. If the matter is not initially reported to the General Counsel, he should be notified by the Agency head or Inspector General. Each agency should regularly remind employees of their obligation to report such information.

Recommendation 77. -- As provided in Recommendation 74, the heads of the FBI and of other intelligence agencies are responsible for reporting to the Attorney General alleged violations of law. When such reports are made, the appropriate congressional committees should be notified.[61]

Recommendation 78. -- The General Counsel and Inspector General of the FBI and of each other intelligence agency should have unrestricted access to all information in the possession of the agency and should have the authority to review all of the agency's activities.[62] The Attorney General, or the Office of Professional Responsibility on his behalf, should have access to all information in the possession of an agency which, in the opinion of the Attorney General, is necessary for an investigation of illegal activity.

Recommendation 79. -- The General Counsel of the FBI and of each other intelligence agency should review all significant proposed agency activities to determine their legality and constitutionality.

Recommendation 80. -- The Director of the FBI and the heads of each other intelligence agency should be required to report, at least annually, to the appropriate committee of the Congress, on the activities of the General Counsel and the Office of the Inspector General.[63]

Recommendation 81. -- The Director of the FBI and the heads of each other intelligence agency should be required to report, at least annually, to the Attorney General on all reports of activities which appear illegal, improper, outside the legislative charter, or in violation of agency regulations. Such reports should include the General Counsel's findings concerning these activities, a summary of the Inspector General's investigations of these activities, and the practices and procedures developed to discover activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.

c. Office of Professional Responsibility

Recommendation 82. -- The Office of Professional Responsibility created by Attorney General Levi should be recognized in statute. The director of the office, appointed by the Attorney General, should report directly to the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General. The functions of the office should include:

(a) Serving as a central repository of reports and notifications provided the Attorney General; and

(b) Investigation, if requested by the Attorney General of alleged violations by intelligence agencies of statutes enacted or regulations promulgated pursuant to these recommendations.[64]

d. Director of the FBI and Assistant Directors of the FBI

Recommendation 83. -- The Attorney General is responsible for all of the activities of the FBI, and the Director of the FBI is responsible to, and should be under the supervision and control of, the Attorney General.

Recommendation 84. -- The Director of the FBI should be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate to serve at the pleasure of the President for a single term of not more than eight years.

Recommendation 85. -- The Attorney General should consider exercising his power to appoint Assistant Directors of the FBI. A maximum term of years should be imposed on the tenure of the Assistant Director for the Intelligence Division.[64]

- - vi. Administrative Rulemaking and Increased Disclosure Should Be Required

a. Administrative Rulemaking

Recommendation 86. -- The Attorney General should approve all administrative regulations required to implement statutes created pursuant to these recommendations.

Recommendation 87. -- Such regulations, except for regulations concerning investigations of hostile foreign intelligence activity or other matters which are properly classified, should he issued pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act and should be subject to the approval of the Attorney General.

Recommendation 88. -- The effective date of regulations pertaining to the following matters should be delayed ninety days, during which time Congress would have the opportunity to review such regulations:[65]

(a) Any CIA activities against Americans, as permitted in ii.a. above;

(b) Military activities at the time of a civil disorder;

(c) The authorized scope of domestic security investigations, authorized investigative techniques, maintenance and dissemination of information by the FBI; and

(d) The termination of investigations and covert techniques as described in Part iv.

b. Disclosure

Recommendation 89. -- Each year the FBI and other intelligence agencies affected by these recommendations should be required to seek annual statutory authorization for their programs.

Recommendation 90. -- The Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552 (b)) and the Federal Privacy Act, (5 U.S.C. 552 (a)) provide important mechanisms by which individuals can gain access to information on intelligence activity directed against them. The Domestic Intelligence Recommendations assume that these statutes will continue to be vigorously enforced. In addition, the Department of Justice should notify all readily identifiable targets of past illegal surveillance techniques, and all COINTELPRO victims, and third parties who had received anonymous COINTELPRO communications, of the nature of the activities directed against them, or the source of the anonymous communication to them.[65]

- - vii. Civil Remedies Should Be Expanded

Recommendation 91 expresses the Committee's concern for establishing a legislative scheme which will afford effective redress to people who are injured by improper federal intelligence activity. The recommended provisions for civil remedies are also intended to deter improper intelligence activity without restricting the sound exercise of discretion by intelligence officers at headquarters or in the field.

As the Committee's investigation has shown, many Americans have suffered injuries from domestic intelligence activity, ranging front deprivation of constitutional rights of privacy and free speech to the loss of a job or professional standing, break-up of a marriage, and impairment of physical or mental health. But the extent, if any, to which an injured citizen can seek relief either monetary or injunctive -- from the government or from an individual intelligence officer is far front clear under the present state of the law.

One major disparity in the current state of the law is that, under the Reconstruction era Civil Rights Act of 1871, the deprivation of constitutional rights by an officer or agent of a state government provides the basis for a suit to redress the injury incurred;[66] but there is no statute which extends the same remedies for identical injuries when they are caused by a federal officer.

In the landmark Bivens case, the Supreme Court held that a federal officer could be sued for money damages for violating a citizen's Fourth Amendment rights.[67] Whether monetary damages can be obtained for violation of other constitutional rights by federal officers remains unclear.

While we believe that any citizen with a substantial and specific claim to injury from intelligence activity should have standing to sue, the Committee is aware of the need for judicial protection against legal claims which amount to harassment or distraction of government officials, disruption of legitimate investigations, and wasteful expenditure of government resources. We also seek to ensure that the creation of a civil remedy for aggrieved persons does not impinge upon the proper exercise of discretion by federal officials.

Therefore, we recommend that where a government official -- as opposed to the government itself -- acted in good faith and with the reasonable belief that his conduct was lawful, he should have an affirmative defense to a suit for damages brought under the proposed statute. To tighten the system of accountability and control of domestic intelligence activity, the Committee proposes that this defense be structured to encourage intelligence officers to obtain written authorization for questionable activities and to seek legal advice about them.[68]

To avoid penalizing federal officers and agents for the exercise of discretion, the Committee believes that the government should indemnify their attorney fees and reasonable litigation costs when they are held not to be liable. To avoid burdening the taxpayers for the deliberate misconduct of intelligence officers and agents, we believe the government should be able to seek reimbursement from those who willfully and knowingly violate statutory charters or the Constitution.

Furthermore, we believe that the courts will be able to fashion discovery procedures, including inspection of material in chambers, and to issue orders as the interests of justice require, to allow plaintiffs with substantial claims to uncover enough factual material to argue their case, while protecting the secrecy of governmental information in which there is a legitimate security interest.

The Committee recommends that a legislative scheme of civil remedies for the victims of intelligence activity be established along the following lines to clarify the state of the law, to encourage the responsible execution of duties created by the statutes recommended herein to regulate intelligence agencies, and to provide relief for the victims of illegal intelligence activity.

Recommendation 91. -- Congress should enact a comprehensive civil remedies statute which would accomplish the following:[69]

(a) Any American with a substantial and specific claim[70] to an actual or threatened injury by a violation of the Constitution by federal intelligence officers or agents[71] acting under color of law should have a federal cause of action against the government and the individual federal intelligence officer or agent responsible for the violation, without regard to the monetary amount in controversy. If actual injury is proven in court, the Committee believes that the injured person should be entitled to equitable relief, actual, general, and punitive damages, and recovery of the costs of litigation.[72] If threatened injury is proven in court, the Committee believes that equitable relief and recovery of the costs of litigation should be available.

(b) Any American with a substantial and specific claim to actual or threatened injury by violation of the statutory charter for intelligence activity (as proposed by these Domestic Intelligence Recommendations) should have a cause of action for relief as in (a) above.

(c) Because of the secrecy that surrounds intelligence programs, the Committee believes that a plaintiff should have two years from the date upon which he discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the facts which give rise to a cause of action for relief from a constitutional or statutory violation.

(d) Whatever statutory provision may be made to permit an individual defendant to raise an affirmative defense that he acted within the scope of his official duties, in good faith, and with a reasonable belief that the action he took was lawful, the Committee believes that to ensure relief to persons injured by governmental intelligence activity, this defense should be available solely to individual defendants and should not extend to the government. Moreover, the defense should not be available to bar injunctions against individual defendants.

- - viii. Criminal Penalties Should Be Enacted

Recommendation 92. -- The Committee -believes that criminal penalties should apply, where appropriate, to willful and knowing violations of statutes enacted pursuant to the Domestic Intelligence Recommendations.

- - ix. The Smith Act and the Voorhis Act Should Either Be Repealed or Amended

Recommendation 93. -- Congress should either repeal the Smith Act (18 U.S.C. 2385) and the Voorhis Act (18 U.S.C. 2386), which on their face appear to authorize investigation of "mere advocacy" of a political ideology, or amend those statutes so that domestic security investigations are only directed at conduct which might serve as the basis for a constitutional criminal prosecution, under Supreme Court decisions interpreting these and related statutes.[73]

- - x. The Espionage Statute Should be Modernized

As suggested in its definition of "hostile foreign intelligence activity" and its recommendations on warrants for electronic surveillance, the Committee agrees with the Attorney General that there may be serious deficiencies in the Federal Espionage Statute (18 U.S.C. 792 et seq.). The basic prohibitions of that statute have not been amended since 1917 and do not encompass certain forms of industrial, technological, or economic espionage. The Attorney General in a recent letter to Senator Kennedy (Reprinted on p. S3889 of the Congressional Record of March 23, 1976) describes some of the problem areas of the statute, including industrial espionage (e.g., a spy obtaining information on computer technology for a foreign power). The Committee took no testimony on this subject and, therefore, makes no specific proposal other than that the appropriate committees of the Congress explore the necessity for amendments to the statute.

Recommendation 94. -- The appropriate committees of the Congress should review the Espionage Act of 1917 to determine whether it should be amended to cover modern forms of foreign espionage, including industrial, technological or economic espionage.

- - xi. Broader Access to Intelligence Agency Files Should be Provided to GAO, as an Investigative Arm of the Congress

Recommendation 95. -- The appropriate congressional oversight committees of the Congress should, from time to time, request the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct audits and reviews of the intelligence activities of any department or agency of the United States affected by the Domestic Intelligence Recommendations. For such purpose, the Comptroller General, or any of his duly authorized representatives, should have access to, and the right to examine, all necessary materials of any such department or agency.

- - xii. Congressional Oversight Should Be Intensified

Recommendation 96. -- The Committee reendorses the concept of vigorous Senate oversight to review the conduct of domestic security activities through a new permanent intelligence oversight committee.

- - xiii. Definitions

For the purposes of these recommendations:

A. "Americans" means U.S. citizens, resident aliens and unincorporated associations, composed primarily of U.S. citizens or resident aliens; and corporations, incorporated or having their principal place of business in the United States or having majority ownership by U.S. citizens, or resident aliens, including foreign subsidiaries of such corporations provided, however, "Americans" does not include corporations directed by foreign governments or organizations.

B. "Collect" means to gather or initiate the acquisition of information, or to request it from another agency.

C. A "covert human source" means undercover agents or informants who are paid or otherwise controlled by an agency.

D. "Covert techniques" means the collection of information, including collection from record sources not readily available to a private person (except state or local law enforcement files), in such a manner as not to be detected by the subject.

E. "Domestic security activities" means governmental activities against Americans or conducted within the United States or its territories, including enforcement of the criminal laws, intended to:

1. protect the United States from hostile foreign intelligence activity including espionage;

2. protect the federal, state, and local governments from domestic violence or rioting; and

3. protect Americans and their government from terrorists.

F. "Foreign communications," refers to a communication between, or among, two or more parties in which at least one party is outside the United States, or a communication transmitted between points within the United States if transmitted over a facility which is under the control of, or exclusively used by, a foreign government.

G. "Foreigners" means persons and organizations who are not Americans as defined above.

H. "Hostile foreign intelligence activities" means acts, or conspiracies, by Americans or foreigners, who are officers, employees, or conscious agents of a foreign power, or who, pursuant to the direction of a foreign power, engage in clandestine intelligence activity,[74] or engage in espionage, sabotage or similar conduct in violation of federal criminal statutes.

I. "Name checks" means the retrieval by an agency of information already in the possession of the federal government or in the possession of state or local law enforcement agencies.

J. "Overt investigative techniques" means the collection of information readily available from public sources, or available to a private person, including interviews of the subject or his friends or associates.

K. "Purged" means to destroy or transfer to the National Archives all personally identifiable information (including references in any general name index).

L. "Sealed" means to retain personally identifiable information and to retain entries in a general name index but to restrict access to the information and entries to circumstances of "compelling necessity."

M. "Reasonable suspicion" is based upon the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and means specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion that specified activity has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur.

N. "Terrorist activities" means acts, or conspiracies, which: (a) are violent or dangerous to human life; and (b) violate federal or state criminal statutes concerning assassination, murder, arson, bombing, hijacking, or kidnapping; and (c) appear intended to, or are likely to have the effect of:

(1) Substantially disrupting federal, state or local government; or

(2) Substantially disrupting interstate or foreign commerce between the United States and another country; or

(3) Directly interfering with the exercise by Americans, of Constitutional rights protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1968, or by foreigners, of their rights under the laws or treaties of the United States.

O. "Unauthorized entry" means entry unauthorized by the target.

[1] Robert H. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of Government (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1955, 1963), pp. 70-71.

[2] De Gregory v. New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966) ; NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 298 (1964) ; Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Commission, 372 U.S. 539,546 (1962) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,488 (1960).

[3] Madison, Federalist No.[ 51. Madison made the point with grace:

"If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions."

[4] Directed primarily at foreigners abroad.

[5] "Domestic security activities" means federal governmental activities, directed against Americans or conducted within the United States or its territories, including enforcement of the criminal law, intended to (a) protect the United States from hostile foreign intelligence activity, including espionage; (b) protect the federal, state, and local governments from domestic violence or rioting; and (c) protect Americans and their government from terrorist activity. See Part xiii of the recommendations and conclusions for all the definitions used in the recommendations.

[6] "Americans" means U.S. citizens, resident aliens and unincorporated associations, composed primarily of U.S. citizens or resident aliens; and corporations, incorporated or having their principal place of business in the United States or having majority ownership by U.S. citizens, or resident aliens, including foreign subsidiaries of such corporations, provided, however, Americans does not include corporations directed by foreign governments or organizations.

[7] "Foreigners" means persons and organizations who are not Americans as defined above.

[8] These terms, which cover the two areas in which the Committee recommends authorizing preventive intelligence investigations, are defined on pp. 340-341.

[9] S. Res.[ 21, See. 5; 2 (12).

[10] See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

[11] "Covert human sources," means undercover agents or informants who are paid or otherwise controlled by an agency.

[12] As noted in the Report on CHAOS, former Directors have had differing interpretations of the mandate of the 1947 Act, to the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods. The Committee agrees with former Director William Colby that the 1947 Act only authorizes the Director to perform a "coordinating" and not an "operational" role.

[13] The activity completely prohibited to CIA includes only the interception of communications restricted under the 1968 Safe Streets Act, and would not limit the use of body recorders, or telephone taps or other electronic surveillance where one party to the communication has given his consent. For example, electronic coverage of a case officer's meeting with his agent would not be included. The prohibition also is not intended to cover the testing of equipment in the United States, when done with the written approval of the Attorney General and under procedures he has approved to minimize interception of private communications and to prevent improper dissemination or use of the communications which are unavoidably intercepted in the testing process. Nor does the prohibition preclude the use of countermeasures to detect electronic surveillance mounted against the CIA, when conducted under general procedures, and safeguards approved in writing by the CIA General Counsel.

[14] Unauthorized entry" means entry unauthorized by the target.

[15] As part of the CIA's responsibility for its own security, however, appropriate personnel should be permitted to carry firearms within the United States not only for courier protection of documents, but also to protect the Director and Deputy Director and defectors and to guard CIA installations.

[16] "Covert techniques" means the collection of information including collection from records sources not readily available to a private person (except state or local law enforcement files) in such a manner as not to be detected by the subject. Covert techniques do not include a check of CIA or other federal agency or state and local police records, or a check of credit bureaus for the limited purpose of obtaining non-financial biographical data, i.e., date and place of birth, to facilitate such name checks, and the subject's place of employment. Nor do "covert techniques" include interviews with persons knowledgeable about the subject conducted on a confidential basis to avoid disclosure of the inquiry to others or to the subject, if he is not yet aware of CIA interest in a prospective relationship, provided the interview does not involve the provision of information from medical, financial, educational, phone or other confidential records.

[17] For purposes of this section employees includes those employees or contractors who work regularly at CIA facilities and have comparable access or freedom of movement at CIA facilities as employees of CIA.

[18] Recommendation 7(c) does permit background and other security investigations conducted with government credentials which do not reveal CIA involvement and, in extremely sensitive cases commercial or other private identification to avoid disclosure of any government connection.

It would also permit CIA investigators to check the effectiveness of cover operations, without revealing their affiliation, by means of inquiries at the vicinity of particularly sensitive CIA projects. If in the course of such inquiries, unidentified CIA employees or contractors' employees are observed to be endangering the project's cover, they may be the subject of limited physical surveillance at that time for the sole purpose of ascertaining their identity so that they may be subsequently contacted.

[19] Such action poses serious danger of misuse. The preparation may involve the agent reporting on his associates so that the CIA can assess his credentials and his observation and reporting ability. This could become an opportunity to collect domestic intelligence on the infiltrated group even when an investigation of that group could not otherwise be commenced under the applicable standards. Obviously, without restrictions the intelligence community could use this technique to conduct domestic spying, arguing that the agents were not being "targeted" against the group but were merely preparing for an overseas operation.

This was done, for example, in the use by Operation CHAOS of agents being provided with radical credentials for use in "Project 2," a foreign intelligence operation abroad. (See the CHAOS Report and the Rockefeller Commission Report.)

One alternative would be to let the FBI handle the agent while he is preparing for overseas assignment. On balance, however, that seems less desirable. The temptation to use the agent to collect domestic intelligence might be stronger for the agency with domestic security responsibilities than it would for the area division of the CIA concerned with foreign intelligence. Also, improper use of the agent to collect such information would be more readily identifiable in the context of the foreign intelligence operation run by the CIA than it would in the context of an agent operation run by the Intelligence Division of the FBI.

[19] Any further investigations conducted in connection with (b) or (c) should be conducted by the FBI, and only if authorized by Part iv.

[20] In addition, the FBI should be notified of such insertions.

[21] "Collect" means to gather or initiate the acquisition of information, or to request it from another agency. It does not include dissemination of information to CIA by another agency acting on its own initiative.

[22] "Employees," as used in this recommendation, would include members of the employee's immediate family or prospective spouse.

[23] In the case of persons unknown to the CIA who volunteer to provide information or otherwise request contact with CIA personnel, the agency may conduct a name check before arranging a meeting.

[24] The CIA may only conduct a name check and confidential interviews of persons who know the subject, if the subject is unaware of CIA interest in him.

[25] The CIA may only collect information by means of a name check.

[26] The CIA may make a name check and determine the place of employment of persons residing or working in the immediate vicinity of sensitive sites, such as persons residing adjacent to premises used for safe houses or defector resettlement, or such as proprietors of businesses in premises adjacent to CIA offices in commercial areas.

[27] The counterintelligence component of the CIA would be able to call to the attention of the FBI any patterns of significance which the CIA thought warranted opening an investigation of an American.

[28] The guidelines state:

A. "Whenever information is uncovered as a byproduct result of CIA foreign targeted intelligence or counterintelligence operations abroad which makes American, suspect for security or counterintelligence reasons ... such information will be reported to the FBI ... specific CIA operations will not be mounted against such individuals; CIA responsibilities thereafter will be restricted to reporting any further intelligence or counterintelligence aspects to the specific case which comes to CIA's attention as a byproduct of its continuing foreign targeted operational activity. If the FBI, on the basis of the receipt of the CIA information, however, specifically requests further information on terrorist or counterintelligence matters relating to the private American citizens . . . CIA may respond to written requests by the FBI for clandestine collection abroad by CIA of information on foreign terrorist or counterintelligence matters involving American citizens." 29 William Nelson testimony, 1/28/76, pp. 33-34. Mr. Nelson was not addressing procedures to obtain a judicial warrant; but the time required for an ex parte application on an expedited basis to a Federal Court in Washington, D.C., would not be excessive for the investigative time frames which Nelson described.

Furthermore, the present wiretap statute authorizes electronic surveillance (for 48 hours) on an emergency basis prior to judicial authorization.

[30] Recommendation 8, p.[ 303.

[30] "Terrorist activities" means acts, or conspiracies, which: (a) are violent or dangerous to human life; and (b) violate federal or state criminal statutes concerning assassination, murder, arson, bombing, hijacking, or kidnaping; and (c) appear intended to, or are likely to have the effect of:

(1) Substantially disrupting federal, state or local government; or

(2) Substantially disrupting interstate or foreign commerce between the United States and another country; or

(3) Directly interfering with the exercise by Americans, of Constitutional rights protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1968, or by foreigners, of their rights under the laws or treaties of the United States.

[30] Hostile foreign intelligence activities" means acts, or conspiracies, by Americans or foreigners, who are officers, employees, or conscious agents of a foreign power, or who, pursuant to the direction of a foreign power, engage in clandestine intelligence activity, or engage in espionage, sabotage or similar conduct in violation of federal criminal statutes. (The term "clandestine intelligence activity" is included in this definition at the suggestion of officials of the Department of Justice. Certain activities engaged in by conscious agents of foreign powers, such as some forms of industrial, technological, or economic espionage, are not now prohibited by federal statutes. It would be preferable to amend the espionage laws to cover such activity and eliminate this term. As a matter of principle, intelligence agencies should not investigate activities of Americans which are not violations of federal criminal statutes. Therefore, the Committee recommends (in Recommendation 94) that Congress immediately consider enacting such statutes and then eliminating this term.)

[31] If the CIA believes that an investigation of an American should be opened but the FBI declines to do so, the CIA should be able to appeal to the Attorney General or to the appropriate committee of the National Security Council.

[32] Such information would include material volunteered by a foreign intelligence service independent of any request by the CIA.

[33] See Recommendation 7, p.[ 302.

[34] None of the Committee's recommendations pertaining to NSA should be construed as inhibiting or preventing NSA from protecting U.S. communications against interception or monitoring by foreign intelligence services.

[35] "Foreign communications," as used in this section, refers to a communication between or among two or more parties in which at least one party is outside the United States, or a communication transmitted between points within the United States only if transmitted over a facility which is under the control of, or exclusively used by, a foreign government.

[36] In order to ensure that this recommendation is implemented, both the Attorney General and the appropriate oversight committees of the Congress should be continuously apprised of, and periodically review, the measures taken by NSA pursuant to this recommendation.

[37] The Committee believes that in the case of interceptions authorized to obtain information about hostile foreign intelligence, there should be a presumption that notice to the subject of such intercepts, which would ordinarily be required under Title I I 1 (18 U. S. C.[ 2518 (8) (d) ), is not required, unless there is evidence of gross abuse.

[38] The Executive Order places no such restriction on the dissemination of information by NSA. Under the Executive Order, NSA is not required to delete names or destroy messages which are personally identifiable to Americans. As long as these messages fall within the categories established by the Order, the names of Americans could be transmitted to other intelligence agencies of the Government.

[39] Based upon its study of the IRS, the Committee believes these recommendations might properly be applied beyond the general domestic security scope of the recommendations.

[40] "Request" as used in the recommendations concerning the Internal Revenue Service should not include circumstances in which the agency is acting with the informed written consent of the taxpayer.

[41] See recommendation 94 for the committee's recommendation that Congress consider amending the Espionage Act so as to cover modern forms of espionage not now criminal.

[42] "Overt investigative techniques" means the collection of information readily available from public sources or to a private person (including interviews of the subject or his friends or associates).

[43] Thus, the Bureau would have an obligation to review any such information before it is placed in files and to review the files, thereafter, to remove it if no longer needed. This obligation does not extend to files sealed under Recommendation 65.

[44] "Reasonable suspicion" is based Upon the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and means specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion that specified activity has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur.

[45] This includes conspiracy to violate a federal statute pertaining to the domestic security. The Committee, however, recommends repeal or amendment of the Smith Act to make clear that "conspiracy" to engage in political advocacy cannot be investigated. (See Recommendation 93.)

[45] This recommendation does not prevent the FBI from conducting criminal investigations or preventive intelligence investigations of terrorist acts in connection with a civil disorder.

[46] For example, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) ; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).

[47] See definition of "name checks" at p.[ 340.

[48] If Congress enacts a security leak criminal statute, this additional investigative authority would be unnecessary. Security leaks would be handled as traditional criminal investigations as described in Recommendations 42 and 43 above.

[49] Review of tax returns and mail covers would also be subject to the Post Office and IRS procedures described in earlier recommendations.

[49] "When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb . . . . " (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, G37 (1952), Justice Jackson concurring.)

[50] The Attorney General is considering additional guidelines on informants.

[51] The period of ninety days begins when the informant is in place and capable of reporting.

[52] The Committee has not taken extensive testimony on these "other covert techniques" and therefore, aside from the general administrative procedures contained in c. below, makes no recommendations designed to treat these techniques fully.

[53] Except where disclosure is called for in connection with the defense in the case of criminal prosecution.

[54] A "covert human source" is an undercover agent or informant who is paid or otherwise controlled by the agency. A cooperating citizen is not ordinarily a covert human source. A covert human source is "directed" at an American when the intelligence agency requests the covert human source to collect new information on the activities of that individual. A covert human source is not "directed" at a target if the intelligence agency merely asks him for information already in his possession, unless through repeated inquiries, or otherwise, the agency implicitly directs the informant against the target of the investigation.

[55] The written finding must be made prior to the time the covert human source is directed at an American, unless exigent circumstances make application impossible, in which case the application must be made as soon thereafter as possible.

[56] Termination requires cessation of payment or any other form of direction or control.

[57] The written finding must be made prior to the time the technique is used against an American, unless exigent circumstances make application impossible, in which case the application must be made as soon thereafter as possible.

[58] If Congress does not enact a security leak criminal statute, Congress might consider authorizing covert techniques in the same circumstances as security risk investigations either as an interim measure or as an alternative to such a statute.

[59] Personally identifiable information on terrorist activity which pertains to a civil disorder could still be disseminated pursuant to (a) above.

[60] This recommendation must be read along with recommendations contained in Part ii, limiting the authority of foreign intelligence and military agencies to investigate security leaks or security risks involving their employees and centralizing those investigations in the FBI.

[61] The Inspector General and General Counsel should have authority, in extraordinary circumstances, and if requested by an employee of the agency providing information, to pass the information directly to the Attorney General and to notify the appropriate congressional committees without informing the head of the agency. Furthermore, nothing herein should prohibit an employee from reporting on his own such information directly to the Attorney General or an appropriate congressional oversight committee.

[62] The head of the agency should be required to provide to the appropriate oversight committees of the Congress and the Executive branch and the Attorney General an immediate explanation, in writing, of any instance in which the Inspector General or the General Counsel has been denied access to information, has been instructed not to report on a particular activity or has been denied the authority to investigate a particular activity.

[63] The report should include: (a) a summary of all agency activities that raise questions of legality or propriety and the General Counsel's findings concerning these activities; (b) a summary of the Inspector General's investigations concerning any of these activities; (c) a summary of the practices and procedures developed to discover activities that raise questions of legality or propriety; (d) a summary of each component, program or issue survey, including the Inspector General's recommendations and the Director's decisions; and (e) a summary of all other matters handled by the Inspector General.

The report should also include discussion of: (a) major legal problems facing the Agency; (b) the need for additional statutes; and (c) any cases referred to the Department of Justice.

[64] The functions of the Office should not include: (a) exercise of routine supervision of FBI domestic security investigations; (b) making requests to other agencies to conduct investigations or direct covert techniques at Americans; or (c) involvement in any other supervisory functions which it might ultimately be required to investigate.

[64] It is not proposed that this recommendation be enacted as a statute.

[65] This review procedure would be similar to the procedure followed with respect to the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure.

[65] It is not proposed that this recommendation be enacted as a statute.

[66] 42 U.S.C. 1983.

[67] Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

[68] One means of structuring such a defense would be to create a rebuttable presumption that an individual defendant acted so as to avail himself of this defense when he proves that he acted in good faith reliance upon: (1) a written order or directive by a government officer empowered to authorize him to take action ; or (2) a written assurance by an appropriate legal officer that his action is lawful.

[69] Due to the scope of the Committee's mandate, we have taken evidence only on constitutional violations by intelligence officers and agents. However, the anomalies and lack of clarity in the present state of the law (as discussed above) and the breadth of constitutional violations revealed by our record, suggest to us that a general civil remedy would be appropriate. Thus, we urge consideration of a statutory civil remedy for constitutional violations by any federal officer; and we encourage the appropriate committees of the Congress to take testimony on this subject.

[70] The requirement of a substantial and specific claim is intended to allow a judge to screen out frivolous claims where a plaintiff cannot allege specific facts which Indicate that be was the target of illegal intelligence activity.

[71] "Federal intelligence officers or agents" should include a person who was an intelligence officer, employee, or agent at the time a cause of action arose. "Agent" should include anyone acting with actual, implied, or apparent authority.

[72] The right to recover "costs of litigation" is intended to include recovery of reasonable attorney fees as well as other litigation costs reasonably incurred.

[73] E.g. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) ; Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) ; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

[74] The term "clandestine intelligence activity" is included in this definition at the suggestion of officials of the

Department of Justice. Certain activities engaged in by the conscious agents of foreign powers, such as some forms of industrial, technological, or economic espionage, are not now prohibited by federal statutes. It would be preferable to amend the espionage laws to cover such activity and eliminate this term. As a matter of principle, intelligence agencies should not investigate activities of Americans which are not federal criminal statutes. Therefore, the Committee recommends (in Recommendation —) that Congress immediately consider enacting such statutes and then eliminating this term.

Appendix A: 94th Congress 1st Session S.Res.21

In the Senate of the United States

January 21,1975

Mr; Pastore submitted the following resolution ; which was ordered to be placed
on the calendar (under general orders)

January 27,1975

Considered, amended, and agreed to

- Resolution

To establish a select committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study with respect to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

Resolved, To establish a select committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study of governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities and of the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government or by any persons, acting individually or in combination with others, with respect to any intelligence activity carried out by or oh behalf of the Federal Government; be it further

Resolved, That (a) there is hereby established a select committee of the Senate which may be called, for convenience of expression, the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities to conduct an investigatioruand study of the .extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any agency or by any persons, acting either’ individually or in combination with others, in carrying out any intelligence or surveillance activities by or on behalf of any agency of the Federal Government.

(b) The select committee created by this resolution- shall consist of eleven Members of the .Senate, six.to be appointed by the President of the Senate from the majority Members of the Senate upon, the recommendation of the majority leader of the Senate, and five minority Members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate upon the recommendation of the minority leader of -the Senate. For the purposes of paragraph 6 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate, service of a Senator as a member, chairman, or vice chairman of the select committee shall not be taken into account.

(c) The majority members of the committee shall seleot a chairman and the minority members shall select a vice chairman and the committee shall adopt rules and procedures to govern its-proceedings. The vice chairman shall preside over meetings of the select committee during the absence of the chairman, and discharge such other responsibilities as may be assigned to him by the select committee or the chairman. Vacancies in the membership of the select committee shall not affect the authority of the remaining members to execute the functions of the select committee and shall be filled in the same manner as original appointment? to it are made.

(d) A majority of the members of the select committee shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business huh the select committee may affix a lesser number as a quorum for the purpose of taking testimony or depositions.

Sec. 2. The select committee is authorized and directed to do everything necessary or appropriate to make the investigations and study specified in subsection (a) of the first section. Without abridging in any way the authority conferred upon the select committee by the preceding sentence, the Senate further expressly authorizes and directs the select committee to make a complete investigation and study of the activities of any agency or of any and all persons or groups of persons or organizations of any kind whi& have any tendency to reveal the full facts with respect to the following matters or questions:

(1) Whether the Central Intelligence Agency has conducted an illegal domestic intelligence operation in the United States.

(2) The conduct of domestic intelligence or counterintelligence operations against United States citizens by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other Federal agency.

(3) The origin and disposition of the so-called Huston Plan to apply United States intelligence agency capabilities against individuals or organizations within the United States.

(4) The extent to which the Federal Bureau, of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other Federal law enforcement or intelligence agencies coordinate their respective activities, any agreements- which govern that coordination, and the extent to which a lack of coordination Inas contributed to activities or actions which are illegal, improper, inefficient, unethical, or contrary to the intent of Congress.

(5) The extent to which the operation of domestic intelligence or counterintelligence activities and the operation of any other activities within the United States by the Central Intelligence Agencj' conforms to the legislative charter of that Agency and the Intent rtf the Congress.

(6) The past and present interpretation by the Director of Central Intelligence of the responsibility protect intelligence sources and methods as it relates the provision in section 102 (d) (3) of Sie National Security Act of 19'47 (50 U.S.C-. 4Q3'(d)- (3)) tW w... that the agency shall have no police-, subpena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions.. . J*

(7) Nature and extent of executive branch oversight of all United States intelligence activities.

(8) The need for specific legislative authority to govern the operations of any intelligence agencies Of the Federal Government now existing without thsfc explicit statutory authority, including but not limited tangencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency anil the National Security Agency.

The nature and extent to which Federal agencies- Cooperate and exchange intelligence information and, the adequacy of any regulations or statutes which govern such cooperation and exchange of intelligence information.

(9) The extent to which United States mtelligenSb agencies are governed by Executive orders, rules, Upregulations either published or secret arid the extent to which those Executive orders, rules’, or regulation^ interpret, expand, or are in Conflict with specific legs- lative authority.

(10) The violation or suspected violation of Ufly State or Federal statute by any intelligence agency or by Any person by or on behalf of any intelligence agency of the Federal Government including but not limited, .to surreptitious entries, surveillance, wiretaps, or eavesdropping, illegal opening of the United States mail, OBf the monitoring of the United States mail.

(11) The need for improved, strengthened, or conr solidated oversight of United States intelligence activities by the Congress.

(12) Whether any of the existing laws of the United States are inadequate, either in their provisions or manner of enforcement, to safeguard the rights of American citizens, to improve executive and legislative control of intelligence and related activities, and to resolve uncertainties as to the authority of United Statds intelligence and related agencies.

(13) Whether there is unnecessary duplication of expenditure and effort in the collection and processing of intelligence information by United States agencies.

(14) The extent and necessity of overt and covert intelligence activities in the United States and abroad.

(15) Such other related matters as the committee.' deems necessary in order to carry out its responsibility under section (a).

Sec. 3. (a) To enable the select committee to make the investigation and study authorized and directed by this resolution, the Sena te hei'eby empowers the select committed •as an agency of the Senate (1) to employ and fix the compensation of such clerical,, investigatory, legal, technical, and other assistants as it deems necessary or appropriate^ but it may not exceed the normal Senate salary schedules: (2) to sit and act at any time or place during sessions, recesses, and adjournment periods of the Senate.; (3) to hold hearings for taking testimony on oath or to receive documentary or physical evidence relating to the matters and questions it is authorized to investigate or study; (4) to require by subpena or otherwise the attendance as witnesses- of any persons who the select committee believes have- knowledge or information concerning any of the matters- 01’ questions it is authorized to investigate and study; (5) to require by subpena or order any department, agency, officer, or employee of the executive branch of the United States Government, or any private person, firm, or corporation, to produce for its consideration or for use as evidence in its investigation and study any books, checks, canceled checks, correspondence, communications, document, papers, physical evidence, records, recordings, tapes, or materials relating to any of the matters or questions it is authorized to investigate and study which they or any of them may have in their custody or under their control; (6) to make to tire Senate any recommendations it deems appropriate in respect to the willful failure or refusal of any person to answer <pi68- Hons or give testimony in his character as a witness during his appearance before it or in respect to the willful failure or refusal of any officer or employee of the executive branch, of the United States Government or any person, firm, Of corporation to produce before the committee any books, checks; -canceled checks, correspondence, communications, document, financial records, papers, physical evidence, records, recordings, tapes, or materials in obedience to ally Subpena or order; (7) to take depositions and other testimony on oath anywhere within the United States or in any Other country; (8) to procure the temporary or inteniligent services of individual consultants, or organizations there of, in the same manner and under the same conditions &S' a standing committee of the Senate may procure such services under section 202 (i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946; (9) to use on a reimbursable.basis, "with the prior consent of the Committee on Rules and Adminis-- , tration, the services of personnel of any such department or agency; (10) to use on a reimbursable basis orofltor- wise with the prior consent of the chairman of any Subcommittee of any committee of the Senate the facilities 0T.‘ services of any members of the staffs of such, other Senate committees or any subcommittees of such other Senate COIU-' mittees whenever the select committee or its chairman-deems that such action is necessary or appropriate to enable the select committee to make the investigation and study authorized and directed by this resolution; (11) to have direct; access through the agency of any members of the select committee or any of its investigatory or legal assistants' designated by it or its chairman or the ranking minority member to any data, evidence, information, report, analysis; or document or papers, relating to any of the matters OK questions which it is authorized and directed to investigate and study in the custody or under the control of any department, agency, officer, or employee of the executive branch, of Ilie United (States Government, including any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States Government having the power under the laws of the United States to investigate any alleged criminal activities or to prosecute, persons charged with crimes against the United States anti any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United. States Government having the authority to conduct intelligence- or surveillance within or outside the United States; without regard Io the jurisdiction or authority of any Other Senate committee, which will aid the select committee £o prepare for or conduct the investigation and study authorized, and directed by this resolution; and (12) to expend to the. extent it determines necessary or appropriate any moneys made available to it by the Senate to perform the-.duties and exercise the powers conferred upon it by this resolution and to make the investigation and study it is authorized- by this resolution to make.

(b) Sitbpenas may be issued by the select, committee- geting through the chgiijnan or;any other member designated, by him, and may be .served by any person designated- by BUjCh.chairman or other member anywhere within.tbc borders of flic United States. The chairman of the select committee, or any other member thereof, is hereby authorized to. administer oaths to any witnesses appearing, before the committee,

(c) In preparing for or. conducting the investigation, and study .authorized and directed by this resolution, tho- Select committee shall be empowered to exercise the powers- conferred upon- committees of the Senate by section 6002 of title 18, United States Code, or any other. Act of Congress regulating the granting of immunity to witnesses.

Sec. 4. The select committee shall have authority to recommend the enactment of any new legislation or the amendment of any existing statute which it considers necessary or desirable to strenghen or clarify the national security, intelligence, or surveillance activities of the United States and to protect the rights of United States citizens. with regard to those activities,

Sec. 5. The select committee shall make a final report Qf-the results of the investigation and study conducted by it-pursuant to this resolution, together with its findings and its recommendations as to new congressional legislation it deems necessary or desirable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but no later than September 1, 1975.- Tho select committee may also submit to tho Senate such interim reports as it considers appropriate. After submission of its final report, the select committee shall have three calendar months to close its affairs, and on the expiration of- sudz three calendar months shall cease to exist.

Sec. G. The expenses of the select committee through September 1, 1975, under this resolution shall not exceed §750,000 of which amount not to exceed §100,000 shall b& available for the procurement of the services of individual consultants or organizations thereof. Such expenses shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon V0Uchcr& approved by the chairman of the select committee.

Sec. 7. The select committee shall institute and eany out such rules and procedures as it may deem necessary to prevent (1) the disclosure, outside the select committee, of any information relating to the activities of the Centred Intelligcnce Agency or any other department or agency of th& Federal Government engaged in intelligence activities, obtained by the select committee during the course of its study and investigation, not authorized by the select committee to be disclosed; and (2.) the disclosure, outside the select committee, of any information, which would adversely affect the intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in foreign countries or the intelligence activities in foreign countries of any other department or agency of the Federal Government.

SEC. 8. As a condition for employment as described in section 3 of this resolution, each person shall agree not to accept any honorarium, royalty or other payment for a. speaking engagement, magazine article, book, or other endeavor connected with the investigation and study undertaken by this committee.

SEC. 9. No employee of the select committee or any ^person engaged by contract or otherwise to perform services for the select committee shall be given access to any classified information by the select committee unless such employee or person has received an appropriate security clearance as determined by the select committee. The type of Security clearance to he required in the case of any such- employee or person shall, within the determination of the Select committee, he commensurate with the sensitivity of. the classified information to which such employee or person. "Will be given access by the select committee,

Appendix B: Previously Issued Reports and Hearings of the Senate Select Committee

A. Reports

1. Senate Report: “Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders”, November 20, 1975.

2. Staff Report: “Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973”, December 18, 1975.

B. Hearings

1. “Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents”, Volume 1, September 16,17 and 18,1975.

2. “Huston Plan”, Volume 2, September 23, 24 and 25, 1975.

3. “Internal Revenue Service”, Volume 3, October 2, 1975.

4. “Mail Opening”, Volume 4, October 21, 22 and 24, 1975.

5. “The National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights”, Volume 5, October 29 and November 6, 1975.

6. “Federal Bureau of Investigation”, Volume 6, November 18 and 19, December 2, 3,9,10 and 11,1975.

7. “Covert Action”, Volume 7, December 4 and 5, 1975.

Appendix C: Staff Acknowledgments: Final Report on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans

The volume of the final report which summarizes the Committee’s inquiry into domestic intelligence activity and sets forth its findings ana recommendations was written and edited, along with the supple- mentary detailed reports, under the supervision of Chief Counsel Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., and Counsel to the Minority Curtis R. Smothers. The work of the entire staff of the Committee—over the long course of investigation, research and hearings—was channeled into the final report. The staff members listed below made major contributions to the writing and editing of this volume.

Principal Authors

James Dick
Mark Gitenstein
Robert Kelley

General Editors

Paul Michel
Andrew Postal
Walter Ricks
Burton Wides

Research Coordination

Lawrence Kieves

Contributing Authors, Editors, and Investigators

Jim Johnston
Chris Pyle
Eric Richard
Lester Seidel
Patrick Shea
Elizabeth P. Smith
John Smith
Britt Snider
Athan Theoharris
Paul Wallach

Research Assistance

Phebe Zimmerman
James Turner

Supplementary Detailed Reports

COINTELPRO: The FBI’s Covert Action Programs Against American Citizens.

The FBI’s Efforts to Disrupt and Neutralize the Black Panther Party.

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Case Study.

CIA and FBI Mail Opening.

Warrantless Electronic Surveillance.

The Use of Informers in FBI Intelligence Investigations.

Warrantless Surreptitious Entries : FBI “Black Bag” Break- ins and Microphone Installations.

The Development of FBI Domestic Intelligence Investigations.

The Internal Revenue Service: An Intelligence Resource and Collector.

National Security Agency Surveillance Affecting Americans.

Improper Surveillance of Private Citizens by the Military.

CIA Intelligence Collection About Americans: The CHAOS Program and the Office of Security.

National Security, Civil Liberties, and the Collection of Intelligence : A Report on the Huston Plan.

Paul Michel Rhett Dawson Michael Madigan

Principal Staff Authors

Barbara Banoff, assisted by Phebe Zimmerman and Mary DeOreo.

Arthur Jefferson, Gordon Rhea.

Michael Epstein, Gordon Rhea, assisted by Mary DeOreo and Dan McCorkle.

James Dick, Paul Wallach, assisted by Thomas Dawson and Edward Griessing.

James Dick, John Elliff.

Robert Kelley, assisted by Jeffrey Kayden and Thomas Dawson.

Frederick Baron.

JohnElliff

Walter Ricks, Arthur Harrigan, assisted by Thomas Dawson.

Peter Fenn, Britt Snider, James Turner, assisted by Judi Mason.

Britt Snider, assisted by James Turner.

Burton Wides, assisted by Jeffrey Kayden.

Loch Johnson, assisted by Margaret Carpenter and Daniel Dwyer.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR PHILIP A. HART

The Committee’s proposal on domestic intelligence is a carefully crafted system of controls to prevent abuse and preserve vigorous dissent in America. The report lays out the issues, notes the problems, and suggests solutions. Committee members and staff, under Senator Mondale’s conscientious leadership, grappled with the exceedingly difficult task of shaping broad principles into workable safeguards.

The recommendations would narrow the scope of permissible intelligence, set standards and time limits for investigations, control dissemination, and provide civil remedies for improprieties.

This comprehensive scheme may be the best we can do to set the delicate balance wheel between liberty and security. It is a considerable accomplishment, and I endorse its consideration by the appropriate legislative committees. I do so, however, with misgivings that the Committee’s record fails to justify even this degree of preventive intelligence investigation of American citizens.

Unlike investigation of committed crimes, “preventive intelligence” means investigating persons thought likely to commit particularly serious acts; it is intended to prevent them. Providing, for the first time, statutory authorization of such surveillance is a dramatic and dangerous step. Congress should take that step with the utmost caution.

It is appealing to say we should let the FBI do everything possible to avert bombing of the Capitol or other terrorist acts. But in America we must refuse to let the Government “do everything possible.” For that would entail spying on every militant opponent of official policy, just in case some of them may resort to violence. We would become a police state. The question, then, is whether a limited form of preventive intelligence, consistent with preserving our civil liberties, can be justified by the expected benefits and can also be kept under effective control.

The Committee was reluctant to authorize any investigations except those of committed or imminent criminal acts. Nevertheless, our Report concludes that some preventive intelligence is justified because it might prevent a significant amount of terrorist activity without posing unacceptable risks for a free society.

However, the shocking record of widespread abuse suggests to me that before Congress endorses a blueprint for preventive intelligence, we need a more rigorous presentation of the case for it than was offered to this Committee.

The FBI only provided the Committee with a handful of substantiated cases—out of the thousands of Americans investigated—in which preventive intelligence produced warning of terrorist activity. Further, most of those few investigations which did detect terrorism could not have been opened under the Committee’s proposed restrictions.[1] In short, there is no substantial record before the Committee that preventive intelligence, under the restrictions we propose, would enable the Government to thwart terrorism.

Essentially, we are asking the American people to accept the risks of preventive intelligence on the hypothetical possibility that the worst imaginable terrorist acts might be averted. Faced with the specter of bombings or assassination plots, we may be in danger of sanctioning domestic spying without any significant prospect that such intelligence activities will in fact prevent them.

It might be argued that with adequate restraints to focus on hard core terrorism, preventive intelligence should be authorized even though we cannot demonstrate it is likely to prevent much violence. In that view, some insurance would be worth the limited cost.

Assuming that premise, there are two overriding issues:

—When may the Government investigate the activities of Americans engaged in political dissent; and

—When may the Government use informants to spy on those Americans?

If we are to have a preventive intelligence program at all, then I believe the Committee’s recommendations on both these issues require refinement.

The Committee found that most improper investigations have been commenced merely on the basis of political advocacy or association, rather than on specific information about expected terrorist activity. The recommendations would preclude mere advocacy or association as a predicate for investigating Americans. In practice, however, that would simply require specific allegations that an unpopular dissident group was planning terrorist violence.

Of course, if the FBI receives a tip that John Jones may resort to bombing to protest American involvement in Vietnam, the Bureau should not be forced to sit on its hand until the blast. But our proposals would permit more than review of federal and local records on John Jones a ad interviews of his associates, even in a preliminary investigation. On the basis of an anonymous letter, with no supporting information—let alone any indication of the source’s reliability—the FBI could conduct secret physical surveillance and ask existing informants about him for up to three months, with the Attorney General’s approval.

The Committee was concerned about authorizing such extensive investigations before there is even a “reasonable basis of suspicion” the subject will engage in terrorism. The Report offers examples of how this recommendation would work, and indicates our desire to insulate lawful political activity from investigation of violent terrorism. But these very examples illustrate how inextricable the two may be at the outset of an inquiry into an allegation or ambiguous information. The task of finding out whether a dissident is contemplating violence or is only involved in vigorous protest inevitably requires investigation of his protest activities. In the process, the FBI could follow the organizers of a Washington peace rally for three months on the basis of an allegation they might also engage in violence.

The second major issue is the use of paid Government informants to spy upon Americans. The great majority of abuses uncovered in domestic intelligence involved the pervasive use of informants against dissident political groups. The Committee defers the question of whether judicial approval should be required for targeting informants, until review by the Attorney General alone has been tested.

In my view, control of informants and control of wiretapping can be distinguished only on the basis of present constitutional doctrine; the Supreme Court has not found the use of informants to violate Fourth Amendment guarantees against Government intrusion. However, in terms of the values underlying both the First and Fourth Amendments, our record shows that the use of informants can, if anything be even more intrusive and more easily abused than electronic surveillance. As a matter of policy, they should be stringently controlled.

From the prosecutor’s viewpoint, a wiretap is more precise and reliable than an informant. The accuracy of an informant witness may be vulnerable to challenge. But as a source of intelligence, informants can be directed at all of the subject’s associates. They can follow the subject from place to place and can even be asked to elicit information through specific questions. In effect, a well-placed informant can be a “walking, thinking ‘bug’.” The use of such informants is at the heart of the chilling effect which preventive intelligence has on political dissent.

Whether informant penetrations are to be approved by the Attorney General or by a judge, the Committee report recognizes the great dangers they pose.[2] We recommend a high standard for their use: Probable cause to believe the target soon will engage in terrorist activity. My concern is that, in an effort, to accommodate the realities of preventive intelligence, our proposals may render this standard illusory.

The FBI argued that, in the case of tightly knit conspiracies, it could not meet that standard without the initial resort to informants.

Therefore, the Committee would permit “temporary” targeting of informants for up to five months. In effect, the FBI could bootstrap its investigation by employing informants to collect enough information to justify their use. The Committee does require that this use of informants be terminated if probable cause cannot be established within five months. But it is doubtful that such termination would be effective to provide the high standard of protection the Committee feels is necessary for the use of such an intrusive technique.[3]

To a great extent, our proposals for controlling preventive intelligence ultimately rely upon the Attorney General and congressional oversight committees. In view of the performances of the Congress and the Justice Department for the past two decades, it is not easy to have full confidence in their ability to prevent abuses of domestic intelligence without precise detailed statutory prohibitions.

Moreover, our task is not to fashion legislation which seems adequate for the present period of national calm and recent revelations of intelligence abuses. We do not need to draft safeguards for an Attorney General who makes clear—as Attorney General Levi has done—his determination to prevent abuse. We must legislate for the next periods of social turmoil and passionate dissent, when the current outrage has faded and those in power may again be tempted to investigate their critics in the name of national security.

In a time of crisis, acts of violence by a tiny minority of those engaged in political protest will again place intense pressures on officials in the Department of Justice to stretch any authority we provide to its limits. For these reasons we must be extremely careful not to build too much flexibility and discretion into a system of preventive intelligence which can be used against domestic dissidents. As the Supreme Court has wisely observed:

The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government. {DeJong v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365.)

<right> Philip A. Hart. </right>

- Additional Statement of Senator Robert Morgan

In 1776 the citizens of a new America, in declaring their independence from a Repressive government, set forth the goals, ideals and standards of their new government in the Declaration of Independence. As we prepare to celebrate the 200th anniversary of the birth of our country later this year, we will reaffirm the beliefs of our forefathers that America will be a free country, with a government of laws and not one of men. That the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has completed its year-long investigation into the secret activities of this country’s intelligence agencies and is releasing this Report is a great testament to the freedom for which America stands.

During the course of the past year, the Committee has discovered and revealed to the American people many actions of agencies of our government which were undertaken in complete disregard for the principles of our democratic society. The Committee’s Report documents many of these abuses, basing its findings directly on the admissions of officials of the governmental agencies being investigated and upon information taken directly from the files of those agencies.

The Report also analyzes those findings and recommends guidelines and procedures designed to protect the rights of American citizens in the future, while at the same time ensuring that our intelligence agencies maintain the capability to function effectively. I fully support the findings, analyses and recommendations, and make this additional statement only for the purpose of sharing with the readers of this Report some of my personal thoughts on the significance of the Committee’s work and where we go from here.

The Committee has approached the performance of its obligation mandated by Sen. Res. 21 with an abundance of caution. Many of the Committee’s executive session hearings, because of the sensitive nature of the subject matter, were even restricted to Members and only those staff who were assigned specific duties relevant to the inquiry. Because of the dedication of the Members and staff to the seriousness of the undertaking, we are approaching the completion of our work with a remarkably clean record as far as leaks of classified material detrimental to the security of the country are concerned.

From the beginning of our work until the end, the Committee has gone beyond the dictates of normal congressional investigation to try to accommodate concerns of the agencies under investigation for the security of material requested by the Committee. To this end, long hours were spent negotiating over what material would be made available to the Committee in response to its requests and in what form that material would be given to the Committee once access to it had been acquired. Nevertheless, on many occasions the Committee received material from which significant details had been deleted, necessitating further negotiations with the responsible agencies and, in some cases, severely hampering the Committee’s inquiry into important and significant areas.

While it is understandable that executive agencies whose very operations are secret would be in some respect resistant to senatorial inquiry into their activities, I can only interpret the strong resistance to some Committee demands and inquiries as being symptomatic of the atmosphere within the agencies which contributed to the occurrence of abuse in the first instance—one of the basic distrusts of the actions of fellow American citizens who have as their goals the strengthening of this nation’s ideals, of its moral fiber.

Just as the American citizen was denied the right to decide for himself what was or was not in the best interest of the country, or what actions of a foreign government or domestic dissident threatened the national security, the impression has been generated by some that the Congress cannot be trusted with the nation’s crucial secrets. As the elected representative of the citizens of my state, I am entrusted with the right and duty to properly conduct the business of our government. Without knowledge of governmental actions or effective means of overseeing those actions, my efforts to fulfill the requirements of that obligation are, at least, severely hampered; at most, impossible, and the successful implementation of an adequate system of checks and balances, as set forth in our Constitution, is effectively negated.

The Committee’s Report contains clear examples of the denial of the rights of American citizens to determine the course of American history. While the FBI’s counterintelligence activities directed at American citizens on many occasions violated the rights of the targets of the programs, a greater abuse was the belief fostered that the ordinary American citizen was not competent enough to, independently of governmental actions, decide, given full knowledge of all facts, what was in his or her best interest or in the best interest of the country. The judicial process, to which we turn for settlement of our disputes and punishment of criminals, was also largelv ignored. FBI action was based, for example, on the assumption that all Americans opposed to this country’s participation in the Vietnam War might one day take to the streets in violent protest, thereby threatening our national security. It was assumed, for example, that right-wing, anti-communist groups in the 1960s would gain the sympathies of too many Americans thereby impeding policies of the then administration, so their taxes were checked. It was assumed, for example, that every black student on every college campus in America would resort to violence, so procedures were undertaken to establish files on all of them.

All of these actions deny Americans the right to decide for themselves what will not be tolerated in a free society. Justice Douglas, defending the freedom of speech in his dissenting opinion in Dennis v. Z7.&, 341 U.S. 494, spoke words which vividly reflect the necessity that we, to remain free, must hold high this basic right of selfdetermination which has enabled us to attain the strength and prosperity that we as a nation now enjoy. Justice Douglas wrote,

Full and free discussion has indeed been the first article of . our faith. We have founded our political system on it. It has been the safeguard of every religious, political, philosophical, economic, and racial group amongst us. We have counted on it to keep us from embracing what is cheap and false; we have trusted the common sense of our people to choose the doctrine true to our genius and to reject the rest. This has been the outstanding tenet that has made our institutions the symbol of freedom and equality. We have deemed it more costly to liberty to suppress a despised minority than to let them vent their spleen. We have above all else feared the political censor. We have wanted a land where our people can be exposed to all the diverse creeds and cultures of the world. [Emphasis added.]

Furthermore, just as the American citizen must be given the right to validly assess the significance and merit of political change sought by others, the elected representatives of the people must have knowledge of governmental action to properly determine which perceived threats to our way of life are real, Justice Brandeis, in 01/mstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, said, “The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”

The continued existence of our democracy demands that we zealously protect the inherent right of all Americans to be free from unwarranted intrustion into their lives by governmental action. History has demonstrated, from the time of the founding of Christianity through the founding of these United States, through today, that there is a place for differences of opinion among our citizenry; for new, bold and innovative ideas. Thomas Jefferson wrote that “the republican is the only form of government which is not eternally at . open or secret war with the rights of mankind.” To maintain our Republic, we must be willing to tolerate the right of every American citizen to, within the confines of the law, be different.

Throughout the existence of the Committee, I have often said that while the occurrence of the events which gave rise to the investigation were unfortunate and are, in many instances, embarrassing to our country and some of its agencies, public disclosure was necessary in order to clear the air so that the agencies could devote their full attention to properly carrying out their important duties. I feel the Committee as a whole shares this view and has attempted to enhance the performance of the functions of the agencies by making specific recommendations which, when implemented and coupled with the establishment of an effective oversight committee, will guarantee that our country will not be subverted, nor subvert its ideals in the name of national security or other improperly perceived threats. It is my sincere hope that our citizens will view this Report as one of the many expressions of freedom we will make this year and that it will rekindle in each of us the belief that perhaps our greatest strength lies - in our ability to deal frankly, openly, and honestly with the problems of our government.

<right> Robert Morgan. </right>

INTRODUCTION TO SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATORS JOHN TOWER, HOWARD H, BAKER, JR., AND BARRY M. GOLDWATER

Our mutual concern that certain remedial measures proposed by this Committee threaten to impose undue restrictions upon vital and legitimate intelligence functions prevents us, in varying degrees, from rendering an unqualified endorsement to this Committee’s findings and recommendations in their entirety. We also perceive a need to emphasize areas of common agreement such as our unanimous endorsement of intelligence reforms heretofore outlined by the President.

Therefore, we have elected to articulate our common concerns and observations, as viewed from our individual perspectives, in separate views which follow.

John Tower, Vice Chairman.

Howard H. Baker, Jr.

Barry M. Goldwater.

(867)

SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATOR JOHN G. TOWER, VICE CHAIRMAN

When the Senate mandated this Committee to conduct an investigation and study of activities of our Nation’s intelligence community, it recognized the need for congressional participation in decisions which impact virtually every aspect of American life. The gravamen of our charge was to examine the Nation’s intelligence needs and the performance of agencies charged with intelligence responsibilities, and to make such assessments and recommendations as in our judgment are necessary to maintain the delicate balance between individual liberties and national security. I do not believe the Committee’s reports and accompanying staff studies comply fully with the charge to maintain that balance. The Committee’s recommendations make significant departures from an overriding lesson of the American experience— the right of American citizens to be free is inextricably bound to their right to be secure.

I do not question the existence of intelligence excesses—the abuses of power, both foreign and domestic, are well documented in the Committee’s report.

Nor do I question the need for expanded legislative, executive, and judicial involvement in intelligence policy and practices—the “uncertainties as to the authority of United States intelligence and related agencies” were explicitly recognized by Senate Resolution 21.

Nevertheless, I question, and take exception to, the Committee’s report to the extent that its recommendations are either unsupported by the factual record or unduly restrict attainment of valid intelligence objectives.

I believe that the 183 separate recommendations proposing new detailed statutes and reporting procedures not only exceed the number and scope of documented abuses, but represent over-reaction. If adopted in their totality, they would unnecessarily limit the effective- . ness of the Nation’s intelligence community.

In the area of foreign intelligence, the Committee was specifically mandated to prevent “.. . disclosure, outside the Select Committeej of any information which would adversely affect the intelligence activities ... of the Federal Government.” In his separate view, Senator Barry Goldwater clearly points up the damage to our efforts in Latin America occasioned by release of the “staff report” on covert action in Chile. I objected to releasing the Chile report and fully support Senator Goldwater’s assessment of the adverse impact of this “ironic” and ill-advised disclosure.

(369)

Another unfortunate aspect of the Committee’s foreign report is its response to incidents of lack of accountability and control by recommending the imposition of a layering of Executive Branch reviews at operational levels and needless bifurcation of the decisionmaking process. The President’s reorganization which centralizes foreign intelligence operations and provides for constant review and oversight, is termed “ambiguous.” Yet the Committee’s recommended statutory changes would [in addition to duplication and multiplication of decisions] add little except to insure that the existing functions set up by the President’s program were “explicitly empowered,” “reaffirmed” or provided with “adequate staff.” By concentration upon such details as which cabinet officer should chair the various review groups or speak for the President, the Committee’s approach unnecessarily restricts Presidential discretion, without enhancing efficiency, control, or accountability. The President’s reorganization is a thorough, comprehensive response to a long-standing problem. It should be supported, not pilloried with statutory amendments amounting to little more than alternative management techniques. It is far more appropriate for the Congress to place primary legislative emphasis on establishing a structure for Congressional Oversight which is compatible with the Executive reorganization while eliminating the present proliferation of committees and subcommittee’s asserting jurisdiction over intelligence activities.

Another area in which I am unable to agree with the Committee’s approach is covert action. It would be a mistake to attempt to require that the Congress receive prior notification of all covert activities. Senator Howard Baker repeatedly urged the Committee to adopt the more realistic approach of obligating the Executive to keep the Congress “fully and currently informed”. I believe any attempt by the legislative branch to impose a strict prior notification requirement upon the Executive’s foreign policy initiatives is neither feasible nor consistent with our constitutionally mandated separation of powers.

On the domestic front the Committee has documented flagrant abuses. Of particular concern were the political misuses of such agencies as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Internal Revenue Service. However, while thoroughly probing these reprehensible activities and recommending needed changes in accountability mechanisms, the Committee’s “corrective” focus is almost exclusively on prohibitions or limitations of agency practices. I hope this approach to remedial action will not be read as broad criticism of the overall performance of the intelligence community or a minimization of the Committee’s own finding that “. . . a fair assessment must place a major part of the blame upon the failures of senior executive officials and Congress.” In fact, I am persuaded that the failure of high officials to investigate these abuses or to terminate them when they learned of them was almost as reprehensible as the abuses themselves.

A further objectionable aspect of the Committee’s approach is the scope of the proposed limitations on the use of electronic surveillance and informants as investigative techniques. With respect to electronic surveillance of Americans suspected of intelligence activities inimical to the national interest, the Committee would limit authority for such probes to violations of specific criminal statutes. This proposal fails to address the real problem of utilizing electronic surveillance against myriad forms of espionage. A majority of the Committee recommended this narrow standard while acknowledging that existing statutes offer inadequate coverage of “modem forms of espionage.” The Committee took no testimony on revision of the espionage laws and simply proposed that another committee “explore the necessity for amendments.” To prohibit electronic surveillance in these cases pending such revision is to sanction an unnecessary risk to the national security. In adopting this position the Committee not only ignores the fact that appellate courts in two federal circuits have upheld the Executive’s inherent authority to conduct such surveillance, but also fails to endorse the Attorney General’s comprehensive proposal to remedy objection to current practices. The proposed safeguards, which include requirements for the Attorney General’s certification of hostile foreign intelligence involvement and issuance of a judicial warrant as a condition precedent to electronic surveillance, represent a significant expansion of civil liberties protections. The proposal enjoys bi-partisan support in Congress and I join those members urging prompt enactment.

I am also opposed to the methods and means proposed by the Committee to regulate the use of informants. Informants have been in the past and will remain in the future a vital tool of law enforcement. To adopt the Committee’s position and impose stringent, mechanical time limits on the use of informants—particularly regarding their use against terrorist or hostile foreign intelligence activities in the United States—would be to place our faith in standards which are not only illusory, but unworkable.

In its overly broad approach to eliminating intelligence abuses, the Committee report urges departure from the Congress’ role as a partner in national security policy and comes dangerously close to being a blueprint for authorizing Congressional management of the day-to- day affairs of the intelligence community. Whether this management is attempted through prior notification of a shopping list of prohibitive statutes and regulations, it is a task for which the legislative branch of government is ill-suited. I believe the adverse impact which would be occasioned by enactment of all the Committee recommendations would be substantial.

Substantial segments of the Committee’s work product will assist this Congress in proceeding with the task of insuring the conduct of necessary intelligence activities in a manner consistent with our obligation to safeguard the rights of American citizens. However, we must now step back from the klieg lights and abuse-dominated atmosphere, and balance our findings and recommendations with a recognition that our intelligence agencies and the men and women who serve therein have been and will always be essential to the existence of our nation.

This Committee was asked to provide a constitutionally acceptable framework for Congress to assist in that mission. We were not mandated to render our intelligence systems so constrained as to be fit for employment only in an ideal world.

In addition to the above remarks I generally endorse the positions set forth in Senator Baker’s individual views. I specifically endorse:

His views stating the need for legislation making it a criminal offense to publish the name of a United States intelligence officer stationed abroad under cover.

His position that there must be a system of greater accountability by our intelligence operations to the United States Congress and the American people.

His concern that the Congress exercise caution to insure that a proper predicate exists before any recommendations for permanent reforms are enacted into law.

His view that there be careful study before endorsing the Committee’s far reaching recommendations calling for an alteration of the intelligence community structure. I also support the individual views of Senator Goldwater.

Further, I specifically endorse:

His assessment that only a small segment of the American public has ever doubted the integrity of our Nation’s intelligence agencies.

His opinion that an intelligence system, however secret, does not place undue strain on our nation’s constitutional government.

His excellent statement concerning covert action as an essential tool of the President’s foreign policy arsenal.

His opposition to the publication of an annual aggregate figure for United States intelligence and his reasons therefor.

His views and comments on the Committee’s recommendations regard the National Security Council and the Office of the President. Specifically, comments number 12,13 and 14.

His views challenging the proposed limitations concerning the recruitment of foreigners by the Central Intelligence Agency.

His views and general comments concerning the right of every American, including academics, clergymen, businessmen and others, to cooperate with his government in its lawful pursuits.

For the reasons stated above, I regret that I am unable to sign the final report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities.

<right> John G. Tower, </right>

<right> Vice Chairman. </right>

SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.

At the close of the Senate Watergate Committee, I felt that there was a compelling need to conduct a thorough examination of our intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA and the FBI. Congress never had taken a close look at the structure or programs of either the CIA or the FBI, since their inception in 1947 and 1924, respectively.[1]

Moreover, there never had been a congressional review of the intelligence community as a whole. Therefore, I felt strongly that this Committee’s investigation was necessary. Its time had come. Like the Watergate investigation, however, for me it was not a pleasant assignment. I say that because our investigation uncovered many actions by agents of the FBI and of the CIA that I would previously have not thought possible (e.g., crude FBI letters to break up marriages or cause strife between Black groups and the CIA assassination plots) in our excellent intelligence and law enforcement institutions. Despite these unsavory actions, however, I do not view either the FBI or CIA as evil or even basically bad. Both agencies have a long and distinguished record of excellent service to our government. With the exception of the worst of the abuses, the agents involved truly believed they were acting in the best interest of the country. Nevertheless, the abuses uncovered can not be condoned and should have been investigated long ago.

I am hopeful, now that all these abuses have been fully aired to the American people through the Committee’s Hearings and Report, that this investigation will have had a cathartic effect; that the FBI and CIA will now be able to grow rather than decline. Such growth with a healthy respect for the rule of law should be our goal; a goal which I am confident can be attained. It is important for the future of this country that the FBI and CIA not be cast as destroyers of our constitutional rights but rather as protectors of those rights. With the abuses behind us this can be accomplished.

Long-Term Improvement of Intelligence Community

On balance, I think the Committee carried out its task responsibly and thoroughly. The Committee’s report on both the Foreign and Domestic areas are the result of extensive study and deliberation, as well as bipartisan cooperation in its drafting. The Report identifies many of the problems in the intelligence field and contains positive suggestions for reform. I support many of the proposed reforms, while differing, at times, with the means we should adopt to attain those reforms. In all candor, however, one must recognize that an investigation such as this one, of necessity, will cause some short-term damage to our intelligence apparatus. A responsible inquiry, as this has been, will in the long run result in a stronger and more efficient intelligence community. As my colleague Senator Morgan recently noted at a Committee meeting, such short-term injury will be outweighed by longterm benefits gained from the re-structuring of the intelligence community with more efficient utilization of our intelligence resources. Former Director William Colby captured this sentiment recently in a New York Times article:

Intelligence has traditionally existed in a shadowy field outside the law. This year’s excitement has made clear that the rule of law applies to all parts of the American Government, including intelligence. In fact, this will strengthen American intelligence. Its secrets will be understood to be necessary ones for the protection of our democracy in tomorrow’s world, not covers for mistake or misdeed. The guidelines within which it should and should not operate will be clarified for those in intelligence and those concerned about it. Improved supervision will ensure that the intelligence agencies will remain within the new guidelines.

The American people will understand and support their intelligence services and press their representatives to give intelligence and its officers better protection from irresponsible exposure and harassment. The costs of the past year were high, but they will be exceeded by the value of this strengthening of what was already the best intelligence service in the world.[2]

The Committee’s investigation, as former Director Colby points out, has probed areas in which reforms are needed not to prevent abuses, but to better protect and strengthen the intelligence services. For example, it is now clear that legislation is needed to make it a criminal offense to publish the name of a United States intelligence officer stationed abroad.[3] Moreover, the Committee’s investigation convinced me that the State Department should revise its publication of lists from which intelligence officers overseas predictably and often easily can be identified.

Yet we have not been able, in a year’s time, to examine carefully all facets of the United States’ incredibly important and complex intelligence community.[4] We have established that in some areas problems exist which need intensive long-term study. Often these most important and complex problems are not ones which lend themselves to quick or easy solutions. As Ambassador Helms noted in his testimony during the Committee’s public hearings:

... I would certainly agree that in view of the statements made by all of you distinguished gentlemen, that some result from this has got to bring about a system of accountability that is going to be satisfactory to the U.S. Congress and to the American people.

Now, exactly how you work out that accountability in a secret intelligence organization, I think, is obviously going to take a good deal of thought and a good deal of work and I do not have any easy ready answer to it because I assure you it is not an easy answer. In other words, there is no quick fix. (Hearings, Vol. I, 9/17/75, p. 124).

Thorough Study Necessary in Several Areas

The areas which concern me the most are those on which we as a Committee have been able to spend only a limited amount of time,[5] i.e., espionage, counterintelligence, covert action, use of informants, and electronic surveillance. It is in these areas that I am concerned that the Committee be extremely careful to ensure that the proper thorough investigatory predicate exist before any permanent reform recommendations be enacted into law.

Our investigation, however, has provided a solid base of evidence from which a permanent oversight committee can and should launch a lengthy and thorough inquiry into the best way to achieve permanent restructuring in these particularly sensitive areas. It is my view that such a study is necessary before I am able to endorse some of the Committee’s recommendations which suggest a far reaching alteration of the structure of some of the most important facets of our intelligence system.

Therefore, while I support many of the Committee’s major recommendations, I find myself unable to agree with all the Committee’s findings and recommendations in both the foreign and domestic areas. Nor am I able to endorse every inference, suggestion, or nuance contained in the findings and supporting individual reports which together total in the thousands of pages. I do, however, fully support all of the factual revelations which our report contains concerning the many abuses in the intelligence field. It is important to disclose to the American people all of the instances of wrongdoing we discovered. With such full disclosure, it is my hope that we can turn the corner and devote our attention in the future to improving our intelligence gathering capability. We must have reform, but we must accomplish it by improving, not limiting, our intelligence productivity. I am confident this can be done.

Cumulative Effect of Recommendations

With regard to the totality of the Committee’s recommendations, I am afraid that the cumulative effect of the numerous restrictions which the report proposes to place on our intelligence community may be damaging to our intelligence effort. I am troubled by the fact that some of the Committee’s recommendations dip too deeply into many of the operational areas of our intelligence agencies. To do so, I am afraid, will cause practical problems. The totality of the proposals may decrease instead of increase our. intelligence product. And, there

may be serious ramifications of some proposals which will, I fear, spawn problems which are as yet unknown. I am unconvinced that the uncertain world of intelligence can be regulated with the use of rigid or inflexible standards.

Specifically, I am not convinced that the answers to all our problems are found by establishing myriad Executive Branch boards, committees, and subcommittees to manage the day-to-day operations of the intelligence community. We must take care to avoid creating a Rube Goldberg maze of review procedures which might result in a bureaucratic morass which would further increase the burden on our already heavily overburdened tax dollar.

We should not over-reform in response to the abuses uncovered. This is not to say that we do not need new controls, because we do. But, it is to say that the controls we impose should be well reasoned and add to, not detract from the efficiency of our intelligence gather- ering system.

Increased Executive Branch controls are only one-half of the solution. Congress for too long has neglected its role in monitoring the intelligence community. That role should be significant but not all- encompassing. Congress has a great many powers which in the past it has not exercised. We must now do our share but, at the same time, we must be careful, in reacting to the abuses uncovered, that we not swing the pendulum back too far in the direction of Congress. Both wisdom and the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers dictate that Congress not place itself in the position of trying to manage and control the day-to-day business of the intelligence operations of the Executive Branch. Vigorous oversight is needed, but it should be carefully structured in a new powerful oversight committee. I believe this can be achieved if we work together to attain it.

In moving toward improving our intelligence capability, we must also streamline it. It is in this approach that my thoughts are somewhat conceptually different from the approach the Committee is recommending. I am concerned that we not overreact to the past by creating a plethora of rigid “thou shalt not” statutes, which, while prohibiting the specific hypothetical abuse postured in the Report, cast a wide net which will catch and eliminate many valuable intelligence programs as well.

The Committee Report recommends the passage of a large number of new statutes to define the functions of and further regulate the intelligence community. I am troubled by how much detail should be used in spelling out the functions and limitations of our intelligence agencies for all the world to see. Do we want to outline for our adversaries just how far our intelligence agencies can go? Do we want to define publicly down to the last detail what they can and cannot do ? I am not sure we do. I rather think the answer is found in establishing carefullv structured charter? for the intelligence agencies with accountability and responsibility in the Executive Branch and vigilant oversight within the Legislative Branch.

President’s Program

It is my view that we need to take both a moderate and efficient course in reforming our intelligence gathering system. In that regard, I think President Ford’s recent restructuring of the intelligence community was an extraordinarily good response to the problems of the past. The President’s program effected a massive reorganization of our entire intelligence community. It was a massive reaction to a massive problem which did not lend itself to easy solution. I am pleased that many of the Committee’s recommendations for intelligence reform mirror the President’s program in format. Centralizing the command and control of the intelligence community, as the President’s program does, is the best way to ensure total accountability and yet not compromise our intelligence gathering capability.

Therefore, I endorse the basic framework of intelligence reform, outlined by President Ford, as embodying: (1) a single permanent oversight committee in Congress, with strong and aggressive staff, to oversee the intelligence community;[6] (2) the Committee on Foreign Intelligence to manage the day-to-day operation of the intelligence community; (3) the re-constituted Operations Advisory Group to review and pass upon all significant covert actions projects;[7] and (4) the Intelligence Oversight Board to monitor any possible abuses in the future, coordinating the activities and reports of what I am confident will be the considerably strengthened offices of General Counsel and Inspector General. This framework will accomplish the accountability and responsibility we seek in the intelligence community with both thoroughness and efficiency. Within this framework, Attorney General Levi’s new guidelines in the Domestic Security area will drastically alter this previously sparsely supervised field. These guidelines will centralize responsibility for domestic intelligence within the Department of Justice and will preclude abuses such as COINTELPRO from ever reoccurring.[8]

Specific Reforms

Within this basic framework, we must look to how we are going to devise a system that can both effectively oversee the intelligence community and yet not impose strictures which will eliminate its productivity. It is to this end that I suggest we move in the following direction:

(1) Demand responsibility and accountability from the Executive Branch by requiring all major policy decisions and all major intelligence action decisions be in writing, and therefore retrievable.[9]

(2) I recommend, as I have previously, that Congress enact a variation of S. 400, which I had the privilege to cosponsor. S. 400 is the Government Operations Committee bill which would create a permanent oversight committee to review the intelligence community. The existing Congressional oversight system has provided infrequent and ineffectual review. And, many of the abuses revealed might have been prevented had Congress been doing its job. The jurisdiction of the new committee should include both the CIA and the FBI, and the committee should be required to review and report periodically to the Senate on all aspects of the intelligence community’s operations. In particular, I recommend that the Committee give specific careful attention to how we might improve as well as control our intelligence capability in the counterintelligence and espionage areas.

(3) Simultaneously with the creation of a permanent oversight committee, Congress should amend the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act, § 662, which now requires the intelligence community to brief 6 committees of the Congress on each and every major intelligence action. Former Director Colby strikes a responsive chord when he complains that the present system will lead to leaking of vital intelligence information. We must put a stop to this. This can be done by allowing the intelligence community to report only to a single secure committee.

(4) Concomitantly with improved oversight, we in Congress must adopt stringent procedures to prevent leaks of intelligence information. In this regard, I recommend we create a regular remedy to prevent the extraordinary remedy of a single member of Congress disclosing the existence of a covert intelligence operation with which he does not agree. Such a remedy could take the form of an appeal procedure within the Congress so that a single member, not satisfied with a Committee’s determination that a particular program is in the national interest, will be provided with an avenue of relief. This procedure, however, must be coupled with stringent penalties for any member of Congress who disregards it and discloses classified information anyway. I intend to offer an amendment to institute such a remedy when S. 400 reaches the Senate floor.[10]

(5) The positions of General Counsel and Inspector General in the intelligence agencies should be elevated in importance and given increased powers. I feel that it is extraordinarily important that these positions, particularly that of General Counsel, be upgraded. For that reason, I think that it is a good idea to have the General Counsel, to both the FBI and the CIA, subject to Senate confirmation. This adds another check and balance which will result in an overall improvement of the system.[11] Additionally, I feel that it is equally important to provide both the General Counsel and Inspector General with unrestricted access to all raw files within their respective agencies.[12] This was not always done in the past and will be a healthy addition to the intraagency system of checks and balances.

(6) I am in favor of making public the aggregate figure for the budget of the entire intelligence community. I believe the people of the United States have the right to know that figure.[13] The citizens of this country have a right to know how much of their money we are spending on intelligence production. But, they also want to get their money’s worth out of that tax dollar. They do not want to spend that money for intelligence production which is going to be handicapped; which is going to produce poor or inaccurate intelligence. Therefore, I am opposed to any further specific delineation of the intelligence community budget. Specifically, I am opposed to the publication of the CIA’s budget or the NSA’s budget. It seems to me we are dealing with the world of the unknown in predicting what a foreign intelligence service can or cannot extrapolate from these budget figures. We received no testimony which guaranteed that, if Congress were to publish the budget figure for the CIA itself, a hostile intelligence organization could not extrapolate from that figure and determine much more accurately what the CIA capabilities are in any number of vital areas. Without such testimony, I am not prepared to go that far. The public’s right to know must be balanced with the efficiency and integrity of our intelligence operations. I think we can accomplish both by taking the middle road; publishing the aggregate figure for the entire intelligence community. It is this proposal that I have voted in favor of.

There are a number of other specific findings and recommendations, supported by a majority of the Committee, which require additional brief comment.

Foreign Intelligence Recommendations

(1) COVERT ACTION

I believe the covert action capability of our intelligence community is vital to the United States. We must maintain our strength in this capacity, but, we must also control it. The key and difficult question, of course, is how we can control it without destroying or damaging its effectiveness. In my view, the best way to both maintain strength and yet insure accountability is to have strict control of the covert action programs through the Operations Advisory Group, with parallel control and supervision by the proposed permanent congressional oversight committee.

Covert action is a complex United States intelligence capability. Covert action provides the United States with the anility to react to changing situations. It is built up over a long period of time. Potential assets are painstakingly recruited all over the world. Having reviewed the history of covert action since its inception, I do not look upon the intelligence agents involved in covert action as a modern day group of bandits who travel the world murdering and kidnapping people. Rather, a vast majority of covert action programs are not only valuable but well thought approaches through media placement and agents of influence which produce positive results.

Covert action programs cannot be mounted instantly upon a crisis. It is naive to think that our intelligence community will be able to address a crisis without working years in advance to establish sources in the various countries in which a crisis might occur. These sources provide what is referred to as the “infrastructure,” which must necessarily be in place throughout the world so that the United States can predict and prevent actions abroad which are inimical to our national interest.[14] I believe that, were we to completely abolish covert action or attempt to remove it from the CIA and place it in a new separate agency, these sources would dry up; and, when a crisis did come, our intelligence community would not be able to meet it effectively. Not only do I question the effectiveness a new separate agency for covert action would have, but such a re-structuring would unnecessarily increase our already burgeoning bureaucracy.

I think that it is important to realize that covert action cannot be conducted in public. We cannot take a Gallup Poll to determine whether we should secretly aid the democratic forces in a particular country. I do not defend some of the covert action which has taken place in Chile. But, the fact remains that we cannot discuss publicly the many successes, both major and minor, which the United States has achieved through the careful use of covert action programs. Many individuals occupy positions of power in the world today as a direct result of aid given through a covert action program. Unfortunately, we cannot boast of or even mention these significant achievements. In short, we cannot approach covert action from a public relations point of view. We should not forget that we must deal with the world as it is today—with our adversaries employing their equivalent of covert action. We must either say that the intelligence community should have the power to address world problems in this manner, under the strict control of the President and Congress, or we should take away that power completley. I cannot subscribe to the latter.

Finally, the issue remains as to how we can best control covert action through statutory reform. First, I believe the Executive Branch can and should carefully review each significant covert action proposal. This will be accomplished through the Operations Advisory Group under the program outlined by President Ford.

Second, Congress can control covert action by passing legislation requiring that the new oversight committee be kept “fully and currently informed.” This, I believe, is the appropriate statutory language to apply to covert action . I do not agree with the Committee’s recommendation that “prior notice” be given to Congress for each and every covert action project. As a matter of practice, the important and signif- cant covert action programs will be discussed with the oversight committee in a form of partnership; and this is the way it should be. “Fully and currently informed” is language which has served us well in the atomic energy area. It has an already existing body of precedent that may be used as a guide for the future. It is flexible, like the Constitution, and provides a strong, broad base to work from. I am not prepared to say, however, that in the years ahead there may not be some vitally sensitive situation of which Congress and the oversight committee should not be told in advance. While the likelihood of this occurring is not great, we should never foreclose with rigid statutory language possibilities which cannot be foreseen today. Our statutory language must be flexible enough to encompass a variety of problems and potential problems, yet rigid enough to ensure total accountability. “Fully and currently informed” accomplishes both purposes.

(2) CIA PUBLISHING RESTRICTIONS

In the area of restrictions on the CIA’s publishing of various materials, I am in complete agreement that anything published in the United States by the CIA, or even sponsored indirectly by the CIA through a proprietary, front, or any other means, must be identified as coming from the CIA. Publications overseas are another matter. We should allow the Agency the flexibility, as we have in our recommendations, to publish whatever they want to overseas and to publish under whatever subterfuge is necessary and thought advisable.[15]

Domestic Intelligence Recommendations

While the Committee’s Domestic Intelligence Report represents an excellent discussion of the problems attendant to that field of intelligence, I feel several of the recommendations may present practical problems. Although our objective of achieving domestic intelligence reforms is the same, I differ with the majority of the Committee in how best to approach the achievement of this goal.

(1) INVESTIGATIVE STANDARDS

Scope, of Domestic Security Investigations

At the outset, I note that most of my concern with the standards for investigations in the domestic security area stem from the fact that “domestic security” is defined by the Committee to include both the “terrorism” and “espionage” areas of investigation. Severe limitations, proscribing the investigation of student groups, are more readily acceptable when they do not also apply to terrorist groups and foreign and domestic agents involved in espionage against the United States. To include these disparate elements within the same “domestic security” rubric, it seems to me, will create unnecessary problems when it comes to the practical application of the theoretical principles enunciated in the Committee’s recommendations.

(a) Preventive intelligence investigations—The Committee’s recommendations limit the FBI’s permissible investigations in these critical areas of terrorism and espionage under standards for what the Committee delineates as preventive intelligence investigations. Under these standards the FBI can only investigate where:

it has a specific allegation or specific or substantiated information that (an) American or foreigner will soon engage in terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity [emphasis added.][16]

In am not convinced that this is the best way to approach the real problem of limiting domestic intelligence investigations. While in theoretical terms the standards of the recommendations may seem appropriate, I fear the inherent practical consequences of their application to the cold, real world of terrorism and espionage. The establishment of an imminency requirement by not permitting any investigation by the FBI unless the allegation or information received establishes that the person or group will “soon engage” in certain activity might prohibit any number of legitimate and necessary FBI investigations. For example, an allegation of an assassination attempt on a public figure at an unspecified date in the future could be precluded from investigation; or, vague information received by the FBI that there was a plan to obtain some nuclear components, but no indication of when or how, could also be prohibited from investigation. Surely, matters such as these should be the valid subjects of investigation—no matter how vague or piecemeal the information is.[17]

(b) Time limits—The Committee’s recommendations would limit any preliminary FBI investigation of an allegation of wrongdoing in the Domestic. Security area to 30 days from the receipt of the information, unless the Attorney General “finds”[18] that the investigation need be extended for an additional 60 days. The FBI investigation may continue beyond 90 days only if the investigatory efforts establish “reasonable suspicion” that the person or group “will soon engage in” terrorist or foreign espionage activities.[19] And, even a full preventive intelligence investigation is not permitted to continue beyond “one year,” except upon a finding by the Attorney General of “compelling circumstances.”[20]

While well-intentioned, I am not persuaded that these are workable standards. I just don’t think we can categorize all investigations into these rigid time frames. Investigations just are not conducted that way. Thirty days, for example, is probably not even enough time to obtain a license check return from some states. Moreover, limiting an investigation to one year may not be realistic when it applies to investigating a violence prone group like the SLA or a Soviet Union espionage ring. These investigations are not easily or quickly accomplished. I do not believe that the creation of artificial time limits is the best way to approach the real concern of the Committee, which is that we establish institutional controls on domestic security investigations. I would prefer approaching the control and accountability problems by providing periodic Department of Justice reviews of all categories of domestic intelligence investigations; not by imposing specific time limits upon all investigations.

(2) INFORMANTS

The Committee recommends broad new restrictions on the use of informants by the FBI. While our investigation has established that, in the domestic intelligence field, there have been numerous abuses in the use of informants, I do not think that the proposed recommen-' dations are the best vehicles to achieve the needed reform. I cannot subscribe to recommendaitons limiting the use of informants to stringent time standards.[21] To limit use of informants to periods of “90 days” [22] unless the Attorney General finds “probable cause” that an American will “soon” engage in terrorist or hostile foreign intelligence activity is impractical and unworkable. When groups such as the SLA attempt to rob, kill, or blow up buildings, it is clearly necessary to cultivate informants who may provide some advance warning. I am concerned that the Committee’s recommendations will preclude this vital function of the FBI. Moreover, specific time limits, it seems to me, will prove to be impractical. For example, at the end of the prescribed time, with not enough evidence for arrests, will informant X be terminated and replaced by informant Y who starts anew, or are informants thereafter banned from penetrating the particular group— even if violence prone or involved in espionage ?

It should be remembered that informants are the single most important tool of the FBI, and local police for that matter, in the fight against terrorism and espionage, as well as organized crime, narcotics, and even the ever pervasive street crimes of murder, rape, and robbery. Indeed, they are the very lifeblood of such investigations. Moreover, informants are involved in a wide spectrum of activities from attending public meetings to actual penetration attempts. I am concerned that theoretical and abstract restrictions designed only for “domestic intelligence”, if enacted, would soon limit our legitimate law enforcement efforts in many other fields as well. People and actions do not always fit nicely in neat little boxes labeled “domestic intelligence,” particularly in the terrorist and espionage areas to which the proposed restrictions on informants would apply. Congress should carefully consider the scope and ramifications of any recommendations with respect to informants.

It is my view that the better way to approach the problems encountered in the use of informants is to put their use under strict supervision of the Department of Justice. Creation of a special staff or committee for this purpose, centralized in the Department of Justice, would provide effective controls over the potential abuses in the use of informants, yet not hamstring their legitimate and valuable use.[23]

(3) ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I wholeheartedly support S. 3197, the new electronic surveillarice bill sent to the Congress by President Ford.[24] It needs consolidated bipartisan support because it represents a significant advance from existing practice. For the first time, it will bring all governmental electronic surveillance under the scrutiny of judicial warrant procedures. I commend the efforts of President Ford in taking this extraordinary step forward in the regulation of electronic surveillance.

In supporting S. 3197, I do not regard the existing wiretaps presently maintained under the direction and control of Attorney General Levi as being in violation of the Constitution. The present practice of electronic surveillance authorization and implementation rests upon a long-standing body of precedent which provides a firm constitutional base for their continued maintenance. The President’s approach is to move from the present practice toward better practices and procedures for authorization. The abuses of electronic surveillance of the past clearly dictate a need for a system of judicial warrant approval. Under the President’s proposal the American people will be able to rest easy— assured that electronic surveillance will be employed carefully, yet when needed to combat serious criminal and espionage activity.

I differ with a majority of the Committee insofar as they recommend that before a judge can issue a warrant for electronic surveillance he must find more than that an American is a conscious agent of a foreign power engaged in clandestine intelligence activities. The Committee would require that probable cause be established for “criminal activity” before a wiretap can be authorized. I think this departure from the S. 3197 standard would be a dangerous one because it would eliminate certain areas of espionage, particularly industrial espionage, from electronic surveillance. Many areas of espionage do not involve clearly criminal activity. Indeed, forms of espionage may not constitute a criminal offense, but should be the valid target of an espionage investigation. For example, a situation such as American oil company executives providing unclassified but important oil reserve information to a Soviet agent might not be a permissible subject of electronic surveillance if “criminal activity,” rather than hostile foreign intelligence, were the standard.[25] I think the Committee proposed standard would harm the FBI’s espionage efforts and would therefore be a mistake.

(4) CIVIL REMEDIES STATUTE

I oppose any broad new civil remedies statute in the field of domestic intelligence as both dangerous and unnecessary. It is dangerous because it could easily open the flood gates for numerous lawsuits filed seeking injunctive relief in the courts to thwart legitimate investigations. It is unnecessary because any substantial actions are already permitted under present Supreme Court decisions, such as Bivens v. United States, for violation of constitutional rights. There is simply no valid reason to carve out a broad new category of lawsuits for those not only injured by domestic intelligence methods but “threatened with injury.”[26] No such statutory provisions are available for “victims” in any other specific category of activity. The present avenues of relief provided by law today are clearly sufficient to address any future abuses in the domestic intelligence field. I note that we have not had the benefit of any sworn testimony from the many constitutional and criminal law. experts in the country, either pro or con such a proposal. Without the benefit of an adequate record and with my concern about the practical results of such a statute, I cannot support its enactment.

(5) CIVIL DISORDERS

A final recommendation which requires brief comment in the Committee’s proposed standards permitting the FBI to assist “federal, state, and local officials in connection with a civil disorder.” The Committee’s recommendation will not allow any investigation by the F.B.I., not even preliminary in nature, unless the Attorney General finds in writing that “there is a clear and immediate threat of domestic violence” which will require the use of Federal troops.

My reservation about this recommendation is that I think it deprives the Attorney General of the necessary flexibility in dealing with these delicate matters (i.e., civil disturbances) and might tend to exacerbate a possibly explosive situation. If the Attorney General is not allowed to dispatch FBI agents to the scene of disorders it seems to me that we deprive him of the very means he needs to make the extraordinarily important decision as to whether Federal troops are likely to be used.

I believe the better practice would be to permit preliminary investigation by the FBI of potentially volatile situations so that the Attorney General might make the most reasoned decision possible with respect to what I consider the drastic step of deploying Federal troops to quell a civil disorder in one of our cities.

- WATERGATE-RELATED INQUIRY

Finally, I wish to address briefly an area of the Committee’s investigation which I pursued for the most part independently. At the close of the Senate Watergate investigation I filed a report as part of my individual views[27] which outlined remaining areas of investigation with respect to the relationships between the Central Intelligence Agency and the former CIA employees who participated in the Watergate break-in.[28] By virtue of my membership on this Select Committee, I have been able to pursue a further inquiry into these matters, and wish to thank the Chairman and the Vice Chairman for the staff assistance and latitude provided me to pursue this area of investigation.

Many of the concerns raised in the Watergate Committee investigation have been overtaken by time and events. For example, the reported references to illegal CIA domestic activities have now been confirmed, as described in detail in the Committee’s Report. The reference to the CIA maintaining a file on Jack Anderson [29] proved to be part of a lengthy investigation and physical surveillance of Anderson by the CIA during a “leak” inquiry. Similarly, the detailing of Howard Hunt’s post-retirement contacts with the CIA has been supplemented with still more such contacts.[30] Since July 1974, we have witnessed a variety of other disclosures relative to the CIA’s domestic activities; indeed, the creation of our Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities was due in part to the continuing public concern about these matters.

Unlike the Watergate Committee investigation of CIA activities, which largely was terminated because of the refusal of the CIA to turn over documents,[31] this investigation was conducted in an atmosphere of cooperation. After some initial difficulties, which the Committee encountered in a variety of areas, the cooperation afforded by the CIA was exemplary. In particular, I especially want to express my appreciation to former Director William Colby and present Director George Bush for cooperating to the fullest extent in this investigation. I also want to thank Ambassador Richard Helms and former Counterintelligence Chief James Angleton for their patience and extensive assistance in numerous conferences, in trying to reconstruct the elusive details of this significant period.

In pursuing this area of inquiry, the Committee staff examined a great volume of highly sensitive material, much of which contained speculative matters and a multitude of information of marginal relevance. This information, which had not been made available in large part to the Separate Watergate Committee, was examined in raw form and without sanitization deletions. Because of the sensitivity of the material, it was reviewed on the Central Intelligence Agency premises. Thus, it was in a spirit of cooperation that this examination was accommodated ; and, this experience indicates that the Congress and the intelligence community can cooperate in an investigation without incurring unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information.[32]

At the close of this Committee’s examination of the available record, I wish to state my belief that the sum total of the evidence does not substantiate a conclusion that the CIA per se was involved in the range of events and circumstances known as Watergate.[33] However, there was considerable evidence that for much of the post-Watergate period the CIA itself was uncertain of the ramifications of the various involvements, witting or otherwise, between members of the Watergate burglary team and members or components of the Agency. Indeed, the CIA was apparently at times as perplexed as Congressional investigators.[34] It should 'be noted that the Agency undertook an extensive internal inquiry in an effort to resolve these uncertainties.

The investigation of Watergate and the possible relationship of the Central Intelligence Agency thereto, produced a panoply of puzzlement. While the available information leaves nagging questions and contains bits and pieces of intriguing evidence, fairness dictates that an assessment be rendered on the basis of the present record. An impartial evaluation of that record compels the conclusion that the CIA, as an institution, was not involved in the Watergate break-in.

<right> Howard H. Baker, Jr. </right>

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF SENATOR GOLDWATER

For over a year the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities has been conducting hearings and taking testimony. Almost six months of this time was frittered away in an unproductive investigation into alleged assassinations (see my individual views accompanying the foreign section of this report).

Thanks to extensive and often sensationalized public hearings, the deficiencies of our domestic intelligence agencies have now been exposed, labelled, and largely admitted to. In response, the individual agencies have undertaken substantial reforms and the Administration itself has piloted corrections by a thoughtful and detailed Executive Order 11905,2/18/76.

Not satisfied, however, the Select Committee’s Report sets forth a voluminous and rambling treatise which pillories the nation’s domestic intelligence agencies, fixes individual culpability, ignores agency efforts at reform, and urges the adoption of recommendations and findings unsubstantiated by fact.

The Report sets forth frequent and unfounded criticism of “executive power.” Ignoring both past and present efforts by the Executive to provide guidance and reform, the Report voices theoretical objection to the conduct of intelligence activities by the “Chief Executive and his surrogates.” Unhappily, the sweeping dissatisfaction of theoreticians and academicians is not reflected in the record of the Select Committee’s proceedings and is almost wholly unsupported by testimony. The pronouncements within the Report deal in a high-handed manner with matters that received little or no attention by the Committee and are, consequently, utterly devoid of an adequate record.

The free-wheeling, self-righteous, and frequently moralizing thrust of the Report therefore assures recommendations which are bottomed in wish and speculation rather than in fact or testimony. Recommendations, for example, that civil remedies be expanded to cover parties alleging “injuries” from domestic intelligence activity; that statutes be enacted to create a cause of action for those allegedly so aggrieved; that criminal sanctions be enacted for willful violation of recommended statutes; and that the Smith and Voorhis Acts be repealed or amended, are all glibly presented without so much as a shred of evidence having been entered into the record in their support.

Although the Report has flatly assured its readers that “the scope of our recommendations coincides with the scope of our investigation”, such assurances are clearly hollow when, for instance, the Report affirms in preamble to certain recommendations that the President has no inherent power to conduct a wiretap without a warrant. Repeatedly and without qualification, the Report reiterates such a proposition, without referring to the unsettled state of the case law, the views of legal scholars, or the relative silence of the Supreme Court on the matter. When, further, the Report counsels restrictions on, say, the use of informants or the surveillance of foreign intelligence activities, it goes beyond restrictions already in the Attorney General’s Guidelines with scant attention to the effectiveness of the guidelines or their application.

Again and again the Report makes far-reaching recommendations which are unsubstantiated by the evidence. Thus the Report urges that the FBI not attempt frustration of hostile foreign intelligence activities by “specialized” techniques unless approved by the Attorney General upon advice of the Secretary of State. What the Report omits, however, is any showing that the Attorney General or the Secretary of State is available, capable, or prepared, to undertake such a role.

In similar fashion, the Report’s Recommendations are frequently critical of the Executive Order’s determination to repose all domestic oversight in a Board rather than vest it exclusively or principally with the Attorney General. The apparent basis for the Report’s preference (and hence its criticism of the Administration’s Executive Order) is the brief and fairly bald conclusion that the Attorney General is the “most appropriate official charged with ensuring that the intelligence agencies of the United States conduct their activities in accordance with the law.” No examination of feasibility, organization, or jurisdiction, buttresses the Report’s conclusion in this respect.

The Report likewise recommends almost wholesale enactment of legislation to prevent recurrence of abuses and repetition of improprieties in the domestic area. In this respect the Report exhibits a decidedly hasty and almost exclusive preference for statute where Order, Rule, or Regulation would provide more expeditious, more particularized, and more flexible remedies. In view of the tentative and even halting nature of so many of the Committee’s conclusions, the clamor for statutes is premature and ill-advised. To urge the quick enactment of criminal provisions is even more injudicious, and, in some cases, verges on the fatuous.

To be precise: the Select Committee has endorsed Recommendation 52, which reads: “All non-consensual electronic surveillance should be conducted pursuant to warrants issued under authority of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.” At the same time, however, the Select Committee admits that “industrial espionage and other modern forms of espionage (are) not presently covered” by the criminal law, and that “there may be serious deficiencies in the Federal Espionage Statute (18 U.S.C. 792 et seq.).” In fact, the Report is constrained to admit that it “took no testimony on this subject.” Nonetheless, in the very teeth of its own admission, the Select Committee endorses a Recommendation that would restrict all electronic surveillance to the narrow and exclusive confines of the criminal law. At Select Committee direction, our counter-intelligence efforts would be forbidden by law to avail themselves of electronic surveillance in the as yet undefined, but admittedly vital, areas of economic, technological, and industrial espionage. With virtual impunity an American could pass, deliver, or sell to the agent of a hostile foreign power any and all secrets of industrv or technology—however important to the nation’s economy or well-being—while the FBI would be effectively precluded from action. As criminal sanctions do not attach—and, in fact, may very well be incapable of attaching—to “industrial espionage”, electronic surveillance would be denied the nation’s intelligence agencies in any effort to forestall, prevent or even monitor, hostile foreign intelligence activity in the economic or technological sphere. While the Report blithely recommends that the espionage laws be modernized to include technological or industrial espionage, it nowhere confronts the massive practical difficulties in such a suggestion.

- Federal Bureau of Investigation

During the last decade or so of Mr. Hoover’s tenure abuses crept into the operations of the Bureau. Because these are thoroughly ventilated, if not overdrawn, in the Majority Report, I shall not dwell on them here, with one exception: at times, suggestions from the White House or the conjectures of Presidential aides directly sparked eavesdropping and interference with the political process.

Almost invariably, however, Bureau impropriety can be attributed— whether directly or by implication—to higher authority. As in the foreign sector, the record of domestic abuse and excess is a commentary on improper or deficient guidance. While particular programs or personnel cannot be spared their proportionate share of responsibility for impropriety, ultimate accountability for Bureau excesses must rest with a negligent Executive and an inattentive Congress.

While I concur in the general objectives of the Committee to insure no repetition of abuses of which the FBI may have been guilty in the past, I strongly disagree with certain specific recommendations in the Committee’s report.

I do not feel the best interests of this country would be served by imposing extraordinary curbs on the FBI or by opening additional channels through which political influence could flow into the inner workings of the FBI. And to a certain extent, the recommendations I find objectionable would tend to accomplish exactly that.

I refer specifically to Recommendation 85, which encourages the Attorney General to exercise his authority to appoint executives in the FBI at the level of Assistant Director.

The Attorneys General, with rare exceptions, have historically been political supporters of the President and his party. By exhorting an Attorney General to by-pass the Director of the FBI and appoint Assistant Directors, we run the risk of further extending White House intrusion into the daily operations of the FBI. FBI Assistant Directors take part in 'administrative decisions and policy-making, and they exercise day-to-day authority over the operations of their respective divisions. Traditionally, they have been professionals who advanced through the ranks of the FBI. Their law enforcement expertise, combined with administrative ability, are qualities needed by the Director of the FBI in discharging his duties. Moreover, any chief executive officer of a line agency should have flexibility in choosing his principal assistants.

The Office of the General Counsel of the FBI is a career position; and the person who occupies that office has traditionally been selected by the Director. No valid reasons have 'been given to require his nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate. As a general rule, the Director or Administrator of a bureau or agency is permitted to choose his own General Counsel.

Personal integrity cannot be assured through such measures as Recommendation 85. Proper supervision by the Attorney General and effective Congressional oversight can, and should, however, serve to discourage abuses of the sort that concern all of us.

I take exception, also, to Recommendations 45, 55-A and 55-B, that impose constraints on preventive intelligence investigations and use of informants. The work of the FBI in this area is far too vital to the security of the American people to impose such stringently restrictive requirements and time limitations on its investigative efforts.

With domestic terrorism burgeoning in this country, I submit it is very risky to forbid the FBI to conduct preliminary investigations of foreigners or citizens unless there is a “specific allegation” or proof that such individuals “will soon engage in terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity.” Here, again, as in some of the foreign recommendations we seem to be saying. “Don’t put out the fire while it is small; wait until it becomes a conflagration.”

Hostile forces at home and abroad are bound by no such chains. And, I don’t want to be party in hamstringing the FBI so that it cannot effectively frustrate those who would espouse the bomb and the gun to impose their evil will on America.

How in the world is the FBI to substantiate information that terrorists and enemy agents will act against Americans without at least preliminary investigation ? To require them to have such proof in hand before even initiating investigation seems unrealistic and is potentially injurious to our security.

The recommendation also states that such preliminary investigation must be concluded within 30 days, unless the Attorney General or his designee finds that the facts warrant additional investigation up to 60 days.

Are we truly prepared to say to the FBI: you must conclude your preventive intelligence investigations within 30 or 90 days unless you establish “reasonable suspicion” that individuals will in fact commit a terrorist act or engage in hostile foreign intelligence, activity?

And, even then, a time limit of one year is recommended for a full preventive intelligence investigation, barring a finding of “compelling circumstances” by the Attorney General. Can we be assured that our enemies will be so obliging as to commit an act within the time span we prescribe ?

And I question the effectiveness of the recommended measures in preventing abuses of Americans’ privacy or in assuring non-violent dissenters in our country that they will not be inhibited by FBI actions.

I submit that effective and proper Congressional oversight and supervision by the Attorney General obviates the necessity of stringent standards and time limitations where a quick response by the FBI may be needed to avert disaster.

While I tend to agree with the motives and objectives of my colleagues on the Committee on Recommendations 55-A and B, I maintain the requirements and limitations imposed on the FBI’s use of informants go beyond what is necessary.

How can we possibly expect the FBI to develop instant security informants, use them for 90 days, and then turn them off like a light switch ?

Are we truly qualified to dictate to a professional law enforcement agency under what circumstances it can use security informants and for how long? The value of such informants has been demonstrated over and over again. Good, stable, effective informants with proved credibility are not easy to come by.

The fact is that their cooperation must be cultivated. Their credibility must be tested. Their stability must be evaluated. Time and patience are essential. Does it make sense to state exactly under what circumstances and for how long a period the FBI will be permitted to accomplish these aims?

The stakes are too high to risk imposing unworkable or cumbersome restrictions—the stakes being human lives and the security of our country.

I have misgivings regarding Recommendation 90-B, which provides a new civil action recourse to Americans who feel that their Constitutional rights have suffered actual or even threatened, violation by Federal officers or agents in intelligence investigations. This provision would have the effect of injecting the courts into the investigative process, even at early stages of investigations when attempts are being made to substantiate or disprove specific allegations of actions requiring legitimate investigation.

We would open the way for individuals and agents hostile to our country and its lawful government to impede and tie up in prolonged litigation investigations required to preserve national security and prevent violence.

Turmoil, upheaval, and readjustment have taken their toll of the FBI. Fortunately for the nation, the many high-caliber and patriotic men and women who are the FBI have continued to serve with dedication and loyalty.

- Internal Revenue Service

Nowhere has the perversion of domestic intelligence been more vividly demonstrated than in the Select Committee’s investigation of the Internal Revenue Service. With much relish but no excuse, IRS functionaries have pried and spied on countless organizations and activities. Intelligence components of the IRS have indiscriminately investigated hundreds of thousands of taxpayers and have amassed reams of information wholly irrelevant to the IRS’s narrow responsibility for collecting the taxes. IRS agents have for decades conducted intrusive campaigns of snooping virtually without let or hindrance, and certainly without justification in fact or in law.

In 1961, for instance, the IRS initiated a program to conduct a test audit of various “right-wing” organizations. Termed the “Ideological Organizations Audit Program,” the project attempted intensive investigation of 10,000 tax-exempt organizations that was far removed from even-handed enforcement of the internal revenue laws. Precedent having been established, a Special Services Staff was organized in 1969 to conduct audits of “activist” and “ideological” taxpayers. Audits were run without reference to established tax criteria and the “special service” rendered the nation was the unwarranted targeting of 18,000 individuals and 3,000 groups. Its insatiable appetite still unsatisfied, the IRS next established an “Information Gathering and Retrieval System” (IGRS) in order to garner still more general intelligence. IGRS was hatched in 1973, and, during its two years of life, proceeded to gather and store information in voracious fashion. Some 465,442 individuals or organizations were examined before the program was terminated in 1975.

Operating secretly and without standards or safeguards, IGRS was typical of the arrogance of the tax collectors. Abuses uncovered in connection with the IRS’s Operation Leprechaun (1969-1972) merely represent the expected and logical extension of policies which are as profoundly contemptuous of the American taxpayer as they are characteristic of the IRS’s perennial efforts to transform itself into a repository of domestic intelligence.

I have refused to sign the final report of the Select Committee on Intelligence Operations in the belief that it can cause severe embarrassment, if not grave harm, to the Nation’s foreign policy. The domestic part of the report has a strong dose of 20-20 hindsight. It will raise more questions than it answers. Reputations will suffer and little will have been gained.

When the resolution creating the Select Committee was presented to the Senate, I endorsed it because I felt it was necessary to conduct such an investigation into any possible abuses on the privacy of American citizens. I thoroughly expected that the Committee would concentrate its efforts in this particular field, but very little work was done On it. Not much can be gained from reading the report as a result of this, and I am, frankly, disappointed that we don’t know more today than we did a year and a half ago about questions raised on this subject.

<right> Barry Goldwater. </right>

- Supplemental Views of Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.

I fully support the Final Report and the Findings and Recommendations of the Select Committee on Intelligence.

The reaffirmation of Constitutional government requires more than rhetoric. It involves, at a minimum, the rendering of accounts by those who have held public trust. It also demands that we renew those principles that are at the center of our democracy. In my view, the Select Committee’s Report is a critical contribution to the process of Constitutional government.

Those who won our independence 200 years ago understood the need to ensure “domestic tranquility” and to “provide for the common defense.” Our intelligence services have played a valuable role in the attainment of those goals.

The Founders of our Nation also understood the need to place governmental power under the rule of law. They knew that power carried with it the seed of abuse. In framing the Constitution, they created a system of checks and balances that would preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. For they recognized that the exercise of power by individuals must be constrained. As Jefferson wrote, “In questions of power, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down by the chains of the Constitution.”

When Senator Mansfield and I first proposed the creation of a Select Committee on Intelligence in the wake of Watergate, we were not seeking to weaken the nation’s intelligence service but to strengthen it. Effective government rests on the confidence of the people. In the aftermath of Watergate and charges of domestic spying and misuse of the intelligence agencies, that confidence was severely strained. And in the face of excessive claims of presidential prerogative, Congress had abdicated its Constitutional responsibilities to oversee and check the exercise of executive power in the intelligence operations of the government.

Secrecy and democratic government are uneasy partners. Intelligence operations are in essence secret operations. But that does not mean that they can be immune from the rule of law and the standards our system of government places on all government operations.

If we can lose our liberties from a too-powerful Government intruding into our lives through burdensome taxes or an excess of regulations, we can surely lose them from government agencies that collect vast amounts of information on the lawful activities of citizens in the interest of “domestic intelligence.” The excessive breadth of domestic intelligence operations investigated by the Committee and many of the techniques used against Americans can severely chill First Amendment rights and deeply infringe upon personal privacy.

The Framers of our Constitution recognized that the vitality of our civil life depends on free discussion. They also recognized that the right of privacy is fundamental to the sanctity of the individual. That is why we have the First and Fourth Amendments. Speech and political ideas are often unsettling. But it is only through free debate and the free exchange of ideas that the people can inform themselves and make their government responsive. And it is through the protection of privacy that we nourish the individual spirit. These are the characteristics that set us apart from totalitarian regimes.

In this, our Bicentennial year, Americans have a special opportunity to reaffirm the values of our forebears. We haveT emerged from the dangers of the post-war era and the trauma of the last decade not by forsaking those values but by adhering to them. To be worthy of our forebears and ourselves, we need only have the courage to keep to the course. By bringing the intelligence arm of the government within our constitutional system, correcting abuses, and checking excesses, we will enable the proper range of intelligence activity to go forward under law in the service of the country.

<right> Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. </right>

o

[1] In most of those cases warning came through informant penetration of local chapters of a national organization undertaken because some of the national leaders had indicated a willingness to use violent means. The Committee’s guidelines preclude investigating an organization’s entire membership throughout the country on the basis of specific information about some individuals.

In the most sinister terrorist conspiracies, only penetration of the inner circle is likely to provide advance warning of an assassination or kidnapping plot. Our record suggests that the only way for the FBI to have much chance to detect such plots in advance wou’d be blanket penetration of every militant protest group in the country. And that would mean a return to precisely the kind of Big Brother government which was attempted in the past.

[2] Some of the “practical” reasons advanced against judicial warrants for informants do not bear close scrutiny. The Committee was told there is no fixed point when a potential source becomes an “informant,” comparable to installation of a wiretap. It was also urged that full supervision of an informant requires day-to-day monitoring of his activities; and that the Attorney General could exercise more comprehensive control. But our proposals do identify a specific event, targeting the informant on particular persons, which requires a decision by the Attorney General. The basic wisdom of the Fourth Amendment is its insistence that a disinterested party apply the appropriate standard rather than the head of an investigative agency. The Attorney General’s ongoing supervision of informant use could supplement the threshold decision of a neutral magistrate, just as it would for wiretaps. There is no need to choose between them.

[3] The informant would still be in a position to report and the FBI could continue to ask him questions, as they could of any citizen. Indeed, he might volunteer information in order to re-establish a paying relationship. The only constraint is that the FBI could no longer give him direction. After five months, however, even the most unsophisticated informant would be aware of those subjects and targets in which the Bureau was interested.

[1] Upon the expiration of the Watergate Committee in September 1974, I had the privilege to consponsor with Senator Weicker, S. 4019, which would have created a joint committee on Congress to oversee all intelligence activities.

[2] New York Times, Jan. 26,1976.

[3] I intend to propose an amendment to S. 400 to make it a criminal offense to publish the name of a United States intelligence officer who is operating in a cover capacity overseas.

[4] For many months, the Committee thoroughly and exhaustively investigated the so-called “assassination plots” which culminated with the filing of our report on November 18, 1975. This Investigation was vitally important in order to clear the air and set the record straight. And, it was instructive as to how “sensitive” operations are conducted within our intelligence structure. But, it necessarily shortened the time available to the Committee to investigate the intelligence community as a whole.

[5] The Committee’s mandate from Congress dictated that the abuses at home and abroad be given detailed attention. And, there are only a finite number of important problems which can be examined and answered conclusively in a year’s time.

[6] My original support for a single joint committee of Congress has evolved, somewhat as affected by the events of this past year’s House Intelligence Committee investigation, to support for a single Senate committee. However, I also favor the mandate of the new committee including, as does the present S. 400, a charge to consider the future option of merging into a permanent joint committee upon consultation with and action by the House of Representatives. The moment for meaningful reform is now and we must not lose it by waiting for a joint committee to be approved by both Houses of Congress.

[7] I think a rule of reason should apply here. All significant projects certainly should receive careful attention from the Group. On the other hand, I would not require a formal meeting with a written record to authorize the payment of 2 sources in X country at $50 per month to be changed to the payment of 3 sources in X country at $40 per month.

[8] I applaud the detailed guidelines issued by the Attorney General to reform the Department’s entire domestic intelligence program. I think he is moving in the right direction by requiring, the FBI to meet a specific and stringent standard for opening an intelligence , investigation, i.e., the Terry v. Ohio standard.

[9] Never again should we be faced with the dilemma we faced in the assassination investigation. We climbed the ladder of authority only to reach a point where there were no more written rungs. Responsibility ceased; accountability ceased; and, in the end, we could not say whether some of the most drastic actions our intelligence community or certain components of it had ever taken against a foreign country or foreign leader were approved of or even known of by the President who was in office at the time.

[10] I would favor a procedure, within the Congress, which would in effect create an avenue of appeal for a member dissatisfied with a Committee determination on a classification issue. Perhaps an appeal committee made up of the Majority and Minority leaders and other appointed members would be appropriate. Leaving the mechanics aside, however, I believe the concept is important and can be implemented.

[11] I differ with the Committee in that I would not have the General Counsel and Inspector General file reports and/or complaints concerning possible abuses with the Attorney General. Rather, I think the more appropriate interface in a new oversight system would be for both to take complaints to the Intelligence Oversight Board and the new congressional oversight committee. The Attorney General would remain the recipient of any and all complaints regarding possible violations of law.

[12] I support the Committee’s recommendation that agency employees report any irregularities directly to the Inspector General without going through the chain of command, i.e. through the particular division chief involved.

[13] I do not feel that, despite my personal view that the aggregate 'budget figure should be disclosed to the public, only six to eleven members of the Senate have the right to release unilaterally the actual budget figures. A majority of both Houses of Congress should be necessary to release such information. And, while I would cast my vote in favor of the release of the aggregate budget figure, I am troubled that there may be no such vote. I am not sure the “right” result, justifies the “wrong” procedures, because the next time the wrong procedure can just as easily be utilized to reach the wrong result.

[14] For example, testimony before the Committee established that the CIA’s failure to act more positively in Portugal was a direct result of an absence of sufficient clandestine infrastructure. William E. Colby testimony, 10/23/75; William Nelson testimony, 11/7/75.

[15] I do not view the “domestic fallout” as a real problem. To be sure, some publications by the CIA abroad will find their way back to the United States. However, to try to impose severe restrictions to prevent such fallout would cause unnecessary damage to the CIA’s valid production of propaganda and other publications abroad.

[16] Committee Domestic Report, p. 320.

[17] My experience dictates that many investigations are begun with very limited or sketchy information. FBI agents and investigators in general are not always or even often immediately presented with information which constitutes probable cause of a crime. Probable cause is often established only through painstaking investigation; putting bits and pieces together. I think we must take this into consideration when formulating threshold investigatory standards.

[18] It is unclear what standard is to be the predicate for any such finding.

[19] Committee Domestic Report, pp. 320-323.

[20] Compelling circumstances is not further defined, so it is unclear what standards should be applied in making such a determination.

[21] My concerns here parallel those I have with respect to the general investigatory standards recommended.

[22] The Committee allows an additional 60 days if the Attorney General finds “compelling circumstances.”

[23] Attorney General Levi is in the process of establishing guidelines to regulate the use of informants. I recommend, however, that these guidelines be enforced through some appropriate form of Department of Justice review of the FBI’s use of informants.

[24] The bill enjoyed a bipartisan co-sponsorship of Senators.

[25] Those Involved in the obtaining of information about our industrial processes, vital to our national security, for our adversaries should be the legitimate subject of electronic surveillance, notwithstanding that no criminal statute is violated. I do not think we can afford to wait for exhaustive reform of our espionage laws. I note that the section of the proposed S.l dealing with espionage reform has presented great difficulty to the drafters. Indeed, drafting espionage into a criminal statute presents some of the same overbreadth problems that the Committee has been concerned with in the domestic intelligence area.

[26] For example, would a cause of action exist simply because X notices a federal agent following him in an automobile, notwithstanding the nature or status of the particular investigation?

[27] Senate Watergate Committee Final Report, S. Res. 93-981, pp. 1105-1165.

[28] _The Required” section of the report, at pages 1150-1157, enumerated unresolved matters and identified materials not provided to the Watergate Committee by the CIA.

[29] Senate Watergate Committee Final Report, p. 1128.

[30] For example this disclosure of personal correspondence (detailing certain of Hunt’s activities in 1971 and 1972) between Hunt and the CIA secretary stationed in Paris whom Hunt sought to have reassigned to work for him at the White House.

[31] By letter of March 7,1974, former Director Colby informed the Senate Watergate Committee that certain items of requested information would not be made available to that committee. Such a withholding of timely information, including that which was totally exculpatory, unnecessarily focused an aura of suspicion and guilt.

[32] For example, the staff was given access to the Martinez contact reports (to which access was refused during the Watergate Committee investigation) in their entirety. This review was accomplished in secure facilities at the CIA, and no notes were taken of sensitive information contained in the reports not related to Hunt or in some other way relevant to the Committee’s inquiry. I cite this as an example of how a Congressional investigation can be thorough and yet not threaten the integrity of CIA secret documentation, containing names of officers and other highly classified information.

[33] I am filing with the Committee the detailed results of this investigation in the form of classified memoranda. These memoranda will be turned over to the successor permanent oversight committee to be kept in its secure files. No useful purpose would be served in further publicizing the contents, because much of it is fragmentary and its sum total reinforces the findings stated herein.

[34] For example, a Colby to Helms letter of 28 January, 1974, references seven to nine communications from Hunt while he was at the White House to Helms’ secretary, with the query: “Can you give us some idea as to what they were about?”

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@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
-#title Cracks in a Grey Sky: An Anthology of Do or Die
+#title Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans
-#subtitle Voices from the Ecological Resistance
+#author US Senate
-#author Various
+#date 1976
-#date 2016
+#source Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, S. Rep. No. 755, Book ll, 94th Congress, Second Session.
 #lang en
-#pubdate 2024-06-11T08:44:21.471Z
+#pubdate 2024-06-22T18:01:14
-#topics Earth First!, Earth Liberation Front, Do or Die!, Little Black Cart, anthology, UK, green, anti-civ, Ardent Press
+#topics Ted’s reading interests & influences
-#source <[[https://www.activedistributionshop.org/product/cracks-in-a-grey-sky/][activedistributionshop.org/product/cracks-in-a-grey-sky/]]>
+#notes Footnote 94 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "Ordering Field Offices to gather information".
-#cover c-i-cracks-in-a-grey-sky-an-anthology-of-do-or-die-1.jpg
+<br>Footnote 51 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "Additional telegrams expressing approval of".
-#publisher Ardent Press
+<br>Footnote 232 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "In fact, the FBI had already used".
-#isbn 978–1620490822
+<br>Endnote 77 was missing from the source PDF after endnote 76 ending with "There had been rumors about a "peace ticket" headed by Dr. King and Benjamin Spock.".
-#notes End footnotes 1, 2 & 3 were missing from “Bashing the GE-nie back in the Bottle” source book & [[https://files.libcom.org/files/do-or-die_09.pdf][original source magazine]] and so marked as missing. Text body footnotes were marked, but missing from “Reports and Thoughts on the Action in Derbyshire”, but found from the original source magazine and so added back in. A marked, but missing footnote from “An Open Letter to the Minister for Transport” was found in the original source magazine and so added back in.
+<br>Footnote 402 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "Reports on all Key Black Extremists were to be".
+<br>Footnotes 481 & 482 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "Informants were used to gather more information".
+<br>Footnote 34 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "Warrantless mail opening and surreptitious".
+<br>Footnote 514 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "In February 1965, President Johnson asked Attorney".
+<br>Footnote 664 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "The FBI recently abolished completely the administrative index".
+<br>Footnote 35 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "program came up because if you have anything in the FBI".
+<br>Footnote 42 was missing from the source PDF in paragraph "You are also cautioned that the nature of this new".
-** An Introduction
+* Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans
-It’s strange to put together a collection of articles from a publication that has been defunct for 13+ years and from nearly 9000 km away. Do or Die, Voices from the Ecological Resistance filled a void that US publications (Live Wild or Die!, Green Anarchy, and Black Seed) have attempted, in their ways, to fill but with nowhere near the quality or quantity of the original. Do or Die (DoD) was the expression of a singular moment by strong writers who agreed about how to approach and discuss a high point of ecological resistance. Here I want to contextualize the struggles discussed in DoD, to speak to the parallels between that time and our current moment, to take seriously the critique and proposals in the paper generally and in “Down with the Empire, Up with the Spring” and “The Four Tasks” specifically. Ultimately we want to introduce a new generation of warriors to the intelligent approach presented in DoD nearly 20 years ago and discuss how this approach is still relevant today.
+<center>
+<strong>BOOK II</strong>
+</center>
-*** The Project and Audience
+<center>
+FINAL REPORT
+</center>
-<quote>
+OF THE
-<em>DoD was produced by and largely aimed at a few hundred people in the</em> UK <em>eco scene. Although it had a wider circulation than this, it was largely produced with this audience in mind. But, DoD has also been really liked by all sorts of other people who often didn’t like each other at all. For example lots of more traditional anarchist communists really liked DoD, as did lots of conservationists--the magazine was big enough that very few people read all of it--people just read the bits they liked and ignored the rest. We’d get comments from more traditional anarchists saying that they really liked it, but it was a shame about the articles about beaver restoration or Native American spirituality. And then we’d get almost exactly opposite comments from other people who liked the beavers but weren’t so into class struggle.</em>
-<br>--From the .EF! postmortem interview circa 2006
-</quote>
-DoD was a pre-Internet project and we can only mourn the differences between then and now. Today print publications--that rare and dying breed-cannot accept contradiction or lack of coherence. When they exist at all it tends to be for a small group of true believers, rather than a broad audience of fellow travelers, which is what DoD eventually pulled together. The idea of having something of value to share with your ideological opponents seems increasingly rare within radical politics. There is no more kumbaya as we clamor for smaller and smaller crumbs from a body politic that has a decreasing appetite for the big dreams and declarations about what is ahead, from radicals who are barely able to demonstrate ambulation and mastication (much less simultaneity).
+<center>
+SELECT COMMITTEE
+<br>TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
+</center>
-DoD had dozens of contributors each issue. While that is also true for the Earth First! Journal here in the US, DoD, in addition to having commentary based on first-person observation and testimonial (especially as the journal grew in size in the last four issues -issue 10 was nearly 400 pages long), also had lengthy theoretical works. EF! barely has theoretical texts at all, and what there are tend to be short and ranty rather than the massive accomplishment of the pieces “Down with the Empire, Up with the Spring” (DwtE) and “The Four Tasks” (TFT), and even smaller but still engaging ones like the pieces on Critical Mass, Action Theater, and the impact of the dole on activism. That kind of effort has to nurtured and celebrated to find its pace.
+WITH RESPECT TO
-It’s also worth noting the decision to shut down the project rather than hand it to the next generation. As they make clear, it wasn’t for lack of relevance or reader enthusiasm. Clearly the same problems and even some of the efforts and solutions offered by DoD make sense to a new generation (hence this collection). But each new generation has to find their own voice, to express even old problems in a way that makes sense to new ears, and dusty old projects (think Rolling Stone) really do tend to stink up the room.
+<center>
+INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
+<br>UNITED STATES SENATE
+</center>
-*** Road Building
+TOGETHER WITH
-What DoD told us about the UK-and about how direct action against the mega-machine looks different when away from forests and wilderness-was wonderful. The imagery and storytelling of road resistance seems like something out of science fiction, not a British parallel to tree sitting and its accompanying culture. In the US the road-protest scene is arguably more needed than it is in the UK, but apart from a few, meager protests (I-69, Loop 202 in AZ, etc), the US innovation seems to be having protests ON freeways rather than efforts against their construction in the first place.
+<center>
+ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE
+<br>VIEWS
+</center>
-The struggle against the M11 link was inspiring on a number of levels. In particular the imagery of tunnels to burrow under and befuddle construction was amazing. The growth of road-building protests in the 90s seemed so much more salient to the everyday life of someone in civilization, rather than tree-spiking and -sitting in far-off locales. The protest against roads seemed like the right kind of action to come from a country that had so little official wildness left to fight for.
+APRIL 26 (legislative day, April 14), 1976
-Clearly the fight for the Earth is complex and the war against roads was lost, or perhaps just the battle, although the protestors doubled the cost of the M11 link (which eventually became the ninth most congested road in the UK), and ended, in embryo, similar road-building attempts (the M12 was cancelled on first review). The fight against such an existential opponent roads are the primary circulation system of capitalism-was a worthy one, but it’s hard to believe that anyone involved ever believed that this fight was enough: necessary, but not sufficient. But the grind of an enormous campaign (the Newbury campaign was attempting to stop construction on a nine-mile piece of land, every day, for months) meant that bigger issues could not be debated-exhaustion, drinking, and politics would not allow for it.
+SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
+<br>WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
-The story of roads is inspirational and a great piece of UK EF! cultural currency but ultimately an open wound--the gap between building a movement of the disparate forces that engage in these forms of struggle and the motivation of those groups being ephemeral and contradictory.
+<center>
+FRANK CHURCH, Idaho, <em>Chairman
+<br></em> JOHN G. TOWER, Texas, <em>Vice Chairman</em>
+</center>
-*** Winning and Losing
+<br>
-<quote>
+<center>
-Basically what happened within EF! was that we won. DoD and the political perspective it represented was relatively unpopular at the beginning. DoD was essentially trying to fulfil the same role that Live Wild or Die! did in the States--a radical anarchist fringe publication <em>trying to ginger things up a</em> bit. When we <em>say that we won, in that the green anarchist perspective went from being the minority to the majority perspective within EF! in the</em> UK <em>over the course of the 1990s, that isn’t quite as arrogant as it sounds... this may have been partly due to our efforts but is probably more due to people’s own experiences of resistance over time. This resulted in lots of people dropping much of the non-violent pacifist</em> ideology, <em>moving more towards an anarchist position and supporting sabotage actions.</em>
+William G. Miller, <em>Staff Director
+<br></em> Fbbdebick A O. Schwarz, Jr., <em>Chief Counsel
+<br></em> Curtis R. Smothers, <em>Counsel to the Minority
+<br></em> Audrey Hatby, <em>Clerk of the Committee</em>
+</center>
-<right>
+(n>
---From the EF! postmortem interview circa 2006
-</right>
-</quote>
-This quote is deep. ft holds a lot of history in a few, easily-missed words and refers to a before that is hard so see from the position of one who has only been in the now. There was a time when EF! held at the same time very different ideas of what comprises direct action in defense of the earth. This is outside of debates about peaceful (or not) tactics or what shape a better world should take. This quote refers to a time when EF! (alongside many other social justice groups) wasn’t homogenous. That is no longer true.
+* Letter of Transmittal
-On the one hand political people (who describe themselves with terms like anarchist) want to have deep and engaged conversations about the implications of ideas to daily life. On the other this has created a cultural context where participation has entailed a type of conformity.
+On behalf of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, and pursuant to the mandate of Senate Resolution 21, I am transmitting herewith to the Senate the volume of the Committee’s Final Report which presents the results of the Committee’s investigation into Federal domestic intelligence activities.
-The example above doesn’t refer to the split between rednecks and hippies but a time when summit protests were being challenged by anarchists as having a limited depth of strategic vision. These same people were developing a tighter connection between a green anarchist perspective and EF! activities. The unforseen consequence of this move has been a further whittling of the kind of opinions, actions, and ideas that EF! participates in. There hasn’t been a rondy in a decade that doesn’t have some sort of identity politics drama attached to it.
+The Committee’s findings and conclusions concerning abuses in intelligence activity and weaknesses in the system of accountability and control are amply documented. I believe they make a compelling case for substantial reform. The recommendations section of this volume sets forth in detail the Committee’s proposals for reforms necessary to protect the right of Americans. The facts revealed by the Committee’s inquiry into the development of domestic intelligence activity are outlined in the balance of the volume.
-*** Down with the Empire
+I would add one principal comment on the results of the Committee’s inquiry: The root cause of the excesses which our record amply demonstrates has been failure to apply the wisdom of the constitutional system of checks and balances to intelligence activities. Our experience as a nation has taught us that we must place our trust in laws, and not solely in men. The founding fathers foresaw excess as the inevitable consequence of granting any part of government unchecked power. This has been demonstrated in the intelligence field where, too often, constitutional principles were subordinated to a pragmatic course of permitting desired ends to dictate and justify improper means.
-This essay is a strong conclusion to the DoD project. It does it all: savors the victories, names the defeats, and tells the story of a decade of attempts by human beings to defend the Earth against the rapacious industrial system. It is a thoughtful, considered, un-depressed summation of years and years of thinking and acting.
+Our recommendations are designed to place intelligence activities within the constitutional scheme for controlling government power.
-DwtE frames the history of UK EF! and, like any frame, is perhaps unfair to future ecological actions in the UK theater. It’s a story of birth, land struggle, localism, and ultimately the globalization of the movement. This might be cold solace to those who are still fighting against roads and industrialism in the nooks and valleys of the greater UK. The article implies, “Keep trying but your story has already been told:’ That said, DwtE was a fantastic introduction to the section that followed it, the rare strategic document, or at the very least a solid set of proposals.
+The members of this Committee have served with utmost diligence and dedication. We have had 126 Full Committee meetings, scores of other sessions at which Senators presided at depositions for the taking of testimony, and over 40 subcommittee meetings devoted to drafting the two volumes of our final report. I thank each and everyone of my colleagues for their hard work and for their determination that the job be done fully and fairly.
-*** The Four Tasks
+John Tower’s service as Vice Chairman was essential to our effectiveness from start to finish. This inquiry could have been distracted by partisan argument over allocating the blame for intelligence excesses. Instead, we have unanimously concluded that intelligence problems are far more fundamental. They are not the product of any single administration, party, or man.
-Somewhere between strategy and tactics is the conversation all of us in the change-the-world movement need to have. At this point I would say that strategy is easy, if silly. It’s easy to declare that peace will be the result of peace, or killing tyrants will make leaders behave. In fact, the focus required to do either enough to test whether the hypotheses work, is in short supply. Grandiose statements-especially since the Internet is so frequently the way we communicate with each other-have become a principle form of non-communication. Tactics is also easy enough. It is simple to talk about the technics, specifics, and experiences of how to deal with meetings, windows, and equipment in the field. But the gap between what we can do and what we want is enormous, it’s existential, and it touches on everything we love and hate about people.
+At the outset of this particular volume, special mention is also due to Senator Walter F. Mondale for his chairmanship of the subcommittee charged with drafting the final report on domestic intelligence activity. During our hearings, Senator Mondale helped to bring into focus the threats posed to the rights of American citizens. He and his
-TFT attempts to bridge this strategy-tactics gap and its effort is worth engaging with, even 20 years later, because of how prescient and accurate (if not precise) it was (with regard to the shape of ecological resistance). TFT is, from our perspective, the zenith of DoD.
+<center>
+(hi)
+</center>
-*** Growing Counter-Cultures
+domestic subcommittee colleagues—Senator Howard Baker, as ranking Minority member, and Senators Philip Hart, Robert Morgan and Richard Schweiker—deserve great credit for the complete and compelling draft which they presented to the Full Committee.
-<quote>
+The staff of the Committee has worked long, hard and well. Without their work over the past year—and during many long nights and weekends—the Committee could not have come close to coping with ’ its massive job. I commend and thank them all. The staff members whose work was particularly associated with this volume and its supplementary detailed reports are listed in Appendix C.
-We need to catalyse living, loving, .fighting counter cultures that can sustain rebellion across generations. In both collective struggle and our everyday lives we must try to live our ecological and libertarian principles. Our counter-cultures must be glimmers of ecological anarchy--fertiliser for the growth of collective imagination. Fulfilling <em>this task is what will enable the others to be fulfilled over the long haul. The counter-cultures must be bases from which to carry out ‘thumb in the dam’ actions and give support to rebellions beyond the core. In times of crisis they should act decisively against authoritarian groups. The counter-culture’s eventual aim should be total social transcendence-(r)evolution.</em>
-</quote>
-In the US the perspective that counter culture is valuable has fallen entirely out of favor. This is mostly because of the Internet (also somewhat because of the surprising popularity and mis-reading-or at least highly attenuated reading-of “Introduction to Civil War” by Tiqqun). These days in the US there is a disdain for all “things counter cultural. Of course the disdainers were also once the royalty of the same counter cultures they are oh-so-over, but that isn’t the point. The Internet killed counter culture[1], especially what was most visually distinctive about it. For the spectacularized American, that was enough. These days no one is allowed their own special little treehouse in which to foment (r)evolution, not without a thousand blogs of light shining down upon them. And this will not do.
+<center>
+Frank Church,
+</center>
-The tension for us, as people who were formed pre-Internet, is that to eschew the counter culture is to embrace mainstream culture: Mom & Dad, jobs and retirement, home ownership and life insurance, kids, dogs, and white picket fences. We claimed counter culture as the escape from that, but mainstream culture has already, mostly, consumed each individual component. You want Mom & Mom, a shared job, no home or insurance, and a cat? Go for it! To put this another way, the problem with American counter culture is that we had no culture in the first place. Since WWII we have had nothing but capitalism’s throbbing successes at solving the problems of human storage and survival. Counter culture, especially as defined by DoD (and by us), is about something else entirely. For starters, it’s about something that spans generation, which we absolutely do not have.
+<center>
+<em>Chairman.</em>
+</center>
-To put this conundrum into slightly more positive language, we feel outside of and opposed to mainstream culture but strongly desire something-like-a-community to fulfill both the spiritual and material needs a culture could provide-so we endure counter culture. We have big dreams for counter culture-which has time and time again disappointed-and believe something connected to our daily life must also be the mechanism by which we participate in the change we’d like to see in the world (which I don’t mind calling (r)evolution even though it sounds dorky to a North American ear).
+<br>
-I think the common criticism of this position is a communist one. We, by whatever broad definition you want to give counter culture, will never be large enough to be a force-to-be-reckoned-with on the stage where a revolution (or even a (r)evolution) would need to be waged. We, to put it gently, are not enough. We aren’t even talking about a Russian Revolution-style change but about survival, fertilizer and safe houses, dance parties and hookups, and even putting thumbs in the dam. It seems hard to fathom a new type of counter culture-mostly comprised of the most educated from the current counter culture that is attempting to build (political) parties, study groups, and gestures towards effects-will have anywhere near the 8keletal structure shown by even the shadow of the previous counter culture.
+* Preface
-Forgive us our internal critiques. This first task of TFI still rings true. We need some place where our probable hostility for each other can look and feel much more like conviviality than a civil war. We need this because if there ever were the requirement for the kind of solidarity and unity of action a radical transformation of this world requires, we don’t currently have it. It is possible that the fragmentation of counter culture (a fragmentation that is largely concurrent to the rise of the Internet) is irreversible. That would mean that the corollary to the First Task may be something like reconciling the irreconcilable of a unitary counter culture vs a diverse one that recognized itself and its boundaries, and had an honest self assessment of the accompanying strategic limitation and opportunities.
+In January 1975, the Senate resolved to establish a Committee to: conduct an investigation and study of governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities and the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government.[1]
-*** Putting Our Thumb in the Dam
+This Committee was organized shortly thereafter and has conducted a year-long investigation into the intelligence activities of the United States Government, the first substantial inquiry into the intelligence community since World War II.
-<quote>
+The inquiry arose out of allegations of substantial wrongdoing by intelligence agencies on behalf of the administrations which they served. A deeper concern underlying the investigation was whether this Government’s intelligence activities were governed and controlled consistently with the fundamental principles of American constitutional government—that power must be checked and balanced and that the preservation of liberty requires the restraint of laws, and not simply the good intentions of men.
-Just as counter-cultures must open up space for (r)evolution to grow <em>we must also open up time. The life support systems of the earth are under unprecedented attack. Biological meltdown is accelerating. (R) evolution takes decades to mature. Unless force is used on the margins of the global society to protect the most important biological areas we may simply not have enough time. The last tribal examples of anarchy, from whom we can learn a lot, could be wiped out within decades if not militantly defended. Thumb-in-the-Dam struggles aim to protect ecological diversity understanding that this civilisation WILL be terminated, by either the unlikely possibility of global (r)evolution or the certainty of industrial collapse.</em>
-</quote>
-This argument is similar to the assertion by EF! types that there is something metaphysical about wildness, therefore justifying its defense at any cost. This kind of argumentation has fallen out of vogue (alongside, thankfully, the deep vs social ecology debate). There are still a thousand not-radical non-profits that are thumbing dams all over the place: saving rhinos. gorillas, rain forests, and other regions and species that will be eliminated as the violence of global capitalism completes its consumption of resources.
+Our investigation has confirmed that properly controlled and lawful intelligence is vital to the nation’s interest. A strong and effective intelligence system serves, for example, to monitor potential military threats from the Soviet Union and its allies, to verify compliance with international agreements such as SALT, and to combat espionage and international terrorism. These, and many other necessary and proper functions are performed by dedicated and hard working employees of the intelligence community.
-An aspect of the radical version of thumbing dams that wasn’t discussed by DoD that is more likely to “open up time “ is green capitalism. Shipping global-north tourists to locations and species in the wild is, perhaps, a more humane and sustainable option to zoos and safaris. The past 20 years has seemed to vindicate this approach more than the one of environmental extremism. Native struggles, which are largely struggles of cultural survival, have been most effective when there are resources under control of natives (whether byways for pipelines or casino revenues) that allow them to get a seat at the table for control of their own destinies. Thumbs in the dam indeed.
+The Committee’s investigation has, however, also confirmed substantial wrongdoing. And it has demonstrated that intelligence activities have not generally been governed and controlled in accord with the fundamental principles of our constitutional system of government.
-The other approach that has some appeal for some radicals (most notably a specific kind of communist) is accelerationism. This perspective is more-or-less the opposite of any kind of ecological concern unless you believe that gaian homeostasis is only possible in the absence of humans. In which case, turning up the heat on human activity, with the resulting crises and collapse, may be the only solution. This is the opposite of putting a thumb in the dam but is one of the interesting propositions since DoD ended.
+The task faced by this Committee was to propose effective measures to prevent intelligence excesses, and at the same time to propose sound guidelines and oversight procedures with which to govern and control legitimate activities.
-*** Preparing for Crises
+Having concluded its investigation, the Committee issues its reports[2] for the purposes of:
-We must have the ability to defend ourselves, survive, and exploit crises in society including capitalist attempts to destroy us. The divided and industrial nature of today’s society has already determined the instability of tomorrow.
+providing a fair factual basis for informed Congressional and public debate on critical issues affecting the role of governmental intelligence activities in a free society; and recommending such legislative and executive action as, in the judgment of the Committee, is appropriate to prevent recurrence of past abuses and to insure adequate coordination, control and oversight of the nation’s intelligence resources, capabilities, and activities.
-Task Three falls gently from Task One and Two. If we have a place that is something like True Community and we commit to emergency struggles, then we must necessarily prepare for upcoming events. Ecological crises has already been a more salient part of daily life in the past 15 years than in the 50 before it. The only quibble with this Task is that it is necessary but not sufficient to the scale of the crises ahead.
+<right>
+f
+</right>
-*** Supporting Rebellion Beyond the Core
+** A. The Committee’s Mandate -
-The counter culture must act in real solidarity with our struggling sisters and brothers on other islands. Aid them in whatever we can and bring the majority world battlefronts to the boardrooms, bedrooms, and barracks of the bourgeoisie.
+In elaboration of the broad mandate set forth at the outset of this Report, the Senate charged the Committee with investigating fourteen specific “matters or questions” and with reporting the “full facts” on them. The fourteen enumerated matters and questions concern: (i) what kind of activities have been—and should be—undertaken by intelligence agencies; (ii) whether those activities conform to law and the Constitution; and (iii) how intelligence agencies have been— and should be—coordinated, controlled and overseen.[3]
-Once you have a real fighting force, one committed to doing something meaningful in the world. then of course the list of what you have to do, what different pressure groups will try to get you to do, can get quite long. The main criticism we would make of the Four Tasks is that they bury thousands of tasks in the four. What is an engaging and critically important conversation about “What is to be Done?” is mostly a series of four principles with little to direct a reader. It is largely a list that details the dozens of complicated projects that could be embraced given infinite time and energy.
+In addition to investigating the “full facts” with respect to such matters, the Committee was instructed to determine:
-The challenge of Task Four (which is basically to help others) is the challenge of environmental activism (actually, all activism): how do we help people who are outside of our experience in real material, cultural, and spiritual ways. The usual answer is that our actions should be directed by solidarity and not charity but this distinction is nearly impossible to define and, in practice, hard lo find examples for. This is not to say that charity is de facto bad but hoping and wishing an action isn’t charity evades an important principle, which is that the people who have money, resources, and power get to decide who they shower those things upon. not need, value, or the people who actually receive the largesse. This privilege is mostly discussed as a type of crime committed by those who have it which seems to have resulted in less and less generosity from rich people.[2]
+Whether any of the existing laws of the United States are inadequate, either in their provisions or manner of enforcement, to safeguard the rights of American citizens, to improve executive and legislative control of intelligence and related activities and to resolve uncertainties as to the authority of United States intelligence and related agencies. [Id., Sec. 2 (12)]
-At the heart of Task Four is an imperative. We must aid our brothers and sisters. This may be the case if we assume some brutal categorizations. “Brothers and sisters on other islands “ seems synonymous with “the poor and huddled masses” of the world. Bringing their fights to the bourgeoisie is a type of restatement of the classic Marxist hagiography with, perhaps, a humanist twist. If we thought categorization of the Marxist variety were a solution to ecological devastation why wouldn’t we be Marxists? Do we really think that bringing new data to the boardrooms and bedrooms would change them one iota? Perhaps what I was hoping for from this Fourth Task was a new model of revolution, a social change movement that was different, but it seemed there wasn’t nearly the imagination about how to do things differently as there was about how many things there are to do.
+** B. The Major Questions
-We’ve drifted again towards having a critical analysis of The Four Tasks but that is only because this nearly 20-year old document is still entirely relevant to the form and function of radical activity today. Almost none of this document feels dated. Today there would be sections on Global Wanning and Intersectionality but fundamentally this text is still a relevant starting point for any group attempting to answer the questions herein. This is an incredible feat and for that I’d place it at the head of the pack of articles that attempt a similar feat-but much more modestly-like <em>Desert,</em> “Earth First Means Social War,:’ “The Issues are not the Issue;’ “You Make Plans--We Make History;’ and various pieces by the Green Anarchy Collective.
+Our investigation addressed the structure, history, activities and policies of America’s most important intelligence agencies. The Committee looked beyond the operation of individual agencies to examine common themes and patterns inherent in intelligence operations. In the course of its investigation, the Committee has sought to answer three broad questions:
-*** But What If It is Too Late?
+First, whether domestic intelligence activities have been consistent with law and with the individual liberties guaranteed to American citizens by the Constitution.
-If you will indulge us for a few minutes we’d feel remiss if we didn’t mention a topic that DoD didn’t emphasize. What if we are too late? This question of “lateness” has a material, cultural, and metaphysical component that we will address. There were people in the eco-scene that were asserting something along the lines of this question but they made the mistake of confusing means and ends and as a result blamed the first victims of our lateness rather than keeping the conversation abstract. Abstraction has the benefit of not summoning emotions, of seeming to be removed from a particular interest group or daily life, which allows us, strangers, to discuss something big and profound. It is an abstraction to say that the world is going to end and there is no hope of redemption (just as saying the opposite is also an abstract ion). But of course endings will impact a great deal of people and are incredibly dramatic and even cataclysmic. For the sake of talking to strangers and talking about something impossibly difficult, for the rest of this section let us ride the line between abstraction and something real.
+Second, whether America’s foreign intelligence activities have served the national interest in a manner consistent with the nation’s ideals and with national purposes.
-It is very much in the ecological tradition to abandon hope: in human agency, in our capacity to slow the gears of Empire’s machinery, that we could make a difference on any stage we’d think worth our energy. This tradition tends to argue for a return to nature, for a withdrawal from the affairs of man (or civilization or society), or towards a spiritual life. Of course there is no escape but there is a principle that is at odds with the Four Tasks and doesn’t require its fundamental hope. What if instead of building a counter culture that doesn’t appear possible-in order to effect a holding action to the decay of this civilization, to prepare for crises, and to (poorly) support the actions of others around the world who are doing the same--what if instead of all that, we just live our lives. What if we accept that we are just a few human creatures among billions?
+Third, whether the institutional procedures for directing and controlling intelligence agencies have adequately ensured their compliance with policy and law, and whether those procedures have been based upon the system of checks and balances among the branches of government required by our Constitution.
-Instead of becoming activists, or politicians with no constituency, we do something else. We don’t try to run and hide (as if that were possible), but instead live as a native to our habitats, do something horrific to bourgeoisie society, live quietly, outside of the organizational model of the Christian sects. Let people be and live on the land, perhaps wildly, perhaps in all the countercultural glory you possess.
+.. The Committee fully subscribes to the premise that intelligence agencies perform a necessary and proper function. The Preamble to the Constitution states that our government was created, in part, to <em>i</em> “insure domestic tranquility [and] provide for the common defense.” Accurate and timely intelligence can and does help meet those goals. The Committee is also mindful, however, of the danger which intelligence collection, and intelligence operations, may pose for a society grounded in democratic principles. The Preamble to our Constitution also declares that our government was created to “secure the blessings of liberty” and to “establish justice”. If domestic intelligence agencies ignore those principles, they may threaten the very values that form the foundation of our society. Similarly, if the government conducts foreign intelligence operations overseas which are inconsistent with our national ideals, our reputation, goals, and influence abroad may be undercut.
-If it is too late to, save humanity from itself then it may be time to wrap up our affairs. In that cause, a more nihilistic ecological perspective has a few modem faces that make sense to mention as a way of concluding. Two of them are publishing projects, inheritors of the <em>DoD</em> legacy but perhaps, in addition to The Four Tasks, also participants in a Fifth Task. Dark Mountain, a publishing project from the UK, is comprised of dozens of authors, many of whom participated in the anti-road activities of the 90. They are best summed up by this, The <em>machine is stuttering and the engineers are in panic. They are wondering if perhaps they do not understand it as well as they imagined. They are wondering whether they are controlling it at all or whether, perhaps, it is controlling them</em> (Dark Mountain Manifesto).
+** C. The Nature of the Committee’s Investigation
-The second project, in which the editors of this book have some involvement, is Black Seed. a newsprint project somewhere in the intersection of indigeneity, green anarchism, and direct action. And the third, non-publication project is the actions of eco-extremists, especially in Mexico, like Individuals Tending Towards the Wild, or Wild Reaction, tendencies that attempt to treat human life as if it is not. in fact. at the center of creation. The influence of The Four Tasks weighs heavily on all these projects.
+*** 1. Selection of Agencies, Programs and Cases To Emphasize
-*** Conclusion
+Necessarily, the Committee had to be selective. To investigate everything relevant to intelligence—and even everything relevant to the fundamental issues on which we had decided to focus—would take forever. Our job was to discover—and suggest solutions for—the major problems “at the earliest practical date”.[4]
-While we have spent most of our energy here focusing on the impressive and influential conclusionary documents “Down with the Empire, Up with the Spring” and “The Four Tasks;’ we intended only to highlight what was great about <em>DoD.</em> By maintaining some semblance of an editorial line, a set of high-quality production efforts, and a theoretical axis around a broad green anarchist perspective. it has maintained its position as one of the most important radical green publications ever. We found the lack of memory of this great publication to be offensive and put forward this book take to remedy that situation.
+Accordingly, the Committee had to choose the particular Governmental entities upon which we would concentrate and then further had to choose particular cases to investigate in depth.
-We hope in the following four hundred plus pages you will find agreement with us as well as your own uses for the great material of Do or Die: Voices from the Ecological Resistance.
+Many agencies, departments or bureaus of the Federal Government have an intelligence function. Of these, the Committee spent the overwhelming preponderance of its energies on five:
-[1] Interesting but partial examples <br> [[http://www.complex.com/style/2015/03/photographers-prove-that-the-internet-has-killed-individual-style][http://www.complex.com/style/2015/03/photographers-prove-that-the-internet-has-killed-individual-style]] <br> [[https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20061008/153603.shtml][https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20061008/153603.shtml]]
+The Federal Bureau of Investigation; The Central Intelligence Agency; The National Security Agency; The national intelligence components of the Defense Department (other than NS A); and The National Security Council and its component parts.[5]
-[2] [[http://www.forbes.com/sites/katiasavchuk/2014/10/06/wealthy-ameri-cans-are-giving-less-of-their-incomes-to-charity-while-poor-are-donating-more/][http://www.forbes.com/sites/katiasavchuk/2014/10/06/wealthy-ameri-cans-are-giving-less-of-their-incomes-to-charity-while-poor-are-donating-more/]]
+The agencies upon which the Committee concentrated are those whose powers are so great and whose practices were so extensive that they must be understood in order fairly to judge whether the intelligence system of the United States needs reform and change.
-* Environment
+Having selected the agencies to emphasize, the Committee also had to select representative programs and policies on which to concentrate. There were many more possible issues and allegations to investigate than could be covered fully and fairly. The principles which guided our choices were:
-** The Day They Drove Twyford Down! (from issue 1)
+(1) More is learned by investigating tens of programs and incidents in depth rather than hundreds superficially. Our goal was to understand causes and, where appropriate, to suggest solutions.
-*** The battle for Twyford Down
+(2) Cases most likely to produce general lessons should receive the most attention.
-For those who don’t already know, Twyford Down is an area of outstanding natural beauty just east of Winchester in Hampshire. With that designation, numerous S.S.S.I.s [Sites of Special Scientific Interest] including the water meadows lining the Itchen valley south of the Down, and two significant scheduled Ancient monuments-an Iron Age Village and a bunch of medieval tracks-the Dongas. Twyford is also one of the last known habitats of the Chalk Blue butterfly and six different species of orchid. It was supposed to be one of the most protected natural sites in England. Indeed, it was placed in the trust of Winchester College by two old boys that bought it in the 1920s to preserve it from the city’s urban sprawl.
+(3) Programs were examined from each administration beginning with Franklin Roosevelt’s. This assured understanding of the historical context within which intelligence activities have developed. Fundamental issues concerning the conduct and character of the nation deserve nonpartisan treatment. It has become clear from our inquiry, moreover, that intelligence excesses, at home and abroad, have been found in every administration. They are not the product of any single party, administration, or man.
-The year’s actions to protect the Dongas have been well covered. Since February 2, many blockades and occupations of the work site have taken place, but still the Department of Transport [DoT] carried on regardless, determined to build their precious motorway. During the summer a camp was set up on the Dongas, where activists planned and based actions against the work site on the water meadows, which by then was being raped by the contractors. By the Autumn the contractors were looking towards the Dongas to begin their motorway monster. This is when the most oppressive and intimidating , tactics against the campaign took place.
+*** 2. Limitations and Strengths
-The Dongas Tribe declared the site an autonomous zone in September, and began building fortifications to defend their land. Tarmac [a British building materials company] had now got the contract to go forth with the cutting, and at this point a virtual siege began with paid security guards having their lookouts next to the Dongas.
+(a) <em>The Focus on Problem Areas</em>
-The siege effectively ended on the 29<sup>th</sup> of October after sheer incompetence on the legal front. The previous Monday, (26<sup>th</sup> of October), the DoT successfully pressured the Estates Bursar of Winchester College into applying to the local court to evict the Dongas Tribe. The summons was so ill-made that that when presented to court that Thursday, the judge ordered the case adjourned until 9<sup>th</sup> of December, well-past the end of the Cooper Lyons contract. With the tribe securely in place and no police cover, all the contractors could do was finish work on the Water Meadow and cut their losses.
+The intelligence community has had broad responsibilitv for activities beyond those which we investigated as possibly “illegal, improper, or unethical”. Our reports primarily address problem areas and the command and control question generallv. However, the intelligence community performs vital tasks outside the areas on which our investigation concentrated. This point must be kept in mind in fairness to the agencies, and to their employees who have devoted their careers to the nation’s service. Moreover, one of many reasons for checking intelligence excesses is to restore the confidence, good name, and effectiveness of intelligence agencies so that they may better serve the nation in the future.[6]
-*** The main contract begins
+(5) <em>Caution on Questions of Individual “Guilt" or “Innocence”</em>
-Tarmac spent well after midnight on the 1<sup>st</sup> of November moving into their depot in Compton, two miles south of the Down. The next morning forty contractors started work on four different sites along the south side of the Itchen Valley, the Tribe were desperately outnumbered and somewhat intimidated. This was compounded by the fact that one of the security guards was suspected of an Arson attack against the Tipi watch post in the trench field a couple of nights after Tarmac arrived. It took until 4<sup>th</sup> of November for EF! to react nationally. Sixty EF!ers marched across the Itchen Valley and stopped the work on all four sites, freaking out Roger Jackson so much that that he lost control of his car and parked it half way up a bank for the rest of the day.
+A Senate Committee is not a prosecutor, a grand jury or a court. It is far better suited to determine how things went wrong and what can be done to prevent their going wrong again, than to resolve disputed questions of individual “guilt” or “innocence”. For the resolution of those questions we properly rely on the courts.
-The Dongas tribe continued to obstruct work on the North End site until around the 30<sup>th</sup> of November. On this day, a Tarmac foreman frustrated by continuous disruption charged demonstrators with a JCB and one of the workers threatened a second arson attack on the camp. The cambers took this second threat seriously and demanded that no further action be taken against the contractors. The Tribe member that came closest to injury in the first attack was outraged at this decision and walked out of the camp, saying that by allowing themselves to be intimidated, the Tribe had made themselves hostages of the good behavior of others opposing the destruction of the down. The camp had vetoed ecotage around the area of the camp for months for fear of retaliation-by vetoing all action, the original reason for the establishment of the camp had been lost the day when Winchester college’s summons was to be heard, the DoT felt that they were in a strong enough position to invade the Dongas. Due to the lack of co-operation from Hampshire Constabulary from the 27<sup>th</sup> of October, the home office recommended Tarmac hire Group Four for the invasion instead.
+Of course, to understand the past in order to better propose guidance for the future, the Committee had to investigate the facts underlying charges of wrongdoing. Facts involve people. Therefore, the Committee has necessarily had to determine what particular individuals appear to have done and, on occasion, to make judgments on their responsibility. We have, however, recognized our limitations and attempted to be cautious in reaching those judgments; the reader should be similarly cautious in evaluating our judgments.
-At dawn, a bulldozer spearheaded the assault, followed up by one hundred Group Four thugs and all the workers at Twyford. Although the tribe had been supplied with a mobile phone to call for support, it had broken down and had not been repaired in the malaise preceding that day’s events. Despite the paucity of communications, over fifty EF!ers had turned up by noon. The contractors put up a barbed wire compound around DoT land and started to remove turf within, but the tribe weren’t taking this without a fight. Their attempts to invade the compound in the next two days were met by violence that hospitalised four of the demonstrators. To control the situation, a hundred cops were drafted in and they in turn made arrests when EF!ers attempted to stop the destruction of the woods at the bottom of the Dongas by occupying trees and the contractors vehicles bulldozing them down on Friday 11<sup>th</sup> of December, despite this unbelievably wanton destruction on the side of Tarmac, the tree-sitters saved a small stand of sycamores and this became their camp site as the tribe began clearing off Winchester College’s land ready for the 14<sup>th</sup> December evictions.
+The Committee’s hope is that this report will provoke a national debate not on “Who did it?”, but on “How did it happen and what can be done to keep it from happening again ?”
-On the Wednesday, Hampshire County Council objected to Tarmac’s spurious claims that the two footpaths across the Dongas had been diverted. The 13<sup>th</sup> of December was an unlucky day for the contractors. Armed with cuttings from the local paper about the destruction of the paths, fifty members of the Ramblers Association turned up at the Down and insisted on the right to walk one of the original tracks. Joined by the tribe and their supporters, the ramblers laid siege to the compound. After ripping the compound gate off its hinges, they barged through fifty Group 4 guards that had linked arms across the breach, and proceeded to walk to the far side of the compound before the cops arrived to “restore order:’ Those biffed out of the compound are now taking the obstruction to court to rip it wide open.
+<br>
-*** A tribe member describes Yellow Wednesday!
+(c) <em>Ability to See the Full Scope of the Problem</em>
-At the battle of the Dongas we witnesses the lengths to which other human beings were prepared to go-to enable destruction of nature to continue.
+This Committee examined a very broad range of issues and compiled a hughe factual record [7] which covers:
-We saw outnumbered protesters being assaulted, then arrested for assault. Activists sustained injuries that the police surgeon described as evidence of systematic beatings. When several arrests failed to enable machinery onto the Dongas-arrests were forgotten as a tactic, and were replaced by brute force and scare tactics by 70 men in yellow jackets.
+(i) the origins and development of intelligence programs over seven administrations;
-As the Earth defenders persistence in the face of arm twisting, head-butting, pressure pointing... etc, became evident 50 black hats waded in.
+’ (ii) intelligence activities both at home and abroad; and
-Instead of making arrests they took over the administration of violence. Two courageous earth sisters were rendered unconscious by wind pipe constriction and suffered torn neck and shoulder ligaments-one being kept in hospital for observation. Many others visited casualty, with barbed-wire cuts, bruises, muscle strain, and abrasions, charges are being brought.
+(111) the programs and practices of the several most important intelligence agencies.
-Despite these tactics and heavy outnumbering the tribe succeeded in keeping machinery out of the enclosed area of the Dongas-From dawn until dusk, throwing their all into the blockade, oblivious to personal injury, risking their lives in one final effort to protect that beautiful piece of land, as if the very planet depended on it!
+( Thus, for the first time, based upon the Committee’s investigation, it is possible to examine the patterns of intelligence activity and not! merely isolated incidents.
-Dawn the next day saw 19 people who were left fit for the protest and 100 black-hats joining the yellow jackets. After attempts at a gate blockade were repelled by a wall of black-hats, physically and mentally numbed protesters wandered around the perimeter fence, watching the surreal massacre that followed. It was like watching a strange dream, by midday all the trees and scrub had been bulldozed, and the unturfed part of the ancient track-ways had been reduced to a huge field of chalk.
+The issues for the country to resolve are best posed by looking, as we have done, at the aggregate, rather than at particular incidents in isolation. Neither the dangers, nor the causes, nor the possible solutions can be fairly evaluated without considering both the broad patterns of intelligence activity which emerge from examining particular cases over the past several decades, and the cumulative effect of activities of different agencies. For example, individual cases or programs of governmental surveillance may constitute interference with constitutionally protected rights of privacy and dissent. But only by examining the cumulative impact of many such programs can the danger of “Big Brother Government” be realistically assessed. Only by understanding the full breadth of governmental efforts against dissenters can one weigh the extent to which those efforts may chill lawful assembly and free expression.
-The only obstruction left was three trees, in the middle of the site occupied by the “never say die” tree sitting club. Huge clouds of smoke billowed over the site from the burning pile of murdered trees, as the bulldozers continued their work. The battle was lost...there were a lot of sad moments but our spirit was not broken. We gained insight and an overwhelming sense of unity. We also saw that other human beings were willing to go to any lengths to achieve their destructive aims...we must be strong ...we must stand together... the Tribe lives on! The Dongas are dead! Long live the Dongas Tribe!
+** D. The Purpose of the Committee’s Findings and Recommendations
-*** What now?
+The central goal of the Committee is to make informed recommendations—based upon a detailed and balanced factual investigation—about:
-Many, particularly the media, who like a nice, neat story. will see the move on the Dongas Camp as the closing act of the Twyford drama. They do not understand how precarious Tarmac’ s current position is. Prior to starting the Twyford contract, Tarmac lost millions when a contract collapsed in Swindon. That on top the general damage the recession has done them, forced Tarmac to beg for a £30 million hand out from the government. They have put in a £24 million bid for the Twyford contract, a third below its proper value, meaning any delay will push them into penalty clauses. The intervention of activists aside, there will certainly be such delays. They will have to cut chalk through Winter and attempt road building across the bottom of the Itchen Valley, which used to be a complex of water meadows meaning they are prone to turn into quagmires. This contract is set to run for two years and the political rationale for it-building infrastructure for European economic union-is looking more tenuous by the day as the Major administration wastes away. The battle for Twyford has not ended-it’s beginning. With proper organisation and determination we can win this crunch battle with the road lobby. The implications of this victory will carry far beyond a small corner of Hampshire.
+(1) which intelligence activities ought to be permitted, and which should be restricted or prohibited; and
-The events of 4<sup>th</sup> November show that we can stop work across Twyford using traditional tactics, given the numbers. If they think they can stop us with threats and violence, we’ve got to make damn sure they don’t. Hunt Sabs regularly get hassle but carry on regardless-learn from their example. They don’t hesitate to document violence against them and bring prosecution.
+(2) what controls and organizational structure are needed to keep intelligence operations both effective and consistent with this country’s most basic values and fundamental interests.
-Obstruction on site needs to be coordinated and supported. The number of days’ work lost is what counts in defeating Tarmac. Consequently, it’s better we have a sixty-strong demonstration two days a week than one demonstration twice that size-that’s overkill. Those on site should make sure that they take down full details of works ongoing and subcontractors involved.
+The first step for this Committee, its successor oversight Committees and the Congress as a whole is to devise the legal framework within which intelligence agencies can, in the future, be guided, checked and operate both properly and efficiently. A basic law—a charter of powers, duties, and limitations—does not presently exist for some of the most important intelligence activities <em>(e.g.,</em> FBI’s domestic intelligence or NSA) or, where it does exist, as with CIA, it is vague, conflicting and incomplete.
-Consideration should also be given to those groups too far from Twyford shouldn’t be confined to the Home Counties. To broaden it out nationally, every Tarmac and associated subcontractors office, depots and sites in the country should be targeted, (A list can be obtained from South Downs EF!). As subcontractors addresses become known, they should join the hit list, not least because they are more vulnerable to persuasion than the larger companies raping the down. Those that can’t make it to Twyford on their day of the week must hit their local target instead. Solidarity actions are already ongoing against the DoT in London and ARC (who supply stone to Tarmac for Twyford) at Whatley Quarry in Somerset. Additional action against the Dean of Bristol University who also happens to run Winchester College are already in the pipeline.
+The absence of laws and the lack of clarity in those that exist has had the effect, if not the intention, of keeping vital issues of national importance away from public debate.
-Its urgent that people explore whether Tarmac or any other subcontractors use freepost addresses or freephone numbers--armchair activists across the country can cost them thousands, legally and from the comfort of their own homes. The possibility of phone, fax and telex blockades should also be explored.
+This Committee’s job was to pose the issues that have been ignored for decades. The technique for doing so was to investigate and then to propose basic laws and other rules as to what can and cannot be done, and on the appropriate command and control structure for intelligence activities.
-There is another string to our bow, too. Tarmac have shown by their behavior on the 9<sup>th</sup> December that they don’t care for the law and only understand money. Well, we can. beat them at their own game on that one, cant we! There is no point in fighting with one arm tied behind our back. After all, Earth First! only respects natural laws. Every leaflet you produce could contain the information needed for a cell to wreak £10,000s of havoc against the contractors and even put smaller subcontractors out of business. If you feel so inspired, study eco-defense and the A.L.F. publications doing the rounds so you know how to do it what it takes. As every channel for negotiation now seems closed, ultimately the only way Tarmac are going to be stopped is by being destroyed.
+There are many other questions, such as the efficiency, cost and quality of intelligence, which are also of vital national importance. We have also examined these matters and consider them in this report. But, the main emphasis of our investigation was on what should be done and not on how it should be done. We seek in our recommendations to lay the underlying legal foundation, and the control and oversight structure for the intelligence community. If these are sound, then we have faith that the other questions will be answered correctly in the future. But if the foundation is unsound or remains unfinished—or if intelligence agencies continue to operate under a structure in which executive power is not effectively checked and examined—then we will have neither quality intelligence nor a society which is free at home and respected abroad.
-No Compromise in Defense of Planet Earth!
+[1] Senate Resolution 21, January 27, 1975, Sec. 1. The full text of S. Res. 21 is printed at Appendix A.
-** Trees for Life: The Amazon on our Doorstep (from <em>issue 2)</em>
+[2] The Committee’s final report is divided into two main volumes. The balance of this volume covers domestic activities of intelligence agencies and their activities overseas to the extent that they affect the constitutional rights of Americans. The other volume covers all other activities of United States foreign and military intelligence agencies.
+<br>
+<br>The Committee has previously issued the reports and hearing records set forth in Appendix B.
-Earlier this year, some EF!ers went to see Alan Watson at Trees for Life [TfL] in Scotland. He says:
+[3] S. Res. 21, Sec. 2. Examples of the “matters or questions” include:
+<br>
+<br>“The conduct of domestic intelligence or counterintelligence operations against United States citizens” by the FBI or other agencies. [Sec. 2(2)];
+<br>
+<br>“The violation or suspected violation of law” by intelligence agencies [Sec. 2(10)];
+<br>
+<br>Allegations of CIA “domestic” activity, and the relationship between CIA responsibility to protect sources and methods and the prohibition of its exercising law enforcement powers or internal security functions [Sec. 2(1), (6)];
+<br>
+<br>“The origin and disposition of the so-called Huston Plan” [Sec. 2(7) (9)];
+<br>
+<br>“The extent and necessity’ of “covert Intelligence activities abroad [Sec. 2(14)];
+<br>
+<br>Whether there is excessive duplication or inadequate coordination among intelligence agencies [Sec. 2(4) (13)] and
+<br>
+<br>The “nature and extent” of executive oversight [Sec. 2(7) (9)] and the “need for improved, strengthened or consolidated’ Congressional oversight [Sec. 2(7)(9)(11)].
-<quote>
+[4] S. Res. 21; Sec. 5.
-<em>Deforestation and loss of biological diversity are now global phenomena, and I believe it is vital for the world to have positive examples showing how the return of natural forests can help heal degraded lands... Trees for Life has been working since 1987 to restore the Caledonian forest in the Highlands of Scotland.. one of the most biologically impoverished parts of the world, where only one percent of the original forest remains.</em>
-</quote>
-Scotland is in the position now that the Amazon will be in in less than 100 years time (unless EF! and others can make a difference). The industrial system that was born in the British Isles began by razing its own environment to the ground, then moved further afield, poisoning the Americas, Asia, Africa, and so on. This is one of the beauties of the TfL project-it sets a global precedent for wilderness restoration and the rejection of civilisation, in the very place where industrialism originated.
+[5] Substantial work was also done on intelligence activities of the Internal Revenue Service and the State Department.
-Alan Watson has a strong commitment to the idea of wilderness. As an article in the <em>Independent</em> newspaper stated: his scheme has <em>no room for ‘sustainable’ woodland, worked and marketed for timber. When he says he wants a natural wilderness he means exactly that. No exploitation, just woods.</em> This is just the kind of vision we need in the badly-degraded and tamed British landscape, and with the return of the wildwood, the malignant, oppressive influence of modern-day society will progressively ebb away.
+[6] Indeed, it is likely that in some cases the high priority given to activities that appear questionable has reduced the attention given to other vital matters. Thus, the FBI, for example, has placed more emphasis on domestic dissent than on organized crime and, according to some, let its efforts against foreign spies suffer because of the amount of time spent checking up on American protest groups.
-EF! in the U.S. has a slogan: <em>As wolves die, so does freedom.</em> The last wolf on these islands was killed in 1743. We have forgotten the meaning of freedom. With projects such as TfL we have a chance to remember.
+[7] Some 800 witnesses were examined, approximately 250 under oath in executive sessions, 50 in public sessions, and the balance in interviews. The aggregate number of transcript pages is almost 30,000. Approximately 110,000 document pages were obtained from the various intelligence agencies (still more were preliminarily reviewed at the agencies), as well as from the White House, presidential libraries, and other sources.
+<br>
+<br>Over the course of its investigation the Committee has had generally good cooperation in obtaining information from the intelligence agencies and the Administration. Of course, there were problems, particularly at the outset—compliance took too long; bureaucratic rules such as the “third agency rule” (which required agencies other than the custodian of the document to review it if they were mentioned) were frustrating. But our experience suggests that those problems can be worked out.
+<br>
+<br>The most important lesson to be derived from our experience is that effective oversight is impossible without regular access to the underlying working documents of the intelligence community. Top level briefings do not adequately describe the realities. For that the documents are a necessary supplement and at times the only source.
-Watson’s plan is truly vast in scale; he is targetting a 600-square mile area of largely bare, roadless hills in the North Central highlands, which happens to contain three of the best surviving forest .remnants. Using these remnants as a nucleus, his ultimate aim is to reafforest 150,000 hectares, and when possible, to reintroduce the large mammal species that previously inhabited the area. This means that we could be seeing brother beaver, sister bear, wolf, lynx, and bison, return to these shores before long, thanks to the efforts of TfL and others. There is already talk of establishing a wolf pack on the Isle of Rhum, off the Western Coast of Scotland.
+<br>
-This is another important symbolic move-experts reckon that most of the large mammals with whom we share the planet will have been rendered extinct shortly into the next century. To reintroduce species shows that this trend is not inevitable or irresistible.
+* Contents
-TfL are keen on the idea of earth repair work. An apparently irreversibly-damaged piece of land can be brought back from the brink. This shows that humanity can co-operate with nature instead of trying to dominate it, and that “nature bats last.” No matter how hard the power junkies and business-beasts try, nature (meaning ordinary humans as well as other species) will ultimately overwhelm them, and their tarmac.
+<right>
+Page
+</right>
-EF! needs to widen what is at present a very narrow definition of direct action. One member of the TfL work party describes his experiences as follows,
+Letter of Transmittal
-<quote>
+Preface
-my week <em>in Glen Affric was wonderful because it made me realise that</em> L<em>as an individual, could do something constructive to help heal our Earth. Not only could I do something, but that it was only through the efforts of everyone that changes happen.</em>
-</quote>
-He took these lessons and applied them to other areas of his life. As a graphic designer, when asked to design a report for a temperate forest-destroying pulpmill in BC, he at first refused, and later resigned his job. His experiences can be summed up in that buzzword, “empowerment;’ a feeling familiar to many EF!ers. What TfL are doing is as much direct action as blockading an ICI plant or a bulldozer at Twyford Down. We need to recognise that we can help to actively heal the earth, as well as carrying out the essential work of stopping business and governments from wounding it further.
+. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY________________________ 1
-*** What Can I Do?
+A. Intelligence Activity: A New Form of Governmental Power to Impair Citizens’ Rights___________________________________________________ 2
-<quote>
+B. The Questions_________________________________________ 4
-We were amazed at the scale of destruction in the areas we looked at. We are all used to the idea of far-away places being ravaged deserts, but here is something on our own doorsteps that needs to be done. No more buying newsletters about death and destruction, here’s some people doing direct action right here, and they need help. There are a series of nine work weeks in Glen Affric between March and June this year. Glen Affric is still a beautiful place to be, and if you can leave it better than you found it, then this could be a real example of that much abused non-word, eco-tourism. The work involves planting native Scots pine and other related tasks. If you can’t make the time for this, you could support them by becoming a member, finding out more (so you can tell other people), and perhaps doing some fundraising.
-There are many similarities between EF!‘s outlook and that of Trees for Life. We thus urge all EF!ers to support them. You, as well as the Caledonian forest, will be the richer for it.
+C. Summary of the Main Problems___________________________ 5
-They can be contacted at [[http://treesforlife.org.uk/][http://treesforlife.org.uk/]]
+. The Number of People Affected by Domestic Intelligence Activity 6
-If you would like to do something about the rest of this devastated isle, please contact SDEF! ...Perhaps we can get something started.
+. Too Much Information Is Collected For Too Long-- 7
-<right>
+. Covert Action and the Use of Illegal or Improper Means_ 10
--Noddy, MA
-</right>
-</quote>
-** A Letter from Scotland (from issue 3)
+a. Covert Action___________________________ 10
-For those who are ‘ aware of the real history of Scotland, the consequences of the actions taken by the colonial administrators on the Scots are self evident. Individuals took advantage of the shattering of customary law to accrue power and influence for themselves at the expense of their own communities collective ownership and security. Traditions stood in the way of profits, so traditions were disregarded. Culture stood in the way of market extension because culture usually involved community ties, solidarity and reciprocity. The wholesale eviction of the indigenous population was then carried out with a blind economic totality and is still a matter touching our inner-most feelings. In this rough and ready article emphasis has been placed on the redefining of land as private property and then its transfer to an elite leading to the mass removal of whole communities for financial gain in a process which is alive today.
+(1) The FBI’s COINTELPRO____________ 10
-The phasing out of Scotland’s culture was top priority as it offered a real challenge in the form of a viable, self-reliant and alternative way of life which wasn’t massively wealthy, but did tend to protect the poor and regulate injustice. The elimination of the native systems, justified by perpetrators and apologists as improvements has been ignored by the education departments, whose task it is to condition a labour force of ignorant and eager consumers.
+(2) Martin Luther King, Jr_______________ 11
-Private property has been legitimised through the imposition of Anglo law via the Scottish office. The poll tax and more recently the water privatisation issue serve to reveal the imposed structure of colonialism clearly.
+b. Illegal or Improper Means__________________ 12
-The Scottish office play a leading role in the undermining of real democracy in Scotland but they are not alone. The powerful corporate bureaucracy of Strathclyde regional council along with the rest of the regions have shown no resistance to the imposition of poll tax. Instead they took on board the unpopular tax in co-operation with the Tories and have used all the powers at their disposal to enforce it, showing that they have virtually transferred their allegiance to the colonial regime. Strathclyde region have already been caught out buying water shares south of the border and meeting with prospective developers.
+(1) Mail Opening______________________ 12
-The people of Scotland are landless as a result of historic coercion into the capitalist labour force. Glasgow, historically a slave camp of the industrial era, doubling as a reservation for the dispossessed natives has been assimilated into the British capitalist system. For this relatively new economic order to be adopted by people, firstly their communal systems of land tenure had to be broken up to substitute with private ownership. Assimilation is ongoing and capitalist ideals are enshrined within schools and institutions for that purpose. Accounts of real history are smothered as a calculated act of policy. Defunct economic theory replaces free thought and the mercenary ideology continues to usurp native intelligence and morality.
+(2) NSA Monitoring___________________ 12
-The cost of this deception is very high and only those who are prepared to DoDge their social/cultural integrity find themselves wealthy enough to insulate themselves from the crisis they are helping to create, be they aware of it or not. While a self-destructive and sociopathic business elite remain in the cockpit of the planet, locked into a suicidal doctrine of economic growth at all costs, our future will remain in the balance. Degradation of people and the environment is the price that must be paid on this path.
+(3) Electronic Surveillance______________ 12
-Yesterday the Caledonian forests fell to the speculators from the south, today from Amazonia to the Siberian forests, the seemingly unstoppable encroachment of market forces continues to wreak environmental havoc. Beyond third world debt and economic destruction and the sharpening division between rich and poor, the market logic now threatens the fundamental biological diversity on which life itself depends.
+(4) Political Abuse_____________________ 13
-We now live in a world where we are acted upon globally, where decisions affecting our lives are made at levels so far removed from ordinary democratic practices that no citizen has a hope of influencing them. The power of transnational corporations (TNCs) and multinationals cannot be ignored.
+(5) Surreptitious Entries_________________ 13
- - 703 of world trade is now controlled by just 500 corporations, which also control 803 of foreign investment.
+(6) Informants________________________ 13
- - Shell Oil’s 1990 gross income ($132 billion) was more than the total GNP of Tanzania, Ethiopia, Nepal, Bangladesh, Zaire, Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya, and Pakistan combined. 500 million people inhabit these countries-nearly a tenth of the worlds human population.
+. Ignoring the Law________________________________ 13
- - Cargill, the Canadian grain giant, alone controls 603 of the world trade in cereals.
+. Deficiencies in Accountability and Control____________ 14
- - Just 13 corporations supply 803 of all cars; five of them sell half of all vehicles manufactured each year.
+. The Adverse Impact of Improper Intelligence Activity__ 15
-US corporations spend more than one million dollars annually on advertising. The average US citizen views 21,000 TV commercials a year. Control of the collective consciousness plays a vitally important role for the success of big business.
+a. General Efforts to Discredit_________________ 15
-These corporations are the dominant force in our world. Disembodied from any one culture and any one environment, they owe no loyalty to any community, any government, or any people anywhere on Earth. These institutions, from the military to government departments and international agencies are driven by a desire to promote their own interests, to perpetuate themselves and increase their power and influence. Decisions are made not because they benefit the community or on environmental grounds but because they serve the institutions’ particular vested interest.
+b. Media Manipulation_______________________ 15
-Employees are similarly disembodied from the real world. When acting for the organisation, company loyalty takes priority over moral and cultural restraints that mediate the rest of their lives. The power wielded by these organisations is greater than that of many, if not all, governments and makes a mockery of certain countries claim to democracy. On the far flung frontiers of the developing world, governments and multinationals are forcing resettlement schemes pushing indigenous peoples off traditional lands, often backed up by the military as part of their assimilation policy, which aims to civilise tribal peoples. This development process frequently begins with widespread brutality and extermination and ends with forest lands being systematically destroyed and plundered for their natural resources.
+c. Distorting Data to Influence Government Policy and Public Perceptions______________________________________ 16
-It’s probably fair to say most people are finding it difficult to make sense of the increasingly complex situation we are in. Many don’t give a damn and the present government-apart from a catalog of major disasters-generally reflects the desires of an ever more materialist society. Most people are busy fighting for a fairer slice of the capitalist cake and don’t have much objection to the system itself but only to the way the cake is sliced. The socialists are telling rights. A fragment of non-feudal land on which we have traditionally known and cherished liberty.
+d. “Chilling” First Amendment Rights___________ 17
-Both socialism and capitalism are concerned with exploiting this planet and so cannot be supported by anyone who wishes to preserve the various ecosystems that make up our home. Socialism is an understandable reaction to a brutally unfair distribution of wealth but it is not enough-we must help recreate a system based on needs not greed.
+e. Preventing the Free Exchange of Ideas_________ 17
-For Scotland to go forward into a genuinely enlightened future we must prepare the ground by illuminating the present in the light of the past, ending the cultural curfew. These sentiments are not racist but pro-culture, based upon the principle that we can’t fully understand or appreciate other cultures if we don’t understand or appreciate our own. Real possibilities for positive change will take place if we shrug off our colonial status, breaking the chains of a system that has fatally undermined our local institutions and cultural patterns, which previously prevented one set of private interests within our society from monopolizing power and imposing its will on the community. We must shut the back door that has been opened to personal gain at the expense of the community’s security, both social and environmental.
+. Cost and Value_________________________________ 18
-The challenge remains for local people to reclaim the political process and to reroot it back in the local community. For people to have inadequate information about their past and little means of acquiring it is a tragedy. It’s vital that we fill in the information gap with an account of real history from our own uniquely Scottish perspective as opposed to the imperial chauvinism which usually passes as such.
+<right>
+. THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE, 1936 to 1976: A. Summary 21
+</right>
-** Car Chases, Sabotage, and Arthur Dent (From issue 3)
+. The Lesson: History Repeats Itself_______________ 21
-*** Twyford Diary-Part 2
+. The Pattern: Broadening Through Time___________ 21
-Twyford Down has become a symbol of resistance, a training ground, a life changer, and a kick up the arse to the British green movement! Below is a brief chronology of events at Twyford since 22 March. The reports of actions dating from mid-February to March 22<sup>nd</sup> can be found in The Twyford Diary Part One--DoD Issue 2. To avoid security fuck ups mentions of monkeywrenching will be limited to quotes from DoT affidavits. Action at Twyford may seem hectic but what I cannot put to text was one of the greatest things to come out of Twyford. That is the camp, the community.
+. Three Periods of Growth for Domestic Intelligence—. 22
-The last diary finished off on March 20<sup>th</sup> with the Arch Druid of Wessex cursing companies at Twyford. This is a transcript of the conversion he had with Mr. Chapman, the Mott MacDonald officer, it is taken from DoT evidence in the Twyford 76 High Court case.
+. Establishing a Permanent Domestic Intelligence Structure: 1936-1945 23
-Druid-I will give you my title. This is an official message from the Arch Druid of Wessex, also a Bard of St. Catherine. This site has been declared officially a sacred site... We would like to inform you....that we have issued a curse against your company. This curse is not a curse against your workers; none of your workers need fear anything personal against them. It is not a death curse but your company will find it will lose money, your workers will lose their jobs, your equipment up here will start breaking down, and you will find this enterprise up here is a white elephant and this thing will not finish until you leave the landscape alone.
+. Background: The Stone Standard___________________ 23
-Mr. Chapman-- wait a minute, we understand-I just want to make it clear whose authority has put this.
+. Main Developments of the 1936-1945 Period_________ 24
-Druid-This authority is from the Order of St. Catherine who are responsible for the site up there. St. Catherines Hill and the environment around.
+<right>
+. 3. Domestic Intelligence Authority: Vague and Conflicting Executive Orders 24
+</right>
-Mr. Chapman-Responsible for-and who declared this on the site as well then?
+a. The Original Roosevelt Orders_____ L_________ 25
-Druid-This is declared by the Council of British Druid Orders which contains all the Druid Orders of the country including Ireland, Wales, Scotland, Manx, Brittany, and suchlike !
+b. Orders in 1938-39: The Vagueness of “Subversive Activities” and “Potential” Crimes. 25
-promise, you will find every one of you will be out of a job. Over the next few months these words were in many ways to become true, as protest activity increased and equipment started breaking down.
+c. Orders 1940-43: The Confusion Continues______ 27
-**** 22<sup>nd</sup> March
+. The Role of Congress_________________________ 28
-protesters hightailed it around the site causing much havoc, no work is done due to the combined effect of protester intervention and Mother Earth pouring fourth buckets.
+a. Executive Avoidance of Congress_________ 28
-**** 23<sup>rd</sup> March
+b. Congress Declines to Confront the Issue------------ 29
-Ten people as above.
+(xi)
-**** 24<sup>th</sup> March
+<br>
-According to a DoT affidavit, “There was fairly substantial vandalism to Hockley bridge overnight”. 22 people including a number of Nicaraguan activists, split into three groups and ran all over the site, Do Dging flying tackles from group 4. It was a half day and we caused a total of seventy five minutes down time.
-**** 25<sup>th</sup> March
-It rained, no site work done.
+xn
-**** 26<sup>th</sup> March
+|
-We arrived 26 strong at 7:45am. How we managed to get up this early, god only knows! We succeeded in occupying one of the large excavators. Two group 4 men pushed an activist off the top of the digger arm 25 foot up, this resulted in a number of chipped ribs. After three attempts six protesters succeeded in stopping a smaller mechanical monster. The Hockley road was then blocked by a sympathetic driver while demonstrators swarmed onto the stranded digger caught in the middle of the road. Up the hill comes an assortment of vans and landies containing over 50 of our local constabulary. Hopelessly outnumbered and standing in a sea of black hats, most demonstrators leave the digger with two people locked to the arm. Two people are arrested on the small digger and by midday the remaining locked-on activists have been cut off by hydraulic bolt croppers. We then went down to what was the Dongas site and blockaded the entrance causing a tail back of three dumper trucks. Group 4 eventually got their act together and pulled us off the road. <em>The actual loss of production was four hours</em> (DoT affidavit). Police later arrested two demonstrators for Criminal Damage to batter rails-charges were not pressed.
+<br>
-**** March 27
-Thirty of us once again spent the morning from 7:15 onwards stopping this and blockading that. As well as group 4 we were once again confronted with thirty police officers. Our numbers were a third of the opposition and due to this we were not as effective as the day before. During the protests there were six arrests including the co-editor of <em>The Ecologist</em> magazine. Five out of the six in the nick went on hunger strike. This lasted until after the court case three days later.
-**** March 29
+<right>
+II. THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE—Continued B. Establishing a Permanent Domestic Intelligence Structure— 1936-1945 Continued
+</right>
-Ten minutes after midnight two people are caught by group 4 amongst the machines in the cutting. When the police arrived they found another two others hiding. None were equipped to cause criminal damage so they were released with cautions. The court case of the six arrested on the 27<sup>th</sup> resulted in them all getting unconditional bail However one defendant was done for contempt of court-e.g. he punctuated the Tarmac laccies sentences with bleats.
+. Scope of Domestic Intelligence----------------------
-**** April 3
+a. Beyond Criminal Investigations-------------
-Twenty-three of us arrived on the site at 7 am, after stopping the work for a short while and after various hair raising events including the tipping of a dumper trucks full load of chalk onto an activists head, group 4 managed to get us off the site. A number of people then started to <em>Dance through an area of wet concrete which had just been laid.</em> This happened several times until a contractor kicked down one dancer and while two held him down, tried to hit him over the head with a spade. Luckily the demonstrator came off with a fair amount of bumps and bruises and nothing worse. On this action as on others a number of female activists were groped and had some articles of their clothing pulled off. This led to group 4 being nicknamed grope 4 and a recommendation that considering the violence of contractors, security, and police towards specifically female activists, we should not go onto the site in women only groups, or in groups under twenty.
+b. “Infiltration” Investigations------------------
-A number of group 4, we are unaware of the figure, had by this time been injured. Injuries ranged from sprained knees, from slipping while trying to rugby tackle us. to more serious fractures. Whenever we tried to occupy a digger the drivers spun the shovels like psychopaths, none of us were hit but group 4 were not so lucky. Tarmac and the police have often cited these incidents to back up the idea that Twyford Activists are a violent mob. This is not true, we are not in any way responsible for the accidental injuries and deaths of DoT employees. It simply shows the idiocy of some security guards and the danger of putting macho men in charge of very big hunks of moving metal.
+c. Partisan Use___________________ ------
-We sauntered home, rather disempowered. As we left the site the police arrived in force. immediately arrested three people for breach of bail conditions. At this time the courts were often giving out outrageous bail restrictions saying we couldn’t go within an exclusion zone three miles long. This included the railway, the A33, and large parts of Winchester itself. They even banned us from going to St. Catherine’s Hill. Of course we were still observed on site and figures were often seen in the trees of St. Catherine’s.
+d. Centralized Authority: FBI and Military
-**** April 4–16
+<right>
+Intelligence -
+</right>
-For much of this period the sky opened up and our feet got muddy. This made the contractors’ work impossible and once again Mother Earth did our job for us. For various reasons our numbers lowered, however the situation soon changed...
+<right>
+. Control by the Attorney General: Compliance and Resistance_________________________ — -------
+</right>
-**** April 17
+<right>
+. Intrusive Techniques: Questionable Authorization — a. Wiretaps: A Strained Statutory Interpretation_____
+</right>
-An overwhelming day of action attended by over 250 people, led into the cutting by David Gee (Ex-director of FoE). Media reports concerning rampaging mobs and security guards receiving fractured skulls were very imaginative and came originally from surprise, surprise the police. However back on the real world the consultative engineers in court evidence said Two group four men received minor injuries in the scuffle. Another DoT affidavit goes on to say:
+<right>
+b. Bugging, Mail Opening, and Surreptitious Entry_______________________________
+</right>
-The protesters came to the top of the hill arriving on site just north of Arethusa clump Almost immediately 50 or so protesters rushed the line of group 4 guards who fell back to the position of the nearest machine. Another machine was overrun by protesters almost straight away. Group 4 fell back to the second machine in an attempt to keep it working. The protesters actions were very vigorous and within a short time (three minutes) one protester got onto the machines boom and this stopped work.
+<right>
+C. Domestic Intelligence in the Cold War Era: 1946-1963
+</right>
-No work was done in the cutting all that day and: There was considerable damage done to machinery all taking place during the protest. Tarmac claim that about a dozen machines were “seriously” damaged, some written off while others remained inoperative till May. Needless to say no one or nothing was caught.
+. Main Developments of the 1946-1963 Period-------
-**** April 19
+. Domestic Intelligence Authority---------------------
-About 10 of us occupied the Mott MacDonald office in Winchester. This and the previous raid/occupation, (see “Twyford Diary, part 1,” page 1) was not only useful in that it disrupted work, but also in that it brought to light just how Do Dgy they are. From <em>obtained</em> documentation we found that not satisfied with being one of the most hated Consultative engineers in Britain, they are also involved in building a logging road through the Venezuelan Rainforest, urban redevelopment in Jakarta (knocking down slum dwellings!), the horrendous World Bank Bangladeshi Flood Action Plan and they are even building a bypass around Bagdad!. Well, I think we can truly say BASTARDS! One minor was arrested for breach of the peace, e.g. being locked onto a radiator and singing, but was released six hours later with no charge.
+a. Anti-Communist Consensus-----------------
-**** April 20
+b. The Federal Employee Loyalty-Security Pro
-We attended the opening of the nearby controversial M36 Salisbury Bypass Inquiry. One activist being infuriated with the actions of the Inspector did a sit in with his coat over his head to the chorus of <em>Jam being muffled,</em> much to the outrage of the inspector who closed the inquiry for the day.
+|
-**** April 21 Second day of the Salisbury inquiry
+<br>
-Outside the hall where the Inquiry was being held was a riot van and a police landie. Inside a collection of sturdy Security men were making their presence known. Three of us were removed by police while trying to ensure a democratic Inquiry. Our actions, in the end, secured the production of written & audio transcripts of the proceedings, an objectors office, a creche, and evening sessions.
-**** April 22–23
-It rained and rained and rained, I love the rain!
+<right>
+gram___________________________
+</right>
-**** April 24
+<right>
+(1) Origins of the Program
+</right>
-Environment Day at Winchester Cathedral. The protest camp set up stall. A large banner was hung saying “Has the environment had its day?” on scaffolding outside the cathedral, and some happy Twyford campers were subsequently chased around the grounds by Cathedral vergers.
+<right>
+(2) Breadth of Investigations
+</right>
-**** April 28
+<right>
+(3) FBI Control of Loyalty-Security Investigations____________________
+</right>
-Meeting with Ecover to discuss boycott
+<right>
+c. Executive Directives: Lack of Guidance and
+</right>
-**** April 29
+|
-The request by the Department of Tarmac for an order to Injunct the Twyford 76 was adjourned as the judge ruled that the governments “case evidence was inadequate”. Much jigging outside the high court.
+<br>
-**** April 30
-Beltain gathering of the tribes. 2–300 came to stay for the weekend. The gathering lasted all weekend, and was the first, (and unfortunately one of the only) free festies of the year. The greenwood was once again awoken.
-**** May 1
+.
-Work was stopped on three sites by 150 people. According to a DoT affidavit:
+|
-<quote>
+<br>
-At <em>8.45 hrs a group of protesters raided one of the small earth-moving operations at Shawford Down and did some very severe damage to the excavator before making off There were between 35–50 of them and they seemed to know exactly what to do to cause the most damage to the machine. At the time much of the detailed setting out of the structure in the area of the site was destroyed.</em>
-</quote>
-The graffiti on the digger indicated that it was one of the cat 245’s only just back in service after the April 17. The driver of this digger the next week jacked in his job and moved to the Skye Bridge contract in an effort to escape “eco maniacs.” Bad location for an escape!
-<quote>
-At 10:20 <em>another group of protesters were at the top of the down and they then started to invade the site as they usually do until...the Blackwells foreman decided to park up the machines to prevent damage...There were many scuffles with protesters in the intervening time where they succeeded in partially stopping several machines...At 10:25 another group of40-50protesters went to the Bar End Bridge and succeeded in stopping all works for an hour or so until they started to walk up to join the other group on the top of Twyford Down. There were two machines damaged adjacent to the Bridge: a bulldozer and a grader.</em>
-</quote>
-On the way to meet action group 2 we spotted dumper trucks whizzing here and there, and after a few minutes we managed to stop them. Then without warning one of the drivers revved up his engine and drove straight into a group of protesters, most jumped out of the way but two held their ground. Alex from Aire Valley EF! (Leeds), was knocked over by 17 tons of dumper truck and for 10 minutes or so had one of its tires on his chest, for a while we thought he was a gonna. An ambulance came & took him to hospital, amazingly he only sustained a sprained shoulder! Guess who’s got the goddess on his side! He is pressing charges so if you were there, contact Aire Valley EF! NOW.
+Controls____________________________
-**** May 2
+|
-The festival of Fire-Another great day of celebration. It was however marred slightly by a couple of hundred police evicting the techno rave in the adjacent field. A very violent situation was narrowly avoided. The ravers after two days of dancing didn’t have the energy to resist, so many a riot shield wielding policeman didn’t get the fight they were so obviously looking forward too.
+<br>
-**** May 3
-This day turned out to be another bizarre one. Overnight two people had been arrested for criminal damage, for allegedly cutting down the fencing around the cutting. One of the activists was badly roughed up by group 4 while waiting for the police. The sun came up and the action began. We didn’t need to take action against the main site at Olivers Battery as the ravers were still using the site as a carpark. Eager not to be out-staged two groups hit the cutting while a third allegedly hit the Compton site. In the words of yet another DoT affidavit, (staked they now reach a foot and a half):
-<quote>
+Scope of Domestic Intelligence, a. “Subversive Activities”
-.30 hrs the first group were now moving up plague pits valley...Blackwells decided to suspend operations and move all plant at the top of the site down to the Hockley traffic lights, where they felt Group 4 could contain the trouble more easily. Unfortunately the protesters were too quick and succeeded in stopping one of the excavators...and preventing another from coming across...A second group of forty came onto the site and started to create problems. 10.00 hrs. The three large motor scrapers were parked up and the protesters tried to rush the larger excavators and there was a serious incident, when one Group 4 man was hit hard in the back by one of the excavators ...He collided with another Group 4 man who was also injured.
-</quote>
-Howie who the police are busy framing with an assault charge on a site he wasn’t even at: on April 17, was seen on the demonstration (a breach of his bail conditions), and, two constables gave chase but he eluded them. A car chase around the South of Hampshire then commenced. We believe the Tarmac Site Supervisor broke speed restrictions on numerous occasions! Tut tut. Howie however once again eluded them, Hurrah!
+|
-<quote>
+<br>
-At <em>10.40 hrs the machines were parked up and left. At 11.00 hrs there were reports of damage to machinery at Compton by a group of people in 8 cars who stormed the area of the site when no work was in progress. They did a severe amount of damage to a medium excavator and to another medium excavator, a large road roller, a track shovel, and compacting plate. A large amount of setting out detail was also destroyed.</em> Shortly after the time these incidence are alleged to have happened those who just happened to have been there were confronted by a horrific site. A quarter of a mile away and running towards us were 60 group 4, and coming down the opposite end of the road were about the same number of police.
-</quote>
-Now knowing that the Group 4 would almost definitely beat us up and the police only probably, we decided to run towards the police. We could not get the road due to a 20-foot metal sound barrier skiting down the side of the road. Our cars were nowhere to be seen as a crash had happened causing a massive tailback with our vehicles about half a mile away. About thirty seconds before we would have met with the police the jam cleared and our cars appeared. Two carloads raced off, resulting in more car chases but the police then blocked the road and six cars were left stranded, some even pushed onto the hard shoulder by police cars. The cars, the site, and everyone present were searched by the police, no tools were found. After all this was a bank holiday excursion of The Roadside Botanical Society. We were interested in the rare Yellow Cradwort, not horrible greasy monkey-wrenches. Two people were arrested under suspicion of criminal damage but were later released and the charges dropped. The whole fracas caused great inconvenience to many Mayday holidaymakers, These incidence happened on the North bound carriageways of the A33, causing a large traffic jam in both directions for 45 minutes. Oh dear!
-**** May 4–21
-Many EF! actions in other places, injunction hearings and gatherings etc. resulted in a drop of activity. The camp was also evicted by Ideal Homes and moved to an abandoned army camp nearby.
+.
-Greenfly, Market Gardens and the Pernicious Tarmac Weed On 22 May an amazing overnight action took place at Twyford Down. In order to stop Tarmac the planet wreckers from building a massive construction bridge over the bypass (codenamed Operation Market Garden by the Dept. of Roads), 300 activists gathered at the protest camp that day for the counter operation Operation Greenfly. There was an overwhelming sense of pessimism and helplessness as reccys had shown that Tarmac were preparing for battle by erecting razor wire barricades all around the site. Group 4, we learnt, had taken the precaution of hiring hundreds more guards and giving them instructions to use more than usual force. The police were there in large numbers and the situation looked pretty fucking scary.
+|
-Well, we worried, we work-shopped, we briefed, we painted our faces, gathered ourselves, and set off to get to the site before the bypass closed down for the night.
+<br>
-The procession of 200 activists looked amazing. Our courage and determination grew as we walked through the water meadows towards the ready built bridge which was about to be pushed across the road. The next sequence of events is amazing and shows what a group of determined people can do. It surprised even the most experienced and seasoned of activists. We formed into a tortoise formation, linked arms and marched onto the site. Rope was tied onto the razor wire, it was pulled away, the other fence was pulled onto it and we stormed in, united. There was nothing Group 4 or the police could do! As Paul said; We almost seemed to fly over the wire. It was as if we were carried. The greenfly buzzed all over the 30 foot high, 200 foot long bridge, WOW WHAT A FEELING!
-For five hours we held that bridge, drumming into the night, until the police had to call in reinforcements from all over the south to get us down. By 2am, there were in total 550 police and 320 group. There were 52 arrests for obstruction of the police and the whole action had been carried out, from our side, with an amazing lack of aggression. It was so empowering. About another 150 people had gathered on the other side of the razor wire, fires burned, and a man breathed fire. On the bridge it was Party time. Night fell, the road closed down, the arc lights roared into action.
-A horrific event unfolded as one activist, while under arrest, was run over by a Tarmac tractor and fuel tank. The driver, laughing, parked up on the site road obstructing an ambulance from entering. Darren received serious injuries and was critical for a while. Darren’s injuries included: a flailed left chest, (i.e. six multiply-broken ribs), a punctured and collapsed left lung, five pelvic fractures, a ruptured urethra, and a broken ankle. He remained in hospital for about a month and a half and was on crutches for longer.
+.
-Meanwhile the rest of the action was going much better. We drummed on the monster structure and the deafening metallic beat echoed across the valley. One man climbed a 40 foot lighting rig and flew the dragon flag and the dragon dancers took the road!
+|
-A bank of TV cameras and press photographers lapped up this spectacular action, there was live footage on TV. It was splashed all over the national press the next day.
+<br>
-What was not reported was that, according to Blackwells, during that morning several excavators and water pumps had been trashed. That night as the greenfly fired up the night on the bridge, elsewhere an excavator was torched, a stretch of Tarmac burned and part of the work site flooded. People have cost Tarmac and the DoT millions in lost time and damaged machinery.
-**** May 24-July 1
-No major action happened at Twyford in this period. Ihe time was taken up with a concoction of smaller actions, court cases and even an invasion of Tarmac’s AGM in London on the 16<sup>th</sup> of June. There was a large Twyford contingent at Glastonbury festival, (a consumer hype if ever I saw one), who gave talks and direct action training all through the festival.
+(1) The Number of Investigations------
-**** July 2
+(2) Vague and Sweeping Standards----
-Tarmac’s injunction against 76 protesters was finally given the nod in the High Court only two days before a planned mass trespass of the work site. This injunction, and others that have appeared since, are near direct copies of the American S.L.A.p.p.s, (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation), and as a legal precedent it brings situations into the fray that EF!ers in this country have not encountered before. Firstly, a possible stay in prison, for contempt of court, for all named injunctees who break the injunction. Secondly, all the injunctees become “jointly and severally liable;’ for all legal costs and damages. The DoT is intending to claim damages of £2 million, and theoretically under this injunction one injunctee who was on the site once could be held entirely responsible for the two million pounds the DoT is claiming. An appeal against the injunction has now been set up and is contactable via, David Plumstead, 0303–265737. (For more details of SLAPPS read “SLAPPS come to Britain;’ Sept/Oct 93 issue of The Ecologist).
+(3) COMINFIL____________ .____
-**** July 4
+<right>
+(4) Exaggeration of Communist Influence________________________
+</right>
-It was evident to all how tyrannical the injunction was and it was decided that it should be made a laughing stock from the very beginning. Two days after the passing of the injunction a ceremonial mass trespass entitled “reclaiming the land” was held. 600 people including a group of injunctees who put their liberty on the line, surrounded the cutting in a massive circle, climbing over into the cutting. This was the biggest Twyford action yet and it seemed, (happily) more like a festie than anything else. There was a healthy mix, sabs, travelers, doctors and EF!ers. Police vans were circled around and the sun blazed down reflecting on the chalk.
+b. “Racial Matters” and “Hate Groups”----- ..
-Tarmac had learnt its lesson and had moved the machinery out of the cutting and into a compound at the other end of the Bailey Bridge. There was no way the police were going to let us in there. An attempt was made but only resulted in exhaustion and twenty or so arrests. There was a severe problem with the lack of drinking water so many just jumped into the River Itchen and cooled off. Needless to say, no site work was carried out and from the onset we had made a mockery of the injunction.
+c. FBI Political Intelligence for the White
-**** July 23
+<right>
+House______________________
+</right>
-In the High Court, “the lord” Just-us Alliot, who had passed the injunction a month earlier, ruled that seven injunctees who had taken part in the Reclaiming the Land demo, were in contempt of court. He said in his summing up that there was one more important thing than nature and that is...the rule of Law! Well he would say that I suppose, being the law.
+d. IRS Investigation of Political Organizations. .
-He sentenced them to 28 days in prison, (more than many wife beaters get!), and hereby created the biggest PR disaster the DoT had ever seen. There was condemnation against his decision from all sides and the prisoners, serving in Holloway (women) and Pentonville (Men), were visited by many notables. These including Carlo Ripa da Meana, the EC minister who resigned in rather suspicious circumstances, after initiating legal action against the English government over Twyford and Oxlees. The prisoners received much media coverage and about 50 letters of support a day from all around the world.
+Accountability and Control--------------------------
-They were finally released after serving 13 days of their sentence. Other injunctees face a spell inside if the combined forces of Bray’s detective agency, the police and group 4 catch up with them. Considering this and the likely spread of these injunctions we can expect many of us to be prisoners in the future. However, we must not let the government’s intimidation tactics work.
+a. Emergency Detention Act_____________
-The cutting at Twyford gets ever deeper and the down, the water meadows and of course most of the Dongas are now destroyed, but its destruction has given birth to a movement and the fight goes on. ‘Ihe road is doomed. We invite all like minded folk to come to the M3 extensions opening ceremony next year with a pick axe, and we will dig this abomination up! But in the mean time Please show your anguish at the loss of this precious place, your solidarity with the injuncted protesters, and your commitment to fight earth rapists everywhere!
+b. Withholding Information---------------------
-Lots of Love and no compromise, ever!!
+c. CIA Domestic Activity-----------------------
-Boudicca and Snufkin.
+(1) Vague Controls on CIA-------------
-xxxxx
+(2) Drug Testing and Cover Programs..
-The main part of the Diary was written by Snufkin, and “Operation Greenfly” is by Boudicca.
+Intrusive Techniques---------------------------------
-Both are small round shiny red insects from Camelot EF!
+a. Communication Interception: CIA and NSA.
-** News From the Autonomous Zones (from issue 4)
+b. FBI Covert Techniques----------------------
-*** The Zone Protects its Own
+(1) Electronic Surveillance-------------
-So what has made the M11 Link Road such a cause celebre? Firstly, it has the advantage of being in London, close enough to embarrass Britain’s politicians and catch the media’s attention. Secondly it is a linchpin of the European Round Tables plans for economic euro-routes in Western Europe. By halting the road in London we can save woodlands, rivers & heathlands all the way to Newcastle, without endangering their ecology by having mud fights with hundreds of security guards and police in their midst.
+(2) “Black Bag” Jobs--------------------
-The area threatened by the Link Road comprises two very different localities. At the Eastern end of the route is Wanstead, a reasonably affluent, conservative leafy-green London suburb. To the West are Leyton and Leytonstone, areas of high-density urban housing, built at the turn of the century, but badly neglected ever since the proposal for the Link Road first blighted the area forty years ago. To look at it now, you could be forgiven for thinking that the best thing for Leyton and Leytonstone would be to demolish them and grow a forest.
+(3) Mail Opening________________
-Overall management of the road-building project has been entrusted to WS Atkins Consulting Engineers. They have divided the road into four separate sections, each of which will be built by a different contractor. So far, only one of the four contracts has been awarded. Norwest Holst have now started work on “Contract 4” in Wanstead, since it is expected to take the longest time to complete. Our hope is that if Norwest Holst can be made to suffer both financially and in PR terms through their involvement in the Link Road, then it will become extremely difficult for the DoT to find three other construction companies who are daft enough to take the remaining contracts! “Contract 2” covers the crucial stretch through Leyton and Leytonstone; although advance preparation works (knocking down houses, or just damaging them enough to make them uninhabitable) are already underway there. the actual road-building contract will not now be awarded until August 1994. It was originally due to have started in January, so they are at least nine months behind schedule already. So the campaign is undoubtedly having some sort of an effect!
+c. Use of FBI Wiretaps_________________
-**** The Start of the Action: 13<sup>th</sup> September: November 1, 1993
+|
-The first big event-a march along the route of the road-took place in mid-August 1993, with just one month to go before the start of the contract. The second event was on September 13, the day the bulldozers were due to arrive! Around 100 people were there to greet the contractors that day-needless to say, the contractors didn’t dare to show up! So the protesters celebrated their first victory in the full glare of the national media, by reclaiming a vacant house which had been compulsory-purchased by the Department of Transport (DoT). By the end of the day, the house had its roof repaired, and was covered in banners. 1–0 to the campaigners!
+<br>
-Contractors Norwest Holst duly arrived the following morning, and immediately met with stiff opposition. Norwest Holst’s first task was to clear a patch of woodland, which took them nearly three weeks, due to regular tree-sits, bulldozer lock-ons and other delaying tactics. On one day, forty men employed for a full day only managed to cut down four small trees!
-Yet in other respects the campaign was not taking off as we might have hoped. The real challenge was (and still is) to find enough people willing to occupy the many houses which the DoT has already purchased and left vacant along the route. Generally the houses are structurally sound, although several have had their first-floor ceilings knocked out, with the aim of making them uninhabitable. The campaign has held a number of house-rebuilding days, in an effort to tempt more squatters to come and live in what can otherwise be fairly unpleasant conditions. Other houses have been barricaded, and we have already had some success in resisting evictions. But the DoT has now accelerated its efforts to destroy the houses.
-**** The Chestnut Tree: November 2--December 7, 1993
+. Domestic Covert Action------------------------------
-At the heart of Wanstead lies George Green, a highly valued local park. ‘Ihe focal point of the Green was a magnificent 250-year-old sweet chestnut tree. Local people had been led to believe that the road would pass under the green in a tunnel, so they assumed that their tree was safe. What they were not told was that the tunnel was only a shallow cut and cover tunnel, and that the tree would have to be cut down to allow it to be built. On Tuesday 2<sup>nd</sup> November, Norwest Holst started to put up wooden hoardings around the chestnut tree. Local people were horrified, especially the children who, for the rest of that week, came out from school as often as they could, and lay down in the way of the contractors to stop them putting up the fences. By Saturday 6<sup>th</sup> November they had finally completed the fencing, just in time to prevent us from holding a planned “Tree Dressing” ceremony. Several hundred local people, furious at this, came out that day and tore the fences down again! Suddenly, the campaign had found a focus and a symbol-local support, which had so far been dormant, now sprang into life!
+a. COINTELPRO: Communist Party_______
-The next day, a local nursery donated a number of plants, and the children created a Peace Garden in the shadow of the tree, bearing the words “Save the World:’ A tree-house was built in the branches of the chestnut tree. A bender was set up beside the tree, and for the following month, the camp fire became a focal point for the campaign. Local people, including grandmothers and children, came down to George Green each night, bringing food for the tree-dwellers. People from different backgrounds began to get to know one another; professional people, retired people, and Twyford Down veterans spent long evenings together, talking, forming new friendships, exchanging ideas about roads, the environment, consumerism, life, the universe and everything................................. Something new and beautiful had been created
+b. Early Expansion of COINTELPRO./--------
-in the community. Many local people talk of their lives having been completely changed by the experience.
+<right>
+D. Intelligence and Domestic Dissent: 1964-1976--------------
+</right>
-Word of the George Green Chestnut Tree spread via a small article in the Guardian newspaper. Two days later, the postman delivered a letter addressed to the Chestnut Tree itself! One of the campaign’s solicitors immediately seized on this to argue in the law courts that the tree-house should be formally recognized as a dwelling! The strategy worked, the tree-house had made legal history, and hundreds more letters started to pour in from all around the country! The DoT now had to apply for a court order to evict the tree-dwellers from their new home, a process that delayed them for several more days. By the time they had obtained the court order, they knew that any attempt to remove the tree-dwellers would meet with serious resistance. They would have to organize a major police operation, and this in tum took several weeks to plan.
+. Main Points During the 1964-1976 Period----------
-Actions continued sporadically, but in practice Norwest Holst were hardly managing to do any work worth stopping! On Tuesday November 30, a crane arrived to start digging the entrance to the tunnel a few yards up the road from George Green. At midday, two protesters evaded the security guards, climbed to the top of the crane, and “locked on” with bike locks 30 metres above the road below! The contractors attempted to remove them with fire engines, high hoists, hydraulic bolt-cutters-but nothing could bring them down! They stayed up until after work had finished at 6pm that evening, before descending voluntarily.
+. Scope of Domestic Intelligence----------------------
-A more sinister development occurred in the early hours of Friday morning, December 3. Protesters were subjected to two attacks within 20 minutes of one another, at different places on the route. The first took place in Claremont Road, a threatened street in Leyton which houses a number of protesters and other squatters. At 1:00am, two men passed down the street, one driving slowly in a car, the other walking beside him, smashing through the window of every parked vehicle in sight. Twenty minutes later, six men struck at Wanstead. They poured petrol over the tree and the bender, and threw a Molotov inside the bender for good measure. Protesters were asleep in both the bender and the tree itself. It is very fortunate that only one protester suffered slight burns-the attackers’ intentions were clearly murderous. Police arrested two people caught escaping the area, and charged them with “arson with intent to endanger life:’ We always knew that roads were built, not for the good of the public, but to suit the interests of the roads lobby. This attack shows just how deeply entrenched those vested interests are, and the extent to which they are prepared to go to defend their interests, once threatened.
+a. Domestic Protest and Dissent: FBI_______
-**** Black And Blue Tuesday: December 7
+|
-By early December, rumors began to circulate of a major police operation to evict the tree-dwelling, and it soon became clear that the rumors were serious. Within 24 hours phone calls had gone out to people all around the country. On Monday evening, 6<sup>th</sup> December, about 150 people gathered for an all-night vigil around the base of the tree. Many more people arrived during the early hours of the following morning. One group locked themselves into a ring around the tree trunk, with their arms linked by steel tubing; others climbed up into the tree itself. As predicted, about 400 police officers arrived at Sam that morning, and immediately started to clear people out of the way from around the base of the tree. Pensioners were dragged away without warning, one had his face punched, smashing his glasses. Another protester had his foot broken when it was deliberately stamped on by a policeman. The police used pressure points extensively whilst removing them. After about an hour of scuffles, the police had the tree surrounded, and started to bring in reinforcements to cordon it off. At 1 lam a cherry picker (a high hoist hydraulic platform) arrived to remove protesters from the tree itself!. People lay in the road blocking its path, and were again dragged away by the police. At one point the cherry picker became stuck in the mud as it approached the tree; one security guard and one demonstrator were injured as it attempted to free itself. One tree occupant managed to climb onto the arm of the cherry picker, and locked himself to it with handcuffs.
+<br>
-Eventually they demolished the tree after nine hours and a police operation that cost £100,000. It had forced the DoT to humiliate itself in a very public manner. Virtually all the national newspapers carried reports and photographs of the incident in many cases on the front page. The loss of the tree was a tragic day, and yet also a truly wonderful day. It had hammered another huge nail into the coffin of the DoT’s roads programme.
-Soon afterwards, local families gathered for a march through central London to the Department of Transport’s offices in Westminster. A nine year old boy presented the DoT with a young sweet chestnut tree, and requested that Roads Minister Mac Gregor should plant the new tree on George Green to replace the one he had demolished, and of course, halt the motorway construction.
-**** Wanstonia
+<right>
+Page
+</right>
-A long Christmas break in the construction industry gave the campaign some time to recover our energy. But it was soon clear that a new threat was looming. On December 30 the DoT served notices to quit on the tenants of a row of large Edwardian houses next to George Green itself. These houses included the homes of Patsy Braga and Mike Edwards, two local anti-road campaigners; another of the houses had been colonized by the campaign in October, for use as a direct action centre! So at the start of 1994, these houses officially became squats. The campaign needed to do something dramatic to make a big issue of these houses. On Sunday January 9, with the threat that the houses could be demolished immediately after a High Court hearing the following Thursday, a meeting of the inhabitants and other local people decided that they would make a Unilateral Declaration of Independence from the UK, and set up the “Independent Free Area of Wanstonia.” The campaign’s solicitors wrote to the Foreign Office to advise them of our intentions & a Declaration of Independence was drawn up. The outcome of the High Court case was unexpectedly favorable; one house was reprieved completely (forcing the DoT to go back to square one), and a stay of execution was granted on the others.
-**** Actions, Actions and Yet More Actions
-Meanwhile outside the Free Area on January 10. the contractors returned from a long Christmas and New year holiday. Activists tree-sat threatened trees and there was much chainsaw diving including one activist head-butting a working chainsaw while wearing a crash helmet. This went on for a number of days. On the 20<sup>th</sup>, 20 Wanstonians blockaded a pile driver being driven onto the construction site at Wansted Green and were met with 50 Territorial Support Group with police dogs-one happily wielding his truncheon.
-**** Site Invasions & Grappling Hooks
-The next action saw a dynamic shift of tactics. Three hundred turned up for a day of action on January 22, shifting gear into the offensive. Fort Norwest-Holst was held siege for an entire day, with the formidable defenses breached on several dramatic occasions, (even if the grappling hook proved over-ambitious!). The security excelled themselves again, old Andy “Chipped Tooth” got so excited he had to be revived with the old “paper bag over the head routine” (apparently it is a recognized first aid technique!). Many of the other guards smashed their own computers in the furore. By the end of the day, the main site on Cambridge Park Road was without security cameras, electricity, or an intact set of blueprints.
-**** Leytonstonia established
-On the same day, (January 25). as the government published four greenwash reports on sustainable eco-rape, tree surgeons arrived to chainsaw down a copse of Yew, Oak, and Holly trees in Leytonstone. Opening the gates they were surprised to find their work site turned into a camp site of assorted benders and tree hammocks. Police arrived to evict trespassers but realized that the protesters had legal possession of the land. {f you want to remove my clients you will have togo through the court! smirked a campaign solicitor to a disgruntled police officer. Nearly the whole of the street was by now under the control of the campaigners and Fillebrooke Road is declared independent. Long live the Autonomous Free Area of Leytonstonia!
-**** Bash Wednesday
-Direct action slowed down in preparation for the upcoming eviction of Wanstonia and we concentrated on digging ditches and erecting barricades. We didn’t have to wait long, the big day came on Ash Wednesday, now renamed Bash Wednesday, and what a surreal day it turned out to be. Far too surreal, in fact, for this scribe so I will leave it to of all people--The Daily Telegraph.
-<quote>
-**Link Road Protesters in handcuffs cut away from**
-<br>**concrete-filled spin drier...**
-<br>**but now they plan to regroup in Leytonstone.**
-<br>**The Battle for Wanstonia-Self-styled republic smashed by police**
-<br><em>The battle of Wansted began at dawn yesterday when police officers taking part in Operation Barnard converged on what protesters had dubbed, “Ihe Independent Free Area of Wanstonia.[3] In their attempt to stop the M11 link road, the protesters had called on the foreign office and the United Nations to recognize the row of Edwardian houses they had occupied as an independent country. Both appeals were rebuffed and they found themselves in breach of court orders requiring them to leave. They refused and the court officials prepared to move in, backed by uniformed officers and units of the Territorial Support Group,[4] who are specialists in public order confrontations, detectives from the area major investigation team, and a small number of horseman. Police detailed to enter the occupied properties had protective clothing and riot helmets... By 6am, the houses had been filled with protesters who were waiting with a mix of apprehension and good humor. Some sang folksy protest songs and one even rang the police station complaining that he was cold and asking them to hurry up. Ihe police arrived in a procession of coaches an hour later ... officers stopped traf c, sealed off the area, and made way for the court of cials to attack the barricadedfront doors with sledgehammers. Once inside the properties, officers worked their way up, systematically clearing each room and ejecting the occupants to behind a cordon of 200 yards away. Protesters used a variety of tactics. Two were chained together through a hole in the chimney breast. Another two were handcuffed to an old spin dryer with cement. When the upper and lowerfloors of the houses had been sealed, the police turned their attention to the roofs. Initial attempts to lift protesters off using one cherry picker crane were unsuccessful; but officers had more success using two cranes. As each house and roof was cleared, the properties were demolished by mechanical diggers, filling the air with choking dust.</em> <em>A</em> <em>handful of demonstrators who had occupied a tree in front of one of the properties was cleared last. By then, the officials were working under lights. Demonstrators appeared demoralized, but said they were planning new occupations on another part of the route in nearby Leytonstone. It has taken them</em> this long to clear a small row of houses, but there are... another 250 for us to occupy before this road is built,” said one... Sabatage and damage to contractors equipment since early <em>December has been estimated at</em> <em>£35,000</em><em>...</em><em>Since last September, when the Wansted protests began in earnest, about 100 people have been arrested, mainly for obstruction and criminal damage to site equipment.</em> <em>A</em> <em>spokesman for the Department of Transport denied any accusation of having ridden roughshod over the wishes of local people.</em>
-</quote>
-**** Wanstonia Rising
-Just when they thought they’d smashed Wanstonia up it pops again, only 500 yards down from where the Chestnut grew. An empty tobacconist due for eviction was squatted and turned into a drop in centre for the campaign. On the following Monday Squibb & Davies the demolition men illegally entered hitting protesters with sledge hammers. After re-enforcement’s of protesters arrived they left, the same rigmarole happens a couple of days later, but the protest regained occupancy. After a few weeks of occupation the contractors smashed apart Wanstonia Rising, but within days a new house was squatted, Wantonia Rising 2. At the time of writing Wanstonia is still Rising, Leytonstonia is still awaiting attack with a 24-hour watch on guard and more houses are coming under our control daily.
-**** Beware the Ides of March
-<quote>
-And that is where Operation Roadblock came in. With the new Criminal Justice Bill imminent, and lets face it, minor amendments aside, imminent is the word, and with the roads programme virtually on its knees, (which it is), we have no choice but to go big time with the current campaigns. Operation Roadblock was planned to form a national rota of activists and get 100 people per day to the M11 for at least a month, starting from March 15, which is of course the Ides of March when Julias Caesar got stabbed-the beginning of the end of the last great road building empire. Operation Roadblock switched the campaign once again on to the offensive. No longer would the state decide the agenda, 1,200 people over one month took part in direct action, digger diving, and all that jazz. Using a rota system turned out to be a very effective means of mobilizing people-a model for other protests maybe? Operation Roadblock 2 is on the horizon as well as the ambiguous sounding Operation Liquidate. So come down to the Autonomous Zones and experience some peaceful urban warfare.
-<right>
--Written by a Do Dgy group of shady characters including Roger Geffin, Secret Squirrel, and Yellow Pinky.
-</right>
-</quote>
-<quote>
-On closer examination we find that trees perform many more offices in relation to the soil than that of merely pegging it down. By virtue of cooling the air and spraying the sky and multiplying the clouds they exert considerate influence upon the fall and distribution of rain; by virtue of sponging the earth around their feet they enormously influence the behavior offloods, the discipline of rivers, the supply of springs, the health of fish;... and by the virtue of their power to suck up moisture by the ton they dry the swamps and control the malarial mosquitoes. Forests are much more than meets the eye. They arc fountains. They are oceans. They are pipes. They are dams. Their work ramifies through the whole economy of nature.
-<right>
--J. S. Collins,
-<br>“The Triumph of the Tree” 1950
-</right>
-</quote>
-[3] It may seem strange that it took the contractors so long to get a cherry picker to the tree, however this can be explained quite simply. The contractors fearing that monkey-wrenchers would be in the area, put their cherry picker under 24 hour guard, and being completely paranoid hired another and hid it down the road in a school car park. According to sources in Norwest Holst there fears were realized and despite the guards the Hydraulic Platform started to fall apart when they attempted to move it. Without hesitation they drove down to their ‘secret* backup platform only to find it WRENCHED! Cherry pickers are rather sparse in East London, especially for companies who have a reputation for “not looking after hired machinery”. Do or Die, of course condemns all acts of illegality!
-[4] The Territorial Support Group are highly trained police units only used in times of public ‘disorder’. Originally named the SPG (Special Patrol Groups), they changed name a couple of years back after a number of embarrassing instances. One involved a baker who was driving his mini to work, unfortunately for him he passed a SPG unit who mistook him for an escaped kidnapper and immediately shot him dead leaving his car careering into others at a roundabout. Numerous occasions of black lads finding themselves bleeding in the gutter after encountering the SPG also surfaced. The SPG now with a very dirty public record disbanded and a day later the TSG was formed--with nearly exactly the same employees. All in all not a nice bunch.
-<br>
-** Biodiversity and the British Isles (from issue 4)
-Species loss like many ecological issues has entered this island’s mass psychology while remaining fundamentally misunderstood. Obscured by a haze of large numbers and strange sights, species loss is seen as something solely in relation to rainforest, pandas, and David Attenburgh talking of brightly colored fungi. Biodiversity is seen as something distant, something separate from day to day life. Something foreign, which has no relation to our “green & pleasant land:’
-Biodiversity is the expression of healthy ecology. It may seem distant to these Isles because these Isles are sick. It has been said that civilised man walks the earth leaving deserts in his footprints. As the frontiers of this civilization opened up, so the cedars of Lebanon and the Broadleaf forests of this island were trampled underfoot. With the great forests all but destroyed the soils of Lebanon eroded, and washed and blew away. Thanks to this island’s mild temperate climate, its fate was to remain. a different kind of desert. A desert of ploughed fields, of a thousand swaying barley stalks. Soon the last sizable remnants of the great forests were slashed, to provide timber for the growing naval machine, to undermine the free who still lived in the forest and to build the new cities and bring more money into the government coffers. All that was left was a spiderweb-like network of hedges and tree lines, draped over an otherwise barren landscape; acting as corridors between, with little exception, small managed woodland. The very symbol of the concept that destroyed the land, <em>property,</em> became the final refuge of diversity. With the advent of agri-business, even the hedges are now being destroyed and the diversity of crop species is decreasing. In short this island’s eco-system has been devastated.
-<quote>
-<em>Since 1945 the</em> UK <em>has lost 30% o.fits rough grazing land, 65% of song thrushes, 90% of meadows, 50% of lowland woodlands, heaths andfens and 140, 000 miles of hedgerow. 80 commons have been deregulated.</em>
-<right>
--Council for the Protection of Rural England
-</right>
-</quote>
-You would think then that biodiversity would be the environmental movement’s main priority, but no. Most local groups involved in stopping new developments, (roads, supermarkets etc.), are more likely to talk about damage to landscape than damage to ecology. To oppose a cutting soley because it destroys a hill fort or the view, rather than because it trashes an ancient woodland or destroys 2,000 year old badger sets is yet more anthropocentric rubbish.
-We live in what is mostly an ecological catastrophe. An anatomy diagram is beautiful, but is nevertheless a dead body. The summer lushness of pasture land is deceptive, after all, the lawns at Wimbledon are green but not particularly healthy. We must start to talk of life, of biodiversity. We must change the way we think about the country. You cannot escape urbanism in the countryside, today’s countryside is, on the whole, an extension of urbanism. The dominant interaction in the country is, as in cities, the oppression and degradation of eco-sytems by civilised man. We must understand the land’s ecology and take further action against those who destroy its remaining diversity, for if we don’t, soon there will be nothing but man and his creations.
-<br>
-** An Open Letter to the Minister for Transport
-<em>(from</em> <em>issue 5)</em>
-<quote>
-<em>I do not want to encourage day-dreaming, we are in a world of practical realities...</em>
-<right>
--Brian Mawinney,
-<br>Minister for Transport[5]
-</right>
-</quote>
-<quote>
-<em>My people shall never work. Those who work can not dream, and wisdom comes to us in dreams.</em>
-<right>
---Smohalla, Native American, 1887 Be <em>Realistic—Demand the Impossible!</em>
-<br>graffiti, Paris May ’68
-</right>
-</quote>
-<quote>
-Mr. Mawinney-- Welcome to the Nightmare.
-After three years of sustained direct action against road building you wish us to sit down at the negotiation table, to be civil and polite to the very same people who have sent riot police, security guards, spies and infiltrators to destroy us. You called for a <em>ceasefire inhe serile feuding overtransport issues,</em> a <em>fresh start... [a] move backoroperly informed, rational argument, with respectfor opposing views, in a manner more fitting to the demo- cratic traditions of our country.[6]</em> You issued this call on the 7<sup>th</sup> of December, exactly one year after the eviction and destruction of the Chestnut Tree at the M11. It took the DoT over 400 cops and 200 security to take the land and that wasn’t the end of it, things for the govt only got worse. Daily site invasions, numerous acts of sabotage; no wonder you want us to sit and talk--when we’re talking we’re not fighting.
-Let’s pretend for a moment that we could suppress our feelings of nausea and rage and sit down to negotiate; what in fact could you offer us? The end of the industrial system-can you offer us that? An end to the assault against the life support systems of the earth, a society within nature, a life where only our passions and desires rule, an earth alive; can you offer us that? Of course not!
-What <em>can</em> you offer us-A “rational reasoned debate on transport”? Why should we debate, we know what you are going to say, you’ve said it countless times before, we are bored of listening. The modern ecology movement is over 30 years old; in the bowels of your office there is a whole forest of reports on the ecological stupidity ofwhat you are doing, you know the situation. Capitalism-and its petrochemical/car making economy--must keep moving. The need for transport infrastructural development is the need of the multinational corporations. ‘Ihe economy, (both nationally and internationally), must expand or die. We have consistently argued that to build more infrastructure simply creates more traffic, that as greater capacity is produced it is filled. More roads = more cars = more roads = more cars, a disastrous spiral down into ecological collapse. You must maintain the demand for cars and petrochemical byproducts as an end in itself. You must preside over the ever increasing centralization of production and consumption-with the lorry on the motorway as the rolling warehouse-making it progressively more difficult to get by in this society without a car. None of this worries you of course, what we call a disastrous spiral you call economic growth. What worries you is the short term survival of the economy. Congestion is what worries you.
-What is congestion? On the whole simply the process of earth destruction slowed down by its own mass. Every morning hundreds of commuters arrive late for work, contracts are broken and goods delivered late--all because of the jam. The CBI estimated it costs the economy around £15 Billion a year. Are we meant to feel distressed about this? Do you really expect us to sit down and work out solutions for <em>your</em> problems? We want no more roads but we also know that the need for most journeys is the need of those we oppose. We are not about to start doing your research for you, we are not going to let <em>your</em> needs monopolise <em>our</em> imaginations. We have better things to do, defending the earth, building communities, growing our carrots and dancing!
-You illustrate your ignorance of natural processes very well with your request for a ceasefire and debate. This nation state owes a massive carbon debt to nature, and apparently is committed to adding to this crisis through its pathetic “reduction of emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000” programme. On the basis of your efforts so far it appears you will not even meet this dismal target! You can try to negotiate with us but how do you plan to “negotiate” with nature-with the nature that is going to flood your petty parliament and destroy your fragile economy as global warming--or any number of impending environmental catastrophes-come home to roost. You have nothing to offer nature-as an ecological cretin you don’t even know what to say. The earth’s carbon cycle now demands the elimination of fossil fuel use and the massive reafforestation of the British Isles and the earth-in other words, the extinction of your civilisation and the resurgence of our culture. That is the ecological reality-your “political realities;’ your “reasoned debate”’ is an <em>absolute</em> irrelevance.
-In short in return for us climbing off our barricades, destroying our emerging communities and halting real resistance, you are willing to hold a debate we have already had and make a decision that we are already forcing you into making. If that were not bad enough we would resign ourselves forever to be in effect a capitalist think lank whose aim would be the smooth running of this genocidal, ecocidal system. Well thanks, but no thanks! We will never join you. To negotiate is to already accept the death of nature. The society which you represent is a constant war against the earth. A ceasefire is the putting down of weapons on both sides. You are not about to put down the weapons with which you fight, not the truncheons, not the factories. There will only be a ceasefire, there will only be <em>real</em> peace when the earth is purged of institutions like that of which you are presently a part.
-Brian, why not dance the forbidden dance, rediscover your humanity, rediscover your wildness, throw all your files out of the window, burn down your office, smash up your TV, break free, and join us, for we will never join you!
-Yours with love,
-<right>
--Some @nonymous digger diving agitators
-</right>
-</quote>
-We received a copy of this letter anonymously--it was, we are told, sent lo Brian Mawinney’s private fax number. Just as we were going to print, he was elevated (maybe the wrong word to use) to the post of Chairman of the Tory party. During his stay as Minister for Transport some activists took his “great transport debate” to mean that it was time for us to stop saying no all the time and put forward practical solutions to his society’s problems--this was often called ironically, “setting our own agenda:’ In the last couple of hours of his post at the DoT nice Mr. Mawinney announced that the Newbury by-pass would go ahead. He may think that he had the last laugh but Brian, we know where you live! It matters little who the minister is, an individual in these cases is merely the role he plays out, therefore this letter equally applies to the new minister. --Eds (allegedly)
-[5] DoT Press Notice no. 471. 7.12.94
-[6] DoT Press Notice no. 54. 27.2.95
+|
-<quote>
+<br>
-Dear Nora,
-Motorway flyover, superstores, shitty yuppie development--we don’t need them and here’s how to stop them.
-Fast: Sneak onto building site and dump icing sugar into cement mixers, bags of sand etc. This stops the cement setting. Slow: Do the same as above, except using rock salt (available in bulk from road gritting bins). Rain will wash the crystals out of the set cement eventually, so weakening it. When the construction is finished, anonymously contact the local planning office and tell them that Elves have been at work. The development will have to be pulled down again as structurally unsound.
-Often the threat of salting is enough to make developers back off. Sweetening cement is usually a good final warning if you are inclined to give one.
+(1) Racial Intelligence____________
-<right>
+(2) “New Left” Intelligence________
-Flo and flying Listards
-<br>from DoD #2
-</right>
-</quote>
-<quote>
+b. FBI Informants_____________________
-<em>...One day’s exposure to mountains is better than a cartload of books.</em>
-<right>
+(1) Infiltration of the Klan_________
--John Muir, (1838–1914)
-</right>
-</quote>
-*** A Review (from issue 5)
+|
-by John C. Stauber
+<br>
-<em>Going Green: How To Communicate</em>
-<br><em>Your Company’s Environmental Commitment</em>
-<br>by E. Bruce Harrison
-More than any other author Rachel Carson is credited with giving birth to popular ecological awareness. Silent Spring, her bombshell 1962 bestseller, gave a dramatic, prophetic, and factual account of massive agrichemical poisoning. Written with the goal of shocking the public, government and industry into action, it sowed seeds of consciousness that burst forth eight years later when millions of people demonstrated in the streets on the first Earth Day, April 22, 1970.
-Now PR executive E. Bruce Harrison, who led the fight to silence <em>Silent Spring,</em> has written his own book, a how-to guide entitled <em>Going Green: How to Communicate Your Company’s Environmental Commitment.</em>
-Harrison’s commitment began when, at age 30, he was appointed Manager of Environmental Information for the manufacturers of agricultural pesticides and other poisons, and assigned to coordinate and conduct the industry’s attack against <em>Silent Spring.</em> They hit back with the PR equivalent of a prolonged carpet bombing campaign. No expense was spared in defending the fledgeling agrochemical industry and its 300 million dollars per year in sales of DDT and other toxins. The national Agricultural Chemical Association doubled its PR budget and distributed thousands of book reviews trashing <em>Silent Spring.</em>
-Along the way, they pioneered environmental PR crisis syndicated from the <em>Earth First! Journal Mabon 1994</em> management techniques that have now become standard industry tactics. They used emotional appeals, scientific misinformation, front groups, extensive mailings to the media and opinion leaders, and the recruitment of doctors and scientists as so-called objective third party defenders of agrichemicals.
-Rachel Carson succumbed to cancer on April 14, 1964, never seeing herself vindicated. Due in part to Harrison’s PR work, the warnings of Silent Spring have never been adequately understood or heeded. Today agrochemical contamination of soil, air, water, animals, and people is one of the most ubiquitous and difficult environmental health disasters we face.
+|
-Harrison, however, is alive and thriving. In 1973, he and his wife established their own PR company, drawing in clients such as Monsanto and Dow Chemical, who were among the sponsors of the campaign against Silent Spring. The PR trade publication Inside PR named him as its 1993 PR All Star, stating that by writing Going Green he had confirmed his status as the leading [PR] thinker on environmental issues and as a continuing pioneer in the field.
+<br>
-The E.Bruce Harrison Company has offices in Washington DC, Dallas, Austin, New York, and San Francisco, and recently opened a new office in Brussels that will, in the words of Inside PR, help its transnational clients work through the complexity of Europe’s new environmental regulations. The company employs more than 50 staff and does 6 million dollars’ worth of business annually for about 80 ofthe world’s largest corporations and associations, including Coors [notoriously right-wing US brewing giant], Clorox, l\J Reynolds, the American Medical Association, and Vista Chemical.
+<br>
-Harrison’s clients include the “wise use” [American term for groups campaigning for GREATER environmental destruction-often funded by industry] Global Climate Coalition (which opposes environmental action to prevent global warming), and the Coalition for Vehicle Choice (which opposes emission-control regulations for automobile manufacturers). He even receives taxpayer funding from one of his clients, the US government’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
+II. THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE—Continued
-<br>
+D. Intelligence and Domestic Dissent: 1964-1976—Continued
+. Scope of Domestic Intelligence—Continued
+<br>b. FBI Informants—Continued
+• (2) “Listening Posts” in the Black Com- <em>'Page</em>
-In Going Green, Harrison shares some of his perspective and methods. The book includes self-promotional chapters in which he discretely brags of the PR green washing successes that he has arranged for clients such as Uniroyal, General Motors, Cosmair, and Zoecon. Of course, he doesn’t use the word greenwashing. The text is filled with environmentally-correct sounding jargon that makes for clumsy reading. The phrase he uses to describe his PR work, for example is •‘sustainable communications:’
+munity__________________________ 75
-In Going Green, Harrison declares that environmental activism has died and that its death presents corporations with a tremendous opportunity to define and dominate the future of environmentalism in the name of “sustainable development” by which he means corporate business-as-usual, made palatable for the public through “sustainable communications:’
+(3) Infiltration of the “New Left”-------------- 76
-Who or what killed environmental activism? According to Harrison, the activist movement that began in the early 1960s, roughly when the use ofpesticides was attacked in the book Silent Sprint succumbed to success over a period roughly covering the last 15 years. Since the first Earth Day in 1970, he argues, ecological activism has been transforming itself from a grassroots movement into dozens ofprofessionally-run, competitive, non-profit businesses, epitomized by groups like the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF).
+c. Army Surveillance of Civilian Political Activity_ 77
-Going Green says that today’s environmental groups are first and foremost business ventures run by managers. Groups like EDF are tax-exempt, customer-based firms primarily concerned with fund-raising and maintaining a respectable public image. This preoccupation with funding and respectability makes them willing to sit down with industry and cut deals in which their main concern is their own financial bottom line. In Harrisons’s words, to <em>stay in the greening business,</em> the goal of environmental groups <em>is not to green, but to ensure the werewithal that enable it to look green.</em>
+d. Federal Encouragement of Local Police Intelligence 77
-Everywhere he looks, Harrison sees the rise of pro-corporate environmentalism and the demise of grassroots eco-activism. Especially since the 1992 Earth Summit in Brazil, *corporate environmentalism is now more lively than external activist environmentalism, and this trend will continue to grow.* [On the subject of the Earth Summit, the larger green groups were cleverly coopted by according them some sort of insider status-access to the hallowed portals of power at last!-designating them as “NGOs” and allotting them a place at the conference table with the big boys. They were even allowed to stay up late! This sort of thing is the illusion of influence. A joke now doing the rounds amongst the more cynical activists in the US states that corporate boardrooms now feature nine white men, a woman (suitably power dressed, no doubt), a black person, and an environmentalist.]
+e. The Justice Department’s Interdivision Information Unit (IDIU) 78
-This opens the door to tremendous opportunities for Harrison’s corporate and government clients, whom he assists in building issue coalitions and alliances with carefully chosen environmentalists ready to reap mutual business benefits.
+f. COMINFIL Investigations: Overbreadth________ 81
-As an example, Harrison points to the partnership between McDonald’s and the Environmental Defense Fund. In the late 1980s, the company slipped into its worst sales slump ever-and the anti-McDonald’s drive of the green movement was at least partly blamed. <em>[EDF’s Executive Directer] Krupp saw the golden arches of McDonald’s, the nation’s fastfood marketing king, as a sign of opportunity...Krupp was ready to deal, and so was McDonald’s.’’</em>
+. Domestic Intelligence Authority____________________ 82
-Harrison is quite happy that the professional environmental establishment is rejecting the tactics of community organizing, street demonstrations, and noisy conflicts with industry. Ironically the unseemly confrontational tactics that the eco-professionals scorn are acknowledged by Harrison to be the main impetus for any real ecological reform.
+a. FBI Intelligence___________________________ 82
-<quote>
+b. Army Intelligence_________________________ 84
-In <em>Going Green,</em> Harrison observes that <em>Greening and the public policy impact ofgreenism are being propelled by what I refer to as the</em> ‘AMP <em>syndrome’-a synergy of Activists + Media + Politicians. Activists stir up conflict, naming ‘victims’ (various people or public sectors) and ‘villains’ (very often, business interests). The news media respond to conflict and publicize it. Politicians respond to media and issues, moving to protect ‘victims’ and punish ‘villains’ with legislative and regulatory actions.</em>
-</quote>
-Some environmentalists haven’t yet accepted the message that protest tactics are dead. In one chapter Harrison advises businesses <em>what to do when you’re attacked by an activist group.</em> He first suggests hiring a private detective to investigate the activists [Bray’s, McLibel, anyone?]-making sure, of course, not to get caught. But strategic co-optation remains his primary strategy for achieving “sustainable communications:” [What are the new Department of Transport ‘conflict resolution’ roundtables if not a device for “strategic co-optation”?]
+c. FBI Interagency Agreements_________________ 85
-<quote>
+. Domestic Covert Action__________________________ 86
-<em>Remember that your organization and the green action group are quite similar when it comes to management goals,” Harrison advises. ‘You’re both trying to create customers... the [activist] group must bepublicly observed in action, on behalf of a cause that has appeal topotential customer-publics Offer to meet with them... Your task is to try and deflate their balloon and to get direct information about what’s motivating them, how serious they are, who they are, what they will consider ‘success’...Be friendly. Politely put off giving more direct information. Offer to meet with them again. As long as you are talking, you may not befighting. [And as has been said, it is the fighting’ they really dislike— e.g. Brian Mawhinney’s plaintive requests for a ‘ceasefire’.] Maybe you can come up with multiple optionsfor mutual benefit that will satisfy their needs.</em>
-</quote>
-<em>Going Green</em> is a book that activists should read to identify and counter the sophisticated tactics of the greenwashers, and to understand industry’s co-optation of the environmental movement. As for E. Bruce Harrison, the godfather of greenwashing is “going green” all the way to the bank.
+a. COINTELPRO___________________________ 86
-The syndrome so cynically described by E. Bruce Harrison is nothing new. A strong historical parallel to it appears in John Nicholson’s book on the Gordon Riots (“The Great Liberty Riot of 1780”, Bozo Press 1985.) The following excerpt shows that the attitude of the green groups described by Harrison is but the latest manifestation of an age old process-presenting us with the cosy illusion of dissent:
+(1) Klan and “White Hate”---------------------- 86
-<quote>
+(2) “Black Nationalist” COINTELPRO. 87
-<em>[on the subject of the widespread corruption in government around 1780:] Before the administration is cast as the villain it should be realized that these cynics [those in power] were not fools. Ihey were not in the habit of’offering bribes for nothing. On the contrary, the offer was merely half the bargain. Ihese administrators were accomplices in the creation of such corruption but they were only recognizing what had become standard practice. Someone had to be open to the bribery to make such a practice into a system. Not only was it acceptable to make oneself a nuisance to provoke an offer to be bought of but some persons rivaled the administration in cynicism. A few actually made careers out of manipulating popular causes in order to sell out to the highest bidder. Ihe mostfamous example in recent times had been John Wilkes, yet he wasfar from alone. As late as .1802 Burdett would cause a stir by arousing popular hopes and then never raising the cause in Parliament.</em>
-</quote>
-These standard bearers, these power brokers, dash our hopes time and time again, as they use pressing popular concerns as a passport to membership of the elite. They are our enemies as much-perhaps more so, since they are contemptible traitors-as the authority figures that they appeal to. In the horsetrading game of politics, they have a pivotal role to play-it is their connivance that keeps the whole sorry show on the road, lending it a spurious air of credibility. Those who agree to some, without demanding it all, fritter away the possibility of real, substantive change. Or have they lost sight of the true magnitude of the ecological crisis that we face in the reams of (recycled) press releases that they put out?
+(3) “New Left” COINTELPRO__________ 88
-<quote>
+b. FBI Target Lists__________________________ 89
-<em>Those who make revolution by half, dig their own graves.</em>
-<right>
+(1) “Rabble Rouser/Agitator” Index_______ 89
-St. Just
-</right>
-</quote>
-<br>
+(2) “Key Activist” Program--------------------- 90
-** Shoreham: Live Exports and Community Defence (from issue 5)
+(3) “Key Black Extremist” Program_______ 91
-<quote>
+(4) Security Index_____________________ 91
-<em>Author’s note: Foa reasons of time, space, etc this short article cannot be a full analysis of live-exports in general or Shoreham in particular.</em> <em>Nor</em> <em>can it adequately deal with the thorny issue of ‘animal rights’.</em> The <em>focus of this article is on the reaction of the local community to l</em><em>i</em><em>v</em><em>e</em><em>-</em><em>e</em><em>x</em><em>po</em><em>rt</em><em>s and the attitude ofpoliticos in Brighton to the growing movement.</em>
-</quote>
-*** Intro
+c. Internal Revenue Service Programs------------- 93
-<quote>
+(1) Misuse by FBI and CIA__________ 93
-<em>Intense lobbying from animal welfare groups designed to discourage passengers from using ports which exported livestock, caused major ports like Dover to pull out of the live-export trade. Ihe major ports realised that if they continued live-exports (a relatively small part of their business) they wouldface losing passengers to otherferry companies who were not involved in the trade and to the newly-opened channel tunnel. By seizing the opportunity presented by an increasingly competitive passenger trade, animal welfare groups were able to bounce one port after the other into banning live-exports. The result of this was that the exporters were forced to find new ports, ones that had no significant passenger trade to speak of These new ports tended to be much smaller and were often located in the heart of closely-knit local community, particularly in the case of Brightlingsea. Spurred on by emotive videos of calves in veal crates and witnessing their suffering atfirst hand, many locals became determined to stop the trade.</em>
-</quote>
-Going down to Shoreham at the start of January was like going to a picket-line, people were sitting in the road trying to block the trucks coming in, the police were dragging people away, in short all the usual push and shove of any major public order situation. At this point it’s important to note the bitter irony that whilst residents of both Brightlingsea and Shoreham were prepared to go to huge lengths to stop the live-export trade, few lifted a finger to stop scab coal being brought in through these same ports to break the miners strike. For the first two nights Sussex police were totally humiliated, as the sheer weight of numbers of the crowd relative to the lack of police meant that they had to back the trucks up to prevent a major public order incident. On the second night the crowd ran wild with people rushing up and down ripping air lines out of the trucks and smashing headlights. One person climbed atop a truck and smashed its windscreen. Sussex police were totally powerless and were unable to control, let alone arrest, most ofthe crowd.
+(2) The Special Service Staff: IRS Targeting of Ideological Groups ____________________________ 94
-Realising they could not deal with the protests alone, on the third night they called in police from five other forces, including public order units from the 1\let. Over 1,500 police turned up. Everywhere you looked there were riot vans, parked nose to tail as far as the eye could see. Whole areas of Brighton were sealed off to allow the passage of riot vans, and huge convoys of green armoured TSG buses could be seen driving down from London on a daily basis. Not only were the Met being paid ridiculous amounts of overtime to come down and beat up the local community, but they were being put up at top-notch hotels, with five-star catering. And it wasn’t long before Shoreham protesters invaded these hotels, resulting in yet more scuffles and arrests.
+. Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Dissent________ 96
-Back at Shoreham protesters were outnumbered five to one and could only watch as the trucks went in, anyone who tried to do anything more was immediately arrested. On the third night and several others there was widespread scuffling, with people throwing bottles and repeated baton charges by riot cops. Many of the people scuffling with the cops were local residents, some of them local youths who had simply come for a ruck. Most people were masked up, including pensioners, and this was not just because it was bitterly cold. The third night set the tone for the next six months of resistance to live-exports, although after a month or so the Met were replaced and their role was taken on by a revitalised and reorganised Sussex police. Many people had thought that the nature of the policing would change when the Met left, particularly as some people in the alternative community think Brighton police are somehow progressive simply because they tolerate raves. But less naive people, particularly those who live on the estates and have seen Brighton police in action, were well aware of their public order reputation. For the next six months protests continued with crowds fluctuating from a few dozen to a thousand, but usually averaging a couple of hundred, in all weathers and at all times of the day and night. And with the continuing protests came continuing arrests, mostly under the public order act, which by the end of the trade amounted to almost 400.
+a. Origins of CIA Involvement in “Internal Se
-After the initial shock of the police invasion local residents began to organise themselves, throwing up a number of separate and often competing groups, all of them eager to represent the mass of protesters down at the dockside. Meetings were held, leaflets distributed, surveillance of the lairages and the convoys were carried out, and demonstrations and sea actions continued. Those politicos who choose to look saw the emerge of a real community of struggle, with all its attendant contradictions. The struggle against live-exports brought people in Shoreham together with the result that many residents feel ambiguous about stopping the trade, on the one hand they oppose it and want it to end, but on the other they want to continue protesting and have no desire to return to their previously atomised existence. Local residents, many of whom have never been part of any campaign, are enjoying the thrill of direct action, the satisfaction of sticking a finger up to the authorities and refusing to compromise. It is this spirit of sheer awkwardness, a refusal to give in, and a determination to continue until they get what they want that is inspiring. Also it is the way they go about getting what they want that is important. Shoreham protesters are not interested in politicians and interminable lying and stitch-ups, you only have to witness the total contempt with which Waldegrave’ s announcement on journey times was greeted.
+curity Functions”___ 96
-But on the other hand there is far too much tolerance for media celebrities like Carla Lane, local MPs like Andrew Bowden (an anti-hunting, pro-animal welfare Tory), and organisations like Compassion In World Farming (who withdrew from the demos after the clashes with the police and then threatened to grass on the protesters who fought back). However such contradictions within a campaign are part of the nature of a community struggle, in the sense that as a ‘community issue’ it includes anyone who claims to be against live-exports. The kind of community we want is not one that is defined geographically, like the Shoreham area, and thus by its nature includes local politicians, businessmen, and celebrities, but a community of struggle. The problem with the anti-live export campaign is that such a large number of people are in favour of ending live exports, they include local politicians, businessmen, and right-wing local newspapers. Even sections of the Shoreham harbour board were opposed to the trade because it was giving the port a bad name and deterring other custom. Sussex police opposed the trade because the protests were rapidly draining their budget, tying up their personnel, and losing them the support of many of their traditional supporters.
+b. CIA Intelligence About Domestic Political Groups 98
-However instead of getting involved and trying to explode the contradictions between the mass of protesters, who wanted to end live exports through the threat of public disorder, and their would-be representatives, who wanted to win media attention and parliamentary support through respectable lobbying, Brighton politicos have remained aloof. Why? The answer seems to be because the campaign concerns the dreaded issue of ‘animal fights’. If it was any other issue you wouldn’t be able to move for people trying to flog you turgid papers, stuff your hands with crappy leaflets, and demand you attended their meetings to create yet new fronts for their pathetic organisations. Whilst avoiding these things has its compensations, it is more than outweighed by the fact that the campaign lacks experienced activists.
+(1) CIA Response to FBI Requests__ 98
-Given the reputation, often undeserved, that Brighton has for being a centre ofradicalism we have to consider why its political groups proved incapable and unwilling to get involved in a struggle on their doorstep. And we have to examine whether this lack of involvement was merely peculiar to Brighton or whether it marks a more general inability to connect with struggles outside of our own particular community, whether that is the workplace (in the case of the Socialist Workers Party [SWP] and to a lesser extent Militant) or the unemployed/alternative community (in the case of Justice? and Brighton Autonomists).
+(2) Operation CHAOS 99
-The SWP have been perhaps the most disconnected of all the groups, their only practical involvement at Shoreham has been to go down to try and shift a few papers, on a more useful note they have used their union contacts to raise a modest amount of money to assist Shoreham defendants. The struggle at Shoreham like the anti-Criminal Justic Act [CJA] movement has exposed just how deeply entrapped in workerism the SWP are. By workerism I mean the idea that the workplace is the site of our power, and it is here that we should be concentrating on organising. The consequence of such an attitude is that struggles outside ofthe workplace are seen at best as secondary and subordinate to workplace struggles, and at worst are denounced as irrelevant and a distraction to the real struggle. So for example the SWP tried to connect to the anti-CJA struggle by saying the act was really all about trying to prevent picketing, presumably all the arrests of sabs and eco-waniors etc are just a smoke screen to divert us. Such workerist attitudes basically end in the demand that we get a job, join a union and go on strike.
+c. CIA Security Operations Within the United
-However for many young people who might have previously joined the SWP there is now a choice between getting involved in the anti-CJA/direct action movement which means hanging out with people of your own age, going to parties, taking drugs, living in trees, d-locking yourself to bulldozers, squatting, fighting with the cops etc or you can go to meetings about Trotsky and stand outside supermarkets trying to sell papers. Consequently it appears the SWP has suffered a drop in its youth membership, and given that students and ex-students arc its life-blood it appears to be in crisis. The only thing that is keeping it going appears to be the ANL. Given that the SWP had nothing to say about Shoreham beyond stating how ‘under socialism’ factory farming would be more efficient and animal research would be even better, and that we should all get a job and join in the ‘real struggle’, they resorted to claiming that the BNP had been down at Shoreham leafleting against live-exports. To my knowledge this is completely untrue and I have heard no mention of it. It is possible fascists have been to Shoreham, but they have not done so openly and have made no attempt to distribute their filth. And given the number of sabs and the attitude of the local residents any fascists who tried to openly organise at the demos would have been severely kicked in, not to mention the fact that the police would probably have arrested them on sight to try and avoid provoking yet more public disorder.
+States: Protecting “Sources” and “Methods”. 102
-One timber importer gets it in the neck to the tune of £800, 000 when one of its warehouses is arsoned. The protests didn’ t just hit the livestock exporters. The constant blockades meant that the other firms at Shoreham “went through the most financially damaging two months many of them have experienced” (Evening Argus, 15.3.95). Companies at Shoreham include BP, Texeco, dredging firms and timber firms. Shoreham is the second biggest importer of dead trees in the country; importing from the wildernesses of Brazil, Canada, the US, Scandinavia, and eastern Europe. It is Britain’s biggest importer of Russian woods. ARC, one of Britain’s largest quarry companies (and responsible for Whatley Q}iarry in Somerset), have lost so much trade they are considering moving. Shipping agent Jim Glover said: “Frequently you can be stranded on the port side of the police cordon in a queue of 60 vehicles waiting to get out.” HA HA HA!
+d. NSA Monitoring 104
-It is right to claim that there was a little-Englander mentality among some of the protesters, particularly at the beginning, which saw live-exports bound for veal crates as yet another example of the decadent and wicked nature of “Johnny foreigner” and as a reason why the British state should immediately withdraw from the European Union. Some Tory blue-rinse types at Shoreham did hold this view, one articulated by a Daily Express article that was photocopied and distributed by some of the more naive protesters. This article expressing outrage at French Muslims importing sheep for a religious festival simply allowed the Daily Mail to give vent to its prejudices, allowing them to attack not only French people in general but French Muslims in particular. However such attitudes among the Shoreham protesters are more than outweighed by people’s new found realisation of the nature of factory farming in Britain, and their opposition to a British veal industry.
+' 6. Intrusive Techniques______ 104
-Members of Militant have been much more directly involved in the campaign at Shoreham, but when they have done so it has not been explicitly as members of Militant. They have got involved on their own initiative, initially in the face of hostility from other members of their party, who have failed to adjust to the new realities of life outside of Labour Party subcommittees. Given their experience of canvassing and community organising, particularly in places like Pollok, Militant seem to be gearing up to take a major role in the campaign against live-exports at Dover, through their anti-CJA front the Kent Defiance Alliance.
+a. Warrantless Electronic Surveillance---------------- 105
-Whilst the trots have been unable to connect to Shoreham, because it isn’t a workplace struggle, other groups like Brighton’s anti-CJA organisation Justice? have failed to get involved in any meaningful sense. Justice? did go to Shoreham, en-masse on a couple of occasions, but the novelty soon wore off. Even though ten percent or more of its active members have been arrested at Shoreham, there has been little collective involvement beyond some office support for the defendants and regular Schnews coverage of protests. Given that Justice? was and probably still is the largest and most active of the anti-CJA organisations, its failure to break out of the alternative ghetto and connect with a real community struggle is disturbing. Justice’s lack of collective involvement is attributable to all the usual reasons, e.g. the fact that most of the organisational work is done by a few very over-worked people, that it was busy organising squats in Brighton, and that many people were off doing direct action at places as far apart as Pollok, Solsbury Hill, and even Berlin!
+(1) Executive Branch Restrictions on Electronic Surveillance: 1965-68... 105
-But its lack of involvement can’t simply be reduced to this, it’s more the case that the anti-live-export campaign was never seen as a priority for Justice?. This was partly because the police have not used the C.JA on a large scale at Shoreham. Only two people have been charged with aggravated trespass and both charges were thrown out of court. Also .Justice?‘s disconnection from Shoreham reflects the fact that most of the sabs in the Brighton area have chosen not to get involved in Justice?, and most members of.Justice? are not interested in sabbing. In the absence of a large sab presence within Justice?, pushing the organisation to get actively involved in the anti-live-export 56 campaign, Shoreham was always going to remain a side-issue. More importantly, Justice’s failure to connect with a real community struggle was mainly due to the fact that most of its members see themselves as part of an alternative community of young unemployed, one which is ill at ease with a community struggle made up of so called ordinary people, many of whom are middle aged and have jobs.
+(2) Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968. 106
-Most disturbing was the predictable failure of Brighton Autonomists to get involved in the struggle at Shoreham, beyond supporting individual defendants. As the most together political group in the Brighton area, comprising an assortment of anarchists and communists, it has been able to avoid both the pitfalls of workerism and the isolation of the alternative ghetto. And significantly it is well aware of the importance of community organisation given its involvement in the anti poll-tax campaign. The reason it has refused to get involved at Shoreham is simply because it sees it as merely an animal rights issue. As a group it is opposed to both the ideology and practice of the animal rights movement. The leading members of Brighton Autonomists are representative of the mid 80’s split in the anarcho movement between class struggle anarchists and animal rights activists. Indeed they were actively involved in this acrimonious rupture and its personal recriminations still haven’t been forgotten by either side. If the struggle at Shoreham was about any other issue all the members of Brighton Autonomists would be actively involved.
+(3) Supreme Court Restrictions on National Security Electronic Surveillance: 1972_____________________ 107
-For Brighton Autonomists animal rights is seen as a liberal side issue with no potential for connecting to anything else. Some of their criticisms are valid. Unlike our fellow humans they can’t organise themselves or make their own demands. We can’t have relations of solidarity with animals, because they can’t struggle. We can only have relations of sympathy with them, projecting our own feelings of alienation and powerlessness onto dewy eyed calves as symbols ofpurity and innocence in a world out of our control. But it has to be said that the fact that people are moved to confront the state by the suffering of animals at least gives us hope that people are not completely alienated.
+b. CIA Mail Opening_______________________ 107
-Also Brighton Autonomists’ criticism of the obsessive insularity of many people in the animal rights ghetto strikes a cord with anyone who has spent time in Brighton. But at the very moment when the anti live-export campaign is involving local communities in daily confrontation with the state, groups like Brighton Autonomists can only sit on the sidelines and worry about the expansion of the animal rights movement.
+c. Expansion of NSA Monitoring______________ 108
-*** Conclusion
+d. FBI Cutbacks___________________________ 109
-<quote>
+(1) The Long Subcommittee Investigation_ 109
-Over the <em>last six months we’ve seen a local community coming together and using direct action to oppose live-exports. Residents have quickly learnt that direct action means con.fronting the police, which means risking arrest and should mean supporting those who have been arrested. Local people have faced down and humiliated Sussex police, ivho were forced to call in the Met and otherforces to put down the protests. Despite having their area invaded by over a thousandpolice and almost.four hundred people arrested, local residents have refused to be intimidated. Most importantly Shoreham residents have won, the exporters have pulled out because Sussex police could only afford to escort convoys two days a week, and this didn’t allow the traders to make a profit. Not only has the public order operation almost bankrupted Sussex police, but it has earned them the undying hatred of the most active Protesters. People who previously supported the police now treat them with contempt.</em>
-<em>Some protesters are now making connections between their struggles and those of other working class communities. I’ve heard middle aged protesters taunt the police about the Brad.ford riots. I’ve seen previously respectable Shoreham ladies holding a police doll, voodoo style, engaged in a heated argument about which coppers need pins sticking in them. And at a meeting, after the end of shipments from Shoreham, 700 local residents cheered when one of the speakers tentatively pointed out that the police were agents of the state whose role was to protect politicians and the rich. This was followed by proposals for Waldegrave to do a sponsored parachute jump with only an empty rucksack.</em>
+(2) Director Hoover’s Restrictions________ 110
-<em>Furthermore many protesters don’t see the stopping of live-exports .from Shoreham as the end, they see it as an opportunity to</em> get involved in other struggles either at Dover or against the local Shamrock monkey farm. Many people are enjoying the feeling of solidarity that comes from standing together against the state and have no wish to return to their previous existence. For many the campaign against live-exports is the best thing that ever happened to them. It is up to local activists, who have been involved at Shoreham, to show these people that they can use the same tactics in other situations. As eco-activists when we talk about ‘community support’ we normally mean a few people bringing us cups of tea. Imagine what effect three hundred local residents who were <em>prepared to disrupt road-construction on a daily basis would have.</em>
+. Accountability and Control_______________________ 111
-<right>
+a. The Huston Plan: A Domestic Intelligence Network 111
-Animal Antics
-</right>
-</quote>
-<quote>
+(1) Intelligence Community Pressures_____ 112
-In Ceres, California, a gopher was found on school grounds by a student, who turned it over to three school janitors. The janitors attempted to kill the gopher by freezing it to death with the spray from several cans of a freezing solvent used to clean floors. After the attempted extermination, one of the janitors tried to light a cigarette, which ignited the solvent and blew the janitors out of the utility room. Nineteen people were injured by the explosion. The gopher survived, and was later released to a field.
-<right>
+(2) The Interagency Committee Report.. 113
-<em>--EF! Journal,</em> Brigid 1996 <em>from DoD #6</em>
-</right>
-</quote>
+(3) Implementation___________________ 115
 <br>
-** No Opencast! (from issue 7)
+II. THE GROWTH OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE—Continued
-No Opencast is a campaign run by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and supported by Women Against Pit Closures and members of the Miners Support Groups. Since early 1995 there has been an informal co-operation between the No Opencast campaign and Earth First!ers. This has culminated, so far, in the action in Derbyshire on Friday 31<sup>st</sup> October 1997. On this action an opencast site, owned by HJ Banks mining company, was visited early in the morning by around 250 activists. Within two hours the mine was put out of operation, with estimates of the damage caused ranging from £375,000 to £4 million. This article attempts to give some background information to this campaign and action but also raises some questions and possible contradictions about its history and aims.
+D. Intelligence and Domestic Dissent: 1964-1976—Continued
-Opencast mining (or strip mining as it is also known) is one of the most ecologically destructive mining methods in use today. To gain access to the raw material wanted it involves the excavation, removal and irreparable destruction of huge quantities of the surface eco-system and the earth below it. Local people have to endure noise, vibration and severe dust pollution. Villages are torn apart by heavy trucks and evidence is growing to show the link between the pollution caused by opencast mining and the incidence of respiratory diseases in children. When the mine is exhausted and the operators have made off with their profits, the problems for the people that live near the site persist. Although the process is the same for whatever is being mined, this article is specifically referring to the issues surrounding opencasting mining for coal here in the UK.
+. Accountability and Control—Continued <sup>Pu</sup>^<sup>e</sup>
-*** Recent History
+b. Political Intelligence_____________________ 116
-Opencast mining has undergone a massive expansion in recent years, yet this has nothing to do with any particular energy policy pushed by the government. It has far more to do with a political vendetta by the State to smash the militant resistance to exploitation shown by mining communities over the years.
+(1) Name Check Requests______________ 116
-In 1972 and 1974 the miners went on strike to protest against the government’s policy of drastic cuts in public sector workers’ pay. In 1972 the State was unprepared; coal stocks were low and this caused an energy crisis resulting in extensive power cuts. In 1974 the then Prime Minister decided to call a snap general election under the slogan: ‘Who rules the country-the miners or the government?’ He lost and was bundled out of power.
+(2) Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, 1964 117
-Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979, nursing a desire for revenge against the miners. She bided her time and by 1984 was ready. Coal stocks were high and she set out to provoke the miners’ unions into strike action in the spring when energy demand was lower. A programme of deep shaft mine closures was announced. The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) predicted that if it went ahead more would follow and the industry would be decimated. They went on strike-not just to protect their jobs, but also their communities and their way of life. What transpired was a year long strike, one of the hardest fought and bitterest in this country’s history.[7] It eventually ended in defeat for the miners and a further round of pit closures ensued.
+(3) By-Product of Foreign Intelligence Coverage 119
-By 1992 the coal industry in this country was down to a fraction of its former size and only the most modern and productive pits had survived. Michael Heseltine, the then President of the Board of Trade, announced the closure of a further 31 pits. The pretext for this was that there was no longer a market for British coal-yet the real reason was to pave the way for the casualisation of labour and the privatisation of the coal industry by destroying any last vestiges of resistance from the miners. Hand in hand with this closing of the deep shaft mines came the expansion of the opencast coal mining industry with its smaller casual workforce that is easier to exploit without organised resistance.
+(4) The Surveillance of Joseph Kraft (1969) 121
-It is these very towns and villages that bore the brunt of the 1984/5 strike which, having had their communities and future weakened-and in some cases destroyed, are now under attack from destructive opencast sites.
+(5) The “17” Wiretaps________________ 122
-*** Opposition to Opencast Grows
+c. The Justice Department’s Internal Security Division 1_ 122
-Opencast mining, as mentioned earlier, is notorious for its air, noise and water pollution and increasingly is being linked with respiratory problems. The main focus, so far, for local opposition groups fighting opencast mining have been these health issues and most planning applications have been fought on this aspect of opencast alone.
+(1) The “new” Internal Security Division- 123
-Since 1995, however, EF!ers have been addressing the wider ecological effects of opencasting. One of the first groups to do this-Leeds EF!-took action in early 1995 targeting an opencast site in Yorkshire, and at about the same time Welsh activists were setting up camps at Selar and Brynhenllys sites near Swansea.[8] Ihese actions, amongst others, led to an increasing alliance between EF!ers and the No Opencast campaign-which raises some questions I will attempt to address later.
+(2) The Sullivan-Mardian Relationship.. 124
-*** Smash the (E)state!
+d. The FBI’s Secret “Administrative Index”______ 125
-On 5<sup>th</sup> January 1997 a group of around a hundred anti-opencast campaigners descended on Chatsworth House in Derbyshire, the ancestral home of the Duke of Devonshire. The Duke owns huge swathes of Derbyshire and allows developers to opencast large areas of it--although not near Chatsworth of course!
+. Reconsideration of FBI Authority 127
-A sound system played loud recordings of noise from an opencast site so that the people who are routinely subjected to it could give him a feeling of what it was like. Three people got inside his house and waved flags from the windows whilst others held banners outside. The Duke’s right hand man mingled with the activists handing out press statements and saying that the Duke would be out in a minute. His peace offering of warm soup was turned over on the ground and after much venom flying in his direction he eventually retreated behind his wrought iron gates for protection.
+a. Developments in 1972-1974________________ 128
-Scotland, too, increasingly was being ripped up for opencasting, as many at last year’s EF! Gathering near Glasgow witnessed first hand. However, due to the fact that all the villages affected were small, and the rural population distribution was fragmented, the opposition mounted was fairly ineffective.
+b. Recent Domestic Intelligence Authority_______ 131
-The No Opencast campaign was getting increasingly frustrated by the loaded planning process and the blatant attempts to destroy mining communities and decided to take more radical action. This led to a series ofjoint actions with Earth First!ers-the first of which was the initial visit to Heseltine’s garden. (See box- ‘Heselmine PLC!’) After this the No Opencast campaign and EF!ers started to work closely together.
+. FINDINGS__________________________ 137
-As well as this the widespread opposition against opencasting across most of the country lead to, amongst other things, Friends of the Earth (FoE) organising a conference of anti-opencast campaigners in early 1996. It was attended by local opposition groups and led to the creation of an English and Welsh network, administered by FoE[9] and now comprising over 120 anti-opencast groups. (There is a separate Scottish network managed by the Scottish Opencast Action Group (SOAG)).
+A. Major Finding: Violating and Ignoring the Law------------------- 137
-[7] To give some indication of this look at the arrest statistics for this strike. They included: 4089 for conduct likely to cause a breach of the peace, 1682 for obstruction of the police, 640 for obstruction of the highway, 1015 for criminal damage. 359 for assault on the police, 137 for riot and 509 for unlawfol assembly. (All from ‘Miners Strike 1984–1985. People versus State.’ by David Reed and Olivia Adamson. (Larkin: London 1985.)) The strike also provided the final fine tuning of the police into the paramilitary force that they are today. For more details on this read: ‘State of Siege: Politics and Policing in the Coalfields-Miners’ Strike 1984’ by Jim Coulter, Susan Miller and Martin Walker. (Canary Press: London 1984.)
+Subfindings:
-[8] For an account of resistance to opencasting in Wales see ‘Autonomy, Resistance and Mediation. The dynamics of Reclaim the Valleys!’ on page 74 in DoD No.6.
+(a) Violating Statutory Law and Constitutional Rights 139
-[9] More specifically it is co-ordinated by Tim Sander of Chesterfield FoE. Tim is now being sued by John Wilson of Fitzwise Ltd., a notorious opencast company. Wilson alleges that in November 1995 Tim produced an agenda for a public meeting libelling him as a hypocrite for moving house in anticipation of an opencast mine being opened nearby. Tim denies the libel, refuses to apologise, and is contesting the case. There is no legal aid for libel cases anti so Tim is representing himself Tis is clearly an attempt to squash resistance to opencasting and to act as a warning to others. Messages of support and donations for legal costs to: Tim Sander c/o Friends of the Earth, 26–28 Underwood Street. London. Nl 7JQ, UK. Telephone: 0171 490 1555.
+(b) Ignoring Illegal Issues______________________ 140
-*** Reports and Thoughts on the Action in Derbyshire
+(c) Continuing Legal Activities----------------------------- 141
-What follows are three accounts of, and some opinions on, the No Opencast action in Derbyshire on Friday 31<sup>st</sup> October 1997 all written by activists who were there. As well as this there is a short piece on some possible contradictions and problems with the nature of the alliance between radical ecologists and the No Opencast campaign.
+(d) Tightening Security for Illegal Activities------------- 146
-**** “All this lurking about in the dark inspired a lot of giggling.”
+(e) Concealing Illegal Activities_________________ 149
-We met in a squat in London and there were maybe 60 people or so. The idea was that we would hide out there, leave in the middle of the night and arrive at the opencast site in Derbyshire at 5 or 6 in the morning. The time until then was to be well spent in planning our actions.
+(f) Weakness of Internal Inspection_______________ 152
-We were given briefing sheets, explaining what we were going to do. These were counted out and counted back in again and then burnt before we left the building. No one was supposed to go in or out of the building until we all left together. I was posted on guard duty to make sure no one got out. All very Mission: Impossible! Meanwhile, with the aid of some big bits of paper on the floor and marker pens, everyone crowding around was given some idea of the layout of the site and what targets we should head for when we were in.
+(g) Weakness of Oversight by Senior Administration Officials 157
-This action appears to have been one of the few occasions when all the rhetoric about how affinity groups are the way forward constantly spouted by EF!ers in this country actually seemed to materialise into something. We split up into affinity groups to go off and decide in private what we were each individually up for-running about, trashing stuff, occupying machinery etc. and what we wanted to head for-machinery, vehicles, offices etc. You have to come equipped if you’re going to be sabotaging things and as none of my spectacularly well-prepared group had brought anything or thought about it at all we decided we weren’t going to be monkeywrenching.
+III. FINDINGS—Continued: '<sup>P8ge</sup>
-However, some people in my group did have a clever plan which could be more widely adopted. They were dressed head-to-toe in standard activist colours (green and black is the new green and black dahling!) with hooded tops and combat boots etc.. Yet underneath this regulation anarcho-garb they were wearing rainbow-coloured hippy jumpers. Thus they could cunningly evade police surveillance and confuse police stereotypes.
+F. Major Finding: Inadequate Controls on Dissemination and Retention 253
-We had a big school-trip type coach to take us to the site, so we all piled on-the tough kids grabbing the back seat and the swots sitting up front in time-honoured fashion. As we hit the motorway we were informed that all mobile phones had to wrapped in the silver foil that was being passed around to prevent them being used to track our progress by the police. The whole planning of the action operated on roughly this level of paranoia.
+Subfindings:
-**** Over the top? Well, maybe...
+(a) Volunteering Irrelevant Information and responding Unquestioningly to Requests--------------------------------------------------------------- 254
-We were woken up 5 or 10 minutes before arrival with chocolate and whiskey which made us all feel a lot better about being in the middle of nowhere at 6 in the morning. As per usual prior to an action I was all nerves and butterflies in the stomach. I’ve never been able to account for this, as when the action starts I’m relatively calm and in control. We all piled out of the coach and attempted to keep quiet and hid behind a hedge that ran along the side of the road. It was cold and dark but dawn was just breaking.
+(b) Excessive Dissemination____________________ 259
-Because of the military precision of the timing we had to hide behind the hedge for about 5 minutes until exactly the time set for us to go over the top into the site. People from other towns and areas would be entering the site from different directions at 1 minute intervals to meet up with our London crew. All this lurking about in the dark inspired a lot of giggling that did not sit well with the highly organised timing and precision. This wasn’t helped by the fact that we had to keep our heads down below the hedge every time a car came past-the bobbing up and down only produced more giggling and noisy shushing and more giggling.
+(c) Federal Employee Security Program------------------ 261
-We all poured over the flimsy barbed wire fence and up the steep embankment that marked the perimeter of the opencast site. Getting to the top of the slope was rather an anticlimax--there was just a big deserted site on the other side. We stopped running and sort of ambled in a big straggly group-all semblance of military order now gone. We weren’t really sure which direction to go so we all just followed the crowd. “Baaaa!” shouted some wit from the rear.
+(d) FBI Retention of Sensitive, Derogatory, and
-The whole action had this weird character-we encountered no resistance which gave the whole thing rather an odd dynamic. It’s like the two sides define each other by opposition-take away our opposition and it all felt rather formless. As often is the case when we are successful we become victims of our own success and don’t know what to do with the totally unexpected situation of actually outwitting the cops and not being faced with a set-piece everyone-knows-their-role cops vs. activists confrontation. With no antagonism, no adrenaline rush of confrontation, there is no opposition to give us a focus. There was no such focus here, so we just sort of ambled about. Our affinity group sort of fell apart as one guy said he’d catch us up as he just had to go off and chat to a friend. It was good the way the whole event was a chance to catch up with old friends from the other end of the country; faces remembered from past actions and evictions, but it did mean the planned organisation of people into affinity groups kind of fell apart.
+Illegally Obtained Information______________ 262
-A van with headlights full on was driving around the site and seemed to have seen us but drove off in a different direction. There was an initial impulse to hide from them but we quickly realised this was pretty pointless-if they didn’t know we were here yet they soon would do. The few mine workers or security who were on site basically stayed out of our way in their little portacabin things throughout the action.
+G. Major Finding: Deficiencies in Control and Accountability-- 265 Subfindings:
-My affinity group/bunch of useless mates (ho ho only joking) soon spotted a great big digging thing on the edge of a rather large hole which we quickly climbed all over. On the top of the pneumatic arm thing we got a great view of the whole site and also got covered in great globs of disgusting grease. From our vantage point we could see other groups arriving from every side of the site. One bunch marched below us led by a bloke in a silly wizard’s hat and a drum. “That’s Manchester” someone said. We exchanged a few yips and whistles and clenched-fist salutes with them and saw another bunch arriving a bit further around the perimeter of the site. This lot looked like locals/ex-miners, and they climbed all over some digging things.
+(a) Presidential Failure to Limit and Control Intelligence Activities 267
-We sang revolutionary songs and posed on the top of the digging arm doing clenched-fist salutes for the locals/ex-miners’ cameras (which in retrospect was probably not very smart thing to do-even though we were all de rigeur masked-up). From our vantage point we could see various bits of machinery—diggers, huge trucks etc. around the site from which banging, crashing sounds were emanating. Soon I was told we had to vacate our adopted digger because some people had come to trash it.
+(b) Attorneys General Failure to Limit and Control FBI Intelligence Activities 270
-This kind of set the tone for the whole action-I had gone along with our affinity group decision just to occupy the site and not to trash anything, but now it seemed the only thing to do was trash things. The only things in an opencast mine are trucks, diggers, big bits of machinery etc. It is very unwise to be sitting on a piece of machinery that has been sabotaged when the police arrive. Its kind of like asking for it. So seeing as pretty much every piece of machinery in the place was damaged in some way within half an hour of arrival I felt pretty redundant
+(c) Encouraging Political Intelligence--------------------- 274
-Almost as soon as we were into the site people were saying: there’s nothing to do now-everything’s been trashed, we might as well leave. Which was kind of odd and disempowering. The attitude of the ‘ego-warrior’ that if you can’t climb a tree then there’s no point in you being here and there’s nothing you can do <em>except make the tea</em> has been recognised as an actual and potential problem in our movement. The opencast action did to an extent suffer from the same division oflabour-ifyou weren’t prepared enough (or knowledgeable enough) to trash machinery then you could end up feeling pretty superfluous. Was this just another example of the production of a hierarchical division between the full-on activists and the ‘ground support’? What’s the point of a mass action if it’s all over so quickly and there is nothing for the mass of people to do?
+(d) Executive Failures to Inquire_________________ 275
-l got the impression that people were getting more bold as dawn broke, the sun rose and there were still no police or security. It felt like we were a bunch of kids who had been left completely unsupervised at playtime. I think there is some similarity here with the Newbury Reunion Rampage of January 1997 when equipment was torched that had earlier been sabbed. I think this shows an escalating threshold of confidence in what people think they can get away with. It was a similar thing here-various bits of kit had some initial damage done to them, i.e. slashing or letting down the tires which was then ‘improved’ on by people going round an hour or so later making sure the job was done more thoroughly. These have been nick-named quality control teams--people were going around asking has that been done?, and then checking to make sure it had been done properly.
+(e) Congressional Failure to Oversee Intelligence Activity and Exert Legislative Control--------------- 277
-Most damage was fairly invisible, not like the spectacular fres at the Reunion Rampage. Fire looks really cool, but we had been informed in no uncertain terms at the pre-meeting that fire in a coal mine was a not a very good idea. The main visible damage I saw was some very obvious smashing of windows. It felt very odd seeing such highly illegal nightwork being carried out in the light ofday, as the early morning sun was rising and the mist still clung to the damp grass-bizarre and exhilarating.
+(f) Intelligence Agencies Act with Insufficient Authorization 281
-After everyone had explored a. bit, chatted to friends new or old and most stuff had been disabled in at least some form, people began to congregate at a point where an access road to the mine workings cut between two very steep slopes or semicliffs. Perched on top of one of these was one of the mobile lighting rigs used to illuminate the mine workings at night. It was just too inviting. Pretty soon a group of 20 or 30 of us were trying our damnedest to push it over the edge. Although our efforts were fairly feeble (it’s not as easy as you think, pushing a lighting rig down a hill!) and the end result was something less than the spectacular crash we had hoped for, this was an example of collective action somewhat different to the sabbing of diggers etc. that had been going on earlier. That seemed to rely on a division between those with the specialised skills, tools and confidence to take it on, and those who lacked these things, whereas here anyone could get involved with the already existing mass of people attempting to heave the lighting thing off the cliff. It was the sort of damage that could only be carried out by a mass of people. It was much more inclusive.
+(g) Termination of Abusive Operations____________ 284
-However despite this most people didn’t join in but stood around as spectators to our efforts (some with cameras!) Maybe they couldn’t see us or didn’t realise we could do with some help. Even on an action it takes time to break out of everyday passivity and become an active collectivity. e.g: at the Newbury protests in early 1996 there were examples of whole groups of people standing around watching others being arrested and not diving in and attempting to de-arrest them. Even . on an action, feelings of powerlessness can overwhelm you or you can fall into regarding the actions of others as a spectacle (even in the case of the most radical actions)-this is where any ‘division of labour’ into ‘climbers’ and ‘ground support’ or ‘saboteurs’ and ‘ordinary protesters’ can be a real liability and where confrontation can help-it focuses us as an antagonistic mass-unifies our purpose. I know. I’ve felt both things myself-quite often at Newbury I felt like a powerless spectator to a drama of security guards and tree-house dwellers carried out before a backdrop of crashing trees. Likewise I have on occasion felt myself as part of a powerful united mass with a common purpose-usually in opposition to a common enemy-almost always the police.
+IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS------------------------------ 289
-Of course the main feeling on actions is just weirdness, any action that is half-way successful is just not like ordinary life. You can tell a really bad demo because it is just like ordinary life-there is no question of rupture in the seamless banality of the everyday.
+A. Conclusions 289
-Normally if you were merely physically obstructing the site, the strategy would be to stay as long as possible. Here, staying on the site any longer than absolutely necessary would have been foolish-just asking to be carted off (like at the Whatley ilirnrry national action of December ’95). We were faced with a dilemma-stay and fuck things up more since we had the chance and risk getting caught, or scarper while the going was good? The general feeling seemed to be that we should all leave en masse now that the job had been done. Wejust walked past the two or three cops at the front gate. We had trashed an entire opencast site right under their noses and they were powerless to stop us. It felt good seeing the cops so powerless. We must have looked so smug-no wonder they arrested everyone later in the day at the office occupation.
+B. Principles Applied in Framing Recommendations and the
-We had a big circle meeting just outside the gate to the site and decided to split up-some people went to leaflet the local town, some went to the offices of the opencast company and the rest of us went to the local cafe and were shocked to find we had just trashed an entire opencast mine to the tune of hundreds of thousands or possibly even millions of pounds and had finished the job in time for breakfast. Qyickest action I’ve ever been on.
+Scope of Recommendations___________________________ 292
-This action shows we can pull off big actions with enough planning and organisation. Since Whatley in December ’95, and excluding the semi-spontaneous pyromania of the Reunion Rampage, there has been rather a record of failure with big national EF! actions, for example-the Sea Empress anniversary action at Milford Haven in February ’97, the abortive action at Shoreham harbour in May ’97. Superior planning and organisation plus the handy expedient of not telling them beforehand where we were going allowed us on this occasion to totally outwit them. The police can’t act spontaneously and are very bad at responding if you catch them by surprise; it is here that our advantage lies, and when we do successfully surprise them we can get away with an incredible amount.
+C. Recommendations____________________________________ 296
-We need to make links, build numbers and have more big mass actions that are inclusive of people from outside the activist community. Leafleting the local area and talking to local people was a most valuable and decidedly unsexy job that needed to be done and I am ashamed to an extent that I did not join the leafleting-the-village posse.
+. Intelligence Agencies Are Subject to the Rule of Law (Recommendations 1-3) 296
-One big fried breakfast later and everyone seemed to have split up-lots of people had gone to the pub I think, but we couldn’t find which one, so school-trip over, we lazed about in the sun waiting for the coach to take us home. We got talking to a bunch of local kids (quite possibly the kids of local ex-miners) who told us they regularly broke into the site and nicked and damaged things! A fitting end to our childlike playtime of unsupervised sabotage-there was mutual respect between rebellious kids of all ages.
+. United States Foreign and Military Agencies Should Be Precluded From Domestic Security Activities (Recommendations 4-27)---------- 297
-**** “A smashing good time!”
+a. Central Intelligence Agency (Recommendations 4-13) . 297
-Around 200 activists arrived by three different routes at the opencast mine at Tibshelf: Derbyshire at approximately 6.15am. The site was completely undefended and the activists were immediately confronted with diggers and six CAT dumpers lined up. At first people sat on the diggers, but it became increasingly obvious that there was no-one to obstruct. Two security guards in a landy approached the diggers, sized up the number of activists and then buggered off again.
+b. National Security Agency (Recommendations 14-19) 308
-What followed was systematic actions of revenge for earth-rape-the like of which I haven’t seen for a while. The six superdumpers, four or five standard CAT diggers. one super-duper digger (I don’t know the makes!) and at least four lighting rigs were trashed before the activists had even recced the entire site. Not content with only superficial damage ‘quality control’ teams were doing the rounds of the site putting the finishing touches to any of the machinery! Near the northern entrance of the site more plant was attacked, and when finally confronted with a police presence (all six/seven of them) a digger had its hydraulics trashed in front of them by a mainly-masked up crowd!
+c. Military Service and Defense Department Investigative Agencies (Recommendations 20-26)______________ 310
-Probably the best lessons of the action were the surprise factor gained by the frankly paranoid organisation of the action (e.g. meeting at one place, revelation of the target site at the last moment and in person) and the fact that at last the majority of people on site were masked-up or at least attempted some form of disguise. The action was euphoric and good-natured (with the possible exception of Mrs. Scargill) with the workers waved at rather than intimidated. Damage estimates have been suggested at around £4m-all in all an incredible start to a week of Earth Nights!
+. Non-Intelligence Agencies Should Be Barred From Domestic Security Activity (Recommendations 27-37)_________________ ---- 313
-**** “What were the aims of the action?”
+a. Internal Revenue Service (Recommendations 27-35) 313
-We have a strange history. Largely a series of victorious defeats which may have muddied the water when it comes to assessing levels of success and failure. The No Opencast action on Friday 31<sup>st</sup> October was very well organised and certainly no failure, but I find it difficult to go along fully with the celebrations of its success. For me the action raised a number of difficult questions about our strategy and direction. And it left me with a gnawing feeling that when the £ signs light up on the criminal damage register our critical attitude goes to the wind.
+b. Post Office (U.S. Postal Service) (Recommendations 36-37) 315
-So, what were the aims of our action? To inflict the maximum financial damage on HJ Banks? To create an interface, an active living point of contact between the No Opencast campaign, the local population, other interested angered people and the workforce? To build the campaign, catalyse further actions and help it gain strength? To generate a feeling ofempowerment and collectivity within the movement?
+. Federal Domestic Security Activities Should Be Limited and Controlled to Prevent Abuses Without Hampering Criminal Investigations or Investigations of Foreign Espionage (Recommendations 38-69)_________ 316
-This action mainly achieved the first and fourth objectives. However, I would argue in this instance that on this particular day the first objective was the least important. Let’s face it, in anything other than exceptional circumstances a one day action will not bring a company to its knees. But because we privileged this course of action we could never get to grips with any wider objectives.
+a. Centralize Supervision, Investigative Responsibility, and the Use of Covert Techniques (Recommendations 38-39)----------- 316
-My main criticism is that while a small group of committed activists succeeded in bringing the site to a halt it was done in way that made involving others very difficult. Sure, I helped hand out leaflets in the local town, Tibshelf, but that was after the action had occurred. All that people could do then was join a small group standing round the entrance gates of a site that wasn’t working. Of course, it’s a good thing it wasn’t working, but if it hadn’t been working because we were in occupation. people could have come and been part of an active crowd stopping the work. Presumably the campaign against opencast mines will only grow if it can somehow engage people. Some may argue that mobilising support occurs before the event as part of the networking process, but surely the revolutionary potential of direct action can only be realised when people see it as something that they can get involved with; when it creates circumstances which can catalyse farther acts of subversion.
+b. Prohibitions (Recommendations 40-41)------------ 317
-Was the action empowering? People certainly felt empowered, but still, questions remain. Individual feelings of empowerment may or may not be connected to whether we are being successful on a much wider level. A mass action is surely at it’s best when through our collective power we achieve things that would have been difficult or impossible for a smaller group to do. Sometimes of course it’s just better to have shit loads of people.
+c. Authorized Scope of Domestic Security In
-You only need one person to occupy a crane but with 30 it just feels so much better. In an ongoing campaign where the sites are well secured it may only be possible to damage machinery with a crowd for cover. On the day of the opencast action, as far as I’m aware we didn’t do much that five people with a spare night and some aluminium oxide couldn’t have done.
+vestigations (Recommendations 42-49)---------- 318
-In practical terms what I’m suggesting is that some of us should have occupied the machinery for the day while others went round the area trying to get people involved in the occupation. People may think that would have been a waste of time when we could effectively stop work through criminal damage without the effort of an occupation and if financial damage were our prime objective this would be true. If it was just one of a number of objectives then some kind of occupation makes more sense. As it was, the action took place in a vacuum in which there was little opportunity for it to go beyond itself. Also, (and this is easy to suggest in retrospect) couldn’t we have occupied a much larger site, a site where the numbers we had would have actually counted?
+d. Authorized Investigative Techniques (Recommendations 50-63) 324
-Given the absence of mainstream media interest, and the very real problems of dealing with a capitalist media, it seems even more crucial to look at how our activities actually communicate their message. For me the best media is the action itself and the build up to it. Knocking on doors, handing out leaflets, stalls, flyposting etc. Actions bring these activities to life, but only actions where there is a real presence. Sometimes it feels as if we are becoming some Bakuninist revolutionary cadre who believe change will come through our actions alone.
+e. Maintenance and Dissemination of Information (Recommendations 64-68) 330
-Although the damage on the day seemed opportunistic rather than planned it may still be worth reflecting on how we situate this activity. Criminal damage is not necessarily a good or bad thing (although it’s difficult to see what could be bad about a profound dislike of private property). It’s a tactic, and the context in which it is used gives the act its meaning and value. Like violence or non-violence it can become ideological, i.e.: be given a value outside its tactical importance, a value in itself. One of the problems with criminal damage is that it feels so damn good. More real perhaps than other methods. For an activist it can become a kind of identity-forming ritual in the same way that happens with the martyrdom of non-violence or the revolutionary heroism of violence. This is not to suggest we should be striving for some neutral tactics which we then apply coldly to our strategy. Obviously methods create and incur meanings. It’s really just to say that we should be wary of privileging a method over it’s context.
+f. Attorney General Oversight of the FBI, Including Termination of Investigations and Covert Techniques (Recommendation 69)-- 332
-One last question-was it necessary for this action to be secret? If it had been open there would have been more opportunity to involve people from the surrounding area, and-in all likelihood-have a bigger overall turnout. Given the nature of an opencast site it would be very difficult for the police to stop a determined crowd from carrying out an occupation. And on the other hand if somehow they managed to stop us, forcing a gigantic police mobilisation on behalf of opencasting might itself be a kind of success. Sometimes, a more open approach may help develop a larger and more political crowd and in consequence force up the political cost of countering our actions.
+IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS—Continued <sup>Pa</sup>s<sup>e</sup>
-**** “Re-open the deep mines? Over my dead body!”
+C. Recommendations—Continued
-The action in October 1997 at Dole Hill Opencast site sparked off some thought on the collaboration between radical eeologists and the No Opencast campaign and this particular alignment raises interesting questions about the nature of forming alliances with other groups engaged in struggle. There seems to be two areas that are potentially problematic with this particular coalition. These are; firstly the nature of a driving force behind the campaign: the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), and then secondly the stated aims of the No Opencast campaign itself.
+. The Responsibility and Authority of the Attorney General for Oversight for Federal Domestic Security Activities must be clarified and General Counsel and Inspectors General of Intelligence Agencies Strengthened (Recommendations 70-86)__________________________________ 332
-Although the NUM is radical in appearance, in reality just like all the other unions-a reformist and bureaucratic organisation. This can be seen, not just from a purely theoretical standpoint, but by it’s actual behaviour in times of heightened struggle.[10]
+a. Attorney General Responsibility and Rela- ship With Other Intelligence Agencies (Recommendations 70-74)---------- 333
-The traditional leftists view of unions is as workers’ selfdefence organisations, there to fight for the needs of the workers themselves. Yet, if we look though history, we see there is far more to unions than this.[11] What then do they do if not the above?
+b. General Counsel and Inspectors General of Intelligence Agencies (Recommendations 75-81)______________ 333
-The answer is that they negotiate with the bosses-they negotiate the going rate for the exploitation of the workers and thus act as a ‘manager’ for the needs of capital. Unions play out a particular role in this society and this is summed up by Lord Balfour when he said; Trade Union organisation was the only thing between us and anarchy.[12] The accusation has also been made that the NUM and the No Opencast campaign have latched onto the ecological direct action movement in order to advance their inherently reformist and unecological aims of re-opening the deep shaft mines. Is this true-are we being used as ‘cannon fodder’ for these aims-or are we using them to forward our aims of shutting down all opencast sites without re-opening the deep mines?
+c. Office of Professional Responsibility (Recommendation 82) 335
-Whilst I stand with the miners in supporting their struggle to defend their communities there are limits. This is especially true when the publicity put out by the campaign about actions I am on is something I fundamentally disagree with. i.e: Re-open the deep shaft mines![13] There are potential problems with workers run industries-evidenced by the fact that Tower Hill Colliery, a mine that was threatened with closure and then bought, and since run, by the workers themselves has recently entered into a partnership with Celtic Energy-notorious and hated opencast company.[14]
+d. Director of the FBI and Assistant Directors
-The similarity with the support given to the Liverpool Dockers has been noted by other people, yet I feel that there are two fundamental differences here. Firstly; not only were the dockers fighting the Merseyside Docks and Harbour Company (MHDC) who sacked them, but they were also battling against their union, the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) that had deserted and actively worked against them. This is partly why the link-up with the dockers was so important-we were working with the people themselves, not their ‘representatives’ the union. Yet with the No Opencast campaign we are working alongside the NUM, a union of the same ilk that sold the dockers out so cold heartedly.[15]
+of the FBI (Recommendations 83-85)_____ 335
-Secondly; the docks, in my ideal world, would be closed--they are an integral part of the insane system of mass production and consumption that I oppose. Despite this, whilst they are open, we should support and fight for the demands of the traditional workforce of the dockers to work there; as opposed to casual labour with all its vestiges of organised resistance crushed. Yet, were the docks to close, I would not get involved in a fight to re-open them-which in essence is half of what the No Opencast campaign is asking to happen with the deep mines! What are we, as radical ecologists, doing getting involved in a struggle to re-open major industries? For instance, when nuclear power is finally wound up, and car factories closed down, are we going to get involved in campaigns to re-open them as well?
+. Administrative Rulemaking and Increased Disclosure Should Be Required (Recommendations 86-89)________________ 336
-Having said all of the above, contradictions are not something we should be afraid of and aim to avoid by adopting some puritanical Green line-even if that it were actually possible. People change their views and aims; particularly through being involved with direct action, and also when arguments are presented to them in a coherent way. It is, although we seem not to know it, possible to be in a working alliance with people that we share some common ground with and still criticise them on particular aspects of their views. Maybe it is as a result of our relative political naivete that this does not seem to have happened with this campaign. \Vhat we do need to decide is on what grounds we form coalitions on, with whom and why. To do this we need to talk, both amongst ourselves and also to others-this is how we will learn and advance our actions.
+a. Administrative Rulemaking (Recommendations 86-88) 336
-I have, rather sadly (and yes I admit it-as a bit of a cop-out) no final conclusion to this writing and the questions, if any, it raises about Earth First! and the No Opencast campaign. If truth be told I have attempted to provoke some thought on thorny issues by trying to raise them in the above article-which should in. no way be taken as total rejection and criticism of any of the individuals or groups involved in past and present struggles against the farther encroachment of the capital and the state. I respect, and acknowledge that we have much to learn from, the miners and similar struggles. What I am suggesting is that we do not lose our critical faculties when it comes to these issues. We must, if we are to change the world to one we want-an ecological one devoid of exploitation, oppression and hierarchy-get involved with other people resisting particular aspects of this system. This will involve working with people that we do not necessarily totally agree with on every ideal; and even if we do- as some great wit once said; If you feel comfortable in your coalition--<em>then it’s not broad enough.</em>
+b. Disclosure (Recommendations 89-90)_______ 336
-There is a forthcoming No Opencast action later this year- for more details of this and the ongoing resistance to opencast mining contact: No Opencast Campaign, c/o 190 Shepherds Bush Road, London, W6 7NL, UK. Telephone: 0181 767 3142 or 0181 672 9698. For current anti-mining/quarrying camp details see ‘Carry on Camping’ on page 54 in this issue of <em>DoD.</em>
+. Civil Remedies Should Be Expanded (Recommendation 91) 336
-[10] For examples of this during the 1984/5 miners strike see page 4 in Outside and Against the Unions-a pamphlet published by Wildcat. Send a donation to: BM CAT, London, WCIN 3XX, UK. See also Occupational Therapy-The Incomplete Story of the University College Hospital Strikes and Occupations of 1992/314 published by News from Everywhere, Box 14, 138 Kingsland High Street, London, E8 2NS, UK.
+. Criminal Penalties Should Be Enacted (Recommendation 92) 338
-[11] See, for example, “Who Killed Ned Ludd?” in Elements of Refusal by John Zerzan (Left Bank: USA 1988)-an account of how the unions were partly responsible for the repression and dispersal of the revolutionary fervour of the Luddite movement in 19<sup>th</sup> century Britain.
+. The Smith Act and the Voorhis Act Should Either Be Repealed or Amended (Recommendation 93)________________________ 339
-[12] Lord Balfour quoted in Unfinished Business-the politics of Class Warpage 28.
+. The Espionage Statute Should Be Modernized (Recommendation 94) 339
-[13] Part of the text from No Opencast campaign sticker distributed at the action on Friday 31<sup>st</sup> October 1997.
+. Broaden Access to Intelligence Agency Files Should Be Provided to GAO, as an Investigative Arm of the Congress (Recommendation 95) 339
-[14] See The Guardian’-Friday 27<sup>th</sup> February 1998.
+. Congressional Oversight Should Be Intensified (Recommendation 96) 339
-[15] Not to mention, amongst others, the Hillingdon Hospital Workers recently expelled from their union Unison.
+. Definitions____________________________________ 339
-<br>
+Appendix A: Senate Resolution 21__________________________________ 343
+Appendix B: Previously Issued Hearings and Reports of Senate Select
-** The New Luddite War (from issue 8) We Will Destroy Genetic Engineering!
+<right>
+Committee________________________________________ 355
+</right>
-Two years ago direct action against genetic engineering in Britain was non-existent. Two years later and it has become one of the main struggles in which our movements are involved. Hundreds of new people have got active in everything from mass trashings to night time sabotage. With over seventy experimental Genetically Modified (GM) test sites destroyed, our action is crippling the advance of the technology. This article will cover how the campaign has evolved and some of the reasons why it is so important that genetic engineering is stopped. Many newspapers have covered the ecological and health disasters that could arise if genetic engineering goes badly wrong. Instead this article will chart the ecological, social and health disasters that will arise if genetic engineering goes badly right.
+Appendix C: Staff Acknowledgments_______________________________ 357
-Though Britain has been the (First World) country where actions against genetic engineering have really kicked off, people have been resisting for over a decade all over the world. The first outdoor genetic test site was a crop of genetically engineered strawberries at the University of California in 1987. The night after the plants had been transplanted Earth First!ers climbed fences, evaded security guards and succeeded in pulling up all 2,000 plants.[16] In 1989 Earth First!ers destroyed yet more test sites in the US which in turn inspired actions in Holland where three test sites were dug up. Claiming responsibility for the Dutch attacks, the ‘Raging Diggers’ stated in their July 1991 communique:
+Additional Views:
-<quote>
+Philip A. Hart_______________________________________________ 359
-The destruction of a test field is designed to both start a <em>discussion on the subject of bio-technology, as well as to offer a direct counter to pro-biotechnology propaganda in the form of sabotage![17]</em>
-</quote>
-Throughout the early and mid nineties a growing alliance of Indian peasant groups organised against GM and the patenting of seeds. The campaign, which involved everything from setting up community seed banks to the mass destruction of an installation belonging to the multinational Cargill, culminated in a 500,000 strong demonstration. Back in Europe, 1996 saw German eco-anarchists squatting fields to stop them being planted as genetic test sites. A third of all sites were prevented from being sown that year and many of those which had been sown were subsequently sabotaged. By the end of the year twelve sites had been dug up, and the remaining experiments were under 24 hour police guard.[18] Crop squats and anti-GM actions in Germany continued throughout the following year. The growing international nature of the resistance showed itself on April 21<sup>st</sup> ’97 when activists simultaneously occupied Monsanto’s head offices in both Britain and America. Two weeks later a GM potato test site was dug up belonging to the Federal Research Institute of Germany. The leader ofthe research project described it as ‘a direct hit’.
+Robert Morgan______________________________________________ 363
-<quote>
+Introduction to Separate Views of Senators John G. Tower, Howard
-On the 8<sup>th</sup> of June [1997] justfive days after the action in Germany the Super Heroes Against Genetix decided to play cricket on a GM potato testfield site just outside Cambridge. Due to the nature of a somewhat muddy and sticky wicket, potatoes replaced the traditional red ball. Fielders had a dif cult time ofit-most of the batting resulting in the ‘balls’ being smashed to pieces, or else being lost amongst upturned soil. The entire GM crop was destroyed.[19]
-</quote>
-Days after the first British GM test site sabotage, Germany saw another field dug up, this time GM sugar beet. Around two months later more sites were dug up in Britain followed in November ’97 by the first of many GM site trashings by the French Confederation Paysanne (p. 103). The following year saw a massive escalation of direct action in Britain with numerous office occupations and test site sabotages. In 1998 over thirty test sites were destroyed, including seven rape-seed-oil experiments in different parts of the country on the same night. Last year also saw the first genetic experiment planted in Ireland. Almost immediately the experiment was dug up, never to be replaced. The year ended with the Indian farmers in Karnataka launching ‘Operation Cremate Monsanto’ by setting fire to three of the company’s crops.
+H. Baker, Jr., and Barry Goldwater____________________________ 367
-Already this year over thirty three sites have been destroyed in Britain either through covert action at night (p. 101) or mass trashings in daylight (p. 99). During the glorious Carnival against Capital in the City of London on June 18<sup>th</sup>, the British HQ of agribusiness multinational Cargill was closed down and its windows and foyer smashed up (p. 1). The international aspect has grown too, with Indian farmers visiting a squatted genetic test site in Essex and blockading a pro-GM greenwash institute in London (p. 97). On the other side of the Channel, the French peasants are continuing their actions, while across the Atlantic, American activists have destroyed three test sites-one action claimed by the ‘Cropatistas’. As I write, three people have been remanded in prison for alleged ‘Conspiracy to Cause Criminal Damage’ at a GM maize field in Lincolnshire (p. 104). For those unaware of what lies behind genetic engineering this explosion of activity around the globe might seem strange. The next part of the article will aim to give a bit of background to the issues of power behind the struggle.
+John G. Tower______________________________________________ 369
-**** Elite Technology “Weaponry for the Class War
+Howard H. Baker, Jr__________________________________________ 373
-Enveloped in darkness, they walked silently through the fields, groups offriends intent on destruction. The elite’s new technology was their target and night after night they laid their blows at progress. The repression started, but while captured comrades languished in prison, others walked the night time paths. I could be describing today’s campaign against genetic engineering but I am not. These bands of merry friends are of the past and despite bravery, imagination and countless escapades they failed. The war waged at the beginning of the last century by the Luddites of Northern England against the elite’s new technology-the emerging factory system-was lost, drowned in blood and compromise. The following years saw an armed uprising . (the Swing Riots) by the rural poor against new technologies in agriculture, but that too was defeated. The price of such deafets is the ecological destruction, pathologcally warped emotions and wage slavery of global industrialism.
+Barry Goldwater_____________________________________________ 389
-A strange tale to tell in an article about the resistance to genetic engineering? No. On the nights I have helped destroy genetic test sites I have thought of people, like those described above, who walked the night time paths before me. Listening to their voices both inspires me and helps me pick out the truth otherwise drowned out by the cacophony of corporate propaganda. With vast budgets the PR departments of the GM companies are trying to convince us that their technology is aimed at feeding the poor and increasing food production[20]. The Luddites of the past remind us of the reality, that the technologies foisted upon the poor by the elite are aimed at accruing profit and power. As one Indian scientist put it, Monocultures spread not because they produce more, but because they control more.[21]
+Charles McC. Mathias, Jr______________________________________ 395
-We and the Luddites are fighters in the same war. Two hundred years ago the English elite’s main enemy was the peasantry who lived for the most part outside the cash economy and were forever rising up. The elite used the enclosure of land and the mechanisation of crafts and agriculture to crush the rebellious autonomy of the English poor. The class was eradicated by physical force and the elite’s technology and forced either to become either wage slaves in the emerging factories or on the farms of the rich.
+<br>
-Two hundred years, and many struggles later, the British poor are for the most part wasting their life in crap jobs or depressed and drug-ridden on the dole-their rebelliousness almost totally extinguished, our history forgotten.Meanwhile the-now global-elite continues to wage a war on the class that remains the main threat to its existence-the global peasantry. The relative autonomy and link with the land which fuelled the Zapatiastas in Mexico, the Viet Cong in Vietnam and the MST in Brasil has to be destroyed. This is where genetic engineering comes in.
+* I. Introduction and Summary
-The new technologies being pushed by the food industry-a sector which has more companies in the top 1000 than any other-aim to purposefolly destroy the social fabric that keeps the land community together and to fully incorporate the peasantry into the global cash economy. The threat is neutralised and becomes fuel for the machine’s forther expansion.
+The resolution creating this Committee placed greatest emphasis on whether intelligence activities threaten the "rights of American citizens."[1]
-To understand genetic engineering you have to look at the process it is part of. The last thirty years have seen, in what was called the ‘green revolution’ (sic), massive industrialisation of agriculture in the Third World. The highly expensive inputs for industrial agriculture; machines, pesticides etc. have forced millions of small farmers off their land. Mechanisation has made redundant many jobs done by agricultural labourers. This process is purposeful, as it was two hundred years ago when the elite dispossessed our ancestors. As one pro-industrialisation advocate put it:
+The critical question before the Committee was to determine how the fundamental liberties of the people can be maintained in the course of the Government's effort to protect their security. The delicate balance between these basic goals of our system of government is often difficult to strike, but it can, and must, be achieved. We reject the view that the traditional American principles of justice and fair play have no place in our struggle against the enemies of freedom. Moreover, our investigation has established that the targets of intelligence activity have ranged far beyond persons who could properly be characterized as enemies of freedom and have extended to a wide array of citizens engaging in lawful activity.
-<quote>
+Americans have rightfully been concerned since before World War II about the dangers of hostile foreign agents likely to commit acts of espionage. Similarly, the violent acts of political terrorists can seriously endanger the rights of Americans. Carefully focused intelligence investigations can help prevent such acts. But too often intelligence has lost this focus and domestic intelligence activities have invaded individual privacy and violated the rights of lawful assembly and political expression. Unless new and tighter controls are established by legislation, domestic intelligence activities threaten to undermine our democratic society and fundamentally alter its nature.
-Economic development. is not compatible with the maintainance of a people’s traditional customs. What is needed is a change in the totality of their culture and theirpsychological attitude, their way of life. What is therefore required amounts to social disorganisation. Unhappiness and discontentment in the sense of wanting more than is obtainable is to be generated. ‘Ihe suffering and dislocation that is caused <em>is the price that has to be paidfor economic development.[22]</em>
-</quote>
-The poor pay the price while the elite reap the profit. Radical social movements usually can’t keep up with the rapid rate of social change, failing to effectively organise. As a result the dispossessed turn the violence of the green revolution, not on their enemies (who sit back comfortably in air conditioned offices often thousands ofmiles away), but on their own class and families. Increases in suicide, the domestic abuse of both women and children, and the re-emergence of serious communal/religious conflict have all been linked by Indian eco-feminists to this social dislocation[23]. In general women bear the brunt of the horror caused, especially the malnourshiment and hunger. In her new book, Germaine Greer points out that women are also increasingly burdened with the sole responsibility of child rearing. Lone female headed families are the poorest sector of the worlds population.
+We have examined three types of "intelligence" activities affecting the rights of American citizens. The first is intelligence collection -- such as infiltrating groups with informants, wiretapping, or opening letters. The second is dissemination of material which has been collected. The third is covert action designed to disrupt and discredit the activities of groups and individuals deemed a threat to the social order. These three types of "intelligence" activity are closely related in the practical world. Information which is disseminated by the intelligence community[2] or used in disruptive programs has usually been obtained through surveillance. Nevertheless, a division between collection, dissemination and covert action is analytically useful both in understanding why excesses have occurred in the past and in devising remedies to prevent those excesses from recurring.
-<quote>
+<em>A.</em> <em>Intelligence Activity: A New Form of Governmental Power to Impair Citizens' Rights</em>
-<em>As the extendedfamily has crumbled under the pressure of urbanisation, increasing landlessness and economic change men no longer constrained by their elders to live as husbands andfathers have backed away from women and children. One quarter of all families in the world are headed by a loan female. In the Caribbean, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa it is about a third and rising.[24]</em>
-</quote>
-Going hand in hand with the destruction of human lives, has been devastation of the ecologies those lives were once a part of. In the Third World, as in Britain, industrial agriculture is responsible for more ecological destruction than any other factor. Corporate PR agencies have been spreading the idea that GM crops will need less chemical spraying and are therefore good for the environment. The truth is that the most common GM plant varieties have been engineered to be herbicide tolerant. This enables a crop to be sprayed with more chemicals than ever before.
+A tension between order and liberty is inevitable in any society. A Government must protect its citizens from those bent on engaging in violence and criminal behavior, or in espionage and other hostile foreign intelligence activity. Many of the intelligence programs reviewed in this report were established for those purposes. Intelligence work has, at times, successfully prevented dangerous and abhorrent acts, such as bombings and foreign spying, and aided in the prosecution of those responsible for such acts.
-In general, genetic-industrial agriculture is characterised by both continuities and discontinuities with the chemical-industrial approach of green revolution agriculture.
+But, intelligence activity in the past decades has, all too often, exceeded the restraints on the exercise of governmental power which are imposed by our country's Constitution, laws, and traditions.
-It is continous with it to the extent that they both share a static, one-dimensional, commodified, fragmented, uniform, toxic, and capital- and input-intensive approach to agriculture. Genetic-industrial agriculture will continue, and indeed extend, the industrialisation of agricultural production, including the practice of monoculture cropping, the replacement of diverse plant varieties with static laboratory-bred varieties, and the use of toxic inputs.
+Excesses in the name of protecting security are not a recent development in our nation's history. In 1798, for example, shortly after the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution, the Allen and Sedition Acts were passed. These Acts, passed in response to fear of proFrench "subversion", made it a crime to criticize the Government.[3] During the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus. Hundreds of American citizens were prosecuted for anti-war statements during World War I, and thousands of "radical" aliens were seized for deportation during the 1920 Palmer Raids. During the Second World War, over the opposition of J. Edgar Hoover and military intelligence,[4] 120,000 Japanese-Americans were apprehended and incarcerated in detention camps.
-Genetic engineering will also enable the destructive practices of industrial agriculture to continue where they may otherwise have reached their limits by creating plants that can tolerate greater quantities of chemical inputs or that are adapted to the soils degraded by industrial agricultural practices. For these reasons, the new genetically engineered seeds and inputs wil perpetuate and intensify the environmental problems and concentrations of power and wealth produced by chemical-industrial agriculture. Indeed it is the very same multinational corporations that have developed and continue to sell chemical products and hybrid seeds that are now developing and commercialising the products of genetic engineering.
+Those actions, however, were fundamentally different from the intelligence activities examined by this Committee. They were generally executed overtly under the authority of a statute or a public executive order. The victims knew what was being done to them and could challenge the Government in the courts and other forums. Intelligence activity, on the other hand, is generally covert. It is concealed from its victims[5] and is seldom described in statutes or explicit executive orders. The victim may never suspect that his misfortunes are the intended result of activities undertaken by his government, and accordingly may have no opportunity to challenge the actions taken against him.
-Despite these continuities, the elite’s new technologies differ significantly in the mode in which they take hold of nature and reconstitute it in new forms, since they now engage with organisms at the molecular level. In being able to tamper directly with the genetic structure of organisms, and to transfer genes across species boundaries, genetic engineering creates new kinds of ecological dangers as well as new forms of social control.[25]
+It is, of course, proper in many circumstances -- such as developing a criminal prosecution - - for the Government to gather information about a citizen and use it to achieve legitimate ends, some of which might be detrimental to the citizen. But in criminal prosecutions, the courts have struck a balance between protecting the rights of the accused citizen and protecting the society which suffers the consequences of crime. Essential to the balancing process are the rules of criminal law which circumscribe the techniques for gathering evidence[6] the kinds of evidence that may be collected, and the uses to which that evidence may be put. In addition, the criminal defendant is given an opportunity to discover and then challenge the legality of how the Government collected information about him and the use which the Government intends to make of that information.
-**** The Colonisation of the Seed
+This Committee has examined a realm of governmental information collection which has not been governed by restraints comparable to those in criminal proceedings. We have examined the collection of intelligence about the political advocacy and actions and the private lives of American citizens. That information has been used covertly to discredit the ideas advocated and to "neutralize" the actions of their proponents. As Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone warned in 1924, when he sought to keep federal agencies from investigating "political or other opinions" as opposed to "conduct . . . forbidden by the laws":
-The relative autonomy of the peasantry has always rested on its ability to grow its own food without the major involvement of the market. Every harvest farmers can collect the seeds from their crops and resow the following year. In many ways, the seed both symbolically and actually holds the key to freedom. Understanding this, the elite’s new technologies change the seed from a key to freedom to a key to further slavery.
+When a police system passes beyond these limits, it is dangerous to the proper administration of justice and to human liberty, which it should be our first concern to cherish.
-One of the most important weapons being developed for use against the rural poor is terminator technology. Terminator technology allows seed companies to sterilise new varieties, meaning that farmers will not be able to obtain healthy seeds for the following year at harvest. Instead, every year they will have to buy seeds off the corporations. This is once again an extension of the green revolution that created hybridised seeds that were by nature sterile. However, in the past, hybridisation has not been possible with many crops. Terminator technology will allow companies to sterilise any of their seeds. Research at the moment is aimed at crops such as rice, wheat, sorghum, and soya beans, the basis of a large section of the world’s daily survival. To paraphrase Brecht; “First control their fodder, then you’re in control of their philosophy”.
+. . . There is always a possibility that a secret police may become a menace to free government and free institutions because it carries with it the possibility of abuses of power which are not always quickly apprehended or understood.[7]
-<quote>
+Our investigation has confirmed that warning. We have seen segments of our Government, in their attitudes and action, adopt tactics unworthy of a democracy, and occasionally reminiscent of the tactics of totalitarian regimes. We have seen a consistent pattern in which programs initiated with limited goals, such as preventing criminal violence or identifying foreign spies, were expanded to what witnesses characterized as "vacuum cleaners",[8] sweeping in information about lawful activities of American citizens.
-Through patents and genetic engineering, new colonies are being carved out. The land, the forests, the rivers, the oceans, and the atmosphere have all been colonised, eroded, and polluted. Capital now has to look for new colonies to invade and exploitfor its further accumulation. These new colonies are, in my view, the interior spaces of the bodies of women, plants and animals. Resistance to [biotechnology] is a resistance to the ultimate colonisation of life itself-of the future of evolution as well as thefuture of non-Western traditions of relating to and knowing nature. It is a struggle to protect the freedom of diverse species to evolve. It is a struggle to protect the freedom of diverse cultures to evolve.[26]
-</quote>
-Like most dominant technologies in this society, genetic engineering is an ecologically destructive, socially devastating weapon used by the elite in its continuing war of expansion against the wild and the world’s poor. In this context it is handy to remember that Monsanto was the producer of Agent Orange, the chemical defoliant used by America in its war with the peasantry of Vietnam. It is no accident that Chiapas, home to the Mexican Zapatistas, is the first place where GM trees are being commercially grown.[27]
+The tendency of intelligence activities to expand beyond their initial scope is a theme which runs through every aspect of our investigative findings. Intelligence collection programs naturally generate ever-increasing demands for new data. And once intelligence has been collected, there are strong pressures to use it against the target.
-**** Disarming the Elite
+The pattern of intelligence agencies expanding the scope of their activities was well described by one witness, who in 1970 had coordinated an effort by most of the intelligence community to obtain authority to undertake more illegal domestic activity:
-What strategies can we use? Many reformist campaigners have mistakenly pinned their hopes on two tactics; (a) lobbying government and (b) consumer boycotts. Neither of these tactics can stop or seriously slow down genetic engineering. Lobbying the state will never have an impact because Western governments are in fact corporate fronts and genetic engineering is too important to them. Third World elites who see genetic engineering as a further grasping back of the small amounts of power they have over their turf, almost unanimously oppose patents on life and GM technology. They are irrelevant, none have the power to stand up to the global elite pushing genetic engineering. This was graphically shown at the 1999 International Bio-Safety Protocol Negotiations:
+The risk was that you would get people who would be susceptible to political considerations as opposed to national security considerations, or would construe political considerations to be national security considerations, to move from the, kid with a bomb to the kid with a picket sign, and from the kid with the picket sign to the kid with the bumper sticker of the opposing candidate.
-<quote>
+And you just keep going down the line.[9]
-<em>As ever the motives were money and power, with the N. Americans wanting to continue in their global control, the Europeans trying to re-assert their right to the globalforay at par with N. Americans; and the Southerners trying to be sparedfrom continuing to be the prey.[28]</em>
-</quote>
-The above quote is the view of Dr Tewolde Egziabher, the general manager of Ethiopia’s Environmental Protection Authority and chairperson of the African group of delegates at the negotiations. His conclusion was that global elite’s aim in running the conference was probably that <em>it merely wished to fool its own public.</em>
+In 1940, Attorney General Robert Jackson saw the same risk. He recognized that using broad labels like "national security" or "subversion" to invoke the vast power of the government is dangerous because there are "no definite standards to determine what constitutes a 'subversive activity, such as we have for murder or larceny." Jackson added:
-On the surface, consumer boycotts look more hopeful; at least they hit the companies in the pocket. Due to mad cow disease and other similar crises the European public are very suspicious of anything the companies and government say about food. Most people also feel that GM is inherently wrong, that is tampering with nature. Despite massive PR propaganda by both the state and the corporations this view only solidifies. A report leaked to Greenpeace, written for Monsanto reveals:
+Activities which seem benevolent or helpful to wage earners, persons on relief, or those who are disadvantaged in the struggle for existence may be regarded as 'subversive' by those whose property interests might be burdened thereby. Those who are in office are apt to regard as 'subversive' the activities of any of those who would bring about a change of administration. Some of our soundest constitutional doctrines were once punished as subversive. We must not forget that it was not so long ago that both the term 'Republican' and the term 'Democrat' were epithets with sinister meaning to denote persons of radical tendencies that were 'subversive' of the order of things then dominant.[10]
-An ongoing collapse of public support for biotechnology and GMfoods. At each point in this project, we keep thinking that we have reached the low point and that public thinking will stabilise, but we apparently have not reached thatpoint.[29]
+This wise warning was not heeded in the conduct of intelligence activity, where the "eternal vigilance" which is the "price of liberty" has been forgotten.
-Some retailers interviewed believed there was a fifty-fifty chance of losing to the pressure groups. Against the odds, thanks mainly to small local demonstrations, trolley blockades, determined leafleting, and pure public cynicism many retailers are backing out of GM foods. Indeed, the elite is getting very worried at this situation. The deputy head of the American Treasury said in a statement to the Senate this spring that the campaign against genetic engineering in Europe is the greatest block to global economic liberalisation presently in existence. People deserve to give themselves a pat on the back for this. However, as the main market for GM crops will be in the Third World consumer boycotts in the first world cannot stop the advancement of genetic engineering.
+<em>B.</em> <em>The Questions</em>
-Two hundred years ago the English elite was forced to construct its new technological weaponry-the factory systemin hostile territory. Night after night the Luddites of northern England laid waste to the technology they knew was aimed directly at the destruction of their communties. Two hundred years later, the elite designs its new technological weapons thousands of miles from the people who will eventually feel the effects. Unable to reach and destroy the experiments themselves the peasantry are forced to rely on us to be the long anns of the third world. We must make the territory hostile again.
+We have directed our investigation toward answering the, following questions:
-The challenge has been taken up and people all over Europe are walking in the footsteps of the Luddites. The test site sabotage is crippling the development of the technology, giving valuable breathing space to Third World movements and really beginning to intimidate companies. This year after many of its test sites were destroyed, Britain’s leading plant breeding company, CPB Twyford, announced that it was pulling out of the development of GM crops. In a press statement they said;
+Which governmental agencies have engaged in domestic spying?
-<quote>
+How many citizens have been targets of Governmental intelligence activity?
-...it was felt that the risks of continuing work with GM Os were not worth taking while the threat of indiscriminate vandalism exists.
-</quote>
-Other research organisations have also given up on genetics due to the possibility of their crops being uprooted. This includes the Royal Agricultural College, who were told by their insurers that premiums would rise massively if GM crops were planted. Nearly half of all test sites in Britain have been destroyed this year and the number will continue to rise.
+What standards have governed the opening of intelligence investigations and when have intelligence investigations been terminated?
-As the Luddites of today, we know that given the continuation of this society, halting-forever-the development of new technological weaponry might not be possible. Even if we don’t succeed in stopping genetic engineering we have already slowed down the introduction of this technology. What this means in real terms is that we’ve succeeded in delaying the further degradation of the lives of millions of people. We have delayed for months, maybe years the ecological destruction, hunger, dispair and domestic abuse that social dislocation brings. If that is all we succeed in then we have achieved much.
+Where have the targets fit on the spectrum between those who commit violent criminal acts and those who seek only to dissent peacefully from Government policy?
-**** Growing the Global Land Community
+To what extent has the information collected included intimate details of the targets' personal lives or their political views, and has such information been disseminated and used to injure individuals?
-As well as the ‘thumb in the dam’ aspect of anti-GM, campaigns, the resistance is serving other purposes. Groups all over the world are linking up, training and learning from each other. France, America, Britain, Holland, Germany, Ireland and India-people are together taking action. The hope for a free and ecological future lies in these embryonic movements which understand their enemies are the machine and its masters, and their comrades the land and its lovers. In helping to catalyse the growth of these revolutionary ecological groups around the world the elite may have designed a weapon which will rebound on themselves.
+What actions beyond surveillance have intelligence agencies taken, such as attempting to disrupt, discredit, or destroy persons or groups who have been the targets of surveillance?
-Under the cover of the mass, masks and midnight we, the new Luddites, will continue to fight back in the land struggle that has never ended.
+Have intelligence agencies been used to serve the political aims of Presidents, other high officials, or the agencies themselves?
-<quote>
+How have the agencies responded either to proper orders or to excessive pressures from their superiors? To what extent have intelligence agencies disclosed, or concealed them from, outside bodies charged with overseeing them?
-<em>Together</em> we, the <em>peasants and you, the poor of Europe will</em> fi<em>ght the multinationals with our sweat, and together we will succeed in de</em>f<em>eating them!</em>
-<right>
+Have intelligence agencies acted outside the law? What has been the attitude of the intelligence community toward the rule of law?
--from a speech in London by an Indian peasant of the Bharta Kissan Union-Punjab, May 1999
-</right>
-</quote>
-**** The Triumph of the Code
+To what extent has the Executive branch and the Congress controlled intelligence agencies and held them accountable?
-Enabled by the total colonisation of the seed, control of the global food industry will be further centralised into the hands of transnational corporations. This is the technologies’ aim. This fusion of the agribusiness corporation and techno-science now culminates in the triumph of the logic of the code; in particular, the genetic-code of biotechnology, and the bar-code of consumerindustrial capitalism. The genetic-code and the bar-code are the means through which ever more aspects of contemporary life are being colonised, commodified and controlled. In this context, perhaps the fusion of these two codes may even lead to the imprinting ofbar codes directly onto the DNA of genetically engineered organisms. Scientists at the Novagene corporation have apparently already <em>devoted enormous time and money to write the company logo into a cell, the world’sirst living trademark.</em> (Cary Fowler et.al, “The Laws of Life;’ <em>Development Dialogue,</em> 1/2 1988, p. 55.)
+Generally, how well has the Federal system of checks and balances between the branches worked to control intelligence activity?
-**** Further Reading
+<em>C.</em> <em>Summary of the Main Problems</em>
-<em>Colonising the Seed: Eenetic Engineering and Techno-Industrial Agriculture</em> by Gyorgy Scrinis. Available from AK Press see page 332 for contact details. If you read one thing on genetics, read this pamphlet.
+The answer to each of these questions is disturbing. Too many people have been spied upon by too many Government agencies and to much information has been collected. The Government has often undertaken the secret surveillance of citizens on the basis of their political beliefs, even when those beliefs posed no threat of violence or illegal acts on behalf of a hostile foreign power. The Government, operating primarily through secret informants, but also using other intrusive techniques such as wiretaps, microphone "bugs" surreptitious mail opening, and break-ins, has swept in vast amounts of information about the personal lives, views, and associations of American citizens. Investigations of groups deemed potentially dangerous -- and even of groups suspected of associating with potentially dangerous organizations -- have continued for decades, despite the fact that those groups did not engage in unlawful activity. Groups and individuals have been harassed and disrupted because of their political views and their lifestyles. Investigations have been based upon vague standards whose breadth made excessive collection inevitable. Unsavory and vicious tactics have been employed -- including anonymous attempts to break up marriages, disrupt meetings, ostracize persons from their professions, and provoke target groups into rivalries that might result in deaths. Intelligence agencies have served the political and personal objectives of presidents and other high officials. While the agencies often committed excesses in response to pressure from high officials in the Executive branch and Congress, they also occasionally initiated improper activities and then concealed them from officials whom they had a duty to inform.
-<em>Biopoltics</em><em>: A Feminist and Ecological reader on Biotechnology,</em> ed. Vandana Shiva and Ingunn Moser, (Zed Books 1995) £14.95, 294 pages, Overly academic but nevertheless illuminating collection of essays on everything from genetics and the Third World to the flawed reductionism ofwestern science!
+Governmental officials -- including those whose principal duty is to enforce the law --have violated or ignored the law over long periods of time and have advocated and defended their right to break the law.
-“Farmageddon: Confronting Industrial Agriculture;’ <em>Do or #</em>ie #7, p40 An over view of the history of land struggle and the horrors of industrial agriculture.
+The Constitutional system of checks and balances has not adequately controlled intelligence activities. Until recently the Executive branch has neither delineated the scope of permissible activities nor established procedures for supervising intelligence agencies. Congress has failed to exercise sufficient oversight, seldom questioning the use to which its apropriations were being put. Most domestic intelligence issues have not reached the courts, and in those cases when they have reached the courts, the judiciary has been reluctant to grapple with them.
-“The Luddites War on Industry: A story of machine smashing and spies,” DoD #6, p. 65 Learn about some of our inspirational political ancestors.
+Each of these points is briefly illustrated below, and covered in substantially greater detail in the following sections of the report.
-<em>Bio Piracy</em><em>: The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge</em> by Vandana Shiva, (Green Books 1998), 143 pages. £7.95 Without a doubt the best book written on genetics and power, even more powerful as it comes from a Third World author.
+<em>1.</em> <em>The Number of People Affected by Domestic Intelligence Activity</em>
-<em>Genetic Engineering, Food and Our Environment</em> by Luke Anderson, (Green Books, 1999), 160 pages, £3.95 A newly published intro guide to the subject, though coming from a rather reformist perspective is definitely worth reading. Contains good scary facts.
+United States intelligence agencies have investigated a vast number of American citizens and domestic organizations. FBI headquarters alone has developed over 500,000 domestic intelligence files,[11] and these have been augmented by additional files at FBI Field Offices. The FBI opened 65,000 of these domestic intelligence files in 1972 alone.[12] In fact, substantially more individuals and groups are subject to intelligence scrutiny than the number of files would appear to indicate, since typically, each domestic intelligence file contains information on more than one individual or group, and this information is readily retrievable through the FBI General Name Index.
-[16] <strong>Earth First! Journal,</strong> June/July 1987
+The number of Americans and domestic groups caught in the domestic intelligence net is further illustrated by the following statistics:
-[17] Attacks on biotechnology in the Netherlands, <strong>Do or Die</strong> #1
+- - Nearly a quarter of a million first class letters were opened and photographed in the United States by the CIA between 1953-1973, producing a CIA computerized index of nearly one and one-half million names.[13]
-[18] Anti-Genetics Actions: Crop Circle Chaos and Vegetable Vandalism, <em>Do or Die</em> <em>#6,</em> p. 57.
+- - At least 130,000 first class letters were opened and photographed by the FBI between 1940-1966 in eight U.S. cities.[14]
-[19] <em>Genetix</em> <em>Update</em> June 1997, #1.
+- - Some 300,000 individuals were indexed in a CIA computer system and separate files were created on approximately 7,200 Americans and over 100 domestic groups during the course of CIA's Operation CHAOS (1967-1973).[15]
-[20] The increased food production ofgreen revolution agriculture is yet another development fallacy. Study after study has shown that labor intensive small scale agriculture is far more efficient in producing food than capital intensive large scale agriculture. Nonindustrial farming techniques produce a large supply of food. consisting of many crops. Industrial-monoculture on the other hand produces a larger supply of one particular crop but a smaller amount of food in general. 1bis uniform production of crops lends itself to mass society and the non-local-and therefore formal—economy. Production from the perspective of capitalist economics is relevant only if it is commodified. In the starving of the millions we see the conflict between commodity production for the market and food production for the stomach.
+- - Millions of private telegrams sent from, to, or through the United States were obtained by the National Security Agency from 1947 to 1975 under a secret arrangement with three United States telegraph companies.[16]
-[21] <em>Monocultures of the Mind: Biodiversity. Biotechnology and the Third World,</em> by Vandana Shiva, Third World Network, 1993, p.7.
+- - An estimated 100,000 Americans were the subjects of United States Army intelligence files created between the mid 1960's and 1971.[17]
-[22] “The Social Anthropology of Economic Underdevelopment:’ by Sadie, <strong>].L,</strong> <em>Ihe Economic Journal,</em> No. 70. 1960, p. 302.
+- - Intelligence files on more than 11,000 individuals and groups were created by the Internal Revenue Service between 1969 and 1973 and tax investigations were started on the basis of political rather than tax criteria.[18]
-[23] The <em>Violence of the Green Revolution</em> by Vandana Shiva, (Zed Books, 1991)
+- - At least 26,000 individuals were at one point catalogued on an FBI list of persons to be rounded up in the event of a "national emergency".[19]
-[24] <em>The Whole Woman</em> by Germaine Greer, (Transworld, Doubleday, 1999), p.320
+<em>2.</em> <em>Too Much Information Is Collected For Too Long</em>
-[25] <em>Colonising the Seed</em> by Gyorgy Scrinis (FOE Australia)
+Intelligence agencies have collected vast amounts of information about the intimate details of citizens' lives and about their participation in legal and peaceful political activities. The targets of intelligence activity have included political adherents of the right and the left, ranging from activitist to casual supporters. Investigations have been directed against proponents of racial causes and women's rights, outspoken apostles of nonviolence and racial harmony; establishment politicians; religious groups; and advocates of new life styles. The widespread targeting of citizens and domestic groups, and the excessive scope of the collection of information, is illustrated by the following examples:
-[26] <em>Bio-Piracy: The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge</em> by Vandana Shiva, (Green Books, 1998) pll
+(a) The "Women's Liberation Movement" was infiltrated by informants who collected material about the movement's policies, leaders, and individual members. One report included the name of every woman who attended meetings,[20] and another stated that each woman at a meeting bad described "how she felt oppressed, sexually or otherwise".[21] Another report concluded that the movement's purpose was to "free women from the humdrum existence of being only a wife and mother", but still recommended that the intelligence investigation should be continued.[22]
-[27] See the June 1999 report “Eucalyptus, Neoliheralisrn and NAFTA in Southeastern Mexico;’ as yet not published on paper but available on the web [[http://www.acerca.org/eucatyptus][http://www.acerca.org/eucatyptus]] _rnexico2.html [Seems to have moved as of 22/7/02: follow the “ACERCA” link from http://www. acerca.org/ then find the paper listed.]
+(b) A prominent civil rights leader and advisor to Dr. Martin Luther ing, Jr., was investigated on the suspicion that he might be a Communist " sympathizer". The FBI field office concluded he was not.[23] Bureau headquarters directed that the investigation continue using a theory of "guilty until proven innocent:"
-[28] “Of Power Affirmed to Men and of Safety Denied to Life:’ by Dr Tewolde Egziabher, <em>Third World Resurgence Magazine,</em> #106 Web: http:// www. twnside. org. sg/
+The Bureau does not agree with the expressed belief of the field office that -----------[24] is not sympathetic to the Party cause. While there may not be any evidence that ----------- is a Communist neither is there any substantial evidence that he is anti-Communist.[25]
-[29] <em>Genetix</em> <em>Update</em> December/January 1999 #11
+(c) FBI sources reported on the formation of the Conservative American Christian Action Council in 1971.[26] In the 1950's, the Bureau collected information about the John Birch Society and passed it to the White House because of the Society's "scurillous attack" on President Eisenhower and other high Government officials.[27]
-<br>
+(d) Some investigations of the lawful activities of peaceful groups have continued for decades. For example, the NAACP was investigated to determine whether it "had connections with" the Communist Party. The investigation lasted for over twenty-five years, although nothing was found to rebut a report during the first year of the investigation that the NAACP had a "strong tendency" to "steer clear of Communist activities."[28] Similarly, the FBI has admitted that the Socialist Workers Party has committed no criminal acts. Yet the Bureau has investigated the Socialist Workers Party for more than three decades on the basis of its revolutionary rhetoric-which the FBI concedes falls short of incitement to violence-and its claimed international links. The Bureau is currently using its informants to collect information about SWP members' political views, including those on "U.S. involvement in Angola," "food prices," "racial matters," the "Vietnam War," and about any of their efforts to support non-SWP candidates for political office.[29]
-** My First Genetic Crop Trashing (from issue 8)
+(e) National political leaders fell within the broad reach of intelligence investigations. For example, Army Intelligrnce nee maintained files on Senator Adlai Stevenson and Congressman Abner Mikva because of their participation in peaceful political meetings under surveillance by Army agents.[30] A letter to Richard Nixon, while he was a candidate for President in 1968, was intercepted under CIA's mail opening program.[31] In the 1960's President Johnson asked the FBI to compare various Senators' statements on Vietnam with the Communist Party line[32] and to conduct name checks on leading antiwar Senators.[33]
-Actions on genetics test sites were increasing and our group thought it was high time we took part. I’d taken part in riskier actions before and ones involving more damage, but walking to the meet up point I still felt a pang of misapprehension. I met up with my friends and after waiting for someone who was (as usual) horrendously late, we set off.
+(f) As part of their effort to collect information which "related even remotely" to people or groups "active" in communities which had "the potential" for civil disorder, Army intelligence agencies took such steps as: sending agents to a Halloween party for elementary school children in Washington, D.C., because they suspected a local "dissident" might be present; monitoring protests of welfare mothers' organizations in Milwaukee; infiltrating a coalition of church youth groups in Colorado; and sending agents to a priests' conference in Washington, D.C., held to discuss birth control measures.[34]
-Bundled as we were, five in the back of a pretty small car. I worried about whether we’d get stopped for simply being overloaded. Then I worried about not having a mask (which I quickly improvised by ripping off my long johns below the knee). I worried when a cop car behind us started flashing its lights motioning for the car behind us. to pull over. Thankfully after about quarter of an hour on the road the little voice in my head saying ‘this is madness’ became less audible. If you’ve never been involved in risky direct action then you may have a view of those of us who do it as brave and courageous. The reality is everyone gets scared-you just learn to ignore the nagging voice in your head. Experience pushes up the threshold so that you find it easier and easier to silence that voice in riskier and riskier situations. In truth it’s only our fear that holds us back.
+(g) In the, late 1960's and early 1970s, student groups were subjected to intense scrutiny. In 1970 the FBI ordered investigations of every member of the Students for a Democratic Society and of "every Black Student Union and similar group regardless of their past or present involvement in disorders."[35] Files were opened on thousands of young men and women so that, as the former head of FBI intelligence explained , the information could be used if they ever applied for a government job.[36]
-After about half an hour in the car. yabbering with my mates, the feelings of misapprehension turned into ones of anticipation. The adrenalin started to rise.
+In the 1960's Bureau agents were instructed to increase their efforts to discredit "New Left" student demonstrators by tactics including publishing photographs ("naturally the most obnoxious picture should be used"),[37] using "misinformation" to falsely notify members events had been cancelled,[38] and writing "tell-tale" letters to students' parents.[39]
-Halfway to the target site we met up with another van full. We didn’t know everyone but we trusted those we did to bring only sensible accomplices. We still had a few hours of driving ahead of us so those of us in the back went to sleep. Awoken from our dreams with the news that we were fifteen minutes away from the target we gobbled some chocolate and psyched ourselves up.
+(h) The FBI Intelligence Division commonly investigated any indication that "subversive" groups already under investigation were seeking to influence or control other groups.[40] One example of the extreme breadth of this "infiltration" theory was an FBI instruction in the mid-1960's to all Field Offices to investigate every "free university" because some of them had come under "subversive influence."[41]
-One of us had recced the site out beforehand so despite the rather vague grid references on the government register we knew exactly where to go. Our car drove past the field first to check it out. All seemed quiet. We parked up a nearby lane and our ragged looking army piled out. We stretched our legs and went to sit behind a hedge-waiting a while for our eyes to grow accustomed to the darkness. Someone started nattering and was answered by the first of many shushes. After about ten minutes, we started trudging through the fields. Walking along the side of the hedgerow, we ducked down so that any cars passing on the (now deserted) country road would not see us. Anticipation, anticipation...
+(i) Each administration from Franklin D. Roosevelt's to Richard Nixon's permitted, and sometimes encouraged, government agencies to handle essentially political intelligence. For example:
-A few fields and a lot ofshushes later, we arrived at the target-a test site of genetically engineered wheat. Silently we got to work trashing the crop. We all had different techniques--some edged forward kneeling on the ground and breaking armfulls of wheat-methodical but slow. Others simply trampled the crop, while some munched a path through the experiment with gardening shears. A house was in sight, but we were all dressed head to toe in black and it being late, we hoped the inhabitants were wrapped up in bed.
+- - President Roosevelt asked the FBI to put in its files the names of citizens sending telegrams to the White House opposing his "national defense" policy and supporting Col. Charles Lindbergh.[42]
-As we had given ourselves half an hour to carry out our mission, we checked our watches regularly. After what seemed like twenty minutes I looked at my watch to find we had only been there for eight. It had rained all day so the wheat was wet and soon we were all soaking. We didn’t care-the adrenaline was rushing. Our faces were sombre and we were concentrating on the job at hand. Suddenly the halogen security lights on the house came on--shining with surprising force directly onto us. After a moment ofpanic we realised they’d probably just been set off by a fox or something and we got back to our work. Soon afterwards the lights blinked off. After quarter of an hour boredom was setting in-then someone realised that the crop would be destroyed quicker if we all lay down in a line and rolled over it. As we all rolled around bumping into each other the sober faces tuned to maniacal grins. Apart from swimming I challenge anyone to find a quicker way to get soaked than rolling around wet fields in the rain. It was truly great.
+- - President Truman received inside information on a former Roosevelt aide's efforts to influence his appointments,[43] labor union negotiating plans,[44] and the publishing plans of journalists.[45]
-Time was running out and so we sped up our rolling. This induced lots of dizziness, maybe not the best thing to happen on an action you may need to run away from at any time. It was at this point that a car drove past. It’s headlights reached out towards us but thankfully we remained in the pitch dark. What a surreal sight would have greeted the driver if his headlights hadn’t been so dirty. As we came to the end of our “mission time” every minute seemed to go quicker. By now it was pouring and we were all pretty weary but a third of the crop was still intact. Breaking our own (sensible) rule we stayed ten minutes extra. The tension had really built by now and mixed with a bit of action hysteria every sound of a distant car brought worried expressions.
+- - President Eisenhower received reports on purely political and social contacts with foreign officials by Bernard Baruch,[46] Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt,[47] and Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas.[47]
-We finished off the crop and happy but tired from our manic work we trudged back to our vehicles. Walking bent over, once again a sudden rash of cars drove past-oblivious to our little tribe five feet away on the other side of the hedge-we hoped. Just as we got to the car someone realised they’d left a pair of shears-with their fingerprints on-in the middle of the field. (Always wear gloves!). After a moment of worry we realised another one of us had picked it up-phew!
+- - The Kennedy Administration had the FBI wiretap a Congressional staff member,[48] three executive officials,[49] a lobbyist,[50] and a, Washington law firm.[51] Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy received the fruits of a FBI "tap" on Martin Luther King, Jr.[52] and a "bug" on a Congressman both of which yielded information of a political nature.[53]
-Driving off. our different vehicles in different directions, we remained tense until we were around ten miles away. Then the smiles and giggling started. Chaos erupted in the back as we took off our top layer of clothes-bought the previous day from a charity shop. We changed shoes chucking the cheap trainers we had bought for the occasion in a bin liner with the clothes and tools. We drove into a town and dumped it all in a skip. We stopped at a phonebox and rang up the van’s mobile to see if they were all right-they were. With no evidence of our crimes on us and entering a different county we all fell pretty pleased with ourselves. We got out the chocolate biscuits and put on some loud music. Too buzzing to sleep we \ chattered about future plans and took the piss out of each other for being too jumpy. In the early hour ofthe morning I was dropped off at home. A contented sleep followed.
+- - President Johnson asked the FBI to conduct "name checks" of his critics and of members of the staff of his 1964 opponent, Senator Barry Goldwater.[54] He also requested purely political intelligence on his critics in the Senate, and received extensive intelligence reports on political activity at the 1964 Democratic Convention from FBI electronic surveillance.[55]
-The sabotage was both successful and fun. It was one of the first actions our affinity group had done and therefore unsurprisingly we made a few mistakes, mistakes we’ve learnt from. Having done a few more site trashings, we’ve refined our techniques. The biggest mistake we made was leaving our vehicles in a nearby layby. Their number plates if spotted would have led the cops right to our doorsteps. In subsequent actions we’ve been dropped off by the drivers, meeting them again at a prearranged pickup point and time. For this reason we have not overstayed our “mission time’ again even if it has meant not entirely finishing the crop.
+-- President Nixon authorized a program of wiretaps which produced for the White House purely political or personal information unrelated to national security, including information about a Supreme Court justice.[56]
-Trashing genetic test sites has really helped our group. New activists are now experienced and willing to go on and organise more actions. Activists who have been around for a while have also been re-empowered.
+<em>3. Covert Action and the Use of Illegal or Improper Means</em>
-From the looks of things more and more sites are being destroyed so there must be a lot of you feeling the same thing as us. Despite the mistakes we made the memory of My First... Genetic Test Trashing will always make me smile. Good luck to you all. especially those of you with night harvests!
+(a) Covert Action. -- Apart from uncovering excesses in the collection of intelligence, our investigation has disclosed covert actions directed against Americans, and the use of illegal and improper surveillance techniques to gather information. For example:
-<br>
+(i) The FBI's COINTELPRO -- counterintelligence program -- was designed to "disrupt" groups and "neutralize" individuals deemed to be threats to domestic security. The FBI resorted to counterintelligence tactics in part because its chief officials believed that the existing law could not control the activities of certain dissident groups, and that court decisions had tied the hands of the intelligence community. Whatever opinion one holds about the policies of the targeted groups, many of the tactics employed by the FBI were indisputably degrading to a free society. COINTELPRO tactics included:
-** Sabbing Shell: Office Occupation A-Go-Go! (from issue 8)
+- - Anonymously attacking the political beliefs of targets in order to induce their employers to fire them;
-On January 4, the first working day of 1999, the Managing Directors at Shell-Mex House in London returned from their Christmas vacations to find their offices barricaded. The fact that it was Ogoni Day[30] was not marked on their corporate calendars. Nor was there a reference in their smart new year diaries to the massacre of the Ijaw people in the occupied lands of Nigeria.
+- - Anonymously mailing letters to the spouses of intelligence targets for the purpose of destroying their marriages;[57]
-Other activists, Shell employees and the media scrambled for more information on the office occupation, which was being broadcast on a live website from inside the building. Meanwhile, in Nigeria the Ijaw people were busy ensuring that Shell’s image was not the only thing being damaged. Nigerian oil production has been cut by a up to a third thanks to occupations of oil refineries and machinery sabotage.[31] The resulting military crackdown had begun to filter through during the Christmas holidays. As an act of solidarity the action could not have been better timed. The Ijaw people had demanded the withdrawal of Shell from their lands by January 11, 1999. The Shell-sponsored Nigerian state response had been to execute eight youths and commit a series of atrocities including rape, torture, and looting in the first days of the new year. News of the occupation reached the Niger Delta via the offices of Environmental Rights Action in Port Harcourt. Perhaps it provided a few shreds of hope for the extraordinary people-Ijaw, Ogoni, or part of the grassroots Chikoko resistance movement-who have consistently put their lives and livelihoods on the line by calling for a complete end to multinational corporate oil production in their lands.
+- - Obtaining from IRS the tax returns of a target and then attempting to provoke an IRS investigation for the express purpose of deterring a protest leader from attending the Democratic National Convention;[58]
-Back in the UK the occupation provided a taste of things to come for Shell and other multinational corporations, in what is turning out to be an interesting year. Cries of “Our resistance is as transnational as capital!” are already reverberating in multinational head offices. While refiling various bits of paper in one of the offices, activists found a document entitled ‘Global Scenarios’. This booklet predicted a rise in the globalisation of protest which would be difficult to police and control. Shell had already decided that its strategy would be to detach itself from its global corporate domination image and focus instead on its contribution to local communities [‘Glocalisation’, in wanky new business parlance]. European environmental activists got a special mention. Apparently Shell and other multinational organisations are at a loss to explain our ability to become so angry at their behaviour. Teir concern centred on our apparent ability to organise quickly and effectively via friendship links and the internet.
+- - Falsely and anonymously labeling as Government informants members of groups known to be violent, thereby exposing the falsely labelled member to expulsion or physical attack;[59]
-The occupation ofthe Shell-Mex offices in central London was looked upon as an outstanding success. While we would not wish to preach or claim that we have a monopoly on being organised, certain well known but too frequently ignored tactics used during the organisation of this action certainly helped. In a nutshell, a healthy cocktail of elaborate planning, a few splashes of chaos and a whole heap of luck ensured that bosses of multinational corporations in London were reminded on the first working day of 1999 that their days are numbered.
+- - Pursuant to instructions to use "misinformation" to disrupt demonstrations, employing such means as broadcasting fake orders on the same citizens band radio frequency used by demonstration marshalls to attempt to control demonstrations,[60] and duplicating and falsely filling out forms soliciting housing for persons coming to a demonstration, thereby causing "long and useless journeys to locate these addresses";[61]
-Good and bad things about the Shell Action: a personal view.
+- - Sending an anonymous letter to the leader of a Chicago street gang (described as "violence-prone") stating that the Black Panthers were supposed to have "a hit out for you". The letter was suggested because it "may intensify . . . animosity" and cause the street gang leader to "take retaliatory action".[62]
-**** The Good Things
+(ii) From "late 1963" until his death in 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr., was the target of an intensive campaign by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to "neutralize" him as an effective civil rights leader. In the words of the man in charge of the FBI's "war" against Dr. King, "No holds were barred."[63]
-***** We Achieved Our Aims
+The FBI gathered information about Dr. King's plans and activities through an extensive surveillance program, employing nearly every intelligence-gathering technique at the Bureau's disposal in order to obtain information about the "private activities of Dr. King and his advisors" to use to "completely discredit" them.[64]
-By the time the action happened, we were, as one of the participants put it, a group that knows exactly what it wants to achieve and why. Some of us had become involved in the action simply in response to the question We’re going to hit an oil company on January 4. Wanna come?The problem is that sometimes, as activists, we don’t get any further than this. We know who the enemy is-what more could we need to know? On the Shell action we thought and thought about why we were doing it. Principles and objectives were thrashed out early on. At the time the process seemed pretentious but in retrospect it pulled us together. A briefing document was prepared so that everyone was equipped with the same amount of knowledge. It goes without saying that a sense of passion and anger provided the motivation to act. What made the Shell action a success was that this passion was combined with pragmatic considerations of where to hit, how and why.
+The program to destroy Dr. King as the leader of the civil rights movement included efforts to discredit him with Executive branch officials, Congressional leaders, foreign heads of state, American ambassadors, churches. universities, and the press.[65]
-***** The Aims of the Action
+The FBI mailed Dr. King a tape recording made from microphones hidden in his hotel rooms which one agent testified was an attempt to destroy Dr. King's marriage.[66] The tape recording was accompanied by a note which Dr. King and his advisors interpreted as threatening to release the tape recording unless Dr. King committed suicide.[67]
- - To show real solidarity with people in the Niger Delta rebelling against Big Oil and its private security force (the Nigerian army). It has becoming increasingly easy for multinational corporations to isolate struggles and resistance. The strength of linking together undermines their ability to do this.
+The extraordinary nature of the campaign to discredit Dr. King is evident from two documents:
-Economic sabotage, in the form of disruption of Shell’s working day by direct action. An important factor highlighted at one of the planning meetings was that the Shell-Mex offices was where images were manufactured. The office occupation and banner drop made it harder for Shell to maintain their respectable facade for a day.
+-- At the August 1963 March on Washington, Dr. King told the country of his "dream" that:
- - To spread dissent and lower the morale not only of Shell’s workforce, but ofother oil industry companies and the corporate world in general.
+all of God's children, black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles, Protestants and Catholics, will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old Negro spiritual, "Free at last, free at last, thank God Almighty, I'm free at last."
- - To carry out a symbolic occupation of the seat of power within Shell-Mex House.
+The Bureau's Domestic Intelligence Division concluded that this "demagogic speech" established Dr. King as the "most dangerous and effective Negro leader in the country."[68] Shortly afterwards, and within days after Dr. King was named "Man of the Year" by Time magazine, the FBI decided to "take him off his pedestal," reduce him completely in influence," and select and promote its own candidate to "assume the role of the leadership of the Negro people."[69]
-In this glorious anti-corporation year the message was clear and simple. Shell also provided an ideal target. Too often we get side-tracked on single issues. Oil companies, with their hideous environmental and social record, combine a series of struggles not only in the developing world but in the UK too.
+-- In early 1968, Bureau headquarters explained to the field that Dr. King must be destroyed because he was seen as a potential "messiah" who could "unify and electrify" the "black nationalist movement". Indeed, to the FBI he was a potential threat because he might "abandon his supposed 'obedience' to white liberal doctrines (non-violence)."[70] In short, a non-violent man was to be secretly attacked and destroyed as insurance against his abandoning non-violence.
-***** It Was Well Planned
+(b) Illegal or Improper Means. -- The surveillance which we investigated was not only vastly excessive in breadth and a basis for degrading counterintelligence actions, but was also often conducted by illegal or improper means. For example:
-Meetings were held well in advance to ensure that the jobs that needed to be done were parcelled out. Tasks were taken on and separate working groups sorted out the internet site, the banner, the text of the leaflet to employees. Each job was valued, criticism was kept to a minimum and praise was dished out regularly. People split up into discussion groups to make decisions and affinity groups were sorted out.
+(1) For approximately 20 years the CIA carried out a program of indiscriminately opening citizens' first class mail. The Bureau also had a mail opening program, but cancelled it in 1966. The Bureau continued, however, to receive the illegal fruits of CIA's program. In 1970, the heads of both agencies signed a document for President Nixon, which correctly stated that mail opening was illegal, falsely stated that it had been discontinued, and proposed that the illegal opening of mail should be resumed because it would provide useful results. The President approved the program, but withdrew his approval five days later. The illegal opening continned nonetheless. Throughout this period CIA officials knew that mail opening was illegal, but expressed concern about the "flap potential" of exposure, not about the illegality of their activity.[71]
-Logistics of how to get into the building, where the Managing Directors’ offices were, how to get there, how to barricade, what to wear, and how to negotiate were discussed well in advance. Too many office occupations simply fail because the main concern is how to get into the building. Once we’ve made it through the door all hell breaks loose. This time we knew where we were going and how to get there. As one group walked up the stairs, they had a long and detailed conversation about someone’s sister who was undergoing fertility treatment. The result was that we were calm and other office staff smiled as they overheard the conversation.
+(2) From 1947 until May 1975, NSA received from international cable companies millions of cables which had been sent by American citizens in the reasonable expectation that they would be kept private.[72]
-***** We Had the Joy of Watching Shell’s Of ces Get Totally Trashed
+(3) Since the early 1930's, intelligence agencies have frequently wiretapped and bugged American citizens without the benefit of judicial warrant. Recent court decisions have curtailed the use of these techniques against domestic targets. But past subjects of these surveillances have included a United States Congressman, a Congressional staff member, journalists and newsmen, and numerous individuals and groups who engaged in no criminal activity and who posed no genuine threat to the national security, such as two White House domestic affairs advisers and an anti Vietnam War protest group. While the prior written approval of the Attorney General has been required for all warrantless wiretaps since 1940, the record is replete with instances where this requirement was ignored and the Attorney General gave only after-the-fact authorization.
-...not by us, but by the forces of evil themselves. Knowing how to barricade an office certainly helps. Filing cabinets, expensive desks, computers, and chairs were piled high in front of doors and inner walls. Shell employees and the police then decided to smash through the walls after failing in their exasperating attempts to negotiate with us (the usual Come out now, you’ve made your point!), and they caused thousands of pounds worth of damage. The situationist group occupying Malcolm Brinded’s office on the fourth floor arranged seats for a theatre-like view of the Tactical Support Group as they smashed their way in. Offers of tea and biscuits neatly arranged on the coffee table somewhat undermined the police’s orders of “On the floor! Now! Everybody!” The police were made to look like fools and we had a good laugh!
+Until 1965, microphone surveillance by intelligence agencies was wholly unregulated in certain classes of cases. Within weeks after a 1954 Supreme Court decision denouncing the FBI's installation of a microphone in a defendant's bedroom, the Attorney General informed the Bureau that he did not believe the decision applied to national security cases and permitted the FBI to continue to install microphones subject only to its own "intelligent restraint".[73]
-***** It Was Well-Timed
+(4) In several cases, purely political information (such as the reaction of Congress to an Administration's legislative proposal) and purely personal information (such as coverage of the extra-marital social activities of a high- level Executive official under surveillance) was obtained from electronic surveillance and disseminated to the highest levels of the federal government.[74]
-Firstly because ofwhat was happening in Nigeria. Activists’ access to the Web while in the building meant that we could get hold of information directly. News of the recent killings in the Niger Delta was still coming through, which had the effect of making us ever angrier. Doubts and fears about what we were doing were instantly dispelled as we continued to hear of the atrocities being carried out by the Nigerian Army. As one activist stated to a Shell bigwig: “you have blood on your hands:’ Secondly because January 1999 marked the handover from the outgoing head of Shell UK, Chris Fay, to the new man at the top, Malcolm Brinded-both their offices were occupied on January 4<sup>th</sup>, letting them know that whoever’s in charge we’re going to be watching them. Also, when Shell turned off the phones and electricity we were self-sufficient. Mobile phones meant that we could continue contact with each other and the outside world.
+(5) Warrantless break-ins have been conducted by intelligence agencies since World War II. During the 1960's alone, the FBI and CIA conducted hundreds of break-ins, many against American citizens and domestic organizations. In some cases, these break-ins were to install microphones; in other cases, they were to steal such items as membership lists from organizations considered "subversive" by the Bureau.[75]
-***** We Didn’t Go To Jail
+(6) The most pervasive surveillance technique has been the informant. In a random sample of domestic intelligence cases, 83% involved informants and 5% involved electronic surveillance.[76] Informants have been used against peaceful, law-abiding groups; they have collected information about personal and political views and activities.[77] To maintain their credentials in violence- prone groups, informants have involved themselves in violent activity. This phenomenon is well illustrated by an informant in the Klan. He was present at the murder of a civil rights worker in Mississippi and subsequently helped to solve the crime and convict the perpetrators. Earlier, however, while performing duties paid for by the Government, he had previously "beaten people severely, had boarded buses and kicked people, had [gone] into restaurants and beaten them [blacks] with blackjacks, chains, pistols."[78] Although the FBI requires agents to instruct informants that they cannot be involved in violence, it was understood that in the Klan, "he couldn't be an angel and be a good informant."[79]
-We thought we would. But we didn’t. Instead, we got a few hours in a police cell, followed by release with no charges, presumably because Shell did not want the embarrassment of a court case. All this had the added bonus of the police being cheesed off with Shell for using them as their private security force. Pissed off Shell, pissed off the pigs, and we’re free. Cool. The Website
+<em>4.</em> <em>Ignoring the Law</em>
-One of the concerns around this innovation was that it might be a media gimmick. In the event, this concern was well-founded--the Guardian’s piece on the action focused entirely on the website, went on about other revolutionary groups who use the internet (my, how clever of us), turned it into an advert for Undercurrents, and didn’t mention the Ijaw once. Seriously.
+Officials of the intelligence agencies occasionally recognized that certain activities were illegal, but expressed concern only for "flap Potential." Even more disturbing was the frequent testimony that the law, and the Constitution were simply ignored. For example, the author of the so-called Huston plan testified:
-However, that says more about mainstream media than about the real reason why we went live on the internet with a site which closely resembled Shell’s own. We were both using our own media and subverting theirs. By the end of the week a large number of people had visited the site, including Shell in the UK the Netherlands, the US and Australia; Texaco in the UK and US: oil company Amerada Hess; the US military and US government and some Do Dgy-looking Romanian finance house. The site received 10,230 hits on January 4<sup>th</sup> alone. The next day Shell threatened to injunct the web site which appears alongside its own when the word “Shell” is searched for.
+Question. Was there any person who stated that the activity recommended, which you have previously identified as being illegal opening of the mail and breaking and entry or burglary -- was there any single person who stated that such activity should not be done because it was unconstitutional?
-***** The Banner
+Answer. No.
-The banner that appeared mid-morning between two lamp posts on Waterloo Bridge as crowds were beginning to gather around the Shell-Mex offices was excellent. It read <em>Shell: Filthy, Thieving Murderers-It’s Time To Go:</em> our message, our thoughts, completely unadulterated by the media circus. Discussions that we had after the action focused on how this had more power than any press article. Imagine if there had been a series of banner drops around London to coincide with the occupation!
+Question. Was there any single person who said such activity should not be done because it was illegal?
-***** The Leaflet
+Answer. No.[80]
-A group of five individuals went back the next day and leafleted employees. Shell employees were dying to know what had happened and why. Workers had to file through police lines, collecting flyers as they went. After, suggestions were made about writing up a version of the action and distributing this to workers with an invitation to leak further information to us.
+Similarly, the man who for ten years headed FBI's Intelligence Division testifed that:
-Such follow-ups limit the ability of companies to whitewash actions and lower morale generally.
+... never once did I hear anybody, including myself, raise the question: "Is this course of action which we have agreed upon lawful, is it legal, is it ethical or moral." We never gave any thought to this line of reasoning, because we were just naturally pragmatic.[81]
-***** The Affinity Groups Worked
+Although the statutory law and the Constitution were often not "[given] a thought",[82] there was a general attitude that intelligence needs were responsive to a higher law. Thus, as one witness testified in justifying the FBI's mail opening program:
-Of course, it’s easy to be all luvvie and self-congratulatory after a good action, but there are good reasons why the group dynamics worked surprisingly well:
+It was my assumption that what we were doing was justified by what we had to do . . . the greater good, the national security.[83]
-We didn’t agree on everything, but through some fairly heavy and long discussions before the action (actually, even before we got down to the planning), we thrashed out what our aims were and whittled them down to some fairly hardcore objectives.
+<em>5.</em> <em>Deficiencies in Accountability and Control</em>
-There were differing levels of experience within the group, but everyone worked on respecting each other. There were disagreements but we had the tools to deal with these and the ability to finally reach a consensus. We also didn’t break the agreements that we’d made with each other about how we would conduct the negotiations.
+The overwhelming number of excesses continuing over a prolonged period of time were due in large measure to the fact that the system of checks and balances -- created in our Constitution to limit abuse of Governmental power -- was seldom applied to the intelligence community. Guidance and regulation from outside the intelligence agencies -- where it has been imposed at all -- has been vague. Presidents and other senior Executive officials, particularly the Attorneys General, have virtually abdicated their Constitutional responsibility to oversee and set standards for intelligence activity. Senior government officials generally gave the agencies broad, general mandates or pressed for immediate results on pressing problems. In neither case did they provide guidance to prevent excesses and their broad mandates and pressures themselves often resulted in excessive or improper intelligence activity.
---------
+Congress has often declined to exercise meaningful oversight, and on occasion has passed laws or made statements which were taken by intelligence agencies as supporting overly- broad investigations.
-**Make Your Own Millennium Bug!**
+On the other hand, the record reveals instances when intelligence agencies have concealed improper activities from their superiors in the Executive branch and from the Congress, or have elected to disclose only the less questionable aspects of their activities.
-<em>There’s a lot ofjob satisfaction in de-activating silicon-based life forms on an office occupation, so we thought we’d offer you the beneft of years ofour experience at crashing computers. Ile three basic techniques thatfollow apply to Windows 95 or 98, and probably to Windows NT too. Start by opening the Windows Explorer and check how many drives there are-if there are more than four, the computer is probably attached to the office network.</em>
+There has been, in short, a, clear and sustained failure by those responsible to control the intelligence community and to ensure its accountability. There has been an equally clear and sustained failure by intelligence agencies to fully inform the proper authorities of their activities and to comply with directives from those authorities.
-<strong><em>Re-formatting:</em></strong> <em>While this may cause the least damage of the three methods, if there is no network attachment it may be your best option.</em> To <em>format the disk, simply select ‘Start menu-shutdown-restart computer in MSDOS mode’. When you get the C:\>Prompt, type ‘format c:/u’.</em>
+<em>6.</em> <em>The Adverse Impact of Improper Intelligence Activity</em>
-<strong><em>Repartitioning:</em></strong> If you’re going to re-format a hard disk, you might as well repartition it too-this makes it harder to recover data than just re-formatting it. Stick a floppy disk in when you get to the C:\>Prompt, and type ‘sys a:’, followed by ‘copy c:\windows\command\fdisk. a:’. If no file is found, type ‘copy c:\dos\fdisk. *a:’ andformat as described above. Reboot the PC with the floppy disk in the machine and type fdisk’. Delete all rartitions, reboot again, type f’disk’ again and finally create two or three new partitions.
+Many of the illegal or improper disruptive efforts directed against American citizens and domestic organizations succeeded in injuring their targets. Although it is sometimes difficult to prove that a target's misfortunes were caused by a counter-intelligence program directed against him, the possibility that an arm of the Untied States Government intended to cause the harm and might have been responsible is itself abhorrant.
-<em>Deleting_files</em> <em>on the hard disk is pretty straightforward. Highlight those you want to delete-select lots by holding the ‘Shift’ or ‘control’ key down as you click. Hold down the ‘Shift’ key before you press the ‘delete’ key, and don’t release it until the ‘confirm file delete’ box appears. It is also worth emptying the recycle bin after deleting-click on the bin and choose ‘empty recycle bin’ from the file’ menu. Installing a Disk cleanup utility (www. ex-ecpc.com/~nbd/Clean Up.html) after deleting should make it almost impossible to recover the data, is much more effective than simply formatting the disk. and the utility is also small enough tofit conveniently onto a floppy disk.</em>
+The Committee has observed numerous examples of the impact of intelligence operations. Sometimes the harm was readily apparent -- destruction of marriages, loss of friends or jobs. Sometimes the attitudes of the public and of Government officials responsible for formulating policy and resolving vital issues were influenced by distorted intelligence. But the most basic harm was to the values of privacy and freedom which our Constitution seeks to protect and which intelligence activity infringed on a broad scale.
-To <em>deletefiles</em> <em>from a network drive follow the same procedure as above, but when you’ve deleted something, go to ‘Start menu-Run and type ‘command’. Change to the drive that you have deleted from by typing the drive letter and a colon (eg. ‘u:’), then type ‘cd!’,followed by ‘purge*/a’. On most networks this should ensure that files are completely deleted.</em>
+- a) General Efforts to Discredit. -- Several efforts against individuals and groups appear to have achieved their stated aims. For example:
-<em>(From a more extensive article at:</em> [[http://www.eco-action.org/efau/][<em>http://www.eco-action.org/efau/</em>]]<em>).</em>
+- - A Bureau Field Office reported that the anonymous letter it had sent to an activist's husband accusing his wife of infidelity "contributed very strongly" to the subsequent breakup of the marriage.[84]
--------
+- - Another Field Office reported that a draft counsellor deliberately, and falsely, accused of being an FBI informant was "ostracized" by his friends and associates.[85]
-The actual affinity groups were very small (four, four, and five), which made us focused and enabled individuals to work very closely with one another in equality.
+- - Two instructors were reportedly put on probation after the Bureau sent an anonymous letter to a university administrator about their funding of an anti-administration student newspaper.[86]
-We were ‘experts’ on the Niger Delta situation
+- - The Bureau evaluated its attempts to "put a stop" to a contribution to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference as "quite successful."[87]
-Thanks to the briefing document it was difficult for Shell to sidetrack us. When the outgoing Managing Director Chris Fay wheeled out a Nigerian employee who assured us from behind the barricades that he knew we were doing this for him, activists promptly replied and demanded to discuss the current situation in the Delta with the Ijaw. The Nigerian employee disappeared as quickly as he had arrived.
+- - An FBI document boasted that a "pretext" phone call to Stokeley Carmichael's mother telling her that members of the Black Panther Party intended to kill her son left her "shocked". The memorandum intimated that the Bureau believed it had been responsible for Carmichael's flight to Africa the following day.[88]
-**** Things That Were Not So Good
+- b) Media Manipulation. -- The FBI has attempted covertly to influence the public's perception of persons and organizations by dissemminating derogatory information to the press, either anonymously or through "friendly" news contacts. The impact of those articles is generally difficult to measure, although in some cases there are fairly direct connections to injury to the target. The Bureau also attempted to influence media reporting which would have any impact on the public image of the FBI. Examples include:
-***** We Wanted To Be In There For 24 Hours
+- - Planting a series of derogatory articles about Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Poor People's Campaign.[89]
-Unforlunately the combined force of 30 Tactical Support Unit bods in riot gear smashing through the walls and our lack of ingenuity (D-Locking ourselves to a wheelie chair in one instance) meant that we were dragged out once the office had been dismantled. Planning An Action Over The Winter Holidays.
+For example, in anticipation of the 1968 "poor people's march on Washington, D.C.," Bureau Headquarters granted authority to furnish "cooperative news media sources" an article "designed to curtail success of Martin Luther King's fund raising."[90] Another memorandum illustrated how "photographs of demonstrators" could be used in discrediting the civil rights movement. Six photographs of participants in the poor people's campaign in Cleveland accompanied the memorandum with the following note attached: "These [photographs] show the militant aggressive appearance of the participants and might be of interest to a cooperative news source."[91] Information on the Poor People's Campaign was provided by the FBI to friendly reporters on the condition that "the Bureau must not be revealed as the source."[92]
-The resulting disruption (no one was where they usually were) on top of a few hangovers and transport nightmares caused plenty of preparation stress which should have been unnecessary. Not least of these was a few of us arriving really late to the planning meeting the day before the action. But then perhaps it’s a cop-out to blame it all on Christmas-maybe the truth is that deep inside every sorted activist there’s a lunchout dying to escape. [Damn right! (See ya...)-Ed.]
+- - Soliciting information from Field Offices "on a continuing basis" for "prompt . . . dissemination to the news media . . . to discredit the New Left movement and its adherents." The Headquarters directive requested, among other things, that:
-***** Lack of a collective decision about the presence of the alternative media.
+specific data should be furnished depicting the scurrilous and depraved nature, of many of the characters, activities, habits, and living conditions representative of New Left adherents.
-Those who invited Undercurrents assumed that it would be okay with everyone else, while those who would have preferred them not to be involved had not articulated the good reasons why not. This was then compounded by the issue being discussed the night before the action with the Undercurrents person already part of the group. Kinda hard to start a big political discussion at that point.
+Field Offices were to be exhorted that: "Every avenue of possible embarrassment must be vigorously and enthusiastically explored."[93]
-***** Total Lack Of Security after the Action Happened
+- - Ordering Field Offices to gather information which would disprove allegations by the "liberal press, the bleeding hearts, and the forces on the left"[94] that the Chicago police used undue force in dealing with demonstrators at the 1968 Democratic Convention.[95]
-Most activists appear to have rather large egos! Enough said!
+- - Taking advantage of a close relationship with the Chairman of the Board -- described in an FBI memorandum as "our good friend"-- of a magazine with national circulation to influence articles which related to the FBI. For example, through this relationship the Bureau: "squelched" an "unfavorable article against the Bureau" written by a free-lance writer about an FBI investigation; "postponed publication" of an article on another FBI case; "forestalled publication" of an article by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; and received information about proposed editing of King's articles.[96]
-***** Liaison with Nigerian Groups in London
+(c) <em>Distorting Data to Influence Government Policy and Public Perceptions</em>
-<quote>
+Accurate intelligence is a prerequisite to sound government policy. However, as the past head of the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division reminded the Committee:
-...prior to the action was a bit farcical. But then it’s not realistic to expect an action-level relationship after two rushed phone calls to a group or person not familiar with the direct action ethic. Fortunately, such relationships are beginning to be fostered since the occupation took place.
-</quote>
-***** Post-Action Idea: Reallocating the Press Role
+The facts by themselves are not too meaningful. They are something like stones cast into a heap.[97]
-Given the emphasis above on direct communication it might be thought that the action did not bother with conventional press. Wrong-we had a press officer, put out a press release, and also had the participation of an Undercurrents activist. (One participant lost all their hardcore credibility instantly when, upon learning of the arrival of TV crews outside, they danced across the room saying <em>The cameras are here! The cameras are here!)</em>
+On certain crucial subjects the domestic intelligence agencies reported the "facts" in ways that gave rise to misleading impressions.
-Some interesting suggestions were made after the action about an alternative role for a press worker or Publicity and Communications Person as they could now be known, such as: • Ringing around EF! and other similar groups to let them know about the action and asking for support-support possibly taking the form of a phone or fax blockade, bogus press calls, leafleting and shutting down local Shell garages.
+For example, the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division initially discounted as an "obvious failure" the alleged attempt's of Communists to influence the civil rights movement.[98] Without any significant change in the factual situation, the Bureau moved from the Division's conclusion to Director Hoover's public congressional testimony characterizing Communist influence on the civil rights movement as "vitally important."[98]
- - Faxing other oil companies to let them know what’s happening and informing them that they are equally a target.
+FBI reporting on protests against the Vietnam War provides another example, of the manner in which the information provided to decision-makers can be skewed. In acquiescence with a judgment already expressed by President Johnson, the Bureau's reports on demonstrations against the War in Vietnam emphasized Communist efforts to influence the anti-war movement and underplayed the fact that the vast majority of demonstrators were not Communist controlled.[99]
- - Contacting groups in other countries struggling against the same company.
+(d) "Chilling" First Amendment Rights. -- The First Amendment protects the Rights of American citizens to engage in free and open discussions, and to associate with persons of their choosing. Intelligence agencies have, on occasion, expressly attempted to interfere with those rights. For example, one internal FBI memorandum called for "more interviews" with New Left subjects "to enhance the paranoia endemic in these circles" and "get the point across there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox."[100]
- - Directly contacting the group you’re trying to support in your solidarity action.
+More importantly, the government's surveillance activities in the aggregate -- whether or not expressly intended to do so -- tends, as the Committee concludes at p. 290 to deter the exercise of First Amended Rights by American citizens who become aware of the government's domestic intelligence program.
-There was a feeling amongst individuals that far too much time was spent discussing the conventional press. It is well to remember that the deep fundamental change we want will never be achieved by relying on the media industry, which after all is as much part of global capitalism as Shell.
+(e) Preventing the Free Exchange of Ideas. -- Speakers, teachers, writers, and publications themselves were targets of the FBI's counterintelligence program. The FBI's efforts to interfere with the free exchange of ideas included:
-**** Conclusion
+- - Anonymously attempting to prevent an alleged "Communist-front" group from holding a forum on a midwest campus, and then investigating the judge who ordered that the meeting be allowed to proceed.[101]
-Clearly a one-off office occupation in solidarity with indigenous groups in the Niger Delta is not going to change the world nor bring a company like Shell to its knees.
+- - Using another "confidential source" in a foundation which contributed to a local college to apply pressure on the school to fire an activist professor.
-However as a symbolic act of solidarity it made its point, made the participants feel positive and with any luck gave some hope to those fighting in the Niger Delta. In the game of cricket that has developed with the state (our tactics are well known and the police know how to deal with them), the ‘ Shell action proved that if we spend the time and energy in preparation and organisation then office occupations and other such actions still have a role to play. As we were occupying Shell-Mex House, news filtered through ofthe Reclaim The Streets occupation of London Underground’s head offices in support of the striking tube workers, and of 60 people up trees and down tunnels in a Crystal Palace eviction alert: Triple Whammy!!!!!!
+- - Anonymously contacting a university official to urge him to "persuade" two professors to stop funding a student newspaper, in order to "eliminate what voice the New Left has" in the area.
-Update: 21/4/99 The Shell Centre-their other London headquarters--splashed with red and green paint as Mark Moody-Stuart (annual salary £1.4m) launched Shell’s second annual report, called People, <em>Planet, Profit An</em> Act <em>of Commitment.</em> This was an act taken in solidarity with the people of the Niger Delta and to make clear that despite the greenwash, there is blood on their hands and there can never be a green or ethical oil industry.
+- - Targeting the New Mexico Free University for teaching "confrontation politics" and "draft counseling training".[102]
-We Must Devastate the Hard Drives Where the Wealthy Live!
+<em>7. Cost and Value</em>
-[30] Ogoni Day has been celebrated since 1993 to mark the anniversary of the day the Ogoni people launched their struggle against Shell and forced the oil company off their lands.
+Domestic intelligence is expensive. We have already indicated the cost of illegal and improper intelligence activities in terms of the harm to victims, the injury to constitutional values, and the damage to the democratic process itself. The cost in dollars is also significant. For example, the FBI has budgeted for fiscal year 1976 over $7 million for its domestic security informant program, more than twice the amount it spends on informants against organized crime.[103] The aggregate budget for FBI domestic security intelligence and foreign counterintelligence is at least $80 million.[104] In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the Bureau was joined by the CIA, the military, and NSA in collecting information about the anti-war movement and black activists, the cost was substantially greater.
-[31] Nigeria produces 2 million barrels a day of oil-up to a third <em>of output was halted at one point last year by piracy and sabotage by activists demanding a fairer share of revenues for the region’s impoverished inhabitants. -The Financial Times</em> 09/06/99.
+Apart from the excesses described above, the usefulness of many domestic intelligence activities in serving the legitimate goal of protecting society has been questionable. Properly directed intelligence investigations concentrating upon hostile foreign agents and violent terrorists can produce valuable results. The Committee has examined cases where the FBI uncovered "illegal" agents of a foreign power engaged in clandestine intelligence activities in violation of federal law. Information leading to the prevention of serious violence has been acquired by the FBI through its informant penetration of terrorist groups and through the inclusion in Bureau files of the names of persons actively involved with such groups.[105] Nevertheless, the most sweeping domestic intelligence surveillance programs have produced surprisingly few useful returns in view of their extent. For example:
-<br>
+- - Between 1960 and 1974, the FBI conducted over 500,000 separate investigations of persons and groups under the "subversive" category, predicated on the possibility that they might be likely to overthrow the government of the United States.[106] Yet not a single individual or group has been prosecuted since 1957 under the laws which prohibit planning or advocating action to overthrow the government and which are the main alleged statutory basis for such FBI investigations.[107]
-** Take a Sad Song and Make it Better? (from issue 8)
+- - A recent study by the General Accounting Office has estimated that of some 17,528 FBI domestic intelligence investigations of individuals in 1974, only 1.3 percent resulted in prosecution and conviction, and in only "about 2 percent" of the cases was advance knowledge of any activity -- legal or illegal -- obtained.[108]
-**** Ecological Restoration in the UK
+- - One of the main reasons advanced for expanded collection of intelligence about urban unrest and anti-war protest was to help responsible officials cope with possible violence. However, a former White House official with major duties in this area under the Johnson administration has concluded, in retrospect, that "in none of these situations . . . would advance intelligence about dissident groups [have] been of much help," that what was needed was "physical intelligence" about the geography of major cities, and that the attempt to "predict violence" was not a "successful undertaking"[109]
-<quote>
+- - Domestic intelligence reports have sometimes even been counterproductive. A local police chief, for example, described FBI reports which led to the positioning of federal troops near his city as:
-I see what is possible when we stand our ground, our common <em>ground.</em> <em>I</em> <em>seeforests</em> <em>and grasslands filled with masses of flowers and the native birds and wildlife that had long ago disappearedfrom this part of the planet. I see what can be done from the barest beginnings and under the most impossible conditians, with hardly any means or resources. Not by calculating, or waiting for the opportune moment, orthe big money, orfor a conference to confirm what must be done. I see what can be done by the power of simply doing it. And as I turn toward the starkly contrasting landscape behind me, I see all that is yet to be done.[32]</em>
-</quote>
-Ecological restoration is one of the most compelling tasks that <em>we</em> face, if we are to patch up the battered cradle of life that sustains us, as well as renewing our own bruised mental ecologies. Successfully removing the sources of the ongoing destruction will simply bring us round to our first full realisation of the scale of capitalism’s ecologically fractured legacy. The challenge will be to steer ourselves to a gentle landing: not only the unglamorous work of clean-up, but the pre-eminent adventure of remaking an idyll from the wreckage. This unfolding process holds out the promise of a new accord: alienation banished, reconciled with ourselves and the world around us.
+<center>
+. . . almost completely composed of unsorted and unevaluated stories, threats,
+<br>and rumors that had crossed my desk in New Haven. Many of these had long
+</center>
-One obvious question is: why restore at all? Nature is resilient, with an immense capacity for recovery, so long as natural processes are given sufficient space and time to operate freely. (Even in a hostile environment, life still crowds irrepressibly up through the cracks.) History is littered with stories of the detritus of past empires redeemed by the encroaching vegetation. Bill Mc Kibben describes “an explosion of green” in the northeastern US after farming was largely abandoned in the 19<sup>th</sup> century-in New York State alone <em>forest cover... continued to grow by more than a million acres a decade through 1980.[33]</em> Closer to home, thousands of acres of woodland sprang up on derelict <em>land in south-east Essex in the 1930s and 1940s.[34]</em>
+before been discounted by our Intelligence Division. But they had made their way from New Haven to Washington, had gained completely unwarranted credibility, and had been submitted by the Director of the FBI to the President of the United States. They seemed to present a convincing picture of impending holocaust.[110]
-Enabling natural colonisation and regeneration, rather than the artifice of planting, is widely favoured. This will <em>allow the most appropriate species for each location and site to establish and in the long term will be most likely to develop into healthy, biologically diverse woodland ecosystems.[35]</em> Conversely, the (understandable) <em>human desire to see instant results or at least appreciable results within our lifetime[36]</em> risks contriving inferior, quick-fix ersatz ecosystems-or “quite areas”:[37]
+In considering its recommendations, the Committee undertook an evaluation of the FBI's claims that domestic intelligence was necessary to combat terrorism, civil disorders, "subversion," and hostile foreign intelligence activity. The Committee reviewed voluminous materials bearing on this issue and questioned Bureau officials, local police officials, and present and former federal executive officials.
-The desire to leave nature to its own regenerative devices is not just sound ecological sense, but a reasonable reaction to the depths of conservation’s mania for management. After the Great Storm of 1987, one organisation blithely proclaimed that <em>Trees are atgreat dangerfrom nature,</em> and another that <em>unless... positive encouragement [is] given to owners to restore these woods... they will revert to scrub and never recover.[38]</em> Preposterous statements like <em>it is important that woodland is effectively managed to ensure its survival[39]</em> seem to spring more from an insecure need to feel wanted and indispensable-and thus engaging in frenetic busywork to obtain some kind of therapy through landscape. Conservationists often appear to suffer from a paternalist philosophy of Spare the Saw and Spoil the Tree.
+We have found that we are in fundamental agreement with the wisdom of Attorney General Stone's initial warning that intelligence agencies must not be "concerned with political or other opinions of individuals" and must be limited to investigating essentially only "such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States." The Committee's record demonstrates that domestic intelligence which departs from this standard raises grave risks of undermining the democratic process and harming the interests of individual citizens. This danger weighs heavily against the speculative or negligible benefits of the ill-defined and overbroad investigations authorized in the past. Thus, the basic purpose of the recommendations contained in Part IV of this report is to limit the FBI to investigating conduct rather than ideas or associations.
-Others have a valid objection to any energies devoted to restoration, given the continuing onslaught against the vestiges of the natural that still remain-comparing it to <em>repaint[ing] the kitchen cabinets when the house is on fire.[40]</em> Amongst practitioners however, there is a widespread assumption that restoration is never a substitute for preservation-rather that the two should complement one another, particularly in a country as devoid of healthy ecosystems as ours.[41] Developers, on the other hand, routinely abuse the concept of restoration-and the related translocation[42]-of habitats, as a pretext smoothing the way for further destruction. Talk of planning gain, end use, mitigation, and exchange land is predicated on the spurious assumption that we can build a better habitat, as good as new-as if they were just so many interchangeable parts on a Fordist assembly line. This kind of habitat engineering is reminiscent of the environment industry’s end of pipe approach to pollution, as applied to physical landscapes rather than toxic chemicals: rejecting any inconvenient changes to their processes, instead concentrating on lucrative cures to treat the problems that invariably arise. (Don’t forget that the Department of Transport [now DETR] is,-, laughably, the nation’s biggest planter of trees.) Possibly one of the most repellent examples of this is English Nature (the government’s abysmal wildlife watchdog) allowing peat-stripping scum Levington to take what it can from the fantastic Thorne and Hatfield Moors SSSI (Site of Special Scientific Interest), only to so-called restore them in about 25 years’ time.[43]
+The excesses of the past do not, however, justify depriving the United States of a clearly defined and effectively controlled domestic intelligence capability. The intelligence services of this nation's international adversaries continue to attempt to conduct clandestine espionage operations within the United States.[111] Our recommendations provide for intelligence investigations of hostile foreign intelligence activity.
-However, the fact that nature can and does bounce back unaided should not be cause for complacency. Recovery-particularly back to its original condition-is not inevitable; nature can roll with most but not all of the punches we throw: <em>‘Forests precede civilisation, it is said, ‘deserts follow’...The [Roman] Empire’s North African breadbasket, where 600 cities onceflourished, is now a desert, as are theforests that were the breeding grounds of Hannibal’s elephants.[44]</em> There is a place for human agency in the work of restoration.
+Moreover, terrorists have engaged in serious acts of violence which have brought death and injury to Americans and threaten further such acts. These acts, not the politics or beliefs of those who would commit them, are the proper focus for investigations to anticipate terrorist violence. Accordingly, the Committee would permit properly controlled intelligence investigations in those narrow circumstances.[112]
-*** Why Restore?
+Concentration on imminent violence can avoid the wasteful dispersion of resources which has characterized the sweeping (and fruitless) domestic intelligence investigations of the past. But the most important reason for the fundamental change in the domestic intelligence operations which our Recommendations propose is the need to protect the constitutional Rights of Americans.
-<quote>
+In light of the record of abuse revealed by our inquiry, the Committee is not satisfied with the position that mere exposure of what has occurred in the past will prevent its recurrence. Clear legal standards and effective oversight and controls are necessary to ensure that domestic intelligence activity does not itself undermine the democratic system it is intended to protect.
-Whether or not a devastated area recovers depends on a number of conditions. Most.fundamentally, the site needs its original topsoil... if the top horizon [of the soil] is altered--by adding chemicals, ploughing or planting crops--a different kindofvegetation emerges when the site is abandoned... But if neitherfertilisers nor crops are introduced, even heavily used areas can return to the condition pfnearby undisturbed areas.[45]
-</quote>
-Unfortunately for us, since at least 1945, virtually all of lowland Britain (and much of the uplands) has been subjected to substantial soil ‘modification’. It may seem odd to define this as a problem, but huge tracts of our countryside are suffering from ‘eutrophication’, or excessive fertility-either as a result of direct application of chemicals, or indirectly felt on adjoining land through ‘drift’ of the chemicals.
-<quote>
+[1] S. Res. 21, see. 2 (12). The Senate specifically charged this Committee with investigating "the conduct of domestic intelligence, or counterintelligence operations against United States citizens." (See. 2(2) ) The resolution added several examples of specific charges of possible "illegal, improper or unethical" governmental intelligence activities as matters to be fully investigated (See. (2) (1)-CIA domestic activities; See. (2) (3)-Huston Plan: See. (2) (10)-surreptitous entries, electronic surveillance, mail opening.)
-The intensity of the seed rain (from a once rich countryside) is much diminished, and though the seed bank in the soil may be long-livedfor some species, decades of herbicide and inorganicfertiliser use have transformed soils to make a return to the previous norm difficult without a helping hand.[46]
-</quote>
-While natural regeneration may, in time, make good some <em>of</em> the losses, without any remedial intervention-including drastic measures such as actually stripping the topsoil[47]--we might find ourselves locked into an intractable spiral of decline. An example of this ‘defertilising’ work-perhaps better described as rehabilitation than restoration-is the ‘biomanipulation’ practised on the Norfolk Broads to reduce accumulated phosphate pollution and the accompanying algal blooms.[48] Such intervention has been described as a kickstart approach[49]--striving not to prejudice its future direction, but setting nature back down on the launch pad, to go its own way.
+[2] Just as the term "Intelligence activity" encompasses activities that go far beyond the collection and analysis of information, the term "intelligence community" includes persons ranging from the President to the lowest field operatives of the intelligence agencies.
-Looked at more broadly, our restoration efforts may at least help by <em>undoing the constraints our industrialism have placed upon [nature</em>}.[50] For instance, while <em>artificially straightened rivers tend to ‘recover’ naturally,[51]</em> this can’t always be relied upon; extensive work was carried out on the Afon Ogwen (which <em>resembled a land drainage channel, not the Welsh river it once was)</em> in Snowdonia in 1998, because <em>the natural... regime of the river had not shown any indication of being able to repair itselffrom the degradations.</em>[52] Rivers and their floodplains have fared as badly as the soil; there is a powerful case for reversing our ubiquitous drainage works, and reinstating coherent hydrological regimes, in <em>what must have been a gloriously wet natural landscapil[53]—as</em> long as we can keep the ague (malaria) at bay this time!
+[3] The Alien Act provided for the deportation of all aliens judged "dangerous to the peace and safety" of the nation. (1 Stat. 570, June 25, 1798) The Sedition Act made it a federal crime to publish "false, scandalous and malicious writing" against the United States government, the Congress, or the President with the intent to "excite against them" the "hatred of the good people of the United States" or to "encourage or abet any hostile designs of any foreign nation against the United States." (1 Stat. 596, July 14, 1798) There were at least 25 arrests, 15 indictments, and 10 convictions under the Sedition Act. (See James M. Smith, Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1956).)
-The scanty (semi) natural areas that we do still enjoy are in anything but robust shape-ill-equipped to absorb the threats that future change and upheaval might bring. Much of conservation is dedicated to shoring up these wobbly, fragmented habitat islands-atomised, overcrowded life rafts, whose species are being inexorably worn down by ‘biogeographical’ attrition.[54] As the National Trust’s Rob Jarman explains, <em>each unit of habitat</em> 108 <em>lost [outside] makes the [ecological] communities on the Trust’s properties that much more vulnerable to external change.[55]</em> An injury to all is an injury to one-for example, other reservoir populations are less available to bail out local extinctions.[56] Probably the most critical challenge confronting the fragments in their already weakened and susceptible state is that of climate change[57]-or more correctly, the accelerated volatility of the Broken Thermostat effect.[58] As climate change brings the crisis of fragmentation to a head, now more than ever the agenda not only should be, but must be one of <em>restoration, enhancement and expansion... rather than just trying to harm [the environment] le</em><em>s</em><em>s</em><em>[59]</em>-joining up the dots to allow for migration in the face of rapidly changing conditions. It is not just the physical movement of individuals and species that is at stake here, but opportunities for the exchange of unique, locally adapted genetic material, which have been so long constrained; basic genetic diversity is the ultimate insurance policy against unpredictable change.[60]
+[4] Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority (Garden City; Doubleday, 1962), p. 224; Roger Daniels, Concentration Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War II (New York: Holt, Rinehart. and Winston, 1971), p. 66.
-In a country-like Britain-plagued with an advanced state of ecological decomposition, what might be termed <em>emergency ward</em> or <em>basket case</em> conservation also becomes very important--this is, perhaps literally, clutching at straws. It can cover particular regions-eg. the Caledonian pine forest ofthe Highlands, or the native woodlands of Orkney and Shetland-where the habitat is at such a perilously low ebb that it is losing its grip on the cliff edge, and may not currently be able to help itself. It can also encompass country-wide habitat types (and indeed species) whose near or total absence leaves a jarring gap in the continuum of the landscape. To pull a few names out of the hat, the following might fall into this category: the natural transitions of woodland up to and beyond the treeline, flooded or “carr” forest, lowland valley mires,[61] and so on.
+[5] Many victims of intelligence activities have claimed in the past that they were being subjected to hostile action by their government. Prior to this investigation, most Americans would have dismissed these allegations. Senator Philip Hart aptly described this phenomenon in the course of the Committee's public hearings on domestic intelligence activities:
+<br>
+<br>"As I'm sure others have, I have been told for years by, among others, some of my own family, that this is exactly what the Bureau was doing all of the time, and in my great wisdom and high office, I assured them that they were [wrong]-it just wasn't true. it couldn't happen. They wouldn't do it. What you have described is a series of illegal actions intended squarely to deny First Amendment rights to some Americans. That is what my children have told me was going on. Now I did not believe it.
+<br>
+<br>"The trick now, as I see it, Mr. Chairman, is for this committee to be able to figure out how to persuade the people of this country that indeed it did go on. And how shall we insure that it will never happen again? But it will happen repeatedly unless we can bring ourselves to understand and accept that it did go on." Senator Philip Hart, 11/18/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 41.
-One must not overlook the inward and social dimensions of ecological restoration-they may even be its most crucial attributes. It is at the least a statement of intent. Without getting too carried away with a sense of our collective power, restoration is ripe with the liberating, even alchemical, promise of transformation-finding its material expression in our immediate surroundings. It offers an exhilarating taste of that most dangerous commodity: hope, and a way out; there’s everything to play for, all bets are off. As ever, when people are truly able to make their world-even the tiniest little scrap-the grinding malaise of destruction and loss begins to dissipate, prospects for creation and renewal rebound, and imprisoning notions of ‘human nature’ go out the window. By getting to grips-down and dirty-with their common patch, so rarely permitted except under the auspices of government and industry, the barren and hostile can become convivial space. We can begin to explore the links between conservation and conversation, between re-creation and recreation. As the Mattole Restoration Council came to realise in Northern California, through engaging with the fundamental processes of a particular place, we might discover the appropriate models for our own activities and organisation.[62] The restorer restored; the doing (praxis) is as important as the done (it’s never done). Tara Garnett writes of the ‘emboldening’ effect of, in this case, urban farming: it can <em>stimulate a sense of common ownership and, in doing so, spur a sense of community into existence. Ihis community may then move on to further collective action[63].</em>.. During the riots in Benwell, Newcastle in the early 1990s, the <em>sense of ownership of the Park [which they had created] by the local community became very apparent... Many houses and the local pub were burnt, but the Nature Park-right in the centre-was untouched.[64]</em>
+[6] As the Supreme court noted in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 483. 486 (1966), even before the Court required law officers to advise criminal suspects of their constitutional rights before custodial interrogation, the FBI had "an exemplary record" in this area-a practice which the Court said should be emulated by state and local law enforcement agencies." This commendable FBI tradition in the general field of law enforcement presents a sharp contrast to the widespread disregard of individual rights in FBI domestic intelligence operations examined in the balance of this Report.
-There is also an argument for efforts to maintain the rich, characteristic cultural-or vernacular-landscapes, whose <em>patterns in particular places were created locally by the daily work of ordinary people.[65]</em> While requiring potentially problematic management, they developed, at least in part, to satisfy local subsistence needs from local means, in the absence of today’s national and global economy. In view of the pressing need to wean ourselves off petrochemical dependence, and to avoid stomping our ecological footprints across the globe[66], habitats like orchards, reedbeds, perhaps coppice, etc., could have a lot to teach us. In conjunction with more recent techniques such as permaculture, they could rejuvenate our sorely depleted skills base, and thus our own resilience and autonomy.[67]
+[7] New York Times, 5/13/24.
-*** Conservation and the Control Complex
+[8] Mary Jo Cook testimony, 12/2/75), Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 111; James B. Adams testimony, 12/2/75. Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 135.
-Conservation has been described as <em>a unique enterprise in which industry expands as the resource diminishes, and there is no product.[68]</em> In this respect it is a quintessentially post-modern industry, and conservationists are masters of meta-work (work about work)-ceaselessly networking and strategising within the charmed circle of accredited bodies-and while <em>ever more effort has gone into conservation of nature ... ever greater loss and destruction have</em> occurred.[69] When considered in historical context, the actual effect of most restoration efforts is only to replace the lost with the new-imparting no net gain. At best, depending on the vagaries of the economy, it is a holding operation[_:_]managing the crisis, knife-edge stabilising of the rate of decline. By virtue of being ‘non-politicai’ realists, conservationists are of course anything but. Refusing to wrestle with the explosive questions of power relations, land ownership and distribution, they are forced to rely upon the fruitless Voluntary Principle, and its unholy trinity of incentives, policy, and guidance-the beseeching, red-carpet treatment for any landowner gracious enough to change their ways.
+[9] Tom Charles Huston testimony, 9/23/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 45.
-W.M. Adams argues that it is <em>an anathema to many conservationists to consider letting nature go,</em> and that <em>caution about the abandonment of land is partly about the loss of control. Much of our conservation is based very precisely on the idea of controf.[70]</em> He likens it to <em>gardening on a vast s</em>c<em>ale</em>[71]-“lawn order.” At times, conservationists seem far more forgiving of economic growth than scrub growth-laissez faire for capitalism, zero tolerance for wild nature. (Maybe it is the only thing over which they can exercise control in this society.) Wildness must be quarantined[72] or taken into protective custody-kept in its place and made literally managable. The ferocity with which they fall upon scrub raises suspicions that it is a displacement activity-anything to divert attention from the uncomfortable realisation that you can’t restore your way out of a social relationship. Habitat loss has come primarily through social factors, and can only truly be made good by social transformation— not by swimming against the tide with more acute and technically proficient land management programmes.
+[10] "The Federal Prosecutor", Journal of the American Judicature Society (June, 1940), p. 18.
-Conservationists are incorrigible planners-partly through necessity, as fragmentation demands “an ever more detailed and complex knowledge of the remaining [wildlife] interest”[73]-and its corollary, an ever more specialist and thus inaccessible conservation, reduced to a technical question. Continually sharpening management tools is not a bad thing in itself: but does seem part of the quest for the holy grail of the “perfect plan’, balancing every conceivable need, at which point everything will fall neatly into place. At worst, it smacks of the hubris of the technocrat, inhabiting an ordered, predictable and empirical universe-the tyranny of the measurable-and a reluctance to admit to uncertainty and doubt-lhere are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamed of in your management plan. Not being armed with a plan is to go naked and exposed into the wood.
+[11] Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 10/6/75.
-Market values permeate the conservationist worldview:
+[12] Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 10/6/75.
-<quote>
+[13] James Angleton testimony, 9/17/75, p. 28.
-From economics have come words and ideas such as ‘produc<em>ers’, ‘consumers’ and ‘efficiency’, and using them ecologists have interpreted ecological change as working like a modem industrial consumer society... [leaving] conservation with a strong legacy of an instrumentalist view of nature... [and] nature as system.</em>[74]
-</quote>
-But it’s not quite this straightforward. Traditional ways of ‘working’ the land did at least enable some natural value to endure intact. Intensification on the other hand has meant the disappearance of even the commonplace[75], and a situation in which those areas which are ‘zoned’ for wildlife-like reserves— often have <em>no natural environment left in between them.[76]</em> The archaic and unproductive <em>1930s agriculture that conservationists practice</em>[77] has become increasingly alienated from the rest of the countryside. Hence there is a tension in conservation. On the one hand there is an impetus to detach land from (at least) the modern, intensive form of economic circulation. Thus there is an implied critique of economic practices; both because, on a practical level, conservationists are only too well aware of the way in which these practices thwart and frustrate their best efforts, and philosophically, because of a sense of nature as being, at heart, unassimilable: other than and perhaps diametrically opposed to the economy. On the other hand, conservationists pursue a strategy of safeguarding and justifying ecological value by assigning economic value (the tail wagging the dog?): pricing, or enclosing, everything that moves (and some that doesn’t)--running around with a butterfly net and a bar coder.[78] From this perspective the problem is not the market itself, but those things that hang in valueless limbo outside it. They must be reincorporated, if only by being enclosed within a policy framework.
+[14] See Mail Opening Report: Section IV, "FBI Mail Openings."
-As well as being self-serving squealing for more snout space in the government trough, the following quote illustrates this well:
+[15] Chief, International Terrorist Group testimony, Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, 3/10/75, pp. 1485-1489.
-Neglect is a real issue, because the heathlands play no real role in any economic system and are simply not cared for. What is needed is better funding of conservation schemes which will enable owners and managers to produce the environmental goods that society now demands.[79]
+[16] Statement by the Chairman, 11/6/75; re: SHAMROCK, Hearings, Vol, 5, pp. 57-60.
-**** Farming for Wildlife, Farming of Wildlife
+[17] See Military Surveillance Report: Section 11, "The Collection of Information about the Political Activities of Private Citizens and Private Organizations."
-The crisis now afflicting farming is the spectre haunting conservation. Their banal big idea, in response to the looming problems triggered by overproduction, liberalisation of world trade under the GATT Treaty and so on, is to reform the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Apparently our basic structures are sound, it is just the details that need tweaking or fine-tuning--this is a job for the policy wonks! (Some are even still resorting to an ‘unfettered’ free market-as opposed to the distortions of the CAP-as the answer to all our woes.[80]) CAP subsidies will be redirected towards ‘agri-environment’ grants, the panacea which will help to reposition farming, and enable farmers to ‘diversify’. Agriculture’s new identity will primarily be as purveyor of intangible luxury environmental goods, such as delivering biodiversity targets-farming for wildlife-the food surplus presenting us with a tremendous window of opportunity for redesigning the countryside for other purposes:[81] in theory, making good those habitat losses. As the Council for National Parks say, the main product is a wild and sustainable landscape, not stock or timber.[82] (Whether any of this is ‘sustainable’ is open to question-it-hinges upon the continuation of surplus, and a highly sophisticated economy that is able to forego economic return on land and set it aside.)
+[18] See IRS Report: Section II, "Selective Enforcement for Non-tax Purposes."
-According to Raoul Vaneigem,
+[19] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, 12/8/54. Many of the memoranda cited in this report were actually written by FBI personnel other than those whose names were indicated at the foot of the document as the author. Citation in this report of specific memoranda by using the names of FBI personnel which so appear is for documentation purposes only and is not intended to presume authorship or even knowledge in all cases.
-<quote>
+[20] Memorandum from Kansas City Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/20/70. (Hearings, Vol. 6, Exhibit 543)
-so <em>brutal has the exploitation of nature been that its resources-the very nature of its profitability-are threatened with exhaustion; there is thus no choice but to develop ecological markets in order to get the economy out of its present morass.[83]</em>
-</quote>
-Central to this is the task of devising virtuous products, along with <em>virtuous</em> jobs like conservation-zealous self-alienationworking long hours for low pay, for the cause.
+[21] Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/28/69, P. 2. (Hearings, Vol. 6, Exhibit 54--1)
-Farming for wildlife readily becomes farming ofwildlife: its discrete commodification (and heaven help those uncharismatic species that are left out in the cold, that can’t be commodified[84]). For example, Landlife are administering the <em>Market Gardening with Indigenous Species</em> project, under which <em>local .farmers will be planting wildflower crops</em> [sic] <em>thanks to a grantfrom the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund.[85]</em> (By the way, their National Wildflower Centre’s mission is to promote <em>the creation of new habitats that have economic, environmental, and ecological benefits for the nation.[86])</em>
+[22] Memorandum from Baltimore Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/11/70, P. 2.
-Many nature reserves already seem akin to beauty factories, governed by aesthetic productivism. What are sometimes known as Physical Outputs are maximised; one manager, discussing the merits of non-intervention, bemoaned the fact that <em>funders [of reserves]... want to see action and colour—</em> hence coppicing, which <em>bring[s] about a short burst of bluebells and butterflies</em>[87]--all fluttering, all flowering habitats, practically on performance-related pay. Nature is <em>consumed in special places... and made to yield predictable products,</em> becoming <em>one among a range of commodities that can be purchased by the wealthy to enhance their leisure time.[88]</em>
+[23] Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/14/64.
-Reserve cramming (like town cramming)-or high unit productivity-is partly a consequence of fragmentation. For instance, <em>woods often act as reserves for the whole landscape, especially in intensively arable regions. Afony... should be regarded as grassland reserves, as well as woodland reserves.[89]</em> They must work flat out to be all things to all taxa-to please all of the species all of the lime. But the more efort that <em>is put in to make</em> <em>it rich, thefurther it departs from naturalness.[90]</em>
+[24] Name deleted by Committee to protect privacy.
-With restoration there is also the temerity of zoning for wildlife-striding grandly about the landscape, prescribing Here a hay meadow, there a salt marsh (but not There), or This is a wood for butterflies, that one is for lichens (a kind of comparative advantage-one hopes with trickle-down-effect benefits for other species).
+[25] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Meld Office 4/24/64, re CPUSA, Negro question.
-Reading RSPB[91] reports I am mesmerised by the dance of the graphs. Conservation is reminiscent of an EPOS (Electronic Point of Sale) stock-taking system, monitoring a steady stream of population data-eg. such-and-such has just made it into the Red Data Book (the species emergency list)-their stock is low-Darren, we need more garganey. The habitat-creation trucks then get rolling for this just-in-time production, bringing new waders on line to match identified need.
+[26] James Adams testimony, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 137.
-Restoration and management for wildlife might actually have detrimental indirect effects on the surrounding area. ‘Rewetting’ of depleted wetland reserves may exacerbate the serious problem of water abstraction: it can cause the already degraded neighbouring countryside to become even drier and less hospitable, by creaming off what little surplus water there is.[92] These refugia might therefore consolidate habitat fragmentation, monopolising the wildlife, acting like a vortex which strips its hinterland of biodiversity, or like an out of town supermarket, emptying value out of its vicinity. For example, Pulborough Brooks in Sussex’s Arnn valley (see profile in the Roundup) now harbours up to <em>75% of the total Arun valley wintering birds</em> every January.[93] While <em>bird counts on the reserve are soaring... counts for the area are stillfalling disastrously.[94]</em> By concentrating the “resource” like this, the very visible spectacular displays at Pulborough may be masking the decline rather than reversing it. (Although it seems likely that in the long run the whole of the Arnn valley may actually benefit from Pulborough.)
+[27] Memorandum from F. T. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 5/29/6.3.
-In an era when the dollar is being encoded into DNA-the final, molecular, frontier of enclosure-the question, what is nature?, is no longer just a matter for dry philosophical discourse.[95] David Helton reported on the 1992 meeting of CITES (the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species), where the doctrine of sustainable utilisation-and by extension, the question of nature’s Identity-was up for grabs. Like “farming for wildlife;’ it involves a species being taken out of the economics of nature and brought into the economics of man[96] [sic] and is heralded as some <em>kind of solution to the problems of human growth, both numeric and economic, without that growth having to stop.</em> The rhino is <em>the one large mammal in the world whose existence is conspicuously threatened by international trade,</em> and has therefore been purposefully excluded from the economic sphere by CITES. And yet, the proposal in 1992 was still to actually “harvest” horn from live rhinos and <em>put [it]... on the legalised, reopened market,</em> with the result that <em>rhinos would be paying their own way in the world.</em>
+[28] Memorandum from Oklahoma City Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 9/19/41. See Development of FBI Domestic Intelligence Investigations: Section IV, "FBI Target Lists."
-Thankfully the proposal was rejected, but as Helton observes, the future foreshadowed by this approach
+[29] Chief Robert Shackleford testimony, 2/6/76, p. 91.
-<quote>
+[30] Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. Report. 1973. p. 57.
-<em>doesn’t look like one worth living in, for people or rhinos either. The reason we save the rhino... is because it’s... living wild on its own terms and deserving to. Ifwe have to use emergency measures now... it’s only so that some time in the future rhinos can return to their proper existence, in a world made sane again, with humanity under its own control and for the other species a normal wild life, not as livestock in a global barnyard-not with the rhino as some kind of tonicproducing cow, an ongoing business. It would almost be better of extinct.</em>
-</quote>
-It’s a clearcut choice, albeit one that has been foisted upon us: to
+[31] Senate Select Committee Staff summary of HTLINGUAL File Review, 9/5/75.
-<quote>
+[32] FBI Summary Memorandum, 1/31/75, re: Coverage of TX. Presentation.
-<em>either stop growing or go for a desperate long shot and put absolutely everything under human management.[97]</em>
-</quote>
-**** Disturbing Climaxes
+[33] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Marvin Watson, 7/15/66.
-Natural succession is the “process of change in plant communities over time towards a natural climax, for example from grassland to scrub and then woodland.”[98] Conservationists have been fighting the ‘wars of succession’ since at least the 1960s, in an attempt to retain those wildlife values that flow from continuity of traditional management features such as heathland. (It should be pointed out here that it can be very difficult to precisely define the traditional practices that conservation harks back to.[99] Also, that arresting ecosystem change in this way has been pointedly compared to the futility of trying to hold back a flood with a raincoat.[100]) However, conservationists are now beginning to stage what might be called a managed retreat (a la Dunkirk?) from universally regulating such natural processes--perhaps learning to let go.
+[34] See Military Report: See. II, "The Collection of information About the Political Activities of Private citizens and Private Organizations."
-The orthodox model of nature emphasised predictability and continuity. Change did figure in the equation, but only as part of an orderly and inexorable progression, with each stage in the succession obligingly laying down the conditions for the next, until it achieved a stable equilibrium-a relatively steady-state (revealing term![101]) climax vegetation like woodland[102] This is of course at least in part a cultural construct reflecting the political climate out of which it sprang as much as it does nature. The theory was strongly rooted in Darwinian ideas of biological evolution, and spin-off ideas of social ‘progressr,’[103] redolent of a time of Eternal Verities, a naturally ordained and fixed social order and a linear and cumulative conception ofhistory. Humanity was perched in its rightful place atop the evolutionary tree-the Crown of Creation, or climax species-with the imputed hierarchy in nature serving to endorse the ranking of classes and races within humanity itself.
+[35] Memorandum from FBI headquarters to all SAC's, 11/4/70.
-However, we now find that
+[36] Charles Brennan testimony, 9/25/75, Hearings, vol. 2 p. 117.
-<quote>
+[37] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 7/5/68.
-<em>climax, like the horizon, may be a useful concept, but it... can never be reached... when ecologists examined climax vegetation their studies were upset by disturbance. It soon became clear that disturbance was not an exception, a temporary upset, but a central part of the ecology of a habitat.</em>[104]
-</quote>
-Disturbance, from grazing, windblow, fire, flooding, erosion and a host of other factors, is perpetually disrupting <em>the progression towards theoretical climax,[105]</em> resetting the clock back. In a sense, there is no beginning and there is no end-it’s all process-an open-ended question. It has been pointed out that people respond to events rather than processes-particularly in spectacular society, where social phenomena are prised loose from their context and reproduced as disembodied and mystifying events. (Conversely, ecology is, if nothing else, the story of context-the antithesis of spectacular amnesia.) Looked at in this light, nature reserves-managed as frozen moments in ecological time-represent soundbite or event habitats.
+[38] Abstracts of New Left Documents #161, 115, 43. Memorandum from Washington Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/21/69.
-This new-found taste for disturbance and uncertainty has led ecologists away from <em>nature as a well-behaved deterministic system</em>[106] towards <em>instability, disorder, a shifting world of upheaval and change that has no direction to it</em>[107] (Mao’s permanent revolution, perhaps?!) Since <em>autonomy is [now] viewed as a fundamental characteristic of ‘real’ nature, it tends to operate as more of a game than a controllable system.</em>[108] This suggests possibilities of a more gratifying, sensuous character to humanity’s interactions with nature-as a player within the game, not an engineering outsider-whose role might be to <em>conserve the capacity of nature to re-create itself.</em>[109]
+[39] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 11/29/68.
-Disturbance is the engine of ecological variety in the landscape, preventing those species that would dominate under (e.g.) a closed canopy climax having it all their own way. There is what might be called a dialectic between structure (such as the canopy) and disturbance here:
+[40] FBI manual of Instructions, See. 87, B (2-f).
-<quote>
+[41] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 7/23/69.
-<em>Too little disturbance leads to dominance of a few strong competitors, while a heavy disturbance regime [as in most of Britain] is tolerated only by a few hardy species.[110]</em>
-</quote>
-Our best bet could be the supremely difficult practice of faithfully emulating the effects of natural disturbance-the commdrum of planning for chance. We’ve already been unknowingly engaged in a form of this for centuries:
+[42] Memorandum from Stephen Early to J. Edgar Hoover, 5/21/40; 6/17/40.
-<quote>
+[43] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to George Allen, 12/3/46.
-<em>As the original wildwood became cleared andfragmented, disturbance from management gradually took over from natural disturbance... which can not operate on the small scale.</em> However, this supplanting of natural processes by management represents a coarsening and simplification-only <em>some of the attributes of natural disturbance [have] continued[111]--the effects of our management have been too uniform, and some crucial components have fallen by the wayside.</em>
-</quote>
-**** What Are We Missing?
+[44] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Maj. Gen. Harry Vaughn, 2/15/47.
-<quote>
+[45] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to M. T. Connelly, 1/27/50.
-<em>The ecological effect of most woodland management is to artificially remove the late mature and decaying elements of the regeneration cycle,[112]</em> including the dead wood <em>which accounts for 50% of the timber in oldforest,[113]</em> and is <em>one of the two or three greatest resources of the woodland habitat.[114]</em>
+[46] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Dillon Anderson, 11/7/55.
+[47] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler, 2/13/58.
-Without this, we miss out on the <em>healthy fungal</em> <em>flora [which] contributes significantly to the ecological health of the wood[115],</em> by breaking the dead wood down and making its nutrients available to other plants. As Rambler and Speight point out, a whopping <em>70% of the energy flow through a terrestrial ecosystem is through the decomposer community,[116]</em> including fungi. In our woodlands, this flow is blocked.
+[47] Letters from T. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler, 4/21/53-4/27/53.
-</quote>
-Another vital element is one that many of us only saw for the first time after the 1987 storm: the “pit and mound” topography formed by the upended root plates of toppled trees, which can cover <em>14–50% of the forestfloor in some unmanaged American woods.[117]</em> Ordinarily, rain leaches nutrients away from an undisturbed soil’s surface. The upturned trees instead turn and mix the soil, bringing nutrients back up to the surface and encouraging plant germination-acting as <em>“an added degree of soil rejuvenation.</em>
+[48] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/16/61.
-According to Tony Whitbread, <em>woodland soils would not naturally form, layer on layer, without... [such] mixing.[118]</em> Deprived of such intrinsic features as these, who can now imagine the ensuing richness and vibrancy that our countryside lacks?
+[49] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/14/61.
-Finally, there are the ecotones-twilight zones where a palette of habitats melt seamlessly into and out of one another, in a kind of hybridising. <em>Many species rely on [this] interface between one habitat and another,[119]</em> but not only do roads, intensive farming, etc, dismember this delicate habitat continuum, fluid
+[50] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/16/61.
-<quote>
+[51] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 6/26/62.
-<em>change is often prevented by management</em>[120] as well. For example, <em>there may be a sharp boundary between a wood and a hay meadow. Scrub invasion, left unchecked, would soon overwhelm the meadow, but the regime that resists it eliminates the ecotone instead. Such harsh zonation is often the only way to preserve habitat fragments, but leaves no room for natural processes to operate.</em>[121]
-</quote>
-It is difficult to manage for ecotones[122], emblematic as they are of a dynamic, supple landscape of flux-which leaves us with a straight choice between zoning and process. Zoning causes the pattern of habitats to ossify, in a kind of habitat reductionism.
+[52] Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 12/19/66.
-Work, and other ‘socially polluting’ alienated activities, can be seen as a ‘habitat fragmentation’ of the time of our lives; with ‘management’ leading to zoning-artificial disjunctions-and eliminating soft-edged ecotones. As Andre Gorz says, “The way our space is arranged carries on the disintegration of people that begins with the division of labour in the factory. It cuts a person into slices, it cuts our time, our life, into separate slices:[123] If you don’t believe me, think about how your lunch hour feels (assuming you are still allowed one), or the slow, ominous countdown of a Sunday night.
+[53] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/18/61.
-**** The National Forest and the Community Forests-Managing People and Nature
+[54] Memorandum from T. Edgar Hoover to Bill Moyers, 10/27/64.
-The National Forest, the twelve Community Forests, and the activities of the Groundwork organisation are all examples of a restoration which is as much concerned with the management of people as it is of nature. The National Forest, which aims to create a <em>multi-purpose forest[124]</em> over 200 square miles of the Midlands, sees itself as a <em>model of sustainable development.[125]</em> The Community Forests are situated on the urban fringe of major English towns, subscribe to the same multi-function forestry framework, and constitute, allegedly, <em>the most significant environmental programme to be launched in Britain this century.[126]</em> Pretty much as you’d expect, they are therefore crap. Both kinds of ‘forest’ have the superficially laudable goal of increasing Britain’s pathetic average tree cover of 73 to around 303 in their area. However, ‘multi-purpose forestry’ is such that one of them actually thought it necessary to remind itself that <em>Trees will play a vitally important role in achieving the community forest.”[127]</em>
+[55] Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to John Mohr, 8/29/64.
-So puny are most of their new woodlands that they deserve to be known as fun-sized woods-in honour of the unsatisfying and anything but Mars Bar ofthe same name.[128] It seems to be a case of drawing lines on a map and designating publicity or 120 policy forests, composed of enterprise glades[129], the modern day bureaucrat’s equivalent of the treeless Deer Forests of Scottish feudalism.. (There’s no shortage of (bureaucratic) deadwood in these forests.) Since the objective is to <em>improve the image”,</em> one gets the impression that they would be as content with just the early impression of forest cover99 as with the real Mc Coy-so long as things are seen to be done.
+[56] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to H.R. Haldeman, 6/25/70.
-The true agenda of Groundwork and the various forests is one ofregeneration and reclamation. By and large they are superimposed on the former strongholds of heavy industry in the Midlands and the North-those areas most badly abused by and then, in the 1980s, abandoned by capitalism. It is about <em>managing change</em>[130]-using trees as a device to bring unsightly derelict land back into economic circulation, and addressing agricultural overproduction through farm diversification into forestry and leisure. It is about trying to ensure a smooth transition to the post-modern service or information economy, where the intangible environmental goods and quality of life issues are paramount-cg. as at the new Earth Centre, near Doncaster.[131] In the National Forest, <em>this regenerated coalfield land, which provided the local community with jobs in the past, will serve them in other ways in thefuture by providing recreationalfacilities, wildlife habitats and an attractive landscape.[132]</em> It is about tailoring a flexible. multi-tasking landscape for a flexible economy-the (relative) solidarity of the old heavy industries giving way to the (relative) atomisation of the casual, service sector-where, doubtless, we’ll all work in partnership.
+[57] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters, to San Francisco Field Office, 11/26/68.
-The Red Rose Forest (Manchester) claim, in a particularly howling non-sequitur, that <em>economic, environmental and social regeneration cannot proceed without one another.[133]</em> Providing <em>an attractive environment in which business can flourish[134]</em> is the Forests’ main weapon in the mad, begging-bowl scramble to attract inward investment, giving them <em>a competitive advantage over competitor areas[135]-a</em> pitiful Pretty please to developers. Because, more than anything else, <em>this forest means business,</em> [136] if all goes according to plan these forests might actually end up more heavily developed than before: where ... [planning] policies allow for increased industrial development, a high quality landscape can be a valuable first step in an aeva’s revitalisation [sic].[137] As well as having their office premises or surplus sites tarted up-what the Mersey Forest calls <em>screen[ing] industry,[138]</em> or landscaping as physical PR-usually at public expense, it offers another more subtle service to business. This is the philanthropic advantage that comes when you <em>display your environmental credentials,</em> helping to <em>generate goodwill... [and] raise... product and brand awareness.[139]</em> Thus we have Manchester Aiq>ort supporting a trifling new tree planting programme-mulched with <em>bioregional</em> Bollin Valley woodchips, no doubt-through the Manchester Aviation Tree Challenge, and sanctimonious noises about the <em>important part [that trees play] in reducing greenhouse gases and global warming.[140]</em>
+[58] Memorandum from [Midwest City] Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/l/68; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to [Midwest City] Field Office, 8/6/68.
-Nor have the older, more classically industrial uses entirely gone away. Grotesque ‘planning gain’ and ‘end use’ scams are rife: “Mining will continue to be a major activity within the Forest... The case for [minerals] development is certainly strengthened if the developer can show a benefit to the National Foresft.”[141] At Broxtowe in the Greenwood Community Forest (Nottinghamshire), <em>opencast mining operations</em> will, in the topsy-turvey world these people inhabit, <em>ultimately [bring]... about economic and environmental benefits:</em> a new woodland of 14 hectares which will <em>provide an attractive backdrop</em> for a <em>new employment site of eight hectares.[142]</em> (This is presumably the kind of thing they have in mind when they talk of-in Groundwork’s <em>words-integrating the economy and the environment.[143])</em>
+[59] Memorandum from Columbia Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/4/70, re: COINTELPRO-New Left.
-**** Community, Partnership, and All That jazz
+[60] Memorandum from Cbarles Brennan to William Sullivan. 8/15/68.
-All of this-particularly in the case of Groundwork-comes robotically decked out in odious communitarian jargon, such as stakeholding, capacity building, zero tolerance (controlling anti-social behaviour through environmental design[144]), participation, and partnership. It is consistent with Blairite big-tent politics-subsuming most potential opponents and marginalising those that won’t be co-opted.[145] The insidious weed of partnership, with its smothering, spurious consensus (like being love bombed), seems to be springing up everywhere nowadays.
+[61] Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/9/68.
-Partnership mendaciously supposes that we all come to the table as equals, and, conveniently, that we all bear a shared responsibility for what has gone wrong-nasty, disruptive blame and dissension must not intrude on these mature deliberations. Class and other power differentials are submerged in the bland, ostensibly classless interest in saving the planet (a union sacree)-political questions are reframed as dispassionate technical ones--the quest for the perfect plan again. It’s just a new way-their latest wheeze-for us to get screwed.
+[62] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 1/30/69 re: COINTELPRO, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups.
-<quote>
+[63] William C. Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, p. 49.
-The cleverly constructed notion of “sustainable development” with its emphasis on harmonious consensus in decision-making, combined with the incorporation of the environment into the market system, has dissipated the imperative that environmental deterioration once hadfor social and political change.[146]
-</quote>
-Community-partnership’s medium-seems to be the elusive Philosopher’s Stone of ‘90s politics; the supreme value before which-irrespective of political persuasion-we must all prostrate ourselves. (Interestingly, the term is most commonly used either where it patently does not exist-eg. the business..., international, the rural community of the Countryside March--or where it is in some way threatened or in question-eg. the black..., the gay...)
+[64] memorandum from Baumgardner to Sullivan, 2/4/64.
-Groundwork constantly brag of their presence in depressed, no-go areas-there is more than a hint of the ‘community development’ troops being parachuted in: <em>Throughout the western world states are characterised by one of the two symbols of control in capitalist society: the tank or the community worker.[147]</em> The environmental focus of the work also serves to locate the community’s problems squarely within its own physical fabric, rather than as emanating from wider, structural forces-as if by simply beautifying the area, you will beautify the social relationships that people experience.
+[65] Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/16/68; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 1/30/69, re: COINTELPRO, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups.
-The partnership and participation must only extend so far. The communities must not realise too uppity a sense of their own strength-which is to say, truly become a community-or the development workers and their political masters might become expendable. In the same way that capitalism, from the 1920s on, had to <em>simultaneously... encourage and repress the ‘creation of dissatisfaction’</em>[148] if it was to shift its surplus goods,
+[66] William C. Sullivan, 11/1/75, pp. 104-105.
-this community development must simultaneously unleash and rein in empowerment. Like derelict land, derelict communities are brought back into economic circulation, and their members enlisted in gilding their cage. Forget building the Situationists’ hacienda, mate-you don’t want to do it like that-this is building the strategic hamlet.
+[67] Andrew Young testimony, 2/19/76. p. 8.
-Local communities are deployed as proxies-a cost-effective means of delivering the desired results?[149] In a hidden subsidy to industry, we do the dirty work of clearing up the ‘externalities’ they leave behind.
+[68] Memorandum from Sullivan to Belmont, 8/30/63.
-<quote>
+[69] Memorandum from Sullivan to Belmont, 1/8/64.
-<em>Working in partnership with local authorities and businesses, Community Forests harness the commitment and enthusiasm of local people, mobilising them to regenerate their area.[150]</em>
-</quote>
-(Oooh, it sounds so good since you put it like that.) Paul Goon (appropriately) of the government’s ‘English Partnerships’ congratulates Groundwork on
+[70] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 3/4/68.
-<quote>
+[71] See Mail Opening Report: Section II, "Legal Considerations and the 'Flap' Potential."
-<em>their unrivalled ability to co-ordinate local communities, engender enthusiasm and deliver the goods at excellent valuefor money.[151]</em>
-</quote>
-It echoes Paulette Goudge’s comment on Third World aid, that
+[72] See NSA Report: Section I. "Introduction and Summary."
-<quote>
+[73] Memorandum from Attorney General Brownell to J. Edgar Hoover, 5/20/54.
-<em>‘sustainable development’ no longer refers to preserving the environment; it now means developments that communities canfinancially sustain themselves</em>[152]
-<right>
+[74] See finding on Political Abuse. To protect the privacy of the targeted individual, the Committee has omitted the citation to the memorandum concerning the example of purely personal information.
---the Polluted Pays principle.
-</right>
-</quote>
-In contrast to the economy’s flexible landscape, in which we are obliged to accept the loss of cherished features, as decreed, heritage is constructed as a reassuring beacon of stability-that <em>which isforever England.</em> There is a tension between the frequent appeals to such sentiments of a <em>common</em> heritage <em>(our</em> patch), and otherwise jealously guarded property rights. It only becomes <em>ours</em> when it suits them-we only get to inherit their cast off dregs, and must be suitably gratefol when granted that much. (Many of the Groundwork and Community Forest sites are, for instance, former chemical waste dumps and landfills.) Perhaps the residents of the Amazon will one day be exhorted to restore <em>their</em> forest, when it has finally been logged out for tremendous private gain. Bottom-up is employed to correct the miserable failures of top down. However they choose to label the bottle it always tastes like shit-instead, we must choose praxis over proxy.
+[75] Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach 7/19/66, p. 2.
-According to Ulrich Beck, the ecological movement is not so much an environmental movement but a social, inward movement which utilises ‘nature’ as a parameterfor certain questions.[153] While one can quibble with his distinction between the environmental and the social, basically there’s a lot of truth to this view. Perhaps the major revolutionary contribution of environmentalism (in the broadest possible sense) is in exploring issues of control over space, the ways in which its use is currently determined, and the ways in which those uses can be radically transformed. These questions may have assumed a greater relative importance in recent years, given the seeming decline of the power to organise and act in the workplace. Like “the Street Party of Street Parties”,[154] our very first need, (the one which prefigures and makes possible the rediscovery of all our myriad other needs), is for a place in which people [can] gather-a common ground-andfocus their attentions on things that could improve the quality of their general existence, and that of wild-life.[155] The act-of occupying a place and remaking it as a space used for interaction and renewal-is an answer to many of our questions in itself. Restoration can be harnessed to make the world safe for capital-by replenishing the regions whose profitability it has exhausted-or can create something which is inimical to it: headstrong communities savouring their own innate resourcefulness. When asked how people might spend their time after the revolution, Marcuse replied that We will tear down the big cities and build new ones[156]--whose districts... could <em>correspond to the whole opedivum ofdiversefeelings that one encounters by chancein everyday life,[157]</em> multifarious nefarious space in which hitherto unrequited lives and blighted potential might at last find expression, freed from the monocultural dictates of capital. We are a very long way from that now, but wherever we see <em>the restoration of whole ecosystems and the empowerment of communities together,</em> [158] its allure beckons, and we are another step closer.
+[76] General Accounting Office Report on Domestic intelligence Operations of the FBI. 9/75.
-The only half-decent thing to come out of the horrific M3 extension through Twyford Down was the ripping up, re-contouring and grassing over of the old A33 Winchester bypass. It gave the people of Winchester easy access across the flood meadows of the River Itchen to St. Catherine’s Hill for the first time in decades. A mere 5 years after the work was done, however, and the local council already wants to re-tarmac 20 acres of the site as a park-and-ride facility. There is strong local opposition to being robbed of their precious green space once more.
+[77] Mary Jo Cook testimony. 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6. p. 111.
-[32] “Revisiting Auroville”, Alan Lithman, in “Helping Nature Heal: An Introduction to Environmental Restoration,” Ed. Richard Nilsen, Whole Earth/Ten Speed Press 1991, p.96.
+[78] Gary Rowe deposition, 10/17/75, p. 9.
-[33] “An Explosion of Green”, Bill Mc Kibben, Atlantic Monthly April 1995, p.63.
+[79] Special Agent No. 3 deposition, 11/21/75, p. 12.
-[34] “Planting Amenity Trees”, Oliver Rackham, in “T Iie Tree Book”, J. Edward Milner, Collins and Brown 1992, p.152. For other examples, see also: “From Waste to Wildlife”, Charles Couzens, Natural World Winter 1992; “Orchids rise from the ashes”, New Scientist 30/9/95; “Return to Paradise”, Laura Spinney, New Scientist 20/7/96; “A real waste”, Fred Pearce, New Scientist 11/4/98; “The Lowdown on Dirt”, Chris Baines, BBC Wildlife Nov. 1990.
+[80] Huston testimony 9/23/75, Hearings, Vol. 2,1).
-[35] “Wild By Design in the National Parks of England and Wales”, Council for National Parks 1997, p.14.
+[81] William Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, pp. 92-93.
-[36] Ibid, p.11.
+[82] The quote is from a Bureau official who had supervised for the "Black Nationalist Hate. Group" COINTELPRO.
+<br>
+<br>"Question. Did anybody at any time that you remember during the course of the program, discuss the Constitutionality or the legal authority, or anything else like that?
+<br>
+<br>"Answer. No, we never gave it a thought. As far as I know, nobody engaged or ever had any idea that they were doing anything other than what was the policy of the Bureau which had been policy for a long time." (George Moore deposition, 11/3/75, p. 83.)
-[37] Actually, this was a misprint of “quiet areas” in a management plan, but the voices in my head made it seem like a good idea at the time.
+[83] Branagan, 10/9/75, p. 41.
-[38] “Aftermath”, Richard Mabey, BBC Wildlife October 1997. Toy’s Hill, Kent is cited as a particularly good case study; the cleared areas needed planting, . and are still struggling, while the uncleared are experiencing “prolific regrowth”.
+[84] Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/19/70.
-[39] “Setting the Scene for Growth”, The Mersey Forest, p.3.
+[85] Memorandum from 'San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/30/69.
-[40] Gar Smith, in “Pitfalls on the Way to Lasting Restoration”, Seth Zuckerman, in Op.Cit.1, p.12.
+[86] Memorandum from Mobile Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/9/70.
-[41] Eg. see: “General information about habitat creation”, Habitat Restoration Project Factsheet 1, English Nature, undated, p.2; “Habitat Creation-A Critical Guide”, D.M. Parker. English Nature Science Report 21, 1995. p.l.
+[87] Memorandum from Wick to DeLoach, 11/9/66.
-[42] Eg. see: “Can you really move places?”, Trevor Lawson, BBC Wildlife January 1997; “Removals no go” [on Teigngrace], Trevor Lawson, BBC Wildlife September 1998; “Sod Off’, [on Ashton Court] SchNEWS 183.
+[88] Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/9/68.
-[43] See: “The Environment Industry: Profiting from Pollution”, Joshua Karliner. The Ecologist March/April 1994. For Thorne and Hatfield. see: “Bogged down in details”, Catherine Caufield, The Guardian 24/9/97; “English Nature in mire over bog”. David Harrison. The Observer 30/11/97.
+[89] See King Report: Sections V and VII.
-[44] World Wide Fund for Nature “Forests” Supplement to The Observer, 1992, p.10.
+[90] Memorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 10/26/68.
-[45] “Natural Restoration-When Humans Walk Away”, Susan E. Davis, in Op.Cit.1, p.22/23.
+[91] Memorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 5/17/68.
-[46] “Creative conservation: a way forward”, Richard Scott and Grant Luscombe, Ecos 16 (2) 1995. p.13. See also: “General information about habitat creation”, Op.Cit.lO., p.3.
+[92] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Miami Field Office, 7/9/68.
-[47] Eg. See “Habitat Restoration Project: Factsheets and Bibliographies”, Rob Dryden, English Nature Research Reports No. 260, 1997.
+[93] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/22/68.
-[48] See “Future Nature-a vision for conservation”, W.M. Adams, Earthscan 1996, p.168.
+[94] omitted in original.
-[49] See Op.Cit.4. p.12; Also pp.9, 14, 42. See debate on p.12 regarding ‘future nature’.
+[95] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 8/28/68.
-[50] Op.Cit.17. p.169.
+[96] Memorandum from W. H. Stapleton to DeLoach, 11/3/64.
-[51] Ibid, p.166.
+[97] Sullivan. 11/1/75, p. 48.
-[52] River Restoration News 1, November 1998, p.3.
+[98] Memorandum from Baumgardner to Sullivan. 8/26/63 p. 1. Hoover himself construed the initial Division estimate to mean that Communist influence was "infinitesimal."
-[53] “Biodiversity Conservation in Britain: Science Replacing Tradition”, Clive Hambler and Martin Speight, British Wildlife February 1995. p.144.
+[98] See Finding on Political Abuse, p. 225.
-[54] See “The Eternal Threat: Biodiversity Loss and the Fragmentation of the Wild” in Do or Die 5 for a fuller explanation of this process. Also, “Conserving wildlife in a black hole”, Adrian Colston, Ecos 18 (1) 1997, p.65, for an excellent example.
+[99] See Finding on Political Abuse. p. 225.
-[55] “Habitat restoration-recanting the status quo”, Rob Jarman, Ecos 16 (2) 1995. p.31.
+[100] "New Left Notes -- Philadelphia." 9/16/70, Edition #1.
-[56] Eg. See “Gambling with nature? A new paradigm of nature and its consequences for nature management strategy”, Johan van Zoest, in “Coastal Dunes-Geomorphology. Ecology and Management for Conservation”. Eds. Carter et al., Balkema 1992, p. 515.
+[101] Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters 10/26/60; Memorandum from P13T Headquarters to Detroit Field Office 10/27, 28, 31/60; Memorandum from Baumgardner to Belmont, 10/26/60.
-[57] See: “Some Like it Hot”, Markham et al, WWF-International 1993; especially p.121 and pp.125–128.
+[102] See COINTELPRO Report: Section 111. "The Goals of COINTELPRO: Preventing or disrupting the exercise of First Amendment Rights."
-[58] See: “Nature Strikes Back!”, Jack Straw [shurely shome mishtake?], Fifth Estate Summer 1994.
+[103] The budget for FBI informant programs includes not only the payments to informants for their services and expenses, but also the expenses of FBI personnel who supervise informants, their support costs, and administrative overhead. (Justice Department letter to Senate Select Committee, 3/2/76).
-[59] “A Natural Method of Conserving Biodiversity in Britain”, A. Whitbread and W. Jenman, British Wildlife 7 (2), December 1995, p.84.
+[104] The Committee is withholding the portion of this figure spent on domestic security intelligence (informants and other investigations combined) to prevent hostile foreign intelligence services from deducing the amount spent on counterespionage. The $80 million figure does not include all costs of separate FBI activities which may be drawn upon for domestic security intelligence purposes. Among these are the Identification Division (maintaining fingerprint records), the Files and Communications Division (managing the storage and retrieval of investigative and intelligence files), and the FBI Laboratory.
-[60] Eg. See “Global WarmingiG!obal Warning: Plant the Right Tree”, Marylee Guinan, in Op.Cit. I, p.44.
+[105] Examples of valuable informant reports include the following: one informant reported a plan to ambush police officers and the location of a cache of weapons and dynamite; another informant reported plans to transport illegally obtained weapons to Washington. D.C.: two informants at one meeting discovered plans to dynamite two city blocks. All of these plans were frustrated by further investigation and protective measures or arrest. (FBI memorandum to Select Committee, 12/10/75; Senate Select Committee Staff memorandum: Intelligence Cases in Which the FBI Prevented Violence, undated.)
+<br>
+<br>One example of the use of information in Bureau files involved a "name check" at Secret Service request on certain persons applying for press credentials to cover the visit of a foreign head of state. The discovery of data in FBI files indicating that one such person bad been actively involved with violent groups led to further investigation and ultimately the issuanoe of a search warrant. The search produced evidence, including weapons, of a plot to assassinate the foreign head of state. (FBI memorandum to Senate Select Committee, 2/23/76)
-[61] Eg. See “Lowland Valley Mires” and “Restoration of Valley Mires”, New Forest LIFE Project Information Sheets, Forestry Commission, undated--“The New Forest contains 90 of the 120 valley mires in Europe”.)
+[106] This figure is the number of "investigative matters" handled by the FBI in this area, including as separate items the investigative leads in particular cases which are followed up by various field offices. (FBI memorandum to Select Committee, 10/6/75.)
-[62] “To Learn the Things We Need to Know”, Freeman House, in Op.Cit!, p.50.
+[107] Schackelford 2/13/76, p. 32. This official does not recall any targets of "subversive" investigations having been even referred to a Grand Jury under these statutes since the 1950s.
-[63] “Farming the City-The Potential of Urban Agriculture”, Tara Garnett, The Ecologist November/December 1996, p.305.
+[108] FBI Domestic Intelligence Operations -- Their Purpose and Scope: Issues That Need To Be Resolved," Report by the Comptroller General to the House Judiciary Committee, 2/24/76, pp. 138-147. The FBI contends that these statistics may be unfair in that they concentrate on investigations of individuals rather than groups. (Ibid., Appendix V) In response, GAO states that its "sample of organization and control files was sufficient to determine that generally the FBI did not report advance knowledge of planned violence." In most of the fourteen instances where such advance knowledge was obtained, it related to "such activities as speeches, demonstrations or meetings-all essentially nonviolent." (Ibid.. p, 144)
-[64] “Changing Places” booklet, BBC Natural History Unit, February 1999, p.5.
+[109] Joseph Califano testimony. 1/27/76, pp. 7-8.
-[65] Op.Cit.17, p.173.
+[110] James Ahern testimony, 1/20/76, pp. 16, 17.
-[66] Eg. See Op.Cit.32, p.299; also “Cultivated Cities”, BBC Wildlife, August 1996, p.56. See: “World Hunger: 12 Myths”, Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins, Earthscan 1988, Chapter 6, for examples of the vastly increased efficiency of small farmers as opposed to large ones.
+[111] An indication of the scope of the problem is the increasing number of official representatives of communist governments in the United States. For example the number of Soviet officials in this country has increased from 333 in 1961 to 1,079 by early 1975. There were 2,683 East-West exchange visitors and 1,500 commercial visitors in 1974. (FBI Memorandum, "Intelligence Activities Within the United States by Foreign Governments," 3/20/75.)
-[67] However, see Op.Cit.22 for a convincing argument that traditional practices are antagonistic to wildlife.
+[112] According to the FBI, there were 89 bombings attributable to terrorist activity in 1975, as compared with 45 in 1974 and 24 in 1973. Six persons died in terrorist-claimed bombings and 76 persons were injured in 1975. Five other deaths were reported in other types of terrorist incidents. Monetary damage reported in terrorist bombings exceeded 2.7 million dollars. It should be noted, however, that terrorist bombings are only a fraction of the total number of bombings in this country. Thus, the 89 terrorist bombings in 1975 were among a total of over 1,900 bombings, most of which were not, according to the FBI , attributable clearly to terrorist activity. (FBI memorandum to Senate Select Committee, 2/23/76.)
-[68] ‘Twitcher’, in British Wildlife February 1998, p.175.
-[69] Op.cit.17, p.xi.
+* II. The Growth of Domestic Intelligence: 1936 To 1976
-[70] Ibid, p.162.
+** A. Summary
-[71] Ibid. See also: Op.Cit.4, p.7.; Op.Cit.22, p.139; Op.Cit.28, p.85, 86 and 87; “When the Wind Blew”, Tony Whitbread, RSNC February 1991, p.22; “Laird of Creation”, Richard 1V1abey, BBC Wildlife January 1992, p.30.
+<em>1.</em> <em>The Lesson: History Repeats Itself</em>
-[72] Eg. see: Op.Cit.4, p.10.
+During and after the First World War, intelligence agencies, including the predecessor of the FBI, engaged in repressive activity.[1]
-[73] Op.Cit.28, p.87.
+A new Attorney General, Harlan Fiske Stone, sought to stop the investigation of "political or other opinions."[2] This restraint was embodied only in an executive pronouncement, however. No statutes were passed to prevent the kind of improper activity which had been exposed. Thereafter, as this narrative will show, the abuses returned in a new form. It is now the responsibility of all three branches of government to ensure that the pattern of abuse of domestic intelligence activity does not recur.
-[74] Op.Cit.17, p.163. See also: “Bionomics-The Inevitability of Capitalism”, .Michael L. Rothschild, Futura 1992. For a view affirming pleasure for its own sake-in contrast to these mechanistic models of animal behaviour-as part of nature, see “Watching Birds”, Peter Porcupine, Here and Now 18, Winter 1997/98. (‘Birds just want to have fun’.) See also “When Elephants Weep--111e Emotional Lives of Animals”, Jeffrey 1\fasson and Susan Mc Carthy, Jonathan Cape 1994.
+<em>2.</em> <em>The Pattern: Broadening Through Time</em>
-[75] Eg. see the British Trust for Ornithology’s deeply depressing “Common [sic] Birds Census”.
+Since the re-establishment of federal domestic intelligence programs in 1936, there has been a steady increase in the government's capability and willingness to pry into, and even disrupt, the political activities and personal lives of the people. The last forty years have witnessed a relentless expansion of domestic intelligence activity beyond investigation of criminal conduct toward the collection of political intelligence and the launching of secret offensive actions against Americans.
-[76] Op.Cit.24. p.29.
+The initial incursions into the realm of ideas and associations were related to concerns about the influence of foreign totalitarian powers.
-[77] Op.Cit.28, p.86.
+Ultimately, however, intelligence activity was directed against domestic groups advocating change in America, particularly those who most vigorously opposed the Vietnam war or sought to improve the conditions of racial minorities. Similarly, the targets of intelligence investigations were broadened from groups perceived to be violence prone to include groups of ordinary protesters.
-[78] Eg. see: “Laird of Creation”, Richard Mabey, BBC Wildlife January 1992, p.33.
+<em>3.</em> <em>Three Periods of Growth for Domestic Intelligence</em>
-[79] Sean Reed, RSPB, quoted in “A do-something charter”, BBC Wildlife May 1998, p.31.
+The expansion of domestic intelligence activity can usefully be divided into three broad periods: (a) the pre-war -and World War II period; (b) the Cold War era, and (c) the period of domestic dissent beginning in the mid-sixties. The main developments in each of these stages in the evolution of domestic intelligence may be summarized as follows:
-[80] Eg. see: ‘“Ihe Killing ofthe Countryside”, Graham Harvey, Vintage 1998; also: “Is there life after subsidies? The New Zealand experience”, Gordon Stephenson, Ecos 18 (3/4) 1997.
+<em>a.</em> <em>1936-1945</em>
-[81] “Plenty and Wilderness? Creating a new countryside”, Bryn Green, Ecos 16 (2) 1995, p.3.
+By presidential directive -- rather than statute -- the FBI and military intelligence agencies were authorized to conduct domestic intelligence investigations. These investigations included a vaguely defined mission to collect intelligence about "subversive activities" which were sometimes unrelated to law enforcement. Wartime exigencies encouraged the unregulated use of intrusive intelligence techniques; and the FBI began to resist supervision by the Attorney General.
-[82] Op.Cit.4, p.17.
+<em>b.</em> <em>1946-1963</em>
-[83] “The Movement of the Free Spirit”, Raoul Vaneigem, Zone Books 1994, p.8.
+Cold War fears and dangers nurtured the domestic intelligence programs of the FBI and military, and they became permanent features of government. Congress deferred to the executive branch in the oversight of these programs. The FBI became increasingly isolated from effective outside control, even from the Attorneys General. The scope of investigations of "subversion" widened greatly. Under the cloak of secrecy, the, FBI instituted its COINTELPRO operations to "disrupt" and "neutralize" "subversives". The National Security Agency, the FBI, and the CIA re-instituted instrusive wartime surveillance techniques in contravention of law.
-[84] Eg. see “The Bap and the ugly”, Trevor Lawson, Guardian 6/8/98. These ‘Biodiversity Action Plans’ for particular endangered species, with their private sponsorship, seem to have a similar effect to ‘Education Action Zones’, and the ‘Private Finance Initiative’ in the health service. (See the comments on the possibility of a ‘two-tier’ reserve system in “ ‘Beyond 2000’-will it deliver’?”, Trevor Lawson, Ecos 18 (3/4) 1997, p.58.) Also, under the Earth Summit’s Biodiversity Convention, scientists have apparently come to the pragmatic conclusion that not everything can he saved. They have therefore decided to concentrate on those species of potential benefit to us-glorified Research & Development.
+<em>c.1964-1976</em>
-[85] Landlife Annual Report 1997/98, p.7.
+Intelligence techniques which previously had been concentrated upon foreign threats and domestic groups said to be under Communist influence were applied with increasing intensity to a wide range of domestic activity by American citizens. These techniques were utilized against peaceful civil rights and antiwar protest activity, and thereafter in reaction to civil unrest, often without regard for the consequences to American liberties. The intelligence agencies of the United States -- sometimes abetted by public opinion and often in response to pressure from administration officials or the Congress -- frequently disregarded the law in their conduct of massive surveillance and aggressive counterintelligence operations against American citizens. In the past few years, some of these activities were curtailed, partly in response to the moderation of the domestic crisis; but all too often improper programs were terminated only in response to exposure, the threat of exposure, or a change in the climate of public opinion, such as that triggered by the Watergate affair.
-[86] Ibid, p.4.
+** B. Establishing a Permanent Domestic Intelligence Structure:
+<br>1936-1945
-[87] “Biodiversity in Conservation” letter, Matthew Frith, British Wildlife August 1995, p.405.
+<em>1.</em> <em>Background. -- The Stone Standard</em>
-[88] Op.Cit.17, p.173.
+The first substantial domestic intelligence programs of the federal government were established during World War I.
-[89] Fuller and Peterken, quoted in “Management for Biodiversity in British Woodlands-Striking a Balance”, Robert Fuller and Martin Warren, British Wildlife October 1995, p.36.
+The Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation (as the FBI was then known), military intelligence, other federal investigative agencies, and the volunteer American Protective League were involved in these programs.[3] In the period immediately following World War I, the Bureau of Investigation took part in the notorious Palmer Raids and other activities against persons characterized as "subversive."[4]
-[90] “Ancient Woodland: A Re-creatable Resource?”, Keith Kirby, Tree News Summer 1992, p.13.
+Harlan Fiske Stone, who became Attorney General in 1924, described the conduct of Justice Department and the Bureau of Investigation before he took office as "lawless, maintaining many activities which were without any authority in federal statutes, and engaging in many practices which were brutal and tyrannical in the extreme."[5]
-[91] Royal Society for the Protection of Birds.
+Fearing that the investigative activities of the Bureau could invade privacy and inhibit political freedoms, Attorney General Stone announced:
-[92] Eg. See “Hydrological Management for Waterfowl on RSPB Lowland Wet Grassland Reserves”, Self et al, RSPB Conservation Review 8, 1994.
+There is always the posibility that a secret police may become a menace to free government and free institutions, because it carries with it the possibility of abuses of power which are not always quickly apprehended or understood. ... It is important that its activities be strictly limited to the performance of those functions for which it was created and that its agents themselves be not above the law or beyond its reach. ... The Bureau of Investigation is not concerned with political or other opinions of individuals. It is concerned only with their conduct and then only with such conduct -as is forbidden by the laws of the United States. When a police system passes beyond these limits, it is dangerous to the proper administration of justice and to human liberty, which it should be our first concern to cherish.[6]
-[93] “Restoration of lowland wet grassland at Pulborough Brooks RSPB Nature Reserve,” Timothy Calloway, in UK <em>Floodplains: Proceedings of a</em> Joint RSPB, Linnaen Society, Environment Agency Symposium, Eds. Bailey et al., Westbury Publishing 1998.
+When Stone appointed J. Edgar Hoover as Acting Director of the Bureau of Investigation, he instructed Hoover to adhere to this standard:
-[94] “Nature and Nurture”, Maev Kennedy, “A Living Countryside”, RSPB/Co-op Bank supplement to The Guardian, undated, p.11.
+The activities of the Bureau are to be limited strictly to investigations of violations of law, under my direction or under the direction of an Assistant Attorney General regularly conducting the work of the Department of Justice.[7]
-[95] Eg. See Ihe End <em>of Nature</em><em>,</em> Bill Mc Kibben, Viking 1990.
+Nevertheless, beginning in the mid-thirties, at White House direction, the FBI reentered the realm of collecting intelligence about ideas and associations.
-[96] “Sustainable Tuesday;’ David Helton, BBC <em>Wildlife,</em> May 1992, p.46.
+<em>2.</em> <em>Main Developments of the 1936-1945 Period</em>
-[97] Ibid, p.47.
+In the years preceding World War II, domestic intelligence activities were reinstituted, expanded, and institutionalized. Based upon vague and conflicting orders to investigate the undefined areas of "subversion" and "potential crimes" related to national security, the FBI commenced a broad intelligence program. The FBI was authorized to preempt the field, although the military engaged in some investigation of civilians.
-[98] Op.Cit.4, p.9.
+The FBI's domestic intelligence jurisdiction went beyond investigations of crime to include a vague mandate to investigate foreign involvement in American affairs. In the exercise of this jurisdictional authority, the Bureau began to investigate law abiding domestic groups and individuals; its program was also open to misuse for political purposes. The most intrusive intelligence techniques -- initially used to meet wartime exigencies -- were based on questionable statutory interpretation, or lacked any formal legal authorization.
-[99] Eg. see: Op.Cit.22, p.141; Op.cit.58, p.29/30; Op.cit.24, p.30; Op.Cit.61, p.47.
+The executive intentionally kept the issue of domestic intelligence-gathering away from the Congress until 1939, and thereafter the Congress appears to have deliberately declined to confront the issue. The FBI generally complied with the Attorney General's policies, but began to resist Justice Department review of its activities. On one occasion, the Bureau appears to have disregarded an Attorney General's policy directive.
-[100] “Pitfalls on the Way to Lasting Restoration”, Seth Zuckerman, in Op.Cit. I, p.13.
+However important these developments were in themselves, the enduring significance of this period is that it opened the institutional door to greater excesses in later years.
-[101] Founded on an assumption that empires aren’t fleeting and anomalous-that they won’t appear and disappear, as habitats do.
+<em>3.</em> <em>Domestic Intelligence Authority: Vague and Conflicting Executive Orders</em>
-[102] Or possibly peatland-eg. see: “Forests destined to end in the mire”, Fred Pearce, New Scientist 7/5/94.
+The executive orders upon which the Bureau based its intelligence activity in the decade before World War II were vague and conflicting. By using words like "subversion" -- a term which was never defined -- and by permitting the investigation of "potential" crimes, and matters "not within the specific provisions of prevailing statutes," the foundation was laid for excessive intelligence gathering about Americans.
-[103] “Natural Restoration-When Humans Walk Away”, Susan E. Davis, in Op.Cit.I, p.23.
+<em>a.</em> <em>The Original Roosevelt Orders</em>
-[104] “When the Wind Blew”, Tony Whitbread, RSNC February 1991, p.32.
+In 1934, according to a memorandum by J. Edgar Hoover, President Roosevelt ordered an investigation of "the Nazi movement in this country." In response, the FBI conducted a onetime investigation, described by FBI Director Hoover as "a so-called intelligence investigation." It concentrated on "the Nazi group," with particular reference to "anti-racial" and "anti-American" activities having "any possible connection with official representatives of the German government in the United States."[8]
-[105] Ibid, p.34.
+Two years later, in August 1936, according to a file memorandum of Director Hoover, President Roosevelt asked for a more systematic collection of intelligence about:
-[106] Op.Cit.25, p.510.
+subversive activities in the United States, particularly Fascism and Communism.
-[107] David Cayley quoted in Op.Cit.17, p.163.
+Hoover indicated further that the President wanted:
-[108] Op.Cit.25, p.503. Although, inexplicably, van Zoest goes on to say that autonomous processes are allowed or stimulated as long as they lead to the <em>desired goals.</em> (p.514.) While this may be a good working description of liberal democracy, it is not autonomy, which must surely be unconditional-the quality of autonomy is not strained...
+a broad picture of the general movement and its activities as [they] may affect the economic and political life of the country as a whole.
-[109] Op.Cit.17, p.163.
+The President and the FBI Director discussed the means by which the Bureau might collect "general intelligence information" on this subject.[9] The only record of Attorney General Homer Cummings' knowledge of, or authorization for, this intelligence assignment is found in a memorandum from Director Hoover to his principal assistant.[10]
-[110] Op.Cit.25, p.507.
+<em>b.</em> <em>Orders in 1938-39: The Vagueness of "Subversive Activities" and "Potential" Crimes</em>
-[111] Op.Cit.73, p.59.
+In October 1938, Director Hoover advised President Roosevelt of the "present purposes and scope" of FBI intelligence investigations, "together with suggestions for expansion." His memorandum stated that the FBI was collecting:
-[112] David Streeter, quoted in “On the Sidelines”, Richard Mabey, BBC Wildlife October 1990, p.728.
+information dealing with various forms of activities of either a subversive or so-called intelligence type.[11]
-[113] Op.Cit.7, p.74.
+Despite the references in Director Hoover's 1938 memorandum to "subversive-type" investigations, an accompanying letter to the President from Attorney General Homer Cummings made no mention of "subversion" and cited only the President's interest in "the so-called espionage situation."[12] Cummings' successor, Attorney General Frank Murphy, appears to have abandoned the term "subversive activities."[13] Moreover, when Director Hoover provided Attorney General Frank Murphy a copy of his 1938 plan, he described it, without mentioning "subversion," as a program "intended to ascertain the identity of persons engaged in espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage of a nature <em>not within the specific provisions of prevailing statutes</em>."[14] [Emphasis added.] Murphy thereafter recommended to the President that he issue an order concentrating "investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters" in the FBI and military intelligence.[15]
-[114] Charles Elton, quoted in Op.Cit.22, p.144.
+President Roosevelt agreed and issued an order which, like Murphy's letter, made no mention of "subversive," or general intelligence:
-[115] Op.Cit.73, p.12.
+It is my desire that the investigation of all espionage, counter espionage, and sabotage matters be controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the Office of Naval Intelligence in the Navy
-[116] Op.Cit.22, p.142.
+Department. The directors of these three agencies are to function as a committee to coordinate their activities.
-[117] Op.Cit.73, p.41.
+No investigations should be conducted by any investigative agency of the Government into matters involving actually <em>or potentially</em> any espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage, except by the three agencies mentioned above. [Emphasis added.][16]
-[118] Ibid, p.15.
+Precisely what the President's reference to "potential" espionage or sabotage was intended to cover was unclear. Whatever it meant, it was apparently intended to be consistent with Director Hoover's earlier description of the FBI program to Attorney General Murphy.[17]
-[119] Op.Cit.28, p.86.
+Three months later, after the outbreak of war in Europe, Director Hoover indicated his concern that private citizens might provide information to the "sabotage squads" which local police departments were creating rather than to the FBI. Hoover urged the Attorney General to ask the President to request local officials to give the FBI all information concerning "espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and neutrality regulations."[18]
-[120] Op.Cit.73, p.44.
+The President immediately issued a statement which continued the confusing treatment of the breadth of the FBI's intelligence authority. On the one hand, the statement began by noting that the FBI had been instructed to investigate:
-[121] Op.Cit.28, p.86.
+matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the neutrality regulations.
-[122] Eg. see Op.Cit.73, p.51.
+On the other hand, the President concluded by adding "subversive activities" to the list of information local law enforcement officials should relay to the FBI.[19]
-[123] “Dear Motorist... The Social Ideology ofthe Motorcar”, Andre Gorz, Institute of Social Disengineering, undated, p.8.
+<em>c.</em> <em>Orders 1940-43: The Confusion Continues</em>
-[124] National Forest Company Annual Report 1997/98.
+President Roosevelt used the term "subversive activities" in a secret directive to Attorney General Robert Jackson on wiretapping in 1940. Referring to activities of other nations engaged in "propaganda of so-called 'fifth columns" and "preparation for sabotage." He directed the Attorney General to authorize wiretaps "of persons suspected of subversive activities against the Government of the United States, including suspected spies." The President instructed that such wiretaps be limited "insofar as possible" to aliens.[20] Neither the President nor the Attorney General subsequently clarified the scope of the FBI's authority to investigate "subversive activity."
-[125] Chairman’s Comment, National Forest News Autumn 1998, p.2.
+The confusion as to the breadth of President Roosevelt's authorization reappeared in Attorney General Francis Biddle's description of FBI jurisdiction in 1942 and in a new Presidential statement in 1943.
-[126] “Thames Chase: Community Forest Facts” information sheet, undated.
+Biddle issued a lengthy order defining the duties of the various parts of the Justice Department in September 1942. Among other things, the FBI was charged with a duty to "investigate" criminal offenses against the United States. In contrast, the FBI was to function as a "clearing house" with respect to "espionage, sabotage, and other subversive matters."[21]
-[127] Forest Plan Summary, Great Western Community Forest March 1994, p.6. See also “Magic Forest up Mr. Downing’s Street,” Greenwood Community Forest Annual Report 1996/97, p.11, and the National Forest Corporate Plan, July 1997, for similar inane remarks.
+Four months later, President Roosevelt renewed his public appeal for cooperation by police and other "patriotic organizations" with the FBI. In this statement, he described his September 1939 order as granting "investigative" authority to the FBI for "espionage, sabotage, and violation of the neutrality regulations." The President did not adopt Attorney General Biddle's "clearing-house" characterization, nor did he mention "subversion."[22]
-[128] English Nature recommends that New woodlands should be a minimum of two hectares in area, and preferably larger than five hectares, if they are to be of any value. (“Woodland Creation for Wildlife;’ EN Habitat Restoration Project Fact Sheet 3.) In England more than 50% of approved Woodland Grant Schemes [the mainfina11cial mechanism for new planting] were under 3 hectares and over 75% were under 10 hectares. (Op.Cit.4, p.35.) In the Red Rose Community Forest, much of the planting “was on plots averaging 2.35 hectares in size:’ (Red Rose Community Forest Annual Report 1997/8, p.3.)
+<em>4.</em> <em>The Role of Congress</em>
-[129] This is the actual address of the National Forest, if you can believe it. 99. Op.cit.8.
+<em>a.</em> <em>Executive Avoidance of Congress</em>
-[130] Forest Plan Summary, Great Western Community Forest, March 1994, p.4.
+In 1938, the President, the Attorney General, and the FBI Director explicitly decided not to seek legislative authorization for the expanding domestic intelligence program.
-[131] Eg. see “Phoenix Park”, John Vidal, The Guardian 24/3/99.
+Attorney General Cummings cautioned that the plan for domestic intelligence "should be held in the strictest confidence."[23] Director Hoover contended that no special legislation should be sought "<em>in order to avoid criticism or objections</em> which might be raised to such an expansion by either ill-informed persons or individuals with some ulterior motive." [Emphasis added.] Hoover thought it "undesirable to seek any special legislation which would draw attention to the fact that it was proposed to develop a special counterespionage drive of any great magnitude" because the FBI's intelligence activity was already "much broader than espionage or counterespionage."[24]
-[132] Scumbag head of the Forestry Commission David Bills (see Do or Die #7, p.19) in National Forest News, Autumn 1998, p.3.
+Director Hoover contended that the FBI had authority to engage in intelligence activity beyond investigating crimes at the request of the Attorney General or the Department of State. He relied on an amendment to the FBI Appropriations Act, passed before World War I, authorizing the Attorney General to appoint officials not only to "detect and prosecute" federal crimes but also to:
-[133] Lord Macclesfield, in “Red Rose Forest-A Place for Life”, Red Rose Forest, undated, p.2. (I can only assume he must be talking about the famous Manchester on Mars, because it can’t be on my planet.)
+conduct such other investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Department of Justice, or the Department of State, as may be directed by the Attorney General.[25]
-[134] Councillor Round, quoted in “Invest in the Success of the Mersey Forest”, The Mersey Forest, undated.
+After conflicts with the State Department in 1939, however, the FBI no longer relied upon this vague statute for its authority to conduct intelligence investigations, instead relying upon the Executive orders.[26]
-[135] “Community Forests”, Countryside Commission Fact Sheet 1994, quoted in ibid. Other fawning references to inward investment in Forest literature are too numerous, and too nauseating, to mention.
+<em>b.</em> <em>Congress Declines to Confront the Issue</em>
-[136] Forest News 7, Forest of Avon, Autumn/Winter 1998, p.2.
+Even though Executive officials originally avoided Congress to prevent criticism or objections, after the President's proclamation of emergency in 1939 they began to inform Congress of FBI intelligence activities In November 1939, Director Hoover told the House Appropriations Committee that the Bureau had set up a General Intelligence Division, "by authority of the President's proclamation."[27] And in January 1940, he told the same Committee that the FBI had authority, under the President's September 6, 1939 statement to investigate espionage, sabotage, neutrality violations, and "any other subversive activities."[28]
-[137] Op.Cit.95.
+There is no evidence that the Appropriations Committee objected or inquired further into the meaning of that last vague term, although members did seek assurance that FBI intelligence could be curtailed when the wartime emergency ended.[29]
-[138] Op.Cit.99. Also: “Gaining public acceptance ... [by] improving the image of development” in Op.Cit.104.
+In 1940, a joint resolution was introduced by New York City Congressman Emmanuel Celler which would have given the FBI broad jurisdiction to investigate, by wiretapping or other means, or "frustrate" any "interference with the national defense" due to certain specified crimes (sabotage, treason, seditious conspiracy, espionage, and violations of the neutrality laws) or "in any other manner."[30] Although the resolution failed to reach the House floor, it seems likely that, rather than opposing domestic intelligence investigations, Congress was simply choosing to avoid the issue of defining the FBI's intelligence jurisdiction. This view is supported by Congress' passage in 1940 and 1941 of two new criminal statutes: the Smith Act made it a crime to advocate the violent overthrow of the Government;[31] and the Voorhis Act required "subversive" organizations advocating the Government's violent overthrow and having foreign ties to register or be subject to criminal penalties.[32]
-[139] Op.cit.99, p.5.
+Although, as indicated, the Executive branch disclosed the fact that the FBI was doing intelligence work and Congress generally raised no objection, there was one occasion when an Executive description of the Bureau's work was less than complete. Following Director Hoover's testimony about the establishment of an Intelligence Division and some public furor over the FBI arrest of several Communist Party members in Detroit, Senator George Norris (R. Neb.) asked whether the Bureau was violating Attorney General Stone's assurance in 1924 that it would conduct only criminal investigations. Attorney General Jackson replied:
-[140] Op.cit.103, p.24.
+Mr. Hoover is in agreement with me that the principles which Attorney General Stone laid down in 1924 when the Federal Bureau of Investigation was reorganized and Mr. Hoover appointed as Director are sound, and that the usefulness of the Bureau depends upon a faithful adherence to these limitations.
-[141] Susan Bell, Countryside Commission, in “Greening the Heart of England”, Fred Pearce, New Scientist 24/9/94, p.33. See p.35 here for an excellent summation of the bullshit ofthe National Forest in action.
+The Federal Bureau of Investigation will confine its activities to the investigation of violation of Federal statutes, the collecting of evidence in cases in which the United States is or may be a party in interest, and the service of process issued by the courts.[33]
-[142] Greenwood Community Forest Annual Report 1995/96, p.10.
+The FBI was, in fact, doing much more than that and had informed the Appropriations Committee of its practice in general terms. Attorney General Jackson himself stated later that the FBI was conducting "steady surveillance" of persons beyond those who had violated federal statutes, including persons who were a "likely source" of federal law violation because the were "sympathetic with the systems or designs of foreign dictators."[34]
-[143] One of their “three key themes” in: “Environments for people”, Groundwork Information Sheet, undated.
+<em>5.</em> <em>Scope of Domestic Intelligence</em>
-[144] Eg. See ‘Direct Action News’ (oh my god!) 19, Autumn 1998, Groundwork Creswell/Ashfield & Mansfield, p.4; “Bringing people into the process”, Groundwork Today 26, undated, p.7.
+<em>a.</em> <em>Beyond Criminal Investigations</em>
-[145] The textbook strategy of ‘greenwashers’ worldwide-see “ ‘Democracy’ for Hire: Public Relations and Environmental Movements”, John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, The Ecologist September/October 1995. Also: “Environmental groups and the business community: A fatal attraction?”, Jamie Wallace, Ecos 18 (3/4) 1997.
+According to Director Hoover's account of his meeting with President Roosevelt in 1936, the President wanted "a broad picture" of the impact of Communism and Fascism on American life.[35] Similarly, the FBI Director described his 1938 plan as "broader than espionage" and covering "in a true sense real intelligence."[36] Thus it appears that one of the first purposes of FBI domestic intelligence was to perform the "pure intelligence" function of supplying executive officials with information believed of value for making policy decisions. This aspect of the assignment to investigate "subversion" was entirely unrelated to the enforcement of federal criminal laws. The second purpose of FBI domestic intelligence gathering was essentially "preventive," in compliance with the President's June 1939 directive to investigate "potential" espionage or sabotage.[37] As war moved closer, preventive intelligence investigations focused on individuals who might be placed on a Custodial Detention List for possible internment in case of war.[38]
-[146] Review of “Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives”, Eds. Avruch et al, by Sharon Beder, The Ecologist November/December 1994, p.236.
+Both pure intelligence about "subversion" and preventive intelligence about "potential" espionage or sabotage involved investigations based on political affiliations and group membership and association. The relationship to law enforcement was often remote and speculative; the Bureau did not focus its intelligence gathering solely on tangible evidence of preparation for crime.
-[147] “Community Work and the State”, Eds. Craig et al, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1982, p.2. However, it would be a mistake to think that these are communities threatening militant working-class action-instead, they are mostly experiencing the inchoate rather than the organised workingclass <em>response to the changes taking place in advanced capitalist society</em> (“Hard Lines and Soft Options: A Criticism of Some Left Attitudes to Community Work;’]. Smith, in <em>Political Issues and Community Work,</em> Ed. p. Curno, Routledge 1978, p.23)-responses such as crime, vandalism, drug (ab)use, family breakdown, etc.
+Directives implementing the general preventive intelligence instruction to investigate "potential" espionage or sabotage were vague and sweeping. In 1939, for instance, field offices were told to investigate persons of German, Italian, and Communist "sympathies" and any other persons "whose interests may be directed primarily to the interest of some other nation than the United States." FBI offices were directed to report the names of members of German and Italian societies, "whether they be of a fraternal character or of some other nature," and members of any other groups "which might have pronounced Nationalistic tendencies." The Bureau sought lists of subscribers and officers of German, Italian, and Communist foreign language newspapers, as well as of other newspapers with "notorious Nationalistic sympathies."[39] The FBI also made confidential inquiries regarding "various so-called radical and fascist organizations" to identify their "leading personnel, purposes and aims, and the part they are likely to play at a time of national crisis."[40]
-[148] “Scenes from a California Maul: Execution and Riot”, Red Wood, <em>Fi</em>ft<em>h Estate,</em> Autumn 1992, p.7.
+The criteria for investigating persons for inclusion on the Custodial Detention List was similarly vague. In 1939, the FBI said its list included persons with "strong Nazi tendencies" and "strong Communist tendencies."[41] FBI field offices were directed in 1940 to gather information on individuals who would be considered for the list because of their "Communistic, Fascist, Nazi, or other nationalistic background."[42]
-[149] See the remarkably frank Majid Rahnema, quoted in “The Business of Conservation, or the Conservation of Business?”, <em>Do or Die</em> #6, p.23.
+<em>b.</em> <em>"Infiltration," Investigations</em> The FBI based its pure intelligence investigations on a theory of subversive "infiltration" which remained an essential part of the rationale for domestic intelligence after the war: anyone who happened to associate with Communists or Fascists or was simply alleged to have such associations became the subject of FBI intelligence reports.[43] Thus, "subversive" investigations produced intelligence about a wide variety of lawful groups and law-abiding citizens. By 1938, the FBI was investigating alleged subversive infiltration of:
-[150] “What are Community Forests?”, Countryside Commission leaflet, undated.
+the maritime industry;
-[151] Rioted in: “Wren’s Nest Agenda for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”, Groundwork Black Country leaflet, undated.
+the steel industry;
-[152] “Own Goals”, Paulette Goudge, The Guardian 17/3/99.
+the coal industry;
-[153] Rioted in a review of his “Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk”, Ecos 16 (2) 1995, p.76.
+the clothing, garment, and fur industries;
-[154] See “Reclaim the Streets”, Do or Die 6, p.6.
+the automobile industry;
-[155] “It’s an orchard, Jim-but not as we know it: Community Orchards and Local Agenda 21”, Duncan Mac Kay, Ecos 18 (1) 1997, p.47.
+the newspaper field;
-[156] Q!wted in Op.Cit.92.
+educational institutions;
-[157] “Formulary for a New Urbanism”. Ivan Chtcheglov, 1953. If you will allow me to sketch in some of the intoxicating possibilities (‘moveable feasts’ -the ‘instantly revocable delegates of the landscape’), in what might be the world’s most self-indulgent footnote: orchards, beekeeping, community composting, reedbeds, pleasure gardens, adventure playgrounds, orreries, ponds, ‘abandoned’ wilderness (‘a dark wood’), hanging gardens, greenhouses, moots. dance halls. speakeasies (shebeens), helter skelters, dance halls, climbing walls, bandstands, rockeries, cairns, stupas, prayer wheels, dovecotes, samizdat (community) walls. zen gardens, windmills/turbines. pagodas, hollow hills/earth houses. houseboats, raft villages, mudslides, burrows and tunnels, gigantic mirrors reflecting one another, gongs, amphitheatres, trampolines, mazes, rope swings, bouncy castles. flags, kites (as in the Pakistani kite festivals), trellis walkways, an intractable swamp, sacred groves, maypoles, topiary, sundials, follies, mushroom cellars, haylofts, stills. birdtable and birdbath forests, wicker men, giant metronomes, ‘Ames rooms’, stockades, crypts... this gets addictive, I must stop now and take my pills. Even if you don’t like my suggestions, they are intended merely to give a sense of the wealth of opportunities available to us in ‘dealienated’ settlements. Spare a thought for your own desires and invent your own list.
+organized labor organizations;
-[158] Op.Cit.17, p.162.
+Negroes;
-<br>
+youth groups;
-** Bashing the GE-nie Back in the Bottle (from issue 9)
+Government affairs;
-*** Borders No Barrier to Sabotage
+and the armed forces.[44]
-The last year has seen a global expansion of resistance to genetic technology. Across the world shadows in the moonlight have razed GE crop trials to the ground. Spades, sticks, scythes, sickles and fire have brought in the harvest. Doors have splintered as labs are broken into. Pies have been aimed at the arrogance of the powerful. Harassment and disruption has greeted the biotech industry wherever it has gathered...
+This kind of intelligence was transmitted to the White House. For example, in 1937 the Attorney General sent the President an FBI report on a proposed pilgrimage to Washington to urge passage of legislation to benefit American youth. The report stated that the American Youth Congress, which sponsored the pilgrimage, was understood to be strongly Communistic.[45] Later reports in 1937 described the Communist Party's role in plans by the Workers Alliance for nationwide demonstrations protesting the plight of the unemployed, as well as the Alliance's plans to lobby Congress in support of the federal relief program.[46]
-Since the last issue of Do or Die was published in August 1999, there have been anti-biotech actions in America, Britain, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, India, Australia, Greece, Ecuador, Brazil, Germany, Italy, Croatia, Bangladesh and the Philippines. (Undoubtedly there have been actions we haven’t heard about in other countries. This especially applies to the Third/Majority World.) Many of these countries are new to trashing the GM-technocrats’ tools. In other countries where resistance to genetic engineering is more established, tactics have evolved, groups consolidated and actions have become increasingly audacious.
+Some investigations and reports (which went into Justice Department and FBI permanent files) covered entirely legal political activities. For example, one local group checked by the Bureau was called the League for Fair Play, which furnished "speakers to Rotary and Kiwanis Clubs and to schools and colleges." The FBI reported in 1941 that:
-Our success-especially in Britain-is remarkable, but we should not fall for the myth of imminent victory. At least in terms of genetic engineering, resistance is not as transnational as capital. Corporate and state bodies have been channelling more and more funds and time into GM crops. Actions are slowing this rate of acceleration but we’re still losing the race.
+the organization was formed in 1937, apparently by two Ministers and a businessman for the purpose of furthering fair play, tolerance, adherence to the Constitution, democracy, liberty, justice, understanding 'and good will among all creeds, races and classes of the United States.
-This should not dissuade us from doing what needs to be done. To ‘merely’ delay massive social dislocation and biological pollution is worthy of the risks involved. As well as the ‘finger in the dam’ aspect of anti-GM campaigns, the resistance is serving other purposes. Groups all over the world are linking up, training and learning from each other. The hope for a free and ecological future lies in these embryonic movements which understand their enemies are the machine and its masters and their comrades the land and its lovers. The resistance against genetic engineering has catalysed the growth of revolutionary ecological groups around the world. The elite may have designed a weapon which will rebound on themselves.
+A synopsis of the report stated, "No indications of Communist activities."[47]
-The aim of this article is to give an overview of actions over the last year in this global anti-technology war. It will not give a political, ecological or strategic background to genetic engineering. If you’re new to this struggle it would be a good idea to read ‘The New Luddite War’ in the last issue of Do or Die, which also includes some recommended reading.
+In 1944, the FBI prepared an extensive intelligence report on an active political group, the Independent Voters of Illinois, apparently because it was considered a target for Communist "infiltration." The Independent Voters group was reported to have been formed:
-**** Hurricane Sabotage Hits GM Harvest
+for the purpose of developing neighborhood political units to help in the reelection of President Roosevelt, and the election of progressive congressmen. Apparently, IVI endorsed or aided Democrats for the most part, although it was stated to be "independent." It does not appear that it entered its own candidates or that it endorsed any Communists. IVI sought to help elect those candidates who would favor fighting inflation, oppose race and class discrimination, favor international cooperation, support a "full employment" program, oppose Facism, etc.[48]
-Over the last year the country that has seen the most dramatic growth of anti-GM sabotage has been the US. The world’s first outdoor genetic test crop was of strawberries at the University of California in 1987. The night after the crop had been transplanted, EF!ers climbed fences, evaded security and succeeded in pulling up all 2,000 plants.[159] In 1989 American EF!ers destroyed yet more test sites, but as the ‘80s slipped into the ‘90s the US sabotage stopped.
+Thus, in its search for subversive "influence," the Bureau gathered extensive information about the lawful activities of left-liberal political groups. At the opposite end of the political spectrum, the activities of numerous right-wing groups like the Christian Front and Christian Mobilizers (followers of Father Coughlin), the American Destiny Party, the American Nationalist Party, and even the less extreme "America First" movement were reported by the FBI.[49]
-Twelve years after the first action, the decade-long lull came to a dramatic end. On the 27<sup>th</sup> of July 99, The University of California once again became the launch pad for a wave of action--this time much bigger than the first. That night a group calling itself ‘The California Croppers’ trashed 14 rows of GM corn. The following night saw an acre of GM corn elsewhere in California destroyed. A month later, resistance had spread to the East Coast where yet more experimental GM corn was destroyed, this time al the University of Maine. A week later Vermont, two days after that Minnesota. Two weeks later 50 rows ofGM corn were destroyed at a Pioneer facility and the campaign moved up a notch with company vehicles damaged. Corn sites continued to be laid waste. GM melons, walnut trees and tomatoes got mashed.
+<em>c.</em> <em>Partisan Use</em>
-June 2000: The Anarchist Golfing Association destroys GE grass at Pure Seed Testing in Canby, Oregon causing $500,000 worth of damage and causing 10–15 years of research.
+The collection of pure intelligence and preventive intelligence about "subversives" led to the inclusion in FBI files of political intelligence about the President's partisan critics. In May 1940, President Roosevelt's secretary sent the FBI Director hundreds of telegrams received by the White House. The attached letter stated:
-After only two months of the campaign there had been twelve successfol sabotages, proceeding to a point where in one action saboteurs could destroy 50 rows of transgenic corn, an acre of herbicide tolerant sunflowers, one hundred melons and trash irrigation equipment and greenhouses undetected.
+As the telegrams all were more or less in opposition to national defense, the President thought you might like to look them over, noting the names and addresses of the senders.[50]
-The last year has seen more and more crop experiments destroyed, ranging from sugar beet to GM trees. While straight site trashings continue, actions have also escalated to levels which Europe has yet to reach. In the third month of the campaign, all the windows on one side of a GM company’s offices were caved in.
+Additional telegrams expressing approval of a speech by one of the President's leading critics, Colonel Charles Lindbergh, were also referred to the FBI.[51][52] A domestic intelligence program without clearly defined boundaries almost invited such action.
-Five months in and a communique announces that 3 hours before the beginning of the new ‘biotech century’ the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) had broken into the office of a Michigan University GM researcher, dousing it with gasoline and setting it on fire, causing $400,000 of damage. The work destroyed was funded in part by the multinational Monsanto, which led the communique to claim the action as the first US burning in solidarity with the Indian KRRS (Karnataka State Farmers Association) Cremate Monsanto campaign. State response was quick and a month after the attack Craig Rosebraugh, who had been acting as ELF Press Officer, was raided at 8.00am by 15 FBI agents with guns drawn. Simultaneously other agents raided the offices of the Portland Liberation Collective. Though obviously triggered by the arson, these raids were linked to a Grand Jury investigation into the ELF.
+<em>d.</em> <em>Centralized Authority: FBI and Military Intelligence</em>
-As the year has gone on, daytime actions have grown like their nighttime counterparts. The road to Cargill’s international HQ was barricaded in March causing two mile tailbacks. The blockade was initially carried out by the normal criminal band of EF!ers and anarchos but they were later joined by a noisy carnival of supportive locals, scientists and farmers. After the cops dislodged the barricade the diverse bunch slowed the traffic around the HQ for hours. Outside the citadel of corporate agribusiness, voices joined together chanting: Burn the Buildings, <em>Pull the Crops, This is Where the Research Stops!</em>
+The basic policy of President Roosevelt and his four Attorneys General was to centralize civilian authority for domestic intelligence in the FBI. Consolidation of domestic intelligence was viewed as a means of protecting civil liberties. Recalling the hysteria of World War I, Attorney General Frank Murphy declared:
-The same month saw Bio-Devastation 2000, a series of actions in Boston aimed at America’s biggest gathering of GM scientists and business. 2,500 people took part in an anti-corporate, anti-GM carnival. Thirty gallons of GM soya beans were dumped blocking the conference centre’s entrance. Activists infiltrated and caused chaos in meetings, disrupting speeches and flanning the faceless bureaucrats. One woman even managed to sneak on the special conference shuttle bus and harangue a captive audience of delegates. Outside the conference centre the police had panicked and prepared for a Seattle. Windows of high street shops, even a pizza emporium, were boarded up, whilst cops patrolled the streets.
+Twenty years ago, inhuman and cruel things were done in the name of justice; sometimes vigilantes and others took over the work. We do not want such things done today, for the work has now been localized in the FBI.[53]
-Minneapolis was the host for the next confrontation when the International Society for Animal Genetics (ISAG) met at the end of]uly.
+Centralization of authority for domestic intelligence also served the FBI's bureaucratic interests. Director Hoover complained about attempts by other agencies to "literally chisel into this type of work."[54] He exhorted: "We don't want to let it slip away from us."[55]
-A police helicopter hovers above us. At least 30 people have been arrested. Three hours ago one hundred unmasked people broke a police line intended to box us into a street. Using plywood sign/shields and a plastic banner that repelled tear gas andpepper spray, the frontline rocked our world and we escaped from their trap, only to re-take the WHOLE STREET downtown, where later we were separated and one group was surrounded. Last night we had a two hour teach-in and speak <em>out, attended by 300weople, who then marched together in the night. Our presencewas strong andwe got awaywith no arrests. A cop got tossedfrom his horse. Today was our time to take to the streets, we chanted “Reclaim the Streets, Reclaim the Genes “ and “l-5-A-G, Fuck your Biotechnology.</em>’[160]
+Pursuant to President Roosevelt's 1939 directive authorizing the FBI and military intelligence to conduct all investigations of "potential" espionage and sabotage, an interagency Delimitation Agreement in June 1940 assigned most such domestic intelligence work to the FBI. As revised in February 1942, the Agreement covered "investigation of all activities coming under the categories of espionage, subversion and sabotage." The FBI was responsible for all investigations "involving civilians in the United States" and for keeping the military informed of "the names of individuals definitely known to be connected with subversive activities."[56]
-Only a few months before in Boston the state had prepared while the rebels were unable to put up street resistance. By the time the ISAG conference came along, the police needed to use heavy force. They fired bean bag rounds, rubber bullets, pepper spray and used batons and still failed to clear the streets of resistance. That night, gun wielding cops stormed one activist house and tried to frame some of its inhabitants on drug dealing charges. This repression will not break the rebels’ resolve.
+The military intelligence agencies were interested in intelligence about civilian activity. In fact, they requested extensive information about civilians from the FBI. In May 1939, for instance, the Army G-2 Military Intelligence Division (MID) transmitted a request for the names and locations of "citizens opposed to our participation in war and conducting antiwar propaganda."[57] Despite the Delimitation Agreement, the MID's Counterintelligence Corps collected intelligence on civilian "subversive activity" as part of a preventive security program using volunteer informers and investigators.[58]
-The tailing off of anti-GM sabotage at the end of the 80s was due to contemporary events in EF!. A widespread state repression campaign culminated in the FBI car bombing California EF!ers, and a SWAT team arresting EF!ers attempting to down powerlines in the Arizona desert. Dave Foreman, EF!‘s co-founder and editor of the sabotage handbook <em>Ecodefence</em> awoke in bed looking down the barrel of a cop’s gun.
+<em>6.</em> <em>Control by the Attorney General: Compliance and Resistance</em>
-People became understandably afraid. A split within EF! partly exacerbated by repression led to it taking an ostensibly more revolutionary path, but one that was more concerned with civil disobedience than sabotage. Even wilderness defence saw a decrease in ecotage, and the anti-GM campaign as a new front simply didn’t survive.
+The basic outlines of the FBI's domestic intelligence program were approved by Attorney General Cummings in 1938 and Attorney General Murphy in 1939.[59] Director Hoover also asked Attorney General Jackson in 1940 for policy guidance concerning the FBI's "suspect list of individuals whose arrest might be considered necessary in the event the United States becomes involved in war."[60]
-The 90s have seen the US movement trying to reconcile the contradictions these times left it with. In the re-emergence of anti-GM resistance we see the convergence of mass street action with social change aims and wilderness-ethic sabotage. This is extremely healthy for the movement as a whole. Let’s hope however that this new flurry of action does not lead to the type of attacks the movement suffered from a decade ago. Even if it does, maybe now the movement is more prepared. As one of those raided after ISAG put it in a statement to the City Council:
+The FBI Director initially opposed, however, Attorney General Jackson's attempt to require more detailed supervision of the FBI's role in the Custodial Detention Program. To oversee this program and others, Jackson created a Neutrality Laws Unit (later renamed the Special War Policies Unit) in the Justice Department. When the Unit proposed to review FBI intelligence, reports on individuals, Director Hoover protested that turning over the FBI's confidential reports would risk the possibility of "leaks." He argued that if the identity of confidential informants became known, it would endanger their "life and safety" and thus the Department would "abandon" the "subversives field."[61]
-We will continue no matter how many times you kick us in the face orpepper spay us. We will continue despite your truncheon blows or shooting us with rubber bullets, because what does not kill us makes us stronger.[161]
+After five months of negotiation, the FBI was ordered to transmit its "dossiers" to the Justice Department Unit.[62] To satisfy the FBI's concerns, the Department agreed to take no formal action against an individual if it "might interfere with sound investigative techniques" and not to disclose confidential informants without the Bureau's "prior approval."[63] Thus, from 1941 to 1943, the Justice Department had the machinery to oversee at least this aspect of FBI domestic intelligence.[64]
-As of October 2000 there have been 40 anti-GM sabotages in America. Despite Grand Juries and police surveillance our friends are still uncaptured.
+In 1943, however, Attorney General Biddle ordered that the Custodial Detention List should be abolished as "impractical. unwise, and dangerous." His directive stated that there was "no statutory authority or other present justification" for keeping the list. The Attorney General concluded that the system for classifying "dangerous" persons was "inherently unreliable;" the evidence used was "inadequate;" and the standards applied were "defective."[65] Biddle observed:
-For more details contact the Bioengineering Action Network (BAN), who are the best contact for the States. Serving the same function over there as the Genetic Engineering Network does over here, they are however openly loads more radical, militant, and wild.
+the notion that it is possible to make a valid determination as to how dangerous a person is in the abstract and without reference to time, environment, and other relevant circumstances, is impractical, unwise, and dangerous.
-Web: [[http://www.tao.ca/-ban][http://www.tao.ca/-ban]]
+Returning to the basic standard espoused by Attorney General Stone, Attorney General Biddle declared:
-Email: [[mailto:ban@tao.ca][ban@tao.ca]]
+The Department fulfills its proper function by investigating the activities of persons who may have violated the law. It is not aided in this work by classifying persons as to dangerousness.[66]
-[159] [**Archivists note:** Footnote missing from source book and original source magazine.]
+Upon receipt of this order, the FBI Director did not in fact abolish its list. The FBI continued to maintain an index of persons "who may be dangerous or potentially dangerous to the public safety or internal security of the United States." In response to the Attorney General's order, the FBI merely changed the name of the list from Custodial Detention List to Security Index. Instructions to the field stated that the Security Index should be kept "strictly confidential," and that it should never be mentioned in FBI reports or "discussed with agencies or individuals outside the Bureau" except for military intelligence agencies.[67]
-[160] [**Archivists note:** Footnote missing from source book and original source magazine.]
+This incident provides an example of the FBI's ability to conduct domestic intelligence operations in opposition to the policies of an Attorney General. Despite Attorney General Biddle's order, the "dangerousness" list continued to be kept, and investigations in support of that list continued to be a significant part of the, Bureau's work.
-[161] [**Archivists note:** Footnote missing from source book and original source magazine.]
+<em>7.</em> <em>Intrusive Techniques: Questionable Authorization</em>
-<br>
+<em>a.</em> <em>Wiretaps: A Strained Statutory Interpretation</em>
-* Extra-environmental
+In 1940, President Roosevelt authorized FBI wiretapping against "persons suspected of subversive activities against the United States, including suspected spies," requiring the specific approval of the Attorney General for each tap and directing that they be limited "insofar as possible to aliens. "[68]
-** Derek Wall Fingers the Green Nazis (from issue 1)
+This order was issued in the face of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, which had prohibited wiretapping.[69] However, the Attorney General interpreted the Act of 1934 so as to permit government wiretapping. Since the Act made it unlawful to "intercept and divulge" communications, Attorney General Jackson contended that it did not apply if there was no divulgence, <em>outside</em> the Government. [Emphasis added][70] Attorney General Jackson's questionable Interpretation was accepted by succeeding Attorneys General (until 1968) but never by the courts.[71]
-Have you heard rumours of Satrivi Devi, the Hindu fascist, who praised the SS for their protection of animals and Hitler for his love of trees? Perhaps you have read Ecology in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, where Anna Bramwell, an ex-young member officer of the Conservative Monday Club, argues that much of Green philosophy is rooted in the ideas of conservative and sometimes racist thinkers! What the hell is going on? Perhaps you have been approached by the distributists to help co-ordinate an anti-McDonalds day. Or been sent a copy of Green Dawn, an innocuous looking and rather environmentalist paper, put out by the National Front [NF]. Or have you been fooled, as Jonathan Porritt and the Centre for Alternative Technology were, into writing for Scorpion, published by Martin Walker, the former NF organiser for Central London.
+Jackson informed the Congress of his interpretation. Congress considered enacting an exception to the 1934 Act, and held hearings in which Director Hoover said wiretapping was "of considerable importance" because of the "gravity" to "national safety" of such offenses as espionage and sabotage.[72] Apparently relying upon Jackson's statutory interpretation, Congress then dropped the matter, leaving the authorization of wiretaps to Executive discretion, without either statutory standards or the requirement of a judicial warrant.[73]
-A few years ago, some Deep Ecologists said some racist and extreme things. Ed Abbey complained of Mexicans swamping the US, forgetting that all sorts of races propelled not by genetics but economics and greed had formed the US on the blood of the Indians. The despicable Chris Manes in his EF! Miss Anthrope column claimed to be taking the piss with his view but briefly associated EF! US with the view that AIDS was a good thing and the Ethopian famine victims (who starved while we in the West dined on their countries) deserved to die. Deep Ecology is no longer associated with such unpleasant views: loving nature and all species requires respect for our own species. Real fascists, the guys and gals who back up their racist views with baseball bats and on occasion bombs, the European equivalent of Guatamalan death squads-who believe in an international Jewish conspiracy, the Fuhrer prinzip, celebrate Hitler’s birthday-have for a long time been trying to infiltrate the green movement.
+The potential for misuse of wiretapping was demonstrated during this period by several FBI wiretaps approved by the, Attorney General or by the White House. In 1941, Attorney General Biddle approved a wiretap on the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce with the caveat:
-Eco-fascism is on the march with a three pronged assault that if successful will destroy Ecology.
+There is no record of espionage at this time; and, unless within a month from today there is some evidence connecting the Chamber of Commerce with espionage, I think the surveillance should be discontinued.[74]
-The first prong is ideological. Martin Walker set up the magazine Scorpion to link neo Nazis with the Green movement, and has over the past four years hoodwinked a whole series of prominent Greens from John Papworth (former editor of Resurgence and an ex-advisor to Zambian leader Kenneth Kaunda) to Peter Cadogan, the pacifist and decentralist, into attending its conferences. Another <em>Scorpion</em> conference goer Anna Bramwell (see <em>Searchlight</em>) in her books <em>Ecology in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century</em> and <em>Blood and Soil: Walther Darre and Hitler’s Green Party,</em> has argued that the first Greens were to be found in Hitler’s Germany and that “Ecologism” is a phenomenon of the “despised white European north:’ As far back as 1973 racists were blaming Third World overpopulation for the problems created by First World greed, in what was termed The Lifeboat Thesis, arguing against aid to famine victims but saying nothing about the links between Third World starvation and First World overconsumption. New Right ecologists have little to say of the brave struggle of African, Asian, and South American greens like Chico Mendes (the Brazilian trade unionist killed for protecting the rainforests), or the rural women involved in the Kenyan Green Belt movement. The plight of the Tasmanian aborigines and other Native people who lived in balance with the environment but were exterminated by European colonialists is forgotten. According to Anna who somehow managed to attend the 1989 Green Party conference, ecology should not be confused with the fight for social justice.
+However, in another case Biddle disapproved an FBI request to wiretap a Philadelphia bookstore "engaged in the sale of Communist literature" and frequented by "important Communist leaders" in 1941.[75]
-The second prong is organisational. Suddenly the brown shirts are green. The Strasserite blood and soil wing of the NF has been followed by other Fascist groups into exploiting environmental issues. Where NF once accused the anti-nuclear movement of being financed by Moscow gold, they now endorse opposition of the building of Hinckley point. The myth of a racially pure rural Britain peppered by nationalistic communes is closely linked to NF protests over the grubbing up of hedges and acid rain. Hull NF have advertised for members worried by “the growing scandal of filth and pollution in our waterways:’ Despite their hatred of other races the far right have become animal lovers. In fact the far right think of everything: Mosley supposedly invented Keynsian economic growth, Hitler built the first motorways, and both were supposedly advocates of the EC before anyone else thought of it. Thal the far right have taken up green issues should not fool us to their real nature, it should not lull us into inaction.
+Materials located in Director Hoover's "Official and Confidential" file indicate that President Roosevelt's aide Harry Hopkins asked the FBI to wiretap his own home telephone in 1944. Additional reports from "technical" surveillance of all unidentified target were sent to Hopkins in May and July 1945, when he served as an aide to President Truman.[76]
-The final element is of direct infiltration. The far right have a strategy of moving into all major political parties and former members of the NF and British National Party have turned up as Labour, Liberal and Conservative candidates in the past. The NF are reputed to have put candidates under the Green or Ecology label in the past in areas where the real Greens are thin on the ground. Further afield Die Gruenen have had major problems with fascist infiltration and have closed down several local Green groups. The NF have gone as far as to stand a candidate under the title of Greenwave, a name ripped off an organisation set up by members of Greenpeace. Obviously neo-nazis find it easier to get votes under bogus green banners than as fascists. In 1989 a parliamentary by-election candidate for the real Green Party was offered help by a mysterious individual from the East End of London, who suggested that she campaigned under the slogan On the Crest of the Greenwave, she declined and other members have been warned of the threat. Yet as long ago as the mid 1970s other would-be environmentalists campaigned under the title of the Survival Party, complete with far right ideology and Mosleyite Flashes of lightning insignia on their publications. The far right soil everything they come into contact with and the greens must be aware of their corrupting influence, step up their vigilance and work for radical policies that attack the racism and inequality that underpins ecological destruction.
+In 1945 two Truman White House aides, E. D. McKim and General H. H. Vaughn, received reports of electronic surveillance of a high executive official. One of these reports included "transcripts of telephone conversations between [the official] and Justice Felix Frankfurter and between [the official] and Drew Pearson."[76]
-The animal rights movement, bizarrely, has been plagued by former and existing members of the NF. There is no doubt the fascists will attempt to infiltrate Earth First! Many of them appear like your average hippy! They are by no menas all skinhead thugs (equally groups like Skinheads Against Racial Prejudice and all the sound Gay/Lesbian suedeheads illustrate that having short hair doesn’t mean you are a nasty nazi!). Be warned! They are thin on the ■ ground but beware. Tlie British National Party, the largest (perhaps 600 plus) nazi group, ignore Deep Ecology, but equally demand opposition. There is an excellent article in the latest issue of Green Anarchist, on the psychology of the BNP and fighting the fascists in general. Larry O’Hara, an exmember of the excellent Big Flame group, bizarrely associated by Searchlight with the far right, is doing some good work on the subject. Ian Coates of Bristol university has produced a useful paper entitled “A Cuckoo in the Nest” on the NF infiltration of the Green movement. Send him an SAE and a small, donation to cover photocopying and I am sure he will let you have a copy (Ian Coates, c/o Dept of Sociology, Bristol University, Woodlands Road, Bristol). Also get hold of The Bigger Tory Vote by Nick Toezek, published by AK Press.
+From June 1945 until May 1948, General Vaughn received reports from electronic surveillance of a former Roosevelt White House aide. A memorandum by J. Edgar Hoover indicates that Attorney General Tom Clark "authorized the placing of a technical surveillance" on this individual and that, according to Clark, President Truman "was particularly concerned" about the activities of this individual "and his associates" and wanted "a very thorough investigation" so that "steps might be taken, if possible, to see that such activities did not interfere with the proper administration of government." Hoover's memorandum did not indicate what these "activities" were.[76]
-Finally why not join your local Anti-Fascist Action group or Anti-Fascist Alliance group, remember the Anti-Nazi League is a naff vehicle for those merchants of debased Leninist bollocks, the Socialist Workers Party.
+<em>b.</em> <em>Bugging, Mail Opening and Surreptitious Entry.</em>
-Remember, people are dying because of Nazis in France, Spain, Germany, and in this country.
+Intrusive techniques such as bugging, mail opening and surreptitious entry were used by the FBI without even the kind of formal Presidential authorization and requirement of Attorney General approval that applied to warrantless wiretapping.
-Derek Wall is an Eco-Socialist and a good friend ofEF! (some of <em>this is from an article first published in</em> Searchlight, June 1989).
+During the war, the FBI began "chamfering" or surreptitious mail opening, to supplement the overt censorship of international mail authorized by statute In Wartime.[77] The practice of surreptitious entry - or breaking-and-entering - was also used by the FBI in wartime intelligence operations.[78] The Bureau continued or resumed the use of these techniques after the war without explicit outside authorization.
-<br>
+Furthermore, the installation of microphone surveillance ("bugs"), either with or without trespass, was exempt from the procedure for Attorney General approval of wiretaps. Justice Department records indicate that no Attorney General formally considered the question of microphone surveillance involving trespass, except on a hypothetical basis, until 1952.[79]
-** Critical Mass: Reclaiming Space and Combating the Car (from issue 5)
+** C. Domestic Intelligence in the Cold War Era: 1946-1963
-<quote>
+<em>1.</em> <em>Main Developments of the 1946-1963 Period</em>
-What a difef rence there was between the old and new parts of Mexico City only twenty years ago. In the old parts of the city, the streets were still true commons. Some people sat on the road to sell vegetables and charcoal. Others put their <em>chairs on the road to sell tequila. Others held their meetings on the road to decide on the new headman for the neighborhood or to determine the price of a donkey. Others drove their donkeys through the crowd, walking next to the heavily-loaded beast of burden; others sat in the saddle. Children played in the gutter, and still people walking could use the road to get from one place to another. Such roads were not builtfor people. Like any true commons, the street itself was the result ofpeople living there and</em> making <em>the space liveable. Ihe dwellings that lined the roads were not private homes in the modern sense-garages for the overnight deposit of workers. Ihe threshold still separated two living areas, one intimate and one common. But neither homes in this intimate sense nor streets as commons survived economic development. In the new sections of Mexico City, streets are no more for people. They are nowadays for automobiles, for buses, for cars, for taxis and trucks. People are barley tolerated on the streets unless they are on their way to a bus stop. Ifpeople now sat down or stopped on the street they would become obstacles for the traffic, and traffic would be dangerous to them. Ihe road has been degradedfrom a commons to a simple resourcefor the circulation of vehicles.”</em>
-<right>
+The domestic intelligence programs of the FBI and the military intelligence agencies, which were established under presidential authority before World War II, did not cease with the end of hostilities. Instead, they set the pattern for decades to come.
--Ivan Illich, “Silence is a Commons”, <em>The Co-evolution Quarterly,</em> Winter 1983.
-</right>
-</quote>
-As Ivan Illich says, it is about “making (our) spaces liveable”-reasserting our control, in a myriad of different ways, over those spaces that once belonged to us but have since been illegitimately wrested away from us, through the process known as “enclosure;” This is what happened to the Dongas at Twyford Down on December 9<sup>th</sup> 1992, to George Green in Wanstead, and to countless other places. This is where demos, or actions, come in--in a sense the issue that they are ostensibly concerned with is of secondary importance to the feelings that our actions engender within ourselves and others--how much of a scene we make and the imprint that it leaves behind. The US anarchist writer Hakim Bey talks of temporary autonomous zones, and this is at the heart of what every demonstration is, or should be striving for-a glimpse of the future (present?) society we long for. The best demos are a gap opening in the clouds of alienation, apathy, and impotence, and a sliver of electrifying sunlight breaking through. The stranglehold of orthodox reality is broken-to quote one example, it seems that at a recent Oxford Cycle action, the traffic was brought to a standstill by a prank that subverted police’s public order expectations and left them confounded-they were confronted by waiters who had appeared out of nowhere and were causally serving tea at Oxford’s newest cafe, as if it were the most normal thing in the world. The street had been redefined.
+Despite Director Hoover's statement that the intelligence structure could be "discontinued or very materially curtailed" with the termination of the national emergency, after the war intelligence operations were neither discontinued nor curtailed.[80] Congressional deference to the executive branch, the broad scope of investigations, the growth of the FBI's power, and the substantial immunity of the Bureau from effective outside supervision became increasingly significant features of domestic intelligence in the United States. New domestic intelligence functions were added to previous responsibilities. No attempt was made to enact a legislative charter replacing the wartime emergency orders, as was done in the foreign intelligence field in 1947.
-This brings us to Critical Mass-an idea and an attitude for bike actions that sprang up in San Francisco, and has now spread to other US cities and international locales, as the potential for mayhem inherent in bikes has been realized and refined. The Mass began as an informal commute home together to show bike solidarity with no real agenda (Maximum Rock n’Roll, Feb. 1994)--Just 50 riders cycling home in the dark. It has since proved to have an irresistible momentum, as hundreds more cyclists have gotten involved in Critical Mass manifestations, and the actions themselves have become more intentional. Their experience has shown the willingness of police and motorists to resort to potentially lethal force to defend what?-One of the supreme totems of our age-the private motor car, and the inalienable right of the motorist to drive, without hindrances of any kind. In one incident in San Francisco in April 1993, a driver reportedly rammed a group of cyclists on the Mass, and proceeded to run over one of its members. The police present duly charged the victims and threatened to arrest other witnesses. I’m sure such experiences will be familiar to those who have participated in Carmageddon actions in the U.K-or indeed, in anti-roads campaigns in general.
+The main developments during the Cold War era may be summarized as follows:
-When death may be the penalty for enjoying an innocuous pleasure such as communal cycling, your ideas tend to become radicalized. Critical Masters now see cars (as) embodying the epitome of ‘American destruction (Maximum R ‘n R). Consequently, aggressive drivers are spat upon or blocked in for longer. The focus of the masses has broadened, with people biking through supermarkets, McDonalds (stealing their flags and causing the manager to lock himself in the process), and other temples of latter day capitalism. Most notably, hordes of cyclists attempted the world’s first cyclotron, surrounding the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange in a bid to levitate it. (Remind you of anything?)
+<em>a.</em> <em>Domestic Intelligence Authority</em>
-One of the most recent events involved blocking a Berkeley motorway, which led to the worst police reprisal so far seen: some of the participants were charged with “felony assault on a police officer with a deadly weapon, to wit: one bicycle” and 61 bikes were confiscated, some ofwhich disappeared while in police hands. The officer who masterminded this operation hit the nail on the head in hilarious fashion when he accused Critical Massers of being <em>nothing more than self proclaimed anarchists and local activists who have adopted innovative tactics to create civil disorder in an attempt to carry out the ‘anarchist revolution’.</em> Give that man a D-lock!
+During this period there was a national consensus regarding the danger to the United States from Communism; little distinction was made between the threats posed by the Soviet Union and by Communists within this country. Domestic intelligence activity was supported by that consensus, although not specifically authorized by the Congress.
-Two of those involved in Critical Mass make a very significant point when they say it “above all builds community...at San Francisco Critical Mass in September for its first birthday, people brought huge cakes and brownies and we all sang happy birthday, and had fun in Golden Gate Park:’ <em>(Maximum R n’R).</em> Again, this feeling of community, and, ideally, tribal links will be familiar to many UKEF!ers. If revolution is the festival of the oppressed, struggling for something you believe in helps to bind you together, restoring the connections between people that this society so often severs as it tries to atomise us. A new zine culture-the “Xerocracy”-has emerged to cater to Critical Mass, fostering communication between strangers whose only previous connection was ownership of a bike and a desire for change, or (equally valid) some excitement. This brings us back to lllich’s point about commons, and the way in which cars (along with a host of other factors) destroy this social space. Numerous studies support such a conclusion-for example, David Engwight’s research (see The Guardian 5/11/93) into how people living on streets with heavy traffic flows experience much less social contact than those living on streets with light flows. The Policy Studies Institute compare roads to <em>crocodile-infested rivers</em> that people dare not cross (New Scientist 24/10/92)-also, think of the traffic canyons that are prevalent in many cities.
+Formal authority for FBI investigations of "subversive activity" and for the agreements between the FBI and military intelligence was explicitly granted in executive directives from Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, the National Security Council, and Attorney General Kennedy. These directives provided no guidance, however, for controlling such investigations.
-An example of resistance to this trend, and reclamation of this space for the people and community was Claremont Road at the M 11. The contents ofhouses-chairs, sofas, a bath tub, a pool table, etc.--were turned out onto the street, breaking down the odious division between public and private spheres. There could be no greater contrast with David Engwight’ s findings, where <em>Heavy Street (high traffic levels)...was used solely as a corridor between the sanctuary of individual homes and the outside world. There was nofeeling of community and residents kept themselves to themselves.</em> In our society, it is not just the physical environment that is colonized and enclosed-it is our minds also. By and large, cultural products are manufactured for us, we passively consume them, and our own idiosyncratic imaginations begin to atrophy. Critical Mass, and many other similar actions in the UK, are thus also important because they subvert this trend. A platform-a vehicle even (excuse the pun)-is provided for people to act out their fantasies, to play, to let rip. One example is Xerocracy, another is that <em>often (the mass) is chaotic, and indecision in the middle of the intersection can be annoying-or lead to outbursts of theater andfun like die-ins and resuscitating people with bikes. (A1aximum R n’R)</em> People exult in the atmosphere and surprise themselves with their hitherto-neglected capabilities. The first time that the A33 at Twyford was blocked (March 1992) was such an occasion-having stilled the ceaseless roar of the traffic (the lifeblood of the cybernetic machine that we inhabit), we reveled in our power and new found freedom. We capered about, danced, sang, hooted, and grunted through road cones as if regressing to primal selves, did an absurd Conga through the stalled cars, openly attempted rash acts of sabotage-possessed by an almost palpable spirit of the moment: for a brief moment, anything seemed possible. To refer back to what I said at the beginning, we were sunbathing.
+<em>b.</em> <em>Scope of Domestic Intelligence</em>
-Critical Masses have been happening all over the country, with over 1,500 at the last London CM and over 300 in Brighton. Join these explosions of bike power: Last Friday of every month: Aberdeen, Bath, Bradford, Cambridge, Cardiff, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Lancaster, Leeds, Leicester, Liverpool, London, Manchester, Middlesborough, Sheffield, Southampton, Stoke, Wolverhampton, York. 1<sup>st</sup> Friday: Birmingham. 2<sup>nd</sup> Friday: Nottingham, 1<sup>st</sup> Saturday: Brighton.
+The breadth of the FBIs investigation of "subversive infiltrationcontinued to produce intelligence reports and massive files on lawful groups and law-abiding citizens who happened to associate, even unwittingly, with Communists or with socialists unconnected with the Soviet Union who used revolutionary rhetoric. At the same time, the scope of FBI intelligence expanded to cover civil rights protest activity as well as violent "Klan-type" and "hate' " groups, vocal anticommunists, and prominent opponents of racial integration. The vagueness of the FBI's investigative mandate and the overbreadth of its collection programs also placed it in position to supply theh White House with numerous items of domestic political intelligence apparently desired by Presidents and their aides.
-Addresses:
+In response to White House and congressional interest in right-wing organizations, the Internal Revenue Service began comprehensive investigations of right-wing groups in 1961 and later expanded to left-wing organizations. This effort was directed at identifying contributions and ascertaining whether the organizations were entitled to maintain their exempt status.
-) Bike Not: London
+<em>c.</em> <em>Accountability and Control</em>
-) The Broken Spoke: San Francisco, CA
+Pervasive secrecy enabled the FBI and the Justice Department to disregard as "unworkable" the Emergency Detention Act intended to set standards for aspects of domestic intelligence. The FBI's independent position also allowed it to withhold significant information from a Presidential commission and from every Attorney General, and no Attorney General inquired fully into the Bureau's operations.
-) The Bicycle Terrorist: Berkeley, CA
+During the same period, apprehensions about having a "security police" influenced Congress to prohibit the Central Intelligence Agency from exercising law enforcement powers or performing "internal security functions." Nevertheless, in secret and without effective internal controls, the CIA undertook programs for testing chemical and biological agents on unwitting Americans, sometimes with tragic consequences. The CIA also used American private institutions as "cover" and used intrusive techniques affecting the rights of Americans.
-) Mudflap: San Francisco, CA
+<em>d.</em> <em>Intrusive Techniques</em>
-) Bicycle Threat: Sacramento, CA
+The CIA and the National Security Agency illegally instituted programs for the interception of international communications to and from American citizens, primarily first class mail and cable traffic.
-<br>
+During this period, the FBI also used intrusive intelligence gathering techniques against domestic "subversives" and counterintelligence targets. Sometimes these techniques were covered by a blanket delegation of authority from the Attorney General, as with microphone surveillance; but frequently they were used without outside authorization, as with mail openings and surreptitious entry. Only conventional wiretaps required the Attorney General's approval in each case, but this method was still misused due to the lack of adequate standards and procedural safeguards.
-** Reclaim the Streets (from issue 6)
+<em>e.</em> <em>Domestic Covert Action</em>
-We are not going to demand anything. We are not going to ask for anything. We are going to take. We are going to occupy.
+In the mid-fifties, the FBI developed the initial COINTELPRO operations, which used aggressive covert actions to disrupt and discredit Communist Party activities. The FBI subsequently expanded its COINTELPRO activities to discredit peaceful protest groups whom Communists had infiltrated but did not control, as well as groups of socialists who used revolutionary rhetoric but had no connections with a hostile foreign power.
-The direct action group Reclaim the Streets (RTS) has developed widespread recognition over the last few years. From road blockades to street parties, from strikes on oil corporations to organising alongside striking workers, its actions and ideas are attracting more and more people and international attention. Yet the apparent sudden emergence of this group, its penetration of popular alternative culture, and its underlying philosophy have rarely been discussed.
+Throughout this period, there was a mixture of secrecy and disclosure. Executive action was often substituted for legislation, sometimes with the full knowledge and consent. of Congress and on other occasions without informing Congress or by advising only a select group of legislators. There is no question that Congress, the courts, and the public expected the FBI to gather domestic intelligence about Communists. But the broad scope of FBI investigations, its specific programs for achieving "pure intelligence" and "preventive intelligence" objectives, and its use of intrusive techniques and disruptive counterintelligence measures against domestic "subversives" were not fully known by anyone outside the Bureau.
-*** The Evolution of RTS
+<em>2.</em> <em>Domestic Intelligence Authority</em>
-RTS was originally formed in London in Autumn 1991, around the dawn of the anti-roads movement. With the battle for Twyford Down rumbling along in the background, a small group of individuals got together to take direct action against the motor car. In their own words they were campaigning: FOR wa <em>lking</em><em>, cycling, and cheap, or free, public transport, and AGAINST cars, roads, and the system thatpushes them.[162]</em>
+<em>a.</em> <em>Anti-Communist Consensus</em>
-Their work was small-scale but effective and even back then it had elements of the cheeky, surprise tactics that have moulded RTS’s more recent activities. There was the trashed car on Park Lane symbolising the arrival of Car-mageddon, DIY cycle lanes painted overnight on London streets, disruption of the 1993 Earls Court Motor Show, and subvertising actions on car adverts around the city. However the onset of the No Ml1 Link Road Campaign presented the group with a specific local focus, and RTS was absorbed temporarily into the No M11 campaign in East London.
+During the Cold War era, the strong consensus in favor of governmental action against Communists was reflected in decisions of the Supreme Court and acts of Congress. In the Korean War period, for instance, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of domestic Communist Party leaders under the Smith Act for conspiracy to advocate violent overthrow of the government. The Court pinned its decision upon the conspiratorial nature of the Communist Party of the United States and its ideological links with the Soviet Union at a time of stress in Soviet-American relations.[81]
-This period of the No M11 Campaign was significant for a number of reasons. Whilst Twyford Down was predominantly an ecological campaign-defending a natural area-the urban setting of the resistance to the M11 construction embodied wider social and political issues Beyond the anti-road and ecological arguments, a whole urban community faced the destruction of its social environment with loss of homes, degradation to its quality of life, and community fragmentation.
+Several statutes buttressed the FBI's claim of legitimacy for at least some aspects of domestic intelligence. Although Congress never directly authorized Bureau intelligence operations, Congress enacted the Internal Security Act of 1950 over President Truman's veto. Its two main provisions were: the Subversives Activities Control Act, requiring the registration of members of communist and communist "front" groups; and the Emergency Detention Act, providing for the internment in an emergency of persons who might engage in espionage or sabotage. In this Act, Congress made findings that the Communist Party was "a disciplined organization" operating in this nation "under Soviet Union control" with the aim of installing "a Soviet style dictatorship."[82] Going even further in 1954, Congress passed the Communist Control Act, which provided that the Communist Party was "not entitled to any of the rights, privileges, and immunities attendant upon legal bodies created under the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States."[83]
-Beyond these political and social considerations, the M11 developed the direct action skills of those involved. Phone trees were established, lots of people were involved in site invasions, crowds of activists had to be manoeuvred cunningly to outwit police. The protesters also gained experience of dealing with associated tasks such as publicity, the media, and fund-raising.
+In 1956, the Supreme Court recognized the existence of FBI intelligence aimed at "Communist seditious activities."[84] The basis for Smith Act prosecutions of "subversive activity" was narrowed in 1957, however, when the Court overturned the convictions of second-string Communist leaders, holding that the government must show advocacy "of action and not merely abstract doctrine."[85] In 1961. the Court sustained the constitutionality under the First Amendment of the requirement that the Communist Party register with the Subversive Activities Control Board.[86]
-Then in late 1994 a political hand-grenade was thrown into the arena of the M11 campaign: the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act. Overnight civil protesting became a criminal act, but. what the government hadn’t counted on was how this piece of legislation would unite and motivate the very groups it was aimed at repressing. The fight of the anti-road activists became synonymous with that of travellers, squatters, and hunt saboteurs. In particular, the suddenly politicised rave scene became a communal social focus for many people.
+The consensus should not be portrayed as monolithic. President Truman was concerned about risks to constitutional government posed by the zealous anti-Communism in Congress. According to one White House staff member's notes during the debate over the Internal Security Act:
-The M11 Link Road campaign culminated in the symbolic and dramatic battle of Claremont Road. Eventually, and with the repetitive beats of The Prodigy in the background, police and security overpowered the barricades, lock-ons, and the scaffold tower, but the war was only just beginning. The period of the Ml1 Campaign had linked together new political and social alliances and in the midst of the campaign’s frenzied activities strong friendships had been formed. When Claremont Road was lost, this collective looked for new sources of expression and Reclaim the Streets was reformed in February 1995.
+The President said that the situation . . . was the worst it had been since the Alien and Sedition Laws of 1798, that a lot of people on the Hill should know better but had been stampeded into running with their tails between their legs.
-The years that followed saw the momentum of RTS flourish. Street Parties I and II were held in rapid succession in the summer of 1995 and there were various actions against the likes of Shell, the Nigerian Embassy, and the 1995 Motor Show. More recently, in July 1996 there was the massive success of the M41 Street Party, where for nine hours 8,000 people took control of the M41 motorway in West London and partied and enjoyed themselves, whilst some dug up the tarmac with jack-hammers and in its place planted trees that had been rescued from the construction path of the M 11.
+Truman announced that he would veto the Internal Security Act "regardless of how politically unpopular it was -- election year or no election year."[87] But President Truman's veto was overridden by an overwhelming margin.
-At a base level the focus ofRTS has remained anti-car but this has been increasingly symbolic, not specific. RTS aimed initially to move debate beyond the anti-roads struggle, to highlight the social, as well as the ecological, costs of the car system.
+<em>b.</em> <em>The Federal Employee Loyalty-Security Program</em>
-<quote>
+(1) Origins of the Program. -- President Truman established a federal employee loyalty program in 1947.[88] Its basic features were retained in the federal employee security program authorized by President Eisenhower in public Executive Order 10450, which, with some modifications, still applies today.[89]
-The cars that fill the streets have narrowed the pavements.. If pedestrians ... want to look at each other, they see cars <em>in the background, if they want to look at the building across the street they see cars in the foreground: there isn’t a single angle of viewfrom which cars will not be visible, from the back, in front, on both sides. Their omnipresent noise corrodes every moment of contemplation like acid.[163]</em>
-</quote>
-Cars dominate our cities, polluting, congesting, and dividing communities. They have isolated people from one another, and our streets have become mere conduits for motor vehicles to hurtle through, oblivious of the neighbourhoods they are disrupting. Cars have created social voids: allowing people to move further and further away from their homes, dispersing and fragmenting daily activities and lives and increasing social anonymity. RTS believe that ridding society of the car would allow us to re-create a safer, more attractive living environment, to return streets to the people who live on them, and perhaps to rediscover a sense of social solidarity.
+Although it had a much broader reach, the program originated out of well-founded concern that Soviet intelligence was then using the Communist Party as a vehicle for the recruitment of espionage agents.[90] President Truman appointed a Temporary Commision on Employee Loyalty in 1946 to examine the problem. FBI Director Hoover submitted a memorandum on the types of activities of "subversive or disloyal persons" in government service which would constitute a "threat" to security. As Hoover saw it, however, the danger was not limited to espionage or recruitment for espionage. It extended to "influencing" government policies in favor of "the foreign country of their ideological choice." Consequently, he urged that attention be given to the associations of government employees with "front" organizations, including "temporary organizations, 'spontaneous' campaigns, and pressure movements so frequently used by subversive groups."[91]
-But cars arc just one piece of the jigsaw and RTS is also about raising the wider questions behind the transport issue--about the political and economic forces that drive car culture. Governments claim that “roads are good for the economy.” More goods travelling on longer journeys, more petrol being burnt, more customers at out-of-town supermarkets-it is all about increasing “consumption;’ because that is an indicator of “economic growth.” ‘Ihe greedy, short-term exploitation of dwindling resources regardless ofthe immediate or long-term costs. Therefore RTS’ s attack on cars cannot be detached from a wider attack on capitalism itself.
+The President's Commission accepted Director Hoover's broad view of the threat, along with the view endorsed by a Presidential Commission on Civil Rights that there also was a danger from "those who would subvert our democracy by ... destroying the civil rights of some groups."[92] Consequently, the Executive Order included, as an indication of disloyalty, membership in or association with groups designated on an "Attorney General's list" as:
 <quote>
-<em>Our streets are as full of capitalism as of cars and the pollution of capitalism is much more insidious.[164]</em>
+totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force, or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.[93]
 </quote>
-More importantly, RTS is about encouraging more people to take part in direct action. Everyone knows the destruction that roads and cars are causing, yet the politicians still take no notice. Hardly surprising-they only care about staying in power and maintaining their authority over the majority of people. Direct action is about destroying that power and authority, and people taking responsibility for themselves. Direct action is not just a tactic: it’s an end in itself. It is about enabling people to unite as individuals with a common aim, to change things directly by their own actions.
+The Executive Order was used to provide a legal basis for the FBI's investigation of allegedly "subversive" organizations which might fall within these categories.[94] Such investigations supplied a body of intelligence data against winch to check the names of prospective federal employees.[95]
-Street Parties I, II, and III were ingenious manifestations of RTS’s views. They embodied the above messages in an inspired formula: cunning direct action, crowd empowerment, fun, humour, and raving. They have evolved into festivals open to all who feel exasperated by conventional society.
-To some extent it is possible to trace the tactics behind the Street Parties in RTS’s history. The mobilisation, assembly, and movement of large crowds draws on skills from road protests. The use ofsound systems draws on dominant popular culture whereas the initial inspiration for Street Parlies certainly reflects the parties of the Claremont Road days. However. RTS have retrospectively also realised that their roots lie deeper in history. The great revolutionary moments have all been enormous popular festivals-the storming of the Bastiile, the Paris Commune, and the uprisings in 1968, to name a few. A carnival celebrates temporary liberation from the established order; it marks the suspension of all hierarchy, rank, privileges, norms, and prohibitions. Crowds ofpeople on the street seized by a sudden awareness of their power and unification through a celebration of their own ideas and creations. It follows then that carnivals and revolutions are not spectacles seen by other people, but the very opposite in that they involve the active participation of the crowd itself. Their very idea embraces all people, and the Street Party as an event has successfully harnessed this emotion.
-The power that such activities embody inevitably challenges the state’s authority, and hence ihe police and security services’ attention has increasingly been drawn, to RTS. The organisation of any form of direct action by the group is closely scrutinised. RTS has been made very aware of this problem. Vehicles carrying equipment have been broken into, followed, and impounded en route to Street Parties. RTS’s office has been raided, telephones have been bugged, and activists from RTS have been followed, harassed, and threatened with heavy conspiracy charges. On top of this a secret RTS action in December 1996 (an attempt to seize a BP tanker on the M25) was foiled by the unexpected presence of two hundred police at the activists’ meeting point. How such information is obtained by the police is uncertain and can easily lead to paranoia in the group: fear of infiltration, anxiety, and suspicion that can themselves be debilitating.
+(2) Breadth of the Investigations. -- By the mid-1950s, the Bureau believed that the Communist Party was no longer used for Soviet espionage; it represented only a "potential" recruiting ground for spies.[96] Thereafter, FBI investigations of Communist organizations and other groups unconnected to espionage but falling within the standards of the Attorney General's list frequently became a means for monitoring the political background of prospective federal employees by means of the "name check" of Bureau files. These investigations also served the "pure intelligence" function of informing the Attorney General of the influence and organizational affiliations of socalled "subversives."[97]
-Yet RTS has not been deterred: they hold open meetings every week, they continue to expand and involve new people, and are also frequently approached by other direct action groups. Alliances have sprouted with other groups-the striking Liverpool Dockers and Tube Workers to name two-as recognition has grown of common ground between these struggles. Throughout the UK and Europe new local RTS groups have formed and late this summer there are likely to be Street Panics worldwide. These new groups have not been created by London RTS. they are fully autonomous. London RTS has merely acted as a calalyst; stimulating individuals to replicate ideas if they are suitable for others to use as well.
+No organizations were formally added to the Attorney General's list after 1955.[98] However, the FBI's "name check" reports on prospective employees were never limited to information about listed organizations. The broad standards for placing a group on the Attorney General's list were used to evaluate an employee's background, regardless of whether or not lie was a member of a group on the list.[99] If a "name check" uncovered information about a prospective employee's association with a group which <em>might</em> come within those standards, the FBI would report the data and attach a "characterization" of the organization relating tothe standards.[100]
-In many ways the evolution of RTS has been a logical progression that reflects its roots and experiences. Equally the forms of expression adopted by RTS are merely modern interpretations of age-old protests: direct action is not a new invention. Like their historic revolutionary counterparts, they arc a group fighting for a better society at a time when many people feel alienated from, and concerned about, the current system. Their success lies in their ingenuity for empowering people, their foresight to forge common ground between issues, and their ability to inspire.
+(3) FBI Control of Loyalty-Security Investigations -- President Eisenhower's 1953 order specifically designated the FBI as responsible for "a full field investigation" whenever a "name check" or a background investigation by the Civil Service Commission or any other agency uncovered information indicating a potential security risk.[101] President Truman had refused to give the Bureau this exclusive power initially, but he fought a losing battle.[102]
-*** The Future Street Party?
+Director Hoover had objected that President Truman's order did not give the FBI exclusive power and threatened "to withdraw from this field of investigation rather than to engage in a tug of war with the Civil Service Commission."[103] President Truman was apprehensive about the FBI's growing power. The notes of one presidential aide on a meeting with the President reflect that Truman felt "very strongly anti-FBI" on the issue and wanted "to be sure and hold FBI down, afraid of 'Gestapo.' "[104]
-From the moment of birth we are immersed in action and can only fitfully guide it by taking thought.--A.N,Whitehead
+Presidential assistant Clark Clifford reviewed the situation and came down on the side of the FBI as "better qualified" than the Civil Service Commission.[105] But the President insisted on a compromise which gave Civil Service "discretion" to call on the FBI "if it wishes."[106] Director Hoover protested this "confusion" about the FBI's jurisdiction.[107] When Justice Department officials warned that Congress would "find flaws" with the compromise, President Truman noted on a memorandum from Clifford:
-Tactics need to move. If they do not those involved become tired or bored. One way to move is to grow; doing it all bigger and better. Relying on tighter organisation and a more specialised activist. This can have immediate benefits that confer success on the group using them: wider media coverage, more ‘subscribers’ to your mailouts, a certain notoriety. Another way-dialectically opposed to the former, though also a type of growth-is to diffuse. Enable more and more people to experience organising the tactic or be affected by its presence and possibilities directly.
+J. Edgar will in all probability get this backward looking Congress to give him what he wants. It's dangerous.[108]
-The Street Party tactic has, to date, been growing in both ways. Three parties in London, each more organised and successful than the last, and the erupting of parties around the country, locally organised and controlled, have shown that, as well as being a serious affair, resistance can be a festival. But what is the point of the street party? What is its future ? What could it be potentially? These questions should be answered if the street party, conceived as a means to a free and ecological end, is not to become a victim of its own success.
+President's Truman's prediction was correct. His budget request of $16 million for Civil Service and $8.7 million for the FBI to conduct loyalty investigations was revised by Congress to allocate $7.4 million to the FBI and only $3 million to Civil Service.[109] The issue was finally resolved to the FBI's satisfaction when the President issued a statement declaring that there were "to be no exceptions" to the rule that the FBI would make all loyalty investigations."[110]
-A simple, but limiting, answer to the first question is: “to highlight the social and environmental costs of the car system.”[165] Which is fine, as far as it goes, but the rationale of the street party, certainly the experience, suggests that a more organic, transformative, even Utopian approach may bring other replies and an answer to the last two questions-its future and potential. The concern is that the street party risks becoming a caricature of itself if it becomes too focused on the spectacular and its participant-the mass. The speculation is that, inherent within its praxis-its mix of desire, spontaneity, and organisation-lie some of the foundations on which to build a participatory politics for a liberated, ecological society.
+<em>c.</em> <em>Executive Directives: Lack of Guidance and Controls</em>
-*** Selling Space
+Two public presidential statements on FBI domestic intelligence authority -- by President Truman in 1950 and by President Eisenhower in 1953 -- specifically declared that the FBI was authorized to investigate "subversive activity," electing the broader interpretation of the directive of conflicting Roosevelt directives. Moreover, a confidential directive of the National Security Council in 1949 granted authority to the FBI and military intelligence for investigation of "subversive activities." In 1962 President Kennedy issued a confidential order shifting supervision of these investigations from the NSC to the Attorney General, and the NSC's 1949 authorizations were reissued by Attorney General Kennedy in 1964.
-The words “street” and “road” are often taken to mean the same thing, but they can be defined in opposition to each other, to represent different concepts of space. In everyday usage the distinction is still common. We talk of the word on the streets, taking to the streets, and street culture. A street suggests dwellings, people, and interaction, in a word: community. A road, in contrast, suggests the tarmac, the horizon, progress, and the private enclosure of the motor car. We speak of ‘*roadworks*’ and ‘*road rage*’.[166]
+As with the earlier Roosevelt directives, these statements, orders and authorizations failed to provide guidance on conducting or controlling "subversive" investigations.
-The road is mechanical, linear movement epitomised by the car. The street. at best, is a living place of human movement and social intercourse, of freedom and spontaneity.[167] The car system steals the street from under us and sells it back for the price of petrol. It privileges time over space, corrupting and reducing both to an obsession with speed or, in economic lingo, turnover. It doesn’t matter who drives this system for its movements are already pre-determined. As Theodore Adorno notes in Iv1inima Moralia: “Which driver is not tempted, merely by the power of his engine, to wipe out the vermin of the street, pedestrians, children, and cyclists? The movements machines demand of their users already have the violent, hardhitting jerkiness of Fascist maltreatment.”
+Under President Truman, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC)[111] was formally authorized in 1949 to supervise coordination between the FBI and the military of "all investigation of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, <em>subversion</em>, and <em>other related intelligence matters</em> affecting internal security."[112] [Emphasis added.]
-Or, as an RTS Street Party flyer put it. <em>Cars can’t dance</em><em>...</em>[168]
+The confidential Delimitations Agreement between the FBI and the military intelligence agencies was also revised In 1949 to require greater exchange of "information of mutual interest" and to require the FBI to advise military intelligence of developments concerning "subversive" groups who were "potential" dangers to the security of the United States.[113]
-The modern city is the capitalist ‘machine’ extended. A factory city serving dominant elites; a transportation hub for import and export, its citizens, as wage slaves, are kept in huge dormitories close to their place of labour. Its inhuman scale, impersonality, and sacrifice of pleasure to efficiency are the very antithesis of a genuine community.The privatisation of public space in the form of the car continues the erosion of neighbourhood and community that defines the metropolis. Road schemes, business “parks;’ shopping developments-all add to the disintegration of community and the flattening of a locality. Everywhere becomes the same as everywhere else. Community becomes commodity-a shopping village, sedated and under constant surveillance. The desire for community is then fulfilled elsewhere, through spectacle, sold to us in simulated form. A tv soap “street” or square mimicking the arena that concrete and capitalism are destroying. The real street, in this scenario, is sterile. A place to move through, not to be in, it exists only as an aid to somewhere else-through a shop window, billboard, or petrol tank.
+In 1050, after the outbreak of the Korean war and in the midst of Congressional consideration of new internal security legislation, Director Hoover recommended that Attorney General J. Howard McGrath[114] and the NSC draft a statement which President Truman issued in July 1950 providing that the FBI:
 <quote>
-Startled Mr. Lacey? Thought you had just taken a job managing an obscure little port, then suddenly there are street battles outside your office, your car gets trashed four times, you can’t go shopping without being attacked by grannies, your house gets trashed and you have to move two times, your wife leaves you and your kids won’t talk to you. Bad career move, eh Phillip.
+should take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, <em>subversive activities and related matters</em>.[115] [Emphasis added.]
 </quote>
-To rescue what is left of the public arena, to enlarge and transform that arena from a selling and increasingly sold space to a common.. free space-from controlled locality to local control-is fundamental to the vision of reclaiming the streets. The logic of this vision implies not only ending the rule of the car and recreating community, but also the liberation of the streets from the wider rule of hierarchy and domination. From economic, ethnic, and gender oppressions. From the consumerism. surveillance, advertising, and profit-making that reduces both people and planet to saleable objects.
+Despite concern among his assistants,[115] President Truman's statement clearly placed him on the record as endorsing FBI investigations of "subversive activities." The statement said that such investigations had been authorized initially by President Roosevelt's "directives" of September 1939 and January 1943. However, those particular directives had not used this precise language.[116]
-<quote>
+Shortly after President Eisenhower took office in 1953, the FBI advised the White House that its "internal security responsibility" went beyond "statutory" authority. The Bureau attached a copy of the Truman statement, but not the Roosevelt directive. The FBI again broadly interpreted the Roosevelt directive by saving that it had authorized "investigative work" related to "subversive activities."[117]
-The barricade blocks the road but opens the way -Paris, May ’63
-</quote>
-*** Street Party as Public Meeting
+In December 1953 President Eisenhower issued a statement reiterating President Truman's "directive" and extending the FBI's mandate to investigations under the Atomic Energy Act.[118]
-That the city space presently given over to traffic and trafficking can be transformed into a festival site, beach, or forest is clear. But equally important is the potential for this space to be used for an authentic politics. For the recreation of a public arena where empowered individuals can join together to collectively manage social affairs. Without the communal sphere, defined here as “the street”, there can be no real community. Without this sphere community is easily identified with the nation-state, and politics-the self-management of the community-is reduced to the practice of statecraft.
+President Kennedy issued no public statement comparable to the Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower "directives." However, in 962 he did transfer the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference to "the supervision of the Attorney General;"[119] and in 1964 Attorney General Robert Kennedy reissued the IIC charter, citing as authority the President's 1962 order and retaining the term "subversion." The 'charter added that it did not "modify" or "affect" the previous "Presidential Directives" relating to the duties of the FBI, and that the Delimitations Agreement between the FBI and military intelligence "shall remain in full force and effect."[120]
-The street party, in theory, suggests a dissolution of centralised power structures in favour of a network of self-controlled localities. The street party could easily involve a public meeting or community assembly that works in opposition to the state: towards taking direct control of its locality and giving all an equal voice in decision-making. By including and engaging with other struggles, by involving more local associations, clubs, and tenants, work, and community groups, by helping others organise smaller street parties that bypass official channels, we extend the practice of direct action and make such a politics possible. In practice that is already what is happening, but without an understanding of where we wish the street party to go it becomes all too easy for authority to co-opt or subvert its form.
+None of the directives, orders, or charters provided any definition of the broad and loose terms "subversion" or "subversive activities;" and none of the administrations provided effective controls over the FBI's investigations in this area.
-The participatory party or street meeting could be a real objective for the future street party. For an event that goes beyond temporarily celebrating its autonomy to laying the ground for permanent social freedom. Discussion areas, decision-making bodies, delegates mandated to attend other parties; in short the formation of a body politic, could all happen within the broader arena of the street party. Such participatory communities in traditional anarchist theory, were called communes. Based on self-government through face-to-face grassroots or street level assemblies they were the final authority for all public policy. Linked together in confederal co-ordination they formed the Commune of communes which, translated into current terminology, gives us the Network of networks or, more appropriately: the Street Party of street parties. That such a street party would tend to undermine centralised state and government structures, constituting a dual power in direct opposition to them, is obvious.
+<em>3.</em> <em>Scope of Domestic Intelligence</em>
-*** The Street Party of Street Parties
+<em>a.</em> <em>"Subversive Activities"</em>
-Revolutionary moments are carnivals in which the individual life <em>celebrates its unification with a regenerated society</em> wrote Raoul Vaneigem.[169] The street party can be read as a situ-esque reversal of this assertion; as an attempt to make Carnival the revolutionary moment. Placing “what could be” in the path of “what is” and celebrating the “here and now” in the road ofthe rush for “there and later,” it hopes to re-energize the possibility of radical change. The continuing emergence of street parties in Britain and increasingly in other countries shows that the desire for this change is not limited to economic equality, to ending injustice, or ensuring survival. It is an expansive desire: for freedom, for creativity; to truly live. This desire, for the present social order, is revolutionary.
+The breadth of the FBI's investigations of "subversive activity" led to massive collection of information on law abiding citizens. FBI domestic intelligence investigations extended beyond known or suspected Communist Party members. They included other individuals who regarded the Soviet Union as the "champion of a superior way of life" and "persons holding important positions who have shown sympathy for Communist objectives and policies." Members of "non-Stalinist" revolutionary socialist groups were investigated because, even though they opposed the Soviet regime, the FBI viewed them as regarding the Soviet Union "as the center for world revolution."[121] Moreover, the FBI's concept of "subversive Infiltration" was so broad that it permitted the investigation for decades of peaceful protest groups such as the NAACP.
-While four out of five westerners live in the city, while two-thirds of the world’s population share the common space of its thoroughfares, it is: On the <em>streets that power must be dissolved; for the streets, where daily life is endured, suffered, and eroded, and where power is con.fronted and.fought, must be turned into the domain where daily life is enjoyed, created, and nourished.[170]</em>
+(1) The Number of Investigations. -- By 1960 the FBI had opened approximately 432,000 files at headquarters on individuals and groups in the "subversive" intelligence field. Bet Between 1960 and 1963 an additional 9,000 such files were opened.[122] An even larger number of investigative files were maintained at FBI field offices.[123] Under the Bureau's filing system, a single file on a group could include references to hundreds or thousands of group members or other persons associated with the group in any way; and such names were indexed so that the information was readily retrievable.
-To street party is to begin reconstructing the geography of everyday life; to re-appropriate the public sphere; to rediscover the streets and attempt to liberate them. To street party is to rescue commonality from the dissection table of capitalism: to oppose the free market with a vision of the free society. This vision, which the street party embodies, is collective imagining in practice. It radically dissolves political, cultural, social, and economic divisions in a Utopian expression. A Utopia defined, not as no-place, but as this-place, here and now.
+(2) Vague and Sweeping Standards.--The FBI conducted continuing investigations of persons whose membership in the Communist Party or in "a revolutionary group" had "not been proven," but who had "anarchistic or revolutionary beliefs" and had "committed past acts of violence during strikes, riots. or demonstrations." Persons not currently engaged in "activity of a subversive nature" were still investigated if they had engaged in such activity "several years ago"' and there was no "positive indication of disaffection."[124]
-The ultimate street party-the Street Party of street partiesis one where each person in each street in every village, town, and city. joins with every other in rejecting capitalism, its exploitation and divisions, Indeed rejecting all hierarchy and domination, embracing instead an ecological vision of mutual aid. freedom, complementarity, and interdependence. When the streets are the authentic social sphere for a participatory politics based on self-activity and direct action. When co-operation and solidarity are the social practice of society. When the ‘street party’ helps make possible, and dissolves into such a future, then, we can begin...
+The FBI Manual stated that it was "not possible to formulate any hard-and-fast standards for measuring "the dangerousness of individual members or affiliates of revolutionary organizations." Persons could be investigated if they were "espousing the line" of "revolutionary movements". Anonymous allegations could start an investigation if they were "sufficiently specific and of sufficient weight." The Manual added,
-<quote>
+Where there is doubt an individual may be a current threat to the internal security of the nation, the question should be resolved in the interest of security and investigation conducted.[125]
-<em>At first</em> <em>the people stop andoverturn the vehicles in their path... here they are avenging themselves on the traffic by decomposing it into its inert original elements. Next they incorporate the wreckage they have created into their rising barricades: they are recombining the isolated inanimate elements into vital new artistic and political .forms Fur one luminous moment, the multitudes of solitudes that make the modern city come together in a new kind of encounter, to make a people. The streets belong to the people’: they seize control</em> of the city’s elemental matter a11d make it their own.[171]
-</quote>
-For more information contact:
+The FBI Manual did not define "subversive" groups in terms of their links to a foreign government. Instead, they were "Marxist revolutionary-type" organizations "seeking the overthrow of the U. S. Government."[126] One purpose of investigation was possible prosecution under the Smith Act. But no prosecutions were initiated under the Act after 1957.[127] The Justice Department advised the FBI in 1956 that such a prosecution required "an actual plan for a violent revolution."[128] The Department's position in 1960 was that "incitement to action in the foreseeable future" was needed.[129] Despite the strict requirements for prosecution, the FBI continued to investigate "subversive" organizations "from an intelligence viewpoint" to appraise their "strength" and "dangerousness."[130]
-Reclaim The Streets
+(3) COMINFIL. -- The FBI's broadest program for collecting intelligence was carried out under the heading COMINFIL, or Communist infiltration.[131] The FBI collected intelligence about Communist "influence" under the following categories:
-E-mail: [[mailto:rts@gn.apc.org][rts@gn.apc.org]]
+Political activities
-They have an internet web site at
+Legislative activities
-http://www.hrc.wmin.ac.uk./campaigns/rts.html
+Domestic administration issues
-[162] Reclaim The Streets leaflet
+Negro question
-[163] <em>Immortality</em> by Milan Kundera (Faber and Faber: London 1991)-page 271
+Youth matters
-[164] Reclaim The Streets Agit-Prop (distributed at the M4I Street Party on Saturday 13<sup>th</sup> July 1996)
+Women's matters
-[165] What is Reclaim the Streets? leaflet.
+Farmers' Matters
-[166] To take a facile example, imagine singing: “We’re on the “street’ to nowhere”-not quite right is it? On the other hand, how about: “Our house, in the middle of our ‘road”.1* Trivial maybe, but indicative of the difference.
+Cultural activities
-[167] And to “reclaim the streets’ is to enact the transformation of the former to the latter. In this context the anti-roads movement is also a pro-streets movement. The struggle against the destruction of nature’ is also a struggle for the human-scale, the face-to-face, for a society in harmony with its natural surrounding.
+Veterans' matters
-[168] Leaflet for Street Party II, Rage against the Machine-Saturday 23<sup>th</sup>.July 1995
+Religion
-[169] Ihe Revolution of Everyday Life by Raoul Vaneigem. < 1967)
+Education
-[170] <em>Post-Scarcity Anarchism</em> by Murray Bookchin, (1971)
+Industry[132]
-[171] All That Is <em>Solid Melts into</em> Air by Marshal Berman. (1982)-quoted in A <em>Shout in the Str</em>ee<em>t</em> by Peter Jukes (1990)
+FBI investigations covered "the entire spectrum of the social and labor movement in the country."[133] The purpose -- as publicly disclosed in the Attorney General's Annual Reports -- was pure intelligence: to "fortify" the Government against "subversive pressures,"[134] or to "strengthen" the Government against "subversive campaigns."[135]
-<br>
+In other words, the COMINFIL program supplied the Attorney General and the President with intelligence about a wide range of groups seeking to influence national policy under the rationale of determining whether Communists were involved.[136] The FBI said it was not concerned with the "legitimate activities" of "nonsubversive groups," but only with whether Communists were "gaining a dominant role."[137] Nevertheless, COMINFIL reports inevitably described "legitimate activities" totally unrelated to the alleged "subversive activity." This is vividly demonstrated by the COMINFIL reports on American's leading civil rights group in this period, the NAACP.[138] The investigation continued for at least twenty-five years in cities throughout the nation, although no evidence was ever found to rebut the observation that the NAACP had a "strong tendency" to "steer clear of Communist activities."[139]
-** Stop Making Sense: Direct Action and Action Theatre (from issue 6)
+(4) Exaggeration of Communist Influence. -- The FBI and the Justice D partment justified the continuation of COMINFIL investigations, despite the Communist Party's steady decline in the fifties and early sixties, on the theory that the Party was "seeking to repair its losses" with the "hope" of being able to "move in" on movements with "laudable objectives."[140]
-In 1973 Jacques Camatte indicated
+The FBI reported to the White House in 1961 that the Communist Party had "attempted" to take advantage of "racial disturbances" in the South and had "endeavored" to bring "pressure to bear" on government officials "through the press, labor unions, and student groups." At that time the FBI was investigating "two hundred known or suspected communist front and communist-infiltrated organizations. "[141] By not stating how effective the "attempts" and "endeavors" of the Communists were, and by not indicating whether they were becoming more or less successful, the FBI offered a deficient rationale for its sweeping intelligence collection policy.
-<quote>
+William C. Sullivan, a former head of the FBI Intelligence Division, has testified that such language was deliberately used to exaggerate the threat of Communist influence. "Attempts" and "influence" were "very significant words" in FBI reports, he said. These terms obscured what he felt to be the more significant criterion - the degree of Communist success. The Bureau "did not discuss this because we would have to say that they did not hit the target, hardly any."[142]
-It <em>is now becoming generally accepted that demonstrations, marches, spectacles and shows, don’t lead anywhere. Waving banners, putting up posters, handing out leaflets, attacking the police are all activities which perpetuate a certain ritual--a ritual wherein the police are always cast in the role of invincible subjugators. The methods of struggle therefore must be put through a thorough analysis because they present an obstacle to the creation of new modes of action. Andfor this to be ef ctive, there has to be a refusal of the old terrain of struggle-both in the workplace and in the streets.</em>[172]
-</quote>
-The response to insights like Camatte’s has been, to a certain extent, a shift of the terrain of struggle away from demonstrations and street fighting to the creation of autonomous -‘zones and communities of resistance, as well as, of course, the development of direct action tactics. In spite of this shift in emphasis, however, a ritualistic element still remains in many direct actions. As in the forms of resistance Camate discusses, the ritual all too often, still casts resisters as valiant, earnest protesters set over and against stern, repressive cops and security guards, and all too frequently the resisters end up playing the roles of victim and martyr-victim of police brutality and martyr to the direct action cause.
+A distorted picture of Communist "infiltration" later served to justify the FBI's intensive investigations of the groups involved in protests against the Vietnam War and the civil rights movement, including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.
-This essay is intended to make some suggestions as to how this ritual-of casting resisters as victims, and cops as victimizers--can be disrupted and perhaps broken. I want to state though that this essay can only offer suggestions, not answers. Moreover, some of these suggestions may already be taking place. Ihe blossoming of actions means that it is impossible to keep up with all the developments currently taking place. No claim to originality is being made here! I also want to stress that the proposals in this paper should not be regarded as an alternative to or a replacement for direct action, but as supplemental to it.
+<em>b.</em> <em>"RacialMatters"and "Hate Groups"</em>
-When I spoke just now about ritual (the scenario that is set up for resisters and cops). I deliberately used a theatrical terminology. Resisters, I suggested, were cast as victims and cops were cast as victimizers. In short, in the scenario that has emerged at the sites of many direct actions, the participants assume particular roles. As a result, direct actions are already theatrical events in which the various players act out their parts. My proposals are based on a recognition of this fact, and suggest that direct action activists should take advantage of direct action’s dramatic elements. This does not mean deliberately staging events for the media as Greenpeace, for example, has, because that means merely playing for the cameras-and once the cameras have gone, the whole momentum of the action can disappear, which sometimes means that the whole campaign disintegrates. On the contrary, taking advantage of the dramatic nature of direct actions means manipulating events by consciously intervening and shaping them in ways that are positive for the resistance.
+In the 1950s, the FBI also developed intelligence programs to investigate "Racial Matters" and "hate organizations" unrelated to "revolutionary-type" subversives. "Hate organizations" were investigated if they had "allegedly adopted a policy of advocating, condoning, or inciting the use of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution." Like the COMINFIL program, however, the Bureau used its "established sources" to monitor the activities of "hate groups" which did not "qualify" under the "advocacy of violence" standard.[143]
-In “Notes on Political Street Theatre, Paris 1968–1969;’ Jean-Jacques Lebel deliberately talks of the Paris uprising of May 1968 in theatrical terms. He says,
+In 1963, FBI field offices were instructed to report "the formation and identities" of "rightist or extremist groups" in the "anticommunist field." Headquarters approval was needed for investigating "groups in this field whose activities are not in violation of any statutes."[144]
-<quote>
+Under these, programs, the FBI collected and disseminated intelligence about the John Birch Society and its founder, Robert Welch, in 1959.[145] The activities of another rightwing spokesman, Gerald L. K. Smith, who headed the Christian Nationalist Crusade, were the subject of FBI reports even after the Justice Department had concluded that the group had not violated federal law and that there was no basis for including the group on the "Attorney General's list."[146]
-<em>The first stage of an uprising... the first stage ofany revolution, is always theatrical... The }day uprising was theatrical in that it was a giganticfiesta, a revelatory and sensuous explosion outside the ‘normal’ pattern of politics.[173]</em>
-</quote>
-It is in this sense that I wish to propose direct action as theatre: not as a dull ritualized scenario with pre-formulated roles for cops and resisters, and with an almost inevitable outcome, but rather as an explosion, as a riot of colour and effective action. In short, I propose the direct action as a prefiguration of uprising, as insurrection in miniature.
+The FBI program for collecting intelligence on "General Racial Matters" was even broader. It went beyond "race riots" to include "civil demonstrations" and "similar developments." These "developments" included:
-As part of the theatrical outburst of the May ’68 uprising, Lebel refers to actual theatrical events on the street:
+proposed or actual activities of individuals, officials, committees, legislatures, organizations, etc., in the racial field.[147]
-<quote>
+The FBI's "intelligence function" was to advise "appropriate" federal and local officials of "pertinent information" about "racial incidents."[148]
-<em>Street theatre as such started to pop up here and there in mass demonstrations, such as the 13<sup>th</sup> of May, which gathered more than a million people. Large effigies appeared of the CRS (French riot police), ofDe Gaulle, and other political clowns. Short, funny, the</em>atrical rituals were performed <em>around them as they burned. When the officially-subsidised</em>
-<em>Odeon Theatre was occupied by the movement, many small groups of students and actors began to interpret the daily news in the street in short comic dramas followed by discussions with the passing audience.[174]</em>
+A briefing of the Cabinet by Director Hoover in 1956 illustrates the breadth of collection and dissemination under the racial matters program. The briefing covered not only incidents of violence and the "efforts" and "plans" of Communists to "influence'" the civil rights movement, but also the legislative strategy of the NAACP and the activities of Southern Governors and Congressmen on behalf of groups opposing integration peacefully.[149]
-</quote>
-Lebel, who was directly involved in what he calls political street theatre, or guerrilla theatre, indicates the rationale for utilizing drama in this way,
+<em>C. FBI Political Intelligence for the White House</em>
-<quote>
+Numerous items of political intelligence were supplied by the FBI to the White House in each of the three administrations during the Cold War era, apparently satisfying the desires of Presidents and their staffs.[150]
-<em>The main problem, then as now. is to propagandise the aims and means of the revolutionary movement among those millions who, while not actually being hostile, have not yet taken part in the action. Since the mass media are totally controlled by the State, all they pour out are lies befitting the State’s psychological warfare ... [So] we tried to use street theatre as a means to provoke encounters and discussions among people who usually shut themselves offfrom each other.[175]</em>
-</quote>
-Here, Lebel is referring to extending agit-prop (agitation and propaganda) theatre to the streets. In the 1920s and 1930s radicals staged agit-prop plays in theatres and community centres, on picket lines and dole queues. These were explicitly didactic plays-i.e. they had specific political messages to convey, and were designed as a form of political agitation and propaganda. Lebel indicates that in May 1968 these agit-prop productions were shifted even further away from the private space of the theatre to the public space of the streets, in order to address wider audiences. Lebel comments,
+President Truman and his aides received regular letters from Director Hoover labeled "Personal and Confidential" containing tidbits of political intelligence. The letters reported on such subjects as: inside information about the negotiating position of a non-Communist labor union;[151] the activities of a former Roosevelt aide who was trying to influence the Truman administration's appointments;[152] a report from a "confidential source" that a "scandal" was brewing which would be "very embarrassing" to the Democratic administration;[153] a report from a "very confidential source" about a meeting of newspaper representatives in Chicago to plan publication of stories exposing organized crime and corrupt politicians;[154] the contents of an in-house communication from Newsweek magazine reporters to their editors about a story they had obtained from the State Department,[155] and criticism of the government's internal security programs by a former Assistant to the Attorney General.[156]
-<quote>
+Letters discussing Communist "influence" provided a considerable amount of extraneous information about the legislative process, including lobbying activities in support of civil rights legislation[157] and the political activities of Senators and Congressmen.[158]
-<em>Our orientation was agit-prop, yet we wanted to be creative and notjust limited to old political cliches-above all we considered “theatre” only as a means of breaking down the Berlin Wall in peoples’ heads and helping them out of their state of passive acceptance. We didn’t give a shit about “art”--we were interested in sabotaging capitalism by helping to blow its arsenal of images, moods, perceptual habits, and tranquilislng illusions of security.[176]</em>
-</quote>
-In other words, political street theatre was regarded not as a work of art but as a weapon, an important tool in the revolutionary struggle.
+President Eisenhower and his aides received similar tid-bits of political intelligence, including an advance text of a speech to be delivered by a prominent labor leader,[159] reports from Bureau "sources" on the meetings of an NAACP delegation with Senators Paul Douglas and Everett Dirksen of Illinois;[160] the report of an "informant" on the role of the United Auto Workers Union at an NAACP conference,[161] summaries of data in FBI files on thirteen persons (including Norman Thomas, Linus Pauling, and Bertrand Russell) who had filed suit to stop nuclear testing,[162] a report of a "confidential source" on plans of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt to hold a reception for the head of a civil rights group,[163] and reports on the activities of Robert Welch and the John Birch Society.[164]
-This is an important issue, but the scripts of the two street plays from May ’68 appended to Lebel’s essay now appear very stagey and hackneyed. Remember that Camatte writing five years after May 68 remarked that demonstrations, marches, spectacles, <em>and shows don’t lead anywhere.</em> And the reproduced scripts seem very much like spectacles and shows. Conditions have changed— not least through the development of direct action tactics-and although something could perhaps he achieved through the kind of political street theatre discussed by Lebel, it no longer seems particularly relevant to the needs of today.
+The FBI also volunteered to the White House information from its most "reliable sources" On purely political or social contacts with foreign government officials by a Deputy Assistant to the President,[165] Bernard Baruch,[166] Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas,[167] and Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt.[168]
-Nevertheless, Lebel points the way to uses of the theatrical that could be used to complement and increase the effectiveness of direct actions.
+Director Hoover sent to the White House a report from a "confidential informant" on the lobbying activities of a California group called Women for Legislative Action because its positions "paralleled" the Communist line.[169]
-Avant-garde artists have often dreamed of demolishing the barriers between life and art, and have indicated that this dream is part of the revolutionary project. In one respect, the trajectory of political theatre in the twentieth century shows a progression towards precisely that aim.
+As in the prior administrations, requests also flowed from the Eisenhower White House to the FBI.[170] For example, a presidential aide asked the FBI to check its files on Rev. Carl McIntyre of the International Council of Christian Churches.[171]
-Agit-prop theatre began the process by reclaiming and redefining the theatrical. Agit-prop took drama out of the private space of the theatre and into more public spaces: away from professional writers and actors and toward amateurs and activists: away from a middle class audience and toward a more popular audience: away from depoliticised representations of bourgeois life and manners, and toward explicitly politicised representations of resistance: and away from spectacularised, commodified forms of theatre and toward more every-day, face-to-face, interactive types of theatre.
+The pattern continued during the Kennedy administration. A summary of material in FBI files on a prominent entertainer was volunteered to Attorney General Kennedy because Hoover thought it "may be of interest."[172] Attorney General Kennedy sent to the President an FBI memorandum on the purely personal life of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.[173] Director Hoover supplied Attorney General Kennedy with background information on a woman who told an Italian newspaper that she had once been engaged to marry President Kennedy[174] and on the husband of a woman who was reported in the press to have stated that the President's daughter would enroll in a cooperative nursery with which she was connected.[175] The FBI Director also passed on information from a Bureau "source" r egarding plans of a group to publish allegations about the President's personal life.[176]
-Political street theatre, as Lebel indicates, took this process to a stage farther (no pun intended!), by taking drama into the streets, and the sites of resistance. It attempted to use street theatre as a way of breaking down allegiance to capital and the State without replacing that allegiance with the cosy answers provided by alternative political ideologies. Now. however, with the advent of direct action, this process-the process of integrating art and life as part of the revolutionary project-can be taken even further.
+In 1962 the FBI complied unquestioningly with a request from Attorney General Kennedy to interview a Steel Company executive and several reporters who had written stories about the Steel executive. The interviews were conducted late at night and early in the morning because, according to the responsible FBI official, the Attorney General indicated the information was needed for a White House meeting the next day.[177]
-In political street theatre, although the script is collectively written and the actors are activist-amateurs, the relationship between performance and audience remains unchanged. The actors act out a play and the audience passively watches a performance. Moreover, the theatrical performance only plays an indirect role in events. In the case of direct action, however, this need not be the case. The performance can become an integral component of the direct action. This is what I term “action theatre:
+Throughout the period, the Bureau also disseminated reports to high executive officials to discredit its critics. The FBI's Inside information on plans of the Lawyers Guild to denounce Bureau surveillance in 1949 gave the Attorney General the opportunity to prepare a rebuttal well in advance of the expected criticism.[178] When the Knoxville Area Human Relations Council charged in 1960 that the FBI was practicing racial discrimination, the FBI did "name checks" on members the Council's board of directors and sent the results to the Attorney General. The name checks dredged up derogatory allegations from as far back as the late thirties and early forties.[179]
-Action theatre would take planning and preparation of course, but there is no need to write a script-all that is needed is a general scenario and a broad understanding among participants that they know what roles they are playing. Suppose, for example, that there is a small group ofpeople of different ages, races, genders, shapes, sizes, etc-some ofwhom look straight or conventional. They plan a scenario, the parts they will play, and what they intend to achieve. They target a site: maybe a shop, a bank, a McDonalds. They enter the site separately, at different times, and pretend not to know one another. One starts making a fuss, asks to see the manager, and starts having a loud row with him/her. One by one, others join in. Some may initially appear to offer counter-arguments to the politicised points put forward by the initiator, but then be won over. Maybe the real customers will be drawn into the seemingly spontaneous debate (maybe they could be drawn in by someone asking them, “what do you think?”). Maybe they won’t, but even so, they will be alerted to some issues. The security guards will be loath to get heavy with seemingly legitimate customers-particularly if there seem to be many people involved.
+<em>d. IRS Investigations of Political Organizations</em>
-The concrete achievements of this scenario are many: business will be disrupted, alternative perspectives raised in public spaces, everyday people will be alerted to or even drawn into issues, and a general impression will be given that unrest and dissatisfaction are widespread and regarded as legitimate by many. Moreover, with this type of theatrical direct action, particularly if it is terminated at the right time, arrests are likely to be minimal or non-existent.
+The IRS program that came to be used against the domestic dissidents of the 1960s was first used against Communists in the 1950s. As part of its COINTELPRO against the Communist Party, the FBI arranged for IRS investigations of Party members, and obtained their tax returns.[180] In its efforts against the Communist Party, the FBI had unlimited access to tax returns: it never told the IRS why it wanted them, and IRS never attempted to find out.[181]
-A variation on this scenario is to place the group of actors in (say) a store that is about to be occupied. Again, these plants will act as legitimate customers. When the direct action commences, the plants can support the action, complaining to staff about security guards and police, threatening to report them, and encouraging real customers to do the same. The outcomes here would be preventing cop brutality and false arrest, as well as indicating to store managers, cops, and customers that direct action is legitimate and widely supported.
+In 1961, responding to White House and congressional interest in right-wing organizations, the IRS began comprehensive investigation of right-wing groups to identify contributors and ascertain whether or not some of them were entitled to their tax exempt status.[182] Left-wing groups were later added, in an effort to avoid charges that such IRS activities were all aimed at one part of the political spectrum. Both right- and left-wing groups were selected for review and investigation because of their political activity and not because of any information that they had violated the tax laws.[183]
-Alternatively, staged events that do not look staged but spontaneous could be used to create diversions-at a construction site. a store, wherever a direct action is taking place-with the aim of diverting cop attention, and gaining valuable lime for direct action activists. Additionally-and this is where the “stop making sense” part of the essay title comes in-action theatre activists could arrange scenarios in which they (and other protesters) confuse cops by acting in unpredictable, absurd ways. Camatte talks about changing the terrain of struggle. The terrain of the cops is one of seriousness and rational, behaviour, so shifting the terrain could involve emphasising the humorous and irrational. If prepared properly, this could really spook cops. It could also very directly challenge the scenario that casts resisters as earnest but also as victims. It could empower resisters in ways that cops might find it hard to cope with.
+While the IRS efforts begun in 1961 to investigate the political activities of tax exempt organizations were not as extensive as later programs in 1969-1973, they were a significant departure by the IRS from normal enforcement criteria for investigating persons or groups on the basis of information indicating noncompliance. By directing tax audits at individuals and groups solely because of their political beliefs, the Ideological Organizations Audit Project (as the 1961 program was known)[184] established a precedent for a far more elaborate program of targeting "dissidents."[185]
+@@@@@@@
+During the Cold War period, there were serious weaknesses in the system of accountability and control of domestic intelligence activity. On occasion the executive chose not to comply with the will of Congress with respect to internal security policy, and the Congressiona attempt to exclude U.S. foreign intelligence agencies from domestic activities was evaded. Intelligence agencies also conducted covert programs in violation of laws protecting the rights of Americans. Problems of accountability were compounded by the lack of effective congressional oversight and the vagueness of executive orders, which allowed intelligence agencies to escape outside scrutiny.
-Action theatre is not an alternative to direct action; rather action theatre can complement direct action. It can cause disruption, but also be funny and fun to do. Moreover, it can get people involved who, because of their age, fitness, criminal record, job, or personal commitments, can’t engage in direct action or can’t afford to get nicked, but can still provide invaluable support for direct action activists, as well as directly contributing to the revolutionary project.
+<em>a.</em> <em>The Emergency Detention Act</em>
-[172] Jacques Camatte, Against Domestication (Black Thumb Press 1981) plS.
+In 1946, four years before the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 was passed, the FBI advised Attorney General Clark that it had secretly compiled a security index of "potentially dangerous" persons.[186] The Justice Department then made tentative plans for emergency detention based on suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.[187] Department officials deliberately avoided going to Congress, advising the FBI in a "blind memorandum:"
-[173] Jean-Jacques Lebel, “Notes on Political Street Theatre, Paris 1968–1969;’ <em>Drunken Boat</em> #1 (Autonomedia, n.d.), p.27.
+The present is no time to seek legislation. To ask for it would only bring on a loud and acrimonious discussion.[188]
-[174] Ibid.
+In 1950, however, Congress passed the Emergency Detention Act which established standards and procedures for the detention, in the event of war, invasion or insurrection "in aid of a foreign enemy," of any person:
-[175] Ibid.
+as to whom there is reasonable ffround to believe that such person probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to engage in, acts of espionage or sabotage.
-[176] Ibid. p.28.
+The Act did not authorize the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and it provided that detained persons could appeal to a review board and to the courts.[189]
-** Lights, Camera... Activism! (from issue 7)
+Shortly after passage of the Detention Act, according to a Bureau document, Attorney General J. Howard McGrath told the FBI to isregard it and to "Proceed with the program as previously outlined." Department officials stated that the Act was "in conflict with" their plans, and was "unworkable." FBI officials agreed that the statutory procedures - such as "recourse to the courts" instead of suspension of habeas corpus - would "destroy" their program.[190] Moreover, the Security Index used broader standards to determine "potential dangerousness" than those prescribed in the statute; and, unlike the Act, Department plans provided for issuing a Master Search Warrant and a Master Arrest Warrant.[191] Two subsequent Attorneys General endorsed the decision to ignore the Emergency Detention Act.[192]
-**Video Media and Direct Action**
+<em>b.</em> <em>Withholding Information</em>
-This article has been written in an attempt to stimulate much-needed discussion in direct action circles about alternative media and its role in our struggles. With the space available the article cannot look at all areas of alternative media, nor tackle the areas it does look at in any great detail. I hope it will, however, act as a catalyst for discussions that should, for once, include the activists on the other side of the lens...
+Not only did the FBI and the Justice Department jointly keep their noncompliance with the Detention Act secret from Congress, but the FBI withheld important aspects of its program from the Attorney General. FBI personnel had been instructed in 1949 that :
-Ifyou live and work in a city you are, on average, filmed by over 400 CCTV cameras per day. If you also manage to squeeze in an early morning national action you could potentially add another dozen cameras to that figure-but that’s OK because it’s our own media-isn’t it?
+no mention must be made in any investigative report relating to the
-<quote>
+classifications of top functionaries and key figures, nor to the Detcom and Comsab Programs, nor to the Security Index or the Communist Index. These investigative procedures and administrative aides are confidential and should not be known to any outside agency.[193]
-I was surprised that not only were people quite happy to send mefootage of actions without asking for any control over its use, but some of them had sent tapes to TV stations and couldn’t remember getting them back again afterwards.
-<right>
+FBI documents indicate that only the Security Index was made known to the Justice Department.
-Researcher, Channel 4, November 1997.
-</right>
-</quote>
-There is a basic philosophy underpinning direct action that goes a lot deeper than the net result of the day’s action. As the RTS poster states: Direct action is founded on the idea that people can develop the ability for self rule only through practice, and proposes that allpersons directly decide the important issues facing them. It is not a last resort when other methods have failed, but the preferred way of doing things. The issues that have to be tackled are how the ideas and theories behind direct action transfer to the alternative media; whether there are certain ethical criteria that have to be fulfilled for the alternative media to interact successfully with other areas of direct action, rather than become part of the mainstream with a profit motivated agenda.
+In 1955, the FBI tightened formal standards for the Security Index, reducing its size from 26,174 to 12,870 by 1958.[194] However, there is no indication that the FBI told the Department that it kept the names of persons taken off the Security Index on a Communist, Index, because the Bureau believed such persons remained "potential threats."[194]  The secret Communist Index was renamed the Reserve Index in 1960 and expanded to include "influential" persons deemed likely to "aid subversive elements" in an emergency because of their "subversive associations and ideology." Such individuals fell under the following categories:
-Although there are many areas of campaign support that need to be looked at in detail, this article focuses primarily on video cameras because, in the wrong hands and with the current state of understanding, they can prove incredibly dangerous.
+Professors, teachers, and educators, labor union organizers and leaders; writers, lecturers, newsmen and others in the mass media field; lawyers, doctors, and scientists; other potentially influential persons on a local or national level; individuals who could potentially furnish financial or material aid.
-Misuse of video cameras can adversely affect the action itself, as well as increasing the risk of arrest for the activists involved.
+Persons on the Reserve Index would receive "priority consideration" for "action" after detention of Security Index subjects. The breadth of this list is illustrated by the inclusion of the names of author Norman Mailer and a professor who merely praised the Soviet Union to his class.[195]
-One case occurred at the launch of a new car in London.
+In addition to keeping these programs secret, the FBI withheld information about espionage from the Justice Department on at least two occasions. In 1946 the FBI had "identified over 100 persons" whom it "suspected of being in the Government Communist Underground." Neither this number nor any names from this list were given to the Department because Director Hoover feared "leaks," and because the Bureau conceded in its internal documents that it did "not have evidence, whether admissible or otherwise, reflecting actual membership in the Communist Party."[196] Thus the Bureau's "suspicions" were not tested by outside review by the Justice Department and the investigations could continue. In 1951 the FBI again withheld from the Department names of certain espionage subjects "for security reasons," since disclosure "would destroy chances of penetration and control."[197]
-The camera operator, working on the Undercurrents video news magazine, had been allowed to record the planning process as well as the action itself. On the day all went as planned, with the car at the centre of the action finishing up covered with paint, and the activists quickly leaving the scene before the police arrived. Incredibly, the person with the camera decided to remain to film the police response-and was subsequently arrested. The tape inside the camera not only contained all the footage of the action but also the build up to it, and the faces and voices of those involved. Although no one was prosecuted as a result of the seizure of the footage it gave the police unnecessary intelligence that could be used in the future.
+Even the President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty could not get highly relevant information from the Bureau. FBI Assistant Director D.M. Ladd told the Commission in 1946 that there was a "substantial" amount of Communist "infiltration of the government." But Ladd declined to answer when Commission members asked for more details of FBI intelligence operations and the information which served as the basis for his characterization of the extent of infiltration.[198] The Commission prepared a list of questions for the FBI and asked that Director Hoover appear in person. Instead, Attorney General Clark made an "informal" appearance and supplied a memorandum stating that the number of "subversives" in government had "not yet reached serious proportions," but that the possibility of "even one disloyal person" in government service constituted a "serious threat."[199] Thus, the President's Commission chose not to insist upon making a serious evaluation of FBI intelligence operations or the extent of the danger.
-On another occasion people were arrested after a demonstration at Hackney Town Hall; unedited activist footage from the action was given straight to the local TV station-who then handed it to the police. During the action the videographer was questioned and claimed to be filming for Undercurrents. This was later found out to be untrue-but, despite the person with the camera being a stranger to everyone on the action, one word acted as a passport to record every intimacy and potentially incriminating act during the action itself.
+The record suggests that executive officials were forced to make decisions regarding security policy without full knowledge. They had to depend on the FBI's estimate of the problem, rather than being able to make their own assessment on the basis of complete information. It is also apparent that by this time outside officials were sometimes unwilling to oppose Director Hoover or to inquire fully into FBI operations.[200]
-There are always two sides to every debate however. Many of those currently taking direct action are there after watching Undercurrents at a festival, whilst others may have read through a copy of Squall or Do or Die and been motivated by the dramatic photographs that complement the articles. But even that raises questions about the movement’s potential to recreate itself in the image of its media representation....... All of which leads to the
+<em>c.</em> <em>CIA Domestic Activity</em>
-same point: there has to be a continuous appraisal of the methods and motivations of those involved (at all levels) in alternative media-and at the moment that is not happening. The following aims to highlight points in the process from action to advert and examine the image, theory, and motivation.
+(1) Vague Controls on CIA. -- The vagueness of Congress's prohibitions of "internal security functions" by the CIA left room for the Agency's subsequent domestic activity. A restriction against "police, law enforcement or internal security functions" first appeared in President Truman's order establishing the Central Intelligence Group in 1946.[201]
-More often than not, the first part of the process is the recording of the image. People will often try and avoid getting their faces near a police Evidence Gatherer (EG) film unit; likewise most will avoid trashing machinery with police filming nearby, yet many appear happy to trust those on site with cameras-as long as they’re wearing green and black. Quite a few will remember the open cast action in Derbyshire, when every machine on site was trashed and over 350 000 damage was caused <em>(SchNEWS,</em> November 7, 1997); police attendance was negligible and no arrests took place on site. People may also remember the video cameras filming the smashing of machinery from afar, whilst others stood at the side taking photographs.
+General Vandenburg, then Director of Central Intelligence, testified in 1947 that this restriction was intended to "draw the lines very sharply between the CIG and the FBI" and to "assure that the Central Intelligence Group can never become a Gestapo or security police."[202] Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal testified that the CIA would be "limited definitely to purposes outside of this country, except the collection of information gathered by other government agencies." The FBI would be relied upon "for domestic activities."[203]
-What action was taken to ensure that none of the footage taken was incriminating-or distributed without the control of those recorded? The answer, as usual, appeared to be very little. Ifyou see someone turning up on their first action with a camera-or even if you see someone you know and trust filming anything potentially incriminating-you have a responsibility to others on the action to question exactly where their motivations lie, and to take appropriate (intelligent) action. Actually taking part in direct action should come before the recording of the event for others. It should not be seen as a spectacle, but as the way to achieve results-people taking back control of their lives.
+In the House floor debate Congressman Holifield stressed that the work of the CIA:
-At present, the activist community seems to have lost control of the image that is often the only connection those not involved have with what is going on and why. The camera can be there as an integral part of the action, a key weapon to be used as part of the greater campaign, but the camera operator should never be-or be seen as-an outside unit. They are there to complement the action, and to support those on the front line; this means working with the various campaigns before hitting the Record button, and finding the balance necessary for the relationship to work. Trust can only be built up over a long time. If those with the cameras haven’t got the patience to get to know at least some of those taking part in the action they want to record, they certainly haven’t got the patience or knowledge necessary to be given control over the resultant images.
+is strictly in the field of secret foreign intelligence -- what is known as clandestine intelligence. They have no right in the domestic field to collect information of a clandestine military nature. They can evaluate it; yes.[204]
-The current alternative media network on which this article is based developed primarily from inside the environmental direct action movement, and this should have ensured that the whole process-from the recording of the initial image through to final distribution-remained within the control of those actively involved in the movement. It should also have ensured our media could develop as an independent and ethically sound means of information dissemination-but the image, from inception to distribution, has fallen from being part of the process to its current position apparently very distant from the ethic it claims to represent.
+Consequently, the National Security Act of 1947 provided specifically that the CIA
-According to i Vlichael Albert (Z Magazine, Oct. 1997):
+shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions.[205]
-<quote>
+However, the 1947 Act also contained a vague and undefined duty to protect intelligence "sources and methods" which later was used to justify domestic activities ranging from electronic surveillance and break-ins to penetration of protest groups.[206]
-What <em>makes alternative media alternative can’t be its product in the simplest sense [It] can’t just mean that the institution’s editorialfocus is in this or that topical area; being alternative must have to do with how the institution is organised and works.</em>
-</quote>
-At present there is one agency that specialises in the production and distribution of alternative video in the UK: Undercurrents. Based initially in London, and now in Oxford, there are a number of lessons that can be learnt from recent revelations about the working ethics of the organisation (see box).
+(2) Drug Testing and Cover Programs. -- In the early 1950s, the CIA began a program of surreptitiously testing, chemical and biological materials, which included drug testing on unwitting Americans. The existence of such a program was kept secret because, as the CIA's Inspector General wrote 1957, it, was necessary to "protect operations from exposure" to "the American public" as well as "enemy forces." Public knowledge of the CIA's "unethical and illicit activities" was thought likely to have serious "political repercussions."[207] CIA drug experimentors disregarded instructions of their superiors within the Agency and failed to take "reasonable precautions" when they undertook the test which resulted in the death of Dr. Frank Olsen.[208]
-We should note the ease with which control over footage from actions can be taken away from the activist community and placed in the hands of those who may have very little or no experience of direct action. Undercurrents have stated that there has always been a hierarchical regime in place within the organisation, and expect the video activist to accept that fact as a fait accompli.
+The CIA made extensive use of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in conducting its program of drug testing on unwitting subjects.
-However, whilst it may be easier to work with such an organisation on their terms, the activist community must both challenge those ideas with which it disagrees, and as necessary find or create alternative outlets for the work. As already stated, direct action does not end when the camera goes back in the bag, and the same ethic has to follow the images from beginning to end. There should be a fluid process in place that allows both common sense to prevail and for overall control to remain within the represented community.
+Military intelligence also administered drugs to volunteer subjects who were unaware of the purpose or nature of the tests in which they were participating.[209]
-Whilst Undercurrents may state they are not deliberately taking control of the image for their own ends, they are demonstrating enough of a lack of understanding to trigger warning bells in all those who come into contact with them. Their explanation. that because the mainstream media want moral rights over all works they use, the activist community must also sign away their moral rights to an outside force, is incredible in its simplicity. If Undercurrents were fulfilling their perceived role as intermediaries between the ‘naive’ activist and the mainstream media, they should be informing activists of their rights, not working to the agenda of the mainstream. To create an environment where those with expert knowledge in a particular area can develop a symbiotic relationship with the activist community at large, the ‘experts’ must also practice the underlying ethics apparent within the images they record.
+The CIA's drug research was conducted in part through arrangements with universities, hospitals, and "private research organizations" in a manner which concealed "from the institution the interests of the CIA," although "key individuals" were made witting of Agency sponsorship.[210] There were similar covert relationships with American private institutions in other CIA intelligence activities.[211]
----------
+<em>5.</em> <em>Intrusive Techniques</em>
-**Focus on Undercurrents**
+Throughout the cold war period, the intelligence agencies used covert techniques which invaded personal privacy to execute their vague, uncontrolled, and overly broad mandate to collect intelligence. Intelligence techniques were not properly controlled by responsible authorities; some of the techniques were misused by senior administration officials. On the other hand, the nature of the programs -- and, in some cases, their very existence -- was often concealed from those authorities.
-A document was circulated last year that detailed some concerns about Undercurrents. Written by several activists with experience of working within the organisation, the main points raised were: Ihat Undercurrents’ contracts ask contributors to waive all moral rights to their work, whilst claiming incorrectly that work could not be used by the mainstream without the waiver.
+a. <em>Communications Interception: CIA and NSA</em>
-That the contracts asked contributors to sign exclusive rights over to Undercurrents for between 20 to 25 years.
+During the 1950s the Central Intelligence Agency instituted a major program for opening mail between the United States and the Soviet Union as it passed through postal facilities in New York City.[212] Two other short-term CIA projects in the fifties also involved the opening of international mail within the United States, through access to Customs Service facilities.[213] Moreover, in the late 1940s the Department of Defense made arrangements with several communications companies to receive international cable traffic, reinstating a relationship that had existed during World War II.[214] These prorams violated not only the ban on internal security functions by foreign intelligence agencies in the 1947 Act, but also specific statutes protecting the privacy of the mails and forbidding the interception of Communications.[215]
-That the contract demands contributors agree to promote the video in any way possible in order to widen distribution.
+While their original purpose was to obtain foreign intelligence, the programs frequently did not distinguish between the messages of foreigners and of Americans.[216] Furthermore, by the late fifties and early sixties, the CIA and NSA were sharing the "take" with the FBI for domestic intelligence purposes.[217]
-That the majority of money from the sale offootage (70 per cent after all costs have been taken) remains within Undercurrents instead of being <em>offered back to the campaign that produced the images in the first place.</em>
+In this period, the CIA opened mail to and from the Soviet Union largely at random, intercepting letters of Americans unrelated to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence.[218] After the FBI learned of the CIA program, it levied requests in certain categories. Apart from foreign counterintelligence criteria, the Bureau expressed interest in letters from citizens professing "pro-Communist sympathies"[219] and "data re U.S. peace groups going to Russia."[220]
-<em>That</em> <em>Undercurrents have been quietly working as a (fairly) exclusive news agency; acting as mainstream when dealing with outside media, yet still claiming to be activists when working in the activistfield.</em>
+The secret arrangements with cable companies to obtain copies of international traffic were initially authorized by Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and Attorney General Tom Clark, although it is not clear that they knew of the interception of American as well as foreign messages.[221] They developed no formal legal rationale, and their later successors were never consulted to renew the authorization.[222]
-<em>That the explicit hierarchy at work within the organisation disallows much sense of ownership to anyone who comes to work there.</em>
+The CIA sought no outside authorization before instituting its mail opening program. Several Post Office officials were misled into believing that the CIA's request for access to the mail only involved examining the exterior of the envelopes.[223] President Kennedy's Postmaster General, J. Edward Day, testified that he told CIA Director Allen Dulles he did not want to "know anything about" what the CIA was doing.[224] Beyond undocumented assumptions by CIA officials, there is no evidence that the President or the Attorney General was ever informed about any aspect of CIA mail-opening operations in this period.[225]
-<em>That</em> <em>Undercurrmts can only profit in this way because its actual methods of operation radically contradicts what we feel is most activists perception of the organisation.</em>
+b. <em>FBI Covert Techniques</em>
-<em>That</em> <em>unless there is a large scale change within the organisation activists should begin to view it very much as they do mainstream media organisations.</em>
+(1) <em>Electronic Surveillance.</em>
-------
+(a) The Question of Authority: In 1946 Attorney General Toni Clark asked President Truman to renew the authorization for warrantless wiretapping issued by President Roosevelt in 1940. Clark's memorandum, however, did not refer to the portion of the Roosevelt directive which said wiretaps should be limited "insofar as possible to aliens." It stressed the danger from "subversive activity here at home," and requested authority to wiretap "in cases vitally affecting the domestic security."[226] The President gave his approval. Truman's aides later discovered Attorney General Clark's omission and the President considered, but decided against, returning to the terms of Roosevelt's authorization.[227]
-There are numerous publications that attempt in different ways to fulfil the alternative criteria. Examples include <em>SchNEWS</em><em>,</em> published each week in Brighton, and the <em>Earth First! Action Update.</em> Both work in different ways, and have put in place criteria that attempt to ensure the media (and thus the image) remains within the control of activists and is not taken over by an unrepresentative elite. In the case of <em>SchNEWS</em><em>,</em> all articles are written, edited, and published by activists; this should ensure that not only do those involved in a campaign get an opportunity to represent themselves, but that training is freely available for all those who want to become more involved in the process. In the case of the <em>EF!Action Update,</em> the creation of an elite is avoided by rotating publication ofthe newsletter each year.
+In 1954 the Supreme Court denounced the Fourth Amendment violation by police who placed a microphone in a bedroom in a local gambling case.[228]
-Where we go from here needs debate that must take place at all levels. The action and current standpoint of Undercurrents should be seen as unacceptable. We need to challenge, change, and learn from our current position to ensure that we never find ourselves in the situation where control of the image has passed to those who place their own survival above the greater good of the movement. The next time someone asks you where you’re from, and tells you to put the camera away, it’s not necessarily part of an ego-war, it could be because they have never seen you before, and want to know where your motivations lie. Do you know?
+Soon thereafter, despite this decision -- and despite his predecessor's ruling that trespassory installation of bugs was in the "area" of the Fourth Amendment -- Attorney General Herbert Brownell authorized the "unrestricted use" in the "national interest" of "trespass in the installation of microphones."[229]
-[Do or Die is obviously not immune to the problems outlined in this article. Opinions and suggestions are welcome.]
+From 1954 until 1965, when Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach reconsidered the policy and imposed stricter regulations,[230] the FBI bad unsupervised discretion to use microphone surveillance and to conduct surreptitious entries to install microphones. Thus, the safeguard of approval by the Attorney General for each wiretap had been undercut by the FBI's ability to intrude into other, often more intimate conversations by microphone "bugging."
-**** Grassroots Video Contacts
+(b) <em>Extensive Bugging</em>: In May 1961, Director Hoover advised Deputy Attorney General Byron White that the FBI was using "microphone surveillances" involving "trespass" for "intelligence purposes" in the "internal security field." He called White's attention to the 1954 Brownell memorandum, although he said microphones were used "on a restricted basis" and cited as examples only "Soviet intelligence agents and Communist Party leaders."[231]
-i-Contact, [New networking centre for those interested in video activism. Looks promising.] Bristol, UK. E-mail: [[mailto:lostit@gifford.co.uk][lostit@gifford.co.uk]]
+In fact, the FBI had already used microphone surveillance for broader coverage than Communists or spies. Indeed, it had "bugged" a hotel room occupied by a Congressman in February 1961. There is no evidence that Attorney General Kennedy or Deputy Attorney General White were specifically informed of this surveillance. But the Attorney General received information which came from the "bug" and authorized a wiretap of the Congressman's secretary.[232][233]
-Organic Chaos Productions (Rampenplan): Sittard, ‘Ihe Netherlands.
+Furthermore, FBI records disclose that the FBI conducted warrantless microphone surveillances in 1960-1963 directed at a "black separatist group," "black separatist group functionaries" and a "(white) racist organization."[234] There may have been others for purely domestic intelligence purposes.[235]
-E-mail: [[mailto:ramp@antenna.nl][ramp@antenna.nl]]
+The FBI maintained no "central file or index" to record all microphone surveillances in this period, and FBI records did not distinguish "bugs" involving trespass.[236]
-Direct Action Media Network (DAMN): Morgantown, WV, USA. E-mail: [[mailto:direct@tao.ca][direct@tao.ca]]
+(2) "<em>Black Bag Jobs</em>." -- There is no indication that any Attorney General was informed of FBI "black bag" jobs, and a "Do Not File" procedure was designed to preclude outside discovery of the FBI's use of the technique.
-HHH Video Magazine: UK
+No permanent records were kept for approvals of "black bag jobs," or surreptitious entries conducted for purposes other than installing a "bug". The FBI has described the procedure for authorization of surreptitious entries as requiring the approval of Director Hoover or his Assistant Clyde Tolson. The authorizing memorandum was filed in the Director's office under a "Do Not File" procedure, and thereafter destroyed. In the field office, the Special Agent in Charge maintained a record of approval in his office safe. At the next yearly field office inspection, an Inspector would review these records to ensure that the SAC had secured FBI headquarters approval in conducting surreptitious entries. Upon completion of the review, these records were destroyed.[237]
-Left of Center: Nashville, TN E-mail: [[mailto:christopher.lugo@nashville.com][christopher.lugo@nashville.com]]
+The only internal FBI memorandum found discussing the policy for surreptitious entries confirms that this was the procedure and states that "we do not obtain authorization from outside the Bureau" because the technique was "clearly illegal." The memorandum indicates that "black bag jobs" were used not only "in the espionage field" but also against "subversive elements" not directly connected to espionage activity. It added that the techniques resulted "on numerous occasions" in obtaining the "highly secret and closely guarded" membership and mailing lists of "subversive" groups.[238]
-Since the original document (referred to in the Focus on Undercurrents box) was circulated, we have heard that there may have been some changes at Undercurrents--but it remains to be seen whether these amount to anything substantial. (We certainly hope so’) People at Undercurrents have been requesting a right to reply in this issue, as they saw this article before publication. After much debate we decided we are not happy with this. Firstly, space was a consideration-inclusion of a reply would mean sacrificing other articles that people had spent months working on. More importantly, why do Undercurrents deserve a reply any more than anyone else criticised in a piece printed in Do or Die? We felt that they could write a letter of under 500 words for the next issue or submit a longer piece as an article, and it will be read and considered for publication as all other submissions are. Undercurrents have had plenty of opportunities to respond to these criticisms in a meaningful way (indeed the author of this article waited fl)r a response from them before concluding it), but have so far consistently failed to do so. Instead they have chosen to misrepresent it as an attack on all video-activism, motivated by a personal grudge. It is nothing of the sort-as you can tell. it seeks to strengthen video activism (and all DIY media) by applying the ethics of direct action to the media which represent it.
+(3) <em>Mail Opening</em>. -- The FBI did not seek outside authorization when it reinstituted mail opening programs in the fifties and early sixties. Eight programs were conducted for foreign intelligence and counterespionage purposes, and Bureau officials who supervised these programs have testified that legal considerations were simply not raised at the time.[239]
-<br>
+Beyond their original purpose, the FBI mail opening programs produced some information of an essentially domestic nature. For example, during this period one program supplied "considerable data" about American citizens who expressed pro-Communist sympathies or made "anti-U.S. statements."[240] Some of the mail-opening by-product regarding Americans was disseminated to other agencies for law enforcement purposes, with the source disguised.[241]
-** Friday June 18<sup>th</sup>, 1999 (from issue 8)
+c. <em>Use of FBI Wiretaps</em>
-**Confronting Capital and Smashing The State!**
+The authorization for wiretapping issued by President Truman in 1946 allowed the Attorney General to approve wiretaps in the investigation of "subversive activity" to protect the "domestic security."[242]
-As the economy has become increasingly transnational, so too has the resistance to its devastating social and ecological consequences. The June 18<sup>th</sup> (118) International Day of Action in financial and banking districts across the world was probably the largest and most diverse day of action against global capital in recent history. Hundreds of actions took place in over 30 countries on every continent,[177] all <em>in recognition that the global capitalist system is based on the exploitation of people and the planet for the profit of a few and is at the very root of our social and ecological troubles.[178]</em> But where did this extraordinary show of international solidarity spring from? And how and why are such diverse groups building global networks of struggle to counter the globalisation[179] of misery under capitalism? What follows is a personal account of the history, context and organisation of the events leading up to June 18<sup>th</sup>. It is a story that needs telling...
+A wiretap on an official of the Nation of Islam, originally authorized by Attorney General Herbert Brownell in 1957, continued thereafter without re-authorization until 1965.[243] Attorney General Robert Kennedy approved FBI requests for wiretaps on an Alabama Klan leader in 1963[244] and on black separatist group leader Malcolm X in 1964.[245] Kennedy also authorized wiretap coverage requested by the Warren Commission in 1964.[246] Kennedy's approval of FBI requests for wiretaps on Dr. Martin Luther King and several of his associates are discussed in greater detail elsewhere in the Committee's report.[247]
-*** Contradictions Of Globalisation
+In addition, Attorney General Kennedy approved wiretaps on four American citizens during investigations of "classified information leaks." The taps failed to discover the sources of the alleged "leaks" and involved procedural irregularities. In 1961 Attorney General Kennedy told Director Hoover that the President wanted the FBI to determine who was responsible for an apparent "leak" to Newsweek reporter Lloyd Norman, author of an article about American military plans in Germany.[248] But the Attorney General was not asked to approve a wiretap on Norman's residence until after it was installed.
-International solidarity and global protest is nothing new. From the European-wide revolutions of 1848, through the upheavals of 1917–18 following the Russian Revolution, to the lightning flashes of resistance nearly everywhere in 1968[180], struggle has always been able to communicate and mutually inspire globally. But what is perhaps unique to our times is the speed and ease with which we can communicate between struggles and the fact that globalisation has meant that many people living in very different cultures across the world now share a common enemy. An enemy that is increasingly becoming less subtle and more excessive (capitalism with its gloves off) and therefore easier to see, understand and ultimately dismantle.[181]
+According to contemporaneous Bureau memoranda, wiretaps in 1962 on the residence of New York Times reporter Hanson Baldwin and his secretary to determine the source of an article about Soviet missile sites were also instituted without prior written approval of the Attorney General; and one of them - the tap on the secretary - was instituted without the Attorney General's prior knowledge.[249] Kennedy's written approval was obtained, however, three days after the Baldwin tap was installed and four days after the tap on the secretary was installed.[250]
-*** A Common Enemy
+The pattern, including <em>ex post facto</em> approval, was repeated for wiretaps of a former FBI agent who disclosed "confidential" Bureau information in a public forum. The first tap lasted for eight days in 1962, and it was reinstituted in 1963 for an undetermined period.[251] Attorney General Kennedy was advised that the FBI desired to place the initial coverage; but he was not informed that it had been effected the day before, and he did not grant written approval until the day it was terminated.[252] It appears that only oral authorization was obtained for reinstituting the tap in 1963.[253]
-The irony is that before the onslaught of globalisation, the system was sometimes hard to recognise in its diverse manifestations and policies. Abstract critical theory was confronting an abstract multifaceted system. But the reduction of diversity in the corporate landscape and the concentration of power within international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the financial markets, has clarified things and offered a focal point for protest and opposition. It is a lot easier to oppose concentrated uniform power than diverse and flexible forms.[182] As power heads further and further in this direction, those opposing it seem to become more and more diverse and fluid, and hence much harder to diffuse and undermine.[183] As the elite, their transnational corporations and their puppets the IMF and WTO impose free market policies on every country on the planet, they are unwittingly creating a situation where diverse movements are recognising each others’ struggles as related and are beginning to work together on an unprecedented scale.
+In February 1961, Attorney General Kennedy requested the FBI to initiate an investigation for the purpose of developing:
-The global race to the bottom in which workers, communities and whole countries are forced to compete by lowering wages, working conditions, environmental protections and social spending, all to facilitate maximum profit for corporations, is stimulating resistance all over the world. People everywhere are realising that their resistance is pointless if they are struggling in isolation. For example-say your community manages, after years of tireless campaigning, to shut down your local toxic waste dump, what does the transnational company that owns the dump do? They simply move it to wherever their costs are less and the resistance weaker-probably somewhere in the Third World or Eastern Europe. Under this system, communities have a stark choice; either compete fiercely with each other or co-operate in resisting the destruction of our lives, land and livelihoods by rampaging capital.[184]
+intelligence data which would provide President Kennedy a picture of what was behind pressures exerted on behalf of [a foreign country] regarding sugar quota deliberations in Congress . . . in connection with pending sugar legislation.[254]
-*** Diversity Versus Uniformity
+This investigation lasted approximately nine weeks, and was reinstituted for a three-month period in mid-1962.
-To accelerate profit and create economies of scale, global capital imposes a monoculture upon the world with the result of making everywhere look and feel like everywhere else-the same restaurants, the same hotels, the same supermarkets filled with the same musak. Sumner Redstone, the multibillionaire owner of MTV, summed up this denial of diversity when he said, <em>Just as teenagers are the same all over the world, children are the same all over the world.</em> On his business trips, he obviously forgets to stop and visit the slums of Delhi or the impoverished rural villages of Africa. In New York, London,[185] and Berlin, kids may have succumbed to his spell of sameness, as they sit prisoners of their own homes, their dull eyes glued to the screen. But the majority of the world’s children would rather have clean water than Jamiroquai.
+According to an FBI memorandum, the Attorney General authorized the wiretaps in 1961 on the theory that "the administration has to act if money or gifts are being passed by the [representatives of a foreign country]."[255] Specifically, he approved wiretaps on several American citizens: three officials of the Agriculture Department (residences only);[256] the clerk of the House Committee on Agriculture who was also secretary to the chairman (residence only);[257] and a registered agent of the foreign country (both residence and business telephones).[258] After passage of the Administration's own sugar bill in April 1961, these wiretaps were discontinued.[259]
-Herbert Read in The Philosophy of Anarchism wrote that, <em>Progress is measured by the degree of differentiation within a society.</em> The president of the Nabisco Corporation would obviously disagree, as he is <em>looking forward to the day when Arabs and Americans, Latins and Scandinavians will be munching Ritz crackers as enthusiastically as they already drink Coke or brush their teeth with Colgate.[186]</em> Progress under the capitalist system is measured by economic growth-which inevitably means monoculture. Just because more money is changing hands doesn’t mean that life is getting any better, it is quite the opposite for the majority ofthe world. But by embracing diversity, social movements are proposing powerful challenges to capital’s addiction to uniformity.
+The investigation was reinstituted in June 1962, when the Bureau learned that representatives of the same foreign country again might be influencing congressional deliberations concerning an amendment to the sugar quota legislation.[260] Attorney General Kennedy approved wiretaps on the office telephone of an attorney believed to be an agent of the foreign country and, again, on the residence telephone of the Clerk of the House, Agriculture Committee.[261] The latter tap continued for one month, but the former apparently lasted for three months.[262]
-*** Space For Utopias
+These wiretaps in 1961 and 1962 were arguably related to "foreign intelligence" -- but not to "subversive activity" unless that term is interpreted beyond its conventional meaning.[263] More important, they generated information which was potentially useful to the Kennedy administration for purely political purposes relating to the legislative process.[264]
-Capital was only able to become truly global after the fall of the Berlin wall and the break-up of the Eastern Bloc. The fall of Communism not only opened up the space for capital to be unrestrained, but also gave a new lease of life to radical movements.[187] For more than <em>70</em> years, Soviet-style socialism was seen as the main model of revolutionary society, and of course it was a total social and ecological disaster. But its shadow lingered over most radical movements. Those who wished to discredit any forms of revolutionary thinking simply pointed to the Soviet model to prove the inevitable failures of any utopian project.
+The wiretap authorized by Attorney General Kennedy on another high executive official in this period did not relate to political considerations, but to concern about possible disclosure of classified information to a foreign government.[265] There is no indication that the wiretap authorized by Attorney General Katzenbach in 1965 on the editor of an anticommunist newsletter was related in any way to the book he had written in 1964 alleging personal impropriety by Attorney General Kennedy.[266]
-Now that the Soviet Union has ceased to exist, it has become a lot easier for those of us working in radical movements to conceive of different societies without having to refer to a failed model. Ideas of utopia can return unhindered. The space has been cleared and the power of radical imagination is back at the centre of revolutionary struggle. Not only has the imagination been freed, it has also become more diverse and fluid than it was ever able to be under the shadow of the strict monolithic ideology of Soviet socialism. There is no longer any need for universal rules, there is not just one way, one utopia to apply globally, because that is exactly what the Free Marketeers are trying to do. The radical social movements that are increasingly coming together don’t want to seize power. but to dissolve it. They are not vanguards but catalysts in the revolutionary process. They are dreaming up many autonomous alternative forms of social organisation, and they are celebrating variety and rejoicing in autonomy.
+<em>6.</em> <em>Domestic Covert Action</em>
-*** The Ecology of Struggle
+In its COINTELPRO operation, the FBI went beyond excessive information-gathering and dissemination to the use of secret tactics designed to "disrupt" and "neutralize" domestic intelligence targets. At the outset, the target was the Communist Party, U.S.A. But, consistent with the pattern revealed in other domestic intelligence activities, the program widened to other targets, increasingly concentrating on domestic dissenters. The expansion of COINTELPRO began in the Cold War period and accelerated in the latter part of the 1960s.
-In Post Scarcity Anarchism, Murray Bookchin wrote that “in almost every period since the Renaissance, the development of revolutionary thought has been heavily influenced by a branch of science.” [188] He gives the examples of mathematics and mechanics for the Enlightenment, and evolutionary biology and anthropology for the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. Ecology has influenced many movements today, and that is perhaps why their model of organisation and co-ordination resembles an ecological model, working like an ecosystem. Highly interconnected, it thrives on diversity, works best when imbedded in its own locality and context and develops most creatively at the edges, the overlap points, the in-between spaces-those spaces where different cultures meet, such as the coming together of the American Earth First! and logging unions or London tube workers and Reclaim the Streets. The societies that they dream of creating will also be like ecosystems-diversified, balanced, and harmonious.
+<em>a.</em> <em>COINTELPRO: Communist Party</em>
-*** Enough Is Enough
+The COINTELPRO program, authorized by Director Hoover against the Communist Party in 1956, had its roots in two lines of Bureau policy going back to the 1940s. The first was the accepted FBI practice of attempting to disrupt "subversive" organizations. A former head of the FBI Intelligence Division has testified:
-The ecological crisis changes the way many of these movements think and act. Kirkpatrick Sale illustrates the scale of the biological meltdown. Afore goods and services have been consumed by the generation alive betiveen 1950 and 1990, measured in constant dollars and on a global scale, than by all the generations in all of human history before.[189] The level of ecological destruction is mind-blowing, and the present generation feels an incredible urgency about the future.[190] We know that mere reform is useless because it is clear that the whole basis of the present system is profoundly anti-ecological, and that there is no longer any use waiting for the right historical conditions for revolution as time is rapidly running out.
+We were engaged in COINTELPRO tactics, to divide, confuse, weaken, in diverse ways, an organization. We were engaged in that when I entered the Bureau in 1941.[267]
-Radically creative and subversive change must happen now, because there is no time left for anything else. During the May ’68 insurrection in Paris, a message was scrawled on the walls of the Theatre de L’Odeon: Dare to go where none has gone before you. Dare to think what none has ever thought. Despite capital’s rapacious ability to enclose and recuperate everything, the space has now been opened up, and we can finally pay attention to that message.
+The memorandum recommending the institution of COINTELPRO stated that the Bureau was already seeking to "foster factionalism" and "cause confusion" within the Communist Party.[268]
-*** Transnational Resistance
+The second line of pre-existing Bureau policy involved propaganda to discredit the Communist Party publicly. For example, in 1946, an earlier head of the FBI Intelligence Division proposed that efforts be made to release "educational material" through "available channels" to influence "public opinion." The "educational" purpose was to undermine Communist support among "labor unions," "persons prominent in religious circles," and "the Liberal elements," and to show "the basically Russian nature of the Communist Party in this country."[269] By 1956, a propaganda effort was underway to bring the Party and its leaders "into disrepute before the American public."[270]
-On New Year’s Day 1994, the day the North American Free Trade Agreement (NA YfA) came into effect, 2,000 indigenous people from several groups came out from the mountains and forests of Chiapas, the most Southern state of Mexico. Masked, armed, and calling themselves Zapatistas, their battle cry was Ya Basta (Enough is Enough). An extraordinary popular uprising which was to change the landscape of global resistance forever had begun. Five towns were occupied and 12 days of fighting followed. This was not an isolated local act of rebellion; through the Zapatistas’ resourceful use of the internet, which could not be censored by the Mexican state, people all over the world soon heard of the uprising.[191] These masked rebels from poverty stricken communities were not only demanding that their own land and lives be given back, neither were they just asking for international support and solidarity. They were talking about neoliberalism, about the death sentence that NAITA and other Free Trade agreements would impose on indigenous people. ‘They were demanding the dissolution of power and the development of civil society, and they were encouraging others all over the world to take on the fight against the enclosure of our lives by capital. Public sympathy in Mexico and abroad was overwhelming, on the day of the ceasefire, celebratory demonstrations took place in numerous countries. In Mexico City, 100,000 marched together shouting “First World HAHAHA!” Phenomenal poetic communiques came out of Chiapas and were rapidly circulated through the internet. There was a new sense of possibility, and the Zapatistas and their supporters were weaving an electronic fabric of struggle to carry the seeds of revolution around the world.[192]
+The evidence indicates that the FBI did not believe that the Communist Party, when the COINTELPRO program was formalized in 1956, constituted as serious a threat in terms of actual espionage as it had in the 1940s.[271] Nevertheless, the FBI systematized its covert action program against the Communist Party in part because the surfacing of informants in legal proceedings had somewhat limited the Bureau's coverage of Party activities, and also to take advantage of internal conflicts within the Party.[272] Covert "disruption" was also designed to make sure that the Party would not reorganize under a new label and thus would remain an easier target for prosecution.[273]
-*** People’s Global Action
+In the years after 1956, the purpose of the Communist Party COINTELPRO changed somewhat. Supreme Court decisions substantially curbed criminal prosecution of Communists.[274] Subsequently, the FBI "rationale" for COINTELPRO was that it had become "impossible to prosecute Communist Party members" and some alternative was needed "to contain the threat."[275]
-In 1996 the Zapatistas, with trepidation as they thought nobody might come, put out a call for a gathering-an ‘encuentra’ (encounter)-of international activists and intellectuals to meet in Chiapas and discuss common tactics, problems and solutions to the common enemy: capitalism?[193] Over 6,000 people attended and spent days talking and sharing their stories of struggle. This was followed a year later by a gathering in Spain, where the idea of a more concrete global campaign, named People’s Global Action (PGA), was hatched by a group made up of ten of the largest and most innovative social movements, including the Movimento Sem Terra, the Brazilian Landless Peasants Movement (see DoD #7, page 88) and the radical Indian Farmers-the Karnataka Stale Farmers Union (KRRS). Four hallmarks were proposed by this group in an attempt to get people to rally around shared principles. These were:
+<em>b.</em> <em>Early Expansion of COINTELPRO</em>
- - A very clear rejection of the institutions that multinationals and speculators have built to take power away from people, like the WTO and other trade liberalisation agreements (like APEC, the EU, NAITA, etc..)
+From 1956 until 1960, the COINTELPRO program was primarily aimed at the Communist Party organization. But, in March 1960, participating FBI field offices were directed to make efforts to prevent Communist "infiltration" of "legitimate mass organizations, such as Parent-Teacher Associations, civil organizations, and racial and religious groups." The initial technique was to notify a leader of the organization, often by "anonymous communications," about the alleged Communist in its midst.[276] In some cases, both the Communist <em>and</em> the "infiltrated" organization were targeted.
- - A confrontational attitude, since we do not think that lobbying can have a major impact in such biased and undemocratic organisations in which transnational capital is the only real policy maker.
+This marked the beginning of the progression from targeting Communist Party members, to those allegedly under Communist "influence," to persons taking positions supported by the Communists. For example, in 1964 targets under the Communist Party COINTELPRO label included a group with some Communist participants urging increased employment of minorities[277] and a non-Communist group in opposition to the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities.[278]
- - A call for non-violent [hmmm] civil disobedience and the construction of local alternatives by local people, as answers to the actions of governments and corporations.
+In 1961, a COINTELPRO operation was initiated against the Socialist Workers Party. The originating memorandum said it was not a "crash" program; and it was never given high priority.[279] The SWP's support for "such causes as Castro's Cuba and integration problems arising in the South" were noted as factors in the FBI's decision to target the organization. The Bureau also relied upon its assessment that the SWP was "not just another socialist group but follows the revolutionary principles of Marx, Lenin, and Engels as interpreted by Leon Trotsky" and that it was "in frequent contact with international Trotskyite groups stopping short of open and direct contact with these groups.[280] The SWP had been designated as "subversive" on the "Attorney General's list" since the 1940s.[281]
- - An organisational philosophy based on decentralisation and autonomy.
+** D. Intelligence and Domestic Dissent: 1964-1976
-In February 1998, PGA was born and for the first time ever, the world’s grassroots movements were beginning to talk and share experiences without the mediation of established Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The first gathering of the PGA was held in Geneva-home of the much hated WTO. More than 300 delegates from 71 countries came to Geneva to share their anger over corporate rule. From the Uwa peoples of Columbia, Canadian Postal Workers, European Reclaim the Streets activists, anti-nuclear campaigners, French farmers, Maori and Ogoni activists, through to Korean Trade Unionists, the Indigenous Women’s Network of North America, and Ukrainian radical ecologists, all were there to form a global instrumentfor <em>communication and co-ordination for all those fighting against the destruction of humanity and the planet by the global market, while building local alternatives and people power.[194]</em>
+<em>1.</em> <em>Main Developments of the 1964-1976 Period</em>
-One of the participants spoke of this inspiring event:
+Beginning in the mid-sixties, the United States experienced a period of domestic unrest and protest unparalleled in this century. Violence erupted in the poverty-stricken urban ghettos, and opposition to American intervention in Vietnam produced massive demonstrations.
-<quote>
+A small minority deliberately used violence as a method for achieving political goals -ranging from the brutal murder and intimidation of black Americans in parts of the South to the terrorist bombing of office buildings and government-supported university facilities. But three Presidential commissions found that the larger outbreaks of violence in the ghettos and on the campuses were most often spontaneous reactions to events in a climate of social tension and upheaval.[282]
-<em>It is difficult to describe the warmth and the depth of the encounters we had here. The global enemy is relatively well known, but the global resistance that it meets rarely passes through the filter of the media. And here we met the people who had shut down whole cities in Canada with general strikes, risked their lives to seize lands in Latin America, destroyed the seat of Cargill in India or Novartis’ transgenic maize in France. Ihe discussions, the concrete planning for action, the stories of struggle, the personalities, the enthusiastic hospitality of the Genevan squatters, the impassioned accents of the women and men facing the police outside the WTO building-all sealed an alliance between us. Scattered around the world again, we will notforget. We remain together. This is our common struggle.</em>
-</quote>
-One of the concrete aims of this gathering was to co-ordinate actions against two events of global importance that were coming up in May of that year, the G8 meeting (an annual event) of the leaders of the eight most industrialised nations, which was to take place in Birmingham and the second ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organisation which was being held a day later in Geneva.
+During this period, thousands of young Americans and members of racial minorities came to believe in civil disobedience as a vehicle for protest and dissent.
-For four consecutive days in May 1998, acts of resistance echoed around the planet. In Hyderabad, India, 200,000 peasant farmers called for the death of the WTO; in Brasilia landless peasants and unemployed workers joined forces and 50,000 of them took to the streets; over 30 Reclaim the Streets parties took place in many countries, ranging from Finland to Sidney, San Francisco to Toronto, Lyon to Berlin. In Prague, the biggest single mobilisation since the Velvet Revolution in ’89, brought over thousands into the streets for a mobile street party that ended with several McDonalds being redesigned and running battles with the police. Meanwhile in the UK, 5,000 people were paralysing central Birmingham as the G8 leaders fled the city to a local manor to continue their meeting in a more tranquil location. The following day, the streets of Geneva exploded. The GS plus many more world leaders had congregated there for the WTO ministerial and to celebrate the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GAAT), the forerunner of the WTO. Over 15,000 people from all over Europe and many from other continents demonstrated. Banks had their windows smashed, the WTO Director General’s Mercedes was turned over and three days of the heaviest rioting ever seen in Geneva followed. The dust settled, the world leaders stuck in their glass bunker beside Lake Geneva made a statement saying that they wanted the WTO to become more <em>transparent!</em> As if that was going to make the blindest bit of difference.
+The government could have set an example for the nation's citizens and prevented spiraling lawlessness by respecting the law as it took steps, to predict or prevent violence. But agencies of the United States, sometimes abetted by public opinion and government officials, all too often disregarded the Constitutional rights of American in their conduct of domestic intelligence operations.
-*** June 18<sup>th</sup>-Keep on Building
+The most significant developments in domestic intelligence activity during this period may be summarized as follows:
-It was clear that things were really moving and that we had to keep the momentum going, and build on the success of the May actions. The question was how? Then came an idea-why not go for the jugular this time? Why not aim at the heart of the beast, the pulsating core of the global economy, the financial and banking districts, the engine room of all ecological and social devastation? This time we could make it bigger, better and even more diverse. According to an article in <em>The Daily Mail[195]</em> entitled “Invitation to a Riot;’ June 18<sup>th</sup> was organised by ringleaders during a <em>secret council of war,</em> several other papers mentioned <em>cells</em> and <em>shadowy groups;</em> while others concentrated on the <em>protest by Stealth,</em> the fact that it was all <em>plotted on the internet[196]</em> and was therefore <em>secret.</em> If you believe the papers, the internet is so secret that <em>The Sunday Times</em> had to <em>intercept an e-mail-</em> which happened to be on the open discussion list-to show to its readers. Apparently the fact that it was “hatched” on the internet also meant it was impossible for the police to estimate how many protesters[197] might be involved[198] or know what the protest was actually about!
+<em>a.</em> <em>Scope of Domestic Intelligence</em>
-**Geneva 1998:** oops that was a director general’s posh car The media go to extraordinary lengths to make people believe that this kind of thing can’t be organised by fairly normal people, using fairly normal everyday life tools such as conversations, phone calls[199] and public meetings. Only shadowy types using weird and highly unusual things like computers and the internet and meeting in strange, secret places like pubs and community centres could possibly organise such an event. But how did it all start, and in what ways was it really organised? If you work for MIS or the police, don’t get all excited and think I’m about to divulge the names and techniques of all the <em>organised anarchists[200]</em> that you so desperately want to catch.[201] I’m going to do no such thing, but what I do want to attempt however, is to demystify the whole process of organising June 18<sup>th</sup>.
+FBI intelligence reports on protest activity and domestic dissent accumulated massive information on lawful activity and law-abiding citizens for vaguely defined "pure intelligence" and "preventive intelligence" purposes related only remotely or not at all to law enforcement or the prevention of violence. The FBI exaggerated the extent of domestic Communist influence, and COMINFIL investigations improperly included groups with no significant connections to Communists.
-*** Desiring The Impossible
+The FBI expanded its use of informers for gathering intelligence about domestic political groups, sometimes upon the urging of the Attorney General. No significant limits were placed on the kind of political or personal information collected by informers, recorded in FBI files, and often disseminated outside the Bureau.
-Those moments where incredible dreams are first shared and aired, where imagination becomes actual by speaking, are wonderful to look back on. Sometimes it takes so little, just a conversation at the right time with the right people, and the seed of an idea is planted and takes root. Like all good ideas, lots of people were thinking the same thoughts at the same time, and all it took was a bit of talking to make those dreams real.
+Army intelligence developed programs for the massive collection of information about, and surveillance of, civilian political activity in the United States and sometimes abroad.
-Last year for the May ’98 actions, Reclaim the Streets had spent some time trying to work out how to hold an event in the City of London, this was before it was decided to move the whole thing up to Birmingham. But the ring of steel, the blanket CCTV coverage and the fact that the event was going to be during the weekend and the City would be empty of office workers put us right off. However, the desire to do something in this small square mile of land right on our doorsteps, Europe’s leading financial centre, and one of capital’s oldest and most powerful sites, proved too strong. Having a tendency to believe in the reality of our desires, we couldn’t let this one go.
+In contrast to previous policies for centralizing domestic intelligence investigations, the Federal Government encouraged local police to establish intelligence programs both for their own use and to feed into the Federal intelligence-gathering process. This greatly expanded the domestic intelligence apparatus, making it harder to control.
-Then during a hot summer’s day in June 1998, a conversation occurred between an RTS activist and someone from London Greenpeace (LGP-the anarchist collective not linked to Greenpeace International) who had been involved in the Stop the City demonstrations during the ‘80s. It turned out that they had been thinking similar thoughts about having an event in the City that year to bring all the single issue campaigns together around the common enemy of capital, and a date[:] had already been set for a public meeting. LGP felt that the time was right to take on such an audacious target. The Stop the Citys in the ‘80s had come out ofthe momentum ofthe peace movement. In the last few years, the ecological direct action movement had been getting stronger. There seemed to be an upsurge in workplace action-the Jubilee line wildcat strikes, and the Thameside care workers being two examples. Street Parties had sprouted up across the country with thousands taking direct action and there was a sense that there was enough momentum to take on such an ambitious and cheeky action.
+The Justice Department established a unit for storing and evaluating intelligence about civil disorders which was designed to use non-intelligence agencies as regular sources of information, which, in fact, drew on military intelligence as well as the FBI, and which transmitted its computer list of citizens to the CIA and the IRS.
-The idea was taken back to RTS’s weekly public meeting and to LGP’ s. In mid-August, the first ofmany public meetings about June the 18<sup>th</sup> was held in a community centre in Central London. As well as RTS and LGP, several groups were present, ranging from the Mexico Support Group, London Animal Action, through to McLibel and Class War. A date was decided, June 18<sup>th</sup>, to coincide with the G8 summit. It was a Friday-therefore a work day in the City. An initial proposal text was agreed and rough ideas of a timetable for the day and different groups to approach for involvement were discussed. It was agreed to hold open co-ordinating meetings every month, and these continued to take place right up to a few weeks before the actual day.
+<em>b.</em> <em>Domestic Intelligence Authority</em> Intelligence gathering related to protest activity was generally increased in response to vague requests by Attorneys General or other officials outside the intelligence agencies; such increases were sometimes ratified retroactively by such officials.
-At this point, there was much debate and some pretty dire brainstorming sessions trying to find a title for the day. Suggestions like A Carnival against Commerce, Laughing All the Way to the Bank, For a Millennium Without Multinationals, Reclaim the City, and Reclaim the World all were mentioned, yet nobody could agree on a suitable name. Time passed and still no title had been thought of, so we stuck to the date-June 18<sup>th</sup>-with a subtitle of a day of action, protest, and carnival in financial centres across the globe. For some extraordinary reason, perhaps due to the fact that a date provides the ultimate in global ownership, no one is taking on someone else’s tag, it seemed to work and eventually, many groups began simply calling it J18.[202]
+The FBIs exclusive control over civilian domestic intelligence at the Federal level was consolidated by formal agreements with the Secret Service regarding protective intelligence and with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms regarding terrorist bombings.
-*** Good Ideas Spread Like Wildfire
+<em>c.</em> <em>Domestic Covert Action</em>
-By the end of August <strong>1998,</strong> the first leaflet was put together-an A4 cut and pasted photocopied sheet-and it was taken to the EF! Summer Gathering for discussion. A small number of people thought it was a suicide mission to try and occupy and transform the city on a work day, when many people would be unable to attend because they were working,[203] but others were excited by it and they agreed to take the idea back to their localities and discuss it. By the beginning of September 1998, an international proposal had been written was taken to the PGA Convenors’ Committee meeting in Finland and discussed with social movements from each continent, who gave the go-ahead for it to be networked internationally. Soon after this, an international networking group was established to distribute and translate the proposal into eight languages. Paper copies found themselves in many backpacks and were taken to far flung places on people’s travels.
+The FBI developed new covert programs for disrupting and discrediting domestic political groups, using the techniques originally applied to Communists. The most intensive domestic intelligence investigations, and frequently COINTELPRO operations, were targeted against persons identified not as criminals or criminal suspects, but as "rabble rousers," "agitators," "key activists," or "key black extremists" because of their militant rhetoric and group leadership. The Security Index was revised to include such persons.
-Preparation pays off-but how many emails before we too get this? (Narita Airport protestors in Japan in the 1970s)
+Without imposing adequate safeguards against misuse, the Internal Revenue Service passed tax information to the FBI and CIA, in some cases in violation of tax regulations. At the urging of the White House and a Congressional Committee, the IRS established a program for investigating politically active groups and individuals, which included auditing their tax returns.
-A J18 e-mail discussion list was set up, where any message sent from anywhere in the world is automatically distributed to everyone who is signed up. This list was entirely public, anyone with an e-mail account could join. During the run up to the action, over 1,000 people passed through the list, and there was a steady membership of about 400 people. Over 300 different people sent an e-mail contributing to the discussion, which showed a suprising level of participation. Someone who had very little experience designing web pages used a web page making programme and set up a basic web site with the proposal on it.
+<em>d.</em> <em>Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Dissent</em>
-Academics and corporations agree that the internet has become one of the most potent weapons of resistance for activists fighting global capital. A PR manager teaching multinationals how to deal with modern day activist groups was quoted as saying The greatest threat to the corporate world’s reputation comes from the internet, the pressure groups’ newest weapon. Their agile <em>use of global tools such as the internet reduces the advantage that corporate budgets once provided.</em> Harry Cleaver, a professor of economics in the USA, has written that <em>the most serious challenge to the basic institutional structures of modem society flowfrom the emergence of computer-linked global social movements.[204]</em>
+A 1966 agreement concerning "coordination" between the CIA and the FBI permitted CIA involvement in internal security functions. Under pressure from the Johnson and Nixon White Houses to determine whether there was "foreign influence" behind anti-war protests and black militant activity, the CIA began collecting intelligence about domestic political groups.
-Despite the fact that most people on the planet don’t own a phone, let alone a computer linked up to the internet, many social movements in both the North and South now have some sort ofinternet access. It’s a relatively cheap medium that enables small groups with very few resources to communicate on a mass scale. June 18<sup>th</sup> could not have happened globally without it. The cost of sending letters or making phone calls halfway across the world would have been prohibitive. But ifs the way the internet spreads ideas rapidly and in every direction through web sites, discussion lists etc. which is extraordinary. Once a message has gone out, a simple click of a button can send it to thousands of people and each one of these in turn can forward that message within seconds. Ideas spread and multiply at the speed of light.
+The CIA also conducted operations within the United States under overly broad interpretations of responsibility to protect the physical security of its facilities and to protect intelligence "sources" and "methods." These operations included surreptitious entry, recruitment of informers in domestic political groups, and at least one instance of warrantless wiretapping approved by the Attorney General.
-There is a great anecdote which describes the decentralised multiplying nature ofthe internet. Someone in the international networking group sent an e-mail to an anarchist group in New York, which was then forwarded by them to Chicago, who in turn forwarded it to Boston and so on to several other cities in the US until eventually it reached Mexico City, where it was forwarded to Zapatista supporters in Chiapas, who were friends of the originator of the e-mail in the UK but who had no idea that she knew anything about J18. They then e-mailed her saying <em>Wow, have you seen this proposal? Have you heard about this action?</em> The message had literally gone around the world.
+In the same period, the National Security Agency monitored international communications of Americans involved in domestic dissent despite the fact that its mission was supposed to be restricted to collecting foreign intelligence and monitoring only foreign communications.
-Traditional media was also of key importance, and by the time 20,000 red, green and black leaflets[205] had been printed and mailed out (yes, real stamps and licking envelopes) to around 1,000 groups around the world, many countries and groups had already got involved-including the North Sumatran Peasants Union, the Policy Information Centre for International Solidarity (PICIS) in South Korea, Chicoco (the coalition of tribal people fighting the oil industry in Nigeria), the Canadian Auto Workers Union, Green Action in Israel and a coalition of several groups in the United States and Australia.
+<em>e.</em> <em>Intrusive Techniques</em>
-J18 was spreading like wildfire. Like a virulent virus, it had taken hold of people’s imaginations. Uncontrollable and untameable, it had moved from city to city and country to country. Like the financial markets, it fed on rumour and speculation. Unlike the markets, it needed co-operation, community and hope to keep it alive.
+As domestic intelligence operations broadened and focused upon dissenters, the Government increased the use of many of its most intrusive surveillance techniques. During the period from 1964 to 1972, the standards and procedures for warrantless electronic surveillance were tightened, but actual practice was sometimes at odds with the articulated policy. Also during these years, CIA mail opening expanded at the Bureau's request, and NSA monitoring expanded to target domestic dissenters. However, the FBI cut back use of certain techniques under the pressure of Congressional probes and changing public opinion.
-*** The Importance of Process
+<em>f.</em> <em>Accountability and Control</em>
-Although what happened on the day went beyond many people’s wildest dreams, the process that led up to it was just as important. Although it had some failings, it did achieve much which will strengthen many of the movements who worked on ]18. Primarily, I believe there are three key areas in which the process succeeded-group building, education and networking, both on local and international level. I can only speak about the first two in terms of what happened in the UK, but I’m sure similar processes happened in many places where actions were organised.
+During this period several sustained domestic intelligence efforts illustrated deficiencies in the system for controlling intelligence agencies and holding them accountable for their actions.
-*** Acting Together
+In 1970, presidential approval was temporarily granted for a plan for interagency coordination of domestic intelligence activities which included several illegal programs. Although the approval was subsequently revoked, some of the programs were implemented separately by various agencies.
-Produced in the months leading up to June 18<sup>th</sup> were two useful action oriented publications. “Squaring up to the Square Mile” was a 32-page pamphlet detailing the institutions and workings of the city. The accompanying publication was an A3 map of the city, marking financial institutions and places. See the resources section for how to get your own copy.
+Throughout the administrations of Presidents Johnson and Nixon, the investigative process was misused as a means of acquiring political intelligence for the White House. At the same time, the Justice Department's Internal Security Division, which should have been a check against the excesses of domestic intelligence, generally failed to restrain such activities. For example, as late as 1971-1973, the FBI continued to evade the will of Congress, partly with Justice Department approval, by maintaining a secret "Administrative Index" of suspects for round-up in case of national emergency.
-In terms of group building, what seemed clear was that the process of local groups getting together to plan their autonomous actions on the day was incredibly important. June 18<sup>th</sup> was providing a common focus for groups up and down the country. New groups were forming and existing groups were coalescing and expanding. Local meetings which brought together diverse interest groups began happening in Sheffield, Cardiff, Newcastle, Brighton, Bristol, Glasgow, Manchester and Southampton to name but a few (eventually there were over 35 different UK groups and places that had their own.June 18<sup>th</sup> point of contact.) Local posters and stickers were produced, stalls and exhibitions appeared in cafes and at festivals. With the freedom to act completely autonomously, yet knowing that there would be many other groups doing actions on the day providing both cover and support, groups found extra confidence and security and felt part of a wider process. All sense of feeling too small and too isolated seemed to evaporate. The success of the day itself will also help inspire them further. Hopefully many of these groups will continue working together for many years to come.
+<em>g.</em> <em>Reconsideration of FBI Authority</em>
-*** Learning Together
+Partly in reaction to congressional inquiries, the FBI in the early 1970s began to reconsider the extent of its authority to conduct domestic intelligence activities and requested clarification from the Attorney General and an executive mandate for intelligence investigations of "terrorists" and "revolutionaries".
-There has been a tendency in the UK direct action movement to concentrate on action at the expense of more conscious thinking and theoretical clarity.[206] 1l1e positive side of this is that it has enabled wildly imaginative actions and strategies to take place. It has also helped avoid the ideological factionalisation and bickering that has beset much of ‘traditional’ politics. The downside of this however, is that if we want to build organised popular movements which think things through, which debate, which act, which <em>experiment, which try alternatives. which develop seeds of the future in the present society,[207]</em> then we have to get a lot better at thinking, talking and educating ourselves and others. June 18<sup>th</sup> once again acted as a focusing agent, bringing together diverse people from different single issue campaigns, and getting them to think about one question-the question of capital.
+In the absence of any new standards imposed by statute, or by the Attorney General, the FBI continued to collect domestic intelligence under sweeping authorizations issued by the Justice Department in 1974 for investigations of "subversives," potential civil disturbances, and "potential crimes". These authorizations were explicitly based on broad theories of inherent executive power. Attorney General Edward H. Levi recently promulgated guidelines which represent the first significant attempt by the Justice Department to set standards and limits for FBI domestic intelligence investigations.
-Few people seriously understand economics, and even fewer understand the complexities of the arcane currency, futures and options markets that lie at the heart of the world’s economy. There are very few places which will tell you about such things in clear and simple language.[208] It is in the interest of the elites to make these things inaccessible and difficult to understand for the average citizen. In many ways, it resembles the hold on power that has gone on for millennia within religious societies. The high priesthood would often hold arcane ceremonies in temples hidden from the populace. and for over a thousand years, mass was held in Latin which excluded the majority of the population from understanding it. Now, in their towering glass temples of Mammon, the elite, the bankers, traders and financiers are still waking up at dawn and engaging in secret rituals. Aloof and isolated from the devastating effects of their magic, they sit safely in front of their screens playing with numbers and abstract mathematical equations, knowing that most people will never make a connection between these arcane games and the misery of their everyday life.
+<em>2.</em> <em>Scope of Domestic Intelligence</em>
-As a first step towards unlocking the City’s mystique[209] and to help educate ourselves on the issues of contemporary capital and financial markets, Corporate Watch and Reclaim the Streets produced a clear and concise 32 page illustrated booklet entitled <em>Squaring Up to The Square Mile-A rough Guide to the City of London.</em> 4000 copies of this excellent publication were distributed to groups preparing for ]18, alternative bookshops and conferences, and a version was also put up on the web. Tucked inside the booklet was a full colour map of potential targets in the City-banks, exchanges, corporate H Qs, investment houses etc., all to help people planning their autonomous actions. A wonderful way of showing that theory without action is useless.
+During this period the FBI continued the same broad investigations of the lawful activities of Americans that were based on the Bureau's vague mandate to collect intelligence about "subversion."
-Face-to-face debate is as important as radical literature, and at the end of February 1999, a day of self education was held in a squatted social ‘ centre in Stoke Newington, London, which involved over <em>100</em> people participating in theoretical workshops and debates about the issues surrounding J18. As well as this, various people travelled around giving workshops at conferences and gatherings, sometimes illustrating them with slide shows and the J18 video. This 1 8-minute video featured an amusing spoof Hollywood trailer for J18, complete with deep husky American voice and superfast paced edits, an ironic short film on the resistance to the IMF and World Bank and a couple of spoof adbusters adverts about growth economics and the G8. One hundred free copies of this were distributed globally, and it was shown in many places ranging from Israeli and US Cable TV, squatted social centres in Europe, through to benefit gigs in London. Some people even illegally dubbed it onto the beginning of rented video tapes!
+In addition, the Bureau -- joined by CIA, NSA, and military intelligence agencies -- took on new and equally broad assignments to investigate "racial matters," the "New Left," "student agitation," and alleged "foreign influence" on the antiwar movement.
-*** Sharing Together
+<em>a.</em> <em>Domestic Protest and Dissent: FBI</em>
-As has been described extensively above, one of the central ideas behind J18 was the need to create international and local networks of resistance. But perhaps describing this amorphous and fluid form of communication as a network is misleading. Harry Cleaver describes a net as a woven fabric made up of interlinked knots-which in social terms means interlinked groups. This is <em>applicable enough when it comes to easily identifiable, co-operating groups, such as NGOs.[210]</em> But, what is missing from this description, continues Cleaver, <em>is the sense of ceaseless, fluid motion within ‘civil society’ in which ‘organising’ may not take theform of ‘organisations’ but an ebb andflow of contact at myriad points.</em>
+"We are an intelligence agency," stated a policy directive to all FBI offices in 1966, "and as such are expected to know what is going on or is likely to happen."[283] Written in the context of demonstrations over the Vietnam war and civil rights, this order illustrates the general attitude among Bureau officials and high administration officials who established intelligence policy: in a country in ferment, the FBI could, and should, know everything that might someday be useful in some undefined manner.
-For Cleaver, the perfect metaphor for the type of organising that is presently taking place between grassroots groups is water, <em>especially of oceans with their ever restless currents and eddies, now moving faster, now slower, now warmer, now colder, now deeper, now on the swface. At some points water does freeze, crystallising into rigidity, but mostly it melts ugain, undoing one molecularform to return to a process of dynamic self-organising that refuses crystallisation yet whose directions and power can be observed and tracked.</em> The process ofJ18 was exactly like this, and this fluidity is one of our greatest strengths against the rigid constraints of capital.
+(1) Racial Intelligence. -- During the 1960s, the FBI, partly on its own and partly in response to outside requests, developed sweeping programs for collecting domestic intelligence concerning racial matters. These programs had roots in the late 1950s.[284] By the early 1960s, they had grown to the point that the Bureau was gathering intelligence about proposed "civil demonstrations" and the related activities of "officials, committees, legislatures, organizations, etc.," in the "racial field."[285]
-*** The Day Gets Nearer-The State Prepares...
+In 1965, FBI field offices were directed to supply "complete," information (including "postponement or cancellation") :
-It was no coincidence that on January 29, a full-page article appeared in <em>The Daily Mirror,</em> with the headline “Police spy bid to smash the anti-car protesters.” Including 10 surveillance mug shots with WANTED printed above them, the article began <em>An Anti-Car group is being targeted by police whofear it plans to bring chaos to Britain’s roads. Every police station in Britain has been circulated with photographs of Reclaim Ihe Streets demonstrators in a bid to identify ringleaders.</em>
+regarding planned racial activity, such as demonstrations, rallies, marches, or threatened opposition to activity of this kind.
-Five months to go ‘til J18 and the state had begun their counteroffensive. According to an article, a Special Branch document obtained by <em>171e Mirror</em> admits it is almost impossible for police to monitor groups like Reclaim The Streets. It says: <em>Increasingly, the environmentalists represent an impenetrable</em> <em>problem for conventional intelligence gathering. Ihe needfor an enhancement in covert pro-active intelligence bypolice is clear.</em> Which was great news, and was further evidence of the fact that the state is completely unable to grasp the way fluid disorganisations work. They are so used to hierarchy, orders, and centralisation that they just can’t see us, let alone catch us. Perhaps this is why Operation Jellystone, as it was called by the police, did not succeed in rounding up ringleaders or preventing Jl8 happening.
+Field offices reported their full "coverage" of "meetings" and "any other pertinent information concerning racial activities."[286]
-The Angry Brigade knew this in <em>1970</em> when they declared <em>We were invincible because we were everybody. Ihey could notjail usfor we did not exist.[211]</em> You would have thought that 25 years later, the state would have cottoned onto us!
+In late 1966, field offices were instructed to begin preparing semi monthly summaries of "existing racial conditions in major urban areas," relying upon "established sources," and "racial," "criminal," and security informants." These reports were to describe the "general programs" of all "civil rights organizations" and "black nationalist organizations" as well as subversive or "hate-type" groups. The information to be gathered was to include: "readily available personal background data" on "leaders and individuals in the civil rights movement" and other "leaders and individuals involved," as well as any data in Bureau files on "subversive associations" they might have; the "objectives sought by the minority community;" the community reaction to "minority demands;" and "the number, character, and intensity of the techniques used by the minority community, such as picketing or sit-in demonstrations, to enforce their demands."[287]
-*** The Day Gets Even Nearer-We Prepare...
+Thus, the FBI was mobilized to used all its available resources to discover everything it could about "general racial conditions." While the stated objective was to arrive at an "evaluation" of potential for violence, the broad sweep of the directives issued to the field resulted in the collection and filing of vast amounts of information unrelated to violence.
-J18 stickers, which were printed with over 30 different designs, were beginning to be seen everywhere-lamp posts, cash machines, bus stops-you could hardly walk down a street in Central London without seeing one. A Virgin Airways advertising campaign proved particularly apt for stickering, as Virgin had recuperated Communist slogans such as “A revolution is in the Air;’ “Up the Workers”-and orange stickers on the deep red background below these slogans looked great! A sticker was even seen stuck to the back of an unsuspecting police officer during the Mayday Reclaim the Streets tube party![212]
+Some programs concerning "general racial matters" were directed to concentrate on groups with a "propensity for violence and civil disorder."[288] But even these programs were so overbroad in their application as to include Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and his non-violent Southern Christian Leadership Conference in the "radical and violence-prone" "hate group" category. The stated justification, unsupported by any facts, was that Dr. King might "abandon his supposed 'obedience' to 'white, liberal doctrines' (nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism."[289]
-Numerous gigs took place to raise awareness and money. Fifty thousand club-like metallic gold J18 flyers[213] which opened up to reveal a quote from Raoul Vaneigem saying <em>To workfor delight and authenticfestivity is barely distinguishable from preparing for general insurrection[214]</em> somehow disappeared within a month as did 10,000 fly posters.
+Another leading civil rights group, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), was investigated under the "Racial Matters" Program because the Bureau concluded that it was moving "away from a legitimate civil rights organization" and "assuming a militant black nationalist posture." The FBI reached this conclusion on the grounds that "some leaders in their public statements" had condoned "violence as a means of attaining Negro rights." The investigation was intensified, even though it was recognized there was no information that its members "advocate violence" or "participate in actual violence."[290]
-Meanwhile, NATO was bombing Serbia back to the stone age in order that Western Capital could enclose this last enclave of the Eastern Bloc. We asked ourselves who was going to rebuild the bridges, oil refineries, roads, schools, hospitals and power stations and who is going to replace the millions of pounds worth of weapons used every day? Could it possibly be Western oil, engineering, construction and arms companies? Many of us felt compelled to do something, to take action. But the timing was dreadful, and as we were are all overworked with June 18<sup>th</sup> preparations, there was no way we could organise anything else. Would the war still be going on on June 18<sup>th</sup>? The issues were so clearly identical, but how could we sucessfully integrate it into the action?
+The same overbreadth characterized the FBI's collection of intelligence about "white militant groups." Among the groups investigated were those "known to sponsor demonstrations against integration and against the busing of Negro students to white schools." As soon as a new organization of this sort was formed, the Bureau used its informants and "established sources" to determine "the aims and purposes of the organization, its leaders, approximate membership," and other "background data" bearing upon "the militancy" of the group.[290]
-With only four weeks to go, the media war began, The Sunday Telegraph’s Business Section front page headline declaring “City faces mass protest threat” went on to claim: <em>Banks and finance houses are being urged by the City of London Police and the British Bankers Association to tighten security and alert their staff after uncovering plans by protest groups to bring Britain’s financial centre to a standstill.[215]</em> After describing ]18 fairly accurately, mostly quoting the web site, the article went on to quote a City professional as saying: <em>We will not bow to these people. We have money to make here.</em> But it was clear that the City was taking things very seriously. All leave was cancelled for City of London police officers on the day. The Corporation of London sent letters out to the Managing Director ofevery firm in the square mile (and many outside it) with instructions to circulate the warning of <em>major disruption</em> and the need for extra security measures to be taken on June 18<sup>th</sup> to all staff. Two weeks to go and the Big Issue’s front cover had a montage of a businessman on fire, with the headline “Breaking the Banks” and a five page feature on J18 inside. The heat was on...
+(2) "New Left" Intelligence. -- The FBI collected intelligence under its VIDEM (Vietnam Demonstration) and STAG (Student Agitation) Programs on "anti-Government demonstrations and protest rallies" which the Bureau considered "disruptive." Field offices were warned against "incomplete and nonspecific reporting" which neglected such details as "number of protesters present, identities of organizations, and identities of speakers and leading activists."[291]
-Leaked letters from firms in the City showed that enormous amounts of security precautions were being taken, including barricades erected in entrances to buildings, extra security guards, minimising meetings with people not normally in the particular offices, discouraging visitors to the building and keeping deliveries to an absolute minimum for the day. There were even rumours that several firms told workers not to bother coming into the City on the day and to work from home.
+The FBI attempted to define the "New Left," but with little success. The Bureau agent who was in charge of New Left intelligence conceded that:
-One particularly worried and especially aggressive city worker sent an abusive e-mail to one of the groups, threatening to <em>smash your pinko faces in.</em> He sent it via a hotmail account, thinking it was an anonymous way of e-mailing someone. Within hours a cyber-geek on the ]18 discussion list had managed to trace the origin of the e-mail to merchant bankers Merryl Lynch. The IT manger there was immediately told of his worker’s abuse of company computers-we never heard of him again!
+It has never been strictly defined, as far as I know.... It's more or less an attitude, I would think.
-*** The Last Few Days...
+He also stated that the definition was expanded continually.[292]
-Now with only a short time left to go, 8,000 red, green, black and gold masks were printed and painstakingly hand threaded with elastic. Final preparations were happening across the country: autonomous action plans tightened up in Bristol, giant carnival heads with sound systems inside were nearing completion in Sheffield, the London International Futures Exchange (LIFFE) was measured up so that it could have a wall built in front of its entrance, the web masters and mistresses put finishing touches to the special web pages which would stream live video from London and Sidney on the day, wigs and disguises were bought, freshly painted banners hung up to dry, four different sound systems donated separate pieces of equipment so that a communal sound system can be driven in on the day, blockading teams memorised maps and mobile phone numbers, people had to file past a competing team of police surveillance and media cameras to get into a meeting, and a crew of Red Bull junkies sat up all night editing a 32-page spoof newspaper. called Evading Standards, for distribution across London.
+Field offices were told that the New Left was a "subversive force" dedicated to destroying our "traditional values." Although it had "no definable ideology," it was seen as having "strong Marxist, existentialist, nihilist and anarchist overtones." Field offices were instructed that "proper areas of inquiry" regarding the subjects of "New Left" investigations were "public statements, the writings and the leadership activities" which might establish their "rejection of law and order" and thus their "potential" threat to security. Such persons would also be placed on the Security Index (for detention in a time of emergency) because of these "anarchistic tendencies," even if the Bureau could not prove "membership in a subversive organization."[293]
-A year on from that hot summer’s day’s conversation, everything was set to go. Hundreds of groups in 43 countries had said they were going to do something on the day, and the City of London Police estimated 10,000 people would turn up for the actions in the Square Mile. But despite all the endless meetings, careful preparations and military precision planning we knew that only one thing will enable the day to succeed-the active spontaneous actions of the participants. Spontaneity is one more vital tool of resistance to join fluidity and diversity. It is the freedom to play. The desire beyond want and external compulsion. It’s the play of life itself and the very opposite of work, order and hierarchy.
+A Bureau memorandum which recommended the use of disruptive techniques against the "New Left" paid particular attention to one of its "anarchistic tendencies":
-Revolutionary epochs are periods of convergence when apparently separate processes collect to form a socially explosive crisis-perhaps it was an unwittingly accurate description of our times, when the leader of The Express claimed that it was Critical Mass which planned...[June 18<sup>th</sup>]...across the world. You and I know that Critical Mass does not exist, that it’s just an .
+the New Left has on many occasions viciously and scurrilously attacked the Director and the Bureau in an attempt to hamper our investigations and drive us off the college campuses.[294]
-idea-the blocking of rush hour traffic by mass bike rides-and it certainly didn’t organise June 18<sup>th</sup>. But perhaps there is no better way of describing what is happening around the world. A critical mass is building-and every year, every month, and every day it gets bigger and stronger. Reports of strikes, of direct actions and ofprotest and occupations from across the world flow along the same lines of communication that carry the trillions ofpounds involved in the reckless unsustainable money game of transnational capital. Soon there is going to be an explosion-an explosion that will be so different from any other revolutionary upsurge that those in power won’t even realise that it is about to transform their world forever. There is much work to be done, but the hope and possibility expressed during the process and events of June 18<sup>th</sup> have brought us one step closer to this wondrous moment...
+Later instructions to the field stated that the term "New Left" did not refer to "a definite organization," but to a "loosely bound, freewheeling, college-oriented movement" and to the "more extreme and militant anti-Vietnam war and antidraft protest organizations." These instructions directed a "comprehensive study of the whole movement" for the purpose of assessing its "dangerousness." Quarterly reports were to be prepared, and "subfiles" opened, under the following headings:
-[177] See the June 18<sup>th</sup> website for a complete list ofactions: http://www.j18.org/
+Organizations ("when organized, objectives, locality which active, whether part
-[178] From the first June 18<sup>th</sup> leaflet, published 1998.
+of a national organization")
-[179] Globalisation has become a buzzword and can be a confusing term. I prefer the term Neoliberalism, used in Europe and Latin America, but will use the more common English term. My understanding of globalisation is best summed up in the following section of Reclaim the Streets Agitprop: <em>Capital has always been global. From the</em> slave trade of earlier centuries to the imperial colonisation of lands and cultures across the world. its boundless drive for expansion—for short term financial gain-has recognised no limits. Backed up by state power, capitalist accumulation has created widespread social and ecological devastation where it ever extended. But now, capitalism is attempting a new strategy to reassert and intensify its dominance over us. its name is economic globalisation, and it consists of the dismantling of national limitations to trade and to the free movement of capital. It enables companies, driven by the demands of the rapacious gambling of money markets, to ransack the entire globe in search for ever higher profits, lowering wages and environmental standards in their wake. Globalisation is arguably the most.fundamental redesign of the planet’s political and economic arrangements since the Industrial Revolution. Global Street Party Agitprop-May 16<sup>th</sup> 1998.
+Membership (and "sympathizers" -- use "best available informants and sources")
-[180] See: Year of the Heroic Guerilla: World Revolution and Counterrevolution in 1968, by Robert V. Daniels, Harvard University Press 1989, for an overview of the global struggles in 1968. Or for a very readable pictorial account: 1968, Marching in the Streets, by Tariq Ali, Castelle 1998.
+Finances (including identity of "angels" and funds from "foreign sources")
-[181] Ironically, this was one of the central weaknesses of the Soviet-Style state. Uniformity undermines diversity and the capacity to diffuse opposition.
+Comunist Influence
-[182] The engines of capital, the financial markets, may be ‘anarchic’, flexible and fluid-but they are still governed by one unbreakable law-profit.
+Publications ("describe publications, show circulation and principal members of editorial staff"']
-[183] A further irony is that the same tools that enable capital to disregard borders and produce commodities thousands of miles away from their markets, the internet and cheap air travel, are the same tools which are helping global social movements to meet and work with each other. Of course I am aware of the ecological and social costs of the computer industry and air travel. The only way I can resolve this contradiction is by applying a homeopathic metaphor to it. The word homeopathy comes from the Greek and means “similar suffering:’ The idea is that a substance that can produce symptoms in a healthy person can cure those symptoms in a sick person. For instance, if you suffer from hayfever, running nose, and eyes, then you take a minute dose of onion, because onion juice produces similar symptoms (something anyone cutting up onions wil have experienced.) The concept of this minimum dose states that we must only use as little medicine as possible to stimulate the body’s own healing mechanism. So if we apply this to the use of destructive technologies to enable social change, it is clear that the amount of air travel and internet used by activists is minute, compared with what is used for capitalist gain and perhaps this minute amount of poisonous substance may actually stimulate the healing capacities of the social body.
+Violence
-[184] See Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello’s excellent book about global struggle: <em>Global Village or Global Pillage: Economic Reconstruction from the Bottom Up,</em> Second Edition, South End Press, Cambridge 1998.
+Religion ("support of movement by religious groups or individuals")
-[185] Despite the fact that a recent government statistics reveal that one in three children in the UK is brought up in poverty.
+Race Relations
-[186] Quoted in <em>Trilaterism</em><em>,</em> edited by Holly Sklar, 1980, quoted in <em>The Case Against the Global Economy</em>, and <em>For a Turn Toward the Local</em>, edited by Mander and Goldsmith. Sierra Club Books, San Francisco 1996.
+Political Activities ("details relating to position taken on political matters including efforts to influence public opinion, the electorate and Government bodies")
+Ideology
+Education ("courses given together with any educational outlines and assigned or suggested reading")
-[187] See: A Handicap Removed by Dominique Vidal, Le Monde Diplomatique, May 1998.
+Reform ("demonstrations aimed at social reform")
-[188] Post Scarcity Anarchism by Murray Bookchin, Black Rose Books, Montreal 1971.
+Labor ("all activity in the labor field")
-[189] Rebels Against the Future-Lessonsfor the Computer Age by Kirkpatrick Sale, Qyartet Books 1996.
+Public Appearances of Leaders ("on radio and television" and "before groups, such as labor, church and minority groups," including "summary of subject matter discussed")
-[190] The generations ofthe ‘sos to the ‘80s had the threat of nuclear apocalypse hanging over them, but that was a question of probability— lfthere were a nuclear war. The question is no longer an if, because there is certainity that as long as business continues as normal, the biosphere will be irrevocably damaged. If it hasn’t already been so.
+Factionalism
-[191] Emanating from Subcommandante Marcos’ now legendary jungle-battered Olivetti laptop.
+Security Measures
-[192] See the excellent writings of US academic Harry Cleaver about computer linked social movements-available on the web at: http:// [[http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/hmchtmlpapers.html][www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/hmchtmlpapers.html]]
+International Relations ("travel in foreign countries," "attacks on United States foreign policy")
-[193] Subcommandante Marcos said in his speech to the Convention: We ... ask in the name of all men and women that you save a moment, a few days, a few hours, enough minutes to find the common enemy.
+Mass Media ("indications of support of New Left by mass media")
-[194] From PGA manifesto, February 1998-see: [[http://www.agp.org/][http://www.agp.org/]] for more details on the PGA.
+Through these massive reports, the FBI hoped to discover "the true nature of the New Left movement."[295] Few Bureau programs better reflect "pure intelligence" objectives which extended far beyond even the most generous definition of "preventive intelligence."[296]
-[195] The Daily Mail, Monday June 21 1999, p. 23 ‘Invitation to a Riot’ by Steve Doughty and Peter Rose.
+Apart from the massive general reports required on the "New Left," examples of particular investigations included: a stockholders group planning to protest their corporation's war production at the annual stockholders meeting;[297] a university professor who was "an active participant in New Left demonstrations," publicly surrendered his draft card, and had been arrested in antiwar demonstrations, but not convicted;[298] and two university instructors who helped support a student "underground" newspaper whose editorial policy was described as "left-of-center, anti- establishment, and opposed [to] the University administration."[299]
-[196] The Daily Express. Saturday June 19 1999, p. 3 ‘Day of Chaos Planned on the Interne’ by Danny Penman.
+The FBI also investigated emerging "New Left" groups, such as "Free Universities" attached to various college campuses, to determine whether they were connected "in any way" with "subversive groups." For example, when an article appeared in a newspaper stating that one "Free University" was being formed and that it was "anti- institutional," the FBI sought to determine its "origin," the persons responsible for its "formation," and whether they had "subversive backgrounds."[300] The resulting report described in detail the formation, curriculum content, and associates of the group. It was disseminated to military intelligence and Secret Service field offices and headquarters in Washington as well as to the State Department and the Justice Department.[301]
-[197] So does that mean that when actions were organised using leaflets and posters. they were able to use their psychic powers and guess exactly how many protestors would be in the City of London? The irony is that police figures, weeks before the protest, estimated 10,000 people which was good deal more accurate than the figures quoted on the day by the majority of the media, which ranged from 3000–7000.
+<em>b.</em> <em>FBI Informants</em>
-[198] The Daily Telegraph, Saturday June 19 1999, p. 5 Protest Hatched on the Internet by Tom Sykes.
+The FBI Manual has never significantly limited informant reporting about the lawful political activities or personal lives of American citizens, except for prohibiting reports about legal defense "plans or strategy," "employer-employee relationships" connected with labor unions, and "legitimate campus activities."[302] In practice, FBI agents imposed no other limitations on the informants they handled and, on occasion, disregarded the prohibitions of the Manual.[303]
-[199] Phone calls are not normal tools in most ofthe world. I am obviously referring to the ‘affluent’ societies here.
+(1) Infiltration of the Klan. -- In mid-1964, Justice Department officials became increasingly concerned about the spread of Ku Klux Klan activity and violence in the Deep South. Attorney General Kennedy advised President Johnson that, because of the "unique difficulty" presented by a situation where "lawless activities" had the "sanction of local law enforcement agencies," the FBI should apply to the Klan the same "techniques" used previously "in the infiltration of Communist groups."[304]
-[200] The Financial Times, Friday June 18 1999, ‘Organised Anarchists’
+Former Attorney General Katzenbach, under whose tenure FBI activities against the Klan expanded, vigorously defended this decision as necessary to "deter violence" by sowing "deep mistrust among Klan members" and making them aware that they were "under constant observation."[305] The FBI Manual did, in fact, advise Bureau agents against "wholesale investigations" of persons who "merely attend meetings on a regular basis. "[306] But FBI intelligence officials chafed under this restriction and sought expanded informant coverage.[307] Subsequently, the Manual was revised in 1967 to require the field to furnish the "details" of Klan "rallies" and "demonstrations."[308] By 1971, the Special Agents in Charge of field offices had the discretion to investigate not only persons with "a potential for violence," but also anyone else who in the SAC's "judgment" was an "extremist."[309]
-[201] After June 18<sup>th</sup> (and at time of writing in August 1999) the police had 60 officers working on the case full time, looking at 5000 hours of CCTV footage and other evidence.
+(2) "Listening Posts" in the Black Community. -- Two special informant programs illustrate the breadth of the Bureau's infiltration of the black community. In 1970, the FBI used its "established informants" to determine the "background, aims and purposes, leaders and Key Activists" in every black student group in the country, "regardless of [the group's] past or present involvement in disorders."[310] Field offices were instructed to "target informants" against these groups and to "develop such coverage" where informants were not already available."[311]
+In response to Attorney General Clark's instructions regarding civil disorders intelligence in 1967, the Bureau launched a "ghetto informant program" which lasted until 1973.[312] The number of ghetto informants expanded rapidly: 4,067 in 1969 and 7,402 by 1972.[313] The original concept was to establish a "listening post"[314] by recruiting a person "who lives or works in a ghetto area" to provide information regarding the "racial situation" and "racial activities."[315] Such information could include "the proprietor of a candy store or barber shop." As the program developed, however, ghetto informants were:
-[202] There is a very unfortunate similarity between J 18 and the name of the violent ultrafascist group C18 (which stands for combat and then the initials ofAdolf Hitler, A and H the first and eighth letters of the alphabet). None of us clocked on to this until too late, but some of the media did mention it!
+utilized to attend public meetings held by extremists, to identify extremists passing through or locating in the ghetto area, to identify purveyors of extremist literature as well as given specific assignments where appropriate.[316]
-[203] Most large-scale action, especially street parties, have taken place on weekends. Holding something which required thousands to participate, if it was going to work, on a weekday was admittedly quite a risk.
+Material to be furnished by ghetto informants included names of "Afro-American type book stores" and their "owners, operators and clientele."[317]
-[204] Computer Linked Social Movements and the Global Threat to Capitalism by Harry Cleaver, [[http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/][http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/]] hmchtrnlpapers.html
+(3) Infiltration of the "New Left". -- The FBI used its "security" informant program to report extensively on all activities relating to opposition to the Vietnam war. Moreover, informants already in groups considered "subversive" by the FBI also reported on the activities of other organizations and their members, if the latter were being "infiltrated" by the former groups.[318]
-[205] Three colours representing Anarchism, Communism, and Ecology.
+The agent who handled one informant in an antiwar group believed to be infiltrated by "subversive groups and/or violent elements" testified that the informant told him "everything she knew" about the chapter she joined.[319] Summaries of her reports indicate that she reported extensively about personal matters and lawful political activity.[320] This informant estimated that her reports identified as many as 1,000 people to the FBI over an 18-month period. The vast majority of these persons were members of peaceful and lawabiding groups, including the United Church for Christ, which were engaged in joint social welfare projects with the antiwar group which the informant had infiltrated.[321]
-[206] See George Mac Kays introduction to DJY Culture, Party and Protest in ‘90s Britain, Verso, London 1998 for an academic but interesting critique.
+Other FBI informants reported, for example, on the Women's Liberation 'Movement, identifying its members at several mid-western universities[322] and reporting statements made by women concerning their personal reasons for participating in the women's movement.[323]
-[207] From J18 international leaflet-quoted from Noam Chomsky. No further reference available.
+Moreover, as in the case of informants in the black community, efforts were made to greatly increase the number of informants who could report on antiwar and related groups. In 1969, the Justice Department specifically asked the FBI to use not only "existing sources," but also "any other sources you may be able to develop" to collect information about "serious campus disorders."[324] The Bureau ordered its field offices in 1970 to "make every effort" to obtain "informant coverage" of every "New Left commune."[325] Later that year, after Director Hoover lifted restrictions against recruiting 18 to 21-year-old informants, field offices were urged to take advantage of this "tremendous opportunity" to expand coverage of New Left "collectives, communes, and staffs of their underground newspapers."[326]
-[208] If you are going to read any paper that tells you the real stories about what is going on in the world, who pulls the strings and how the system works, then you have to fork out 85p for the <em>Financial Times.</em> Or go into a large branch ofWH Smiths, where they trust you to pay just by dropping the change (a few coppers can do) into a bucket. It will be the most educating shoplifting you have ever done.
+<em>c.</em> <em>Army Surveillance of Civilian Political Activity</em>
-[209] From the introduction of <em>Squaring Up to the Square Mile-A Rough Guide to the City of London,</em> Corporate Watch and Reclaim the Streets, ]18 Publications 1999.
+In the early 1960s, after several commitments of troops to control racial disturbances and enforce court orders in the South, Army intelligence began collecting information on civilian political activity in all areas where it believed civil disorders might occur. The growth of the Army's domestic intelligence program typifies, once again, the general tendency of information-gathering operations to continually broaden their coverage.
-[210] <em>Computer-linked Social Movements and the Global Threat to Capitalism</em> by Harry Cleaver, see above.
+Shortly after the Army was called upon to quell civil disorders in Detroit and to cope with an antiwar demonstration at the Pentagon in 1967, the Army Chief of Staff approved a recommendation for "continuous counterintelligence investigations" to obtain information on "subversive personalities, groups or organizations" and their "influence on urban populations" in promoting civil disturbances.[327] The Army's "collection plan" for civil disturbances specifically targeted as "dissident elements" (without further definition) the "civil rights movement" and the "anti-Vietnam/anti-draft movements."[328] As revised later, Army intelligence-gathering extended beyond "subversion" and "dissident groups" to "prominent persons" who were "friendly" with the "leaders of the disturbance" or "sympathetic with their plans."[329]
-[211] The Angry Brigade Communique 6/7, 1970.
+<em>d.</em> <em>Federal Encouragement of Local Police Intelligence</em>
-[212] RTS organised a Tube Party in support of Tube workers and against the privatisation of the London Underground, which took place on May 1<sup>st</sup>, 1999.
+In reaction to civil disorders in 1965-1966, Attorney General Katzenbach turned for advice to the newly created President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. After holding a conference with police and National Guard officials, the President's Commission urged police not to react with too much force to disorder "in the course of demonstrations," but to make advance plans for "a true riot situation." This meant that police should establish "procedures for the acquisition and channeling of intelligence" for the use of "those who need it."[330] Former Assistant Attorney General Vinson recalled the Justice Department's concern that local police did not have "any useful intelligence or knowledge about ghettos, about black communities in the big cities."[331]
-[213] Many people assumed that these gold flyers cost the earth to print, in fact they cost the same amount as if we had done them in any other colour.
+During the winter of 1967-1968, the Justice Department and the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders reiterated the message that local police should establish "intelligence units" to gather and disseminate information on "potential" civil disorders. These units would use "undercover police personnel and informants" and draw on "community leaders, agencies, and organizations in the ghetto."[332] The Commission also urged that these local units be linked to "a national center and clearinghouse" in the Justice Department.[333] One consequence of these recommendations was that the FBI, because of regular liaison with local police, became a channel and repository for much of this intelligence data.
-[214] <em>The Revolution of Everyday Life,</em> Raoul Vaneigem, Rebel Press 1994.
+Local police intelligence provided a convenient manner for the FBI to acquire information it wanted while avoiding criticism for using covert techniques such as developing campus informants. For example, in 1969, Director Hoover decided "that additional student informants cannot be developed" by the Bureau.[334] Field offices were instructed, however, that one way to continue obtaining intelligence on "situations having a potential for violence" was to develop "in-depth liaison with local law enforcement agencies. "[335] Instead of recruiting student informants itself, the FBI would rely on local police to do so.
-[215] <em>The Sunday Telegraph,</em> May 16 1999 “City Faces Mass Protest Threat” by Grant Ringshaw.
+These Federal policies contributed to the proliferation of local police intelligence activities, often without adequate controls. One result was that still more persons were subjected to investigation who neither engaged in unlawful activity, nor belonged to groups which might be violent. For example, a recent state grand jury report on the Chicago Police Department's "Security Section" described its "close working relationship" with Federal intelligence agencies, including Army intelligence and the FBI. The report found that the police intelligence system produced "inherently inaccurate, and distortive data" which contaminated Federal intelligence. One police officer testified that he listed "any person" who attended two "public meetings" of a group as a "member." This conclusion was forwarded "as a fact" to the FBI. Subsequently, an agency seeking, "background information" on that person from the Bureau in an employment investigation or for other purposes would be told that the individual was "a member." The grand jury stated:
-<br>
+Since federal agencies accepted data from the Security Section without questioning the procedures followed, or methods used to gain information, the federal government cannot escape responsibility for the harm done to untold numbers of innocent persons.[336]
-** Desire is Speaking: Utopian Rhizomes (from issue 8)
+<em>e.</em> <em>The Justice Department's Interdivision Information Unit (IDIU)</em>
-The similarity of squatters’ cultures in various Western European countries is remarkable, I wrote in a report of a tour of my band in May 1995 through four or five different West European countries. The buildings, music, clothes, codes, and of course, the inevitable dogs, are practically the same everywhere. Can it be that the dominant West European mass culture produces its own subculture? Isn’t it time for something new? This observation points to the existence of a West (and increasingly East) European network of people who do not necessarily know each other, but share ideals, practices, and preferences that are different and opposed to the dominant culture: a network of bands, squats, zines, labels, mail orders, newsgroups, and people.
+Joseph Califano, President Johnson's assistant in 1967, testified that the Newark and Detroit riots were a "shattering experience" for Justice Department officials and "for us in the White House." They were concerned about the "lack of intelligence" about "black groups." Consequently, "there was a desire to have the Justice Department have better intelligence, for lack of a better term, about dissident groups." This desire "precipitated the intelligence unit" established by Attorney General Ramsey Clark in late 1967. According to Califano, the President and the White House staff were insisting: "There must be a way to predict violence. We've got to know more about this."[337]
-The ‘70s are generally considered to be the last utopian period.[216] After the failure of the near-revolution of 1968 it became clear that the spectacle transforms our desires into something it can cope with. The spontaneous explosion of desires was absorbed through student councils, democratic reforms, wage increases, employee participation, and freedom of the press. In the Netherlands, the actions of the Provos and Kabouters were overruled by Marxist student leaders and the politicians of the New Left. The desires became harmless, the utopian moment passed by.
+In September 1967 Attorney Genera I Clark asked Assistant Attorney General John Doar to review the Department's "facilities" for civil disorders intelligence.[338] Doar recommended creating a Departmental "intelligence unit" to analyze FBI information about "certain persons and groups" (without further definition) in the urban ghettos. He proposed that its "scope be very broad initially" so as to "measure the influence of particular groups." Doar recommended that, in addition to the FBI, agencies who should "funnel information" to the unit should include:
-After the utopian period of Love and Peace, the ‘80s with all its No Future attitude can be considered to be an atopia. With their dark clothes and nihilistic attitude, punks were not exactly flower children. They had no poetic vision of the future. Only the here and now existed, with the notion that you have to make the best out of that. If the system sucks, create something yourself, something different, something better, or at least something more fun.
+Community Relations Service
-When mainstream punk died a few years after it appeared on stage, the punk movement could start. Bands sprouted like weeds because according to the DIY ethos ofpunk anyone can play: you’re a musician if you want to, not because a producer of a record company or journalist says so. With the bands came the venues, labels, rehearsal rooms, mail orders, zines. An inspiring underground culture appeared, while the media had lost their interest.
+Poverty Programs
-The same can be said for the squatters’ movement. In Holland, and also abroad, the punk and the squatters’ movements of the ‘80s were very much interwoven. Especially in the beginning, punk bands depended on squats for their gigs. If a huge house was occupied, the first thing you did was open a bar and try to create a gig space where (punk) bands could play. Famous in Amsterdam were the Emma-a huge warehouse, and the music studio-Jokes Koeienverhuurbedrijf. Not just Amsterdam, but many other towns had their own squats with gig spaces as well. Some of these have been legalized, others still exist as squats, some have disappeared. Nowadays they don’t only feature punk bands, because in the end, even squatters learned to dance to techno and jungle.
+Neighborhood Legal Services
-The squatters’ movement did not only offer space for bands but for a lot of other things as well. It was supposed to have died in 1984, after the eviction of a huge squat called the Wyers.[217] I always considered this notion funny, because I arrived in Amsterdam in 1984 and since then the main part of my life has taken place in squats or legalized squats. Most of my friends used to live in squatted houses, and we frequented squatted bars, discos, gig venues, and restaurants. Almost everything you needed or wanted could be found in squatted buildings, from grocery stores to saunas. Some of these facilities were especially directed at squatters, but a lot were also accessible to the general public. Back then it was no problem at all to live in what might be called a squatted zone for almost 24 hours a day; you could even travel to squats in other European countries in your holidays. You only dropped in at the dole office for this month’s cash, or sometimes you got yourself a job (although this was not done back Lhen).
+Program Labor Department Programs
-Some people just squatted out of necessity, while for some it fitted into a broader ideology. But no matter how many squatters flirted with revolutionary ideas-for example, there were many support committees for the guerrillas in Central America, and some people went to Nicaragua to support the Sandinista revolution-most of them dissociated themselves from the theoretical discussions of young anarchists and communists in the ‘60s and ‘70s. Most squatters didn’t want to change the world, but live their life here and now the way they chose to. If we can speak of any ideology, it was the ideology that there was none. As a female squatter said to a journalist of the newspaper de Volkskrant:[218] Not an abstract ideal, nor the adherence to an ideology, or even a better society, but the improvement of a lousy personal situation. Ihat is why I am involved.
+Intelligence Unit of the Internal Revenue Service
-Just as in the women’s movement, the slogan “the personal is political” was in vogue. Squatting and direct action became an attitude to life. Politics starts in you daily life, where power relations take hold, where you can start changing things and create room for different ways of living, working and relating to each other. In the squatters’ magazine <em>Bluf!,[219]</em> someone said in an article called “Utopia,”
+Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Division of the Treasury Department
-<quote>
+Narcotics Bureau (then in the Treasury Department)
-<em>/feel at home in the squatters’ movement because</em> I <em>can live</em> and work <em>there and be politically active, together with people who generally have no illusions, without getting stuck in a ‘no-future’ attitude. People who have no illusions about the welfare state regarding housing, work, culture, love and whatever else is for sale. No illusions about parliamentary politics. People who resist nonetheless, not against the establishment, nor randomly, but because they have their own ideas about how they want to live and who want tofightfor a space to realise that. In short: people who do not want the patterns and perspectives of their lives being dominated by what society has to ‘offer’, but by their own insights and desires.</em>
-</quote>
-There are altogether fewer squats now than in the ‘80s, due to hassle through new laws which have resulted in quicker and easier evictions. A lot of squats only exist for a few months. The problem with this is that it’s harder to create gig venues, cafes, shops, and other facilities. At the end of the ‘80s and the beginning of this decade a lot of the projects and infrastructure of the squatters’ movement disappeared or chose some legalized form to continue their activities. Some of the initiatives now make use of state-subsidized jobs, employing each other on workfare schemes. Squatters are idealistic, but also pragmatic, or perhaps strategic is a better word here. In order to survive you have to use the various possibilities the system unintentionally offers you. But in Amsterdam it’s still squatday (squats are being opened) almost every Sunday, and many young people opt for the uncertain but exciting life in a squat.
+Post Office Department
-According to social scientists and journalists,[220] social movements are considered important when they play a role in the political arena, the media, or both. The squatters movement did so between <strong>1976</strong> and <strong>1984,</strong> at least in Amsterdam. Squatters were large in number and well organised into neighbourhood groups; they had political impact and staged spectacular riots, and because of that, gained a lot of media attention. The squatters’ movement disappeared as a political factor and as a media event after <strong>1984,</strong> but the (new or legalized) squats and networks survived, and they turned out to be fertile soil for other initiatives and experimental ways of life.[221]
+Doar recognized that the Justice Department's Community Relations Service, designed to conciliate racial conflicts, risked losing its "credibility" and thereby its ability to help prevent riots, but he assured the Attorney General that the "confidentiality" of its information could be protected.[339]
-Out of the squatters’ movement came a network of squats, communally owned houses, food co-ops, LET-systems (local exchange systems without money, based on trading skills), sound systems, bands, mailorders, festivals, direct-action groups, research groups, no-paper (immigration) groups, publishers, magazines, internet providers and newsgroups, infoshops, people’s kitchens, mobile kitchens, etc. Within this movement, a few thousand people are on the move. A lot ofpeople are disappointed that there isn’t a shared utopia anymore, no expectation of a better future. According to some of them, the shared utopian vision has always been the core of left politics, and that has to stay that way.[222] Well, if this is true, then perhaps the movement isn’t left anymore. But the dischord with the existing order and the desire to create something different here and now still remains. The shared utopia disappeared, but the utopian practices didn’t.
+A later study for Attorney General Clark -added the following agencies to Doar's list:
-At the moment, when neo-liberalism is the only ideology and the market economy has colonized everything-even our genes-these practices show us possibilities for other ways of living. other economies, or even the end of economy. There is an ongoing discussion about the necessity of creating an alternative economy that is less dependent on the mainstream market and the state. The Dutch VAK-group, for example-a federation of houses, studios, work places, companies, a farm, and financial institutions-strives towards an alternative infrastructure based on anarchist ideas, such as local democracy and federation. By supplying financial means, skills, experiences, and other services, new projects can be supported and existing projects can network.
+President's Commission on Civil Disorders
-Desire, however, doesn’t know exchange, but only theft and gift. ‘Ihe market economy expands by appropriating things that were freely available before. It is only after claiming exclusive ownership that things can be bought and sold. In this context, de-economizing is the breaking down of exclusive ownership: the reclaiming of public and private spaces, goods, and provisions. The struggle against the economization of our daily lives is not merely a struggle against the market, but against economy itself, against the notion of scarcity. Most of the movement’s practices are based on this notion of abundance.
+New Jersey Blue Ribbon Commission (and similar state-agencies)
-According to the squatting movement, there are enough places to live in; you only need to occupy them. Punk and DIY culture show that anyone can make music, records, organise gigs, make ‘zines, just do it. Like primitives, travellers are the hunters and gatherers of contemporary wild nature: the technological megacity, which offers more than enough waste to live on. The refugee aid movement or no-paper groups (supporting illegal immigrants) show that hospitality costs nothing, but is a way to meet new friends, come into contact with other cultures, and enhance your experience. Q!ieers show that there is more than heterosexuality or homosexuality, more than man and woman. A collective like Rampenplan, which consists of a mobile kitchen, a publisher, and a direct action video group, shows that it is possible to cook organic meals based on the principle of a fair price and in doing so generate money for other projects, without expecting anything in return. Even the LET-schemes, which use the principle of exchange, are based on the notion that everybody has some skills to offer somebody else, on abundance instead of scarcity. But most important is that the movement shows that you can have fun doing what you do, that you can play instead ofwork.
+State Department Army Intelligence Office of Economic Opportunity
-So what kind of community is the Dutch movement? It is clear that people participate together in direct actions and demonstrations, read the same magazines, go to the same bars, gigs and festivals and some of them live together in squats or communally owned houses. They certainly meet. But they also meet people ‘outside’; they attend schools or universities, or have a job. Hardly anyone is a full-time squatter anymore. You can live in a squat and study and work and play in a band and make love with men and women...
+Department of Housing and Urban Development (surveys and Model City applications)
-Although there are always people who try to formulate criteria as to who is inside and who is not, the movement of the ‘90s is relatively open, and because of that also lacks the sometimes suffocating pressure towards uniformity that was characteristic of the social movements of the ‘70s and ‘80s, like the women’s and gay movements, and also the squatters movement.
+Central Intelligence Agency
-What we see here is not a community, nor solidarity groups, but configurations of desire: networks of friendship and expression that undermine the prevailing relations of production, society, politics, family, the body, sex, and even the cosmos. Lacking a single clear goal or programme, we see a multitude of struggles. There is no utopian tree from which readymade ideas about another world can be picked, but endless rhizomes on which, at unexpected moments, flowers appear.
+National Security Agency
-The concept of rhizomes, modelled on the strange root systems of certain plants, was introduced by the French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. They’re opposed to the tree, which stands for the dominant Western reality and all of Western thought, from botany to biology and anatomy, and also gnosticism, theology, ontology, philosophy. The tree exists in a hierarchical order of a central trunk with larger and smaller branches. The trunk forms the connection between all parts, thus in a way limiting connections. A rhizome, on the contrary, can be connected with any other at any point. A tree can be cut down, whereas rhizomes are much less subject to destruction.
+This study recommended that FBI reports relating "to the civil disturbance problem" under the headings "black power, new left, pacifist, pro-Red Chinese, anti-Vietnam war, proCastro, etc." be used to develop "a master index on individuals, or organizations, and by cities."[340]
-Rhizomes can grow again along another line if broken at some point. Rhizomes are abundant; if weeded out in one place, they will definitely show up somewhere else. Rhizomes are endless, as are desire and the imagination.
+Attorney General Clark approved these recommendations and established the Interdivision Information Unit (IDIU) for:
-So utopianism didn’t disappear after the ‘70s, it’s everywhere-sometimes hidden, sometimes exposed. It can’t be exterminated, because it’s like a weed. It’s the voice of desire and the imagination in a world dominated by material interests and reason. Like weeds. desire can be ‘cultivated’ for a shorter or longer period, it can be locked up within political organisations or single issue groups, but it can never be weeded out. In some periods it’s more underground, voluntarily so or because the state or political organisations (right or left) force it to be. But it will always find a way to break out. It will always find a hole to break through and flow free, a hole in the spectacle, temporarily or permanent.
+reviewing and reducing to quickly retrievable form all information that may come to this Department relating to organizations and individuals who may play a role, whether purposefully or not, either in instigating or spreading civil disorders, or in preventing or checking them.[341]
-submitted by Ravage, bi-weekly magazine, Van Ostadestraat 233n, 1073 TN Amsterdam, Holland
+In early instructions, Clark had stated that the Department must "endeavor to increase" such intelligence from "external sources."[342]
-[216] Saskia Poldervaart, ‘Anti-utopisten maken zich er gemakkelijk vanaf in ‘de Volkskrant’, June 1998
+In fact, according to its first head, the IDIU did use intelligence from the Army, the Internal Revenue Service, and "other investigative agencies." Sometimes IDIU information was used to "determine whether or not" the Community Relations Service should "mediate" a dispute.[343] The Unit developed a computer system which could generate lists of all "members or affiliates" of an organization, their location and travel, "all incidents" relating to "specific issues", and "all information" on a "planned specific demonstration."[344]
-[217] See Virginia Mamadouh, ‘De stad in eigen hand’, Amsterdam 1992.
+By 1970, the IDIU computer was receiving over 42,000 "intelligence reports" a year relating to "civil disorders and campus disturbances" from:
-[218] 8 March, 1980
+the FBI, the U.S. Attorneys, Bureau of Narcotics, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Division of the Treasury Department and other intelligence gathering bodies within the Executive Branch.[345]
-[219] No. 79, 28 September, 1983
+IDIU computer tapes, which included 10-12,000 entries on "numerous anti-war activists and other dissidents," were provided to the Central Intelligence Agency in 1970 by Assistant Attorney General Jerris Leonard, then the Attorney General's Chief of Staff for Civil Disturbance and head of the Civil Rights Division.[346] This list of persons was sent to the Internal Revenue Service where the Special Services staff opened intelligence files on all persons and organizations listed. Many of them were later investigated or audited, in some cases merely because they were on the list.
-[220] Scum [editor’s comment]
+In 1971, the IDIU computer included data on such prominent persons as Rev. Ralph Abernathy, Caesar Chavez, Bosley Crowther (former New York Times film critic), Sammy Davis, Jr., Charles Evers, James Farmer, Seymour Hersh, and Coretta King. Organizations on which information had been collected included the NAACP, the Congress of Racial Equality, the Institute for Policy Studies, VISTA, United Farm Workers of California, and the Urban League. Ordinary private citizens who were not nationally prominent were also included. One was described as "a local civil rights worker," another as a "student at Merritt College and a member of the Peace and Freedom Party as of mid-68," and another as "a bearded militant who writes and recites poetry."[347]
-[221] I prefer not to use the word <em>lifestyle,</em> because its meaning has been obscured, both by marketeers and the American social ecologist Murray Bookchin. See his essay ‘Social anarchism or lifestyle anarchism, an unbridgeable chasm’, AK Press 1995.
+Thus, beginning in 1967-1968, the IDIU was the focal point of a massive domestic intelligence apparatus established in response to ghetto riots, militant black rhetoric, antiwar protest, and campus disruptions. Through IDIU, the Attorney General received the benefits of information gathered by numerous agencies, without setting limits to intelligence reporting or providing clear policy guidance. Each component of the structure FBI, Army, IDIU, local police, and many others -- set its own generalized standards and priorities, resulting in excessive collection of information about law abiding citizens.
-[222] Ronald van Haasteren et al in ‘Het Gelijk...uitnodiging tot een debat’, Papieren Tijger 199
+<em>f.</em> <em>COMINFIL Investigations: Overbreadth</em>
-** Running to Stand Still <em>(from issue 9)</em>
+In the late 1960's the Communist infiltration or association concept continued to be used as a central basis for FBI intelligence investigations. In many cases it led to the collection of information on the same groups and persons who were swept into the investigative net by the vague missions to investigatie such subjects as "racial matters" or the "New Left." As it had from its beginning, theCOMINFIL concept produced investigations of individuals and groups who were not Communists. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. is the best known example.[348] But the lawful activities of many other persons were recorded in FBI files and reports, because they associated in some wholly innocent way with Communists, a term which the Bureau required its agents to "interpret in its broad sense" to include "splinter" and "offshoot" groups.[349]
-*** Globalisation, Blagging, and the Dole
+During this period, when millions of Americans demonstrated in favor of civil rights and against the Vietnam war, many law-abiding citizens and groups came under the scrutiny of intelligence agencies. Under the COMINFIL program, for example, the Bureau compiled extensive reports on moderate groups, like the NAACP.[350]
-Over the years the government has helpfully financed many campaigns and actions against itself. Lots ofpeople in the direct action movement rely on dole money from the state in order to survive. However, over the last few years there has been a big shake up of the welfare state. What has our response been to this? How will it affect us? And has the supply of free money finally run dry?
+The FBI significantly impaired the democratic decisionmaking process by its distorted intelligence reporting on Communist infiltration of and influence on domestic political activity. In private remarks to Presidents and in public statements, the Bureau seriously exaggerated the extent of Communist influence in both the civil rights and anti- Vietnam war movements.[351]
-Throughout the past two decades, the dole has provided the basis for a number of creative projects and movements, some of which have been overtly political. In the 1980s, the relaxed benefit regime allowed many to drop out ofwork and form new types of antagonistic lifestyles and tendencies, for example around the anarcho-punk scene. This was carried on into the 1990s when the dole became the basis for the growing anti-roads movement, the campaign against the Criminal Justice Bill, as well as the more recent development of the militant direct action movement. Being on the dole has simply given us the time to become full-time politicos; the dole has in effect been a trouble-maker’s grant. After all, who can find the time to do an office action on a Monday morning, spend days waiting for an eviction or take part in days of action from J18 to Bastille Day that always seem to be on a week day? Fair enough, phoning in sick became part of the action on J18, but we can’t exactly phone in sick every week when we want to go to an action, let alone risk being locked up in a cell for days. But apart from giving us the time to become full-time politicos, in an important sense opting out of work has become a political statement in itself in the direct action scene.
+<em>3.</em> <em>Domestic Intelligence Authority</em>
-Riot to Work? The unemployed did things differently then... A march of the Right to Work Campaign in London in 1908. There was a national Right to Work movement in the early years of the last century with committees being set up across the country between 1904 and 1908. Their threat was not an idle one-in 1905 there was serious Right to Work rioting in Manchester.
+During this period there were no formal executive directives outlining the scope of authority for domestic intelligence activity of the sort previously issued by Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy.[352] However, there was a series of high-level requests for intelligence concerning racial and urban unrest directed to the FBI and military intelligence agencies. As with the earlier formal Presidential directives on subjects like "subversion," these instructions provided no significant guidelines or controls.
-The first major attack on this lifestyle came in the mid-1990s when the Conservative government replaced the old-style benefit regime with the Job Seekers Allowance (JSA). This was followed shortly by the workfare scheme, ‘Project Work’, which was piloted in a number of towns and then implemented more widely by the New Labour government. Both were met by some collective resistance. However, when New Labour introduced a much more ambitious quasi-workfare based programme, the New Deal, the limited collective resistance there had been previously was reduced to individual solutions, characterised by blags and scams.
+<em>a.</em> <em>FBI Intelligence</em>
-It was this lack of collective resistance to the New Deal, and more recently to the Welfare Reform Act, that led some to emphasise the tragic consequences this would have for the direct action scene.[223] Arguing that the dole was the financial basis for the so-called full-time politico, the recent attacks on the dole were seen as potentially a threat to this movement. Whereas previously long-term unemployment, and hence the political opportunities it afforded, could almost be thought of as a lifetime career, the slogan <em>no fifth option</em>[224]-repeatedly voiced by the Blairites in No. 10-served to illustrate that such careers would no longer be possible.
+Since the early 1960s, the Justice Department had been making sporadic requests for intelligence related to specific racial events. For example, the FBI was requested to provide a tape recording of a speech by Governor-elect George Wallace of Alabama in late 1962[353] and for "photographic coverage" of a civil rights demonstration on the 100th anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation.[354] On its own initiative, the FBI supplied the Civil Rights Division with information from a "confidential source" about plans for a demonstration in Virginia, including background data on its "sponsor" and the intention to make "a test case."[355] The Civil Rights Division prepared regular summaries of information from the Bureau on "demonstrations and other racial matters."[356]
-However, two years into the New Deal, it seems that all this fuss was over nothing. Quite a few people have been on the introductory stage of the New Deal as well as on placements, and contrary to the doom and gloom predictions, in some areas at least, people have found it quite easy to blag their way through it. Perhaps the introduction of Welfare to Work-type schemes wasn’t such a big threat to the movement after all.
+A formal directive, for a similar purpose, was sent by Attorney General Kennedy to U.S. Attorneys throughout the South in May 1963. It instructed them to "make a survey" to ascertain "any places where racial demonstrations are expected within the next 30 days" and to make "assessments of situations" in their districts. The FBI was "asked to cooperate. "[357]
-**** The Global Workhouse
+President Johnson ordered the FBI to investigate and report on the origins and extent of the first small-scale Northern ghetto disturbances in the summer of 1964.[358] After the FBI submitted a report on the Watts riot in Los Angeles in 1965, however, Attorney General Katzenbach advised President Johnson that the FBI should investigate "directly" only the possible "subversive involvement." Katzenbach did not believe that the FBI should conduct a "general investigation" of "other aspects of the riot," since these were local law enforcement matters. The President approved this "limited investigation."[359] Nonetheless, internal Bureau instructions in 1965 and 1966 went far beyond this limitation.[360] By 1967 new Attorney General Ramsey Clark reversed the Department's position on such limitations.
-Before discussing the effectiveness of blagging, it is necessary brief y to examine the rationale behind the current tendency for workfare-type programmes and to situate their introduction in the context of our struggles. After all, what has the New Deal got to do with genetics, road building, animal liberation, prison actions or reclaiming our streets?
+After the riots in Newark and Detroit in the summer of 1967, President Johnson announced that the FBI had "standing instructions" for investigating riots "to search for evidence on conspiracy."[361] This announcement accompanied the creation of a National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders to investigate the "basic factors and causes leading to" the riots, including the "influence" of groups or persons "dedicated to the incitement or encouragement of violence." The President ordered the FBI in particular to "provide investigative information and assistance" to the Commission.[362] Director Hoover also agreed to investigate "allegations of subversive influence, involvement of out-of-state influences, and the like. "[363]
-The concept of globalisation is one that many in the direct action movement have used to make the link between our diverse struggles. As has been discussed in these pages, “globalisation” is the problematic term commonly used to describe the strategy pursued by capital in response to the last revolutionary upsurge which took place at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s.[225] In Britain and other advanced industrialised countries, the post-war compromise between capital and labour was essentially based on a productivity deal in which higher wages were conditional upon a growth in productivity. But by the end of the 1960s, workers demanded higher wages only now for less and less work. At its highest point, this tendency expressed itself as a refusal ofwork at the point of production. The link between wages and work was being stretched to the limit and beyond. Te response of capital was flight from investment in those industries and countries characterised by this bloody-mindedness and refusal. Such flight thus served to outflank areas of working class strength.
+In September 1967, Attorney General Clark directed the FBI to:
-This restructuring was particularly acute in Britain. Unlike some of the other advanced industrialised countries, Britain was a relatively developed centre of finance capital, and therefore could afford to abandon huge swathes of its manufacturing industry. Politically, therefore, the Thatcherite project meant the introduction of policies that capitalised on the transformation of large-scale manufacture into footloose global finance capital.
+use the maximum resources, investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing upon the question as to whether there has been or is a scheme or conspiracy by any group of whatever size, effectiveness or affiliation, to plan, promote or aggravate riot activity.[364]
-Most importantly, the post-war consensus around full employment was abandoned. Instead, unemployment was allowed to let rip. Along with anti-strike legislation, the creation of a pool of unemployed workers was intended to eliminate some of the more militant sections and to discipline the working class as a whole.
+Justice Department executives were generally aware of, and in some cases sought to widen, the scope of FBI intelligence collection. In a lengthy review of Bureau reports, John Doar, Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, expressed concern that the FBI had not "taken a broad spectrum approach" to intelligence collection, since it had "focused narrowly" on "traditional subversive groups" and on persons suspected of "specific statutory violations."[365]
-While the neo-liberal policies employed by many of the governments in the advanced industrialised countries had some success in curbing militant and revolutionary tendencies among workers, they also served to create a number of barriers to further capital expansion. From the point of view of capital, a pool of unemployed workers encourages those within work to work harder and accept lower wages by operating as the competition. Yet if the pool of unemployed is allowed to become stagnant, it will no longer represent such competition, and instead existing workers will still retain some leverage in their relations with the bosses. What had in fact emerged was a dual labour market where those out of work were either unwilling to find work or perceived as being unemployable; as a result, the people in work could move around from job to job still demanding relatively high wages.[226] It therefore became hard to impose flexible working conditions. Some of the highest expressions of this unemployed recalcitrance were among those who consciously used the dole as the basis for various anti-capitalist projects. In effect, the refusal of work that had previously appeared at the point of production had now been displaced onto the dole.
+Reiterating this viewpoint, Attorney General Clark told Director Hoover that "existing intelligence sources" may not have "regularly monitored" possible riot conspirators in "the urban ghetto." He added that it was necessary to conduct a "broad investigation" and that
-Industrial capital in countries such as Britain transformed itself into globally footloose finance capital in order to seek the most accommodating labour markets. Yet, in proletarianising workers in less-industrialised countries such as Taiwan and Korea, it served to create militants where they hadn’t previously existed. The multinational companies and investment firms that we associate with globalisation therefore continually need nation-states to re-impose the most conducive labour conditions so that they can flee those countries where they are threatened by worker militancy. In short, globalisation is essentially about the re-imposition of work.
+sources or informants in black nationalist organizations, SNCC (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee) and other less publicized groups should be developed and expanded to determine the size and purpose of these groups and their relationship to other groups . . .[366]
-In Britain and other advanced industrialised countries, the stagnant reserve army of labour had to be done away with in order to attract greater capital investment. It is no coincidence that all these countries are now pursuing similar policies in order to develop compliant labour market conditions. The policies in Britain, the USA, France, Germany, Holland, Denmark, Canada, Australia and New Zealand go by a number of names and vary in their degree of compulsion, but all are variations on the theme of work-for-dole, or workfare. Workfare, then, is the face of globalisation for many of us. Workfare overcomes the problem of recalcitrance in the reserve army of labour by inculcating work discipline in everyone. Both those who seek a job but who have been out of work for too long and those who found in mass unemployment an opportunity to pursue anti-capitalist lifestyles are to be instilled with the necessary work discipline to participate in the labour market. Although in Britain it is New Labour which has made the principles of workfare the keystone of its attempt to restructure the labour-market, the foundations were already laid by the Conservatives, with the introduction of the Job Seekers Allowance (]SA) in 1996. Being unwilling to increase public spending, the Conservatives hoped that the dual labour-market could be overcome simply by pressuring people into the existing jobs. By putting in place sanctions for any of us who couldn’t provide proof that we had been applying for jobs, it replaced the notion of us being passive claimants with one of us being active job-seekers. A further advance was made in the re-imposition of work with Project Work-a quasi-workfare scheme presented as a work experience programme rather than work-for-your-benefits.
+Clark described his directive as setting forth "a relatively new area of investigation and intelligence reporting for the FBI."[367]
-But as with other overtly neo-liberal measures introduced by the Tories, these policies not only failed to gather public support, but the orthodox neo-liberal insistence on not increasing public spending on welfare was to be their downfall. The punitive approach to unemployment meant that not only claimants directly affected by the measures came out in opposition, which on the direct action and anarcho scene mainly manifested itself in the actions of the Groundswell network, but the dole workers themselves put up considerable resistance, in some areas downing tools on the day the ISA came into force.[227] But although this resistance did prevent the smooth implementation of both the ISA and Project Work, the limits of both ultimately became obvious more as a result of them being grossly under-funded, and consequently serving more to fiddle the unemployment figures by pushing people off the dole than dealing sufficiently with the dual labour market.
+In response to the Attorney General's instructions, the FBI advised its field offices of the immediate "need to develop additional penetrative coverage of the militant black nationalist groups and the ghetto areas."[368]
-**** The New Deal and the Welfare Reform Act
+<em>b.</em> <em>Army Intelligence</em>
-When New Labour, shortly after they came into office, launched the New Deal as the government’s flagship policy, it was hoped that both the problem of public perception of the schemes and the problem of their overtly punitive nature could be effectively avoided. In line with the so-called Third Way between social democracy and neo-liberalism, they abandoned Conservative dogma against state intervention. By investing £3.5 billion in the programme (a lot more than they could ever hope to save in the short-term from getting people off the dole}, their intention was clear: the New Deal was not just supposed to slash a few million quid off the welfare bill, but was an altogether more ambitious scheme aimed at tackling the dual labour market once and for all.
+On January 10, 1968, a meeting took place at the White House for the purpose of "advance planning for summer riots." The White House memorandum of the meeting reported:
-And unlike the old punitive schemes relying on merely pushing people off the dole, the New Deal was sold as a state-led attempt to do away with social exclusion. Consequently, when the New Deal was launched as a compulsory scheme for 18–24 year olds in April 1998, the initial Gateway stage was presented not as an extension of the intensive job-search introduced with the JSA, but as a three-month period of individualised job counselling. The subsequent four options of educational training, sweeping streets on the Environmental Task Force, or a placement either in the voluntary sector or a subsidised job were presented not as working for your dole but as work experience programmes that would provide the unemployed with a smooth entry into the job market. The New Deal has since been extended to most other age groups, single parents, and partners of the unemployed.
+The Army has undertaken its own intelligence study, and has rated various cities as to their riot potential. They are making contingency plans for troop movements, landing sites, facilities, etc.
-With the recent introduction of the Welfare Reform Act, this help has been extended to all other claimants not sufficiently covered under the other schemes: by the simple act of centralising all the benefit offices into a one-stop-shop, the work-focused interviews associated with the JSA will now be extended to all other claims. Under the banner of helping the disabled back into the community, they are justifying getting people off the sick (whereas encouraging people to go on the sick previously served as a means to fiddle unemployment figures, New Labour has made it clear that whatever your condition, there is now no safe haven from the labour market). Moreover, abandoning the social-democratic dogma of public ownership, New Labour have sought to introduce the dynamism of the market into the Job Centres themselves, by privatising Employment Service functions at the same time as some of the new elements of Welfare Reform have been introduced. Thus not only is the New Deal delivered by private firms (such as Reed Employment) in some areas, but the new intensive Employment Zones are the responsibility of consortia made up of partnerships between the Employment Service and companies such as Ernst & Young and Manpower.[228]
+It added that the Attorney General and the Deputy Secretary of Defense "had agreed to coordinate their efforts."[369] The Army General Counsel's memorandum of the meeting stated that Attorney General Clark had "stressed the difficulty of the intelligence effort," especially because there were "only 40 Negro FBI agents" out of the total of about 6,300. Clark added that "every resource" was needed in "the intelligence collection effort," although he asked the Defense Department to "screen" its "incoming intelligence" and send "only key items" to the Justice Department.[370]
-In other words, although New Labour tries to present their Welfare to Work programme as a more integrative approach to the issue of unemployment, and as such a departure from the punitive and openly neo-liberal approach of the previous government, the reality is that they do this only because it is a more efficient way of integrating the recalcitrant unemployed into a flexible labour market. The language and state-intervention normally associated with social democracy has come to the service of a neo-liberal agenda. And as is acutely clear for anybody who has had to sit through one of their work-focused interviews, and politely turn down their help, the bedrock of the New Deal is of course still the harsh JSA regime they so proudly proclaim themselves to have departed from: refuse the counselling or the ‘options’ and you will have all your benefits stopped.
+There is no record that at this or any other similar meeting in this period the Attorney General or White House aides explicitly ordered the Army to conduct intelligence investigations using infiltration or other covert surveillance techniques. However, even though Army collection plans which were circulated to the Justice Department and the FBI[371] did not mention techniques of collection, the information they described could only be obtained by covert surveillance. No objections were voiced by the Justice Department.
-**** Dole Workers and Activists
+Not until 1969 was there a formal civilian decision specifically authorizing Army surveillance of civilian political activity. At that time, Attorney General John Mitchell and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird considered the matter and over the objections of the Army General Counsel, decided that the Army would participate in intelligence collection concerning civil disturbances.[372] The Army's collection plan was not rescinded until June 1970, after public exposure and congressional criticism.[373]
-Despite the clear discrepancy between the reality of the recent attacks on the dole and the ideological offensive that has accompanied it, a lot of lefty-liberals seem to have bought into it. Indeed it has to some extent succeeded in getting the people on board who had previously shown the most fierce and effective resistance to the JSA and Project Work, namely many of the dole workers. To some extent identifying with the concept of work being important for your self-respect, many see their role as being one of helping the individual claimants into a better existence. The New Deal with its seemingly individualised claimant-based approach and job counselling seems to do just that, and as a result the resistance of the past has become more muted, despite continuing cynicism among dole workers about government policies.[229]
+<em>c.</em> <em>FBI Interagency Agreements</em>
-A similar thing seems to have happened in the direct action scene. Where there was at least some collective resistance against the JSA and Project Work, resistance to the New Deal has been if not non-existent, then much less visible-mostly taking the form of individual blags. Has the direct action scene been taken in by NewLabour Speak? We think not. In fact, in an important sense, they couldn’t be further apart. Where the lefty-liberals’ part endorsement of New Labour’s Welfare to Work programme, in contrast to their opposition to the previous schemes, is essentially based on an identification with social democracy, the people in the direct action scene seem, to have no such illusions about the supposedly progressive nature of this. The notion of duties and responsibilities to society is quite clearly seen as duties to state and capital. And the notion of work being good for your soul hasn’t exactly had any resonance either.
+After the assassination of President Kennedy, the FBI and the rot Service negotiated an - agreement which recognized that the Bureau had "general jurisdiction" over "subversion." The term was more narrowly than it had been defined by practice in the past, knowingly or wilfully advocat[ing]" overthrow of the Government by "force or violence" or by "assassination." Except for "temporary" action to "neutralize" -a threat to the President, the Secret Service agreed to "conduct no investigation" of "members of subversive WU without notifying the FBI. The Bureau, on the other hand, would not investigate individuals "solely" to determine their "dangerousness to the President."[374]
-The reason why there has been no overt resistance to the New Deal and the Welfare Reform Act in the activist scene lies not so much in ideology as in practicalities. The very inclusiveness of New Labour’s Welfare to Work scheme has made it a great deal easier for us to blag our way through than it was at first thought. Ironically, one of the reasons why this has been the case in at least some areas around the country lies in the fact that the dole workers have in certain unforeseen ways taken seriously the new ethos of the New Deal. Many dole workers resent the policing aspects of their job and have taken advantage of the flexibility of the new schemes to avoid pressuring people; they have allowed people to stay on the Gateway job counselling stage well beyond the three months limit set by the government. Their acceptance of the New Deal and the Welfare Reform Act as genuine measures to help claimants also means that they have welcomed claimants’ own initiatives, thereby making it easier for us to sort out our own soft placements. The result has in many areas been that a lot of claimants have found it easier to stay on the dole without much hassle.
+After Congress enacted antibombing legislation in 1970, the FBI was assigned primary responsibility for investigating "offenses perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary groups."[375] When these guidelines were developed, the FBI shifted supervision of bombing cases from its General Investigative Division to the Intelligence Division because, as one official put it, the specific criminal investigations were "so interrelated with the gathering of intelligence in the racial and security fields that overlap constantly occurs."[376]
-But apart from this, people in the direct action scene have, as always, been quick in developing a number of elaborate blags and scams. Before the current purge of those entitled to sickness benefit, the easiest and quickest way to avoid being included in the New Deal would be to fake depression or an unidentifiable physical illness. But even if this is no longer possible, plenty of other avenues are still open. Out of a whole number of scams, the most common one has been to find some fake placement with a friend or contact in which you are officially placed on a work experience programme in whatever company. In this way many have been able to keep the dole office off their back, without ever having to show up either at the so-called placement or to sign on every fortnight. Of course, not all of us are so lucky— instead we find that we are actually expected to help out a bit at our fake placement (a favour for a favour). But even so, digging some organic allotment once in a while, helping out in some right-on book shop, political archive, or Third World centre isn’t really that much of a hassle. In fact, it might not even be that far removed from what we would be doing anyway. Even better, some have been able to turn the New Deal to their own advantage by getting on an otherwise pricey mountaineering, desk top publishing or web design course-all handy skills when you want to set up a road camp. occupy buildings, or produce political magazines and web sites.
+The agreement with Secret Service and the "guidelines" covering bombing investigations did not give the FBI any additional domestic intelligence-gathering authority. They simply provided for dissemination of information to Secret Service and allocated criminal investigative jurisdiction between the FBI and the Alcohol, Firearms, and Tobacco Division. Nevertheless, both presupposed that the FBI had broad authority to investigate "subversives" or "terrorist/revolutionary groups."
-And if things start to get tough, if you are signing on with your partner, you can always swap the claim, or alternatively just sign off for about three months, do a bit of work and go abroad. So even if schemes such as the New Deal initially appeared as a potential threat to the movement, in some cases quite the opposite would seem to have happened. Not only have a substantial amount of people around the direct action scene been able to work their way around it, but it has arguably helped us to become more effective political activists. If the old dole regime was characterised as a trouble-maker’s grant, this term has now gained an added meaning (a trouble-maker’s training scheme?).
+<em>4.</em> <em>Domestic Covert Action</em>
-However, it is quite likely that the effects the changes in the dole have had on our movement are not at present visible. For largely unrelated reasons there are currently no large-scale campaigns involving loads of people. There are very few protest sites now and those which there are are smaller. The sort of activity that direct action people have been engaging in recently is more compatible with work; single big demos, one-day things, etc.--not living up a tree for a year. It is possible that were there again to be a large campaign which would require people to be on the dole we would notice our depleted ranks more than at present.
+<em>a.</em> <em>COINTELPRO</em>
-**** Working to Avoid Work
+The FBI's initiation of COINTELPRO operations against the Ku Klux Klan, "Black Nationalists" and the "New Left" brought to bear upon a wide range of domestic groups the techniques previously developed to combat Communists and persons who happened to associate with them.
-Not everyone can blag all the time, and the government is slowly catching up on our different blags. As a lot of people have come to realise lately, remaining on the sick is becoming increasingly difficult.[230] The government has even picked up on the phenomenon of the full-time politico and has used it to cut our benefits by arguing that we can’t be actively seeking work if we are involved in these sorts of activities. This has obviously been hard for them to prove unless they have got evidence of us living on site or otherwise engaged in some clearly ‘full-time’ activity.
+The start of each program coincided with significant national events. The Klan program followed the widely-publicized disappearance in 1964 of three civil rights workers in Mississippi. The "Black Nationalist" program was authorized in the aftermath of the Newark and Detroit riots in 1967. The "New Left" program developed shortly after student disruption of the Columbia University campus in the spring of 1968. While the initiating memoranda approved by Director Hoover do not refer to these specific events, it is clear that they shaped the context for the Bureau's decisions.
-But as people who have been PANSIED (Politically Active Not Seeking Employment-apparantly one of the dole office’s official categories!) at various protest sites have found out, it is even possible for them to overcome this barrier. At the Manchester Airport protests in 1997, the dole office tried a new strategy. They simply matched up the signing records to where different sites had been (e.g. someone who had suspiciously moved between Exeter, Newbury, and Manchester), and attempted to cut people’s dole on the basis that they weren’t actively seeking work. (In this case, the protesters were able to successfully argue that they were religious and not political activists, threatening to take the DSS to court if they didn’t give everybody their dole back.) In November 1999, a similar thing happened to 15 activists who had been living on or associated with the Gorse Wood site in Essex-only this time it seems that it came about through co-operation between the dole office and police intelligence, as people who had been spotted on site but weren’t actually living there were amongst the 15 who got their dole money stopped on the basis that they were fraudulently claiming benefits.
+These programs were not directed at obtaining evidence for use In possible criminal prosecutions arising out of those events. Rather, they were secret programs -- "under no circumstances" to be "made known outside the Bureau"[377] -- which used unlawful or improper acts to "disrupt" or "neutralize" the activities of groups and individuals targeted on the basis of imprecise criteria.
-In general, then, while a given individual might be able lo blag for a certain amount of time, the government is always seeking to close these loopholes. Blags that existed in the 1980s dole heyday no longer exist; and by the same token, today’s blags will eventually be snuffed out: you can run but you can’t hide!
+(1) Klan and "White Hate" COINTELPRO. -- The expansion of Klan investigations, in response to pressure from President Johnson and Attorney General Kennedy,[378] was accompanied by an internal Bureau decision to shift their supervision from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence Division. One internal FBI argument for the transfer was that the Intelligence Division was "in a position to launch a disruptive counterintelligence program" against the Klan with the "same effectiveness" it had against the Communist Party.[379]
-The inherently temporary nature of dole-blags means that the search for new blags becomes an objective in itself. But a culture of blagging-blagging as an end in itself-has side-effects upon ourselves and what we are striving to do as a movement. The need to find individual blags can obscure the overall situation in which we are all having to channel our creativity in these ways. It is as if this culture of blagging has taken on a life of its own, to the extent that we become blind to the overall facts of the situation. It is as if we are so used to being on the receiving end of countless state attacks, that we have given up on trying to collectively resist them and instead pat ourselves on the backs when we have found a new way of fiddling them individually.
+Accordingly, in September 1964 a directive was sent to seventeen field offices instituting a COINTELPRO against the Klan and what considered to be other "White Hate" organizations (e.g., American Nazi Party, National States Rights Party) "to expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize" the activities of the groups, "their leaders, and adherents."[380]
-But whilst we pat each other on the back for all our scheming, the government has meanwhile succeeded in getting what the Conservatives could only have dreamt of: in a very short space of time they have managed to dispose of the idea of passive claimants, and made it into an active process. Only five years ago we could have sat back content in the knowledge that if we wanted a life of leisure (if a rather low-budget one) all we had to do was to show up at the dole office every fortnight. Now, if not actively seeking work, we are actively avoiding work. And this in itself has become a full-time occupation.
+During the 1964-1971 period, when the program was in operation, 287 proposals for COINTELPRO actions against Klan and "White Hate" groups were authorized by FBI headquarters.[381] Covert techniques used in this COINTELPRO included creating new Klan chapters to be controlled by Bureau informants and sending an anonymous letter designed to break up a marriage.[382]
-In fact, the extent to which the culture of blagging has taken on a momentum of its own also becomes obvious in our relation to work. Whereas the whole alternative scene of the 1980s and 90s was accompanied by an anti-work ethic-a sentiment carried forward into the direct action scene today-it seems that our idealisation of blagging has gone so far that we are even willing to do a bit of work if this becomes necessary. This has become clear in cases where our fake placements actually expect us to help out by playing on the good old unwritten rules of favour for favour-a crude form ofwhat can only be termed moralistic blackmailing that most of us might be annoyed by, but are nevertheless willing to accept. In effect, although blagging was only supposed to be a means to avoid work, we have conceded to working in the name of blagging.
+(2) "Black Nationalist" COINTELPRO. -- The stated strategy of the "Black Nationalist" COINTELPRO instituted in 1967 was "to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize" such groups and their "leadership, spokesmen, members, and supporters." The larger objectives were to "counter" their "propensity for violence" and to "frustrate" their efforts to "consolidate their forces" or to "recruit new or youthful adherents." Field offices were instructed to exploit conflicts within and between groups; to use news media contacts ridicule and otherwise discredit groups; to prevent "rabble rousers" from spreading their "philosophy" publicly; and to gather information on the "unsavory backgrounds" of group leaders.[383]
-**** Assets to Globalisation
+In March 1968, the program was expanded from twenty-three to forty-one field offices and the following long-range goals were set forth:
-In addition, the resourcefulness of people around the direct action scene has also helped the implementation of the recent attacks on all claimants. One of the major problems the government has encountered in implementing their Welfare to Work schemes has been that of finding the necessary amount of placements needed for the people they still haven’t managed to push into a job on the Gateway stage of the New Deal. This might at first seem strange as from the employer’s point of view New Deal placements would seem like an offer they couldn’t possibly resist. Here’s the deal: get people on the New Deal to work for you for free. And don’t worry, there’s no catch. You don’t even have to commit yourself to employing them afterwards. As soon as the 6 month period of free labour is up, you just get rid of them and take on some new trainees. However, if there is one thing that employers like less than paying £3.60 an hour to their employees, it is having workers they can’t even rely on to show up, let alone do an honest day’s work, hence the cautious take-up rate for the New Deal placement schemes. So by finding our own placements we are helping the government in one of the tasks they have found most difficult to complete. Insofar as these are soft placements, this is obviously not a direct substitute for what the state would have wanted, but it increases the success rate of New Deal placements, hence giving it more credibility.
+(1) prevent the "coalition of militant black nationalist groups;"
-More importantly though, finding placements (real or otherwise) serves to justify putting more pressure on all other claimants who might not be as resourceful or have as many (green) middle class connections as some people in the direct action scene do. Measures such as the New Deal and the Welfare Reform Act have actually met substantial passive resistance from most claimants, which is exactly why the government has decided to increase some of its sanctions lately. But if there are claimants who, before even being forced into a placement, continually manage to find their own, as well as successfully completing them without any complaints from either the claimant or the placement provider, it obviously legitimises putting more pressure on the remaining claimants. They appear less co-operative and therefore become the undeserving poor, those who have had the offers of work and who must be ‘scroungers’ because they have refused such offers. They are therefore to be subject to more pressure and sanctions. It is ironic that the people who are actively trying to resist measures such as the New Deal, by doing so with individual blags, actually end up leaving the rest in the shit.
+(2) prevent the rise of a "messiah" who could "unify and electrify" the movement, naming specifically Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Stokely Carmichael, and Elijah Muhammed;
-The seemingly boundless resourcefulness of people around the direct action scene does mean that we have avoided what was otherwise depicted as a doom and gloom scenario of welfare reform being a serious threat to the movement. But not only does it require more and more work for us to simply avoid being forced off the dole, but our continuous blags have also had the effect of justifying increased pressure on other claimants. Maybe more importantly though, it seems to have made us blind to the overall picture of why and how the state chooses to attack us. We constantly talk about the evils of globalisation and neo-liberalism, but when we actually experience what that means in Britain in our own lives we don’t even seem to notice, let alone do anything about it except as individuals. Yet individual solutions are effectively collective problems. The welfare reform we have seen the government pursuing for the past three years has entailed attacks on the benefits of different groups, one at a time (single parents, the disabled, under 25s etc.); the government has been carefol not to attack everyone at once for fear of prompting collective resistance. By using individual solutions such as blagging we are relying on the atomised and fragmented climate they are seeking to create and therefore just playing into their hands. As mentioned, globalisation has been one concept the direct action movement has drawn upon in order to overcome the fragmentation of struggles. Yet, since globalisation is actually about the re-imposition of work, and since the struggle within and against work is part of our daily existence, the concrete link we really need to make is between global capital and our own experience of being pressured to work. Individual blagging, when posited as the principal solution to the attack on benefits, only serves to further the very globalisation we are supposedly resisting in our trips to Prague or Seattle. Blagging isn’t against globalisation; it is part of it..
+(3) prevent violence by pinpointing "potential troublemakers" and "neutralizing" them before they "exercise their potential for violence;"
-[223] See the pamphlet Dole autonomy versus the re-imposition ofwork: “Analysis of the current tendency to workfare in the UK’ by Aufheben.
+(4) prevent groups and leaders from gaining "respectabily by discrediting them to the "responsible" Negro community, the "responsible" white community, "liberals" with "vestiges of sympathy" for militant black nationalists, and "Negro radicals;" and
-[224] The New Deal for 18- to 24-year olds entails four options: subsidised employment, study or training, work in the “voluntary”’ sector, or work on the Environmental Task Force. Refusing the options can mean a benefit sanction.
+(5) "prevent these groups from recruiting young people."[384]
-[225] See “Globalisation: Origins-History--Analysis—Resistance” in DoD #8.
+After the Black Panther Party emerged as a group of national stature, FBI field offices were instructed to develop "imaginative and hard-hitting counterintelligence measures aimed at crippling the BPP." Particular attention was to be given to aggravating conflicts between the Black Panthers and rival groups in a number of cities where such conflict had already taken on the character of "gang warfare with attendant threats of murder and reprisals."[385]
-[226] 1iough there is often talk of a skills gap, what apparently puts bosses most off employing the unemployed is our lack of soft skills-by which they mean basic work-discipline.
+During 1967-1971, FBI headquarters approved 379 proposals for COINTELPRO actions against "black nationalists."[386] These operations utilized dangerous and unsavory techniques which gave rise to the risk of death and often disregarded the personal rights and dignity of the victims.
-[227] Job Centre workers and claimants had different reasons for opposing the JSA, but both were opposed to the increased ‘policing’ aspects--the dole workers because they realised that it would bring them into greater conflict with claimants. Although the common ground of discontent between claimants and dole workers could have been used to our advantage, in most areas around the country it wasn’t. In fact, the struggle against the JSA by some people around the Groundwell network often manifested itself in very personalised struggles against the dole workers themselves (e.g. Three Strikes and You’re Out, an initiative whereby individual dole workers who gave claimants hassle would receive warnings on their first and second offences and action would be taken against them on the third). In Brighton, however, an alliance was made, and occupations of Job Centres were accompanied by downing tools.
+(3) "New Left" COINTELPRO. -- The most vaguely defined and haphazard of the COINTELPRO operations was that initiated against the "New Left" in May 1968. It was justified to the FBI Director by his subordinates on the basis of the following considerations:
-[228] Employment Zones involve a personal job account whereby money is supposedly spent on whatever the claimant and advisor regard as maximising employability-be it wage subsidies or training schemes. Any money left over when the claimant is shoved into a job is kept by the providers as profits. Employment Zones were introduced in 14 high-unemployment areas in April 2000. The scheme is compulsory for those over 24 who have been claimingJSA for over 12 months.
+The nation was "undergoing an era of disruption and violence" which was "caused to a large extent" by individuals "generally connected with the New Left."
-[229] This simmering down of resistance should not be overstated, however. It was always more overtly collective than that of claimants themselves and has expressed itself in continuing opposition to the incursion of private companies into the Employment Service; the involvement of such private firms threatens not only the new ethos of the New Deal but also the wages and conditions of the relatively entrenched public sector dole workers. Indeed the latter is the key reason for the government’s decision to involve the private sector in the Employment Service.
+Some of these, "activists" were urging "revolution" and calling for "the defeat of the United States in Vietnam."
-[230] Just as the Conservatives introduced the All Work Test to make the conditions of claiming sickness benefit more stringent, New Labour have introduced further hurdles with their Personal Capability Assessment test: if you can lick a stamp you can work, never mind that you’re dying of heart disease.
+The problem was not just that they committed "unlawful acts," but also that they "falsely" alleged police brutality, and that they "scurrilously attacked the Director and the Bureau" in an attempt to "hamper" FBI investigations and to "drive us off the college campuses."[387]
-** Space Invaders: Rants about Radical Space (from issue 10)
+Consequently, the COINTELPRO was intended to "expose, disrupt, and otherwise neutralize" the activities of "this group" and "persons connected with it."[388] The lack of any clear definition of "New Left" meant, as an FBI supervisor testified, that "legitimate" and nonviolent antiwar groups were targeted because they were "lending aid and comfort" to more disruptive groups.[389]
-In the last few years, there has been a small wave of new radical social centres in Britain. A number of people involved in Earth First! and the direct action scene have been involved in opening these co-operatively owned and managed spaces. Some of these places are up and running, others are still in the early stages. As is healthy in any movement, there are different views on this subject. Here we present two different pieces, one critical of these social centres and another from someone heavily involved in one of the new projects.
+Further directives issued soon after initiation of the program urged field offices to "vigorously and enthusiastically" explore "every avenue of possible embarrassment" of New Left adherents. Agents were instructed to gather information on the "immorality" and the "scurrilous and depraved" behavior, "habits, and living conditions" of the members of targeted groups.[390] This message was reiterated several months later, when the offices were taken to task for their failure to remain alert for and seek specific data depicting the "depraved nature and moral looseness of the New Left" and to "use this Material in a vigorous and enthusiastic approach to neutralizing them."[391]
-*** Social Dis-Centres
+In July 1968, the field offices were further prodded by FBI headquarters to:
-Mortgages, loans, investment, property development, licence applications, accountancy, endless legislation, business plans, backbiting, membership lists, the dead time absorbing activists and the debt, oh the debt!
+(1) prepare leaflets using "the most obnoxious pictures" of New Left leaders at various universities;
-Welcome to legal social centres! Have a pleasant stay. The Cowley Club in Brighton just opened. It’s a posh looking bar. It has a bookshop, the prices are cheaper than normal, the front door of the building is made of Indonesian hardwood (Solidarity South Pacific?!), and the plants were bought at Ikea. It has no dedicated meeting space (yet), only the bar area-revealing its priorities in the design. In themselves, legal social centres are what they are; a social enterprise-cafes, bars, possible gathering spaces. But the danger is that, springing up on the back of the direct action movement, they will divert activist time and energy into an essentially non-radical and liberal project. A project perceived, by dint of association, as a radical social space.
+(2) instigate "personal conflicts or animosities" between New Left leaders;
-The Cowley Club is not the only new legal social centre. There is the Sumac Centre in Nottingham, which has filled a community space left behind by the now defunct Rainbow Centre. The 1 in 12 Club in Bradford is a longstanding example of a legal club. The recent social centre boom has taken a lot of time and energy in the last couple of years, and caused some tension amongst those involved (directly and indirectly). In a way, people feel they have had to take sides as people’s politics are thrown into sharper relief. An example of this is some of the discussions that have emerged, the sudden imposition of legal hurdles and ownership allowing more liberal concepts to push into the agenda: should people be paid or not, the merits of CCTV, how the need to appear to be a legitimate cafe and drinking hole means that people should perhaps refrain from offering too many hardcore books in the library or bookshop or from holding radical meetings or events for a while.
+(3) create the impression that leaders are "informants for the Bureau or other law enforcement agencies" (the "snitch jacket" technique) ;
-The Sumac Centre considered asking people not to hold Earth First! Winter Moot meetings there due to the threat of not getting their bar license. We were collectively requested to respect the fact that the Sumac Centre was in a vulnerable position and did not want to be too obviously connected with the Moot. While I respect many of the radical people involved in the creating and running of the space, this request implied that we were obliged to have some allegiance to it as a project, even though we had not been able to use it for the purpose for which we thought it had partly been created. Instead there is a sense of coercion attached to these centres, from Drink-here-rather-than-elsewhere,-comrade, through to Don’t-set-up-free-squatted-spaces-that-might-compete. These notions coupled with walking on eggshells around the demands of legislation results in policing. An insidious selfpolicing of radical agendas by those’ more willing to make concessions, creating division and fucking around with grassroots support-no room at the inn for autonomous groups who potentially compromise the legal status of the centre.
+(4) send articles from student or "underground" newspapers which show "depravity" ("use of narcotics and free sex") of New Left leaders to university officials, donors, legislators, and parents;
-How do we fight against property speculation and ownership, gentrification, and corporate public space with a legal social centre that has more in common with these things than not? How can we engender radicalism in our society if people’s first point of contact with non-mainstream politics is a space built on compromise, which exists only because the state says it can? The bricks and mortar, the signatures on legal and financial papers, the SWP-style membership structure, the boredom on the faces of volunteer staff paying off the bank, the ghetto-all these things that come with toeing the line, turn our politics into rhetoric. Running a legal social centre is, at best, the equivalent of working for an NGO.
+(5) have members arrested on marijuana charges;
-It may be green money that has enabled people to build them, but pursuing social change through the mainstream means being forced to acquire skills applicable to the terms and conditions of mainstream ventures, it means creating a respectable business to gain the confidence of investors. What does any of this have to do with a movement in revolt against the machinery of capital and which fights the idea of exclusion and powerlessness based on social, political, and economic leverage?
+(6) send anonymous letters about a student's activities to parents, neighbors, and the parents' employers;
-But, we hear the Management Committees cry, these centres are for the people, they are welcome, it is their space too. Well sort of, but let’s take the idea of membership. If meetings do take place in The Cowley Club, for example, and run into bar time, those attending the meeting must sign in to the club. We complain about a lack of security in our culture and then set up formalities requiring people to put their names and addresses to political activity. The idea also clearly promotes the feeling that other people are in charge of your access to social space, either alienating you from that space because you aren’t a member or from those outside the space if you are. Furthermore, buying £400,000 buildings is not something everyone can do, it does not empower other people to do the same, it only perpetuates the idea that some people are consumers dependent on the product of those, the elite, who have the power and connections to access resources that most people can’t. People can work for the centres, they can get nominated into the inner circle, the decision-making body, but how challenging, radical, or empowering a process is that? A squatted social centre or an action can inspire us and we can do it ourselves too.
+(7) send anonymous letters about New Left faculty members (signed "A Concerned Alumni" or "A Concerned Taxpayer") to university officials, legislators, Board of Regents, and the press;
-If we think we need access points for new people to be inspired by our political perspective, then surely this is best achieved through practising direct action-not through acquiring crippling mortgages, obeying a myriad of regulations set by the state, and spending years doing Di’Y of the conventional sort. The energy that has gone into legal social centres during what has been an action-quiet couple of years might well have found other avenues for action had a lot of very energetic people not been engaged in property development. And it doesn’t stop when the centre is up and running, as the mantra goes.
+(8) use "cooperative press contacts;"
-My best experience of a social centre (A-Spire in Leeds) is my counter-argument. I like A-Spire-a lot. And although I haven’t personally been to them, the OK Cafe in Manchester and Radical Dairy in London are projects that through their process and their inherent conflict with the state have been truly radical and desirable spaces. Squatted spaces are temporary autonomous zones reclaimed from property owners and councils. They explode through the cracks in the system and when they are crushed-often forcibly-they leave pieces of themselves everywhere, in the hearts of the people who went there, in new behaviour, new alliances, new thoughts. They are a practical attempt to get free from the state, to be free from the compromises and creeping obedience of a legal space.
+(9) exploit the "hostility" between New Left and Old Left groups;
-Everyone there holds the squatted space together, with no formal membership, no nominations, no rulebook, just based on a self-determined responsibility for each other and the people who may use or simply neighbour the space. As a radical project, the group process of working together to choose and crack a building, open it up, decide what it’s going to do and run it until an eviction, develops collectivity, responsibility, mutuality, and autonomy. It has no management committee, just a bunch of people who’ve come together. It does not have to make money, no one gets paid for anything. There are no legal rules or bureaucratic strangleholds limiting what can be done with the space beyond those we internally discuss and evaluate. After much discussion about whether to be selling anything at all, A-Spire had a really cheap bar with proceeds going directly to various radical projects (not to pay off debts and the mortgage) but you could bring your own too, it had a donations cafe (with skipped and stolen food), a free shop, an indoor skating ramp, an art space, and many meeting spaces. It was radical to a level that I believe a legal social centre can never be.
+(10) disrupt New Left coffee houses near military bases which are attempting to "influence members of the Armed forces;"
-It is radical because the squatted social centre endeavours to get to the heart of the matter by removing itself from questions of legality and compliance. The space is laid bare. The people who occupy the space are laid bare. Each squat, each A-Spire or OK Cafe or Radical Dairy is a new world. Psychologically, the space is liberating. It is an action. It is about clearing a way through formal structures and accepted ways of organising social spaces. It is about how we relate to each other outside the dominant system. It is hard enough to explore fundamental questions of social transformation, process, mutuality, inclusivity, and hard enough to break down ingrained power structures and behaviours in a squatted space that has gone a long way to clearing its head of legal constraints and practical ownership, but it is even harder to find those the questions if you still shuffling along head and shoulders bowed under the added weight of legal and state apparatus, to reach anything resembling autonomy.
+(11) use cartoons, photographs, and anonymous letters to "ridicule" the New Left;
-The squatted social centre is radically politicising in and of itself. As radicals, we try to challenge or bypass laws, regulations, routine, hierarchy. Not only this, but I would argue that by desiring and seeking permanence through legal social centres, in a sense we collaborate with the system. Every time we leave the state behind, every time we accept that what we have created in a squatted space may get moved on, we confirm our refusal of the system because we understand that the state will only allow to be permanent that which is compliant, corrupt, no threat. By accepting transience, by re-evaluating a desire for permanence in a world we wish to move on from, we expand our ability and desire to transform the world as it is into what we want it to be. The temporary autonomous zone is characterised by an intensity, militancy, and dynamism only possible under those circumstances. For the time it exists, it is everything-not a daily or weekly shift in a permanent space.
+(12) use "misinformation" to "confuse and disrupt" New Left activities, such as by notifying members that events have been cancelled.[392]
-In my experience, people are very different in a squatted social centre. They are more open and creative, more communicative and questioning. While doing the bar at A-Spire one night I spent a long time talking to a young guy who’d just left prison and heard that A-Spire was happening (this is a very important word-a legal social centre doesn’t happen!), that it was pretty cool and decided to give it a go even though he didn’t know anyone involved. He’d never experienced anything like it and was really excited. I was excited too and we talked for hours about our lives, and politics and the politics of the space. I don’t hear those conversations happening at the Cowley Club, and I’m pretty sure that had it been a legal social centre with regular clientele and sign-up book, this guy might well not have come in, would certainly not have been that excited by it and I doubt whether I would have communicated with him in the way I did. There would have been less to talk about for a start. A job is so much less exciting and dynamic than an action.
+During the period 1968-1971, 291 COINTELPRO actions against the "New Left" were, approved by headquarters.[393] Particular emphasis was placed upon preventing the targeted individuals from public speaking or teaching and providing "misinformation" to confuse demonstrators.
-That intensity creates an explosion of political understanding and bonding that is harder to achieve in a permanent, legal space. When the last A-Spire was evicted, it brought everyone together, it introduced people to crackdown by the state. It wasn’t rhetoric, it wasn’t an eviction described to someone new to evictions over morning coffee, or read in a book. It was a clear and actual political situation, an experience of us against them, inspiring solidarity. It was difficult yet invigorating. If the Cowley Club or the Sumac Centre got closed down, I believe it would divide rather than unify. We would probably see blame put on the heads of other people in the community rather than on the authorities. It would be a cause of resentment between those who have put money and work into it and those who have transgressed, who have “disrespected the space:’
+<em>b.</em> <em>FBI Target Lists</em>
-To me, the legal social centre is a worrying development, selling the illusion of a politicised and radicalising public space when in fact it can by its very nature be nothing of the sort. It poses in a hoody and mask, keeping pretty well clear of the front line. The desire for accessible space is the same desire that underpins autonomous, squatted spaces-to reach out beyond the ghetto. But setting down roots in polluted ground is not going to develop healthy politics or healthy communities. They are a sell-out and a buy-in. We already compromise on so many things (from a place to live, to schooling our kids). Surely we can conspire to at least keep our public spaces radical and admit that if we have to make that many compromises to keep them, then they’re probably not worth having?
+The FBI's most intensive domestic intelligence investigations and COINTELPRO operations were directed against persons identified, not as criminals or criminal suspects, but in vague terms such as "rabble rouser," "agitators," "key activists," or "key black extremists." The Security Index for detention in time of national emergency was revised to include such persons.
-Disclaimer: This piece probably contains factual errors, omissions, wild sweeping statements, vicious lies and blissful abuse of punctuation! It’s an opinion piece. In terms of the ethos and spirit of what I think “we” stand for and what I would like to see in society in general, I stand by the caution and criticism expressed in this piece regarding the inherent liberalism and dangers of entering establishment space. A culture of tense whispers has grown up around the recent legal social centres: I hope this article wil open up space for more discussion about what legal social centres should expect from the communities they demand energy and allegiance from, and I hope that we can distance ourselves enough from these extremely stressful and confusing projects to reflect more deeply on the political character of the spaces we are creating.
+(1) "Rabble Rouser/Agitator" Index. -- Following a meeting with the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders in August 1967, Director Hoover ordered his subordinates to intensify collection of intelligence about "vociferous rabble-rousers."[393]  He also directed a "Key Black Extremist" "that an index be compiled of racial agitators and individuals who have demonstrated a potential for fomenting racial discord."[394]
-**** Stable Bases
+The already vague standards for the Rabble Rouser Index were broadened in November 1967 to cover persons with a "propensity for fomenting" any disorders affecting the "internal security" -- as opposed to only racial disorders -- and to include persons of local as well as national interest. This included "black nationalists, white supremacists, Puerto Rican nationalists, anti-Vietnam demonstration leaders, and other extremists." A rabble rouser was defined as:
-The last couple of years have seen a few social centres with an anarchist and radical ecological outlook opening up by buying their premises, with other similar projects aiming to open soon. These spaces have been created to fulfil a need that has been felt for a long time-the need for social spaces under our collective control.
+a person who tries to arouse people to violent action by appealing to their emotions, prejudices, etcetera; a demagogue.[395]
-What goes on there can be as varied as the people involved, but a few current uses that spring to mind are-cheap bar, cheap cafe, library, infoshop, space for meetings, gigs, film shows, kids’ events, self defence sessions, office space, self-managed housing, advice and solidarity for benefit and work problems, and not least an easily accessible way for people to wander in off the street and find all this!
+In March 1968, the Rabble Rouser Index was renamed the Agitator Index and field offices were ordered to obtain a photograph of each person on the Index.[396] However, expanding the size of the Agitator Index lessened its value as an efficient target list for FBI intelligence operations. Consequently, the Bureau developed a more refined tool for this purpose-the Key Activist Program.
-So far, so good, but there are two main ways of getting a building to house these kind of activities. The first is to buy one, as has started happening recently, the second is to squat one.[231] All things being equal, it’s obviously a better idea to just occupy what we need than it is to borrow loads ofmoney and buy somewhere. Unfortunately though, all things are not equal, and there are different problems with both options.
+(2) "Key Activist" Program. -- Instructions were issued to ten major field offices in January 1968 to designate certain persons as "Key Activists," who were defined as
-The problems involved in buying a building are fairly obvious. Typically, the buildings have been bought with money from “green” or “ethical” banks, co-operative support groups such as Radical Routes, and small loans from groups and individuals, all of which involves a few people dealing with a lot of bureaucratic bollocks. There are various state agencies to deal with, although this is mostly during the renovations stage (fire and building standards regulations etc.). Once the centre’s open there’s much less of this. with the two main exceptions of keeping accounts, and alcohol sales. For the latter you need a licence, you have to keep to certain opening hours (unless you’re somewhere where lock-ins are common of course) and if the bar runs as a members club people have to give a name and address when they join, and sign in with that name when they come for a pint. Most importantly though, there can be a need to make a certain amount of money every month to pay the debts off (although this can come largely, or entirely, from rental income from housing, i.e. probably from housing benefit).
+individuals in the Students for Democratic Society and the anti-Vietnam war groups [who] are extremely active and most vocal in their statements denouncing the United States and calling for civil disobedience and other forms of unlawful and disruptive acts.
-There are also problems with squatting the spaces we need, the main one being that whatever you do isn’t going to be there very long! Before getting involved in a (hopefully) more permanent space, I’d been part of lots of squatted social centres, which lasted for an average of four to six weeks each. While they were there, they were often great places, and sometimes shitholes, but I got very frustrated by the constant moves. Temporary Autonomous Zones (TA Zs) sound good on paper[232], but I’m a lot less keen on them when waiting for angry builders and cops to show up first thing in the morning, after shifting everything across town in shopping trolleys, four weeks after you last went through the process. The first time it’s an adventure, the tenth time it’s a pain in the arse. Inevitably, this kind of hassle means that there are long periods when there’s no space of this kind around at all. When the space does exist there’s usually no incentive to develop the building much-if it’s going to be evicted soon, why bother to fix the toilets, or make il wheelchair accessible? And if somebody wants to sort out a venue for a gig, or a talk in a month’s time, the best we can say is that there might be somewhere for it... Of course none of this is a problem with squatting itself, it’s more a reflection of the current weakness of the movements that squat buildings. Resistance movements in other times and places have been able to take and hold the spaces they needed, and that is something I want to see developing here and now. Squatting in the current situation is certainly one way of trying to move towards this, but it’s not the only way.
+There was to be an "intensive investigation" of each Key Activist, which might include "high-level informant coverage" and "technical surveillances and physical surveillances."[397]
-Some problems can potentially arise with any social centre, whether it’s squatted or not. For a start, there’s always some people who have the time, inclination, and energy to put more into a centre (or any other project) than most, and it’s hard to run things in a way that means these people aren’t seen as the de facto leaders. Certainly, having no formal structures is no guarantee that this situation won’t arise. The fear of repression causing a more or less subtle self-policing within centres can also be a problem, whether it’s fear of losing a licence, or fear of provoking an eviction. I’ve heard similar sentiments expressed in squats, other social centres, and road camps, and it’s a tendency that we should beware of-while it’s not always clever to shout about what we’re doing, these kind of considerations shouldn’t put us off doing things that we’d otherwise want to do. Another common problem is the ghettoisation of social spaces, whether deliberate or unintentional. Creating spaces where we can put some of our ideas into practice also means there are more possibilities for reconnecting radical politics to the working class communities around us. Not so much by getting our ideas across,[233] but by providing a way for different people pissed off with the way things are to meet, talk and act together, and a resource for people to explore their own ideas. Obviously, this can only happen in social centres if people come to them, and centres need to be welcoming. In my experience it’s not class war or riot posters on the walls that put most people off, it’s feeling like you need to have a certain haircut, or be a certain age, or be middle class (to give a few common examples) that excludes people. Nor does exclusivity have much to do with legality-squats can be accessible places on the high street; just as bought buildings can be exclusive hangouts for a particular scene.
+The "New Left" COINTELPRO was designed in part to "neutralize" the Key Activists, who were "the moving forces behind the New Left.[398] One of the first techniques employed in this program was to obtain the Federal income tax returns of Key Activists for use in disrupting their activities.[399] In October 1968, the Key Activist Program was expanded to virtually all field offices. The field agents were instructed to recommend additional persons for the program and to "consider if the individual was rendered ineffective would it curtail [disruptive] activity in his area of influence." While the FBI considered Federal prosecution a "logical" result of these investigations and "the best deterrent," Key Activists were not selected because they were suspected of committing or planning to commit any specific Federal crime.[400]
-I’d like nothing better than to see the emergence of a movement strong enough to occupy the spaces it needed and keep them for as long as they were of use. But that movement undeniably isn’t here now. What is here now is a movement that needs space for its activities, space for living our lives. Sometimes that space is squatted and temporary, sometimes it’s in co-operatives and less temporary. I don’t see a conflict between the two-more stable bases should be a way of fomenting and co-ordinating action, including squatting. At the moment, they’re not likely to conflict, because squats don’t last long enough to compete-if squats do become able to fulfil the same functions as more long term centres, then I’ll be the first to celebrate and throw the mortgage repayment forms in the bin!
+(3) "Key Black Extremist" Program. -- A "Key Black Extremist" target list for concentrated investigation and COINTELPRO actions was instituted in 1970. Key Black Extremists were defined as
-[231] In other European countries there have been, and are, other options such as being given buildings by lefty councils, or squats being offered permanent contracts. These have typically been ways of trying to buy off militant mass movements, and aren’t likely to be a realistic choice here right now!
+leaders or activists [who] are particularly extreme, agitative, anti-Government, and vocal in their calls for terrorism and violence.[401]
-[232] Hakim Bey’s theory of temporarily liberating space in a ‘guerrilla’ fashion. with TA Zs coming into existence, melting away and reappearing at another time and place, in another form. It has could be argued that this is a way of convincing ourselves that current weaknesses, during a low ebb of class struggle, are actually virtues.
+Field offices were instructed to place all Key Black Extremists in the to priority category of the Security Index and in the Black Nationalist Photograph Album, which concentrated on "militant black nationalists" who traveled extensively. In addition, the following steps were to be taken:
-[233] Since anarchist politics probably has at least as much to gain from a closer connection to working class communities and struggles as vice versa.
+(1) All aspects of the finances of a KBE must be determined. Bank accounts must be monitored. . . .
-**** Social Centres
+(2) Continuing consideration must be given by each office to develop means to neutralize the effectiveness of each KBE. . . .
-Autonomous Centre of Edinburgh
+(3) Obtain suitable handwriting specimens. . . .
-<br>17 West Montgomery Place Edinburgh EH7 5HA
-<br>Web: [[http://www.autonomous.org.uk/][http://www.autonomous.org.uk/]]
-The Cowley Club
+(4) Particular efforts should be made to obtain records of and/or reliable witnesses to, inflammatory statements. . . .
-<br>12 London Road Brighton B Nl 4JA
-<br>[[http://www.cowleyclub.org.uk/][http://www.cowleyclub.org.uk/]]
-<br>Social centre in the heart of Brighton with members bar, vegan cafe and radical bookshop. Has regular events.
-Rants about Radical Space
+(5) Where there appears to be a possible violation of a statute within the investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau, [it should be] vigorously investigated. ...
-<br>62 Fieldgate Street London El lES
-<br>[[http://www.londonarc.org/][http://www.londonarc.org/]]
-<br>Collectively run building providing computers, roof garden, reference library, and space for non-hierarchical projects for radical social change.
-Sumac Centre
+(6) Particular attention must be paid to travel by a KBE and every effort made to determine financial arrangements for such travel. . . .
-<br>245 Gladstone Street Nottingham NG7 6HX
-<br>http://www.veggies.org.11k/rainbow/welcome.htm
-<br>vegan cafe, bar, radical information, resource library, space for radical events
-(q) Infoshop
+(7) The Federal income tax returns of all KBEs must be checked annually. . . .
-<br>56 Crampton Street London SE17 3AE
-<br>[[http://www.safetycat.org/56a/][http://www.safetycat.org/56a/]]
-<br>radical bookshop, anarchist archive, wholefood co-op, and bike workshop
-Kebele Community Centre
+Reports on all Key Black Extremists were to be submitted every ninety days, and the field was urged to use "initiative and imagination" to achieve "the desired results."[402][403] Once again, the "result" was not limited to prosecution of crimes and the targets were not chosen because they were suspected of committing crimes.
-<br>14 Robertson Road Eastville Bristol BS5 6JY
-<br>[[http://www.kebele.org/][http://www.kebele.org/]]
-<br>ex-squatted social centre, cafe, bike workshop, anarchist library, housing co-op, more
-in 12 Club
+(4) Security Index. -- The Agitator Index was abolished in 1971 because "extremist subjects" were "adequately followed" through the Security Index.[404] In contrast to the other indices, the Security Index was not reviewed by the FBI alone. It had, from the late 1940's, been largely a joint FBI-Justice Department program based on the Department's plans for emergency detention.[405] According to FBI memoranda, moreover, President Johnson was directly involved in the updating of emergency detention plans.[406]
-<br>21–23 Albion Street Bradford B Dl 2LY
-<br>[[http://www.1inl2.com/][http://www.1inl2.com/]]
-<br>anarchist-managed social centre with cheap beer, punk gigs, information, resources
-Warzone
+After a large-scale march on the Pentagon against the Vietnam War in October 1967, President Johnson ordered a comprehensive review of the government's emergency plans. Attorney General Clark was appointed chairman of a committee to review the Presidential Emergency Action Documents (PEADs) prepared under the Emergency Detention Program. One result of this review, in which the FBI took Part, was a decision to bring the Detention Program into line with the Emergency Detention Act of 1950, reversing the previous decision to "disregard" as "unworkable" the procedural requirements of the Act, which were tighter than the standards which had been applied by FBI and Justice.[407]
-<br>3–5 Donegal Lane Belfast
-<br>[[http://www.martinx.demon.co.uk/about.htm][http://www.martinx.demon.co.uk/about.htm]]
-<br>anarcho-punk social centre since 1984, includes a cafe, gig space, practice room, food co-op, recording studio, arts studio, etc.
-The Initiative Factory
+The Bureau also had to revise its criteria for inclusion of names on the Security Index, which since 1950 had disregarded the statutory standards. However, the definition chosen of a "dangerous individual" was so broad that it enabled the Bureau to add persons not previously eligible. A "dangerous individual" was defined as a
-<br>29 Hope Street Liverpool L1 9BQ
-<br>[[http://www.gn.apc.org/initfa CtoryI][http://www.gn.apc.org/initfa CtoryI]]
-<br>club run on co-operative principles by sacked Liverpool Dockers, profits go towards an employment-training centre
-The Autonomy Club
+person as to whom there is reasonable ground to believe that such person probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to engage in, acts of espionage and sabotage, <em>including</em> acts of terrorism or assassination and <em>any interference with</em> or threat to the survival of and <em>effective operation</em> of the national, state, and <em>local governments</em> and of the national defense effort. [Emphasis added.][408]
-<br>84b Whitechapel High Street London El 7QX
-<br>new social centre in the East End sharing the same building as the long-running Freedom Press bookshop, distro, and publishers
-We haven’t listed squatted social centres because they move and change frequently. For information on these, you could try contacting the London Social Centres Network:
+The emphasized language greatly broadened the Security Index standards. It gave FBI intelligence officials the opportunity to include on the Security Index "racial militants", "black nationalists", and individuals associated with the "New Left" who were not affiliated with the "basic revolutionary organizations" as the Bureau characterized the Communist Party, which had previously been the focus of the Security Index.[409] Once again, the limitations which a statute was intended to impose were effectively circumvented by the use of elastic language in a Presidential directive.
-<br>Email: [[mailto:londonscn@yahoo.co.uk][londonscn@yahoo.co.uk]]
-<br>Discussion list: [[mailto:londonscn-forum-subscribe@lists.riseup.net][londonscn-forum-subscribe@lists.riseup.net]]
-<br>Events list/newsletter: [[mailto:londonscn-events-subscribe@lists.riseup.net][londonscn-events-subscribe@lists.riseup.net]]
-<br>
+Moreover, the Bureau adopted a new "priority" ranking for apprehension in case of an emergency. Top priority was now given not only to leaders of "basic subversive organizations," but also to "leaders of anarchistic groups."[410] It was said to be the "anarchistic tendencies" of New Left and racial militants that made them a "threat to the internal security."[411]
-* Movement
+Initially, the Justice Department approved informally these changes in the criteria for "the persons listed for apprehension."[412] After several months of "study," the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel formally approved the new Security Index criteria. This was the first time since 1955 that the Department had fully considered the matter, and the previous policy of disregarding the procedures of the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 was formally abandoned. If an emergency occurred, the Attorney General would abide by "the requirement that any person actually detained will be entitled to a hearing at which time the evidence will have to satisfy the standards of [the Act]." However, the Office of Legal Counsel declared that the Security Index criteria themselves could be - as they were - less precise than those of the Act because of the "needed flexibility and discretion at the operating level in order to carry on an effective surveillance program."[413] Thus while the plan to ignore Congress' procedural limitations was abandoned, Congress' substantive standards were disregarded as insufficiently "flexible."
-** Earth First! and Tribalism: A Lesson from Twyford Down (from issue 2)
+<em>c.</em> <em>Internal Revenue Service Program</em>
-After over a year of Earth First! activity in this country, it is time to reassess the situation and ask fundamental questions about the way groups run themselves. Looking through the British EF! Contact list one thing stands out: EF! Groups seem to exist mainly in urban areas.
+(1) Misuse by FBI and CIA. -- IRS information was used as an instrument of domestic intelligence mainly by the FBI. For example, in 1965, the Bureau obtained the tax returns of Ku Klux Klan members in order to develop "discrediting or embarrassing" information as part of the Bureau's COINTELPRO against the Klan.[414] The procedure by which FBI obtained access to tax returns and related information held by IRS was deemed "illegal" when it was discovered by the Chief of the IRS Disclosure Branch in 1968.[415] The FBI had not followed the procedures for obtaining returns which required written application to the IRS Disclosure Branch. Instead the Bureau had arranged to obtain the returns and information surreptitiously through contacts inside the IRS Intelligence Division. The procedure for FBI access was regularized by the IRS after 1968: a formal request on behalf of the Bureau was made to the IRS Disclosure Branch, by the internal Security Division of the Justice Department.
-There are obvious reasons for this-there are more people in cities and many EF!ers are students or ex-students. This pattern is reflected in all radical groups. However, is this pattern healthy, and if not, are there any alternatives?
+During this same period, the CIA was obtaining tax returns in a similar manner to the FBI, although in much smaller numbers. Yet even after procedures were changed for the FBI's access to tax information in 1968, the IRS did not re-examine the CIA's practices.[416] Therefore, CIA continued to receive tax return information without filing requests as required by the regulations.
-Reviewing EF! actions on this isle, the most effective campaign has undoubtedly been Twyford Down. The first action happened in February of last year, and there have been hundreds of actions since. A campaign that has been so successful that Tarmac Construction spends just under a quarter of a million a week on security to combat it, and the DoT employs a private detective firm to find out who activists are.
+Between 1968 and 1974, either directly or through the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department, the FBI requested at least 130 tax returns for domestic intelligence purposes. This included the returns of 46 "New Left activists" and 74 "black extremists,"[417] as part of Bureau COINTELPRO operations to "neutralize" these individuals.[418] These requests were not predicated upon any specific information suggesting delinquency in fulfilling tax obligations.
-What, I ask you, has been the reason for this success? The answer is that since April last year the resistance at Twyford Down has had a physical and spiritual focus-a community! Since the end of this February, Camelot EF! Has managed to have an action nearly every day. This is because of empowerment. connection with the Earth, and community.
+Even after a formal request was required before supplying the FBI with tax returns, the IRS accepted the Justice Department's undocumented assertions that tax information was "necessary" in connection with an "official matter" involving "internal security."[419] Yet in making such assertions, the Justice Department's Internal Security Division relied entirely on the Bureau's judgment. Thus, while the IRS is required by the statute to release tax information only where necessary, it in effect delegated its responsibility to the Internal Security Division which in turn delegated the decision to the FBI. Although most FBI requests for tax information were for targets of various COINTELPRO operations, the Justice Department official who made the requests on behalf of the Bureau said he was never informed of the existence of COINTELpRo.[420]
-Ninety-nine percent of Earth First!ers are ill; not half as ill as Sun readers, but nevertheless ill. We walk around with this beautiful dream of wilderness and small happy communities emblazoned in our hearts, but we walk on concrete, and go to sleep in a house where at best we live with two or three friends, if that. The group comes together in some room above a pub once a month, and the only life we see is the occasional park or piece of wasteland. For Christ’s sake, we can’t even see the stars because of the horrible yellow glow given out by thousands of streets lights.
+Even after 1968, the Bureau sometimes used tax information in improper or unlawful ways. For example, the Bureau attempted to use such information to cause IRS to audit a midwestern college professor associated with "new left" activities at the time he was planning to attend the 1968 Democratic Party National Convention in Chicago. The FBI agent in charge of the operation against the professor explained its purpose in a memorandum:
-There is no point in us fighting to help the Earth survive if we ourselves make ourselves unhealthy, if we are stressed out, exhausted, and feeling spiritually low. I put it to you that if the movement is to really be effective, we must be strong and after an action be able to return to the camp fire and sing and drum and smile and cry-not be surrounded by concrete madness, the antithesis of everything we believe in.
+if IRS contact with [the Professor] can be arranged within the next two weeks their demands upon him may be a source of distraction during the critical period when he is engaged in meetings and plans for disruption of the Democratic National Convention. Any drain upon the time and concentration which [the Professor], a leading figure in Demcon planning, can bring to bear upon this activity can only accrue to the benefit of the Government and general public.[421]
-Moving into the country is easier than you think, all you need is say eight or so friends, some tarps to make benders with, and a peep at the land register to find land with Ownership Unknown. You will of course need new skills (like lighting a fire and building benders) but you can always learn these skills at the Winchester Institute of Outdoor Living, a.k.a. Camelot EF! Get yourself sacked from your job. Money is no problem, the state pays for people to be eco-activists-it’s called the dole. You will be surprised at how little it costs to actually live communally: a tenner a week at most. You can spend the rest on campaigning. If you think you need access to a computer, you can always stick a microchip nightmare in a van, and fix it up to a generator or wind turbine (Generators are freely available from all road building sites around the country).
+Among the tax returns which the CIA obtained informally from IRS in an informal and illegal manner were those of the author of a book, the publication of which the CIA sought to prevent,[422] and of Ramparts magazine which had exposed the CIA's covert use of the National Student Association.[423] In the latter case, CIA memoranda indicate that its officials were unwilling to risk a formal request for tax information without first learning through informal disclosure whether the tax returns contained any information that would be helpful in their effort to deter this "attack on the CIA" and on "the administration in general."[424]
-Let us live on the edge of town, commute to our office occupations (!) and our Carmaggedon actions, let us sabotage the city rather than let the city sabotage us. Let’s live wild, take back the hill forts and Visualize Industrial Collapse.
+(2) The Special Service Staff. -- IRS Targeting of Ideological Groups. -- In 1969, the IRS established a Special Service Staff to gather intelligence on a category of taxpayers defined essentially by political criteria. The SSS attempted to develop tax cases against the targeted taxpayers and initiated tax fraud investigations against some who would otherwise never have been investigated.
--Eldrum
+The SSS originated as a result of pressure from the permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations[425] and from President Nixon, acting through White House assistants Tom Charles Huston and Dr- Arthur Burns.[426] According to the IRS Commissioner's memorandum, Dr. Burns expressed to him the President's concern
-<br>
+over the fact that tax-exempt funds may be supporting activist groups engaged in stimulating riots both on the campus and within our inner cities.[427]
-** Direct Action Six Years Down the Road (from issue 7)
+The administration did not supply any facts to support the assertion that such groups were violating tax laws.
-The British EF! movement has been dominated over the last six years by campaigns against roadbuilding. These seem to have had results-for instance, roads budgets slashed, miles of media column inches written, and the anti-roads “ecowarrior” enshrined as a cultural stereotype. This article discusses how successful our struggles have been, whilst also attempting to look to the future.
+After the SSS was established, the FBI and the Justice Department's Inter di visional Information Unit (IDIU) became its largest sources of names. An Assistant IRS Commissioner requested the FBI to provide information regarding "various organizations of predominantly dissident or extremist nature and/or people prominently identified within those organizations."[428] The FBI agreed, believing, as one intelligence official put it, that SSS would "deal a blow" to "dissident elements."[429]
-The wider anti-roads movement has many agendas. Many local groups and activists with no involvement in direct action have also been working harder than ever in the last few years, as have mainstream anti-road groups such as Transport 2000, Alarm UK and Friends of the Earth (FoE). Although we combine on a practical level to “stop the road” with various tactics, underlying objectives may vary from a sustainable transport policy (whatever that means!), to promotion of a lifestyle or an organisation, or to global industrial collapse. To what extent you judge the last five years to have been a success may depend on your objective.
+Among the material received by SSS from the FBI was a list of 2,300 organizations categorized as "Old Left," "New Left," and "Right Wing."[430] The SSS also received about 10,000 names on IDIU computer printouts.[431] SSS opened files on all these taxpayers, many of whom were later subjected to tax audits and some to tax fraud investigations. There is no reason to believe that the names listed by the FBI or the IDIU were selected on the basis of any probable noncompliance with the tax laws. Rather, these groups and individuals were targeted because of their political and ideological beliefs and activities.[432]
-In terms of stopping roads being built, direct activists don’t have a very good record. With some notable recent exceptions--Guildford, for instance-most roads we have fought have been, or are being, constructed. Roadbuilders don’t like publicly backing down to hippy law-breakers, however much we cost them otherwise. Meanwhile, the English roads budget has been sliced from about £23 billion to a few £billion since 1992; nearly 500 out of 600 road schemes have been scrapped since 1989; that’s 500 places untrashed, saved-for now. These are massive cuts; Construction News wrote in May ...the major roadbuilding programme has <em>virtually been destroyed</em>[234]. The important question is: how much did all our bulldozer-diving, fly-posting, phone-calling, tree-sitting, media-tarting, etc. contribute towards this?
+The SSS, by the time it was disbanded in 1973, had gone over approximately half of the IDIU index and established files on those individuals on whom it had no file. Names on the SSS list included Nobel Prize winner Linus Pauling, Senators Charles Goodell and Ernest Gruening, Congressman Charles Diggs, journalists Joseph Alsop and Jimmy Breslin. and attorney Mitchell Rogovin. Organizations on the SSS list included: political groups ranging from the John Birch Society to Common Cause; religious organizations such as the B'nai Brith Antidefamation League and the Associated Catholic Charities; professional associations such as the American Law Institute and the Legal Aid Society; private foundations such as the Carnegie Foundation; publications ranging from "Playboy" to "Commonwealth;" and government institutions including the United States Civil Rights Commission.[433]
-A broad range of activists have been inspired by direct action protests, and road-blighted local communities have been radicalised. As one East London resident said of the protest against the M11 Link: ...<em>all I was trying to do was defend our local bit of land. I’ve never thought of myselfas political be.fore but this has</em> <em>shown me that all life is politics-if you step out of line.[235]</em> Nimbys have redefined their patch, as described by a local anti-M25 campaigner: <em>Our whole approach is ‘not in my back yard, not in our county, not in our country and not on this planet’</em><em>..[236]</em>. In addition, national groups have been keen to take advantage of the public interest direct action has generated. Anti-roads protest has had a huge impact on the modern green movement.
+SSS officials have conceded that some cases referred to the field for tax investigations would not have qualified for referral but for the ideological category in which they fell. While IRS field offices closed out many cases because, of the lack of tax grounds upon which legal action could be taken, referral from the SSS probably resulted in the examination of some cases despite the lack of adequate grounds. Interviews with IRS field personnel confirm that this did occur in several instances.[433]
-Today’s EF! movement cut its teeth on fighting roads, and has thus been shaped in many ways, in terms of tactics, attitude, ambitions, and politics. The energy and activity of our movement owes a great deal to anti-road campaigns. It is important to recognise this, whilst acknowledging that different issues may need different approaches.
+Upon discovering that its functions were not tax-related, new IRS Commissioner Alexander ordered the Special Service Staff abolished. He testified:
-The road-building issue has been relatively successful in creating wide debate. The broad relevance of the issue must be a factor; there were so many road plans in the early 90’ s that there was one near most people, and everyone’s life is affected by road transport. Holes in the ozone layer, burning rainforests, and even nuclear power stations, are much less immediate to most British lives. Road building allowed a crucial link to be made between consumer lifestyles and environmental destruction. The struggle against the M11 Link in 1993/4 added a crucial social element-resistance to the destruction done to urban communities by car culture, a mission continued by the subsequent rapid spread of Reclaim The Streets (RTS) actions.
+Mr. ALEXANDER. I ordered the Special Service staff abolished. That order was given on August the 9th, 1973. It was implemented by manual supplements issued on August the 13th, 1973. We held the files. I ordered the files be held intact -- I'm not going to give any negative assurances to this Committee -- in order that this Committee and other Committees could review these files to see what, was in them, and see, what sort of information was supplied to us on this more than 11,000 individuals and organizations as to whom and which files were maintained.
-It seems fair to link the rise in direct action with the diminishing road budget (down every year since 1993, the year of the big Twyford actions). The controversy generated by our protests has surely made this budget an expedient target for Treasury cuts, and the roads lobby has had a miserable few years as a result. Of course, the cuts are motivated by the need lo save cash more than anything else, as illustrated by the promotion of privately-financed roadbuilding, such as Design Build Finance Operate (DBFO) schemes, and by Labour’s approval of the Birmingham Northern Relief Road (BNRR) this summer.
+I suggested, Mr. Chairman, that at the end of all of these inquiries, I would like to take those files to the Ellipse and have the biggest bonfire since 1814.
-The government has no idea what to do with the roads programme. In their rhetoric they combine the totally irreconcilable aims of economic growth and “environmental protection”, trying to placate both us and their capitalist mates at the same time. Because protest has made roadbuilding such a tricky issue, the government reacts by doing (and spending) as little as possible-building few roads, hoping we’ll go away, and launching reviews and consultation exercises. The roads budget would not be so small if roads got built without confrontation-and if pressure doesn’t continue, the budget is more likely to grow again.
+The CHAIRMAN. Well, I concur in that judgment. I would only say this to you; in a way, it might be a more important bonfire than the Boston Tea Party when it comes to protecting individual rights of American citizens. I am glad you feel that way. I am glad you took that action.[434]
-The Noisy Defeats, Qiiet Victories scenario suggests that anti-road direct action is very unlikely to stop that particular road, but creates a climate of opinion where other road schemes are more likely to be defeated before they start. It’s hard to quantify any such general link. However, pro-roads lobbyists and local green activists agree that the Twyford protests were a major factor in the scrapping of the East London River Crossing through Oxleas Wood in 1993; and that Newbury had an effect on the decision to drop the Salisbury Bypass because of its “environmental disbenefits”[237] in 1997. In both cases the threat of large-scale direct action was there, and in the case of Oxleas, explicitly spelt out. The threat was coupled with the involvement of a wide range of mainstream groups, and a strong local campaign. (Of course, the threat of direct action often doesn’t stop roads, as illustrated by Newbury )
+<em>5.</em> <em>Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Dissent</em>
-A crucial ingredient in the Noisy Defeats, Quiet Victories scenario is a hungry, broadly sympathetic media. Direct action can only make roads controversial, and news consumers aware, if we get coverage. This has generally worked surprisingly well for us. An important side effect has been the elevation of the roads protester to (sub)cultural icon status, appearing in TV and radio soap operas, in several novels, on children’s TV... the list goes on. These days everyone knows that roadbuilding means dreadlocked hippies up trees, just as foxhunting means saboteurs.
+In the late 1960's, CIA and NSA, acting in response to presidential pressure, turned their technological capacity and great resources toward spying on certain Americans. The initial impetus was to determine whether the antiwar movement -- and to a lesser extent the "black power" movement -- were controlled by foreigners. Despite evidence that there was no significant foreign influence, the intelligence gathering which culminated in CIA's "Operation CHAOS" followed the general pattern of broadening in scope and intensity. The procedure for one aspect of these programs was established by an informal agreement between the CIA and FBI in 1966, which permitted CIA to engage in "internal security" activities in the United States.
-This media and cultural focus on protester lifestyles and spectacular tactics helps to alienate many people from our struggles, to stereotype activists, and thus to fit the movement into a pigeonhole (or perhaps a tunnel?). Everyone’s heard of Swampy, but few know what he was digging under, or why, or could relate 235 this to their own lives. Our impact on the public consciousness has been large, but few seem prepared to get out of their car, still less to demand an ecological revolution!
+<em>a.</em> <em>Origins of CIA Involvement in "Internal Security Functions"</em>
-Let’s turn from hearts and minds to pockets. As tactics have evolved, and our mobilisation abilities grown, our power to inflict economic damage has increased. This damage doesn’t just mean trashing machines etc, but also includes extra security costs, and delays to work-time is money, remember? Although costs we inflict are dwarfed by those caused by an industrial labour dispute, for instance, this is something we’re quite good at. Unfortunately, our enemies are increasingly good at countering it.
+The National Security Act of 1947 explicitly prohibited the CIA from exercising "police, subpoena, or law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions." But the Act did not address the question of the CIA's authority to conduct clandestine intelligence activity within the United States for what Secretary Forrestal called "purposes outside of this country."[435]
-There are now a host of specialists who have made a career out of trying to contain us. Individuals like John Chapman, site engineer at Twyford and then Newbury, spring to mind; he rates himself as an expert in finishing roads on time despite protests. Andrew Wilson, the Under Sheriff of Lancashire, touts for business (along with sidekick Amanda Webster) as a consultant to beleaguered contractors, with a 24-hour phoneline for those really urgent protest problems. Devon’s Under Sheriff Trevor Coleman, with his recently-launched Major Protest Unit available for hire, is his major competitor.
+Under Director Hoover, the FBI interpreted the term "internal security functions" broadly to encompass almost "anything that CIA might be doing in the United States."[436] Throughout the 1950's and into the early 1960's, Director Hoover's position led to jurisdictional conflicts between the CIA and the FBI.
-We think also of Brays Detectives, who have grown from a small firm tailing unfaithfol husbands to become the British specialists in protester surveillance; and Richard Turner Ltd, transformed from cleaners and painters of tall buildings to the market leaders in dishing out violence in doomed treetops. The security sector has of course received a big boost from our struggles, not to mention fencing contractors, manufacturers of fluorescent jackets, and so on. We have created opportunities for a whole new sector of capitalism.
+The Bureau insisted on being informed of the CIA's activity in the United States so that it could be coordinated with the Bureau. As the FBI liaison with the CIA in that period recalled, "CIA would take action, it would come to our attention and we would have a flap."[437]
-This is market forces in full effect; just as specialist drainage contractors might be hired to deal with problematical ground conditions, so the anti-anti-roads gang can be hired to thwart those pesky protesters. Contractors are judged by their ability to deal with protests; Tarmac’s pious public declaration that the Newbury Bypass was too environmentally damaging for them (with no chance of securing the contract anyway) was a PR coup. They were assisted by FoE’s foolish public praise for this cynical greenwash, exposed a few months later by Tarmac accepting a Newbury aggregates subcontract! Tarmac, complete with new green logo, have also established an Environment Advisory Panel to fight the PR war for them. Market forces again: our struggles are a challenge for corporations to adapt to, or risk losing business to more sophisticated competitors. As protesterbashing consultant Amanda Webster says: Ihe advent of the protest movement will actually provide market advantages to those contractors who can handle it effectively.[238] We are a market risk. Thus, DBFO contractors now routinely take Protester Risk into account when submitting their bids. One way to avoid being “taken into account” is to spread, diversify, and increase the risk. Companies have found themselves (and their suppliers and subcontractors) increasingly targeted in their offices and distant sites, at AG Ms and at directors’ homes, not just on the construction site. Anti-roads battles are also anti-corporate battles; this will become more evident as privately-funded road building continues. The forthcoming important campaign against the BNRR must also aim to do damage to Kvaerner/Trafalgar House.
+In 1966 the FBI and CIA negotiated an informal agreement to regularize their coordination. This agreement was said to have "led to a great improvement" and almost eliminated the "flaps."[438]
-Civil engineers are coping with the lack of British road jobs by diversifying into rail projects, and, more significantly, by seeking more roads business in underdeveloped overseas markets, like Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, and South and Central America. This puts our successes in curbing the British roads programme into perspective. In the face of an increasingly globalised corporate hegemony, the importance of linking global struggles, and of sharing information between activist groups world-wide, also increases.
+Under the agreement, the CIA would "seek concurrence and coordination of the FBI" before engaging in clandestine activity in the United States and the FBI would "concur and coordinate if the proposed action does not conflict with any operation, current or planned, including active investigation of the FBI."[439] When an operative recruited by the CIA abroad arrived in the United States, the FBI would "be advised" and the two agencies would "confer regarding the handling of the agent in the United States." The CIA would continue its "handling" of the agent for "foreign intelligence" purposes. The FBI would also become involved where there were "internal security factors," although it was recognized that the CIA might continue to "handle" the agent in the United States and provide the Bureau with "information" bearing on "internal security matters."[440]
-Our enemies can’t just accommodate our threat by adapting their business practice, so must attack our movement more directly. The G AndALF trial is very significant here; it is (amongst other things) an attempt to forge a link between extreme animal liberationists and extreme EF!ers. The animal lib movement has long been demonised, largely via the media, in the public eye, and we may soon get more of the same treatment, backed up by legal sanctions. Smear stories about anti-road campaigns have already been around for years.
+As part of their handling of "internal security factors," CIA operatives were used after 1966 to report on domestic "dissidents" for the FBI. There were infrequent instances in which, according to the former FBI liaison with CIA:
-A classic divide-and-rule tactic to marginalise a radical movement is to incorporate it as much as possible into the mainstream, whilst isolating and discrediting those who refuse to be incorporated. The Guardian thinks that The challenge facing John Prescott...is how to bring such [direct action] protesters back into the political system.[239] Bollocks to that; the challenge facing us is to resist all attempts to artificially divide our movement into reasonable vs. extreme, arid show solidarity for those collared for conspiracy charges or other serious offences.
+CIA had penetrations abroad in radical, revolutionary organizations and the individual was coming here to attend a conference, a meeting, and would be associating with leading dissidents, and the question came up, can he be of any use to us, can we have access to him during that period.
-We want to be a real threat to the malignant cancer of corporate capitalism, rather than a media freakshow or irritating market risk. To do this on even a local level, we must innovate and expand at least as much in the next five years as we have in the last five. Broadening our support base, maximising our subversive edge, linking struggles, taking the fight to the enemy, working in (not with, in) local communities-these, surely, are key factors in making us strong enough to be that threat.
+In most instances, because he was here for a relatively short period, we would levy the requirement or the request upon the CIA to find out what was taking place at the meetings to get his assessment of the individuals that he was meeting, and any other general intelligence that he could collect from his associations with the people who were of interest to us.[441]
-It’s been an eventful and exciting few years. Much has changed since the first protests at Twyford Down, and we have achieved a lot. As the EF! and anti-road movements develop and diversify, and our opponents gear up their determination to defend their oily industrial interests, we can expect the next few years to be no less eventful.
+The policies embodied in the 1966 agreement and the practice under 'it clearly involved the CIA in the performance of "internal security functions." At no time did the Executive branch ask Congress to amend the 1947 act to modify its ban against CIA exercising "internal security functions." Nor was Congress asked to clarify the ambiguity of the 1947 act about the CIA's authority to conduct clandestine foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities within the United States, a matter dealt with even today by Executive Order.[442]
-Shortly after the announcement that the Newbury Bypass would be postponed for a year, an exasperated local pro-roader was heard to wonder what the hell will it take to shut these people up?We’re not going to shut up, but must continue to build on our successes, keeping our anger, and our hunger for real change, sharp. We need to show that we won’t be satisfied with deep cuts in the road budget, better public transport, and more cycle lanes, or whatever. We must demand the earth.
+Moreover, National Security Council Intelligence Directive 5 provided authority within the Executive Branch for the Director of Central Intelligence to coordinate, and for the CIA to conduct, counterintelligence activities abroad to protect the United States against not only espionage and sabotage, but also "subversion."[443] However, NSCID 5 did not purport to give the CIA authority for counterintelligence activities in the United States, as provided in the FBI-CIA agreement of 1966.
-<quote>
+<em>b.</em> <em>CIA Intelligence About Domestic Political Groups</em>
-They shut the road through the woods Seventy years ago.
-Weather and rain have undone it again, And now you would never know
+In the late 1960s, the CIA increasingly was drawn into collecting intelligence about domestic political groups, particularly the anti-war movement, in response to FBI requests and to pressure from Presidents Johnson and Nixon. A principal assistant to President Johnson testified that high governmental officials could not believe that
-There was once a road through the woods
+a cause that is so clearly right for the country, as they perceive it, would be so widely attacked if there were not some [foreign] force behind it.[444]
-Before they planted the trees.
+The same pressures and beliefs led to CIA investigations of "militant black nationalists" and radical students.
-It is underneath the coppice and heath
+(1) CIA Response to FBI Requests. -- The FBI was the main channel for mobilizing foreign intelligence resources and techniques against domestic targets. The FBI regularly notified the CIA that it wished coverage of Americans overseas.[444] Indeed, the CIA regarded the mention of a name in any of the thousands of reports sent to it by the FBI as a standing requirement from the FBI for information about those persons.[445] FBI reports flowed to the CIA at a rate of over 1,000 a month.[446] From 1967 to 1974, the CIA responded with over 5,000 reports to the FBI. These CIA disseminations included some reports of information acquired by the CIA in the course of its own operations, not sought in response to a specific FBI request.[447]
-And the thin anemones.
+The FBI's broad approach to the investigations of foreign influence which it coordinated with the CIA is shown by a memorandum prepared in the Intelligence Division early in 1969 summarizing its "Coverage of the New Left:"
-Only the keeper sees
+Foreign influence of the New Left movement offers us a fertile field to develop valuable intelligence data. To date there is no real cohesiveness between international New Left groups, but ... despite the factionalism and confusion now so prevalent, <em>there is great potential</em> for the development of an international student revolutionary movement. [Emphasis added.]
-That, where the ring-doves broods,
+The memorandum expressed concern that "old line" leftist groups were
-And the badgers roll at ease,
+... making a determined effort to move into the New Left movement ... [and were] influencing the thinking of the against the police in general and the FBI in particular, to drive us off the campuses; as well as attacks against the new administration to degrade President Nixon.[448]
-There was once a road through the woods.
+There was no mention of, or apparent concern for, direct influence or control of the "New Left" by agents of hostile foreign powers. Instead, the stress was almost entirely upon ideological links and similarities, and the threat of ideas considered dangerous by the FBI.
-<right>
+The enlistment of both CIA and NSA resources in domestic intelligence is illustrated by the "Black Nationalist" investigations. In 1967, FBI Headquarters instructed field offices that:
--Rudyard Kipling.
-<br>The Way Through the Woods
-</right>
-</quote>
-[234] Construction News, 15/5/97
+. . . penetrative investigations should be initiated at this time looking toward developing any information regarding contacts on the part of these individuals with foreign elements and looking toward developing any additional information having a bearing upon whether the individual involved is currently subjected to foreign influence or direction. . . .
-[235] The Observer Life, 27/2/94
+During your investigative coverage of all militant black nationalists, be most alert to any foreign travel. Advise the Bureau promptly of such in order that appropriate overseas investigations may be conducted to establish activities and contacts abroad. [Emphasis added.][449]
-[236] The Daily Telegraph, 28/7/97
+The FBI passed such information to the CIA, which in turn began to place individual black nationalists on a "watch list" for the interception of international communications by the National Security Agency. After 1969, the FBI began submitting names of citizens engaged in domestic protest and violence to the CIA not only for investigation abroad, but also for placement on the "watch list" of the CIA's mail opening project. Similar lists of names went from the FBI to the National Security Agency, for use on a "watch list" for monitoring other channels of international communication.
-[237] Department of Environment, Transport, and the Regions News Release #176/Transport, 28/7/97
+(2) Operation CHAOS. -- The CIA did not restrict itself to servicing the FBI's requests. Under White House pressure, the CIA developed its own program -- Operation CHAOS -as an adjunct to the CIA's foreign counterintelligence activities, although CIA officials recognized from the outset that it bad "definite domestic counterintelligence aspects."[450]
-[238] Construction News, 28/5/97
+Former CIA Director Richard Helms testified that he established the program in response to President Johnson's persistent interest in the extent of foreign influence on domestic dissidents. According to Helms, the President would repeatedly ask, "How are you getting along with your examination?" and "Have you picked up any more information on this subject?"[451]
-[239] The Guardian, Editorial, 21/5/97
+The first CHAOS instructions to CIA station chiefs in August 1967 described the need for "keeping tabs on radical students and U.S. Negro expatriates as well as travelers passing through certain select areas abroad." The originally stated objective was "to find out [the] extent to which Soviets, Chicoms (Chinese Communists) and Cubans are exploiting our domestic problems in terms of espionage and subversion."[452]
-<br>
+Following the consistent pattern of intelligence activities, those original instructions gradually broadened without any precision in the kind of foreign contacts which were to be targeted by CIA operations. For example:
-** Action Stations! (from issue 9)
+--President Johnson asked the CIA to conduct a study of "International Connections of the U.S. Peace Movement" following the October 1967 demonstration at the Pentagon.[453] In response, CIA headquarters sent a directive to CIA stations seeking information on "illegal and subversive" connections between U.S. activists and "communist, communist front, or other anti-American and foreign elements abroad. Such connections might range from casual contacts based merely on mutual interest to closely controlled channels for party directives." [Emphasis added.] [454]
-*** Planning direct action
+--In mid-1968, the DDP described CHAOS to CIA stations as a "high priority program" concerning foreign "contacts" with the "Radical Left," which was defined as: "radical students, antiwar activists, draft resisters and deserters, black nationalists, anarchists, and assorted 'New Leftists.'"[455]
-This article explains some of the things to think about when planning an action. It’s been written for smaller affinity group actions, rather than for mass street mobilisations. It is not intended to be a comprehensive guide that has to be strictly followed, but more a list of things that might need to be sorted out for an action to happen successfully. Remember, in the best tradition of transferable skills and multitasking, many of the ideas mentioned here could be used in other areas of subversive activity. Eco-bank robbers anyone?
+--In 1969, President Nixon's White House required the CIA to study foreign communist support of American protest groups and stressed that "support" should be "liberally construed" to include "encouragement" by Communist countries.[456]
-*** Pre-Action
+--In the fall of 1969, CIA stations were asked to report on any foreign support, guidance, or "inspiration" to protest activities in the United States.[457]
-**** Aims and Activity
+Thus, this attempt to ascertain and evaluate "foreign links', was so broadly defined that it required much more than background information or investigation of a few individuals suspected of being agents directed by a hostile power. Instead, at a time when there was considerable international communication and travel by Americans engaged in protest and dissent, a substantial segment by American protest groups was encompassed by CIA collection requirements to investigate foreign "encouragement," "inspiration," "casual contacts" or "mutual interest." Once again, the use of elastic words in mandates for intelligence activity resulted in overbroad coverage and collection.
-What would you like the action to achieve? It may be education and agitation, economic damage, physical disruption, solidarity with others in struggle, or elements of all of these and more. It is best to clarify which is your priority. This helps identify the activity needed to achieve your aims.
+In addition to their intelligence activity directed at Americans abroad, CHAOS undercover agents, while in the United States in preparation for overseas assignment or between assignments, provided substantial information about lawful domestic activities of dissident American groups, as well as providing leads about possible foreign activities.[458] In a few instances, the CIA agents appear to have been encouraged to participate in specific protest activity or to obtain particular domestic information.[459] The CHAOS program also involved obtain inforination about Americans from the CIA mail opening project other domestic CIA components[460] and from a National Security Agency international communications intercept program.[461]
-You may decide on a banner drop, GM crop trashing, machine sabotage, office or site occupation, leafletting, propaganda production or something else completely.
+CIA officials recognized that the CIAs examination of domestic groups violated the Agency's mandate and thus accorded it a high degree of sensitivity. As CIA Director Richard Helms wrote in 1969, when he transmitted to the White House the CIA's study of "Restless Youth:"
-**** Target
+In an effort to round out our discussion of this subject, we have included a section on American students. This is an area not within the charter of this Agency, so I need not emphasize how extremely sensitive this makes the paper. Should anyone learn of its existence, it would prove most embarrassing for all concerned.[462]
-You may have a target in mind already. If so, think through whether it is possible to achieve the aims wanted with the activity you’ve decided upon.
+The reaction to such admissions of illegality was neither an instruction to stop the program or an attempt to change the Iaw. Rather, the White House continued to ask for more information and continued to urge the CIA to confirm the theory that American dissidents were under foreign control.[463]
-When you have an idea of the aims, activity and target you have an outline plan. That is-you know what you want to achieve, and will do so by taking a certain type of action on a specific target.
+Director Richard Helms testified that the only manner in which the CIA could support its conclusion that there was no significant foreign influence on the domestic dissent, in the face of incredulity at the White House, was to continually expand the coverage of CHAOS. Only by being able to demonstrate that it had investigated <em>all</em> anti-war persons and <em>all</em> contacts between them and any foreign person could CIA "prove the negative" that none were under foreign domination.[464]
-When you have this you can move onto the first reconnaissance (recce) for the action.
+In 1972, the CIA Inspector General found "general concern" among the overseas stations "over what appeared to constitute a monitoring of the political views and activities of Americans not known to be, or suspected of, being involved in espionage." Several stations had "doubts as to the nature and legitimacy of the program" because requests for reports on "prominent persons" were based on "nebulous" allegations of "subversion."[465] This led to "a reduction in the intensity of attention to political dissidents,"[466] although the program was not terminated until March 1974.[467]
-**** Primary Reece
+By the end of the CHAOS program, 13,000 different files were accumulated, including more than 7,200 on American citizens. Documents in these files included the names of more than 300,000 persons and groups indexed by computer.[468] In addition to collecting information on an excessive number of persons, some of the kinds of information were wholly irrelevant to the legitimate interests of the CIA or any other government agency. For example, one CIA agent supplying information on domestic activities to Operation CHAOS submitted detailed accounts of the activities of women who were interested in "women's liberation."[469]
-Even if the action is to be done at night it may be best to make this first recce a daylight one. Use it for gathering ‘hard infonnation’. Get maps, photographs and plans of the target and the surrounding area. Look for likely drop off points for people, entrance and exit points from the target as well as escape routes. Also look for places for the driver to park up away from the target, or circular routes that could be driven whilst the action takes place.
+<em>c.</em> <em>CIA Security Operations Within the United States: Protecting "Sources" and "Methods"</em>
-**** Primary Plan
+The National Security Act of 1947 granted the Director of Central Intelligence a vaguely- worded responsibility for "protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."[470] The legislative history of this provision suggests that it was initially intended to allay concerns of the military services that the new CIA would not operate with adequate safeguards to protect the military intelligence secrets which would be shared with the CIA.[471] However, this authority was later read by the CIA to authorize infiltration of domestic groups in order to protect CIA personnel and facilities from possibly violent public demonstrations. It was also read to permit electronic surveillance and surreptitious entry to protect sensitive information.
-After the first recce sit down with your fellow planners in a secure location and work out a basic plan. This should include a route to the target that is free of CCTV, a drop off or park up point, entrance point/s into the target, exit point/s and escape route/s.
+The CIA undertook a series of specific security investigations within the United States, in some cases to find the, source of news leaks and in others to determine whether government employees were involved in espionage or otherwise constituted "security risks." These investigations were directed at former CIA employees, employees of other government agencies, newsmen and other private, citizens in this country.[472] Among the techniques used were physical surveillance, mail and tax information coverage, electronic surveillance, and surreptitious entry. Attorney General Robert Kennedy appears to have authorized CIA wiretapping in one of these investigations. With this exception, however, there is no suggestion that the CIA's security investigations were specifically approved by the Attorney General.[473]
-It should be decided when the action will take place, what time of day or night, roughly how long each part will take (getting to the drop off point, drop off point to target, doing the action, re-grouping. getting back to the pick up point and getting away) and how many people will be needed. The plan should also include where the vehicle will be left/taken and possible routes there.
+The CIA Office of Security established two programs directed at protest demonstrations which involved the CIA in domestic affairs on the theory that doing so was necessary to safeguard CIA facilities in the United States.[474] Project MERRIMACK (1967 to 1973) involved the infiltration by CIA agents of Washington-based peace groups and Black activist groups. The stated purpose of the program was to obtain early warning of demonstrations and other physical threats to the CIA. However, the collection requirements were broadened to include general information about the leadership, funding, activities, and policies of the targeted groups.
-The plan should also involve communications. This includes who might need to communicate with who and how on the action. This might be between drivers and the people they have dropped off, lookouts and people on the action or a radio scanner monitor and everybody else.
+Project RESISTANCE (1967 to 1973) was a broad effort to obtain general background information about radical groups across the country, particularly on campuses. The CIA justified this program as a means of predicting violence which might threaten CIA installations, recruiters, or contractors, and gathering information with which to evaluate applicants for CIA employment. Much of the reporting by CIA field offices to headquarters was from open sources such as newspapers. But additional information was obtained from cooperating police departments, campus officials, and other local authorities, some of whom in turn were using collection techniques such as informants.
-**** Secondary Reece
+These programs illustrated fundamental weaknesses and contradictions in the statutory definition of CIA authority in the 1947 Act. While the Director of Central Intelligence is charged with responsibility to protect intelligence "sources and methods," the CIA is forbidden from exercising law enforcement and police powers and "internal security functions." The CIA never went to Congress for a clarification of this ambiguity, nor did it seek interpretation from the chief legal officer of the United States -- the Attorney General - - except on the rarest of occasions.[477]
-If the action is going to be at night make this second recce at night as well so as to familiarise yourself with the area in the dark. It may be possible to do both recces on the same day, and then have time for planning the action afterwards.
+<em>d.</em> <em>NSA Monitoring</em>
-On this second recce look at the target in more depth. Pay particular attention to any security systems. Actually time the different stages of the action. Think about what tools you will need to do the job and what you will do with them afterwards. Check out the approach and escape routes in more detail, and also the vehicle park up/driving route for during the action. They should all be CCTV-free and there should be alternatives in case of unpredictable circumstances such as cops, roadworks or other people parked up.
+The National Security Agency was created by Executive Order in 1952 to conduct "signals intelligence," including the interception and analysis of messages transmitted by electronic means, such as telephone calls and telegrams.[478] In contrast to the CIA, there has never been a statutory "charter" for NSA.
-Check that the drop off and pick up points are away from buildings and lights, and there is space to turn a vehicle around. If the pick-up point is quite away from the target you may need to decide on a re-group point near the target so everyone leaves together.
+The executive directives which authorize NSA's activities prohibit the agency from monitoring communication between persons within the United States and communication concerning purely domestic affairs. The current NSA Director testified:
+[The] mission of NSA is directed to foreign intelligence obtained from foreign electrical communications . . . .[479]
-Decide what communications equipment you will need and test that it works in the area. Think about the likelihood of carrying away evidence on your clothes and look for places on the getaway route for dumping clothes and perhaps tools. Look for possible regroup points (perhaps a mile or so away) where people could meet up if the action goes wrong and everyone has to scatter.
+However, NSA has interpreted "foreign communications" to include communication where one terminal is outside the United States. Under this interpretation, NSA has, for many years, intercepted communications between the United States and a foreign country even though the sender or receiver was an American. During the past decade, NSA increasingly broadened its interpretation of "foreign intelligence" to include economic and financial matters and "international terrorism."[480]
-**** Detailed Action Plan
+The overall consequence, as in the case of CIA activities such as Project CHAOS, was to break down the distinction between "foreign" and "domestic" intelligence. For example, in the 1960s, NSA began adding to its "watch lists," at the request of various intelligence agencies, the names of Americans suspected of involvement in civil disturbance or drug activity which had some foreign aspects. Second, Operation Shamrock, which began as an effort to acquire the telegrams of certain foreign targets, expanded so that NSA obtained from at least two cable companies essentially all cables to or from the United States, including millions of the private communications of Americans.
-This plan should fill out the basic plan with all the rest of the information needed to carry out the action. It should go from the point people meet to go on the action to the point people disperse at the end. It needs to include precise timings, which routes will be taken, what will be happening at each stage of the action, who will be communicating with who, what tools and other equipment will be needed, what will happen to the vehicle, and what roles need to be filled, e.g. driver, navigator, spotters etc.
+<em>6.</em> <em>Intrusive Techniques</em>
-The plan should also identify places to dump incriminating evidence as well as regroup point/s. If possible try and arrange to have a trusted person on the end of a phone, well away from the area the action is taking place in, who can be called in an emergency. It might be helpful if they had a large detailed map of the area to direct you if you ring up and are lost. Use a secure mobile for this rather than a landline.
+As domestic intelligence activity increasingly broadened to cover domestic dissenters under many different programs, the government intensified the use of covert techniques which intruded upon individual privacy.
-**** Made up Plans
+Informants were used to gather more information about more Americans, often targeting an individual because of his political views and "regardless of past or present involvement in disorders."[481][482][483] The CIA's mail opening program increasingly focused upon domestic groups, including "protest and peace organizations" which were covered at the FBI's request.[484] Similarly, NSA-largely in response to Army, CIA, and FBI pressures -expanded its international interception program to include "information on U.S. organizations or individuals who are engaged in activities which may result in civil disturbances or otherwise subvert the national security of the United States."[485]
-The back up plan/s should be done in the same way as the main action plan. Back ups could be alternative actions to do at the target selected, or new targets entirely.
+During this period, Director Hoover ordered cutbacks on the FBI's use of a number of intrusive techniques. Frustration with Hoover's cutbacks was a substantial contributing factor to the effort in 1970 -- coordinated by White House Aide Tom Charles Huston and strongly supported by CIA Director Helms, NSA Director Gaylor and Hoover's Intelligence Division subordinates -- to obtain Presidential authorization for numerous illegal or questionable intelligence techniques.
-Consideration should be given to the conditions in which the initial plan will be abandoned and how the decision to revert to a back up plan will be made and communicated to others.
+<em>a.</em> <em>Warrantless Electronic Surveillance</em>
-**** Running Through the Plans
+(1) Executive Branch Restrictions on Electronic Surveillance: 1965-1968 -- In March 1965, Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach established a new requirement for the FBI's intelligence operations: the Bureau had to obtain the written approval of the Attorney General prior to the implementation of an microphone surveillance. He also imposed a six month limitation on both wiretaps and microphone surveillances, after which time new requests had to be submitted for the Attorney General's re-authorization.[486]
-If possible everyone going on the action should be involved in talking through the plan and making any changes needed. Roles identified should be filled so everyone knows who is doing what. Decisions should be made about what to take (see Checklist for Recces/Actions) and it should be established who is going to acquire the different items and bring them to the meeting point for the action. Everyone should make sure they have any mobile phone numbers or radio channels being used on the action. This is the point to identify any new skills the group will need to use and arrange to practice them in a ‘neutral’ setting rather than in the middle of an action.
+Upon Katzenbach's recommendation, President Johnson issued a directive in June 1965 forbidding all federal government wiretapping "except in conjunction with investigations related to national security."[487] This standard was reiterated by Attorney General Katzenbach, for both wiretapping and microphone surveillances three months later, and again in July 1966.[487]
-Finally, people should decide how to organise themselves on the action. You could pair off in buddies or split into smaller groups. Doing this makes it easier to look after one another, move quickly and know if anyone is missing. Make sure everybody knows the names and addresses they will be using if arrested.
+While the procedures were tightened, the broad "national security" standard still allowed for questionable authorizations of electronic surveillance. In fact, Katzenbach told Director Hoover that he would "continue to approve all such requests in the future as I have in the past." He saw "no need to curtail any such activities in the national security field."[488]
-**** Action
+In line with that policy, Katzenbach approved FBI requests for wiretaps on the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee,[489] Students for a Democratic Society,[490] the editor of an anti-communist newsletter,[491] a Washington attorney with whom the editor was in frequent contact,[492] a Klan official,[493] and a leader of the black Revolutionary Action Movement.[494] According to FBI records, Katzenbach also initialed three memoranda informing him of microphone surveillances of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.[495]
-Before going to the meeting point for the action, run through the checklist of what you will need and give yourself time to get it all together. Be on time to meet up so people aren’t left suspiciously hanging around. It may be best to meet up at a neutral place rather than somebody’s house or the centre of town.
+There were no similar electronic surveillance authorizations by Attorney General Ramsey
-Once on the way to the action, make sure everyone is clear about what they are doing. Try notto stop on the way unless you really have to, and remember that if you do have to stop most petrol stations and town centres have CCTV. All being well, you’ll arrive at your destination without incident. Put any disguises, such as hoods, masks or gloves, on at the last moment, as if you get pulled by the cops it’s good to look straight.
+Clark in cases involving purely domestic "national security" considerations.[496] Clark has stated that his policy was "to confine the area of approval to international activities directly related to the military security of the United States.[497]
-If the action is taking place at night it’s best not lo use torches or internal car lights for around 20 minutes before you get dropped off. This allows your eyes to become accustomed to the dark
+(2) Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968. -- In response to a 1967 Supreme Court decision that required judicial warrants for the use of electronic surveillance in criminal cases,[498] Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968. This Act established warrant procedures for wiretapping and microphone surveillances, but it included a provision that neither it nor the Federal Communications Act of 1934 "shall limit the constitutional power of the President."[499] Although Congress did not purport to define the President's power,[500] the Act suggested five broad categories in which warrantless electronic surveillance might be permitted. The first three categories related to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence matters:
-Once the action starts try to keep focussed on what you are doing, but aware of where others are and what is going on around you. It’s important to follow the communication structures you have decided on, e.g. making sure you are in earshot/ sight of each other if you need to pass a message on/check everyone is there. Everyone should have a watch that has been synchronised beforehand, so at the designated finishing time for the action people know to re-group and get ready to leave. If there is no finish time maybe have an easily identifiable signal.
+(1) to protect the nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power;
-Get together at the re-group point and check everybody is there and okay. This is easier to do if everybody has teamed up into buddy pairs before the action and then sticks together and keeps an eye on each other. If people are missing try and find out what has happened to them. Depending on the type of action and what happened this may be a point where you want to destroy any incriminating evidence.
+(2) to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States; and
-If the action doesn’t go according to plan and people are forced to scatter, try to stay with your buddy or group, move fast and keep in mind the direction you are going. If it’s taking place at night you can very easily get disorientated and lost, so before the action have a look at the map and get a clear idea of what direction and where you could head to if this happens.
+(3) to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.
-The most important thing is to not panic. Remember that many people have got out of the most pear-shaped situations by having a clear head and a grim determination not to be caught!
+The last two categories dealt with domestic intelligence interests:
-If it’s possible get to the pre-arranged meeting point. If that’s not an option get out of the area as quickly as you can, and ring the emergency mobile as soon as it is safe to do so so people know you’re okay.
+(4) to protect the United States against overthrow of the government by force or other unlawful means, or
-*** Post-Action
+(5) against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the government.
-**** Debrief
+Thus, although Congress suggested criteria for warrantless electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes, it left to the courts the task of defining the scope of the national security exception, if any, to the warrant requirement.
-Try and have a meeting of all those that were on the action to discuss how the planning and execution of it went. Think about what was good and bad and try and learn lessons for the next action. This is best done in the first few days after before memories get fuzzy and important details are forgotten.
+Between 1969 and 1972, the Nixon administration used these criteria to justify a number of questionable wiretaps. One New Left organization was tapped because, among other factors, its members desired to "take the radical politics they learned on campus and spread them among factory workers."[501] Four newsmen were wiretapped or bugged during this period, as were sixteen executive branch officials, one former executive official, and a relative of an executive official."[502] There were numerous wiretaps and some microphones used against the Black Panther Party and similar domestic groups.[503] Attorney Gen John Mitchell approved FBI requests for wiretaps on organizations involved in planning the November 1969 antiwar "March on Washington" including the moderate Vietnam Moratorium Committee.[503]
-*** Mutual Aid
+(a) Supreme Court Restrictions on National Security Electronic Surveillance: 1972. -- The issue of national security electronic surveillance was not addressed by the Supreme Court until 1972, when it held in the so-called Keith case that the President did not have the "constitutional power" to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance to protect the
-Look after yourself and one another. Don’t pressure people to go on actions if they are tired or stressed out. Take time out to relax and don’t get into ‘the struggle is my life’ martyrdom headspace. Address problems and power relations within the group. In the longer term make an effort to learn skills that only one or two people have. This stops lhem being put under unnecessary pressure, and ensures a balance of responsibility.
+security of the nation from "domestic" threats.[504] The Court remained silent, however, on the legality of warrantless electronic surveillance where there was a 'significant connection with a foreign power, its agents or agencies."[505] As a result of this decision, the Justice Department eliminated as criteria for the use of warrantless electronic surveillance the two categories, described by Congress in the 1968 Act, dealing with domestic intelligence interests.[506]
-*** Security
+<em>b.</em> <em>CIA Mail Opening</em>
-Don’t let your security slacken because the action is in the past. The cops have longer memories than we do and if your action is considered serious by the state an investigation into it can continue for months-or even years.
+Although Director Hoover terminated the FBI's own mail opening programs in 1966, the Bureau's use of the CIA program continued. In 1969, uopn the recommendation of the official in charge of the CIA's CHAOS program, the FBI began submitting names of domestic political radicals and black militants to the CIA for inclusion on its mail opening "Watch List."[507] By 1972, the FBIs list of targets for CIA mail opening included:
-*** Political Understanding
+New Left activists, extremists, and other subversives.
-Analyse the tactical and strategic impact of your actions. Are there better targets or ways of operating? Read our history and learn from current and past struggles, movements and groups. Communication
+Extremist and New Left organizations.
-It is sometimes useful to communicate to other people what you have done. Maybe write a short article reporting the action for SchNEWS, BF! Action Update and other newsletters. Consider issuing an anonymous press release/communique to other media. These could be done through an anonymous web based email service set up for this purpose and then only used once. Maybe produce flyposters or stickers about the action and put them up around your local area and send them to other groups. If useful lessons were learnt from the action let other people know by writing a leaflet, discussion document or article.
+Protest and peace organizations, such as People's Coalition for Peace and Justice National Peace Action Committee, and Women's Strike for Peace.
-*** Broadening the Struggle
+Subversive and extremist groups, such as the Black Panthers, White Panthers, Black Nationalists and Liberation Groups, Students for a Democratic Society, Resist, Revolutionary Union, and other New Left Groups.
-Help facilitate other people’s involvement in the resistance. If you have a closed cell/group help interested people set up another group. If you work in an open group let people know what you are doing and how they can get involved. Doing stalls and printing leaflets with your contact details on are two ways of doing this. Continue with your own activity!.
+Traffic to and from Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands showing anti-U.S. or subversive sympathies.[508]
-*** Further Reading
+Thus, the mail opening program that began fourteen years earlier as a means of discovering hostile intelligence efforts in the United States had expanded to encompass communications of domestic dissidents of all types.
-Ecodefence! A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching edited by Dave Foreman and Bill Haywood (Third Edition, Abbzug Press, 1993) Ozymandias Sabotage Skills Handbook Volume 1-Getting Started by Anonymous (Self Published, First Edition 1995). [[http://cafeun-derground.com/Cafesite/Rooms/Ozymandia/sabotage_index][http://cafeunderground.com/Cafesite/Rooms/Ozymandia/sabotage_index]]. html [See [[http://www.reachoutpub.com/osh/][http://www.reachoutpub.com/osh/]]]
+<em>c.</em> <em>Expansion of NSA Monitoring</em>
-Road Raging: Top Tips for Wrecking Road Building published by Road Alert! (Self Published, Second Edition 1998}. http://www.eco-action.org/
+Although NSA began to intercept and disseminate the communications of selected Americans in the early 1960s, the systematic inclusion of a wide range of American names on the "Watch List" did not occur until 1967.
-An Interview with an ALF Activist’ in Without a Trace by Anonymous (Self Published pamphlet).
+The Army Chief of Staff for Intelligence requested "any information on a continuing basis" that NSA might intercept concerning:
-*** Checklist for RECCES/Actions
+A. Indications that foreign governments or individuals or organizations acting as agents of foreign governments are controlling or attempting to control or influence the activities of U.S. "peace" groups and "Black Power" organizations.
-What follows is a checklist of equipment that may be needed for your recce or action. Use it as it stands or modify it for your particular group, way ofworking or task. Hopefully it will help avoid those awkward moments in the van when somebody asks, “So, who brought the map then?” and everybody looks blank.
+B. Identities of foreign agencies exerting control or influence on U.S. organizations.
-**** Group Tat
+C. Identities of individuals and organizations in U.S. in contact with agents of foreign governments.
-Transport with a full tank of petrol and keys
+D. Instructions or advice being given to U.S. groups by agents of foreign governments.[509]
-Vehicle breakdown and recovery details!
+Two years later, NSA issued an internal instruction intended to ensure the secrecy of the fact that it was monitoring and disseminating communications to and from Americans.[510] This memorandum described the "Watch List" program in terms which indicated that it had widened beyond its originally broad mandate. In addition to describing the program as covering foreigners who "are attempting" to "influence, coordinate or control" U.S. groups or individuals who "may foment civil disturbance or otherwise undermine the national security of the U.S.," the memorandum indicated that the program intercepted communications dealing with:
-Spare vehicle keys
+Information on U.S. organizations or individuals who are engaged in activities which may result in civil disturbances or otherwise subvert the national security of the U.S.[511]
-Road map
+This standard, which was clearly outside the foreign intelligence mandate of NSA, resulted in sweeping coverage. Communications such as the following were intercepted, disseminated. and stored in Government files: discussion of a peace concert, the interest of the wife of a U.S. Senator in peace causes; a correspondent's report from Southeast Asia to his magazine in New York; an anti-war activist's request for a speaker in New York.
-Detailed map of action area
+According to testimony before the Committee, the material which resulted from the "Watch List" was of little intelligence value; most intercepted communications were of a private or personal nature or involved rallies and demonstrations that werepublic knowledge.[512]
-Communications gear with new batteries
+<em>d.</em> <em>FBI Cutbacks</em>
-Emergency money
+The reasons for J. Edgar Hoover's cutback in 1966 on FBI use of several covert techniques are not clear. Hoover's former assistants have cited widely divergent factors.
-Binliners for post-action evidence disposal First Aid kit
+Certainly by the mid-1960s, Hoover was highly sensitive to the possibility of damage to the FBI from public exposure of its most intrusive intelligence techniques. This sensitivity was reflected in a memorandum to Attorney General Katzenbach in September 1965, where Hoover referred to "the present atmosphere" of "Congressional and public alarm and opposition to any activity which could in any way be termed an invasion of privacy."[513] The FBI Director was particularly concerned about an inquiry by the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee chaired by Senator Edward Long.
-As well as this you will need equipment that is specific to the recce or action that you are doing. Amongst other things it may be worth taking binoculars, radio scanner, notebook and pen, flag, camera, and a Global Positioning System (GPS). You’ll also need any tools or props specific to the tasks you are going to do on the action itself, i.e. sabotage tools, crowbar, sticks etc. Remember to take any spares or back up gear like new batteries.
+(1) The Long Subcommittee Investigation. -- The Senate Subcommittee was primarily investigating electronic surveillance and mail cover. The Bureau was seen as a major subject of the inquiry, although the Internal Revenue Service and other Executive agencies also included.
-**** Individual Tat
+In February 1965, President Johnson asked Attorney General Katzenbach to coordinate all matters relating to the investigation, and Katzenbach then met with senior FBI officials to discuss the problems it raised.[514][515] According to a memorandum by A. H. Belmont, one of the FBI Director's principal assistants, Katzenbach stated that he planned to see Senator Edward Long, the Subcommittee chairman, for the purpose of "impressing on him that the committee would not want to stumble by mistake into an area of extreme interest to the national security." According to Belmont, the Attorney General added that he "might have to resort to pressure from the President" and that he did not want the Subcommittee to "undermine the restricted and tightly controlled operations of the Bureau." FBI officials had assured Katzenbach that their activities were, indeed "tightly controlled" and restricted to "important security matters."[516]
-Spare clothes and shoes
+The following note on the memorandum of this meeting provides a sign of Director Hoover's attitude at that time:
-<em>Waterproof jacket and trousers</em>
+I don't see what all the excitement is about. I would have no hesitancy in discontinuing all techniques -- technical coverage, microphones, trash covers, mail covers, etc. While it might handicap us I doubt they are as valuable as some believe and none warrant the FBI being used to justify them.[517]
-<em>Watch</em>
+Several days later, according to a memorandum of the FBI Director, the Attorney General "advised that he had talked to Senator Long," and that the Senator "said he did not want to get into any national security area."[518] Katzenbach has confirmed that he "would have been concerned" in these circumstances about the Subcommittee's demands for information about "matters of a national security nature" and that he was "declining to provide such information" to Long.[519]
-<em>Masks and other disguises</em>
+Again in 1966, the FBI took steps to, in the words of Bureau official Cartha DeLoach, "neutralize" the "threat of being embarrassed by the Long Subcommittee."[520] This time the issue involved warrantless electronic surveillance by the FBI, particularly in organized crime matters. DeLoach and another ranking Bureau official visited Senator Long to urge that he issue a statement that "the FBI had never participated in uncontrolled usage of wiretaps or microphones and that FBI usage of such devices had been completely justified in all instances."[521] The Bureau prepared such a statement for Senator Long to release as his own, which apparently was not used.[522] At another meeting with DeLoach, Senator Long agreed to make "a commitment that he would in no way embarrass the FBI." When the Subcommittee's Chief Counsel asked if a Bureau spokesman could appear and "make a simple statement," DeLoach replied that this would "open a Pandora's box, in so far as our enemies in the press were concerned." Senator Long then stated that he would call no FBI witnesses.[523]
-<em>Gloves</em>
+(2) Director Hoover's Restriction. -- The Director subsequently issued instructions that the number of warrantless wiretaps installed at any one time be cut in half. One of his subordinates speculated that this was done out of a concern that the Subcommittee's "inquiry might get into the use of that technique by the FBI."[524]
-<em>Small torch</em> (best with red or blue filter) <em>Compass and unmarked map</em> of the area <em>Food and water</em> (maybe a flask of hot drink) <em>Petrol and emergency money</em>
+In July 1966, after hundreds of FBI "black bag job" operations had been approved over many years, Director Hoover decided to eliminate warrantless surreptitious entries for purposes other than microphone installations.[525] In response to an Intelligence Division analysis that such break-ins were an "invaluable technique," although "clearly illegal," Hoover stated that "no more such techniques must be used."[526] Bureau subordinates took Hoover's "no more such techniques" language as an injunction against the Bureau's mail opening program as well.[527] Apparently, a termination order was issued to field offices by telephone. FBI mail-opening was suspended, although the Bureau continued to seek information from CIA's illegal mail-opening program until its suspension in 1973.
+A year and a half before Hoover's cutbacks on wire-tapping, "black bag jobs," and mailopening, he prohibited the FBI's use of other covert techniques such as mail covers and trash covers.[528]
-**** Bag to carry stuff in
+FBI intelligence officials persisted in requesting authority for "black bag" techniques. In 1967 Director Hoover ordered that "no such recommendations should be submitted."[529] At about this time, Attorney General Ramsey Clark was asked to approve a "breaking and entering" operation and declined to do so.[530] There was an apparently unauthorized surreptitious entry directed at a "domestic subversive target as late as April, 1968.[531] A proposal from the field to resume mail opening for foreign counterintelligence purposes was turned down by FBI officials in 1970.[532]
-In addition to all this everybody going on the action should have a working knowledge of the whole plan and their role in it.
+<em>7.</em> <em>Accountability and Control</em>
-**** Security
+<em>a.</em> <em>The Huston Plan: A Domestic Intelligence Network</em>
-To have a completely secure action is impossible. Whatever you do there is a risk of getting caught. Security is about taking measures to lessen the chances of this. A few ways people get caught include
+In 1970, pressures from the White House and from within the intelligence community led to the formulation of a plan for coordination and expansion of domestic intelligence activity. The so-called "Huston Plan" called for Presidential authorization of illegal intelligence techniques, expanded domestic intelligence collection, and centralized evaluation of domestic intelligence. President Nixon approved the plan and then, five days later, revoked his approval. Despite the revocation of official approval, many major aspects of the plan were implemented, and some techniques which the intelligence community asked for permission to implement had already been underway.
-**** Physical Evidence
+In 1970, there was an intensification of the social tension in America that had provided the impetus in the 1960s for ever-widening domestic intelligence operations. The spring invasion of Cambodia by United States forces triggered the most extensive campus demonstrations and student "strikes" in the history of the war in Southeast Asia. Domestic strife heightened even further when four students were killed by National Guardsmen at Kent State University. Within one twenty-four hour period, there were 400 bomb threats in New York City alone. To respond, White House Chief of Staff, H. R. Haldeman, assigned principal responsibility for domestic intelligence planning to staff assistant Tom Charles Huston.[533]
-Diaries, plans, manuals, stuff left at the action by accident or on purpose, communiques, stored information on computers and paper trails from the use of bank cards and the hire or purchase of equipment. Avoid these by always paying cash and destroying or removing everything relating to the action before you go on it. Don’t take anything traceable to you (like ID or engraved jewellery) on actions. Consider using false ID if you are hiring gear. If you must use a computer encrypt all files with P Gp.
+Since June 1969, Huston had been in touch with the head of the FBI Domestic Intelligence Division, Assistant Director William C. Sullivan. Huston initially contacted Sullivan on President Nixon's behalf to request "all information possibly relating to foreign influences and financing of the New Left."[534] Huston also made similar requests to CIA, NSA, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The quality of the data provided by these agencies, especially the FBI, had failed to satisfy Huston and Presidential assistant John Ehrlichman.[535] Thereafter, Huston's continued discussions with Assistant Director Sullivan convinced him that the restraints imposed upon domestic intelligence techniques by Director Hoover impeded the collection of important information about dissident activity.[536]
-**** Forensic Evidence
+(1) Intelligence Community Pressures. -- The interest of the White House in better intelligence about domestic protest activity coincided with growing dissatisfaction among the foreign intelligence agencies with the FBI Director's restrictions on their performance of foreign intelligence functions in America.[537]
-Mainly just fingerprints and DNA, but also includes matching up of tool usage, soil samples and footprints. Watch out for prints on things that aren’t immediately obvious like torch batteries. Ensure everything is fingerprint free before the action and wear gloves and hats. Dispose of traceable items like clothes and tools as soon as possible post-action.
+The CIA's concerns crystallized in March 1970 when -- as a result of a "flap" over the CIA's refusal to disclose information to the FBI -- Hoover issued an order that "direct liaison" at FBI headquarters with CIA "be terminated" and that "any contact with CIA in the future" was to take place "by letter only."[538] This order did not bar interagency communication; secure telephones were installed and working-level contacts continued. But the position of FBI "liaison agent" with CIA was eliminated.[539]
-**** Witnesses
+CIA Director Helms subsequently attempted to reopen the question of FBI cooperation with CIA requests for installing electronic surveillances and covering mail.[540] Hoover replied that he agreed with Helms that there should be, expanded "exchange of information between our agencies concerning New Left and racial extremist matters." However, he refused the request for aid with electronic surveillance and mail coverage. Hoover cited the "widespread concern by the American public regarding the possible misuse of this type of coverage." Their use, in "domestic investigations" posed legal problems not encountered "in similar operations abroad." Hoover added, "The FBI's effectiveness has always depended in large measure on our capacity to retain the full confidence of the American people."[541]
-People being able to identify you or your vehicle, not just at the action, but also on the way there, or even just leaving your house at a connected time. Includes images from CCTV or police video/stills teams. Plan meet-ups, routes to the action, etc. avoiding cameras and nosy neighbours. Disguise yourselves and wear indistinguishable clothes. Don’t tell people what they don’t need to know.
+(2) The Interagency Committee Report. -- In the following months, Tom Charles Huston arranged a meeting between President Nixon and the directors of the FBI, CIA, NSA, and DIA on June 5, 1970.[542] The President's emphasis was upon improved coordination among the agencies to strengthen their capabilities to collect intelligence about "revolutionary activism" and "the support -- ideological and otherwise -- of foreign powers" for these activities. The talking paper prepared by Huston for the President to read at the meeting declared, "We are now confronted with a new and grave crisis in our country -which we know too little about."[543]
-**** Surveillance
+From this meeting emanated the Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), prepared jointly by representatives of the FBI, CIA, NSA, and DIA, and submitted to the President a month later.[544] The report presented the President a series of options, and Huston recommended that the President approve the following:
-Includes phone taps, post and email interception, listening devices, and following you or placing tracking units in your vehicles. Conducted by numerous, and sometimes competing, state and private agencies. Operates at various levels from the fairly routine, which shouldn’t effect your activity that much, through to ones where everything you say and do is listened to and watched. Avoid talking or communicating about anything action related in your home, over email or on a phone. Look out for cops following you on actions.
+(1) "coverage by NSA of the communications of U.S. citizens using international facilities;"
-<br>
+(2) "intensification" of "electronic surveillances and penetrations" directed at individuals and groups "who pose a major threat to the internal security" and at "foreign nationals" in the United States "of interest to the intelligence community;"
-** Down with the Empire, Up with the Spring! <em>From</em> <em>issue 10)</em>
+(3) removal of restrictions on "legal" mail coverage and relaxation of "restrictions on covert coverage" [mail opening] on "selected targets of priority foreign intelligence and internal security interest;"
-<quote>
+(4) modification of "present restrictions" on "surreptitious entry" to allow "procurement of vitally needed foreign cryptographic material" and "to permit selective use" against "high priority internal security targets;"
-After over a decade of radical ecological resistance i11 Britain, it’s time to look back on our actions and look forward to the future.
-<em>It’s time to CELEBRATE</em> <em>our resistance: digger diving, window smashing, pleasant picnicking, office occupying, hoody wearing, gene-modified [GM] crop trashing, squat cracking, su11 lit</em> <em>Lovin’,</em> <em>machine burning, treeliving-total fucking anarchy. It’s time to AiOUR Nfor our moment. Over the last decade thousands of species have been wiped out of existence. Vast fiirests-charred stumps. Coral reefs bleached dead by warmed seas. Millions starved within the prison of civilisation. Wild peoples massacred, enslaved. and pauperised. It’s time to</em> STRA TEGISE <em>how to make a real impact on this apocalypse. Look seriously at our strengths and weaknesses and pull together to RE-SIST. The empire</em> <em>is powerful but the spring is</em> <em>growing. It’s a challenge like no other, but with love, luck and hard resolve we can TRANSCEND.</em>
+(5) relaxation of "present restrictions" on the "development of campus sources" to permit "expanded coverage of violence-prone and student-related groups;'
-</quote>
-*** Part One: Recent Pre-History<br>An Insurgency of Dreams
+(6) "increased" coverage by CIA "of American students (and others) traveling or living abroad;"
-<quote>
+(7) appointment of a "permanent committee consisting of the FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies" to evaluate "domestic intelligence" and to carry out the other objectives specified in the report."[545]
-Defend the Collective Imagination.
-<br>Beneath the cobblestones, the beach
-<right>
+Huston also raised and dismissed questions about the legality of two collection techniques in particular. "Covert [mail opening] coverage is illegal, and there are serious risks involved," he wrote. "However, the advantages to be derived from its use outweigh the risks."[546] As for surreptitious entry, Huston advised:
---Slogan daubed in Paris, May 1968
-</right>
-</quote>
-The radical ecological movement was born from the world-wide revolutionary upsurge of the 1960s and ‘70s. Love of the earth and for each other has always been with us, but in that period these feelings exploded across the world in a way they hadn’t for decades. In nearly every land people came together and resisted. In some areas there were decisive victories for people in the battle against power; in others, power won hands down.
+Use of this technique is clearly illegal: it amounts to burglary. It is also highly risky and could result in great embarrassment if exposed. However, it is also the most fruitful tool and can produce the type of intelligence which cannot be obtained in any other fashion."[547]
-The epic struggle of the Vietnamese people and the anti-Vietnam war actions across the world; urban guerrillas across Europe; barricades in Paris; the European squatting movement, the brutal end of the Prague Spring; the rise of the Black Power movement.
+Huston testified that his recommendations "reflected what I understood to be the consensus of the working group" of intelligence officials on the interagency committee.[548]
-This upsurge brought with it the (re)birth of the feminist, ecological, indigenous and libertarian ideas that now form the basis of our worldview.
+Just over a week later, the FBI, CIA, NSA, and DIA were advised by Huston that "the President has ... made the following decisions"to adopt all of Huston's recommendations.[549] Henceforth, with Presidential authority, the intelligence community could intercept the international communications of Americans; eavesdrop electronically on anyone deemed a "threat to the internal security;" read the mail of American citizens; break into the homes of anyone regarded as a security threat; and monitor the activities of student political groups at home and abroad.
-Authoritarian Communism had dominated the radical movements ever since the Bolshevik coun-ter-revolution. After having been physically exterminated in country after country, anar-chist/libertarian groups started once again to grow.
+There is no indication that the President was informed at this time that NSA was already covering the international communications of Americans and had been doing so for domestic intelligence purposes since at least 1967. Nor is there any indication that he was told that the CIA was opening the mail of Americans and sharing the contents with the FBI and the military for domestic intelligence purposes. In effect, the "Huston plan" supplied Presidential authority for operations previously undertaken in secret without such authorization. For instance, the plan gave FBI Assistant Director Sullivan the "support" from "responsible quarters" which he had believed necessary to resume the "black bag jobs" and mail-opening programs Director Hoover had terminated in 1966.[550]
-Industrial development accelerated in the ‘Third World’ following World War IL l1ie global elite extended its tentacles, attempting to assimilate or exterminate tribes and band societies outside its control. In turn indigenous peoples fought back. In the 1970s the American Indian Movement (AIM) re-launched indigenous armed resistance in North America, reminding us that even the capitalist core countries were always colonies.
+Nevertheless, the FBI Director was not satisfied with Huston's memorandum concerning the authorization of the plan.[551] Hoover went immediately to Attorney General Mitchell, who had not known of the prior deliberations or the President's "decisions."[552] In a memorandum, Director Hoover said he would implement the plan, but only with the explicit approval of the Attorney General or the President:
-Seeing the horrors inflicted on our imprisoned non-human relations-in laboratories, abattoirs and factory farms-the animal liberation movement was born with sabotage at its centre.
+Despite my clear-cut and specific opposition to the lifting of the various investigative restraints referred to above and to the creation of a permanent interagency committee on domestic intelligence, the FBI is prepared to implement the instructions of the White House at your direction. Of course, we would continue to seek your specific authorization, where appropriate, to utilize the various sensitive investigative techniques involved in individual cases.[553]
-New generations took up the standard of Women’s Liberation, challenging not only the dominant society but also its patriarchal (loyal) opposition that forever sidelined women’s lives in the cause ofthe (male) workers struggle.
+CIA Director Helms shortly thereafter indicated his support for the to the Attorney General, telling him "we had put our backs into exercise."[554] Nonetheless, Mitchell advised the President to withdraw his approval.[555] Huston was told to rescind his memorandum, and the White House Situation Room dispatched a message requesting its return.[556]
-After decades of almost universal techno-worship, not least by radicals, many people began to see that the earth was being destroyed, and started trying both to defend it and regain understanding.
+(3) Implementation. -- The President's withdrawal of approval for the "Huston plan" did not, in fact, result in the termination of either the NS A program for covering the communications of Americans or the CIA mail-opening program. These programs continued withoutformal authorization which had been hoped for.[557] The directors of the CIA and NSA also continued to explore means of expanding their involvement in, and access to, domestic intelligence.[558] A new group, the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC), was created by Attorney General Mitchell within the Justice Department to consider such expansion.[559] NSA, CIA, Army counterintelligence, and the FBI each sent representatives to the IEC. NSA Director Gayler provided the IEC with a statement of NSA's capabilities and procedures for supplying domestic intelligence.[560] Although the IEC merely evaluated raw intelligence data, over 90 percent of which came to it through the FBI, it had access to domestic intelligence from NSA coverage and the CIA's mail-opening and CHAOS programs, which was channeled to the FBI.[561]
-**** ‘The Rise of Environmentalism
+Two of the specific recommendations in the "Huston Plan" were thereafter implemented by the FBI -- the lowering of the age limit for campus informants from 21 to 18 and the resumption of "legal mail covers."[562] Two men who had participated in developing the "Huston Plan" were promoted to positions of greater influence within the Bureau.[563] More important the Bureau greatly intensified its domestic intelligence investigations in the fall of 1970 without using "clearly illegal" techniques. The Key Black Extremist Program was inaugurated and field offices were instructed to open approximately 10,500 new investigations, including investigations of all black student groups "regardless of their present or past involvement in disorders." All members of "militant New Left campus organizations" were also to be investigated even if they were not "known to be violence prone." The objective of these investigations was "to identify potential" as well as "actual extremists."[564]
-<quote>
+The chief of the Domestic Intelligence Division in 1970 said the "Huston Plan" had "nothing to do" with the FBI's expanded intelligence activities. Rather, both the "Huston Plan" and the Bureau intensification represented the same effort by FBI intelligence officials "to recommend the types of action and programs which they thought necessary to cope with the problem."[565] Brennan admits that "the FBI was getting a tremendous amount of pressure from the White House," although he attributes this pressure to demands from "a vast majority of the American people" who wanted to know "why something wasn't being done" about violence and disruption in the country.[566]
-It’s time for a warrior society to rise up out of the Earth and throw <em>itself in front of the juggernaut of destruction.</em>
-<right>
+<em>b.</em> <em>Political Intelligence</em>
--Dave Foreman, US EF! co-founder.
-</right>
-</quote>
-The Western environmental movement grew as part of the upsurge, but also in large part as a postscript. When the barricades-both actual and metaphorical-were cleared, a generation of Western radicals looked to new fronts while many others retreated to rural idylls and communes. What they both found was strength in nature and a burning urge to defend it. This early envi-ronmental movement fundamentally challenged the established conservation organisations which for so long had acted as mere (ineffective) park keepers.
+The FBI practice of supplying political information to the White House and, on occasion, responding to White House requests for such information was established before 1964. However, under the administrations of President Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, this practice grew to unprecedented dimensions.[567]
-At sea a raw energy propelled tiny dinghies to confront the nuclear and whaling industries. On land new organisations were forming, fighting toxic waste dumps, logging, mining and other es-sentials of industry. Scientists were uncovering huge cataclysms facing the earth and-to elite horror-breaking ranks. This environmentalism had a threatening potential that had to be defused--an army of hacks, cops, advertisers and ideologues got to work.
+(1) Name Check Requests. -- White House aides serving under Presidents Johnson and Nixon made numerous requests for "name checks" of FBI files to elicit all Bureau information on particular critics of each administration. Johnson aides requested such reports on critics of the escalating war in Vietnam.[568] President Johnson's assistants also requested name checks on members of the Senate staff of Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater in 1964,[569] on Justice and Treasury Department officials responsible for a phase of the criminal investigation of Johnson's former aide Bobby Baker,[569] on the authors of books critical of the Warren Commission report,[570] a nd on prominent newsmen.[571] President Nixon's aides asked for similar name checks on another newsman, the Chairman of Americans for Democratic Action, and the producer of a film critical of the President.[572]
-Capital and state both attacked environmentalists while simultaneously funding counter-tendencies to steer the movement away from confrontation and towards co-operation. This carrot and stick approach co-opted many; groups which had looked promising succumbed to respecta-bility and corporate funding. Environmentalists were given a seat at the table but the talk was not of nature but of compromise, techno-fix and corporate greenwash. Assimilation.
+According to a memorandum by Director Hoover, Vice President Spiro Agnew received ammunition from Bureau files that could be used in "destroying [the] credibility" of Southern Christian Leadership Conference leader Reverend Ralph Abernathy.[573]
-In fact, as early as 1972, The <em>Ecologist</em> magazine (at the time printing articles on the links be-tween ecology and anarchy) carried an editorial entitled “Down with Environmentalism” saying: <em>We must repudiate the term ‘environmental.’ It is too far gone to be rescued.[240]</em>
+(2) Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, 1964. -- On August 22, 1964, at the request of the White House, the FBI sent a "special squad" to the Democratic National Convention site in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The squad was assigned to assist the Secret Service in protecting President Lyndon Johnson and to ensure that the convention itself would not be marred by civil disruption.
-All through the ‘70s environmental groups were gaining increased support and membership lists were expanding dramatically. By building mass based organisations environmentalism was split into campaigners and supporters. Bigger offices and bigger salaries were needed to manage the movement. This division-a creation of scale-acted (and still acts) as a terrible internal pres-sure crushing the radical content and practical usefulness of groups.
+But it went beyond these functions to report political intelligence to the White House. Approximately 30 Special Agents, headed by Assistant Director Cartha DeLoach, "were able to keep the White House fully apprised of all major developments during the Conventions' course" by means of "informant coverage, by use of various confidential techniques, by infiltration of key groups through use of undercover agents, and through utilization of agents using appropriate cover as reporters."[574] Among these "confidential techniques" were: a wiretap on the hotel room occupied by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and microphone surveillance of a storefront serving as headquarters for the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and another civil rights organization.[575]
-Those attracted to campaign jobs were often exactly the wrong class of people (inclined to pa-per pushing rather than physical action) while most of the support their supporters gave was the annual return of cheques and membership forms-conscience-salving exercises. When serious people got involved in groups their action was often curtailed by other campaigners (or the cop in their own head) reminding them that it could alienate the public and thus cut into membership and funding.
+Neither of the electronic surveillances at Atlantic City were specifically authorized by the Attorney General. At that time, Justice Department procedures did not require the written approval of the Attorney General for bugs such as the one directed against SNCC in Atlantic City. Bureau officials apparently believed that the wiretap on King was justified as an extension of Robert Kennedy's October 10, 1963, approval for surveillance of King at his then-current address in Atlanta, Georgia, or at any future address to which he might move.[576] The only recorded reason for instituting the wiretap on Dr. King in Atlantic City, however, was set forth in an internal memorandum prepared shortly before the Convention:
-This process was as prevalent in what was then the most radical ofthe environmental groups-Greenpeace (GP). In 1977 Paul Watson one of G Ps directors (who became an icon when he drove a dinghy straight into the path of a whaling harpoon) was heading an expedition to the Newfoundland ice floes. At one point he grabbed a club used to kill baby harp seals and threw it into the waters. The sealers dunked and nearly drowned him yet worse was to come on return to the office-betrayal. Throwing the club into the sea was criminal damage and he was told by a faceless lawyer, I don’t think you understand what Greenpeace is all about. He was expelled from the corporation.
+Martin Luther King, Jr., head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), an organization set up to promote integration which we are investigating to determine the extent of Communist Party (CP) influence on King and the SCLC, plans to attend and possibly may indulge in a hunger fast as a means of protest.[577]
-Watson went on to found the whaler-sinking. Sea Shepherd (more of them later) while Greenpeace just got bigger, gaining millions of members while all the time becoming more symbolic and less of a threat. As GP’ s founder Bob Hunter said with an air of depression. Nothing could be done to stop it.from growing. It’ll keep growing and growing, a juggernaut that is out of control.[241]
+Walter Jenkins, an Administrative Assistant to President Johnson who was the recipient of information developed by the Bureau, stated that he was unaware that any of the intelligence was obtained by wiretapping or bugging.[578] DeLoach, moreover, has testified that he is uncertain whether he ever informed Jenkins of these sources.[579]
-Meanwhile the global attack on the wild was left largely unabated. Christopher Maines in Green <em>Rage</em> put it well:
+Walter Jenkins, and presumably President Johnson, received a significant volume of information from the electronic surveillance at Atlantic City, much of it purely political and only tangentially related to possible civil disturbances. The most important single issue for President Johnson at the Atlantic City Convention was the seating challenge of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party to the regular Mississippi delegation.[580] From the electronic surveillances of King and SNCC, the White House was able to obtain the most intimate details of the plans of individuals supporting the MFDP's challenge unrelated to the possibility of violent demonstrations.
-<quote>
+Jenkins received a steady stream of reports on political strategy in the struggle to seat the MFDP delegation and other political plans and discussions by the civil rights groups under surveillance.[581] Moreover, the 1975 Inspection Report stated that "several Congressmen, Senators, and Governors of States" were overheard on the King tap."[582]
-Like the Youth movement, the women’s movement, and rock <em>and roll, the eeform environmental movement suffered from tsown success. It entered the ‘70s as a vague criticofour society and exited as an institution, wrapped in the consumerism andpolitical ambitions it once condemned. In their drive to win credibility with the government agencies and corporations... the new professional environmentalists seemed to have wandered into the ambiguous world of George Orwell’s Animal Farm, where it was increasingly difficult to tell the farmers from the pigs.[242]</em>
-</quote>
-**** The Birth of Earth First!
+According to both Cartha DeLoach and Walter Jenkins, the Bureau's coverage in Atlantic City was not designed to serve political ends. DeLoach testified:
-<quote>
+I was sent there to provide information . . . which could reflect on the orderly progress of the convention and the danger to distinguished individuals, and particularly the danger to the President of the United States, as exemplified by the many, many references [to possible civil disturbances] in the memoranda furnished Mr. Jenkins . . . .[583]
-<em>So, from the vast sea of raging moderation, irresponsible compromise, knee-jerkrh etorical Sierra Club dogma, and unknowing (OK, sometimes knowing) duplicity in the systematic destruction of the earth, a small seed of sanity sprouts: Earth First!</em>
-<right>
+Jenkins has stated that the mandate of the FBI's special unit did not encompass the gathering of political intelligence and speculated that the dissemination of any such intelligence was due to the inability of Bureau agents to distinguish dissident activities which represented a genuine potential for violence.[584] Jenkins did not believe the White House ever used the incidental political intelligence that was received. However, a document located at the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library suggests that at least one political use was made of Mr. DeLoach's reports.[585]
---Howie Wolke, EF! co-founder.
-</right>
-</quote>
-In 1980 five friends hiked into the desert. All long-term activists sick of careerism, legality, and failure, they knew a new kind of group was needed. One that would break the law, push open the envelope, hit the corporations where it hurt (in the pocket), and most of all never EVER compromise in defence of mother earth. Around their camp fire Earth First! was born.
+Thus, although it may have been implemented to prevent violence at the Convention site, the Bureau's coverage in Atlantic City -- which included two electronic surveillances -undeniably provided useful political intelligence to the President as well.[586]
-EF!s first act was one of sarcastic symbolism-and defection. In a land full of memorials to the genocidal victor, EF! raised a plaque commemorating Victoria, an Apache who wiped out a mining camp.
+(3) By-Product of Foreign Intelligence Coverage. -- Through the FBI's coverage of certain foreign officials in Washington, D.C., the Bureau was able to comply with President Johnson's request for reports of the contacts between members of Congress and foreign officials opposed to his Vietnam policy. According to a summary memorandum prepared by the FBI:
-**** Victoria, Outstanding Preservationist and Great American.
+On March 14, 1966, then President Lyndon B. Johnson informed Mr. DeLoach [Cartha DeLoach, Assistant Director of the FBI] ... that the FBI should constantly keep abreast of the actions of [certain foreign officials] in making contact with Senators and Congressmen and any citizen of a prominent nature.
-<quote>
+The President stated he strongly felt that much of the protest concerning his Vietnam policy, particularly the hearings in the Senate, had been generated by [certain foreign officials].[587]
-This monument celebrates the 100<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the great <em>Apache chief Victoria’s, raid on the Cooney mining camp near Mogollon, New Mexico, on April 28, 1880.</em> <em>Victoria strove to protect these mountainsfrom mining and other destructive activities of the white race. Ihe present Gila Wilderness is partly a fruit of his efforts. Erected by the New</em> <em>Mexico Patriotic Heritage Society.</em>
-</quote>
-The next action EF! pulled off was at the Glen Canyon Dam, where a three hundred foot poly-thene banner was unfurled down the side of the dam, looking for all the world like a vast crack opening up. lhe demonstrators chanted RAZE THE <em>DAM.</em> People had campaigned in the past against new dams but no one had ever had the audacity to campaign to pull down those already built. lhe Glen Canyon Dam in fact held special significance. In a sickening deal the big environmental groups had accepted the damming of the canyon in return for the cancellation of a dam elsewhere. lhis was exactly the kind of compromise EF! was founded to resist.
+As a result of the President's request, the FBI prepared a chronological summary -- apparently based in part on existing electronic surveillances of the contacts of each Senator, Representative, or legislative staff member who communicated with selected foreign officials during the period July 1, 1964, to March 17, 1966. This 67-page summary was transmitted to the White House on March 21, 1966, with a note that certain foreign officials were "making more contacts" with four named Senators "than with other United States legislators."[588] A second summary, prepared on further contacts between Congressmen and foreign officials, was transmitted to the White House on May 13, 1966. From then until the end of the Johnson Administration in January 1969, biweekly additions to the second summary were regularly disseminated to the White House.[589]
-Thus from the very beginning EF!ers set themselves not only the task of defending the last fragments but of reversing the process: pulling down the dams and the powerlines. EF! launched its proposal for a network of vast wilderness preserves-half of Nevada for instance would be declared <em>off limits to industrial human civilieation, as preserves for the free flow of naturalprocesses.</em> EF! didn’t want people to wait for the state to set them up. Instead the people themselves should make them happen-direct action. If logging needed stopping-stop it, blockade it, trash the machines. If a road needed digging up--DIG IT UP! This militancy was a touchstone of even early EF!, but it wasn’t just its militancy that made it stand out globally (though it shocked Americans). All around the world groups were turning to direct action in environmental struggles. In both Britain and Germany, for example, anti-nuclear mass action had been growing apace. What was unique in the environmental movement was EF!s militant biocentrism.
+This practice was reinstituted during the Nixon Administration. On July 27, 1970, Larry Higby, Assistant to H. R. Haldeman, informed the Bureau that Haldeman "wanted any information possessed by the FBI relating to contacts between [certain foreign officials] and Members of Congress and its staff." Two days later, the Bureau provided the White House with a statistical compilation of such contacts from January 1, 1967, to the present. Unlike the case of the information provided to the Johnson White House, however, there is no indication in related Bureau records that President Nixon or his aides were concerned about critics of the President's policy. The Bureau's reports did not identify individual Senators; they provided overall statistics and two examples of foreign recruitment attempts (with names removed.[590]
-The wilderness proposals preamble stated, the central idea of EF! is that humans have no divine right to subdue the Earth, that we are merely one of several million forms of life on this planet. We reject even the notion of benevolent stewardship as that implies dominance. Instead we believe that we should be plain citizens of the Land community.
+In at least one instance the FBI, at the request of the President and with the approval of the Attorney General, instituted an electronic surveillance of a foreign target for the express purpose of intercepting telephone conversations of an American citizen. An FBI memorandum states that shortly before the 1968 Presidential election, President Johnson became suspicious that the South Vietnamese were trying to sabotage his peace negotiations in the hope that Presidential candidate Nixon would win the election and then take a harder line toward North Vietnam. To determine the validity of this suspicion, the White House instructed the FBI to institute physical surveillance of Mrs. Anna Chennault, a prominent Republican, as well as electronic surveillance directed against a South Vietnamese target.[591]
-Echoing The Ecologist’s earlier denunciation of environmentalism Dave Foreman goes one step further.
+The electronic surveillance was authorized by Attorney General Ramsey Clark on October 29, 1968, installed the same day, and continued until January 6, 1969.[592] Thus, a "foreign" electronic surveillance was instituted to target indirectly an American citizen who could not be legitimately surveilled directly. Also as part of this investigation, President Johnson personally ordered a check of the long distance toll call records of Vice Presidential candidate Spiro Agnew.[593]
-<quote>
+(4) The Surveillance of Joseph Kraft (1969). -- There is no substantial indication of any genuine national security rationale for the electronic surveillance overseas of columnist Joseph Kraft in 1969. John Erlichman testified before the Senate Watergate Committee that the national security was involved, but did not elaborate further.[594]
-Wilderness is the essence of everything we’re after. We aren’t an environmental group. Environmental groups worry about environmental health hazards to human beings, they worry about clean air and waterfor the benefit ofpeople and ask us why we’re so wrapped up in something as irrelevant and <em>tangential and elitist as wilderness.</em> Well, I <em>can tell you a wolf or a redwood or a grizzly bear doesn’t think wilderness is elitist. Wilderness is the essence of everything. It’s the real world.[243]</em>
-</quote>
-Within a year EF! moved beyond symbolism to direct struggle. Around the country a combination of civil disobedience and sabotage halted logging and oil drilling. Groups were setting up all over. What many in industry had originally written off as a joke was quickly becoming a nightmare. In 1985 EF!ers published <em>Ecodefence</em><em>:</em> <em>A</em> <em>Field Guide to kfonkeywrenching.</em> This was unashamed, heads held high 350-page manual on how to trash pretty much any machine with which civilisation attacks the wild. Written by over 100 contributors to the <em>Earth First! Journal,</em> this book was information for action.
+Beyond this general claim, however, there is little evidence that any national security issue was involved in the case. Former Deputy Attorney General and Acting FBI Director William Ruckelshaus testified that after reviewing the matter he "could never see any national security justification" for the surveillance of Kraft. Ruckelshaus stated that the Administration's "justification" for bugging Kraft's hotel room was that he was "asking questions of some members of the North Vietnamese Government." Ruckelshaus believed that this was not an adequate national security justification for placing "any kind of surveillance on an American citizen or newsman."[595] Mr. Kraft agreed he was in contact with North Vietnamese officials while he was abroad in 1969, but noted that this was a common practice among journalists and that "at the time" he never knowingly published any classified information.[596]
-Diggers trashed, forests occupied, billboards subverted, logging roads dug up, trees spiked, offices invaded, windows smashed, snares disabled, computers scrapped-EF! was on the move. But so now was the state.
+The documentary record also reveals no national security justification for the FBI's electronic surveillance of Mr. Kraft overseas. The one memorandum which referred to "Possible Leaks of Information" by Kraft does not indicate that there clearly was a leak of national security significance or that Mr. Kraft was responsible for such a leak if it occurred.[597] Furthermore, the hotel room bug did not produce any evidence that Kraft received or published any classified information.[598]
-The FBI wasn’t about to let a crew of hippies, feminists, cowboys. and desert anarchists continue to hammer company profits. The late ‘80s onwards saw a wave of reaction that included infiltra-tion, set ups, conspiracy trials, raids, corporate directed anti-environmental hate groups and even assassination attempts on ‘leading’ EF!ers. This was a continuation of the FBI’s COINTELPRO (Counter Insurgency Programme) previously unleashed in the ‘60s/‘70s upsurge against the Weather Underground, the New Left, the American Indian Movement, the Black Panthers and the Puertorican liberation movement. Now some of the same agents that had destroyed those movements were overseeing the attack on EF!
+Similarly, there is no evidence of a national security justification for the physical surveillance and proposed electronic surveillance of Kraft in the fall of 1969. A Bureau memorandum suggests that the Attorney General requested some type of coverage of Kraft,[599] but the record reveals no purpose for this coverage. The physical surveillance was discontinued after five weeks because it had "not been productive." Apparently, the Attorney General himself was unconvinced that a genuine national security justification supported the Kraft surveillance: he refused to authorize the requested wiretap, and it was consequently never implemented.[600]
-Pre-existing divisions over philosophy, tactics, and, not least, personality were exacerbated by the crisis that engulfed EF! A split begun to emerge between supporters of EF! co-founder Dave Foreman and long-term California organiser Judi Bari. All the while both were under serious corporate/state attack. Foreman was woken up one morning with an FBI gun to his head and charged with conspiracy to down power lines. Bari was carbombed.
+(5) The "17" Wiretaps. -- The relative ease with which high administration officials could select improper intelligence targets was demonstrated by the "17" wiretaps on Executive officials and newsmen installed between 1969-1971 under the rationale of determining the source of leaks of sensitive information.[600] In three cases no national security claim was even advanced. While national security issues were at least arguably involved in the initiation of the other taps, the program continued in two instances against persons who left the government and took positions as advisors to Senator Edmund Muskie, then the leading Democratic Presidential prospect.[601]
-The split and the state attacks seriously weakened US EF! and it would never fully recover its accelerating drive. Nevertheless it did survive and at the beginning of the ‘90s it was still the kickass environmental movement of the developed world. It’s actions, ideas and attitude would inspire a massive wave of aclion across the Atlantic.
+The records of these wiretaps were kept separate from the FBI's regular electronic surveillance files;[602] their duration in many cases went beyond the period then required for re-authorization by the Attorney General; and in some cases the Attorney General did not authorize the tap until after it had begun.[603] In 1971, the records were removed from the FBI's possession and sent to the White House.
-**** EF! Crosses the Atlantic
+Thus, misuse of the FBI had progressed by 1971 from the regular receipt by the White House of political "tid-bits" and occasional requests for name checks of Bureau files to the use of a full array of intelligence operations to serve the political interests of the administration. The final irony was that the Nixon administration came to distrust Director Hoover's reliability and, consequently, to develop a White House-based covert intelligence operation.[604]
-The climate in Britain in 1991 was similar to that which had given birth to US EF! Organisations that had started off quite radical in the ‘70s were well and truly assimilated. Big offices, good salaries. lobbying, and little else.
+<em>c.</em> <em>The Justice Department's Internal Security Division</em>
-Back in 1972, in its first ever newsletter, FoE UK stated:
+FBI intelligence reports flowed consistently to the Justice Department, especially to the IDIU established by Attorney General Clark in 1967 and to the Internal Security Division. Before 1971, the Justice Department provided little guidance to the FBI on the proper scope of domestic intelligence investigations.[605] For example, in response to a Bureau inquiry in 1964 about whether a group's activities came "within the criteria" of the employee security program or were "in violation of any other federal statute,"[606] the Internal Security Division replied that there was "insufficient evidence" for prosecution and that the group's leaders were "becoming more cautious in their utterances."[607] Nevertheless, the FBI continued for years to investigate the group with the knowledge and approval of the Division.
-<quote>
+(1) The "New" Internal Security Division. -- When Robert Mardian was appointed Assistant Attorney General in late 1970, the Internal Security Division assumed a more active posture. In fact, one of the alternatives to implementation of the "Huston Plan" suggested to Attorney General John Mitchell by White House aide John Dean was the invigoration of the Division.[608] This included Mardian's establishment of the IEC to prepare domestic intelligence estimates. Equally significant, however, was Mardian's preparation of a new Executive Order on federal employee security. The new order assigned to the moribund Subversive Activities Control Board the function of designating groups for what had been the "Attorney General's list"[609] This attempt to assign broad new functions by Executive fiat to a Board with limited statutory responsibilities clearly disregarded the desires of the Congress.[610]
-We want to avoid the centre-periphery situation, whereby an organisation’s forces and resources tend to be drawn to the centre, to ‘head office’ while patently the strength of the group ... is derivedfrom experience in the field.[244]
-</quote>
-By the ‘90s <em>FoE</em> had undeniably failed to avoid the “centreperiphery situation” (to put it politely). Greenpeace was even more centrist-its local groups simply fundraisers.[245] The late ‘80s had seen a massive increase in support for environmental groups yet nothing real was happening. Something more radical-and practical-was needed.
+According to Mardian, there was a "problem" because the list had "not been updated for 17 years." He expected that the revitalized SACB would "deal specifically with the revolutionary/terrorist organizations which have recently become a part of our history."[611]
-On the south coast in the seedy kiss-me-quick seaside town of Hastings some sixth form students were plotting. They were bored out of their minds by A-levels and disillusioned with OE. In contrast the biocentric approach of US EF! and its victorious direct action tactics were inspiring. The wild was calling...
+Assistant Attorney General Mardian's views coincided with those of FBI Assistant Director Brennan, who had seen a need to compile massive data on the "New Left" for future employee security purposes.[612] Since FBI intelligence investigations were based in part on standards for the "Attorney General's list," the new Executive Order substantially redefined and expanded FBI authority. The new order included groups who advocated the use of force to deny individual rights under the "laws of any State" or to overthrow the government of "any State or subdivision thereof."[613] The new order also continued to use the term "subversive," although it was theoretically more restrictive than the previous standard for the Attorney General's list because it required "unlawful" advocacy.
-They formed Britain’s first EF! group with a handfol of people and no resources. Within a few months they would be making headlines-for now they spraypainted Hastings. A year later they had kick-started the biggest wave of ecological defence Britain has seen since the vanquishing of the peasantry... [246]
+Mardian made it clear that, under the order, the FBI was to provide intelligence to the Subversive Activities Control Board:
-So as to cover the last decade relatively briefy I’m going to have to paint with big strokes. The time covered divides (pretty) neatly into three overlapping stages:
+We have a new brand of radical in this country and we are trying to address ourselves to the new situation. With the investigative effort of the FBI, we hope to present petitions to the Board in accordance with requirement of the Executive Order.[614]
- - Earth First! Birth Period (1991–1993)
+FBI intelligence officials learned that the Internal Security Division intended to "initiate proceedings against the Black Panther Party, Progressive Labor Party, Young Socialist Alliance, and Ku Klux Klan." They also noted: "The language of Executive Order 11605 is very broad and generally coincides with the basis for our investigation of extremist groups."[615] Mardian had, in effect, provided a new and wider "charter" for FBI domestic intelligence.[616]
- - Land Struggle Period (1993–1998)
+(2) The Sullivan-Mardian Relationship. -- In 1971, Director Hoover expressed growing concern over the close relationship developing between his FBI subordinates in the Domestic Intelligence Division and the Internal Security Division under Mardian. For example, when FBI intelligence officials met with Mardian's principal deputy, A. William Olsen, to discuss "proposed changes in procedure" for the Attorney General's authorization of electronic surveillance, Hoover reiterated instructions that Bureau officials be "very careful in our dealings" with Mardian. Moreover, to have a source of legal advice independent of the Justice Department, the FBI Director created a new position of Assistant Director for Legal Counsel and required that he attend "at any time officials of the Department are being contacted on any policy consideration which affects the Bureau."[617]
- - Consolidation and Global Resistance Period (1998–2002)
+In the summer of 1971, William C. Sullivan openly challenged FBI Director Hoover, possibly counting on Mardian and Attorney General Mitchell to back him up and oust Hoover.[618] Sullivan charged in one memorandum to Hoover that other Bureau officials lacked "objectivity" and "independent thinking" and that "they said what they did because they thought this was what the Director wanted them to say."[619]
-**** EF! Birth Period (1991–1993)
+Shortly thereafter, Director Hoover appointed W. Mark Felt, formerly Assistant Director for the Inspection Division, to a newly created position as Sullivan's superior. Apparently realizing that he was on his way out, Sullivan gave Assistant Attorney General Mardian the FBI's documents recording the authorization for, and dissemination of, information from the "17" wiretaps placed on Exccutive officials and newsmen in 1969-1971. The absence of these materials was not discovered by other FBI officials until after Sullivan was forced to resign in September 1971.[620] Mardian eventually took part in the transfer of these records to the White House.[621]
-Earth First! hit the headlines when two EF!ers flew from Britain to the rainforests of Sarawak. At the time the Penan tribes were barricading logging roads and standing up to the corporate attack on their home-the forest. The two joined the blockades and for their efforts were locked up for two months in a stinking Malay jail. This news story went through the roof-much to the annoyance of both the Malaysian government and the UK’s leading environmental groups.
+Thus, the Attorney General's principal assistant for internal security collaborated with a ranking FBI official to conceal vital records, ultimately to be secreted away in the White House. This provides a striking example of the manner in which channels of legitimate authority within the Executive Branch can be abused.
-FoE Central Office publicly denounced EF!, arguing that by taking action in Sarawak the EF!ers AIDED the Malaysian government who wanted to paint all opposition as emanating from the West. This position ignored that the Penan had requested that people join them and that the Malaysian government was unlikely to halt the destruction without increased PHYSICAL opposition. As one of the imprisoned EF!ers said:
+<em>d.</em> <em>The FBIs Secret "Administrative Index"</em>
-fa our absence from Britain we had been tried and convicted by the mainstream groups. They have convicted us of a crime they themselves could never be accused of action. With friends like these, the Earth doesn’t need enemies.
+In the fall of 1971, the FBI confronted the prospect of the first serious Congressional curtailment of domestic intelligence investigations -- repeal of the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 -- and set a course of evasion of the will of Congress which continued, partly with justice Department approval, until 1973.
-This was the first of many public attacks on the new generation of radical ecological activists by the headquarters of the environmental NGOs. The difference between the two tendencies was shown in July 1991. While the Sarawak Two were in prison the annual meeting of the G7 (world’s seven leading state powers) came to London. EF!ers with no money and few numbers carried out a number of actions-banner drops outside and disruption of meetings inside. The NGOs submitted reports. This mobilisation by EF! was small but a portent of things to come. The next time the G7 came to Britain the radical ecological movement would field not dozens but thousands...
+An FBI Inspection Report viewed the prospect of the repeal without great alarm. In the event the Act was repealed, the FBI intended to continue as before under "the Government's inherent right to protect itself internally."[622] After the repeal took place, Bureau officials elaborated the following rationale for keeping the Security Index of "potentially dangerous subversives:"
-Thanks to the Sarawak campaign the Hastings lot quickly began to make links with people around the country from a variety of pre-existing networks: Green Anarchist, the (embryonic) Rainforest Action Network, ALF, Green Student groups, peace groups, local FoE, and the hunt saboteurs. Out of a generation largely consisting of students and doleys disillusioned with mainstream environmentalism, groups sprang up in London, Brighton, Glastonbury, Liverpool, Oxford, Manchester, and Norwich.
+Should this country come under attack from hostile forces, foreign <em>or domestic</em>, there is nothing to preclude the President from going before a joint session of Congress and requesting necessary authority to apprehend and detain those who would constitute a menace to national defense. At this point, it would be absolutely essential to have an immediate list, such as the SI, for use in making such apprehensions.[623] [Emphasis added.]
-**** Roads, Rebels and Rainforests
+Thus, FBI officials hoped there would be a way to circumvent the repeal "in which the essence of the Security Index and emergency detention of dangerous individuals could be utilized under Presidential powers."[624]
-Inspired by abroad the handful of new activists went about importing the North American/Australian model. What this meant was a combination of non-violent civil disobedience, me-dia stunts, and monkey-wrenching. Actions were organised as part of international rainforest days co-ordinated in the US and Australia. Australia had seen some recent big dock blockades and the tactic was quickly brought to Britain.
+Assistant Director Dwight Dalbey, the FBI's Legal Counsel, recommended writing to the Attorney General for "a reassessment" in order to "protect" the Bureau in case "some spokesman of the extreme left" claimed that repeal of the Detention Act eliminated FBI authority for domestic intelligence activity. Dalbey agreed that, since the Act "could easily be put back in force should an emergency convince Congress of its need," the Bureau should "have on hand the necessary action information pertaining to individuals."[625] Thereupon, a letter was sent to Attorney General Mitchell proposing that the Bureau be allowed to "maintain an administrative index" of individuals who "pose a threat to the internal security of the country." Such an index would be an aid to the Bureau in discharging its "investigative responsibility." However, the letter made no reference to the theory prevailing within the FBI that the new "administrative index" would serve as the basis for a revived detention program in some future emergency.[625]
-On 4<sup>th</sup> December 1991, in what was EF!‘s first really successful action, 200 people invaded Tilbury docks in London. That month the EF! Action Update also reported under the headline ‘Re-claim the Streets’ a small roadblock done by South Downs
+Thus, when the Attorney General replied that the repeal of the Act did not prohibit the FBI from compiling an "administrative index" to make "readily retrievable" the "results of its investigations," he did not deal with the question of whether the index would also serve as a round-up list for a future emergency. The Attorney General also stated that the Department did not "desire a copy" of the new index, abdicating even the minimal supervisory role performed previously by the Internal Security Division in its review of the names on the Security Index.[626] FBI officials realized that they were "now in a position to make a sole determination as to which individuals should be included in an index of subversive individuals."[627]
-EF! More was to be heard of Reclaim the Streets...
+There were two major consequences of the new system. First, the new "administrative index" (ADEX) was expanded to include an elastic category: "the new breed of subversive."[628] Second, the previous Reserve Index, which had never been disclosed to the Justice Department, was incorporated into the ADEX. It included "teachers, writers, lawyers, etc." who did not actively participate in subversive activity "but who were nevertheless influential in espousing their respective philosophies." It was estimated that the total case load under the ADEX would be "in excess of 23,000."[629]
-Tilbury was followed by a 400-strong protest at Liverpool docks.
+One of the FBI standards for placing someone on the ADEX list demonstrates the vast breadth of the list and the assumption that it could be used as the basis for detention in an emergency:
-<quote>
+An individual who, although not a member of or participant in activities of revolutionary organizations or considered an activist in affiliated fronts, has exhibited a revolutionary ideology and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by national emergency to commit acts of espionage or sabotage, including acts of terrorism, assassination or any interference with or threat to the survival and effective operation of the national, state, and local governments and of the defense efforts. [Emphasis added.][630]
-On the first day we stormed the fences, occupied cranes, piles of dead rainj(Jrest, observation towers and machinery; we <em>hung banners off everything and blocked the busy dock road... Police relations were good; because offull liaison work, violence on both sides was prevented and we all got on like good mates. This was helped with good legal backup, and non-violence training from experienced CND activists... People stayed up the cranes all night... The second day saw a complete change in attitude by the authorities. They’d let us have ourfun on the first day and they were determined that the ship would dock on the Wednesday. Underfear of violence, our press office got the media straight down there-our strongest weapon againstfoul play, but al-ready the police were wading in and holdingpeople in a big cage.[247]</em>
-</quote>
-The description of state force as “foul play” and our greatest protection from it being the media illustrates well the startlingly naive views held by many at the time. The dockworkers refused to unload the shipment while EF!ers were still running around in danger. Eventually the police cleared the dock and the shipment was unloaded.
+These criteria were supplied to the Justice Department in 1972, and the Attorney General did not question the fact that the ADEX was more than an administrative aid for conducting investigations, as he had previously been told.[631]
-February saw the first anti-road direct action at Twyford Down. FoE held a symbolic chaining up of the site which they ended when injucted. At the request of the T Wyford Down Association, EF!ers from all over the country started a wave of site actions, sabotage, and blockades.
+A Bureau memorandum indicates that "representatives of the Department" in fact agreed with the view that there might be "circumstances" where it would be necessary "to quickly identify persons who were a threat to the national security" and that the President could then go to Congress "for emergency legislation permitting apprehension and detention."[632]
-Offices started to be targeted around this time with an example being the chaining up of the Malaysian airline office by 29 activists in solidarity with 31 Penan on trial.[248]
+Thus, although the Attorney General did not formally authorize the ADEX as a continuation of the previous detention list, there was informal Departmental knowledge that the FBI would proceed on that basis. One FBI official later recognized that the ADEX could be "interpreted as a means to circumvent repeal of the Emergency Detention Act."[633]
-While the national days of actions at Twyford continued down south, up north the campaign to stop peat extraction from Thorne Moors hotted up. On Monday 13<sup>th</sup> April £100,000 of damage was done to Fisons machinery. A telephone call to the media claimed the action for Earth First! The FoE central office quickly condemned the action on television.
+<em>8.</em> <em>Reconsideration of FBI Authority</em>
-In many ways the first few months of 1992 set a pattern of activism prevalent for much of the next decade-a cycle of national actions, anti-road campaigns, office occupations, nighttime sabotage and street blockades.
+In February 1971, the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee began a series of hearings on federal data banks and the Bill of Rights which marked a crucial turning point in the development of domestic intelligence policy. The Subcommittee, chaired by Senator Sam J. Ervin of North Carolina, reflected growing concern among Americans for the protection of "the privacy of the individual against the 'information power' of government."[634]
-The South Downs hosted Britains first EF! gathering in April 1992. Around 60 people turned up to discuss direction, aims and plan future actions. While EF! was quite unified at the time, divi-sions were definitely present. The recent Moors sabotage and unwise interviews to the press con-cerning the future environmental use of explosives caused quite a stir. Most agreed that if EF! itself was seen to do criminal damage then it would put groups at risk. A line of “We neither condemn nor condone” was agreed upon. For some this was simply a legal technicality-in reality EF!ers would still be doing damage. For the less militant faction it was seen as meaning civil disobedience was the tactic for EF! while sabotage was secondary, separate, and something done by others. Though I’d still say that the wet faction was wrong, it was understandable given the widespread paranoia following the then-recent Arizona conspiracy trial and the FBI bombing of EF!ers.
+Largely in response to this first serious Congressional inquiry into domestic intelligence policy, the Army curtailed its extensive surveillance of civilian political activity. The Senate inquiry also led, after Director Hoover's death in 1972, to reconsideration by the FBI of the legal basis for its domestic intelligence activities and eventually to a request to the Attorney General for clarification of its authority.[635]
-In this period EF! was primarily involved nationally in two campaigns: rainforests and anti-roads. While similar tactics were used for both they had fundamentally different characters. While rain-forest days of action would trail off, anti-road action would get bigger and bigger.
+<em>a.</em> <em>Developments in 1972-1974</em>
-While the rainforest actions were often very successful-on their own terms-they rarely lasted more than a day. On May 11<sup>th</sup> ’92 over 100 invaded the yard of Britain’s biggest mahogany importer. Though a successfol action in itself, it remained in the whole a media stunt. The site remained operative, the offices weren’t trashed, and next day it opened up again as usual. We all felt empowered by the action, but there was a different feeling at Twyford Down. At Twyford the movement could engage in protracted physical resistance. It was a land struggle. You could feel the land you were struggling over with your hands and your soul. When people started to move onto the land itself they connected with it, became part of it. Standing in the sun, grass between your toes looking to the diggers on the horizon the rage grew. It wasn’t a single issue-it was war.
+There is no indication that FBI "guidelines" material or the FBI Manual provisions themselves were submitted to, or requested by, the Justice Department prior to 1972.[636] Indeed, when Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst testified in February 1972 at the hearings on his nomination to be Attorney General, he stated that be was "not sure" what guidelines were used by the FBI. Kleindienst also stated that he believed FBI investigations were "restricted to criminal conduct or the likelihood of criminal conduct."[637] Director Hoover noted on a newspaper report of the testimony, "Prepare succinct memo to him on our guidelines."[638]
-On an entirely practical level it was a focus; an easily accessible battleground local groups could drive their vans to. In this struggle EF! grew and evolved. Most actions through ’92 were done by between 10–50 people and commonly resulted in minor arrests for breach ofthe peace. Sabotage commenced almost immediately. The site was regularly flooded by redirecting the River ltchens water and machines were wrenched. Just as it was new for us so too it was for the state, who were suprisingly unprepared. In these first few months it would be case of running onto site, climbing a crane or locking onto a digger. An hour or so later the state’s most regular foot soldier would arrive-Bill Aud, a copper with a sideline in mobile disco. lhe Camps Begin...
+After Hoover's death in 1912, a sharp split developed within the Domestic Intelligence Division over whether or not the Bureau should continue to rely on the various Executive Orders as a basis for its authority.[639]
-The need for groups to have somewhere to sleep after travelling distances for days of action was the catalyst that set up Britains first ever ecological direct action camp. A traveller site had long graced one side of the hill, but in June an obviously separate action camp was set up on the don-gas-an area of threatened downland furrowed deep with sheep droves. This became a base for action against the road-building that was going on further down the hill. On the dongas a real feeling of tribe developed as many more were attracted to the site by summer beauty and direct action.
+Acting Director Gray postponed making any formal decisions on this matter; he did not formally request advice from the Attorney General.[640] Meanwhile, the Domestic Intelligence Division proceeded on its own to revise the pertinent Manual sections and the ADEX standards.[641] The list was to be trimmed to those who were "an actual danger now," reducing the number of persons on the ADEX by two-thirds.[642]
-While some travellers had early on got involved in EF!,[249] it was at Twyford that a real mix started to develop between (predominately urban) EF!/Animal Lib types and (predominately rural) travellers. Each threw different ingredients into the campfire cauldron (of veggie slop). The activists-action techniques; the Travellers-on the land living skills. Teepees and benders sprung up, machines were trashed. This crossover would propel ecological direct action into a potent cycle of struggle with big numbers and big successes.
+A revision of the FBI Manual was completed by May 1973. It was described as "a major step" away from "heavy reliance upon Presidential Directives" to an approach "based on existing Federal statutes.[643] Although field offices were instructed to "close" investigations not meeting the new criteria, headquarters did not want "a massive review on crash basis" of all existing cases.[644]
-However while both sides complemented each other it would be ridiculous to iron over the very real family squabbles. As the summer progressed there was tension within the Dongas Tribe over what offensive actions should be taken and what defensive measures should be put in place. Discussion of how to resist the (obviously imminent) eviction was silenced with the classic hippy refrain: If you think negative things, negative things will happen. It was even suggested, in a basically religious formulation, that mother earth would simply not allow the destruction of the dongas to happen. This tendency grew as the months went on until by autumn serious conflict reared up. Following a threat by security to repeat an earlier arson attack on the camp in retaliation for site sabotage, offensive action was actually banned by a “meeting of the tribe:’ Hippie authoritarian pacifists[250] practically banished EF!ers who had been involved from the start. Predictably, however, the state wasn’t standing idle-it was preparing.
+After a series of regional conferences with field office supervisors, the standards were revised to allow greater flexibility.[645] For the first time in FBI history, a copy of the Manual section for "domestic subversive investigations" was sent to the Attorney General.[646]
-Elsewhere the campaign against roads was building apace. New road openings were disrupted and the newspapers were already talking about the “next Twyford”-the battle for Oxleas Wood in London. Across the country the government boasted it was building the biggest road programme since the Romans. These roads smashed through some ofthe most biologically im-portant areas-SS Sis (Special Sites of Scientific Interest) and so it was obvious that by fighting roads one could take on Thatcher’s Great Car Economy, while directly defending important habitat. Direct action was starting to spread beyond roads. At Golden Hill in Bristol an impressive community resistance against the destruction of local green space by Tesco, resulted in arrests and mass policing. A new air was definitely abroad. Back at Twyford the inevitable eviction came brutally on the 9<sup>th</sup> of December-Yellow Wednesday. A hundred flouro-jacketed Group 4 security guards escorted bulldozers in to trash the camp. Throwing themselves in front of the landrovers and machines those in the camp slowed the eviction-suffering arrests and injuries. Two were rendered unconscious by cops; lines of coiled razor wire crossed the down. The drama appearing live on television brought local ramblers, environmentalists, kids, and the simply shocked to the site, many of whom without hesitation joined the resistance. Others came from around the country, making the eviction last three days. The eviction was an important moment-deeply depressing to most involved, it nevertheless captured the imagination of thousands.
+After Clarence M. Kelley was confirmed as FBI Director, he authorized a request for guidance from Attorney General Elliot Richardson.[647] Kelley advised that it "would be folly" to limit the Bureau to investigations only when a crime "has been committed," since the government had to "defend itself against revolutionary and terrorist efforts to destroy it." Consequently, he urged that the President exercise his "inherent Executive power to <em>expand</em> by further <em>defining</em> the FBI's investigative authority to enable it to develop advance information" about the plans of "terrorists and revolutionaries who seek to overthrow or destroy the Government."[648] [Emphasis added.]
-Many, particularly the media, who like a nice neat storywill see the move of the Dongas Camp as the closing act of the Twyford drama, but the battle has not ended-it’s beginning. Ifthey think they can stop us with threats and violence, we’ve got to make damn sure they don’t. Hunt sabs regularly get hassle but carry on regardless-let’s learn from their example. Obstruction on site needs to be co-ordinated and supported. The number of days work lost is what counts. To broaden it out nationally, every Tarmac and associated subcontractors office, depots and sites in the country should be targeted. Every leaflet produced should contain the infor-mation neededfor a cell to wreak £10,000 of havoc against the contractors and even put smaller sub-contractors out of business. No Compromise in Defence of Planet Earth!’--Do or Die, #1, Jan 1993
+Director Kelley's request initiated a process of reconsideration of FBI intelligence authority by the Attorney General.[649]
-**** From the Ashes ... Twyford Rising!
+The general study of FBI authority was superceded in December 1973 when Acting Attorney General Robert Bork, in consultation with Attorney General-designate William Saxbe, gave higher priority to a Departmental inquiry into the FBI's COINTELPRO practices. Responsibility for this inquiry was assigned to a committee headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Peterson.[650]
-In February following an eventful invasion of Whatley Quarry, a new camp was set up at Twyford. Off route and up on the hill overlooking the cutting, this camp, and those that fol-lowed it, would have a very different attitude than the one on the dongas. Not defence, ATTACK!
+Even at this stage, the Bureau resisted efforts by the Department to look too deeply into its operations. Director Kelley advised the Acting Attorney General that the Department should exclude from its review the FBI's "extremely sensitive foreign intelligence collection techniques."[651]
-Starting with half a dozen campers (Camelot EF!) the site steadily grew through spring with di-rect action practically everyday-and many nights too! Some actions were carried out by a handful of people locking onto machines, others were mass invasions by hundreds. Diggers were trashed, offices invaded. A sunrise circle-dance was followed by an eight car sabotage convoy.
+As a result, the Petersen committee's review of COINTELPRO did not consider anything more than a brief FBI prepared summary of foreign counterintelligence operations.[652] Moreover, the inquiry into domestic COINTELPRO cases was based mainly on short summaries of each incident compiled by FBI agents, with Department attorneys making only spot-checks of the underlying files to assure the accuracy of the summaries. Thus, the inquiry was unable to consider the complete story of COINTELPRO as reflected in the actual memoranda discussing the reasons for adopting particular tactics and the means by which they were implemented.[653]
-The state response to these actions grew more organised: hordes of guards, private investigators and cops were stationed daily to stop the actions. They failed. Endless arrests, restrictive bail conditions, camp evictions and harassment only hardened resolve. By late April the Department of Transport was in the High Court pushing for an injunction on 76 named individuals. To back up their case they produced evidence nearly a foot thick with hilarious daily reports from Twyford. A not unusual entry read thus:
+Thus, at the same time that the Bureau was seeking guidance and clarification of its authority, vestiges remained of its past resistance to outside scrutiny and its desire to rely on Executive authority, rather than statute, for the definition of its intelligence activities.
-<quote>
+<em>b.</em> <em>Recent Domestic Intelligence Authority</em>
-<em>At 08.45 hrs a group of protestors raided one of the small earthmoving operations at Shawford Down and did some very severe damage to the excavator before making of There were between 35–50</em> <em>of them and they seemed to know exactly what to do to cause the most damage to the machines.[251]</em>
-</quote>
-Unsurprisingly the High Court backed the DoT and injuncted the 76. lhe reaction from our side was swift, two days after the hearing 500 joined a Mass Trespass at the cutting. In a moving sign of multi-generational resistance the crowd was addressed by Benny Rothman, one of the leaders of the 1932 Kinder Scout Trespass. The mass injunction breaking resulted in six being sent to jail for a month-the first of many to end up in the clink for fighting road building. On the day of their release they were greeted by friends, smiles, hugs and... sabotage. In Collingham, Linconshire, under the spray painted title <em>For the Prisoners of Twyford Down,</em> the following was wrenched: three bulldozers, three Tarmac trucks, two diesel pumps, one work shed and a control station.[252]
+In the absence of any new standards imposed by statute, or by the Attorney General, the FBI continued to collect domestic intelligence under sweeping authorizations issued by the Justice Department in 1974 for investigations of "subversives," potential civil disturbances, and "potential crimes." These authorizations were explicitly based on conceptions of inherent Executive power, broader in theory than the FBI's own claim in 1973 that its authority could be found in the criminal statues. Attorney General Levi has recently promulgated guidelines which stand as the first significant attempt by the Justice Department to set standards and limits for FBI domestic intelligence investigations.[655]
-Tarmac PLC was feeling the pressure. Across the country many of its offices were occupied, its machines targeted. When its AGM was disrupted the directors made their fears known. Thanks to good research their home addresses had been uncovered and published. Some had been freaked enough to hire security guards-their apprehension heightened by past targeting of directors by Animal Liberationists. Considering the relatively few ‘radical eco’ home visits since, this may seem surprising. However at this time the movement was influenced by quite divergent groups. The fact that directors were largely left unscathed in the years to come was not a given-it was a choice.
+(1) Executive Order 1045O, As Amended. -- The Federal employee security program continued to serve as a basis for FBI domestic intelligence investigations. An internal Bureau memorandum stated that the Justice Department's instruction regarding the program:
-During that summer everything from Druid curses to burning tarmac was hurled at the contractors in a hectic campaign which was; <em>a symbol of resistance, a training ground, a life changer and a kick up the arse to the British green movement.[253]</em> Nevertheless, though it slowed it, the M3 was not stopped. <em>The cutting at Twyford Down gets ever deeper and the down, the water meadows and of</em> 263 course most of the dongas are now destroyed, but its destruction has given birth to a movement and the fight goes on.[254]
+specifically requires the FBI to check the names of all civil applicants and incumbents of the Executive Branch against our records. In order to meet this responsibility FBIHQ records must contain identities of all persons connected with subversive or extremist activities, together with necessary identifying information.[656]
-As the resistance at Twyford waned anti-road actions were spreading across the country like wildfire. Digger diving was organised on a near daily basis at Wymondham near Norwich, and in Newcastle hammocks were strewn in the trees at Jesmond Dene. Like Twyford, once again it was local EF!ers and residents that catalysed the intial actions that burgenoned into widescale tribal resistance on the land.
+FBI field offices were instructed in mid-1974 to report to Bureau headquarters such data as the following:
-Further north, action was hotting up in Scotland with tree and crane sits, some lasting days, connected to the M74 in Glasgow. Even further north was the campaign against the Skye Bridge, a monstrosity cutting across the Kyle of Lockash, immortalised in the environmental classic, The Ring of Bright Water. The bridge not only affected the direct habitat (famous for its otters) but connected the Hebrides into the mainland infrastructure, endangering the whole regions ecology by exposing it to further development.
+Identities of subversive and/or extremist groups or movements (including front groups) with which subject has been identified, period of membership, positions held, and a summary of the type and extent of subversive or extremist activities engaged in by subject (e.g., attendance at meetings or other functions, fundraising or recruiting activities on behalf of the organization, contributions, etc.).[657]
-Unfortunately at the time there was only limited active local support for resistance. The first and only day of action against the building was carried out by around a dozen, who, bar a few from Skye and Glasgow EF!, were all from south of the border. As cops stationed on the island could be counted on one hand, reinforcements were brought in. Inflatables were launched as the main work was being carried out off barges. The reaction of the construction firm was brutal-industrial hoses were used as water-cannons in an attempt to knock those up floating cranes into the sea. The Scottish press were present in numbers and also enjoyed some corporate PR. The front page of Ihe Scotsman put it like this:
+In June 1974, President Nixon formally abolished the "Attorney General's list" upon the recommendation of Attorney General Saxbe. However, the President's order retained a revised definition of the types of organizations, association [with] which would still be considered in evaluating prospective federal employees.[658] The Justice Department instructed the FBI that it should "detect organizations with a potential" for falling within the terms of the order and investigate "individuals who are active either as members of or as affiliates of" such organizations. The Department instructions added:
-Journalistic objectivity is a wonderful thing. However, it is easily damaged, especially by people trying to ram your boat, sink you, throw rocks at you, then threatening you first with a crowbar and then a grappling hook, not to mention attacking you with a tracked excavator.[255]
+It is not necessary that a crime occur before the investigation is initiated, but only that a reasonable evaluation of the available information suggests that the activities of the organization may fall within the prescription of the Order....
-The boats were impounded and most were arrested. Bussed a hundred miles away, the group was given strict bail by an all-powerful Roving Sheriff (another great colonial legacy) not to return to the Highlands and Islands for over a year. Police escorted the van most of the way to the border. Elsewhere actions were taken against the projects funders, The Bank of America, but the campaign was effectively stillborn by low local involvement and immediate corporate/state direct action.
+It is <em>not possible to set definite parameters covering the initiation</em> of investigations of potential organizations falling within the Order but once the investigation reaches a stage that offers a basis for determining that the activities are legal in nature, then the investigation should cease, but if the investigation suggests a determination that the organization is engaged in illegal activities or <em>potentially</em> illegal activities it should continue. [Emphasis added.]
-A very different situation had produced a very different result at Oxleas Wood in London. These woods in SE London were widely believed to be the next big battle and 3,000 people had signed a pledge to Beat the Bulldozers. After over a year of direct action at Twyford and with resistance spreading the government knew it couldn’t risk hitting such a beautiful place within “recruitment distance” of millions. The summer of 1993 saw this £300 million scheme dropped, a major victory after just a year of sustained action against infrastructural growth. Not Single Issues, Just One <strong>War</strong> This success was all the more impressive considering that this campaign, though then becoming the dominant terrain of struggle for the movement, was still only one of the battles it was in-volved in. The daily fight on the land was interspersed with national and local days of action across the country on a range of issues.
+The Department applied "the same yardstick" to investigations of individuals "when information is received suggesting their involvement."[659]
-Timber depots in Oxford, Rochdale, and London were all targeted by days of action. One national week of action against mahogany saw ethical shoplifting (the seizure of illegally logged timber from shops), in towns across the country; and abroad the simultaneous total destruction of logging equipment by the Amazonian Parkana Indians![256] Other actions included bank occupations (against Third World debt), an ICI factory invasion (to highlight continued ozone depletion), road blockades (against car culture) and regular quarry blockades at Whatley in Somerset. These different battles were all viewed as part of the same war by EF!ers. Many of the hundreds that invaded Oxford Timbnet for the second time had come direct from a weekend of action at Twyford. lhe next day a cavalcade moved onto Bristol to help disrupt the opening of the disputed Golden Hill Tesco. Then, as now (maybe more so) many EF!ers were also involved in the animal liberation movement.
+(2) Civil Disorders Intelligence. -- The Justice Department also instructed the FBI in 1974 that it should not, as the Bureau had suggested, limit its civil disturbance reporting "to those particular situations which are of such a serious nature that Federal military personnel may be called upon for assistance." The Department advised that this suggested "guideline" was "not practical" since, it "would place the burden on the Bureau" to make an initial decision as to "whether military personnel may ultimately be needed," and this responsibility rested "legally" with the President. Instead, the FBI was ordered to "continue" to report on
-The campaigns were carried out in a global context of escalating radical ecological resistance. Anti-road campaigns in the (French) Pyranees, anti-whaling action by Sea Shepherd (around Norway), the campaign against the Narmada Dam (in India), the Ogoni struggle against Shell (Nigeria), EF! defence of the Danube (in Slovakia), biotech companies bombed (in Switzerland), GM crop experiments dug up (in the Netherlands), and of course anti-logging battles (in North America, the Pacific, the Amazon, and Australia).
+all significant incidents of civil unrest and should not be restricted to situations where, in the judgment of the Bureau, military personnel eventually may be used.[660]
-It’s a long way from North America to Newcastle but in 1993 the tactic of protracted tree-sits crossed the Atlantic. Following demos earlier in the year the bulldozers had gone into Jesmond Dene unannounced on June 16<sup>th</sup>. The state, however, hadn’t factored in skiving Geordie kids, who stopped the machines working while the alarm went out. The next morning protestors barricaded the site entrance. More kids came back and shovelled earth with plastic flowerpots to build up the barricade-the Flowerpot Tribe was born. The campfire was set burning and a strong community formed. A combination of local talent and reinforcements from Twyford and elsewhere made the next five months an avalanche of site occupations, tree-sitting, piss-taking and nightly sabotage. The legendary winds of Newcastle seemed to blow down the construction site fencing again and again! The kids sang: Ihe <em>Chainsaws, the Chainsaws--they cut down all our trees. Ihe Pixies, the Pixies, trashed their JC Bs.</em> Of course despite the laughs it was hard.
+Moreover, under this authority the Bureau was also ordered to "continue" reporting on
-<quote>
+all disturbances where there are indications that extremist organizations such as the Communist Party, Ku Klux Klan, or Black Panther Party are believed to be involved in efforts to instigate or exploit them.
-<em>Everyone</em> is <em>getting very knackerd and pissed of tree sitting is saving the trees that are hammocked, but it’s tiring, cold, stressful, and often boring. Ground support people face prison for breaking injunctions as they take food to trees. It’s</em> GRIM <em>for sitters when the trees are felled near them. Local people sab a Cement mixer under the copper beech by throwing rock salt into it-a workman goes berserk and tries attacking the beech with a JCB, trying to knock the tree-sitters out. He survived but the copper beech loses another couple of branches.[257]</em>
-</quote>
-In 1991 EF!‘s handful of activists were the radical ecological movement. By the end of the summer of 1993, EF! not only had 45 local groups but had catalysed thousands to take direct action-mostly not under the EF! banner. Now one could really begin to talk about a movement. After the Jesmond Dene camps were evicted, one of the Flowerpot Tribe wrote:
+The instructions specifically declared that the Bureau "should make timely reports of significant disturbances, even when no specific violation of Federal law is indicated." This was to be done, at least in part, through "liaison" with local law enforcement agencies.[661]
-<quote>
+Even after the Justice Department's IDIU dismantled its computerized data bank, its basic functions continued to be, performed by a Civil Disturbance Unit in the office of the Deputy Attorney General, and the FBI was under instructions to disseminate its civil disturbance reports to that Unit.[662]
-Those who’ve been involved are also gearing up to fight other <em>schemes... What we’ve learnt will spread out to other road and environmentalprotests... itjustgets bigger and bigger. If we can’t stop the bastards totally we can COST them, show them there’s no easy profit in earth rape. They’ve already been cost millions-let’s cost them some more.[258]</em>
-</quote>
-**** Land Struggle Period (1993–1998)
+FBI officials considered these instructions "significant" because they gave it "an official, written mandate from the Department." The Department's desires were viewed as "consistent with what we have already been doing for the past several years," although the Bureau Manual was rewritten to "incorporate into it excerpts from the Department's letter."[663]
-<quote>
+(3) "Potential" Crimes. -- The FBI recently abolished completely the administrative index (ADEX) of persons considered "dangerous now." However, the Justice Department has advanced a theory to support broad power for the Executive Branch in investigating groups which represent a "potential threat to the public safety" or which have a "potential" for violating specific statutes. For example, the Department advised the FBI that the General Crimes Section of the Criminal Division had "recommended continued investigation" of one group on the basis of "potential violations" of the antiriot statutes.[664][665] These same instructions added that there need not be a "potential" for violation of any specific statute.[666]
-<em>Land struggles were infectious, the next period seeing an explosion of activity. The winning combination was relatively solid networks of long term anti-road campaigners (AL.ARAI UK), a nationwide network of</em> EF! <em>groups and most importantly a swelling ‘tribe’ willing to travel across the land.</em>
-</quote>
-**** Welcome to the Autonomous Zones
+(4) Claim of Inherent Executive Power. -- The Department's theory of executive power was set forth in 1974 testimony before the House Internal Security Committee. According to Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin Maroney, "the primary basis" for FBI domestic intelligence authority rests in "the constitutional powers and responsibilities vested in the President under Article II of the Constitution." These powers were specified as: the President's duty undertaken in his oath of office to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States;"[667] the Chief Executive's duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed:"[668] the President's responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief of the military; and his "power to conduct our foreign relations."[669]
-While the state had backed down at Oxleas it intended to go full steam ahead with the M11 link through East London. DoT bureaucrats and politicians probably thought the movement wouldn’t pull together over the destruction of a small amount of trees and hundreds of working class homes. They were wrong.
+The chairman of the Internal Security Committee, Rep. Richard H. Ichord, stated at that time that, except in limited areas, the Congress "has not directly imposed upon the FBI clearly defined duties in the acquisition, use, or dissemination of domestic or internal security intelligence."[670]
-Hundreds of the houses were already squatted, long since having been compulsorily purchased. This vibrant scene was joined by others from Jesmond and Twyford. With much of the road smashing through a long-term squatting community and a solidly working class area, this more than any previous anti-road campaign was a defence ofhuman lives as well as wildlife. Nevertheless, there were beautiful patches of overgrown gardens and <em>Copses</em><em>,</em> and the struggle was also understood in the national ecological context.
+Subsequently, the FBI Intelligence Division revised its 1972-1973 position on its legal authority, and in a paper completed in 1975 it returned to the view "that the intelligencegathering activities of the FBI have had as their basis the intention of the President to delegate his Constitutional authority," as well as the statutes "pertaining to the national security."[671]
-<quote>
+The Attorney General has continued to assert the claim of inherent executive power to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance of American citizens, although this power has been exercised sparingly.[672] The Justice Department has also claimed that this inherent executive power permits warrantless surreptitious entries.[673] However, the Executive Branch has recently joined a bipartisan group of Senators and Representatives in sponsoring a legislative proposal requiring judicial warrants for all electronic surveillance by the FBI.
-<em>By halting the road in London we can save woodlands, rivers and heathlands all the way to Scotland, without endangering their ecology by having mud fights with hundreds of security guards and police in their midst.[259]</em>
-</quote>
-The first real flashpoint came at a chestnut tree on George Green, common land in the heart of Wanstead. The l Oft hoardings which had been erected to enclose the common were trashed by a jolly mob of kids, activists, and local people. On the Green a hunched woman in her eighties was crying. She had always felt powerless, but when she pushed the fences down with hundreds of others, she said she felt powerful for the first time in her life. Empowerment is direct action’s magic, and the spell was spreading.
+(5) Attorney General Levi's Guidelines. -- During 1975, the Congress and the Executive Branch began major efforts to review the field of domestic intelligence. A Presidential commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller inquired into the CIA's improper surveillance of Americans.[674] Attorney General Edward H. Levi established a committee in the Justice Department to develop "guidelines" for the FBI,[675] and the Justice Department began to work on draft legislation to require warrants for national security electronic surveillance.[676]
-<quote>
+These efforts have begun to bear fruit in recent months. President Ford has issued an Executive Order regulating foreign intelligence activities;[677] Attorney General Levi has promulgated several sets of "guidelines" for the FBI.[678] And the administration has endorsed a specific bill to establish a warrant procedure for all national security wiretaps and bugs in the United States.[679]
-A treehouse was built in the branches of the chestnut tree... For the following month the camp-fire became a focal point... <em>People from different backgrounds began to get to know one another, spending long evenings together, talking, forming new friendships. Something new and beautiful had been created in the community. Many local people talk of their lives having been completely changed by the experience.[260]</em>
-</quote>
-The eviction came in December and was carried out by 400 police. With 150 people resisting it took nine hours to bring down one tree! Sabotage also played a part-both of the contractor’s hydraulic platforms had been wrenched the night before.
+These Executive initiatives are a major step forward in creating safeguards and establishing standards, but they are incomplete without legislation.[680] Among the issues left open by the President's Executive Order, for example, are: (1) the definition of the term "foreign subversion" used to characterize the counter- intelligence responsibilities of the CIA and the FBI; and (2) clarification of the vague provisions in the National Security Act of 1947 relating to the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect "sources" and "methods;" and (3) amplification of the 1947 Act's prohibition against the CIA's exercise of "law enforcement powers" or "internal security functions."
-<quote>
+Although they represent only a partial answer to the need for permanent restraints, the initiatives of the Executive Branch demonstrate a willingness to seriously consider the need for legislative action. The Attorney General has recognized that Executive "guidelines" are not enough to regulate, and authorize FBI intelligence activities.[681] The Committee's conclusions and recommendations in Part IV of this report indicate the areas most in need of legislative attention.
-<em>The eviction had forced the Do</em> T <em>to humiliate itself in a very public way. The loss of the tree was a tragic day, and yet also a truly wonderful day. It had hammered another huge nail in the coffin of the roads programme.[261]</em>
-</quote>
-The state hoped this was the end of No Ml I, but it was just the beginning. Other areas had already been occupied, and regular action against the contractors continued. It was a fitting end to the second year of concerted action against roads.
-On January 1, 1994, the Indigenous Zapatistas of Mexico launched themselves on to the stage of world history. Liberating town after town, freeing prisoners, redistributing food, declaring themselves autonomous of the new economic order. They didn’t just redistribute food; they redistributed hope worldwide, and were to have a significant impact on the movement here.
+[1] Repressive practices during World War I included the formation of a volunteer auxiliary force, known as the American Protective League, which assisted the Justice Department and military intelligence in the investigation of "un American activities" and in the mass round-up of 50,000 persons to discover draft evaders. These so-called "slacker raids" of 1918 involved warrantless arrests without sufficient probable cause to believe that crime had been or was about to be committed (FBI intelligence Division memorandum, "An Analysis of FBI Domestic Security intelligence Investigations," 10/28/75.)
+<br>
+<br>The American Protective League also contributed to the pressures which resulted in nearly 2,000 prosecutions for disloyal utterances and activities during World War I, a policy described by John Lord O'Brien, Attorney General Gregory's Special Assistant, as one of "wholesale repression and restraint of public opinion." (Zechariah Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941) p. 69,)
+<br>
+<br>Shortly after the war the Justice Department and the Bureau of Investigation Jointly planned the notorious "Palmer Raids", named for Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer who ordered the overnight round-up and detention of some 10,000 persons who were thought to be "anarchist" or "revolutionary" aliens subject to deportation. (William Preston, Aliens and Dissenters (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1963), chs. 7-8: Stanley Cohen, A. Mitchell Palmer-, Politician (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), chs. 11-12.)
-Meanwhile in Britain the year nearly started off with a big bang. In January a very small amount of broadsheet coverage reported the police detonation of an explosive device under the main bridge at Twyford Down. Coverage also reported a bomb found at Tarmac’s HQ.[262]
+[2] See Attorney General Stone's full statement, p. 23.
-The Spring saw camps sprout up against the Wymondham Bypass near Norwich, the Leadenham Bypass in Lincolnshire, the Batheastern-Swainswick Bypasses outside Bath and the Blackburn Bypass in Lancashire. In inner-city Manchester, a threatened local park got a dose of eco-action at Abbey Pond. Back in the East End, Spring saw vast defensive and offensive road-resisting. A row of large Edwardian houses were next en route-they were barricaded, and Vvanstonia was born: it was <em>declared an autonomous free zone. People made joke passports and the like. We were digging this huge trench all the way around the site. Doing that probably had zero tactical effectiveness but it really made us feel that this was where the</em> UK <em>ended and our space started.</em>[263]
+[3] See Joan Jensen, The Price of Vigilance (Chicago: Rand McNally 1968). one FBI official recalled later, "There were probably seven or eight such active organizations operating at full force during war day,; and it was not an uncommon experience for an Agent of this Bureau to call upon an individual in the Course Of his investigation, to find out that six or seven other Government agencies had been around to interview the party about the same matter." (Memorandum of IF. X. O'Donnell, Subject: Operations During World War 1, 10/4/38).
-The State does not take well to losing territory.
+[4] See footnote 1, p. 21.
-<quote>
+[5] Letter from Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to Jack Alexander, 9/21/37, cited in Alpheus T. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law (New York, Viking, 1956) p 149.
-In <em>a scene reminiscent of a medieval siege, around</em> 800 <em>police and bailif supported by cherry-pickers and diggers besieged the independent state of Wanstonia. After cordoning off the area the invaders preceded to storm thefive houses. The police had to break through the barricades to enter only to find the staircases removed thus forcing them to get in through roofs or upperfloors. Some protestors were on the roofs having chained themselves to the chimneys, the con-tractors preceded to destroy the houses while many people were still occupying them... It took ten hours to remove 300</em><em>people.[264]</em>
-</quote>
-This impressive and costly eviction was followed up by Operation Roadblock-a month of rota-based daily direct action, where groups booked in which days they would take action. It worked remarkably well, with sizeable disruption every day through March. Elsewhere many of the resistance techniques developed at the M 11, both for the defence of houses and trees, were now being used against other schemes.
+[6] New York Times, 5/10/24.
-**** Progress, Yuck-Time to Go Back to the Trees
+[7] Stone to Hoover. 5/13/24, quoted in Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone, at p. 151. Although Hoover bad served as head of the General Intelligence Division of the Justice Department at the time of the "Palmer Raids" and became an Assistant Director of the Bureau in 1921, he persuaded Attorney General Stone and Roger Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union that he had played an "unwilling part" in the excesses of the past. and he agreed to disband the Bureau's "radical division." Baldwin advised Stone, "I think we were wrong in our estimate of his attitude." (Baldwin to Stone, 8/6/24, quoted in Donald Johnson, The Challenge to American Freedoms (University of Kentucky Press, 1963). pp, 174-175.)
+<br>
+<br>In December 1924, Stone made Hoover Director of the Bureau of Investigation.
-Tactics were evolving fast. At Jesmond, temporary hammocks had graced the branches: at George Green a single treehouse had been built; at Bath the first real network of treehouses hit the skyline; in Blackburn there was a full-on Ewok-style Tree Village. Unable to defeat the bailiffs on the ground, resistance had moved skyward.
+[8] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Mr. Cowley, 5/10/34.
-<quote>
+[9] J. Edgar Hoover memorandum to the files, 8/24/36. This memorandum states that, earlier In the conversation, Director Hoover had told the President:
-You’d be standing at the fire at night, and it would be thefirst time you’d been down on the ground all day. You’d look up <em>and there would be all these little twinkles from candles up above you... How were they going to get us out?</em>... I <em>don’t think</em> I <em>can describe here how special it is to sleep and wake in the branches of a tree. To see the stars and the moon. To feel the sunshine andfeel the rain.[265]</em>
+<br>
-</quote>
+<br>(i) Communists controlled or planned to take control of the West Coast longshoreman's union, the United Mine Workers Union and the Newspaper Guild (and using those unions would be "able at any time to paralyze the country");
+<br>
+<br>(ii) "activities ... inspired by Communists" had recently taken place in the Government, "particularly in some of the Departments and the National Labor Relations Board"; and
+<br>
+<br>(iii) The Communist Internationale had recently issued instructions for all Communists to "vote for President Roosevelt and against Governor Landon because of the fact that Governor Landon is opposed to class warfare."
+<br>
+<br>These comments indicate that the Bureau had already begun some intelligence gathering on Communists and activities "inspired" by them prior to any Presidential order. In addition, Hoover's memorandum referred to prior intelligence collection on domestic right-wing figures Father Charles Coughlin and General Smedley Butler.
-Hundreds were now living on-site across the country, with many, many more weekending or visiting for days of action. Most campaigns were now setting up multiple camps, each taking a slightly different form according to the lay of the land. Previously, barricades had been built around houses and woodlands-now they themselves were transformed into barricades--complex networks of walkways, treehouses, lock-ons, concrete and determination.
+[10] Hoover stated that Secretary of State Hall "at the President's suggestion, requested of me, the representative of the Department of Justice, to have investigation made of the subversive activities in this country, including communism and fascism." He added that "the Attorney General verbally directed me to proceed with this Investigation." (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to E. A. Tamm, 9/10/36.)
-Solsbury Hill’s fourth site eviction at Whitecroft was the first full-on, all-treetop eviction. Using cherry-pickers and standard chainsaw men, the Sheriff failed to take down a single tree; the camp had defeated him... for now. The cost was high; one protestor hospitalised with spinal injuries and a collapsed lung. Ten days later the Sheriff returned, this time with madder baliffs--Equity card-holding stunt men. These were more crazy, muscular, and willing to take risks with their own lives as well as of those in the trees. By the end of the day Whitecroft was no more. This-the most spectacular at the time-was only one of the many conflicts countrywide. These evictions were becoming hugely costly-to the contractors, to the state, and to social stability. Most sites at this time continued offensive action as well, using the by then standard for-mula; digger diving, office occupations and crane-sits, alongside overt and covert sabotage. The state was being challenged-it would soon escalate its response.
+[11] Memorandum on "domestic intelligence," prepared by J. Edgar Hoover. enclosed with letter from Attorney General Cummings to Roosevelt, 10/20/38. Director Hoover met with the President who, according to Hoover's memorandum, "approved the plan which I had prepared and which had been sent to him by the Attorney General." (Memorandum to the files from J. Edgar Hoover, 11/7/38.)
-With every campaign the movement seemed to be going from strength to strength, with one exception, Leadenham. A camp had set up, and the DoT said it was putting the scheme into review, but victory was not to be. The contractors launched a surprise attack-during the reprieve-while those still on site were dealt with a few weeks later by local thugs. Vigilante attacks on sites had always been an occasional occurrence, but they were usually minor in scale. At Leadenham though there was a sizeable group of pro-road locals willing to take direct action.
+[12] Letter from Attorney General Cummings to the President, 10/20/38.
-The attack happened.following a demo by local people in favour of the bypass. Leadenham villagers decided in their infinite wisdom that a road was preferable to a few trees’. Masked vigilantes arrived at the camp at Sam armed with chainsaws. They proceeded to hack down trees protestors had been sitting in. Anyone getting in their way was punched and violently assaulted.[266]
+[13] On 2/7/39, the Assistant to the the Attorney General wrote letters to the Secret Service, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Narcotics Bureau, the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, and the Postal Inspection Service stating that the FBI and military intelligence had "undertaken activities to investigate matters relating to espionage and subversive activities." (Letter from J. B. Keenan. Assistant to the Attorney General, to F. J. Wilson, Chief, Secret Service, 2/7/39.)
+<br>
+<br>A letter from Attorney General Murphy to the Secretary of the Treasury shortly thereafter also referred to "subversive activities." (Letter from Attorney General Murphy to the Secretary of the Treasury, 2/16/39.)
+<br>
+<br>However, a similar letter two days later referred only to matters "involving espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage," without mentioning "subversive activities." (Letter from Attorney General Murphy to the Secretary of the Treasury, 2/18/39.) This may have reflected a decision by Murphy to cease using "subversive activities" to describe FBI investigations. The record does not clarify the reason for his deletion of the phrase.
-This basically put an end to site occupation at the scheme, though days of action still followed. What Leadenham showed was the absolute necessity ofhaving significant community support IF a camp was set up. Without it, there was a danger of being sitting/sleeping targets. Thankfully, through this period no other sites were mass attacked by local vigilantes in this way.[267]
+[14] Memorandum from T. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Murphy, 3/16/39. Murphy was aware that the FBI contemplated investigations of subversive activities, since Hoover enclosed his 1938 plan with -this memorandum.
-While in this article I’ll give an overview of this period, from so high up one can’t hope to focus on the detail-and it’s the detail that counts. The incredible moments, the passion, the exhilaration, the waiting, the amazing people, the occasional twat-the tribe. Not to mention the holy trinity: dogs, mud, and cider. On site and in the trees, this feeling of togetherness and otherness grew. Leaving site to get food or giros, the harshness and speed of the industrial world hit you; but by living a daily existence of resistance we were hitting back.
+[15] Letter from Attorney General Murphy to the President, 6/17/39.
-**** Hunting the Machines
+[16] Confidential Memorandum from the President to Department Heads, 6/26/39.
-Every month brought news of an increase in sabotage despite minimal coverage in either main-stream or radical press, not least because communiques were rarely sent. Sabotage largely centred around projects where ongoing daytime campaigns were underway, but some was done in soli-darity with campaigns further afield. With so many groups fighting multiple schemes by the same companies actions often ended fulfilling both roles. ARC, for instance, had supplied roadstone to Twyford Down and was trying to expand quarries in North Wales and Somerset. Afterforcing their way into the control room [of ARC Penmaemawr quarry] the <em>intruders smashed a glass partition and then caused</em> £10,000 <em>worth ofdamage to computer equipment.[268]</em>
+[17] Memorandum from Hoover to Murphy, 3/16/39, enclosing Hoover memorandum on "domestic intelligence," 10/20/38.
-The scale of sabotage carried out during the ‘90s land struggles is often forgotten. Altogether the direct costs of replacement and repair at construction sites must have easily run into the tens of millions. Fantasists may dream that this was the work of highly organised anonymous cells, striking and then disappearing[269], but in truth most trashings were carried out by those camping on-site; either subtley during digger diving, raucously as a mob, or covertly after heavy drinking sessions around the campfire. Basically, whenever it was possible, people fucked shit up. The sensible and commendable desire not to boast has left these actions hidden behind newspaper images of smiling tree-people. The grins though were often those of mischievous machine-wreckers; near campfires no yellow monster was safe from the hunt.
+[18] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Murphy, 9/6/39.
-Some celebrity liberals[270] argued criminal damage should not have a place in campaigns as it would put off normal everyday people. This ridiculous idea was even stupider considering one of the main groups consistently carrying out sabotage were those locals with jobs and families who didn’t have available (day)time to live on site, and for whom arrests for minor digger-diving could lead to unemployment and family problems. For many normal everyday people” covert sabotage was less risky than overt civil disobedience. Another group of locals that always took to environmental vandalism like ducks to water were kids, nearly always the most rebellious section of any community, often with the most intimate relationship to the local environment.
+[19] Statement of the President, 9/6/39.
+<br>
+<br>President Roosevelt never formally defined "subversive activities" - a term whose vagueness has proven a problem throughout the FBI's history. However, a hint as to his definition is contained in his remarks at a press conference on September 9, 1939. A national emergency bad just been declared, and pursuant thereto, the President had issued an authorization for up to 150 extra FBI agents to handle "additional duties." In explaining that action, he stated he was concerned about "things that happened" before World War I, specifically "Sabotage" and "Propaganda by both belligerents" to "sway public opinion. . . . [I]t is to guard against that and the spread by any foreign nation of propaganda in this nation which would tend to he subversive - I believe that is the word - of our form of Government." (1939 Public Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt. pp. 495-496.)
-Of course despite what I say above, some ecotage was carried out entirely covertly with modus operandi borrowed from the Animal Liberation Front [ALF].
+[20] Confidential memorandum from President Roosevelt to Attorney General Jackson, 5/21/40. In May 1941, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy urged "a broadening of the investigative responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the fields of subversive control of labor." (Memorandum from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to the President, 5/29/41) The President replied that he was sending their letter to the Attorney General "with my general approval." (Memorandum from President Roosevelt to the Secretaries of War and Navy, 6/4/41.)
-<quote>
+[21] Attorney General's Order No. 3732, 9/25/42, p. 19. But see Delimitation Agreement between the FBI and Military Intelligence, 2/9/42, at footnote 56.
-<em>Police believe a</em> £2 <em>million blaze at an Essex construction site could be the work of Green Activists. The fire swept through Cory Environment’s aggregates and waste disposal site at Barling, near Southend, ruiningfour bulldozers, two diggers,</em> and a fleet of six trucks owned by the main contractor. The police say thatforensic evidence confirms arson.[271]
-</quote>
-**** There is no justice, just Us!
+[22] Statement of the President on "Police Cooperation," 1/8/43. A note in the President's handwriting added that the FBI was to receive information "relating to espionage and related matters." (Copy in FDR Library.)
-It was becoming obvious that the ecological land struggles were really getting in the way ofprogress.
+[23] Cummings to Roosevelt, 10/20/38.
-The government (correctly) saw the movement as part of a social fabric (travelling culture, festivals, squatting, hunt sabbing) born of the ‘60s/‘70s upsurge. With the Criminal Justice Bill it sought to tear this fabric apart. No more toleration, the government announced; it was giving itself new powers to close free parties, ban demonstrations, create huge exclusion zones, evict squats and jail persistent road-protest trespassers. Unsurprisingly this challenge was met with a sudden flurry of activity. High street squat info centres around the country; local and national demos. Thousands turned up for marches in London. Rather than deterring people the new laws brought people together-Unity in Diversity the call of the day.
+[24] Hoover memorandum, enclosed with letter from Cummings to Roosevelt, 10/20/38. Director Hoover's full point was that:
+<br>
+<br>"In considering the steps to be taken for the expansion of the present structure of intelligence work, it is believed imperative that it be proceeded with, with the utmost degree of secrecy in order to avoid criticism or objections which might be raised to such an expansion by either ill-informed persons or individuals having some ulterior motive. The word 'espionage' has long been a word that has been repugnant to the American people and it is believed that the structure which is already in existence is much broader than espionage or counterespionage, but covers in a true sense real intelligence values to the three services interested, namely, the Navy, the Army, and the civilian branch of the Government - the Department of Justice. Consequently, it would seem undesirable to seek any special legislation which would draw attention to the fact that it was proposed to develop a special counterespionage drive of any great magnitude."
-On October 9 a demo of 75,000 ended in Hyde Park for the normal ritual of platform speakers. When a sound-system tried to get in at Speakers Corner to turn it into an illegal “party in the park;’ it was attacked by police. In turn people fought back. The call went out across the Park-Defend the System; thousands ran from the speeches to the action-the Hyde Park Riot had begun.
+[25] 28 U.S.C. 533 (3).
-<quote>
+[26] The conflicts between the FBI and the State Department in 1939 are discussed at footnote 54.
-Although some peoplefaced up to the police in Park Lane itself, most of the crowd ended up inside the park separated by the metal railings from the riot cops. This made it dif cult for the police to launch baton charges or send in the horses, and when they tried to force their way through the small gates in the railings they were repelled with sticks, bottles and whatever was to hand.
-There were some ve1y surreal touches while all this was going on: people dancing notfarfrom the police lines, a unicyclist weaving his way through the riot cops, a man fire-breathing. Some people have argued that the police deliberately provoked a riot to make sure the Criminal Justice Bill was passed, but this ignores thefact that there was never any danger of the CJB not being passed, as there had never been any serious opposition within parliament.[272]
+[27] Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Bill 1940, Hearings before the House Appropriations Committee, 11/30/39, pp. 303-307.
-</quote>
+<br>
+<br>In fact, the FBI had established a General Intelligence Section in its Investigative Division shortly after the President's 1936 requests. Congress was not advised of the Bureau's activities undertaken prior to September 1939, nor of the President's earlier directives.
+[28] Justice Department Appropriation Bill. 1941, Hearings before the House Appropriations committee, 1/5/40, p. 151. The President's 1939 statement did not specifically say that the FBI had authority to investigate "subversive activities."
-Hyde Park-like the eviction of the Dongas-was a landmark confrontation. At Twyford the movement was forced to face up to the reality of state violence. At Hyde Park it was forced to face the reality of movement violence, the reality being simple-when faced with riot cops many saw nothing wrong with fighting back to defend temporarily liberated space. At the beginning of the march, Keep it Fluffy stickers had been handed out liberally. Later as the helicopter floodlights shone down on a riot, the sight of a crusty with a rainbow jumper emblazoned with one of the stickers-throwing a bit ofpaving slab at the cops-showed how moments of collective power can change people. The following months would see an intensification of violence/nonviolence discussions around the country.
+[29] 1939 Hearings, p. 307; First Deficiency Appropriation Bill, 1941, Hearings before the House Appropriations Committee 2/19/41, pp. 189-189.
-When the Bill became an Act in November everyone understood that the only way to defeat a possible ‘crackdown’ was by defying it. As the EF! Action Update put it: As far as it af cts Earth First!ers ... its purpose is not so much to imprison us as to <em>intimidate us-and we mustn’t let that</em> work[273] The day the Act went through on November 4<sup>th</sup>, activists from No M11 climbed onto the roof of Parliament and unfurled a banner-Defy The Act. Hunt sabs went out in bigger numbers, more road protest camps were established, free parties flourished. By the end of the month a big confrontation came that would test whether the government had succeeded in intimidating the resistance.
+[30] H.J. Res. 571, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1940).
-**** A Street Reclaimed
+[31] 18 U.S.C. 2385,2387.
-Throughout the Summer, evictions and resistance on the M11 had continued and most of the route was rubble. One major obstacle lay in the path of the bulldozers-Claremont Road, an entire squatted street had been transformed into a surreal otherworld. Turned inside-out, the road itself became the collective living room, the remaining cars flowerbeds. Above the sofa, huge chess board, and open fire a vast scaffolding tower reached daily further up to the sky. This state of the art reclaimed street was not going to take eviction easy. When it did come, it became the longest and most expensive in English history-5 days, 700 police, 200 bailiffs and 400 security guards, costing £2 million.
+[32] 18 U. S.C. 2386.
-<quote>
+[33] Letter from Attorney General Jackson to Senator Norris, 86 Cong. Rec. 5642-5643.
-When the bailiffs arrived they were met by 500 people using every delay tactic possible. A concrete filled car with protruding scaffold poles stopping the cherry pickers moving in. People locked on to the road. Others hung in nets strung across the street. People in bunkers, others huddled on rooftops and in treehouses. Lastly, 12 people scrambled up the 100ft scaffold tower painted with grease and tied with pink ribbons.[274]
-</quote>
-One by one, minute by costly minute, the state forces removed the 500-taking the best part of a week. The sheer ingenuity of the tactics, the resolve of the people involved, and the incredible barricading techniques made this an amazing moment. Like the Chestnut Tree, Salsbury Hil , and a dozen other evictions, the state won the battle-but they were losing the war. With every hugely-expensive eviction, every trashed machine, every delayed contract, every citizen turned subversive, every tree occupied-the social and economic cost of pushing through the roads programme was becoming unbearable.
+[34] Proeeedings of the Federal-State Conference on Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense, 8/5-6/40. Several months earlier, Attorney General Tnckqon had warned federal prosecutors about the dangers of prosecuting "subversives" because of the lack of standards and the danger of overbreadth. (Robert H. Jackson. "The Federal Prosecutor," Journal of the American Judicature Society, 6/40, p. 18.)
-Yet Claremont-like all anti-roads sites-wasn’t simply a reaction to destruction, it was also a reaffirmation of life, of autonomy. It was an experience that changed hundreds of people; its memory would remain precious and propel a whole new wave of streets to be reclaimed. Reclaim the Streets had been formed by EF!ers in ’92 to combat the car culture on the city streets. With the expansion of anti-road resistance the idea had gone into hibernation, but many who had seen the topsy-turvey, inside-out world of Claremont Road wanted to feel the like again. After the end of the M 11 campaign, RTS was reformed. The state had foolishly thought Claremont Road lay in rubble; in fact it haunted those who’d been there and its festive rebel spectre would reappear on streets across the country.
+[35] Hoover memorandum to the files, 8/24/36.
-It started with a reclamation of that bastion of consumption, Camden High Street.
+[36] Hoover memorandum, enclosed with Cummings to Roosevelt, 10/20/38, see p. 28.
-<quote>
+[37] Confidential memorandum from the President to Department heads, 6/26/39.
-Two cars entered the high street and to the astonishment of passing shoppers ceremoniously piled into each other-crash! Thirty radical pedestrians jumped on top and started trashing them-soon joined by kids. An instant cafe was set up distributing free food to all and sundry, rainbow carpets unrolled, smothering the tarmac, and a host of alternative street decor... A <em>plethora of entertainmentfollowed including live music, firebreathing... and the Rinky-Dink bike-powered sound system.[275]</em>
-</quote>
-A month later and the action was much bigger; word had got around-1,500 met at the meet-up point, jumped the Tube and arrived at Islington High Street.
+[38] See pp. 34-35.
-<quote>
+[39] The above-mentioned directives were all contained in a memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to FBI Field Offices, 9/2/39.
-<em>They swarmed across the dual carriageway asfive 25ft tripods were erected blocking all the access roads. Half a ton ofsand was dumped on the tarmacfor kids of all ages to build sand castles with. An armoured personnel carrier blasting out rave set up, fire hydrants were opened up-spraying the ravers dancing in the sunshine. All the cops could do was stand to the side and sweat.[276]</em>
-</quote>
-While the Claremont eviction was the first major sign of the failure of the CJA, street parties spreading across the country were basically dancing on its grave. With the Act’s implementation resistance became a bit more difficult, but its deterrent effect was dead in the water. The rebellion against the CJA had brought together different alternative culture currents and coalesced them into a serious counter culture; now RTS was making more connections. Above the wonderful spectacle of the Islington Street Party flew a banner declaring solidarity with the Tubeworkers. Back on the Farm
+[40] Memorandum from Clyde Tolson to J. Edgar Hoover, 10/30/39,
-While London events got the lion’s share of media coverage, people were defying the CJA all over, most by simply carrying on with actions-business as usual. The eviction of urban camps at Pollock in Glasgow against the M77 involved hundreds-250 kids even broke out of school to help slop one eviction. The act had been meant to neuter direct action. Instead in the climate of opposition, whole new struggles opened up, such as those against the live export of sheep and calves, involving thousands more in direct action.
+[41] Internal FBI memorandum of E. A. Tamm, 11/9/39.
-In the Southwest the one year anniversary gathering at Solsbury Hill went off with a bang. An Anti-CJA event on the hill ended with lots of fencing pulled down, trashed machinery and secu-rity thugs in hospital. As one woman from the local Avon Gorge EF! group put it: I <em>guess people had had enough of being used as punch bags.</em>[277] This was followed by a day of action with 200 people-stopping most of the work along the route.
+[42] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to FBI Field Offices, 6/15/40.
-Up North the campaign against the M65 saw a major shift in tactics by both those in the trees and those who’d taken the job of getting them out. Three camps had already been evicted, but the crescendo came at Stanworth Valley, an amazing network ofwalkways, platforms, nets and over 40 treehouses. Through the valley surged the River Ribblesworth. It was truly a village in the sky, which was lucky as the ground was pure quagmire half the time. You’ve never seen such mud!
+[43] Director Hoover declared in 1940 that a advocates of foreign "isms" had "succeeded in boring into every phase of American life, masquerading behind 'front' organizations. (Proceedings of the Federal-State Conference on Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense, August 5-6,1940.) In his best-selling book on Communists, Hoover stated, "Infiltration is the method whereby Party members move into noncommunist organizations for the purpose of exercising influence for Communism. If control is secured, the organization becomes a communist front." (J. Edgar Hoover, Masters of Deceit (New York: Henry Holt, 1958), Ch. 16.)
-As well as new people and local activists there was now a dedicated nomadic tribe, seasoned at many previous evictions. After over a year of life in the branches, some were agile and confident at height-at home in the trees. The state realised that it needed a new force that was as confident on the ropes-Stanworth became the first place where members of the climbing community took sides against nature.
+[44] Hoover memorandum. enclosed with Cummings to Roosevelt, 10/20/38.
-Upon entering the treetops they were quite shocked to find the people were notjust passive spectators to their own removal. A gentle butfirm push with the foot often kept them out of a treelwuse. Two climbers tried to manhandle an activist out of the trees, mistakenly thinking they were alone. The calls for help were quickly answered and to the climbers’ astonishment out of the thick shroud of leaves above, activists abseiled down, others painered up .from below and yet more appearedfrom both sides running along the walkways and branches. The climbers could beforgiven for thinking they were caught in a spiders web.[278]
+[45] Letter from Attorney General Cummings to the President (and enclosure), 1/30/37 (FDR Library).
-Eventually after five days, all 120 people had been ripped from the trees-bringing the total contract cost increased by the No M65 campaign to £12.2 million. The climbers had found new lucrative employment but they would do their best to avoid ever repeating an eviction under leaf cover. From now on most evictions would be when the leaves were off the trees; the combined factor of nature’s abundance and activist up-for-it attitude a severe deterrent.
+[46] Letter from Attorney General Cummings to the President (and enclosure), 8/11/37 (FDR Library).
-The spread of anti-road camps was by now incredible with ’95 probably the highpoint in terms of national spread. On top of the established camps, new areas were occupied in Berkshire, Kent, Devon, and Somerset. Over the next year the struggle moved well beyond just fighting roads. Camps were set up to protect land from open-cast mining in South Wales, leisure development in Kent and quarrying in the South West. No surprise then that one of the major voices spurring on this culture of resistance got some special attention from some special people.
+[47] Report of New York City field office. 10/22/41, summarized in Justice Department memorandum from S. Brodie to Assistant Attorney General Quinn, 10/10/47.
-Green Anarchist [GA] magazine in the mid ‘90s was a meeting point of movements. Its readership included significant numbers of travellers, hunt sabs, class struggle anarchos, Green Party members, eco-warriors, and animal liberationists. It was an obvious target for the secret state. A set of 17 raids aimed at GA and the ALF resulted in the jailing of a number of its editors. This repression, like the CJA, backfired. Instead of marginalising GA it actually made them far more well known; an alliance of largely liberal publications swung behind them, motions of support were even brought up at the Green Party and FoE annual conferences. This increased exposure, combined with MlS fears about court documents released in appeal hearings compromising their agents, secured their release. A major aim of the repression against GA had been to deter sabotage, while large parts of the CJA were aimed at stopping Aggravated Trespass. Their absolute failure to deter the radical ecological direct action movement was shown clearly one morning in Somerset.
+[48] Report of Chicago field office. 12/29/44, summarized in Justice Department memorandum from S. Brodie to Assistant Attorney General Quinn, 10/9/47.
-**** Whatley Qyarry-Yee Ha!
+[49] Justice Department memorandum re: Christian Front, 10/28/41.
-The ‘national’ EF! action to shut down Whatley Q.uarry was an even greater success than expected. A week later the owners hadn’t managed to restart work. At 5.30am, 400 activists de-scended on the quarry. Small teams ensured gates were blockaded and all plant and machinery occupied... Detailed maps and a predetermined plan ensured police and security were out ma-noeuvred. Tripods were carried nine miles overnight and set up on the quarry’s rail line whilst lorries were turned away. Press reports state that £250,000 worth of damage was caused-not counting the cost of a week’s lost production, for a quarry normally selling 11,000 tonnes per day! Twenty metres of railway track leading out of the quarry ‘disappeared’; the control panelfor video monitoring of the plantfell apart; a two storey crane pulled itself to bits; three control rooms dismantled themselves; and several diggers and conveyor belts broke down.[279]
+[50] Letter from Stephen Early, Secretary to the President, to J. Edgar Hoover, 5/21/40 (FDR Library)
-The police managed to arrest 64 people, mostly under the CJA for aggravated trespass. In time, most of the cases were dropped. All through the land struggle period EF! had been organising national actions-this was by far the most effective. It had come on the back of four years of concerted actions at Whatley and showed what can be achieved by good organisation and the element of surprise. While the cops had prepared in their hundreds, they simply hadn’t factored in that ‘hippies’ could get up at 4am. This action really set the mood for the next year.
+[51] omitted in original.
-“An Adrenaline Junkie’s Idea of Heaven”
+[52] Memorandum from Stephen Early, secretary to the President, to J. Edgar Hoover, 6/17/40.
-<quote>
+[53] New York Times, 10/1/39, p. 38.
-Police on the Newbury Bypass site today condemned the tactics of those who last night took a heavy tractorfrom road-works and drove <em>to a construction area, where they damaged compoundfencing, lighting equipment and a portacabin building. Police were called but the ofenders ran away before they arrived at the scene.[280]</em>
-</quote>
-The Newbury bypass was the big battle. The scale was immense. Nine miles long, over 30 camps, ten thousand trees, over a thousand arrests. A daily struggle with up to 1,600 security guards[281], hundreds ofpolice, private detectives, and state climbers lined up against tribes of hundreds of committed, mud-living activists. Day after relentless day, evictions and resistance. “Every morning, cider and flies:”
+[54] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Murphy, 9/16/39. The "literally chisel" reference reflects concern with a State Department attempt to "coordinate" all domestic intelligence. It may explain why, after 1938, the FBI no longer relied for its intelligence authority on the statutory provision for FBI investigations of "official matters under control of . . . the Department of State." Director Hoover stated that the FBI required State Department authorization only where "the subject of a particular investigation enjoys any diplomatic status."
-I don’t have space to cover all the campaigns across the country, so I am focusing on those that saw important changes. Equally, I can’t hope to give a true impression of what it was like to be living on site, at Newbury least of all. Crazy and medieval--in both good ways and bad-is all I’ll say. (The book <em>Copse</em><em></em> captures the spirit of those times best, with a mix of photos, interviews, and cartoons. VERY highly recommended!)
+[55] Note attached to letter from Col. J. M. Churchill, Army G-2, to Mr. E. A. Tamm, FBI, 5/16/39.
-The stale had by this time learnt from some of its previous mistakes; no longer would it try to clear the road in stages at the same time as building works progressed. In the past this allowed a healthy mix of offensive action against construction as well as defensive action against clearance. At Newbury the chainsaws were given five months to clear the site. Initially when protests had started the massive increased cost of clearence had pushed up costs-billed straight to the corporations, destroying any profits. Now when the contracts were tendered these millions were fac-tored in-billed straight to the state. This made the campaigns of this period increasingly defensive in nature. Though there were attempts to move beyond this, to a certain extent it was an inevitable result of a change in terrain. Yet the costs of keeping a force capable of clearing a route dotted with camps, with highly evolved defence techniques, needing highly paid specialist climbers to evict, was now immense.
+[56] Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Division. 2/9/42.
-Newbury, more than any other, was a national campaign in one locale. Practically everyone who had been heavily involved in radical eco stuff over the preceding five years bumped into each other in the wasteland. This was no accident-everyone knew that at Newbury the state wanted to break the movement. In reply people were determined to break the state’s resolve to build roads beyond Newbury. Glorious defeats for us meant economic defeat for the Department of Transport. This war of attrition had been rolling now for years but at Newbury both sides wanted to put in the death blow. After over a year of building defences, five months of fighting evictions, night after night of sabotage and a lifetime of manic moments, the clearance was finished; but in the aftermath so were the roads programme. Of course it took a while to die. Some projects were still in the pipeline and others were continuing, but after Newbury the conclusion was not in doubt.
+[57] Memorandum from Colonel Churchill, Counter Intelligence Branch, MID, to E. A. Tamm, FBI, 5/16/39.
-A year after the clearance work had started, hundreds arrived at Newbury for the anniversary, now known as the Reunion Rampage. After minor scuffles and tedious speeches from the likes of FoE leadership, fencing surrounding a major construction compound was cut, and the crowd surged in.
+[58] Victor J. Johanson, "The Role of the Army in the Civilian Arena. 1920-1970," U.S. Army Intelligence Command Study (1971). The scope of wartime Army intelligence has been summarized as follows:
+<br>
+<br>"It reported on radical labor groups, communists, Nazi sympathizers, and 'semi-radical' groups concerned with civil liberties and pacifism. The latter, well intentioned but impractical groups as one corps area intelligence officer labeled them, were playing into the hands of the more extreme and realistic radical elements. G-2 still believed that it had a right to investigate 'semi-radicals' because they undermined adherence to the established order by propaganda through newspapers, periodicals, schools, and churches." (Joan M. Jensen. "Military Surveillance of Civilians, 1917 1967," in Military Intelligence, Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (1974), pp. 174-175.)
-<quote>
+[59] Letter from Attorney General Cumming,; to the President, 10/20/38; letter front Attorney General Murphy to the President. 6/17/39. The confusion as to whether Attorney General Murphy. Attorney General Jackson and Attorney General Biddle defined the FBI's duties to cover investigation of "subversive activities" is indicated at footnotes 13, 21 and 34.
-So we put <em>sand in the fuel tanks of generators, took spanners to the motor of the crane. As we were leaving the site, a tipper truck on fire to my left and the crane on fire down to my right; there was one man standing straight in front of me, silhouetted against the bright billowing flames rolling up out of the portacabin. He stood in an X</em> <em>shape, his hands in victory’ V signs, shouting</em> YES! YES! YES!’ <em>It wasn’t chaotic, there was a sense ofpurpose, of collective will, ofcarnival, celebration, strong magic, triumph ofpeople power, of a small but very real piece ofjustice being done.[282]</em>
-</quote>
-**** After Defeats, Victories!
+[60] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Jackson, 10/16/40.
-If this kind of disorder freaked the nation state, local government was terrified. At Guildford, Surrey Council cancelled a scheme where five camps had been set up-it simply couldn’t afford the economic and social costs of taking on the movement. Opencast mines were shelved in South Wales thanks to the sterling resistance at the evictions of the Selar and Brynhennlys camps. Camps saved nature reserves from destruction by agribusiness in Sussex. Camps stopped supermarket developments. Camps stopped leisure developments in Kent, and quarries were put on hold in the Southwest after costly evictions at Dead Woman’s Bottom.
+[61] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to L.M.C. Smith, Chief, Neutrality Law Unit, 11/28/40.
-If Newbury put the final nail in the coffin of the Roads to Prosperity building programme, the A30 camps were shovelling in the soil. Put into full use for the first time, tunnels became another tactic of delay. Tree defence and complex subterranean networks made the eviction at Fairmile last longer than every previous eviction-with the tunnels staying occupied six days in. While the resistance to the A30 was amazing it was also a waymarker. Following the evictions there was <em>no</em> daytime offensive action against the construction contract, though a one day camp and some impressive nightwork did get done. The amazing community had evolved over two and half years of occupation-its effect would last far longer.
+[62] Memorandum from M. F. McGuire, Assistant to the Attorney General, to J. Edgar Hoover and L. M. C. Smith, 4/21/41.
-By mid 1997 Road Alert! could happily report the demise of the national roads programme.
+[63] Memorandum from M. F. McGuire, Assistant to the Attorney General, to ,I Edgar Hoover, 4/17/41.
-<quote>
+[64] The Custodial Detention Program should not be confused with the internment of Japanese Americans in 1942. The mass detention of Americans solely on the basis of race was exactly what the Program was designed to prevent, by making it possible for the government to decide in individual cases whether a Person should be arrested in the event of war. When the Program was implemented after Pearl Harbor, it was limited to dangerous enemy aliens only. FBI Director Hoover opposed the mass round-up of Japanese Americans.
-<em>It has been slicedfrom about £23 billion to a few £billion since 1992; nearly</em> 500 <em>out of the</em> 600 <em>road schemes have been scrapped; that’s</em> 500 <em>places untrashed, saved-for now. Ihese are massive cuts; Construction News wrote ‘...the major road-building</em> programme has virtually been destroyed’... It seemsfair to link the rise of direct action with the diminishing budget, down every year since 1993, the year of the big Twyford actions.[283]
-</quote>
-On TV even the ex-Transport Minister Stephen Norris, of all people, presented a documentary on how “the protesters were right” and he was wrong. Contractor newspapers sounded more and more like obituary columns every week.
+[65] Memorandum from Attorney General Biddle to Assistant Attorney General Cox and J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, 7/16/43.
-The unlikely had happened, the movement’s main immediate objective had been largely attained, and the ‘threat capacity’ generated by the struggle now deterred developments in other fields. More sites were still being set up-now against disparate targets; logging in Caledonia, housing in Essex, an airport extension at Manchester.
+[66] Memorandum for Attorney General Biddle to Assistant Attorney General Cox and J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, 7/16/43.
-**** Fly, Fly into the Streets!
+[67] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to FBI Field Offices, Re: Dangerousness Classification, 8/14/43. This is the only document pertaining to Director Hoover's decision which appears in the material provided by the FBI to the Select Committee covering Bureau policies for the "Security Index." The FBI interpreted the Attorney General's order as applying only to "the dangerous classifications previously made by the ... Special War Policies Unit" of the Justice Department. (The full text of the Attorney General's order and the FBI directive appear in Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 412-415.)
-While most camps were in the countryside, contestation was also spreading in the streets. After the success of the London ’95 street parties, RTS followed up with an 8,000 strong take over of the M41; across the country RT Ss were held in dozens of towns often more than once. Some were amazing revelatory moments--windows into future worlds-others were just crap. In ’96/’97 RTS London had mobilised the alternative culture ghetto-now it was organising a break out, first making connections with the striking tube-workers, then with the locked-out Liverpool Dockers. In an inspiring act of solidarity radical eco-types climbed cranes, blockaded en-trances and occupied roofs at the Docks. Around 800 protestors and dockers mingled on the ac-tion and a strong feeling of connection was born.
+[68] Contidential memorandum from President Roosevelt to Attorney General Jackson. 5/21/40.
-Following on the back of this action came a massive mobilisation just before the May election, around 20,000 marched and partied with the Dockers at the March for Social Justice. The plan had been to occupy the then-empty Department of Environment building in Whitehall. Though the police succeeded in stopping this happening, the march ended in a huge party/riot at Trafalgar Square, above the crowd a massive banner-“Never Mind the Ballots, Reclaim the Streets:’ More and more street parties were continuing around the country.
+[69] 47 U.S.C. 605. The Supreme Court held that this Act made wiretap-obtained evidence or the fruits thereof inadmissible in federal criminal cases. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
-**** National Actions
+[70] Letter from Attorney General Jackson to Rep. Hatton Summers, 3/19/41.
-After Whatley had been such a success, people wanted more. Unfortunately, the police were once bitten, twice shy. Any whiff of an EF! national mobilisation resulted in massive policing that made most actions just impossible. While the cops were still often outfoxed, mostly by moving location (an action in North Wales moved to Manchester, an action at an oil refinery moved to an opencast site), it was largely making the best of a bad situation.
+[71] E.g., United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Ivanov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974). The Court of Appeals held in this case that warrantless wiretapping could only be justified on a theory of inherent Presidential power, and questioned the statutory interpretation relied upon since Attorney General Jackson's time. Until 1967, the Supreme Court did not rule that wiretapping violated the Fourth Amendment. [Olmstead v. United States, 275 U.S. 557 (1927) ; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).]
-Yet it wasn’t just the state that caused problems here. The big Whatley action had come out of discussion at an EF! national gathering, with groups all over committing themselves to both turning up and organising it. Other national actions that followed were often organised by local groups that wanted an injection of collective power into their campaign. lhis meant that effectively they were local campaigns calling on the national movement for support-very different from the national movement organising to support a local campaign.
+[72] Hearings before the House Judiciary Committee, To Authorize Wiretapping, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), p. 112.
-One of the biggest failures came when a local group-Cardigan Bay EF!-declared a national day of action on the anniversary of the Milford Haven oil spill. This was to be followed by actions against opencast in the Welsh valleys.
+[73] Congress continued to refrain from setting wiretap standards until 1968 when the Omnibus Crime Control Act was passed. The Act was limited to criminal ewes and, once again, avoided the issue of intelligence wiretaps. [18 U.S.C. 2511 (3).]
-Vans arrived from around the country to find little local work had been done by CBEF! (not ’even accommodation had been sorted) and no decent plans were in place, the organising group not even turning up to sort out the mess. J\Ieanwhile hundreds of cops waited at the port. Thankfully, the wonderful Reclaim the Valleys stepped in days before they were due to and sorted a squat and a few decent actions. Nevertheless, it was a disempowering experience to say the least.
+[74] Memorandum from Attorney General Biddle to J. Edgar Hoover, 11/19/41. Biddle advised Hoover that wiretaps (or "technical surveillances") would not be authorized unless there was "information leading to the conclusion that the activities of any particular individual or group are connected with espionage or are authorized sources outside of this country."
-It was followed by an action at Shoreham Docks that drew 60 people... and 800 cops. Like at Milford Haven where the refinery had been closed despite no action, ah work at Shoreham stopped for the day. On one level these actions were successful, in that they stopped work comprehensively, but disempowerment meant they stifled any chance of long-term organising around the issue.
+[75] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Biddle, 10/2/41; memorandum from Attorney General Biddle to J. Edgar Hoover, 10/22/41.
-Public defeats also resulted in a loss to the movement’s “threat capacity”-something that had the power to stall developments before they started. Though even successful national actions (such as that at Doe Hill opencast in Yorkshire, which turned into a smorgasbord of criminal damage) did not result in local campaign numbers swelling, the threat capacity factor meant that local groups looked a whole lot scarier to the target involved. This fear was a factor in many developments not going ahead.
+[76] Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 3/26/76 and enclosures.
-Attempts to go beyond individual land struggles to get “at the root of the problem” usually meant taking a step backwards to occasional, media-centric events with no easily winnable immediate objectives. National direct action campaigns against the oil industry and ruling class land ownership both died early on.
+[76] Memorandum from D. M. Ladd to Hoover, 5/23/45.
-**** A Shift from the Local to the Global
+[76] Hoover memorandum, 11/15/45; a memorandum headed "Summaries Delivered to the White House," lists over 175 reports sent to General Vaughn from this surveillance; memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 3/26/76, and enclosures.
-In 1997 a major shift of emphasis happened in the movement. At the time it wasn’t so obvious, but after a while it would become seismic. The last massive eviction-based land struggle with multiple camps was the resistance at Manchester airport. This was near Newbury in scale and saw weeks of sieges and evictions, scraps in the trees, night-time fence pulling and underground tunnel occupations: What Newbury didfor the South, Manchester Airport did for the North in terms o,f attracting thousands of new people and cementing the network.[284]
+[77] FBI memorandum from C. E. Hennrich to A. H. Belmont, 9/7/51.
-Both sides of the conflict were now highly -evolved, with complex delay tactics and well-trained state tunnel and tree specialists; on one level it became a clash of professionals. Manchester probably continues to have an impact on the speed at which the government is prepared to build new airports, but the campaign-unlike that against roads or quarries-was not easily reproducible. After all, there weren’t any major expansions elsewhere happening at the time.
+[78] Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 9/23/75.
-Once the evictions had finished, some moved onto smaller camps around the country-but many of those who remained active moved off site and onto new terrains of struggle. Britain’s higgeldy-piggeldy mix of land occupations, office invasions, and national actions were happening in a global context, and that context was changing. In 1997 two landmark events happened, one in Cambridgeshire and one in Southern Spain; both would shape the next period.
+[79] A 1944 Justice Department memorandum discussed the "admissibility of evidence obtained by trash covers and microphone surveillance," in response to a series of hypothetical questions submitted by the FBI. The memorandum concluded that evidence so obtained was admissible even if the microphone surveillance involved a trespass. (Memorandum front Alexander Holtzoff, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, to J. Edgar Hoover, 7/4/44; c.f., memorandum from Attorney General J. Howard McGrath to J. Edgar Hoover, 2/26/52.) See footnote 229 for the 1950s consideration of bugs by the Attorney General.
-The Mexican Zapatista rebels had inspired strugglers around the world and in 1996 held an encuentro of movements for “land, liberty, and democracy” in their Lacandon rainforest home. A diverse mix of 6,000 turned up. The following year in 1997 a second global encuentro was held in Spain. Attended by many from Britain, this proposed the formation of the Peoples’ Global Action (PGA). It seemed a new global movement was being born and EF!ers wanted in. At the same time it turned out that the globe was soon coming to Britain.
+[80] In early 1941, Director Hoover had had the following exchange with members of the House Appropriations Committee:
+<br>
+<br>"Mr. LUDLOW. At the close of the present emergency, when peace comes, it would mean that much of this emergency work necessarily will be discontinued."
+<br>
+<br>"Mr. HOOVER. That is correct.... If the national emergency should terminate, the structure dealing with national defense can immediately be discontinued or very materially curtailed according to the wishes of Congress." (First Deficiency Appropriation Bill, 1941, Hearings before the House Committee on Appropriations, 3/19/41, pp. 188-189.)
-In the Autumn of 1997 a handful of activists started to talk about the May 1998 GB summit. It seemed an opportunity not to be missed-world leaders meeting in the UK and the chance to kickstart the debate on globalisation.[285]
+[81] The Court held that the grave and probable danger posed by the Communist Party justified this restriction on free speech under the First Amendment:
+<br>
+<br>"The formation by petitioners of such a highly organized conspiracy, with rigidly disciplined members subject to call when the leaders, these petitioners, felt that the time had come for action, coupled with the inflammable nature of world conditions, and the touch-and-go nature of our relations with countries with whom petitioners were in the very least ideologically attuned, convince us that their convictions were justified on this score." [Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 510-511).]
-On the continent there was increasing resistance to genetic engineering; but in Britain, none. In the summer of ’97 in a potato field somewhere in Cambridgeshire activists carried out the first sabotage of a GM test site in Britain. It was the first of hundreds to come.
+[82] 64 Stat. 987 (1950) The Subversive Activities Control Act's registration provision was held not to violate the First Amendment in 1961. (Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961).] However, registration of Communists under the Act was later held to violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. [Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 882 U.S. 70 (1965).] The Emergency Detention Act was repealed in 1971.
-Land Struggles-though still useful and active-would soon no longer be the main hook the movement hung on. Camps would continue to be set up and many victories (and some defeats) were yet to come but the radical ecological movement was definitely now going in a new direction. The Land Struggle Period had inspired, involved, and trained thousands. Let’s make no mistake--it played the major role in the cancellation of 500 new roads, numerous quarry/opencast expansions, and many house building projects. An amazing coming together of rebel subcultures (travellers, animal liberationists, EF!ers, city squatters, Welsh ex-miners, ravers, local FoE activists, and the mad) forged the biggest wave of struggle for the land Industrial Britain had ever seen.
+[83] 68 Stat. 775 (1954), 50 U. S.C. 841-844. The constitutionality of the Communist Control Act of 1954 has never been tested.
-**** Consolidation and Global Resistance Period (1998–2002)
+[84] In light of the facts now known, the Supreme Court seems to have overstated the degree to which Congress had explicitly "charged" the FBI with intelligence responsibilities:
+<br>
+<br>"Congress has devised an all-embracing program for resistance to the various forms of totalitarian aggression.... It has charged the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency with responsibility for intelligence concerning Communist seditious activities against our Government, and has denominated such activities as part of a world conspiracy." [Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504-505 (1956).]
+<br>
+<br>This decision held that the federal government had preempted state sedition laws, citing President Roosevelt's September 1939 statement on FBI authority and an address by FBI Director Hoover to state law enforcement officials in August 1940.
-The spectacular growth of our action through much of the ‘90s was in part thanks to the clear ecological priority ofthe moment-stop roads. While many camps continued after Newbury against other developments, without the obvious and nationally unifying factor of major road-building the movement was a bit lost. We had never had to really think about what to defend before; the Department of Transport did that job for us. By moving into a period of Consolidation and Global Resistance we could pretty much sidestep this question-for a time anyway. Tribal Gatherings
+[85] Yates v United states, 354 U.S. 298, 325 (1957).
-Throughout the ‘90s EF! gatherings were the main place that activists from all over got together to discuss and organise. While most that attended felt some allegiance to the EF! banner, many were not active in listed EF! groups and would not consider themselves EF!ers. More, the gatherings were/are a place:
+[86] Justice Douglas, who dissented on Fifth Amendment grounds, agreed with the majority on the First Amendment issue:
+<br>
+<br>The Bill of Rights was designed to give fullest play to the exchange and dissemination of ideas that touch the politics, culture, and other aspects of our life. When an organization is used by a foreign power to make advances here, questions of security are raised beyond the ken of disputation and debate between the people resident here" [Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 174 (1961).]
-<quote>
+[87] File memorandum of S. J. Spingarn, assistant counsel to the President, 7/22/50. (Spingarn Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.)
-...where people involved in radical ecological direct action-or <em>those who want to be-get together for four days o</em><em>f</em> <em>time and space to talk, walk, share skills, learn, play, rant, find out what’s on, find out what’s next, live outside, strategise, hang out, incite, laugh, and conspire.[286]</em>
-</quote>
-At the 1997 gathering near Glasgow, attended by around 400 people in total, it was obvious that with the roads programme massively scaled down, some major things were going to change. While there were many discussions throughout the week, these were some ofthe key points:
+[88] Executive Order 9835. 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947).
- - The national roads programme would continue to create individual aberrations (such as Birmingham Northern Relief Road) but it would not provide so many sites for resistance nation-wide.
+[89] Executive Order 10450,18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953).
- - The road campaigns had been very successful as struggles, but had largely failed to leave solid groups or communities of activists behind after the direct action camp roadshow moved on.
+[90] A report by a Canadian Royal Commission in June 1946 greatly influenced United States government policy. The Royal Commission stated that "a number of young Canadians, public servants and others, who begin with a desire to advance causes which they consider worthy, have been induced into joining study groups of the Communist Party. They are persuaded to keep this adherence secret. They have been led step by step along the ingeneous psychological development course . . . until under the influence of sophisticated and unscrupuloos leaders they have been persuaded to engage in illegal activities directed against the safety and interests of their own society." The Royal Commission recommended additional security measures, "to prevent the infiltration into positions of trust under the Government of persons likely to commit" such acts of espionage. (The Report of the Royal Commission, 6/27/46, pp. 82-83, 686-689.)
- - Most of those present saw the radical ecological movement (and EF! in particular) as a network of revolutionaries, part of a global libertarian, ecological movement of movements.
+[91] Memorandum from the FBI Director to the President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, 1/3/47.
-Of course these things converged. Given that revolution wasn’t looking immediate that week, as revolutionaries we had to be in it for the long haul. The ‘90s had seen rapid growth, thousands had taken action but the movement, being relatively new, didn’t have the infrastructure to support long term participation. With less major land struggles, fewer people would get involved in direct action. There was a high risk that established groups might entropy when activists got disil-lusioned. Nonaligned individuals who had been active against roads, yet who hadn’t become part of any network, might simply drift into reformist politics/work/drugs/mental asylums.[287]
+[92] President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights (1947), p. 52.
-Unsurprisingly the gathering didn’t cook up any magical formulae, but it did throw together something passable. To tackle a drop in ‘recruitment’ concerted outreach would be done and to keep what activists the movement did have, local groups would consolidate. The fight against GM test sites was enthusiastically accepted as a new terrain of action.[288] The keynote evening talk on the weekend was done by a woman recently returned from the Zapatista autonomous ter-ritories. With the first congress of PGA coming up the following Spring it looked like, despite the drop in sizeable confrontations on the land, we were in for an exciting few years...
+[93] Executive order 9835, part 1, section 2; cf. Executive Order 10450, Section 8 (a) (5).
-**** Local Consolidation and Outreach
+[94] In 1960, for instance, the Justice Department advised the FBI to continue investigating an organization not on the Attorney General's list in order to secure "additional information . . . relative to the criteria" of the employee security order. (memorandum from Assistant Attorney General I. Walter Yeagley to J. Edgar Hoover, 5/17/60.)
-Squat cafes were nothihg new, but 1998 saw a sudden proliferation around the country, as groups took over buildings in highly prominent locations, creating autonomous spaces where people interested in direct action could mix and conspire. In January, Manchester EF! opened up the first of many O Kasional Cafes: The squats were intended mainly to get political ideas across through socialising; as political groups in Manchester were quite inaccessible.[289] Similar projects were carried out in Brighton, London, North Wales, Leeds, Worthing and Nottingham. In Norwich a squat cafe was opened because the local group thought it would be a good idea to do a squat centre as a form of outreach and as a group building exercise.[290] In this period direct action forums sprung up all over-regular town meetings for mischief-making miscreants.
+[95] FBI "name checks" are authorized as one of the, "national agencies checks" required by Executive order 10450, section 3 (a).
-Both the forwns and the centres were essentially attempts to bring together the diverse scenes of animal liberationists, class struggle anarchists, forest gardeners, EF!ers, and the like.
+[96] FBI monograph, "The Menace of Communism in the United states Today", 7/29/55, pp. iv-v. See footnote 271.
-In parallel with this outreach, many radical eco circles were working to give themselves permanent bases and support mechanisms-needed for the long haul.[291] The number oftowns with activist housing co-ops would increase substantially over the next four years. In the countryside quite a few communities of ex-road protesters would consolidate in bought or occupied land/housing from the Scottish Highlands, to Yorkshire, and through to Devon. Others went onto the water in narrow boats. Following the last evictions at Manchester airport dozens moved into the Hulme redbricks in inner-city Manchester. Other needed supports such as vans, printing machines, a mobile action kitchen, prisoner support groups, and propaganda distribution were slowly built up. This process of consolidating local direct action communities has paid a large part in making sure that the radical ecological movement hasn’t been a one hit wonder: dying off after the victory against the roads programme. At its centre was the obvious truth; what’s the point in trying to get more people involved if you can’t keep those who already are?
+[97] The FBI official in charge of the Internal Security section of the Intelligence Division in the fifties and early sixties testified that the primary purpose of FBI investigations of communist "infiltration" was to advise the Attorney General so that be could determine whether a group should go on the Attorney General's list. He also testified that investigations for this purpose continued after the Attorney General ceased adding names of groups to the list. (F. J. Baumgardner testimony, 10/8/75, pp. 48-49.) See pp. 49-49 for discussion of the FBI's COMINFIL program.
-**** On the Streets, In the Fields
+[98] Memoranda from the Attorney General to heads of Departments and Agencies, 4/29/53; 7/15/53; 9/28/53; 1/22/54. Groups designated prior to that time Included numerous defunct German and Japanese societies, Communist and Communist "front' organizations, the Socialist Workers Party, the Nationalist Party Of Puerto Rico, and several Ku Klux Klan organizations.
-This period saw an escalation of crowd action on the streets and covert sabotage in the fields: both types of action increasingly seen as part of a global struggle.
+[99] Executive Order 10450, section 8 (a) (5).
-In February ’98 the first ever meeting of the PGA was held in Geneva, home of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The congress, despite in-built problems, was an amazing coming together of over 300 people from movements across the globe:
+[100] The FBI's field offices were supplied with such "thumb-nail sketches" or characterizations to supplement the Attorney General's list and the reports of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. (E.g., SAC Letter No. 60 34, 7/12/60.)
-<quote>
+[101] Executive Order 10450, section 8 (d).
-There’s a woman from the Peruvian guerrilla group Tupac Amaru chatting to an Russian environmentalist. Nearby, activists <em>from the Brazilian land squatters movement are doing some funky moves on the dancefloor with a guyfrom the Filipino seafarers union. Then some Brits brashly challenge a bunch of lvlaori indigenous activists to a drinking contest.[292]</em>
-</quote>
-Needless to say, the Brits lost. Ideas were swapped, arguments had, and plans laid to take action around two events coming up in May-the annual G8 meeting and the second ministerial of the WTO a day later. Back in Britain Reclaim the Streets parties were continuing around the country-Leeds’ fourth RTS was typical:
+[102] The reference to a "full field investigation" where there was "derogatory information with respect to loyalty" did not, in the Truman order, say who would conduct the investigation. (Executive Order 9835, part I, section 4.)
-<quote>
+[103] Memoranda from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Toni Clark, 3/1()/41 and 3/31/47.
-<em>West Yorkshire coppers threatened to ruin the party before it had started, petulantly waving around side handled batons and vigorously wrestling the not-yet-inflated bouncy castle from the vigorously bouncy crowd. But ajier halfan hour of unrest the</em> police suddenly withdrew. Then a full on 600-strong party: bouncy castle, billowing banners, free food, and techno... At the end of the afternoon everyone escorted the system safely away, whilst the police sent a few cheeky snatch squads into the <em>crowd’s dwindling remainder; one person was run down and then beaten with truncheons.</em> 22 <em>arrests.[293]</em>
-</quote>
-Meanwhile sabotage of GM sites was on the up. The first action against a test site may have been in ’97, but by the end of ’98, 36 had been done over. Most were destroyed by small groups acting at night-covert, anonymous, prepared, and loving every minute. Others were carried out by hundreds in festive daytime trashings. GM sabotage by this time was becoming an international pursuit with actions throughout the Global South and trashings in four other European countries. One of the best aspects of test-site sabotage is that it has been a lot less intimidating for people to do if they have had no experience of sabotage. After all, you don’t need to know your way around aJCB engine (or an incendiary device) to work out how to dig up sugar beet. Alongside sabotage, other actions against GM proliferated, ranging from office occupations to the squatting of a (recently trashed) test site.
+[104] File memorandum of George 11. Elsey, 5/2/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
-<quote>
+[105] Memorandum from Clark Clifford to the 105 105 President, 5/7/47.
-Activists were getting more sorted, as Police Review attested: <em>The protesters are ingenious, organised, articulate... They use inventive tactics to achieve their aims. Forces are having to deploy increasingly sophisticated techniques in the policing of environmental protests.[294]</em> These “sophisticated techniques” were often quite comical: <em>Undercover cops who’d set up a secret camera in a Tayside farmer’s barn and parked up in their unmarked car, hoping to catch some of the Scottish folk who are decontaminating their country by removing genetic test crops, had to run for their lives when the car exhaust set the barn on fire. Both the barn and the car were destroyed.”[295]</em>
-</quote>
-On May 16<sup>th</sup> the annual G8 meeting came to Britain. The last time it had been here in 1991, half a dozen EF!ers had caused trouble. In 1998 things were a bit different-5,000 people paralysed central Birmingham in Britain’s contribution to the Global Street Party. Tripods, sound-systems, and banners were all smuggled into the area.
+[106] Memorandum from Clark Clifford to the President, 5/9/47; letter from, President Truman to H. B. Mitchell, U.S. Civil Service Commission, 5/9/47, (Harry S. Truman Library.)
-There were some great comic scenes of police incompetence, including them surrounding the small soundsystem (disguised as a family car) and escorting it into the middle of the party. They never once asked why the ‘frightenedfamily’ inside wanted to escape by deliberately driving the wrong way around the roundabout towards the crowd. By the time they realised their mistake it was all too late... the decks were under the travel blankets, boys. What threw you off the scent? The baby seat, or the toys?[296]
+[107] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Clark, 5/12/47.
-The party, populated by ranks of scary clowns and gurning ravers, lasted for hours, the normal strange combination of ruck and rave. Unamused, the leaders of the most powerful nations on earth fled the city for the day to a country manor. This being their showpiece, the day was a major victory.
+[108] Memorandum from Clark Clifford to the President, 5/9/47. (Harry Truman Library.)
-Simultaneously other PGA affiliates were on the streets in the first International Day of Action. In India 200,000 peasant farmers called for the death of the WTO, in Brasilia, landless peasants and unemployed workers joined forces and 50,000 took to the streets. Across the world over 30 Reclaim the Streets parties took place, from Finland to Sydney, San Francisco to Toronto, Lyon to Berlin.
+[109] Eleanor Bontecou. The Federal Loyalty-Security Program (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1953), pp. 33-34.
-The world leaders flew off our island, no doubt with TV images of dancing rioters on their minds, thinking Ah now to genteel Geneva and wine by the lake at the lVTO. On arrival a huge (molotov) cocktail party welcomed them, the car of the WTO Director General was turned over and three days of heavy rioting followed. While the movement against power was always global, now it was networking and co-ordinating at a speed and depth rarely seen before.
+[110] Memorandum from J. R. Steelman, Assistant to the President, to the Attorney General, 11/3/47.
-Street parties and GM sabotage continued throughout the Summer. No longer content with holding one massive street party, RTS London organised two on the same day-in both North and South London. By now state counter-action was a real problem; following the M41 action, the RTS office had been raided and activists arrested for conspiracy. Despite the surveillance, the parties were both pulled off beautifully, with 4,000 in Tottenham and a similar number in Brixton.
+[111] In a March 1949 directive on coordination of internal security President Truman approved the creation of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference ("IIC"). Memorandum by J. P. Coyne, Major Chronological Developments on the Subject of internal Security, 4/8/49 (Harry S.Truman Library), and NSC memorandum 17/4, 3/23/49.
-<quote>
+[112] NSC Memorandum 17/5, 6/15/49. The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947, which authorized the NSC to advise the President with respect to "the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies" relating to the "national security." (section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947.) Under this authority, the NSC then approved a secret charter for the ICC, composed of the FBI Director (as chairman) and the heads of the three military intelligence agencies.
-<em>I remember two of us standing at Tottenham in the hot sun, getting drenched by a hose directed at us by a laughing local in a flat above. North London RTS had entirely outfoxed the cops and we knew so had South London. Three sound-systems, thousands ofpeople-all blocking some of London’s main arteries. Itfelt wonderful.</em>
-<em>A</em> <em>couple of nights before, seven oil seed rape test sites had been destroyed across the country on one night.</em> I <em>mean, both of us were usually pretty positive about the movement, yet ifa couple of years befoee someone had predicted that one night multiple affinity groups would covertly hit seven dife rent targets and that that would be almost immediately followed by the simultaneous take-over of two main streets in the capital; well both of us would have thought they were a nutter. Thinking about those actions and looking around us at the smiling crowd we both cracked up, our dreams were becoming reality, we were getting stronger, the music was thumping, and the party even had tented pissoirs over the drains![297]</em>
+[113] Delimitation of investigative Duties and Agreement for coordination, 2/23/49. A supplementary agreement required FBI and military intelligence officials in the field to "maintain close personal liaison," particularly to avoid "duplication in ... the use of informers." Where there was "doubt" as to whether another agency was interested in information, it "should be transmitted." (Supplemental Agreement No. 1 to the Delimitation Agreement, 6/2/49.)
-</quote>
-**** The Struggle is Global, lhe Struggle is Local
+[114] Letter from Attorney General McGrath to Charles S. Murphy, Counsel to the President 7/11/50.
-The PGA International Day of Action and the Global Street Party catalysed a wave of actions across the globe, unprecedented in recent times in terms of both scale and interconnection.
+[115] Statement of President Truman, 7/24/50.
-Hundreds of Indian farmers from PGA affiliated organisations travelled across Europe holding meetings and demos and carrying out anti-GM actions. Strange occasions proliferated. A squatted ex-test site in Essex hosted a visit from the farmers, one <em>of</em> whom (to much applause) sang an old Indian song about killing the English. The farmers’ organisations had destroyed test sites and a laboratory in India, so despite the huge cultural differences, this was a meeting of comrades. As one Indian put it: <em>Together we, the peasants, and you, the poor of Europe, willfight the multinationals with our sweat and together we will succeed in defeating them.</em> That month nine test sites were destroyed in one night and a major research organisation pulled out of GM due to being constantly attacked by direct action.[298] The year would see over 50 experiments trashed.
+[115] One noted, "This is the most inscrutable Presidential statement I've seen in a long time." Another asked, "How in H-- did this get out?" A third replied, "Don't know -- I thought you were handling." Notes initialed D. Bell. SJS (S. J. Spingarn), and GWE (George W. Elsey), 7/24-25/50 (Elsey Papers, Harry S. Truman Library). Even before the statement was issued, one of these aides had warned the President's counsel that the Justice Department was attempting "an end run." [Memorandum from G. W. Elsey to Charles S. Murphy, Counsel to the President, 7/12/50. (Murphy Papers. Harry S. Truman Library .)]
-Next came J18, bringing actions in 27 countries by over a hundred groups. Thousands closing down the centre of the capital in Nigeria, besieging Shell, and 12,000 storming the City of London-one of the hearts of the global financial system--were just two of the highlights. ]18 in London was more successful than anyone could have imagined. Many offices were closed for the day in fear of the action. Many of those that weren’t probably wished they had been. As the soundsytems played, a festive masked crowd (9,000 had been handed out) took advantage of their control of a slice of the city to dance and destroy.
+[116] See footnotes 19 and 22.
-I ran into the LIPPE building [the Futures Exchange], smashing a .few mirrors in the .of yer and then looked round to see this masked upfigure light a distress flare and hurl it up the escalators towards the offices. Fuck I thought, this is really full on.
+[117] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President, 1/28/53, and attached memorandum on "FBI Liaison Activities," 1/26/53.
-I was nicked... so I was in the police station... one cop came in drenchedfrom head to toe in white paint. I really had to control myselfto stop laughing-it looked like he’d been shat 011 by a huge bird.[299]
+[118] Statement of President Eisenhower, 12/15/53.
-The HQ of the GM food giant Cargill had its foyer trashed as were the fronts of countless other banks, posh car showrooms and the like. The police were solidly defeated on the day. Above the crowd glittered beautiful banners, one proclaiming “Resist, Refuse, Reclaim, Revolt;” and to back up the statement, hidden inside the banner were half a dozen broom handles-seen the next day on front covers being used against the cops to great effect. Another banner high above the street declared-“Our Resistance is as Global as Capital,” with a huge list of places where actions were happening across the planet. June 18<sup>th</sup>, more than any event before it, saw the coming together of generations of radical opposition in a celebration of our power to create another world-unified around the planet by action.
+[119] National Security Action Memorandum 161, Subject: U.S. Internal Security Programs, 6/9/62.
-l1ie success of the first two days of action had now created a global cycle of inspiration. In November 1999, N30 saw more action. Timed once again to coincide with the meeting of the WTO, actions happened in Britain but undoubtedly the main event was in the US-Seattle. Tens of thousands brought the city to a standstill and in three incredible days forced the meeting to close. This was understandably seen as an amazing victory, especially considering the paucity and assimilated nature of much of American opposition. lhe victory in America was mirrored in Britain by what many saw as a defeat. RTS London were now in a pickle. People expected them to organise big mass events, but apart from being very busy many were worried about the (violent) genie they had let out of the bottle on J18. N30 in London was a static rally, masks were not handed out. Despite the burning cop van (always a pretty sight) N30 London remained contained by the police, and to a certain extent by the organisers. For good or bad you can’t turn the clock back-from now on any RTS style event in the capital would see massive policing and people coming expecting a major ruck.
+[120] Memorandum from Attorney General Kennedy to J. Edgar Hoover, Chairmail, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, 3/5/64.
-Of course, resistance was not only centred around GM and the International Days of Action, or for that matter around internationalism; the local was still at the forefront for many. While the big days got the column inches, everywhere activists were fighting small local land struggles and in-creasingly getting stuck into community organising. In fact, in the 12 months following the Global Street Party, there were 34 direct action camps across the country.[300] Most of these were now a combination of tree-houses, benders and tunnels and set up against a diverse set of developments. While most were populated by what The Sun described as the “tribe of treepeople;’ some were almost entirely done by locals-the type of people who before the road wars might have simply written to their Mp. Direct action was so big in the ‘90s that it was seen as a normal tactic for fighting projects.
+[121] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Clark, 3/5/46.
-This generalisation of direct action is one of the many hidden but hugely important victories the movement has had.
+[122] Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 10/28/75. An indication of the breadth of the investigations is illustrated by the fact that the number of files far exceeded the Bureau's estimate of the "all time high" in Communist Party membership which was 80,000 in 1944 and steadily declined thereafter. (William C. Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, pp. 33-34.)
-While there were no major technical innovations in camps over this period (Nine Ladies in 2002 looked pretty like Manchester Airport in 1997-but smaller) there were many victories. Simply the threat of a site stopped many developments and many camps had to “tat down” after victories, usually against local authorities or developers. Even evicted camps sometimes resulted in victory. In London a camp ran for a year against a major leisure complex in Crystal Palace Park. The eviction came at the cost of over £1 million.
+[123] Report to the House Committee on the Judiciary by the Comptroller General of the United States, 2/24/76, pp. 118--119.
-Bailifsf, accompanied by around 350 police, moved on to the site and began removing thefifty people presentfrom the various tree <em>and bunker defences. The eviction was completed a record breaking</em> 19 <em>days later when the last two occupants came out of the bunker they had been in since the beginning of the eviction.[301]</em> This campaign won. The eviction cost, and the prospect of more trouble, freaked out the council no end. Though this period saw far fewer victories than the fight against the national roads programme, it saw many more victories where camps themselves actually won there and then. Despite this, without the unifying nature of the previous period (and with many activists both “looking to the global” and not willing to go to sites), camps decreased in number.
+[124] Such investigations were conducted because the Communist Party had issued instructions that "sleepers" should leave the Party and go "underground," still maintaining secret links to the Party. (Memorandum from J. F. Bland to A. 11. Belmont, 7/30/58.)
+<br>
+<br>"Refusal to cooperate" with an FBI agent's interview was "taken into consideration along with other facts" in determining whether to continue the investigation. (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Deputy Attorney General Peyton Ford, 6/28/51.)
-Other factors also included increased police harassment (especially following J18) and of course “defeat through victory:’ In the South Downs during this time, two major developments, the Hastings Bypass and a house building project in Peacehaven[302] were both halted (for now) after direct action pledges were launched. Many other groups have been in this situation, which, while a cause for jubilation, has meant that the culture of camps has suffered setbacks while its spectre wins victories. The year and a half between July ’99 and January ’01 saw only 10 camps operate, a quarter of the number that had been active in the previous year and a half. Since January ’02 there have never been more than four ecological direct action camps at any given time.
+[125] 1960 FBI Manual Section 87, p. 5.
-Other local struggles such as those against casualised workplaces or for access to the land have continued, never though really become period-setting events.[303] One major area that many have moved into-often at the same time as night-time sabotage and irregular big days out-has been community organising. From helping run women’s refuges and self defence, to doing ecological education with kids and sorting out local food projects, this work has been an important extension of direct action.[304] While these actions don’t directly defend ecologies they work (we hope) to grow libertarian and ecological tendencies in society, an integral part of the revolutionary process.[305]
+[126] 1960 FBI Manual Section 87, p. 5.
-**** Guerrilla Gardening
+[127] The Supreme Court's last decision upholding a Smith Act conviction was Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), which reiterated that there must be "advocacy of action." See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
-The next PGA International Day of Action was Mayday 2000. Once again there were actions all over the globe. Across Britain events happened in quite a few established activist towns, many very successfully; unfortunately overshadowing them was the mess that was the London Guerrilla Gardening event.
+[128] Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Tompkins to Director, FBI, 3/15/56.
-The idea of doing another big national action was mooted at an EF! gathering in Oxford the previous winter-nearly everyone thought it a terrible concept. The state would massively prepare, the number of imprisoned activists would no doubt increase. As has been argued elsewhere,[306] Mayday 2000-and most of its follow ups-were essentially attempts to copy J18 minus the street violence and sound systems.
+[129] Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley to Director, FBI, 5/17/60.
-J18 had come from a momentum built up by street parties and anti-road protests, and it worked in part because it involved groups all over the country and had the element of surprise. As with national EF! actions after Whatley, the police were once bitten, twice shy. Containment of the crowd by both the cops, and in part by the organisers, created what most saw as both a rubbish party and a rubbish riot. Up until this event there had always been quite a strong working relationship between radical eco groups nationwide and activists in London. Following Mayday this would sadly decrease.
+[130] 1960 FBI Manual Section 87, p. 5.
-Ironically, the symbolic guerrilla gardening at Parliament Square only succeeded in reminding activists across the country why they liked actual guerrilla action, like covert GM sabotage, and actual gardening on their allotments. The next year’s London Mayday was hardly better. The double whammy of N30 followed by Mayday resulted in RTS London losing its great party reputation, at the same time as street parties were happening less and less regularly across the country.
+[131] 1960 FBI Manual Section 87, pp. 83-84.
-Meanwhile actions against GM continued to increase in scale, some involving up to 800 people. The vast majority, however, continued to be carried out covertly at night. Globally, GM sabotage was now spreading even more. Across the world shadows in the moonlight were razing GM crops trials to the ground. Spades, sticks, scythes, sickles, and fire brought in the harvest.
+[132] 1960 FBI Manual Section 87, pp. 5-11.
-Doors splintered as labs were broken into. Pies were aimed at the arrogance of the powerful. Harassment and disruption greeted the biotech industry wherever it gathered. lhe deputy head of the American Treasury said in a statement to the Senate that the campaign against genetic engineering in Europe is the greatest block to global economic liberalisation presently in existence.
+[133] Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1955, p. 195.
-The actions were hugely successful in frightening institutions into not extending GM research and forcing many supermarkets to withdraw from pushing GM food. Sadly though, pure research was rarely attacked in Britain. Apart from the major successes the campaign achieved/is achieving, GM sabotage schooled hundreds in covert cell-structured sabotage-a capacity that will no doubt become ever-more useful.
+[134] Annual Report for 1958, p. 338.
-**** Channel Hopping
+[135] Annual Report for 1964, p. 375.
-Given the decrease in day-to-day struggle and the failure of the London street actions, there was a sharp turn towards international riot tourism. Te biggest workshops at the 2000 EF! Summer gathering were for those preparing to go to the next meeting of the World Bank and the IMF in Prague. Hundreds went from Britain, experiencing an exciting range of success and failure.
+[136] (Examples of such reports to the White House are set forth later, pp. 5153.) The Chief of the Internal Security Section of the FBI Intelligence Division in 1948-1966 testified that the Bureau "had to be certain" that a group's position did not coincide with the Communist line "just by accident." The FBI would not "open a case" until it had "specific information" that "the Communists were there" and were "influencing" the group to "assist the Communist movement." (F. J. Baumgardner testimony, 10/8/75 p. 47.)
-Divisions over violence and symbolism that were always present in the British scene were thrown into relief by the extremes of the situation. Some joined the street-fighting international black block, others (both pro- and anti-violent attacks on the summit), formed together in the Pink and Silver Block. This Barmy Army was a contradictory group of people with quite divergent views, pulled together by a desire for national unity. Diversity in this case was definitely not strength. Putting the problems aside (dealt with well elsewhere[307]), Prague was immensely inspiring. Thousands from all over Europe converged and forced the conferences to close early, creating a surreal, almost civil war atmosphere. Though the crowds failed to break into the conference, they shattered the desire of future cities to host these events. Previously, a visit from one of these august ruling class bodies was the dream of any town bureaucrat or politician-now it was their nightmare.
+[137] Annual Report for 1955, p. 195.
-The following year, many more from the movement would go to Genoa in Italy where an unparalleled number of people on the street would clash with the state (and sometimes each other). Many also went to the anti-summit actions in Scandinavia, Switzerland, and France. Only three years after the Global Street Party and the riot in Geneva started the wave of summit actions, the global elite was having to organise massive defence operations to stay safe behind their barricades. This wave of action not only inspired thousands, and spread the wildfire of resistance worldwide, it also forced many of these meetings to cut down the length of their events, move to ever-less accessible fortresses and in some cases cancel their roving showcases all together.[308]
+[138] For more detailed discussion of the FBI investigations of the NAACP and other civil rights groups see the Report on the Development of FBI Domestic intelligence investigations.
-Beyond the big street spectaculars many British activists were increasingly spending time abroad, inspired by the often more up-for-it squatting scenes. This acted as a further drain on the movement, but it also brought new experiences into the collective mind, aided future action, made real human links across borders and just as importantly gave some amazing moments to those involved. The move to the territory of other nations, temporary for most, comes as no surprise in a period defined by its internationalism.
+[139] Report of Oklahoma City Field Office, 9/19/41. This report continued: "Nevertheless, there is a strong movement on the part of the Communists to <em>attempt</em> to dominate this group ... Consequently, the activities of the NAACP will be closely observed and scrutinized in the future." [Emphasis added.] This stress on Communist "attempts" rather than their actual achievements is typical of COMINFIL reports. The annual reports on the FBI's COMINFIL investigation of the NAACP indicate that the Communists consistently failed in these "attempts" at the national level, although the Bureau took credit for using covert tactics to prevent a Communist takeover of a major NAACP chapter. (Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General-elect Robert F. Kennedy, 1/10/61 attached memorandum, subject: Communist Party, USA -- FBI Counterattack.)
-**** International Solidarity
+[140] Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1959, pp. 247-249.
-Back in Britain, the radical ecological scene was increasingly involved in solidarity with (largely so-called Third World) groups abroad. As the Malaysia campaign showed, this had always been a major part of the movement. Following the ’95 EF! gathering, activists invaded a factory that built Hawk aircraft and hoisted the East Timorese flag. Throughout the land struggle period, office actions, AGM actions, embassy blockades, petrol station pickets and home visits to corporate directors had all been used to support the Ogoni/Ijaw struggle in Nigeria and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army in Papua New Guinea. Yet in this period solidarity with struggling communities beyond the capitalist core became a much bigger part of the movement. This was part and parcel of the shift in emphasis towards people seeing the radical ecological movement as part of a global revolutionary movement.
+[141] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security, 7/25/61, enclosing IIC Report, Status of Internal Security Programs.
-On the first business day of 1999, three groups barricaded themselves into two senior management offices and the corporate library in Shell-Mex House in London.
+[142] William C. Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, pp. 40-41.
-<quote>
+[143] 1960 FBI Manual Section 122, p. 1.
-January 4 was Ogoni Day, celebrated since Shell wasforced out of Ogoni through massive resistance. The concerned individuals seized three key locations in the building, some of which had a pleasing view of Waterloo bridge and the banner being hung across-by others-reading Shell: Filthy Theiving Murderers.[309]
-</quote>
-In 1999 the keynote speech at the EF! Summer gathering was made by a visiting Papuan tribesman from the OPM. His inspirational talk resulted in actions across the country that Autumn against various corporations involved. Sporadic actions would continue in solidarity with this South Pacific struggle, as well as financial support for refugees and medical aid for prisoners, both actions which literally kept people alive.
+[144] SAC Letter No. 63-27, 6/11/63.
-Less theory, it was more lived experience abroad that inspired solidarity work back at home. By 2001, most towns listed with EF! groups had at least one returnee from the jungles of the Mexican South West. In 2001 a steady stream of activists going to Palestine started, many doing valuable on-the-ground solidarity work in the heat of the second Intifada-and the Israeli crackdown.
+[145] The FBI has denied that it ever conducted a "security-type investigation" of the Birch Society or Welch, but state the Boston field office "was instructed in 1959 to obtain background data" on Welch using public sources. (Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 2/10/76.) A 1963 internal FBI memorandum stated that the Bureau "checked into the background of the Birch Society because of its scurrilous attack on President Eisenhower and other high Government officials." (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 5/29/63.) Reports were sent to the White House, see footnote 164.
-Those returning from abroad wanted to “bring the war home” with a range of actions, speaking tours, and fundraising pushes. Of course GM actions are also in part solidarity actions with Third World peasants. From benefit gigs to demos at the Argentinian embassy-solidarity work was increasingly filling the gap a lack of land struggles left behind.
+[146] Letter from Assistant Attorney General Tompkins to Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President, 11/22/54; letters from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President, 10/15/57, and 1/17/58. (Eisenhower Library.)
-**** Then and Now
+[147] 1960 FBI Manual Section 122, pp. 5--6.
-This decade-long retrospective ends at the end of 2001. I did think of extending it when this issue of Do or Die became ever later and later but I thought better of it for a number of reasons. Firstly it seemed a neat end point; secondly much of this issue of DoD covers the next year and a half to Summer 2003; and thirdly Part Two of this article was released in January 2002 and some of what the movement has engaged in since then has been, at least partially, as a result of its suggestions. For good or bad I’ll leave it to others to use hindsight to judge whether some proposals were blind alleys or blinding campaigns. To analyse them here would be definitely to put the cart before the horse.
+[148] 1960 FBI 'Manual Section 122,pp. 5-6.
-Nevertheless, I’ll say a little about where we find ourselves. Looking at the first EF! AU of 2002, it seems strange, slightly worrying, but also inspiring that 10 years on there is an obvious continuity of action through the decade: a new protest site, nighttime sabotage actions, actions against summits, anti-war demos. The centre spread is a briefing for the campaign to defend Northern peat bogs, a struggle from right back in 1991 (and further) that re-started in 2001 and is covered elsewhere in this issue.
+[149] "Racial Tensions and Civil Rights," 3/1/56, statement. used by the FBI Director at Cabinet briefing, 3/9/56.
-In a way the last year or so has reminded me of the film Back to the Future (now I’m showing my age); not only was the peat campaign back up and running, but also there was an anti-road gathering in Nottingham, and actions were announced to aid tribal groups in the Pacific.
+[150] See p. 37 for discussion of White House wiretap requests in 1945-1948.
-There are now far fewer EF! groups listed than in the mid ‘90s, and the travelling culture many site activists came from has been largely destroyed by state force and drugs. Nevertheless, the radical ecological movement is in a surprisingly healthy state and has succeeded in not being assimilated into the mainstream. Ten years on and we’re still more likely to be interviewed by the police than a marketing consult or academic (remember to say “No Comment” to all three!). The movement is still active and still raw. Many places continue to be saved by ecological direct action, our threat potential still puts the willies up developers, and people are still, getting involved and inspired.
+[151] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to George E. Allen, Director, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 12/13/46. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
-Our gathering this year will probably be attended by around 350–400 in total-the same kind of number it has been since 1996. While we don’t want to build up the movement like a Leninist party-“more members, please more members”-the fact that we have stayed at this number despite catalysing situations of struggle involving thousands should give us some pause for thought.
+[152] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Maj. Gen. Harry 14. Vaughn, Military Aide to the President, 2/15/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
-Two prime contradictions have haunted the radical ecological resistance on this island. British EF! was born as a wilderness defence movement with no wilderness, and evolved into a network of revolutionaries in non-revolutionary times. The process of consolidation that was started in 1997 enabled radical ecological circles to survive the slowdown of domestic land struggles after the viclory against national roadbuilding. This process combined with the upsurge in global resistance enabled us in part to side-step the questions posed by the above contradictions.
+[153] Letter from Hoover to Vaughn, 6/25/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
-If we want to see the wildlands defended and any chance of libertarian, ecological (r)evolution increase then practical action is needed. Much is already underway, but more is needed and without a clear strategy we are bound to fail. “Part Two: The Four Tasks” aims to provide some pointers towards a unified strategy and an attempt to resolve, or at least overcome, some of the contradictions of our movement.
+[154] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Matthew J. Connelly, Secretary to the President, 1/27/50. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
-On a personal note the ten years of radical ecological action documented here have been immensely inspiring to me. It’s been an honour to stand on the frontlines (as well as lounge about in lounges) with some lovely, brave, insightful, and amazing people. Thank you.
+[155] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Clark, 4/1/46. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
-*** Appendix
+[156] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to 'Maj. Gen. Harry H. Vaughn, Military Aide to the President, 11/13/47. (Harry Truman Library.)
-**** Friend or FoE?
+[157] Letters from J. Edgar Hoover to Brig. Gen. Harry H. Vaughn, Military Aide to the President, 1/11/46 and 1/17/46. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
-In the early 1990s Friends of the Earth (FoE) central office made a concerted effort to restrict the growth of the new movement. Negative public statements about EF! were issued (most notably about the Sarawak jailings) but it wasn’t until the April 1992 Thorne Moors sabotage that FoE central office showed its true colours when Andrew Lees-then head of FoE-condemned the action on TV.
+[158] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to George E. Allen, Director, Reconstruction Finance corporation, 5/29/49. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
-<quote>
+[159] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President, 4/21/55. (Eisenhower Library.)
-We have to be very careful that this style of anti-environmental action does not actually get misrepresented as something the environment movement support. We decry, we deny it. It has noplace in a democracy which relies, and must rely, on public demanding thepoliticians deliver the goods.[310]
-</quote>
-This public condemnation of the very essence of direct action showed how far FoE central office had come from its early radical days. Contrast it with a statement by FoE’ s first director twenty years previously.
+[160] Letter from Hoover to Anderson, 3/6/56. (Eisenhower Library.)
-<quote>
+[161] Letter from Hoover to Anderson, 3/5/56. (Eisenhower Library.)
-Whilst it is the case that the Japanese experience of people physically fighting the construction of an airport or motorway has not been repeated in Britain that is not to say that it will not occur here. Indeed... it is almost inconceivable that clashes... will be avoided... when patience runs out we won’t really be--<em>what’s the word?</em>--militant. After all is said and done, putting sugar in a bulldozer’s petrol tank is relatively undramatic compared with blowing up a mountain.[311]
-</quote>
-After slagging the action publicly Lees got to work on his own members. Worried (correctly) that many local FoE groups were showing interest in direct action, an edict was issued banning them from working with EF! It even went as far as to warn FoE groups that if they demonstrated with EF! their right to use the FoE Ltd. name might be revoked. This intimidation was too much for some of the FoE grassroots. At FoE National Conference local groups led by Birmingham and Brighton challenged Lees on this and defeated him.
+[162] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President, 4/11/58. (Eisenhower Library.)
-Lees and others at FoE Central had seen the new movement as a potential threat to power. They thought they could nip it in the bud-they couldn’t. It would grow much bigger and gain vast public sympathy. The strategy of FoE changed-from one of strength to one of weakness. By the mid-‘90s a new director was trying to court EF!-even turning up to an EF! Gathering with a large block of dope (whisky for the natives). He invisaged a series of meetings at which he and two or three other top staff could meet a similar number of EF! representatives behind dosed doors. This was of course out of the question. Just as no one could represent EF! at a national level, EF! could not represent everyone involved in eco-direct action. Over 20 EF!ers came to the first meeting, most to make this point and make sure no one could sell the movement down the river. FoE said it had learnt from its past mistakes-most EF!ers looked sceptical.
+[163] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President, 2/13/58. (Eisenhower Library.) The group was described as the "successor" to a group cited by the House Un-American Activities Committee as a "communist front."
-At the same time the Newbury Bypass saw FoE Central’s biggest push to capitalise on direct action. It even managed to take over the campaign’s media liaison, (resulting in a major increase in its media profile and resultant subs money). Promises not to publicly slag direct action were hastily forgotten when over a hundred stormed an office throwing computers out of the window. When hundreds took part in the festive burning of diggers, FoE Central once again condemned the resistance.
+[164] Letters from J. Edgar Hoover to Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President, 9/11/59 and 9/16/59.
-The experience of dealing with FoE Central would be just the first of its kind. A few years later, following the J18 global day of action, the Socialist Workers Party [SWP] (another reformist hierarchical racket) would try to boost its membership by fronting itself as the backbone of the movement. Just like FoE it condemned militant and genuine resistance while trying to build bridges to mainstream groups.
+[165] Letter from Hoover to Cutler, 6/6/58. (Eisenhower Library). This involved contact with a foreign official whose later contacts with U.S. official were reported by the FBI under the Kennedy Administration in connection with the "sugar lobby," see pp. 64-6.1.
-NGOs, political parties. These professional priests of assimilation are simply vampires-let’s do some staking.
+[166] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President, 11/7/55. (Eisenhower Library.)
-**** Utter Contempt for the Court
+[167] Letters from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler, Administrative Assistant to the President, 4/21/53 and 4/27/53. (Eisenhower Library.)
-During Jesmond Dene, people were still being picked up for having broken the Twyford injunction. Qyolobolox knew the cops would nick him sooner or later at the Dene and send him down to the High Court, but he was prepared. When the inevitable arrest came he gave the High Court quite a surprise. Stripping off to orange suspenders, worn all summer under his trousers especially for this occasion, he goosestepped up and down in front of the judge sieg-heiling. The judge closed the court in horror. This was a not-so-subtle reference to the recent death of Steven Milligan, the Tory MP for Eastleigh (near Twyford). Milligan, (who had once memorably described the Dongas Tribe as “weirdoes”) was found dead hanging from the ceiling after an erotic auto-asphyxiation disaster, wearing nothing but suspenders with an amyl nitrate-soaked orange in his mouth. Unsurprisingly the judge added weeks to Q_uolobolox’s sentence for Contempt of Court.
+[168] Letter from Hoover to Cutler, 10/1/57. (Eisenhower Library.)
-<br>
+[169] Letter from Hoover to Gray, 11/9/59. (Eisenhower Library.) Hoover added that membership in the group "does not, of itself, connote membership in or sympathy with the Communist Party."
-*** Part Two: The Four Tasks
+[170] Requests under the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, including wiretap requests, are discussed at pp. 33 and 37.
-In Part One we looked at some of radical ecology’s recent history; now it’s time to stop looking back and start looking forward. I called Part One “Recent Pre-History” because the past is prologue. An understanding of our own movement’s evolution so far is essential when discussing in which direction(s) we want to evolve.
+[171] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Thomas E. Stephens, Secretary to the President, 4/13/54. (Eisenhower Library.)
-For if we are going to help catalyse a movement that can “confront, stop, and eventually reverse the forces responsible for the <em>destruction of the earth and its inhabitgnts,”</em> we <em>are going to need ood stratey.</em>
+[172] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to R. F. Kennedy, 2/10/61, "Personal." (John F. Kennedy Library.)
-<em>We live in important times. This moment does not allow us much margin of error.</em>
+[173] Memorandum from the Attorney General to the President, 8/20/63, attaching memorandum from Hoover to Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach, 8/13/63. (John F. Kennedy Library.)
-<em>This is an attempt to solidify my ideas on our strategy and put them across in a digestible form. Though</em> I <em>am doing the typing and the mentalfiling, the ideas are by no means mine alone. Some are very common in our circles, in the lastfew years having reached the point of cross-group consensus.</em> I<em>will</em> <em>state them nonetheless as it’s useful for those who’ve recently entered our arcane world, who may not know the subtext. Ihey are alsoworth clarifying for those of ushose minds, filledwith the subtext, become murkier every day. A1any of the ideas are not in anyway cross-group consensus. 7 Jiey are offered up and can be treated as delicacies or dogfood depending on your taste.</em>
+[174] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to R. F. Kennedy, 2/6/61, "Personal." John F. Kennedy Library.)
-<em>This is a strategy documentwritten to promote discussion in Britain’s radical ecological direct action movement. Much of it may be useful for people from other circles and countries. BUT it is</em> NOT <em>an attempt to build some overriding strategy for “the emerging global resistance” or any similar abstraction. While it may be useful for readers in the global North,</em> I <em>reckon it’s largely out of context in the Majority World. Even within Western Europe, culture, terrains of struggle and movements vary a lot. It’sworth reiterating the obvious. Strategy should be informed by the global context but primarily shaped by the local conditions.</em>
+[175] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to R. F. Kennedy, 2/8/61, "Personal." John F. Kennedy Library.)
-A Small Editorial Note
+[176] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to R. F. Kennedy, 11/20/63. (John F. Kennedy Library.)
-“Part Two: The Four Tasks” was pre-published for the EF! Winter Moot in 2002 where 150 copies were given out free. I did this for two reasons. Firstly I wanted to get feedback with an aim to improvement, and secondly I feared that DoD #10 would not come out for months... or years. DoD #10 came out 17 months later and by then I had gotten quite a lot of wise responses. Many of those thoughts from good warriors and friends have been incorporated in the re-written text printed here. In large part this project, despite its meglomaniacal undertones, was always a collective effort-a bringing together of many of the strands that bind us together as movements. The many helpful suggestions, criticisms and funny chats that resulted have made it all the more so.
+[177] Memorandum from Attorney General Kennedy to the President, 4/12/62 enclosing memorandum from Director, FBI. to the Attorney General. 4/12/62: testimony of Courtney Evans, former Assistant Director, FBI, 12/1/77, p. 39.
-As a strategy document it is of its time more that most writings, maybe. As you are reading this well over a year after it was written, action has moved on. One glaring example is the peat campaign, mentioned as an embryonic campaign, when in fact it has now succeeded in most of its original objectives. Some recommendations in this Part Two have been taken up, others ignored. While some increased activity in some areas may seem-in hindsight-a result of this text it would mostly be more true to see the four tasks as mirroring existing trends, not necessarily inspiring them. In some places I have updated the text to take consideration of this time lag, mostly though I have just left the text unchanged with the occasional [editorial intermission].
+[178] Letter from Attorney General McGrath to President Truman, 12/7/49; letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Maj. Gen. Harry H. Vaughn, Military Aide to the President, 1/14/50
-**** I: Growing Counter Cultures
+[179] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General William P. Rogers, 5/25/60.
-<quote>
+[180] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, 8/28/56, p. 4.
-We need to catalyse living, loving, fighting counter-cultures that can sustain rebellion across generations. In both collective struggle and our everyday lives we must try to live our ecological and libertarian principles. Our counter cultures must be glimmers of ecological anarchy-fertiliser for the growth of collective imagination. Fulfilling this task is what will enable the others to be fulfilled over the long haul. The counter cultures must be bases from which to carry out thumb-in-the-dam actions and give support to rebellions beyond the core. In times of crisis they should act decisively against authoritarian groups. The counter culture’s eventual aim should be total social transcendence-(r)evolution.
-[An anarchist society] can hardly come about when isolated groups follow a policy of resistancefor the sake of resistance. Unless we can first prove that anarchism works through creating libertarian communities, the critical level of support that we need will never materialise, for the mass of workers will otherwise continue to be influenced by authoritarian propaganda...
+[181] Leon Green testimony, 9/12/75, pp. 6-8.
-[One] reason for developing a libertarian social and work structure is that it is a bulwark against authoritarian groups <em>when the upheaval comes. If we have not yet learnt the lessons of the Rus-sian and Spanish revolutions when the communists savagely attacked thefreedom of anarchism, then we do not deserve to survive as a movement. We start at a severe disadvantage vis-a-vis our authoritarian ‘comrades’, and they will easily destroy us again unless the shoots of libertarianism are already pushing through the crumbling remains of the old society.</em>
+[182] Memorandum, William Loeb, Assistant Commissioner, Compliance to Dem. J. Barron, Director of Audit, 11/30/61.
-<right>
+[183] Memorandum Attorney Assistant to Commission to Director, IRS Audit Division, 4/2/62.
---Stuart Christie, <em>Towards</em> A <em>Citizens Militia</em>
-</right>
-</quote>
-***** Map Reading in the Social Desert
+[184] IRS referred to it as Tax Political Action Groups Project. It was apparently labeled as above by the Joint Committee on internal Revenue Taxation.
-Things are going to shit. They have been for a long while (10,000 years) but now it’s getting really serious. Social solidarity is imploding and ecological systems are being ravaged as never before. What is needed is an entire change of direction for global human society. We need to find each other and together find our way back to nature.
+[185] See pp. for discussion of later IRS programs.
-We must totally dismantle the technological web of slavery and dependence that we have been born into. For the earth’s remaining forests to stay up, the world’s factories have to come down. To do this we will have to take on the most murderous ruling classes ever to disgrace the earth.
+[186] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Clark, 3/8/46. See footnote 67 for the origins of the Security Index in contravention of Attorney General Biddle's policy.
-Of course, within the realm of contemporary politics, these solutions are not only unrealistic, but also unintelligible. That hardly matters. The biological meltdown is fast making the logic of industrial society irrelevant.
+[187] Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General T. L. Caudle to Attorney General Clark, 7/11/46.
-Reformist manoeuvres in this context resemble rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. Global ecological and libertarian revolution, though incredibly unlikely, is a far more realistic strategy for defeating apocalypse and global slavery than recycling or voting for the Socialist Alliance.
+[188] Quoted in internal FBI memorandum from D. M. Ladd to J. Edgar Hoover, 1/22/48.
-A consensus in plenary at the 1997 EF! Gathering was that the movement saw itself as an ecological revolutionary network.[312] This is a considerable change from the past radical ecological view that sees no hope for positive social change this side of industrial collapse.
+[189] Internal Security Act of 1950, Title II -- Emergency Detention, 64 Stat. 987 (1950).
-So, if we set ourselves the task of advancing (r)evolution here in the core, how are we going to go about it’? We are talking vast change here. Lefties just want to change the rules of the game leaving hierarchy, ideology, and industry intact. We want to stop the game and start living. While they want to build workers power (power for lefty ex-students mostly) we want to destroy power and abolish work. This is a massive (though not a mass[313]) undertaking.
+[190] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to D. 11. Ladd, 10/15/52.
-The mythical Revolution is not something that will just happen suddenly one day after we’ve polished some ideology long enough. (R)evolution is a process of individuals and collectives reclaiming what has been taken from us, rediscovering our power and creativity together. Sometimes gradually, sometimes in huge leaps during times of greater struggle.
+[191] Memorandum from D. M. Ladd to J. Edgar Hoover, 11/13/52.
-***** Expand the Cultural Oases
+[192] Memorandum from Attorney General James McGranery to J. Edgar Hoover, 11/25/52; memorandum from Attorney General Herbert Brownell to J. Edgar Hoover, 4/27/53.
-If we are to actually change things then there are some things we have to do: We have to build our own economic, justice and social systems. We have to do this all the while main-taining an equal emphasis towards destroying the existing culture and its fucked up systems.
+[193] SAC Letter No. 97, Series 1949, 10/19/49. Field offices gave special attention to "key figures" and "top functionaries" of the Communist Party. The "Comsab" Program concentrated on potential Communist saboteurs, and the "Detcom" program was the FBI's own "priority arrest" list. The Communist Index was "a comprehensive compilation of individuals of interest to the internal security."
-***** Making Punk A Threat Again[314]
+[194] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Brownell, 3/9/55; memorandum from J. F. Bland to A. H. Belmont. 7/30/58.
-(R)evolution is about practical change in everyday life, class consciousness, solidarity, love, and imagination.
+[194] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, 1/14/55.
-(R)evolution is the evolutionary process of the creation of new worlds.
+[195] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Parsons, 6/3/60.
-Ecological direct action could be just an exciting holiday of autonomy between leaving school and entering the world of work and parenting. If that’s all it ends up being, then it has still given me and thousands of others some of the most beautiful, exhilarating, and just plain weird moments in our lives.
+[196] Memorandum from D. M. Ladd to J. Edgar Hoover, 9/5/46; memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Clark, 9/5/46.
-However if we really want to kick this system in and grow a new world we have got to build a multigenerational culture that can sustain us for the long haul.
+[197] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to D. M. Ladd, 4/17/51.
-In growing ecological libertarian counter cultures it is worth looking at past experiences of anarchist (r)evolution. Probably the best example in the West remains that of the historical Spanish anarchist movement.
+[198] Minutes of the President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, 1/17/47. (Harry S. Truman Library.)
-***** The Spanish Anarchist Counter-Society
+[199] Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Mr. Vanech, Chairman, President's Temporary Commission, 2/14/47. ( Truman Library.)
-Us anarchists have a tendency to fetishise Spain 1936. In the non-insurreclionary times that we live, looking back to a golden age of anarchism can seriously get in the way of analysing and struggling in the here and now. We are a long way off from the cataclysm, and clashes of the Spanish civil war. However there is a lot to learn from the Spanish experience-less in the trenches of Aragon and more in the movement that gave them birth.
+[200] See finding (G) for a full discussion of the problem of FBI accountability.
-A simplistic view sees the Spanish revolution as starting in 1936 and ending with Franco’s victory. In fact the (r)evolution started decades before. Franco’s attempted coup d’etat and the ensuing civil war was the rich’s (eventually successful) attempt to stall the growth of a culture that was reaching transcendent levels in many parts of Spain. Increasingly class conscious and combatative workers organising in /largely) anarchist unions were immersed in a multigenerational culture that not only opposed, but replaced, much of Spain’s state/church-backed infrastructure; they were maturing into a movement that, given a few more years, would have been almost impossible to destroy. In learning about the movement that Franco had to unleash a sea ofblood to wash away we can see in part what needs to be done in our own times.
+[201] Presidential Directive, Coordination of Federal Foreign Intelligence Activities 1/22/46, 11 Fed. Reg. 1337. Fears that a foreign intelligence agency would intrude into domestic matters went back to 1944, when General William Donovan head of the Office of Strategic'Services (the CIA's wartime predecessor) proposed that OSS be transformed from a wartime basis to a permanent "central intelligence service." Donovan's plan was leaked to the Chicago Tribune, allegedly by FBI Director Hoover, and it was denounced as a "super spy system" which would "pry into the lives of citizens at home." [Corey Ford, Donovan of the OSS (Boston: Little Brown, 1970), pp. 303-304.]
-In his brilliant book about the pre-civil war anarchist movement Murray Bookchin has this to say,
+[202] Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee on S. 758, 80th Cong. (1947), P. 497.
-<quote>
+[203] Hearings before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments on H.R. 2319, 80th Cong. (1947), p. 127.
-<em>The Spanish anarchists left behind them a tangible reality that has considerable relevance for social radicalism today. Iheir movements ‘heroic years’</em> 1868–1936 <em>were marked by a fascinating process ofexperimentation... [They] had evolved an astonishingly well organised subculture within Spanish society thatfostered enormousfreedom of action</em>...[315]
-<em>What these Spanish anarchists aimed for, in effect, was a ‘counter-society’ to the old one. It is easy to mistake thisfor an ‘alternate society’, one that would co-exist with capitalism as an enclave of purity and.freedom, however, nothing could be .furtherfrom the truth. The Spanish anarchists expressly rejected the concept of an ‘alternate society’ with its hope of peaceful reconstruction and its privileged position in a world of general misery... Since social or personal freedom could not be acquired within the established ordyr, they viewed a ‘countersociety’ as terrain in which to remake themselves into revolutionaries and remove their interests from any stake in bourgeois society... The bureaucracy, state, and church were the anarchist’s mortal enemies; any voluntary dealings with these institutions were to be avoided. Children were sent to libertarian or union schools.</em>
+[204] 93 Cong. Rec. 9430 (1947).
-<em>Wherever the [anarchist movement] had a substantial following it established Centro Obreros, which functioned not merely as union headquarters but as cultural centres. Depending upon its resources, the Centro Obrero might provide literature, books, classes, and meeting halls for discussion on a wide variety of subjects. This institution exercised a profound influence on the personal life ofthe worker who belonged to anarchist influenced unions... Ricardo l’vfella recalls Seville ‘with its enormous Centro Obrero, capable of holding thousands of people.’[316]</em>
+[205] 50 U.S.C. 403 (d) (3).
-<em>Far more important than the episodic revolutionary uprisings, individual atentados [assassination of bosses or bosses men], or the daring escapes of small circles ofcomrades was the ability of the Spanish anarchists to patiently knit together highly independent groups (united by ‘social conviviality’ as well as by social views) into sizeable, coherent organisations, to coordinate them into effective social forces when crises emerged, and to develop an informed mode of spontaneity thatfuelled the most valuable traits of group discipline with personal initiative.</em>”
+[206] See pp. 102-103.
-<em>Out of this process emerged an organic community and a sense of mutual aid unequalled by any workers movement of that era.</em>[317]
+[207] Inspector General's Report on the Technical Services Division, Central Intelligence Agency, 1957.
-</quote>
-We are in a very different situation today and we are quite different people. The Spanish counter culture was an expression of a transitional class captivated by an ideal that reflected its rural communal past and its harrowing social present.[318] Yet we should take inspiration and practical guidance from their example.
+[208] Memorandum from the CIA General Counsel to the Inspector General, 1/5/54.
-In Britain a similar-but signif cantly different-workingclass culture of mutual aid grew in nineteenth-century industrial communities. This culture sought to resist the intrusions of an industrial system into every aspect of people’s lives and was the domestic flipside of defensive work-place struggles.
+[209] U.S. Army Intelligence Center Staff Study: Material Testing Program EA 1729, 10/15/59.
-People endeavoured to mitigate for each other visitations of sickness, the death of children, the perishing of women in childbirth, and a continuing inadequacy of basic resources. Much of this was the work of women, and was possible thorough networks of kinship and neighbourhood, as well as the associations in the workplace, through trade unions. co-operative societies, burial clubs, and friendly societies.
+[210] CIA Inspector General's Report, 1963.
-Many radicals saw in this lived working class solidarity culture an embryo of a non-capitalist society, but thanks to industry and ideology it never embraced libertarian insurrectionry fervour like its Spanish relative; in fact’, the opposite. Despite-or perhaps because of-the monumental mistakes made, we can learn a lot from the still warm corpse of the British labour movement
+[211] This issue is examined more fully in the Committee's Report on Foreign and Military Intelligence Activities.
-Its continuation into the relatively recent past underlines what many libertarians have pointed out. Under the veneer of illusory command it is voluntary co-operation, mutual aid, nurturing, human solidarity, and love that keeps society from imploding. Here though we are concerned with something grander than mere survival-living free.
+[212] Memorandum from James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, to Chief of Operations, 11/21/55 (attachment).
-***** 30 Years of Temporary Counter-Cultures
+[213] CIA Memorandum re: Project SETTER, undated (New Orleans) Memorandum from "Identity #13" to Deputy Director of Security, 10/9/57 (New Orleans) ; Rockefeller Commission Staff Summary of CIA Office Officer Interview, 3/18/75 (Hawaii).
-Beyond the First World, significant counter cultures are arising. Yet here in the capitalist core since the proletarian glory days there have been no (r)evolutionary counter cultures on the kind of seismic scale that evolved in Spain. This is no surprise given that the “class in transition” that defended the barricades of Paris, Barcelona, and Kronstadt is largely no longer found in the core.
+[214] Robert Andrews, Special Assistant to the General Counsel, Department Of Defense, testimony, 9/23/75, pp. 34- 40.
-Since the ‘60s upheaval Britain has seen quite a number of anarchist/ecological counter cultures form then dissipate through inertia, state repression, or simply assimilation. These autonomous cultures-squatting, feminism, travelling, punk, back to the land, ecological direct action camps, animal liberation, anarchism, etc.-have all been predominantly youth movements operating in the heady (and vanishing) space of dole autonomy.
+[215] 18 U.S.C. 1701-1703 (mail); 47 U.S.C. 605 (Federal Communications Act of 1934).
-They have remained temporary because they have largely been generational; failing to either accommodate the changing needs of their ageing members or have any ability to involve younger generations. The one major exception has been travelling which has evolved into a multigenerational culture-there are now three generations of new travellers on the road together. Unfortunately travellers have suffered more state repression then anyone-resulting in a mass exodus from Britain of tens of thousands.
+[216] CIA memorandum "For the Record" from Thomas B. Abernathy, 8/21/61; Dr. Louis Tordella, former Deputy Director, National Security Agency, testimony 10/21/75, pp. 17-20.
-The temporary nature of these counter cultures-though not invalidating them-does significantly limit their scope from a (r) evolutionary perspective. The struggle then is to first join the dots, link up these generations of libertarians by creating multi-generational counter cultures.
+[217] High FBI officials decided to use the CIA mail opening program for "our internal security objectives" in 1958. They did not want the Bureau to "assume this coverage" itself because its "sensitive nature" created "inherent dangers" and due to its "complexity, size, and expense." Instead, the Bureau would hold CIA "responsible to share their coverage with us." (Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, 1/22/58.) The initial FBI request to NSA involved "commercial and personal communications between persons in Cuba and tile United States." (Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, Assistant Director, Domestic Intelligence Division, 5/18/62.)
-To a certain extent we have been going down this road for a few years. The inspiring actions of the ‘90s have brought many different age ranges together. Yet our radical ecological circles still remain very much ‘Clubl8-30‘. [I first wrote the previous sentence around four years ago and it may be truer now to say Club 21–33! Rather worrying considering the next paragraph... ho hum.]
+[218] Abernathy memorandum, 8/21/61.
-The next few years will show whether our movement will share the fate of the Trots (who, bar students, are mostly in their late 40s having been in their 20s in the ’60/‘70s upsurge)-an isolated political generation moving through time shrinking with every year.
+[219] Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan (attachment), 8/21/61.
-The creation of multigenerational counter cultures is essential simply from the perspective of our network survival.
+[220] Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 2/15/62.
-***** Opening Up Space
+[221] Select Committee Memorandum, Subject: Review of Documents at DOD Regarding LP MEDLEY 9/17/75 . ("LP MEDLEY" was the CIA's codename for this Program; the NSA codename was SHAMROCK.)
-More than anything else we need to open up space for (r)evolution to grow. Keeping ourselves undigested within the bowels of the system is going to be difficult. Later in Task II I will talk about biological meltdown and some of the steps we must take to combat it. Yet just as civilisation is destroying nature all over the globe so too it is haemorrhaging our internal nature. (The best kept state secret is the misery of everyday life.-Raoul Vaneigem ) This ever-speeding emotional meltdown is resulting in an epidemic of depression, self-harm, and violence. Without hope the oppressed will always turn their violence on themselves and each other. Ever more people in the core are turning to damaging pseudo-escapism; alcoholism, drug addiction, and even religion are all on the rise. These panaceas only further poison society. Those without hope but also without the ability to fool themselves turn in larger numbers to an escapism that is in no way pseudo-suicide.
+[222] Secretary Forrestal's immediate successor, Louis Johnson, renewed the arrangement in 1949. To the knowledge of those interviewed by the Committee, this was the last instance in which the companies raised any question as to the authority for the arrangements. (Andrews, 9/23/75. pp. 34, 40.)
-Suicide is now the single biggest killer of men under 35... The rate-three times that of women of the same age-has nearly doubled since 1971. Working class men are atparticular risk, with suicide rates four times those of men in professional occupations... The Samaritans believe thefigures could be much worse as examination of road-traffic accidents involving just one driver suggests that some of them may well have been deliberate.[319]
+[223] Richard Helms Testimony, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 84. Memorandum from Richard Helms to Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, 5/17/54.
-Although women-especially the young-lag behind men as successful suicides, they are way ahead when it comes to attempts.
+[224] J. Edward Day Testimony, 10/22/75, Hearings Vol 4, p. 45. However, a contemporaneous CIA memorandum stated that "no relevant details" were withheld from Day when he was briefed in 1961 by CIA officials. (Memorandum from Richard Helms to Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff, 2/16/61.)
-Speaking personally I have already lost too many friends and comrades to death, depression, and drugs. Many of these were great warriors and brave, good people who shone during the ‘90s land struggles. But after these struggles and the culture it spawned ended, their shield from the world was gone. Soon after, so were many of them-if not in body then in spirit. I believe that for quite a few the temporary counter culture of land struggle put off for years their not-inevitable descent. It is from this that I take the beliefthat the growth of counter cultures can go some way to re-instilling-and sustaining-hope and authentic human behaviour. Yet if we are to make these cultures (at least Semi-) Permanent Autonomous Zones then we need radical spaces and communities that will hold. To a large extent we have already started building (well, buying or breaking into mostly) the structures we need:
+[225] Helms, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, pp, 87-89.
- - Communes: Housing co-ops, traveller sites, big shared houses, farms, squats, direct action camps, and land projects
+[226] Letter from Attorney General Clark to President Truman, 7/17/46.
- - Social Centres: Squats, members clubs, resource centres
+[227] Memorandum from G. M. Elsey, Assistant Counsel to the President, to S. J. Spingarn; memorandum from Elsey to the President, 2/2/50, (Spingarn Papers. Harry S. Truman Library).
-Our strength is in our ability to take action ourselves and by doing so inspire others to take action. To a large extent both the Land Struggle Period and the Global Resistance Period were catalysed initially by a very small number of people. Our network’s strategy has been one of empowering others to replicate our activity rather than expand ourselves as such. It is both a duty and a pleasure to live our ecological and libertarian principles and if we do so as coherently and consistently as possible I believe it is quite infectious. Most of us, after all, got hooked on the laughs and commitment of others.
+[228] Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
-While counter cultures should act as partial sanctuaries we should never forget the importance of defence through attack. In the words of the SPK (the ‘70s armed German psychological self-help group): Civilisation: This sick society has made us sick. Let us strike a death blow at this sick society.
+[229] Memorandum from Attorney General Brownell to J. Edgar Hoover, 5/20/54. In 1952 Attorney General J. Howard McGrath refused to authorize microphone surveillance involving trespass because it was "in the area of the Fourth Amendment." (Memorandum from Attorney General McGrath to J. Edgar Hoover, 2/26/52.)
-***** Changing Change
+[230] See p. 105. (The Chief Counsel to the 'Select Committee disqualified himself from participating in Committee deliberations concerning either Mr. Katzenbach or former Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall because of a previous attorney-client relationship with those two persons.)
-Too often radicals decry others’ inability to face up to the desperate need for change. A few years back Jeremy Seabrook interviewed many radicals in an attempt to find the root of their failure to change society:
+[231] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Deputy Attorney General Byron White, 5/4/61.
-<quote>
+[232] omitted in original.
-We were becoming uneasy about the recurring theme that ‘people <em>must change’. We began to wonder if the reason why the parties advocating radical change were so unsuccessful was be-cause they were striking against the resistance of people who had changed, who had been com-pelled to change, too much. The experience of industrialisation had been driven and relentless change, and continues to be so. Even countries which pride themselves on having reached an advanced stage of development, of being post-industrial, of being ‘developed’, constantly require accelerating change from their privileged populations. So why should we expect that exhortations to</em> change will be welcomed by those who have known little else for at least two centuries? In this context, the desire to conserve, to protect, to safeguard, to rescue, to resist, becomes <em>the heart of a radical project.[320]</em>
-</quote>
-In the capitalist core, development is simply renamed progress and the ground is always moving from under our feet. Our thumb-in-the-dam defence of ecologies over the last decade has garnered vast levels of support. A similar but far more subtle process must be carried out to defend threatened positive social relationships.
+[233] In the course of an investigation, authorized by Attorney General Kennedy, into lobbying efforts on behalf of a foreign country regarding sugar quota legislation, FBI determined that Congressman Harold D. Cooley, chairman of the House Agriculture Committee, planned to meet with representatives of a foreign country in a hotel room. (FBI memorandum, 2/15/61 ; Memorandum from W.R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 12/22/66.)
+<br>
+<br>At the instruction of Director Hoover, the Bureau installed a microphone in the hotel room to record this meeting. (FBI memorandum, 2/15/61; Memorandum from D. E. Moore to A. 11. Belmont, 2/16/61.) The results of the meeting were subsequently disseminated to the Attorney General. (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 2/18/61.)
+<br>
+<br>A review of this case by FBI officials in 1966 concluded that "our files, contain no clear Indication that the Attorney General was specifically advised that a microphone surveillance was being utilized. . ." (Memorandum from Wannall to Sullivan, 12/21/66.) It was noted, however, that on the morning of February 17,1961-- after the microphone was in place but all hour or two before the meeting actually occurred -Director Hoover spoke with Attorney General Kennedy and, according to Hoover's contemporaneous memorandum, advised him that the Cooley meeting was to take place that day and that "we are trying to cover" it. (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Parsons, Mohr, Belmont, and DeLoach, 2/17/61.)
-We must first root ourselves in surviving communal and ecological practises, preserve them, extend them, and link them with the emerging counter culture.
+[234] According to records compiled by the FBI, there was FBI microphone surveillance of one "black separatist group" in 1960; one "black separatist group" and one "black separatist group functionary" in 1961; two "black separatist groups," one "black separatist group functionary," and one "(white) racist organization" in 1962; and two "black separatist groups" and one "black separatist group functionary" in 1963. (Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 10/23/75.)
-In this way the base for (r)evolution is not merely new relationships fostered by radicals but age-old radical (in the original meaning) relationships. One example is allotments and the connection to the land and sense of autonomy they breed--under constant threat from development.
+[235] The Select Committee has determined that the FBI, on at least one occasion, maintained no records of the approval of a microphone surveillance authorized by an Assistant Director. (FBI Memorandum, 1/30/75, Subject: Special Squad at Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey, 8/22-28/64.)
-The oppressed multitude needs to wrest control of change from the elite, becoming no longer change’ s subjects but its agents.
+[236] Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 10/17/75. This memorandum also states that, on the basis of the recollections of agents and a review of headquarters files, the FBI has "been able to identify" the following number of "surreptitious entries for microphone installations" in "internal security intelligence, and counterintelligence" investigations: 1960: 49; 1961: 63; 1962: 75; 1963: 79; and the following number of such entries "in criminal investigations" (as opposed to intelligence) 1960: 11; 1961: 69; 1962: 106; 1963: 84.
-***** Counter (R)evolution
+[237] Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 9/23/75.
-The elite pre-empt counter cultural transcendence with civil war. To attempt to seriously change the world is to put realism in the attic, a worthy piece of Spring cleaning. Yet to embark on a project of change without taking heed of the likely reaction is not merely idiotic but terribly irresponsible.
+[238] Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 7/19/66. Subject: "Black Bag" Jobs. Initials on this memorandum indicate that it was prepared by F. J. Baumgardner, an FBI Intelligence Division Section Chief, and approved by J. A. Sizoo, principal deputy to Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan. This memorandum was located in Director Hoover's "Official and Confidential" files, and it appears that the memorandum was shifted from Hoover's "Personal Files" shortly before his death. (Helen Gandy deposition, 11/12/75, pp. 4-6.) The FBI compiled a list of the "domestic subversive" targets, based "upon recollections of Special Agents who have knowledge of such activities, and review of those files identified by recollection as being targets of surreptitious entries." The list states "at least fourteen domestic subversive targets were the subject of at least 238 entries from 1942 to April 1968. In addition, at least three domestic subversive targets were the subject of numerous entries from October 1952 to June 1966. . . . One white hate group was the target of an entry in March 1966." The Bureau admits that this list is "incomplete." (Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 9/23/75.)
-<quote>
+[239] Deposition of William R. Branigan, Section Chief, FBI Intelligence Division, 10/9/75, pp. 13, 39, 40. Testimony of Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall, FBI Intelligence Division, 10/24/75, Hearings, vol. 4, pp. 148-9.
-A <em>truly revolutionary culture that is eJ]ective (demonstrating realistic, sincere designs aimed at the overthrow of established power) will be attacked by the built-in automatic survival instincts of the established power complex creating a need to counterpoise the violence ofpower. Without the ability to organise a counterforce to neutralise the violence of established power, antithesis dies. We are not contending with fools.</em>
-<right>
+[240] Memorandum from San Francisco field office to FBI Headquarters, 3/11/60.
--George Jackson[321]
-</right>
-</quote>
-The rich will try to pre-empt and destroy by military means any movements of the multitude with the potential to transcend and destroy power. In Spain, Hungry, Latin America, Indochinasocial threats and state massacres.
+[241] Memorandum from S. B. Donahoe to W. C. Sullivan, 9/15/61 ; Memorandum from San Francisco field office to FBI headquarters, 7/28/61.
-Relatively peaceful social struggle and construction is only possible up to a point--the point at which it begins to seriously undermine elite power.
+[242] Letter from Attorney General Clark to President Truman, 7/17/46.
-It is of course most likely that we will never get anywhere and therefore fail to bring the roof down on ourselves. However if we believe radical social change is at all possible than we must think and prepare for the reaction.
+[243] Memorandum from Hoover to Brownell, 12/31/56.
-The leaflets for June 18<sup>th</sup> 1999 proclaimed that: *To work for delight and authentic festivity is barely distinguishable from preparing for general insurrection*. I’m a bit of a sucker for Situation-ist semantics but I have to say that pretty banners and samba bands do not armed militias make! Don’t get me wrong, I like a good street party as much as the next twenty something; but let’s call a spade a spade.
+[244] Memorandum from Hoover to Kennedy, 10/9/63.
-Situ slogans like this have been made common radical currency by the events of France 1968: rioting students in the Sorbonne, factory occupations, red and black flags in the sunshine. France ’68 is often used as justification for the idea that spontaneous revolution can succeed without the need for significant (r)evolutionary preparation. In fact the failure of France ’68 proves the opposite.
+[245] Memorandum from Hoover to Kennedy, 4/1/64.
-From the boredom and misery of everyday life a momentous social upsurge swept across France without warning. President De Gaulle, freaked out and doubting the loyalty of the French army, left French soil for the relative safely of troops stationed in Germany. Great! But just as the upsurge had appeared, suddenly so too it dissipated. Why?
+[246] Memorandum from Hoover to Kennedy, 2/24/64.
-There are a number of reasons-the Stalinist stranglehold on the unions chief among them. One simple factor, often ignored, was De Gaulle’s appearance on national television to basically proclaim if you want civil war I’ll give it to you.[322] He insinuated he had the loyalty of a large part of the army while revolutionaries could claim the loyalty of none. While this was not entirely true (action committees had been formed within camps of conscripted soldiers to organise break outs), it was mostly true. Trusted regiments were deployed around Paris and widely photographed.
+[247] See Findings C and G and Committee Report on the FBI and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
-A near million strong mass march of the forces of reaction took to the streets. Faced by this threat and sizing up the fight, a large section of the working class, already disorganised by the Stalinists, understood its own weakness and abandoned the moment. Skirmishes at factories continued but De Gaulle’s broadcast really was the turning point. Imagination is Power but the power ofimagination is not enough when confronted with the armed might of the state. What is needed is class strength--an armed people.
+[248] Memorandum from R. D. Cotter to W. C. Sullivan, 12/15/66. On the same day, and without specific authorization from the Attorney General, the FBI Placed a wiretap on Norman's residence. Attorney General Kennedy was informed of the wiretap two days later, and approved it the following day. (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 6/29/61.) The tap continued for four days until Norman went on vacation. (Memorandum from S. B. Donahoe to W. C. Sullivan, 7/3/61.) At no time did this or any other aspect of the FBI's investigation produce any evidence that Norman had actually obtained classified information. An FBI summary stated: "The majority of those interviewed thought a competent, well-informed reporter could have written the article without having reviewed or received classified information." (Memorandum from Cotter to Sullivan, 12/15/66.)
-The failure of France in ’68 was that coming so suddenly, the rebellion never really went beyond negative opposition to move to positive social growth and defence.
+[249] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 7/27/62.
-When offered civil war-the blood and the horror-many workers couldn’t envision a future worth it. They also knew that they didn’t have the class strength to get through a civil war. lhe lack of a decade-by-decade counter culture left those who occupied the factories nothing tangible to defend and expand and not enough weapons to do it with.
+[250] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 7/31/62. The tap on the secretary lasted three weeks, and the tap on Baldwin a month. Memoranda from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 8/13/62 and 8/28/62.
-By resigning itself to the resumption of party politics instead of engaging in a bloody slug fest it would lose, the French working class was entirely logical. The failure of many radicals to size up fights-and as a result see the centrality of an armed class in (r)evolution-says more about their class background than anything else. Stuart Christie, long-term British anarchist, founder of Black Flag magazine and attempted assassin of Franco, puts it well:
+[251] Unaddressed memorandum from A. H. Belmont, 1/9/63.
-<quote>
+[252] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 10/19/62.
-One <em>of thefundamental rules of guerrilla warfare is to spread the struggle to every piece of terri-tory and to every facet of life. Unless the seeds of anarchistfreedom have already been sown there, we are doomed to perish however good our military preparation might be.[323]</em>
-</quote>
-***** Surplus Baggage
+[253] Unaddressed memorandum from "hwg" (Director Hoover's secretary was Helen W. Gandy), 1/9/63. This memorandum reads: "Mr. Belmont called to say (Courtney) Evans spoke to the Attorney General replacing the tech on [former FBI agent] again, and the Attorney General said by all means do this. Mr. Belmont has instructed New York to do so." (Assistant Director Courtney Evans was the FBI's normal liaison with Attorney General Kennedy.)
-Despite our professed militancy and radicalism we still carry a lot of baggage from, the political terrain many of us first got involved in-single issue campaigns. As has been pointed out elsewhere, our move into revolutionary politics has often been carried out by pressure group methods.
+[254] Memorandum from W. R. Wanall to W. C. Sullivan, 12/22/66. The Sugar Lobby investigation is also discussed at footnote 233.
-Our responsibility to any (r)evolutionary process is not to make revolution, but to evolve counter cultures that can make revolutionaries.
+[255] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Parsons, 2/14/61.
-Ideally counter cultures can have enough time to evolve, through struggle, to a point at which social transcendence, total (r)evolution, is possible. By such a time it would be able to field considerable armed class strength and possibly defeat elite attempts to drown it in bloody counter (r)evolution.
+[256] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 2/14/61.
-Of course history rarely leaves anyone alone with their plans and this is just such a case. Here lies the rub, in the words of a Canadian army military historian:
+[257] Memorandum from Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/16/61.
-Revolutions are not, in fact made by revolutionaries. Ihe professional agitators, the terrible exiles of history have seldom succeeded in raising even the smallest revolutionary mob. Ihe best they can hope for is to seize control of the course of the revolution once it has started. The thing itself is caused by the persistent stupidities and brutalities of government.[324]
+[258] Memorandum from Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/16/61.
-That revolutionaries don’t make revolution is no bad thing considering those who executed most of the last century’s revolutionary hopes were the very people who described themselves as revolutionaries-socialists like Lenin and Hitler. As libertarians a large part of our job is to stop these murderous parasites from seizing control of the course of tidal waves of change. How far we are away from crises of this scale is unknowable but discussed in Task III-Preparing for Crises.
+[259] According to a memorandum of a meeting between Attorney General Kennedy and Courtney Evans, Kennedy stated that "now the law was passed he did not feel there was justification for continuing this extensive investigation." (Memorandum from C. A. Evans to Mr. Parsons 4/14/61.) The investigation did discover possibly unlawful influence was being exerted by representatives of the foreign country involved, but it did not reveal that money was actually being passed to any Executive or congressional official. (Memorandum from Wannall to Sullivan, 12/22/66.)
-By strolling on to the terrain of revolution (at least theoretically) we are confronted by a plethora of leftist ideologies. Thankfully as libertarians we are inoculated against infection from some of most virulent-and stupid-authoritarian dogmas. For instance we have rightly rejected out of hand much of the (ridiculous) party building and fetishism of organisation which characterise the revolutionary (HA!) left in particular and capitalism in general.
+[260] FBI letterhead memoranda, 6/15, 18, 19/62.
-There is an opposing left tendency that disagrees with almost any activity aimed at preparing for the tumultuous events that punctuate history. In times of social crisis faith is put in the revolutionary impulse of the proletariat. One can sum up the theory of this tendency as It’ll Be Alright on the Night. There is unfortunately little evidence from history that the working class-never mind anyone else-is intrinsically predisposed to libertarian or ecological revolution. Thousands of years of authoritarian socialisation favour the jackboot and this is the very reason why libertarian counter cultures are so important.
+[261] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 6/26/62.
-***** Some Proposals
+[262] The wiretap on the House Committee Clerk had "produced no information of value." While there is no indication that the other wiretaps, including five directed at foreign targets, produced evidence of actual payoff.,;, they did reveal that possibly unlawful influence was again being exerted by the foreign government, and internal Bureau permission was obtained to continue them for sixty day.,; beyond the initial thirty-day period. (Memorandum from W. R. Wan nail to W. C. Sullivan, 8/16/62.)
-The practical work involved in this task is far more than all the others.
+[263] A White House "briefing paper," prepared in February 1961, stated, "It is thought by some informed observers that the outcome of the sugar legislation which comes up for renewal in the U.S. Congress in March 1961 will be all-important to the future of U.S./ (foreign country) relations." (Memorandum from Richard M. Bissell, Jr. to McGeorge Bundy, 2/17/61.) Another White House "briefing memorandum" in June 1962 stated, "The action taken by the House of Representatives in passing the House Agriculture Committee bill (The Cooley bill) has created a furor in the (foreign country) . . ." Officials of that country said that the legislation "would be disastrous" to its "economy." (Memorandum from William H. Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy and Myer Feldman, 6/23/62.) (JFK Library.)
- - It means growing real friendships that can weather the storms of struggles and relationships.
+[264] See Finding on Political Abuse, pp. 233, 234. The wiretapping of American citizens in these instances could only serve "intelligence," rather than law enforcement purposes, since any criminal prosecution (i.e., for bribery) would have been "tainted" by the warrantless wiretaps. [Coplon v. United States, 185 F. 2d 629 (1950), 191 F. 2d 749 (1951).]
- - It means creating our lives so parenting and activism neither conflict with each other nor are seen as separate things.
+[265] The circumstances indicating this possibility and the eventual determination that the allegation was unfounded are set forth in a memorandum from Director Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy in 1964. (Hoover to Kennedy, 5/4/64 and enclosure. (John F. Kennedy Library) )
- - It means growing food on our allotments and rebuilding the land community.
+[266] The FBI requested the wiretap on the editor and an accompanying tap on a Washington attorney in contact with the editor because of its concern about possible "leaks" of information about FBI loyalty-security investigations of government officials. Director Hoover advised that publication of this "classified information" constituted "a danger to the internal security of the United States." (Memorandum from Hoover to Katzenbach, 4/19/65.) However, in 1964 Director Hoover had volunteered to Attorney General Kennedy information about the Publication of the book alleging impropriety. The author himself had supplied information about the book to the FBI. (Memoranda from Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 7/8/64 and 7/15/64.)
- - It means consolidating locally.
+[267] Testimony of William C. Sullivan, Assistant Director for the Domestic Intelligence Division (1961-1970) and Assistant to the Director (1970-1971), 11/1/75, pp. 42-43.
- - It means if forced into jobs continuing the struggle in the workplace.
+[268] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, 8/28/56.
- - It means solidarity between groups.
+[269] Memorandum from D. M. Ladd to J. Edgar Hoover, 2/27/46. According to this memorandum the underlying reason for such Bureau propaganda was to anticipate and counteract the "flood of propaganda from Leftist and so-called Liberal sources" which would "be encountered in the event of extensive arrests of Communists" if war with the Soviet Union broke out.
- - It means being vigilant against cultural assimilation, patriarchy, and depression.
+[270] Belmont to Boardman, 8/28/56.
- - It means safe houses.
+[271] A Bureau monograph in mid-1955 "measured" the Communist Party threat as:
+<br>
+<br>"Influence over the masses, ability to create controversy leading to confusion and disunity, penetration of specific channels in American life where public opinion is molded, and espionage and sabotage <em>potential</em>." [Emphasis supplied.] (Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President, 7/29/55, and enclosed FBI monograph, "The Menace of Communism in the United States Today," pp. iv-v.)
+<br>
+<br>The FBI official who served as Director Hoover's liaison with the CIA in the 1950s stated that "the Communist Party provided a pool of talent for the Soviet [intelligence] services" in the "30s and into the 40s." During that period the Soviets recruited agents "from the Party" to penetrate "the U.S. Government" and "scientific circles." He added, however, that "primarily because of the action and counter-action taken by the FBI during the late 40s, the Soviet services changed their tactics and considerably reduced any programs or projects designed to recruit CP members, realizing or assuming that they were getting heavy attention from the Bureau." (Testimony of former FBI liason with CIA, 0/22/75, p. 32.)
- - It means acting together informally in our shared interest. Your mates landlord won’t return her deposit-a short office visit by her mates should sort that out.
+[272] Belmont to Boardman, 8/28/65.
- - It means demolishing authoritarian socialists in general and Nazis and Stalinists in particular.
+[273] Belmont to Boardman, 9/5/56; memorandum from FBI headquarters to SAC, New York, 9/6/56.
- - It means not allowing us to drift apart.[325]
+[274] E.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
- - It means training.
+[275] Deposition of Supervisor, Internal Security Section, FBI Intelligence Division, 10/16/75, pp. 10, 14.
- - It means laughing together as we fight together.
+[276] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York field office, 3/31/60.
-Really the list is too long to go through. I will not even attempt to catalogue what ingredients good counter cultures needs-social evolution and the individual situation will do that.
+[277] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco field office. 4/16/64.
-The two primary divisions in this society that need to be overcome are our disconnection from each other and our disconnection from the land. Practically there are some very obvious things we can do now as an evolving counter-culture.
+[278] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland field office, 11/6/64.
-<br>
+[279] Forty-five actions were approved by FBI Headquarters tinder the SWP COINTELPRO from 1961 until it was discontinued in 1969. The SWP program Was then subsumed under the New Left COINTELPRO, see pp. 88-89.
-***** Reconnecting with Each Other
+[280] Memorandum from Director, FBI, to New York field office, 10/12/61.
-) Build a British Social Centre Network
+[281] Memorandum from the Attorney General to Heads of Departments and Agencies, 4/29/53.
-Social centres-which place politics where they should be, in friendship-are the key to viable counter-cultures. Probably because of the post ‘70s travelling culture Britain is unusual in not de-veloping a social centre network. Across Europe social centres are at the very heart of anarchist counter-cultures. (This is also true incidentally of Irish Republicanism and Basque separatism). This process has begun and from this one act of organisation a thousand acts of resistance will follow. [Since this was first published a London Social Centres Network has formed and plans are afoot for one nationwide.]
+[282] Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968), ch. 2; Report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (1969) ; Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest (1970).
-) Prepare for Strike Support
+[283] SAC letter 67-27, 5/3/66.
-Our circles, despite inhabiting a economically peripheral social position (casual labour, dole, sin-gle parenthood) have a far better record in the last 10 years in supporting strikes than the left. To quote a shop steward from the Liverpool Dockers: “others talk, these people do!” A small amount of thought can make our ability to use direct action to intervene in workplace struggles much easier. Solidarity among the poor-the very basis of counter-cultures and anarchy.
+[284] See p. 50.
-) Resist Together, Train Together
+[285] 1964 FBI Manual section 122, p. 1.
-While a (r)evolutionary culture can include everything from cabbage growing to hip-hop, without active resistance a culture will not hold. We need to be up against it to make sure both that the petty things don’t split us and the big things bring us together. Living in a mundane world you can know someone for years and not truly know them as you do after a day of struggle.
+[286] 1965 FBI Manual section 122, pp. 6-8.
-Acts of purposeful resistance build our collective strength but we shouldn’t just rely on events but train to grow our power. Run Faster-go running with a mate. Trash Better-learn sabo-tage skills before you need them. Find Direction-go orienteering at night. Get Fitter-give up smoking collectively. Hit Harder-spar with friends. Strength is infectious.
+[287] FBI Manual Section 122, revised 12/13/06, pp. 8-9.
-Reconnecting with the Land 1) Grow the Land Community Allotments are available to us all thanks to Nineteenth Century arson, but hundreds of sites every year are being destroyed by developers. More direct action is needed to stop this haemorrhaging of an inheritance born of struggle. More work allotments in Britain than work in farming and it is only from this land community that any hope for ecological autonomy can grow. The experience ofgrowing your own food is (r)evolutionary.
+[288] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 8/25/67.
-Allotments also offer a jump point for those committed to leaving the cities and towns. On these small patches we can learn many of the skills in miniature needed if we are to grow out of our dependency on the industrial. From farm communities in Cornwall to land projects in the Scottish Highlands many of our circles have gone back to the land in the last decade. Many more will follow. The call of the soil cannot be drowned by the cacophony of traffic.[326]
+[289] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 3/4/68.
-In the final analysis, all revolutions are fought over the question of land. -Malcolm X[327]
+[290] SAC Letter 68-16, 3/12/68, Subject: Congress of Racial Equality.
-) Rewild Ourselves
+[290] SAC Letter 68-25, 4/30/68.
-Get out beyond the streetlights andjoin the stars. Hear the darkness and see the sounds of the night. Learn skills, light fires. Discover wild foods. Sit quietly in a wood and wait. Guide kids to the true joy of mud and spiders. Wear down the soles ofyour walking boots, harden the soles of your feet. Get naked in the sun and snow. Pack a heavy rucksack with everything you’ll need for a weekend camping, then leave it on the bed and walk out the door. Nurture saplings, plant the spring. Improvise shelters, get nifty with a knife. Don’t go to work-fuck in forests.
+[291] SAC Memorandum 1-72; 5/23/72, Subject: Reporting of Protest Demonstrations
-) Continue Ecological Land Struggles
+[292] Supervisor, FBI Intelligence Division, deposition, 10/28/75, pp. 7-8.
-In Britain our struggles over ecology and wildness are powerful theatres for the growth of ecological sensibility. In living on, for, and in defence of the land, one forges an immensely strong connection. Fluorescent-bibbed cops grappling with tree defenders brings out into the open the age-old conflict. On one side the property/state axis, on the other wildness,
+[293] SAC Letter 68-21, 4/2/68. This directive did caution that "mere dissent and opposition to Governmental policies pursued in a legal constitutional manner" was "not sufficient to warrant inclusion in the Security Index." Moreover, "anti-Vietnam or peace group sentiments" were not, in themselves, supposed to "justify an investigation." The failure of this admonition to achieve its stated objective is discussed in the findings on "Overbreadth" and "Covert Action to Disrupt."
-diversity, freedom. By creating these situations of struggle, mythic discourse is shattered with a power no essay or clever turn of phrase will ever have. Unleashing these revelatory (r)evolutionary moments is at the heart of our action. With every broken illusion we take a step back from the abyss.[328]
+[294] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/9/68.
-***** Task Conclusion: Grow and Live
+[295] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 10/28/68, and enclosure, New Left Movement -Report outline.
-For new worlds of land, liberty, and love there will be both kisses and gunfire.
+[296] A further reason for collecting information on the New Left was put forward by Assistant Director] Brennan, head of the FBI intelligence Division in 1970-1971. Since New Left "leaders" had "publicly professed" their desire to overthrow the Government, the Bureau should file the names of anyone who 'joined in membership" for "future reference" in case they ever "obtained a sensitive Government position." (Charles Brennan testimony, 9/25/75, Hearings Vol. 2, pp. 116-117.)
-Taking responsibility for our own lives and those around us is daunting. It’s not just the cops, the bosses, the scabs, and the poverty that keeps people working for the man. It’s the terror of the blank page. We are schooled to be dependent on fictions and commands, not to believe in ourselves. Growing and defending new worlds is a daunting task, yet the alternative is far worse. An acceptence of a tide ofvoid that consumes species and peoples while it daily drains us of dignity.
+[297] Memorandum from Minneapolis field office to FBI Headquarters, 4/1/70.
-The aim of our counter cultures should be total social transcendence-(r)evolution. That (r)evolution is extremely unlikely (there is no point pretending otherwise) does not fundamentally question the need for counter cultural growth. Counter cultures are not only new worlds for the future but barracks and sanctuaries for today.
+[298] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh field office, 5/1/70.
-**** II. Putting Our Thumb in the Dam
+[299] Memorandum from Mobile field office to FBI Headquarters, 12/9/70.
-Just as counter cultures must open up space for (r)evolution to grow we must also open up time. The life support systems of the earth are under unprecedented attack. Biological meltdown is accelerating. (R)evolution takes decades to mature. Unless force is used on the margins of the global society to protect the most important biological areas we may simply not have enough time. The last tribal examples of anarchy, from whom we can learn a lot, could be wiped out within decades if not militantly defended. ‘Thumb in the Dam’struggles to protect ecological diversity understanding that this civilisation WILL be terminated, by either the unlikely possibility of global (r)evolution or the certainty of industrial collapse.
+[300] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit field offices, 2/17/66.
-<quote>
+[301] Memorandum from Detroit field office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66.
-<em>What would the world be, once bereft,</em>
-Of <em>wet and of wilderness? Let them be left,</em>
+[302] FBI Manual, Section 107.
-O let them be left, wildness and wet;
+[303] See Findings on use of informants in "Intrusive Techniques," p. 192.
-<br>Long live the weeds and the wilderness yet
+[304] Memorandum from Attorney General Kennedy to the President, June 1964, quoted in Victor Navasky, Kennedy Justice (New York: Atheneum, 1971), pp. 105--106. The President asked former CIA Director Allen Dulles to evaluate tile situation in Mississippi. Upon his return from a survey of the state, Dulles endorsed the Attorney General's recommendation that the FBI be used to "control the terrorist activities." ("Dulles Requests More FBI Agents for Mississippi," New York Times, 6/27/64.)
-<right>
+[305] Testimony of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach 12/3/75. Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 207.
---Gerard Manley Hopkins, Inversnaid.
-</right>
-</quote>
-<quote>
+[306] 1965 FBI manual, section 122, pp. 1-2.
-Our job is to save the evolutionary building blocks and to make sure there are grizzly bears andgreat blue whales and rainforests and redwoods somewhere, so that in thefinal thrashing of the industrial monster everything else that’s good on this planet isn’t destroyed.
-<right>
+[307] FBI Executives conference memorandum, 3/24/66, Subject: Establishment of a Special Squad Against the Ku Klux Klan.
---Dave Foreman, Earth First! co-founder.
-</right>
-</quote>
-***** Here Come the End Days
+[308] 1967 FBI manual, Section 122, p. 2.
-The aim of this piece is to help prioritise and direct our action and organising. However our absolute action priorities are not left to us to determine. They have been decided for us by the point in history in which we live. For this reason I have made this task section considerably longer than the others.
+[309] 1971 FBI manual, Section 122, p. 2.
-Industrial Capitalism has continued civilisation’s age-old attack on the wild and free-resulting in unparalleled biological and cultural meltdown. lhe decimation of wild peoples (cultural melt-down) and the devastation of ecological diversity (biological meltdown) are now reaching truly apocalyptic proportions.
+[310] Memorandum from FBI Executive Conference to Mr. Tolson, 10/29/70.
-***** Biological Meltdown
+[311] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs. 11/4/70.
-<quote>
+[312] Memorandum from G. C. Moore to William C. Sullivan, 10/11/67. For Attorney General Clark's order, see pp. 83-84.
-Indeed, all the indications are that we are standing at the opening phase of a mass extinction event that will be comparable in scale to thefive great extinction episodes that have taken place in the history of life on earth, the most recent being the loss of the dinosaurs some 65 million years ago. Impending extinction rates are at leastfour orders of magnitude than is found in thefossil record. That means in the order of 10,000 times greater, a frightening prospect to say the least. If allowed to continue the current extinction episode, could well eliminate between a third and two thirds of all species... [within this] century.[329]
-</quote>
-One third to two thirds of all species on earth-GONE! Stop a while, attempt to conceptualise the magnitude of the moment.
+[313] Memorandum from FBI to Select committee, 8/20/75 and enclosures.)
-Nothing in the history ofhumankind has prepared us for this appalling event, but our generation will probably witness the disappearance of a third to one half of the earth’s rich and subtle forms of life, which have been evolving for billions of years. In the early 1990s Michael Soule, founder of the Society for Conservation Biology, made this chilling assessment of the status of the earth’s biosphere: For theffrst time in hundreds of million of years significant evolutionary change in most higher organisms is coming to a screeching halt... Vertebrate evolution may be at an end.[330] Soule is saying that humanity’s disruption of the environment has been so systematic and profound that it has halted the same natural processes that have brought everything we know into existence, including our very bodies and minds.
+[314] Memorandum from G. C. Moore to E. S. Miller, 9/8/72.
-***** Cultural Meltdown
+[315] Memorandum from G. C. Moore to C. D. Brennan. 10/27/70.
-It is tempting when facing this scale of doom to think of humanity as an intrinsically ecocidal organism. A pox on the earth. This however lets us and our society-city culture-off the hook.
+[316] Memorandum from Moore to Miller, 9/27/72. This program continued until 1973, when the FBI decided to rely on its regular extremist informants "for 'by-product' information on civil unrest." The most "productive" ghetto informants were "converted" into regular informants. (FBI Inspection Division Memorandum, 11/24/72; Memorandum from Director Clarence M. Kelley to all SACs, 7/31/73.)
-Numerous cultures have developed a sustainable and harmonious relationship with their surroundings: the Mbuti, the Penan, the !Kung, to name but a few. These societies chose not to dominate nature. In the larger history of humankind, they are the norm and we are the exception.
+[317] Philadelphia Field Office memo 8/12/68, re Racial Informant.
-On civilisation’s periphery, some of these wild peoples live on. Their very existence is a serious threat to city culture; simply in the fact that they show that there is a reality outside our world. Defending their autonomy and the land of which they are a part, they are the best protectors of some of the earth’s wildest places.
+[318] FBI Manual Section 87.
-Just as wild nature is being denuded and domesticated, so too is wild humanity. This century will probably be the last for many cultures ages old. Civilisation aims to wipe out their other worlds. Men of money and men of god conspire. If these tribes are wiped out by our culture, it will be the first time in millions of years that no human communities have lived in harmony with nature.
+[319] Testimony of FBI Special Agent, 11/20/75, p. 55.
-Guns, gold, god, and diseases could make Homo Sapiens extinct in our lifetime. For when the last gatherer-hunters are hunted down, all that will be left of humanity will be in the entrails of Leviathan-having the potential for life but unliving.
+[320] Staff review of informant report summaries.
-<quote>
+[321] Mary Jo Cook, testimony, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 111, 119-120.
-<em>Land, the mother earth from which we are born and to which we die, on whom our lives depend, through which our spiritual ways remain intact. To impose changes on this ancient order would serve to destroy our dignity and identity as Indigenous people. Without the land, the peoples are lost. Without the Indigenous peoples the land is lost.</em>
-<right>
+[322] Report of Kansas City Field Office, 10/20/70.
--Declaration oflndigenous Peoples, 1987
-</right>
-</quote>
-***** A Critical Moment
+[323] Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/28/69.
-It is in this context that we must see ourselves. Not simply as rebels against empire, like so many before us, but rebels at the most critical moment in human history.
+[324] Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley to J. Edgar Hoover, 3/3/69. This memorandum stated that the Department was considering "conducting a grand jury investigation" under the antiriot act and other statutes.
-Our generation will likely see the decimation of remaining ecological/anarchic cultures and the haemorrhaging of the earth’s life support systems. As I outlined in Task I reformist strategies are irrelevant but (Revolution is not only unlikely but also takes time. This has often been acknowledged by radicals in the past. Emma Goldman in her last years wrote that she believed anarchy was too huge an idea for her age to move to in one step. She looked to future generations, seeing in them hope for the spring. Her feelings echo that of many over the aeons. Looking back, an example arises from the ashes and war cries of arson and insurrection in early 19<sup>th</sup> century England. One rebel anthem sung with gusto at the time resonates.
+[325] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 4/17/70. This directive defined a "commune" as "a group of individuals residing in one location who practice communal living, i.e., they share income and adhere to the philosophy of a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist-oriented violent revolution."
-<quote>
+[326] SAC Letter 70-48, 9/15/70. This directive implemented one provision of the "Huston Plan," which had been disapproved as a domestic intelligence package. See pp. 113, 116.
-<em>A hundred years, a thousand years,</em>
-<br><em>We’re marching on the road.</em>
-<br><em>The going isn’t easy yet,</em>
-<br><em>We’ve got a heavy load.</em>
-<em>The way is blind with blood and sweat,</em>
+[327] See Memorandum for the Record from Milton B. Hyman, Office of the General Counsel, to the Army General Counsel, 1/23/71, in Military Surveillance, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974), p. 203.
-<br><em>And death sings in our ears.</em>
-<br><em>But time is marching on our side.</em>
-<br><em>We will defeat the years.[331]</em>
-</quote>
-They fought, but like many before and after, failed to get to the promised land. Yet they took solace in believing their path was right and others would follow, reaching where they had not. Their belief in an almost endless future of possibility, in the unswerving progressive march of humanity through and with time gave hope to the weary.
+[328] Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights, Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (1971), at pp. 1120-1121.
-We no longer have that luxury.
+[329] Federal Data Banks. Hearings, at pp. 1123-1138.
-Today time is not marching on our side, but against us. We must fight all the faster. We cannot pass the gauntlet of defending the wild to unborn generations. It is that wildness and those un-born generations that are in peril today. What we do in our lives, in this moment, is of utmost importance. For no other generation has the weight of the future rested so heavily on the present.
+[330] President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967), pp. 118-119.
-Given the urgency, the pain, the horror, and the magnitude of the unfolding catastrophe, the questions what to do and where to start are daunting ones. Thankfully the way has been charted in part by the last 25 years of radical ecological action. “Thumb in the Dam” struggles have been at the very centre of our activity.
+[331] Fred M. Vinson testimony, 1/27/76, p. 32.
-How can one best defend wild areas and cultures? In the absence of significant (r)evolution the answer lies in a combination of conservation, direct action and the strengthening of ecological cultures. Groups such as the Wildlife Trusts (in Britain) and Conservation International (globally) have adopted land purchase as their main tactic. lhis has its place but the times call for a more militant attitude. Most of us have little money to protect habitats by buying them up, while protected areas are often far from safe. Direct action on the other hand puts the costs onto those who attack nature not those who wish to defend it. Trashing a digger poised to level a Copse feels like a far more authentic reaction to ecological destruction than any amount of paper shuffling. For most of us, well targeted direct action is the most effective and efficient use of our lim-ited time and resources. In the early ‘80s the failure of reform environmentalism made this clear and the radical ecological resistance was born. Militant direct action by warrior societies putting the earth first!
+[332] Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968), p. 487 (Bantam Books ed.).
-What objectives and strategy can we base our actions around, given the vast scale of the attack and the minute scale of the resistance? This task section will hopefully give at least a partial answer.
+[333] Report of the National Advisory Commission, p. 490.
-***** Defending the Living Land
+[334] SAC Letter 69-16, 3/11/69 . This order "recognized that with the graduation of senior classes, you will lose a certain percentage of your existing student informant coverage." But this would "not be accepted as an excuse for not developing the necessary information."
-Though it was from an understanding of the global ecological crisis that our movement was born it was in local ecological land struggles that our movement grew. As stated earlier, we can take pride in the beauty and vitality of habitats throughout Britain that are alive today because of our resistance to infrastructure growth (roads), resource extraction (quarrying, opencast coal mining, peat digging, timber cutting) and city expansion (house building).
+[335] SAC Letter 69-44, 8/19/69.
-These struggles have changed forever all of us who have taken part in them. They have connected us to the earth in a deeply emotional and meaningful way. Exhilaration, fear, empowerment, true human communication, anger, love, homes, and a feeling of belonging in both communities and the land; these are just some of what we have been given by these struggles. I emphasise this so that what I say next is not taken as a disavowal of British local ecological land struggles.
+[336] Improper Police Intelligence Activities, A Report by the Extended March 1975 Cook County (Illinois) Grand Jury, 11/10/75.
-To those of us brought up in Britain’s woodlands, copses, downland, and dales, these habitats have an immense importance-reaching deep into our soul. However, from a global perspective how important are these ecologies given the accelerating biological meltdown?
+[337] Califano testimony, 1/27/76, pp. 6-9. Califano states in retrospect that the attempt to "predict violence" was "not a successful undertaking," that "advance intelligence about dissident groups" would not "have been of much help," and that what is "important" is "physical intelligence about geography, hospitals, power stations, etc." (Califano, 1/27/76, pp. 8, 11-12.)
-We must direct our action where it will have most effect. Trauma medics use triage to sort casualties according to priority-which lives are most threatened, which lives are most saveable. In this way they can put their resources where they will have most effect. What we need then is a form of global habitat triage for the biological casualties of civilisations war on the wild. Thankfully in the last 15 years such a system has taken shape, in the form of the Hotspot Theory.
+[338] In 1966, the Justice Department had started an informal "Summer Project," staffed by a handful of law students, to pull together data from the newspapers, the U.S. Attorneys, and "some Bureau material" for the purpose, according to former Assistant Attorney General Fred Vinson, Jr., of finding out "what's going on in the black community." (Vinson, 1/27/76 p. 33.)
-Hotspot Theory was first conceived by British ecologist Norman Myers. First, it makes the task of defending biodiversity more approachable by demonstrating that we can conserve a major share of terrestrial biodiversity in a relatively small portion of the planet. Secondly, it demonstrates specifically where these areas are located, and why they are so important, entering into considerable detail on what each of them contains. Third, it elucidates the different threats faced by each of the hotspots.
+[339] Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General John Doar to Attorney General Clark, 9/27/67.
-lhe Hotspots: Earth’s Biologically Richest and Most Endangered Terrestrial Eco-Regions Myers’ Hotspot priority system uses vascular plants as the main determinant, given that plants are the primary fixers of energy from the sun and are necessary for the survival of most other organisms.
+[340] Memorandum from Messrs. Maroney, Nugent, McTiernan, and Turner to Attorney General Clark, 12/6/67.
-Hotspots are defined with two criteria. First, biological diversity. Secondly, degree of threat. A minimum of 0.53 of total global vascular plant diversity endemic to the area in question is the primary cut-off point for inclusion on the hotspot list. The theory uses the most current estimate of vascular plants as 300,000 i.e. the cut off is an area must have 1,500 endemic vascular plants within its borders. Also bird, mammal, reptile and amphibian diversity is taken into account, in that order of importance. The second criteria, degree of threat, has a cut off measure that is, a hotspot should have 253 or less of its original primary natural vegetation cover remaining intact.
+[341] Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Assistant Attorneys General John Doar, Fred Vinson, Jr., Roger W. Wilkins, and J. Walter Yeagley, 12/18/67.
-Hotspot analysis carried out between 1996–1998 resulted in a list of 25 hotspots and two exceptional mini-hotspots (the Galapagos and Juan Fernadez islands). The hotspots are:
+[342] Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Kevin T. Maroney, et al., 11/9/67.
-Tropical Andes, Meso-america, Caribbean, Choco Darien, Atlantic Forest Region, Brazilian Cerrado, Central Chile, California Floristic Province, Madagascar and Indian Ocean Islands, Easter Arc Mountains, Cape Floristic Province, Succulent Karoo, Guinean forests of West Africa, Mediterranean Basin, Caucasus, Sundaland, Wallacea, Philippines, Indo-Burma, Mountains of Central China, Western Ghats and Sri Lanka, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Polynesia, South West Australia.
+[343] Testimony of Kevin T. Maroney (Deputy Assistant Attorney General), 1/27/76, pp. 59-60.
-Cumulatively, these 25 areas plus the mini-hotspots have almost <strong>883</strong> of their original area destroyed or denuded with only 12.283 remaining intact. This intact percentage amounts to just 1.443 of the land surface of the planet-a little smaller than the EU!
+[344] Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley to Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst, 2/6/69.
-A staggering 131,399 vascular plants are endemic to the hotspots representing 43.83 of all plants on earth. Adding in estimations of non-endemic plant species found within the hotspots brings us to an even larger figure.
+[345] Justice Department memorandum from James T. Devine, 9/10/70, Subject: Interdivisional Information Unit.
-At least 65. 7% and more likely 70% or more of all vascular plants occur within the 1.44% of earth’s land surface occupied by the hotspots.[332]
+[346] Statement of Deputy Attorney General Laurence H. Silberman, Justice Department, 1/14/75. According to this statement, a Justice Department inquiry in 1975 concluded that Leonard "initiated the transaction by requesting the CIA to check against its own sources whether any of the Individuals on the IDIU list were engaged in foreign travel, or received foreign assistance or funding."
-This indicates a vast percentage of all life in other species groups-mammals, avi-fauna etc. In fact 35.53 of the global total of non-fish vertebrates are endemic to the hotspots. Once again, adding in estimations of non-endemic non-fish vertebrates, we come to a figure of at least 623. Maybe perhaps 703 or more of all non-fish vertebrates occurring in the hotspots. As the authors of Hotspots say themselves:
+[347] Staff Memorandum for the Subcommittee on constitutional Rights, United States Senate, 9/14/71.
-If 60% or more of all terrestrial biodiversity occurs in the most threatened 1.44% of the land surface of the planet, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that these areas deserve a lion’s share of our attention over the nextfew decades. Indeed, if .. we are at risk of losing one third to two thirds of all species within the foreseeable future, and if almost two thirds of at least the terrestrial species are in the hotspots, then it seemsfairly obvious that we may make a major dent in the entire endangered species/mass extinction problem by placing very heavy emphasis on the hotspots.[333]
+[348] See detailed report on Martin Luther King, Jr.
-This analysis is immensely useful, and has been refined further. Lots of number crunching later leads to a Top 9 Hotspot list: Tropical Andes, Sundaland, Meso-America, Indo-Burma, Caribbean, Atlantic Forest Region of Brazil, Madagascar, Mediterranean Basin, & Choco-Darien (Western Ecuador).
+[349] Manual, Section 87.
-These nine areas account for 29.53 of all vascular plants and 24.93 of non-fish vertebrates. This in just 0.733 of the planet’s land surfa Ce-around half of the size of the EU!!
+[350] The Bureau frequently disseminated reports on the NAACP to military intelliegence because (as one report put it) of the latter's "interest in matters pertaining to infiltration of the NAACP." (Report from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/5/65.) All the national officers and board members were listed, and any data in FBI files on their past "association" with "subversives" was included. Most of this information went back to the 1940's. (Report from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/65.) When changes occurred in the NAACP's leadership and board, the Bureau once again went back to its files to dredge up "subversive" associations from the 1940's. (Report from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66.) Chapter member information was sometimes obtained by "pretext telephone call ... utilizing the pretext of being interested in joining that branch of the NAACP." (Memorandum from Los Angels field office to FBI Headquarters, 11/5/65.) As discussed previously, the Bureau never found that the NAACP had abandoned its consistent anti-Communist policy. (See p. 49).
-Further analysis on threat highlights three hotspots; the hottest of the hot. They are: The Caribbean, the Philippines,[334] and Madagascar.
+[351] See examples of the exaggeration of Communist influence set forth in Findings on Political Abuse. Such distortion continues today. An FBI Intelligence Division Section Chief told the Committee that he could not "think of very many" major demonstrations in this country in recent years "that were not caused by" the Communist Party or the Socialist Workers Party. In response to questioning, the Section Chief listed eleven specific demonstrations since 1965. Three of these turned out to be principally SDS demonstrations, although some individual Communists did participate in one of them. Six others were organized by the National (or New) Mobilization Committee, which the Section Chief stated was subject to Communist and Socialist Workers Party "influence. " But the Section Chief admitted that the mobilization Committee "probably" included a wide spectrum of persons from all elements of American society. (R. L. Shackleford deposition, 2/13/76, pp. 3-8.) The FBI has not alleged that the Socialist Workers Party is dominated or controlled by any foreign government. (Shackelford testimony, 2/6/76, pp. 73-77, 114.)
-If this theory is correct, and there is every reason to think it is, some solid conclusions can be drawn:
+[352] See Sections B-3 and C-2.
-. At this moment in time radical ecologists around the world must do everything in our power to defend the 25 Hotspots.
+[353] Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall (Civil Rights Division), 12/4/62.
-. Serious action must be taken to halt or slow the destruction of the three hottest hotspots.
+[354] Memorandum from St. J. B. (St. John Barrett) to Burke Marshall, 6/18/63.
-. Northern Europe appears nowhere on the hotspot list. In fact it has a relatively low level of biological diversity thanks to a combination of climate, past glaciation and human habitat destruction. We should obviously continue to defend Northern European habitats. However in the context of the global biological meltdown, struggles to defend Northern European habitats are entirely peripheral.
+[355] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, 7/11/63.
-. The appearance in the hotspots list of the Mediterranean Basin should focus us in Europe. The fact that a hotspot covers parts of the EU is a surprising revelation and one that has serious repercussions.
+[356] Memorandum from Carl W. Gabel to Burke Marshall, 7/19/63. This memorandum described twenty-one such "racial matters" In ten states, including states outside the South such as Ohio, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Nevada. While some of the items in this and later summaries related to violent or potentially violent protest demonstrations, they went beyond those limits to include entirely peaceful protest activity and group activities (such as conferences, meetings, leadership changes) unrelated to demonstrations. (Memoranda from Gabel to Marshall, 7/22 and 7/25, 8/2 and 8/22/63.) The Justice Department's role in expanding FBI Intelligence operations against the Klan is discussed at pp.
-. Given serious action, the preservation of significant sections of global biodiversity is a real possibility, if only because it could involve such a small percentage of global land surface.
+[357] Telegram from Attorney General Kennedy to U.S. Attorneys, 5/27/63.
-These conclusions combined with a sensible analysis of our powers (as radical ecologists primarily in Northern Europe) begin to give us answers to the urgent question posed earlier. Where to start?
+[358] The basis for the inquiry was explained in the most general terms: "Keeping the Peace In this country is essentially the responsibility of the state government. Where lawless conditions arise, however, with similar characteristics from coast to coast, the matter is one of national concern even though there is no direct connection between the events and even though no Federal law is violated." (Text Of FBI Report on Recent Racial Disturbances, New York Times, 9/27/64.)
-A hierarchy of global priority setting can follow the pattern: global>regional>national>local>specific sites. Obviously, given our location and limited powers, the priorities set by such a system cannot be transferred immediately to a list of practically realisable objectives. Beyond this we can also set a hierarchy of priorities for local habitat defence here on our island and its environs-understanding all the time these struggles’ largely peripheral role in the global direct defence of diversity. For now I will talk of the global terrain. What follows is a hierarchy of top priorities for terrestrial habitat defence set in light of the hotspot theory.
+[359] Memorandum from Attorney General Katzenbach to President Johnson, 8/17/65.
-***** The Hottest of the Hot
+[360] See p.. 71.
-At the moment the three hottest are undeniably the global priority areas for defence. Unfortunately, facing reality we can have very little direct effect on these areas-at present. This is likely to remain so for the medium term at least. Let’s not fool ourselves. We often ignore threatened habitats in Britain because they’re more than a few hours drive from an activist centre: the Caribbean, Madagascar, and the Philippines. I don’t see any of our ropey vans getting there any time soon. However, let’s look at them one by one.
+[361] Remarks of the President, 7/29/67, in Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968), p. 537 (Bantam Books ed.)
-<strong><em>Madagascar:</em></strong> This amazing island has been at the centre of global conservation concern for decades. A number of British companies are involved in trashing it, our old friends RTZ for example. Actions against them would be very. very good. It is here, if anywhere, that the global conservation NGOs have some chance of using big money to big effect. Like it or not, they are probably the islands greatest hope. Many of them are using the Hotspot Theory to set their priorities so their targeting of Madagascar is increasing.
+[362] Executive Order 11365 7/29/67.
-Philippines: Of the three hottest hotspots it is in the Philippines that we have most extensive contacts. A number of EF! groups are active. Growing out of anarcho-punk there is a small but growing active eco-minded anarchist scene. Peoples’ Global Action (PGA) called international days saw sizeable mobilisations. and anti-GM direct action by peasants is on the up. A number of communities are resisting the logging and mining that is destroying their areas. A remnant of the original gatherer-hunter population of the Philippines survives. We need to talk more to Filipino groups to find out how we can best help. Solidarity actions, communication, and funds should all be disproportionately channelled their way. UK-based companies are active and possibilities for joint action should be pursued. While this responsibility belongs to us all. some people from our scene need to take on acting as primary intermediaries and push this forward-catalysing communication and action.
+[363] Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Tolson, 8/1/67, Subject: Director's Testimony Before National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. This memorandum indicates that, following this testimony, Director Hoover ordered his subordinates to intensify their collection of intelligence about "vociferous rabble- rousers." The creation thereafter of a "Rabble Rouser Index" is discussed at pp. 89-90.
-<strong><em>The Caribbean:</em></strong> To put it lightly, many more people in Britain have links with the Caribbean than with either the Philippines or Madagascar! At a guess I’d say that of the Majority World hotspots it is with the Caribbean that Britain has most personal (rather than corporate) connections. Unfortunately environmentalism, for reasons around race and class, is almost devoid of British Afro-Caribbean involvement. Thus ecological struggles are happening in the region but are largely off our radar.
+[364] Memorandum from Attorney General Ramsey Clark to J. Edgar Hoover, 9/14/67.
-While steps must be taken to remedy this,[335] our potential as a (predominantly white) movement to support this region is much smaller than that of the Afro-Caribbean communities. Some within these communities are working on the issue. It’ll be nothing to do with us if any major expansion of activity happens, so there is little point going into detail here. One thing is worth emphasising though. Mobilisation by Afro-Caribbean groups has the potential to be the most meaningful support work done by Brits for any of the Majority World hotspots.
+[365] Memorandum from Assistant Attorney 'General John Doar to Attorney General Clark, 9/27/67.
-Given the regions position as one of the three hottest hotspots it could be the most globally important eco-action carried out here. We have reason to hope for such a situation, and corporate ravagers of the Caribbean based in Britain have reason to fear it.
+[366] Memorandum from Clark to Hoover, 9/14/67.
-One of our main entry points for far off lands-anarchism--is little use to us in the Caribbean where anarchist groups are pretty much non-existent. Cuba is the only island where a sizeable movement ever took root, and no organisations survive now thanks to Castro’s social weeding.[336]
+[367] Clark to Hoover, 9/14/67. The Department's establishment of a special unit for Intelligence evaluation Is discussed at pp. 115-116.
-The Caribbean is one of only two hotspots whose area is partly within the US. Unsurprisingly we know more people in Florida than say, Haiti. EF!ers are active in Florida and good solidarity actions for them would he great.
+[368] SAC Letter 67-72, 10/17/67. The scope of the "ghetto informant program" Is described at pp. 75-76.
-***** The Top Nine Hotspots
+[369] Memorandum from Joseph Califano to the President, 1/18/68. Those present were Attorney General Clark, Deputy Attorney General Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, Acting Army General Counsel Robert Jordan, and Presidential assistants Matthew Nimetz and Califano.
-Moving down one level of priority to the top nine we find similar patterns to the top three. These regions are largely out of our direct reach. We can do little at the moment bar actively supporting radical ecological influenced groups in these areas. Groups in the top nine should be given dis-proportionate support and direct aid.
+[370] Memorandum from the Army General Counsel to the Under Secretary of the Army, 1/10/68. Former Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson has said that there were several other meetings at the White House where the Army was urged to take a greater role In the civil disturbance collection effort. (Staff summary Of Harold K. Johnson Interview, 11/18/75.)
-Covering less than 13 of global land surface, mostly in Majority World locations, the top nine are ofimmense importance. In this context even relatively minor conservation programs are worth supporting-physically and financially.[337]
+[371] Federal Data Banks, Hearings, at p. 1137 on at least one occasion, Deputy Attorney General Warren Christopher thanked an Army intelligence officer for reports and daily summaries. (Letter from Deputy Assistant General Christopher to Maj. Gen. William P. Yarborough, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 5/15/68.) The Justice Department's intelligence analysis unit received "army intelligence reports" during 1968 on persons and groups involved in "racial agitation." (Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley to Duputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst. 2/6/69.)
-Of course this kind of thing is all well and good but we’ve rarely shown ourselves to be particularly brilliant at sustained international solidarity. We need to build a strategy based solidly on our strengths. Stopping developments. Fucking shit up. Blockades. Sabotage. Land occupations. Broken windows and crippled corporate confidence. To be really effective we need terrains of struggle which are both easily reachable and globally important.
+[372] Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Attorney General John N. Mitchell to the President, 4/1/69, Subject: Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances. This reflected a failure on the part of the Army General Counsel to persuade the Justice Department to relieve the Army of HO domestic intelligence-gathering role. (Memorandum from Robert E. Jordan, Army General Counsel, to the Secretary of the Army, Subject: Review of Civil Disturbance Intelligence History, in Military Surveillance, Hearings, p. 296.)
-Thankfully one of the top nine is within our reach-the Mediterranean Basin. The Med is both amazingly hiodiverse and under serious threat. Due to this hotspot’s direct relevance to us and our activity I have re-printed here an essay by N. Myers and R. M. Cowling from the Hotspots book. I have shortened it due to space constraints. It’s more eloquent than I, so read it and then return to me.
+[373] Letter from Robert E. Lynch, Acting Adjutant General of the Army, to subordinate commands, 6/9/70, Subject: Collection, Reporting, Processing, and Storage of Civil Disturbance information.
+<br>
+<br>See discussion of the termination of this program in Section III ["Terminations" Sub-finding under "Accountability and Control"].
-I read that essay and was struck by its importance for us. Travel becomes ever cheaper. Less than 24 hours away on a coach is one of the nine most important terrestrial eco-regions on earth. Victories and defeats in this arena are of the utmost global importance. The same cannot be said of many of the places we have fought for in the last 10 years. As I said earlier, I do not mean to lessen the importance of those campaigns, and our many victories, only to point to the reality that they mean little when it comes to confronting global biological meltdown. For a whole host of reasons they should continue, but it’s time for us to join other battles.
+[374] Agreement Between the Federal Bureau of investigation and the Secret Service Concerning Presidential Protection, 2/3/65. The FBI was to report to Secret Service information about "subversives, ultra-rightists, racists and fascists" who expressed "strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiment" or made "statements indicating a propensity for violence and antipathy toward good order and government."
+<br>
+<br>These reporting standards were modified in 1971 to require the FBI to refer to Secret Service: "Information concerning civil disturbances, anti-U.S. demonstrations or incidents or demonstrations against foreign diplomatic establishments;" and "Information concerning persons who may be considered potentially dangerous to individuals protected by the [Secret Service] because of their -- participation in groups engaging in activities inimical to the United States." With respect to organizations, the FBI reported information on their "officers," "size," "goals," "source of financial support," and other "background data." (Agreement Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Secret Service Concerning Protective Responsibilities, 11/26/71.)
-Looking at the map of the Med we can quickly come to some obvious basis for our action. Though there are conservationists in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Turkey,[338] Libya, Egypt, Jordon, and Syria, there are no radical ecological groups to link up with. Israel is the only country in the Near East with a listed EF! contact. Ecological struggles are of course going on but are largely off our radar.[339] Work should be carried out to rectify this situation, but to be brutally honest I don’t fancy doing direct action in Morroco much. Ask the Saharawians about it! We should support struggling communities and aid conservationists if and where we can in North Africa and the Near East-but let’s face it we’re not likely to very much. However, unlike other hotspots we can get stuck in to a large part of the area relatively easily. We have contacts in the European half of the Mediterranean hotspot and getting there is a cinch.
+[375] Investigative Guidelines: Title XI, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Regulation of Explosives.
-It is within this area that some of Europe’s most militant ecological action has been taken. In fact at the time of writing there are eco-saboteurs serving time in Spain (for fucking up construction of the Itoiz Dam}, Italy (for trashing a high speed rail construction site in the Sosa Valley) and Greece (attempting to bomb the Ministry oflndustry in solidarity with communities fighting mega-port construction). The struggles these prisoners are part of are all being fought by anarchist/radical ecological groups our scene is in direct contact with, and there are many more.
+[376] FBI Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, August 17-September 9, 1971, pp. 224-38.
-Looking for allies lets take a trip around the European section of the basin anti-clockwise. We start with Greece. Much of it is a red alert area and has a sizeable and very militant anarchist scene with a slowly-increasing green hue. Albania has no established radical ecological groups. There are smatterings of anarchos and radical eco-types throughout the ex-Yugoslav republics.
+[377] Memoranda from FBI headquarters to all SAC's, 9/2/64; 8/25/67; 5/9/68
-Italy’s anarchists are pretty full on and increasingly engaged in some ecological resistance (The Italian-French Maritime Alps red alert area is relatively near Turin’s anarchists and the area someone is in jail for defending). Southern France also has many active groups from GM trashing Confederation Paysanne to anarchists, with the French Pyrenees being the site of the ten year resistance to the road through the Valle d’Aspe.
+[378] See pp. 74-75.
-On the other side of the Pyrenees in Spain there are large anarchist groups and at present probably the biggest squatting movement in Europe. The Basque country (which borders the hotspot) has a history of mass struggles against mining, dams, etc. with even ETA getting in on the act. The Spanish section of the Rif-Betique red alert area has become home for a sizeable British punk and crusty exile community. The Canaries red alert area (which despite being off Western Sahara is part of Spain) has a few environmental groups and like the Basque country has a (much smaller) nationalist movement with ecological tendencies.
+[379] Memorandum from J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson, 7/30/64 (Gale was Assistant Director for the Inspection Division).
-Portugal has a number of eco-influenced anarchist groups and significant clashes continue between its peasant past and the onslaught of modernity.
+[380] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 9/2/64.
-Over the last few years many of our circle have increasingly turned to the continent for adventure and action. The relatively low level of struggle in Britain since the end of the anti-road period, the rising (and now setting?) sun of the Spanish squatting scene, the strength of sterling, riot tourism, cheaper travel, and the warmer climate of parts of Europe have all been factors. In the ‘90s the transient tribes of anti-road activists moved around Britain with little concern for distance. Now a similar situation is evolving for which the terrain is the whole of Europe. This situation will expand significantly over the next decade. For while some of its causes have their origin in Britain’s present,[340] others arise from the increasingly unified nature of Europe’s planned future.
+[381] The average of 40 "White Hate" actions per year way be compared to an average of over 100 per year against the Communist Party from 1956-1971(totalling 1636). Exhibit 11, Hearings, vol. 6, p. 371.
-While this causes some problems for sustaining local organising in Britain it also opens up amazing opportunities.
+[382] These techniques and those used against the other target groups referred to below are discussed in greater detail in the COINTELPRO detailed report and in the Covert Action section of the Findings, Part III, p. 211.
-Of the ten red alert areas, the ones nearest Mediterranean activist hubs are the Spanish section of the Rif-Betique, the Maritime Alps of the French/Italian border and southern/central Greece. Campaigns and targets in these areas should be relatively easy to find out about. If we in Britain added our weight to our comrades in these countries and convinced other Northern Europeans to do so, we would be moving towards serious defence of a globally important area-making an actual impact on biological meltdown.
+[383] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 8/25/67.
-Experience and contacts made through struggle in these easily accessible three areas will chart the way forward towards action in other parts of the Med. A full scale migration is not needed. Some of our circle are planning to move to the Med’s warmer climate. Many others are already wintering or taking small sojourns there. Significant contact has been made with groups in these areas. All that is needed is that this pre-existing process be consciously and collectively shaped to the immediate goal at hand.
+[384] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACS. 3/4/68.
-It is important in some areas to join local campaigns. In others, covert holiday sabotage is more in order. The latter is really just a call for the European adoption of one of North American EF!‘s longest running tactics-roving monkeywrenching. With the consolidation of the European su-per-state, travelling across borders to trek into and defend wildness seems ever more like crossing US states to defend wilderness. A practice, despite the distance, our North American friends think little of.
+[385] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to SACS. 11/25/68.
-***** The Remaining 15 Hotspots
+[386] The average was over 90 per year. (Exhibit 11. Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 371.)
-I am not going to go into much detail about the remaining hotspots; it would take too much space and be rather repetitive.
+[387] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/9/68.
-Of the 15, all bar three are in the Majority World; countries at the moment largely out of our direct reach. As stated earlier, active ecologically-minded groups in the hotpots should be given priority when it comes to support actions and funding. We do, in fact, have contacts in most of these areas. Some EF!ers do conservation work abroad and it would make sense that it is concentrated within the hotspots. If we can be of any practical help to efforts in these areas we should muck in wholeheartedly.
+[388] C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/9/68.
-Three of the remaining 15 stand out, for us, if only because they’re predominately English speaking and Western-South West Australia, New Zealand, and the Californian Floristic Province. In all three areas serious land battles are being fought and we have quite extensive contacts.
+[389] Supervisor, FBI Intelligence Division, 10/28/75, p. 39.
-Aoterea: In Aoterea (New Zealand) there is a large indigenous resistance movement keyed into the PGA. There is also a sprinkling of anarchos and radical eco-types.
+[390] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACS, 5/23/68.
-South West Australia: This region has a history of aboriginal land defence stretching from the invasion to the present day. The last three decades have also seen significant struggles by white radical environmentalists, defectors to the side of the indigenous and the land. When EF! first came to Britain, Australia was probably at the forefront of ecological resistance in the West. Large-scale actions against the importation of tropical timber were carried out hand-in-hand with direct land defence. Over the last decade this scene has shrunk but is still never the less both active and pregnant with great possibility. Australians have been responsible for some of the largest summit actions of the Global Resistance Period. It has the normal assortment of anarchists-many being very eco in word and deed.
+[391] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACS, 10/9/68.
-For obvious reasons there is a reasonable amount of three way traffic between Britain, Australia and New Zealand. While these areas are not as important or threatened as some other hotspots higher up the global diversity/threat hierarchy, for cultural reasons it is simply more likely that links will continue and consolidate with these areas.
+[392] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACS, 7/6/68.
-Californian Floristic Province: This hotspot is probably the one we have historically had most ties with. Though the latter ‘90s have seen an increasing turn towards Europe, in the early ‘90s British EF! oriented itself primarily with reference to North American EF! By the time of the birth of our movement EF! had internationalised, yet it was still very much a North American export. For this reason I will go into more detail about the only hotspot found predominantly in North America.
+[393] Approximately 100 per year (Exhibit 11, Hearings, Vol. 6, P. 371.).
-The Californian Floristic Province stretches along the western coast of North America, most of it within the state of California. However, it also extends north into Oregon and south into Baja California, Mexico.
+[393] Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Tolson, 8/1/67. (At the meeting, a Commission member had asked the Bureau to "identify the number of militant Negroes and whites.")
-Approximately 603 of California’s land is included within the floristic province. The total number of plant species present is greater than that for central and northern US and the adjacent portion of Canada, an area almost ten times as large.[341]
+[394] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/3/67; SAC Letter 67-56, 9/12/67.
-This rich biodiversity is seriously threatened. California is the most populous of the United States, its economy ranks among those of the world’s top seven countries and it produces half of the food the US consumes. Among the main threats faced by this hotspot are urbanisation, air pollution, expansion of large scale agriculture, livestock grazing, logging, strip mining, oil extraction, road building, the spread of non-native plants, an increasing use of off-road vehicles, and the suppressing of natural fires necessary for reproduction of key plant species.[342]
+[395] SAC Letter No. 67-70, 11/28/67.
-In defending this region against attacks North American EF! has had some of its most memorable moments. The massive Redwood Summer campaign which led to the car bombings of EF!ers Judi Bari and Daryl Cherney. The amazing direct action victory at Warner Creek, the killing of EF!er David Chain by a logger from Pacific Lumber. Two Eugene radical eco-anarchists are serving long sentences in the region for arson attacks on an off-road vehicle showroom.
+[396] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs. 3/21/68.
-In the early ‘90s we did quite a few solidarity actions for our North American friends. More recently most have been for Majority World groups. Those actions should continue but we should not neglect supporting North American EF!, especially in its struggle over this immensely im-portant hotspot. Apart from the Mediterranean Basin, this hotspot is the one people from our circles visit more than any other. Big wilderness, cheap flights and an impressive (English speaking) movement will continue to be a pull for many. What we can offer those defending this hotspot is regular communication, occasional solidarity actions and itinerant Brits. Well, it’s better than a bag of beans. Defending the Land: Medium Term Global Objectives Here, I am attempting to set, using the hotspot theory and an understanding of our strengths, a hierarchy of our top global biological objectives for the next ten years.
+[397] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 1/30/68.
-In many ways this seems ridiculous. However, in 1992 we set ourselves the task of stopping 600 roads which were ripping through a significant proportion of Britain’s most important habitats. Within five years 500 had been cancelled. I am confident that unified action can have a momentous effect. Those who believe less than I in our cumulative power should see the utility of strategising all the more clearly. Here then is what I think our top global objectives should be, in order of their importance to us.
+[398] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/9/68.
-. Get Militant in the Med: A big push is needed to directly defend the Mediterranean Basin Hotspot. It is the only one of the Top 9 found in the West and the only hotspot to include part of Europe. Over the next few years we should consolidate links with Basin groups and start to engage directly in action within it. The Med’s 10 Red Alert Areas are of greatest importance. Of these the Maritime Alps, the Spanish section of the Rif-Betique and Southern and Central Greece should be our first concern. Involvement in resistance in these areas should build our ability to engage and support struggle elsewhere in the northern part of the hotspot. Within a relatively short period of time we could be involved in serious defence of a globally important areamaking an actual impact on biological meltdown.
+[399] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/24/68.
-. Uncompromising Aid for the Three Most Threatened Hotspots: The Philippines, Madagascar, and the Caribbean are the priorities at the moment, yet as we are unlikely to actually get to them they are not our highest objective. However we should target solidarity and aid to radicals, resisters and conservationists in these three hotspots as a matter of urgency. Of the three it is with the Philippines that we have most extensive links-these should be consolidated. Filipino EF!ers and anarchists should be given substantial aid. [Since this was first distributed EF!ers from Leeds have formed the Philippine Solidarity Group, providing practical aid for EF! and indigenous groups there. This has included direct financial aid, on-the-ground solidarity, prisoner support etc.]
+[400] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 10/24/68.
-. Go <strong><em>Wild for the ‘Western’ Hotspots:</em></strong> For various cultural and economic reasons our direct involvement with struggles is more likely in ‘Western’ countries than Majority World ones. The areas under occupation by the West largely do not appear in the hotspot list. Apart from the Med and a small part of the Caribbean, those that do are South Western Australia, New Zealand, and the Californian Floristic Province. Already existing links should be solidified, solidarity actions carried out and the steady flow of our visitors to these hotspots should continue. Just remember to wrench at least one big machine for each long-haul flight!
+[401] Memorandum from G. C. Moore to C. D. Brennan, 12/22/70.
-Beyond this we should do anything we can to assist the preservation of all hotspots, not just those mentioned above. Wild areas not included in the hotspots should of course also be defended. However if we want to have any meaningful impact on biological meltdown, as much of our activity as possible should be aimed at the hotspots in general and the above objectives in particular.
+[402] omitted in original.
-***** Back to Britain, ‘Back to Reality
+[403] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 12/23/70.
-So far I have charted what I believe we should do on the global terrain. Yet most of what we have done over the last decade has been defending the land of these dear isles. I am not calling for abandonment of this struggle. It is important for both us and the ecology of Britain. It is also what we have shown ourselves to be pretty good at. Hundreds of habitats remain living due to ecological direct action. Kiss the earth and feel proud. We-among many-have done well.
+[404] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 4/30/68.
-Though many of us wil take action in the global hotspots, few will spend most of our time there. One criticism of following a hotspot based global triage strategy is that it lacks soul. Species diversity surveys do not an ecological sensibility make! While that’s true, the global crisis calls for globally important action and I believe that the hotspot theory has utility. Yet acceptance of the globally peripheral nature of British habitat defence does not extinguish our desire or duty to de-fend our land. An authentic land ethic must be rooted in where we are. My bioregion may be ‘species poor’ compared to a rainforest but I love it. It’s the bracing wind on its bright hills that whisper to me to live wilder. On a totally practical level it’s far easier to defend land nearby.
+[405] See pp. 54-55.
-As I said earlier in Part One, throughout the 1993–1998 Land Struggle Period our action priorities were largely set by the Department of Transport. When we decimated the state road building program we lost a terrain of struggle that unified and strengthened us nationally. The question posed, then, is what is the greatest and most geographically spread threat to British ecology?
+[406] C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 4/30/68.
-The tactically unfortunate answer is industrial agriculture.[343] The great thing about road building was that wherever you were in the country it produced a front to attack, land to defend. It bit into Britain’s ecology in big bites. The terrible thing about industrial agriculture is that though it devours more, it does so incrementally, with small bites. Fronts rarely present themselves. The camps at Offham,[344] The Land is Ours occupations and trespasses,[345] and most of all the growth of anti-GM actions, are all in part attempts to bypass this impasse.
+[407] See pp. 54-55 and Report on FBI Investigations.
-The post 1998 wave of global resistance allowed us to totally side step the question of what land to defend (of course, some camps continued but little on the previous scale). Now we are faced once again with this question. Essentially without a national programme to attack, the question divides further-at least from the perspective of strategy. There are three categories of British land habitat defence to take into consideration: a) Bio-regional Habitat Defence. Specific local sites under threat that may not be perceived as either ecologically or strategically national priorities should none the less be defended by local groups.
+[408] Presidential Emergency Action Document 6, as quoted in Brennan to Sullivan, 4/30/68.
-b) National Co-ordinated Habitat Defence. Land deemed ecologically or strategically[346] of prime national importance, which the movement as a whole can recognise and act on.
+[409] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 4/30/68.
-c) Defence of the Wild Periphery. Areas beyond the bioregions of any local groups and far from large population centres that have some character of wilderness about them.
+[410] C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 4/30/68.
-With roads, local bio-regional habitat defence fed into national co-ordinated habitat defence. Any terrains which mirror this hugely advantageous situation should be pursued. At the moment I can see no such terrain, but let’s keep a look out! I’ll go through each category in order with some suggestions. Bio-regional Habitat Defence
+[411] C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 4/30/68.
-Essentially this is a question for us as individuals, groups and hopefully eventually as local counter cultures. We should be intimately aware of the ecologies around us. Only through a deep knowledge of, and connection with the land can we hope to defend our bio-regions from further damage. Looking at local biodiversity studies[347] is worthwhile, but it is our feet across the landscape that is most informative. Get out into the countryside around you. Make sure you are familiar with the wildness on your doorstep. Know your land and you’ll know when it’s threatened.
+[412] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to J. Walter Yeagley, 5/1/68; Yeagley to Hoover, 6/17/68.
-Put yourselfabout in peculiar circles. Conservationists, twitchers, ramblers, insect lovers; in most areas there are a smattering of nature nerds. If you’re not one, make sure you’re friends with some. They’ll know about the housing development that’ll destroy ancient woodland or the farmer who’s draining some amphibian rich marshland for subsidies. Keep your ear to the ground.
+[413] Among the criteria specifically approved by the Justice Department which Went beyond the statutory standard of reasonable likelihood of espionage and sabotage were the expanded references to persons who have "anarchistic or revolutionary beliefs" and are "likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency" to commit acts which constitute "interference with" the "effective operation of the national, state and local governments and of the defense effort." (Assistant Attorney General Frank M. Wozencraft, Office of Legal Counsel, to Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley, Internal Security Division, 9/9/68.) The standards as approved were transmitted to the FBI, and its Manual was revised accordingly. (Yeagley to Hoover, 9/19/68; Hoover to Yeagley, 9/26/68; FBI Manual, Section 87, p. 45, revised 10/14/68.) The FBI still maintained its Reserve Index, unbeknownst to the Department.
-Many of our most important habitats are listed as Sites of Special Scientific Interest. SS Sis are Britain’s ecological backbone, but nevertheless are often threatened. Make sure to keep an eye on the ones nearby.
+[414] One of the express purposes was to use tax information to "expose" the Klan Members "within the Klan organization for] publicly by showing Income beyond their means," (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 5/10/65.) Disclosure of tax Information "publicly" or "within the Klan organization" in is prohibited by statute.
-I am not going to go into detail about what tactics are needed in local battles. After 10 years it’s pretty obvious. Community mobilising, occupations, blockades, bulldozer pledges, sabotage. Threatening the destroyers with costly chaos and giving it to them if they try it on.
+[415] Memorandum from D. 0. Virdin to H. E. Snyder, 5/2/68. Subject: Inspection Of Returns by FBI
-***** Nationally Co-ordinated Habitat Defence
+[416] Donald 0. Virdin testimony, 9/16/75, pp. 69-73.
-Since Newbury/Manchester there hasn’t been a piece of land that we have all pulled together to defend. This has been a great shame. Together we are quite a force/farce to be reckoned with. National co-ordination has some real advantages. For a start it maintains our circle’s bad reputa-tion, which is invaluable. Countless sites have been saved with just the threat of camps and direct action. However, significant and loud struggles are needed to keep this threat potential alive.
+[417] Staff Memorandum: Review of Materials in FBI Administrative File on "Income Tax Returns Requested."
-Beyond tactical considerations, some ecosystems are simply so precious they call upon us all to cram into crummy vans, meet joyously in the mud, and fuck shit up. Above all else, these moments can be bonding, inspiring and educational (when they don’t go horribly wrong).
+[418] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 12/6/68.
-When deciding whether a particular piece of land should be coalesced around nationally, a few questions should be asked. Is it highly ecologically important? Is it winnable? Is it easily accessible nationally? Is the actual physical terrain conducive to action? Will a victory or noisy defeat on this land help save habitats elsewhere?
+[419] Leon Green deposition, 9/12/75, pp. 6-8.
-Mid to late 2001 saw the re-emergence of direct action in defence of the Thorne & Hatfield raised peat bogs. To all the above questions this habitat answers with an enthusiastic YES! At the risk of seeming foolish from the perspective of a few years hence, I believe this campaign to be immensely important. Not only does its re-emergence allow us to co-ordinate nationally but direct victory is quite conceivable. [Since this text was first distributed the campaign escalated and secured the end of peat extraction on Thorne & Hatfield and other sites.]
+[420] Statement of J. W. Yeagley to Senate Select Committee, September 1975.
-Reform environmentalism has spectacularly failed to save this hugely ecologically precious habitat. If we win this battle and choose our next equally well we could end up in a cycle of success. One noisy victory leads to another and many quiet ones besides.
+[421] Memorandum from Midwest City Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/1/68.
-A recent good example of such a cycle is when animal rights groups got on a roll after closing down Consort, who bred dogs for vivisection.[348] Once they had shown their mettle by closing Consort they followed up by forcing closed Hillgrove (cat breeders) and Shamrock Farm (a monkey quarantine centre). By the time the cycle reached Regal (rabbit breeders), the owners were so freaked that they packed up the day after the campaign was launched!
+[422] CIA memorandum, Subject: BUTANE-Victor Marchetti.
-These successes understandably led animal liberationists to become too cocky too quickly and take on a much bigger target--Huntingdon Life Sciences [HLS]. HLS is integral to corporate Britain. The state saw the danger of animal liberationists on a roll and realised that if HLS was brought down the animal rights extremists would feel unstoppable. Smaller companies would crumble at the sound of their approach. lhanks in large part to the targeting of its financial backers things were getting economicaly dicey for HLS. The state reacted and stabilised the company by arranging a large injection of capital. From then on HLS has acted as a firebreak, stopping the spread of animal liberation. The cycle may have been broken. The teeth of this trap should not be allowed to cut into resistance again.
+[423] CIA memorandum, Subject: IRS Briefing on Ramparts, 2/2/67.
-A comprehensive analysis ofnational land defence priorities is too big a job for this piece. Such a study must take place. For the moment we can concentrate on the peat bogs, but we should not wait till victory to map out our next targets. It is around our ability to act nationally that our network survival (rather than just that of our local groups) rests. Previous waves ofnational action have been defeated by either our victory in a particular battle (i.e. roads) or the pig’s success in swamping us (i.e. Sea Empress, Target Tarmac, etc). Hopefully this time we’ll get the wagon rolling fast enough that it can’t be stopped-at least for a while!!!
+[424] CIA memorandum. Subject: IRS Briefing on Ramparts, 2/2/67.
-One priority that can definitely be set is confronting corporations in the National Parks. As long as they succeed in one development, one quarry, one pipeline, the vampires will push on with another attack. It should be our job to make them scared enough to retreat-at least out of some of the National Parks.
+[425] Leon C. Green testimony, 9/12/75, p. 36.
-The National Parks are immensely important and the hold they have over popular imagination makes them easier to organise around than other areas. It is also often easier to find out about threats facing the Parks. If the companies are given an inch they’ll take a mile, but if their profits are threatened they’ll run a mile.
+[426] Investigation of the Special Service Staff of the IRS" by the staff of the Joint Committee on internal Revenue Taxation, 6/5/75, pp. 17-18.
-The present Nine Ladies action camp in the Peak District National Park stands a fair chance of success. has strengthened the resolve oflocal conservationists and is deterring other destructive projects.
+[427] Memorandum of IRS Commissioner Thrower, 6/16/69.
-***** Defence ofthe Wild Periphery
+[428] Memorandum from D. W. Bacon to Director, FBI, 8/8/69.
-Our movement for the wild has evolved in a physical and political environment lacking big wilderness. Habitats near large human population centres are more likely to defended by us than wilder and more precious eco-systems far from the cities. Wildness is everywhere from the grass between the paving slabs to the high mountains. It’s good that we defend wild pockets in deserts of development (the M11, Abbey Pond, Crystal Palace, etc.)-primarily for such struggles’ (r)evolutionary potential-but we should not ignore ‘the mountains’ altogether. So far this has largely been the case.
+[429] Memorandum from D. J. Brennan, Jr., to W. C. Sullivan, 8/15/69.
-With the exception of some good work in North Wales, the stillborn (but dramatic) campaign against the Skye Bridge and the victorious defence of the Pressmenan \Voods Caledon remnant, defence of the wild periphery has been pretty paltry.
+[430] SSS Bi-weekly Report, 6/15/70.
-An example of our failures can be found in the Cairngormsone of Britain’s largest roadless areas. For at least eight years I remember occasional campfire/pub chat about the possible construction of a funicular railway up Cairngorm. It’s been very contentious as the train replacing the ageing chairlift (itself an aberration) will massively increase the amount of people on the Cairngorm Plateau (1,000 a day is a figure bandied about). With them we knew would come much damage and significant building work, shops and all. Plans are even being discussed for hotels! This isn’t fucking Mayfair-it’s the summit plateau of one the wildest areas in Britain. Many said that direct action should be used if construction started. The project was put on hold at one point and I for one presumed it had been cancelled.
+[431] SSS Bi-weekly Report, 8/29/69.
-Yet no one kept their ear to the ground or acted if they knew. ‘The first I heard about the railway being actually built was Autumn 2001 and on January 1, 2002 the first public train ride up Cairngorm was broadcast across the nation. A carriage filled with smiling politicians toasting the New Year-pass the sick bag (No wonder they were smiling-there was no way the parasitic slobs could have got up the mountain in January if they had had to walk it. That would have made far more amusing TV). The glint in their eyes was the reflection of our failure. If one of the last British bastions of wildness can become a site for development, what chance have we got of re-wilding London or Liverpool!
+[432] For a discussion of IDIU standards, see pp. 78-81, 122-123.
-In the Cairngorms 103 of the area below the treeline is still covered by native woodlands and is the <em>most extensive example of Borealforest in the</em> UK <em>and one of the largest tracts of comparatively unmanaged and still mainly unenclosed woodland.</em>[349] If we have failed to defend the wildness of the Cairngorms Plateau it is essential we protect these remnants of Caledonia and other sites like them. Though a signiflcant proportion of the massif is now under conservation ownership, a lot of damaging economic/ ecocidal activity continues. If anywhere calls for some occasional monkeywrenching, it’s these wildlands.
+[433] Donald Alexander testimony, 10/2/25, Hearings, Vol. 3, pp. 29-30.
-I use this example because it’s horriflc and it’s in Scotland. If protecting SS Sis and the like is of primary national importance it is worth pointing to one simple fact: 203 of the total area of Scotland is designated either an SSSI, National Nature Reserve, or National Scenic Area. Scotland’s total species diversity is far less than England’s but its habitats are far less fragmented.
+[433] Green. 9/12/75, pp. 65-456, 73-74; Statement of Auditor, San Francisco District, 7/30/75, p. 1 ; statement of Collector. Los Angeles District, 8/3/75.
-<quote>
+[434] Donald Alexander testimony, 10/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 3, pp. 10-11.
-<em>We have species and habitats in Scotland that are important, in both the national and international context. Examples are the native pinewoods, the extensive blanket bogs, the bryophyte-rich Atlantic woodlands and the enormous colonies of breeding seabirds.[350]</em>
-</quote>
-These areas should be militantly defended. Yet apart from the exceptional actions of some communities, few stand up to defend these wild areas from the threats of plantations, logging, development, etc. In large part this is because of the absence of people in much of the Scottish countryside-excluded by one of the highest concentrations of land ownership anywhere in the world. Given this, it is all our responsibility to protect these areas. If not you, who’? In the long run it would be good to formulate ways of confronting this destruction in a coordinated fashion. Until then, happy hikers with wrenches in their backpacks have an important role to play.
+[435] Hearings before the House Committee on Expenditures In the Executive Departments, on H.R. 2319 80th Cong. (1947), p. 127.
-Unfortunately what makes Scottish bio-diversity globally unique-its climate edge position resulting in an amazing coexistence of species from different ecologies-is itself under threat from climate change. This should not dissuade us from action but remind us all the more of the need in times of flux for massive wilderness restoration; and situate our local British struggles in the global context. As one contributor at a conference on biodiversity in Scotland put it: Our Scottish action on biodiversity is in danger of being reduced to trivial tinkerings on the margin: <em>another example of deckchair-shifting on the Titanic.[351]</em>
+[436] Former FBI Liaison with CIA testimony, 9/22/75, p. 9.
-As in Scotland, so it is across the divided queendom-many habitats main protection lies in their remoteness and the efforts of an array of often relatively powerless conservationists. Not even on this domesticated isle has the wild been vanquished, but it is under threat. I’m not going to specify the areas in need of special defence-across the wild periphery diversity is being whittled away. We are a people in love with the wild. We are committed to the wild-to its power and its defence. By spending more time out in it, we will better know which areas are threatened and gain the inspiration to take the action needed.
+[437] Former FBI liaison with CIA testimony, 9/22/75, pp, 9-11.
-Many tens of thousands desire these areas, finding solace and strength in them. One of Newbury’s greatest moments was when the state’s use ofclimbers catalysed the involvement of many from the climbing fraternity. Those who took the state’s silver were seen by other climbers for what they truly were--scabs, traitors to the land. A leading climbing magazine stated that what Britain’s wild areas really need is a monkeywrench gang unity forged between us, two tribes of the outdoors. I couldn’t agree more.
+[438] Liaison, 9/22/75, p. 11. For a discussion of liaison problems between FBI and CIA In 1970. see pp. 112113.
-Many committed to the wild will not engage in our (r)evolutionary organising. They may scent defeat and futility or simply disagree with our ‘political’ aims. This is understandable. Thumb in the Dam resistance enables those without hope for any positive change in culture to take action, by militantly defending wildness from negative change by culture. In this they can create hope for nature even ifthey see little hope for humanity. In the masses of climbers, walkers, hill runners, and mountain risk freaks is an untapped force, that if unleashed could become a formidable biocentric army for the wild. Against such a force incursions like the Cairngorm Railway would have little chance.
+[439] Liaison, 9/22/75, p. 52. "Central intelligence Agency operations in the United States,, FBI-CIA Memorandum of Understanding, 2/7/66.
-Through walking the wildlands we become more able to defend them and unite with others who hold them in their hearts. As John Muir said: One day’s exposure to mountains is better than a cartload of books. Or a radical eco rag like this for that matter. Defending the Land: Immediate British Objectives Having gone through each of the categories in turn I’ll outline some objectives for British habitat defence. These I believe are realistic objectives, some of which we have already got our teeth in-to. In defending the wildness of our isles we can find both great peace and great excitement. We have shown ourselves capable of being adequate habitat defenders. Let us march on to the defence ofmany more.
+[440] Liaison, 9/22/75, p, 55
-. Build Bioregional Defence: Locally we should all continue to expand knowledge of our bioregions and take action when important habitats are threatened. Our ability to generalise the skills and confidence needed for direct action is what will protect areas.
+[441] Liaison, 9/22/75, PI). *57-58. These "internal security" aspects of the 1966 FBI-CIA agreement were not the only pre-CHAOS arrangements bringing the CIA into liaison with the FBI. For example, as early as 1963 the FBI Manual was revised to state that information concerning "proposed travel abroad" by domestic "subversives" was to be "furnished by the Bureau to the Department Of State" and the "Central Intelligence Agency:" and field offices were advised to recommend the "extent of foreign investigation" which was required. (FBI Manual Section 87, p. 33a, revised 4/15/63.)
-. Save Thorne/Hatfield Moors and Kickstart a National Cycle of Successes: Despite considerable success throughout the ‘90s direct action is often seen as a last stand rather than a tactic that wins. As a network we should pull together for a loud and undeniable victory which can catalyse others. The defence of Hatfield Moors is an excellent terrain of struggle. The habitat is very precious, on the brink of unrecoverable damage and yet it is winnable. It’s strategically and ecologically in all our interests that the campaign succeeds. [The campaign has succeeded!]
+[442] President Ford's Executive Order 11905, 2/18/76. This order, discussed more fully in Part IV, Recommendations, in effect reinforces the 1966 FBI-CIA agreement and defines CIA counterintelligence duties abroad to include "foreign subversion" directed against the United States.
-. Keep Camp Culture Alive: The high cost ofevicting action camps is the reason many habi-tats are still alive. As recently as 2001 the state cancelled the Hastings Bypass when camps were threatened. Unfortunately the last few years have seen a steady decline in camps. If allowed to continue a decline in our threat potential to stop developments may follow. It’s make or break time. We should do all we can-as predominantly urban activists-to keep camp culture alive; otherwise much of the ground gained by the Land Struggle Period could be lost.
+[443] The National Security Council Intelligence Directives, or NSCIDs, have been promulgated by the National Security Council to provide the basic organization and direction of the intelligence agencies.
-At the time of writing there are only three ecological defence camps. The responsibility for aiding them lies with all of us-not just those groups nearest. Tat, cash and bodies are always needed on site. Next time the bailiffs go in we should descend en masse to kick shit, up costs.
+[444] Joseph Califano testimony, 1/27/76, p. 70.
-Ok, so I sound a bit old school; after all many of us lived on camps but now choose not to. However we should not let our present cloud the continuing and future importance of camps. For nearly 10 years there has not been one month in which a camp hasn’t held out against development. Let’s make sure we can say the same in another ten.
+[444] Richard Ober testimony, 10/30/75, p. 88.
-. Increase Action on the Wild Periphery: Our movement for the wild has too long neglected the wild areas far from the cities. As many in our circles spend more time ‘out in it’ this action will increase. Let’s remember to pack a wrench as well as our waterproofs!
+[445] Ober, 10/28/75, p. 45.
-A concerted effort should be made to push militancy among the many tens of thousands who walk the wild. We should aim to empower those who don’t wish to join our movement, but nevertheless embrace the land ethic and want to defend the areas they love. Boltcroppers for every hiker!
+[446] Memorandum from Richard Ober to James Angleton, 6/9/70, p. 9.
-Links should be consolidated with the small number of organisations representing non-ruling class interests in the wilder parts of the British countryside (prime among them of course the Crofters Union[352]).
+[447] Letter from Director W. Colby to Vice President Rockefeller, 8/8/75, p. 6 of attachment.
-We should build towards a future where we can make significant interventions on behalf of threatened habitats even when they are far from activist centres. Until then, it’s monkeywrench gang time!
+[448] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan re New Left Movement, 2/3/69.
-Given the onslaught of climate change and the highly fragmented nature of British ecology-especially in England--ecological restoration is essential from a Thumb in the Dam perspective. Isolated reserves will be little use in the long term, what is needed here is the regeneration of big ecosystems that can manage themselves. Before we are finished let’s see bison and wolves in the Cotswolds!
+[449] SAC Letter No. 67--66,11/7/67.
-***** Defending the Living Sea
+[450] Memorandum from Thomas Karamessines to James Angleton, 8/15/67, p. 1.
-Most of this earth is covered by sea. The oceans, birth place of all life. Despite civilisation’s ravaging they remain wild. Two centuries ago Byron said it well:
+[451] Helms, Rockefeller Commission, 4/28/75, pp. 2434-2435.
-There is a murmur on the lonely shore. There is a society where none intrudes. By the deep sea and music in it’s roar. Roll on thou deep and dark blue Ocean. Four thousandfleets sweep over thee in Vain. Man marks the earth with ruin. His control stops with the Shore.
+[452] CIA Headquarters cable to several field stations, August, 1967, p. 1.
-Since Byron’s time the fleets have grown. Huge factory ships sweep the seas leaving ruin in their wake; fisheries that must have seemed endless now brought to the edge by machines which must have been unthinkable;[353] giants of the sea hunted to extinction. Yet Byron is still right. The oceans are the largest wilderness left on earth, injured but untamed.
+[453] Memorandum from Richard Helms to President Johnson, 11/15/67.
-It is unlikely that the ecologies of the seas will suffer the fate of many of their land cousins; dehabilitated, denuded, and finally enclosed within the prison of agriculture.[354] Yet many are under serious threat of being wiped out. In the seas are some of the planet’s oldest species and systems, survivors of hundreds of millions of years. Now, they drown in man.
+[454] CIA Cable from Acting DDP to various field stations, November 1967, pp. 1-2.
-Climate change, pollution, factory fishing, whaling, oil exploration, and increasing volumes of shipping are some of the main threats to the oceans. How, if at al , can we combat these attacks?
+[455] CIA Cable from Thomas Karamessines to various field stations, July 1968, P. 1.
-As always, when looking into the chasm we have to accept that much of what is alive today will be dead tomorrow, whatever we do. Coral reefs are one example. Already climate change-induced warming of high sea temperatures has killed most of the coral reefs in the Indian Ocean, Western Pacific, and Eastern Pacific. Corals in the Caribbean and Brazil have also been badly damaged.[355] Given the time lag inherent in climate change, if we had global insurrection tomorrow (unlikely), we could still expect the death of most of our reefs and the life that depends on them. Depressing, but as the hackneyed old slogan goes: Don’t Mourn, Organise! We can take some practical action to slow some assaults on the sea.
+[456] Memorandum from Tom Huston to the Deputy Director, CIA, 6/20/69, p. 1.
-Despite the spectacular image of Greenpeace dashing around in natty zodiacs, relatively little direct action has been carried out to protect the seas. This is largely for entirely understandable reasons. We are, after all, land mammals and few of us spend much time at sea. When compared to the odd roll of poly-prop the cost of running anything sea-worthy is astronomical. Yet we in the British Isles are ideally placed to get to grips with the problem.
+[457] Cable from CIA headquarters to stations, November 1969.
-So far the only serious group to take Gaia’s side on the oceans is the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society [SSCS]. Its founder, Paul Watson, declared: <em>Earth First! is mother earth’s army and we are her navy.</em> Their first action was the 1979 ramming and disabling of a whaling ship off the Portuguese coast. The whaler managed to limp into port only to be mysteriously bombed a few months later sunk with a magnetic limpet mine.
+[458] Charles Marcules testimony, Rockefeller Commission, 3/10/75, pp. 1538-1547, 16566-1567; Ober, 9/24/75, p. 46. (For security reasons, the CHAOS agent case officer testified as "Charles Marcules".)
-Since then Sea Shepherd has been confronting enemies of the oceans with an arse kicking attitude. Slicing the nets of driftnetters, ramming and scuttling whalers, and sabotaging seal and turtle kills. As I write they are patrolling the waters off the Galapagos Islands. The last year has seen them make headway in eliminating the ecocidal ships attacking this immensely important area.[356] If they succeed it will be one of ecological direct action’s biggest victories. It should be no surprise that they might be responsible. In fact, if it weren’t for Sea Shepherd, mass commercial whaling probably would have restarted, pushing numerous species to extinction.
+[459] Marcules Contact Report, 4/17/71; Marcules, Rockefeller Commission, 3/10/75 Jr. 1556-1558.
-Though predominately based in North America, Sea Shepherd has operated all over the world carrying out many operations in European waters. Most recently Norwegian and Faeroes whalers have been targets. Its mere presence has a serious deterrent effect. The Italian fishing industry halted its most damaging practices on hearing Sea Shepherd had entered the Mediterranean.
+[460] Memorandum from Richard Ober to Chief, CI Project, 2/15/72.
-Though a smattering of Brits have crewed, the number is surprisingly small when you think how many of our mad lot it might appeal to. There are a number of reasons. Real lasting links have never been made between us and Sea Shepherd. Personality politics is also a factor. The figure of Captain Paul Watson is both immensely inspiring and deeply off-putting to circles with a dislike for hierarchy and the media. Our height was also their low point. The mid to late ‘90s coincided with a relatively Jess active period for Sea Shepherd. That period has thankfully now ended with two large boats in the fleet and a growing international organisation.
+[461] Ober, 10/30/75, pp. 16-17.
-Though few links exist now, if ever there is a meaningful attempt by our circles to contribute to the defence of the seas, we will have lots to learn from Sea Shepherd. A major driving force be-ind their success has been good strategy and well-applied tactics. So let’s have a look.
+[462] Letter from Richard Helms to Henry Kissinger, 2/18/69.
-Most of Sea Shepherds most spectacular actions can be divided into two categories: sea confrontations and harbour sabotage. The terrain of struggle they operate in is one of both waves and laws. A lot ofwhat they confront is illegal and often beyond state territorial waters. Political considerations make the extradition and jailing of anti-whaling activists difficult. Sea Confrontations: Slicing driftnets and ramming enemies of the sea is what has made Sea Shepherd famous. The keys to the success of many SSCS sea confrontations is that they’re militant--though non-violent, media friendly-though not merely stunts, carried out on an international level but rarely against Sea Shepherd host nations, largely against illegal activity, and regularly in international waters. The main key of course is having big fuck-off boats and crews committed enough to plough them into target ships. Keeping these ships running is expensive.
+[463] Richard Helms deposition, Rockefeller Commission, 4/24/75, p. 223.
-<strong><em>Harbour Sabotage:</em></strong> Sea Shepherd’s most infamous action was a daring raid in 1986 that left half of Iceland’s whaling fleet at the bottom of a harbour and its major processing plant trashed. This action needed only good intelligence, cunning, a little funding, and two brave souls to open up the boats’ sea water intake valves. By the time the action was discovered, the two, a Native American and a Cornishman, were on their way to the airport to leave Iceland forever. Since ’86 Sea Shepherd has carried out other impressive scuttling, most notably against Norwegian whalers. So far no one in Sea Shepherd has served any major time for any of their actions! Despite SSCS’s glaring victories no other groups have successfully copied them by taking to the seas. It would be excellent if an autonomous Sea Shepherd-like organisation evolved in Europe. But with no such groups coming into existence, those who wish to take action at sea must join the long volunteer lists of SSCS.
+[464] Helms deposition, Rockefeller Commission, 4/24/75, p. 234, Ober deposition, Rockefeller Commission, 3/28/75, pp. 137-138.
-Readers who have served aboard Sea Shepherd or have general maritime experience should seriously consider the need for a European addition to Neptune’s Navy.
+[465] memorandum from Inspector General to Executive Director-comptroller, 11/9/72, P. 1.
-Much money and commitment would be needed to set it up, but it would be an immense asset to ecological resistance in Europe. Such a project, if handled right, could bring together energy and resources from a range of circles-radical eco-types, ex-members of Greenpeace’s direct action units, animal liberationists & rights groups, ex-Sea Shepherd crew, etc. Indeed, the years have proven that there is significant mass support for radical action at sea-especially when it comes to dosh. Two decades ago, a third of the cost of the first Sea Shepherd boat was put up by the RSPCA. The Faeroes campaign in ’86 was funded mainly by English school children who raised £12,000 in a save-the-whale walkathon?[357]
+[466] Memorandum from Executive Director-Comptroller to DDP, 12/20/72.
-While Sea Shepherd is alone in carrying out militant sea confrontations, the tactic of harbour sabotage has been taken up by others. Even here in Britain serious sabotage was carried out against seal cullers in the mid ‘70s, resulting in the destruction of one vessel and damage to another.[358] Across Europe a number of ecocidal ships have been scuttled. Recently, Norway has been the prime target.
+[467] Cable from CIA Director William Colby to Field Stations, March 1974.
-On 11/12/01 one of Norway’s main meat processing plants at Loften Dock was destroyed by fire, causing damage totalling at least £1.5 million. Five days earlier, the whaler Nehella had burned and sunk at the same dock costing £150,000. Another whaler, the Nybraena, was damaged when the factory fire spread to the dock. The Nybraena had been scuttled by Sea Shepherd agents in Christmas 1992, for which Norway sought in vain to extradite Captain Watson.
+[468] Rockefeller Commission Report, p. 23.
-These recent actions also follow another action on 27/2/00. Then, another Norwegian whaling vessel, the Villduen, was destroyed when an explosion sunk the ship at its moorings. The blast collapsed the deck and the ship sank to the bottom of the harbour half an hour later. Sea Shepherd stated publicly that they were not responsible. It has always denied the use of explosives and this is what it said about the attacks. We neither take, nor condone actions that might result in any injuries. None the less, we are pleased for the whales![359]
+[469] Agent 1. Contact Report, Volume 11, Agent 1 file.
-While putting a new fleet afoat would take a lot of work, basic harbour sabotage takes few resources bar pluck. While the recent Norway bombing and arson were obviously very effective, monkeywrenching can be effectively done with just hand tools. An exact and proven guide to the subject has been written by Sea Shepherd Agent #013. S/he says in the intro:
+[470] 50 U. S.C. 403 (d) (3).
-With the scuttling of ecologically destructive ships comes the possibility of doing tens of millions of dollars of economic damage. We are talking megatage here. Thejoy of bringing down a whaler can be one of the great pleasures in an eco-warrior’s life. It can be the most treasured offeathers in one’s spiritual war bonnet.[360]
+[471] Lawrence Houston testimony, Rockefeller Commission, 3/17/75, pp. 1654-1655.
-S/he should know-the author was one of the team that scuttled the Nybraena in 1992.
+[472] Rockefeller Commission Report, pp. 162-166.
-We have looked at direct action tactics used in the defence of the sea and posited some possible conclusions. Now maybe it’s worth looking at the situation around the British Isles directly. Beyond the unconfrontable cataclysms of climate change and the like, a variety of processes threaten the marine ecologies around our shores. The oil industry (especially expansion into the Atlantic frontier), factory fishing, industrial shoreline expansion, marine aggregate dredging, and pollution.
+[473] According to a "memorandum for the record" sent by CIA General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston to Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers in 1954, an agreement was reached at that time allowing the CIA to investigate on its own any "actual or probable violation of criminal statutes" involving the CIA's "covert operations" and to determine for itself, without consulting the Justice Department, whether there were "possibilities for prosecution." The Justice Department would not be informed if the CIA decided that there should be no prosecution on the ground that it might lead to "revelation of highly classified information." (Memorandum from Houston to Rogers, 3/1/54, and enclosed memorandum from Houston to the Director of Central Intelligence, 2/23/54.)
+<br>
+<br>This practice was reviewed and re-confirmed internally within the CIA on at least two subsequent occasions. (Memorandum from Houston to the Assistant to the Director, CIA, 1/6/60; memorandum from Houston to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. 6/10/64.) It was not terminated until 1975. (Memorandum from John S. Warner, CIA General Counsel, for the record. 1/31/75.)
-In my opinion we can have little impact on pollution given the continuation of the system. It’s a hydra with too many heads/ outflow pipes. The odd concrete blockage might be good for press attention and a bit ofjustice, but it’s not really meaningful.
+[474] These CIA activities, Projects MERRIMACK and RESISTANCE, were described in great detail by the Rockefeller Commission. (Rockefeller Commission Report. Chg. 12 and 13.)
-Of the other threats, we have only done action against industrial shoreline expansion. The best example is the campaign against the Cardiff Bay Barrage, which though unsuccessful is credited with discouraging some other similar schemes. A similar struggle could soon arise al Dibden Bay on the edge of the New Forest. These campaigns are really just an extension of the land struggles, with the possible added excitement of zipping around in dinghies, so I will not go into detail here.
+[477] The Rockefeller Commission Report describes two cases in which telephones of three newsmen were tapped ... [One] occurred in 1962, apparently with the knowledge and consent of Attorney General Kennedy." (Rockefeller Commission Report, p. 164.)
-The oil industry at sea has been largely ignored by us bar the ridiculous debacle that was the Sea Empress Spill Anniversary Action. As it happened it would have been far better had we ignored it. (1bough all credit to Reclaim the Valleys, which tried to rescue the situation when the organising group Cardigan Bay EF! went AWOL on the day, after 70+ activists from around the country turned up!) So far only Greenpeace has done actions around the Atlantic Frontier. It is beyond me how with our present resources we could carry out direct defence of this globally important marine ecosystem-but let’s at least get our grey cells working on the issue. Though it’s not actually getting in the way on the Atlantic Frontier itself, blockades, etc of Britain’s oil infrastructure may be useful.[361] When jewels like the St. Kilda region are under threat, action must be taken.
+[478] Memorandum from President Truman to Secretary of Defense, 10/24/52.
-As for factory fishing, Britain is both a base and a stopping port for fleets of driftnetters and klondkyers from around the world. Look through the eyes of agent #013 to see the work ahead.
+[479] General Lew Allen testimony, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 6.
-Fishing quotas are resulting in the elimination of over half of the British fishing fleet. Unfortunately this is not automatically a cause for celebration. The elite are using the collapse of fish stocks to eliminate small fishing boats while leaving large factory boats to trawl the seas. There is potential for some level ofjoint action by radical ecologists and militant fishing communities against big ships and the economic forces steering them. The barriers and conflicts which would need to be overcome to build such a unity are maybe too big and it’s maybe too late already.
+[480] Allen, 10/29/75, Hearings, vol. 2, p. 11. The programs of NSA are discussed further in the succeeding section, "Intrusive Techniques," p. 183.
-Aggregate dredging-aka quarrying the sea-is set to become a significant threat to marine life around this island. Massive expansion plans are afoot which among other things threaten “fish stock breeding areas:’ Fisherfolk in France have already shown their opposition, and ironically there could be a point of tactical unity between us around this attack. As far as I know, no one is organising on this.
+[481] omitted in original.
-***** Defending the Living Sea: Medium Term Objectives
+[482] omitted in original.
-I have been more vague when dealing with defending the living sea than I was when discussing defending the living land. This is not a reflection of their relative importance; just on our position today and the powers we have developed. Though hotspot style analysis does exist for the seas, it is both less developed, less accurate, and, for us anyway, less relevant. As mentioned before, some of the most diverse marine ecosystems-such as many coral reefs-are probably doomed thanks to climate change. Nothing we can do will save them. However, I do believe there are some steps we can take to move towards the challenge of defending the living seas
+[483] Memorandum from FBI Executive Conference to Mr. Tolson, 10/29/70. see pp. 74-76.
-. Engage with Sea Shepherd: The SSCS has a UK contact but no office. We should build connections and aid them if possible. At the very least we should distribute their material and give whatever support we can when their boats visit Britain. We should raise awareness of their mission and do solidarity actions if and when they are arrested. Despite reservations, more Brits should volunteer to serve aboard Sea Shepherd vessels.
+[484] Memorandum from Hoover to Angleton, 3/10/72.
-. Expand Neptune’s Navy: There is no innate reason for the non-existence of European Sea Shepherd-style boats. This project could take years to come to fruition but would be immensely valuable as both a tool for direct action and a training ship for marine wilderness defenders.
+[485] Memorandum from NSA MINARET Charter, 7/1/69.
-. Sink ‘Em My Hearties: No massive organisation is needed to scuttle a whaler or similar ship. Serious thought should go on before such action is taken. Illegal whalers should primarily be targeted as they are presently trying to expand their ‘harvest’. All that holds us back is our fear.
+[486] Memorandum from Hoover to Katzenbach, 3/30/65.
-. Investigate and Take Action off British Shores: Research needs to be done, similar in scope to that needed for British land habitats, to find out which marine ecosystems are both threatened and within our capacity to defend. Solid conclusions should lead to solid action, setting national priorities for action.
+[487] Memorandum from President Johnson to Heads of Departments, 6/30/65.
-. Skill Up: Our circles should try to increase our watery skills.
+[487] Memorandum from Katzenbach to Hoover, 9/27/65; Supplemental Memorandum to the Supreme Court in Black v. United States, July 13, 1966.
+<br>
+<br>Katzenbach also stated to Hoover that while he believed such techniques could be properly used in cases involving organized crime, he would not approve such requests in the immediate future "in light of the present atmosphere."
-Scuba, ships, zodiacs, sailing, navigation—-whatever. Worse case scenario is we have a fun time with little political payoff. Best scenario is we have fun and prepare ourselves for campaigns to come.
+[488] Memorandum from Katzenbach to Hoover, 9/27/65.
-***** Defending Living Culture
+[489] Memorandum from Hoover to Katzenbach, 6/15/65.
-Radical ecology has always taken its cue from indigenous resistance. Our crossed wrench and stone axe symbol holds the very essence of our movement; a fighting unity between primal people and those deep in industrial society who want to wrench their way out.
+[490] Memorandum from Hoover to Katzenbach, 5/25/65.
-While the Fourth World survives enveloped within the borders of some First World countries, most indigenous people live in the Majority World. In Europe, only a minority of Sarni live in any way similar to our ancestors. Thus as with biological meltdown, the struggle against cultural meltdown calls us over the water.
+[491] Memorandum from Hoover to Katzenbach, 4/19/65, see footnote 266.
-Beyond the core the tribes are everywhere under attack. Many are engaged in large-scale resistance to Leviathan: the Papuans, the Zapatistas, and the Ijaw for example. Our circles have already done quite a lot of action to support these indigenous communities and this should continue. Here I am less concerned with them (cultures with significant populations capable of major action), than with those small shrinking wild societies that if left without allies will undoubtedly soon perish. I cover the work needed to aid struggling indigenous communities later at length in Task IV-Supporting Rebellions Beyond the Core.
+[492] Memorandum from Hoover to Katzenbach, 6/7/65, see footnote 266.
-There are many scattered individuals trying to help endangered primal cultures but no solid network that enables them to co-operate internationally. The nearest to what is needed is Friends of People Close to Nature (FPCN). FPCN has carried out serious no-compromise work around the world. Unfortunately it revolves largely around a man who has severe problems working with other people and has dubious ideas around gender and race. Nevertheless, many practical things can be learned from this network.
+[493] Memorandum from Hoover to Katzenbach, 9/28/64.
-FPCN concentrates less on solidarity actions than with getting out there and helping directly. Two examples of some recent campaigns illustrate their attitude.
+[494] Memorandum from Hoover to Katzenbach, 3/3/65.
-Within the territory of Tanzania live the Hadzabe-East Africa’s last gatherer-hunters. One band are typical. Pushed to the most marginal land, banned from using the only watering hole in miles unless they perform for tourists, their children abducted by soldiers and forced into schools; under siege from all sides by settlers & missionaries. While Western White trophy hunters armed with modern weapons zip around in Land Rovers decimating the local mega-fauna, Hadzabe hunters are jailed for hunting with bows and arrows in their traditional lands. They don’t have hunting licences, just an unbroken history thousands of years old.
+[495] Memoranda from Hoover to Katzenbach, 5/17/65,10/19/65, 12/1/65.
-FPCN activists visited the scattered camps to see how they could help. They provided basic humanitarian aid and protested against the local powers. Best of all, they hired a truck and rescued abducted Hadzabe children from enforced schooling and returned them to their families in the bush. There, as everywhere, missionaries are the advance guard of civilisation. The simple presence of Westerners who decry the missionaries for the fools, charlatans, and profiteers they are strengthened the tribal resolve.
+[496] For example, Clark turned down FBI requests to wiretap the National Mobilization Committee Office for Demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1968. (Memoranda from Hoover to Clark 3/11/68, 3/22/68, 6/11/68). Clark decided that there wag not "an adequate demonstration of a direct threat to the national security." (Clark to Hoover, 3/12/68) (These memoranda appear at Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 740-755.
-Ihe hatred against these strangers grows among the Hadzabe. FPL”‘N stands ready to sanction and assist with the burning out of churches on Hadzalandfollowing a similar explosion where a church was completely destroyed by local tribespeople.[362]
+[497] Clark has stated that he denied requests "to tap Abba Eban when he was on a visit to this country, an employee of the United Nations Secretariat, the Organization of Arab Students in the U.S., the Tanzanian Mission to the U.N., the office of the Agricultural Counselor at the Soviet Embassy and a correspondent of TASS." [Statement of Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate (1974).]
-Many thousands of miles away, the last gatherer-hunters surviving in the Philippines face similar threats. Like many tribes across the world, genocide has whittled down the Agta to the low hundreds. They are Red Book humans! They have become landless refugees in their own land.
+[498] Katz v. United States, 397 U.S. 347 (1967). This case explicitly left open the question of warrantless electronic surveillance in "situation(s) involving the national security." (397 U.S., at 358 n. 23.)
-In 2001 FPCN raised £8,000 and purchased 10 hectares of stolen Agta tribal land in Dipuntian. This land is meant to be a base for a significant section of the Agta population and for action against local logging of the rainforest. FPCN have called for sorted Western visitors to help out on the reserve and in the resistance:
+[499] 19 U. S.C. 2511 (3).
-***** I would suggest you stay here and look what can be done.
+[500] See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
-<quote>
+[501] Memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Mitchell, 3/16/70.
-<em>Watch the non-hierarchic and soft way of Agta life, so you will perhaps love them andfeel the need to protect them.[363]</em>
-FPCN is now trying to raise another £10,000 to buy an adjoining piece of land for another 100 Agta who want to stay. FPCN list a number of things western visitors can do at Dipuntian from <em>watch the small scale loggers not to cut the trees to Keep missionaries out of the place. The Agta feel safer when foreigners are around.[364]</em>
+[502] See Findings C and E, pp. 183 and 225.
-</quote>
-In Task IV I go into detail about practical work that can be done to support rebellions beyond the core, much ofwhich is directly applicable to the defence of primal cultures. So to avoid repetition I will not go into tactical detail here. The two campaigns mentioned above provide good examples of what might be needed to slow cultural meltdown.
+[503] For example, at one time in March 1971 the FBI was conducting one microphone surveillance of Black Panther Party leader Huey Newton, seven wiretaps of Black Panther Party offices including Newton's residence, one wiretap on another black extremist group, one wiretap on Jewish Defense League headquarters, one wiretap on a "New Left extremist group", and two wiretaps on "New Left extremist activities." (Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to C. D. Brennan, 3/29/71, printed in Hearings, Vol. II, pp. 270-271.)
-***** Defending Living Culture: Immediate Objectives
+[503] Memoranda from Hoover to Attorney General Mitchell, 11/5/69 and 11/7/69. This and other aspects of electronic surveillance in this period are discussed in Findings C and E in greater detail, pp. 183 and 225.
-I will draw out some objectives to further us on the path to aiding tribes in general and gatherer-hunters in particular.
+[504] United States v. United States District Court. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
-) Forge Links with Allies
+[505] United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S., at 309 (1972).
-A real effort needs to be made to link up supporters of gathererhunters interested in solidarity actions and direct aid. The lack of a well-functioning network is hindering activity. [In the first published version of this text I advocated consolidating links with FPCN. Unfortunately despite a lot of good will on the side ofEF!ers FPCN’s leader had been obstructive, rude, and downright difficult to deal with from the start. Other problems specifically around FPCN and the Agta have also surfaced. Despite this I believe they have done more to help out gatherer-hunters than nearly any other Western group. This should not blind us to the group’s serious problems, but instead underline the need for activists from our networks to learn from and in large part replace them.]
+[506] Memorandum. from William Olson to Elliott Richardson, June 1973. Until 1975, however, the Justice Department stretched the term "connection with a foreign Power" to include domestic groups, such as the Jewish Defense League, whose protest actions against a foreign nation were believed to threaten the United States," relations with that nation. [Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F. 2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975).]
-) Provide Direct Aid to Gatherer-Hunters, starting with the Agta By aiding the Agta we can have a real impact on a perilous situation. Only £10,000 is needed to buy the adjacent land to the Dipuntian reserve. Raising a substantial proportion of the cash needed should not be impossible. Flights from Europe plus internal connections to the reserve cost just over £400. Once there, living costs are low. This is an unusually cheap opening for on-the-ground support work, not to mention an amazing experience. Don’t let this opportunity pass by! [People didn’t-see below.]
+[507] Memorandum from FBI/CIA Liaison Agent to D. J. Brennan, 1/16/69.
-The Agta are defenders of the local rainforest. Earlier I stated that the Philippines are one of the three hottest hotspots: in facing global biological meltdown one of our highest priorities. Here we have an opportun ity to give direct aid and on-the-ground solidarity to an endangered gatherer-hunter community struggling to protect an ecology within one of the three hottest of the global hotspots, in one of the few Majority World countries with active EF! groups. The imp ortance of any action on this field cannot be overstated.
+[508] Routing Slip from J. Edgar Hoover to James Angleton (attachment), 3/10/72.
-Any involvement by our circles with the Agta would act as a jumping board, extending experience and contacts-thus enabling similar work elsewhere. [In January of 2003 four Leeds EF!ers went over to the Philippines with the express purpose of helping at Dipuntian and working with EF! Philippines. Meanwhile quite a few in the movement had pulled together around the inspirational sounding project and raised the needed funds for the second land purchase through a mix of benefit gigs, beer selling, personal donations. and grants. Unfortunately Dipuntian was definitely different than is publicity stated. As the EF!ers said on return; <em>For the past year, much of the work of Solidarity South Pacific [SSP) on the Philippines has centred around the FPCN project at Dipuntian... We provided publicity and volunteers, and secured.funding to buy more landfor the project. Having now visited and worked on the project we have made the decision to withdraw our support for it.</em> While this was very disapointing, the visit was by no means a waste of time. Not only did the fact-finding mission uncover some unfortunate facts-it also orged links with Agta bands elsewhere and tribes throughout the islands, as well as supporting Filipino EF!ers. The Leeds visit achieved a number of decent things itself and has opened up the way to further, targeted action. More info can be found on continuing work and the probems involved on [[http://www.eco-action.org/ssp][www.eco-action.org/ssp]].] 3) Reconnect with Young Lions EF!
+[509] DOD Cable, Yarborough to Carter, 10/20/67.
-Six years ago Young Lions EF! (South Africa) were aiding the San Bushman, setting up bush skill training camps where elders taught the old knowledge to assimilated San. The last we heard from them they were planning to smuggle a considerable member of San back into the Kalahari desert from which they had been expelled. We have heard nothing since despite some attempts at contact. YLEF! were an exceptional group, we must hope they’re alright. Serious attempts should be made to find out what happened and aid them if they are still active.
+[510] NSA's name, for example, was to be kept off any of the disseminated "product."
-) Continue to Build Indigenous Solidarity Work
+[511] MINARET Charter, 7/1/69.
-Those struggling indigenous peoples we have aided so far (Ogoni, Ijaw, Papuan, Bougainvillian, Zapatista etc.) deserve our support. This will involve a lot of activity, but we are well on our way. A detailed look at what is needed can be found in Task IV. The last wild peoples call us over the water. I know some of us will answer them, yet we must be very careful not to cause damage with our good intentions-Mosquito Coast style. These are incredibly delicate situations. Tribal people already have a plague of do gooders, what they need is allies.
+[512] W. R. Wannnall (FBI Assistant Director for Intelligence), 10/3/75, p. 13. "The feeling is that there was very little in the way of good product as a result of our having supplied names to NSA."
-Most tribes have no voice. They need people like us as allies because all the otherpotential allies have agendas they want to impose in return for help. They are fighting forfreedom, not for rights within our culture. Since freedom doesn’t exist in our culture then theirs is truly the same.[365]
+[513] Memorandum from Hoover to Katzenbach, 9/14/65. This memorandum dealt specifically with electronic surveillance and did not mention mail openings or "Black Bag Jobs." Hoover said the FBI bad "discontinued" microphone surveillances (bugs), a restriction which Attorney General Katzenbach said went too far. (Katzenbach to Hoover 9/27/65.)
-***** Task Conclusion: Warriors for the Earth
+[514] omitted in original.
-To the land of these Isles most of us will return one day-dying, rotting, giving life. Until then, the wind and soil in our soul should direct us. When our leaps halt machines, our scythes cut through experiments, our wrenches disable diggers, and our matches start fires-we are the land.
+[515] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Tolson, 2/27/65. Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/75. Hearings, Vol. 6. p. 204.
-Though we love this land, we love this entire earth and thus the global crisis calls us over the water. In the biological/cultural meltdown Britain’s diversity is marginal. To confront the meltdown we will need to join the battle to defend the earth’s last big wildernesses on land and at sea. However, many of us will be unable to reach these global ecological frontlines and will have to fight to preserve fragments behind enemy lines. Above all else, the wild areas in the Mediterranean call us.
+[516] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to C. Tolson, 2/27/65.
-To slow cultural meltdown, the last remaining wild peoples must be aided in every way. If most of our species are ever to break out of this nightmare of our own making and find our way back to the earth, we will have a lot to learn from them.
+[517] Hoover Note on Belmont Memorandum to Tolson, 2/27/65.
-Back in Britain, let’s expand and escalate our action. In the conflict over road building ecological direct action took on the <em>state</em> and won. Let’s zero in on particular attacks on wildness and stop them one after the other.
+[518] Memorandum from Hoover to Tolson, et al., 3/2/65.
-We have the power to defeat some of civilisation’s attacks on the wild, both here and in the hotspots; will we unleash it? While community mobilising may win the day in some battles, sometimes vanguard action is called for. Here lies a contradiction for us. The militant action needed could in fact alienate and hinder the (r)evolulionary process. It could result in increased state repression and a cut in public support. These are big problems but do not mean we should preclude militant action-for the price may be worth paying. After all, Thnmb-in-the-Dam struggles aim to protect ecological diversity while waiting not just for the possibility of global (Revolution but the certainty of industrial collapse. As warriors for the earth we must put the earth first!
+[519] Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 205-206.
-**** III. Preparing for Crises
+[520] Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 1/21/66.
-We must have the ability to defend ourselves, survive, and exploit crises in society including capitalist attempts to destroy us. The divided and industrial nature of today’s society has al-ready determined the instability of tomorrow.
+[521] Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 1/10/66.
-<quote>
+[522] Memorandum from M. A. Tones to Robert Wick, 1/11/66.
-It <em>is difficultfor the British with their tradition of stability to imagine disorders arising beyond the powers of the police to handle.. but already there are indications that such a situation could arise, and this at a time of apparently unrivalled affluence...</em>
+[523] Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 1/21/66.
+[524] C. D. Brennan deposition, 9/23/75, p. 42.
-<em>If a genuine and serious grievance arose, such as might result from a significant drop in the standard of living, all those who now dissipate their protest over a wide variety of causes might concentrate their efforts andproduce a situation which was beyond the power of the police to handle. Should this happen the army would be required to restore the position rapidly.</em>
+[525] According to FBI records and the recollections of Bureau agents, the following number of microphone surveillances involving "surreptitious entry" were installed in "internal security, intelligence, and counterintelligence" investigations: 1964: 80; 1965: 59; 1966: 4; 1967: 0: 1968: 9; 1969: 8; 1970: 15: 1971: 6; 1972: 22: 1973: 18: 1974: 9; 1975: 13. The similar figures for "criminal investigations" (including installations authorized by judicial warrant after 1968) are: 1964: 83; 1965: 41; 1966: 0; 1967: 0: 1968: 0; 1969: 3: 1970: 8; 1971: 7; 1972: 19 ; 1973: 27; 1974: 22; 1975: 11. (Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 10/17/75.)
-<em>Fumbling at this juncture might have grave consequences even to the extent of undermining confidence in the whole system of government.</em>
+[526] Hoover note on memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach, 7/19/66. This memorandum cited as a "prime example" of the utility of a "black bag jobs" a break-in to steal records of three high-ranking Klan officials relating to finances and membership which "we have been using most effectively to disrupt the organization."
-<right>
+[527] Wannall, 10/13/75, pp. 45-46. There is to this day no formal order prohibiting FBI maiI-opening, although Assistant Director Wannall contended that general FBI Manual instructions now applicable forbid any unlawful technique.
-— General Sir Frank Kitson,
-<br>ex-Commander-in-Chief of UK Land Forces.
-</right>
-</quote>
-<quote>
+[528] These techniques were not prohibited by law. Their use was banned in all cases, including serious criminal investigations and foreign counterintelligence matters. (memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. 11. Belmont, 9/30/64.) Mail covers, which may be used to identify from their exteriors certain letters which can then be opened with a judicial warrant, were reinstituted with Justice Department approval in 1971. (Memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell, 7/27/71; Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson to Hoover, 9/31/71.)
-Imagine having no running water to drink.
-Chemicals contaminate the pipes leading to your sink.
+[529] Memorandum from Hoover to Tolson and DeLoach, 1/6/67.
-<em>Just think, if the grocery stores close their doors.</em>
+[530] "Once Mr. Hoover, apparently at the request of the National Security Agency, bought approval to break and enter into a foreign mission at the United Nations to procure cryptographic materials to facilitate decoding of intercepted transmissions. The request was presented with some urgency, rejected and presented again on perhaps several occasions. it was never approved and constituted the only request of that kind." [Statement of former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, (1974).]
-<em>And they saturate the streets with tanks and start martial law. Would you be ready for civil war?</em>
+[531] Memorandum from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 2/23/75.
-<right>
+[532] Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 3/31/70.
---dead prez The Myth of Stability
-</right>
-</quote>
-The myth is that though we may see crisis on the TV in other countries, Western Europe will be forever stable. This is an idea that our generation holds; other living generations are not so ahistorical-they, after all, have lived through history.
+[533] Memorandum from John R. Brown to H. R. Haldeman, 4/30/70.
-Our grandparents experienced the Second World War and all of its horrors and the cold war partition of Europe. Many of our parents were teenagers during the fall ofthe Spanish and Portu-guese fascist regimes in the ‘70s, the rise and fall of the CIA-backed military coup in Greece, the May ’68 revolt in France, and serious social conflict in Italy in the ‘70s, to name but a few of Western Europe’s recent crises. Not to mention internment of radicals, soldiers on the streets for nearly 30 years, bombings and guerrilla warfare in Northern Ireland.
+[534] Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach, 6/20/69; Memorandum from Huston to Hoover, 6/20/69.
-<quote>
+[535] Tom Charles Huston testimony, 5/23/75, p. 19.
-For those who think <em>that sort of thing couldn’t happen here</em> it’s worth remembering that Britain came perilously close in 1968–75 to a military coup spearheaded by leading industrialists, high ranking army officers, and members of the secret services.[366]
-</quote>
-Social crises are regular occurrences in societies based on class warfare.
+[536] Huston, 5/23/75, pp. 23, 28.
-***** The Living Earth in Crisis
+[537] Helms deposition, 9/10/75, p. 3; Bennett deposition, 8/5/75, p. 12; Gayler deposition, 6/19/75, pp. 6-7. As early as 1963, the FBI Director had successfully opposed a proposal to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board by CIA Director John McCone for expanded domestic wiretapping for foreign Intelligence purposes. (Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 3/7/70). In 1969, CIA Director Richard Helms was told by the Bureau, when he asked it to institute electronic surveillance on behalf of the CIA, that he should "refer such requests directly to Attorney General for approval." (Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach, 3/30/70.) The administrators of NSA also failed to persuade Director Hoover to lift his restraints on foreign intelligence electronic surveillance. (Staff summary of Louis Tordella interview, 6/16/75.)
-The crises we’ve known are likely to look pretty minor compared to what’s on the horizon. Climate change and biological meltdown are already kicking off serious crises, killing hundreds of thousands and the ride hasn’t even got going yet. The extremes of ecological instability are most visible at the ecological extremes-the Tropical, Arctic and Antarctic zones. However the evolving global crises <em>will</em> reach us in the Temperate zone. Things are gonna go a bit fucking weird. There is no way out of it; the ecological effects of yesterday’s industry have already decided the ecological instability of tomorrow. If the climate and life support systems of the earth destabilise, you can guarantee that society will also.
+[538] Note by Hoover on letter from Helms to Hoover. 2/26/70.
-***** The Megamachine in Crisis
+[539] Former FBI Liaison with CIA testimony, 9/22/75, p. 3.
-Economic crisis, though connected to crises arising from class struggle and ecological destabilisation, are capable of creating chaos in their own right. In the last five years of the twentieth century a wave of economic crises crashed whole economies; Albania, Russia, the Asian Tiger countries. In a globalised system the collapse of one economy can create a domino effect. For those assimilated into these fragile economies living standards get worse. Many people simply cannot afford to let things continue as they are.
+[540] Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach, 3/30/70, pp. 1-2, 4.
-The Indonesian uprising which ousted Suharto and the 1997 insurrection in Albania[367] show what happens to regimes when their economies collapse. So, unfortunately, does the depression-era rise of the Nazis.
+[541] Memorandum from Hoover to Helms, 3/31/70.
-Tiianks to heavy economic manoeuvring West European societies have not experienced the destabilisation that has swept East Asia and the Second World in the last decade. Their economies are inherently less robust than those of the core capitalist countries, but that does not mean that the core capitalist countries are untouchable. Listen hard-you can hear the crash before the impact.
+[542] Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 32.
-***** The Flesh in Crisis
+[543] Presidential Talking Paper, 6/5/70, from the Nixon Papers.
-The mass nature of industrialism-a society evolved to consolidate oppressor order-itself produces mass ‘personal’ disorders in the oppressed. Incremental changes in mental and physical health can seem trivial until a threshold is reached. Under certain circumstances these personal disorders can seriously re-order civilisation.[368]
+[544] The report was written by the Research Section of the FBI Domestic Intelligence Division on the basis of committee decisions and FBI Director Hoover's revisions (Staff Summary of Richard Cotter interview, 9/15/75.)
-With herd medicine and transport systems turning humanity ever more into a mono-culture, we can expect future epidemics to reap an unparalleled harvest of heads. In the mean time a divided society will continue to create divisions, not just between people but within people. Despite the glossy charade, such a fractured society is always on the edge of implosion. As in the past, it is just a matter of time and chance how soon it will be before the personal becomes political in a cataclysmic fashion. Crisis Breeds Change
+[545] The seven recommendations were made in an attachment to a memorandum from Huston to Haldeman, 7/70.
-For all the reasons stated above it is highly likely that British society will be hit by serious crises within our lifetime. Any movement that does not take this into consideration is unlike-ly to survive. Crises by their very nature contain truckloads of both danger and possibility. Crises are moments of the extreme and when the shit hits the fan people look for extreme solutions. Times of sudden (r)evolutionary possibility often arise out of war, chaos and social collapse. The period after both world wars saw massive revolutionary waves. The First World War brought us the Russian revolution as well as workers and peasant uprisings across much of Europe. The Second World War seriously damaged much of the social fabric of empire leading the way to insurgencies across the Third World. In turn the horror of the Vietnam War opened up faultlines across American society.
+[546] Memorandum from Huston to Haldeman, 7/70.
-While insurrections have often arisen out of crises, crises may not be fertile ground for harmonious social (r)evolution. Though people look for extreme solutions, there are no pre-ordained reasons for them to turn to anarchist ideas rather than authoritarian ones. In fact libertarian tendencies in the people are likely to be heavily curtailed when confronted with the interwebbed complexity of industrial society, people’s alienation from their own food and the scale of modern warfare.
+[547] Memorandum from Huston to Haldeman, 7/70. In using the word "burglary," Huston said he sought to "escalate the rhetoric ... to make it as bold as possible." He thought that, as a staff man, he should give the President "the worst possible interpretation of what the recommendation would result in." (Huston deposition. 5/22/75, p. 69.)
-Read no more odes my son, read timetables: they’re to the point. And roll the sea charts out before it’s to late. Be watchful, do not sing, for once again the day is clearly coming when they will brand refusers on the chest and nail up lists of names on people’s doors.
+[548] Huston deposition. 5/22/75, p. 8.
-Learn how to go unknown, learn more than me: To change yourface, your documents, your country. Become adept at every petty treason, The sly escape each day and any season.
+[549] Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to Intelligence Directors, 7/23/70.
-For lighting fires encyclicals are good:
+[550] Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach, 4/14/70.
-<quote>
+[551] An assistant to the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency recalls agreeing with his superior that the memorandum from Huston to the intelligence directors showed that the White House had "passed that one down about as low as they could go" and that the absence of signatures by the President or his top aides indicated "what a hot potato it was." (Staff summary of James Stillwell interview, 5/21/75.)
-And the defenceless can always put to use,
-<br>As butter wrappers, party manifestos,
-<br>Anger and persistence will be required
-<br>To blow into the lungs ofpower the dust
-<br>Choking, insidious, ground out by those who,
-<br><em>Storing experience. stay scrupulous: by you.</em>
-<right>
+[552] Mitchell testimony, 10/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 122.
---Hans Magnus Enzenburger Hope for the Best-Prepare For the Worst
-</right>
-</quote>
-Once again this is where I depart from what I’ve earlier called the It’ll Be All Right On The Night tendency. Two factors that are likely to partly decide what happens in a crisis are: 1) How well known are anti-authoritarian ideas? In crises people’s perception of the possible widens. Ideas that under normal circumstances are rejected out of hand, in moments of crises can be judged sensible. However, they can only be judged if they have been put forward in the past. Thus antiauthoritarian educational work to the non-aligned[369] majority today, can influence decisions over aims and forms of organisation they make in crises tomorrow.
+[553] Memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell, 7/25/70.
-) How experienced and organised libertarian groups are. In any crises in British society today the main course of events will primarily be determined by the elite and the previously nonaligned. However, history has shown that relatively small groups can have a decisive effect in moments of crises. Spain in the 1920s and 1936, Northem Ireland, the Ukraine in 1919, and the French resistance provide some examples.
+[554] Helms memorandum for the record, 7/28/70.
-I am not advocating organising an armed vanguard force to lead the people to revolution in times of crisis. I’ll leave these ridiculous notions to the Leninists. I am saying that as groups which understand what might be coming and have the ability in part to affect it we have a duty to inter-vene in times of crises. It’s our role as anarchists to stop authoritarian organisations--right wing or left wing-gaining ground in times of crisis, or at least to attempt to do so.
+[555] Mitchell, 10/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 123.
-If a group is to have any effect it must: a. Have an intimate knowledge of its local area. b. Have a range of basic skills and resources available from those needed for fighting to medicine, printing and the use of communication equipment. c. Consist of members who through previous struggle have pushed back their fear barriers and extended their creative operational vision of the possible.
+[556] Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 56; staff summary of David McManus interview, 7/1/75.
-d. Have an understanding of what actions authoritarian organisations are likely to carry out in moments of crisis.
+[557] Director Helms thinks he told Attorney General Mitchell about the CIA mail program. Helms also believes President Nixon may have known about the program although Helms did not personally inform him. (Helms, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, pp. 88-89.) Mitchell denied that Helms told him of a CIA mail opening program and testified that the President had no knowledge of the at least not as of the time we discussed the Huston Plan." (Mitchell, 9/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, pp. 120,138.)
-e. Have a number of members entirely unknown to the state as subversives.
+[558] In March 1971, NSA Director Noel Gayler and CIA Director Helms met with. Attorney General Mitchell and Director Hoover. According to Hoover's memo of the meeting, it had been arranged by Helms to discuss "a broadening of operations, particularly of the very confidential type in covering intelligence both domestic and foreign." Hoover was again "not enthusiastic" because of "the hazards involved." Mitchell asked Helms and Gayler to prepare "an in-depth examination" of the collection methods they desired. (Memorandum for the files by J. Edgar Hoover, 4/12/71.) It was less than two months after this meeting that, according to a CIA memorandum, Director Helms briefed Mitchell on the program. (CIA memorandum for the record, 6/3/71.) Even before this meeting, NSA Director Gayler sent a memorandum to Attorney General Mitchell and Secretary Melvin Laird describing "NSA's Contribution to Domestic Intelligence." This memorandum refers to a discussion with both Mitchell and Laird on how NSA could assist with "intelligence bearing on domestic problems." The memorandum mentioned the monitoring of foreign support for subversive activities, as well as for drug trafficking, although it did not discuss specifically the NSA "Watch List" of Americans. (Memorandum from NSA Director Noel to the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General, January 26, 1971.) NSA official Benson Buffham recorded that he personally showed this memorandum to Mitchell and had been told by the Military Assistant to Secretary Laird that the Secretary had read and agreed with it. (Memorandum for the by Benson K. Buffham, 2/3/71.)
-Thankfully, actions taken under other areas of strategy from Thumb-in-the-Dam struggles to the growing of a combatative counter culture prepare us in part for what might need to be done in crises. The experience affinity groups get in the present from involvement in mass actions, anti-GM sabotage, strikes, hunt sabbing, monkeywrenching, animal liberation, pirate radio, general criminality, and anti-fascist activity are all useful training for the unexpected future.
+[559] Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian to Attorney Mitchell, 12/4/70.
-The anarchist scene in Britain is growing but it’s still a small shoal in a sea of sixty million fishes. Nevertheless it’s easy to underestimate our ability to intervene in a crisis by concentrating on our present number of activists. In fact one consistent aspect of crises is that when the barricades go up many ex-activists/militants come out of retirement.
+[560] Memorandum from Gayler to Laird and Mitchell. 1/26/71.
-Thanks to dole cheques and the low level of generalised class struggle the British radical ecological and libertarian scenes have existed as alternative youth cultures. These cultures have encapsulated the lives of tens upon tens of thousands of people over the last three decades.[370] By their very nature youth cultures are cultures of the young, and when the young get older they usually leave. However, I believe that most of those who have “left;’ “dropped out of politics;’ “got disillusioned;’ “burnt out;’ etc. rejected not the principles of anarchism but the practice of activism. In times of social crises those who got offthe hamster wheel will know that action not only has purpose but is in their interest. Those who have once stood up are likely to stand again.
+[561] For a discussion of the FBI as "consumer," see pp. 107-109.
-***** Visualise Industrial Collapse
+[562] The resumption of mail covers is discussed above at footnote 528. FBI field offices were instructed that they could recruit 18-21 year-old informers in September 1970. (SAC Letter No. 70-48, 9/15/70.) See. p. 76.
-The above sub-header is an oft-used North American EF! slogan. Ecologically this civilisation (unfortunately probably not civilisation itself) is doomed-maybe not today, maybe not tomorrow but within the lifetime of our children’s children, our children, or possibly even ourselves. We should not mourn for the death of this tyrannical, earth destroying culture but we should prepare for its end.
+[563] The head of the FBI Domestic Intelligence Division, William C. Sullivan, was promoted to be Assistant to the Director for all investigative and intelligence activities. His successor in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division was Charles D. Brennan.
-For the second time in this pamphlet I’m emphasising the need-in times of crisis, in times of stability-to know how to feed yourse(f, yourfamily, friends, and comrades! We will not always be able to rely on the destruction and imperialism of industrial agribusiness to feed us like babies; nor should we.
+[564] Executives Conference to Tolson, 10/29/70; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 11/4/70.
-George Bradford of the American anarchist magazine Fifth Estate is instructive in his essay “We All Live In Bhopal:’ In the aftermath of the 1984 chemical explosion in Bhopal, India (which killed and continues to kill thousands), the population fled.
+[565] Brennan deposition, 9/23/75, pp. 29-31.
-The New York Times quoted one man, who said, ‘They are not believing the scientists or the state or anybody. They only want to save their lives... All the public has gone to the village.’ the reporter explained that ‘going to the village’ is what Indians do when trouble comes. A wise and age-old strategy for survival by which little communities always renewed themselves when bronze, iron, and golden empires with clay feetfell to their ruin. But subsistence has been and is everywhere being destroyed, and with it, culture. What are we to do when there is no village to go to?...
+[566] Brennan testimony, 9/2.5/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 108.
-The corporate vampires are guilty of greed, plunder, murder, slavery, extermination and devastation. We should avoid any pangs of sentimentalism when the time comesfor them to pay for their crimes against humanity and the natural world. But we will have to go beyond them, to ourselves: subsistence... We mustfind our way back to the village, or as the North American natives said, ‘back to the blanket,’ and we must do this not by trying to save an industrial civilisation that is doomed, but in the renewal of life which must take place in the ruin.
+[567] The involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in improper activities for the White House is described in the Rockefeller Commission Report, Ch. 14.
-Until recently people were adept at subsistence even in Britain-birth place of industry. For most people it is only a few generations that separate their fingers from the soil. One does not need to go back to the times of the peasantry to see this connection. On an allotment site anywhere in Britain you’ll find elderly working-class people who know both the satisfaction and the personal and political reasons for growing.
+[568] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Marvin Watson, 6/4/65.
-Subsistence skills can be learnt by us all, and passed on to our children. Non-industrial medicine must also be strengthened. In preparing for The Collapse we also build our autonomy and reconnect with living systems. There are few things more satisfying, and sensible, than sitting down to eat a meal grown by the combined powers of nature and one’s own hands. Let us rebuild the generational connection with the land now. And as Bradford says, Let us do so soon before we are crushed.
+[569] Memorandum from Hoover to Moyers, 10/27/64, cited in FBI summary memorandum, subject: Senator Barry Goldwater, 1/31/75.
-Counter (R)evolution’?-We should be so lucky (lucky, lucky, lucky) In this section I have been talking about how we should prepare for a number of types of crises. I have not mentioned counter (r)evolution which I have largely dealt with in Task I: Growing Counter Cultures. To many it may seem strange that I have separated preparing for crises and preparing for counter revolution-surely a type of crisis?
+[569] Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 1/17/67.
-My answer is that in this section I have been talking about what preparation our existing movement can make in anticipation of crises that are likely to be coming. On the other hand, discussions of counter revolution presume a revolution worth countering: a class movement of vast scale. I have argued that in Western Europe only a significant working-class counter culture can seriously threaten the elite. That does not exist in Britain and no doubt is unlikely to in the immediate to medium term-if at all. In other words, preparations to defeat counter revolution could only be made by a movement as yet not in existence in anticipation of crises that without its existence are unlikely to come.
+[570] Memorandum from Hoover to Marvin Watson, 11/8/66.
-As I argued earlier in Task 1, only a combination of military disaffection and an armed people has any hope of successfully defeating a counter (r)evolution-winning a civil war. I also argued that rebellions such as France in ’68 will remain only temporary when they are not products of past struggles and a strong counter culture that can not only propel a vision of the future but field considerable armed class strength.
+[571] See Finding on Political Abuse, p. 225.
-***** Task Conclusion: Don’t Call Up Blood
+[572] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to John D. Ehrlichman, 10/6/69, House Judiciary Committee Hearings, Statement of Information (1974), Book VII, P. 1111; Book VIII, p. 183 Director Hoover volunteered information from Bureau files to the Johnson White House on the author of a play satirizing the President. (Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 1/9/67.)
-It is worth here underlining the point that we should not look forward to these moments of cataclysm with relish. Anarchist history is brim-full with stories of social crises leading to uprisings that have in turn lead to the extermination , of libertarians.
+[573] Memorandum from Hoover to Tolson, et al., 5/18/70. Agnew admits having received such information, but denies having asked for it. (Staff summary of Spiro Agnew interview, 10/15/75.)
-All powennongers are our foes and as a result anarchists have a tendency to get it in the neck. While harmony can be born of crisis, the child is more often horror.
+[574] Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Mohr, 8/29/64.
-However, an understanding that crises are likely in our lifetime shows that being in a sorted counter culture rooted in the land yet with an ability to act in conflict is in our own interest. Radical groupings are essentially gangs (see Camatte!) and gangs are what you need to survive and prosper in times of crises. IV Supporting Rebellion Beyond the Core The counter culture must act in real solidarity with our struggling sisters and brothers on other islands. Aid them in whatever we can and bring the majority world battlefronts to the boardrooms, bedrooms, and barracks of the bourgeoisie.
+[575] DeLoach memorandum, 8/29/64; Cartha DeLoach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 177. A 1975 FBI Inspection Report has speculated that the SNCC bug may have been planted because the Bureau had information in 1964 that "an apparent member of the Communist Party, USA, was engaging in considerable activity, much in a leadership capacity in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee." (FBI summary memorandum. 1/30/75.) It is unclear, however, whether this bug was even approved internally by FBI Headquarters, as ordinarily required by Bureau procedures. DeLoach stated in a contemporaneous memorandum that the microphone surveillance of SNCC was instituted "with Bureau approval." (Memorandum from DeLoach to Mohr, 8/29/64.) But the Inspection Report concluded that "a thorough review of Bureau records fails to locate any memorandum containing [internal] authorization for same." (FBI summary memorandum, 1/30/75.)
-<quote>
+[576] Mr. DeLoach cited the fact that In the summer of 1964 "there was an ongoing electronic surveillance on Dr. Martin Luther King . . . as authorized by Attorney General Kennedy." (Cartha DeLoach testimony, 11/26/75, p. 110) The Inspection Report noted that the Special Agent in Charge of the Newark office was instructed to institute the wiretap on the ground that "the Bureau had authority from the Attorney General to cover any residences which King may use with a technical installation." (FBI summary memorandum 1/30/75, Subject: "Special Squad at Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey, August 22-28, 1964. ")
-Our intention is to disrupt the empire. To incapacitate it, to put pressure on the cracks, to make it hard to carry out its bloody .functioning against the people of the world, to join the world struggle, to attack from the inside.
-<right>
+[577] Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, 8/21/64.
---Prairie Fire.
-<br>The Weather Underground Organisation, 1974
-</right>
-</quote>
-<quote>
+[578] Staff summary of Walter Jenkins interview, 12/1/75.
-Mohammed Singh Azad. Sindabad! No apologies. Not a shot in <em>the dark. This is a warning. The sleeping tiger awakes each and every morning. The time is now right to burst the imperial bubble. And my act of revenge is just a part of the struggle. A bullet to the head won’t bring back the dead. But it will lift the spirits of my people. We’ll keep on fighting. bee’ve been a nation abused. Your stif upper lip will bleed. And yourpride will be bruised. I’ll shake hands with the hangman. I’ll wear the noose with pride. For unlike the British I’ve no crimes to justify. Pentonville will be my last place on earth. And then death will return me to the land of my birth.</em>
-<right>
+[579] DeLoach, 11/26/75. p. 114.
---Assassin,
-<br>Asian Dub Foundation[371]
-</right>
-</quote>
-***** Solidarity is also a Weapon
+[580] Theodore White, Making of the President 1964 (New York: Athenium. 1965). pp. 277-280. Walter Jenkins also confirmed this characterization. (Staff summary of Jenkins interview, 12/1/75).
-All over this earth millions ofpeasants, workers, and tribals are defending themselves and the land against constant assaults by capital. In every nation the war between the classes es-calates and at present it is the rich that are winning most of the battles.
+[581] Memorandum from DeLoach to Mohr, 8/29/64.
-Ever since the radical ecological direct action movement emerged, one of its central themes has been support for struggles in the Majority World. The communities we have chosen to support have reflected changes in our worldview and how we see ourselves.
+[582] Memorandum from H. N. Bassett to Mr. Callahan, 1/29/75.
-At first, only non-violent struggles were given any support. This can be illustrated by looking at the Direct Action Empowerment Video-produced in early 1993. The film (which I like, despite some cringe-worthy moments) covers ecological conflicts around the world. The only Majority World struggles given space were the Narmada protests, the Ogoni in Nigeria, and the Penan logging blockades in Sarawak. At the time, all three communities professed some sort of non-violence code. The tactic of non-violent confrontation is pretty rare in the Majority World, for sensible reasons, so this selection is quite revealing. During the ‘90s most of our circles abandoned the ideology of non-violence and as a result we have increasingly been supporting those engaged in armed resistance to the global empire. Now perceiving ourselves as revolutionaries, we are engaged with revolutionary communities.
+[583] DeLoach, 11/26/75, p. 139.
-Originally our actions were media-centric, trying to bring press attention to the plight of our adopted peoples. Now that we see ourselves involved in a growing network of communities in resistance, how do we engage in real solidarity’?
+[584] Staff summary of Jenkins interview, 1/21/75.
-Real solidarity with a rebellion abroad is (as the Zapatistas hammer on at us) creating rebellion at home. Only a truly global rising will put an end to class society/civilisation and give birth to a new world, fighting not for them but with them against a common enemy. However, there are some important things that we are well placed to do. Below is by no means a complete list.
+[585] Exhibit 68-2, Hearings, Vol. VI, p. 713.
-***** Direct Cash Aid to Struggling Communities
+[586] FBI memoranda indicate that in 1968 Vice President Hubert Humphrey's Executive Assistant, Bill Connell, asked the Bureau to send a "special team" to the forthcoming Democratic National Convention, since President Johnson "allegedly told the Vice President that the FBI had been of great service to him and he had been given considerable information on a timely basis throughout the entire convention." (Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 8/7/68). After talkIng with Connell, Director Hoover advised the SAC in Chicago that the Bureau was "not going to get into anything political but anything of extreme action or violence contemplated we want to let Connell know." (Memorandum from Hoover to Tolson, Pt al., 8/15/68.) Democratic Party Treasurer John Criswell made a similar request, stating that Postmaster General Marvin Watson "had informed him of the great service performed by the FBI during the last Democratic Convention." (Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 8/22/68.)
-Thanks to exchange rates small amounts of hard currency can have a much larger effect in Majority World countries than it does here. Providing practical financial aid for revolutionary groups abroad should not be seen as charity. It’s merely a tool of solidarity that we have available to us as a result of our position in the highly moneterised capitalist core.
+[587] FBI summary memorandum, 2/3/75.
-) Money for Community Health and Survival
+[588] FBI summary memorandum, 2/3/75.
-The types of low intensity warfare that many groups find themselves in are not fought out simply between soldiers and armed groups. They are fought out in the hearts and minds ofthe community as a whole. A long-established tenet of counterrevolutionary warfare is to firstly grind down the subsistence and health of a population. Secondly, at the moment of desperation, offer medical, educational and technical aid to families and villages within the conflict zone who are willing to take sides with the state and corporations. The carrot-and-stick approach aims to disconnect the population from radicals in its midst, and form counter gangs to oppose them. By supplying aid money directly to struggling communities we can in part oppose this process through positive action. For instance one minor punk benefit gig in America paid for a Zapatista (EZLN) community to be connected up to clean water. One US/Mexican anarchist federation quickly raised enough money to set up a women’s health clinic in Chiapas.
+[589] FBI summary memorandum, 2/3/75.
-Regimes often purposefully spread diseases in rebellious populations and put up medical block-ades. This is exacerbated by the fact that many struggling communities do not have basic immun-ity to Western diseases and live on marginal land, or in slums and shanty towns. Thanks to mal-nutrition they often have weakened immune systems from the start.
+[590] FBI summary memorandum, 2/3/75. See Findings on Political Abuse.
-One Bougainvillian told me that due to the medical blockade by Papua New Guinea (PNG), £25 raised in Britain to smuggle in medical aid could save the life of half a dozen revolutionaries on Bougainville. If that’s not a good deal I don’t know what is! Saving the lives of six, self-described ecological revolutionaries, for the price of a couple of rounds down the pub and a curry!
+[591] FBI summary memorandum, 2/1/75.
-) Money for Refugee Camps
+[592] Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 10/29/68: memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 10/30/68; memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General. 3/27/69.
+<br>
+<br>Attorney General Clark testified that he was unaware of any surveillance of Mrs. Chennault, (Clark, 12/3/75. Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 251-252.)
-When people try to defend themselves and their land, the resulting military repression often forces a significant proportion of the population to flee over borders to the relative safety of neighbouring countries. The resulting life of the refugee can vary tremendously but is almost always hard, poor, and crammed. Often forced to rely on outside support, refugee communities sometimes find none at all.
+[593] See Findings on Political Abuse, p. 225.
-When the Nigerian military cracked down on the Ogoni resistance against Shell Oil, around a third of the Ogoni fled their home villages, many of which had been razed to the ground. Thousands fled to camps in neighbouring countries where they lived for months in squalid conditions. A small amount of medical aid, clothing and funds were collected in Britain and sent over by a solidarity group and by Ogoni living in London. In a desperate situation this aid made a real difference.
+[594] John Ehrlichman testimony, Senate Watergate Committee, 7/24/73, p. 2535. According to the transcript of the White House tapes, President Nixon stated to John Dean on April 16,1973:
+<br>
+<br>"What I mean is I think in the case of the Kraft stuff what the FBI did, they were both fine. I have checked the facts. There were some done through private sources. Most of it was done through the Bureau after we got -Hoover didn't want to do Kraft. What it involved apparently, John, was this: the leaks from NSC [National Security Council]. They were in Kraft and others columns and we were trying to plug the leaks and we had to get it done and finally we turned it over to Hoover. And then when the hullabaloo developed we just knocked it off altogether. (Submission of Recorded Presidential Conversations to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives by President Richard Nixon, 4/30/74.) The President's statement was made in the context of 'coaching' John Dean on what to say to the Watergate Grand Jury.
-However, it was still very little compared with what could have been raised. At the time the Ogoni were big in the newspapers and hundreds were willing to risk arrest in petrol station blockades across the country. Tens of thousands could easily have been raised by local groups. Even without public fundraising a sizeable amount could have been raised very quickly. At least 300 people took part in the petrol station blockades. If.just those 300 people had each put in a fiver £1,500 could have been raised at the click of our movement’s fingers-enough for a sizeable aid package!
+[595] William Ruckleshaus testimony before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, 5/9/74, p. 320.
-Recently a couple of hundred quid was sent to Papua New Guinea. This paltry amount paid for a consignment of anti-malarial drugs for West Papuan refugees.
+[596] Kraft testified that Henry Kissinger, then the President's Special Adviser National Security, informed him that he had no knowledge of either the wire or the hotel room bug. Kraft also stated that former Attorney General Elliot Richardson indicated to him that "there was no justification for these activities." (Joseph Kraft testimony, Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, 5/10/74, p. 381.)
-) Money for Prisoners
+[597] Letter from W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Hoover, 7/12/69.
-Of course, any movement which gains any success will quickly find some of its number in prison. Being in prison in Europe is no picnic and our movement’s prisoners desperately need more sup-port than they get. Most of the problems we associate with prison support here are similar outside of the West but in more drastic ways.
+[598] While the summaries sent to Hoover by Sullivan did show that Kraft contacted North Vietnamese officials (Letter from Sullivan to Hoover, 7/12/69), the Bureau did not discover any improprieties or indiscretions on his part. When Ruchelshaus was asked if his review of these summaries revealed to him that engaged in any conduct while abroad that posed a danger to the national security he replied: "Absolutely not." (Ruckelshaus testimony before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, 5/9/74, p. 320.)
-Family visits, if allowed at all, are often costly both in travel and in bribes. In many Majority World countries a prisoner will not be fed from the prison budget but will have to rely on his community to supply either food itself or money to the prison in order to stay alive. (It’s worth pointing out this used to be the case in many British prisons hundreds of years ago!) In the usually horrendously unhygienic conditions decent doctors also have to be paid for. Even the smallest privilege can be impossible without bribes to prison officials. Legal aid will also have to be paid. This financial burden can cripple families. Increasingly, the time and energy a community used to put into revolutionary action has to be put into raising funds to keep its prisoners alive and relatively healthy.
+[599] Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach, 11/4/69.
-Over the last few years British Anarchist Black Cross activists have raised hundreds ofpounds for East European anarchist prisoners and their support campaigns. This money has been a large boost because hundreds of British pounds in countries like the Czech Republic and Poland translates into a lot of money. In the Third World this is even more the case. Ridiculously small amounts of money can make a real difference to those in cages in the colonies.
+[600] Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach, 12/11/69.
-) Money for Agitation and Propaganda
+[600] For discussion of dissemination of political intelligence from the "17" wiretaps, see Finding on Political Abuse, p. 22-5.
-Why not sponsor a pamphlet, leaflet, book or poster campaign by an anarchist/ecological group outside of the West? You’ll definitely get more propaganda for your pennies! As an example a donation of $40 from anarchists in the US paid for a campaign of stickers, posters and leaflets by anarchists in universities across the Czech Republic. Another good recent example is the funding and provision of basic radio transmission and studio equipment by Black liberationists in the US to the anarcho-syndicalist Awareness League in Nigeria.
+[601] Sen. Edmund Muskie testimony, Senate Foreign Relations committee, 9/10/73 Executive Session, pp. 5051.
-***** Travelling to and Joining their Struggle
+[602] Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 5/11/69.
-Revolutionary tourism-a contentious subject! I would say that, despite limitations, Western activists can be very useful on the ground in Majority World struggles-as long as they take their cue from native groups and don’t just follow their own agenda. This opinion is shared by the Mexican EZLN, the Free Papua Movement (OPM), the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), Anti-Dam communities in India and the Rainbow Keepers in Russia; all of which have recently asked for foreign radicals to come to their lands. From the perspective of the volunteer, sojourns in others struggles can be extremely instructive.
+[603] Report of the House Judiciary Committee, 9/20/74. pp. 146-154.
-Activists should only take part in this on-the-ground solidarity at the invitation of the communities themselves. In some situations, the presence of a foreigner can bring down hassle on the community and just be another mouth to feed. The communities will know what is needed and what is applicable.
+[604] The creation of the "plumbers" unit in the White House led inexorably to Watergate. See Report of the House Judiciary Committee, 8/20/74, pp. 157-162, 166-170.
-Three years ago some EF!ers and friends published a great basic guide to what one can practically do on-the-ground in Chiapas. Though much of it will be inapplicable to other struggles, I urge anyone thinking of engaging in a bit of revolutionary tourism to read this book, which goes into far greater detail than I do here.[372]
+[605] An example of a generalized Departmental Instruction is Attorney General Clark's order of September 1967 (see p. 79) regarding civil disorders.
-Essentially, the useful work that can be done by Western activists can be divided into work involving 1) Specialist practical skill and 2) Work which involves very little specialist practical skill. I’ll deal with these two areas separately.
+[606] Memorandum from FBI Director to Yeagley, 1/31/64.
-<strong>On-the-Ground Solidarity Work with Specialist Practical Skills</strong>
+[607] Memorandum from Yeagley to FBI Director, 3/3/64. There was no reauthorization of the continuing investigation between 1966 and 1974.
-The nature of the struggle will define what skills outside radicals can provide that might not be available or plentiful to struggling communities. In general, external specialist technological expertise is more useful in less urban struggles. I’ll list just a few of the most obvious useful skills that have been requested by movements in recent years.
+[608] Memorandum from Dean to Mitchell, 9/18/70.
-<strong>Medical Expertise</strong>
+[609] Executive order 11605, 7/71.
-This is the one skill that without a doubt is always needed and never available enough to radical groups. Whatever form the struggle takes-violent or non-violent-resisters will get attacked by the state. Whether it is mass demonstrations, small blockades or guerrilla actions, those en-gaged. in struggle risk injury and often death. Medical support on the ground can make all the difference. Whole movements sometimes operate with practically no medical support at all-at a terrible cost. This is especially true of indigenous groups such as the OPM.
+[610] By 1971, the SACB had the limited function of making findings that specific individuals and groups were Communist. Its registration of Communist had been declared unconstitutional. [Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965).]
-<strong>Radio and Communication Technology</strong>
+[611] Robert C. Mardian, address before the Atomic Energy Commission Security Conference, Washington, D.C. 10/27/71. Mardian added that the "problem" was that without an updated, formal list of subversive organizations, federal agencies were required "to individually evaluate information regarding membership in allegedly subversive organizations based on raw data furnished by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or other governmental sources."
-Many movements have got this sorted but many more have not. Communication technology needs divide into three areas:
+[612] Brennan testimony, 9/25/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, 116-117.
-a) Internal organisational communication-such as radio links between different groups throughout a country and different cells on actions and demonstrations.
+[613] Executive Order 11605, 7/71. By contrast, the prior order had been limited to groups seeking forcible violation of rights "under the Constitution of the United States" or seeking "to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means." Executive Order 10450 (1953).
-b) External communication to the domestic population at large--such as mobile pirate radio systems.
+[614] Hearings on the appropriation for the Department of Justice before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., (1972), p. 673
-c) International communication to movements and groups world-wide-such as mobile phones, long distance radio and internet set ups. Lack of electronic communication systems can leave movements-especially guerrilla ones-isolated within themselves, from the people as a whole and from international solidarity. They are by no means essential-and in some situations an unnecessary danger-but they can make the way easier.
+[615] Inspection Report, FBI Domestic Intelligence Division, August 17-September 9, 1971.
-<strong>Appropriate Technology</strong>
+[616] The hostile Congressional reaction to this Order, which shifted duties by Executive flat to a Board created by statute for other purposes, led to the death of the SACB when no appropriation was granted in 1972.
-If you’re good at turning rubbish into useful things, there is always a place for you. At whatever stage of struggle innovation is always needed. Bougainville showed how far you can get with appropriate technology-water power turbines running lighting and lathes for making home-made guns and coconuts fuelling cooking, BRA unit jeeps and pretty much everything else. However, be wary of any tendency to push development through technology!
+[617] FBI Executives Conference Memorandum, 6/2/71. The first Assistant Director for Legal Counsel was Dwight Dalbey, who had for years been in charge of the legal training of Bureau agents. Dalbey's elevation early in 1971, and Hoover's requirement that he review all legal aspects of FBI policy, including intelligence matters, was a major change in Bureau procedure. (Memorandum from Hoover to All Bureau Officials and Supervisors, 3/8/71.)
-<strong>Weaponry and Warfare</strong>
+[618] FBI Summary of Interview with Robert Mardian, 5/10/73, pp. 1-3.
-It’s extremely unlikely that if a group has modem weaponry it will need Westerners to tell it how to suck eggs. However, if you’re an ex-squaddie, you might be useful in some strugglesnot so much as some sort ofunpaid mercenary, but more for any specialist knowledge the state may have taught you.
+[619] Memorandum from Sullivan to Hoover, 6/16/71.
-On the Ground Solidarity Work not with Specialist Practical Skills
+[620] Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 5/13/73, pp. 1, 8.
-If you have little of the skills described above you can still-depending on the struggle-be of possible great use on-the-ground. As an anarchist Westerner one is in the peculiar position of, upon leaving the West, being able to do certain things merely because of the passport one carries or the colour of one’s skin. lhe following is just a short list of some useful roles. It is worth under-lining that these can largely only be carried out in situations no more intense than low intensity warfare.
+[621] FBI Summary of Interview with Robert Mardian, 5/10/73, pp. 2-3. The Watergate Special Prosecutor investigated these events, and did not find sufficient evidence of criminal conduct to bring an indictment. However, they occurred at the time of intense White House pressure to develop a criminal prosecution against Daniel Ellsberg over the Pentagon Papers matter. The dismissal of charges against Ellsberg in 1973 was largely due to the belated discovery of the fact that Ellsberg had been overheard on a wiretap indicated in these records, which were withheld from the court, preventing its determination of the pertinency of the material to the Ellsberg case.
-***** Human Shield/Human Rights Observer
+[622] Inspection Report, Domestic Intelligence Division, 8/17-9/9/71, p. 98.
-The presence of Westerners can decrease the likelihood of some forms of assault on communities. As an example, aerial bombardment and artillery are less likely if there’s awkward Westerners who it’s embarrassing to kill hanging about. In some situations making the state do its massacres by hand decreases the state’s in-built military advantage. Sometimes the mere presence of a Westerner can cool a situation-albeit temporarily. Such work has been very useful in various places but most solidly in Chiapas. Situations are different between countries and within countries. One activist who went to West Papua found his presence did have a positive effect in one area, a negative effect in another.
+[623] Memorandum from R. D. Cotter to E. S. Miller, 9/21/71.
-***** Media Work
+[624] Memorandum from Cotter to Miller, 9/17/71.
-As Western activists we have greater access to the international media than native communities. Though liberals put too much stock in raising the profile of struggling groups, it can. make a real difference. Footage and reportage of strikes, rebellions, armed struggle, riots, and general chaos can be the deciding factor that convinces a company it is not worth investing in such a trouble spot.
+[625] Memorandum from D. J. Dalbey to C. Tolson, 9/24/71.
-***** Travel Companion
+[625] Memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell, 9/30/71.
-The presence of a Westerner with limited immunity to arrest, torture and disappearance can be very useful when exiled radicals attempt to re-enter their homeland. Airports and border crossings can be very dangerous. A Majority World friend told me once that despite being wanted by the state, when he was back among the mass of his people he felt relatively safe. But entering his country was terrifying. Would the patrolling secret police become suspicious and guess who he was? Would they check his passport was fully in order? Alone in the airport, he could have been picked up and nobody would know that he had been taken. No outside support would come to a man no one knew was missing. For this reason, a British activist went with him so that at least his people and solidarity groups would know they needed to look for him. Of course, the very fact of travelling with a Westerner can arouse suspicion so it is not always a good idea. One Kurdish anarchist was asked if she wanted such a travelling companion, but she believed in Turkey it would make no difference. For her, possible torture or worse was merely the luck of the draw.
+[626] Memorandum from Mitchell to Hoover, 10/22/71.
-***** Prison Visiting
+[627] Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 11/11/71. It was noted that in the past the Department had "frequently removed individuals" from the Security Index because of its strict "legal interpretation.
-Westerners can sometimes get into places that might be difficult for locals. Also for different reasons there may be no organised prison visiting programme by a native community. Prisoners could be held in far offjails maybe hundreds of miles away from their friends and families. Visits by a prisoner’s comrades may only result in the visitor himself being interrogated and possibly jailed. This is less likely for Westerners.
+[628] This new breed was described as follows:
+<br>
+<br>"He may adhere to the old-line revolutionary concepts but he is unaffiliated with any organization. He may belong to or follow one New Left-type group today and another tomorrow. He may simply belong to the loosely knit group of revolutionaries who have no particular political philosophy but who continuously plot the overthrow of our Government. He is the nihilist who seeks only to destroy America."
+<br>
+<br>"On the other hand, he may be one of the revolutionary black extremists who, while perhaps influenced by groups such as the Black Panther Party, is also unaffiliated either permanently or temporarily with any black organization but with a seething hatred of the white establishment will assassinate, explode, or otherwise destroy white America." (T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 11/11/71.)
-***** Agricultural Work
+[629] Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 11/11/71.
-One of the commonest forms of on-the-ground solidarity with struggling peasant communities has been just getting stuck in and lending a hand with rural work. In the ‘70s Cuba was one of the New Left’s favourite resorts and many US rads worked the sugar harvest. Similarly in the 80s bundles of British lefties went to Nicaragua to join agricultural work brigades. They in some small way acted like an international Red version of the WW2 Land Girls-enabling peasants (this time men and women) to go to the front without their land falling fallow. Putting aside (big) political differences over the nature of the Sandinista and Cuban states, the work these anti-imperialists did was practically useful (though minor in scale).
+[630] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 11/15/71.
-In Chiapas, Human Rights Observers have taken part in the work of the communities too, rather than just hang about waiting for the next military incursion. At the time of writing, similar work is underway in Palestine where Israelis and foreign activists are picking olives in frontline Palestinian villages. This is in reaction to the shootings, by Zionist settlers and the army, of Palestini-ans doing the harvest on exposed positions. While I have put agricultural work under the general heading of non-specialist it would be foolish to underestimate the skill and labour involved in peasant work. Friends have remarked on their sudden-found frailty compared to much older Zapatista peasants. Even those with agricultural experience will find the day demanding. But all are likely to find the work rewarding, and working with others can be the best way to really get to know them.
+[631] Memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell, 2/10/72; cf. memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell, 9/30/71 for the previous statement.
-***** Hosting Majority World Radicals
+[632] Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 8/29/72.
-For a whole range of reasons (safety, educational, economic, operational), Majority World radicals can crop up in the core capitalist countries. More often than not they join already existing communities of radical ex-pats, (see “Immigrant Communities in Rome” below), but for some there may be no community to join. In these cases it is our responsibility to act as good hosts.
+[633] Memorandum from Domestic Intelligence Division, Position Paper: Scope of Authority, Jurisdiction and Responsibility in Domestic Intelligence Investigations, 7/31/72.
-Arrival here can be very confusing and we can be useful simply in terms of aiding orientation. Also there are basic needs such as cash, food and accommodation-all ofwhich might be be-yond the reach of lone radicals. With ever more repressive state action against economically poor immigrants these basic needs will increasingly come to the fore. If they are here legally they will probably need help dealing with visas and travel arrangements.
+[634] Federal Data Banks, Hearings, Opening Statement of Senator Ervin, February 23, 1971, p. 1. Senator Ervin declared that a major objective of the inquiry was to look into "programs for taking official note of lawabiding people who are active politically or who participate in community activities on social and political issues." The problem, as Senator Ervin saw it, was that there were citizens who felt "intimidated" by these programs and were "fearful about exercising their rights under the First Amendment to sign petitions, or to speak and write freely on current issues of Government policy." The ranking minority member of the Subcommittee, Senator Roman Hruska, endorsed the need for a "penetrating and searching" inquiry. (Hearings, pp. 4, 7.)
-Depending on the purpose and duration of their stay they may want help in projects here in the core aimed directly at helping their people, or they may wish to start conventional solidarity campaigns with speaking tours, newsletters etc. It should be left to them to ask what they want of us, rather than we presupposing what would be useful.[373] We can also be of use in providing many types of information-from the political to the technical.
+[635] Also during March 1971, an FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania was broken into; a substantial number of documents were removed and soon began to appear In the press. One of these was captioned COINTELPRO. The Bureau reacted by ordering its field offices to "discontinue" COINTELPRO operations "for security reasons because of their sensitivity." It was suggested, however, that "counter-intelligence action" would be considered "in exceptional instances" so long as there were "tight procedures to insure absolute secrecy." (Memorandum from Brennan to Sullivan, 4/27/71 ; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 4/28/71.) For actions taken thereafter, see COINTELPRO report.
-We can catalyse communication between them and members of other similar groups from their regions who may be in the core. Ironically it is often within the core that many groups from the Majority World meet for the first time. Logistics and state repression at home can be a major barrier to inter-movement/international discussion.
+[636] After repeal of the Emergency Detention Act in the fall of 1971, the FBI's Assistant Director for Legal Counsel recommended that the Bureau's request for approval of its new ADEX also include a more general request for re-affirmation of FBI domestic intelligence authority to investigate "subversive activity." (Memorandum from D. J. Dalbey to Mr. Tolson, 9/24/71.) The letter to the Attorney General reviewed the line of "Presidential directives" from 1939 to 1951. (Memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell, 9/30/71.) The Attorney General replied with a general endorsement of FBI authority to investigate "subversive activities." (Memorandum from Mitchell to Hoover, 10/22/71.)
-A recent example comes to mind. Despite a common enemy (the Indonesian State in particular and the capitalist system in general) communication between the East Timorese and West Papuan resistance movements has been rare.[374] The beginning of renewed communication between the two movements in part came when people from both were introduced by common friends at a British EF! Winter Moot.
+[637] Richard Kleindienst testimony, Senate Judiciary Committee, 2/24/72, p. 64
-Such instances are bizarre but regular occurrences in history-during the 20<sup>th</sup> century anti-colonial wave it was within the core that many militants from different countries first met each other. The recent growth of a number of non-centralised libertarian Internationals (People’s Global Action, Via Capensina, International Anarchist Federation, EF!, International Workers Association, and many radical global internet networks), is easing communication between majority world radicals (and us in the core of course!) and our minor role as inter-movement communication enablers is likely to decrease but it is still unlikely to disappear.
+[638] FBI routing slip attached to Washington Post article, 2/24/72. The FBI's summary of its "guidelines," submitted to the Attorney General stated that its investigations were partly based on criminal statutes, but that "subversive activity . . . often does not clearly involve a specific section of a specific statute." Thus, investigations were also based on the 1939 Roosevelt directives which were said to have been "reiterated <em>and broadened</em> by subsequent Directives." (Attachment to Hoover memorandum to Kleindienst, 2/25/72.) (Emphasis added.)
-Issues around security have to be given serious thought when hosting a foreign radical. The state(s) their groups are resisting at home are likely to have embassies and agents here. Whether or not their foes find out who they are and what they have been doing can decide life or death, freedom or prison when re-entering the home country. In many cases states share intelligence so it is not merely a case of avoiding foreign state interest but also domestic state interest.
+[639] The background for this development may be summarized as follows: In May 1972, FBI intelligence officials prepared a "position paper" for Acting Director L. Patrick Gray. This paper merely recited the various Presidential directives, Executive Orders, delimitation agreements, and general authorizations from the Attorney General, with no attempt at analysis. (FBI Domestic Intelligence Division Position Paper: Investigations of Subversion, 5/19/72.) Assistant Director E. S. Miller, head of the Domestic Intelligence Division, withdrew this paper at a conference with Gray and other top Bureau officials; Miller then initiated work on a more extensive position paper, which was completed in July. It concluded that domestic intelligence investigations could practicably be based on the "concept" that their purpose was "to prevent a violation of a statute." The paper also indicated that the ADEX would be revised so that it could not be "interpreted as a means to circumvent repeal of the Emergency Detention Act." (FBI Domestic Intelligence Division: Position Paper: Scope of FBI Authority, 7/31/72; T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 8/1/72.)
-Hosting Majority World activists is not just our responsibility-it can be immensely rewarding and illuminating.
+[640] Gray did order that the Bureau should indicate its "jurisdictional authority" to investigate in every case, "by citing the pertinent provision of the U.S. Code. or other authority," and also that the Bureau should "indicate whether or not an investigation was directed by DJ (Department of Justice), or we opened it without any request from DJ." In the latter case, the Bureau was to "cite our reasons." (FBI routing slip, 8/27/72.)
-***** Supporting Prisoners
+[641] One official observed that there were "some individuals now included in ADEX even though they do not realistically pose a threat to the national security." He added that this would leave the Bureau "in a vulnerable position if our guidelines were to be scrutinized by interested Congressional Committees." (Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 8/29/72.)
-Writing letters to prisoners in jails outside the core is one of the easiest-and most real-ways to aid our distant struggling sisters and brothers. Amnesty International rarely sup-port those who are in prison for resisting something, as opposed to just saying something. So it’s up to us to support imprisoned libertarian and ecological saboteurs, rioters, guerrillas, politicos and tribal warriors. Anarchist Black Cross groups have been doing a brilliant job but it shouldn’t just be left to them. A letter from a far-off land can help brighten a prisoners day and remind the wardens that people on the outside are looking in.
+[642] Memorandum from Smith to Miller. 8/29/72. The anticipated reduction was from 15,259 (the current figure) to 4,786 (the top two priority categories). The Justice Department was advised of this change. (Memorandum from Gray to Kleindienst, 9/18/72.)
-Chipas Link received a message from a Zapatista prisoner organisation in response to its letter writing campaign. Jose from the Autonomous Municipality of the 17<sup>th</sup> of November stated: Aforale had been extremely low due to a wave of recent arrests. We were feeling depressed. Letters from the UK helped raise morale and made us feel we were not alone. We want to say thank you.
+[643] Draft copies were distributed to the field for suggestions. (E. S. Miller to Mr. Felt, 5/22/73.)
+[644] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 6/7/73. The memorandum to the field stated, looking back on past Bureau policy, that since the FBI's authority to investigate "subversive elements" had never been "seriously challenged until recently," Bureau personnel (and "the general public") had accepted "the FBI's right to handle internal security matters and investigate subversive activities without reference to specific statutes." But the "rationale" based on "Presidential Directives" was no longer "adequate."
 <br>
+<br>The field was advised that the "chief statutes" upon which the new criteria were based were those dealing with rebellion or insurrection (18 U.S.C. 2583), seditious conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 2584) and advocating overthrow of the government (18 U.S.C. 2528). The ADEX was to be "strictly an administrative device" and should play no part "in investigative decisions or policies." The revision also eliminated "overemphasis" on the Communist Party.
-***** Solidarity Actions
+[645] For example, the field offices saw the need to undertake "preliminary inquiries" before it was known "whether a statutory basis for investigation exists." This specifically applied where a person had "contact with known subversive groups or subjects," but the Bureau did not know "the purpose of the contact." These preliminary investigations could go on for at least 90 days, to determine whether "a statutory basis for a full investigation exists." Moreover, at the urging of the field supervisors, the period for a preliminary investigation of an allegedly "Subversive organization" was expanded from 45 to 90 days. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 8/8/73.)
-For years we have been barricading ourselves inside corporate offices, disrupting AG Ms, block-ading petrol stations and going to directors’ houses. These are all valuable and should continue but do they effectively hinder the system or do they largely symbolically oppose it? Let’s first look at what we have done so far.
+[646] This was apparently "in connection with" a request made earlier by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, who had requested to see this section at the time of the confirmation hearings for Attorney General Kleindienst in 1972. (Kleindienst, Senate Judiciary Committee, 2/24/72, p. 64; memorandum from Kelley to Richardson, 8/7/73.)
-Our solidarity actions have usually had three objectives: a) Raising the Spirits: Hearing that people far away care about you and have taken action, however small, can really raise the spirits.
+[647] In a memorandum to the Attorney General, Director Kelley cited Senator Sam J. Ervin's view that the FBI should be prohibited by statute "from investigating any person without the individual's consent, unless the Government has reason to believe that the person has committed a crime or is about to commit a crime." Kelley then summarized the position paper prepared by the Domestic Intelligence Division and the Bureau's current policy of attempting to rely on statutory authority. However, he observed that the statutes upon which the FBI was relying were either "designed for the Civil War era, not the Twentieth Century" (the rebellion and insurrection laws) or had been "reduced to a fragile shell by the Supreme Court" (the Smith Act dealing with advocacy of overthrow). Moreover, it was difficult to fit into the statutory framework groups "such as the Ku Klux Klan, which do not seek to overthrow the Government, but nevertheless are totalitarian in nature and seek to deprive constitutionally guaranteed rights."
+<br>
+<br>Kelley stated that, while the FBI had "statutory authority," it still needed "a definite requirement from the President as to the nature and type of intelligence data he requires in the pursuit of his responsibilities based on our statutory authority." (Emphasis added.) While the statutes gave "authority," an Executive Order "would define our national security objectives." The FBI Director added:
+<br>
+<br>"It would appear that the President would rather spell out his own requirements in an Executive Order instead of having Congress tell him what the FBI might do to help him fulfill his obligations and responsibilities as President."
-b) Harassing the Attackers: The functionaries ripping the world will back down from individual attacks only if their profits or their wellbeing is threatened.
+[648] Memorandum from Kelley to Richardson, 8/7/73.
-c) Exposing the Struggles: Actions increase awareness of both the individual struggle involved and the global struggle in general. This helps us here and sometimes builds direct aid for over there.
+[649] Even before Kelley's request, Deputy Attorney General-Designate William Ruckelshaus (who had served for two months as Acting FBI Director between Gray and Kelley), sent a list of questions to the Bureau to begin "an in-depth examination of some of the problems facing the Bureau in the future." (Memorandum from Ruckelshaus to Kelley, 7/20/73.) The Ruckelshaus study was Interrupted by his departure in the "Saturday Night Massacre" of October 1973.
-Some solidarity actions over the last decade have needed meticulous planning like the Shell-Mex office occupation.[375] Others like the daytime smashing of the Nigerian Embassy windows just took two dozen people with pluck.
+[650] Memorandum from Bork to Kelley, 12/5/73.
-These actions can sometimes have quite an impact. One office occupation yielded an internal report that stated the actions were harrowing company moral and public image. When loads of us around the country were doing blockades at Shell petrol stations it felt, to be honest, a bit naff. Occasionally we would close down a petrol station for a few hours or even half a day, sometimes co-ordinated across the country, but was it really having any effect? The surprising answer is yes!
+[651] These techniques were handled within the Bureau "on a strictly need-to-know basis" and Kelley believed that they should not be included in a study "which will be beyond the control of the FBI." (Memorandum from Kelley to Bork. 12/11/73.)
+<br>
+<br>One Bureau memorandum to the Petersen committee even suggested that the Attorney General did not have authority over the FBI's foreign counterintelligence operations, since the Bureau was accountable in this area directly to the United States Intelligence Board and the National Security Council. (Petersen Committee Report, pp. 34-35.) The Petersen Committee sharply rejected this view, especially because the ad hoc equivalent of the U.S. Intelligence Board had approved the discredited "Huston plan" in 1970. The Committee declared: "There can be no doubt that in the area of foreign counterintelligence, as in all its other functions, the FBI is subject to the power and authority of the Attorney General." (Petersen Committee Report, p. 35.)
-After the Nigerian state/Shell executed Ken Saro Wiwa, 21 of his co-conspirators lay in jail awaiting a similar fate. Against expectation after months of suffering, the prisoners were released. Once outside the bars they wrote a letter to their supporters in Britain. The letter thanked everyone for their support and specifically mentioned the petrol station blockades as a major factor in their survival.
+[652] FBI Memorandum, "Overall Recommendations -- Counterintelligence Activity," Appendix to Petersen Committee Report.
-The Shell campaign built up a head of steam over years and garnered significant mainstream support after Ken was killed (little of which turned into any meaningful aid). It was exceptional but not, thankfully, an absolute exception.
+[653] Henry Petersen Testimony, 12/8/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 27O-71.
-Most of the time the power of our actions comes from constancy, confronting targets over and over again. However in times of foreign crisis lone acts can be useful. A recent funny example was when Those Pesky Kids invaded the Argentine embassy pulling down its flag and hoisting up the black and red. It will not make much difference on the Argentina streets but its image has travelled the world through papers and the web. Argentinian anarchos were really jollied up, their spirits raised.
+[655] Attorney General's Guidelines: "Domestic Security Investigations," "RIporting on Civil Disorders and Demonstrations Involving a Federal Interest," and "White House Personnel Security and Background Investigations."
-Other solidarity actions, notably those done for the Zapatistas, have succeeded to differing levels in raising the spirits, harassing the attackers and exposing the struggles. Over the last decade I think our solidarity actions, given our numbers, have been remarkably successfol in achieving these objectives. Sometimes, though, it could be said that we are using Majority World struggles as scripts with which we can act out our own politics.
+[656] Memorandum from A. B. Fulton to Mr. Wannall, 7/10/74. See pp. 42-44 for discussion of the initiation of the program.
-***** The Clouds are Gathering?
+[657] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 8/16/74.
-The type of solidarity actions described above should continue but let’s face it-they rarely hinder the system, but symbolically oppose it. Symbolism has a lot of power-but not as much as force.
+[658] Executive Order 11785, 6/4/74. The new standard: "Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or <em>adherence to</em> and active participation in, any foreign <em>or domestic</em> organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons (hereinafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully <em>advocates</em> or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or <em>of any state</em>, or which seeks to overthrow the Government of the United States or <em>any State or subdivisions thereof</em> by unlawful means." [Emphasis added.]
-In 1997 a British/South African mercenary outfit acting for British mining giant RTZ was planning, from their London offices on the Kings Road, to burn up the rebel-held territory in Bougainville, carpet bomb the heart of the resistance. Helicopters were to rain down bombs and bullets on friends, families, and forest. Poison. Fire. Blood.
+[659] Memorandum from Glen E. Pommerening, Assistant Attorney General for Administration, to Kelley, 11/17/74.
+<br>
+<br>With respect to one organization, the Department advised the Bureau that "despite the abolition" of the Attorney General's list, the group "would still come within the criteria" of the employee security program if it "may have engaged in activities" of the sort proscribed by the revised executive order. (Memorandum from Henry E. Petersen to Clarence Kelley, 11/13/74.)
-The mercenaries would be richer and the murdered land would be back under control-ripe for mining again. Thankfolly this plan was scuppered at the last moment by an uprising on PNG that forced the mercenaries out of the country.
+[660] "On the other hand," the instructions stated ambiguously, "the FBI should not report every minor local disturbance where there is no apparent interest to the President, the Attorney General or other Government officials and agencies." (Memorandum from Petersen to Kelley, 10/22/74.)
-Imagine that had not occurred and put yourself in the shoes of one of the self-described ecological revolutionaries on Bougainville, looking the 1,000s of miles from the Jaba river valley to the streets of London. What would you do if you could be on the Kings Road in London rather than a jungle in the Pacific awaiting death? Hold a banner? Shout at a few people? Occupy an oflice?
+[661] Memorandum from Petersen to Kelley, 10/22/74. The FBI was expected to "be aware of disturbances and patterns of disorder," although it is not to report "each and every relatively insignificant incident of a strictly local nature."
-If such a situation arose again, and it will, what will be the reaction of our circles? While British mercenaries on PNG were preparing to decimate Bougainville, Greek, and Italian troops were crushing the Albanian insurrection. It is likely that Western European troops will be increasingly used to counter revolutions in the Majority World. Direct action must be used to hinder the functioning of the militarised arms of capital when they reach out to destroy libertarian and ecological rebellions. We are where they are based. We are where the guns are produced. Sited as we are in the heart of the beast small amounts of intense action can have a disproportionate affect.
+[662] Memorandum from Petersen to Kelley, 10/22/74. Frank Nyland testimony, 1/27/76, pp. 46--58.
-It’s worth taking a quick look back at what attempts at solidarity were made by previous generations of capitalist core radicals.
+[663] Memorandum from J. G. Deegan to W. R. Wannall, 10/30/74. From a legal viewpoint, the Justice Department's instructors dealing with the collection of intelligence on potential civil disturbances were significant because they relied for authority on: (1) the President's powers under Article IV, section 4 of the Constitution to protect the states, upon application of the legislature or the executive, against "domestic violence;" (2) the statute (10 U.S.C. 331. et seq.) authorizing the use of troops; and (3) the Presidential directive of 1969 designating the Attorney General as chief civilian officer to coordinate the Government's response to civil disturbances. (Memorandum from Petersen to Kelley, 10/22/74; Memorandum from Melvin Laird and John Mitchell to the President, 4/1/69.)
-In the 1960s and 70s western solidarity with the Vietnamese struggle[376] took many forms, most of which was pretty useless. As an American Indian Movement activist put it: holding candlelit vigils and walking down the street does not constitute “acts of solidarity” with those engaged in armed struggle.[377] However there were rare actions with real effects. The German left wing urban-guerrilla group, the Red Army Faction, attacked a whole array of US army targets. One of its most successful actions was a major attack on a key US base from which the laying of mines in Vietnam was organised. Across the water the Weather Underground bombed the Air Force wing of the Pentagon. The consequent flooding crashed the central computer of the US military’s global communication system. These two acts had a real effect. By “bringing the war home” they directly joined the struggle in the jungles of Vietnam and contributed to the crippling of US military morale. That both actions were born out of a politics of despair, (arising from the orchestrated apocalypse in Vietnam and the selfpacifying, racist and delusional character of mother country radicals), did not diminish their utility in supporting rebellion beyond the core, merely the ability of the organisations carrying them out to survive.
+[664] omitted in original.
-From the perspective of domestic (r)evolution most of the ’60-‘70s European guerrilla movements were counterproductive. Irish Republicanism and Basque Separatism (Europe’s longest running armed struggles) were both expressions of communities in rebellion. The European New Left guerrillas on the other hand, (with the exception of Italy), were largely the project of middle class student radicals with little social base. Often seeing themselves as vanguards who would lead the working class to victory, they became self destructive cliques that probably even regressed the building of (r)evolution in their countries.
+[665] 18 U.S.C. 2101-2102.
-This does not however detract from the fact that some of things they did were extremely effective ‘fourth column operations’ carried out in time of war. Given the absence of generalised struggle in the capitalist core these radicals were given a choice. They effectively decided to defect. While other New Left formations immersed themselves in (largely futile) domestic (r)evolutionary activity (such as supporting unions) the Weather Underground concentrated on the global struggle. Their (amazingly arrogant) attitude to the rest of their country was summed up well when they reacted to an opposing left wing groups slogan Serve the People. Weather replied that they would .fight the people if to do so would further the international revolution.[378]
+[666] Memorandum from Petersen to Kelley, 11/13/74. This-memorandum added: "[W]ithout a broad range of intelligence information, the President and the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch could not properly and adequately protect our nation's security and enforce <em>the numerous statutes</em> pertaining thereto . . . [T]he Department, and in particular the Attorney General, must continue to be informed of those organizations that engage in violence which represent <em>a potential threat to the public safety</em>." [Emphasis added.]
-The question is not whether vanguard adventurism is a way of rousing domestic (r)evolution (it isn’t) but whether the potential gains to revolutions elsewhere outweigh the negative effect it has on domestic social evolution.
+[667] The opinion of the Supreme Court in the United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) -- the domestic security wiretapping case stated, "Implicit in that duty is the power to protect our Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means."
-To a certain extent a pretty stupid question, but a real one posed by the contradictions inherent in the global struggle. It all depends how one weighs up at this point in time (r)evolutionary possi-bilities in the core-and political activists relationship to such possibilities if they exist-and (r)evolutionary/anti-enclosure struggles in the Majority World.
+[668] A 19th century Supreme Court opinion was cited as having interpreted the word "laws" broadly to encompass not only statutes enacted by Congress, but also "the rights, duties, and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our international relations and all the protection implied by the nature of Government under the Constitution." [In Re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).]
-If we came to the conclusion that as a movement we were going nowhere yet were either in a position to: a) significantly aid an allied struggle with a better chance of success, orb) significantly decrease the level ofviolence visited on friends being drowned in blood; what would we do?
+[669] The latter power was said to relate "more particularly to the Executive's power to conduct foreign intelligence activities here and abroad." (Kevin Maroney testimony, "Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes," Hearings before the House Committee on Internal Security, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), pp. 3332-3335.) Mr. Maroney added:
+<br>
+<br>"We recognize the complexity and difficulty of adequately spelling out the FBI's authority and responsibility to conduct domestic intelligence-type investigations. The concept national security is admittedly a broad one, while the term subversive activities is even more difficult to define."
+<br>
+<br>Mr. Maroney also cited the following from the Supreme Court's opinion in the domestic security wiretapping case: "The gathering of security intelligence is often long-range and involves the interrelation of various sources and types of information. The exact targets of such surveillance may be more difficult to identify . . . Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity or the enhancement of the Government's preparedness for some possible future crisis or emergency. Thus, the focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than that directed against more conventional types of crime." [United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 21.97, 322 (1972).]
-Any really effective action might bring down a level of repression that our circles could not survive. Yet if serious action is not taken solely so as to avoid personal hardship (rather than for any real strategic reason) we are guilty of ‘posing as progressives’ while accommodating ourselves to power. It is worth here repeating the well-known quote by Black Panther Assata Shakur. Back in 1984 she said:
+[670] House Committee on Internal Security Hearings, 1974, pp. 3330-3331.
-<quote>
+[671] W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant Director for the Intelligence Division, Memorandum on the "Basis for FBI National Security Intelligence Investigations," 2/13/75.
-It is the obligation of every person who claims to oppose oppression to resist the oppressor by every means at his or her <em>disposal. Not to engage in physical resistance, armed resistance to oppression, is to serve the interests of the oppressor; no more, no less. There are no exceptions to the rule, no easy out...</em>
-</quote>
-In fact the question is not just one concerning armed resistance.[379] If non-violent action is actually effective (not merely symbolic) it too results in severe repression. At present a number of Animal Liberationists are in prison for waves of fire bombings that the ALF press office would correctly describe as non-violent. The repression that has followed each wave of action has been considerable. One could guarantee at least the same level of repression if ecological circles ever took the road of some solidarity movements in the past.
+[672] After several recent transformations, the policy of the Attorney General was established as authorizing warrantless surveillance "only when it is shown that its subjects are the active, conscious agents of foreign powers;" and this standard "is applied with particular stringency where the subjects are American citizens or permanent resident aliens." (Justice Department memorandum from Ron Carr, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, to Mike Shaheen, Counsel on Professional Responsibility, 2/26/76.)
-The guerrilla movements were crushed by state repression and internal dynamics. Jail and death was the fate of many of our forbears. I for one have no desire to join them but it is important that we look at their stories and think seriously about these issues. Sadly, it has to be said that in many ways the urban guerrillas never fully escaped the symbolic political terrain they had evolved in. Looking at their targets one sees again and again globally unimportant army bases, recruiting offices, and the like. Despite being very direct, their actions, with some notable exceptions, were rarely very targeted. Most of the armed action was relatively minor in scale and of course armies are designed to sustain and survive mass death and destruction. Attacks on key armaments factories for instance would have had considerably more on-the-ground effect in Vietnam.
+[673] In May 1975, for the first time in American history, the Department of Justice publicly asserted the power of the Executive Branch to conduct warrantless surreptitious entries unconnected with the use of electronic surveillance. This occurred in a letter to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia concerning an appeal by John Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman was appealing a conviction arising from the break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist after publication of the "Pentagon Papers" in 1971.
+<br>
+<br>The Justice Department's position was that "warrantless searches involving physical entries into private premises" can be "lawful under the Fourth Amendment" if they are "very carefully controlled:"
+<br>
+<br>"There must be solid reason to believe that foreign espionage or intelligence is involved. In addition, the intrusion into any zone of expected privacy must be kept to the minimum and there must he personal authorization by the President or the Attorney General." (Letter from John C. Kenney, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Hugh E. Cline. Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 5/9/75.)
-There are serious questions here about strategy, racism, symbolism, violence, the nature of sacrifice, and our position in the global slavery pyramid. These ideas have to be thought through, all the time rejecting both a cult of violence and an internalisation of passivity.
+[674] Rockefeller Commission Report.
-***** Immigrant Communities Within Rome
+[675] Levi, 12/11/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 316-317.
-The Terrorism Act which passed into law in 2000 was seen by many as part of a clampdown on the direct action scene. It is likely that some of its powers will to be used against us in the future, but as targets of the new legislation we are peripheral. The main targets are undeniably Irish Republicans and immigrant communities. The newly proscribed organisations are almost all British wings of Majority World organisations-mostly Communists or Islamists. This should come as no surprisestates have aways worried about immigrant communities becoming enemies within.[380]
+[676] Levi. 11/6/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 90.
-Until last century the individuals and institutions of Western power were largely out of reach to the far off peoples they massacred. With the growth of international travel and increased immigration into the core capitalist countries this is no longer the case. [This section was written before the attacks on the Pentagon and the WTC-1 deal with these in the box below. [see appendix 11.9.2001] Some of these organisations have been sending fighters to Majority World battles and carrying out attacks in the core. We may have sent footballers to Chiapas[381] but Islamists have been sending guerrillas to Yemen. No surprise who got proscribed.
+[677] Executive Order 11509, 2/19/76.
-Whether Islamic or Communist we should have no illusions about the authoritarian nature of many of these groups. It is hardly likely that anarcho-athiest types are likely to make common cause with religious nuts of any persuasion but there are often calls to build anti-imperialist unity with immigrant community commies.
+[678] Attorney General's Guidelines, "Domestic Security Investigations", "Whitehouse Personnel Security and Background Investigations", and "Reporting on Civil Disorders and Demonstrations Involving a Federal Interest", 3/10/76.
-The best example of a left-wing immigrant community is that of the Kurds. Kurdish groups here in Britain retain direct communication with their respective organisations both at home and throughout Europe. The demonstrations, occupations, and immolations in London-and throughout the Kurdish diaspora--that followed the trial of the leader of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) were highly co-ordinated. The Kurds have been very active in supporting struggles in Britain such as the Liverpool Dockers-taking part in marches and raising money. They have turned up en masse at two arms trade blockades and were some of the most up-for-it people on Mayday 2000 in London. In Germany there is a much larger Kurdish population and though the PKK has been proscribed for years, attacks on Turkish interests have continued. In fact the PKK remains one of the largest left-wing organisations in Germany.
+[679] S. 3197, introduced 3/23/76.
-Another good example is the Palestinians. The 1970s saw Palestinian organisations (chiefly the PFLP) carrying out attacks on targets in the core related to their struggle. While the level of at-tacks in the West by Palestinians has decreased, there are still reasonably regular outbreaks. As I write two Palestinians are serving time for bombings in London in 1994.[382]
+[680] The major questions posed by the President's Executive Order and the Attorney General's guidelines for the FBI are discussed in the recommendation section of this report, as are the problems with the national security electronic surveillance bill.
-On the face of it there is a good argument for working with these communities, but the case of the Kurds throws up important questions which are widely applicable. The PKK and its various offshoots and rivals are largely Stalinist parties whose political aim is in total contradiction to liberty and ecology. This reality can result in serious problems-here as well as in Kurdistan.
+[681] Levi Testimony, 12/11/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 345.
-A few years ago members of the London 5<sup>th</sup> of May Group (Turkish/Kurdish anarchist exiles) were threatened by a Kurdish Stalinist sect. Back in Turkey the same sect has murdered two an-archists, one on the streets and one in prison. Ironically the British wing of the same sect was appealing for solidarity for the PKK prisoners in their struggle against control units.
-Around the same time the flags of Turkish Stalinist parties were held aloft in Parliament Square on our Mayday 2000. If they had been held up by white English people I am sure our circles would have forced them down. The emblems of authoritarian socialism are the tombstones of libertarians past, present, and future. How would we feel if Turkish anarchists marched alongside the banners of a gang that had executed one of us?
+* III. Findings
-Anti-imperialist unity despite its seeming attractions can be worse than vacuous. It can mean unifying with priesthoods of new imperialisms. A true opposition to Empire requires us to choose those communities and organisations we organise with carefully.
+The Committee makes seven major findings. Each finding is accompanied by subfindings and by an elaboration which draws upon the evidentiary record set forth in our historical narrative (Part II herein) and in the thirteen detailed reports which will be published as supplements to this volume. We have sought to analyze in our findings characteristics shared by intelligence programs, practices which involved abuses, and general problems in the system which led to those abuses.
-This does not mean we should not practically engage in struggle alongside groups we are bitterly opposed to. During the march for the Liverpool Dockers it would have been ridiculous for us not to be part of the demo because it contained a contingent of Kurdish Stalinists-who were there in an inspiring show of genuine class solidarity. (As ridiculous as, say. refusing to take part in the Newbury Bypass protest because FoE is involved, with its pro-industrial stance.) However such unavoidable-contradictions arise largely within the realm of advancing (r)evolution at home (Task I). Here we are concerned with supporting rebellion beyond the core (Task IV).
+The findings treat the following themes that run through the facts revealed by our investigation of domestic intelligence activity: (A) Violating and Ignoring the Law; (B) Overbreadth of Domestic Intelligence Activity; (C) Excessive Use of Intrusive Techniques; (D) Using Covert Action to Disrupt and Discredit Domestic Groups; (E) Political Abuse of Intelligence Information; (F) Inadequate Controls on Dissemination and Retention; (G) Deficiencies in Control and Accountability.
-While the dynamics of (r)evolutionary struggle may decide our bedfellows for us, we can still decide who to actively support. Here I am talking about actions, money, resource sharing, and solidarity. Giving support to organisations here which stand in opposition to libertarian tendencies at home, (not to mention the interests of the people and planet!), is worse than nothing..
+Viewed separately, each finding demonstrates a serious problem in the conduct and control of domestic intelligence operations. Taken together, they make a compelling case for the necessity of change. Our recommendations (in Part IV) flow from this analysis and propose changes which the Committee believes to be appropriate in light of the record.
-Marxist authoritarian ideologies which are dying off throughout the core retain real power outside it. Radical immigrant communities reflect their political culture of origin, yet within many of these communities there will be libertarian and antiindustrial groups and individuals. It is our responsibility to seek them out and however we can help them aid their people and land.
+** A. Violating and Ignoring the Law
-***** Luddite Attacks on Evolving Elite Technology
+<center>
+MAJOR FINDING
+</center>
-Just as we should oppose the militarised arms of capital based here so to we must slow the evolution of new elite technologies (weaponry for the class war) being developed here. One of the major aims of genetic engineering is to purposefully destroy the social fabric that keeps the land community together and fully incorporate the peasantry into the global cash economy. The threat is neutralised and becomes fuel for the machine’s further expansion.
+The Committee finds that the domestic activities of the intelligence community at times violated specific statutory prohibitions and infringed the constitutional rights of American citizens.[1] The legal questions involved in intelligence programs were often not considered. On other occasions, they were intentionally disregarded in the belief that because the programs served the "national security" the law did not apply. While intelligence officers on occasion failed to disclose to their superiors programs which were illegal or of questionable legality, the Committee finds that the most serious breaches of duty were those of senior officials, who were responsible for controlling intelligence activities and generally failed to assure compliance with the law.
-GM sabotage throughout the world is growing. Here in Britain we can say that we have hindered the evolution of this technology considerably.
+<em>Subfindings</em>
-As the Luddites of today, we know that, given the continuation of this society, halting-forever-the development of new technological weaponry might not be possible. Even if we don’t succeed in stopping genetic engineering we have already slowed down the introduction of this technology. What this means in real terms is that we’ve succeeded in delaying the further degradation of the lives of millions of people. We have delayed for months, maybe years the ecological destruction, hunger, despair, and domestic abuse that social dislocation brings. If that is all we succeed in then we have achieved much.[383]
+(a) In its attempt to implement instructions to protect the security of the United States, the intelligence community engaged in some activities which violated statutory law and the constitutional rights of American citizens.
-By slowing technologies of enclosure we are defending the ability of Majority World peasant communities to rebel. More will suffer as a result of these enclosures than ever do in overt global policing operations/ imperialist wars. Effective action against GM and other elite technologies are direct attacks on empire’s power of expansion. Let’s keep at it.
+(b) Legal issues were often overlooked by many of the intelligence officers who directed these operations. Some held a pragmatic view of intelligence activities that did not regularly attach sufficient significance to questions of legality. The question raised was usually not whether a particular program was legal or ethical, but whether it worked.
-***** Smashing Up the Spectacle, Spectacularly!
+(c) On some occasions when agency officials did assume, or were told, that a program was illegal, they still permitted it to continue. They justified their conduct in some cases on the ground that the failure of "the enemy" to play by the rules granted them the right to do likewise, and in other cases on the ground that the "national security" permitted programs that would otherwise be illegal.
-The recent global resistance period has been hugely successful in building solidarity across borders and in supporting rebellions beyond the core. Radicals in every part of world have fought together on the PGA-called international days of action. This physical unity is immensely powerfol. Beyond direct communication the conflict on the streets has itself an important message, one that cannot be diluted by the forces of mediation.
+(d) Internal recognition of the illegality or the questionable legality of many of these activities frequently led to a tightening of security rather than to their termination. Partly to avoid exposure and a public "flap," knowledge of these programs was tightly held within the agencies, special filing procedures were used, and "cover stories" were devised.
-<quote>
+(e) On occasion, intelligence agencies failed to disclose candidly their programs and practices to their own General Counsels, and to Attorneys General, Presidents, and Congress.
-This is one important thing to remember about Genoa-because it was the GS summit, all the world’s media were there, and <em>the news and the images of the rioting will have been carried back to almostevery country in the world. The value of this, especially in much of the Third World is inestimable. Many people in other countries in the world imagine that everyone in the West lives a life of indolent luxury. Remember that Baywatch is the most popular</em> TV <em>programme in the world. This is the image that many people across the world have of life in the West. It is very valuable for them to see images of things they are familiar with-poor people fighting the police-taking place in the ‘rich’ West, leading them to see that the image they have been fed of the Western lifestyle is not all it’s cracked up to be and that maybe there are people like them in the Westfightingfor the same things they are fighting for. The riots in Genoa will send a message of hope to</em> people all over the world that right inside the belly of the beast there are thousands ofpeople who are against the system and <em>are prepared to risk their own life and liberty to fight it.[384]</em>
-</quote>
-For a moment Genoa’s burning barricades effectively monkeywrenched the global image factory that aims to haemorrhage the self worth ofpeoples in the Majority World, to make more malleable fodder for the global economy.
+(f) The internal inspection mechanisms of the CIA and the FBI did not keep -- and, in the case of the FBI, were not designed to keep -- the activities of those agencies within legal bounds. Their primary concern was efficiency, not legality or propriety.
-The environment created by the street at global conferences has also helped open up cracks in empire. The collapse ofthe Seattle-era WTO negotiations a good example. Another is the increased bargaining power the protest has given Majority World elites. They, like all of their global class are scum, but any action that opens up divisions in the global ruling class while bridging gaps between the global multitude is great.
+(g) When senior administration officials with a duty to control domestic intelligence activities knew, or had a basis for suspecting, that questionable activities had occurred, they often responded with silence or approval. In certain cases, they were presented with a partial description of a program but did not ask for details, thereby abdicating their responsibility. In other cases, they were fully aware of the nature of the practice and implicitly or explicitly approved it.
-***** Task Conclusion: There is No Rosy Picture
+<em>Elaboration of findings</em>
-While I tend towards believing libertarian social (r)evolution is extremely unlikely within the core, I don’t have a particularly rosy picture for the Majority World either.
+The elaboration which follows details the general finding of the Committee that inattention to -- and disregard of -- legal issues was an all too common occurrence in the intelligence community. While this section focuses on the actions and attitudes of intelligence officials and certain high policy officials, the Committee recognizes that a pattern of lawless activity does not result from the deeds of a single stratum of the government or of a few individuals alone. The implementation and continuation of illegal and questionable programs would not have been possible without the cooperation or tacit approval of people at all levels within and above the intelligence community, through many successive administrations.
-The combined factors of social dislocation, the spread of adolescent culture, the increasing dep-redation of the poor--especially of women, growing religious fundamentalism, bad health, agricultural crises, climate crises, the quickening internalisation of all into the global economy, the continuing survival of authoritarian ideologies-Marxism and nationalism in particular and most of all the unparalleled disparity in any capacity for force between the Core and its colonial multitudes; all these factors lead to a pretty horrific future for the majority of the worlds population.
+The agents in the field, for their part, rarely questioned the orders they received. Their often uncertain knowledge of the law, coupled with the natural desire to please one's superiors and with simple bureaucratic momentum, clearly contributed to their willingness to participate in illegal and questionable programs. The absence of any prosecutions for law violations by intelligence agents inevitably affected their attitudes as well. Under pressure from above to accomplish their assigned tasks, and without the realistic threat of prosecution to remind them of their legal obligations, it is understandable that these agents frequently acted without concern for issues of law and at times assumed that normal legal restraints and prohibitions did not apply to their activities.
-Presently the oppressed throughout the world are hamstrung, how long this will remain one cannot say. However there is no point in being absolutist. Just because the arrival of global freedom has been (maybe terminally) delayed does not mean that action is without purpose. By supporting ecological and libertarian rebellions and anti-enclosure struggles we aid the opening up of local freedoms and slow the devastation of the earth..
+Significantly, those officials at the highest levels of government, who had a duty to control the activities of the intelligence community, sometimes set in motion the very forces that permitted lawlessness to occur -- even if every act committed by intelligence agencies was not known to them. By demanding results without carefully limiting the means by which the results were achieved; by over-emphasizing the threats to national security without ensuring sensitivity to the rights of American citizens; and by propounding concepts such as the right of the "sovereign" to break the law, ultimate responsibility for the consequent climate of permissiveness should be placed at their door.[2]
-***** Conclusion: Fires in the Night
+<em>Subfinding (a)</em>
-I hope the conclusion to this pre-history and future strategy will not be written in words-but in action.
+In its attempt to implement instructions to protect the security of the United States, the intelligence community engaged in some activities which violated statutory law and the constitutional rights of American citizens.
-I went to a funeral. An ending, but it felt like a beginning. Old Mick was a veteran squatter, rebel and thief. His most successful heist was the reclaiming of his life from those bosses andjailers who think they own us. For decades he lived in the gaps. No one made him into a wageslave. No dropout, he fought. He was no saint, but if ever there was a temporary autonomous zone, Mick was it.
+From 1940 to 1973, the CIA and the FBI engaged in twelve covert mail opening programs in violation of Sections 1701-1703 of Title 18 of the United States Code which prohibit the obstruction, interception, or opening of mail. Both of these agencies also engaged in warrantless "surreptitious entries" -- break-ins -- against American citizens within the United States in apparent violation of state laws prohibiting trespass and burglary. Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 was violated by NSA's program for obtaining millions of telegrams of Americans unrelated to foreign targets and by the Army Security Agency's interception of domestic radio communications.
-His funeral was one of the best actions I have ever been on. Mick wanted to burn in Lyminge Forest, a large part of which was saved from destruction by direct action. Funeral pyres are ille-gal, death rights have to be sanctioned by the state. Mick wasn’t going to take that, neither were his mates.
+All of these activities, as well as the FBI's use of electronic surveillance without a substantial national security predicate, also infringed the rights of countless Americans under the Fourth Amendment protection "against unreasonable searches and seizures."
-Thanks to a snitch the cops had got wind of the plan and a decoy was arranged to throw them off the scent. Meet up points were organised, phones rung. From all over the country vehicles arrived at the secret destination, appropriately marked Covert Woods on the OS map. Over a hundred were gathered. Ten foot the pyre of stolen wood rose, Mick’s coffin astride. Night came. Fireworks shot into the sky. Crackling fire, we saw Mick’s bones burn, back to the earth. For hours he burned. Some were lairy, some were silent. All of us knew that despite the petty daily bother, we were tribe and on the pyre was one of our elders.
+The abusive techniques used by the FBI in COINTELPRO from 1956 to 1971 included violations of both federal and state statutes prohibiting mail fraud, wire fraud, incitement to violence, sending obscene material through the mail, and extortion. More fundamentally, the harassment of innocent citizens engaged in lawful forms of political expression did serious injury to the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and the right of the people to assemble peaceably and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. The Bureau's maintenance of the Security Index, which targeted thousands of American citizens for detention in the event of national emergency, clearly overstepped the permissible bounds established by Congress in the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 and represented, in contravention of the Act, a potential general suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus secured by Article 1, Section 9, of the Constitution.
-Away from the roads, fearful in the dark-authority crept. The cops knew they had no power here. In the woods, a short confrontation. We were many, they were few. Behind our line-a fire. They listed their petty rules. Illegal gathering. Illegal land occupation. Not to mention illegal funeral. But they could do nothing. Just then a track on the sound system announced with base certainty: Ihe day belongs to Ihe Man, but we shall control the night.
+A distressing number of the programs and techniques developed by the intelligence community involved transgressions against human decency that were no less serious than any technical violations of law. Some of the most fundamental values of this society were threatened by activities such as the smear campaign against Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the testing of dangerous drugs on unsuspecting American citizens, the dissemination of information about the sex lives, drinking habits, and marital problems of electronic surveillance targets, and the COINTELPRO attempts to turn dissident organizations against one another and to destroy marriages.
-***** Be the Spark
+<em>Subfinding (b)</em>
-When we step out of legality, when we are masked by the night, when we become the earth, we are unconquerable.
+Legal issues were often overlooked by many of the intelligence officers who directed these operations. Some held a pragmatic view of intelligence activities that did not regularly attach sufficient significance to questions of legality. The question raised was usually not whether a particular program was legal or ethical, but whether it worked.
-These moments of collective power, of togetherness and tribe, are not limited to those times we mass together. In the dark in different places, different times, our sparks join together as one fire. Many of us will never meet each other; all the better, we’ll still be one-but those who want to extinguish our flames will find it all the more difl cult.
+Legal issues were clearly not a primary consideration -- if they were a consideration at all -in many of the programs and techniques of the intelligence community. When the former head of the FBI's Racial Intelligence Section was asked whether anybody in the FBI at any time during the 15-year course of COINTELPRO discussed its constitutionality or legal authority for example, he replied: "No, we never gave it a thought."[3] This attitude is echoed by other Bureau officials in connection with other programs. The former Section Chief of one of the FBI's Counterintelligence sections, and the former Assistant Director of the Bureau's Domestic Intelligence Division both testified that legal considerations were simply not raised in policy decisions concerning the FBI's mail opening programs.[4] Similarly, when the FBI was presented with the opportunity to assume responsibility for the CIA's New York mail opening operation, legal factors played no role in the Bureau's refusal; rather, the opportunity was declined simply because of the attendant expense, manpower requirements, and security problems.[5]
-Sun Tzu counselled that even under attack an enemy will only fall through its own mistakes and weakness. The key to victory is not so much to defeat one’s enemy, instead it is to make oneself undefeatable.
+One of the most abusive of all FBI programs was its attempt to discredit Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Yet former FBI Assistant Director William C. Sullivan testified that he "never heard anyone raise the question of legality or constitutionality, never."[6]
-lhis is true for our aim, objectives and form. In a sense it is the depth of our victory which is at stake; as victory, given our aim, is not in question. For we know one thing; civilisation is temporary, an aberration. lhe class war is vicious-but there can be only one winner, the wild. We aim to shorten civilisation’s rule, to hamstring its tyranny, to lessen its damage. How far we succeed will in large part depend on which objectives we set and which forms we grow.
+Former Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms testified publicly that he never seriously questioned the legal status of the twenty-year CIA New York mail opening project because he assumed his predecessor, Allen Dulles, had "made his legal peace with [it]."[7]
-Of course our networks have not come out of nowhere, but have evolved within struggle. Many of what others see as our weaknesses, are our greatest strengths-with us thanks to a rejection of past mistakes. Our tactics are pretty direct, our immediate objectives usually achievable, our forms relatively autonomous.
+"... [F]rom time to time," he said, "the Agency got useful information out of it,"[8] so he permitted it to continue throughout his sevenyear tenure as Director.
-As the corporations and states grow ever more powerful they know they can win any ‘symmet-rical conflict’. What the strategists of authority view with horror is the potential ‘network power’ of increasingly direct, decentralised, oppositional movements. Their nightmare, our dream; but to reach our potential we must go far beyond ourselves.
+The Huston Plan that was prepared for President Richard Nixon in June 1970 constituted a virtual charter for the use of intrusive and illegal techniques against American dissidents as well as foreign agents. Its principal author has testified, however, that during the drafting sessions with representatives of the FBI, CIA, NSA, and Defense Intelligence Agency, no one ever objected to any of the recommendations on the grounds that they involved illegal acts, nor was the legality or constitutionality of any of the recommendations ever discussed.[9]
-Our strength is in our ability to take action and by doing so inspire olhers to take action. Nol mass growth but cellular growth.
+William C. Sullivan, who participated in the drafting of the Huston Plan and served on the United States Intelligence Board and as FBI Assistant Director for Intelligence for 10 years, stated that in his entire experience in the intelligence community he never heard legal issues raised at all:
-Rooting ourselves in the soil and the future, with keen strategy and an ever more tangible-but less visible-combative edge, we can get far stronger.
+We never gave any thought to this realm of reasoning, because we were just naturally pragmatists. The one thing we were concerned about was this: Will this course of action work, will it get us what we want, will we reach the objective that we desire to reach? As far as legality is concerned, morals, or ethics, [it] was never raised by myself or anybody else ... I think this suggests really in government that we are amoral. In government -- I am not speaking for everybody -- the general atmosphere is one of amorality.[10]
-Our tribes, our counter cultures will grow. We’ll prepare for the fight. No prostituting ourselves to the media, we’ll grow in the shadows, but strike when needed. New technologies will attempt to track us, we’ll have to evolve to throw them off the scent. Some of the old techniques will have to be , abandoned, others picked up. No faces. No names. No Compromise.
+<em>Subfinding (c)</em>
-For over a decade many on this island have fought for the earth. Yet if we are going to truly defect we will have to struggle harder, think quicker and live wilder. lhe long trek back to the earth and each other is only beginning. In writing this I merely hope to aid our navigation. Part One showed where we came from. Part Two pointed a few routes to the future. The four tasks are huge; yet with sensible objective-led thinking, luck and hard will, they are perfectly realisable.
+On some occasions when agency officials did assume, or were told, that a program was illegal, they still permitted it to continue. They justified their conduct in some cases on the ground that the failure of "the enemy" to play by the rules granted them the right to do likewise, and in other cases on the ground that the "national security" permitted programs that would otherwise be illegal.
-<br>Imagine the machines, the pylons, the factories, the labs, the tanks-broken by you.
-<br>Imagine the wind, the sun, the beautiful moments-lived by you.
-Down with the Empire! Up with the Spring!
+Even when agency officials recognized certain programs or techniques to be illegal, they sometimes advocated their implementation or permitted them to continue nonetheless.
-<quote>
+This point is illustrated by a passage in a 1954 memorandum from an FBI Assistant Director to J. Edgar Hoover, which recommended that an electronic listening device be planted in the hotel room of a suspected Communist sympathizer: "Although such an installation will not be legal, it is believed that the intelligence information to be obtained will make such an installation necessary and desirable."[11] Hoover approved the installation.[12]
-<em>Whatever you can do, or dream you can-begin it.</em>
-<br><em>Boldness has genius, power, and magic in it.</em>
-<br><em>Begin it now.</em>
-<right>
+More than a decade later, a memorandum was sent to Director Hoover which described the current FBI policy and procedures for "black bag jobs" (warrantless break-ins for purposes other than microphone installation). This memorandum read in part:
---Goethe
-</right>
+Such a technique involves trespass and is clearly illegal; therefore, it would be impossible to obtain any legal sanction for it. Despite this, "black bag" jobs have been used because they represent an invaluable technique in combatting subversive activities . . . aimed directly at undermining and destroying our nation.[13]
-</quote>
+In other words, breaking the law was seen as useful in combating those who threatened the legal fabric of society. Although Hoover terminated the general use of "black bag jobs" in July 1966, they were employed on a large scale before that time and have been used in isolated instances since then.
+Another example of disregard for the law is found in a 1969 memorandum from William C.
+Sullivan to Director Hoover. In June of that year, Sullivan was requested by the Director, apparently at the urging of White House officials to travel to France for the purpose of electronically monitoring the conversations of journalist Joseph Kraft.[14] With the cooperation of local authorities, Sullivan was able to have a microphone installed in Kraft's hotel room, and informed Hoover of his success. "Parenthetically," he wrote in his letter to the Director, "I might add that such a cover is regarded as illegal."[15]
+The attitude that legal standards and issues of privacy can be overridden by other factors is further reflected in a memorandum written by Richard Helms in connection with the testing of dangerous drugs on unsuspecting American citizens in 1963. Mr. Helms wrote the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence:
+While I share your uneasiness and distaste for any program which tends to intrude on an individual's private and legal prerogatives, I believe it is necessary that the Agency maintain a central role in this activity, keep current on enemy capabilities in the manipulation of human behavior, and maintain an offensive capability. I, therefore, recommend your approval for continuation of this testimony program . . .[15]
+The history of the CIA's New York mail opening program is replete with examples of conscious contravention of the law. The original proposal for large-scale mail opening in 1955, for instance, explicitly recognized that "[t]here is no overt, authorized or legal censorship or monitoring of first class mails which enter, depart or transit the United States at the present time."[16] A 1962 memorandum on the project noted that its exposure could "give rise to grave charges of criminal misuse of the mails by Government agencies" and that "existing Federal statutes preclude the concoction of any legal excuse for the violation . . .[17] And again in 1963, a CIA officer wrote: "There is no legal basis for monitoring postal communications in the United States except during time of war or national emergency . . ."[18]
+Both the former Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff and the former Director of Security - - who were in charge of the New York project -- testified that they believed it to be illegal.[19] One Inspector General who reviewed the project in 1969 also flatly stated: "[O]f course, we knew that this was illegal. [E]verybody knew that it was [illegal] ..."[20]
+In spite of the general recognition of its illegality, the New York mail opening project continued for a total of 20 years and was not terminated until 1973, when the Watergate- created political climate had increased the risks of exposure.[21]
+With the full knowledge of J. Edgar Hoover, moreover, the FBI continued to receive the fruits of this project for three years after the FBI Director informed the President of the United States that "the FBI is opposed to implementing any covert mail coverage because it is clearly illegal ..."[22] The Bureau's own mail opening programs had been terminated in 1966, but it continued intentionally and knowingly to benefit from the illegal acts of the CIA until 1973.
+The Huston Plan is another disturbing reminder of the fact that intelligence programs and techniques may be advocated and authorized with the knowledge that they are illegal. At least two of the options that were presented to President Nixon were described as unlawful on the face of the Report. Of "covert mail coverage" (mail opening) it was written that "[t] his coverage, not having the sanction of law, runs the risk of any illicit act magnified by the involvement of a Government agency."[23] The Report also noted that surreptitious entry "involves illegal entry and trespass."[24] Thus, the intelligence community presented the nation's highest executive official with the option of approving courses of action described as illegal. The fact that President Nixon did authorize them, even if only for five days, is more disquieting still.[25]
+When President Nixon eventually revoked his approval of the Huston Plan, the intelligence community nevertheless proceded to initiate some programs suggested in the Plan. Intelligence agencies also continued to employ techniques recommended in the Plan, such as mail opening which had been used previously without presidential approval.[26]
+The recent history of Army intelligence provides an additional example of continuing an activity described as illegal. Beginning in 1967, the Army Security Agency monitored the radio communications of amateur radio operators in this country to determine if dissident elements planned disruptive activity at particular demonstrations and events. Because Army officials questioned whether such monitoring was legal under Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, they requested a legal opinion from the Federal Communications Commission. At a meeting held in August 1968, the FCC advised the Army that such monitoring was illegal under the Act. FCC representatives also stated that the matter had been raised with Attorney General Ramsey Clark and that he had disapproved the program.[27] The FCC agreed, however, to submit a written reply to the Army, stating only that it could not "Provide a positive answer to the Army's proposal."[28]
+Despite having been told that their monitoring activity was illegal, and that the Attorney General himself disapproved it, the Army Security Agency continued to monitor the radio communications of American citizens for another two years.[29]
+Several factors may explain the intelligence community's frequent disregard of legal issues.
+Some intelligence officials expressed the view that the legal and ethical restraints that applied to the rest of society simply did not apply to intelligence activities. This concept is reflected in a 1959 memorandum on the Army's covert drug testing program: "In intelligence, the stakes involved and the interest of national security may permit a more tolerant interpretation of moral-ethical values . . ."[30]
+As William C. Sullivan also pointed out, many intelligence officers had been imbued with a "war psychology." "Legality was not questioned," he said. "it was not an issue."[31] In war, one simply did what was "expected to do as a soldier."[32] "It was my assumption," said one FBI official connected with the Bureau's mail opening programs, "that what we were doing was justified by what we had to do."[33] Since the "enemy" did not play by the rules, moreover, intelligence officials often believed they could not afford to do so either.[34]
+One FBI intelligence officer appeared to attribute the disregard of the law in the Bureau's C0INTELPRO operations to simple restlessness on the part of "action-oriented" FBI agents. George C. Moore, the Racial Intelligence Section Chief, testified that:
+... the FBI's counterintelligence program came up because if you have anything in the FBI, you have an action oriented group of people who see something happening and want to do something to take its place.[35][36]
+Others in the intelligence community have contended that questionable and illegal acts were justified by a law higher than the United States Code or the Constitution. An FBI Counterintelligence Section Chief, for example, stated the following reason for believing in the necessity of techniques such as mail opening:
+The greater good, the national security, this is correct. This is what I believed in. Why I thought these programs were good, it was that the national security required this, this is correct.[37]
+Similarly, when intelligence officials secured the cooperation of telegraph company executives for Project SHAMROCK, in which NSA received millions of copies of international telegraph messages without the sender's knowledge, they assured the executives that they would not be subjected to criminal liability because the project was "in the highest interests of the nation."[38]
+Perhaps the most novel reason for advocating illegal action was proffered by Tom Charles Huston. Huston explained that he believed the real threat to internal security was potential repression by right-wing forces within the United States. He argued that the "New Left" was capable of producing a climate of fear that would bring forth every repressive demagogue in the country. Huston believed that the intelligence professionals, if given the chance, could protect the people from the latent forces of repression by monitoring the New Left, including by illegal means.[39] Illegal action directed against the New Left, in other words, should be used by the Government to forestall potential repression by the Right.
+In attempting to explain why illegal activities were advocated and defended, the impact of the attitudes and actions of government officials in supervisory positions -- Presidents, Cabinet officers, and Congressmen -- should not be discounted. Their occasional endorsement of such activities, as well as the atmosphere of permissiveness created by their emphasis on national security and their demands for results, clearly contributed to the notion that strict adherence to the law was unimportant. So, too, did the concept, propounded by some senior officials, that a "sovereign" president may authorize violations of the law.
-*** Appendix: Love’s Labours Lost
+Whatever the reasons, however, it is clear that a number of intelligence officers acted in knowing contravention of the law.
-In Britain-birth place of industry-the transitional class came much earlier than elsewhere. Defeated in a bitter class struggle Britain’s poor had internalised industrial logic and embraced social democratic ideas even in the midst of continuing struggle. The working class (under signif-icant influence from marxist socialists) created the hopelessly reformist Labour movement which in turn institutionalised the culture of working class mutual aid in the welfare state.
+<em>Subfinding (d)</em>
-Thus whereas Spanish working class solidarity grew anarchist (r)cvolution and the CNT, British working class solidarity produced the welfare state and the Labour Party. The post war ‘triumph’ of the labour movement and the founding of the welfare state was the near total subsumption of the working class by the state, not the other way round as lefties choose to believe.
+Internal recognition of the illegality or questionable legality of many of these activities frequently led to a tightening of security rather than to their termination. Partly to avoid exposure and a public "flap," knowledge of these programs was tightly held within the agencies, special filing procedures were used, and "cover stories" were devised.
-The welfare state produced a security for capitalism which enabled it to set out on a period of expansion such as had not been seen since the exuberance of the early nineteenth century. An expansion which is bringing life to the brink.
+When intelligence agencies realized that certain programs and techniques were of questionable legality, they frequently took special security precautions to avoid public exposure, criticism, and embarrassment. The CIA's study of student unrest throughout the world in the late 1960s, for example, included a section on student dissent in the United States, an area that was clearly outside the Agency's statutory charter. DCI's Richard Helms urged the President's national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, to treat it with extreme sensivity in light of the acknowledged jurisdictional violation:
-The intergenerational culture of the British labour movement has now been destroyed over the last 20 years or so by Thatcherism/ Neoliberalism. With the decimation ofheavy industry and the restructuring of the economy most of the old strongholds of the British workers movement no longer exist-e.g. mining, shipbuilding, the docks, and the nationalised industries.
+"Herewith is a survey of student dissidence world-wide as requested by the President. In an effort to round out our discussion of this subject, we have included a section on American students. This is an area not within the charter of this Agency, so I need not emphasize how extremely sensitive this makes the paper. Should anyone learn of its existence, it would prove most embarrassing for all concerned."[40]
-**** The Mediterranean Hotspot
+Concern for the FBI's public image prompted security measures which Protected numerous questionable activities. For example, in approving or denying COINTELPRO proposals, many of which were clearly illegal, a main consideration was preventing "embarrassment to the Bureau.[41] A characteristic caution to FBI agents appears in the letter which initiated the COINTELPRO against "Black Nationalists":
-This huge hotspot stretches from Portugal to Jordan and from the Canary Islands to Northern Italy. It encompasses all of Cyprus and over 903 of Greece, Lebanon, and Portugal. though less than 103 of France, Algeria, and Libya. In Spain, 6,000 of the country’s 7,500 plant species occur within the Mediterranean climate zone, in Israel 1,500 out of 2,200, and in Morocco 3,800 out of 4,200.
+You are also cautioned that the nature of this new endeavor is such that under no circumstances should the existence of the program be made known outside the Bureau and appropriate within-office security should be afforded to sensitive operations and techniques considered under the program.
-The flora of the Mediterranean Basin includes 25,000 species of vascular plants, 13,000 ofwhich are endemic. This figure is very high when compared to the 6,000 species of non-Mediterranean Europe in an area nearly four times as large. It is also the third highest of all the hotspots, being surpassed only by the Tropical Andes and Sundaland.
+Examples of attention to such security are that anonymous letters had to be written on commercially purchased stationery; newsmen had to be so completely trustworthy that they were guaranteed not to reveal the Bureau's interest; and inquiries of law enforcement officials had to be made under the pretext of a criminal investigation. A similar preoccupation with security measures for improper activities affected both the NSA and the Army Security Agency.
-The Basin’s violent geographical history has produced an unusual geographical and topographical diversity, with high mountain ranges, peninsulas, and one of the largest archipelagos in the world. The Mediterranean Sea includes several hundred islands.
+NSA's guidelines for its watch list activity provided that NSA's name should not be on any of the disseminated watch list material involving Americans. The aim was to "restrict the knowledge that such information is being collected and processed" by NSA.[43]
-In mammal and bird faunas endemism is moderate, at 253 and 143. The reptile and amphibian faunas on the other hand, have levels of endemism of 613 and 523.
+The Army Security Agency's radio monitoring activity, which continued even after the Army was told that the FCC and the Attorney General regarded it as illegal, also had to be conducted in secrecy if a public outcry was to be avoided. When Army officials decided to permit radio monitoring in connection with the military's Civil Disturbance Collection Plan, their instruction provided that all ASA personnel had to be "disguised" either in civilian clothes or as members of regular military Units.[44]
-The typical and most widespread vegetation type is a hard-leafed shrubland dominated by evergreens. Shrublands, including maquis and the aromatic, soft-leafed and drought deciduous phrygana, have persisted throughout the Q!,iaternary in the semiarid, lowland, and coastal regions of the Basin. However, prior to the onset of significant human impact, which started some 8,000 years ago, most of the Mediterranean Basin was covered by some form of forest, including evergreen oak forests, deciduous forests, and conifer forests.
+The perceived illegality -- and consequent "flap potential" -- of the CIA's New York mail opening project led Agency officials to formulate a drastic strategy to follow in the event of public exposure. A review of the project by the Inspector General's Office in the early 1960s concluded that it would be desirable to fabricate a "cover story." A formal recommendation was therefore made that "[a]n emergency plan and cover story be prepared for the possibility that the operation might be blown."[45] In response to this recommendation, the Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff agreed that "a 'flap' will put us 'out of business' immediately and may give rise to grave charges of criminal misuse of the mails by government agencies," but he argued:
-Endemics are concentrated on islands, peninsulas, rocky cliffs, and mountain peaks. The principal foci in the Mediterranean are 10 smaller “mini-hotspots within the larger hotspot:’ These 10 are areas in which unusual amounts of original vegetation still survive and where many of the endemic species hang on, albeit several threatened. These areas cover about 153 of the Basin’s total area, yet account for almost 4,800 endemics, or 373 of the total tally. Clearly, these are priority sites for conservation of these plant components of Mediterranean biodiversity.
+Since no good purpose can be served by an official admission of the violation, and existing Federal statutes preclude the concoction of any legal excuse for the violation, it must be recognized that no cover story is available to any Government Agency. Therefore, it is important that all Federal law enforcement and US Intelligence Agencies vigorously deny any association, direct or indirect, with any such activity as charged.... Unless the charge is supported by the presentation of interior items from the Project, it should be relatively easy to "hush up" the entire affair, or to explain that it consists of legal mail cover activities conducted by the Post Office at the request of authorized Federal agencies. Under the most unfavorable circumstances ... it might be necessary after the matter has cooled off during an extended period of investigation, to find a scapegoat to blame for unauthorized tampering with the mails. Such cases by their very nature do not have much appeal to the imagination of the public, and this would he an effective way to resolve the initial charge of censorship of the mails.[46]
-Diversity and endemism among Mediterranean Basin vertebrates is much lower than for plants. The present number ofland mammals in the region is about 184, of which 46 (253) are endemic. During the Holocene, but especially in the last few thousand years, many of the larger mammals became extinct because of aridification, habitat alteration, and persecution. ‘Ille earliest victims included some spectacular species like dwarf hippopotamuses and elephants on some islands. These were followed by other large mammals, including the African elephant, wild ass, scimitar-horned oryx, northern hartebeest, and lion. Still others are so severely depleted as to be on the verge of extinction, among them the brown bear, leopard, and Mediterranean monk seal.
+This strategy of complete denial and transferring blame to a scapegoat was approved by the Director of Security in February 1962.[47]
-The region’s avifauna includes about 345 breeding species of which only 47 (143) are endemic. A few small portions of the Mediterranean Basin also appear as priorities in Bird Life International’s recent global analysis of Endemic Bird Areas (EB As). These are Cyprus, with two bird species confined to that EBA, and Madeira and the Canary Islands, with nine species, eight of them confined to the EBA, and one species, the Canary Islands oystercatcher already extinct.
+Another extreme example of a security measure that was adopted because of the threat that illegal activity might be exposed was the outright destruction of files.
-Endemism is much better developed in reptiles, with 179 species, 110 (613) of which are endemic, and amphibians, with 62 species, 32 (523) ofwhich are endemic. Reptile diversity is highest in the drier, eastern and North African parts of the Basin, whereas the opposite is true of amphibians. For both groups, the Mediterranean Basin is an important centre of diversity and endemism for some families.
+The FBI developed a special filing system -- or, more accurately, a destruction system -- for memoranda written about illegal techniques, such as break-ins,[48] and highly questionable operations, such as the microphone surveillance of Joseph Kraft.[49] Under this system -which was referred to as the "DO NOT FILE" procedure -- authorizing documents and other memoranda were filed in special safes at headquarters and field offices until the next annual inspection by the Inspection Division, at which time they were to be systematically destroyed.[50]
-As is the case for the other hotspots, much less is known about the invertebrate fauna. One of the exceptions are the insect pollinators, which have been relatively well-studied as a group. The dominant pollinators are bees, with an estimated 3,000–4,000 species.
+<em>Subfinding (e)</em>
-**** Flagship Species
+On occasion, intelligence agencies failed to disclose candidly programs and practices to their own General Counsels, and to Attorney Generals, Presidents, and Congress.
-The Mediterranean Basin is characterised more by its plants than its animals. Among the interest-ing plants are the cedars: one endemic to Cyprus and represented only by a very small relic popu-lation; another, fairly abundant in Morocco and Algeria but experiencing very rapid depletion by timber cutters; and a third. the famous Lebanon cedar, mentioned below, hangs on in Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey. Another interesting endemic flagship species is the only palm tree native to the Basin, found exclusively in a tiny corner of Crete and on the Datca peninsula in Turkey, where it is threatened by tourist development.
+<em>(i)</em> <em>Concealment from Executive Branch Officials</em>
-A number of animals qualify as flagship species as well. Particularly noteworthy are the ‘Mediter-ranean’ tortoises, four in number. Among the endemic mammals, there are several standouts as well. The Barbary macaque is now found in relatively small and disjunct habitat pockets in the Rif, Loyen, and Haut Atlas mountain ranges of Morocco, and in the Chiffa, Petite, and Grande Kabylies mountain ranges of Algeria, with a small, well-known population on Gibraltar that lives in a free-ranging state but is provisioned. It is believed that the Gibraltar macaques were present since early times, but have been sporadically replenished by imports from Morocco. The Gibraltar macaques are now the only free-living nonhuman primates in Europe.
+Intelligence officers frequently concealed or misrepresented illegal activities to their own General Counsel and superiors within and outside the agencies in order to protect these activities from exposure.
-The Barbary deer is confined to a small area of cork oak and pine forest on the border between Algeria and Tunisia. The population is down to only a few hundred individuals, including those in captivity in both countries. The Corsican red deer is considered extinct in Corsica, and is now found only in three mountainous areas near the southern coast of Sardinia. The total population is only about 200.
+For example, during the entire 20-year history of the CIA's mail opening project, the Agency's General Counsel was never informed of its existence. According to one Agency official, this knowledge was purposefully kept from him. Former Inspector General Gordon Stewart testified:
-The Mediterranean monk seal, though primarily a marine species, does use coastal beaches and has long been an important symbol. It was once distributed throughout the Mediterranean, the Northwest coast of Africa, and the Black Sea. Today, the approximate 400 animals that still survive have been pushed to isolated spots in Turkey, Greece, the Atlantic coast of Morocco, Mauritania, Sardinia, Algeria, and Madeira.
+Well, I am sure that it was held back from [the General Counsel] on purpose. An operation of this sort in the CIA is run -- if it is closely held, it is run by those people immediately concerned, and to the extent that it is really possible, according to the practices that we had in the fifties and sixties, those persons not immediately concerned were supposed to be ignorant of it.[51]
-Remnant populations of other once wide-ranging mamals include the brown bear, which still hangs on in the mountains of Spain, France, Italy, Greece, and some of the Balkan countries, and two subspecies ofthe leopard, the North African leopard and the Anatolian leopard, both of which are considered critically endangered.
+The evidence also indicates that two Directors of Central Intelligence under whom the New York mail operations continued -- John McCone and Admiral Raborn-- were never informed of its existence.[52] In 1954, Postmaster General Arthur Summerfield was informed that the CIA operated a mail cover project in New York, but be was not told that the Agency opened or intended to open any mail.[53] In 1965, the CIA briefly considered informing Postmaster General John A. Gronouski about the project when its existence was felt to be jeopardized by a congressional subcommittee that was investigating the use of mail covers and other investigative techniques by federal agencies. According to an internal memorandum, however, the idea was quickly rejected "in view of various statements by Gronouski before this subcommittee."[54] Since Gronouski had agreed with the subcommittee that tighter administrative controls on mail covers were necessary and generally supported the principle of the sanctity of the mail, it is reasonable to infer that CIA officials assumed he would not be sympathetic to the technique of mail opening.[55]
-**** Threats
+The only claim that any President may have known about the project was made by Richard Helms, who testified that "there was a possibility" that he "mentioned" it to President Lyndon Johnson in 1967 or 1968.[56] No documentary evidence is available that either supports or refutes this statement. During the preparation of the Huston Plan, neither CIA nor FBI representatives informed Tom Charles Huston, President Nixon's representative, that the mail opening project existed. The final interagency report on the Huston Plan signed by Richard Helms and J. Edgar Hoover, was sent to the President with the statement, contrary to fact, that all mail opening programs by federal agencies had been discontinued.[57]
-The present human population of the Mediterranean Basin is some 300 million, although population pressures have existed for millennia. Indeed, there is no other region in the world where the development of ecosystems has been intimately associated with human social systems for so long. The region has been home to sizeable human settlements for well over two millennia and significant human activity for another six millennia (there was a large town in Turkey 8,400 years ago!). In Roman times, the more fertile parts of Tunisia and Algeria-Rome’s bread basket-were laid waste through agricultural overuse, and the historian Pliny warned the ancient Greeks of the damages of deforestation. In Lebanon, the uplands were once covered with stately cedars whose height, strength, and utility became legendary throughout the Old World. Felling of the trees started as early as 3,000 BC, when the Phoenicians began a lucrative trade in cedarwood with the Egyptian Pharaohs and King Solomon, among others. Now the Lebanon highlands have lost most of their trees, and the cedar is a threatened species.
+In connection with another CIA mail opening Project, middle-level Agency officials apparently did not even tell their own superiors within the CIA that they intended to open mail, as opposed to merely inspecting envelope exteriors. The ranking officials testified that they approved the project believing it to be a mail cover program only.[58] No Cabinet officials or President knew of this project and the approval of the Deputy Chief Postal Inspector (for what he also believed to be a mail cover operation) was secured through conscious deception.[59]
-The impact ofthis long history of human assault on Mediterranean ecosystems has been huge. Perhaps the most severe transformation has been the conversion of forests, especially primeval deciduous forests, to agricultural lands, evergreen woodlands, and maquis. The first significant deforestation began as early as 8,000 BC, and increased dramatically at the end of the Neolithic. Each wave of civilisation created new pressures on the forests, culminating in the rapid human population growth and widespread increase in mechanised agriculture of the present century.
+A pattern of concealment was repeated by the FBI in their mail opening programs. There is no claim by the Bureau that any Postmaster General, Attorney General, or President was ever advised of the true nature and scope of its mail projects. One FBI official testified that it was an unofficial Bureau policy not to inform postal officials with whom they dealt of the actual intention of FBI agents in receiving the mail, and there is no indication that this policy was ever violated.[60] At one point in 1965, Assistant Director Alan Belmont and Inspector Donald Moore apparently informed Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach that FBI agents received custody of the mail in connection with espionage cases on some occasions.[61] But Moore testified that the Attorney General was not told that mail was actually opened. When asked if he felt any need to hold back from Katzenbach the fact of mail openings as opposed to the fact that Bureau agents received direct access to the mail, Moore replied:
-A crucial factor is fragmentation. The original vegetation has been reduced to only small patches today. This is hardly more than to be expected of a region that has been heavily settled for over 2,000 years, longer than any other hotspot. While some vegetation fragments still total several hundred square kilometres, many are less than 100 km<sup>2</sup>, a few are 10km<sup>2</sup> at most, and one or two are down to a final handful of hectares. Equally significant are many of the 13,000 endemic plant species, that are narrow endemic, confined to unusually small areas. This makes them exceptionally susceptible to threats such as expanding farming, overgrazing by domestic stock, and spread of urban communities. Indeed, probably more species have already been driven to extinction in this hotspot than virtually any other, some species having been eliminated many centuries ago, totalling probably hundreds of plant species alone. As for threatened species, the total for plants is put as high as one half of the entire flora.
+It is perhaps difficult to answer. Perhaps I could liken it to ... a defector in place in the KGB. You don't want to tell anybody his name, the location, the title, or anything like that. Not that you don't trust them completely, but the fact is that any time one additional person becomes aware of it, there is a potential for the information to . . . go further.[62]
-lhe outlook is not propitious, if only by reason of the surge in human numbers and their de-mands. While one can readily point a finger at population growth in non-European countries it is Northern Europeans that generate most of the tourist influx to the shores of the Mediterranean as the biggest large-scale tourist attraction in the world. There are a:round 100 million visitors per year already, scheduled to become twice as many within another two decades. The tourism sector is flourishing and expanding its disruptive impact in Spain, France, Italy and Greece, and increasingly in Turkey, Cyprus, Tunisia, and Morocco. Through the spread of hotels and associated buildings, the construction of roads and other infrastructure-plus the impact of millions of feet trampling through fragile environments every day-tourism has caused exceptional damage. It is now the most serious threat to seminatural areas in Western and Southern Turkey, and in Cyprus, Tunisia, and Morocco, a list that may shortly be joined by Greece among several other countries, particularly as concerns the Mediterranean islands such as the Balearics, Corsica, Sardinia, Crete, and the Canary and Madeira islands.
+Another Bureau agent speculated that the Attorney General was not told because, mail opening "was not legal, as far as I knew."[63]
-There are also growing threats from what has always been the number one competitor for natural environments, agriculture. More people generally means more farmland to support them. The main agricultural threat today lies within food demands from people in far-off lands. Consumers of Northern Europe are becoming accustomed to strawberries and carnations right around the year, and during October-March they turn to warmer climates for supplies. Thus the speedy expansion of horticulture in many parts of the Basin; the market is already huge.
+Similarly, there is no indication that the FBI ever informed any Attorney General about its use of "black bag jobs" (illegal break-ins for purposes other than microphone installations) ; the full scope of its activities in COINTELPRO ; or its submission of names for inclusion on either the CIA's "Watch List" for mail opening or, before 1973, on the NSA's "Watch List" for electronic monitoring of international communications.[64]
-As for population growth, the countries of the Southern and Eastern seaboards are projected to increase their numbers by 543 as early as the year 2025. Partly because of population pressures, environments are declining apace. Morocco, Tunisia and Libya each are losing around 1,000 km2 to desertification every year, and Algeria still more.
+After J. Edgar Hoover disregarded Attorney General Biddle's 1943 order to terminate the Custodial Detention List by merely changing its name to the Security Index moreover, Bureau headquarters instructed the field officers that the new list should be kept "strictly confidential" and that it should never be mentioned in FBI reports or "discussed with agencies or individuals outside the Bureau" except for military intelligence agencies. For several years thereafter, the Attorney General and the Justice Department were not informed of the FBI's decision.[65]
-All of these factors contribute to making the Mediterranean Basin one of the hottest of the hotspots; indeed in many ways it is hyper-hot, scoring very high in the fundamental criteria that we use to define hotspots. It is exceptionally rich in diversity, especially plants, and second in the world in plant endemism. In is also highly threatened, and in fact has the lowest percentage of natural vegetation remaining in pristine condition of any hotspot.
+An incident which occurred in 1967 in connection with the Bureau's COINTELPRO operations is particularly illustrative of the lengths to which intelligence agencies would go to protect illegal programs from scrutiny by executive branch officers outside the intelligence community. As one phase of its disruption of the United Klans of America, the Bureau sent a letter to Klan officers purportedly prepared by the highly secret "National Intelligence Committee" (NIC) of the Klan.[66] The fake letter purported to fire the North Carolina Grand Dragon for personal misconduct and misfeasance in office, and to suspend Imperial Wizard Robert Shelton for his failure to remove the Grand Dragon. Shelton complained to the FBI and the Post Office about this apparent violation of the mail fraud statutes -- without realizing that the Bureau had in fact sent the letter.[67] The Bureau, after solemnly assuring Shelton that his complaint was not within the FBI's jurisdiction, approached the Chief Postal Inspector's office in Washington to determine what action the Post Office planned to take regarding Shelton's allegation. The FBI was advised that the matter had been referred to the Justice Department's Criminal Division.[68] At no time did the Bureau inform either the Post Office or the Justice Department that FBI agents had authored the letter. When no investigation was deemed to be warranted by the Criminal Division, FBI Headquarters directed the Bureau's Charlotte, North Carolina office to prepare a second phony NIC letter to send to Klan officials.[69] This letter was not mailed, however, because, the Charlotte office proposed and implemented a different idea -- the formation of an FBI-controlled alternative Klan organization, which eventually attracted 250 members.[70]
-**** The Mediterranean Red Alert Areas
+The Huston Plan itself was prepared without the knowledge of the Attorney General. Neither the Attorney General nor anyone in his office was invited to the drafting sessions at Langley or consulted during the proceedings. Huston testified that it never occurred to him to confer with the Attorney General before making the recommendations in the Report, in part because the plan was seen as an intelligence matter to be handled by the intelligence agency directors.[71]
-. Atlas Mountains
+Similarly, the CIA's General Counsel was not included or consulted in the formulation of the Huston Plan. As James Angleton testified, "the custom and usage was not to deal with the General Counsel, as a rule, until there were some troubles. He was not a part of the process of project approval."[73]
-. Rif-Betique in Southern Spain and two coastal strips of Morocco and Algeria
+<em>(ii)</em> <em>Concealment from Congress</em>
-. Maritime Alps of the French-Italian border
+At times, knowledge of illegal programs and techniques has been concealed from Congress as well as executive branch officials. On two occasions, for example, officials of the Army Security Agency ordered its units -- in apparent violation of that Agency's jurisdiction -- to conduct general searches of the radio spectrum without regard to the source or subject matter of the transmissions. ASA did not report these incidents to ranking Army officials, even when specifically asked to do so as part of the Army's preparation for the hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights in 1971.[74]
-. Tyrrhenian Islands (Balerarics, Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily) 5. Southern and Central Greece
+Events surrounding the 1965 and 1966 investigation by Senator Edward Long of Missouri into federal agencies' use of mail covers and other investigative techniques clearly showed the desire on the part of CIA and FBI officials to protect their programs from congressional review.[75] Fearing that the New York mail opening program might be discovered by this subcommittee, the CIA considered suspending the, operation until the investigation had been completed. An internal CIA memorandum dated April 23, 1965, reads in part:
-. Crete
+Mr. Karamessines [Assistant Deputy Director for Plans] felt that the dangers inherent in Long's subcommittee activities to the security of the Project's operations in New York should be thoroughly studied in order that a determination can be made as to whether these operations should be partially or fully suspended until the subcommittee's investigations are completed.[76]
-. Southern Turkey/Cyprus
+When it was learned that Chief Postal Inspector Henry Montague had been contacted about the Long investigation and believed that it would "soon cool off", however, it was decided to continue the operation without suspension.[77]
-. Israel and Lebanon
+The FBI was also concerned that the subcommittee might expose its mail opening programs. Bureau memoranda indicate that the FBI intended to "warn the Long Committee away from those areas which would be injurious to the national defense."[78] J. Edgar Hoover personally contacted the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee,[79] and urged him "to see Long not later than Wednesday morning to caution him that [the Chief Counsel] must not go into the kind of question he made of Chief Inspector Montague of the Post Office Department"[80] -- questioning that had threatened to reveal the FBI's mail project the Previous week.[81]
-. Cyrenaica (the Libyan ‘bump’)
+When the Long subcommittee began to investigate electronic surveillance practices several months later, Bureau officials convinced Senator Edward Long that there was no need to pursue such an investigation since, they said, the FBI's operations were tightly controlled and properly implemented.[82] According to Bureau documents, FBI agents wrote a press release for the Senator from Missouri, with his approval, that stated his subcommittee had
-. Canaries/Madeira Islands
+conducted exhaustive research into the activities, procedures, and techniques of this agency [and] based upon careful study ... we are fully satisfied that the FBI has not participated in highhanded or uncontrolled usage of wiretaps, microphones, or other electronic equipment.[83]
-**** Conservation
+Not only was this release written by the FBI itself, it was misleading. The "exhaustive research" apparently consisted of a ninety-minute briefing by FBI officials describing their electronic surveillance practices; neither the Senator nor the public learned of the instances of improper electronic surveillances that had been conducted by the FBI.[84] When Senator Edward Long later asked certain FBI officials to testify about the Bureau's electronic surveillance policy before the Subcommittee, they refused, arguing: ". . . to put an FBI
-The Basin’s protected areas are of diverse sorts and cover 1.83 of the total area.
+witness on the stand would be an attempt to open a Pandora's box, insofar as our enemies in the press were concerned ...."[85]
-Today, most countries of the Basin are planning substantial increases in their protected area systems. But due to the demands of agriculture and other activities that absorb large tracts of natural environment, many protected areas are too small to meet the imperatives of island biogeography. Moreover, many protected areas suffer some effects of pollution arising far outside their specific locations. Some of them are short of water after feeder rivers rising in distant watersheds have been diverted for industry, agriculture, and urban communities. All of these problems are likely to become more pronounced as human numbers and human demands keep on growing-and that is without counting the rigors of enhanced U-VB radiation through the depleted ozone layer and the onset of global warming with its many dislocations of plant communities. In a greenhouse-affected world, plant and animal communities will try to follow warm-temperature zones as these head northwards. Those in Northern Italy will have to try to migrate over the Alps and those in Eastern Spain over the Pyrenees, while those in Western Spain and Portugal will find themselves migrating into the Bay of Biscany.
+After the press release had been delivered to Senator Long and the refusal to testify had been accepted, one FBI official wrote to the Associate Director that while some problems still existed, "we have neutralized the threat of being embarrassed by the Long Subcommittee ..."[86]
-**** Some (Don’t) Like it Hot(spot)
+@@@@@@@@@
-While this section leans heavily on the hotspot theory, for good reasons, it is merely a system of global priority setting and thus should not become ideology. At base the very utility of such a project can be questioned-is global (rather than local) thinking possible or even desirable? Should our objectives be taken from cold, scientific number crunching? Unfortunately I think our time and geographic location force us to such analysis if we are to have an impact on biological meltdown. Other biological priority systems are out there but if we accept the need to go in this direction I reckon the hotspot theory offers the best route.
+<em>Subfinding (f)</em>
-On a similar tack we should not see species diversity as a measure of the value of specific ecologies. Te basic tenant of biocentric thought is after all that wild nature has value in and of itself. The kind of discourse that leads to telling phrases like species richness is poor substitute for a real connection with nature. In relation to Red Alert areas a true holistic/whole ecosystem approach is essential. There is after all little point protecting a habitat if, outside the protected area, the river that services it is dammed or redirected.
+The internal inspection mechanisms of the CIA and the FBI did not keep -- and, in the case of the FBI, were not designed to keep -- the activities of those agencies within legal bounds. Their primary concern was efficiency, not legality or propriety.
-There is one deep worry I have about the hotspot theory--maybe it’s simply too hopeful.
+The internal inspection mechanisms of the CIA and the FBI were ineffective in ensuring that the activities of these agencies were kept within legal bounds. This failure was sometimes due to structural deficiencies which kept knowledge of questionable programs tightly compartmented and shielded from those who could evaluate their legality.
-It concentrates on those highly diverse areas at imminent high risk of desolation. It’s global-->regional-->local priorities are Hottest of the Hot-->individual hotspots-->Red Alert areas within the Hotspots.
+As noted above, for example, the CIA's General Counsel was not informed about either the New York mail opening project or CIA's participation in the Huston Plan deliberations. The role of the CIA's General Counsel was essentially a passive one; he did not initiate inquiries but responded to requests from other Agency components. As James Angleton stated, the General Counsel was not a part of the normal project approval process and generally was not consulted until "something was going wrong."[87]
-By concentrating on those precious areas most at threat we are possibly concentrating our energy in those areas in which we are most likely to lose.
+When the General Counsel was consulted, he often exerted a positive influence on the conduct of CIA activities. For example, the CIA stopped monitoring telephone calls to and from Latin America after the General Counsel issued an opinion describing the telephone intercepts as illegal.[88] But internal CIA regulations have never required employees who know of illegal, improper, or questionable activities to report them to the General Counsel; rather, employes with such knowledge are instructed to inform either the Director of Central Intelligence or, the Inspector General. The Director and the Inspector General may refer the matter to the General Counsel but until recently they were not obligated to do so.[88] As Richard Helms stated, "Somtimes we did [consult the General Counsel]; sometimes we did not. I think the record on that is rather spotty, quite frankly."[89]
-This is a dilemma worth pointing to because other strategies are available-though ones with more depressing conclusions. Tis then swings on one’s calculation of the collective power that ecological direct action, conservation biology, enlightened bureaucrats (ha!) and popular movements can muster. I choose to believe that we can have some serious impact in the hotspots, but it would not be exactly illogical to think otherwise. Many of the Red Alert areas specifically and some of the hotspots in general are probably doomed. It might make more strategic sense to concentrate instead on the less devastated/domesticated areas (the big rainforest wildernesses not included in the hotspots) making links and preparing for battles to come. This Long War strategy of concentrating on the cold spots (Amazon, Congo, New Guinea) is attractive but it does take as a given that a vast 3 of global biodiversity is unsaveable. I choose more hope than that-for now. A reappraisal of the situation should happen in maybe 10–15 years. If our trouble-making and conservationist money hasn’t resulted in victory in at least some hotspots then a switch of strategy would seem in order.
+Indeed, the record suggests that those programs that were most questionable -- such as the New York mail opening project and Project CHAOS -- were ]lot referred to the General Counsel because they were considered extremely sensitive.[90] Even when questionable activities re called to the attention of the General Counsel, moreover, the internal Agency regulations did not guarantee him unrestricted access all relevant information. Thus, the General Counsel was not in a position to conduct a complete evaluation of the propriety of particular programs.
-**** (Counter) Revolutionary Rainy Day Reads
+Part of the failure of internal inspection to terminate improper programs and practices may be attributed to the fact that the primary focus of the CIA's Office of the Inspector General and the FBI's Inspection Division has been on efficiency and effectiveness rather than on propriety.
-It’s raining outside and unusually you’re not feeling particularly passionate. Hell, why not read up on state counter-insurgency strategy? When it comes to insurrection and revolutionary strug-gle the state is highly efficient at assessing and learning from its successes and defeats. Sadly, radical movements rarely are. In times of relative social peace we have the space to learn from the past. If we ever need the lessons in the future we are unlikely to be able to do the reading. As well as studying our own histories it is highly useful lo read the other side’s view of things-not the propaganda it gives the people but the analyses it gives its own armies. Some ofthem are publicly available if you look for them and unlike the pie in the sky rubbish radicals can come out with, they are useful, relatively undogmatic analyses of confrontations of strategy.
+The CIA's Inspector General is charged with the responsibility, among other matters, of investigating activities which might be construed as "illegal, improper, and outside the CIA's legislative charter."[91] In at least one case, the Inspector General did force the suspension of a suspect activity: the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting, nonvolunteer, human subjects which was suspended in 1963.[92] An earlier Inspector General's review of the larger, more general program for the testing of behavorial control agents, however, had labeled that program "unethical and illegal" and it nonetheless continued for another seven years.[93] In general, as the Rockefeller Commission pointed out, "the focus of the Inspector General component reviews was on operational effectiveness. Examination of the legality or propriety of CIA activities was not normally a primary concern."[94] Two separate reviews of the New York mail opening projects by the Inspector General's office, for example, considered issues of administration and security at length but did riot even mention legal considerations.[95]
-The first book worth reading is without a doubt the one from which this section’s front page quote is from Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping by Frank Kitson, ISBN 0571161812. Anyone who jokingly might think themselves a revolutionary should read this book-without doubt a .Machiavellian masterpiece. Kitson’s career culminated in being the top bod in the British land army and along the way he helped screw insurrections in Kenya, Malaysia, Oman, Cyprus, and most famously of all, Northern Ireland. Written at the beginning of the ‘70s, Low Intensity Operations has remained hugely influential, especially in the British and American military. In the words of the author’s 1991 Preface it was written: primarily to prepare the army to play a part in countering subversion and insurgency... While a tad dated, as a practical how-to book on snuffing out subversion it should be read by us all.
+Internal inspection at the FBI has traditionally not encompassed legal or ethical questions at all. According to W. Mark Felt, the Assistant FBI Director in charge of the Inspection Division from 1964 to 1971, his job was to ensure that Bureau programs were being operated efficiently, not constitutionally: "There was no instruction to me," he stated, "nor do I believe there is any instruction in the Inspector's manuals, that inspectors should be on the alert to see that constitutional values are being protected."[96] He could not recall any program which was terminated because it might have been violating someone's civil rights.[97]
-A good introductory (though non-specialist and therefore less useful) is Ragged War: The Story of Unconventional and Counter-Revolutionary Warfare by Leroy Thompson, ISBN 185409369X. Its author has a decent pedigree from a USAF Ranger-trained special missions unit and seems to have spent most of the last three decades training some real oppressive scumfucks. Being recently published this is by nature far more contemporary. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War by Lt. Col. John]. Mc Cuen, (ex-US Army General Staff) was published in 1972 and thus like Low Intensity Operations is heavily dated but well worth reading; not least for its vast and bi-partisan bibliographies.
+A number of questionable FBI programs were apparently never inspected. Felt could recall no inspection, for instance, of either the FBI mail opening programs or the Bureau's participation in the CIA's New York mail opening project.[98] Even when improper programs were inspected, the Inspection Division did not attempt to exercise oversight in the sense of looking for wrongdoing. Its responsibility was simply to ensure that FBI policy, as defined by J. Edgar Hoover was effectively implemented and not to question the propriety of the policy.[99] Thus, Felt testified that if, in the course of an inspection of a field office, he discovered a microphone surveillance on Martin Luther King, Jr., the only questions he would ask were whether it had been approved by the Director and whether the procedures had been properly followed.[100]
-While much of these books concentrate (understandably) on countering predominantly rural guerrilla warfare, to ignore urban counter insurgency strategy would be a serious mistake. Northern Ireland is the classic Western case and radicals should devour anything they can find about it. The best available I’d say is The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement by MLR Smith (Lecturer at Greenwich Military College), ISBN 0415091616.
+When Felt was asked whether the Inspection Division conducted any investigation into the propriety of COINTELPRO, the following exchange ensued:
-The only serious attempt to breach this subject by British anarchists is the wonderful-but now very dated-Towards A Citizens Militia by Cienfuegos Press, ISBN 0904564339. It’s a good introductory guide to principles of armed resistance, organisation and conduct of guerrilla warfare, the tactics of security forces, and the organisation and operation of civilian resistance movements. It’s written by Stuart Christie, an Orkneybased anarchist who put his money where his mouth was--among other things famously attempting to assassinate Franco. It’s practical, and at 28 A4 pages, quite concise. If you read any hook in this selection read this one. Beware though-state technologies have advanced a lot in the last 20 years!
+Mr. FELT. Not into the propriety.
-After a rainy day in with that lot you should be able to join the swelling ranks of counter-insurgency warfare trainspotters.
+Q. So in the case of COINTELPRO, as in the case of NSA interceptions, your job as Inspector was to determine whether the program was being pursued effectively as opposed to whether it was proper?
-**** 11.9.2001
+Mr. FELT. Right, with this exception, that in any of these situations, Counterintelligence Program or whatever, it very frequently happened that the inspectors, in reviewing the files, would direct that a certain investigation be discontinued, that it was not productive, or that there was some reason that it be discontinued.
-I will say little about S 11. I found out about the attacks on the Pentagon and the WTC from an excited kid leaving school, having spent most of the glorious sunny day in a different world picking beans on an allotment. As is obvious from bin Ladens’ CIA history this was, to use Malcolm X’s statement on the Kennedy assassination, America’s chickens coming home to roost.
+But I don't recall any cases being discontinued in the Counterintelligence
-The world is class divided and filled to the brim with religious idiocy. As long as that remains the case, war and all its horrors will be visited on people everywhere. S 11 was pretty horrific but the 4,000+ deaths are small fry compared to those put in the gas chambers by industry, pollution, enclosure, etc. The hysterical reaction of many to the events-while understandable-seems rather sickening considering the lack of any similar response to the many thousands more deaths every day caused by profit and the dominant hierarchy.
+program.[101]
-S11 has many ramifications but I will mention only a few. Firstly, radical US prisoners are getting a harder time of it. They need our support. Secondly, I stated above that militants from the Majority World will increase attacks in the core-thanks to the changing nature of global society. Rome was sacked by armies that invaded on roads Rome itself had built. When I wrote this section I wasn’t envisioning anything as dramatic as S11. The fact that it was carried out by religious nuts isn’t really surprising considering what I say later in “There is No Rosy Picture:’ S11 was the first attack by Majority World militants of its scale, and it is only the first. All over the world in shantytowns and slums teenagers with no future will be thinking about what can be done with a few box-cutters-not even knives for fuck’s sake! One of the Los Alamos Lab team that exploded the first nuclear bomb said that there was nothing hidden that had stopped others from doing what they did. The secret was that it could be done. S11 showed what can be done. The ringside slug fest of Leviathan’s slaves has only begun.
+As a result of this role definition, the Inspection Division became an active participant in some of the most questionable FBI programs For example, it was responsible for reviewing on an annual basis all memoranda relating to illegal break-ins prior to their destruction under the "DO NOT FILE" procedure.
-During the Second World War the RAF’s firestorm massacre of thousands of civilian Germans at Dresden was justified by saying that those who worked in the factories of the Nazi war machine were military targets as much as those who fought on the field. During the post-war anti-imperialist wave, Algerian guerrillas rejected this logic when they rejected a plan to crash a hijacked plane into Paris. The horrors of the unity-in-opposition of 50 years of communism and capitalism has resulted now in Arab anti-imperialists, lost in the Koran, accepting the logic of Bomber Harris.
+Improper programs and techniques in the FBI were protected not only by the Inspection Division's perception of its function, but also by the maxim that FBI agents should never "embarrass the Bureau." This standard, which served as a shield to outside scrutiny, was explicitly reflected in the FBI Manual:
-For a thought-provoking read check out Some People Push Back: On the Justice of Roosting Chickens by American Indian Movement activist Ward Churchill
+Any investigation necessary to develop complete essential facts regarding any allegation against Bureau employees must be instituted promptly, and every logical lead which will establish the true facts should be completely run out <em>unless such action would embarrass the Bureau</em> ... in which event the Bureau will weigh the facts, along with the recommendations of the division head. [Emphasis added.][102]
-No War Between Nations.
+Such an instruction, coupled with the Inspection Division's inattention to the law, could only inhibit or prevent the termination and exposure of illegal practices.
-No Peace Between Classes.
+<em>Subfinding (g)</em>
-**** Peasants and the Transitional Class
+When senior administration officials with a duty to control domestic intelligence activities knew, or had a basis for suspecting, that questionable activities had occurred, they often responded with silence or approval. In certain cases, they were presented with a partial description of a program but did not ask for details, thereby abdicating their responsibility. In other cases, they were fully aware of the nature of the practice and implicitly or explicitly approved it.
-Unsurprisingly, the majority of the resistance to the global empire arises where the majority of its subjects and slaves live-the hilariously named “Third World:’ To accept this is not to reject the reality of class struggle in the core capitalist countries but merely to accept the logic of maths and geography. The Third World is, after all, most of the world.
+On several occasions, senior administration officials with a duty to control domestic intelligence activities were supplied with partial details about questionable or illegal programs but they did not ask for additional information and the programs continued.
-In the Majority World the global elite are faced with class enemies they have long since vanquished within the industrialised West-the peasantry and the transitional class. ‘Ihese two classes are the main human block to the elite’s expansion and consolidation over the majority of the planet.
+Sometimes the failure to probe further stemmed from the administration official's assumption that an intelligence agency would not engage in lawless conduct. Former Chief Postal Inspector Henry Montague, for example, was aware that the FBI received custody of the mail in connection with several of its mail opening programs -- indeed, he had approved such custody in one case -- but he testified that he believed these were mail cover operations only.[103] Montague stated that he did not ask FBI officials if the Bureau opened mail because he
-Nearly half of the world’s population do not live in cities. Of these, hundreds of millions are hardly under the actual domination of capital at all. As peasants they retain relatively high levels of autonomy and have yet to be fully (or often even partially) enclosed by capital. For the actual domination of capital to expand that autonomy must be destroyed. ‘Ihey themselves and the land they live on must be commodified; their land turned into resources and they themselves into wage slaves.
+never thought that would be necessary .... I trusted them the same as I would another [Postal] Inspector. I would never feel that I would have to tell a Postal person that you cannot open mail. By the same token, I would not consider it necessary to emphasize it to any great degree with the FBI.[104]
-In localities all over the Majority World the continuing class struggle between loggers, agribusiness, oil corporations, local land autocracies, and the state on one side, and peasants and tribal people on the other is, in fact, the border war between the global economy and the land community. It is a border war that, despite heavy resistance from groups as diverse as farmers in India, river delta communities in Nigeria, the Zapatistas in Mexico, and tribes in Papua, is largely being won by the wealthy. Of course people do not immediately submit to power and accept their position as wage slaves. Throughout the <em>developing world</em> (a telling phrase) the new inhabitants of the cities fight back.
+A former FBI official has also testified, as noted above, that he informed Attorney General Katzenbach about selected aspects of the FBI mail opening programs. This official did not tell Katzenbach that mail was actually opened, but he testified that he "pointed out [to the Attorney General] that we do receive mail from the Post Office in certain sensitive areas."[105] While Katzenbach stated that he never knew mail was opened or that the FBI gained access to mail on a regular basis in large-scale operations,[106] the former Attorney General acknowledged that he did learn that "in some cases the outside of mail might have been examined or even photographed by persons other than Post Office employees".[107] However, neither at this time nor at any other time did the Justice Department make any inquiry to determine the full scope of the FBI mail operations.
-One would expect Western radicals to orient themselves towards <em>Third World</em> struggles according to their present class position, and the fact that our shared past is their shared present. Unfortunately the vision of many communists, liberals, greens, and anarchists is still hazy, blurred by the misleading mythologies of Marxism. There sometimes seems to be an unbridgeable split between those who think that social change can only arise out of the core capitalist countries and those who believe it will be fought out in the Majority World. This really is a false dichotomy and both sides take their ridiculous scripts from the Left.
+Similarly, former Attorneys General Nicholas Katzenbach and Ramsey Clark testified that they were familiar with the FBI's efforts to disrupt the Ku Klux Klan through regular investigative techniques but said they were unaware of the offensive tactics that occurred in COINTELPRO. Katzenbach said he did not believe it necessary to explore possible irregularities since "[i]t never occurred to me that the Bureau would engage in the sort of sustained improper activity which it apparently did."[108]
-On one hand ‘Ihird Worldists have supported all sorts of authoritarian murderous gangs and governments on stupid basis like the nationalism of the oppressed is different than the nationalism of the oppressor. (It should be almost banal now to point to Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians or Ethiopia’s offensives against Eritrea, as just two examples of the nationalism of the oppressed becoming the nationalism of the oppressor.) Anyone saying anything like this cannot in any way be an anarchist and at this historical juncture should just be the cause of mirth. Lenin’s bizarrely inverted version of anti-imperialism has a lot to answer for. In a sickening twist the “What’s a few massacres between comrades” tendency are often the first to condemn even the most minimal revolutionary violence in the West-“It’s alright for niggers and chinks in far-away countries to go killing each other in the cause of revolution but don’t throw rocks at white english policemen-they’re human too!”
+Both Robert Kennedy and Nicholas Katzenbach were also aware of some aspects of the FBI's investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., yet neither ascertained the full details of the Bureau's campaign to discredit the civil rights leader. Kennedy intensified the original "communist influence" investigation in October 1963 by authorizing wiretaps on King's home and office telephones.[109] Kennedy requested that an evaluation of the results be submitted to him in thirty days in order to determine whether or not to maintain the taps, but the evaluation was never delivered to him and he did not insist on it.[110] Since he never ordered the termination of the wiretap, the Bureau could, and did, install additional wiretaps on King by invoking the original authorization.[111] According to Bureau memoranda apparently initialled by Attorney General Katzenbach, Katzenbach received after the fact notification in 1965 that three bugs had been planted in Dr. King's hotel rooms.[112] A transmittal memorandum written by Katzenbach also indicates that he may have instructed the FBI to be "very cautious" in conducting these surveillances.[113] There is no indication, however, that, he requested further details about any of them or prohibited the FBI from future use of this technique against Dr. King.
-On the other hand the Marxist dogma ofthe fully developed industrial working class as the ‘revolutionary subject’ has led many to ignore the vast scale of struggle going on in the majority of the world. This is highly ironic considering that the European “proletarian glory days;’ starting with the French insurrection of 1848 and ending with the crushing of the Spanish Revolution, were pushed forward by a class that today can be found throughout the Majority World but only on the social margins in the West. For the second time in this pamphlet I’ll quote at length from Bookchin’s seminal work, The Spanish Anarchists:
+While there is no evidence that the full extent of the FBI's campaign to discredit Dr. King was authorized by or known to anyone outside of the Bureau, there is evidence that officials responsible for supervising the FBI received indications that some such efforts were being undertaken. For example, former Attorney General Katzenbach and former Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall both testified that in late 1964 they learned that the Bureau had offered tape recordings of Dr. King to certain newsmen in Washington, D.C. They further stated that they informed President Johnson of the FBI's offers.[114] The Committee has discovered no evidence, however, that the President or Justice Department officials made any further effort to halt the discrediting campaign at this time or at any other time; indeed, the Bureau's campaign continued for several years after this incident.
-<quote>
+On some occasions, administration officials did not request further details about intelligence programs because they simply did not want to know. Former Postmaster General J. Edward Day testified that when Allen Dulles and Richard Helms spoke to him about a CIA project in 1961, he interrupted them before they could tell him the purpose of their visit (which Helms said was to say mail was being opened). Day stated:
-The June barricades of 1848 had in fact been manned not by an industrial proletariat ‘Disciplined, united, and organised by the process of capitalist production, ‘[Marx] but by craftsman, home-workers, nondescript labourers of every sort, porters, unemployed urban and rural poor, even tavern keepers, waiters, and prostitutes-in short, the flotsam andjetsam of French society... These very same elements, nearly a quarter of a century later, were to man the barricades of the Paris Commune. It was precisely the industrialisation of France after the Commune-and with this process, the emergence of a ‘full-grown’ hereditary proletariat ‘disciplined, united, organised by the process of capitalist production’-thatfinally was to silence the ‘crowing’ of the French ‘Red Cock’ that had summoned Europe to revolution during the nineteenth century. Indeed, much the same could be said of the Russian proletariat <em>of 1917, so recently recruited from the countryside that it was nyting buta ‘full-grown’working class.</em>
-<em>The great proletarian insurrections that seemed to lend such compelling support to the concept ofproletarian socialism werefuelled primarily by social strata that livedwithin neither industrial nor village society but in the tense, almost electrifying force field of both. Proletarian socialism became a revolutionary force for nearly a century not because awell organised, consolidated, hereditary proletariat had emergedwith the factory system but because of the very process of proleterianisation. Dispossessed rural people and craftsmen were being removed from disintegrating preindustrialway of life and plunged into standardised, dehumanising, and mechanical urban and industrial surroundings. Neither the village and small shop as such nor the factory as such predisposed them to the boldest kind of social action; rather, they were moved by the disintegration of the former and the shock of the latter. Demoralised to the point of recklessness, declasse in spirit and often in fact, they became the adherents ofthe Paris Commune, the Petrograd soviets, and the Barcelona</em> <em>CNT.</em>
+... Mr. Dulles, after some preliminary visiting and so on, said that he wanted to tell me something very secret, and I said, "Do I have to know about it?" And he
-<em>The very ‘half grown’ quality of the early proletariat, formerly peasants and craftsmen or perhaps a generation removed from such status, produced a volatility, intractability, and boldness that the industrial system andfactory hierarchy were to attenuate in their descendants-the hereditary proletariat of the 1940s and 1 950s, a class that knew no other world but the industrial one. For this class, no tension was to exist between town and country, the anomie of the city and the sense of shared responsibility of the small community, the standardised rhythms of the factory and the physiological rhythms of the land. The premises of the proletariat in this later era were formed around the validity of the factory as an arena ofproductive activity, the industrial hierarchy as a system of technical authority, and the union bureaucracy as a structure of class command. The era</em> ofproletarian socialism came to an end in a step-by-step <em>process during which the ‘half grown,‘presumably ‘primitive’ proletariat became ‘fullgrown’, ‘mature’-in short, fully proletarianised.[385]</em>
+said, "No."
-</quote>
-Crammed into the growing Majority World metropolises, hundreds of millions today find themselves a part of this class in transition, caught in the electrifying force field between village and city. They face inhuman and desperate conditions as wage slaves within the city. They have memory of the communal experiences of the village that enable them to envision a different reality that they could create. They have vast potential collective power in the sheer numbers of young fellow shanty town/ghetto dwellers who share their class position. This is a potent revolutionary mix.
+I said, "My experience is that where there is something that is very secret, it is likely to leak out, and anybody that knew about it is likely to be suspected of having been part of leaking it out, so I would rather not know anything about it."
-Many Majority World writers talk about this village in the city. Within the slums and shanties, old vil age system of kinship and communal decision making often continue to aid survival in a hostile capitalist environment. It is from these collectivities that mass organised squatter move-ments arise such as the Movement of the Landless (MST) in Brazil, which challenge the urban autocracy and the rural latifundi.
+What additional things were said in connection with him building up to that, I don't know. But I am sure ... that I was not told anything about opening mail."[115]
-It is this tension that propelled the insurrectionary hordes in 1997 to bring down Suharto and systematically burn out the mansions of the Indonesian elite. It should come as no surprise to hear the voice of Lucy Parsons echoing from Haymarket through a hundred years--<em>We shall devastate the avenues where the wealthy live!</em> The class that gave birth to Parsons today spawns innumerable children throughout the developing world.
+By his own account, therefore, Mr. Day did not learn the true nature of this project because he "would rather not know anything about it." Although rarely expressed in such unequivocal terms, this attitude appears to have been all too common among senior government officials.
-I am <em>not</em> contending that rebellion and resistance do not and will not break out in the core capitalist countries. As long as society is based on class warfare normality will be punctuated by episodes of rebellion and day-to-day opposition. Widespread insurrection and anarchist revolution are however another thing entirely. It is in the majority of the planet that the most seismic struggles are happening. For most of last century the resistance and transcendence of the oppressed Third World global majority has faced two huge foes. The unity-in-opposition of two forms of capitalism: the Marxist National Liberation of native elites and the colonialism of Western elites has hamstrung the oppressed.
+Even when administration officials were fully apprised of the illegal or questionable nature of certain programs and techniques, they sometimes permitted them to continue. An example of acquiescence is presented in the case of William Cotter, a former Chief Postal Inspector who knew that the CIA opened mail in connection with its New York project but took no direct action to terminate the project for a period of four years.[116] Cotter had learned of this project in his capacity as a CIA official in the mid-1950's and he knew that it was continuing when he was sworn in as Chief Postal Inspector in April 1969.[117] Because the primary responsibility of his position was to insure the sanctity of the mails, he was understandably "very, very uncomfortable with [knowledge of the New York] project,"[118] but he felt constrained by the letter and spirit of the secrecy oath which he had signed when he left the CIA in 1969 "attesting to the fact that I would not divulge secret information that came into my possession during the time that I was with the CIA."[119] Cotter stated: "After coming from eighteen years in the CIA, I was hypersensitive, perhaps, to the protection of what I believed to be a most sensitive project . . ."[120] For several years, he placed the dictate of the secrecy oath above that of the law he was charged with enforcing.
-With the death of the USSR and the final withering away of state socialism around the world, a growing unity is developing between movements of those who live on the land and those who live in the shanties. Increasingly libertarian and ecological new generations are taking the fore. It is this unity that, more than anything else, could reap the whirlwind, shaking capitalism to its foundations and maybe even replacing it with a more authentic world.
+Former White House adviser John Ehrlichman also stated that he learned of a program of intercepting mail between the United States and Communist countries "because I had seen reports that cited those kinds of sources in connection with this, the bombings, the dissident activities."[121] Yet he cannot recall any White House inquiry that was made into such a program nor can he recall raising the matter with the President.[122]
-**** The Panthers-Militants of a Transitional Class
+When President Nixon learned of the illegal techniques that were recommended in the Huston Plan, he initially endorsed, rather than disavowed them. The former President stated that "[t]o the extent that I reviewed the Special Report of Interagency Committee on Intelligence, I would have been informed that certain recommendations or decisions set forth in that report were, or might be construed to be, illegal."[123] He nonetheless approved them, in part because they represented an efficient method of intelligence collection. As President Nixon explained, "[M]y approval was based largely on the fact that the procedures were consistent with those employed by prior administrations and had been found to be effective by the intelligence agencies."[124]
-An interesting aside. Hugely influential to the radical wave that swept the west in the ‘60s and ‘70s was the Black Liberation struggle in America. Two examples stand above others. Germaine Greer says second wave feminism took its rallying standard-Women’s Liberation-in reflection of the concurrent Black Liberation struggles, (see her book <em>The Whole Woman).</em> The rebirth of Republicanism in Northern Ireland arose largely out of the Civil Rights Movement, which took its name and in large part inspiration from American Blacks.
+Mr. Nixon also apparently relied on the theory that a "sovereign" President can authorize the violation of criminal laws in the name of "national security" when the President, in his sole discretion, deems it appropriate. He recently stated:
-The Black Panther Party-itself deeply inspired by struggles in the Majority World-is often seen as being entirely urban in origin. In contradiction, David Hilliard, ex-chairman of the Panthers, cites the land-based culture of the Deep South which many Panthers or their parents were brought up in as highly influential:
+It is quite obvious that there are certain inherently governmental actions which if undertaken by the sovereign in protection of the interest of the nation's security are lawful but which if undertaken by private persons are not. . . .
-<quote>
+... [I]t is naive to attempt to categorize activities a President might authorize as "legal" or "illegal" without reference to the circumstances under which he concludes that the activity is necessary. . . .
-<em>When I think about the influences that inspired the spirit and work of the Black Panther Party-many of which are still not understood-this culture figures large among them. Many of the most important members of the party-people like }ohn and Bobby Seale and Geronimo Pratt, Bobby Rush and Fred Hampton-were imbued with the moral and spiritual values of their parents; and the work that went into the party, our dignity as an independent people, the communal ideal andpractise that informed our programs, all stem in part from the civilisation of which my mother andfather were so representative a part.[386]</em>
-</quote>
-**** It’s Time to Defect!
+In short, there have been -- and will be in the future -- circumstances in which Presidents may lawfully authorize actions in the interests of the security of this country, which if undertaken by other persons, or even by the President under different circumstances, would be illegal.[125]
-At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century we all have to choose sides. Do we remain on the side of industrial civilisation or do we stand with struggling peoples in defence of our earth? Across the world the fight is on, fires are flickering, arrows flying. Look around you, see the targets.
+As the former President described this doctrine, it could apply not only to actions taken openly, which are subject to later challenge by Congress and the courts, but also to actions such as those recommended in the Huston Plan, which are covertly endorsed and implemented. The dangers inherent in this theory are clear, for it permits a President to create exceptions to normal legal restraints and prohibitions, without review by a neutral authority and without objective standards to guide him.[126] The Huston Plan itself serves as a reminder of these dangers.
-Pull up your mask, it’s time to defect.
+Significantly, President Nixon's revocation of approval for the Huston Plan was based on the possibility of "media criticism" if the use of these techniques was revealed. The former President stated:
-[240] <em>E Co</em> <em>Ecologist,</em> Vol. 2, #12, December 1972
+Mr. Mitchell informed me that it was Director Hoover's opinion that initiating a program which would permit several government intelligence agencies to utilize the investigative techniques outlined in the Committee's report would significantly increase the possibility of their public disclosure. Mr. Mitchell explained to me that Mr. Hoover believed that although each of the intelligence gathering methods outlined in the Committee's recommendations had been utilized by one or more previous Administrations, their sensitivity would likely generate media criticism if they were employed. Mr. Mitchell further informed me that it was his opinion that the risk of disclosure of the possible illegal actions, such as unauthorized entry into foreign embassies to install a microphone transmitter, was greater than the possible benefit to be derived. Based upon this conversation with Attorney General Mitchell, I decided to revoke the approval originally extended to the Committee's recommendations.[127]
-[241] <em>Eco-Warriors</em> by Rik Scarce, p. 103
+In more than one instance, administration officials outside the intelligence community have specifically requested intelligence agencies to undertake questionable actions. NSA's program of monitoring telephonic communications between New York City and a city in South America, for example, was undertaken at the specific request of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, a law enforcement agency.
-[242] Green Rage, Christopher Manes, p. 65
+BNDD officials had been concerned about drug deals that were apparently arranged in calls from public telephones in New York to South America, but they felt that they could not legally wiretap these telephone booths.[128] In order to avoid tapping a limited number of phones in New York, BNDD submitted the names of 450 American citizens for inclusion in NSA's Watch List, and requested NSA to monitor a communications link between New York and South America which necessitated the interception of thousands of international telephone calls.[129]
-[243] Speech by Dave Foreman, Grand Canyon, 7/7/87
+The legal limitations on domestic wiretapping apparently did not concern certain officials in the White House or Attorneys General who requested the FBI to do their bidding. In some instances, they specifically requested the FBI to institute wiretaps on American citizens with no substantial national security predicate for doing so.[130]
-[244] FoE Newsletter #1, Jan 1972
+On occasion, Attorneys General have also encouraged the FBI to circumvent the will of both Congress and the Supreme Court. As noted above, after Congress passed the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 to regulate the FBI program for listing people to be detained in case of war or other emergency, Justice Department officials concluded that its procedural safeguards and substantive standards were "unworkable". Attorney General J. Howard McGrath instructed the FBI to disregard the statute and "proceed with the [Security Index] program as previously outlined."[131] Two subsequent Attorneys General -- James McGranery and Herbert Brownell endorsed the decision to ignore the Emergency Detention Act.[132]
-[245] While FoE and GP remain centrist, both groups increasingly try to engage their membership <em>as</em> activists not just as supporters. ‘Ihis, as many of their staff admit, is due to the influence of the ‘90s land struggles.
+In 1954, the Supreme Court denounced the use of microphone surveillances by local police in criminal cases;[133] the fact that a microphone had been installed in a defendant's bedroom particularly outraged the court. Within weeks of this decision, however, Attorney General Herbert Brownell reversed the existing Justice Department policy prohibiting trespassory microphone installations by the FBI, and gave the Bureau sweeping new authority to engage in bugging for intelligence purposes -- even when it meant planting microphones in bedrooms.[134] Brownell wrote J. Edgar Hoover:
-[246] A ridiculous statement I admit-but true!
+Obviously, the installation of a microphone in a bedroom or in some comparably intimate location should be avoided whenever possible. It may appear, however, that important intelligence or evidence relating to matters connected with the national security can only be obtained by the installation of a microphone in such a location. . . .
-[247] EF! <em>Action Update,</em> #3
+... I recognize that for the FBI to fulfill its important intelligence function, considerations of internal security and the national safety are paramount and, therefore, may compel the unrestricted use of this technique in the national interest.[135]
-[248] Ibid.
+Brownell did not even require the Bureau to seek the Attorney General's prior approval for microphone installations in particular cases.[136] In the face of the Irvine decision, therefore, he gave the FBI authority to bug whomever it wished wherever it wished in cases that the Bureau -- and not the Attorney General -- determined were "in the national interest."
-[249] Noticibly South Somerset EF! who organised the early Whatley Quarry actions.
+In short, disregard of the law by intelligence officers was seldom corrected, and sometimes encouraged or facilitated, by officials outside the agencies. Whether by inaction or direct participation, these administration officials contributed to the perception that legal restraints did not apply to intelligence activities.
-[250] This description is no joke-one described herself on more than one occasion as “the queen of the tribe”!
-[251] Dept of Transport Affidavit concerning May 1<sup>st</sup> 1993
+[1] This section discusses the legal issues raised by particular programs and activities only; a discussion of the aggregate effect upon constitutional rights of all domestic surveillance practices is at p.[[290] of the Conclusions section.
-[252] “Welcome Back Twyford Six;’ <em>Do or Die</em> #3, p. 45
+[2] The accountability of senior administration officials is noted here to place the details which follow in their proper context, and is developed at greater length in Finding G, p.[ 265.
-[253] “Car Chases, Sabotage, and Arthur Dent: Twyford Diary;’ Pt. 2, <em>Do or Die,</em> #3, p. 21
+[3] George C. Moore testimony, 11/3/75, p. 83.
+[4] Branigan testimony, 10/9/75, pp. 13, 139, 140; Wannall testimony, 10/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 149.
-[254] Ibid., p. 22
+[5] Branigan, 10/9/75, p. 89.
-[255] ‘Skye Campaign Soaked in Sea of Anger’, <em>Do or Die,</em> #3, p. 11
+[6] William C. Sullivan testimony, 11/1/75, pp. 49,50.
-[256] EF! <em>Action Update,</em> #5
+[7] Richard Helms, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 94. This testimony is partially contradicted, however, by the fact that in 1970 Helms signed the Huston Report. in which "covert mail coverage" -- defined as mail opening- was specifically described as illegal. (Special Report, June 1970, p. 30.)
-[257] ‘For Flapjack and Mother Earth: Earth Warriors At Jesmond Dene\ [[http://www.eco-action.org/][www.eco-action.org/]] dt/jesmond.html
+[8] Helms, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 103.
-[258] Ibid. ’
+[9] Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 21.
-[259] ‘News From The Autonomous Zones’, <em>Do or Die</em> #4, p. 21
+[10] Sullivan, 11/1/75, pp. 92, 93.
-[260] Ibid., p. 22
+[11] Memorandum from Mr. Boardman to the Director, FBI, 4/30/54.
-[261] Ibid., p. 23
+[12] Ibid.
-[262] These were not police smear stories. There was only a few sentences ever mentioning them and no tabloid ‘eco-terrorist’ horror stories. If anything the state probably enforced a ‘quieting strategy’ on the situation as they did to the ALF at its height of support.
+[13] Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C.D. Deloach, 7/19/66.
-[263] Copse: The Cartoon Book of Tree Protesting by Kate Evans, (ISBN 0 9532674 07), p. 32
+[14] Report of the House Judiciary Committee, 8/20/74, p. 150.
-[264] EF! Action Update, #9
+[15] Memorandum from William C. Sullivan to J. Edgar Hoover, 6/30/69.
-[265] Copse, p. 20
+[15]  Memorandum from Richard Helms to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 12/17/63.
-[266] “‘Leadenham;’ Do or Die #4, p. 6
+[16] Blind memorandum, 11/7/55.
-[267] Fash threatened a number of sites through the ‘90s. At Jesmond they were chased off’, running for their lives (which is what they do best)--mostly they didn’t even turn up (with the one major exception of the Ml 1). Far more dangerous were random individual loonies. Arson attacks on camps happened right from the beginning-both at Twyford and the Ml l. Of course the police paid little notice. On one occasion when some posh student arsonists were nicked at Newbury (after they had put a petrol bomb through a truck window and into a sleeping child’s bedroom) they got off-the magistrates viewed them as drunken pranksters.
+[17] Memorandum from Deputy Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, to Director, Offlee of Security, 2/1/62.
-[268] <em>Daily Post</em> (North Wales), 9/1/94
+[18] Memorandum from Chief, CI/Project to Chief, Division, 9/26/63.
-[269] Green Ana?<em>whist</em> was undoubtedly a great influence on this period. One big gripe though-again and again one would read GA reports of actions which said the Earth Liberation Front had done this or that. Some may have been true but most of these claimed actions were often simply done by crowds or camp warparties. In fact on a number of occasions people have been arrested for criminal damage only to read later in <em>GA</em> that the ELF had carried out their action. This is both dishonest and dangerous.
+[19] Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 61; Howard Osborn, deposition, 8/28/75, p. 90.
-[270] Jonathan Dimbelby at Solsbury Hill for instance.
+[20] Gordon Stewart, 9/30/75, p. 28.
-[271] <em>Construction News</em>
+[21] See e.g., Howard Osborn deposition, 8/28/75. p. 89.
-[272] ‘The Battle For Hyde Park: Ruffians, Radicals and Ravers, 1855–1994’, (Practical History)
+[22] Special Report, June 1970, p.[ 31.
-[273] “CJB: Business As Usual;’ <em>AC Action Update,</em> #12
+[23] Special Report, June 1970, p.[ 30.
-[274] <em>Schnews</em><em>,</em> #3
+[24] Special Report, June 1970, p.[ 32.
-[275] ‘London Regional Report’, <em>Do or Die,</em> #5, p. 23
+[25] President Nixon stated that he approved these activities in part because they "had been found to be effective." (Response of Richard M. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatory 19, 3/9/76, p. 13.)
-[276] Ibid., p. 25
+[26] For a description of the techniques which continued or were subsequently instituted, see pp.[ 115-116.
-[277] ‘Meanwhile Down in the West-Country’. Do or Die, #5, p. 18
+A memorandum from John Dean to John Mitchell suggests that, after President Nixon's revocation of approval for the Huston Plan, the White House itself supported the continued pursuit of some of the objectives of the Huston Plan, through an interagency unit known as the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. (Memorandum from John Dean to the Attorney General, 9/18/70.) In this memorandum, Dean suggested the creation of such a unit for "both operational and evaluation purposes." He wrote in part:
-[278] “It’s (Not Really That) Grim Up North!” <em>Do or Die,</em> #5, p. 12
+"[T]he unit can serve to make appropriate recommendations for the type of intelligence that should be immediately pursued by the various agencies. In regard to this . . . point, I believe we agreed that it would be inappropriate to have any blanket removal of restrictions; rather, the most appropriate procedure would be to decide on the type of intelligence we need, based on an assessment of the recommendations of this unit, and then to proceed to remove the restraints as necessary to obtain such intelligence." (Dean memorandum, 9/18/70.)
-[279] EF! <em>Action Update,</em> #23
+[27] Memorandum for the record by Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 8/16/68, Staff summary of Sol Lindenbaum (former Executive Assistant to the Attorney General) interview, 5/8/75.
-[280] Thames Valley Police Press Release 11/11/96
+[28] Memorandum for the record by Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.[ 8/16/68.
-[281] <em>Copse</em><em>,</em> p. 105
+[29] The Army's general domestic surveillance program provides an example of evasion of a departmental order which had been issued out of concern with legal issues. The practice of collecting vast amounts of information on American citizens was terminated in 1971, when new Department of Defense restrictions came into effect calling for the destruction of all files on "unaffiliated" persons, and organizations. Rather than destroying the files, however, several Army intelligence units simply turned their intelligence files an dissident individuals and groups over to local police authorities; and one Air Force counterintelligence unit in San Diego began to create new files the next year. (Hearings before Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate.[ 92nd Congress, 1st session, 1971, p. 1297; "Ex-FBI Aid Accused in Police Spy Hearings" Chicago Tribune, 6/21/75. p. 3.)
-[282] <em>There’s A Riot Going</em> 011 by Merrick (Godhaven Press)
+[30] USAINTC Staff Study: Material Testing Program EA 1729.[ 10/15/59.
-[283] ‘Direct Action, Six Years Down the Line’, <em>Do or Die,</em> #7, p. 1
+[31] Sullivan attributes much of this attitude to the molding influence of World War II upon young intelligence agents who later rose to positions of influence in the intelligence community. (Sullivan, 11/1/75, pp. 94-95.) Disregard of the "niceties of law," he stated, continued after the war had ended:
-[284] EF! <em>Action Update,</em> #40
+"Along came the Cold War. We pursued the same course in the Korean War, and the Cold War continued, then the Vietnam War. We never freed ourselves from that psychology that we were indoctrinated with, right after Pearl Harbor, you see. I think this accounts for the fact that nobody seemed to be concerned about raising the question is this lawful, is this legal, is this ethical? It was just like a soldier in the battlefield. When he shot down an enemy he did not ask himself is this legal or lawful, is it ethical? It is what he was expected to do as a soldier."
-[285] Global Street Party—Birmingham and the G8, p. 3
+"We did what we were expected to do. It became part of our thinking, a part of our personality." (Sullivan. 11/1/75. pp. 95,96.)
-[286] EF! Summer Gathering 2003 leaflet.
+Unfortunately, it made too little difference whether the "enemy" was a foreign spy, a civil rights leader, or a Vietnam protester.
-[287] This reference to Mental Asylums is no joke-over a dozen people were sectioned from Newbury alone, prompting the setting up of the Head State Support Group. Land Struggles had been immensely therapeutic for many, but for some they became the catalyst for mental breakdown. On sites the intense connection to other people and the land was amazing. Feeling the land being ripped all around you and having your community broken up was unbearable for many. Some would have been broken by Industry either way, hut it was the movement’s duty to provide support for those who were asked to risk all. It mostly failed in that duty.
+[32] Sullivan, 11/1/75, P. 96.
-[288] It’s worth pointing out that EF! is a network of autonomous groups and individuals. Gatherings can he the place where people decide what they are going to do, but they cannot decide what others should or shouldn’t do. After a number of bad experiences with people representing the movement in outside publications and stating that ‘EF! has said the...’ it was decided that gatherings would mostly not distribute written reports—too often the writer’s own poiitical dogma misrepresented the consensus-or lack of one. Here, I am trying to sum up some of the points the ’97 gathering came up with in consensus. I have asked around to check that my memory is correct, but I may too have clouded the reality of the discussion with the fog of my own particular dogma. I apologise if this is so.
+[33] Branigan.[ 10/9/75, p. 41.
-[289] “Autonomous Spaces:’ <em>Do or Die</em> #8. p. 130
+[34] Staff summary of William C. Sullivan interview, 6/10/75.
-[290] Ibid.
+[35] omitted in original.
-[291] Fears that the giro checks would soon stop arriving, bringing an end to the dole autonomy that, along with student grants and crime, had been the main economic backbone of movements here for generations was also a major factor. Resistance to the introduction of the Jobseekers Allowance and the New Deal did occur-but with most claimants not joining in with collective efforts to repel the squeeze, the campaign was doomed. By individualising their problem people were collectively defeated.
+[36] Moore deposition, 11/3/75, p. 79.
-[292] <em>Sc/mews,</em> #1 56
+[37] Branagan deposition, 1/9/75, p. 41. Richard Helms referred to another kind of "greater good" when asked to speculate about the possible motivation of a CIA scientist who did not heed President Nixon's directive to destroy all biological and chemical toxins. Noting that the scientist might have "had thoughts about immunization ... or treatment of disease where [the toxin he had developed might be useful," Helms said that the retention of this biological agent could be explained as "yielding to that human impulse of the greater good." (Richard Helm- testimony, 9/15/75, p. 96.)
-[293] <em>Schnews</em><em>,</em> #167
+[38] Robert Andrews testimony 9/23/75, p.[ 34; See NSA Report: "SHAMROCK." By cooperating with the Government in SHAMROCK, executives of three companies chose to ignore the advice of their respective legal counsels who had recommended against participation because they considered the program to be in violation of the law and FCC regulations. (Memorandum for the record, Armed Forces Security Agency, Subject: SHAMROCK Operation, 8/25/50.)
-[294] Police Review, quoted in “Surveillance Watch,” <em>Schnews</em> <em>Survival Handbook</em>
+[39] Tom Charles Huston deposition, 5/22/75, p. 43; Staff Summary of Toni Charles Huston interview, 5/22/75.
-[295] <em>EF! Action Update,</em> #50
+[40] Letter from Richard Helms to Henry Kissinger, 2/18/69.
-[296] Global Street Party: Birmingham and the G8 pamphlet.
+[41] See COINTELPRO Report: See. V, "Outside the Bureau" memorandum; from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 8/25/67.
-[297] The reference-me and a mate on a glorious day!
+[42] omitted in original.
-[298] EF! <em>Action Update,</em> #59
+[43] Buffham, 9/12/75, p. 20; MINARET Charter, 7/1/69.
-[299] “Friday June 18<sup>th</sup> 1999: Confronting Capital and Smashing the State;’ <em>Do or Die</em> #8, p. 20
+At other times, however, NSA's special security measures were applied to Protect documents which concerned far more than NSA. Thus, at Richard Helms suggestion, Huston Plan working papers and documents were all stamped with legends designed to protect NSA's lawful communications activity, although only a small portion of the documents actually concerned NSA. (Unaddressed memorandum, Subject: "Interagency Committee on Intelligence, Working Subcommittee, Minutes of the First Meeting," 6/10/70.)
-[300] ‘Carry on Camping’. <em>Do or Die</em> #8, p. 148
+[44] Department of Army Message to Subordinate Commands, 3/31/68.
-[301] <em>EF! Action</em> <em>Update,</em> #57
+[45] CIA memorandum, Subject: Inspector General's Survey of the Office of Security, Annex II, undated.
-[302] EF! <em>Action Update,</em> #48
+[46] Memorandum from Deputy Chief, CI Staff, to Director Office of Security, 2/1/62.
-[303] For a short while it looked like The Land Is Ours might successfully set off a wave of action around the country. However the entrenched nature of the problem and the spectacular, media-centric style of some of the main occupations cut that possibility short.
+[47] Memorandum from Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, to Deputy Director for Support, 2/21/62.
-[304] There is always a danger here of merely becoming unpaid social workers. For too many in the past rnmmunity organising has been a way back into the mainstream. That this is a danger should not stop people doing these bread and butter activities-but should remind us to be ever vigilant against assimilation.
+[48] Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 7/19/66. The same document that describes the application of the "DO NOT FILE" procedure to "black bag jobs" also notes that before a break-in could be approved within the FBI, the Special Agent in Charge of the field office had to assure headquarters that it could be accomplished without "embarrassment to the Bureau." (Sullivan memorandum, 7/19/66.)
-[305] One argument put forward for community organising over ecological defence, is that only the working class can defeat capitalism so “real work” needs to be done in the working class to strengthen it and radicalise it. Apart from the obvious patronising missionary attitude this view ignores the fact that the Land Struggle Period saw large actions with and by working class communities across the country; a level ofjoint action most traditional class struggle anarchos could only dream of. While many of the places ‘90s land struggles happened in were Tory shires others were in the old ‘barracks of the labour movement’-the East End, South Wales, Glasgow, inner-city Manchester and the Yorkshire mining areas!
+An isolated instance of file destruction apparently occurred in the Los Angeles office of the Internal Revenue Service in December 1974, at a time when Congressional investigation of the intelligence agencies was imminent. This office had collected large amounts of essentially political information regarding black militants and political activists. In violation of internal document destruction procedures the files were destroyed prior to their proposed review by IRS authorities. See IRS Report; Sec. IV. "The Information Gathering and Retrieval System"; Staff Summary of interview with Chief, IRS Division, Los Angeles, 8/1/75.
-[306] For a good analysis of this debacle see--“May Day: Guerrilla? Gardening?;’ Do or Die #9, p. 69
+[49] For example, letters from W. C. Sullivan to J. Edgar Hoover, 6/30/69, 7/2/69, 7 3/69, 7/7/69. These letters were sent to Hoover from Paris, where Sullivan coordinated the Kraft surveillance. All of them bear the notation "DO NOT FILE."
-[307] “Here Comes the Barmy Army!” Do or Die #9, p. 12
+[50] Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 7/19/66.
-[308] This year’s EU summit in Greece is likely tobe the last outside ofthe EU Fortress in Brussels.
+[51] Gordon Stewart, 9/30/75, p. 29.
-[309] EF! Action Update, #55
+[52] McCone, 10/9/75, pp. 3-4; Angleton, 9/17/75, p. 20; Osborn, 10/21/75; Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 38.
-[310] Direct Action Video, Oxford EF!
+[53] Memorandum from Richard Helms to Director of Security, 5/17/74; Helms, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 84. By the CIA's own account, moreover, at most only three Cabinet-level officials may have been told about the mail opening aspects of this project. Each of these three -- Postmasters General J. Edward Day and Winton M. Blount, and Attorney General John Mitchell -- dispute the Agency's claim. (Day, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 45; Blount, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 47; Mitchell, 10/2/75, pp. 13-14.)
-[311] “Militancy,” FoE <em>Newsletter,</em> #10, Oct 1972
+[54] Blind memorandum from "CIA Officer,"[ 4/23/65.
-[312] Simply wishing this doesn’t make it a reality. It may be truer to say that we aspire to become ecological revolutionaries.
+[55] Ibid. Mr. Gronouski testified as follows about the CIA's successful attempt to keep knowledge of the New York project from him:
-[313] Civilisation needs us all to become increasingly isolated individuals that can only exist as part of a mass. Authoritarian revolutionaries and reformists alike often talk of the need for a mass movement to create change, yet libertarian change only happens in everyday life. Check out the pamphlet: <em>Anti-Mass-Methods of Organising for Collectives.</em>
+"When this news [about CIA mail opening) broke [in 19751, I thought it was incredible that a person in a top position of responsibility in Government in an agency should have something of this sort that is very illegal going on within his own agency and did not know about it. It is not that I did not try to know about these things. I think it is incumbent upon anybody at the top office to try to know everything that goes on in his organization." (Gronouski, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4 p. 44.)
-[314] “Making Punk A Threat Again” by <em>Profane Existence.</em>
+[56] Helms, 10/23/75, pp. 28,30-31.
-[315] <em>The Spanish Anarchists: The Heroic Years 1868–1936</em> by Murray Bookchin (AK Press), p. 288
+[57] Special Report, p.[ 29. Richard Helms testified as follows about this inaccurate statement:
-[316] Ibid. p. 146
+". . . the only explanation I have for it was that this applied entirely to the FBI and had nothing to do with the CIA, that we never advertised to this Committee or told this Committee that this mail operation was going on, and there was no intention of attesting to a lie. . . ."
-[317] Ibid. p. 288
+"And if I signed this thing, then maybe I didn't read it carefully enough."
-[318] “Peasants and the Transitional Class” at the end of Task IV explains this further.
+"There was no intention to mislead or lie to the President." (Helms, 10/22/75, Hearings Vol. 4, p. 95).
-[319] ‘It’s Good to Talk’, <em>Observer Magazine,</em> 09/06/02.
+[58] Howard Osborn, 8/28/75, pp. 58, 59; Thomas Karamessines, 10/8/75, p. 12; Richard Helms, 9/10/75, p. 127.
-[320] <em>The Revolt Against Change</em> by Trevor Blackwell and Jeremy Seabrook, p. 3
+[59] For example, Chief, Security Support Division memorandum, 12/24/74; Memorandum from C/TSD/CCG/CRB to the file, 3/26/60; memorandum from C/TSD/CCG/CRB to the file, 9/15/69.
-[321] <em>Blood in My Eye</em> by George Jackson (Penguin Books, 1975) p. 50. Black Liberation fighter Jackson was killed by the screws inside San fentin prison only a few days after finishing this book.
+[60] Donald E. Moore, 10/1/75, p. 79.
-[322] Enrages and the Situationists in the Occupation Movement, France, Atay <em>’68</em> by Rene Vienet, ISBN 094606105X, p. 94
+[61] Moore, 10/1/75, p. 31; Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, vol. 6, pp. 204, 205.
-[323] Towards a Citizens’ Militia (Cienfuegos Press, 1980).
+[62] Moore 10/1/75, p.[ 48. See Mail Report: see. IV, "Nature and Value of the Product Received."
-[324] “The Coup D”Etat” by Lt-Colonel DJ Goodspeed in the interesting but slightly weird <em>Civilian Resistance as a National Defence</em> ed. Adam Roberts (Pelican).
+[63] FBI agent testimony, 10/10/75, p. 30.
-[325] A good point from another <em>DoD</em> editor: <em>In some ways, I really don’t like the extrapolation of the ‘personal is political’ that some c’.fthese proposals represent. Tnstead of all social relations being subsumed/made subordinate to capital, they are subsumed to the task’ of building the counter culture/ revolution. Have you not considered that people drift apart because they realise that they simply don’t like each other any more-and that it might be unhealthy to stay togetherfor the sake of the revolution?</em>
+[64] See NSA Report: See. II, "Summary of NSA Watch List Activity."
-<br>
-<br>A danger correctly spotted. This is why it important to grow substantive cultures made up of interlinked smal human sized groups. A good example was the Newbury Bypass Campaign. One of the factors that made it so good was that there were over 30 camps --each with a different atmosphere. Living in many different bands enabled us to be a strong temporary tribe. If we had all been part of one organisation we could never have held together at all. “Affinity groups structures” (read: groups of friends!) grow countercultural unity by separating people as much as bringing them together. Here lies another major difference with authoritarians. In large organisations personal clashes arc channelled into competitive scrambles for dominance over the mass membership.
-[326] In the city’s isolation from the land can drive you mad, in the countryside isolation from other people can have the same affect. For this reason it is important that those moving onto the land do so collectively and/or stay in regular contact with those elsewhere. The takeover of land-legal or illegal--should be seen as an extension of the counter-culture not a flight from it. For more on allotment history, forest gardening and land struggle see ‘Farmageddon: Confronting Industrial Agriculture’, <em>Do or Die</em> #7, p. 40
+[65] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to FBI Field Offices, 8/14/43.
-[327] Rioted by Stokely Carmichael (ex-prez of SNCC) in <em>Black Poets and Prophets: A Bold, Uncompromising Clear Blueprint for Black Liberation</em> edited by Woodie King and Earl Anthony, (New American Library, 1972).
+[66] Memorandum from Atlanta Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/7/67.
-[328] “Or maybe a step closer to despair and the loony bin’-says another <em>DoD</em> editor.
+[67] Memorandum from Birmingham Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/14/67.
-[329] From Harrison Ford’s (!) intro to: <em>Hotspots: Earth’s Biologically Richest and Most Endangered Terrestrial Ecosystems</em> by Russel <em>A</em> Mittermeher, Norman Myers and Christina Goettsch, ISBN 9686397582
+[68] Postal officials told Bureau liaison that since Shelton's allegations "appear to involve an internal struggle for control of Ku Klux Klan activities in North Carolina and since the evidence of mail fraud was somewhat tenuous in nature, the Post Office did not contemplate any investigation." (Memorandum from Special Agent to D. J. Brennan, 7/11/67.) Had the FBI informed the Post Office that Bureau agents had written the letter, it would have been apparent that Shelton's allegations were not based on an "internal struggle" within the KKK.
-[330] <em>Conservation Biology</em> by ME Soule and Bruce A. Wilcox, Eds., p. 166
+[69] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Charlotte Field Office, 8/21/67.
-[331] “The Chartist Anthem,” in <em>The Jolly Machine: Songs cf Industrial Protest</em> and Social Discontent From the West Midlands by M. Raven.
+[70] Memorandum from Charlotte Field Office to FBI Headquarters 8/22/67.
-[332] *Hotspots*, p. 37
+[71] Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, Val. 2, p. 24.
-[333] Ibid. A number of the hugely important major tropical wildernesses are not presently included in the hotspot list They are Amazonia, the Congolian Forest Block of Central Africa, New Guinea (i.e. West Papua and PNG), the Melanesian Islands-New Britain. New Ireland, Northern Solomons (i.e. Bougainville and Buka), Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. These areas are all under some level of attack-some heavy-but they all retain over 253 of their original area untrashed. ‘Ihe team that wrote Hotspots are in the process of writing a report on these areas. While they need defence, from the perspective of global triage they are not presently areas of highest global priority. Of course if industrialism continues ‘for much longer these areas will almost definitely join the global habitat Red List.
+When J. Edgar Hoover informed Attorney General John Mitchell about the Report on July 27, 1970, Mitchell objected to its proposals and influenced the President to withdraw his original approval.
-[334] While the Philippines does not appear in the overall Top 9 list; when looking at plant endemism alone it is ranked ninth highest of all the hotspots.
+According to John 'Mitchell, he believed that the proposals "were inimical to the best interests of the country and certainly should not be something that the President of the United States should be approving." (John Mitchell testimony, 10/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 23.)
-[335] Caribbean Environment Watch produce a useful newsletter: CEW, 141 Coldershaw Road, Ealing, London, WI3 9DU.
+[73] James Angleton, 9/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 77.
-[336] Cubans grew one of the largest anarcho-syndicalist movements in the world. Though its height was in the 1920s it was still a significant force when Castro rose to power. Armed resistance to the communist counterrevolution ended in jail for well over 100 anarchists. Many companeras were killed and hundreds more went into exile.
+[74] See Military Surveillance Report: Sec.[ 1, "Improper Surveillance of Private Citizens by the Military"; Inspector General Report, Department of the Army, 1/3/72.
-[337] Important issues must be faced when supporting mainstream conservation programs in the Majority World which too often just shit on local people. Though conservation fiefdoms are in many ways just another form of colonialism they may still be the best hope for some species sur-vival through this century. A prickly reality. It matters little to a hear how oppressed its killer is and the sap still spurts whether the tree is cut with the axe of a peasant or the chainsaw of a company logger. In the war between humanity and nature, I side with the bears. Nevertheless multinational conservation organisations awash with money make questionable allies!
+[75] The Johnson Administration itself attempted to restrict the Long Subcommittee's investigation into national security matters, although there is no indication that this attempt was motivated by a desire to protect illegal activities. (E.g., Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Tolson, 2/27/65; memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Gale, Rosen, Sullivan, and DeLoach, 3/2/65.)
-[338] As well as mainstream conservationists some Turkish anarchists have recently done anti-GM actions-hopefully an indication of the greening of that scene.
+[76] Blind memorandum from "CIA Officer,"[ 4/23/65.
-[339] This is for many reasons-not least of which relates to language and Britain’s colonial past. It is no surprise that many of the majority world groups we Brits have linked up with have been in ex-British colonies and/ or Christianised countries. We need to go beyond this and forge links across these divides. So for some of the countries in the Med the kind of work needed for most other hotspots is called for. It is likely that groups in Spain, Italy etc. will be able to connect us up to groups in these areas better. For example, French anarchists, for reasons connected to their own country’s colonial past, are much more aware of the 2001 Berber uprising in Algeria than British activists.
+[77] Ibid.
-[340] The desire to escape the boredom of much of our present activism. The state repression of travellers. The squeezing of dole autonomy. High land prices and repressive planning law.
+[78] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Tolson, 2/27/65.
-[341] *Hotspots*, p. 177
+[79] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Gale, Rosen, Sullivan, and DeLoach, 3/1/65.
-[342] *Hotspots*, p. 182
+[80] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Gale, Rosen, Sullivan, and DeLoach 3/1/65.
-[343] See “Farmageddon: Confronting Industrial Agriculture;” Do or Die #7, p. 40
+[81] Mail Report Part IV, See. VII, "Concern with Exposure." At the time of his testimony before the Long Subcommittee, Chief Postal Inspector Montague knew of ongoing FBI projects in which Bureau agents received custody of the mail, but he was apparently unaware that these projects involved mail openings.
-[344] See ‘Victory at Offham’, Do or Die #6, p. 62
+[82] For example, Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Tolson, 1/10/66.
-[345] See ‘South Downs Mass Trespasses ’98: Notes on Packed Lunches and Revolution’, Anon., South Downs EF!
+[83] Memorandum from M. A. Jones to Mr. Wick, Attachment, 1/11/66.
-[346] Ecological and strategical importance are fundamentally different. Strategical importance relates to us, our abilities, and what effect action at a specific site will have on our growth or col-lective power. Ecological importance relates to the intrinsic value of sites irrespective of our ability to defend them.
+[84] See pp.[ 62--65, 105, 205-206 for a description of some of these improper surveillances.
-[347] At the Rio Earth Summit nonsense in 1992, governments said they would catalogue their countries’ biodiversity. The card-filers of the apocalypse have been busy and you can check out their handy work on the UK Biodiversity Website: [[http://www.ukbap.org.uk][www.ukbap.org.uk]]. Te website is being added to constantly and you can search it for particular habitat types nationally or locally, or look at biodiversity in your county generally. Some of the website is very useful, other parts blather.
+[85] Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Tolson, 1/21/66.
-[348] The move into a cycle oflarge-scale daytime national mobilisations was a significant shift in strategy for animal libbers-catalysed by the unexpected mass explosion of the live export protests (See “Shoreham: Live Exports and Community Defence;’ Do or Die #5, p. 75). After the significant victories of the ‘80s against vivisection and fur farming animal libbers looked to escalate action against the largest cause of animal suffering in Britain. Their target-industrial agriculture. Their action against the meat/dairy industry-a vast target to say the least-though dramatic (just look at those meat trucks burn!), was a failure. Few animals were saved and the entirely covert nature of the activity seriously cut into recruitment and outreach. Industrial agriculture is just too big a target. Ironically the live export resistance opened a way out of this impasse.
+[86] DeLoach memorandum, 1/21/66. This incident also illustrates that Congress has at times permitted itself to be "neutralized." The general reluctance of Congress to discharge its responsibilities toward intelligence agencies is discussed at pp. 277-281.
-[349] Common Sense and Sustainability: A Partnership for the Cairngorms-Executive Summary, The Scottish Office, p. 4
+[87] James Angleton; 9/17/75. p. 48
-[350] Biodiversity in Scotland, The Stationary Office, ISBN 0114958157
+[88] Memorandum from Lawrence Houston to Acting Chief, Division D, 1/29/73.
-[351] Ibid. p. 287. Read: ‘No Evolution Without Revolution: The Political Ecology of Wolves, Beavers, Sheep and Deer’, Do or Die #6, p. 34
+[88] Proposed regulations drafted in response to Executive Order 11905 (March 1976) require the Inspector General to refer "all legal matters" to the Office of General Counsel. (Draft Reg. HR 1-3.)
-[352] While crofters are some ofthe best allies ofthe Highlands and Islands nothing is without its contradictions. The growth of hugely damaging salmon farms is one example. The Crofters Union has recently been in increased contact with Via Capensina!, the global peasant network which includes among others the Karnataka farmers and the Confederation Paysanne. For a good intro to reality for today’s crofters read: ‘Ihe Story of Crofting in Scotland by Douglas Willis, ISBN 0859763447
+[89] Helms deposition, 9/10/75, P. 59.
-[353] See: ‘Over Fishing: Causes and Consequences’, ‘Ihe Ecologist, March 1995.
+[90] Gordon Stewart deposition, 4/30/75, p. 29; Rockefeller Commission Report, p. 146; Report on the Offices of the General Counsel and Inspector General: The General Counsel's Responsibilities, 9/30/75, p. 29.
-[354] “Though still globally minor in scale industrial ‘mariculture’ is set to grow massively over the next few decades. From the salmon farms of the Scottish Hebrides to the slaveing of Caribbean fisheries, civilisation is attempting to manage sealife as it does landlife. All over the world considerable struggles are being waged between traditional fishers and industrial sea farming. See: ‘Taking the Pisces: Struggles of the Fishworkers of inclia’, Do or Die #8, p. 251
+[91] Regulation HR 7-1a (6).
-[355] ‘Wildlife in Danger’, The Ecologist, March 1999.
+[92] Memorandum for the Record by J. S. Earman, Inspector General, 11/29/63; Memorandum from Helms to DCI, 11/9/64.
-[356] The Galapagos Islands are one of the two exceptional mini-hotspots which Myers et al. see as global priorities on a par with the 25 conventional hotspots.
+[93] 1957 I.G. Inspection of the Technical Services Division.
-[357] ‘Occurrences in the Ferocious Isles’, EF! Journal, September 1986.
+[94] Rockefeller Commission Report, 6/6/75, p. 89.
-[358] The 1974 seal cull ship sabotage at Sutton Bridge was one of the first acts of the Band of Mercy, predecessor of the ALF. See: Animal Warfare: The Story of the A11imal Liberation Front, David Henshaw, ISBN 0006373240, p. 15
+[95] Memorandum from L. K. White, Deputy Director for Support, to Acting Inspector General, Attachment, 3/9/62; blind memorandum, undated (1969). The Inspector General under whose auspices the second review was conducted stated "[O]f course we knew that this was illegal," but he believed that it was "unnecessary" to raise the matter of its illegality with Director Helms "since everybody knew that it was [illegal] and it didn't seem ... that I would be telling Mr. Helms anything that he didn't know." (Gordon Stewart, 9/30/75, p. 32.)
-[359] Notorious Vessel Meets Explosive Encl! : [[http://www.seashepherC.org/][www.seashepherC.org/]] research/international/villcluen.html-link broken [alternate link: http:// [[http://www.newsweek.com/so-much-saving-whales-158105][www.newsweek.com/so-much-saving-whales-158105]]]
+[96] W. Mark Felt testimony, 2/3/75, p. 65.
-[360] “How to Sink Whalers, Driftnetters, and Other Environmentally Destructive Ships” by Sea Shepherd Agent #013, p. 343 in Ecodefence, Eel. Dave Foreman, ISBN 0963775103
+[97] Felt, 2/3/75, p. 57.
-[361] See: “Putting a Spanner in the Oil Industry’s Works:’ Do or Die No.7, p. 66
+[98] Felt, 2/3/75, pp. 54, 55.
-[362] “Haclzabe: East Africa’s Last Hunting and Gathering Tribe,” Do or Die #8, p. 267
+[99] Felt, 2/3/75, pp. 59-60.
-[363] For more information see: [[http://www.eco-action.org][www.eco-action.org]] .
+[100] Felt, 2/3/75, p. 60.
-[364] “Haclzabe: East Africa’s Last Hunting and Gathering Tribe,” Do or <em>Die</em> #8, p. 267
+[101] Felt, 2/3/75, pp. 56, 57.
-[365] “Tribal Round-up,” <em>Do or Die</em> #8, p. 264
+[102] When asked about this Manual provision, Attorney General Edward Levi stated:
-[366] The 1970s crisis and the secret state destabilisation of a succession of Labour governments is a rarely mentioned but extremely important part of recent British history: A <em>substantial section cf the British Secret state and its allies in the Conservative party, business and the media believed, orfound it useful to prete11d to believe-the distinctio11 is d(fficult to make--that British democracy, the state. and even the capitalist system itself was under threat from a resurgent left, spearhead by the trade unions and manipulated by the British Communist Party under instruction from Moscow</em>...-from Lobster Magazine #34, p.32.
+"I do believe ... some further explanation is in order. First, the Bureau informs me that the provision has not been interpreted to mean that an investigation should not take place and that any interpretation that an investigation would not be instituted because of the possibility of embarrassment to the Bureau was never intended and, in fact, has never been the policy of this Bureau.' I am told that 'what was intended to be conveyed was that in such eventuality FBI Headquarters desired to be advised of the matter before investigation is instituted so that Headquarters would be on notice and could direct the inquiry, if necessary."'
-<br>
-<br>Radical Right militias led by intelligence and military men were formed. Newspapers openly discussed the right circumstances for Army intervention in Britain while MlS orchestrated black propaganda against the Labour Cabinet and trade union leaders. joint military and police opera-lions were carried out at Heathrow Airport without government sanction. Plans were advanced to install an unelected government of National Unity lead by Lord Mountbatten. No unsubstantiated conspiracy theory, this was first exposed in an autobiography by an ex-Daily Mirror executive who was actually at a meeting with some of the conspirators and a long time MIS agent. Similar manoeuvres within the military continued through to the mid ‘70s.
-<br>
-<br>The parapolitical background to the ‘70s crisis is essential to any understanding of the death of the post-war consensus and the triumph of the Thatcherite radical right. It’s amazing to realise how near to the brink Britain really was! See Who Framed Colin Wallace? by Paul Foot, (Macmillan, 1988) and, Smear: Wilson and the Secret State by Stephen Dorill and Robin Ramsay, (Fourth Estate). These are still the best and most fully documented accounts of the Wilson plot.
-[367] After the collapse of the state-backed pyramid scheme much of the Albanian population were left destitute. As a result in 1997, Albania experienced one of the most profound proletarian revolutions of the Twentieth Century. Virtually the entire armedforces mutinied whilst workers formed <em>revolutionary councils and seized 80% of the country... the Albanian Government was not going to extinguish the Albanian revolution because there was no longer a government. The revolution had extinguished the Albanian state. The world’s investors began to panic. It took the armies often countries to crush the Albanian revolution and it was a close call</em> ... “Kissing goodbye to their Koreas;’ <em>Black Flag</em> #213, p.22.
+"Second, the manual provision dates back to March 30, 1955."
-[368] Blatantly crazy millenarian revolts and the pro-peasant social reorganisation following the Black Death, are examples of the positive effects of past social ruptures, themselves arising from mass explosions of personal physical and mental health problems. On a similar but more depressing note we can look at the global rise of the West, enabled in large part by the mass deaths that Western disease brought to indigenous peoples.
+"Third, I am informed by the Bureau that 'immediate steps are being taken to remove that phraseology from our Manual of Rules and Regulations.'"
-[369] I’m talking here about crisis as opposed to counter-revolutions. Counter-revolutions are essentially attempts by elites to counter and destroy the self-organisation of peasants and the working class-Roll back (r)evolution. While counter-revolutions by their nature presume the existence oflarge movements of the politically aligned, crises can break out when the majority of people are ‘non-aligned’. I do <em>not</em> use the phrase non-aligned to mean apathetic. Most people today in Britain would not align themselves to any group of politicos for a whole host of very sensible reasons.
+(Letter from Attorney General Levi to Senator Richard Schweiker, 11/10/75.)
-[370] Here I am talking about those who really lived inside the activist cultures of squatting, animal liberation, ecological direct action etc. In fact the sum total of all those involved peripherally over this period would probably run to over 100,000. Anyone who doubts this should note that despite most people who went to anti-road protests not being arrested there were 1,000+ arrests at Newbury alone! Similarly J18 was just below 10,000, while smaller RT Ss have happened all over Britain. In the same period every weekend in the season dozens of hunt sab groups were out in the field. At the turn of the ‘90s heyday of travelling tens of thousands were on the road at any given time. A high proportion of all those people would see themselves as anarchists.
+[103] Henry Montague testimony, 10/2/75, pp. 55, 71.
-[371] The track Assassin by ADP concerns the payback one Indian revolutionary gave Sir Michael O’Dwyer, ex-governor of the Punjab. O’Dwyer had presided over the massacre of unarmed peasants and workers in Amiritsar in 1919. Nearly 20 years later Udham Singh shot him dead in London at a meeting of the East India Association. Singh was an electrician, trade unionist, and in 1938 in Coventry the initiator of the first Indian Workers Association. The action both harrowed the English, elite and lifted the spirit of many of his people. He was hung in Pentonville prison. ‘Ihe Indian Workers Association remains active today. For a good intro to Black resistance in Britain, see .4. <em>Different Hunger</em> by A. Sivanandan, ISBN 0861043715
+[104] Henry Montague, 10/2/75, pp. 15-16.
-[372] <em>The Zapatistas: A Rough</em> <em>Guide,</em> (Chiapas Link) ISBN 0904367992
+[105] Donald Moore, 10/1/75, p. 31.
-[373] Too often activists from other countries are pushed into reformist- and futile-trajectories by their liberal Western hosts. Indigenous groups especially are told to engage with the UN, etc. While this idiocy is unlikely in our circles, other problems arise. Sometimes radical groups’ normal ways of behaviour can lead them to push their guests into an endless round of solidarity talks, meetings, pamphlet and newsletter writing. Often these are aimed primarily at the domestic group’s own constituency and may be of more use to them than to the foreign group whose member they are hosting. ‘Ibis can waste time the guest could more constructively spend on studying and organising in their own community’s interest. However the above mentioned activities can be very useful ifthey build solidarity actions here and other forms of direct aid. If not, the relationship can descend to one of the foreign guest giving a bit of Third World political entertainment to the Western radicals.
+[106] Nicholas Katzenbach, 10/11/75, p. 35.
-[374] In fact the Indonesian state has used classic divide and rule strategy by using ethnically Papuan Indonesian soldiers to suppress revolt in East Timor and ethnically Timorese Indonesian soldiers to suppress revolt in West Papua.
+[107] Katzenbach statement, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 205.
-[375] A lot can be learned from this action. See the article “Sabbing Shell” in Do or Die, No.8, p.125
+[108] Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 207; Ramsey Clark, 12/3/75; Hearings, Vol. 6 p. 235; Katzenbach's and Clark's knowledge of disruptive operations is discussed at greater length in Finding G: "Deficiences in Control and Accountability" p. 265.
-[376] The struggle of the Vietnamese against America was unbelievably heroic, from which many lessons can be learned, but it should be underlined that Ho Chi Minh’s regime was an authoritarian state that mercilessly crushed all opposition. Our enemy’s enemy is not our friend!
+[109] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 10/7/63; memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 16/18/63.
-[377] See <em>Pacifism as Pathology</em> by Ward Churchill, ISBN 18 940370 73, p.79. A brilliant <em>intervention into the delusion, aroma of racism, and sense of privilege which mark the coved self-defeatism of mainstream dissident politics.</em> Speaking as an ex-pacifist, I highly recommend it!
+[110] Memorandum from C. A. Evans to Mr. Belmont 10/21/63.
-[378] “A Strategy to Win” by Bill Ayers in <em>New Left Notes,</em> 12.9.1969.
+In May 1961, Robert Kennedy also became aware of the CIA's use of organized crime figures in connection with "clandestine efforts" against the Cuban government. (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 5/22/61.) But he did not instruct the CIA to terminate its involvement with underworld figures either at that time or in May 1962, when he learned at a briefing by CIA officials that an assassination attempt had occurred. According to the CIA's General Counsel, who participated in the 1962 briefing, Kennedy only said if we were going to get involved with Mafia personnel again he wanted to be informed first." (Lawrence Houston deposition, 6/2/75, p. 14.)
-[379] The whole concept of armed struggle is rather nebulous in a similar way to its dualistic opposite non-violence. The fetishising of guns-basically just tools—is often carried out with equal abandon by those who advocate their use and those who vehemently oppose them. What is ‘armed struggle’? ls the destruction of a digger by explosives (as was the case in one action by the Welsh Mebion Glydowr) an act of armed struggle? If hand tools were used to the same effect (as say at Manchester Airport) is that not armed? Is tossing a mollie/petrol bomb at a cop in Genoa not armed struggle? Was the machine gunning of the Spanish Embassy by the Angry Brigade (in which no one was injured) armed struggle? If so, was the smashing up of the Nigerian Embassy with hammers not armed struggle? If the definition of armed struggle lies entirely on whether guns are used, the concept is of little use to us. We should not let tools define our activity, but our activity define which tools to use.
+The CIA's use of underworld figures clearly posed problems for the FBI's ongoing investigation of organized crime in the United States, which had in large part been initiated by Attorney General Kennedy himself. (Senate Select Committee, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders," pp. 125-129.)
-[380] It is not just in the realm of actions, bombings and the like that Immigrant communities become “an enemy within:’ Over the last few years immigrants have been at the forefront of work-place struggle. The combination in some immigrant communities of radicalism and low wages has resulted in prolonged strikes such as at Hilingdon Hospital and JJ Foods. Inner city riots by young Blacks and Asians are another example. However it is not within the scope of this task section to discuss rebellions within the core (Task I) whoever they are carried out by.
+[111] The FBI instituted additional wiretaps on King on four separate occasions between 1964 and 1965. Since Justice Department policy before March 1965 imposed no limit on the duration of wiretaps and they were approved by the Attorney General, the Bureau claimed that the King taps were justified as a continuation of the tap originally authorized by Kennedy in October 1963. (For example, memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Atlanta Field Office, 4/19/65; Martin Luther King Report: Sec. IC, "Wiretap Surveillance of Dr. King and the SCLC."
-[381] “Easton Cowboys Go West” in <em>Do or Die</em> #8, p.248
+[112] Katzenbach's initials appear on memoranda addressed to the Attorney General advising him of these bugs, but he cannot recall seeing or initialing them. (Memoranda from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 5/17/65, 10/19/65, 12/1/65; Katzenbach, 12/1/75. Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 211, p. 46.) He stated, however, that if he had read these documents, he would have "done something about it." (Katzenbach, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 230.)
-[382] In the crackdown that followed the bombings of a Zionist office and the Israeli embassy many Palestinian activists were raided. Samar Alami and Jawd Botmeh were convicted of the attacks and given 20 years after which they face deportation to Israel. They maintain they have been framed. See “The Israeli Embassy Bombing and the Secret State” in <em>Do or Die</em> #8, p.224
+[113] A transmittal slip, which the FBI claims had been attached to the 12/1/65 memorandum, notes that "these are particularly delicate surveillances" and that "we should be very cautious in terms of the non-FBI people who may from time to time necessarily be involved in some aspect of installation." (Memorandum from Nicholas Katzenbach to J. Edgar Hoover, 12/10/65.) This message is signed by Katzenbach, but he testified that he is unsure it related to the King surveillances. (Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 229.)
-[383] “The New Luddite War” in <em>Do or Die,</em> #8, p.95
+[114] Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 210; Burke Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, pp. 3943.
-[384] “Being Busy” by Anonymous (SDEF!), in <em>On Fire: Ihe Battle of Genoa and the Anti-capitalist Movement,</em> p.41
+[115] J. Edward Day testimony, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4. p. 45.
-[385] <em>The Spanish Anarchists: ‘The Heroic Years</em> by Murray Bookchin, p.281
+[116] In 1973, however, Mr. Cotter was instrumental in effecting the termination of the CIA's New York project. (Cotter, 8/7/75, p. 45.)
-[386] <em>This Side of Glory</em> by David Hilliard, ISBN 0316364215, p.27
+[117] Cotter, 8/7/75, p. 45.
-<br>
+[118] Ibid.
-* Afterword
+[119] Cotter 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol.[ 4, p. 74.
-** <em>Do or Die</em> Editors Interview
+[120] Ibid.
-<em>This inteview was conducted at the end of 2006 for the American</em> Earth First’ Journal.
+[121] John Erlichman testimony, President's Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, 4/17/75, p. 98.
-Describe the project: its inception/inspiration...
+[122] Erlichman testimony, President's Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, 4/17/75, p. 98.
-None ofthe current ex-editors were involved at the beginning of the project. The editorial group has changed over time, with quite a few people passing through.
+[123] Answer of Richard M. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatory 23, 3/9/76, p. 13.
-Do or Die (DoD) started in 1992, within a year of EF! starting in Britain. It pushed a green anarchist, direct action perspective. At this time EF! was split and was half liberal and half radical.
+[124] Answer of Richard M. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatory 19, 3/9/76, p. 13.
-DoD has never fulfilled the role of the EF! <em>Journal</em> in the States. The <em>Journal</em> is the official voice of EF! with the editors accountable to the gatherings. <em>DoD</em> was always a voice of Earth First! <em>DoD</em> explicitly gave publicity to sabotage and had a no compromise attitude. Some people in EF! didn’t like it at first and even tried to expel <em>DoD</em> from EF! The Ea<em>rt</em>h <em>First! Action Update</em> [EF!AU] has worked more like the <em>Journal-it</em> has had a rotating editorial collective and has been accountable to gatherings.
+[125] Answer of Richard M. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatory 34, 3/9/76, pp. 16-17.
-Early on <em>DoD</em> was supposed to carry more news and was supposed to be more frequent-every three months or so. ft started out as a 24-page zinc photocopied at night at American Express by members of staff (the European headquarters of AMEX is a well-known and much-hated landmark in Brighton). It kind of mutated into a massive book over time.
+[126] President Ford has recently rejected this doctrine of Presidential power.
-It might be useful for American readers to point out the other ways in which DoD is different from the EF! <em>Journal. DoD</em> has always been all voluntary-no one has ever been paid to work for <em>DoD.</em> Also DoD has pretty much always been all anonymous-no writers, photographers, or artists were credited. This is something which is pretty much taken for granted in the EF! scene in the UK (the EF!AU was also pretty much anonymous after the first two or three years) but is more unusual in the USA. This has sometimes caused confusion amongst people who didn’t realise that DoD was written by lots of different people. Some of the articles in DoD were written by people from the editorial collective, but there were probably 50 or 60 contributors per issue. An article being in DoD didn’t necessarily mean it was written by us or that the editorial collective supported everything in it. Hence there was lots of stuff in DoD that contradicted lots of other stuff in <em>DoD.</em> Sometimes this was explicit-like when we had pro and anti articles on some subject—e.g. legal social centres in issue 10 or the issue of mental illness at the Newbury Bypass protest in issue 6.
+[127] Answer of Richard M. Nixon to Senate Select Committee Interrogatory 17, 8/9/76, pp. 11-12.
-Anonymity was a point of principle and mostly due to repression of known leaders and personalities in EF! in the USA (e.g. Judi Bari) and in the British animal lib movement (e.g. Arkangel) at around the time that EF! was getting going in the UK. It seemed sensible to avoid a cult of personality-there was an awareness of how EF! in the USA had been split by groupings forming around particular charismatic individuals-e.g. Dave Foreman and Judi Bari.
+[128] Milton Iredell, 9/18/75, p. 99.
-It also needs saying that the people involved in putting together DoD were not writers or journalists. Pretty much everyone involved spent more time on actions than they did on DoD. We did not want to be journalists-reporting on other people’s struggles, we wanted to record the voices ofthe people involved in the struggles themselves. If we couldn’t bully them to write for us we would often interview them.
+[129] Memorandum from Ingersoll to Gayler, 4/10/70.
-DoD was produced by and largely aimed at a few hundred people in the UK eco scene. Although it had a wider circulation than this, it was largely produced with this audience in mind. But, DoD has also been really liked by all sorts of other people who often didn’t like each other at all. For example lots of more traditional anarchist communists really liked DoD, as did lots of conservationists-the magazine was big enough that very few people read all of it—-people just read the bits they liked and ignored the rest. We’d get comments from more traditional anarchists saying that they really liked it, but it was a shame about the articles about beaver restoration or Native American spirituality. And then we’d get almost exactly opposite comments from other people who liked the beavers but weren’t so into class struggle.
+[130] See Findings, "Political Abuse" and "Intrusive Techniques" for examples.
-<em>DoD</em> was at its strongest when it had the most contributors ndalsowhen the editorial collectivewas at its biggest (6-ish,as opposed to 2-ish at some other points). Personally I think issue 8 was a bit of a high point. But then again-it’s also what you’ve got to work with-there was a lot to write about in 1999. It also maybe depends what you like. For example DoD 9 was more anti-capitalist, summit protest oriented, and it’s some people’s favourite issue-more traditional anarchists liked it, but it had less eco stuff in it and was less of a mish-mash than some other issues. That was partly a reflection of what was going on at the time and of the people who were putting it together and of the fact that that issue had a very small editorial collective and so it just was not possible to have such a varied contents.
+[131] Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to D. M. Ladd, 10/15/52.
-Each ofthe people involved in the editorial collective brought their own interests and knowledge to it, so it was partly the make up of the editorial collective that ‘ made the magazine what it was-one person knew about conservation biology, one knew about counter-insurgency theory, one knew about ultra-left theory, one knew about European punk squats, etc. So we missed out on stuff when the editorial collective shrunk sometimes.
+[132] Memorandum from Attorney General James McGranery to I. Edgar Hoover, 11/25/52; memorandum from Attorney General Herbert Brownell to J. Edgar Hoover, 4/27/53.
-There was more of an international focus in recent issues--this was possibly due to a slow down of ecological resistance in the UK-there was less day-to-day stuff happening than there was in the mid-‘90s. However, there was still a lot of stuff going on. Also the movement as a whole gained a more international perspective and DoD reflected that as people started looking to the wider causes of what they were fighting-to globalisation and to the summit meetings of the global elite for example.
+[133] Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
-Describe its role/influence in the UK’s eco-a11archist movement... Basically what happened within EF! was that we won. DoD and the political perspective it represented was relatively unpopular at the beginning. DoD was essentially trying to fulfil the same role that <em>Live Wild or Die!</em> did in the States-a radical anarchist fringe publication trying to ginger things up a bit. When we say that we won-in that the green anarchist perspective went from being the minority to the majority perspective within EF! in the UK over the course of the 1990s-that isn’t quite as arrogant as it sounds ... It may have been partly due to our efforts but is probably more due to people’s own experiences of resistance over time. This resulted in lots ofpeople dropping much of nonviolent pacifist ideology, moving more towards an anarchist position and supporting sabotage actions.
+[134] Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, 5/20/54.
-The reason maybe why our ideas reflected the way things were going a bit more than some other people’s was perhaps that the people involved in doing DoD had been influenced by other tendencies, mostly animal liberation, as opposed to others who had come to EF! from more liberal environmentalist organisations like Friends of the Earth.
+[135] Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, 5/20/54.
-How long did it run for? Why did it cease production? DoD ran from 1992 to 2003-ish-over ten years. We stopped it because most of the people in the editorial collective did not personally want to be doing it anymore and wanted to move on to other things. The project was very time consuming and always seemed to end up with us spending the summer sitting in front of a computer in some sunless basement. We did not want to hand the project over to an entirely different group of people-that would have made it into something entirely different (this is kind of what happened to Fifth Estate-and maybe it would have been better to have just ended it). We didn’t stop producing <em>DoD</em> for financial reasons. Our “suicide note” in the last issue has led some people to assume this. Neither did we stop producing the magazine because of lack of popularity or distro problems or because we thought it had no point anymore-right up to the end there was no lack of submissions or sales or of things to write about. Ideally, in the abstract, <em>DoD</em> would have carried on, it’s just that personally there weren’t enough people who actually wanted to carry on with it. As one ex-collective member memorably said: “kill it while it’s good:’ It wasn’t that we felt it wasn’t relevant anymore, or wasn’t serving a useful purpose.
+[136] Ibid.
-Another reason behind ending <em>DoD</em> was a desire to actually do some of things on the Four Tasks list [page 333], not just to produce the world’s biggest English-language anarchist journal.
+** B. The Overbreadth of Domestic Intelligence Activity
-<quote>
+<center>
-<em>I want to focus on the last issue a bit. What kind of response did you all get to “Down With ‘Ihe Empire, Up With the Spring”? Was it circulated independently of the book format in the UK?</em>
+MAJOR FINDING
-</quote>
+</center>
-Some of the ideas from “Down with the Empire, Up with the Spring” (DwtE) were originally circulated in a discussion document in ‘97/’98. But the real first appearance of it was about a year before DoD #10 came out. The second part of the article (“The Four Tasks”) was circulated as a little free pamphlet (that became known as “/he Little Grey Book) at the EF! Winter l\foot.
+The Committee finds that domestic intelligence activity has been overbroad in that (1) many Americans and domestic groups have been subjected to investigation who were not suspected of criminal activity and (2) the intelligence agencies have regularly collected information about personal and political activities irrelevant to any legitimate governmental interest.
-That stimulated things-people acting on what it said; some good criticism that was incorporated into the final version; and quite a common response-“good strategy, shame it’s too late--why didn’t you write this when we still had a movement?” The answer to this is probably that the author was too busy ‘being in the movement when it was in its heyday to be able to stop and think about it. He sat down afterwards to strategise. DwtE came out at a point when the movement was in downturn. This might be another thing perhaps not appreciated by Americans-the US and British EF! movements have had their peaks and troughs in different places-when one was on the up the other has been in decline... The starting point for DwtE was the need to change because of changing demographics-people getting older, having kids, getting jobs, the dole becoming harder and harder, it becoming harder and harder to live as a traveller.
+Subfindings
-Reactions to it over the past three years or so have been varied ... DwtE said that summit demonstrations were a good thing but the article found favour with those who opposed them. There was an emerging split-or perhaps rather a divergence--within the movement between those who were more into the anti-capitalist/anti-globalisation thing-summit demonstrations, no border camps, etc. and those who were more into the green anarchist/primitivist angle. New people came into the movement around summit demonstrations, etc. in the late ‘90s/early ‘00s with whom DoD was not such an influence. DwtE influenced one half of the movement more than the other, but even this wasn’t black and white-e.g. the section on social centres in DwtE fits very well into a lot of what the anti-globalisation folks have been doing. Various people have used DwtE to justify what they were doing anyway-people on both sides have quoted it-picking and choosing different bits to suit their purposes.
+(a) Large numbers of law-abiding Americans and lawful domestic groups have been subjected to extensive intelligence investigation and surveillance.
-The British response to DwtE came earlier-many people in the movement read it in its early Little Grey Book version and by the time it appeared in DoD #10 and became more widely distributed, many people had already started acting on what it said. There have been a couple of DwtE reading groups.
+(b) The absence of precise standards for intelligence, investigations of Americans contributed to overbreadth. Congress did not enact statutes precisely delineating the authority of the intelligence agencies or defining the purpose and scope of domestic intelligence activity. The executive branch abandoned the standard set by Attorney General Stone -- that the government's concern was not with political opinions but with "such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States." Intelligence agencies' superiors issued over-inclusive directives to investigate "subversion" (a term that was never defined in presidential directives) and "potential" rather than actual or likely criminal conduct, as well as to collect general intelligence on lawful political and social dissent.
-An international response to DwtE came about two years later once it had appeared in DoD #10 and then been distributed around the world. DwtE has been translated into French (where there have been reading groups reading it) and Dutch (where it has been republished in a journal and then as a book, with added material about the Dutch radical eco movement). It has also been republished in the USA in two separate editions, again with added material making it more relevant to the local conditions. We are still hearing about translations and reactions-you get delayed reactions from around the world as it is translated into other languages, etc.
+(c) The intelligence agencies themselves used imprecise and overinclusive criteria in their conduct of intelligence investigations. Intelligence investigations extended beyond "subversive" or violent targets to additional groups and individuals subject to minimal "subversive influence" or having little or no "potential" for violence.
-A number of projects have been solely inspired by DwtE in the UK and Europe. Some of these have been successfol and saved bits of nature from destruction. On a wider level DwtE reflects what was going on anyway... the author was not the only person thinking these things-he was drawing on a shared pool of ideas.
+(d) Intelligence agencies pursued a "vacuum cleaner" approach to intelligence collection -drawing in all available information about groups and individuals, including their lawful political activity and details of their personal lives.
-What do you see occurring within the EF! Movement/network at the present?
+(e) Intelligence investigations in many cases continued for excessively long periods of time, resulting in sustained governmental monitoring of political activity in the absence of any indication of criminal conduct or "subversion."
-Well, Part One of DwtE gives you a pretty good background up to about 2002-ish and since then... well the ageing process has continued-the generational, cyclical nature of British radical politics. There has also been the sort of split that we mentioned above. But there is still stuff happening... In a way for ecological resistance, the situation now feels quite similar to about 1992-before the anti-roads movement took off and before the movement against the Criminal Justice Act brought lots of people together.
+<em>Elaboration of Findings</em>
-It’s all relative-ecological resistance obviously had a heyday in the mid-‘90s. It was not obvious at the time that it was the heyday. This has only become clear in retrospect. So from the perspective of people who lived through that, the situation now must seem like a bit of a comedown but there’s still quite a lot going on-there are at least five active permanent protest sites; we just had all the G8 protests last year; two years running large numbers of people from the radical ecological movement in Britain have gone over to defend the wilderness in Iceland; we also just had the Camp for Climate Action this summer when several hundred people tried to shut down the biggest C02 producing power station in Britain... Just check the web and you can see there’s actually a lot of stuff going on. People’s it’s-not-like-the-good-old-days feeling probably says more about them getting older than what’s actually going on...
+The central problem posed by domestic intelligence activity has been its departure from the standards of the law. This departure from law has meant not only the violation of constitutional prohibitions and explicit statutes, but also the adoption of criteria unrelated to the law as the basis for extensive investigations of Americans.
-In some ways the movement has been a victim of its own success-we won quite a lot, against road building for example. ‘Ibey cut the road building programme almost to nothing and so then there were far fewer protest sites, but not for any bad reason, but because there wasn’t so much need for them. Likewise a few years ago you might have been hearing about lots of anti-GM sabotage actions and you might not be hearing about them so much anymore. That is attributable not to the decline of the movement but to the fact that we won and there have been as far as I’m aware NO GM test sites at all for the past few years (They are just now talking about trying some again next year).
+In 1917-1924, the federal government, often assisted by the private vigilante American Protective League, conducted sweeping investigations of dissenters, war protesters, labor organizers, and alleged "anarchists" and "revolutionaries." These investigations led to massarrests of thousands of persons in the 1920 "Palmer raids." Reacting to these and other abuses of investigative power, Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone in 1924 confined the Bureau of Investigation in the Justice Department to the investigation of federal crimes. Attorney General Stone articulated a clear and workable standard:
-In the mid-‘90s the radical eco movement was really the only game in town. In a very moribund political scene, it was the only thing going on with any life or vitality. Every other radical tendency was in decline. For a few years it was the social/political trend to which everything else had to orient itself-everyone wanted to jump on our bandwagon. The mainstream environmental movement had to reposition itself relative to us; the anarchist movement had to do the same; aspects of this movement were picked up in fashion, music, on radio and television, etc. (There was a point where it was de rigueur for every TV soap opera to have its own road protestor character.) This is different now-by comparison the radical eco movement seems not so significant now, but that may be partly because there’s more other stuff going on... the radical eco scene is now merely one thing among many-anti-capitalism/social centres/the anti-war movement, etc.
+The Bureau of Investigation is not concerned with political or other opinions of individuals. It is concerned only with their conduct and then only such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States.[1]
-Talking about the radical eco movement is one thing, talking about the EF! network is another-they are not the same thing, although I guess the radical eco movement is bigger than and encompasses EF! Earth First! existed before there was a big wave of eco-direct action and now it exists again after that wave has come and gone as a network of groups, individuals, and social centres etc. most of whom probably don’t actually call themselves Earth First! But in a way that’s not much different from how it has always been. There are still EF! gatherings every summer, attracting 200–300 people, occasionally Winter Moots, attracting fewer, the EF!AU on paper has kind of died at the moment, but there is now a website for Earth First! action reports. There are now fewer EF! groups, the network itself is less visible-you could say it barely exists, but then it has barely existed or existed in a very underground, invisible way for most of its existence! Many of the most famous EF! things were never done under that name. June 18<sup>th</sup> was organised by the ]18 Network, there was The Third Battle of Newbury, there was Road Alert, The Genetic Engineering Network... Even in the heyday of ecological resistance in the UK, Earth First! was often a largely invisible part of it-many Earth First!ers chose not to use that name and worked under a variety of “flags of convenience”-using different names for different actions.
+Nevertheless, his restriction lasted for little more than a decade.
-One reason EF! now might seem more non-existent than it is, is due to lack of infrastructure-the EF!A Uhas stopped, DoD has stopped—pretty much the only thing that keeps Earth First! existing as a thing is the Summer Gathering. There’s actually a lot of stuff happening on a local level. There’s a lot of people out there being very busy, but half the time we don’t even know what we are doing, let alone anyone else. When there have been national campaigns like the anti-roads thing (especially in the heyday of the camps, because people were travelling from camp to eamp and hitch-hiking constantly back and forth across the country) or the genetics campaign there has been more of a sense of national unity (ooo-err!) and more of an awareness of what everyone else was doing. of what we were doing as a collective entity.
+In the mid-1930s the FBI resumed domestic intelligence functions, carrying out President Roosevelt's vague order to investigate "subversive activities." The President and the Attorney General authorized FBI and military intelligence investigations of conduct explicitly recognized as "not within the specific provisions of prevailing statutes." As a result, ideas and associations, rather than suspicion of criminal offenses, once again became the focus of federal investigations.
-So maybe that’s a problem with the non-existence of <em>DoD—</em> it was one of the things giving us some national-level infrastructure, a channel of communication between us and us and between us and the rest of the world. Now though there is a new generation that watched the battles at Newbury on the television as they were growing up and has been reading DoD and DwtE because there hasn’t been so much going on recently.
+The scope of domestic intelligence investigations consistently widened in the decades after the 1930s, reaching its greatest extent in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
-Do we need another Do or Die style publication? Is there still an existing movement that would make use of a publication for “voicesfrom the ecological resistance “?
+Domestic intelligence investigations were permitted under criteria which more nearly resembled political or social labels than standards for governmental action. Rather than Attorney General Stone's standard of investigating "only such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States," domestic intelligence used such labels as the following to target intelligence investigations:
-One criticism of DoD that was expressed sometimes was that such a well-produced huge magazine was shading out other independent media publication that would otherwise exist. We can now see that this criticism is the rubbish that I always suspected it was. DoD died ages ago and nothing has sprung up to replace it-there is realy nothing filling that niche... lots of things, like the Iceland campaign or the Climate Camp will probably go pretty much un-analysed, un-recorded...
+--"rightist" or "extremist" groups in the "anticommunist field
-It’s hard to say what the influence of DoD will be. <em>DoD</em> will retain some influence for longer because it’s a book and therefore gets kept on people’s bookshelves when they clear out and throw away magazines. It survives better also in libraries and archives than zines or whatever. Newsprint decays. For us the change to a journal format was a very good thing. It survives longer...
+--persons with "anarchistic or revolutionary beliefs" or who were "espousing the line of revolutionary movements"
-Generational info gets lost. Our underground history gets lost as people get older, drop out, clear out their old pamphlet collections ... DoD is endlessly referenced by academics whereas all zines disappear. What survives for posterity will be a view of history based largely on what academics write. When we’re all 70 and the actions of our youth have been totally rewritten and distorted by historians, DoD is going to be one of the only surviving sources for the actual voices of the people involved. Because of its format it has for some become the representation of a time period because it has survived better than other things.
+--"general racial matters"
-DoD has also had quite an afterlife in academia. For people trying to write about the radical eco movement in the ‘90s, or about anti-globalisation or whatever, DoD makes very good source material. It’s all straight from the horse’s mouth as we have articles written by activists. It’s not academic so referencing it probably looks like you’ve done your research, but it’s also very easy to find as most of it is on the web and due to our clever webmaster we always get very high search results on search engines.
+--"hate organizations"
-We never exploited it as much as we could have done. We could have pushed the distro loads more and done a lot more of getting it distributed all over the place. For example for sure we could have sold about 100 times more copies in the USA if we’d had some way ofsorting out the distribution. It’s just that that’s a boring bureaucratic job that no one really fancied doing very much, we wanted to have lives instead. Hence why we stopped doing it too.
+--"rabblerousers"
-What do you think of a proposal that the EF! journal in the US change format to be lessfrequent, but larger with more analysis and broader in scope, accompanied by a more regularly published EF!AU? Did that model seem effective for disseminating news and ideas in the UK?
+--"key activists"
-We can’t really give advice to the US. Things don’t just simply transfer to the USA. But that said, the way it worked with the combination of the EF!AU and DoD wasn’t bad, it seemed to work pretty well for a while. The EFA Uwas always written in a pretty neutral objective way because it had to keep everyone in the movement happy-it couldn’t too obviously take sides. The idea of something that is the official voice of a movement that also takes sides in ongoing arguments is pretty problematic. The <em>EF!AU</em> just did news and info and contacts. Also, it’s worth pointing out, that it wasn’t only the A Uand DoD, various other publications did and still do come out of the radical eco scene and, more widely, the various overlapping direct action/anti-capitalist/anarchist scenes... The EF!A Uwas the only thing that was ever officially EF! and that didn’t try and cover all the divergent opinions. Other publications covered all the divergent ideas-e.g. Cmporate Watch, DoD, Green Anarchist, and various other local ones...
+--"black nationalists"
-Anything else you want to discuss or mention?
+--"white supremacists"
-There should have been more about climate change in DwtE. It’s later than we thought when we published DwtE. There should have been more stuff on preparing for crisis in it. The Four Tasks of DwtE will be affected by climate change. Things are speeding up more than anyone thought. The Hotspots analysis is still useful but we’re further down the road than anyone thought. In DwtE we said give the Hotspots 10 years and then maybe swap to Coldspots. We probably haven’t got that long. But even then, the idea of switching to Coldspots is still assuming that habitat destruction is the main problem, but if the Amazon catches fire we’re in a different place altogether.
+--"agitators"
-Things have happened since we published DoD #10, e.g. the stuff that James Lovelock has come out with and the realisation of the effects of global dimming. which puts us about 10 years further down the road than we thought we were. The increasing realisation of the severity of the climate crisis affects different people in different ways. Some people think it’s too late and have given up. Other people are inspired to take action now-e.g. the Climate Camp.
+--"key black extremists"
-Discussion of collapse is becoming increasingly mainstream (at least here in the UK). People now are thinking that they will live to see the collapse. This was not necessarily true of eco radicals in the early ‘90s. We were getting bigger and stronger and the problems didn’t seem quite so insurmountable... The default then was that you were involved in these politics because you thought that you could save the world. Now that’s not necessarily true. There’s no implicit assumption that we can save it. There’s less hope.
+These broad and imprecise labels reflect the ill-defined mission of domestic intelligence, which resulted from recurring demands for progressively wider investigations of Americans. Without the firm guidance provided by law, intelligence activities intruded into areas of American life which are protected from governmental inquiry by the constitutional guarantees of personal privacy and free speech and assembly.
-<br>
+<em>Subfinding (a)</em>
-* [Back Cover]
+Large numbers of law-abiding Americans and lawful domestic groups have been subjected to extensive intelligence investigation and surveillance.
-Describe the role/influence of Do or Die in the UK’s eco-anarchist movement...
+Some domestic intelligence activity has focused on specific illegal conduct or on instances where there was tangible evidence that illegal conduct was likely to occur. But domestic intelligence has gone far beyond such matters in collecting massive amounts of data on Americans. For example:
-<quote>
+FBI Domestic Intelligence. -- The FBI has compiled at its headquarters over 480,000 files on its "subversion" investigations and over 33,000 files on its "extremism" investigations.[2] During the twenty years from 1955 to 1975, the FBI conducted 740,000 investigations of "subversive matters" and 190,000 investigations of "extremist matters."[3]
-<em>Basically what happened within EF! was that we won. DoD and the political perspective it represented was relatively unpopular at the beginning. DoD was essentially trying to fulfil the same role that Live Wild or Die! did in the States—a radical anarchist fringe publication trying to ginger things up a hit. When we say that we won—in that the green anarchist perspective went from being the minority to the majority perspective within EF! in the UK over the course of the 1990s—that isn’t quite as arrogant as it sounds... It may have been partly due to our efforts but is probably more due Io people’s own experiences of resistance over time. This resulted in lots of people dropping much of non-violent pacifist ideology, moving more towards an anarchist position and supporting sabotage actions.</em>
-<em>The reason maybe why our ideas reflected the way things were going a bit more than some other peoples was perhaps that the people involved in doing DoD had been influenced by other tendencies, mostly animal liberation, as opposed to others who had come to EF! from more liberal environmentalist organisations like Friends of the Earth.</em>
+The targets for FBI intelligence collection have included:
-</quote>
-from interview with the DoD Editors
+- -the Women's Liberation Movement
-$15
+- -the conservative Christian Front and Christian Mobilizers of Father Coughlin;
-<br>
+- -the conservative American Christian Action Council of Rev. Carl McIntyre;
-[[v-c-various-cracks-in-a-grey-sky-an-anthology-of-d-2.jpg]]
+- -a wide variety of university, church and political groups opposed to the Vietnam war;
+--those in the non-violent civil rights movement, such as Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Council, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the Council on Racial Equality (CORE).
+Army Surveillance of Civilians. -- The Army's nationwide intelligence surveillance program created files on some 100,000 Americans and an equally large number of domestic organizations, encompassing virtually every group seeking peaceful change in the United States including:
+- -the John Birch Society;
+- -Young Americans for Freedom;
+- -the National Organization of Women;
+- -the NAACP;
+- -the Urban League;
+- -the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith; and Business Executives to End the War in Vietnam.[4]
+CIA's CHAOS Program. -- The CIA's extensive CHAOS program -- which compiled intelligence on domestic groups and individuals protesting the Vietnam war and racial conditions -- amassed some 10,000 intelligence files on American citizens and groups and indexed 300,000 names of Americans in CIA computer records.[5]
+IRS Selective Tax Investigations of Dissenters. -- Between 1969 and 1973, the Internal Revenue Service, through a secret "Special Service Staff" (SSS), targeted more than 10,000 individuals and groups for tax examinations because of their political activity.[6] The FBI and the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department gave SSS lists of taxpayers deemed to be "activists" or "ideological organizations;" the FBI, in providing SSS with a list of over 2,000 groups and individuals classified as "Right Wing," "New Left," and "Old Left," expressed its hope that SSS tax examinations would "deal a blow to dissident elements."[7] A smaller though more intensive selective enforcement program, the "Ideological Organization Project," was established in November 1961 in response to White House criticism of "right-wing extremist" groups.[8] On the basis of such political criteria, 18 organizations were selected for special audit although there was no evidence of tax violation.[9] In 1964, the IRS proosed to expand its program to make "10,000 examinations of tax exempt organizations of all types including the extremist groups."[10] Although this program never fully materialized, the "Ideological Organizations Project" can be viewed as a precursor to SSS.
+CIA and FBI Mail Opening. -- The 12 mail opening programs conducted by the CIA and FBI between 1940 and 1973 resulted in the illegal opening of hundreds of thousands of first-class letters. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the international correspondence of large numbers of Americans who challenged the condition of racial minorities or who opposed the war in Vietnam was specifically targeted for mail opening by both the CIA and FBI.
+The overbreadth of the longest CIA mail opening program -- the 20 year (1953-1973) program in New York City -- is shown by the fact that of the more than 28 million letters screened by the CIA, the exteriors of 2.7 million were photographed and 214,820 letters were opened.[11] This is further shown by the fact that American groups and individuals placed on the Watch List for the project included:
+- -The Federation of American Scientists;
+- -authors such as John Steinbeck and Edward Albee;
+--numerous American peace groups such as the American Friends Service Committee and Women's Strike for Peace; and
+- -businesses, such as Praeger Publishers.[12]
+By one CIA estimate, random selection accounted for 75 percent of the 200,000 letters opened, including letters to or from American political figures, such as Richard Nixon, while a presidential candidate in 1968, and Senators Frank Church and Edward Kennedy.[13]
+IV NSA's Watch List and SHAMROCK Programs. -- The National Security Agency's SHAMROCK program, by which copies of millions of telegrams sent to, from, or through the United States were obtained between 1947 and 1973, involved the use of a Watch List 1967-1973. The watch list included groups and individuals selected by the FBI for its domestic intelligence investigations and by the CIA for its Operation CHAOS program. In addition, the SHAMROCK Program resulted in NSA's obtaining not only telegrams to an from certain foreign targets, but countless telegrams between Americans in the United States and American or foreign parties abroad.[14]
+In short, virtually every element of our society has been subjected to excessive government- ordered intelligence inquiries. Opposition to government policy or the expression of controversial views was frequently onsidered sufficient for collecting data on Americans.
+The committee finds that this extreme breadth of intelligence activity is inconsistent with the principles of our Constitution which protact the rights of speech, political activity, and privacy against un"Justified governmental intrusion.
+<em>Subfinding (b)</em>
+The absence of precise standards for intelligence investigations of Americans contributed to overbreadth. Congress did not enact statutes precisely delineating the authority of the intelligence agencies or defining the purpose and scope of domestic intelligence activity. The Executive branch abandoned the standard set by Attorney General Stone -- that the government's concern was not with political opinions but with "such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States." Intelligence agencies' superiors issued overinclusive directives to investigate "subversion" (a term that was never defined in presidential directives) and "potential" rather than actual or likely criminal conduct, as well as to collect general intelligence on lawful political -and social dissent.
+Congress has never set out a specific statutory charter for FBI domestic intelligence activity delineating the standards for opening intelligence investigations or defining the purpose and scope of domestic intelligence activity.[15]
+Nor have the charters for foreign intelligence agencies -- the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency -- articulated adequate standards to insure that those agencies did not become involved in domestic intelligence activity. While the 1947 National Security Act provided that the CIA shall have no "police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions,"[16] the Act was silent concerning whether the CIA was authorized to target Americans abroad or to gather intelligence in the United States on Americans or foreign nationals in connection with its foreign intelligence responsibilities. By classified presidential directive, the CIA was authorized to conduct counterintelligence operations abroad and to maintain central counterintelligence files for the intelligence community.[17] Counterintelligence activity was defined in the directive to include protection of the nation against "subversion," a term which, as in the directives authorizing FBI domestic intelligence activity, was not defined.
+In the absence of specific standards for CIA activity and given the susceptibility of the term "subversion" to broad interpretation, the CIA conducted Operation CHAOS -- a large scale intelligence program involving the gathering of data on thousands of Americans and domestic groups to determine if they had "subversive connections"and illegally opened the mail of hundreds of thousands of Americans.
+Moreover, the Act does not define the scope of the authority granted to CIA's Director to protect intelligence "sources and methods."[18] This authority has been broadly interpreted to permit surveillance of present and former CIA employees in the United States as well as domestic groups thought to be a threat to CIA installations in the United States.
+No statute at all deals with the National Security Agency. That Agency -- one of the largest of the intelligence agencies -- was created by Executive Order in 1952. Although NSA's mission is to obtain foreign intelligence from "foreign" communications, this has been interpreted to permit NSA to intercept communications where one terminal -- the sender or receiver -- was in the United States. Consequently when an American has used telephone or telegraph facilities between this country and overseas, his message has been subject to interception by NSA. NSA obtained copies of millions of private telegrams sent from, to or through the United States in its SHAMROCK program and complied with requests to target the international communications of specific Americans through the use of a watch list.
+In addition to the failure of Congress to enact precise statutory standards, members of Congress have put pressure on the intelligence agencies for the collection of domestic intelligence without adequate regard to constitutional interests.[19] Moreover, Congress has passed statutes, such as the Smith Act, which, although not directly authorizing domestic intelligence collection, had the effect of contributing to the excessive collection of intelligence about Americans.
+Three functional policies, established by the Executive branch and acquiesced in by Congress, were the basis for the overbreadth of intelligence investigations directed at Americans. These policies centered on (1) so-called "subversion investigations" of attempts by hostile foreign governments and their agents in this country to influence the course of American life; (2) the investigation of persons and groups thought to have a "potential" for violating the law or committing violence; and (3) the collection of general intelligence on political and social movements in the interest of predicting and controlling civil disturbances.
+Each of these policies grew out of a legitimate concern. Nazi Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union mounted intelligence efforts in this country before World War II; and Soviet operations continued after the war. In the 1960s and early 1970s, racist groups used force to deprive Americans of their civil rights, some American dissidents engaged in violence as a form of political protest, and there were large-scale protest demonstrations and major civil disorders in cities stemming from minority frustrations.
+The Committee recognizes that the government had a responsibility to act in the face of the very real dangers presented by these developments. But appropriate restraints, controls, and prohibitions on intelligence collection were not devised; distinctions between legitimate targets of investigations and innocent citizens were forgotten; and the Government's actions were never examined for their effects on the constitutional rights of Americans, either when programs originated or as they continued over the years.
+The policies of investigating Americans thought to have a "potential" for violence and the collection of general intelligence on political and social movements inevitably resulted in the surveillance of American citizens and domestic groups engaged in lawful political activity. "Subversive" was never defined in the presidential directives from Presidents Roosevelt to Kennedy authorizing FBI domestic intelligence activity. Consequently, "subversive" investigations did not focus solely on the activities of hostile foreign governments in this country. Rather, they targeted Americans who dissented from administration positions or whose political positions were thought to resemble those of "subversive" groups. An example of the ultimate result of accepting the concept of "subversive" investigations is the Johnson White House, instruction to the FBI to monitor public hearings on Vietnam policy and compare the extent to which Senators' views "followed the Communist Party line."[20]
+Similarly, investigations of those thought to have the "potential" for violating laws or committing violence and the collection of general intelligence to prepare for civil disturbances resulted in the surveillance of Americans where there was not reasonable suspicion to believe crime or violence were likely to occur. Broad categories of American society -- conservatives, liberals, blacks, women, young people and churches -- were targeted for intelligence collection.
+Domestic intelligence expanded to cover widespread political protest movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For example, in September 1967, Attorney General Ramsey Clark called for a "new area of investigation and intelligence reporting" by the FBI regarding the possibility of "an organized pattern of violence" by groups in the "urban ghetto." He Instructed FBI Director Hoover:
+... we must make certain that every attempt is being made to get all information bearing upon these problems; to take every step possible to determine whether the rioting is preplanned or organized.... As apart of the broad investigation which must be conducted ... sources or informants in black nationalist organizations, SNCC and other less publicized groups should be developed and expanded to determine the size and purpose of these groups and their relationship to other groups.[21]
+Such instructions did not limit investigation to facts pointing to particular criminal or violent activity but called for intensive intelligence surveillance of a broad category of black groups (and their connections with other groups) to determine their "size and purpose."
+Similarly, the Army's broad domestic surveillance program reflected administration pressure on the Army for information on groups and individuals involved in domestic dissent.[22] As a former Assistant Secretary of Defense testified, the Army's sweeping collection plan "reflected the all-encompassing and uninhibited demand for information directed at the Department of the Army."[23]
+Presidents Johnson and Nixon subjected the CIA to intensive pressure to find foreign influence on the domestic peace movements, resulting in the establishment of Operation CHAOS.[24] When the Nixon Administration called for an intensification of CIA's effort, the CIA was instructed to broaden its targeting criteria and strengthen its collection efforts. CIA was told that "foreign Communist support" should be "liberally construed."[25] The White House stated further that "it appears our present intelligence collection capabilities in this area may be inadequate" and implied that any gaps in CIA"s collection program resulting from "inadequate resources or a low priority of attention" should be corrected.[26]
+In short, having abandoned Attorney General Stone's standard that restricted Government investigations to "conduct and then only such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States," the Government's far-reaching domestic intelligence policies inevitably, produced investigations and surveillance of large numbers of lawabiding Americans.
+<em>Subfinding (c)</em>
+The intelligence agencies themselves used imprecise and over-inclusive criteria in their conduct of intelligence investigations. Intelligence investigations extended beyond "subversive" or violent targets to additional groups and individuals subject to minimal "subversive influence" or having little or no "potential" for violence.
+Having been given vague directions by their superiors and subjected to substantial pressure to report on a broad range of matters, the intelligence agencies themselves often established overinclusive targeting criteria. The criteria followed in the major domestic intelligence programs conducted in the 1960s and 1970s illustrate the breadth of intelligence targeting:
+@@@@@@
+"*General Racial Matters*". -- The FBI gathered intelligence about proposed "civil demonstrations" and related activities of "officials, committees, legislatures, organizations, etc." in the "racial field."[27]
+FBI Field Offices were directed to report the "general programs" of all "civil rights organizations" and "readily available personal background data" on leaders and individuals "in the civil rights movement," as well as any "subversive association" that might be recorded in Field Office files.[28] In addition, the FBI reported "the objectives sought by the minority Community."[29]
+These broad criteria were also reflected in the FBI's targeting of "white militant groups" in the reporting of racial matters. Those who were "known to sponsor demonstrations against integration and against the busing of Negro students to white schools" were to be investigated.[30]
+"New Left" Intelligence. -- In conducting a "comprehensive study of the whole New Left movement" (rather than investigating particular violations of law), the FBI defined its intelligence target as a "loosely-bound, free-wheeling, college-oriented movement."[31] Organizations to be investigated were those who fit criteria phrased as the "more extreme and militant anti-Vietnam war and antidraft organizations."[32]
+The use of such imprecise criteria resulted in investigations of such matters as (1) two university instructors who helped support a student newspaper whose editorial policy was described by the FBI as "left-of-center, antiestablishment, and opposed to the University Administration";[33] (2) a dissident stockholder's group planning to protest a large corporation's war production at the annual stockholder's meeting;[34] and (3) "Free Universities" attached to college campuses, whether or not there were facts indicating any actual or potential violation of law.[35]
+"Rabble Rouser" Index. -- Beginning in August 1967, the FBI conducted intensive intelligence investigations of individuals identified as "rabble rousers."" The program was begun after a member of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders asked the FBI at a meeting of the Commission "to identify the number of militant Negroes and Whites."[36] This vague reference was subsequently used by the FBI as the basis for instructions implementing a broad new program: persons were to be investigated and placed on the "rabble rouser" index who were "racial agitators who have demonstrated a potential for fomenting racial discord."[37]
+@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+Ultimately, a "rabble rouser" was defined as:
+A person who tries to arouse people to violent action by appealing to their emotions, prejudices, et cetera; a demagogue.[38]
+Thus, rather than collecting information on those who had or were likely to commit criminal or violent acts, a major intelligence program was launched to identify "demagogues."
+Army Domestic Surveillance of "Dissidents." -- Extremely broad criteria were used in the Army's nationwide surveillance program conducted in the late 1960s. Such general terms as "the civil rights movement" and the "anti- Vietnam/anti-draft movements" were used to indicate targets for investigation.[39] In collecting information on these "Movements" and on the "cause of civil disturbances," Army intelligence was to investigate "instigators," "group participants" and "subversive elements" -- all undefined.
+Under later revisions, the Army collection plan extended even beyond "subversion" and "dissident groups" to "prominent persons" who were "friendly" with the "leaders of the disturbance" or "sympathetic with their plans."[40]
+These imprecise criteria led to the creation of intelligence files on nearly 100,000 Americans, including Dr. Martin Luther King, Major General Edwin Walker, Julian Bond, Joan Baez, Dr. Benjamin Spock, Rev. William Sloane Coffin, Congressman Abner Mikva, Senator Adlai Stevenson III,[41] as well as clergymen, teachers, journalists, editors, attorneys, industrialists, a laborer, a construction worker, railroad engineers, a postal clerk, a taxi driver, a chiropractor, a doctor, a chemist, an economist, a historian, a playwright, an accountant, an entertainer, professors, a radio announcer, athletes, business executives and authors -- all of whom became subjects of Army files simply because of their participation in political protests or their association with those who were engaged in such political activity.[42]
+The IRS Computerized Intelligence Index. -- In 1973, IRS established a central computer index -- the "Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System" -- for general intelligence data, much of it unrelated to tax law enforcement. More than 465,000 Americans were indexed in the IRS computer system, including J. Edgar Hoover and the IRS Commissioner, as well as thousands of others also not suspected of tax violation. Names in newspaper articles and other published sources were indexed wholesale into the IRS computer. Under the system, intelligence gathering preceded any specific allegation of a violation, and possible "future value" was the sole criterion for inclusion of information into the Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System.
+CIA's Operation CHAOS. -- In seeking to fulfill White House requests for evidence of foreign influence on domestic dissent, the CIA gave broad instructions to its overseas stations. These directives called for reporting on the "Radical Left" which included, according to the CIA, "radical students, antiwar activists, draft resisters and deserters, black nationalists, anarchists, and assorted 'New Leftists'."[43] CIA built its huge CHAOS data base on the assumption that to know whether there was significant foreign involvement in a domestic group "one has to know whether each and every one of these persons has any connection to foreigners."[44] CIA instructed its stations that even "casual contacts based merely on mutual interest" between Americans opposed to the Vietnam war and "foreign elements" were deemed to "casual contacts based merely on mutual interest" between Americans opposed to the Vietnam war and "foreign elements" were deemed to constitute "subversive connections."[45] Similarly, CIA's request to NSA for materials on persons targeted by the NSA Watch List called for all information regardless of how innocuous it may seem."[46]
+The Committee's investigation has shown that the absence of precise statutory standards and the use of overbroad criteria for domestic intelligence activity resulted in the extension of intelligence investigations beyond their original "subversive" or violent targets. Intelligence investigations extended to those thought to be subject to "subversive influence." Moreover, those thought to have a "potential" for violence were also targeted and, in some cases, investigations extended even to those engaged in wholly non-violent lawful political expression.
+FBI "COMINFIL" Investigations. -- Under the FBI's COMINFIL ("communist infiltration") program, large numbers of groups and individuals engaged in lawful political activity have been subjected to informant coverage and intelligence scrutiny. Although COMINFIL investigations were supposed to focus on the Communist Party's alleged efforts to penetrate domestic groups, in practice the target often became the domestic groups themselves.
+FBI COMINFIL investigations reached into domestic groups in virtually every area of American political life. The FBI conducted COMINFIL investigations in such areas as "religion," "education," "veterans' matters," "women's matters," "Negro question," and "cultural activities."[47] The "entire spectrum of the social and labor movement" was covered.[48]
+The overbreadth that results from the practice of investigating groups for indications of communist influence, or infiltration is illustrated by the following FBI COMINFIL intelligence investigations:
+NAACP. -- An intensive 25 year long surveillance of the NAACP was conducted, ostensibly to determine whether there was Communist infiltration of the NAACP. This surveillance, however, produced detailed intelligence reports on NAACP activities wholly unrelated to any alleged communist "attempts" to infiltrate the NAACP, and despite the fact that no evidence was ever found to contradict the FBI's initial finding that the NAACP was opposed to communism.[48]
+Northern Virginia Citizens Concerned About the ABM. -- In 1969, the FBI conducted an intelligence investigation and used informants to report on a meeting held in a public high school auditorium at which the merits of the Anti-Ballistic Missile System were debated by, among others, Department of Defense officials. The investigation was apparently opened because a communist newspaper had commented on the fact that the meeting was to be held.[49]
+National Conference on Amnesty for Vietnam Veterans. -- In 1974, FBI informants reported on a national conference sponsored by church and civil liberties groups to support amnesty for Vietnam veterans. The investigation was based on a two-step "infiltration" theory. Other informants had reported that the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (which was itself the subject of an intelligence investigation because it was thought to be subject to communist or foreign influence) might try to "control" the conference.[50] Although the conference was thus twice removed from the original target, it was nevertheless subjected to informant surveillance.
+FBI intelligence investigations to find whether groups are subject to communist or "subversive" influence result in the collection of information on groups and individuals engaged in wholly legitimate activity. Reports on the NAACP were not limited to alleged communist infiltration. Similarly, the investigation of the National Amnesty Conference produced reports describing the topics discussed at the conference and the organization of a steering committee which would include families of men killed in Vietnam and congressional staff aides.[51] The reports on the meeting concerning the ABM system covered the past and present residence of the person who applied to rent the high school auditorium, and plans for a future meeting, including the names of prominent political figures who planned to attend.[52]
+The trigger for COMINFIL-type investigations -- that subversive attempts" to infiltrate groups were a substantial threat -- was greatly exaggerated. According to the testimony of FBI officials, the mention in a communist newspaper of the citizens' meeting to debate the ABM was sufficient to produce intelligence coverage of that meeting.[53] A large public teach-in on Vietnam, including representatives of Catholic, Episcopal, Methodist and Unitarian churches, as well as a number of spokesmen for antiwar groups, was investigated because a Communist Party official had "urged" party members to attend and one speaker representing the W. E. B. DuBois Club was identified as a communist.[54] The FBI surveillance of the teach-in resulted in a 41-page intelligence report based on coverage by 13 informants and sources.[55] And the FBI's investigation of <em>all</em> Free Universities near colleges and universities was undertaken because "several" allegedly had been formed by the Communist Party "and other subversive groups."[56]
+Similarly, the FBI's broad COMINFIL investigations of the civiI rights movement in the South were based on the FBI's conclusion that the Communist Party had "attempted" to take advantage of racial unrest and had "endeavored" to pressure U.S. Government officials "through the press, labor unions and student groups.[57] [Emphasis supplied.] No mention was made of the general failure of these attempts."
+The Committee finds that COMINFIL investigations have been based on an exaggerated notion of the threat posed by "subversives" and foreign influence on American political expression. There has been unjustified belief that Americans need informants and government surveillance to protect them from "subversive" influence in their unions, churches, schools, parties and political efforts.
+Investigations of Wholly Non-Violent Political Expression. -- Domestic intelligence investigations have extended from those who commit or are likely to commit violent acts to those thought to have a "potential" for violence, and then to those engaged in purely peaceful political expression. This characteristic was graphically described by the White House official who coordinated the intelligence agencies' recommendations for "expanded" (and illegal) coverage in 1970. He testified that intelligence investigations risked moving
+from the kid with a bomb to the kid with a picket sign, and from the kid with the picket sign to the kid with the bumper sticker of the opposing candidate.
+And you just keep going down the line.[53]
+Without precise standards to restrict their scope, intelligence investigations did move beyond those who committed or were likely to commit criminal or violent acts. For example:
+--Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was targeted for the FBI's COINTELPRO operations against "Black Nationalist Hate Groups" on the theory, without factual justification, that Dr. King might "abandon" his adherence to nonviolence.[59]
+--The intensive FBI investigation of the Women's Liberation Movement was similarly predicated on the theory that the activities of women in that Movement might lead to demonstrations and violence.[60]
+--The FBI investigations of Black Student Unions proceeded from the concern of the FBI and its superiors over violence in the cities. Yet, the FBI opened intelligence investigations on "every Black Student Union and similar group regardless of their past or present involvement in disorders."[61] [Emphasis added.]
+--The nationwide Army Intelligence surveillance of civilians was conducted in connection with civil disorders. However, the Army collection plan focused not merely on those likely to commit violence but was "so comprehensive . . . that any category of information related even remotely to people or organizations active in a community in which the potential for violence was present would fall within their scope."[62]
+The Committee finds that such intelligence surveillance of groups and individuals has greatly exceeded the legitimate interest of the government in law enforcement and the prevention of violence. Where unsupported determinations as to "potential" behavior are the basis for surveillance of groups and individuals, no one is safe from the inquisitive eye of the intelligence agency.
+Subfindings (d)
+Intelligence agencies pursued a "vacuum cleaner" approach to intelligence collection -drawing in all available information about groups and individuals, including their lawful political activity and details of their personal lives.
+Intelligence agencies collect an excessive amount of information by pursuing a "vacuum cleaner" approach that draws in all available information, including lawful political activity, personal matters, and trivia. Even where the theory of the investigation is that the subject is likely to be engaged in criminal or violent activity, the overbroad approach to intelligence collection intrudes into personal matters unrelated to such criminal or violent activity.
+FBI officials conceded to the Committee that in conducting broad intelligence investigations to determine the "real purpose" of an organization, they sometimes gathered "too much information."[63]
+The FBI's intelligence investigation of the "New Left," for example, was directed towards a "comprehensive study of the whole movement" and produced intensive monitoring of such subjects as "support of movement by religious groups or individuals," "demonstrations aimed at social reform," "indications of support by mass media," "all activity in the labor field," and "efforts to influence public opinion, the electorate and Government bodies."[64]
+Similar overbreadth characterized the FBI's collection of intelligence on "white militant groups." In 1968 FBI field offices were instructed not to gather information solely on actual or potential violations of law or violence, but to use informants to determine the "aims and purposes of the organization, its leaders, approximate membership" and other "background data" relating to the group's "militancy." In 1971 the criteria for investigating individuals were widened. Special Agents in Charge of FBI field offices were instructed to investigate not only persons with "a potential for violence," but also anyone else "who in judgment of SAC should be subject of investigation due to extremist activities."[66]
+Even in searching for indications of potential violence in black urban areas or in collecting information about violence prone Ku Klux Klan chapters, there was marked overbreadth. In black urban areas, for example, FBI agents were instructed to have their informants obtain the names of "Afro-American type bookstores" and their "owners, operators and clientele."[67] The activities of civil rights and black groups as well as details of the personal lives of Klan members, were reported on by an FBI intelligence informant in the Ku Klux Klan.[67]  Under this approach, the average citizen who merely attends a meeting, signs a petition, is placed on a mailing list, or visits a book store, is subject to being recorded in intelligence files.
+A striking example of informant reporting on all they touch was provided by an FBI informant in an antiwar group with only 55 regular members and some 250 persons who gave occasional support. The informant estimated she reported nearly 1,000 names to the FBI in an 18-month period -- 60-70 percent of whom were members of other groups (such as the United Church of Christ and the American Civil Liberties Union) which were engaging in peaceful, lawful political activity together with the antiwar group or who were on the group's mailing list.[68] Similarly in the intelligence investigation of the Women's Liberation Movement, informants reported the identities of individual women attending meetings (as well as reporting such matters as the fact that women at meetings had stated "how they felt oppressed, sexually or otherwise.").[69]
+Such collection of "intelligence" unrelated to specific criminal or violent activity constitutes a serious misuse of governmental power. In reaching into the private lives of individuals and monitoring their lawful political activity -- matters irrelevant to any proper governmental interest -- domestic intelligence collection has been unreasonably broad.
+<em>Subfinding (e)</em>
+Intelligence investigations in many cases continued for excessively long periods of time, resulting in sustained governmental monitoring of political activity in the absence of any indication of criminal conduct or "subversion."
+One of the most disturbing aspects of domestic intelligence investigations found by the Committee was their excessive length. Intelligence investigations often continued, despite the absence of facts indicating an individual or group is violating or is likely to violate the law, resulting in long-term government monitoring of lawful political activity. The following are examples:
+(i) The FBI Intelligence Investigation of the NAACP (1941-1966). -- The investigation of the NAACP began in 1941 and continued for at least 25 years. Initiated according to one FBI report as an investigation of protests by 15 black mess attendants about racial discrimination in the Navy,[70] the investigation expanded to encompass NAACP chapters in cities across the nation. Although the ostensible purpose of this investigation was to determine if there was "Communist infiltration" of the NAACP, the investigation constituted a long-term monitoring of the NAACP's wholly lawful political activity by FBI informants. Thus:
+--The FBI New York Field Office submitted a 137-page report to FBI headquarters describing the national office of the NAACP, its national convention, its growth and membership, its officers and directors, and its stand against Communism.[71]
+--An FBI informant in Seattle obtained a list of NAACP branch officers and reported on a meeting where signatures were gathered on a "petition directed to President Eisenhower" and plans for two members to go to Washington, D.C., for a "Prayer Pilgrimage."[72]
+--In 1966, the New York Field Office reported the names of all NAACP national officers and board members, and summarized their political associations as far back as the 1940s.[73]
+--As late as 1966, the FBI was obtaining NAACP chapter membership figures by "pretext telephone call ... utilizing the pretext of being interested in joining that branch of the NAACP."[74]
+--Based on the reports of FBI informants, the FBI submitted a detailed report of a 1956 NAACP-sponsored Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and described plans for a Conference delegation to visit Senators Paul Douglas, Herbert Lehman, Wayne Morse, Hubert Humphrey, and John Bricker.[75] Later reports covered what transpired at several of these meetings with Senators.[76] Most significantly, all these reports were sent to the White House.[77]
+(ii) The FBI Intelligence Investigation of the Socialist Workers Party (1940 to date). -- The FBI has investigated the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) from 1940 to the present day on the basis of that Party's revolutionary rhetoric and alleged international links. Nevertheless, FBI officials testified that the SWP has not been responsible for any violent acts nor has it urged actions constituting an indictable incitement to violence.[77]
+FBI informants have been reporting the political positions taken by the SWP with respect to such issues as the "Vietnam War," "racial matters," "U.S. involvement in Angola," "food prices," and any SWP efforts to support a non-SWP candidate for political office.[78]
+Moreover, to enable the FBI to develop "background information" on SWP leaders, informants have been reporting certain personal aspects of their lives, such as marital status.[79] The informants also have been reporting on SWP cooperation with other groups who are not the subject of separate intelligence investigations.[80]
+(iii) The Effort to Prove Negatives. -- Intelligence investigations and programs have also continued for excessively long periods in efforts to prove negatives. CIA's Operation CHAOS began in 1967. From that year until the program's termination in 1974,[81] the CIA repeatedly reached formal conclusions that there was negligible foreign influence on domestic protest activity. In 1967, the CIA concluded that Communist front groups did not control student organizations and that there were no significant links with foreign radicals;[82] in 1968, the CIA concluded that U.S. student protest was essentially homegrown and not stimulated by an international conspiracy;[83] and in 1971 the CIA found "there is no evidence that foreign governments, organizations, or intelligence services now control U.S. New Left Movements ... the U.S. New Left is basically self-sufficient and moves under its own impetus."[84]
+The result of these repeated findings was not the termination of CHAOS's surveillance of Americans, but its redoubling. Presidents Johnson and Nixon pressured the CIA to intensify its intelligence effort, to find evidence of foreign direction of the U.S. peace movement. As Director Helms testified:
+<center>
+When a President keeps asking if there is any information, "how are you
+</center>
+getting along with your examination," "have you picked up any more information on this subject," it isn't a direct order to do something, but it seems to me it behooves the Director of Central Intelligence to find some way to im prove his performance, or improve his Agency's performance.[85]
+In an effort to prove its negative finding to a skeptical White House -- and to test its validity each succeeding year -- CIA expanded its program, increasing its coverage of Americans overseas and building an ever larger "data base" on domestic political activity. Intelligence was exchanged with the FBI, NSA, and other agencies and eventually CIA agents who had infiltrated domestic organizations for other purposes supplied general information on the groups' activities.[86] Thus, the intelligence mission became one of continued surveillance to prove a negative, with no thought to terminating the program in the face of the negative findings.
+As in the CHAOS operation, FBI intelligence investigations have often continued even in the absence of any evidence of "subversive" activities merely because the subjects of the investigation have not demonstrated their innocence to the FBI's satisfaction. The long term investigations of the NAACP and the Socialist Workers Party described above are typical examples.
+A striking illustration of FBI practice is provided by the intelligence investigation of an advisor of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The advisor was investigated on the theory that he might be a communist "sympathizer." The Bureau's New York office concluded he was not.[87] Using a theory of "guilty until proven innocent," FBI headquarters directed that the investigation continue:
+The Bureau does not agree with the expressed belief of the New York office that [ ] 88 is not sympathetic to the Party cause. While there may not be any evidence that [ ] is a Communist neither is there any substantial evidence that he is anti-Communist.[89]
+Where citizens must demonstrate not simply that they have no connection with an intelligence target, but must exhibit "substantial evidence" that they are in opposition to the target, intelligence investigations are indeed open ended.
+[1] New York Times, 5/10/24. Attorney General Stone implemented this policy by issuing a directive to Acting Director J. Edgar Hoover of the Bureau of Investigation: "The activities of the Bureau are to be limited strictly to investigations of violations of law, under my direction or under the direction of an Assistant Attorney General regularly conducting the work of the Department of Justice." (Memorandum from Attorney General Stone to J. Edgar Hoover, 5/13/24, cited in Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law [New York: Viking Press, 1956), p. 151.]
+[2] Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 10/6/75.
+[3] Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, Re: Investigative Matters, received 11/12/75. These statistics include as separate "matters" investigative leads pursued by different FBI offices in the same case.
+[4] Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, "Federal Data Banks, Computers, and Bill of
+Rights," 1971, p. 264.
+[5] See CHAOS Report: See. II D, "Operation of the CHAOS Program and Related CIA Projects."
+[6] See IRS Report: Part II, See. II, "Special Service Staff."
+[7] Memorandum from D. J. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/15/69.
+[8] Memorandum from William Loeb to Dean Barron, 11/30/61.
+[9] Memorandum from Mitchell Rogovin to Dean Barron, 12/20/61.
+[10] Memorandum from Commissioner, IRS to Myer Feldman, 7/11/63.
+[11] See Mail Report: Part I, "Domestic CIA and FBI Mail Opening Programs."
+[12] See Mail Report: Part II, See. II B (1), "Selection Criteria."
+[13] See Mail Report: Part II, See. II B (1), "Selection Criteria."
+[14] See "National Security Agency Surveillance Affecting Americans", NSA Report: Sec. II A, "Summary of NSA Watch List Activity".
+[15] The FBI's statutory authority provides that the Attorney General may appoint officials: "(1) to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States; (2) to assist in the protection of the President; and (3) to conduct such investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Department of Justice and the Department of State as may be directed by the Attorney General." (28 U.S.C.[ 533.)
+Attorney General Edward H. Levi told the Select Committee "that the statutory basis for the operations of the Bureau cannot be said to be fully satisfactory." (Edward H. Levi testimony, 12/11/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 313.)
+[16] 50 U.S.C.[ 403 (d) (3).
+[17] National Security Intelligence Directive No.[ 5.
+[18] 50 U. S.C.[ 403 (d) (3).
+[19] See Finding on Deficiencies in Control and Accountability, pp.[ 277-279.
+[20] FBI summary memorandum, 1/31/75.
+[21] Memorandum from Ramsey Clark to J. Edgar Hoover, 9/14/67.
+[22] See Military Surveillance Report: See. II C.
+[23] Robert F. Froehkle testimony, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, 1971, cited hereinafter as 1971 Hearings.
+[24] See pp.[ 99-101.
+[25] Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to Deputy Director of CIA, 6/20/69 p. 1.
+[26] Memorandum from Tom Charles Huston to Deputy Director of CIA, 6/20/69, p. 1.
+[27] 1964 FBI Manual Section 122, p.[ 1.
+[28] FBI Manual, Section 122, revised 12/13/66, p.[ 8-9.
+[29] FBI Manual, Section 122, revised 12/13/66; p.[ 8-9.
+[30] SAC Letter, 68-25,4/30/68.
+[31] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 10/28/68.
+[32] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's 10/28/68.
+[33] Memorandum from Mobile Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/9/70.
+[34] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office, 4/23/70.
+[35] Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66.
+[36] Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to Clyde Tolson, 8/1/67.
+[37] Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 8/3/67; SAC Letter 67-56, 9/12/67.
+[38] SAC Letter No.[ 67-70, 11/28/67.
+[39] 1971 Hearings, pp.[ 1120-1121.
+[40] 1971 Hearings, pp, 1123-1138.
+[41] Stein testimony, 1971 Hearings, p. 266.
+[42] "Military surveillance of Civilian Politics," Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on constitutional Rights Report, 1973, p. 57, cited hereafter as 1973 Report.
+[43] Book cable from Thomas Karamessines to various European Stations, June 1968.
+[44] Richard Ober testimony, Rockefeller Commission, 3/28/75, pp. 88-89.
+[45] Cable from CIA Headquarters to field stations, November 1967, pp.[ 1-2.
+[46] Memorandum from Richard Ober to NSA, 9/14/71.
+[47] 1960 FBI Manual, Section 87, pp.[ 5-11.
+[48] Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1955, p.[ 195.
+[48]  See History of Domestic Intelligence, Report, Part II at note 139.
+[49] James Adams testimony, 11/19/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 137-138. FBI documents indicate that another factor in the opening of the investigation was the role of the wife of a Communist in assisting in publicity work for the meeting (Memorandum from Washington Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 5/28/69, memorandum from Alexandria Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/3/69) See Findings 6(a), p. 10, for the broad dissemination of reports that resulted from this inquiry.
+[50] Raymond W. Wannall testimony, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 139.
+[51] Memorandum from Louisville Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/21/74.
+[52] Memoranda from Alexandria Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/5/69.
+[53] Adams, 11/19/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 138.
+[54] Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/2/66.
+[55] Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/2/66.
+[56] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 2/17/66.
+[57] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental intelligence Conference, to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security, 7/25/61, enclosing IIC Report, Status of U.S. internal Security Programs. See Findings on Political Abuse, p. 225 for discussion on the larger impact of such FBI terminology.
+[58] Tom Charles Huston testimony, 9/23/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 45.
+[59] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 3/4/68.
+[60] Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/28/69. (Hearings, Vol. 6, Exhibit 54.)
+[61] Memorandum from Executives Conference to Tolson, 10/29/70.
+[62] Froehlke, 1971 Hearings, p. 384.
+[63] Adams, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 69 p. 135.
+[64] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 10/28/68.
+[65] SAC Letter 68-25, 4/30/68.
+[66] 1971 Manual, Section 122.
+[67] Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/12/68.
+[67]  Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 116.
+[68] Mary Jo Cook testimony, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 112, 120.
+[69] Memorandum from Kansas City Field Office, 10/20/70; memorandum New York Field Office, 5/28/69; memorandum from Baltimore Field Office, 5/11/70 to FBI Headquarters. CIA agents in the United States also reported on Women's Liberation activities in the course of their preparation for overseas duty in Operation cHaOS. (Agent 1, Contact Report, Vol. 11, Agent 1 file.)
+[70] Memorandum from Washington Field Office to FBI headquarters, 3/11/41.
+[71] Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/12/57.
+[72] Memorandum from Seattle Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/1/57.
+[73] Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/65.
+[74] Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66.
+[75] Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 3/5/56.
+[76] Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 3/6/56.
+[77] See Findings on "Political Abuse."
+[77]  Robert Shackelford testimony, 2/2/76; pp. 89-90.
+[78] Shackelford, 2/2/76, p. 89.
+[79] Shackelford, 2/2/76; p. 90.
+[80] Shackleford, 2/2/76, p. 92.
+[81] See Findings, "Deficiencies in Control and Accountability", p.[ 265.
+[82] CIA memorandum, "Student Dissent and Its Techniques in the U.S.", 1/5/68.
+[83] CIA Report, "Restless Youth," Conclusions, p.[ 1, 9/4/68.
+[84] CIA Report, "Definition and Assessment of Existing Internal Security Threat-Foreign,"[ 1/5/71, pp. 1-3.
+[85] Richard Helms testimony, Rockefeller Commission, 4/28/75, pp. 2434-2435. Helms further testified: "President Johnson was after this all the time ... this was something that came up almost daily and weekly." Helms, Rockefeller Commission, 1/13/75, pp. 163-164.
+[86] See CHAOS Report: Section II D, "Operations of the CHAOS Program and Related CIA Projects," and II E, "1969 Expansion of CHAOS."
+[87] Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/14/64.
+[88] Name deleted by Committee to protect privacy.
+[89] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 4/24/64.
+** C. Excessive Use of Intrusive Techniques
+<center>
+MAJOR FINDING
+</center>
+The intelligence community has employed surreptitious collection techniques -- mail opening, surreptitious entries, informants, and "traditional" and highly sophisticated forms of electronic surveillance -- to achieve its overly broad intelligence targeting and collection objectives. Although there are circumstances where these techniques, if properly controlled, are legal and appropriate, the Committee finds that their very nature makes them a threat to the personal privacy and Constitutionally protected activities of both the targets and of persons who communicate with or associate with the targets. The dangers inherent in the use of these techniques have been compounded by the lack of adequate standards limiting their use and by the absence of review by neutral authorities outside the intelligence agencies. As a consequence, these techniques have collected enormous amounts of personal and political information serving no legitimate governmental interest.
+<em>Subfindings</em>
+(a) Given the highly intrusive nature of these techniques, the legal standards and procedures regulating their use have been insufficient. There have been no statutory controls on the use of informants; there have been gaps and exceptions in the law of electronic surveillance; and the legal prohibitions against warrantless mail opening and surreptitious entries have been ignored.
+(b) In addition to providing the means by which the Government can collect too much information about too many people, certain techniques have their own peculiar dangers:
+(i) Informants have provoked and participated in violence and other illegal activities in order to maintain their cover, and they have obtained membership lists and other private documents.
+(ii) Scientific and technological advances have rendered traditional controls on electronic surveillance obsolete and have made it more difficult to limit intrusions. Because of the nature of wiretaps, microphones and other sophisticated electronic techniques, it has not always been possible to restrict the monitoring of communications to the persons being investigated.
+(c) The imprecision and manipulation of labels such as "national security," "domestic security," "subversive activities," and "foreign intelligence" have led to unjustified use of these techniques.
+<em>Elaboration of Findings</em>
+The preceding section described how the absence of rigorous standards for opening, controlling, and terminating investigations subjected many diverse elements of this society to scrutiny by intelligence agencies, without their being suspected of violating any law. Once an investigation was opened, almost any item of information about a target's personal behavior or political views was considered worth collecting.
+Extremely intrusive techniques -- such as those listed above -- have often been used to accomplish those overly broad targeting and collection objectives.
+The paid and directed informant has been the most extensively used technique in FBI domestic intelligence investigations. Informants were used in 83% of the domestic intelligence investigations analyzed in a recent study by the General Accounting Office. 1a As of June 30, 1975, the FBI was using a total of 1,500 domestic intelligence informants.[2] In 1972 there were over 7,000 informants in the ghetto informant program alone. In fiscal year 1976, the Bureau has budgeted more than $7.4 million for its domestic intelligence informant program, more than twice the amount allocated for its organized crime informant program.[3]
+Wiretaps and microphones have also been a significant means of gathering intelligence. Until 1972, the FBI directed these electronic techniques against scores of American citizens and domestic organizations during investigations of such matters as domestic "subversive" activities and leaks of classified information. The Bureau continues to use these techniques against foreign targets in the United States.
+The most extensive use of electronic surveillance has been by the National Security Agency. NSA has electronically monitored (without wiretapping in the traditional sense) international communication links since its inception in 1952; because of its sophisticated technology, it is capable of intercepting and recording an enormous number of communications between the United States and foreign countries.[4]
+All mail opening programs have now been terminated, but a total of twelve such operations were conducted by the CIA and the FBI in ten American cities between 1940 and 1973.[5] Four of these were operated by the CIA, whose most massive project involved the opening of more than 215,000 letters between the United States and the Soviet Union over a twentyyear period. The, FBI conducted eight mail opening programs, three of which included opening mail sent between two points in the United States. The longest FBI mail opening program lasted, with one period of suspension, for approximately twenty-six years.
+The FBI has also cunducted hundreds of warrantless surreptitious entries -- break-ins -during the past twenty-five years. Often these entries were conducted to install electronic listening devices, at other times they involved physical searches for information. The widespread use of warrantless surreptitious entries against both foreign and domestic targets was terminated by the Bureau in 1966 but the FBI has occasionally made such entries against foreign targets in more recent years.
+All of these techniques have been turned against American citizens its well as against certain foreign targets. On the theory that the executive's responsibility in the area of "national security" and "foreign intelligence" justified their use without the need of judicial supervision, the intelligence community believed it was free to direct these techniques against individuals and organizations whom it believed threatened the country's security. The standards governing the use of these techniques have been imprecise and susceptible to expansive interpretation and in the absence of any judicial check on the application of these vague standards to particular cases. it was relatively easy for intelligence agencies and their superiors to extend them to many cases where they were clearly inappropriate. Lax internal controls on the use of some of these techniques compounded the problem.
+These intrusive techniques by their very nature invaded the private communications and activities both of the individuals they were directed against and of the persons, with whom the targets communicated or associated. Consequently. they provided the means by which all types of information -- including personal and political information totally unrelated to any legitimate governmental objective -- were collected and in some cases disseminated to the highest levels of the government.
+<em>Subfinding (a)</em>
+Given the highly intrusive nature of these techniques, the legal standards and procedures regulating their use have been insufficient. There have been no statutory controls on the use of informants; there have been gaps and exceptions in the law of electronic surveillance; and the legal prohibitions against warrantless mail opening and surreptitious entries have been ignored.
+<em>1.</em> <em>The Absense of Statutory Restraints on the Use of Information</em>
+There are no statutes or published regulations governing the use of informants.,, Consequently, the FBI is free to use informants, guided only by its own internal directives which can be changed at any time by FBI officials without approval from outside the Bureau.[7]
+Apart from court decisions precluding the use of informants to entrap persons into criminal activity, there are few judicial opinions dealing with informants and most of those concern criminal rather than intelligence informants.[8] The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on whether the use of intelligence informants in the contexts revealed by the Committee's investigation offend First Amendment rights of freedom of expression and association.[9]
+In the absence of regulation through statute, published regulation, or court, decision, the FBI has used informants to report on virtually every aspect of a targeted group or individual's activity, including lawful political expression, political meetings, the identities of group members and their associates, the "thoughts and feelings, intentions and ambitions," of members,[10] and personal matters irrelevant to any legitimate governmental interest. Informants have also been used by the FBI to obtain the confidential records and documents of a group.[11]
+Informants could be used in any intelligence investigation. FBI directives have not limited informant reporting to actual or likely violence or other violations of law.[12] Nor has any determination been made concerning whether the substantial intrusion represented by informant coverage is justified by the government's interest in obtaining information, or whether less intrusive means would adequately serve the government's interest. There has also been no requirement that the decisions of FBI officials to use informants be reviewed by anyone outside the FBI. In short, intelligence informant coverage has not been subject to the standards which govern the use of other intrusive techniques such as electronic surveillance, even though informants can produce a far broader range of information.
+<em>2.</em> <em>Gaps and Exceptions in the Law of Electronic Surveillance</em>
+Congress and the Supreme Court have both addressed the legal issues raised by electronic surveillance, but the law has been riddled with gaps and exceptions. The Executive branch has been able to apply vague standards for the use of this technique to particular cases as it has seen fit, and, in the case of NSA monitoring, the standards and procedures for the use of electronic surveillance were not applied at all.
+When the Supreme Court first considered wiretapping, it held that the warrantless use of this technique was constitutional because the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applied only to physical trespass and did not extend to the seizure of conversation. This decision, the 1928 case of Olmstead v. United States, involved a criminal prosecution, and left federal agencies free to engage in the unrestricted use of wiretaps in both criminal and intelligence investigations.[13]
+Six years later, Congress enacted the Federal Communications Act of 1934, which made it a crime for "any person," without authorization, to intercept and divulge or publish the contents of wire and radio communications. The Supreme Court subsequently construed this section to apply to federal agents as well as to ordinary citizens, and held that evidence obtained directly or indirectly from the interception of wire and radio communications was not admissible in court.[14] But Congress acquiesed in the Justice Department's position that these cases prohibited only the divulgence of contents of wire communications outside the executive branch,[15] and Government wiretapping for intelligence purposes other than prosecution continued.
+On the ground that neither the 1934 Act nor the Supreme Court decisions on wiretapping were meant to apply to "grave matters involving the defense of the nation," President Franklin Roosevelt authorized Attorney General Jackson in 1940 to approve wiretaps on "persons suspected of subversive activities against the Government of the United States, including suspected spies."[16] In the absence of any guidance from Congress or the Court for another quarter century, the executive branch first broadened this standard in 1946 to permit wiretapping in "cases vitally affecting the domestic security or where human life is in jeopardy,"[17] and then modified it in 1965 to allow wiretapping in "investigations related to the national security."[18] Internal Justice Department policy required the prior approval of the Attorney General before the FBI could institute wiretaps in particular cases,[19] but until the mid-1960's there was no requirement of periodic reapproval by the Attorney General.[20] In the absence of any instruction to terminate, them, some wiretaps remained in effect for years.[21]
+In 1967, the Supreme Court reversed its holding in the Olmstead case and decided that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement did apply to electronic surveillances.[22] It expressly declined, however, to extend this holding to cases involving the "national security."[22] Congress followed suit the next year in the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968, which established a warrant procedure for electronic surveillance in criminal cases but included a provision that neither it nor the Federal Communications Act of 1934 "shall limit the constitutional power of the President."[23] Although Congress did not purport to define the President's power, the Act referred to five broad categories which thereafter served as the Justice Department's criteria for warrantless electronic surveillance. The first three categories related to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence matters:
+(1) to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power;
+(2) to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States; and
+(3) to protect the national security information against foreign intelligence activities.
+The last two categories dealt with domestic intelligence interests:
+(4) to protect the United States against overthrow of the government by force or
+other unlawful means, or
+(5) against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the government.
+In 1972, the Supreme Court held in United States v. United States District Court,[23]  that the President did not have the constitutional power to authorize warrantless electronic surveillances to protect the nation from domestic threats.[24] The Court pointedly refrained, however, from any "judgment on the scope of the Presidents' surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within or without this country."[25] Only "the domestic aspects of national security" came within the ambit of the Court's decision.[26]
+To conform with the holding in this case, the Justice Department thereafter limited warrantless wiretapping to cases involving a "significant connection with a foreign power, its agents or agencies."[27]
+At no time, however, were the Justice Department's standards and procedures ever applied to NSA's electronic monitoring system and its "watch listing" of American citizens.[28] From the early 1960's until 1973, NSA compiled a list of individuals and organizations, including 1200 American citizens and domestic groups, whose communications were segregated from the mass of communications intercepted by the Agency, transcribed, and frequently disseminated to other agencies for intelligence purposes.[29]
+The Americans on this list, many of whom were active in the antiwar and civil rights movements, were placed there by the FBI, CIA, Secret Service, Defense Department, and NSA itself without prior judicial warrant or even the prior approval of the Attorney General. In 1970, NSA began to monitor telephone communications links between the United States and South America at the request of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) to obtain information about international drug trafficking. BNDD subsequently submitted the names of 450 American citizens for inclusion on the Watch List, again without warrant or the approval of the Attorney General.[30]
+The legal standards and procedures regulating the use of microphone surveillance have traditionally been even more lax than those regulating the use of wiretapping. The first major Supreme Court decision on microphone surveillance was Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), which held that such surveillance in a criminal case was constitutional when the installation did not involve a trespass. Citing this case, Attorney General McGrath prohibited the trespassory use of this technique by the FBI in 1952.[31] But two years later -a few weeks after the Supreme Court denounced the use of a microphone installation in a criminal defendant's bedroom 32 -- Attorney General Brownell gave the FBI sweeping authority to engage in bugging for intelligence purposes. ". . . (C)onsiderations of internal security and the national safety are paramount," he wrote, "and, therefore, may compel the unrestricted use of this technique in the national interest."[33]
+Since Brownell did not require the prior approval of the Attorney General for bugging specific targets, he largely undercut the policy that had developed for wiretapping. The FBI in many cases could obtain equivalent coverage by utilizing bugs rather than taps and would not be burdened with the necessity of a formal request to the Attorney General.
+The vague "national interest" standards established by Brownell, and the policy of not requiring the Attorney General's prior approval for microphone installations, continued until 1965, when the Justice Department began to apply the same criteria and procedures to both microphone and telephone surveillance.
+<em>3.</em> <em>Ignoring the Prohibitions Against Warrantless Mail Opening and Surreptitious Entries</em>
+Warrantless mail opening and surreptitious entries, unlike the use of informants and electronic surveillance, have been clearly prohibited by both statutory and constitutional law. In violation of these prohibitions, the FBI and the CIA decided on their own when and how these techniques should be used.[34][35]
+Sections 1701 through 1973 of Title 18 of the United States Code forbid persons other than employees of the Postal Service "dead letter" office from tampering with or opening mail that is not addressed to them. Violations of these statutes may result in fines of up to $2000 and imprisonment for not more than five years. The Supreme Court has also held that both First Amendment and Fourth Amendment restrictions apply to mail opening.
+The Fourth Amendment concerns were articulated as early as 1878, when the Court wrote:
+The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and examined under like warrant . . . as is required when papers are subjected to search 'it one's own household.[36]
+This principle was reaffirmed as recently as 1970 in United States v. Van Leeuwen, 396 U.S. 249 (1970). The infringement of citizens' First Amendment rights resulting from warrantless mail opening was first recognized by Justice Holmes in 1921. "The use of the mails," he wrote in a dissent now embraced by prevailing legal opinion, "is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues."[37] This principle, too, has been affirmed in recent years.[38]
+Breaking and entering is a common law felony as well as a violation of state and federal statutes. When committed by Government agents, it has long been recognized as "the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed."[39]
+In the one judicial decision concerning the legality of warrantless "national security" breakins for physical search purposes, United States District Court Judge Gerhard Gesell held such entries unconstitutional. This case, United States v. Ehrlichman,[40] involved an entry into the office of a Los Angeles psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding, to obtain the medical records of his client Daniel Ellsberg, who was then under federal indictment for revealing classified documents. The entry was approved by two Presidential assistants, John Ehrlichman and Charles Colson, who argued that it had been justified "in the national interest." Ruling on the defendants' discovery motions, Judge Gesell found that because no search warrant was obtained:
+The search of Dr. Fielding's office was clearly illegal under the unambiguous mandate of the Fourth Amendment. . . [T]he Government must comply with the strict constitutional and statutory limitations on trespassory searches and arrests even when known foreign agents are involved.... To hold otherwise, except under the most exigent circumstances, would be to abandon the Fourth Amendment to the whim of the Executive in total disregard of the Amendment's history and purpose.[41]
+In the appeal of this decision, the Justice Department has taken the position that a physical search may be authorized by the Attorney General without a warrant for "foreign intelligence" proposes.[42] The warrantless mail opening programs and surreptitious entries by the FBI and CIA did not even conform to the "foreign intelligence" standard, however, nor were they specifically approved in each case by the Attorney General. Domestic "subversives" and "extremists" were targeted for mail opening; and domestic "subversives" and "White Hate groups" were among those targeted for surreptitious entries. Until the Justice Department's recent statement in the Ehrlichman case, moreover, no legal justification had ever been advanced publicly for violating the statutory or constitutional prohibitions against physical searches or opening mail without a judicial warrant, and none has ever been officially advanced by any Administration to justify warrantless mail openings.
+<em>Subfinding (b)</em>
+In addition to providing the means by which the Government can collect too much information about too many people, certain techniques have their own peculiar dangers:
+(i) Informants have provoked and participated in violence and other illegal activities in order to maintain their cover, and they have obtained membership lists and other private documents.
+(ii) Scientific and technological advances have rendered obsolete traditional controls on electronic surveillance and have made it more difficult to limit intrusions. Because of the nature of wiretaps, microphones, and other sophisticated electronic techniques, it has not always been possible to restrict the monitoring of communications to the persons being investigated.
+<em>a.</em> <em>The Intrusive Nature of the Intelligence Informant Technique</em>
+The FBI employs two types of informants: (1) "intelligence informants" who are used to report on groups and individuals in the course of intelligence investigations, and (2) "criminal informants," who are used in connection with investigations of specific criminal activity. FBI intelligence informants are administered by the FBI Intelligence Division at Bureau headquarters through a centralized system that is separate from the administrative system for FBI criminal informants. For example, the FBI's large-scale Ghetto Informant Program was administered by the FBI Intelligence Division. The Committee's investigation centered on the use of FBI intelligence informants. The FBI's criminal informant program fell outside the scope of the Committee's mandate, and accordingly it was not examined.
+The Committee recognizes that FBI intelligence informants in violent groups have sometimes played a key role in the enforcement of the criminal law. The Committee examined a number of such cases,[44] and in public hearings on the use of FBI intelligence informants included the testimony of a former informant in the Ku Klux Klan whose reporting and court room testimony was essential to the arrest and conviction of the murderers of Mrs. Viola Liuzzo, a civil rights worker killed in 1965.[45] Former Attorney General Katzenbach testified that informants were vital to the solution of the murders of three civil rights workers killed in Mississippi in 1964.[46]
+FBI informant coverage of the Women's Liberation Movement resulted in intensive reporting on the identities and opinions of women who attended WLM meetings. For example, the FBI's New York Field Office summarized one informant's report in a memorandum to FBI Headquarters:
+Informant advised that a WLM meeting was held on 47 Each woman at this meeting stated why she had come to the meeting and how she felt oppressed, sexually or otherwise.
+According to this informant, these women are mostly concerned with liberating women from this "oppressive society." They are mostly against marriage, children, and other states of oppression caused by men. Few of them, according to the informant, have had political backgrounds.[48]
+Individual women who attended WLM meetings at midwestern universities were identified by FBI intelligence informants. A report by the Kansas City FBI Field Office stated:
+Informant indicates members of Women's Liberation campus group who are now enrolled as students at University of Missouri, Kansas City, are, , , , .[49] Informant noted that and 50 not currently students on the UMKC campus are reportedly roommates at.[51]
+Informants were instructed to report "everything" they knew about a group to the FBI.
+. . . to go to meetings, write up reports . . . on what happened, who was there . . . to try to totally identify the background of every person there, what their relationships were, who they were living with, who they were sleeping with, to try to get some sense of the local structure and the local relationships among the people in the organization.[52]
+Another intelligence informant described his mission as "total reporting." Rowe testified that he reported "anything and everything I observed or heard" pertaining to any member of the group he infiltrated.[53]
+Even where intelligence informants are used to infiltrate groups where some members are suspected of violent activity, the nature of the intelligence mission results in governmental intrusion into matters irrelevant to that inquiry. The FBI Special Agents who directed an intelligence informant in the Ku Klux Klan testified that the informant
+. . . furnished us information on the meetings and the thoughts and feelings, intentions and ambitions, as best he knew them, of other members of the Klan, both the rank and file and the leadership.[54]
+Intelligence informants also report on other groups -- not the subject of intelligence investigations -- which merely associate with, or are even opposed to, the targeted group. For example, an FBI informant in the VVAW had the following exchange with a member of the Committee:
+Senator HART (Mich.). . . . did you report also on groups and individuals outside the [VVAW], such as other peace groups or individuals who were opposed to the war whom you came in contact with because they were cooperating with the [VVAW] in connection with protest demonstrations and petitions?
+Ms. Cook. . . . I ended up reporting on groups like the United Church of Christ, American Civil Liberties Union, the National Lawyers Guild, liberal church organizations [which] quite often went into coalition with the VVAW.[55]
+This informant reported the identities of an estimated 1,000 individuals to the FBI, although the local chapter to which she was assigned had only 55 regular members.[56] Similarly, an FBI informant in the Ku Klux Klan reported on the activities of civil rights and black groups that he observed in the course of his work in the Klan.[57]
+In short, the intelligence informant technique is not a precise instrument. By its nature, it extends far beyond the sphere of proper governmental interest and risks governmental monitoring of the private lives and the constitutionally-protected activity of Americans. Nor is the intelligence informant technique used infrequently. As reflected in the statistics described above, FBI intelligence investigations are in large part conducted through the use of informants; and FBI agents are instructed to "develop reliable informants at all levels and in all segments" of groups under investigation.[58]
+<em>b.</em> <em>Other Dangers in the Intelligence Informant Technique</em>
+In the absence of clear guidelines for informant conduct, FBI paid and directed intelligence informants have participated in violence and other illegal activities and have taken membership lists and other private documents.
+<em>1.</em> <em>Participation in Violence and Other Illegal Activity</em>
+The Committee's investigation has revealed that there is often a fundamental dilemma in the use of intelligence informants in violent organizations. The Committee recognizes that intelligence informants in such groups have sometimes played essential roles in the enforcement of the criminal law. At the same time, however, the Committee has found that the intelligence informant technique carries with it the substantial danger that informants will participate in, or provoke, violence or illegal activity. Intelligence informants are frequently infiltrated into groups for long-term reporting rather than to collect evidence for use in prosecutions. Consequently, intelligence informants must participate in the activity of the group they penetrate to preserve their cover for extended periods. Where the group is involved in violence or illegal activity, there is a substantial risk that the informant must also become involved in this activity. As an FBI Special Agent who handled an intelligence informant in the Ku Klux Klan testified: "[you] couldn't be an angel and be a good informant."[59]
+FBI officials testified that it is Bureau practice to instruct informants that they are not to engage in violence or unlawful activity and, if they do so, they may be prosecuted. FBI Deputy Associate Director Adams testified:
+. . . we have informants who have gotten involved in the violation of the law, and we have immediately converted their status from an informant to the subject, and have prosecuted, I would say, offhand ... around 20 informants.[60]
+The Committee finds, however, that the existing guidelines dealing with informant conduct do not adequately ensure that intelligence informants stay within the law in carrying out their assignments. The FBI Manual of Instructions contain no provisions governing informant conduct. While FBI employee conduct regulations prohibit an FBI agent from directing informants to engage in violent or other illegal activity, informants themselves are not governed by these regulations since the FBI does not consider them as FBI employees.
+In the absence of clear and precise written provisions directly applicable to informants, FBI intelligence informants have engaged in violent and other illegal activity. For example, an FBI intelligence informant who penetrated the Ku Klux Klan and reported on its activities for over five years testified that on a number of occasions he and other Klansmen had "beaten people severely, had boarded buses and kicked people off; had went in restaurants and beaten them with blackjacks, chains, pistols."[61] This informant described how he had taken part in Klan attacks on Freedom Riders at the Birmingham, Alabama, bus depot, where "baseball bats, clubs, chains and pistols" were used in beatings.[62]
+Although the FBI Special Agents who directed this informant instructed him that he was not to engage in violence, it was recognized that there was a substantial risk that he would become a participant in violent activity.
+As one of the Agents testified:
+... it is kind of difficult to tell him that we would like you to be there on deck, observing, be able to give us information and still keep yourself detached and uninvolved and clean, and that was the problem that we constantly had.[63]
+In another example, an FBI intelligence informant penetrated "right wing" groups operating in California under the names "The Minutemen" and "The Secret Army Organization." The informant reported on the activities of these "right wing" paramilitary groups for a period of five years but was also involved in acts of violence or destruction. In addition, the informant actually rose to a position of leadership in the SAO and became an innovator of various harassment actions. For example, he admittedly participated in firebombing of an automobile and was present, conducting a "surveillance" of a professor at San Diego State University, when his associate and subordinate in the SAO took out a gun and fired into the home of the professor, wounding a young woman.[64]
+An FBI intelligence informant in a group of antiwar protesters planning to break into a draft board claimed to have provided technical instruction and materials that were essential to the illegal breaktestified to the committee:
+Everything they learned about breaking into a building or climbing a wall or cutting glass or destroying lockers, I taught them. I got sample equipment, the type of windows that we would go through, I picked up off the job and taught them how to cut the glass, how to drill holes in the glass so you cannot bear it and stuff like that, and the FBI supplied me with the equipment needed. The stuff I did not have, the [the FBI] got off their own agents.[65]
+The Committee finds that where informants are paid and directed by a government agency, the government has a responsibility to impose clear restrictions on their conduct. Unwritten practice or general provisions aimed at persons other than the informants themselves are not sufficient. In the investigation of violence or illegal activity, it is essential that the government not be implicated in such activity.
+<em>2.</em> <em>Membership Lists and Other Private Documents Obtained by the Government Through Intelligence Informants</em>
+The Committee finds that there are inadequate guidelines to regulate the conduct of intelligence informants with respect to private and confidential documents, such as membership lists, mailing lists and papers relating to legal matters. The Fourth Amendment provides that citizens shall be "secure in their ... papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" and requires probable cause to believe there has been a violation of law before a search warrant may issue. Moreover the Supreme Court, in NAACP v. Alabama,[66] held that the First Amendment's protections of speech, assembly and group association did not permit a state to compel the production of the membership list of a group engaged in lawful activity. The Court distinguished the case where a state was able to demonstrate a "controlling justification" for such lists by showing a group's activities involved "acts of unlawful intimidation and violence."[66]
+There are no provisions in the FBI Manual which preclude the FBI from obtaining private and confidential documents through intelligence informants. The Manual does prohibit informant reporting of "any information pertaining to defense plans or strategy," but the FBI interprets this as applying only to privileged communications between an attorney and client in connection with a specific court proceeding.[67]
+The Committee's investigation has shown that, the FBI, through its intelligence informants and sources, has sought to obtain membership lists and other confidential documents of groups and individuals.[68] For example, one FBI Special Agent testified:
+I remember one evening . . . [an informant] called my home and said I will meet you in a half an hour ... I have a complete list of everybody that I have just taken out of the files, but i have to have it back within such a length of time.
+Well, naturally I left home and met him and had the list duplicated forthwith, and back in his possession and back in the files with nobody suspecting."[69]
+Similarly, the FBI Special Agent who handled an intelligence informant in an antiwar group testified that he obtained confidential papers of the group which related to legal defense matters:
+"She brought back several things . . . various position papers taken by various legal defense groups, general statements of . . . the VVAW, legal thoughts on various trials, the Gainesville (Florida) 8 . . . the Camden (New Jersey) 9 . . . various documents from all of these groups."[70]
+This informant also testified that she took the confidential mailing list of the group she had penetrated and gave it to the FBI.[71]
+She also gave the FBI a legal manual prepared by the group's attorneys to guide lawyers in defending the group's members should they be arrested in connection with antiwar demonstrations or other political activity.[72] Since this document was prepared as a general legal reference manual rather than in connection with a specific trial the FBI considered it outside the attorney-client privilege and not barred by the FBI Manual provision with respect to legal defense and strategy matters.
+For the government to obtain membership lists and other private documents pertaining to lawful and protected activities covertly through intelligence informants risks infringing rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The Committee finds that there is a need for new guidelines for informant conduct with-respect to the private papers of groups and individuals.
+<em>c.</em> <em>Electronic Surveillance</em>
+In the absence of judicial warrant, both the "traditional" forms of electronic surveillance practiced by the FBI wiretapping and bugging -- and the highly sophisticated form of electronic monitoring practiced by NS A have been used to collect too much information about too many people.
+<em>1.</em> <em>Wiretapping and Bugging</em>
+Wiretaps and bugs are considered by FBI officials to be one of the most valuable techniques for the collection of information relevant to the Bureau's legitimate foreign counterintelligence mandate. W. Raymond Wannall, the former Assistant Director in charge of the FBI's Intelligence Division, stated that electronic surveillance assisted Bureau officials in making "decisions" as to operations against foreigners engaged in espionage. "It gives us leads as to persons ... hostile intelligence services are trying to subvert or utilize in the United States, so certainly it is a valuable technique."[73]
+Despite its stated value in foreign counterintelligence cases, however, the dangers inherent in its use imply a clear need for rigorous controls. By their nature, wiretaps and bugs are incapable of a surgical precision that would permit intelligence agencies to overhear only the target's conversations. Since wiretaps are placed on particular telephones, anyone who uses a tapped phone -- including members of the target's family -- can be overheard. So, too, can everyone with whom the target (or anyone else using the target's telephone) communicates.[74] Microphones planted in the target's room or office inevitably intercept all conversations in a particular area: anyone confessing in the room or office, not just the target, is overheard.
+The intrusiveness of these techniques has a second aspect as well. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to limit the interception to conversations that are relevant to the purposes for which the surveillance is placed. Virtually all conversations are overheard, no matter how trivial, personal, or political they might be. When the electronic surveillance target is a political figure who is likely to discuss political affairs, or a lawyer, who confers with his clients, the possibilities for abuse are obviously heightened.
+The dangers of indiscriminate interception are perhaps most acute in the case of microphones planted in locations such as bedrooms. When Attorney General Herbert Brownell gave the FBI sweeping authority to engage in microphone surveillances for intelligence purposes in 1954, he expressly permitted the Bureau to plant microphones in such locations if, in the sole discretion of the FBI, the facts warranted the installation.[75] Acting under this general authority, for example, the Bureau installed no fewer than twelve bugs in hotel rooms occupied by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.[76]
+The King surveillances which occurred between January 1964 and October 1965, were ostensibly approved within the FBI for internal security reasons, but they produced vast amounts of personal information that were totally unrelated to any legitimate governmental interest; indeed, a single hotel room bug alone yielded twenty reels of tape that subsequently provided the basis for the dissemination of personal information about Dr. King throughout the Federal establishment.[76]  Significantly, FBI internal memoranda with respect to some of the installations make clear that they were planted in Dr. King's hotel rooms for the express purpose of obtaining personal information about him.[77]
+Extremely personal information about the target, his family, and his friends, is easily obtained from wiretaps as well as microphones. This fact is clearly illustrated by the warrantless electronic surveillance of an American citizen who was suspected of leaking classified data to the press. A wiretap on this individual produced no evidence that he had in fact leaked any stories or documents, but among the items of information that the FBI did obtain from the tap (and delivered in utmost secrecy to the White House) were the following: that "meat was ordered [by the target's family] from a grocer;" that the target's daughter had a toothache; that the target needed grass clippings for a compost heap he was building; and that during a telephone conversation between the target's wife and a friend the "matters discussed were milk bills, hair, soap operas, and church."[78]
+The so-called "seventeen" wiretaps on journalists and government employees, which collectively lasted from May 1969 to February 1971, also illustrate the intrusiveness of electronic surveillance. According to former President Nixon, these taps produced "just gobs of material: gossip and bull."[79] FBI summaries of information obtained from the wiretaps and disseminated to the White House suggest that the former President's private evaluation of them was correct. This wiretapping program did not reveal the source of any leaks of classified data, which was its ostensible purpose, but it did generate a wealth of information about the personal lives of the targets -- their social contacts, their vacation plans, their employment satisfactions and dissatisfaction, their marital problems, their drinking habits, and even their sex lives.[80]
+Among those who were incidentally overheard on one of these wiretaps was a currently sitting Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, who made plans to review a manuscript written by one of the targets.[81] Vast amounts of political information were also obtained from these wiretaps.[82]
+The "seventeen" wiretaps also exemplify the particularly acute problems of wiretapping when the targeted individuals are involved in the domestic political process. These wiretaps produced vast amounts of purely political information,[82] much of which was obtained from the home telephones of two consultants to Senator Edmund Muskie and other Democratic politicians.
+The incidental collection of political information from electronic surveillance is also shown by a series of telephone and microphone surveillances conducted during the Kennedy administration. In an investigation of the possibly unlawful attempts of representatives of a foreign country to influence congressional deliberations about sugar quota legislation in the early 1960s, Attorney General Robert Kennedy authorized a total of twelve warrantless wiretaps on foreign and domestic targets. Among the wiretaps of American citizens were two on American lobbyists, three on executive branch officials, and two on a staff member of a House of Representatives' Committee.[83] A bug was also planted in the hotel room of a United States Congressman, the Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee, Harold D. Cooley.[84]
+Although this investigation was apparently initiated because of the Government's concern about future relations with the foreign country involved and the possibility of bribery,[85] it is clear that the Kennedy administration was politically interested in the outcome of the sugar quota legislation as well.[86] Given the nature of the techniques used and of the targets they were directed against, it is not surprising that a great deal of potentially useful political information was generated from these "Sugar Lobby" surveillances.[87]
+The highly intrusive nature of electronic surveillance also raises special problems when the targets are lawyers and journalists. Over the past two decades there have been a number of wiretaps placed on the office telephones of lawyers.[88] In the Sugar Lobby investigation, for example, Robert Kennedy authorized wiretaps on ten telephone lines of a single law firm.[90] All of these lines were apparently used by the one lawyer who was a target and presumably by other attorneys in the firm as well. Such wiretaps represent a serious threat to the attorney-client privilege, because once they are instituted they are capable of detecting all conversations between a lawyer and his clients, even those relating to pending criminal cases.
+Since 1960, at least six American journalists and newsmen have also been the targets of warrantless wiretaps or bugs.[91] These surveillances were all rationalized as necessary to discover the source of leaks of classified information, but, since wiretaps and bugs are indiscriminate in the types of information collected, some of these taps revealed the attitudes of various newsmen toward certain politicians and supplied advance notice of forthcoming newspaper and magazine articles dealing with administration policies. The collection of information such as this, and the precedent set by wiretapping of newsmen, generally, inevitably tends to undermine the constitutional guarantee of a free and independent press.
+<em>2.</em> <em>NSA Monitoring</em>
+The National Security Agency (NSA) has the capability to monitor almost any electronic communication which travels through the air. This means that NSA is capable of intercepting a telephone call or even a telegram, if such call or telegram is transmitted at least partially through the air. Radio transmissions, a fortiori, are also within NSA's reach.
+Since most communications today -- to an increasing extent even domestic communications -- are, at some point, transmitted through the air, NSA's potential to violate the privacy of American citizens is unmatched by any other intelligence agency. Furthermore, since the interception of electronic signals entails neither the installation of electronic surveillance devices nor the cooperation of private communications companies, the possibility that such interceptions will be undetected is enhanced.
+NSA has never turned its monitoring apparatus upon entirely domestic communications, but from the early 1960s until 1973, it did intercept the international communications of American citizens, without a warrant, at the request of other federal agencies.
+Under current practice, NSA does not target any American citizen or firm for the purpose of intercepting their foreign communications. As a result of monitoring international links of communication, however, it does acquire an enormous number of communications to, from, or about American citizens and firms.[93]
+As a practical matter, most of the communications of American citizens or firms acquired by NSA as incidental to its foreign intelligencegathering process are destroyed upon recognition as a communication to or from an American citizen. But other such communications, which bear upon NSA's foreign intelligence requirements, are processed, and information obtained from them are used in NSA's reports to other intelligence agencies. Current practice precludes NSA from identifying American citizens and firms by name in such reports. Nonetheless, the practice does result in NSA's disseminating information derived from the international communications of American citizens and firms to the intelligence agencies and policymakers in the federal government.
+In his dissent in Olmstead v. United States,[94] which held that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement did not apply to the seizure of conversations by means of wiretapping, Justice Louis D. Brandeis expressed grave concern that new technologies might outstrip the ability of the Constitution to protect American citizens. He wrote:
+Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the government ... (and) the progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping.
+Ways may some day be developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home .... Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual security?
+The question posed by Justice Brandeis applies with obvious force to the technological developments that allow NSA to monitor an enormous number of communications each year. His fears were firmly based, for in fact no warrant was ever obtained for the inclusion of 1200 American citizens on NSA's "Watch List" between the early 1960s and 1973, and none is obtained today for the dissemination within the intelligence community of information derived from the international communications of American citizens and firms. In the face of this new technology, it is well to remember the answer Justice Brandeis gave to his own question. Quoting from *Boyd* v. *United States*, 116 U.S. 616, he wrote:
+It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the essense of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property . . .[94]
+<em>D.</em> <em>Mail Opening</em>
+By ignoring the legal prohibitions against warrantless mail opening, the CIA and the FBI were able to obtain access to the written communications of hundreds of thousands of individuals, a large proportion of whom were American citizens. The intercepted letters were presumably sealed with the expectation that they would only be opened by the party to whom they were addressed, but intelligence agents in ten cities throughout the United States surreptitiously opened the seal and photographed the entire contents for inclusion in their intelligence files.
+Mail opening is an imprecise technique. In addition to relying on a "Watch List" of names, the CIA opened vast numbers of letters on an entirely random basis; as one agent who opened mail in the CIA's New York project testified, "You never knew what you would hit."[95] Given the imprecision of the technique and the large quantity of correspondence that was opened, it is perhaps not surprising that during the twenty year course of the Agency's New York project, the mail that was randomly opened included that of at least three United States Senators and a Congressman, one Presidential Candidate, and numerous educational, business, and civil rights leaders.[96]
+Several of the FBI programs utilized as selection criteria certain "indicators" on the outside of envelopes that suggested that the communication might be to or from a foreign espionage agent. These "indicators" were more refined than the "shotgun approach"[97] which characterized the CIA's New York project, and they did lead to the identification of three foreign spies.[98] But even by the Bureau's own accounting, it is clear that the mail of hundreds of innocent American citizens was opened and read for every successful counterintelligence lead that was obtained by means of "indicators."[99]
+Large volumes of mail were also intercepted and opened in other FBI mail programs that were based not on indicators but on far less precise criteria. Two programs that involved the opening of mail to and from an Asian country, for example, used "letters to or from a university, scientific, or technical facility" as one selection criterion.[100] According to FBI memoranda, an average of 50 to 100 letters per day was opened and photographed during the ten years in which one of these two programs operated.[101]
+<em>E.</em> <em>Surreptitious Entries</em>
+Surreptitious entries, conducted in violation of the law, have also permitted intelligence agencies to gather a wide range of information about American citizens and domestic organization as well as foreign targets.[102] By definition this technique involves a physical entry into the private premises of individuals and groups. Once intelligence agents are inside, no "papers or effects" are secure. As the Huston Plan recommendations stated in 1970, "It amounts to burglary."[103]
+The most private documents are rendered vulnerable by the use of surreptitious entries. According to a 1966 internal FBI memorandum, which discusses the use of this technique against domestic. organizations:
+[The FBI has] on numerous occasions been able to obtain material held highly secret, and closely guarded by subversive groups and organizations which consisted of membership lists and mailing lists of these organizations.[104]
+A specific example cited in this memorandum also reveals the types of information that this technique can collect and the uses to which the information thus collected may be put:
+Through a "black bag" job, we obtained the records in the possession of three high-ranking officials of a Klan organization. These records gave us the complete membership and financial information concerning the Klan's operation which we have been using most effectively to disrupt the organization and, in fact, to bring about Its near disintegration.[105]
+Unlike techniques such as electronic surveillance, government entries into private premises were familiar to the Founding Fathers. "Indeed," Judge Gesell wrote in the Ehrlichman case, "the American Revolution was sparked in part by the complaints of the colonists against the issuance of writs of assistance, pursuant to which the King's revenue officers conducted unrestricted, indiscriminate searches of persons and homes to uncover contraband."[106] Recognition of the intrusiveness of government break-ins was one of the primary reasons for the subsequent adoption of the Fourth Amendment in 1791,[107] and this technique is certainly no less intrusive today.
+<em>Subfinding (c)</em>
+The imprecision and manipulation of labels such as "national security," "domestic security," "subversive activities" and "foreign intelligence" have led to unjustified use of these techniques.
+Using labels such as "national security" and "foreign intelligence", intelligence agencies have directed these highly intrusive techniques against individuals and organizations who were suspected of no criminal activity and who posed no genuine threat to the national security. In the absence of precise standards and effective outside control, the selection of American citizens as targets has at times been predicated on grounds no more substantial than their lawful protests or their non-conformist philosophies. Almost any connection with any perceived danger to the country has sufficed.
+The application of the "national security" rationale to cases lacking a substantial national security basis has been most apparent in the area of warrantless electronic surveillance. Indeed, the unjustified use of wiretaps and bugs under this and related labels has a long history. Among the wiretaps approved by Attorney General Francis Biddle under the standard of "persons suspected of subversive activities," for example, was one on the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce in 1941.[108] This was approved in spite of his comment to J. Edgar Hoover that the target organization had "no record of espionage at this time."[109] In 1945, Attorney General Tom Clark authorized a wiretap on a former aide to President Roosevelt.[110] According to a memorandum by J. Edgar Hoover, Clark stated that President Truman wanted "a very thorough investigation" of the activities of the former official so that "steps might be taken, if possible, to see that [his] activities did not interfere with the proper administration of government."[111] The memorandum makes no reference to "subversive activities" or any other national security considerations.
+The "Sugar Lobby" and Martin Luther King, Jr., wiretaps in the early 1960s both show the elasticity of the "domestic security" standard which supplemented President Roosevelt's "subversive activities" formulation. Among those wiretapped in the Sugar Lobby investigation, as noted above, was a Congressional staff aide. Yet the documentary record of this investigation reveals no evidence indicating that the target herself represented any threat to the "domestic security." Similarly, while the FBI may properly have been concerned with the activities of certain advisors to Dr. King, the direct wiretapping of Dr. King shows that the "domestic security" standard could be stretched to unjustified lengths.
+The microphone surveillances of Congressman Cooley and Dr. King under the "national interest" standard established by Attorney General Brownell in 1954 also reveal the relative ease with which electronic bugging devices could be used against American citizens who posed no genuine "national security" threat. Neither of these targets advocated or engaged in any conduct that was damaging to the security of the United States.
+In April, 1964, Attorney General Robert Kennedy approved "technical coverage (electronic surveillance)" of a black nationalist leader after the FBI advised Kennedy that he was "forming a new group" which would be "more aggressive" and would "participate in racial demonstrations and civil rights activities." The only indication of possible danger noted in the FBI's request for the wiretaps, however, was that this leader had "recommended the possession of firearms by members for their self-protection.[112]
+One year later, Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach approved a wiretap on the offices of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee on the basis of potential communist infiltration into that organization. The request which was sent to the Attorney General noted that "confidential informants" described SNCC as "the principal target for Communist Party infiltration among the various civil rights organizations" and stated that some of its leaders had "made public appearances with leaders of communist-front organizations" and had "subversive backgrounds."[113] The FBI presented no substantial evidence however, that SNCC was in fact infiltrated by communists -- only that the organization was apparently a target for such infiltration in the future.
+After the Justice Department adopted new criteria for the institution of warrantless electronic surveillance in 1968, the unjustified use of wiretaps continued. In November 1969, Attorney General John Mitchell approved a series of three wiretaps on organizations involved in planning the antiwar "March on Washington." The FBI's request for coverage of the first group made no claim that its members engaged or were likely to engage in violent activity; the request was simply based on the statement that the anticipated size of the demonstration was cause for "concern should violence of any type break out."[114]
+The only additional justification given for the wiretap on one of the other groups, the Vietnam Moratorium Committee, was that it "has recently endorsed fully the activities of the [first group] concerning the upcoming antiwar demonstrations."[115]
+In 1970, approval for a wiretap on a "New Left oriented campus group" was granted by Attorney General Mitchell on the basis of an FBI request which included, among other factors deemed relevant to the necessity for the wiretap, evidence that the group was attempting "to develop strong ties with the cafeteria, maintenance and other workers on campus" and wanted to "go into industry and factories and ... take the radical politics they learned on the campus and spread them among factory workers."[116]
+This approval was renewed three months later despite the fact that the request for renewal made no mention of violent or illegal activity by the group. The value of the wiretap was shown, according to the FBI, by such results as obtaining "the identities of over 600 persons either in touch with the national headquarters or associated with" it during the preceding three months.[117] Six months after the original authorization the number of persons so identified had increased to 1,428; and approval was granted for a third three-month period."[118]
+The "seventeen wiretaps" also show how the term "national security" as a justification for wiretapping can obscure improper use of this technique. Shortly after these wiretaps were revealed publicly, President Nixon stated they had been justified by the need to prevent leaks of classified information harmful to the national security.[119]
+Wiretaps for this purpose had, in fact, been authorized under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. President Nixon learned of these and other prior taps and, at a news conference, sought to justify the taps he had authorized by referring to past precedent. He stated that in the:
+period of 1961 to '63 there were wiretaps on news organizations, on news people, on civil rights leaders and on other people. And I think they were perfectly justified and I'm sure that President Kennedy and his brother, Robert Kennedy, would never have authorized them, unless he thought they were in the national interest. (Presidential News Conference, 8/22/73.)
+Thus, questionable electronic surveillances by earlier administrations were put forward as a defense for improper surveillances exposed in 1973. In fact, however, two of these wiretaps were placed on domestic affairs advisers at the White House who had no foreign affairs responsibilities and apparently no access to classified foreign policy materialis.[121] A third target was a White House speech writer who had been overheard on an existing tap agreeing to provide a reporter with background information on a Presidential speech concerning domestic revenue sharing and welfare reform.[122] The reinstatement of another wiretap in this series was requested by H. R. Haldeman simply because "they may have a bad apple and have to get him out of the basket."[123] The last four requests in this series that were sent to the Attorney General (including the requests for a tap on the "bad apple") did not mention any national security justification at all. As former Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus has testified:
+I think some of the individuals who were tapped, at least to the extent I have reviewed the record, had very little, if any, relationship to any claim of national security . . . I think that as the program proceeded and it became clear to those who could sign off on taps how easy it was to institute a wiretap under the present procedure that these kinds of considerations [i.e., genuine national security justifications] were considerably relaxed as the program went on.[124]
+None of the "seventeen" wiretaps was ever reauthorized by the Attorney General, although 10 of them remained in operation for periods longer than 90 days and although President Nixon himself stated privately that "[t]he tapping was a very, very unproductive thing ... it's never been useful to any operation I've conducted . . ."[125]
+In short, warrantless electronic surveillance has been defended on the ground that it was essential for the national security, but the history of the use of this technique clearly shows that the imprecision and manipulation of this and similar labels, coupled with the absence of any outside scrutiny, has led to its improper use against American citizens who posed no criminal or national security threat to the country.[126]
+Similarly, the terms "foreign intelligence" and "counterespionage" were used by the CIA and the FBI to justify their cooperation in the CIA's New York mail opening project, but this project was also used to target entirely innocent American citizens.
+As noted above, the CIA compiled a "Watch List" of names of persons and organizations whose mail was to be opened if it passed through the New York facility. In the early days of the project. the names on this list -- which then numbered fewer than twenty -- might reasonably have been expected to lead to genuine foreign intelligence or counterintelligence information. But as the project developed, the Watch List grew and its focus changed. By the late 1960s there were approximately 600 names on the list, many of them American citizens and organizations who were engaged in purely lawful and constitutionally protected forms of protest against governmental policies. Among the domestic organizations on the Watch List, which was supplemented by submissions from the FBI, were: Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam, the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Ramparts, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, the Center for the Study of Public Policy, and the American Friends Service Committee.[127]
+The FBI levied more general requirements on the CIA's project as well. The focus of the original categories of correspondence in which the FBI expressed an interest was clearly foreign counterespionage, but subsequent requirements became progressively more domestic in their focus and progressively broader in their scope. The requirements that were levied by the FBI in 1972, one year before the termination of the project, included the following:
+". . . [p]ersons on the Watch List; known communists, New Left activists, extremists, and other subversives . . .
+Communist party and front organizations ... extremist and New Left organizations.
+Protest and peace organizations, such as People's Coalition for Peace and Justice, National Peace Action Committee, and Women's Strike for Peace.
+Communists, Trotskyites and members of other Marxist-Leninist, subversive and extremist groups, such as the Black Nationalists and Liberation groups ... Students for a Democratic Society ... and other New Left groups.
+Traffic to and from Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands showing anti-U.S. or subversive sympathies."[128]
+This final set of requirements evidently reflected the domestic turmoil of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The mail opening program that began as a means of collecting foreign intelligence information and discovering Soviet intelligence efforts in the United States had expanded to encompass detection of the activities of domestic dissidents of all types.
+In the absence of effective outside control, highly intrusive techniques have been used to gather vast amounts of information about the entirely lawful activities -- and privately held beliefs -- of large numbers of American citizens. The very intrusiveness of these techniques demands the utmost circumspection in their use. But with vague or non-existent standards to guide them, and with labels such as "national security" and "foreign intelligence" to shield them, executive branch officials have been all too willing to unleash these techniques against American citizens with little or no legitimate justification.
+[1] The techniques noted here do not constitute an exhaustive list of the surreptitious means by which intelligence agencies have collected information. The FBI, for example, has obtained a great deal of financial information about American citizens from tax returns filed with the Internal Revenue Service. (See IRS Report: Sec. I, "IRS Disclosures to FBI and CIA.") This section, however, is limited to problems raised by electronic surveillance, mail opening, surreptitious entries informants and electronic surveillances.
+[1]  Report to the House Committee on the Judiciary, by the Comptroller General of the United States, "FBI Domestic Intelligence Operations -- Their purpose and scope: Issues that Need to be Resolved,"[ 2/24/76, p. 96.
+[2] FBI memorandum to the Select Committee, 11/28/75.
+[3] Memorandum, FBI Overall Intelligence Program FY 1977 Compared to FY 1976 undated. The cost of the intelligence informant program comprises payments to informants for services and expense as well as the costs of FBI personnel. support and overhead.
+[4] See NSA Report: Sec. I, "Introduction and Summary."
+[5] See Mail Opening Reports: Sec. I, "Summary and Principal Conclusions."
+[6] Title 28 of the United States Code provides only that appropriations for the Department of Justice are available for payment of informants.[ 28 U.S.C. ? 524.
+[7] The Attorney General has announced that he will issue guidelines on the use of informants in the near future, and our recommendations provide standards for informant control and prohibitions on informant activity. (See pp.[ 328.) In addition, the Attorney General's recently promulgated guidelines on "Domestic Security Investigations" limit the use of informants at the early stages of such inquiries and provide for review by the Justice Department of the initiation of "full investigations" in which new informants may be recruited.
+[8] In a criminal case involving charges of jury bribery, United States v. Hoffa, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), the Supreme Court ruled that an informant's testimony concerning conversations of a defendant could not be considered the product of a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment on the ground the defendant had consented to the presence of the informant. In another criminal case, Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966), the Court stated that "in the detection of many types of crimes, the Government is entitled to use decoys and to conceal the identity of its agents."
+[9] In a more recent case, the California Supreme Court held that secret surveillance of classes and group meetings at a university through the use of undercover agents was "likely to pose a substantial restraint upon the exercise of First Amendment rights." White v. Davis, 533 Pac. Rep. 2d, 223 (1975) Citing a number of U.S. Supreme Court opinions, the California Supreme Court stated in its unanimous decision:
+"In view of this significant potential chilling effect, the challenged surveillance activities can only be sustained if [the Government] can demonstrate a 'compelling' state interest which justifies the resultant deterrence of First Amendment rights and which cannot be served by alternative means less intrusive on fundamental rights." 533 Pac. Rep. 2d, at 232
+[10] Gary Rowe testimony, 12/2/75 Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 111, 118.
+[11] Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 111.
+[12] The FBI Manual of Instructions proscribes only reporting of privileged communications between an attorney and client, legal "defense plans or strategy," "employer-employee relationships" (where an informant is connected with a labor union), and "legitimate institution or campus activities" at schools. (FBI Manual Section 107.)
+[13] Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
+[14] Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 397 (1937); 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
+[15] For example, letter from Attorney General Jackson to Rep. Hatton Summers, 3/19/41; See Electronic Surveillance Report: Sec. II.
+[16] Memorandum from President Roosevelt to the Attorney General 5/21/40.
+[17] Letter from Attorney General Tom C. Clark to President Truman, 7/17/46.
+[18] Directive from President Johnson to Heads of Agencies, 6/30/65.
+[19] President Roosevelt's 1940 order directed the Attorney General to approve wiretaps "after investigation of the need in each ease." (Memorandum from President Roosevelt to Attorney General Jackson, 5/21/40.) However, Attorney General Francis Biddle recalled that Attorney General Jackson "turned it over 'to Edgar Hoover without himself passing on each case" in 1940 and 1941, Biddle's practice beginning in 1941 conformed to the President's order. (Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority (Garden City: Doubleday, 1962), p. 167.)
+Since 1965, explicit written authorization has been required. (Directive of President Johnson 6/30/65.) This requirement however, has often been disregarded. In violation of this requirement, for example, no written authorizations were obtained from the Attorney General -- or from any one else -- for a series of four wiretaps implemented in 1971 and 1972 on Yeoman Charles Radford, two of his friends, and his father-in-law. See Electronics Surveillance Report; Sec. VI. The first and third of these taps were implemented at the oral instruction of Attorney General John Mitchell. (Memorandum from T. J. Smith E. S. Miller 2/26/73.) The remaining taps were implemented at the oral request of David Young, an assistant to John Ehrlichman at the White House, who merely informed the Bureau that the requests originated with Ehrlichman and had the Attorney General's concurrence. (Memorandum from T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, 6/14/73.
+[20] Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach instituted this requirement in March 1965. (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 3/3/65.)
+[21] The FBI maintained one wiretap on an official of the Nation of Islam that had originally been authorized by Attorney General Brownell in 1957 for seven years until 1964 without any subsequent re-authorization. (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 12/31/65, initialed "Approved: HB, 1/2/57.")
+As Nicholas Katzenbach testified: "The custom was not to put a time limit on a tap, or any wiretap authorization. Indeed, I think the Bureau would have felt free in 1965 to put a tap on a phone authorized by Attorney General Jackson before World War Il." (Nicholas Katzenbach testimony, 11/12/75, p. 87.)
+[22] Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
+[22]  The Court wrote: "Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a question not presented by this case."[ 389 U.S. at 358 n. 23
+[23] 18 U.S. C.[ 2511 (3).
+[23]  407 U.S.[ 297 (1972)
+[24] At the same time, the Court recognized that "domestic security surveillance" may involve different policy and practical considerations apart from the surveillance of 'ordinary crime,' 407 U.S. at 321, and thus did not hold that "the same type of standards and procedures prescribed by Title III [of the 1968 Act] are necessarily applicable to this case." (407 U.S. at 321.) The Court noted:
+"Given the potential distinctions between Title III criminal surveillances and those involving the domestic security, Congress may wish to consider protective standards for the latter which differ from those already prescribed for specified crime in Title III. Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment." (407 U.S. at 321.)
+[25] 407 U.S. at 307.
+[26] 407 U.S. at 320. United States v. United States District Court remains the only Supreme Court case dealing with the issue of warrantless electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes. Three federal circuit courts have considered this issue since 1972, however. The Third Circuit and the Fifth Circuit both held that the President may constitutionally authorize warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign counterespionage and foreign intelligence purposes. [United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Ivanov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974) ; and United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir., 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 960 (1974).] The District of Columbia Circuit held unconstitutional the warrantless electronic surveillance of the Jewish Defense League, a domestic organization whose activities allegedly affected U.S. Soviet relations but which was neither the agent of nor in collaboration with a foreign power. [Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir., 1975) (en banc).]
+[27] Testimony of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kevin Maroney, Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedures, 6/29/72, p. 10. This language paralleled that of the Court in United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 309 it. 8.
+[28] Although Attorney General John Mitchell and Justice Department officials on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee apparently learned that NSA was making a contribution to domestic intelligence in 1971, there is no indication that the FBI told them of its submission of names of Americans for inclusion on a NSA "watch list." When Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen learned of these practices in 1973, Attorney General Elliott Richardson ordered that they be terminated. (See Report on NSA: Sec. I, "Introduction and Summary.")
+[29] See NSA Report: Sec. I, "Introduction and Summary."
+[30] Memorandum from Iredell to Gayler, 4/10/70; See NSA Report: Sec. I. Introduction and Summary. BNDD originally requested NSA to monitor the South American link because it did not believe it had authority to wiretap a few public telephones in New York City from which drug deals were apparently being arranged. (Iredell testimony, 9/18/75, p. 99.)
+[31] Memorandum from the Attorney General to Mr. Hoover, 2/26/52.
+[32] Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
+[33] Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, 5/20/54.
+[34] omitted in original.
+[35] While such techniques might have been authorized by Attorneys General under expansive "internal security" or "national interest" theories similar to Brownell's authorization for installing microphones by trespass, the issue was never presented to them for decision before 1967, when Attorney General Ramsey Clark turned down a surreptitious entry request. There is no indication that the legal questions were considered in any depth in 1970 or 1971 at the time of the "Huston Plan" and its aftermath. See Huston Plan Report: See. III, Who, What, When and Where.
+[36] Ex Parte Jackson, 96, U.S. 727, 733 (1878).
+[37] Milwaukee Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (dissent).
+[38] See Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) ; Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1975).
+[39] United States v. United States District Court, 407 US 297, 313 (1972).
+[40] 376 F. Supp.[ 29, (D.D.C. 1974).
+[41] 376 F. Supp. at 33.
+[42] Letter from Acting Assistant Attorney General John C. Keeny to Hugh E. Kline. Clerk of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 5/9/75.
+[43] The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. United States District Court.[ 407 U.S. 297 (1972), clearly established the principle that such warrantless invasions of the privacy of Americans are unconstitutional.
+[44] In one case, an FBI informant involved in an intelligence investigation of the Detroit Black Panther Party furnished advance information regarding a planned ambush of Detroit police officers which enabled the Detroit Police Department to take necessary action to prevent injury or death to the officers and resulted in the arrest of eight persons and the seizure of a cache of weapons. The informant also furnished information resulting in the location and confiscation by Bureau agents of approximately fifty sticks of dynamite available to the Black Panther Party which likely resulted in the saving of lives and the prevention of property damage. (Joseph Deegan testimony, 2/13/76, p. 54)
+[45] Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p, 115.
+[46] Katzenbach testified that the case "could not have been solved without acquiring informants who were highly placed members of the Klan." (Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 215.)
+[47] Date and address deleted at FBI request so as not to reveal informant's identity.
+[48] Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, re: Women's Liberation Movement, 5/28/69, p. 2.
+[49] Names deleted for security reasons.
+[50] Names deleted for security reasons.
+[51] Names and addresses deleted for security reasons.
+[52] Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, P. Ill.
+[53] Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 116.
+[54] Special Agent, 11/21/75, p. 7.
+[55] Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 119,120.
+[56] Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 120.
+[57] Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 116.
+[58] FBI Manual, Section 10T c (3).
+[59] Special Agent, 11/21/75, p. 12.
+[60] Adams, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 150.
+[61] Rowe deposition, 10/17/75, p. 12.
+[62] Rowe, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6. p. 118.
+[63] Special Agent, 11/21/75. pp. 16-17.
+[64] Memorandum from the FBI to Senate Select Committee, 2/26/76, with enclosures.
+[65] Hardy, 9/29/75, pp. 16-17.
+[66] 357 U.S.[ 449 (1958). Similarly, in Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), the Supreme Court held compulsory disclosure of group membership lists was an unjustified interference with members' freedom of association.
+[66]  361 U.S. at 465.
+[67] FBI Manual of Instructions, Section 107.
+[68] Surreptitious entry has also provided a means for the obtaining of such lists and other confidential documents.
+[69] Special Agent, 11/19/75, pp. 10-11.
+[70] Special Agent, 11/20/75, pp. 15-16,
+[71] Cook, 12/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p.112.
+[72] Cook deposition, 10/14/75, p. 36.
+[73] W. Raymond Wannall testimony, 10/21/75, p.21.
+[74] Under the Justice Department's procedures for Title III (court-ordered) wiretaps, however, the monitoring agent is obligated to turn off the recording equipment when certain privileged communications begin. Manual for conduct of Electronic Surveillance under Title III of Public Law 90--351, Sec.[ 8.1.
+[75] Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, 5/20/54.
+[76] Three additional bugs were planted in Dr. King's hotel rooms in 1965 after the standards for wiretapping and microphone surveillance became identical. According to FBI memoranda, apparently initiated by Katzenbach, Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach was given after the fact notification that these three surveillances of Dr. King had occurred. See p.[ 273, and the King Report, Sec. IV. for further details.
+[76]  Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardener to W. C. Sullivan, 3/26/64.
+[77] For example, memorandum from Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 2/4/64.
+[78] FBI memoranda. Identifying details are being withheld by the Select Committee because of privacy considerations. Even the FBI realized that this type of information was unrelated to criminal activity or national security: for the last four months of this surveillance, most of the summaries that were disseminated to the White House began, "The following is a summary of nonpertinent information concerning captioned individual as of . . ."
+[79] Transcript of Presidential Tapes, 2/28/73 (House Judiciary Committee Statement of Information, Book VII, Part 4, p. 1754).
+[80] For example, letters from Hoover to the Attorney General, 7/25/69, and 7/31/69: letters from Hoover to H. R. Haldeman, 6/25/70.
+Letter from Hoover to Haldeman. 6/25/70.
+Examples of such information are listed in the finding on Political Abuse, "The '17' wiretaps."
+[83] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/14/61: Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 2/16/61: Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 6/26/62; Memorandum from Wannall to W. C. Sullivan. 12/22/66.
+[84] Memorandum from D. E. Moore to A. H. Belmont, 2/16/61.
+[85] Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 12/22/66; Memorandum from A. H. Belmont to Mr. Parsons, 2/14/61. This investigation did discover that representatives of a foreign nation were attempting to influence Congressional deliberations, but it did not reveal that money was being passed to any member of Congress or Congressional staff aide.
+[86] Memorandum from Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 12/22/66.
+[87] See Finding on Political Abuse, p.[ 233.
+[88] Electronic Surveillance Report: See. II, "Presidential and Attorney General Authorization."
+[89] omitted in original.
+[90] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 6/26/62.
+[91] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 6/29/61; memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 7/31/62; memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 4/19/65; memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 6/4/69; memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 9/10/69; letter from W. C. Sullivan to J. Edgar Hoover 7/2/69.
+[92] omitted in original.
+[93] NSA has long asserted that it had the authority to do this so long as one of the parties to such communication was located in a foreign country.
+[94] 277 U.S.[ 438, 473-474 (1928).
+[94]  277 U.S. at 474-475.
+[95] CIA Officer" testimony, 9/30/75, p. 15.
+[96] Staff summary of "Master index." review, 9/5/75.
+[97] James Angelton testimony, 9/17/75, p. 28.
+[98] Wannall, 10/21/75, p. 5.
+[99] In one of the programs based on "indicators" a participating agent testified that he opened 30 to 00 letters each day. (FBI agent statement, 9/10/75, p. 23.) In a second such program, a total of 1,011 letters were opened in one of the six cities In which it operated; statistics on the number of letters opened in the other live cities cannot be reconstructed. (W. Raymond Wannall testimony, 10/21/75, P. 5.) In a third such project, 2,350 letters were opened in one city and statistics for the other two cities in which it operated are unavailable. (Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to W. C. Sullivan, 8/31/61; Memorandum from Mr. Branigan to Mr. Sullivan, 12/21/61; memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/5/62.)
+[100] Letter from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 10/29/75. Six other criteria were used in these programs. See Mail Opening Report, Sec. IV.
+[101] Memorandum from S. B. Donohoe to A. H. Belmont, 2/23/61: Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/11/60. Statistics relating to the number of letters opened in the other program which used this criterion cannot be reconstructed.
+[102] According to the FBI, "there were at least 239 surreptitious entries (for purposes other than microphone installation) conducted against at least fifteen domestic subversive targets from 1942 to April 1968.... In addition, at least three domestic subversive targets were the subject of numerous entries from October 1952 to June 1966." (FBI memorandum to the Senate Select Committee, 10/13/76.) One target, the Socialist Workers Party, was the subject of possibly as many as 92 break-ins by the FBI, between 1960 and 1966 alone. The home of at least one SWP member was also apparently broken into. (Sixth Supplementary Response to Requests for Production of Documents of Defendant, Director of the FBI, Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 73 Civ. 3160, (SDNY), 3/24/76.) An entry against one "white hate group" was also reported by the FBI. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to the Senate Select Committee, 10/13/75.)
+[103] Memorandum from Tom Huston to H. R. Haldeman, 7/70, p. 3.
+[104] Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 7/19/66.
+[105] Ibid.
+[106] United States v. Ehrlichman, 376 F. Supp. 29,32 (D.D.C. 1974).
+[107] See e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, (1928).
+[108] Memorandum from Francis Biddle to Mr. Hoover, 11/19/41.
+[109] Ibid.
+[110] Unaddressed Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, 11/15/45, found in Director Hoover's "Official and Confidential" files.
+[111] Ibid.
+[112] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 4/1/64.
+[113] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 6/15/65.
+[114] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 11/5/69.
+[115] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Mitchell.[ 11/7/69.
+[116] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 3/16/70. The strongest evidence that this group's conduct was inimical to the national security was reported as follows:
+"The [group) is dominated and controlled by the pro-Chinese Marxist Leninist (excised) ....
+"In carrying out the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the (excised) members have repeatedly sought to become involved in labor disputes on the side of labor, join picket lines and engage in disruptive and sometimes violent tactics against industry recruiters on college campuses....
+"This faction is currently very active in many of the major demonstrations and student violence on college campuses (Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 3/16/70. The excised words have been deleted by the FBI.)
+[117] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 6/16/70. The only other results noted by Hoover related to the fact that the wiretap had "obtained information concerning the activities of the national headquarters of [the group and] plans for [the group's] support and participation in demonstrations supporting antiwar groups and the (excised)." It was also noted that the wiretap "revealed ... contacts with Canadian student elements".
+[118] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General, 9/16/70. The only other results noted by Hoover again related to obtaining information about the "plans and activities" of the group. Specifically mentioned were the "plans for the National Interim Committee (ruling body of [excised]) meeting which took place in New York and Chicago", and the plans "for demonstrations at San Francisco, Detroit, Salt Lake City, Minneapolis, and Chicago." There was no Indication that these demonstrations were expected to be violent. (The excised words have been deleted by the FBI).
+[119] Public statement of President Nixon, 5/22/73.
+[120] omitted in original.
+[121] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 7/23/69; memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 12/14/70.
+[122] Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 8/1/69.
+[123] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Sullivan and D. C. Brennan, 10/15/70.
+[124] Ruckelshaus testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, 5/9/74, pp. 311-12.
+[125] Transcript of the Presidential Tapes, 2/28/73 (House Judiciary Committee Statement of Information Book VII, Part W, p. 1754.)
+[126] The term "national security" was also used by John Ehrlichman and Charles Colson to justify their roles in the break in of Dr. Fielding's office in 1971. A March 21, 1973 tape recording of a meeting between President Nixon, John Dean, and H. R. Haldeman suggests, however, that the national security "justification" may have been developed long after the event for the purpose of obscuring its impropriety. When the President asked what could be done if the break-in was revealed publicly, John Dean suggested, "You might put it on a national security grounds basis." Later in the conversation. President Nixon stated "With the bombing thing coming out and everything coming out, the whole thing was national security," and Dean said, "I think we could get by on that." (Transcript of Presidential tapes, 3/21/73.)
+[127] Staff summary of Watch List review, 9/5/75.
+[128] Routing slip from J. Edgar Hoover to James Angelton (attachment), 3/10/72.
+** D. Using Covert Action to Disrupt and Discredit Domestic
+<br>GROUPS
+<center>
+MAJOR FINDING
+</center>
+The Committee finds that covert action programs have been used to disrupt the lawful political activities of individual Americans and groups and to discredit them, using dangerous and degrading tactics which are abhorrent in a free and decent society.
+<em>Subfindings</em>
+(a) Although the claimed purposes of these action programs were to protect the national security and to prevent violence, many of the victims were concededly nonviolent, were not controlled by a foreign power, and posed no threat to the national security.
+(b) The acts taken interfered with the First Amendment rights of citizens. They were explicitly intended to deter citizens from joining groups, "neutralize" those who were already members, and prevent or inhibit the expression of ideas.
+(c) The tactics used against Americans often risked and sometimes caused serious emotional, economic, or physical damage. Actions were taken which were designed to break up marriages, terminate funding or employment, and encourage gang warfare between violent rival groups. Due process of law forbids the use of such covert tactics, whether the victims are innocent law-abiding citizens or members of groups suspected of involvement in violence.
+(d) The sustained use of such tactics by the FBI in an attempt to destroy Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., violated the law and fundamental human decency.
+<em>Elaboration of the Findings</em>
+For fifteen years from 1956 until 1971, the FBI carried out a series of covert action programs directed against American citizens.[1] These "counterintelligence programs" (shortened to the acronym COINTELPRO) resulted in part from frustration with Supreme Court rulings limiting the Government's power to proceed overtly against dissident groups.[2]
+They ended formally in 1971 with the threat of public exposure.[3] Some of the findings discussed herein are related to the findings on lawlessness, overbreadth, and intrusive techniques previously set forth. Some of the most offensive actions in the FBI's COINTELPRO programs (anonymous letters intended to break up marriages, or efforts to deprive people of their jobs, for example) were based upon the covert use of information obtained through overly-broad investigations and intrusive techniques.[4] Similarly, as noted above, COINTELPRO involved specific violations of law, and the law and the Constitution were "not [given] a thought" under the FBI's policies.[5]
+But COINTELPRO was more than simply violating the law or the Constitution. In COINTELPRO the Bureau secretly 6 took the law into its own hands, going beyond the collection of intelligence and beyond its law enforcement function to act outside the legal process altogether and to covertly disrupt, discredit and harass groups and individuals. A law enforcement agency must not secretly usurp the functions of judge and jury, even when the investigation reveals criminal activity. But in COINTELPRO, the Bureau imposed summary punishment, not only on the allegedly violent, but also on the nonviolent advocates of change. Such action is the hallmark of the vigilante and has no place in a democratic society.
+Under COINTELPRO, certain techniques the Bureau had used against hostile foreign agents were adoped for use against perceived domestic threats to the established political and social order.[7]
+Some of the targets of COINTELPRO were law-abiding citizens merely advocating change in our society. Other targets were members of groups that had been involved in violence, such as the Ku Klux Klan or the Black Panther Party. Some victims did nothing more than associate with targets.[8]
+The Committee does not condone acts of violence, but the response of Government to allegations of illegal conduct must comply with the due process of law demanded by the Constitution. Lawlessness by citizens does not justify lawlessness by Government.
+The tactics which were employed by the Bureau are therefore unacceptable, even against the alleged criminal. The imprecision of the targeting compounded the abuse. Once the Government decided to take the law into its own hands, those unacceptable tactics came almost inevitably to be used not only against the "kid with the bomb" but also against the "kid with the bumper sticker."
+<em>Subfinding (a)</em>
+Although the claimed purposes of these action programs were to protect the "national security" and to prevent violence, many of the victims were concededly nonviolent, were not controlled by a foreign power, and posed no threat to the "national security."
+The Bureau conducted five "counterintelligence programs" aimed against domestic groups: the "Communist Party, USA" program (1956-71); the "Socialist Workers Party" program (1961-69); the "White Hate" program (1964-1971); the "Black Nationalist-Hate Group" program (1967-71) ; and the "New Left" program (1968-71).
+While the declared purposes of these programs were to protect the "national security" or prevent violence, Bureau witnesses admit that many of the targets were nonviolent and most had no connections with a foreign power. Indeed, nonviolent organizations and individuals were targeted because the Bureau believed they represented a "potential" for violence -- and nonviolent citizens who were against the war in Vietnam were targeted because they gave "aid and comfort" to violent demonstrators by lending respectability to their cause.[11]
+The imprecision of the targeting is demonstrated by the inability of the Bureau to define the subjects of the programs. The Black Nationalist program, according to its supervisor, included "a great number of organizations that you might not today characterize as black nationalist but which were in fact primarily black."[12] Thus, the nonviolent Southern Christian Leadership Conference was labeled as a Black Nationalist-"Hate Group."
+Furthermore, the actual targets were chosen from a far broader group than the titles of the programs would imply. The CPUSA program targeted not only Communist Party members but also sponsors of the National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee 14 and civil rights leaders allegedly under Communist influence or not deemed to be "anti-Communist".[15] The Socialist Workers Party program included non-SWP sponsors of antiwar demonstrations which were cosponsored by the SWP or the Young Socialist Alliance, its youth group.[16] The Black Nationalist program targeted a range of organizations from the Panthers to SNCC to the peaceful Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and included every Black Student Union and many other black student groups.[17] New Left targets ranged from the SDS 18 to the InterUniversity Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy,[19] from Antioch College ("vanguard of the New Left")[20] to the New
+Mexico Free University and other "alternate" schools,[21] and from underground newspapers 22 to students protesting university censorship of a student publication by carrying signs with four-letter words on them.[23]
+<em>Subfinding (b)</em>
+The acts taken interfered with the First Amendment rights of citizens. They were explicitly intended to deter citizens from joining groups, "neutralize" those who were already members, and prevent or inhibit the expression of ideas.
+In achieving its purported goals Of protecting the national security and preventing violence, the Bureau attempted to deter membership in the target groups. As the supervisor of the "Black Nationalist" COINTELPRO stated, "Obviously, you are going to prevent violence or a greater amount of violence if you have smaller groups. 4 The chief of the COINTELPRO unit agreed: "We also made an effort . . . to deter recruitment where we could. This was done with the view that if we could curb the organization, we could curb the action or the violence within the organization."[25] As noted above, many of the organizations "curbed" were not violent, and covert attacks on group membership contravened the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom to associate.
+Nor was this the only First Amendment right violated by the Bureau. In addition to attempting to prevent people from joining or continuing to be members in target organizations, the Bureau tried to "deter or counteract" what it called "propaganda"[26] -- the expression of ideas which it considered dangerous. Thus, the originating document for the "Black Nationalist" COINTELPRO noted that "consideration should be given to techniques to preclude" leaders of the target organizations "from spreading their philosophy publicly or through various mass communication media."[27]
+Instructions to "preclude" free speech were not limited to "black nationalists;" they occurred in every program. In the New Left program, for instance, approximately thirty-nine percent of all actions attempted to keep targets from speaking, teaching, writing, or publishing.[28]
+The cases included attempts (sometimes successful) to prompt the firing of university and high school teachers;[29] to prevent targets from speaking on campus;[30] to stop chapters of target groups from being formed;[31] to prevent the distribution of books, newspapers, or periodicals;[32] to disrupt or cancel news conferences;[33] to interfere with peaceful demonstrations, including the SCLC's Poor People's Campaign and Washington Spring Project and most of the large anti-war marches;[34] and to deny facilities for meetings or conferences.[35]
+As the above cases demonstrate, the FBI was not just "chilling" free speech, but squarely attacking it.
+The tactics used against Americans often risked and sometimes caused serious emotional, economic, or physical damage. Actions were taken which were designed to break up marriages, terminate funding or employment, and encourage gang warfare between violent rival groups. Due process of law forbids the use of such covert tactics whether the victims are innocent law-abiding citizens or members of groups suspected of involvement in violence. The former head of the Domestic Intelligence Division described counterintelligence as a "rough, tough, dirty, and dangerous" business.[36] His description was accurate.
+One technique used in COINTELPRO involved sending anonymous letters to spouses intended, in the words of one proposal, to "produce ill-feeling and possibly a lasting distrust" between husband and wife, so that "concern over what to do about it" would distract the target from "time spent in the plots and plans" of the organization.[37] The image of an agent of the United States Government scrawling a poison-pen letter to someone's wife in language usually reserved for bathroom walls is not a happy one. Nevertheless, anonymous letters were sent to, among others, a Klansman's wife, informing her that her husband had "taken the flesh of another unto himself," the other person being a woman named Ruby, with her "lust filled eyes and smart aleck figure;"[38] and to a "Black Nationalist's" wife saying that her husband "been maken it here" with other women in his organization "and than he gives us this jive bout their better in bed then you."[39] A husband who was concerned about his wife's activities in a biracial group received a letter which started, "Look man I guess your old lady doesn't get enough at home or she wouldn't be shucking and jiving with our Black Men" in the group.[40] The Field Office reported as a "tangible result" of this letter that the target and her husband separated.[41]
+The Bureau also contacted employers and funding organizations in order to cause the firing of the targets or the termination of their support.[42] For example, priests who allowed their churches to be used for the Black Panther breakfast programs were targeted, and anonymous letters were sent to their bishops;[43] a television commentator who expressed admiration for a Black Nationalist leader and criticized heavy defense spending was transferred after the Bureau contacted his employer;[44] and an employee of the Urban League was fired after the FBI approached a "confidential source" in a foundation which funded the League.[45]
+The Bureau also encouraged "gang warfare" between violent groups. An FBI memorandum dated November 25,1968 to certain Field Offices conducting investigations of the Black Panther Party ordered recipient offices to submit "imaginative and hard-hitting counterintelligence measures aimed at crippling the BPP." Proposals were to be received every two weeks. Particular attention was to be given to capitalizing upon differences between the Panthers and US, Inc. (an other "Black Nationalist" group), which had reached such proportions that "it is taking on the aura of gang warfare with attendant threats of murder and reprisals."[45]  On May 26,1970, after U.S. organization members had killed four BPP members and members of each organization had been shot and beaten by members of the other, the Field Office reported:
+Information received from local sources indicate[s] that, in general, the membership of the Los Angeles BPP is physically afraid of US members and take premeditated precautions to avoid confrontations.
+In view of their anxieties, it is not presently felt that the Los Angeles BPP can be prompted into what could result in an internecine struggle between the two organizations. . . .
+The Los Angeles Division is aware of the mutually hostile feelings harbored between the organizations and the first opportunity to capitalize on the situation will be maximized. It is intended that US Inc. will be appropriately and discreetly advised of the time and location of BPP activities <em>in order that the two organizations might be brought together and thus grant nature the</em>
+<em>opportunity to take'her due course</em>.[46] [Emphasis added.]
+A second Field Office noted:
+Shootings, beatings and a high degree of unrest continues to prevail in the ghetto area of Southeast San Diego. Although no specific counterintelligence action can be credited with contributing to this overall situation, it is felt that a substantial amount of the unrest is directly attributable to this program.[47]
+In another case, an anonymous letter was sent to the leader of the Blackstone Rangers (a group, according to the Field Offices' proposal, "to whom violent-type activity, shooting, and the like are second nature") advising him that "the brothers that run the Panthers blame you for blocking their thing and there's supposed to be a hit out for you." The letter was intended to "intensify the degree of animosity between the two groups" and cause "retaliatory action which could disrupt the BPP or lead to reprisals against its leadership."[48]
+Another technique which risked serious harm to the target was falsely labeling a target an informant. This technique was used in all five domestic COINTELPROs. When a member of a nonviolent group was successfully mislabeled as an informant, the result was alienation from the group.[49] When the target belonged to a group known to have killed suspected informants, the risk was substantially more serious. On several occasions, the Bureau used this technique against members of the Black Panther Party; it was used at least twice after FBI documents expressed concern over the possible consequences because two members of the BPP had been murdered as suspected informants.[50]
+The Bureau recognized that some techniques used in COINTELPRO were more likely than others to cause serious physical, emotional, or economic damage to the targets.[51] Any proposed use of such techniques -- for example, encouraging enmity between violent rival groups, falsely labeling group members as informants, and mailing anonymous letters to targets' spouses accusing the target of infidelity -- was scrutinized carefully by headquarters supervisory personnel, in an attempt to balance the "greater good" to be achieved by the proposal against the known or risked harm to the target. If the "good" was sufficient, the proposal was approved. For instance, in discussing anonymous letters to spouses, the agent who supervised the New Left COINTELPRO stated:
+[Before recommending approval] I would want to know what you want to get out of this, who are these people. If it's somebody, and say they did split up, what would accrue from it as far as disrupting the New Left is concerned? Say they broke up, what then. . . .
+[The question would be] is it worth it? 52
+Similarly, with regard to causing false suspicions that an individual was an informant, the chief of the Racial Intelligence Section stated:
+You have to be able to make decisions and I am sure that labeling somebody as an informant, that you'd want to make certain that it served a good purpose before you did it and not do it haphazardly.... It is a serious thing ... As far as I am aware, in the black extremist area, by using that technique, no one was
+killed. I am sure of that.[52]
+This official was asked whether the fact that no one was killed was the, result of "luck or planning." He answered: "Oh, it just happened that way, I am sure."[52]
+It is intolerable in a free society that an agency of the Government should adopt such tactics, whether or not the targets are involved in criminal activity. The "greater good" of the country is in fact served by adherence to the rule of law mandated by the Constitution.
+<em>Subfinding (d)</em>
+The sustained use of such tactics by the FBI in an attempt to destroy Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., violated the law and fundamental human decency.
+The Committee devoted substantial attention to the FBI's covert action campaign against Dr. Martin Luther King because it demonstrates just how far the Government could go in a secret war against one citizen. In focusing upon Dr. King, however, it should not be forgotten that the Bureau carried out disruptive activities against hundreds of lesser known American citizens. It should also be borne in mind that positive action on the part of high Government officials outside the FBI might have prevented what occurred in this case.[53]
+The FBI's claimed justification for targeting Dr. King -- alleged Communist influence on him and the civil rights movement -- is examined elsewhere in this report.[54]
+The FBI's campaign against Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. began in December 1963, four months after the famous civil rights March on Washington,[55] when a nine-hour meeting was convened at FBI Headquarters to discuss various "avenues of approach aimed at neutralizing King as an effective Negro leader."[56] Following the meeting, agents in the field were instructed to "continue to gather information concerning King's personal activities ... in order that we may consider using this information at an opportune time in a counterintelligence move to discredit him."[57]
+About two weeks after that conference, FBI agents planted a microphone in Dr. King's bedroom at the Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C.[58] During the next two years, the FBI installed at least fourteen more "bugs" in Dr. King's hotel rooms across the country.[59] Physical and photographic surveillances accompanied some of the microphone, coverage.[60]
+The FBI also scrutinized Dr. King's tax returns, monitored his financial affairs, and even tried to determine whether he had a secret foreign bank account.[61]
+In late 1964, a "sterilized" tape was prepared in a manner that would prevent attribution to the FBI and was "anonymously" mailed to Dr. King just before he received the Nobel Peace Prize.[62] Enclosed in the package with the tape was an unsigned letter which warned Dr. King, "your end is approaching . . . you are finished." The letter intimated that the tape might be publicly released, and closed with the following message:
+King, there is only one thing left for you to do. You know what it is. You have just 34 days in which to do (this exact number has been selected for a specific reason, it has definite practical significance). You are done. There is but one
+way out for you . . .[63]
+Dr. King's associates have said he interpreted the message as an effort to induce him to commit suicide.[64]
+At about the same time that it mailed the "sanitized" tape, the FBI was also apparently offering tapes and transcripts to newsmen.[65] Later when civil rights leaders Roy Wilkins and James Farmer went to Washington to persuade Bureau officials to halt the FBI's discrediting efforts,[66] they were told that "if King want[s] war we [are] prepared to give it to him."[67]
+Shortly thereafter, Dr. King went to Europe to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. The Bureau tried to undermine ambassadorial receptions in several of the countries he visited '68 and when he returned to the United States, took steps to diminish support for a banquet and a special "day" being planned in his honor.[69]
+The Bureau's actions against Dr. King included attempts to prevent him from meeting with world leaders, receiving honors or favorable publicity, and gaining financial support. When the Bureau learned of a possible meeting between Dr. King and the Pope in August 1964, the FBI asked Cardinal Spellman to try to arrange a cancellation of the audience.[70] Discovering that two schools (Springfield College and Marquette University) were going to honor Dr. King with special degrees in the spring of 1964, Bureau agents tried to convince officials at the schools to rescind their plans.[71] And when the Bureau learned in October 1966 that the Ford Foundation might grant three million dollars to Dr. King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference, they asked a former FBI agent who was a high official at the Ford Motor Company to try to block the award.[72]
+A magazine was asked not to publish favorable articles about him.[73] Religious leaders and institutions were contacted to undermine their support of him.[74] Press conference questions were prepared and distributed to "friendly" journalists.[75] And plans were even discussed for sabotaging his political campaign in the event he decided to run for national office.[76] An SCLC employee was "anonymously" informed that the SCLC was trying to get rid of her "so that the Bureau [would be] in a position to capitalize on [her] bitterness."[78] Bureau officials contacted members of Congress,[79] and special "off the record" testimony was prepared for the Director's use before the House Appropriations Committee.[80]
+The "neutralization" program continued until Dr. King's death. As late as March 1968, FBI agents were being instructed to neutralize Dr. King because he might become a "messiah" who could "unify, and electrify, the militant black nationalist movement" if he were to "abandon his supposed 'obedience' to 'white liberal doctrines' (nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism."[81] Steps were taken to subvert the "Poor People's Campaign" which Dr. King was planning to lead in the spring of 1968.[82] Even after Dr. King's death, agents in the field were proposing methods for harassing his widow 83 and Bureau officials were trying to prevent his birthday from becoming a national holiday.[84]
+The actions taken against Dr. King are indefensible. They represent a sad episode in the dark history of covert actions directed against law abiding citizens by a law enforcement agency.
+[1] Before 1956 the FBI engaged in activities to disrupt and discredit Communists and (before World War II) Fascists, but not as part of a formal program. The Bureau is the only agency which carried on a sustained effort to "neutralize" domestic groups, although other agencies made sporadic attempts to disrupt dissident groups. (See Military Surveillance Report; IRS Report.)
+[2] The Bureau personnel involved in COINTELPRO link the first formal counterintelligence program, against the Communist Party, USA, to the Supreme Court reversal of the Smith Act convictions, which "made it impossible to prosecute Communist Party members at the time". (COINTELPRO unit chief, 10/16/75, p. 14.) It should be noted, however, that the Court's reversal occurred In 1957, the year after the program was instituted. This belief in the deficiencies of the law was a major factor in the four subsequent programs as well: "The other COINTELPRO programs were opened as the threat arose in areas of extremism and subversion and there were not adequate statutes to proceed against the organization or to prevent their activities." (COINTELPRO Unit Chief, 10/16/75, p. 15.)
+[3] For further information on the termination of each of the programs, see The Accountability and Control Findings, p.[ 265 and the detailed reports on the Black Panther Party and COINTELPRO.
+Although the programs have been formally terminated, Bureau witnesses agree that there is a "grey area" between "counter-intelligence" and investigative activities which are inherently disruptive. These investigative activities, continue. (See COINTELPRO Report: "Command and Control -- The Problems of Oversight.")
+[4] Information gained from electronic surveillance, informant coverage, burglaries, and confidential financial records was used in COINTELPRO. p.[ 275.)
+[5] Moore, 11/3/75, p. 83.
+[6] Field offices were instructed that no one outside the Bureau was to know that COINTELPRO existed, although certain persons in the executive branch and in Congress were told about -- and did not object to -efforts to disrupt the CPUSA and the Klan. However, no one was told about the other COINTELPRO programs, or about the more dangerous and degrading techniques employed. (See p.[ 275.)
+[7] As the Chief of the Racial Intelligence Section put it:
+"You can trace [the origins of COINTELPRO] up and back to foreign intelligence, particularly penetration of the group by the individual informant. Before you can engage in counterintelligence you must have intelligence. . . . If you have good intelligence and know what it's going to do, you can seed distrust, sow misinformation. The same technique is used, misinformation, disruption, is used in the domestic groups, although in the domestic groups you are dealing in '67 and '68 with many, many more across the country ... than you had ever dealt with as far as your foreign groups." (Moore, 11/3/75, pp. 32-33.)
+Former Assistant Director William C. Sullivan also testified that the "rough, tough, dirty business" of foreign counterintelligence was "brought home against any organization against which we were targeted. We did not differentiate." (Sullivan, 11/1/75, pp. 97-98.)
+[8] For example, parents and spouse, of targets received letters containing accusations of immoral conduct by the target. (Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/30/70; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office, 11/4/68.)
+[9] Huston, 9/23/75, Hearings, Vol. 2, p. 45.
+[10] Moore, 11/8/75, p. 37.
+[11] New Left supervisor, 10/28/75, p. 69.
+[12] Black Nationalist Supervisor, 10/17/75, p. 12.
+[13] omitted in original.
+[14] For example, the entire Unitarian Society of Cleveland was targeted because the minister and some members circulated a petition calling for the abolition of HUAC, and because the Church gave office space to the "Citizens for Constitutional Rights". (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 11/6/64.)
+[15] See Finding on "Overbreadth" p.[ 181.
+[16] For instance, the Bureau targeted two non-member students who participated in an anti-war "hunger strike" at Oberlin, which was "guided and directed" by the Young Socialists Alliance. The students' parents received anonymous letters, purportedly from a friend of their sons. One letter expressed concern that a group of "left wing students" were "cynically using" the boy, which would lead to "injury" to his health and "damage to his academic standing". The other letter also stated that it was motivated by concern for "damage" to the student's "health and personal future" and "the belief that you may not be aware of John's current involvement in leftwing activities." (Memorandum from FBI headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 11/29/68.)
+[17] One proposal sought to expose Black Student Union Chapters as "breeding grounds for racial militancy" by an anonymous mailing to "all institutions where there are BSU chapters or incipient chapters". (Memorandum from Portland Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/3/68.)
+[18] For example Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 10/31/68.
+[19] An anonymous letter was sent to "influential" Michigan political figures, the mass media, University of Michigan administrators, and the Board of Regents, in an attempt to "discredit and neutralize" the "communist activities" of the IUCDFP. The letter decried the "undue publicity" given anti-war protest activities which "undoubtedly give 'aid and comfort' to the enemy" and encourage the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese in "refusing to come to the bargaining table". The letter continued, "I wonder if the strategy is to bleed the United States white by prolonging the war in Vietnam and pave the way for a takeover by Russia?" (Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/11/66; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters, to Detroit Field Office 10/26/66.)
+[20] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office, 6/18/68.
+[21] The New Mexico Free University was targeted because it taught such courses as "confrontation politics" and "draft counselling". (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Albuquerque Field Office, 3/19/69.) In another case, an "alternate" school for students "aged five and beyond", which was co-sponsored by the ACLU, was targeted because "from the staff being assembled, it appears that the school will be a New Left venture and of a radical revolutionary nature". The Bureau contacted a confidential source in the bank financing the school so that he could "take steps to discourage its developments". (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 7/23/69.
+[22] See e.g., Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office, 11/14/69.
+[23] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office, 11/4/68.
+[24] Black Nationalist supervisor, 10/17/75, p. 24.
+[25] COINTELPRO unit chief, 10/12/75, p. 54.
+[26] COINTELPRO unit chief, 10/12/75, P. 54.
+[27] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 8/25/67.
+[28] The FBI was not the only intelligence agency to attempt to prevent the propagation of ideas with which it disagreed, but it was the only one to do so in any organized way. The IRS responded to Congressional and Administration pressure by targeting political organizations and dissidents for audit. The CIA Improperly obtained the tax returns of Ramparts magazine after it learned that the magazine intended to publish an article revealing Agency support of the National Student Association. The CIA saw the article as "an attack on CIA in particular and the Administration in general." (CIA memorandum re: "IRS Briefing on Ramparts,"[ 2/2/67.)
+[29] For instance, a high school English teacher was targeted for inviting two poets to attend a class at his school. The poets were noted for their efforts in the draft resistance movement. The Bureau sent anonymous letters to two local newspapers, the Board of Education, and the school board. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office, 6/19/69.)
+[30] In one case, the Bureau attempted to stop a "Communist" speaker from appearing on campus. The sponsoring organization went to court and won an order permitting the lecture to proceed as scheduled; the Bureau then investigated the judge who issued the order. (Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters.[ 10/26/60; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 10/27/60, 10/28/, 10/31/60; Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to A. H. Belmont, 10/26/60.)
+[31] The Bureau tried on several occasions to prevent the formation of campus chapters of SDS and the Young Socialist Alliance. (See, e.g., Memorandum from San Antonio Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/1/69; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 5/1/69.)
+[32] For example, an anonymous letter to a state legislator protested the distribution on campus of an underground newspaper's "depravity", (Memorandum from Newark Meld Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/23/69; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Newark Field Office, 6/4/69) and the Bureau anonymously contacted the landlady of premises rented by two "New Left" newspapers in an attempt to have them evicted. (Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/9/68; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office, 9/23/68.)
+[33] For example, a confidential source in a radio station was contacted In two successful attempts to cancel news conferences. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 10/1/65; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office 10/4/65; Memorandum from Boston Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/5/64; Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 6/25/64.)
+[34] For instance, the Bureau used the standard counterespionage technique of "disinformation" against demonstrators. In one case, the Chicago Field Office duplicated blank forms soliciting housing for demonstrators coming to Chicago for the Democratic National Convention, filled them out with fictitious names and addresses and sent them to the organizers. Demonstrators reportedly made "long and useless journeys to locate these addresses." (Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters.[ 9/9/68.) The same program was carried out by the Washington Field Office when housing forms were distributed for demonstrators coming to the 1969 Presidential inaugural ceremonies. (Memorandum from ]FBI Headquarters to Washington Field Office. 1/10/69.) Army Intelligence agents occasionally took similar, but wholly unauthorized action, see Military Surveillance Report: Section Ill: "Domestic Radio Monitoring by ASA: 1967-1970."
+[35] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego field office, 9/11/69.
+[36] Sullivan, 11/1/75, pp. 97-98.
+[37] Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/14/69.
+[38] Memorandum from Richmond Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/26/66.
+[39] The wife who received this letter was described in the Field Office proposal as "faithful . . . an intelligent respectable young mother who is active in the AME Methodist Church." (Memorandum from St. Louis Meld Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/14/69.)
+[40] Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/30/70.
+[41] Memorandum from St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/19/70.
+[42] When the targets were teachers, the intent was to prevent the propagation of ideas. In the case of other employer contacts, the purpose was to stop a source of funds.
+[43] Memorandum from New Haven Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/12/69; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office, 9/9/69.
+[44] memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office, 3/28/69.
+[45] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Pittsburgh Field Office, 3/3/69.
+[45]  Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Baltimore Field Office, 11/25/68.
+[46] Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI headquarters, 5/26/70, pp. 1-2.
+[47] Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI headquarters, 9/15/69.
+[48] Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI headquarters, 1/12/69; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 1/30/69.
+[49] See, e.g., Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/30/69.
+[50] One proposal to label a BPP member a "pig informer" was rejected because the Panthers had recently murdered two suspected informers. The victims had not been targets of a Bureau effort to label them informants. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Cincinnati Field Office, 2/18/71.) Nevertheless, two similar proposals were implemented a month later, (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Washington Field Office, 3/19/71; Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Charlotte Field Office, 3/31/71.)
+[51] At least four assaults -- two of them on women -- were reported as "results" of Bureau actions, (See COINTELPRO Report, Section IV: Wartimes Technique Brought Home.)
+[52] New Left supervisor 10/28/75, pp.[ 72, 74.
+[52]  Moore, 11/3/75, p. 62.
+[52]  Moore, 11/3/75, p. 64.
+[53] See pp.[ 275-277 and 205-206 of this Report for a detailed discussion of which officials were aware or should have been aware of what the Bureau was doing to Dr. King and how their action or inaction might have contributed to what went on.
+[54] See Martin Luther King Report, Section III, "Concern in the FBI and the Kennedy Administration Over Allegations of Communist Influence in the Civil Rights Movement Increases, and the FBI Intensifies the Investigation: October 1962-October 1963." See generally, Finding on Overbreadth, p.[ 175.
+[55] The August 1963 march on Washington was the occasion of Dr. Kings "I Have a Dream" speech, on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial. (See memorandum from William C. Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 8/30/63, characterizing the speech as "demagogic".)
+[56] Memorandum from William C. Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 12/24/63. Although FBI officials were making derogatory references to Dr. King and passing personal information about Dr. King to their superiors. (Memorandum from Hoover to Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach, 8/13/63.) Prior to December 1963, the Committee had discovered no document reflecting a strategy to deliberately discredit him prior to the memorandum relating to the December 1963 meeting.
+[57] Memorandum from William C. Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 12/24/63.
+[58] The microphone was installed on January 5, 1964 (Memorandum from William C. Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 1/6/64.), just days after Dr. King's picture appeared on the cover of Time magazine as "Man of the Year." (Time Magazine, January 3, 1964.) Reading of the Time magazine award, the Director had written, "They had to dig deep in the garbage to come up with this one." (Note on UP release, 12/29/63.)
+[59] FBI memoranda make clear that microphones were one of the techniques being used in the effort to obtain Information about Dr. King's private life. (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan 1/28/64.) The microphones were installed at the following places: Washington: Willard Hotel (Jan.[ 1964) ; Milwaukee: Shroeder Hotel (Jan. 1964) ; Honolulu: Hilton Hawaiian Village (Feb. 1964) ; Detroit: Statler Hotel (March 1964) ; Sacramento: Senator Motel (Apr. 1964) ; New York City: Park Sheraton Hotel (Jan. 1965), Americana Hotel (Jan. and Nov. 1965), Sheraton Atlantic Hotel (May 1965), Astor Hotel (Oct. 1965), New York Hilton Hotel (Oct. 1965).
+[60] FBI summary memorandum, 10/3/75; memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 3/26/64; memorandum from William C. Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 2/22/64; and unsigned memorandum, 2/28/64.
+[61] Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 3/27/64; memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/2/64; memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 7/14/65.
+[62] Sullivan 11/1/75, pp.[ 104-105, staff summary of a special agent interview, 7/25/75. Three days before the tape was mailed, Director Hoover had publicly branded Dr. King "the most notorious liar in the country" and Dr. King had responded with a criticism of the Bureau. (Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 11/18/64; telegram from Martin Luther King to J. Edgar Hoover 11/19/64.)
+[63] This paragraph appears in a document in the form of a letter which the FBI has supplied to the Committee and which the Bureau maintains was discovered in the files of former Assistant Director Sullivan. (FBI memorandum to the Select Committee, 9/18/75.) Sullivan stated that he did not recall the letter and suggested that it may have been "planted" in his files by his former colleagues. (Sullivan 11/1/75, p. 104.) Congressman Andrew Young has informed the Committee that an identical paragraph was contained in the letter which was actually received by Dr. King with the tape, and that the letter the committee had, supplied by the Bureau, appears to be an "early draft." (Young, 2/19/76, P. 36.)
+Sullivan said that the purpose of sending the tape was "to blackmail King into silence . . . to stop him from criticising Hoover; . . . to diminish his stature. In other words, if it caused a break between Coretta and Martin Luther King, that would diminish his stature. It would weaken him as a leader." (Sullivan, 11/1/75, 11/26/75, p. 152.)
+[64] Young, 2/19/76, p. 37, Time magazine had reported earlier in the year that Dr. King had attempted suicide twice as a child. [Time magazine, Jan. 4, 1964.]
+[65] Several newsmen have informed the Committee that they were offered this kind of material or that they were aware that such material was available. Some have refused to Identify the individuals who made the offers and others have said they could not recall their identities. Former FBI officials have denied that tapes or transcripts were offered to the press (e.g., DeLoach testimony, 11/26/75, p. 152) and the Bureau maintains that their files contain no documents reflecting that this occurred.
+[66] Staff interviews of Roy Wilkins, 11/23/75, and James Farmer, 11/13/75.
+[67] Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 11/27/64; staff interview of James Farmer, 11/13/75. Three days after Wilkins' meeting with DeLoach, Dr. King asked to see the Director, telling the press "the time has come to bring this controversy to an end." (UPI release, 12/1/64) Dr. King and Hoover met the following day; the meeting was described as "amicable." (Memoranda from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 12/1/64 and 12/2/64.) Despite the "amicable" meeting, the Bureau's campaign against Dr. King continued.
+[68] Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 11/30/64; memorandum from Legat to FBI
+Headquarters, 12/10/64. Steps were also taken to thwart a meeting which Dr. King was planning to have with a foreign leader during this same trip (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 11/10/64; memorandum, from FBI Headquarters to Legat, 11/10/64), and to influence a pending USIA decision to send Dr. King on a ten-day lecture trip in Africa after receiving the Nobel Prize. (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 11/12/64.)
+[69] The Bureau was in touch with Atlanta Constitution publisher Ralph McGill, and tried to obtain the assistance of the Constitution's editor, Eugene Patterson, to undermine the banquet. (Memorandum from William C. Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 12/21/64; staff summary of Eugene Patterson interview, 4/30/75.) A governor's assistance was sought in the effort to "water down" the "King day." (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 3/2/65.)
+[70] The Bureau had decided it would be "astounding" for Dr. King to have an audience with the Pope and that plans for any such meeting should be "nipped In the bud." (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 8/31/64.) When the Bureau failed to block the meeting and the press reported that the audience was about to occur, the Director noted that this was "astounding." (FBI Director's notation on UPI release, 9/18/64). FBI officials took immediate steps to determine "if there could possibly have been a slipup" (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 9/17/64.)
+[71] The Bureau had decided that it would be "shocking indeed that the possibility exists that King may receive an Honorary Degree from the same Institution (Marquette) which honored the Director with such a Degree in 1950." With respect to Springfield College, where the Director had also been offered an honorary degree, the Bureau's decision about whom to contact included the observation that "it would not appear to be prudent to attempt to deal with" the President of the college because he "is very close to Sargent Shriver." (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 3/4/64; and 4/2/64; memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 4/8/64.)
+[72] Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to Clyde Tolson, 10/25/66 and 10/26/66. At about the same time, the Bureau leaked a story to the press about Dr. King's intention to seek financial assistance from Teamsters Union President James R. Hoffa because "[disclosure would be mutually embarrassing to both men and probably cause King's quest for badly needed funds to fail in this instance" (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 10/28/66.)
+The Bureau also tried to block the National Science Foundation (NSF) from dealing with the SCLC. "It is incredible that an outfit such as the SCLC should be utilized for the purpose of recruiting Negroes to take part In the NSF program, particularly where funds of the U.S. Government are involved." (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 12/17/64.)
+[73] Memorandum from Special Agent to Cartha DeLoach, 11/3/64.
+[74] "It is shocking Indeed that King continues to be honored by religious groups." (Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 2/1/65.) Contacts were made with representatives of the National Council of Churches of Christ, the Baptist World Alliance, the American Church in Paris, and Catholic Church, (Memoranda from William C. Sullivan to Alan Belmont, 6/12/64, 12/15/64 and 2/16/64; memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 2/18/66; memorandum from Chicago Meld Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/24/66, and memorandum from Legat, Paris, to FBI Headquarters, 4/14/66 and 5/9/66.) The Director did disapprove a suggestion that religious leaders be permitted "to listen to sources we have" (FBI Director's note on memorandum from Jones to Thomas Bishop, 12/8/64.)
+[75] Memorandum from Charles Brennan to William C. Sullivan, 3/8/67. The Bureau also disseminated to "friendly media sources" a newspaper article which was critical of Dr. King's position on the Vietnam war. The stated purposes were to "publicize King as a traitor to his country and his race," and to "reduce his income," (memorandum from George C. Moore to William C. Sullivan, 10/18/67.) "Background information" was also given to at least one wire service (memorandum from Sizoo to William C. Sullivan, 5/24/65).
+[76] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office 5/18/67. There had been rumors about a "peace ticket" headed by Dr. King and Benjamin Spock.
+[77] [Footnote missing]
+[78] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 4/13/64; memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/2/64.
+[79] Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 8/14/65; memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 1/10/67.
+[89] Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to William C. Sullivan, 1/22/64; memorandum from Nicholas Callahan to John Mohr, 1/31/64. On one occasion the testimony leaked to other members of Congress, prompting the Director to note, "Someone on Rooney's Committee certainly betrayed the secrecy of the 'off the record' testimony I gave re: King." (Director's note on memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 3/16/64.)
+[81] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 3/4/68.
+[82] Memorandum from George C. Moore to William C. Sullivan, 3/26/68.
+[83] Memorandum from Atlanta Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/18/69.
+[84] Memoranda: From George C. Moore to William C. Sullivan, 1/17/69; and from Jones to Thomas Bishop, 3/18/69. Steps were even taken to prevent the issuance of "commemorative medals." (Memorandum from Jones to Thomas Bishop, 5/22/68.)
+** E. Political Abuse of Intelligence Information
+<center>
+MAJOR FINDING
+</center>
+The Committee finds that information has been collected and disseminated in order to serve the purely political interests of an intelligence agency or the administration, and to influence social policy and political action.
+<em>Subfindings</em>
+(a) White House officials have requested and obtained politically useful information from the FBI, including information on the activities of political opponents or critics.
+(b) In some cases, political or personal information was not specifically requested, but was nevertheless collected and disseminated to administration officials as part of investigations they had requested. Neither the FBI nor the recipients differentiated in these cases between national security or law enforcement information and purely political intelligence.
+(c) The FBI has also volunteered information to Presidents and their staffs, without having been asked for it, sometimes apparently to curry favor with the current administration. Similarly, the FBI has assembled intelligence on its critics and on political figures it believed might influence public attitudes or Congressional support.
+(d) The FBI has also used intelligence as a vehicle for covert efforts to influence social policy and political action.
+E <em>laboration of Findings</em>
+The FBI's ability to gather information without effective restraints gave it enormous power. That power was inevitably attractive to politicians, who could use information on opponents and critics for their own advantage, and was also an asset to the Bureau, which depended on politicians for support. In the political arena, as in other facets of American life touched by the intelligence community, the existence of unchecked power led to its abuse.
+By providing politically useful information to the White House and congressional supporters, sometimes on demand and sometimes gratuitously, the Bureau buttressed its own position in the political structure. At the same time, the widespread -- and accurate -belief in Congress and the administration that the Bureau had available to it, derogatory information on politicians and critics created what the late Majority Leader of the House of Representatives, Hale Boggs, called a "fear" of the Bureau:
+Freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of action for men in public life can be compromised quite as effectively by the fear of surveillance as by the fact of surveillance.[1]
+Information gathered and disseminated to the White House ranged from purely political intelligence, such as lobbying efforts on bills ail administration opposed and the strategy of a delegate challenge at a national political convention, to "tidbits" about the activities of politicians and public figures which the Bureau believed "of interest" to the recipients.
+Such participation in political machinations by an intelligence agency is totally improper. Responsibility for what amounted to a betrayal of the public trust in the integrity of the FBI must be shared between the officials who requested such information and those who provided it.
+The Bureau's collection and dissemination of politically useful information was not colored by partisan considerations; rather its effect was to entrench the Bureau's own position in the political structure, regardless of which party was in power at the time. However, the Bureau also used its powers to serve ideoIogical purposes, attempting covertly to influence social policy and and political action.
+In its efforts to "protect society," the FBI engaged in activities which necessarily affected the processes by which American citizens make decisions. In doing so, it distorted and exaggerated facts, made use of the mass media, and attacked the leadership of groups which it considered threats to the social order.
+Law enforcement officers are, of course, entitled to state their opinions about what choices the people should make on contemporary social and political issues. The First Amendment guarantees their right to enter the marketplace of ideas and persuade their fellow citizens of the correctness of those opinions by making speeches, writing books, and, within certain statutory limits, supporting political candidates. The problem lies not in the open expression of views, but in the covert use of power or position of trust to influence others. This abuse is aggravated by the agency's control over information on which the public and its elected representatives rely to make decisions.
+The essence of democracy is the belief that the people must be free to make decisions about matters of public policy. The FBI's actions interfered with the democratic process, because attitudes within the Bureau toward social change led to the belief that such intervention formed a part of its obligation to protect society. When a governmental agency clandestinely tries to impose its views of what is right upon the American people, then the democratic process is undermined.
+<em>Subfinding (a)</em>
+White House officials have requested and obtained politically useful information from the FBI, including personal life information on the activities of political opponents or critics.
+Presidents and White House aides have asked the FBI to provide political or personal information on opponents and critics, including "name checks" of Bureau files.[2] They have also asked the Bureau to conduct electronic surveillance or more limited investigations of such persons. The FBI appears to have complied unquestioningly with these requests, despite occasional internal doubts about their propriety.[3]
+Precedents for certain political abuses go back to the very outset of the domestic intelligence program. In 1940 the FBI complied with President Roosevelt's request to file the names of people sending critical telegrams to the White House.[4] There is evidence of improper electronic surveillance for the White House in the 1940s.[5] And an aide to President Eisenhower asked the FBI to conduct a questionable name check.[6] In 1962, the FBI complied unquestioningly with a request from Attorney General Kennedy to interview a steel executive and several reporters who had written stories about a statement by the executive.[7] As part of an investigation of foreign lobbying efforts on sugar quota legislation in 1961 and 1962, Attorney General Kennedy requested wiretaps on a Congressional aide, three executive officials, and two American lobbyists, including a Washington law firm.[8]
+Nevertheless, the political misuse of the FBI under the Johnson and Nixon administrations appears to have been more extensive than in previous years.
+Under the Johnson administration, the FBI was used to gather and report political intelligence on the, administration's partisan opponents in the last days of the 1964 and 1968 Presidential election campaigns. In the closing days of the 1964 campaign, Presidential aide Bill Moyers asked the Bureau to conduct "name checks" on all persons employed in Senator Goldwater's Senate office, and information on two staff members was reported to the White House.[9] Similarly, in the last two weeks of the 1968 campaign, the Johnson White House requested an investigation (including indirect electronic surveillance and direct physical surveillance) of Mrs. Anna Chennault, a prominent Republican leader, and her relationships with certain South Vietnamese officials.[10] This investigation also included an FBI check of Vice Presidential candidate Spiro Agnew's long distance telephone call records, apparently at the personal request of President Johnson.[11]
+Another investigation for the Johnson White House involved executive branch officials who took part in the criminal investigation of former Johnson Senate aide Bobby Baker. When Baker's trial began in 1967, it was revealed that one of the government witnesses had been "wired" to record his conversations with Baker. Presidential aide Marvin Watson told the FBI that Johnson was quite "exercised," and the Bureau was ordered to conduct a discreet "run down" on the former head of the Justice Department's Criminal Division and four Treasury Department officials who had been responsible for "wiring" the witness. The Bureau was specifically insisted to include any associations between those persons and Robert Kennedy.[12]
+Several Johnson White House requests were directed at critics of the war in Vietnam, at newsmen, and at other opponents. According a Bureau memorandum, White House aide Marvin Watson attempted to disguise his, and the President's interest in such requests asking the FBI to channel its replies through a lower level White House staff member.[13]
+In 1966, Watson asked the FBI to monitor the televised hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Vietnam policy and prepare a memorandum comparing statements of the President's Senate critics with "the Communist Party line."[14] Similarly, in 1967 when seven Senators made statements criticizing the bombing of North Vietnam, Watson requested (and the Bureau delivered) a "blind memorandum" setting forth information from FBI files on each of the Senators. Among the data supplied were the following items:
+Senator Clark was quoted in the press as stating that the three major threats to America are the military-industrial complex, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency.
+Senator McGovern spoke at a rally sponsored by the Chicago, Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, a pacifist group. Senator McGovern stated that the "United States was making too much of the communist take-over of Cuba."
+[Another Senator now deceased] has, on many occasions, publicly criticized United States policy toward Vietnam. He frequently speaks before groups throughout the United States on this subject. He has been reported as intentionally entering into controversial areas so that his services as a speaker for which he receives a fee, will be in demand.[15]
+The Johnson administration also requested information on contacts between members of Congress and certain foreign officials known to oppose the United States presence in Vietnam. According to FBI records, President Johnson believed these foreign officials had generated "much of the protest concerning his Vietnam policy, particularly the hearings in the Senate."[16]
+White House requests were not limited to critical Congressmen. Ordinary citizens who sent telegrams protesting the Vietnam war to the White House were also the subject of Watson requests for FBI name check reports.[17] Presidential aide Jake Jacobsen asked for name checks on persons whose names appeared in the Congressional Record as signers of a letter to Senator Wayne Morse expressing support for his criticism of U.S. Vietnam policy.[18] On at least one occasion, a request was channeled through Attorney General Ramsey Clark, who supplied Watson (at the latter's request) with a summary of information on the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy.[19]
+Other individuals who were the subject of such name check requests under the Johnson Administration included NBC Commentator David Brinkley,[20] Associated Press reporter Peter Arnett,[21] columnist Joseph Kraft,[22] Life magazine Washington bureau chief Richard Stolley,[23] Chicago Daily News Washington bureau chief Peter Lisagor,[24] and Ben W. Gilbert of the Washington Post.[25] The Johnson White House also requested (and received) name check reports on the authors of books critical of the Warren Commission report; some of these reports included derogatory information about the personal lives of the individuals.[26]
+The Nixon administration continued the practice of using the FBI to produce political information. In 1969 John Ehrlichman, counsel to President Nixon, asked the FBI to conduct a "name check" on Joseph Duffy, chairman of Americans for Democratic Action. Data in Bureau files covered Duffy's "handling arrangements" for an antiwar teach-in in 1965, his position as State Coordinator of the group "Negotiation Now" in 1967, and his activity as chairman of Connecticut Citizens for McCarthy in 1968.[26]
+Presidential aide H. R. Haldeman requested a name check on CBS reporter Daniel Schorr. In this instance, the FBI mistakenly considered the request to be for a full background investigation and began to conduct interviews. These interviews made the inquiry public. Subsequently, White House officials stated (falsely) that Schorr was under consideration for an executive appointment.[27] In another case, a Bureau memorandum states that Vice President Agnew asked the FBI for information about Rev. Ralph David Abernathy, then head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, for use in "destroying Abernathy's credibility."[28] (Agnew has denied that he made such a request, but agrees that he received the information.)[29]
+Several White House requests involved the initiation of electronic surveillance. Apparently on the instructions of President Nixon's aide John Ehrlichman and Director Hoover, FBI Assistant Director William C. Sullivan arranged for the microphone surveillance of the hotel, room of columnist Joseph Kraft while be was visiting a foreign country.[30] Kraft was also the target of physical surveillance by the FBI.[31] There is no record of any specific "national security" rationale for the surveillance.
+Similarly, although the "17" wiretaps were authorized ostensibly to investigate national security "leaks," there is no record in three of the cases of any national security claim having been advanced in their support. Two of the targets were domestic affairs advisers at the White House, with no foreign affairs duties and no access to foreign policy materials.[32] A third was a White House speechwriter who had been overheard on an existing tap agreeing to provide a reporter with background on a presidential speech concerning, not foreign policy, but revenue sharing and welfare reform.[33]
+<em>Subfinding (b)</em>
+In some cases, political or personal information was not specifically requested, but was nevertheless collected and disseminated to administration officials as part of investigations they had requested. Neither the FBI nor the recipients differentiated in these cases between national security or law enforcement information and purely political intelligence.
+In some instances, the initial request for or dissemination of information was premised upon law enforcement or national security purposes. However, pursuant to such a request, information was furnished which obviously could serve only partisan or personal interests. As one Bureau official summarized its attitude, the FBI "did not decide what was political or what represented potential strife and violence. We are an investigative agency and we passed on all data."[34]
+Examples from the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations illustrate this failure to distinguish between political and nonpolitical intelligence. They include, the FBI's reports to the White House in 1956 on NAACP lobbying activities, the intelligence about the legislative process produced by the "sugar lobby" wiretaps in 1961-1962, the purely political data disseminated to the White House on the credentials challenge in the 1964 Democratic Convention, and dissemination of both political and personal information from the "leak" wiretaps in 1969-1972.
+<em>(i)</em> <em>The NAACP</em>
+In early 1956 Director Hoover sent the White House a memorandum describing the "potential for violence" in the current "racial situation".[35] Later reports to the White House, however, went far beyond intelligence about possible violence; they included extensive inside information about NAACP lobbying efforts, such as the following:
+A report on "meetings held in Chicago" in connection with a planned Leadership Conference on Civil Rights to be held in Washington under the sponsorship of the NAACP.[36]
+An extensive report on the Leadership Conference, based on the Bureau's "reliable sources" and describing plans of Conference delegations to visit Senators Paul Douglas, Herbert Lehman, Wayne Morse, Hubert Humphrey, and John Bricker. The report also summarized a speech by Roy Wilkins, other conference proceedings, and the report of "an informant" that the United Auto Workers was a "predominant organization" at the conference.[37]
+Another report on the conference included an account of what transpired at meetings between conference delegations and Senators Paul Douglas and Everett Dirksen.[38]
+A report including the information that two New Jersey congressmen would sign a petition to the Attorney General.[39]
+A presidential aide suggested that Hoover brief the Cabinet on "developments in the South."[40] Director Hoover's Cabinet briefing also included political intelligence. He covered not only the NAACP conference, but also the speeches and political activities of Southern Senators and Governors and the formation of the Federation for Constitutional Government with Southern Congressmen and Governors on its advisory board.[41]
+<em>(ii)</em> <em>The Sugar Lobby</em>
+The electronic surveillance of persons involved in a foreign country's lobbying activities on sugar quota legislation in 1961-1962, authorized by Attorney General Robert Kennedy for the White House, also produced substantial political intelligence unrelated to the activities of foreign officiaIs.[42] Such information came from wiretaps both on foreign officials and on American citizens, as well as from the microphone surveillance of the chairman of the House Agriculture Committee when he met with foreign officials in a New York hotel room.[43] The following are examples of the purely political (and personal) by-product:
+A particular lobbyist "mentioned he is working on the Senate and has the Republicans all lined up."[44]
+The same lobbyist said that "he had seen two additional representatives on the House Agriculture Committee, one of whom was 'dead set against us' and who may reconsider, and the other was neutral and 'may vote for us.'"[45]
+The Agriculture Committee chairman believed "he had accomplished nothing" and that "he had been fighting over the Rules Committee and this had interfered with his attempt to organize."[46]
+The "friend" of a foreign official "was under strong pressure from the present administration, and since the 'friend' is a Democrat, it would be very difficult for him to present a strong front to a Democratic Administration."[47]
+A lobbyist stated that Secretary of State Rusk "had received a friendly reception by the Committee and there appeared to be no problem with regard to the sugar bill."[48]
+A foreign official was reported to be in contact with two Congressmen's secretaries "for reasons other than business." The official asked one of the secretaries to tell the other that he "would not be able to call her that evening" and that one of his associates "was planning to take [the two secretaries and another Congressional aide] to Bermuda."[49]
+The FBI's own evaluation of these wiretaps indicates that they "undoubtedly ... contributed heavily to the Administration's success" in passing the legislation it desired.[50]
+<em>(iii)</em> <em>The 1964 Democratic Convention</em>
+Political reports were disseminated by the FBI to the White House from the 1964 Democratic convention in Atlantic City. These reports, from the FBI's "special squad" at the convention, apparently resulted from a civil disorders intelligence investigation which got out of hand because no one was willing to shut off the partisan by-product.[51] They centered on the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party's credentials challenge. Examples of the political intelligence which flowed from FBI surveillance at the 1964 convention include the following: 52
+Dr. Martin Luther King and an associate "were drafting a telegram to President Johnson . . . to register a mild protest. According to King, the President pledged complete neutrality regarding the selecting of the proper Mississippi delegation to be seated at the convention. King feels that the Credentials Committee will turn down the Mississippi Freedom Party and that they are doing this because the President exerted pressure on the committee along this line."[53]
+Another associate of Dr. King contacted a member of the MFDP who "said she thought King should see Governor Endicott Peabody of Massachusetts, Mayor Robert Wagner of New York City, Governor Edmund G. (Pat) Brown of California, Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago, and Governor John W. King of New Hampshire." The purpose was "to urge them to call the White House directly and put pressure on the White House in behalf of the MFDP."[54]
+"MFDP leaders have asked Reverend King to call Governor Egan of Alaska and Governor Burns of Hawaii in an attempt to enlist their support. According to the MFDP spokesman, the Negro Mississippi Party needs these two states plus California and New York for the roll call tonight."[55]
+An SCLC staff member told a representative of the MFDP: "Off the record, of course, you know we will accept the Green compromise proposed." This referred to "the proposal of Congresswoman Edith Green of Oregon."[56]
+In a discussion between Dr. King and another civil rights leader, the question of "a Vice- Presidential nominee came up and King asked what [the other leader] thought of Hugh [sic] Humphrey, and [the other leader] said Hugh Humphrey is not going to get it, that Johnson needs a Catholic ... and therefore the VicePresident will be Muskie of Maine."[57]
+An unsigned White House memorandum disclosing Dr. King's strategy in connection with a meeting to be, attended by President Johnson suggests that there was political use of these FBI reports.[58]
+<em>(iv)</em> <em>The ”17” Wiretaps.</em>
+The Nixon White House learned a substantial amount of purely political intelligence from wiretaps to investigate "leaks" of classified information placed on three newsmen and fourteen executive officials during 1969-1971.[59] The following illustrate the range of data supplied:
+One of the targets "recently stated that he was to spend an hour with Senator Kennedy's Vietnam man, as Senator Kennedy is giving a speech on the 15th."[60]
+Another target said that Senator Fulbright postponed congressional hearings on
+Vietnam because he did not believe they would be popular at that time.[61]
+A well-known television news correspondent "was very distressed over having been 'singled out' by the Vice President."[62]
+A friend of one of the targets said the Washington Star planned to do an article critical of Henry Kissinger.[63]
+One of the targets helped former Ambassador Sargent Shriver write a press release criticizing a recent speech by President Nixon in which the President "attacked" certain Congressmen.[64]
+One of the targets told a friend it "is clear the Administration will win on the ABM by a two-vote margin. He said 'They've got [a Senator] and they've got [another Senator].'."[65]
+A friend of one of the targets wanted to see if a Senator would "buy a new amendment" and stated that "they" were "going to meet with" another Senator.[66]
+A friend of one of the targets described a Senator as "marginal" on the CooperChurch Amendment and stated that another Senator might be persuaded to support it.[67]
+One of the targets said Senator Mondale was in a "dilemma" over the "trade bill."[68]
+A friend of one of the targets said he had spoken to former President Johnson and "Johnson would not back Senator Muskie for the Presidency as he intended to stay out of politics."[69]
+There is at least one clear example of the political use of such information. After the FBI Director informed the White House that former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford planned to write a magazine article criticizing President Nixon's Vietnam policy,[70] White House aide Jeb Stuart Magruder advised John Ehrlichman and H. R. Haldeman that "we are in a position to counteract this article in any number of ways."[71] It is also significant that, after May 1970, the FBI Director's letters summarizing the results of the wiretaps were no longer sent to Henry Kissinger, the President's national security advisor, but to the President's political advisor, H. R. Haldeman.[72]
+These four illustrations from administrations of both political parties indicate clearly that direct channels of communication between top FBI officials and the White House, combined with the failure to screen out extraneous information, and coupled with overly broad investigations in the first instance, have been sources of flagrant political abuse of the intelligence process.[73]
+<em>Subfinding (c)</em>
+The FBI has also volunteered information to Presidents and their staffs, without having been asked for it, sometimes apparently to curry favor with the current administration. Similarly, the FBI has assembled information on its critics and on political figures it believed might influence public attitudes or Congressional support.
+There have been numerous instances over the past three decades where the FBI volunteered to its superiors purely political or personal information believed by the FBI Director to be "of interest" to them.[74]
+The following are examples of the information in Director Hoover's letters under the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations.[75]
+To Major General Harry Vaughn, Military Aide to President Truman, a report on the activities of a former Roosevelt aide who was trying to influence the Truman administration's appointments.[76]
+To Matthew J. Connelly, Secretary to President Truman, a report from a "very confidential source" about a meeting of newspaper representatives in Chicago to plan publication of stories exposing organized crime and corrupt politicians.[77]
+To Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, the advance text of a speech to be delivered by a prominent labor leader.[78]
+To Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, a report of a "confidential source" on plans of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt to hold a reception for the head of a civil rights group.[79]
+To Attorney General Robert Kennedy, information from a Bureau "source" regarding plans of a group to publish allegations about the President's personal life.[80]
+To Attorney General Kennedy, a summary of material in FBI files on a prominent entertainer which the FBI Director thought "may be of interest".[81]
+To Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to President Johnson, a summary of data in Bureau files on the author of a play satirizing the President.[82]
+As these illustrations indicate, the FBI Director provided such data to administrations of both political parties without apparent partisan favoritism.[83]
+Additionally, during the Nixon Administration, the FBI's INLET (Intelligence Letter) Program for sending regular short summaries of FBI intelligence to the White House was used on one occasion to provide information on the purely personal relationship between an entertainer and the subject of an FBI domestic intelligence investigation.[84] SACs were instructed under the INLET program to submit to Bureau headquarters items with an "unusual twist" or regarding "prominent" persons.
+One reason for the Bureau's volunteering information to the White House was to please the Administration and thus presumably to build high-level political support for the FBI. Thus, a 1975 Bureau report on the Atlantic City episode states:
+One [agent said], "I would like to state that at no time did I ever consider (it) to be a political operation but it was obvious that DeLoach wanted to impress Jenkins and Moyers with the Bureau's ability to develop information which would be of interest to them." Furthermore, in response to a question as to whether the Bureau's services were being utilized for political reasons, [another] answered, "No. I do recall, however, that on one occasion I was present when DeLoach held a lengthy telephone conversation with Walter Jenkins. They appeared to be discussing the President's 'image.' At the end of the conversation DeLoach told us something to the effect, 'that may have sounded a little political to you but this doesn't do the Bureau any harm.'"[86]
+In addition to providing information useful to superiors, the Bureau assembled information on its own critics and on political figures it believed might influence public attitudes or congressional support. FBI Director Hoover had massive amounts of information at his fingertips. As indicated above, he could have the Bureau's files checked on anyone of interest to him. He personally received political information and "personal tidbits" from the special agents in charge of FBI field offices.[87] This information, both from the files and Hoover's personal sources, was available to discredit critics.
+The following are examples of how the Bureau disseminated information to discredit its opponents:
+In 1949 the FBI provided Attorney General J. Howard McGrath and Presidential aide Harry Vaughn inside information on plans of the Lawyers Guild to denounce Bureau surveillance so they would have an opportunity to prepare a rebuttal well in advance of the expected criticism.[88]
+In 1960, when the Knoxville Area Human Relations Council in Tennessee charged that the FBI was practicing racial discrimination, the Bureau conducted name checks on members of the Council's board of directors and sent the results to Attorney General William Rogers, including derogatory personal allegations and political affiliations from as far back as the late thirties and early forties.[89]
+When a reporter wrote stories critical of the Bureau, he was not only refused any further interviews, but an FBI official in charge of press relations also spread derogatory personal information about him to other newsmen.[90]
+The Bureau also maintained a "not to contact list' of "those individuals known to be hostile to the Bureau." Director Hoover specifically ordered that "each name" on the list "should be the subject of memo."[91]
+This request for "a memo" on each critic meant that, before someone was placed on the list, the Director received, in effect, a "name check" report summarizing "what we had in our files" on the individual.[92]
+In addition to assembling information on critics, name checks were run as a matter of regular Bureau policy on all "newly elected Governors and Congressmen." The Crime Records Division instructed the field offices to submit "summary memoranda" on such officials, covering both "public source information" and "any other information that they had in their files."[93] These "summary memoranda" were provided to Director Hoover and maintained in the Crime Records Division for use in "congressional liason" -- which the Division head said included "selling" hostile Congressmen on "liking the FBI."[94]
+It has been widely believed among Members of Congress that the Bureau had information on each of them.[95] The impact of that belief led Congressman Boggs to state:
+Our apathy in this Congress, our silence in this House, our very fear of speaking out in other forums has watered the roots and hastened the growth of a vine of tyranny which is ensnaring that Constitution and Bill of Rights which we are each sworn to uphold.
+Our society can survive many challenges and many threats.
+It cannot survive a planned and programmed fear of its own government bureaus and agencies.[96]
+<em>Subfinding (d)</em>
+The FBI has also used intelligence as a vehicle for covert efforts to influence social policy and political action.
+The FBI's interference with the democratic process was not the result of any overt decision to reshape society in conformance with Bureau-approved norms. Rather, the Bureau's actions were the natural consequence of attitudes within the Bureau toward social change, combined with a strong sense of duty to protect society -- even from its own "wrong" choices.
+The FBI saw itself as the guardian of the public order, and believed that it had a responsibility to counter threats to that order, using any means available.[97] At the same time, the Bureau's assessment of what constituted a "threat" was influenced by its attitude toward the forces of change. In effect, the Bureau chose sides in the major social movements of the last fifteen years, and then attacked the other side with the unchecked power at its disposal.
+The clearest proof of the Bureau's attitude toward change is its own rhetoric. The language used in internal documents which were not intended to be disseminated outside the Bureau is that of the highly charged polemic revealing clear biases.
+For example, in one of its annual internal reports on COINTELPRO, the Bureau took pride in having given "the lie" to what it called "the Communist canard" that "the Negro is downtrodden and has no opportunities in America." This was accomplished by placing a story in a newspaper in which a "wealthy Negro industrialist" stated that "the Negro will have to earn respectability and a responsible position in the community before he is accepted as an equal." It is significant that this view was expressed at about the same time as the civil rights movement's March on Washington, which was intended to focus public attention on the denial of opportunities to black Americans, and which rejected the view that inalienable rights have to be "earned."[98]
+The rhetoric used in dealing with the Vietnam War and those in opposition to it is even more revealing. The war in Vietnam produced sharply divided opinions in the country; again, the Bureau knew which side it was on. For instance, fifty copies of an article entitled "Rabbi in Vietnam Says Withdrawal Not The Answer" were anonymously mailed by the FBI to members of the Vietnam Day Committee to "convince" the recipients "of the correctness of the U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam."[99]
+The Bureau also ordered copies of a film called "While Brave Men Die" which depicted "communists, left-wing and pacifist activities associated with the so-called 'peace movement' or student agitational demonstrations in opposition to the United States position in Vietnam." The film was to be used for training Bureau personnel in connection with "increased responsibilities relating to communist inspired student agitational activities."[100]
+In the same vein, a directive to the Chicago field office shortly after the 1968 Democratic Convention instructed it to "obtain all possible evidence" that would "disprove" charges that the Chicago police used undue force in dealing with antiwar demonstrations at the Convention:
+Once again, the liberal press and the bleeding hearts and the forces on the left are taking advantage of the situation in Chicago surrounding the Democratic National Convention to attack the police and organized law enforcement agencies.... We should be mindful of this situation and develop all possible evidence to expose this activity and to refute these false allegations.[101]
+The Bureau also attempted to enforce its view of sexual morality. For example, two students became COINTELPRO targets when they defended the use of a four-letter word, even though the demonstration in which they participated "does not appear to be inspired by the New Left," because it "shows obvious disregard for decency and established morality."[102] An anonymous letter purportedly from an irate parent and an article entitled "Free Love Comes to Austin" were mailed to a state senator and the chairman of the University of Texas Board of Regents to aid in "forcing the University to take action against those administrators who are permitting an atmosphere to build up on campus that will be a fertile field for the New Left."[103] And a field office was outraged at the distribution on campus of a newspaper called SCREW, which was described as "containing a type of filth that could only originate in a depraved mind. It is representative of the type of mentality that is following the New Left theory of immorality on certain college campuses."[104]
+As these examples demonstrate, the FBI believed it had a duty to maintain the existing social and political order. Whether or not one agrees with the Bureau's views, it is profoundly disturbing that an agency of the government secretly attempted to impose its views on the American people.
+<em>(i) Use of the Media</em>
+The FBI attempted to influence public opinion by supplying information or articles to "confidential sources" in the news media. The FBI's Crime Records Division 105 was responsible for covert liaison with the media to advance two main domestic intelligence objectives: 106
+(1) providing derogatory information to the media intended to generally discredit the activities or ideas of targeted groups or individuals; and (2) disseminating unfavorable articles, news releases, and background information in order to disrupt particular activities.
+Typically, a local FBI agent would provide information to a "friendly news source" on the condition "that the Bureau's interest in these matters is to be kept in the strictest confidence."[107] Thomas E. Bishop, former Director of the Crime Records Division, testified that he kept a list of the Bureau's "press friends" in his desk.[108] Bishop and one of his predecessors indicated that the FBI sometimes refused to cooperate with reporters critical of the Bureau or its Director.[109]
+Bishop stated that as a "general rule," the Bureau disseminated only "public record information" to its media contacts, but this category was viewed by the Bureau to include any information which could conceivably be obtained by close scrutiny of even the most obscure publications.[110]
+Within these parameters, background information supplied to reporters "in most cases [could] include everything" in the Bureau files on a targeted individual; the selection of information for publication would be left to the reporter's judgment.[111]
+There are numerous examples of authorization for the preparation and dissemination of unfavorable information to discredit generally the activities and ideas of a target;[112]
+- - FBI headquarters solicited information from field offices "on a continuing basis" for "prompt ... dissemination to the news media ... to discredit the New Left movement and its adherents." Headquarters requested, among other things, that:
+specific data should be furnished depicting the scurrilous and depraved nature of many of the characters, activities, habits and living conditions representative of New Left adherents.
+Field Offices were to be exhorted that "Every avenue of possible embarrassment must be vigorously and enthusiastically explored."[113]
+-FBI headquarters authorized a Field Office to furnish a media contact with "background information and any arrest record" on a man affiliated with "a radical New Left element" who had been "active in showing films on the Black Panthers and police in action at various universities during student rioting." The media contact had requested material from the Bureau which "would have a detrimental effect on [the target's] activities."[114]
+- - Photographs depicting a radical group's apartment as "a shambles with lewd, obscene and revolutionary slogans displayed on the walls" were furnished to a free-lance writer. The directive from headquarters said: "As this publicity will be derogatory in nature and might serve to neutralize the group, it is being approved."[115]
+- - The Boston Field Office was authorized to furnish "derogatory information about the Nation of Islam (NOI) to established source [name excised]":
+Your suggestions concerning material to furnish [name] are good. Emphasize to him that the NOI predilection for violence, preaching of race hatred, and hypocrisy, should be exposed. Material furnished [name] should be either public source or known to enough people as to protect your sources. Insure the Bureau's interest in this matter is completely protected by [name].[116]
+One Bureau-inspired documentary on the NOI reached an audience of 200,000.[117] Although the public was to be convinced that the NOI was "violent", the Bureau knew this was not in fact true of the organization as a whole.[118]
+- - The Section which supervised the. COINTELPRO against the Communist Party intended to discredit a couple "identified with the Community Party movement" by preparing a news release on the drug arrest of their son, which was to be furnished to "news media contacts and sources on Capitol Hill." A Bureau official observed that the son's "arrest and the Party connections of himself and his parents presents an excellent opportunity for exploitation." The news release noted that "the Russian-born mother is currently under a deportation order" and had a former marriage to the son of a prominent Communist Party member. The release added: "the Red Chinese have long used narcotics to help weaken the youth of target countries."[119]
+- - When the wife of a Communist Party leader purchased a new car, the FBI prepared a news item for distribution to "a cooperative news media source" mocking the leader's "prosperity" "as a disruptive tactic." The item commented sarcastically that "comrades of the self-proclaimed leader of the American working class should not allow this example of [the leader's] prosperity to discourage their continued contributions to Party coffers."[120]
+- - After a public meeting in New York City, where "the handling of the [JFK assassination] investigation was criticized," the FBI prepared a news item for placement "with a cooperative news media source" to discredit the meeting on the grounds that "a reliable [FBI] source" had reported a "convicted perjurer and identified espionage agent as present in the audience."[121]
+- - As part of the New Left COINTELPRO, the FBI sent a letter under a fictitious name to Life magazine to "call attention to the unsavory character" of the editor of an underground magazine, who was characterized as "one of the moving forces behind the Youth International Party, commonly known as the Yippies." To counteract a recent Life "article favorable" to the Yippie editor, the FBI's fictitious letter said that "the cuckoo editor of an unimportant smutty little rag" should be "left in the sewers."[122]
+Much of the Bureau's use of the media to influence public opinion was directed at disrupting specific activities or plans of targeted groups or individuals:
+- - In March 1968, FBI Headquarters granted authority for furnishing to a "cooperative national news media source" an article "designed to curtail success of Martin Luther King's fund raising" for the poor people's march on Washington, D.C. by asserting that "an embarrassment of riches has befallen King . . . and King doesn't need the money."[123] To further this objective, Headquarters authorized the Miami Office "to furnish data concerning money wasted by the Poor People's Campaign" to a friendly news reporter on the usual condition that "the Bureau must not be revealed as the source."[124]
+The Section Chief in charge of the Black Nationalist COINTELPRO also recommended that "photographs of demonstrators" at the march should be furnished; he attached six photographs of Poor People's Campaign participants at a Cleveland rally, accompanied by the note: "These show the militant, aggressive appearance of the participants and might be of interest to a cooperative news source."[125]
+- As part of the New Left COINTELPRO, authority was granted to the Atlanta Field Office to furnish a newspaper editor who had "written numerous editorials praising the Bureau" with "information to supplement that already known to him from public sources concerning subversive influences in the Atlanta peace movement. His use of this material in well-timed articles would be used to thwart the [upcoming] demonstrations."[126]
+- - An FBI Special Agent in Chicago contacted a reporter for a major newspaper to arrange for the publication of an article which was expected to "greatly encourage factional antagonisms during the SDS Convention" by publicizing the attempt of "an underground communist organization" to take over SDS. This contact resulted in an article headlined "Red Unit Seeks SDS Rule."[127]
+- - FBI Director Hoover approved a Field Office plan "to get cooperative news media to cover closed meetings of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and other New Left groups" with the aim of "disrupting them."[128]
+- - Several months after COINTELPRO operations were supposed to have terminated, the FBI attempted to discredit attorney Leonard Boudin at the time of his defense of Daniel Ellsberg in the Pentagon Papers case. The FBI "called to the attention" of the Washington bureau chief of a major news service information on Boudin's alleged "sympathy" and "legal services" for "communist causes." The reporter placed a detailed news release on the wires which cited Boudin's "identification with Leftist causes" and included references to the arrest of Boudin's daughter, his legal representation of the Cuban government and "Communist sympathizer" Paul Robeson, and the statement that "his name also has been connected with a number of other alleged communist front groups." In a handwritten note, J. Edgar Hoover directed that copies of the news release be sent to "Haldeman, A. G., and Deputy."[129]
+The Bureau sometimes used its media contacts to prevent or postpone the publication of articles it considered favorable to its targets or unfavorable to the FBI. For example, to influence articles which related to the FBI, the Bureau took advantage of a close relationship with a high official of a major national magazine, described in an FBI memorandum as "our good friend." Through this relationship, the FBI "squelched" an "unfavorable article against the Bureau" written by a free-lance writer about an FBI investigation; "postponed publication" of an article on another FBI case; "forestalled publication" of an article by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; and received information about proposed editing of King's articles.[130]
+The Bureau also attempted to influence public opinion by using news media sources to discredit dissident groups by linking them to the Communist Party:
+- - A confidential source who published a "self -described conservative weekly newspaper" was anonymously mailed information on a church's sponsorship of efforts to abolish the House Committee on Un-American activities. This prompted an article entitled "Locals to Aid Red Line," naming the minister, among others, as a local sponsor of what it termed a "Communist dominated plot" to abolish HUAC.[131]
+- - The Bureau targeted a professor who had been the president of a local peace center, a "coalition of anti-Vietnam and anti-draft groups." In 1968, he resigned temporarily to become state chairman of Eugene McCarthy's presidential campaign organization. Information on the professor's wife, who had apparently associated with Communist Party members in the early 1950's, was furnished to a newspaper editor to "expose those people at this time when they are receiving considerable publicity in order" to "disrupt the members" of the peace organization.[132]
+-- Other instances included an attempt to link a school boycott with the Communists by alerting newsmen to the boycott leader's plans to attend a literary reception at the Soviet mission;[133] furnishing information to the media on the participation of the Communist Party presidential candidate in the United Farm Workers' picket line;[134] "confidentially" informing established sources in three northern California newspapers that the San Francisco County Communist Party Committee had stated that civil rights groups were to "begin working" on the area's large newspapers "in an effort to secure greater employment of Negroes;"[135] and furnishing information to the media on Socialist Workers Party participation in the Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam to "discredit" the antiwar group.[136]
+<em>(ii)</em> <em>Attacks on Leaders</em>
+Through covert propaganda, the FBI not only attempted to influence public opinion on matters of social policy, but also directly intervened in the people's choice of leadership both through the electoral process and in other, less formal arenas.
+For instance, the Bureau made plans to disrupt a possible "Peace Party" ticket in the 1968 elections. One field office noted that "effectively tabbing as communists or as communist- backed the more hysterical opponents of the President on the Vietnam question in the midst of the presidential campaign would be a real boon to Mr. Johnson."[137]
+In the FBI's COINTELPRO programs, political candidates were targeted for disruption. The document which originated the Socialist Workers Party COINTELPRO noted that the SWP "has, over the past several years, been openly espousing its line on a local and national basis through running candidates for public office." The Bureau decided to "alert the public to the fact that the SWP is not just another socialist group but follows the revolutionary principles of Marx, Lenin, and Engels as interpreted by Leon Trotsky." Several SWP candidates were targeted, usually by leaking derogatory information about the candidate to the press.[138]
+Other COINTELPRO programs also included attempts to disrupt campaigns. For example, a Midwest lawyer running for City Council was targeted because he and his firm had represented "subversives". The Bureau sent an anonymous letter to several community leaders which decried his "communist background" and labelled him a "Charlatan."[139] Under a fictitious name, the Bureau sent a letter to a television on which the candidate was to appear, enclosing a series of questions about his clients and his activities which it believed should be asked.[140] The candidate was defeated. He later ran (successfully, as it happened) for a judgeship. The Bureau attempted to disrupt this subsequent, successful campaign for a judgeship by using an anticommunist group to distribute fliers and write letters opposing his candidacy.[141]
+In another instance, the FBI attempted to have a Democratic Party fundraising affair raided by the state Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission. The fund raiser was targeted because of two of the candidates who would be present. One, a state assemblyman running for reelection, was active in the Vietnam Day Committee; the other, the Democratic candidate for Congress, had been a sponsor of the National Committee to Abolish the House Committee on Un-American Activities and had led demonstrations opposing the manufacture of napalm bombs.[142]
+Although the disruption of election campaigns is the clearest example, the FBI's interference, with the political process was much broader. For example, all of the COINTELPRO programs were aimed at the leadership of dissident groups.[143]
+In one case, the Bureau's plans to discredit a civil rights leader included an attempt to replace him with a candidate chosen by the Bureau. During 1964, the FBI began a massive program to discredit Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and to "neutralize" his effectiveness as the leader of the civil rights movement.[144] On January 8, 1964, Assistant Director William C. Sullivan proposed that the FBI select a new "national Negro leader" as Dr. King's successor after the Bureau had taken Dr. King "off his pedestal":
+When this is done, and it can and will be done . . . the Negroes will be left without a national leader of sufficiently compelling personality to steer them in the right direction. This is what could happen, but need not happen if the right kind of Negro leader could at this time be gradually developed so as to overshadow Dr. King and be in the position to assume the role of leadership of the Negro people, when King has been completely discredited.
+I want to make it clear at once that I don't propose that the FBI in any way became involved openly as the sponsor of a Negro leader to overshadow Martin Luther King.... But I do propose that I be given permission to explore further this entire matter....
+If this thing can be set up properly without the Bureau in any way becoming directly involved, I think it would not only be a great help to the FBI but would be a fine thing for the country at large. While I am not specifying at this moment, there are various ways in which the FBI could give this entire matter the proper direction and development. There are highly placed contacts of the FBI who might be very helpful to further such a step . . . .[145]
+The Bureau's efforts to discredit Dr. King are discussed more fully elsewhere.[146] It is, however, important to note here that some of the Bureau's efforts coincided with Dr. King's activities and statements concerning major social and political issues.
+<em>(iii)</em> <em>Exaggerating The Threat</em>
+The Bureau also used its control over the infomiation-gathering process to shape the views of government officials and the public on the threats it perceived to the social order. For example, the FBI exaggerated the strength of the Communist Party and its influence over the civil rights and anti-Vietnam war movements.
+Opponents of civil rights legislation in the early 1960s had charged that such legislation was "a part of the world Communist conspiracy to divide and conquer our country from within." The truth or falsity of these charges was a matter of concern to the administration, Congress, and the public. Since the Bureau was assigned to compile intelligence on Communist activity, its estimate was sought and, presumably, relied upon. Accordingly, in 1963, the Domestic Intelligence Division submitted a memorandum to Director Hoover detailing the CPUSA's "efforts" to exploit black Americans, which it concluded were an
+"obvious failure."[147]
+Director Hoover was not pleased with this conclusion. He sent a sharp message back to the Division which, according to the Assistant Director in charge, made it "evident that we had to change our ways or we would all be out on the street."[148] Another memorandum was 'therefore written to give the Director "what Hoover wanted to hear."[149]
+The memorandum stated, "The Director is correct;" it called Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. "the most dangerous Negro of the future in this Nation from the standpoint of communism, the Negro, and national security;" and it concluded that it was "unrealistic" to "limit ourselves" to "legalistic proofs or definitely conclusive evidence" that the Communist Party wields "substantial influence over Negroes which one day could become decisive."[150]
+Although the Division still had not said the influence was decisive, by 1964 the Director testified before the House Appropriations Subcommittee that the "Communist influence" in the "Negro movement" was "vitally important." "I Only someone with access to the underlying information would note that the facts could be interpreted quite differently.[151]
+A similar exaggeration occurred in some of the Bureau's statements on communist influence on the anti-Vietnam war demonstrations.
+In April 1965 President Johnson met with Director Hoover to discuss Johnson's "concern over the anti-Vietnam situation." According to Hoover, Johnson said he had "no doubt" that Communists were "behind the disturbances."[152] Hoover agreed, stating that upcoming demonstrations in eighty-five cities were being planned by the Students for a Democratic Society and that SDS was "largely infiltrated by communists and [it] has been woven into the civil rights situation which we know has large communist influence."[153]
+Immediately after the meeting, however, Hoover told his associates that the Bureau might not be able to "technically state" that SDS was "an actual communist organization." The FBI merely knew that there were "communists in it." Hoover instructed, however, "What I want to get to the President is the background with emphasis upon the communist influence therein so that he will know exactly what the picture is." The Director added that he wanted "a good, strong memorandum" pinpointing that the demonstrations had been "largely participated in by communists even though they may not have initiated them;" the Bureau could "at least" say that they had "joined and forced the issue." According to the Director, President Johnson was "quite concerned" and wanted "prompt and quick action."[154]
+Once again, the Bureau wrote a report which made Communist "efforts" sound like Communist success. The eight page memorandum detailed all of the Communist Party's attempts to "encourage" domestic dissent by "a crescendo of criticism aimed at negating every effort of the United States to prevent Vietnam from being engulfed by communist aggressors." Twice in the eight pages, for a total of two and a half sentences, it was pointed out that most demonstrators were not Party members and their decisions were not initiated or controlled by the communists. Each of these brief statements moreover, was followed by a qualification: (1) "however, the Communist Party, USA ... has vigorously supported these groups and exerted influence;" (2) "While the March [on Washington] was not Communist initiated ... Communist Party members from throughout the nation participated." [Emphasis added.][155]
+The rest of the memorandum is an illustration of what former Assistant Director Sullivan called "interpretive" memo writing in which Communist efforts and desires are emphasized without an evaluation of whether they had been or were likely to be successful.
+The exaggeration of Communist participation, both by the FBI and White House staff members relying on FBI reports,[156] could only have had the effect of reinforcing President Johnson's original tendency to discount dissent against the Vietnam War as "Communist inspired" -- a belief shared by his successor.[157] It is impossible to measure the full effect of this distorted perception at the very highest policymaking level.
+[1] Remarks by Rep. Hale Boggs, 4/22/71, Congressional Record, Vol. 117, Part 9, P. 11565.
+[2] A "name check" is not an investigation, but a search of existing FBI files through the use of the Bureau's comprehensive general name index. Requests for FBI "name checks" were peculiarly damaging because no new investigation was done to verify allegations stored away for years in Bureau files. A former FBI official responsible for compliance with such requests said that the Bureau "answered ... by furnishing the White House every piece of information in our files on the individuals requested." Deposition of Thomas E. Bishop, former Assistant Director, Crime Records Division, 12/2/75, p. 144.)
+[3] Former FBI executive Cartha DeLoach, who was FBI liaison with the White House during part of the Johnson administration, has stated, "I simply followed Mr. Hoover's instructions in complying with White House requests and I never asked any questions of the White House as to what they did with the material afterwards." (DeLoach deposition, 11/25/75, p. 28.) On at least one occasion, when a White House aide indicated that President Johnson did not want any record made by the FBI of a request for a "run-down" on the links between Robert Kennedy and officials involved in the Bobby Baker investigation, the Bureau disregarded the order. DeLoach stated that he "ignored the specific instructions" in this instance because he "felt that any instructions we received from the White House should be a matter of record." (DeLoach deposition, 11/25/75, P. 89.)
+Former Assistant Director Bishop stated, "Who am I to ask the President of the United States what statutory basis he has if he wants to know what Information is in the files of the FBI?" It was a "proper dissemination" because it was "not a dissemination outside the executive branch" and because there was "no law, no policy of the Department of Justice. . . . no statute of the United States that says that was not permissible." But even if there had been a statute laying down standards, Bishop said "it wouldn't have made a bit of difference . . . when the Attorney General or the President asks for it."
+Bishop recalled from his "own knowledge" instances where President Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon had "called over and asked Mr. Hoover for a memo on certain people." (Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, pp. 153-154.)
+[4] Memoranda from Stephen Early, Secretary to the President, to Hoover, 5/21/40 and 6/17/40.
+[5] FBI memorandum to Senate Select Committee, 3/26/76; See pp. 36-37.
+[6] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Thomas E. Stephens, Secretary to the President, 4/13/54.
+[7] Courtney Evans deposition, 12/1/75, p. 39.
+[8] See pp.[ 64-65. The tap authorized by Attorney General Kennedy on another high executive official was not related to political considerations, nor apparently was the tap authorized by Attorney General Katzenbach in 1965 on the editor of an anti-communist newsletter who had published a book alleging impropriety by Robert Kennedy a year earlier.
+[9] Memorandum from Hoover to Moyers, 10/27/64, cited in FBI summary memorandum, 1/31/75.
+[10] Bureau files indicate that the apparent "reason" for the "White House interest" was to determine "whether the South Vietnamese had secretly been in touch with supporters of Presidential candidate Nixon, possibly through Mrs. Chennault, as President Johnson was apparently suspicious that the South Vietnamese were trying to sabotage his peace negotiations in the hope that Nixon would win the election and then take a harder line towards North Vietnam." (FBI memorandum, subject: Mrs. Anna Chennault.[ 2/1/75.) The FBI has claimed that its investigation of Mrs. Chennault was "consistent with FBI responsibilities to determine if her activities were in violation of certain provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act and of the Neutrality Act."
+Direct electronic surveillance of Mrs. Chennault was rejected, according to a contemporaneous FBI memorandum, because FBI executive Cartha DeLoach pointed out that "it was widely known that she was involved in Republican political circles and, if it became known that the FBI was surveilling her this would put us in a most untenable and embarrassing position." (Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 10/30/68.)
+Electronic surveillance was, however, directed at the South Vietnamese officials and was approved by Attorney General Ramsey Clark. Clark has testified that he did not know of the physical surveillance aspect of the FBI's investigation, but that he did authorize the electronic surveillance of the South Vietnamese officials. (Clark testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 252.)
+[11] FBI executive Cartha DeLoach has stated that a White House aide made the initial request for the check of telephone company records late one night. According to DeLoach, the request was "to find out who, either Mr. Agnew or Mr. Nixon, when they had been in Albuquerque (New Mexico) several days prior to that, had called from Albuquerque while they were there." When DeLoach refused to contact the telephone company "late in the evening," President Johnson "came on the phone and proceeded to remind me that he was Commander in Chief and he should get what he wanted, and he wanted me to do it immediately." DeLoach then talked with Director Hoover, who told him to "stand your ground." The next day, however, Hoover ordered that the records be checked, but the only calls identified were "made by Mr. Agnew's staff." These wore reported to the White House. (DeLoach Deposition.[ 11/25/75, pp. 74-7.5.) Agnew's arrival and departure times in and out of Albuquerque were also "verified at the request of the White House." (FBI summary memorandum. subject: Mrs. Anna Chennault, 2/1/75).
+[12] FBI Director Hoover brought the matter to the attention of the White House in a letter describing why the FBI had refused to "wire" the witness (there was not adequate "security") and how the Criminal Division had then used the Bureau of Narcotics to do so. (Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 1/12/67.) This was the instance where FBI executive Cartha DeLoach made a record, after Watson told him that "the President does not want any record made." (Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 1/17/67; see also FBI summary memorandum, 2/3/75.)
+[13] According to this memorandum, Watson told Cartha DeLoach in 1967 that "he and the President" wanted all "communications addressed to him by the Director" to be addressed instead to a lower level White House staff member. Watson told DeLoach that the "reason for this change" was that the staff member "did not have the direct connection with the President that he had and, consequently, people who saw such communications would not suspicion (sic) that Watson or the President had requested such information, nor were interested in such information." (memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 3/17/67.)
+[14] FBI summary memorandum, subject: Coverage of Television Presentation, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1/31/75. Former FBI executive Cartha DeLoach has stated, regarding this incident. "We felt that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the FBI, but obviously Mr. Hoover felt that this was a request by the President and he desired it to be done." (DeLoach deposition, 11/25/75, P. 58.)
+[15] Blind FBI memorandum, 2/10/67.
+[16] President Johnson's request also went beyond "legislators," and included contacts by any "prominent U.S. citizens." (FBI summary memorandum, subject: Information Concerning Contacts Between [Certain Foreign officials] and Members or Staff of the United States Congress Furnished to the White House at the Request of the President, 2/3/75.) The FBI's reports indicated that its information came "through coverage" of the foreign officials and that the Bureau, in this case, had "conducted no investigation of members of Congress." (FBI summary memorandum, 2/3/75.) FBI "coverage" apparently included electronic surveillance.
+President Nixon also requested information on contacts between foreign officials and Congressmen, but his request does not appear to have related to Presidential critics. Rather, the Nixon request grew out of concern about "an increase in [foreign] interest on Capitol Hill" which had been expressed to President Nixon by at least one Senator; and the FBI's report "included two examples of [foreign] intelligence initiatives directed against Capitol Hill without identifying the [foreigners] or American involved." (FBI summary memorandum, 2/3/75.)
+[17] Memoranda from Hoover to Watson, 6/4/65 and 7/30/65.
+[18] Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 7/15/66, citing Jacobsen request.
+[19] Memorandum from Clark to Watson, 4/8/67, enclosing memorandum from Director, FBI to the Attorney General. 4/7/67. (LBJ Library.)
+[20] Memoranda from Hoover to Watson, 2/15/65 and 5/29/65.
+[21] Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 7/22/65.
+[22] Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 1/27/67.
+[23] Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 4/6/66.
+[24] Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 2/24/66.
+[25] Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 4/6/66.
+[26] Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 11/8/66; DeLoach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, pp. 180-182.
+[26]  Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to John D. Ehrlichman, 10/6/69; letter from Clarence M. Kelly to Joseph Duffy, 7/14/75, enclosing FBI records transmitted under Freedom of Information Act.
+[27] House Judiciary Committee Hearings, Book VII, White House Surveillance Activities (1974), p.[ 1111.
+[28] According to Director Hoover's memorandum of the conversation, Agnew asked Hoover for "some assistance" in obtaining information about Rev. Abernathy. Hoover recorded: "The Vice President said he thought he was going to have to start destroying Abernathy's credibility, so anything I can give him would be appreciated. I told him I would be glad to." (Memorandum from Hoover to Tolson, et a], 5/18/70.) Subsequently, the FBI Director sent Agnew a report on Rev. Abernathy containing not only the by-product of Bureau investigations, but also derogatory public record information. (Letter from Hoover to Agnew, 5/19/70.)
+[29] Staff summary of Spiro Agnew interview, 10/15/75.
+[30] Memoranda from Sullivan to Hoover, 6/30/69 and 7/2/69.
+[31] Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach, 11/5/69. The Kraft surveillance Is also discussed in Part II, pp. 121-122.
+[32] Coverage in these two cases was requested by neither Henry Kissinger nor Alexander Haig (as most of the "17" were), but by other White House officials. Attorney General Mitchell approved the first at the request of "higher authority." (Memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell, 7/23/69.) The second was specifically requested by H. R. Haldeman. (Memorandum from Hoover to Mitchell, 12/14/70.
+[33] This tap was also apparently requested by White House officials other than Kissinger or Haig.
+(Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach, 8/1/69.) The "17" wiretaps are also discussed at p. 122.
+[34] DeLoach, 12/3/75, Hearing-, Vol. 6. p. 180.
+[35] Memorandum from Hoover to Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President.[ 1/3/56. This report was also provided to the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense. and military intelligence.
+[36] Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 3/2/56.
+[37] Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson.[ 3/5/56.
+[38] Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 3/6/56.
+[39] Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 3/7/56. A National Security Council staff member responsible for Internal security matters summarized these reports as providing information "regarding attempts being made by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People to send instructed delegations to high- ranking Government officials 'to tactfully draw out their positions concerning civil rights."' (Memorandum from J. Patrick Coyne to Anderson, 3/6/56.)
+[40] After consulting the Attorney General, this aide advised the Secretary to the Cabinet that the FBI had "reported developments in recent weeks in several southern States, indicating a marked deterioration in relationships between the races, and in some instances fomented by communist or communist-front organizations." (Memorandum from Anderson to Maxwell Rabb, 1/16/56.) The Secretary to the Cabinet, who had "experience in handling minority matters" for the White House, agreed that "each Cabinet Member should be equipped with the plain facts." (Memorandum from Rabb to Anderson, 1/17/56.) A National Security Council staff member who handled internal security matters reported shortly thereafter that the FBI Director was "prepared to brief the Cabinet along the general lines" of his written communications to the White House. (Memorandum from J. Patrick Coyne to Anderson, 2/1/56.)
+[41] Memorandum from Director, FBI, to the Executive Assistant to the Attorney General, 3/9/56, enclosing FBI memorandum described as the "basic statement" used by the Director "in the Cabinet Briefing this morning on Racial Tension and Civil Rights." For a further discussion of the exaggeration of Communist influence on the NAACP in this briefing, see pp. 250-257, note 151a.
+[42] The electronic surveillances were generally related to foreign affairs concerns. See pp.[ 64 - 65.
+[43] The Americans include three Agriculture Department officials, the secretary to the Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee, and two registered lobbying agents for foreign interests. For Attorney General Kennedy's relationship to the microphone surveillance of the Congressman, see p.[ 61, note 233. One of the wiretaps directed at a registered lobbying agent was placed on the office telephone of a Washington law firm. (See p. 201)
+[44] FBI memorandum, 6/15/62.
+[45] FBI memorandum, 6/15/62.
+[46] Memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Kennedy, 2/18/61. This information came from the Bureau's "coverage" (by microphone surveillance) of the Congressman's hotel room meeting.
+[47] FBI memorandum, 2/15/62.
+[48] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Kennedy, 3/13/61.
+[49] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Kennedy, 3/13/61.
+[50] Memorandum from W. R. Wannall to W. C. Sullivan, 12/22/66. According to a Bureau memorandum of a meeting between Attorney General Kennedy and FBI Assistant Director Courtney Evans, Kennedy stated in April 1961 that "now the law has passed he did not feel there was justification for continuing this extensive investigation." (Memorandum from Evans to Parsons, 4/15/61.)
+[51] There is no clear evidence as to what President Johnson had in mind when, as a contemporaneous FBI memorandum indicates, he directed "the assignment of the special squad to Atlantic City." (DeLoach to Mohr 8/29/64) Cartha DeLoach has testified that Presidential aide Walter Jenkins made the original request to him, but that he said it should be discussed with Director Hoover and that "Mr. Jenkins or the President, to the best of my recollection, later called Mr. Hoover and asked that this be done." DeLoach claimed that the purpose was to gather "intelligence concerning matters of strife, violence, etc." which might arise out of the credentials challenge. (DeLoach, 12/3/75. hearings, Vol. 6, p. 175.)
+[52] The operations of the FBI in Atlantic City are described in greater detail in Section II, pp.[ 117-119.
+[53] Memorandum from DeLoach to Jenkins.[ 8/24/64.
+[54] Memorandum from DeLoach to Jenkins, 8/25/64.
+[55] Memorandum from DeLoach to Jenkins, 8/25/64.
+[56] Memorandum from DeLoach to Jenkins, 8/25/64.
+[57] Memorandum from DeLoach to Jenkins, 8/25/64.
+[58] Blind memorandum from LBJ Library bearing handwritten date 8/26/64 and the typewritten date 8/19/64, Hearings, Vol.[ 6, Exhibit 68-2, p. 713.
+[59] In at least two instances. the wiretaps continued on targets after they left the Executive Branch and became advisers to Senator Edmund Muskie, then the leading Democratic prospect for the Presidency. See Part II, p.[ 122.
+[60] Memorandum from Hoover to Nixon, Kissinger, and Mitchell, 10/9/69.
+[61] Memorandum from Hoover to Nixon and Kissinger, 12/3/69.
+[62] Memorandum from Hoover to Nixon and Kissinger, 2/26/70.
+[63] Memorandum from Hoover to H. R. Haldeman, 6/2/70.
+[64] Memorandum from Hoover to Haldeman.[ 9/4/70.
+[65] Memorandum from Hoover to Nixon and Kissinger, 7/18/69.
+[66] Memorandum from Hoover to Haldeman, 5/18/70.
+[67] Memorandum from Hoover to Haldeman, 6/23/70.
+[68] Memorandum from Hoover to Haldeman, 11/24/70.
+[69] Memorandum from Hoover to Haldeman, 12/22/70.
+[70] Memorandum from Hoover to Nixon, Kissinger, and Mitchell, 12/29/69.
+[71] Memorandum from Magruder to Haldeman and Ehrlichman, 1/15/70. Ehrlichman advised Haldeman, "This is the kind of early warning we need more ofyour game planners are now in an excellent position to map anticipatory action." (Memorandum from "E" (Ehrlichman) to "H" (Haldeman), undated.) Haldeman responded, "I agree with John's point. Let's get going." (Memorandum from "H" to "M" (Magruder), undated).
+[72] Report of the House Judiciary Committee, 8/20/74, p. 147.
+[73] It should be noted, however, that in at least one case the Bureau did distinguish between political and nonpolitical information. In 1968, when an aide to Vice President Humphrey asked that a "special squad" be sent to the Demoeratic National Convention in Chicago, Director Hoover not only declined, but he also specifically instructed the SAC in Chicago not "to get into anything political" but to confine his reports to "extreme action or violence." (Memorandum from Hoover to Tolson., et al, 8/15/68.) There were no comparable instructions at Atlantic City.
+[74] Former Attorney General Francis Biddle recalled in his autobiography how J. Edgar Hoover shared with him some of the "intimate details" of what his fellow Cabinet members did and said, "their likes and dislikes, their weaknesses and their associations." Biddle confessed that he enjoyed hearing these derogatory and sometimes "embarrassing" tidbits and that Hoover "knew how to flatter his superior." (Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority [Garden City: Doubleday, 1962], pp. 258-259.)
+A former FBI official has described one aspect of the Bureau's practice:
+"Mr. Hoover would say what do we have in our files on this guy? Just what do we have? Not blind memorandum, not public source information, everything we've got. And we would maybe write a 25 page memo. When he got it and saw what's in it, he'd say we'd better send that to the White House and the Attorney General so they can have in one place everything that the FBI has now on this guy. . . . (Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, pp. 141-142.)"
+[75] None of these letters indicate that they were in response to requests, as is the case with other similar letters examined by the Committee. All were volunteered as matters which Director Hoover considered to be "of interest" to the recipients.
+[76] Memorandum from Hoover to Vaughn, 2/15/47.
+[77] Memorandum from Hoover to Connelly, 1/27/50.
+[78] Memorandum from Hoover to Anderson, 4/21/55.
+[79] Memorandum from Hoover to Cutler, 2/13/58.
+[80] Memorandum from Hoover to Robert Kennedy, 11/20/63.
+[81] Memorandum from Hoover to Robert Kennedy, 2/10/61.
+[82] Memorandum from Hoover to Watson, 1/9/67.
+[83] For additional examples, See Section II, pp.[ 51-53.
+[84] Staff memorandum: Review of INLET letters, 11/18/75.
+[85] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 11/26/69.
+[86] Memorandum from Bassett to Callahan, 1/29/75.
+[87] Former FBI official Mark Felt has stated that the SAC's could have sent personal letters to Hoover containing such "personal tidbits" "to curry favor with him," and on one occasion he did so himself with respect to a "scandalous" incident. (W. Mark Felt testimony, 2/3/76, p. 91.)
+The following excerpt from one SAC's letter is an example of political information fed to the Director: "I have heard several comments and items which I wanted to bring to your attention. As I imagine is true in all States at this time, the political situation in [this state] is getting to be very interesting. As you know, Senator [deleted] is coming up for re-election as is Representative [deleted]. For a long time it appeared that [the Senator] would have no opposition amount to anything in his campaign for re-election. The speculation and word around the State right now is that probably [the Representative] will file for the U.S. Senate seat now held by [the Senator]. I have also been informed that [the Senator's] forces have offered [the Representative] $50,000 if he will stay out of the Senate race and run for re-election as Congressman." (Letter from SAC to Hoover, 5/20/64.)
+[88] Letter from Attorney General McGrath to President Truman, 12/7/49; letter from Hoover to Vaughn, 1/14/50.
+[89] Memorandum from Hoover to Rogers, 5/25/60.
+[90] Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, p. 211. Bishop stated that he acted on his own, rather than at the direction of higher Bureau executives. However, Director Hoover did have a memorandum prepared on the reporter summarizing everything in the Bureau's files about him, which he referred to when he met with the reporter's superiors. (Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, p. 215.)
+[91] Memorandum from Executives Conference to Hoover, 1/4/50. Early examples included historian Henry Steele Commager, "personnel of CBS," and former Interior Secretary Harold Ickes. (Memorandum from Mohr to Tolson, 12/21/49.) By the time it was abolished in 1972, the list included 332 names, including mystery writer Rex Stout, whose novel 'The Doorbell Rang" had "presented a highly distorted and most unfavorable picture of the Bureau." (Memorandum from M. A. Jones to Bishop, 7/11/72.)
+[92] Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, p. 207.
+[93] The field office was also expected to send to headquarters any additional allegations about the Congressman or Governor which might come to its attention in future investigations, even if the Congressman or Governor was not himself the "subject" of the investigation. (Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, pp. 194-200.)
+[94] Bishop deposition, 12/2/75, pp. 206-7.
+[95] The FBI is not the only agency believed to have files on Congressmen. According to Rep. Andrew Young, "in the freshman orientation" of new House members, "one of the things you are told is that there are seven agencies that keep files on private lives of Congressmen." (Rep. Andrew Young testimony, 2/19/76, P. 48.)
+[96] Remarks by Rep. Hale Boggs, House of Representatives, 4/22/71, Congressional Record, Vol. 117, Part 9, p. 11562.
+[97] The means used are discussed in the finding on "Covert Action to Disrupt and Discredit Domestic Groups", as well as the Detailed Reports on COINTELPRO, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Black Panther Party.
+[98] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, et al., 8/13/63.
+[99] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 11/11/65
+[100] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office et al., 3/9/66.
+[101] Memorandum from FBI headquarters to Chicago Field Office 8/28/68.
+[102] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Minneapolis Field Office, 11/4/68.
+[103] Memorandum from San Antonio Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/12/68; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 8/27/68.
+[104] The field office also disapproved of the "hippy types" distributing the newspaper, with their "unkempt clothes", "wild beards", and "other examples of their nonconformity". Accordingly, an anonymous letter was sent to a state legislator protesting the distribution of such "depravity" at a state university, noting that "this is becoming a way of campus life. Poison the minds of the young, destroy their moral being, and in less than one generation this country will be ripe for its downfall." (Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/23/69; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Newark Field Office, 1/69.
+[105] The Crime Records Division also had responsibility for disseminating information to cultivate a favorable public image for the FBI -- a practice common to many government agencies. This objective was pursued in various ways. One section of the Crime Records Division was assigned to assemble "material that was needed for a public relations program." This section "developed information for television shows, for writers, for authors, for newspapermen, people who wanted in-depth information concerning the FBI." The section also "handled scripts" for public service radio programs produced by FBI Field Offices; reviewed scripts for television and radio shows dealing with the FBI; and handled the "public relations and publicity aspect" of the "ten most wanted fugitives program." The Bureau attempted to assert control over media presentations of information about its activities. For example, Director Hoover's approval was necessary before the Crime Records Division would cooperate with an author intending to write a book about the FBI (Bishop testimony, 12/2/75, pp. 6-8, 18.)
+[106] Memoranda recommending use of the media for COINTELPRO purposes sometimes bore the designation "Mass Media Program," which appeared mereIy to signify the function of the Crime Records Division as a "conduit" for disseminating information at the request of the Domestic Intelligence Division. (Bishop testimony, 12/2/75, pp. 63, 68, 88.) The dissemination of derogatory information to the media was usually reviewed through the Bureau's chain of command and received final approval from Director Hoover. (Bishop testimony, 12/2/75, p. 89.)
+[107] For example, Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Atlanta Field Office, 10/22/68.
+[108] Bishop, 12/2/75, p. 33.
+[109] Cartha DeLoach, who handled media contacts for several years, testified that this technique was not actually used as much as the Director desired:
+If any unfair comment appeared in any segment of the press concerning Mr. Hoover or the FBI ... Mr. Hoover ... would say do not contact this particular newspaper or do not contact this person or do not cooperate with this person.... If I had complied strictly to the letter of the law to Mr. Hoover's instructions, I think I would be fair in saying that we wouldn't be cooperating with hardly a single newspaper in the United States.... The men down through the years had to overlook some of those instructions and deal fairly with all segments of the press. (DeLoach testimony, 11/25/75, pp. 213-214.)
+[110] Bishop stated that the Crime Records Division was "scrupulous" in providing information which could be cited to a "page and paragraph" in a public source. (Bishop, 12/2/75, pp. 24, 177-178.)
+[111] Bishop, 12/2/75, pp. 135-136.
+[112] T. E. Bishop stated that from the FBI documents available to the Committee, it was impossible to determine whether an article was actually printed after a news release or a draft article had been supplied to a media source. (Bishop, 12/2/75, p. 86.)
+[113] Memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/22/68.
+[114] Memorandum to Director from SAC Miami, 3/10/70. Bishop testified that he "would hope" that in response to the directive to disseminate the target's "arrest record" the Division would have disseminated only conviction records. Bishop said that under the Attorney General's guidelines then in effect only conviction records or arrests which were a matter of public record in a particular jurisdiction were to be disseminated. Bishop stated that his policy was not to disseminate an arrest record "especially if that arrest record resulted in an acquittal or if the charge was never completed ... because that is not, to my mind, anything derogatory against a guy, until he actually gets convicted." (Bishop testimony, 12/2/75, pp. 163-167, 173.)
+[115] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Boston Field Office, 1/13/68.
+[116] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Boston Field Office, 2/27/68.
+[117] Memorandurn from Tampa Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/7/69.
+[118] Deposition of Black Nationalist COINTELPRO supervisor, 10/17/75, p, 21; Deposition of George C. Moore, Chief of the Racial Intelligence Section, 11/3/75. p. 36.
+[119] Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 6/3/63.
+[120] Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 8/9/65.
+[121] Memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan, 2/24/64.
+[122] Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/16/68.
+[123] Memorandum from G. C. 'Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 10/26/68.
+[124] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Miami Meld Office, 7/9/68.
+[125] Memorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 5/17/76.
+[126] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Atlanta Field Office, 10/22/68.
+[127] Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/18/69.
+[128] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Indianapolis Field Office, 6/17/68.
+[129] FBI Memorandum from Bishop to Mohr, 7/6/71; Bishop testimony, 12/2/75, pp.148-151.
+Two years earlier the Crime Records Division prepared a sixteen-page memorandum containing information on "Leonard B. Boudin, Attorney for Dr. Benjamin Spock," written at the time of Spock's indictment for conspiring to violate the Selective Service Act. (FBI Memorandum from M. A. Jones to T. E. Bishop, 2/26/68) The memorandum described "alleged associations and activities of Boudin" related to organizations or individuals considered "subversive" by the FBI, (Bishop, 12/2/75, pp. 134-135) and included: names of many of Boudin's clients; citations to magazines and journals in which Boudin had published articles; references to petitions he had signed; and notes on rallies and academic conferences at which he had spoken. The memorandum indicated that "the White House and Attorney General have been advised" of the information on Boudin's background. Notations on the cover sheet of the memorandum by high Bureau officials indicate that approval was granted for "furnishing the attached information to one of our friendly news contacts" but the information was not used until after the "results of appeal in Spock's case." Bishop did not recall distributing the Boudin memorandum. (Bishop, 12/2/75, pp. 125-126)
+The head of the Crime Records Division speculated that the memorandum was prepared at the request of a reporter because he did not remember a request from Hoover or from the Domestic Intelligence Division, which was the normal route for assignments to the Crime Records Division. Division Chief Bishop testified that he probably instructed the Division "to get up any public source information that we have concerning Boudin that shows his connection with the Communist Party or related groups of that nature." (Bishop, 12/2/75, pp. 131-133)
+[130] Memorandum from W. H. Stapleton to C. D. DeLoach, 11/5/64.
+[131] Memorandum from Cleveland Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/28/64; memorandum from FBI
+Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 11/6/64.
+[132] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Phoenix Field Office, 6/11/68.
+[133] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 2/4/64.
+[134] The target was not intended to be the United Farm Workers, but a local college professor expected to participate in the picket line. The Bureau had unsuccessfully directed "considerable efforts to prevent hiring" the professor. Apparently, the Bureau did not consider the impact of this technique on the United Farm Workers' efforts. (Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/12/68; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 9/13/68.)
+[135] Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 4/16/64.
+[136] Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/10/67.
+[137] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 3/14/67.
+[138] Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/1/67. Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 10/12/61.
+[139] Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/1/65; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 9/22/61,
+[140] Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/28/65; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Detroit Field Office, 10/1/65.
+[141] Memorandum from Detroit Field Office, to FBI Headquarters, 1/19/67.
+[142] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office, 11/14/66. The attempt was unsuccessful; a prior raid on a fire department's fund raiser had angered the local District Attorney, and the ABC decided not to raid the Democrats because of "political ramifications."
+[143] The originating document for the "Black Nationalist" COINTELPRO ordered field offices to "expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize" the "leadership" and "spokesmen" of the target groups. The "New Left" originating memo called for efforts to "neutralize" the New Left and the "Key Activists," defined as "those individuals who are the moving forces behind the New Left;" the letter to field offices made it clear that the targets were the "leadership" of the "New Left" -- a term which was never defined. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all sAc's, 8/25/67.)
+[144] Memorandum from Brennan to Sullivan, 5/9/68; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SAC's, 5/10/68.
+[145] Memorandum from Sullivan to Belmont, 1/8/64. Although this proposal was approved by Director Hoover, there is no evidence that any steps were taken to Implement the plan.
+[146] See Martin Luther King, Jr. Report: Sec. V, The FBI's Efforts to Discredit Dr. Martin Luther King: 1964, Sec. VII, The FBI Program Against Dr. King: 1965-1968.
+[147] Memorandum from Baumgardner to Sullivan, 8/23/63, p. 1.
+[148] Sullivan deposition, 11/1/75, p. 20.
+[149] Sullivan deposition, 11/1/75, p. 29.
+[150] Memorandum from Sullivan to, Director, FBI, 8/30/63. Sullivan described this process of "interpretive" memo writing to lead a reader to believe the Communists were influential without actually stating they were in control of a movement: "You have to spend years in the Bureau really to get the feel of this.... You came down here to 'efforts', these 'colossal efforts'. That was a key word of ours when we are getting around the facts.... You will not find anywhere In the memorandum whether the efforts were successful or unsuccessful.... Here is another one of our words that we used to cover up the facts, 'efforts to exploit', that word 'exploit'. Nowhere will you find in some of these memos the results of the exploitation. [Like] 'planning to do all possible', you can search in vain for a statement to the effect that their plans were successful or unsuccessful, partly successful or partly unsuccessful." (Sullivan, 11/1/75, pp. 15-16.)
+[151] Hearings before the House Appropriations Subcommittee, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), p. 309. Director Hoover's statement was widely publicized. (E.g., "Hoover Says Reds Exploit Negroes," New York Times, 4/22/64, p. 30) it caused serious concern among civil rights leaders who feared that it would hurt the prospects for passage of the 1964 civil rights bill.
+[151]  Director Hoover had included similar exaggerated statements about Communist influence in a briefing to the Eisenhower Cabinet in 1956. Hoover had stated, regarding an NAACP-sponsored conference:
+"The Communist Party plans to use this conference to embarrass the Administration by causing a rift between the Administration and Dixiecrats who have supported it, by forcing the Administration to take a stand on civil rights legislation with the present Congress. The Party hopes through a rift to affect the 1956 elections." [Emphasis added.] (Memorandum from Director, FBI, to the Executive Assistant to the Attorney General, 3/9/56, and enclosure.)
+Director Hoover did not include in his prepared briefing statement the information reported to the White House separately earlier that there was "no indication" the the NAACP had "allowed the Communist Party to infiltrate the conference." (Hoover to Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President, 3/5/56.) According to one historical account, Hoover's Cabinet briefing "reinforced the President's inclination to passivity" on civil rights legislation. (J. W. Anderson, Eisenhower, Brownell, and the Congress: The Tangled Origins of the Civil Rights Bill of 1956-57 [University of Alabama Press, 1964], p. 34.)
+[152] Memorandum from Hoover to subordinate FBI officials, 4/28/65.
+[153] Hoover memorandum, 4/28/65.
+[154] Hoover memorandum, 4/28/65.
+[155] Letter from Hoover to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President (National Security), 4/28/65, enclosing FBI memorandum, Subject: Communist Activities Relative to United States Policy on Vietnam.
+[156] See, e.g., a memorandum from Marvin (Watson) to the President, 5/16/67, quoting from a Bureau report that: "the Communist Party and other organizations are continuing their efforts to force the United States to change its present policy toward Vietnam."
+[157] The report prepared by the intelligence agencies as the basis for the 1970 "Huston Plan" included the following similar emphasis on the potential threat (and downplaying of the actual lack of success) :
+"Leaders of student protest groups" who traveled abroad were "considered to have potential for recruitment and participation in foreign-directed intelligence activity."
+"Antiwar activists" who had "frequently traveled abroad" were considered "as having potential for engaging in foreign directed intelligence collection."
+The CIA was "of the view that the Soviet and bloc intelligence services are committed at the political level to exploit all domestic dissidents wherever possible."
+Although there was "no hard evidence" of substantial foreign control of "the black extremist movement," there was "a marked potential" and the groups were "highly susceptible to exploitation by hostile foreign intelligence services." "Communist intelligence services are capable of using their personnel, facilities, and agent personnel to work in the black extremist field."
+While there were "no substantial indications that the communist intelligence services have actively fomented domestic unrest," their "capability" could not "be minimized."
+"The dissidence and violence in the United States today present adversary intelligence services with opportunities unparalleled for forty years." [Emphasis added.] (Special Report, Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), June 1970; substantial portions of this report appear in Hearings, Vol. 2, pp. 141-188.)
+** F. Inadequate Controls on Dissemination and Retention
+<center>
+MAJOR FINDING
+</center>
+The Committee finds that the product of intelligence investigations has been disseminated without adequate controls. Reports on lawful political activity and law-abiding citizens have been disseminated to agencies having no proper reason to receive them. Information that should have been discarded, purged, or sealed, including the product of illegal techniques and overbroad investigations, has been retained and is available for future use.
+<em>Subfindings</em>
+(a) Agencies have volunteered massive amounts of irrelevant information to other officials and agencies and have responded unquestioningly in some instances to requests for data without assuring that the information would be used for a Iawful purpose.
+(b) Excessive dissemination has sometimes contributed to the inefficiency of the intelligence process itself.
+(c) Under the federal employee security program, unnecessary information about, the political beliefs and associations of prospective government employees has been disseminated.
+(d) The FBI, which has been the "clearinghouse" for all domestic intelligence data, maintains in readily accessible files sensitive and derogatory personal information not relevant to any investigation, as well as information which was improperly or illegally obtained.
+<em>Elaboration of Findings</em>
+The adverse effects on privacy of the Overbreadth of domestic intelligence collection and of the use of Intrusive Techniques have been magnified many times over by the dissemination practices of the collecting agencies. Information which should not have been gathered in the first place has gone beyond the initial agency to numerous other agencies and officials, thus compounding the original intrusion. The amount disseminated within the Executive branch has often been so voluminous as to make it difficult to separate useful data from worthless detail.
+The Committee's finding on Political Abuse describes dissemination of intelligence for the political advantage of high officials or the self-interest of an agency. The problems of excessive dissemination, however, include more than political use. Dissemination has not been confined to what is appropriate for law enforcement or other proper government purposes. Rather, any information which could have been conceived to be useful was passed on, and doubts were generally resolved in favor of dissemination. Until recently, none of the standards for the exchange of data among agencies has taken privacy interests into account. The same failure to consider privacy interests has characterized the retention of data by the original collecting agency.
+<em>Subfinding (a)</em>
+Agencies have volunteered massive amounts of irrelevant information to other officials and agencies and have responded unquestioningly in some instances to requests for data without assuring that the information would be used for a lawful purpose.
+The following examples illustrate the extent of dissemination:
+- - FBI reports on dissident Americans flowed to the CIA at a rate as high as 1,000 a month. CIA officials regarded any names in these reports as a standing requirement from the FBI for information about those persons.[1]
+- - In 1967 the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department was receiving 150 reports and memoranda a day from the FBI on "organizations and individuals engaged in agitational activity of one kind or another."[2]
+- - Attorney General Ramsey Clark could not "keep up with" the volume of FBI memoranda coming into him and to the Assistant Attorneys General on the 700,000 FBI investigations per year.[3]
+- - The Justice Department's IDIU sent its computer list of 10,000 to 12,000 American dissidents to the CIA's Operation CHAOS (which apparently found it useless) and to the Special Service Staff of the Internal Revenue Service which did use it as part of its program of tax investigations).[4]
+- - In fiscal year 1974 alone, the FBI, the Civil Service Commission, and military intelligence received over 367,000 requests for "national agency checks," or name checks of their files, on prospective federal government employees.[5]
+The information disseminated to other agencies has often been considered useless by the recipients. FBI officials have said they received "very little in the way of good product" from the National Security Agency's interception of the international communications of Americans.[6] FBI officials also considered most of the material on "the domestic scene" sent to them from the CIA mail opening project to be irrelevant "junk."[6] The Secret Service destroyed over ninety percent of the information disseminated to it by the FBI without ever putting it in its own intelligence files.[7] Defense Department directives require the destruction of a great deal of information it receives from the FBI about civilians considered "threatening" to the military, including reports on civilian "subversion."[8]
+Sometimes dissemination has become almost -air end in itself. The FBI would often anticipate what it considered to be the needs of other "appropriate agencies."[9] The Bureau has disseminated data to military intelligence agencies, regardless of whether or not there was likely to be serious violence requiring the dispatch of troops; the Bureau also disseminated information when there was no connection between the subject of the report and any military personnel or facility.[10] Consequently, the computerized and noncomputerized domestic intelligence data banks compiled by the Continental Army Command cited the FBI as "data source" for about 80 percent of the information where a source was identified.[11]
+FBI dissemination to the military has shown how information can get into the hands of agencies which have no proper reason to receive it.[12]
+The FBI disseminated a large volume of information on domestic political activities to the CIA, thus providing a substantial part of the data for the CHAOS program.[13] Much of this information was also furnished to the State Department." The FBI sometimes disseminated reports to the ClA and the State Department if the subject matter involved public discussion of national security policy and possible "subversive" influence.[15]
+The FBI was also the largest source of political targets for tax investigations by the Special Service Staff of the Internal Revenue Service. While still in its formative days, SSS was placed on the FBI's distribution list in response to a request from an Assistant IRS Commissioner for information regarding:
+various organizations of predominantly dissident or extremist nature and/or people prominently identified with those organizations.[16]
+The FBI, perceiving that SSS would "deal a blow to dissident elements,"[17] decided to supply reports relating to this broad category of individuals and organizations.
+The FBI did not select the reports it forwarded on the basis of the presence of a probable tax violation, but on the basis of the political and ideological criteria IRS had supplied-, yet the furnishing of the report resulted in establishment of an SSS file and, subject to resource limitations, to a review of possible tax liability.[18] Among the other lists of "extremists," "subversives" and dissidents SSS received was a list of 2,300 organizations the FBI categorized as "Old Left," "New Left," and "Right Wing."[19]
+One reason for the Bureau's widespread dissemination of intelligence throughout the Executive branch was recalled by a former FBI official. In the late 1940s a sensitive espionage case involved a high government official. At that time the FBI held such information "very tightly," as it had during World War II. However, one item of information that "became rather significant" had allegedly "not been disseminated to the White House or the Secretary of State."
+Mr. Hoover was criticized for that, and frankly, he never forgot it. From then on, you might say, the policy was disseminate, disseminate, disseminate.[20]
+This testimony illustrates the dilemma of an agency which was blamed for inadequate dissemination, but never criticized for too much dissemination. In practice, this dilemma was resolved by passing on any information "which in any way even remotely suggested that there was a responsibility for another agency."[21]
+The following are examples of excessive dissemination, drawn from a random sample of materials in FBI headquarters files:
+- - In 1969 the FBI disseminated to Army and Air Force intelligence, Secret Service, and the IDIU a report on a Black Student Union; the report which discussed "a tea" sponsored by the group to develop faculty-student "dialogue" as a junior college and the plans of the college to establish a course on "The History of the American Negro." There was no indication of violence whatsoever. Dissemination to the military intelligence agencies and Secret Service took place both at the field level and at headquarters in Washington, D.C. The information came from college officials.[22]
+- - In 1970 the FBI disseminated to military intelligence and the Secret Service (both locally and at Headquarters), as well as to the Justice Department (IDIU, Internal Security Division, and Civil Rights Division) a report received from a local police intelligence unit on the picketing of a local Industries of the Blind plant by "blind black workers" who were on strike. The sixteen-page report included a copy of a handbill distributed at a United Church of Christ announcing a meeting at the church to support the strike, as well as copies of "leaflets that had been distributed by the blind workers." The only hint of violence in this report was the opinion of a local police intelligence officer that "young black militants," who supported the strike by urging blacks to boycott white-owned stores in the community, might cause "confrontations that might result in violence."[23]
+- - The FBI disseminated a report on Dr. Carl McIntyre's American Christian Action Council to the Secret Service in 1972. The cover memorandum to Secret Service indicated that the group fell within the category of the FBI-Secret Service agreement described as "potentially dangerous because of background, emotional instability or activity in groups engaged in activities inimical to U.S." The report itself reflected no "activities inimical to" the country, but only plans to hold peaceful demonstrations. The report also discussed policies and activities of the group unrelated to demonstrations, including plans to enter lawsuits in "school busing" cases, opposition to "Nixon's China trip" and support for a constitutional amendment for "public school prayer." This data came from a Bureau informant.[24]
+- - In 1966 the FBI disseminated to the Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence divisions, to the Secret Service (locally and at Headquarters), to the Justice Department and to the State Department a ten-page report on a "Free University." The report described in detail the courses offered, including such subjects as "Modern Film," "Workshop on Art and Values," "Contemporary Music," "Poetry Now," and "Autobiography and the Image of Self." Over thirty "associates" were listed by name, although only one was identified as having "subversive connections" (and his course had been "dropped because not enough students had registered.") Others were identified as "involved in Vietnam protest activities" or as being known to officials of a nearby established university as "problem people." The information came from several FBI informants and a confidential source.[25]
+- - In 1966 the FBI disseminated to "appropriate federal and local authorities," including military intelligence, Secret Service, the Department of State and Justice, and a campus security officers (who was a former FBI agent) a report on a group formed for "discussion on Vietnam." The "controlling influence" on the organization was said to be "the local Friends Meeting." Only one person characterized as "subversive" was active in the group. The report was devoted to describing a "speak out" demonstration attended by approximately 300 persons on a university campus. The gathering was entirely peaceful and included "speakers who supported U.S. policies in Viet Nam." The data came from two Bureau informants.[26]
+- - In 1969 the FBI disseminated reports to the White House, the CIA, the State Department, the three military intelligence agencies, Secret Service, the IDIU, the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, and the Internal Security and Civil Rights Divisions on a meeting sponsored by a coalition of citizens concerned about the Anti Ballistic Missile. The only indication of "subversive" influence was that one woman married to a Communist was assisting in publicity work for the meeting. The reports described (from reliable FBI sources) the speakers, pro and con, including prominent scientists, academics, and a Defense Department spokesman.[27]
+- - In 1974 the FBI disseminated to the State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Secret Service, the Internal Security Division, and the Civil Disturbance Unit (formerly IDIU), extensive reports on a national conference on amnesty for war resisters. One of the participants had "recently organized [a] nonviolent protest demonstration" during a visit by President Ford, two others were identified as draft evaders, and the Vietnam Veterans Against the War were active at the conference. But the report went much further to describe -- based on information from FBI informants -- the activities of religious, civil liberties, and student groups, as well as "families of men killed in Vietnam" and congressional staff aides.
+- - In 1974 the FBI disseminated a report on a peaceful vigil in the vicinity of the Soviet Embassy in support of the rights of Soviet Jews, not just to the Secret Service and the Justice Department's Civil Disturbance Unit, but also to the CIA and the State Department.[29]
+- - In 1972 the FBI disseminated a report to the CIA, Army and Navy intelligence, and an un-named "U.S. Government agency which conducts security-type investigations" in West Germany (apparently a military intelligence agency). The latter agency had asked the Bureau for information about an antiwar reservist group and a project to furnish "legal advice to GI's and veterans." The report described not only the reservists group, but also "a group dedicated to giving free legal aid to servicemen" and "an antiwar political group" which endorsed "political candidates for office who have a solid peace position and a favorable chance of being elected." The three groups "planned to share offices." This data came from a Bureau informant.[30]
+The FBI does have an obligation to disseminate to local law enforcement agencies information about crimes within their jurisdiction. Nevertheless, there has been improper dissemination to local police under at least two Bureau programs. Such dissemination occurred under COINTELPRO, as part of the FBI's effort to discredit individuals or disrupt groups.[31] Others were in response to local police requests for "public source" information relating to "subversive matters."[32] Experienced police officials confirmed that the term "subversive" is so broad that it inevitably leads to dissemination about political beliefs.[33]
+Other executive agencies have also engaged in excessive dissemination. The Justice Department's Inter-Division Information Unit (IDIU) sent its computerized data to the CIA, in order that the CIA could check its records on foreign travel of American dissidents.[34] The IDIU sent the same material to the Internal Revenue Service's Special Service Staff, which used the information as part of its program for initiating tax audits.[35] The Internal Revenue Service itself disseminated tax returns or related tax information to the CIA, the FBI, and the Justice Department's Internal Security Division (which also made requests on behalf of the FBI), without ascertaining whether there was a proper basis for the request or the purpose for which the information would be used.[36]
+<em>Subfinding (b)</em>
+Excessive dissemination has sometimes contributed to the inefficiency of the intelligence process itself.
+The dissemination of large amounts of relatively useless or totally irrelevant information has reduced the efficiency of the intelligence process. It has made it difficult for decisionmakers to weigh the importance of reports.[37] Agencies such as the FBI have collected intelligence, not because of its own needs or desires, or because it had been requested to do so, but because the data was assumed to be of value to someone else. Units established to screen and evaluate intelligence have encouraged, rather than reduced, further dissemination.
+In some instances the FBI has disseminated information to local police in a manner that was counterproductive to effective law enforcement. One former police chief has described how the Bureau, under "pressure" from the White House to prepare for a specific demonstration, "passed on information in such a way that it was totally useless" because it was not "evaluated" and thus exaggerated the dangers.[38] The need for prior evaluation of the significance of raw intelligence has not been fully recognized in the Bureau's policy for dissemination of data on protest demonstrations.[39]
+The impediments to accurate intelligence collection have been augmented by the dissemination practices of some local law enforcement agencies. An example is the report oil the Chicago Police Department's Security Section, which has been described as having passed "inherently inaccurate and distortive data" to federal intelligence agericies.[40] The General Accounting Office has confirmed that this is a general problem.[41] While the Committee has not examined local law enforcement intelligence, the dissemination practices of such agencies require as much careful control as federal agencies.[42]
+The assumption that some other agency might need information has not only produced excessive dissemination, but has also served as a specific rationale for collection of intelligence that was not otherwise within an agency's jurisdiction. The best example is the FBI's collection of intelligence on "general racial matters" for the military.[43]
+One of the ironies in the recent history of domestic intelligence was that the Justice Department's IDIU, which was set up to collate and evaluate the massive amounts of data flowing to the Justice Department from the FBI, contributed to even more extensive collection and dissemination.[44] The IDIU encouraged numerous federal agencies (including many without regular investigative functions) to disseminate information to it about "organizations and individuals" who might "instigate" or "prevent" civil disorders.[45]
+<em>Subfinding (c)</em>
+Under the federal employee security program, unnecessary information about the political beliefs and associations of prospective government employees has been disseminated.
+For nearly thirty years the federal employee security program has required a "national agency check" of the files of several government agencies, including the FBI, the Civil Service Commission, and military intelligence, on prospective employees.[46] Although there was often no information to report, federal agencies received "name check" reports on all candidates for employment. This appears to have been the single largest source of regular dissemination of data in intelligence files.
+These name check reports have provided information from intelligence files not only about possible criminal activity or personal weaknesses of the individual, but also about lawful political activity and association. Until recently the Executive Order on employee security required reports on any "association" with a person or group supporting "subversive" views. These reports have been required for every federal employee, regardless of whether he or she holds a sensitive position or has access to classified information.[47]
+It has been the policy of the FBI, and presumably other agencies as well, to disseminate via name check reports any information in its files -- no matter how old or how unreliable -which might relate to the standards of the Executive Order.[48] The current criteria have been substantially narrowed: the basic standards for reporting are group membership and potential criminal conduct.[49] However, the Justice Department has advised the FBI that "it is not possible to set definite parameters" for organizations and that the Bureau should include those with a "potential" for meeting the criteria.[50] The FBI does not determine whether or not the information it furnishes is decisive under these standards. Departmental instructions state:
+It is not the Bureau's responsibility to determine whether the information is or is not of importance to the particular agency in the carrying out of its current activities and responsibilities, and whether or not any action is taken by the department or agency is not, of course, a principal concern of the Bureau.[51]
+The FBI itself has expressed misgivings about the breadth of its responsibilities under the employee security program. It has continued to seek "clarification" from the Justice Department, and it has pointed out that there have been no "adverse actions" taken against current or prospective Federal employees under the loyalty and security provisions of the Executive Order "for several years." This has been due to the fact "that difficulties of proof imposed by the courts in loyalty and security cases have proved almost insurmountable."[52]
+The employee security program has served an essential function in full background investigation and name checks for those having access to classified information. But its extension to vaguely-defined "subversives" in nonsensitive positions has gone beyond the Government's proper need for information on the suitability of persons for employment.[53]
+<em>Subfinding (d)</em>
+The FBI, which has been the "clearinghouse" for all domestic intelligence data, maintains in readily accessible files sensitive and derogatory personal information not relevant to any investigation, as well as information which was improperly or illegally obtained.
+In recent years, the Secret Service, military intelligence, and other agencies have instituted significant programs for the destruction or purging of useless information.[54] However, the FBI has retained its vast general files, accumulated over the years under its duty to serve as a "clearinghouse" for domestic intelligence data.[55] There are over 6,500,000 files at FBI headquarters; and the data is retrievable through a general index consisting of over 58,000,000 index cards. Each Bureau Field Office has substantial additional information in its files. Domestic intelligence information included in the general index is described by the FBI as:
+associates and relatives of the subject; members of organizations under investigation or deter-mined to be possible subversive individuals contributing funds to subversive-type activity; subversive or seditious publications; writers of articles in. subversive or seditious publications - bookstores specializing in subversive-type publications and related types of information.[56]
+The Committee has found that there are massive amounts of irrelevant and trivial information in these files.[57] The FBI has kept such data in its filing system on the theory that they might he useful someday in the future to solve crimes, for employee background checks, to evaluate the reliability of the source, or to "answer questions or challenges" about the Bureau's conduct.[58]
+The FBI has recently issued instructions to its Field Offices to take greater care in recording domestic intelligence information in its files. They are to exercise "judgment" as to whether or not the activity is "pertinent" to the Bureau's "legitimate investigative interest." 11 Nevertheless, current policies still allow the indexing of the names of persons who are not the subject of investigation but just attend meetings of a group under investigation.[60]
+Finally, there is Information in FBI files which was collected by illegal or improper means. It ranges from the fruits of warrantless electronic surveillance, mail openings, and surreptitious entries, to the results of sweeping intelligence investigations which collected data about the lawful political activities and personal lives of Americans. Where such intelligence remain in the name-indexed files, it can be retrieved and disseminated along with other information, thus continuing indefinitely the potential for compounding the initial intrusion into constitutionally protected areas.
+[1] Richard Ober testimony, 10/28/75, pp. 67, 68.
+[2] Memorandum from Kevin Maroney, et al, to Attorney General Ramsey Clark, 12/6/67.
+[3] Clark, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 249. This statistic refers to criminal investigations as well as intelligence investigations.
+[4] See Part II, pp.[ 80. 95.
+[5] Statement of Attorney General Edward H. Levi before House Judiciary Committee, February 1975.
+[6] W. R. Wannall testimony, 10/3/75, p. 13.
+[6]  W. A. Branigan testimony, 10/24/75, Hearings, Vol. 4,1). 168.
+[7] GAO Report, p. 125.
+[8] DOD Directive 5200.27, 3/1/71.
+[9] For example, in 1966 before the FBI had received any specific instructions from the Attorney General to gather civil disturbance intelligence, Bureau Headquarters advised all Field Offices that "national, state, and local" government officials "rely on us" for information "so they can take appropriate action to avert disastrous outbreaks." Thus, FBI offices were told to "intensify and expand" their "coverage" of demonstrations opposing "United States foreign policy in Vietnam" or "Protests involving racial issues," in order to insure that "advance signs" of violence could be "disseminated to appropriate authorities." (SAC Letter 66-27, 5/2/66)
+[10] These policies were part of the formal obligation of the FBI under the 1949 Delimitation Agreement with military intelligence. The Agreement itself required the FBI to keep military intelligence agencies advised of the activities of "civilian groups" classed as "subversive." (Delimitation Agreement, 2/23/49.) And a Supplementary Agreement said, "Where there is doubt as to whether or not one of the other agencies is interested in information collected, it should be transmitted to the other agency." (Supplemental Agreement No. 1 to the Delimitation Agreement, 6/2/49.)
+[11] "Military Surveillance of Civilian Politics," Report of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (1973), p.[ 72.
+[12] The Agreements between the FBI and military intelligence have not been revised to take account of the restrictions on Army surveillance imposed by the Department of Defense in 1971. See DOD Directive 5200.27, 3/1/71.
+[13] Richard Ober, 10/28/75, pp. 67,68.
+[14] The FBI Manual stated that information concerning "proposed travel abroad" by domestic "subversives" was to be furnished to the CIA and the State Department, and Bureau Field Offices were told to recommend the "extent of foreign investigation" required. (FBI Manual of Instructions, Section 87, p.[ 33a, revised 4/15/63.)
+[15] For example, Reports on the ABM debate discussed on pp.[ 257-258.
+[16] Memorandum from D. W. Bacon to Director, FBI, 8/8/69.
+[17] FBI memorandum from D. J. Brennan, Jr., to W. C. Sullivan, 8/15/69.
+[18] SSS Bi-weekly Reports, 6/15/70; from Donald Bacon, 9/15/75 pp. 91-05.
+[19] SSS Bi-weekly Report, 8/29/69.
+[20] Former FBI liaison with CIA deposition, 9/22/75, pp. 16-17.
+[21] Former FBI liaison with CIA deposition, 9/22/75, pp. 16-17; Memorandum from Attorney General Tom Clark to J. Edgar Hoover, 12/5/47.
+[22] Memorandum from Tampa Meld Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/29/69.
+[23] Memorandum from Charlotte Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/10/70.
+[24] Letter from Acting Director, FBI, to Director, United States Secret Service, 5/25/72.
+[25] Memorandum from Detroit Field Office, to FBI Headquarters, 4/15/66.
+[26] Memorandum from Springfield Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/5/66.
+[27] Memorandum from Washington Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/28/69; memorandum from Alexandria Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/3/69.
+[28] Memorandum from Louisville Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 11/14/74, 11/15/74, 11/20/74.
+[29] Memorandum from Washington Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/28/74.
+[30] Memorandum from Legal Attache, Bonn, to FBI Headquarters, 1/11/72; memorandum from Boston Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/4/72.
+[31] See COINTELPRO report: Sec. IV, for examples of FBI dissemination to local police of data on trivial offenses for the purpose of disruption.
+[32] The FBI responds to such requests with "a blind memorandum" upon the condition that the Bureau's "identity as source of the information must be kept strictly confidential." Bureau regulations do not link this procedure to any specific criminal law enforcement function. (FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 5, p.[ 7.)
+[33] Testimony of James F. Ahern (former New Haven police chief), Robert diGrazia (Boston chief of police), and Patrick V. Murphy (former New York police commissioner and President of the Police Foundation), 1/20/76, p. 44, These experienced law enforcement officials stated that local police do not need information from the FBI about "political beliefs."
+[34] See CHAOS Report: Section III.
+[35] See IRS Report: Section, "SSS."
+[36] See IRS Report: Section, "Dissemination."
+[37] On at least one occasion, Justice Department officials expressed concern that they had received a report from the FBI on an incident and then a second report from Army intelligence which appeared to confirm the Bureau's information, but the Army's report turned out to have been based on the FBI's information. This led to a Justice Department request that the Army "screen" its intelligence and send "only key items." (Memorandum for the Record General Counsel Robert E. Jordan to Under Secretary of the Army David McGiffert, 1/10/68.)
+[38] Ahern, 1/20/76, p. 4.
+[39] The FBI had adhered across-the-board to the position that its reports do not contain "conclusions," and Bureau rules have permitted the dissemination of data from "sources known to be unreliable" so long as "good judgment" is used. It has been up to the recipient agencies "to intelligently evaluate the information" on the basis of "descriptive information" about the Bureau's sources. (FBI Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 5) Thus the FBI has not adequately distinguished between situations where evaluation is or is not necessary. More than just "descriptive information" about FBI sources is needed to help recipients of data on possible violent protest demonstration understand the likelihood of actual disorders.
+[40] See Part 11, p.[ 78.
+[41] The GAO has ranked the types of sources of information relied upon by the FBI in beginning domestic intelligence investigations according to whether the data initially supplied were "hard," "medium," or "soft." According to tile GAO, police and other state and local agencies were found to have provided tile lowest proportion of "hard" information and the highest proportion of "soft" information. (GAO Report, p.[ 106).
+[42] Two major cities have made efforts recently to establish standards for police intelligence activities. (Los Angeles Police Department, Public Disorder Intelligence Division: Standards and Procedures, 4/10/75; New York City Police Department. Procedures: Public Security Activities of the Intelligence Division, House Internal Security Committee, Hearings, Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes, 1974.)
+[43] The FBI Manual cited the needs of the military as a basis for its intelligencegathering on "general racial matters." The Manual stated that the Bureau did not itself have "investigative jurisdiction over such general racial matters," but that its "intelligence function" included advising "appropriate Government agencies" of information about "proposed or actual activities of individuals, officials, committees, legislatures, organizations, etc., in the racial field." The Manual based "Federal jurisdiction" on the military's responsibility:
+"Insofar as Federal jurisdiction in general racial matters is concerned, U.S. Army regulations place responsibility upon the Army to keep advised of any developments of a civil disturbance nature which may require the rendering of assistance to civil authorities or the intervention of federal troops. OSI (Air Force) and ONI (Navy) have a collateral responsibility under Army in such matters and copies of pertinent documents disseminated to Army concerning such matters should be furnished to OSI and ONI." (1960 FBI Manual Section 122, pp. 5-6)
+[44] For example, in addition to containing the names of known activists, the IDIU printouts supplied to IRS's SSS also contained the names of many prominent citizens whom the Justice Department thought could be of assistance in quelling a civil disturbance in a particular locality should one occur. SSS personnel were unaware that the IDIU printout contained the names of these persons and established files indiscriminately on them.
+[45] Attorney General Clark to Maroney, et al, 11/9/67.
+[46] Executive Order 10450, Section 3 (a). For a discussion of the origins and application of this order, pp.[ 4244.
+[47] Executive Order 10450, Section 8 (a) (5).
+[48] Memorandum from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 3/3/76.
+[49] The current criteria are: "Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in, any foreign or domestic organization, association movement, group, or combination of persons (hereinafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State, or which seeks to overthrow the Government of the United States or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means." (Executive Order 11785, Section 3, June 4, 1974.) This order also abolished the "Attorney General's list."
+[50] memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Glen E. Pommerening to FBI Director Clarence Kelley, 11/1/74.
+[51] Letter from Attorney General Tom Clark to J. Edgar Hoover, 12/5/47. The FBI advises that it considers this directive still to be in effect. (Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 3/3/76.)
+[52] Letter from Kelley to Pommerening, 12/11/74. The FBI has advised that federal employees are now evaluated according to "suitability" rather than "loyalty and security" criteria. (Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 3/3/76.)
+[53] According to a 1974 Bureau memorandum and a confirming Justice Department memorandum, the purpose is to provide "information concerning possible subversive infiltration into the Executive Branch of Government." (Kelley to Pommerening, 8/14/74; Pommerening to Kelley, 8/26/74.) As indicated in the Committee's finding on overbreadth, the concept "subversion" is so vague and flexible as to invite excesses.
+[54] Secret Service practices are described in Review of Secret Service Protective Measures, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), p. 16. Destruction of Army intelligence files is discussed in Report on Military Surveillance.
+[55] For a discussion or the origins of this function, see p.[ 23.
+[56] Memorandum from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 5/22/75.
+[57] Current FBI policies modify past practice with respect to the indexing of unsolicited allegations, including those of "a personal nature," not requiring "investigative action." The Bureau no longer includes in its name index the name of the person about whom the information is volunteered where the Bureau has "no legitimate investigative interest." In the case of an unsolicited letter, for example, the name of the sender only is included in the index. The letter itself is also retained so the FBI "can retrieve" it via the index reference to the sender "should an occasion arise in the future when we need to refer back to it." (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 11/10/75.)
+[58] Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 7/21/75. This memorandum states that the Bureau has adopted, under regulations of the National Archives, a program for destroying files which "no longer have contemporary value." The FBI has not included within this program most of the investigative and intelligence information in its files dating back as far as 1939.
+[59] Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 1/27/76. The Field Offices were given the following specific guidance:
+"For example, the statement of a local leader of the Ku Klux Klan in which he advocates regular attendance at church would be merely an exercise of his right to free speech and, hence, maintenance of such a record would be prohibited. On the other hand, should this same individual stand up before a gathering and advocate the use of violence in furthering the organization's objectives, this obviously would be pertinent to our investigation."
+Bureau headquarters recognized that these were "extreme" examples and that "Problems" were created in "those instances which are in the middle and which are not so clear." Thus, FBI agents were encouraged to consult Headquarters "to resolve any question concerning a specific problem."
+[60] One Field Office has described regular Bureau procedures as follows:
+"[Our] informants, after attending meetings of these organizations [under investigation], usually submit reports in which they describe briefly the activities and discussions which took place as well as listing those members and non members in attendance at such meetings. Copies of these informant reports are disseminated to various individuals' files <em>and the names of those in attendance where no individuals file exists, are indexed</em> to the organization's file." (Memorandum from SAC to FBI Headquarters, 12/1/75). [Emphasis added.]
+FBI headquarters did not indicate that this practice was outside the "scope" of authorized "law enforcement activity." It is considered "pertinent" to the investigation "to maintain records concerning membership, public utterings, and/or other activities" of an organization under investigation. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs, 1/27/76.)
+** G. Deficiencies in Control and Accountability
+<center>
+MAJOR FINDING
+</center>
+The Committee finds that those responsible for overseeing, supervising, and controlling domestic activities of the intelligence community, although often unaware of details of the excesses described in this report, made those excesses possible by delegating broad authority without establishing adequate guidelines and procedural checks; by failing to monitor and coordinate sufficiently the activities of the agencies under their charge; by failing to inquire further after receiving indications that improper activities may have been occurring; by exhibiting a reluctance to know about secret details of programs; and sometimes by requesting intelligence agencies to engage in questionable practices. On numerous occasions, intelligence agencies have, by concealment, misrepresentation, or partial disclosure, hidden improper activities from those to whom they owed a duty of disclosure. But such deceit and the improper practices which it concealed would not have been possible to such a degree if senior officials of the Executive Branch and Congress had clearly allocated responsibility and imposed requirements for reporting and obtaining prior approval for activities, and had insisted on adherence to those requirements.
+<em>Subfindings</em>
+(a) Presidents have given intelligence agencies firm orders to collect information concerning "subversive activities" of American citizens, but have failed until recently to define the limits of domestic intelligence, to provide safeguards for the rights of American citizens, or to coordinate and control the ever-expanding intelligence efforts by an increasing number of agencies.
+(b) Attorneys General have permitted and even encouraged the FBI to engage in domestic intelligence activities and to use a wide range of intrusive investigative techniques -- such as wiretaps, microphones, and informants -- but have failed until recently to supervise or establish limits on these activities or techniques by issuing adequate safeguards, guidelines, or procedures for review.
+(c) Presidents, White House officials, and Attorneys General have requested and received domestic political intelligence, thereby contributing to and profiting from the abuses of domestic intelligence and setting a bad example for their subordinates.
+(d) Presidents, Attorneys General, and other Cabinet officers have neglected until recently to make inquiries in the face of clear indications that intelligence agencies were engaging in improper domestic activities.
+(e) Congress, which has the authority to place restraints on domestic intelligence activities through legislation, appropriations, and oversight committees, has not effectively asserted its responsibilities until recently. It has failed to define the scope of domestic intelligence activities or intelligence collection techniques, to uncover excesses, or to propose legislative solutions. Some of its members have failed to object to improper activities of which they were aware and have prodded agencies into questionable activities.
+(f) Intelligence agencies have often undertaken programs without authorization with insufficient authorization, or in disregard of express orders.
+(g) The weakness of the system of accountability and control can be seen in the fact that many illegal or abusive domestic intelligence operations were terminated only after they had been exposed or threatened with exposure by Congress or the news media.
+<em>Elaboration of Findings</em>
+The Committee has found excesses committed by intelligence agencies -- lawless and improper behavior, intervention in the democratic process, overbroad intelligence targeting and collection, and the use of covert techniques to discredit and "neutralize" persons and groups defined as enemies by the agencies. But responsibility for those acts does not fall solely on the intelligence agencies which committed them. Systematic excesses would not have occurred if lines of authority had been clearly defined; if procedures for reporting and review had been established; and if those responsible for supervising the intelligence community had properly discharged their duties.
+The pressure of events and the widespread confidence in the FBI help to explain the deficiencies in command and authorization discovered by the Committee. Most of the activities examined in this report occurred during periods of foreign or domestic crisis. There was substantial support from the public and all branches of government for some of the central objectives of domestic intelligence policy, including the search for "Fifth Columnists" before World War II; the desire to identify communist "influence" in the Cold War atmosphere of the 1950s; the demand for action against Klan violence in the early 1960s; and the reaction to violent racial disturbances and anti-Vietnam war activities in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It was in this heated environment that President and Attorneys General ordered the FBI to investigate "subversive activities". Further, the Bureau's reputation for effectiveness and professionalism, and Director Hoover's ability to cultivate political support and to inspire apprehension, played a significant role in shaping the relationship between the FBI and the rest of the Government.
+With only a few exceptions, the domestic intelligence activities reviewed by the Committee were properly authorized within the intelligence agencies. The FBI epitomizes a smoothly functioning military structure: activities of agents are closedly supervised; programs are authorized only after they have traveled a well-defined bureaucratic circuit; and virtually all activities -- ranging from high-level policy considerations to the minutia of daily reports from field agencies -- are reduced to writing. These characteristics are commendable. All efficient law enforcement and intelligence-gathering machine, acting consistently with law, can greatly benefit the nation. However, when used for wrongful purposes, this efficiency can pose a grave danger.
+It appears that many specific abuses were not known by the Attorney General, the President, or other Cabinet-level officials directly responsible for supervising domestic intelligence activities. But whether or not particular activities were authorized by a President or Attorney General, those individuals must -- as the chief executive and the principal law enforcement officer of the United States Government -- bear ultimate responsibility for the activities of executive agencies under their command. The President and his Cabinet officers have a duty to determine the nature of activities engaged in by executive agencies and to prevent undesired activities from taking place. This duty is particularly compelling when responsible officials have reason to believe that undesirable activity is occurring, as has often been the case in the context of domestic intelligence.
+The Committee's inquiry has revealed a pattern of reckless disregard of activities that threatened our Constitutional system. Intelligence agencies were ordered to investigate "subversive activities," and were then usually left to determine for themselves which activities were "subversive" and how those activities should be investigated. Intelligence agencies were told they could use investigative techniques -- wiretaps, microphones, informants -- that permitted them to pry into the most valued areas of privacy and were then given in many cases the unregulated authority to determine when to use those techniques and how long to continue them. Intelligence agencies were encouraged to gather "pure intelligence," which was put to political use by public officials outside of those agencies. This was possibly because Congress had failed to pass laws limiting the areas into which intelligence agencies could legally inquire and the information they could disseminate.
+Improper acts were often intentionally concealed from the Government officials responsible for supervising the intelligence agencies, or undertaken without express authority. Such behavior is inexcusable. But equally inexcusable is the absence of executive and congressional oversight that engendered an atmosphere in which the heads of those agencies believed they could conceal activities from their superiors. Attorney General Levi's recent guidelines and the recommendations of this Committee are intended to provide the necessary guidance.
+Whether or not the responsible Government officials knew about improper intelligence activities, and even if the agency heads failed in their duty of full disclosure, it still follows that Presidents and the appropriate Cabinet officials should have known about those activities. This is a demanding standard, but one that must be imposed. The future of democracy rests upon such accountability.
+<em>Subfinding (a)</em>
+Presidents have given intelligence agencies firm orders to collect information concerning "subversive activities" of American citizens, but have failed until recently to define the limits of domestic intelligence, to provide safeguards for the rights of American citizens, or to coordinate and control the ever-expanding intelligence efforts by an increasing number of agencies.
+As emphasized throughout this report, domestic intelligence activities have been undertaken pursuant to mandates from the Executive branch, generally issued during times of war or domestic crisis. The directives of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower to investigate "subversive activities," or other equally ill-defined targets, were echoed in various orders from Attorneys General, who themselves encouraged the FBI to undertake domestic intelligence activities with vague but vigorous commands.
+Neither Presidents nor their chief legal officers, the Attorneys General, have defined the "subversive activities" which may be investigated or provided guidelines to the agencies in determining which individuals or groups were engaging in those activities. No reporting procedures were established to enable Cabinet-level officials or their designees to review the types of targets of domestic investigations and to exercise independent judgment concerning whether such investigations were warranted. No mechanisms were established for monitoring the conduct of domestic investigations or for determining if and when they should be terminated. If Presidents had articulated standards in these areas, or had designated someone to do the job for them, it is possible that many of the abuses described in this report would not have occurred.
+Considering the proliferation of agencies engaging in domestic intelligence and the overlapping jurisdictional lines, it is surprising that no President has successfully designated one individual or body to coordinate and supervise the domestic intelligence activities of the various agencies. The half-hearted steps that were taken in that direction appear either to have been abandoned or to have resulted in the concentration of even more power in individual agency heads. For example, in 1949 President Truman attempted to establish a control mechanism -- the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference -- to centralize authority for supervising domestic intelligence activities of the FBI and military intelligence agencies in a committee chaired by the Director of the FBI. The Committee reported to the National Security Council, and an NSC staff member was assigned responsibility for internal security.[1] The practical effect of the IIC was apparently to increase the power of the FBI Director and to remove control further from the Cabinet level. In 1962, the functions of the IIC were transferred to the Justice Department, and the Attorney General was put in nominal charge of domestic intelligence.[2] While in theory supervision resided in the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department, that Division deferred in large part to the FBI and provided little oversight.[3] The top two executives of the Internal Security Division were former FBI officials. They appeared sympathetic to the Bureau, and like the Bureau, emphasized threats of Communist "influence" without mentioning actual results.[4]
+Another opportunity to coordinate intelligence collection was missed in 1967, when Attorney General Ramsey Clark established the Interdivisional Intelligence Unit (IDIU) to draw on virtually the entire Federal Government's intelligence collecting capability for information concerning groups and individuals "who may play a role, whether purposefully or not, either in instigating or spreading civil disorders, or in preventing or checking them."[5] In the rush to obtain intelligence, no efforts were made to formulate standards or guidelines for controlling how the intelligence would be collected. In the absence of such guidelines and under pressure for results, the agencies undertook some of the most overly broad programs encountered by the Committee. For example, the FBI's "ghetto" informant program was a direct response to the Attorney General's broad requests for intelligence.
+The need for centralized control of domestic intelligence was again given serious consideration during the vigorous demonstrations against the war in Vietnam in 1970. The intelligence community's program for dealing with internal dissent -- the Huston Plan -envisioned not only relaxing controls on surveillance techniques, but also coordinating intelligence collection efforts. According to Tom Charles Huston's testimony, the President viewed the suggestion of a coordinating body as the most important contribution of the plan.[8] Although the President quickly revoked his approval for the Huston Plan, the idea of a central domestic intelligence body had taken root. Two months later, with the encouragement of Attorney General John Mitchell, the Intelligence Evaluation Committee was established in the Justice Department. That Committee, like its precursor, the IDIU, compiled and evaluated raw intelligence; it did not exercise supervision.[9]
+The growing sophistication of intelligence collection techniques underscores the present need for central control and coordination of domestic intelligence activities. Although the Executive Branch has recognized that need in the past, it has not, until recently, faced up to its responsibilities. President Gerald Ford's joint effort with members of Congress to place further restrictions on wiretaps is a welcome step in the right direction. Congress must act expeditiously in this area.
+<em>Subfinding (b)</em>
+Attorneys General have permitted and even encouraged the FBI to engage in domestic intelligence activities and to use a wide range of intrusive investigative techniques -- such as wiretaps, microphones, and informants -- but have failed until recently to supervise or establish limits on these activities or techniques by issuing adequate safeguards, guidelines, or procedures for review.
+The Attorney General is the chief law enforcement officer of the United States and the Cabinet-level officer formally in charge of the FBI.[10] The Justice Department, until recently, has failed to issue directives to the FBI articulating the grounds for opening domestic intelligence investigations or the standards to be followed in carrying out those investigations. The Justice Department has neglected to establish machinery for monitoring and supervising the conduct of FBI investigations, for requiring approval of major investigative decisions, and for determining when an investigation should be terminated. Indeed, in 1972 the Attorney General said he did not even know whether the FBI itself bad formulated guidelines and standards for domestic intelligence activities, was not aware of the FBI's manual of instructions, and had never reviewed the FBI's internal guidelines.[11]
+The Justice Department has frequently levied specific demands on the FBI for domestic intelligence, but has not accompanied these demands with restrictions or guidelines. Examples include the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division's requests for reports on demonstrations in the early 1960's (including coverage of a speech by Governor elect George Wallace 11a and coverage of a civil rights demonstration on the 100th anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation 12 ): Attorney General Kennedy's efforts to expand FBI infiltration of the Ku Klux Klan in 1964;[13] Attorney General Clark's sweeping instructions to collect intelligence about civil disorders in 1967;[14] and the Internal Security Division's request for more extensive investigations of campus demonstrations in 1969.[15] While a limited investigation into some of these areas may have been warranted, the improper acts committed in the course of those investigations were possible because no restraints had been imposed.
+The Justice Department also cooperated with the FBI in defying the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 by approving the Bureau's Security Index criteria for the investigation of "potentially dangerous" persons.[16] Even after Congress repealed the Detention Act, the Justice Department allowed the Bureau to continue listing "potentially dangerous" persons on a new Administrative Index. The Department stopped reviewing the names on the FBI's index, and apparently endorsed the FBI's view that the list could, contrary to law, be used for detention purposes in an "emergency."
+The FBI's autonomy has been a prominent and long-accepted feature of the Federal bureaucratic terrain. As early as the 1940s the FBI could oppose Justice Department inquiries into its internal affairs by raising the specter of "leaks."[17] The Department acquiesced in the Bureau's claim that it was entitled to withhold its raw files, conceal the identities of informants, and, in a number of cases, refuse to give the Justice Department evidence supporting broad allegations and characterizations. Former Attorney General Katzenbach has pointed out that there were both positive and negative sides to the Bureau's autonomy:
+Keeping the Bureau free from political interference was a powerful argument against efforts by politically appointed officials, whatever their motivations, to gain a greater measure of control over operations of the Bureau.... [Director Hoover also] found great value in his formal position as subordinate to the Attorney General and the fact that the FBI was a part of the Department of Justice.... In effect, he was uniquely successful in having it both ways; he was protected from public criticism by having a theoretical superior who took responsibility for his work, and was protected from his superior by his public reputation.[18]
+As a consequence of its autonomy, the Bureau could plan and implement many of the abusive operations described in this report. Former Attorneys General have told the Committee that they would never have permitted the more unsavory aspects of the New Left or Racial COINTELPROs if they had been aware of the Bureau's plans. To the extent that Attorneys General were ignorant of the Bureau's activities, it was the consequence not only of the FBI Director's independent political position, but also of the failure of the Attorneys General to establish procedures for finding out what the Bureau was doing and for permitting an atmosphere to evolve in which Bureau officials believed that they had no duty to report their activities to the Justice Department, and that they could conceal those activities with little risk of exposure.[20]
+Attorneys General have not only neglected to establish procedures for reviewing FBI programs and activities, but they have at the same time granted the FBI authority to employ highly intrusive investigative techniques with inadequate guidelines and review procedures, and in some instances with no external restraints whatsoever. Before 1965, wiretaps required the approval of the Attorney General in advance, but once the Attorney General had authorized wiretap coverage of a subject, the Bureau could continue the surveillance for as long as it judged necessary.
+This permissive policy was current in October 1963 when Attorney General Robert Kennedy authorized the FBI to wiretap the phones of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. "at his current address or at any future address to which he may move" and to wiretap the New York and Atlanta SCLC offices.[21] Reading the Attorney General's wiretap authorization broadly, the FBI construed Dr. King's "residence" so as to permit wiretaps on three\, of his hotel rooms and the homes of friends with whom he stayed temporarily.[22] The FBI was still relying on Attorney General Kennedy's initial authorization when it sought reauthorization for the King wiretaps in April 1965 in response to new procedures formulated by Attorney General Katzenbach. Although Attorney General Kennedy's authorizing memorandum in October 1963 said that the FBI should provide him with an evaluation of the wiretaps after 60 days, he failed to complain when the FBI neglected to send him the evaluation. Apparently the Attorney General never mentioned the wiretaps to the FBI again, even though he received FBI reports from the wiretaps until he resigned in September, 1964.[23]
+The Justice Department's policy toward the use of microphones has been even more permissive than for wiretaps. Until 1965, the FBI was free to carry out microphone surveillance in national security cases without first seeking the approval of the Attorney General or notifying him afterward. The total absence of supervision enabled the FBI to hide microphones in Dr. Martin Luther King's hotel rooms for nearly two years for the express purpose of not only determining whether he was being influenced by allegedly communist advisers. but to "attempt" to obtain information about the private "activities of Dr. King and his associates" so that Dr. King could be "completely discredited."[21] Attorney General Kennedy was apparently never told about the microphone surveillances of Dr. King, although he did receive reports containing unattributed information from that surveillance from which he might have concluded that microphones were the source.[25]
+The Justice Department imposed external control over microphones for the first time in March 1965, when Attorney General Katzenbach applied the same procedures to wiretaps and microphones, requiring not only prior authorization but also formal periodic review.[26] But irregularities were tolerated even with this standard. For example, the FBI has provided the Committee three memoranda from Director Hoover, initialed by Attorney General Katzenbach, as evidence that it informed the Justice Department of its microphone surveillance of Dr. King after the March 1965 policy change. These documents, however, show that Katzenbach was informed about the microphones only after they had already been installed.[27] Such after-the-fact approval was permitted under Katzenbach's procedures.[27] There is no indication that Katzenbach inquired further after receiving the notice.[28]
+The Justice Department condoned, and often encouraged, the FBI's use of informants -- the investigative technique with the highest potential for abuse. However, the Justice Department imposed no restrictions on informant activity or reporting, and established no procedures for reviewing the Bureau's decision to use informants in a particular case.
+In 1954 the Justice Department entered into an agreement with the CIA in which the CIA was permitted to withhold the names of employees whom it had determined were "almost certainly guilty of violations of criminal statutes" when the CIA could "devise no charge" under which they could be prosecuted that would not "require revelation of highly classified information."[29] This practice was terminated by the Justice Department in January, 1975.[29]
+Despite the failure of Attorneys General to exercise the supervision that is necessary in the area of domestic intelligence, several Attorneys General have taken steps in the right direction. Of note were Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach's review procedures for electronic surveillance in 1965; Ramsey Clark's refusal to approve electronic surveillance of domestic intelligence targets and his rejection of repeated requests by the FBI for such surveillance; Acting Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus' inquiries into the Bureau's domestic intelligence program; Deputy Attorney General Laurence Silberman's inquiry into political abuses of the FBI in early 1975; and Attorney General Saxbe's decision to make the Justice Department's COINTELPRO report public.
+During the past year, Attorney General Edward H. Levi has exercised welcome leadership by formulating guidelines for FBI investigations; developing legislative proposals requiring a judicial warrant for national security wiretaps and microphones; establishing the Office of Professional Responsibility to inquire into departmental misconduct; initiating investigations of alleged wrongdoing by the FBI; and cooperating with this Committee's requests for documents on FBI intelligence operations.[30] The Justice Department's concern in recent years is a hopeful sign, but long overdue.
+<em>Subfinding (c)</em>
+Presidents, White House officials, and Attorneys General have requested and received domestic political intelligence, thereby contributing to and profiting from the abuses of domestic intelligence and setting a bad example for their subordinates.
+The separate finding on "political abuse" sets forth instances in which the FBI was used by White House officials to gather politically useful information, including data on administration opponents and critics. This misuse of the Bureau's powers by its political superiors necessarily contributed to the atmosphere in which abuses flourished.
+If the Bureau's superiors were willing to accept the fruits of excessive intelligence gathering, to authorize electronic surveillance, for political purposes, and to receive reports on critics which included intimate details of their personal lives, they could not credibly hold the Bureau to a high ethical standard. If political expediency characterized the decisions of those expected to set limits on the Bureau's conduct, it is not surprising that the FBI considered the principle of expediency endorsed.
+<em>Subfinding (d)</em>
+Presidents, Attorneys General, and other cabinet officers have neglected, until recently, to make inquiries in the face of clear indications that intelligence agencies were engaging in improper domestic activities.
+Executive branch officials contributed to an atmosphere in which excesses were possible by ignoring clear indications of excesses and failing to take corrective measures when directly confronted with improper behavior. The Committee's findings on "Violating and Ignoring the Law" illustrate that several questionable or illegal programs continued after higher officials had learned partial details and failed to ask for additional information, either out of the naive assumption that intelligence agencies would not engage in lawless conduct, or because they preferred not to be informed.[31]
+Some of the most disturbing examples of insufficient action in the face of clear danger signals were uncovered in the Committee's investigation of the FBI's program to "neutralize" Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. as the leader of the civil rights movement. The Bureau informed the Committee that its files contain no evidence that any officials outside of the FBI "were specifically aware of any efforts, steps, or plans or proposals to 'discredit' or 'neutralize' King."[32] The relevant executive branch officials have told the Committee that they were, unaware of a general Bureau program to discredit King. Former Attorney General Katzenbach, however, told the Committee:
+Nobody in the Department of Justice connected with Civil Rights could possibly have been unaware of Mr. Hoover's feelings [against Dr. King]. Nobody could have been unaware of the potential for disaster which those feelings embodied. But, given the realities of the situation, I do not believe one could have anticipated the extremes to which it was apparently carried.[34]
+The evidence before the Committee confirms that the "potential for disaster" was indeed clear at the time. There is no question that officials in the White House and Justice Department, including President Johnson and Attorney General Katzenbach, knew that the Bureau was taking steps to discredit Dr. King, although they did not know the full extent of the Bureau's efforts.
+- - In January 1964 the FBI gave Presidential Assistant Walter Jenkins an FBI report unfavorable to Dr. King. According to a contemporaneous FBI memorandum, Jenkins said that he "was of the opinion that the FBI could perform a good service to the country if this matter could somehow be confidentially given to members of the press." Jenkins, in a staff interview, denied having made such a suggestion.[35]
+- - In February 1964 a reporter informed the Justice Department that the FBI had offered to "leak" information unfavorable to Dr. King to the press. The Justice Department's Press Chief, Edwin Guthman, asked Cartha DeLoach, the FBI's liaison with the press, about this allegation and DeLoach denied any involvement. The Justice Department took no further action.[36]
+- - Bill Moyers, an Assistant to President Johnson, testified that he learned sometime in early 1964 that an FBI agent twice offered to play a tape recording for Walter Jenkins that would have been personally embarrassing to Dr. King and that Jenkins refused to listen to the tape on both occasions.[36] Moyers testified that he never asked the FBI why it had the tape or was offering to play it in the White House.[37] When asked if he had ever questioned the propriety of the FBI's disseminating information of a personal nature about Dr. King within the Government, he replied, "I never questioned it, no." When he was asked if he could recall anyone in the White House ever questioning the propriety of the FBI disseminating this type of material, Moyers testified. "I think . . . there were comments that tended to ridicule the FBI's doing this, but no."[38]
+- - Burke Marshall, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division, testified that sometime in 1964 a reporter told him that the Bureau had offered information unfavorable to Dr. King. Marshall testified that he repeated this allegation to a Bureau official and asked for a report. The Bureau official subsequently informed him "The Director wants you to know that you're a . . . damned liar."[39]
+- - In November 1964 the Washington Bureau Chief of a national news publication told Attorney General Katzenbach and Assistant Attorney General Marshall that one of his reporters had been approached by the FBI and offered the opportunity to hear some "interesting" tape recordings involving Dr. King. Katzenbach testified that, he had been "shocked," and that he and Marshall had informed President Johnson, who "took the matter very seriously" and promised to contact Director Hoover.[40] Neither Marshall nor Katzenbach knew if the President contacted Hoover.[41] Katzenbach testified that, during this same period, he learned of at least one other reporter who had been offered tape recordings by the Bureau, and that he personally confronted DeLoach, who was reported to have made the offers.[42] DeLoach told Katzenbach that be had never made such offers.[43] The only record of this episode in FBI files is a memorandum by DeLoach stating that Moyers had informed him that the newsman was "telling all over town" that the FBI was making allegations concerning Dr. King, and that Moyers had "stated that the President felt that [the newsman] lacked integrity...."[44] Moyers could not recall this episode, but told the Committee that it would be fair to conclude that the President had been upset by the fact that the newsman revealed the Bureau's conduct rather than by the Bureau's conduct itself.[45]
+The response of top White House and Justice Department officials to strong indications of wrongdoing by the FBI was clearly inadequate. The Attorney General went no further than complaining to the President and asking a Bureau official if the charges were true. President Johnson apparently not only failed to order the Bureau to stop, but indeed warned it not to deal with certain reporters because they had complained about the Bureau's improper conduct.
+In 1968 Attorney General Ramsey Clark asked Director Hoover if he had "any information as to how" facts about Attorney General Kennedy's authorization of the wiretap on Dr. King had leaked to columnists Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson. Clark requested the FBI Director to "undertake whatever investigation you deem feasible to determine how this happened.[45] Director Hoover's reply, drafted in the office of Cartha DeLoach, expressed "dismay" at the leak and offered no indication of the likely source.[45]
+In fact, DeLoach had prepared a memorandum ten days earlier stating that a middle-level Justice Department official with knowledge of the King wiretap met with him and admitted having "discussed this matter with Drew Pearson." According to this memorandum, DeLoach attempted to persuade the official not to allow the story to be printed because "certain Negro groups would still blame the FBI, whether we were ordered to take such action or not."[45] Thus, DeLoach and Hoover deliberately misled Attorney General Clark by withholding their knowledge of the source of the "leak."
+<em>Subfinding (e)</em>
+Congress, which has the authority to place restraints on domestic intelligence activities through legislation, appropriations, and oversight committees, has not effectively asserted its responsibilities until recently. It has failed to define the scope of domestic intelligence activities or intelligence collection techniques, to uncover excesses, or to propose legislative solutions. Some of its members have failed to object to improper activities of which they were aware and have prodded agencies into questionable activities.
+Congress, unlike the Executive branch, does not have the function of supervising the dayto-day activities of agencies engaged in domestic intelligence. Congress does, however, have the ability through legislation to affect almost every aspect of domestic intelligence activity: to erect the framework for coordinating domestic intelligence activities; to define and limit the types of activities in which executive agencies may engage; to establish the standards for conducting investigations; and to promulgate guidelines for controlling the use of wiretaps, microphones, and informants. Congress could also exercise a great influence over domestic intelligence through its power over the appropriations for intelligence agencies' budgets and through the investigative powers of its committees.
+Congress has failed to establish precise standards governing domestic intelligence. No congressional statutes deal with the authority of executive agencies to conduct domestic intelligence operations, or instruct the executive in how to structure and supervise those operations. No statutes address when or under what conditions investigations may be conducted. Congress did not attempt to formulate standards for wiretaps or microphones until 1968, and even then avoided the issue of domestic intelligence wiretaps by allowing an exception for an undefined claim of inherent executive power to conduct domestic security surveillance, which was subsequently held unconstitutional.[45] No legislative standards have been enacted to govern the use of informants.
+Congress has helped shape the environment in which improper intelligence activities were possible. The FBI claims that sweeping provisions in several vague criminal statutes and regulatory measures enacted by Congress provide a basis for much of its domestic intelligence activity.[45] Congress also added its voice to the strong consensus in favor of governmental action against Communism in the 1950's and domestic dissidents in the 1960's and 1970's.
+Congress' failure to define intelligence functions has invited action by the executive. If the top officials of the executive branch are responsible for failing to control the intelligence agencies, that failure is in part due to a lack of guidance from Congress.
+During most of the 40-year period covered in this report, congressional committees did not effectively monitor domestic intelligence activities. For example, in 1966, a Senate Judiciary subcommittee undertook an investigation of electronic surveillance and other intrusive techniques by Federal agencies. According to an FBI memorandum, its chairman told a delegation from the FBI that he would make "a commitment that he would in no way embarrass the FBI," and acceded in the FBI's request that the subcommittee refrain from calling FBI witnesses.[46]
+Another example of the deficiencies in congressional oversight is seen in the House Appropriations Committee's regular approval of the FBI's requests for appropriations without raising objections to the activities described in the Director's testimony and off-the- record briefings. There is no question that members of a House Appropriations subcommittee were aware not only that the Bureau was engaged in broad domestic intelligence investigations, but that it was also employing disruptive tactics against domestic targets.
+In 1958, Director Hoover informed the subcommittee that the Bureau had an "intensive program" to "disorganize and disrupt" the Communist Party, that the program had existed "for years" and that Bureau informants were used "as a disruptive tactic."[47] The next year, the Director informed the subcommittee that informants in 12 field offices
+have been carefully briefed to engage in controversial discussions with the Communist Party so as to promote dissention, factionalism and defections from the communist cause. This technique has been extremely successful from a disruptive standpoint.
+Under another phase of this program, we have carefully selected 28 items of anticommunist propaganda and have anonymously mailed it to selected communists, carefully concealing the identity of the FBI as its source. More than 2,800 copies of literature have been placed in the hands of active communists.[48]
+Hoover described more aggressive "psychological warfare" techniques in 1962:
+During the past year we have caused disruption at large Party meetings, rallies and press conferences through various techniques such as causing the last-minute cancellation of the rental of the hall, packing the audience with anticommunists, arranging adverse publicity in the press and making available embarrassing questions for friendly reporters to ask the Communist Party functionaries.
+The Appropriations subcommittee was also told during this briefing that the FBI's operations included exposing and discrediting "communists who are secretly operating in legitimate organizations and employments, such as the Young Men's Christian Association, Boy Scouts, civic groups, and the like."[49]
+In 1966 Director Hoover informed the Appropriations subcommittee that the disruptive program had been extended to the Ku Klux Klan.[50]
+The present Associate Director of the FBI, Nicholas Callahan, who accompanied Director Hoover during several of his appearances before the Appropriations subcommittee, said that members of the subcommittee made "no critical comment" about "the Bureau's efforts to neutralize groups and associations."[51]
+Subcommittee Chairman John Rooney's statements in a televised interview in 1971 regarding FBI briefings about Dr. Martin Luther King are indicative of the subcommittee's attitude toward the Bureau:
+Representative ROONEY. Now you talk about the F.B.I. leaking something about Martin Luther King. I happen to know all about Martin Luther King, but I have never told anybody.
+Interviewer. How do you know everything about Martin Luther King?
+Representative ROONEY. From the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
+Interviewer. They've told you -- gave you information based on taps or other sources about Martin Luther King.
+Representative ROONEY. They did.
+Interviewer. Is that proper?
+Representative ROONEY. Why not? 52
+Former Assistant Attorney General Fred Vinson recalled that in 1967 the Justice Department averaged "fifty letters a week from Congress" demanding that "people like [Stokely] Carmichael be jailed." Vinson said that on one occasion when he was explaining First Amendment limits at a congressional hearing, a Congressman "got so provoked he raised his hand and said, 'to hell with the First Amendment."' Vinson testified that these incidents fairly characterized "the atmosphere of the time."[53]
+The congressional performance has improved, however, in recent years. Subcommittees of the Senate Judiciary Committee have initiated inquiries into Army surveillance of domestic targets and into electronic surveillance by the FBI. House Judiciary Committee subcommittees commissioned a study of the FBI by the General Accounting Office and have inquired into FBI misconduct and surveillance activities. Concurrent with this Committee's investigations, the House Select Committee on Intelligence considered FBI domestic intelligence activities.
+Our Constitution envisions Congress as a check on the Executive branch, and gives Congress certain powers for discharging that function. Until recently, Congress has not effectively fulfilled its constitutional role in the area of domestic intelligence. Although the appropriate congressional committees did not always know what intelligence agencies were, doing, they could have asked. The Appropriations subcommittee was aware that the FBI was engaging in activities far beyond the mere collection of intelligence, yet it did not inquire into the details of those programs.[54] If Congress had addressed the issues of domestic intelligence and passed regulatory legislation, and if it had probed into the activities of intelligence agencies and required them to account for their deeds, many of the excesses in this Report might not have occurred.
+<em>Subfinding (f)</em>
+Intelligence agencies have often undertaken programs without authorization, with insufficient authorization, or in defiance of express orders.
+The excesses detailed in this report were due in part to the failure of Congress and the Executive branch to erect a sound framework for domestic intelligence, and in part to the dereliction of responsibility by executive branch officials who were in charge of individual agencies. Yet substantial responsibility lies with officials of the intelligence agencies themselves. They had no justification for initiating major activities without first seeking the express approval of their superiors. The pattern of concealment and partial and misleading disclosures must never again be allowed to occur.
+The Committee's investigations have revealed numerous instances in which intelligence agencies have assumed programs or activities were authorized under circumstances where it could not reasonably be inferred that higher officials intended to confer authorization. Sometimes far-reaching domestic programs were initiated without the knowledge or approval of the appropriate official outside of the agencies. Sometimes it was claimed that higher officials had been "notified" of a program after they had been informed only about some aspects of the program, or after the program had been described with vague references and euphemisms, such as "neutralize," that carried different meanings for agency personnel than for uninitiated outsiders. Sometimes notice consisted of references to programs buried in the details of lengthy memoranda; and "authorization" was inferred from the fact that higher officials failed to order the agency to discontinue the program that had been obscurely mentioned.
+The Bureau has made no claim of outside authorization for its COINTELPROs against the Socialist Workers Party, Black Nationalists, or New Left adherents. After 1960, its fragile claim for authorization of the COINTELPROs against the Communist Party USA and White Hate Groups was drawn from a series of hints and partial, obscured disclosures to the Attorneys General and the White House.
+The first evidence of notification to higher government officials of the FBI's COINTELPRO against the Communist Party USA consists of letters from Director Hoover to President Eisenhower and Attorney General William Rogers in May 1958 informing them that "in August of 1956, this Bureau initiated a program designed to promote disruption within the ranks of the Communist Party (CP) USA."[55] There is no record of any reply to these letters.
+Later that same year, Director Hoover told President Eisenhower and his Cabinet:
+To counteract a resurgence of Communist Party influence in the United States, we have a ... program designed to intensify any confusion and dissatisfaction among its members.
+During the past few years, this program has been most effective. Selected informants were briefed and trained to raise controversial issues within the Party.... The Internal Revenue Service was furnished names and addresses of Party functionaries who had been active in the underground apparatus ... ; Anticommunist literature and simulated Party documents were mailed anonymously to carefully chosen members . . . .[56]
+The FBI's only claim to having notified the Kennedy Administration about COINTELPRO rests upon a letter written shortly before the inauguration in January 1961 from Director Hoover to Attorney General-designate Robert Kennedy, Deputy Attorney General-designate Byron R. White, and Secretary of State-designate Dean Rusk. One paragraph in the five- page letter stated that the Bureau had a "carefully planned program of counterattack against the CPUSA which keeps it off balance," and which was "carried on from both inside and outside the party organization." The Bureau claimed to have been "successful in preventing communists from seizing control of legitimate, mass organizations" and to have "discredited others who were secretly operating inside such organizations."[67] Specific techniques were not mentioned, and no additional notice was provided to the Kennedy Administration. Indeed, when the Kennedy White House formally requested of Hoover a report on "Internal Security Programs," the Director described only the FBI's "investigative program," and made no reference to disruptive activities.[58]
+The only claimed notice of the COINTELPRO against the Ku Klux Klan was given after the program had begun and consisted of a partial description buried within a discussion of other subjects. In September 1965, copies of a two page letter were sent to President Johnson and Attorney General Katzenbach, describing the Bureau's success in solving a number of cases involving racial violence in the South. That report contained a paragraph stating that the Bureau was "seizing every opportunity to disrupt the activities of Klan organizations," and briefly described the exposure of a Klan member's "kickback" scheme involving insurance company premiums.[59] More questionable tactics, such as sending a letter to a Klansman's wife to destroy their marriage, were not mentioned. The Bureau viewed Katzenbach's reply to its letter -- which praises the investigative successes which are the focus of the FBI's letter -- as constituting authorization for the White Hate COINTELPRO.[60]
+The claimed notification to Attorney General Ramsey Clark of the White Hate COINTELPRO consisted of a ten-page memorandum captioned "Ku Klux Klan Investigations -- FBI Accomplishments" with a buried reference to Bureau informants "removing" Klan officers and "provoking scandal" within the Klan organization 61, Clark told the Committee that he did not recall reading those phrases or interpreting them as notice that the Bureau was engaging in disruptive tactics.[62] Cartha DeLoach, Assistant to the Director during this period, testified that he "distinctly" recalled briefing Attorney General Clark "generally ... concerning COINTELPRO."[63] Clark denied havingbeen briefed.[64]
+The letters and briefings described above, which constitute the Bureau's entire claim to notice and authorization for the CPUSA and White Hate COINTELPROs, failed to mention techniques which risked physical, emotional, or economic harm to their targets. In no case was an Attorney General clearly told the nature and extent of the programs and asked for his approval. In no case was approval expressly given.
+Former Attorney General Katzenbach cogently described another misleading form of "authorization" relied on by the Bureau and other intelligence agencies:
+As far as Mr. Hoover was concerned, it was sufficient for the Bureau if at any time any Attorney General had authorized [a particular] activity in any circumstances. In fact, it was often sufficient if any Attorney General had written something which could be construed to authorize it or had been informed in some one of hundreds of memoranda of some facts from which he could conceivably have inferred the possibility of such an activity. Perhaps to a permanent head of a large bureaucracy this seems a reasonable way of proceeding. However, there is simply no way an incoming Cabinet officer can or should be charged with endorsing every decision of his predecessor . . . .[65]
+For example, the CPUSA COINTELPRO was substantially described to the Eisenhower Administration, obliquely to the Kennedy Administration designees, but continued -apparently solely on the strength of those assumed authorizations -- through the Johnson Administration and into the Nixon Administration. The idea that authority might continue from one administration to the next and that there is no duty to reaffirm authority inhibits responsible decision making. Circumstances may change and judgments may differ. New officials should be given -- and should insist upon -- the opportunity to review significant programs.
+The CIA's mail opening project illustrates an instance in which an intelligence agency apparently received authorization for a limited program and then expanded that program into significant new areas without seeking further authorization. In May 1954, DCI Allen Dulles and Richard Helms, then Chief of Operations in the CIA's Directorate of Plans, briefed Postmaster General Arthur Summerfield about the CIA's New York mail project, which at that time involved only the examination of envelope exteriors. CIA memoranda indicate that Summerfield's approval was obtained for photographing envelope exteriors, but no mention was made of the possibility of mail opening.[66]
+The focus of the CIA's project shifted to mail opening sometime during the ensuing year, but the CIA did not return to inform Summerfield and made no attempt to secure his approval for this illegal operation.
+Intelligence officers have sometimes withheld information from their superiors and concealed programs to prevent discovery by their superiors. The Bureau apparently ignored the Attorney General's order to stop classifying persons as "dangerous" in 1943; unilaterally decided not to provide the Justice Department with information about communist espionage on at least two occasions "for security reasons;" and withheld similar information from the Presidential Commission investigating the government's security program in 1947.[67] More recently, CIA and NSA concealed from President Richard Nixon their respective mail opening and communications interception programs.
+These incidents are not unique. The FBI also concealed its Reserve Index of prominent persons who were not included on the Security Index reviewed by the Justice Department; its other targeting programs against "Rabble Rousers," "Agitators," "Key Activists," and "Key Extremists;" and its use of intrusive mail opening and surrepititious entry techniques. Indeed, the FBI institutionalized its capability to conceal activities from the Justice Department by establishing a regular "Do Not File" procedure, which assured internal control while frustrating external accountability.
+<em>Subfinding (g)</em>
+The weakness of the system of accountability and control can be seen in the fact that many illegal or abusive domestic intelligence operations were terminated only after they had been exposed or threatened with exposure by Congress or the news media.
+The lack of vigorous oversight and internal controls on domestic intelligence activity frequently left the termination of improper programs to the ad hoc process of public exposure or threat of exposure by Congress, the press, or private citizens. Less frequently, domestic intelligence projects were terminated solely because of an agency's internal review of impropriety.
+The Committee is aware that public exposure can jeopardize legitimate, productive, and costly intelligence programs. We do not condone the extralegal activities which led to the exposure of some questionable operations.
+Nevertheless two points emerge from an examination of the termination of numerous domestic intelligence activities: (1) major illegal or improper operations thrived in an atmosphere of secrecy and inadequate executive control; and (2) public airing proved to be the most effective means of terminating or reforming those operations.
+Some intelligence officers and Executive branch administrators sought the termination of questionable programs as soon as they became aware of the nature of the operation -- the Committee praises their actions. However, too often we have seen that the secrecy that protected illegal or improper activities and the insular nature of the agencies involved prevented intelligence officers from questioning their actions or realizing that they were wrong.
+There are several noteworthy examples of illegal or abusive domestic intelligence activities which were terminated only after the threat of public exposure:
+- - The FBI's widesweeping COINTELPRO operations were terminated on April 27, 1971, in response to disclosures about the program in the press.[73]
+- - IRS payments to confidential informants were suspended in March 1975 as a result of journalistic investigation of Operation Leprechaun.[74]
+- - The Army's termination of several major domestic intelligence operations, which were clearly overbroad or illegal, came only after the programs were disclosed in the press or were scheduled as the subject of congressional inquiry.[75]
+- - On one occasion, FBI Director Hoover insisted that electronic surveillance be discontinued prior to his appearance before the House Appropriations Committee so that he could report a relatively small number of wiretaps in place.[76] Contrary to frequent allegations, however, no general pattern of temporary suspensions or terminations during the Director's appearances before the House Appropriations Committee is revealed by Bureau records.
+- - Following the report of a Presidential committee which had been established in response to news reports in 1967, the CIA terminated its covert relationship with a large number of domestically based organizations, such as academic institutions, student groups, private foundations, and media projects aimed at an international audience.[78]
+Other examples of curtailment of domestic intelligence activity in response to the prospect of public exposure include: President Nixon's revocation of approval for the Huston Plan out of concern for the risk of disclosure of the possible illegal actions proposed and the fact that "their sensitivity would likely generate media criticism if they were employed;"[79] J. Edgar Hoover's cessation of the bugging of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s hotel rooms after the initiation of a Senate investigation chaired by Edward V. Long of Missouri;[80] and the CIA's consideration of suspending mail-opening until the Long inquiry abated and eventual termination of the program "in the Watergate climate."[81] More recently, several questionable domestic intelligence practices have been terminated at least in part as a result of Congressional investigation.[82]
+There are several prominent instances of terminations which resulted from an internal review process:
+- - In August 1973, shortly after taking office, Internal Revenue Service Commissioner Donald Alexander abolished the Special Service Staff upon learning that it was engaged in political intelligence activities which he considered "antithetical to proper tax administration."[83]
+- - An internal legal review in 1973 prompted the termination of the joint effort by NSA and CIA to monitor United States - South American communications by individuals named on a drug traffic "watch list."[84]
+- - On May 9, 1973, newly appointed CIA Director James Schlesinger requested from CIA personnel an inventory of all "questionable activities" which the Agency had undertaken. The 694 pages of memoranda received in response to this request -- which became known at the CIA as "The Family Jewels" -- prompted the termination or limitation of a number of programs which were in violation of the the Agency's mandate, notably the CHAOS project involving intelligence-gathering against American citizens.[85]
+- - In the early 1960s, the CIA's MKULTRA testing program, which involved surreptitiously administering drugs to unwitting persons, was "frozen" after the Inspector General questioned the morality and lack of administrative control of the program.[85]
+- - Several mail-opening operations were terminated because they lacked sufficient intelligence value, which was often measured in relation to the "flap potential" -- or risk of disclosure -- of an operation. However, both the CIA and the FBI continued other mailopening operations after these terminations.[86]
+The Committee's examination of the circumstances surrounding terminations of a wide range of improper or illegal domestic intelligence activities clearly points to the need for more effective oversight from outside the agencies. In too many cases, the impetus for the termination of programs of obviously questionable propriety came from the press or the Congress rather than from intelligence agency administrators or their superiors in the Executive Branch. Although there were several laudable instances of termination as a responsible outgrowth of an agency's internal review process, the Committee's record indicates that this process alone is insufficient -- intelligence agencies cannot be left to police themselves.
+[1] National Security Council memorandum 17/5,6/15/49.
+[2] National Security Action memorandum 161, 6/9/62.
+[3] For example, the FBI continued an investigation of one group in 1964 after the internal Security Division told the Bureau there was "insufficient evidence" of any legal violations. (Memorandum from Yeagley to Hoover, 3/3/64.) Two years later, an FBI intelligence official suggested that it would be "in the Bureau's best interest to put the Department on record again." The Department approved the FBI's request for permission to continue the investigation even though there had been "no significant changes as to the character and tactics of the organization." The FBI did not request further instructions in this investigation until 1973. (Memorandum from Baumgardner to Sullivan, 7/15/66; memorandum from Yeagley to Hoover, 7/28/66.)
+[4] For example, the annual report of Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley for Fiscal Year 1959 emphasized Communist attempts to wield influence, without pointing out the lack of tangible results:
+"Despite the 'thaw,' real or apparent, in the Cold War, and despite [its] losses, the [Communist] Party has continued as an organized force, constantly <em>seeking to repair</em> its losses and <em>to regain</em> its former position of influence. In a number of fields its activities are directed ostensibly toward laudable objectives, such as the elimination of discrimination by reason of race, low cost housing for the economically underprivileged, and so on. These activities are pursued in large part <em>as a way of extending</em> the forces and currents in American life, and <em>with the hope of being able to</em> 'move in' on such movements when the time seems propitious." [Emphasis added.] (Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1959, pp. 247-248.)
+The same executives headed the Internal Security Division from 1959 until 1970, through the administrations of five Attorneys General and four Presidents. In 1971 a new Assistant Attorney General for the Internal Security Division, Robert Mardian, actively encouraged FBI surveillance and collaborated with FBI executive William C. Sullivan in transferring the records of the "17" wiretaps from the Bureau to the Nixon White House.
+[5] Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Kevin Maroney, et al., 11/9/67.
+[6] & 7 omitted in original.
+[8] Tom Charles Huston deposition, 5/23/75, p. 32.
+[9] Staff summary of interview of Colonel Werner E. Michel, 5/12/75.
+[10] Despite the formal line of responsibility to the Attorney General, Director J. Edgar Hoover in fact developed an informal channel to the White House. During several administrations beginning with President Franklin Roosevelt the Director and the President circumvented the Justice Department and dealt directly with each other.
+[11] Memorandum from St. John Barrett to Marshall, 6/18/63.
+[11]  Memorandum from Director, FBI to Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall, 12/4/62.
+[12] Memorandum from Director, FBI to Assistant Attorney General Burke
+[13] Annual Report of the Attorney General for Fiscal Year 1965, pp.[ 185-186.
+[14] Memorandum from Attorney General Clark to Hoover, 9/14/67.
+[15] Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley to Hoover, 3/3/69.
+[16] Memorandum from Belmont to Ladd, 10/15/52.
+[17] Memorandum from Hoover to L. M. C. Smith, Chief, Neutrality Laws Unit, 11/28/40.
+[18] Nicholas Katzenbach testimony, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 201.
+[20] The Justice Department's investigation of the FBI's COINTELPRO illustrates the reluctance of the Justice Department to interfere in or even inquire about Internal Bureau matters. Although the existence of COINTELPRO was made public in 1971, the Justice Department did not initiate an investigation until 1974. The Department's Committee, headed by Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen, which conducted the investigation, agreed to use only summaries of documents prepared by the Bureau instead of examining the Bureau documents themselves.
+Those summaries were often extremely misleading. For example, one summary stated:
+"it was recommended that an anonymous letter be mailed to the leader of the Blackstone Rangers, a black extremist organization in Chicago. The letter would hopefully drive a wedge between the Blackstone Rangers and the Black Panthers Party. The anonymous letter would indicate that the Black Panther Party in Chicago blamed the leader of the Blackstone Rangers for blocking their programs."
+The document from which this summary was derived, however, stated that the Blackstone Rangers were prone to "violent type activity, shooting, and the like." The anonymous letter was to state that "the Panthers blame you for blocking their thing and there's supposed to be a hit out for you." The memorandum concluded that the letter "may intensify the degree of animosity between the two groups" and "lead to reprisals against its leadership." (Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/18/69.)
+[21] Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, 10/7/63; memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, 10/18/63.
+[22] Letter from FBI to Senate Select Committee, 7/24/75, pp. 4-5.
+[23] See M. L. King Report: "Electronic Surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King and the Christian Leadership Conference." It should be noted, however, that President Kennedy was assassinated a month after the wiretap was installed which may account for Attorney General Kennedy's failure to inquire about the King wiretaps, at least for the first few months.
+[24] Memorandum from Frederick Baumgardner to William Sullivan, 1/28/64.
+[25] The FBI informed the Committee that it has no documents indicating that Attorney General Kennedy was told about the microphones. His associates in the Justice Department testified that they were never told, and they did not believe that the Attorney General had been told about the microphones. (See memorandum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan, 12/19/66; Courtney Evans testimony, 12/1/75, p. 20; Burke Marshall testimony, 3/3/76, p. 43.)
+The question of whether Attorney General Kennedy suspected that the FBI was using microphones to gather information about Dr. King must be viewed in light of the Attorney General's express authorization of wiretaps in the King case on national security grounds, and the FBI's practice -- known to the Attorney General -- of installing microphones in such national security cases without notifying the Department.
+[26] Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 3/30/65, p. 2. The Attorney General's policy change occurred during a period of publicity and Congressional inquiry into the FBI's use of electronic surveillance.
+[27] Memorandum from Director, FBI to Attorney General, 5/17/65; Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Attorney General, 10/19/65; Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Attorney General, 12/1/65.
+[27]  Katzenbach advised Director Hoover in September 1965 that "in emergency situations [wiretaps and microphones] may be used subject to my later ratification." (Memorandum from Katzenbach to Hoover, 9/27/65.) Nevertheless, there is no indication that these microphone surveillances of Dr. King presented "emergency situations."
+[28] Katzenbach testified that he could not recall having seen the notices, although he acknowledged the initials on the memoranda as in his handwriting and in the location where he customarily placed his initials. (Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 227.)
+[29] Memorandum from Lawrence Houston to Deputy Attorney General, 3/1/54.
+[29]  Memorandum for the Record by General Counsel, CIA, 1/31/75.
+[30] The Committee's requests also provided the Department of Justice with the opportunity to see most of these FBI documents for the first time.
+[31] One cabinet official, when told that the CIA wanted to tell him something secret, replied, "I would rather not know anything about it." The "secret" matter was CIA's illegal mail opening program. (J. Edward Day testimony, 10/22/75, Hearings, Vol. 4, p. 45.)
+[32] Letter from FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 11/6/75.
+[34] Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 209.
+[35] Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to J. Edgar Hoover, 1/14/64; Staff summary of Walter Jenkins Interview, 12/1/75, pp. 1-2. Mr. Jenkins subsequently said that he was unable to testify formally because of illness and has failed to answer written interrogatories submitted to him by the Committee for response under oath.
+[36] Memorandum from John Mohr to Cartha DeLoach, 2/5/65; Edwin Guthman testimony, 3/16/76, pp. 20-23.
+[36]  Bill Moyers testimony, 3/2/76, p. 19.
+[37] Bill Moyers testimony, 3/2/76, p. 19; staff summary of Bill Moyers interview, 11/24/75.
+In an unsworn staff interview, Jenkins denied that he ever received an offer to listen to such tapes. (Staff summary of Walter Jenkins interview, 12/1/75.)
+[38] Moyers, 3/2/76, pp. 17-18.
+[39] Marshall, 3/8/76, pp. 4647.
+[40] Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 210.
+[41] Marshall, 3/3/76, p. 43; Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 210.
+[42] Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 210.
+[43] Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 210. DeLoach testified before the Committee that he did not recall conversations with reporters about tape recordings of Dr. King. (Cartha DeLoach testimony, 11/25/75, p. 156.)
+[44] Memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, 12/1/64.
+[45] Moyers, 3/2/76. p. 9.
+[45]  Memorandum from Clark to Hoover, 5/27/69. The story was published in the midst of Robert Kennedy's campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination.
+[45]  Memorandum from Hoover to Clark, 5/29/68.
+[45]  Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Tolson, 5/17/68. Four days later DeLoach had a phone conversation with Jack Anderson in which, according to partment [sic] official "had advised him concerning specific information involving an old wire tap on King." (Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to Mr. Tolson, 5/21/68.) Both of these memoranda were initialed by Hoover.
+[45]  U.S. V. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
+[45]  These include the Smith Act of 1940 and the Voorhis Act of 1941. In addition to reliance on these statutes to buttress its claim of authority for domestic intelligence operations, the FBI has also placed reliance on a Civil War seditious conspiracy statute and a rebellion and insurrection statute passed during the Whiskey Rebellion of the 1790's. FBI Director Clarence Kelley, in a letter to the Attorney General, stated that these later statutes were designed for past centuries, "not the Twentieth Century." (memorandum from Director, FBI, to Attorney General, Hearings, Vol.[ 6, Exhibit 53.) The Committee agrees.
+[46] Memorandum from DeLoach to Clyde Tolson, 1/21/66.
+[47] 1958 Fiscal Year Briefing Paper prepared by FBI for House Appropriations Committee.
+[48] 1959 Fiscal Year Briefing Paper prepared by FBI for House Appropriations Committee.
+[49] 1962 Fiscal Year Briefing Paper prepared by FBI for House Appropriations Committee.
+[50] 1966 Fiscal Year Briefing Paper prepared by FBI for House Appropriations Committee.
+[51] Memorandum from FBI to Select Committee, 1/12/76.
+[52] Interview with Congressman Rooney, NBC News' "First Tuesday,"[ 6/1/71.
+[53] Fred Vinson testimony, 1/27/76, p. 34.
+[54] Director Hoover appears to have told the subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee more about COINTELPRO operations and techniques than he told the Justice Department or the White House.
+[55] Memorandum from the Director, FBI to the Attorney General, 5/8/58.
+[56] Excerpt from FBI Director's Briefing of Cabinet, 11/6/58.
+[57] Memorandum from Hoover to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, 1/10/61, copies to White and Rusk.
+[58] Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to McGeorge Bundy, 7/25/61, and attached I.I.C. Report: "Status of U.S. Internal Security Programs."
+[59] Letters from Hoover to Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to the President, and Attorney General Katzenbach, 9/17/65.
+[60] Memorandum from Katzenbach to Hoover, 9/3/65.
+[61] Memorandum from Hoover to Clark, 12/18/67.
+[62] Clark, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 235.
+[63] DeLoach, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 183.
+[64] Clark, 12/3/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 232.
+[65] Katzenbach, 12/3/75, Hearing-, Vol. 6, p. 202.
+[66] Memorandum from Richard. Helms, Chief of Operations, DDP, to Director of Security, 5/17/54.
+[67] See Part II, pp.[ 35-36, 55-56.
+-72 omitted in original.
+[73] Memorandum from Brennan to Sullivan, 4/27/71; letter from Director, FBI, to all Field Offices, 4/28/71. Even after the termination of COINTELPRO, it was suggested that "counterintelligence action" would be considered "in exceptional instances" so long as there were "tight procedures to insure absolute secrecy" (Sullivan memorandum, 4/27/71; letter from Director, FBI to all Field Offices, 4/28/71.)
+[74] See IRS Report: "Operation Leprechaun."
+[75] The Army made its first effort to curb its domestic collection of "civil disturbance" intelligence on the political activities of private citizens in June 1970, only after press disclosures about the program which prompted two Congressional committees to schedule hearings on the matter, (Christopher Pyle, "CONUS Intelligence: The Army Watches Civilian Politics" Washington Monthly, January 1970.) Despite legal opinions, both from inside and outside the Army, that domestic radio monitoring by the Army Security Agency was illegal, the Army did not move to terminate the program until after the media revealed that the Army Security Agency had monitored radio transmissions during the 1968 Democratic National Convention (Memorandum from Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence to the Army General Counsel re: UPASA Covert Activities in Civil Disturbance Control Operations.) Department of Defense controls on domestic surveillance were not imposed until March 1971, after NBC News reported that the Army had placed Senator Adlai Stevenson III and Congressman Abner Mikva under surveillance. (NBC News, "First Tuesday", 12/1/70.)
+[76] This involved nine of the so-called "17" wiretaps in February 1971. (Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 8/20/75, pp. 148, 149.)
+[77] omitted in original.
+[78] This included nine of the so-called "17" wiretaps in February 1971. In response to the storm of public and congressional criticism engendered by a press account of CIA support for a student organization, President Johnson appointed a Committee, chaired by then Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, to review government activities that "endanger the integrity and independence" of United States educational and private voluntary organizations which operate abroad. In March 1967, the Committee recommended "that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations." The CIA responded with a major review of such projects.
+The question of the nature and extent of the CIA's compliance with the Katzenbach guidelines is discussed in the Committee's Foreign Intelligence Report.
+[79] Response by Richard Nixon to interrogatory Number 17 posed by Senate Select Committee.
+[80] On January 7, 1966, in response to Associate Director Tolson's recommendation, Director Hoover "reserve [d] final decision" about whether to discontinue all microphone surveillance of Dr. King "until DeLoach sees [Senator Edward V.] Long." (Memorandum from Sullivan to DeLoach, 1/21/66.) The only occasion on which the FBI Director rejected a recommendation for bugging a hotel room of Dr. King's was January 21, 1966, the same day that Assistant Director DeLoach met with an aide to Senator Long to try to head off the Long Committee's hearings on the subject of FBI "bugs" and taps. (Memorandum from DeLoach to Tolson, 1/21/66.) When DeLoach returned from the meeting, he reported:
+"While we have neutralized the threat of being embarrassed by the Long Subcommittee, we have not yet eliminated certain dangers which might be created as a result of newspaper pressure on Long. We therefore must keep on top of this situation at all times." (Memorandum, Executives Conference to the Director, 1/7/66.) Another possible explanation for Hoover's cessation of the King hotel bugging is found in the impact of a memorandum from the Solicitor General in the Black case which Hoover apparently interpreted as a restriction upon the FBI's authority to conduct microphone surveillance. (Supplemental memorandum for the United States, U.S. v. Black, submitted by Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall, 7/13/66; Katzenbach, 10/11/75. p. 58.)
+[81] In 1965, the Long Subcommittee investigation caused the CIA to consider whether its major mail opening "operations should be partially or fully suspended until the subcommittee's investigations are completed." When the CIA contacted Chief Postal Inspector Henry Montague and learned that he believed that the Long investigation would "soon cool off," it was decided to continue the operation. (Memorandum to the files by "CIA officer."[ 4/23/65.)
+Despite continued apprehensions about the "flap potential" of exposure and repeated recognition of its illegality, the actual termination of the CIA's New York mail-opening project came, according to CIA Office of Security Director Howard Osborn because: "I thought it was illegal and in the Watergate climate we had absolutely no business doing this." (Howard Osborn deposition, 8/28/75, p. 89.) He discussed the matter with William Colby who agreed that the project was illegal and should not be continued, "particularly in a climate of that type." (Osborn deposition, 8/28/75, p. 90.)
+[82] Shortly after the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities held hearings on the laxity of the system for disclosure of tax return information to United States attorneys, the practice was changed. In October 1975, U.S. Attorneys requesting tax return information were required by the IRS to provide a sufficient explanation of the need for the information and the intended use to which it would be put to enable IRS to ascertain the validity of the request. Operation SHAMROCK, NSA's program of obtaining millions of international telegrams, was terminated in May 1975, according to a senior NSA official, primarily because it was no longer a valuable source of foreign intelligence and because the Senate Select Committee's investigation of the program had increased the risk of exposure. (Staff summary of "senior NSA official" interview, 9/17/75, p. 3.)
+[83] Donald Alexander testimony, 10/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 3, p. 8. Alexander testified, however, that in a meeting with IRS administrators on the day after he took office, the SSS was discussed, and "full disclosure" was not made to him. Prior to the Leprechaun revelations, Commissioner Alexander had also initiated a general review of IRS information-gathering and retrieval systems, and he had already suspended certain types of information-gathering due to discovery of vast quantities of non-tax-related material. (Alexander, 10/2/75, Hearings, Vol. 3, pp. 8-10.)
+Another termination due to internal review took place at IRS in 1968. The Chief of the Disclosure Branch terminated what he considered the "illegal" provision of tax return information to the FBI by another IRS Division. (IRS Memorandum, D. O. Virdin to Harold Snyder, 5/2/68.) During this same period, the CIA was also obtaining returns in a manner similar to the FBI (though in much smaller numbers), yet no one in the Intelligence Division or elsewhere in the Compliance Division apparently thought to examine that practice in light of the change being made in the practice with respect to the FBI. (Donald 0. Virdin testimony, 9/16/75, pp. 69-73.)
+[84] The CIA suspended its participation in the program as a result of an opinion by its General Counsel, Lawrence Houston, that the intercepts were illegal. (Memorandum from Houston to Acting Chief of Division, 1/29/73.) Shortly thereafter, NASA reviewed the legality and appropriateness of its own involvement in what was essentially a law enforcement effort by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs rather than a foreign intelligence program, which is the only authorized province for NSA operations. ("Senior NSA official deposition," 9/16/75, p. 10.) In June 1973 the Director of NSA terminated the drug watch list, several months after the CIA had terminated its own intercept program. NSA's drug watch list activity had been in operation since 1970. (Allen, 10/29/75, Hearings, Vol. 5, p. 23.)
+In the fall of 1973, NSA terminated the remainder of its watch list activity, which had involved monitoring communications by individuals targeted for NSA by other agencies including CIA, FBI, and BNDD. In response to the Keith case and to another case which threatened to disclose the existence of the NSA watch list, NSA and the Justice Department had begun to reconsider the propriety of the program. The review process culminated in termination. See NSA Report: Termination of Civil Disturbance Watch List.
+[85] Schlesinger described his review of "grey area activities" which were "perhaps legal, perhaps not legal" as a part of "the enhanced effort that came in the wake of Watergate" for oversight of the propriety of Government activities. (Schlesinger testimony. Rockefeller Commission, 5/5/75, pp. 114,116.) Schlesinger testified that his request for the reporting of "questionable activities" came after learning that "there was this whole set of relationships" between the CIA and White House "plumber" E. Howard Hunt, Jr., about which Schlesinger had not been briefed completely upon assuming his position. (Schlesinger, Rockefeller Commission testimony, p. 115.) "As a consequence," Schlesinger "insisted that all people come forward" with "anything to do with the Watergate affair" and any other arguably improper or illegal operations. (Schlesinger, Rockefeller Commission, 5/5/75, p. 116.)
+[85]  After the Inspector General's survey of the Technical Services Division, he recommended termination of the testing program. (Earman memorandum, 5/5/63.) The program was then suspended pending resolution at the highest levels within the CIA of the issues presented by the program -- "the risks of embarrassment to the Agency, coupled with the moral problem." (Memorandum from DDP Helms to DCI McCone, 9/4/65.) In response to the IG Report, DDP Helms recommended to DCI McCone that unwitting testing continue. Helms maintained that the program could be conducted in a "secure and effective manner" and believed it "necessary that the Agency maintain a central role in this activity, keep current on enemy capabilities in the manipulation of human behavior, and maintain an offensive capability." (Memorandum from Helms to DCI McCone, 8/19/63.) The Acting DCI deferred decision on the matter and directed TSD in the meantime to "continue the freeze on unwitting testing." (CIA memorandum to Senate Select Commitee, received 9/4/75.) According to a CIA report to the Select Committee:
+"With the destruction of the MKULTRA files in early 1973, It is believed that there are no definitive records in CIA that would record the termination of the program for testing behavioral drugs on unwitting persons. . . . There is no record to our knowledge, that [the] freeze was ever lifted." (CIA memorandum to Senate Select Committee, received 9/4/75.)
+Testimony from the CIA officials involved confirmed that the testing was not resumed. (See Foreign and Military Intelligence Report.)
+[86] Two FBI mail-opening programs were suspended for security reasons involving changes in local postal personnel and never reinstituted, on the theory that the value of the programs did not justify the risk involved. (Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/19/66.) The CIA's San Francisco mailopening project "was terminated since the risk factor outweighed continuing an activity which had already achieved its objectives." (Memorandum to Chief, East Asia Division, June 1973.) The lack of any significant intelligence value to the CIA apparently led to the termination of the New Orleans mail-opening program. (Memorandum from "Identity 13" to Deputy Director of Security, 10/9/57.) Three other programs were terminated because they had produced no valuable counterintelligence information, while diverting manpower needed for other operations.
+* IV. Conclusions and Recommendations
+** A. Conclusions
+The findings which have emerged from our investigation convince us that the Government's domestic intelligence policies and practices require fundamental reform. We have attempted to set out the basic facts; now it is time for Congress to turn its attention to legislating restraints upon intelligence activities which may endanger the constitutional rights of Americans.
+The Committee's fundamental conclusion is that intelligence activities have undermined the constitutional rights of citizens and that they have done so primarily because checks and balances designed by the framers of the Constitution to assure accountability have not been applied.
+Before examining that conclusion, we make the following observations.
+-While nearly all of our findings focus on excesses and things that went wrong, we do not question the need for lawful domestic intelligence. We recognize that certain intelligence activities serve perfectly proper and clearly necessary ends of government. Surely, catching spies and stopping crime, including acts of terrorism, is essential to insure "domestic tranquility" and to "provide for the common defense." Therefore, the power of government to conduct proper domestic intelligence activities under effective restraints and controls must be preserved.
+-We are aware that the few earlier efforts to limit domestic intelligence activities have proven ineffectual. This pattern reinforces the need for statutory restraints coupled with much more effective oversight from all branches of the Government.
+-The crescendo of improper intelligence activity in the latter part of the 1960s and the early 1970s shows what we must watch out for: In time of crisis, the Government will exercise its power to conduct domestic intelligence activities to the fullest extent. The distinction between legal dissent and criminal conduct is easily forgotten. Our job is to recommend means to help ensure that the distinction will always be observed.
+-In an era where the technological capability of Government relentlessly increases, we must be wary about the drift toward "big brother government." The potential for abuse is awesome and requires special attention to fashioning restraints which not only cure past problems but anticipate and prevent the future misuse of technology.
+-We cannot dismiss what we have found as isolated acts which were limited in time and confined to a few willful men. The failures to obey the law and, in the words of the oath of office, to "preserve, protect, and defend" the Constitution, have occurred repeatedly throughout administrations of both political parties going back four decades.
+-We must acknowledge that the assignment which the Government has given to the intelligence community has, in many ways, been impossible to fulfill. It has been expected to predict or prevent every crisis, respond immediately with information on any question, act to meet all threats, and anticipate the special needs of Presidents. And then it is chastised for its zeal. Certainly, a fair assessment must place a major part of the blame upon the failures of senior executive officials and Congress.
+In the final analysis, however, the purpose of this Committee's work is not to allocate blame among individuals. Indeed, to focus on personal culpability may divert attention from the underlying institutional causes and thus may become an excuse for inaction.
+Before this investigation, domestic intelligence had never been systematically surveyed. For the first time, the Government's domestic surveillance programs, as they have developed over the past forty years, can be measured against the values which our Constitution seeks to preserve and protect. Based upon our full record, and the findings which we have set forth in Part III above, the Committee concludes that:
+<em>Domestic Intelligence Activity Has Threatened and Undermined The</em>
+<em>Constitutional Rights of Americans to Free Speech, Association and Privacy. It Has Done So Primarily Became The Constitutional System for Checking Abuse of Power Has Not Been Applied.</em>
+Our findings and the detailed reports which supplement this volume set forth a massive record of intelligence abuses over the years. Through a vast network of informants, and through the uncontrolled or illegal use of intrusive techniques -- ranging from simple theft to sophisticated electronic surveillance -- the Government has collected, and then used improperly, huge amounts of information about the private lives, political beliefs and associations of numerous Americans.
+Affect Upon Constitutional Rights. -- That these abuses have adversely affected the constitutional rights of particular Americans is beyond question. But we believe the harm extends far beyond the citizens directly affected.
+Personal privacy is protected because it is essential to liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Our Constitution checks the power of Government for the purpose of protecting the rights of individuals, in order that all our citizens may live in a free and decent society. Unlike totalitarian states, we do not believe that any government has a monopoly on truth.
+When Government infringes those rights instead of nurturing and protecting them, the injury spreads far beyond the particular citizens targeted to untold numbers of other Americans who may be intimidated.
+Free government depends upon the ability of all its citizens to speak their minds without fear of official sanction. The ability of ordinary people to be heard by their leaders means that they must be free to join in groups in order more effectively to express their grievances. Constitutional safeguards are needed to protect the timid as well as the courageous, the weak as well as the strong. While many Americans have been willing to assert their beliefs in the face of possible governmental reprisals, no citizen should have to weigh his or her desire to express an opinion, or join a group, against the risk of having lawful speech or association used against him.
+Persons most intimidated may well not be those at the extremes of the political spectrum, but rather those nearer the middle. Yet voices of moderation are vital to balance public debate and avoid polarization of our society. The federal government has recently been looked to for answers to nearly every problem. The result has been a vast centralization of power. Such power can be turned against the rights of the people. Many of the restraints imposed by the Constitution were designed to guard against such use of power by the government.
+Since the end of World War II, governmental power has been increasingly exercised through a proliferation of federal intelligence programs. The very size of this intelligence system, multiplies the opportunities for misuse.
+Exposure of the excesses of this huge structure has been necessary. Americans are now aware of the capability and proven willingness of their Government to collect intelligence about their lawful activities and associations. What some suspected and others feared has turned out to be largely true -- vigorous expression of unpopular views, association with dissenting groups, participation in peaceful protest activities, have provoked both government surveillance and retaliation.
+Over twenty years ago, Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, previously an Attorney General, warned against growth of a centralized power of investigation. Without clear limits, a federal investigative agency would "have enough on enough people" so that "even if it does not elect to prosecute them" the Government would, he wrote, still "find no opposition to its policies". Jackson added, "Even those who are supposed to supervise [intelligence agencies] are likely to fear [them]." His advice speaks directly to our responsibilities today:
+I believe that the safeguard of our liberty lies in limiting any national police or investigative organization, first of all to a small number of strictly federal offenses, and secondly to nonpolitical ones. The fact that we may have confidence in the administration of a federal investigative agency under its existing head does not mean that it may not revert again to the days when the Department of Justice was headed by men to whom the investigative power was a weapon to be used for their own purposes.[1]
+Failure to Apply Checks and Balances. -- The natural tendency of Government is toward abuse of power. Men entrusted with power, even those aware of its dangers, tend, particularly when pressured, to slight liberty.
+Our constitutional system guards against this tendency. It establishes many different checks upon power. It is those wise restraints which 'keep men free. In the field of intelligence those restraints have too often been ignored.
+The three main departures in the intelligence field from the constitutional plan for controlling abuse of power have been:
+(a) Excessive Executive Power. -- In a sense the growth of domestic intelligence activities mirrored the growth of presidential power generally. But more than any other activity, more even than exercise of the war power, intelligence activities have been left to the control of the Executive.
+For decades Congress and the courts as well as the press and the public have accepted the notion that the control of intelligence activities was the exclusive prerogative of the Chief Executive and his surrogates. The exercise of this power was not questioned or even inquired into by outsiders. Indeed, at times the power was seen as flowing not from the law, but as inherent, in the Presidency. Whatever the theory, the fact was that intelligence activities were essentially exempted from the normal system of checks and balances.
+Such Executive power, not founded in law or checked by Congress or the courts, contained the seeds of abuse and its growth was to be expected.
+(b) Excessive Secrecy. -- Abuse thrives on secrecy. Obviously, public disclosure, of matters such as the names of intelligence agents or the technological details of collection methods is inappropriate. But in the field of intelligence, secrecy has been extended to inhibit review of the basic programs and practices themselves.
+Those within the Executive branch and the Congress who would exercise their responsibilities wisely must be fully informed. The American public, as well, should know enough about intelligence activities to be able to apply its good sense to the underlying issues of policy and morality.
+Knowledge is the key to control. Secrecy should no longer be allowed to shield the existence of constitutional, legal and moral problems from the scrutiny of all three branches of government or from the American people themselves.
+(c) Avoidance of the Rule of Law. -- Lawlessness by Government breeds corrosive cynicism among the people and erodes the trust upon which government depends.
+Here, there is no sovereign who stands above the law. Each of us, from presidents to the most disadvantaged citizen, must obey the law.
+As intelligence operations developed, however, rationalizations were fashioned to immunize them from the restraints of the Bill of Rights and the specific prohibitions of the criminal code. The experience of our investigation leads us to conclude that such rationalizations are a dangerous delusion.
+** B. Principles Applied in Framing Recommedations and The Scope of the Recommendations.
+Although our recommendations are numerous and detailed, they flow naturally from our basic conclusion. Excessive intelligence activity which undermines individual rights must end. The system for controlling intelligence must be brought back within the constitutional scheme.
+Some of our proposals are stark and simple. Because certain domestic intelligence activities were clearly wrong, the obvious solution is to prohibit them altogether. Thus, we would ban tactics such as those used in the FBI's COINTELPRO. But other activities present more complex problems. We see a clear need to safeguard the constitutional rights of speech, assembly, and privacy. At the same time, we do not want to prohibit or unduly restrict necessary and proper intelligence activity.
+In seeking to accommodate those sometimes conflicting interests we have been guided by the earlier efforts of those who originally shaped our nation as a republic under law.
+The Constitutional amendments protecting speech and assembly and individual privacy seek to preserve values at the core of our heritage, and vital to our future. The Bill of Rights, and the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting it suggest three principles which we have followed:
+(1) Governmental action which directly infringes the rights of free speech and association must be prohibited. The First Amendment recognizes that even if useful to a proper end, certain governmental actions are simply too dangerous to permit at all. It commands that "Congress shall make no law" abridging freedom of speech or assembly.
+(2) The Supreme Court, in interpreting that command, has required that any governmental action which has a collateral (rather than direct) impact upon the rights of speech and assembly is permissible only if it meets two tests. First, the action must be undertaken only to fulfill a compelling governmental need, and second, the government must use the least restrictive means to meet that need. The effect upon protected interests must be minimized.[2]
+(3) Procedural safeguards -- "auxiliary precautions" as they were characterized in the Federalist Papers -- must be adopted along with substantive restraints. For example, while the Fourth Amendment prohibits only "unreasonable" searches and seizures, it requires a procedural check for reasonableness-the obtaining of a judicial warrant upon probable cause from a neutral magistrate. Our proposed procedural checks range from judicial review of intelligence activity before or after the fact, to formal and high level Executive branch approval, to greater disclosure and more effective Congressional oversight.
+The Committee believes that its recommendations should be embodied in a comprehensive legislative charter defining and controlling the domestic security activities of the Federal Government. Accordingly, Part i of the, recommendations provides that intelligence agencies must be made subject to the rule of law. In addition, Part i makes clear that no theory, of "inherent constitutional authority" or otherwise, can justify the violation of any statute. Starting from the conclusion, based upon our record, that the Constitution and our fundamental values require a substantial curtailment of the scope of domestic surveillance, we deal after Part i with five basic questions:
+. Which agencies should conduct domestic security investigations?
+The FBI should be primarily responsible for such investigations. Under the minimization principle, and to facilitate the control of domestic intelligence operations, only one agency should be involved in investigative activities which, even when limited as we propose, could give rise to abuse. Accordingly, Part ii of these recommendations reflects the Committee's position that foreign intelligence agencies (the CIA, NSA, and the military agencies) should be precluded from domestic security activity in the United States. Moreover, they should only become involved in matters involving the rights of Americans abroad where it is impractical to use the FBI, or where in the course of their lawful foreign intelligence operations they inadvertently collect information relevant to domestic security investigations. In Part iii the Committee recommends that non-intelligence agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service and the Post Office be required, in the course of any incidental involvement in domestic security investigations, to protect the privacy which citizens expect of first class mail and tax records entrusted to those agencies.
+. When should an American be the subject of an investigation at all; and when can particularly intrusive covert techniques, such as electronic surveillance or informants, be used?
+In Part iv, which deals with the FBI, the Committee's recommendations seek to prevent the excessively broad, ill defined and open ended investigations shown to have been conducted over the past four decades. We attempt to change the focus of investigations from constitutionally protected advocacy and association to dangerous conduct. Part iv also sets forth specific substantive standards for, and procedural controls on, particular intrusive techniques.
+. Who should be accountable within the Executive branch for ensuring that intelligence agencies comply with the law and for the investigation of alleged abuses by employees of those agencies?
+In Parts v and vi, the Committee recommends that these responsibilities fall initially upon the agency heads, their general counsel and inspectors general, but ultimately upon the Attorney General. The information necessary for control must be made available to those responsible for control, oversight and review; and their responsibilities must be made clear, formal, and fixed.
+. What is the appropriate role of the courts?
+In Part vii, the Committee recommends the enactment of a comprehensive, civil remedy providing the courts with jurisdiction to entertain legitimate complaints by citizens injured by unconstitutional or illegal activities of intelligence agencies. Part viii suggests that criminal penalties should attach in cases of gross abuse. In addition, Part iv provides for judicial warrants before certain intrusive techniques can be used.
+. What is the appropriate role of Congress:
+In Part xii the Committee reiterates its position that the Senate create a permanent intelligence oversight committee. The recommendations deal with numerous other issues such as the proposed repeal or amendment of the Smith Act, the proposed modernization of the Espionage Act to cover modern forms of espionage seriously detrimental to the national interest, the use of the GAO to assist Congressional oversight of the intelligence community, and remedial measures for past victims of improper intelligence activity.
+Scope of Recommendations. -- The scope of our recommendations coincides with the scope of our investigation. We examined the FBI, which has been responsible for most domestic security investigations, as well as foreign and military intelligence agencies, the IRS, and the Post Office, to the extent they became involved incidentally in domestic intelligence functions. While there are undoubtedly activities of other agencies which might legitimately be addressed in these recommendations, the Committee simply did not have the time or resources to conduct a broader investigation. Furthermore, the mandate of Senate Resolution 21 required that the Committee exclude from the coverage of its recommendations those activities of the federal government which are directed at organized crime and narcotics.
+The Committee believes that American citizens should not lose their constitutional rights to be free from improper intrusion by their Government when they travel overseas. Accordingly, the Committee proposes recommendations which apply to protect the rights of Americans abroad as well as at home.
+. Activities Covered
+The Domestic Intelligence Recommendations pertain to: the domestic security activities of the federal government;[5] and any activities of military or foreign intelligence agencies which affect the rights of Americans 6 and any intelligence activities of any nonintelligence agency working in concert with intelligence agencies, which affect those rights.
+. Activities Not Covered
+The recommendations are not designed to control federal investigative activities directed at organized crime, narcotics, or other law enforcement investigations unrelated to domestic security activities.
+. Agencies Covered
+The agencies whose activities are specifically covered by the recommendations are:
+(1) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (ii) the Central Intelligence Agency;
+(111) the, National Security Agency and other intelligence agencies of the Department of Defense; (iv) the Internal Revenue Service; and (v) the United States Postal Service.
+While it might be appropriate to provide similar detailed treatment to the activities of other agencies, such as the Secret Service, Customs Service, and Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division (Treasury Department), the Committee did not study these agencies intensively. A permanent oversight committee should investigate and study the intelligence functions of those agencies and the effect of their activities on the rights of Americans.
+. Indirect Prohibitions
+Except as specifically provided herein, these Recommendations are intended to prohibit any agency from doing indirectly that which it would be prohibited from doing directly. Specifically, no agency covered by these Recommendations should request or induce any other agency, or any person, whether the agency or person is American or foreign, to engage in any activity which the requesting or inducing agency is prohibited from doing itself.
+. Individuals and Groups Not Covered
+Except as specifically provided herein, these Recommendations do not apply to investigation of foreigners 7 who are officers or employees of a foreign power, or foreigners who, pursuant to the direction of a foreign power, are engaged in or about to engage in "hostile foreign intelligence activity" or "terrorist activity".[8]
+. Geographic Scope
+These Recommendations apply to intelligence activities which affect the rights of Americans whether at home or abroad, including all domestic security activities within the United States.
+. Legislative Enactment of Recommendations
+Most of these Recommendations are designed to be implemented in the form of legislation and others in the form of regulations pursuant to statute. (Recommendations 85 and 90 are not proposed to be implemented by statute.
+** C. Recommendations
+Pursuant to the requirement of Senate Resolution 21, these recommendations set forth the new congressional legislation [the Committee] deems necessary to "safeguard the rights of American citizens."[9] We believe these recommendations are the appropriate conclusion to a traumatic year of disclosures of abuses. We hope they will prevent such abuses in the future.
+*** i. Intelligence Agencies Are Subject to the Rule of Law
+Establishing a legal framework for agencies engaged in domestic security investigation is the most fundamental reform needed to end the long history of violating and ignoring the law set forth in Finding A. The legal framework can be created by a two-stage process of enabling legislation and administrative regulations promulgated to implement the legislation.
+However, the Committee proposes that the Congress, in developing this mix of legislative and administrative charters, make clear to the Executive branch that it will not condone, and does not accept, any theory of inherent or implied authority to violate the Constitution, the proposed new charters, or any other statutes. We do not believe the Executive has, or should have, the inherent constitutional authority to violate the law or infringe the legal rights of Americans, whether it be a warrantless break-in into the home or office of an American, warrantless electronic surveillance, or a President's authorization to the FBI to create a massive domestic security program based upon secret oral directives. Certainly, there would be no such authority after Congress has, as we propose it should, covered the field by enactment of a comprehensive legislative charter.[10] Therefore statutes enacted pursuant to these recommendations should provide the exclusive legal authority for domestic security activities.
+Recommendation 1. -- There is no inherent constitutional authority for the President or any intelligence agency to violate the law.
+Recommendation 2. -- It is the intent of the Committee that statutes implementing these recommendations provide the exclusive legal authority for federal domestic security activities.
+(a) No intelligence agency may engage in such activities unless authorized by statute, nor may it permit its employees, informants, or other covert human sources 11 to engage in such activities on its behalf.
+(b) No executive directive or order may be issued which would conflict with such statutes.
+Recommendation 3. -- In authorizing intelligence agencies to engage in certain activities, it is not intended that such authority empower agencies, their informants, or covert human sources to violate any prohibition enacted pursuant to these Recomendations or contained in the Constitution or in any other law.
+*** ii. United States Foreign and Military Agencies Should Be Precluded from Domestic Security Activities
+Part iv of these Recommendations centralizes domestic security investigations within the FBI. Past abuses also make it necessary that the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the military departments be preeluded expressly, except as specifically provided herein, from investigative activity which is conducted within the United States. Their activities abroad should also be controlled as provided herein to minimize their impact on the rights of Americans.
+<em>a. Central Intelligence Agency</em> The CIA is responsible, for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. These recommendations minimize the impact of CIA operations on Americans. They do not affect CIA investigations of foreigners outside of the United States. The, main thrust is to prohibit past actions revealed as excessive, and to transfer to the FBI other activities which might involve the CIA in internal security or law enforcement matters. Those limited activities which the CIA retains are placed under tighter controls.
+The Committee's recommendations on CIA domestic activities are similar to Executive Order 11905. They go beyond the Executive Order, however, in that they recommend that the main safeguards be made law. And, in addition, the Committee proposes tighter standards to preclude repetition of some past abuses.
+<center>
+<em>General Provisions</em>
+</center>
+The first two Recommendations pertaining to the CIA provide the context for more specific proposals. In Recommendation 4, the Committee endorses the prohibitions of the 1947 Act upon exercise by the CIA of subpoena, police or law enforcement powers or internal security functions. The Committee intends that Congress supplement, rather than supplant or derogate from the more general restrictions of the 1947 Act.
+Recommendation 5 clarifies the role of the Director of Central Intelligence, in the protection of intelligence sources and methods. He should be charged with "coordinating" the protection of sources and methods -- that is, the development of procedures for the protection of sources and methods.[12] (Primary responsibility for investigations of security leaks should reside in the FBI.) Recommendation 5 also makes clear that the Director's responsibility for protecting sources and methods does not permit violations of law. The effect of the new Executive Order is substantially the same as Recommendation 5.
+Recommendation 4 -- To supplement the prohibitions in the 1947 National Security Act against the CIA exercising "police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions," the CIA should be prohibited from conducting domestic security activities within the United States, except as specifically permitted by these recommendations.
+Recommendation 5 -- The Director of Central Intelligence should be made responsible for "coordinating" the protection of sources and methods of the intelligence community. As head of the CIA, the Director should also be responsible in the first instance for the security of CIA facilities, personnel, operations, and information. Neither function, however, authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence to violate any federal or state law, or to take any action which is otherwise inconsistent with statutes implementing these recommendations.
+<center>
+<em>CIA Activities Within the United States</em>
+</center>
+. Wiretapping, Mail Opening and Unauthorized Entry. -- The Committee's recommendations on CIA domestic activities apply primarily to actions directed at Americans. However, in Recommendation 6 the Committee recommends that the most intrusive and dangerous investigative techniques (electronic surveillance;[13] mail opening; or unauthorized entry 14) should be used in the United States only by the FBI and only pursuant to the judicial warrant procedures described in Recommendations 53, 54 and 55.
+This approach is similar to the Executive order except that the Order permits the CIA to open mail in the United States pursuant to applicable statutes and regulations (i.e., with a warrant). The Committee's recommendations (see Parts iii and iv), places all three techniques -- mail opening, electronic surveillance and unauthorized entry -- under judicial warrant procedures and centralizes their use within the FBI under Attorney General supervision. The Committee sees no justification for distinguishing among these techniques, all of which represent an exercise of domestic police powers 15 which is inappropriate for a U.S. foreign intelligence agency within the United States and which inherently involve special dangers to civil liberties and personal privacy.
+. Other Covert Techniques. -- The use of other covert techniques by the CIA within the United States is sharply restricted by Recommendation 7 to specific situations.
+The Committee would permit the CIA to conduct physical surveillance of persons on the premises of its own installations and facilities. Outside of its premises, the Committee would permit the CIA to conduct limited physical surveillance and confidential inquiries of its own employees 17 as part of a preliminary security investigation.
+Although the Committee generally centralizes such investigations within the FBI, it would be too burdensome to require the Bureau to investigate every allegation that an employee has personal difficulties, which could make him a security risk, or allegations of suspicious behavior suggesting the disclosure of information. Before involving the FBI, the CIA could conduct a preliminary inquiry, which usually consists of nothing more than interviews with the subject's office colleagues, or his family, neighbors or associates, and perhaps confrontation of the subject himself. In some situations, however, limited physical surveillance might enable the CIA to resolve the allegation or to determine that there was a serious security breach involved.
+Unlike the Executive Order, however, the Committee recommendations limit this authority to present CIA employees who are subject to summary dismissal. The only remedy available to the Government for security problems with past employees is criminal prosecution or other legal action. All security leak investigations for proposed criminal prosecution should be centralized in the FBI. Authorizing the use of any covert technique against contractors and their employees, let alone former employees of CIA contractors, as the Executive Order does, would authorize CIA surveillance of too large a number of Americans. The CIA can withdraw security clearances until satisfied by the contractor that a security risk has been remedied and, in serious cases, any investigations could be handled by the FBI.
+The recommendation on the use of covert techniques within the United States also precludes the use of covert human sources such as undercover agents and informants," with one exception expressly stated to be limited to "exceptional" cases. The Committee would authorize the CIA to place an agent in a domestic group, but only for the purpose of establishing credible cover to be used in a foreign intelligence mission abroad and only when the Director of Central Intelligence finds it to be "essential" to collection of information "vital" to the United States and the Attorney General finds that the operation will be conducted tinder procedures designed to prevent misuse.[19]
+Apart from this limited exception, the CIA could not infiltrate groups within the United States for any purpose, including, as was done in the, past, the purported protection of intelligence sources and methods or the general security of the CIA's facilities and personnel. (The Executive Order prohibits infiltration of groups within the United States "for purposes of reporting on or influencing its activities or members," but does not explicitly prohibit infiltration to protect intelligence sources and methods or the physical security of the agency.)
+. Collection of Information. -- In addition to limiting the use of particular covert techniques, the Committee limits, in Recommendation 8, the situations in which the CIA may intentionally collect, by any means, information within the United States concerning Americans. The recommendation permits the CIA to collect information within the United States about Americans only with-respect to persons working for the CIA or having some other significant affiliation or contact, with CIA. The CIA should not be in the business of investigating Americans as intelligence or counterintelligence targets within the United States -- a responsibility which should be centralized in the FBI and performed only under the circumstances proposed as lawful in Part iv.
+The Executive Order only restricts CIA collection of information about Americans if the information concerns "the domestic activities of United States citizens." Unlike the Committee, the Order does not restrict CIA collection of information about foreign travel or wholly lawful international contacts and communication of Americans. As the Committee has learned from its study of the CIA's CHAOS operation, in the process of gathering information about the international travel and contacts of Americans, the CIA acquired within the United States a great deal of additional information about the domestic activities of Americans.
+The Executive Order also permits collection within the United States of information about the domestic activities of Americans in several other instances not permitted under the Committee recommendations:
+(a) Collection of "foreign intelligence or counterintelligence" about the domestic activity of commercial organizations. (The Committee's restrictions on the collection of information apply to investigations of organizations as well as individuals.) ;
+(b) Collection of information concerning the identity of persons in contact with CIA employees or with foreigners who are subjects of a counterintelligence inquiry. (Within the United States, the Committee would require any investigations to collect such information to be conducted by the FBI, and only if authorized under Part iv, and subject to its procedural controls.) ;
+(c) Collection of "foreign intelligence" from a cooperating source within the United States about the domestic activities of Americans. "Foreign intelligence," is an exceedingly broad and vague standard. The use of such a standard raises the prospect of another Project CHAOS. (The Committee would prohibit such collection by the CIA within the United States, except with respect to persons presently or prospectively affiliated with CIA.) ;
+(d) Collection of information about Americans "reasonably believed" to be acting on behalf of a foreign power or engaging in international terrorist or narcotic activities. (The Committee would require investigations to collect,such information within the United States, to be conducted by the FBI, and only if authorized under Part iv.) ;
+(e) Collection of information concerning persons considered by the CIA to pose a clear threat to intelligence agency facilities or personnel, provided such information is retained only by the "threatened" agency and that proper coordination is established with the FBI. (This was the basis for the Office of Security's RESISTANCE program investigating dissent throughout the country.) (The Committee would require any such "threat" collection outside the CIA be conducted by the FBI, and only if authorized by Part iv, or by local law enforcement.)
+Recommendation 6. -- The CIA should not conduct electronic surveillance, unauthorized entry, or mail opening within the United States for any purpose.
+Recommendation 7. -- The CIA should not employ physical surveillance, infiltration of groups or any other covert techniques against Americans within the United States except:
+(a) Physical surveillance of persons on the grounds of CIA installations;
+(b) Physical surveillance during a preliminary investigation of allegations an employee is a security risk for a limited period outside of CIA installations. Such surveillance should be conducted only upon written authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence and should be limited to the subject of the investigation and, only to the extent necessary to identify them, to persons with whom the subject has contact;
+(c) Confidential inquiries, during a preliminary investigation of allegations an employee is a security risk, of outside sources concerning medical or financial information about the subject which is relevant to those allegations;[19]
+(d) The use of identification which does not reveal CIA or government affiliation, in background and other security investigations permitted the CIA by these recommendations, and the conduct of checks, which do not reveal CIA or government affiliation for the purpose of judging the effectiveness of cover operations, upon the written authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence;
+(e) In exceptional cases, the placement or recruitment of agents within an unwitting domestic group solely for the purpose of preparing them for assignments abroad and only for as long as is necessary to accomplish that purpose. This should take place only if the Director of Central Intelligence makes a written finding that it is essential for foreign intelligence collection of vital importance to the United States, and the Attorney General makes a written finding that the operation will be conducted under procedures designed to prevent misuse of the undisclosed participation or of any information obtained therefrom.[20] In the case of any such action, no information received by CIA from the agent as a result of his position in the group should be disseminated outside the CIA unless it indicates felonious criminal conduct or threat of death or serious bodily harm, in which case dissemination should be permitted to an appropriate official agency if approved by the Attorney General.
+Recommendation 8. -- The CIA should not collect 21 information within the United States concerning Americans except:
+(a) Information concerning CIA employees,[22] CIA contractors and their employees, or applicants for such employment or contracting;
+(b) Information concerning individuals or organizations providing, or offering to provide,[23] assistance to the CIA;
+(c) Information concerning individuals or organizations being considered by the CIA as potential sources of information or assistance;[24]
+(d) Visitors to CIA facilities;[25]
+(e) Persons otherwise in the immediate vicinity of sensitive CIA sites;[26] or
+(f) Persons who give their informed written consent to such collection.
+In (a), (b) and (c) above, information should be collected only if necessary for the purpose of determining the person's fitness for employment, contracting or assistance. If, in the course of such collection, information is obtained which indicates criminal activity, it should be transmitted to the FBI or other appropriate agency. When an American's relationship with the CIA is prospective, information should only be collected if there is a bona fide expectation the person might be used by the CIA.
+<center>
+<em>CIA Activities Outside of the United States</em>
+</center>
+The Committee would permit a wider range of CIA activities against Americans abroad than it would permit the CIA to undertake within the United States, but it would not permit the CIA to investigate abroad the lawful activities of Americans to any greater degree than the FBI could investigate such activities at home.
+Abroad, the FBI is not in-a position to protect the CIA from serious threats to its facilities or personnel, or to investigate all serious security violations. To the extent it is impractical to rely on local law enforcement authorities, the CIA should be free to preserve its security by specified appropriate investigations which may involve Americans, including surveillance, of persons other than its own employees.
+The Committee gives to the FBI the sole responsibility within the United States for authorized domestic security investigations of Americans. However, when such an investigation has overseas aspects, the FBI looks to the CIA as the overseas operational arm of the intelligence community. The recommendations would authorize the CIA to target Americans abroad as part of an authorized investigation initiated by the FBI.
+The Committee does not recommend permitting the CIA itself to initiate such investigations of Americans overseas.[27] Present communications permit rapid consultation with the Department of Justice. Moreover, the lesson of CHAOS is that an American's activities abroad may be ambiguous, such as contact with persons who may be acting on behalf of hostile foreign powers at an international conference on disarmament. The question is who shall determine there is sufficient information to justify making an American citizen a target of his government's intelligence apparatus?
+The limitations contained in Recommendation 9 only pertain to the CIA initiating investigations or otherwise intentionally collecting information on Americans abroad. The CIA would not be prohibited from accepting and passing on information on the illegal activities of Americans which the CIA acquires incidentally in the course of its other activities abroad.
+The Committee believes that judgments should be centralized within the Justice Department to promote consistent, carefully controlled application of the appropriate standards and protection of Constitutional rights. This is the same position taken by Director Colby in setting current CIA policy for mounting operations against Americans abroad. In March 1974, Director Colby formally terminated the CHAOS program and promulgated new guidelines for future activity abroad involving Americans, which, in effect, transferred such responsibilities to the Department of Justice.[28]
+The Committee is somewhat more restrictive than the Executive Order with respect to collection of information on Americans. As mentioned earlier, the Order only restricts CIA collection of information about the "domestic activities" of Americans and does not prohibit the collection of information regarding the lawful travel or international contacts of American citizens. This creates a particularly significant problem with respect to CIA activities directed against Americans abroad.
+The Order permits the CIA wider latitude abroad than do the Committee's Recommendations in two other important respects. The Order permits collection of information if the American is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power. That exemption on its face would include Americans working for a foreign country on business or legal matters or otherwise engaged in wholly lawful activities in compliance with applicable registration or other regulatory statutes. More importantly, the Order permits the CIA to collect "foreign intelligence" or "counterintelligence" information abroad about the <em>domestic activities</em> of Americans. The Order then broadly defines "foreign intelligence" as information about the intentions or activities of a foreign country or person, or information about areas outside the United States. This would authorize the CIA to collect, abroad, for example, information about the domestic activities of American businessmen which provided intelligence about business transactions of foreign persons.
+The CIA does not at present specifically collect intelligence on the economic activities of Americans overseas. The Committee suggests that appropriate oversight committees examine the question of the overseas collection of economic intelligence.
+<center>
+<em>Use of Covert Techniques Against Americans Abroad</em>
+</center>
+Recommendation 11 requires the use of all covert techniques be governed by the same standards, procedures, and approvals required for their use by the Justice Department against Americans within the United States. Thus, in the case of electronic surveillance, unauthorized entry, or mail opening, a judicial warrant would be required. As a matter of sound Constitutional principle, the Fourth Amendment protections enjoyed by Americans at home should also apply to protect them against their Government abroad. It would be just as offensive to have a CIA agent burglarize an American's apartment in Rome as it would be for the FBI to do so in New York.
+Requirements that a warrant be obtained in the United States would not present an excessive burden. Electronic surveillance and unauthorized entries are not presently conducted against Americans abroad without prior consultation and approval from CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Moreover, the, present Deputy Director of CIA for Operations has testified that bona fide counterintelligence investigations are lengthy and time consuming and prior review within the United States, including consultation with the Justice Department, would not be a serious problem.[29] Indeed electronic surveillance of Americans abroad under present administration policy also requires approval by the Attorney General.
+The Committee reinforces the general restrictions upon overseas targeting of Americans by recommending that the CIA be prohibited from requesting a friendly foreign intelligence service or other person from undertaking activities against Americans which the CIA itself may not do. This would not require that a foreign government's use of covert techniques be conducted under the same procedures, e.g., warrants, required by those Recommendations for the CIA and the FBI. It would mean that the CIA cannot ask a foreign intelligence service to bug the apartment of an American unless the circumstances would permit the United States Government to obtain a judicial warrant from a Federal Court in this country to conduct such surveillance of the American abroad.
+The Committee places greater restrictions upon the CIA's use of covert techniques against Americans abroad than does the Executive Order. For example, the Order permits the CIA to conduct electronic surveillance and unauthorized entries under "procedures approved by the Attorney General consistent with the law." No judicial warrant procedure is required. In addition, the Order's restriction on CIA's opening mail of Americans is limited to mail "in the United States postal channels." In other words, under the Order the CIA is not prevented from intercepting abroad and opening a letter mailed by an American to his family, or sent to him from the United States.
+The Order also contains no restrictions on the CIA infiltrating a group abroad, even if it were one composed entirely of Americans engaged in wholly lawful activities such as a political club of American students in Paris. Furthermore, the Order permits the CIA to conduct physical surveillance abroad of any American "reasonably believed to be" engaged in "activities threatening to the national security." On its face this language appears overly permissive and might be read to authorize a repetition of the CHAOS program in which Americans were targeted for surveillance because of their participation in international conferences critical of the U.S. role in Vietnam.
+Recommendation 9. -- The CIA should not collect information abroad concerning Americans except:
+(a) Information concerning Americans which it is permitted to collect within the United States;[30]
+(b) At the request of the Justice Department as part of criminal investigations or an investigation of an American for suspected terrorist,[30]  or hostile foreign intelligence 30b activities or security leak or security risk investigations which the FBI has opened pursuant to Part iv of those recommendations and which is conducted consistently with recommendations contained in Part iv.[31]
+Recommendation 10. -- The CIA should be able to transmit to the FBI or other appropriate agencies information concerning Americans acquired as the incidental byproduct of otherwise permissible foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations,[32] whenever such information indicates any activity in violation of American law.
+Recommendation 11. -- The CIA may employ covert techniques abroad against Americans:
+(a) Under circumstances in which the CIA could use such covert techniques against Americans within the United States;[33] or
+(b) When collecting information as part of Justice Department investigation, in which case the CIA may use a particular covert techniques under the standards and procedures and approvals applicable to its use against Americans within the United States by the FBI (See Part iv); or
+(c) To the extent necessary to identify persons known or suspected to be Americans who come in contact with foreigners the CIA is investigating.
+<center>
+<em>CIA Human Experiments and Drug Use</em>
+</center>
+Recommendation 12 tracks similar restrictions in the Executive Order but proposes an additional safeguard -- giving the National Commission on Biomedical Ethics and Human Standards jurisdiction to review any testing on Americans.
+Recommendation 12 -- The CIA should not use in experimentation on human subjects, any drug, device or procedure which is designed or intended to harm, or is reasonably likely to harm, the physical or mental health of the human subject, except with the informed written consent, witnessed by a disinterested third party, of each human subject, and in accordance with the guidelines issued by the National Cornmission for the Protection of Human Subjects for Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The jurisdiction of the Commission should be amended to include the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies of the United States Government.
+<center>
+<em>Review and Certification</em>
+</center>
+Recommendation 13 ensures careful monitoring of those CIA activities authorized in the recommendations which are directed at Americans.
+Recommendation 13 -- Any CIA activity engaged in pursuant to Recommendations 7, 8, 9, 10, or 11 should be subject to periodic review and certification of compliance with the Constitution, applicable statutes, agency regulations and executive orders by:
+(a) The Inspector General of the CIA;
+(b) The General Counsel of the CIA in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence;
+(c) The Attorney General; and
+(d) The oversight committee recommended in Part xii.
+All such certifications should be available for review by congressional oversight committees.
+<em>b.</em> <em>National Security Agency</em>
+The recommendations contained in this section suggest controls on the electronic surveillance activities of the National Security Agency insofar as they involve, or could involve, Americans. There is no statute which either authorizes or specifically restricts such activities. NSA was created by executive order in 1952, and its functions are described in directives of the National Security Council.
+While, in practice, NSA's collection activities are complex and sophisticated, the process by which it produces foreign intelligence can be reduced to a few easily understood principles. NSA intercepts messages passing over international lines of communication, some of which have one terminal within the United States. Traveling over these lines of communication, especially those with one terminal in the United States, are the messages of Americans, most of which are irrelevant to NSA's foreign intelligence mission. NSA often has no means of excluding such messages, however, from others it intercepts which might be of foreign intelligence value. It does have, however, the capability to select particular messages from those it intercepts which are of foreign intelligence value. Most international communications of Americans are not selected, since they do not meet foreign intelligence criteria. Having selected messages of possible intelligence value, NSA monitors (reads) them, and uses the information it obtains as the basis for reports which it furnishes the intelligence agencies.
+Having this process in mind, one will more readily understand the recommendations of the Committee insofar as NSA's handling of the messages of Americans is concerned. The Committee recommends first that NSA monitor only foreign communications. It should not monitor domestic communications, even for foreign intelligence purposes. Second, the Committee recommends that NSA should not select messages for monitoring, from those foreign communications it has intercepted, because the message is to or from or refers to a particular American, unless the Department of Justice has first obtained a search warrant, or the particular American has consented. Third, the Committee recommends that NSA be required to make every practicable effort to eliminate or minimize the extent to which the communications of Americans are intercepted, selected, or monitored. Fourth, for those communications of Americans which are nevertheless incidentally selected and monitored, the Committee recommends that NSA be prohibited from disseminating such communication, or information derived therefrom, which identifies an American, unless the communication indicates evidence of hostile foreign intelligence or terrorist activity, or felonious criminal conduct, or contains a threat of death or serious bodily harm. In these cases, the Committee recommends that the Attorney General approve any such dissemination as being consistent with these policies.
+In summary, the Committee's recommendations reflect its belief that NSA should have no greater latitude to monitor the communications of Americans than any other intelligence agency. To the extent that other agencies are required to obtain a warrant before monitoring the communications of Americans, NSA should be required to obtain a warrant.[34]
+Recommendation 14. -- NSA should not engage in domestic security activities. Its functions should be limited in a precisely drawn legislative charter to the collection of foreign intelligence from foreign communications.[35]
+Recommendation 15. -- NSA should take all practicable measures consistent with its foreign intelligence mission to eliminate or minimize the interception, selection, and monitoring of communications of Americans from the foreign communications.[36]
+Recommendation 16. -- NSA should not be permitted to select for monitoring any communication to, from, or about an American without his consent, except for the purpose of obtaining information about hostile foreign intelligence or terrorist activities, and then only if a warrant approving such monitoring is obtained in accordance with procedures similar[37] to those contained in Title Ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
+(This recommendation would eliminate the possibility that NSA would re-establish its "watch lists" of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In that case, the names of Americans were submitted to NSA by other federal agencies and were used as a basis for selecting and monitoring, without a warrant, the international communications of those Americans.)
+Recommendation 17. -- Any personally identifiable information about an American which NSA incidentally acquires, other than pursuant to a warrant, should not be disseminated without the consent of the American, but should be destroyed as promptly as possible, unless it indicates:
+(a) Hostile foreign intelligence or terrorist activities; or
+(b) Felonious criminal conduct for which a warrant might be obtained pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968; or
+(c) A threat of death or serious bodily harm.
+If dissemination is permitted, by (a), (b) and (c) above, it must only be made to an appropriate official and after approval by the Attorney General.
+(This recommendation is consistent with NSA's policy prior to the Executive Order.[38] NSA's practice prior to the Executive Order was not to disseminate material containing personally identifiable information about Americans.)
+Recommendation 18. -- NSA should not request from any commercial carrier any communication which it could not otherwise obtain pursuant to these recommendations.
+(This recommendation is to ensure that NSA will not resume an operation such as SHAMROCK, disclosed during the Committee's hearings, whereby NSA received for almost 30 years copies of most international telegrams transmitted by certain international telegraph companies in the United States.)
+Recommendation 19. -- The Office of Security at NSA should be permitted to collect background information on present or prospective employees or contractors of NSA, solely for the purpose of determining their fitness for employment. With respect to security risks or the security of its installations, NSA should be permitted to conduct physical surveillances, consistent with such surveillances as the CIA is permitted to conduct, in similar circumstances, by these recommendations.
+<center>
+<em>c.</em> <em>Military Service and Defense Department Investigative Agencies</em>
+</center>
+This section of the Committee's recommendations pertains to the controls upon the intelligence activities of the military services and Department of Defense insofar as they involve Americans who are not members of or affiliated with the armed forces.
+In general, the restrictions seek to limit military investigations to activities in the civilian community which are necessary and pertinent to the military mission, and which cannot feasibly be accomplished by civilian agencies. In overseas locations where civilian agencies do not perform investigative activities to assist the military mission, military intelligence is given more latitude. Specifically, the Committee recommends that military intelligence be limited within the United States to conducting investigations of violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice; investigations for security clearances of Department of Defense employees and contractors; and investigations immediately before and during the deployment of armed forces in connection with civil disturbances. None of these investigations should involve the use of any covert technique employed against American civilians. In overseas locations, the Committee recommends that military intelligence have additional authority to conduct investigations of terrorist activity and hostile foreign intelligence activity. In these cases, covert techniques directed at Americans may be employed if consistent with the Committee's restrictions upon the use of such techniques in the United States in Part iv.
+Recommendation 20. -- Except as specifically provided herein, the Department of Defense should not engage in domestic security activities. Its functions, as they relate to the activities of the foreign intelligence community, should be limited in a precisely drawn legislative charter to the conduct of foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence activities and tactical military intelligence activities abroad, and production, analysis, and dissemination of departmental intelligence.
+Recommendation 21. -- In addition to its foreign intelligence responsibility, the Department of Defense has a responsibility to investigate its personnel in order to protect the security of its installations and property, to ensure order and discipline within its ranks, and to conduct other limited investigations once dispatched by the President to suppress a civil disorder. A legislative charter should define precisely -- in a manner which is not inconsistent with these recommendations -- the authorized scope and purpose of any investigations undertaken by the Department of Defense to satisfy these responsibilities.
+Recommendation 22. -- No agency of the Department of Defense should conduct investigations of violations of criminal law or otherwise perform any law enforcement or domestic security functions within the United States, except on military bases or concerning military personnel, to enforce the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
+<center>
+<em>Control of Civil Disturbance Intelligence</em>
+</center>
+The Department of the Army has executive responsibility for rendering assistance in connection with civil disturbances. In the late 1960s, it instituted a nationwide collection program in which Army investigators were dispatched to collect information on the political activities of Americans. This was done on the theory that such information was necessary to prepare the Army in the event that its troops were sent to the scene of civil disturbances. The Committee believes that the Army's potential role in civil disturbances does not justify such an intelligence effort directed against American civilians.
+Recommendation 23. -- The Department of Defense should not be permitted to conduct investigations of Americans on the theory that the information derived therefrom might be useful in potential civil disorders. The Army should be permitted to gather information about geography, logistical matters, or the identity of local officials which is necessary to the positioning, support, and use of troops in an area where troops are likely to be deployed by the President in connection with a civil disturbance. The Army should be permitted to investigate Americans involved in such disturbances after troops have been deployed to the site of a civil disorder, (i) to the extent necessary to fulfill the military mission, and (ii) to the extent the information cannot be obtained from the FBI. (The FBI's responsibility in connection with civil disorders and its assistance to the Army is described in Part IV.)
+Recommendation 24. -- Appropriate agencies of the Department of Defense should be permitted to collect background information on their present or prospective employees or contractors. With respect to security risks or the security of its installations, the Department of Defense should be permitted to conduct physical surveillance consistent with such surveillances as the CIA is permitted to conduct, in similar circumstances, by these recommendations.
+<center>
+<em>Prohibitions and Limitations of Covert Techniques</em>
+</center>
+During the Army's civil disturbance collection program of the late 1960s, Army intelligence agents employed a variety of covert techniques to gather information about civilian political activities. These included covert penetrations of private meetings and organizations, use of informants, monitoring amateur radio broadcasts, and posing as newsmen. This provision is designed to prevent the use of such covert techniques against American civilians. The Committee believes that none of the legitimate investigative tasks of the military within the United States justified the use of such techniques against unaffiliated Americans.
+Recommendation 25. -- Except as provided in 27 below, the Department of Defense should not direct any covert technique (e.g., electronic surveillance, informants, etc.) at American civilians.
+<center>
+<em>Limited investigations Abroad</em>
+</center>
+The military services currently conduct preventive intelligence investigations within the United States where members of their respective services are agents of, or are collaborating with, a hostile foreign intelligence service. These investigations are coordinated with, and under the ultimate control of, the FBI. The Committee's recommendations are not intended to prevent the military services from continuing to assist the FBI with such investigations involving members of the armed forces. They are intended, however, to place responsibility for these investigations, insofar as they take place within the United States, in the FBI, and not in the military services themselves. The military services, on the other band, are given additional responsibility to conduct investigations of Americans who are suspected of engaging in terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity in overseas locations.
+Recommendation 26. -- The Department of Defense should be permitted to conduct abroad preventive intelligence investigations of unaffiliated Americans as described in Part iv below, provided 'Such investigations are first approved by the FBI. Such investigations by the Department of Defense, including the use of covert techniques, should ordinarily be conducted in a manner consistent with the recommendations pertaining to the FBI, contained in Part iv; however, overseas locations, where U.S. military forces constitute the governing power, or where U.S. military forces are engaged in hostilities, circumstances may require greater latitude to conduct such investigations.
+*** iii. Non-Intelligence Agencies Should Be Barred From Domestic Security Activity
+<em>a.</em> <em>Internal Revenue Service</em>
+The Committee's review of intelligence collection and investigative activity by IRS' Intelligence Division and of the practice of furnishing information in IRS files to the intelligence agencies demonstrates that reforms are necessary and appropriate. The primary objective of reform is to prevent IRS from becoming an instrumentality of the intelligence agencies, beyond the scope of what IRS, as the Federal tax collector, should be doing. Recommendations 27 through 29 are designed to achieve this objective by providing that IRS collection of intelligence and its conduct of investigations are to be confined strictly to tax matters. Moreover, programs of tax investigation, in which targets are selected partly because of indications of tax violations and partly because of reasons relating to domestic security, are prohibited where they would erode constitutional rights. Where otherwise appropriate, such programs must be conducted under special safeguards to prevent any adverse effect on the exercise of those rights.
+These recommendations should prevent a recurrence of the excesses associated with the Special Services Staff and the Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System.
+<em>Targeting of Persons or Groups for Investigations or Intelligence-Gathering by IRS</em>[39]
+Recommendation 27. -- The IRS should not, on behalf of any intelligence agency or for its own use, collect any information about the activities of Americans except for the purposes of enforcing the tax laws.
+Recommendation 28. -- IRS should not select any person or group for tax investigation on the basis of political activity or for any other reason not relevant to enforcement of the tax laws.
+Recommendation 29. -- Any program of intelligence investigation relating to domestic security in which targets are selected by both tax and non-tax criteria should only be initiated:
+(a) Upon the written request of the Attorney General or the Secretary of the Treasury, specifying the nature of the requested program and the need therefore; and
+(b) After the written certification by the Commissioner of the IRS that procedures have been developed which are sufficient to prevent the infringement of the constitutional rights of Americans; and
+(c) With congressional oversight committees being kept continually advised of the nature and extent of such programs.
+<center>
+<em>Disclosure Procedures</em>
+</center>
+The Committee's review of disclosure of tax information by IRS to the FBI and the CIA showed three principal abuses by those intelligence agencies: (1) the by-passing of disclosure procedures mandated by law, resulting in the agencies obtaining access to tax returns and tax-related information through improper channels, and, sometimes, without a proper basis; (2) the failure to state the reasons justifying the need for the information and the uses contemplated so that IRS could determine if the request met the applicable criteria for disclosure; and (3) the improper use of tax returns and information, particularly by the FBI in COINTELPRO. Recommendations 30 through 35 are designed to prevent these abuses from occurring again.
+While general problems of disclosure are being studied by several different congressional committees with jurisdiction over IRS, these recommendations reflect this Committee's focus on disclosure problems seen in the interaction between IRS and the intelligence agencies.
+Recommendation 30. -- No intelligence agency should request 40 from the Internal Revenue Service tax returns or tax related information except under the statutes and regulations controlling such disclosures. In addition, the existing procedures under which tax returns and tax-related information are released by the IRS should be strengthened, as suggested in the following five recommendations.
+Recommendation 31. -- All requests from an intelligence agency to the IRS for tax returns and tax-related information should be in writing, and signed by the bead of the intelligence agency making the request, or his designee. Copies of such requests should be filed with the Attorney General. Each request should include a clear statement of:
+(d) The purpose for which disclosure is sought;
+(e) Facts sufficient to establish that the requested information is needed by the requesting agency for the performance of an authorized and lawful function;
+(f) The uses which the requesting agency intends to make of the information;
+(g) The extent of the disclosures sought;
+(h) Agreement by the requesting agency not to use the documents or information for any purpose other than that stated in the request; and
+(i) Agreement by the requesting agency that the information will not be disclosed to any other agency or person except in accordance with the law.
+Recommendation 32. -- IRS should not release tax returns or taxrelated information to any intelligence agency unless it has received a request satisfying the requirements of Recommendation 31, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has approved the request in writing.
+Recommendation 33. -- IRS should maintain a record of all such requests and responses thereto for a period of twenty years.
+Recommendation 34. -- No intelligence agency should use the information supplied to it by the IRS pursuant to a request of the agency except as stated in a proper request for disclosure.
+Recommendation 35. -- All requests for information sought by the FBI should be filed by the Department of Justice. Such requests should be signed by the Attorney General or his designee, following a determination by the Department that the request is proper under the applicable statutes and regulations.
+<em>b.</em> <em>Post Office (U.S. Postal Service)</em>
+These recommendations are designed to tighten the existing restrictions regarding requests by intelligence agencies for both inspection of the exteriors of mail ("mail cover") and inspection of the contents of first class mail ("mail opening"). As to mail cover, the Committee's recommendation is to centralize the review and approval of all requests by requiring that only the Attorney General may authorize mail cover, and to eliminate unjustified mail covers by requiring that the mail cover be found "necessary" to a domestic security investigation. With respect to mail opening, the recommendations provide that it can only be done pursuant to court warrant.
+Recommendation 36. -- The Post Office should not Permit the FBI or any intelligence agency to inspect markings or addresses on first class mail, nor should the Post Office itself inspect markings or addresses on behalf of the FBI or any intelligence agency, on first class mail, except upon the written approval of the Attorney General or his designee. Where one of the correspondents is an American, the Attorney General or his designee should only approve such inspection for domestic security purposes upon a written finding that it is necessary to a criminal investigation or a preventive intelligence investigation of terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity.
+Upon such a request, the Post Office may temporarily remove from circulation such correspondence for the purpose of such inspection of its exterior as is related to the investigation.
+Recommendation 37. -- The Post Office should not transfer the custody of any first class mail to any agency except the Department of Justice. Such mail should not be transferred or opened except upon a judicial search warrant.
+(a) In the case of mail where one of the correspondents is an American, the judge must find that there is probable cause to believe that the mail contains evidence, of a crime.[41]
+(b) In the case of mail where both parties are foreigners:
+l. ) The judge must find that there is probable cause to believe that both parties to such correspondence are foreigners, and one of the correspondents is an officer, employee or conscious agent of a foreign power; and
+m. ) The Attorney General must certify that the mail opening is likely to reveal information necessary either (i) to the protection of the nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of force of a foreign power; (ii) to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States; or (iii) to protect national security information against hostile foreign intelligence activity.
+*** iv. Federal Domestic Security Activities Should Be Limited and Controlled to Prevent Abuses Without Hampering Criminal Investigations or Investigations of Foreign Espionage
+The recommendations contained in this part are designed to accomplish two principal objectives: (1) prohibit improper intelligence activities and (2) define the limited domestic security investigations which should be permitted. As suggested earlier, the ultimate goal is a statutory mandate for the federal government's domestic security function that will ensure that the FBI, as the primary domestic security investigative agency, concentrates upon criminal conduct as opposed to political rhetoric or association. Our recommendations would vastly curtail the scope of domestic security investigations as they have been conducted, by prohibiting inquiries initiated because the Bureau regards a group as falling within a vaguely defined category such as "subversive," "New Left," "Black Nationalist Hate Groups," or "White Hate Groups." The recommendations also ban investigations based merely upon the fact that a person or group is associating with others who are being investigated (e.g., the Bureau's investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference because of alleged "Communist infiltration").
+The simplest way to eliminate investigations of peaceful speech and association would be to limit the FBI to traditional investigations of crimes which have been committed (including the crimes of attempt and conspiracy). The Committee found, however, that there are circumstances where the FBI should have authority to conduct limited "intelligence investigations" of threatened conduct (terrorism and foreign espionage) which is generally covered by the criminal law, where the conduct has not yet reached the stage of a prosecuteable act.
+The Committee, however, found that abuses were frequently associated even with such intelligence investigations. This led us also to recommend: precise limitations upon the use of covert techniques (Recommendations 51 to 60) ; restrictions upon maintenance and dissemination of information gathered in such investigations (Recommendations 64 to 68) ; and a statutory requirement that the Attorney General monitor these investigations and terminate them as soon as practical (Recommendation 69).
+<em>a.</em> <em>Centralize Supervision, Investigative Responsibility, and the Use of Covert Techniques</em>
+Investigations should be centralized within the Department of Justice. It is the Committee's judgment that if former Attorneys General had been held accountable by the Congress for ensuring compliance by the FBI and the intelligence agencies with laws designed to protect the rights of Americans, the Department of Justice would have been more likely to discover and enjoin improper activities. Furthermore, centralizing domestic security investigations within the FBI will facilitate the Attorney General's supervision of them.
+Recommendation 38. -- All domestic security investigative activity, including the use of covert techniques, should be centralized within the Federal Bureau of Investigation, except those investigations by the Secret Service designed to protect the life of the President or other Secret Service protectees. Such investigations and the use of covert techniques in those investigations should be centralized within the Secret Service.
+Recommendation 39. -- All domestic security activities of the federal government and all other intelligence agency activities covered by the Domestic Intelligence Recommendations should be subject to Justice Department oversight to assure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
+<em>b.</em> <em>Prohibitions</em>
+The Committee recommends a set of prohibitions, in addition to its later recommendations limiting the scope of and procedural controls for domestic security investigations.
+The following prohibitions cover abuses ranging from the political use of the sensitive information maintained by the Bureau to the excesses of COINTELPRO. They are intended to cover activities engaged in, by, or on behalf of, the FBI. For example, in prohibiting Bureau interference in lawful speech, publication, assembly, organization, or association of Americans, the Committee intends to prohibit a Bureau agent from mailing fake letters to factionalize a group as well as to prohibit an informant from manipulating or influencing the peaceful activities of a group on behalf of the FBI.
+Subsequent recommendations limit the kinds of investigations which can be opened and provide controls for those investigations. Specifically, the Committee limits FBI authority to collect information on Americans to enumerated circumstances; limits authority to maintain information on political beliefs, political assocations, or private lives of Americans; requires judicial warrants for the most intrusive covert collection techniques (electronic surveillance, mail opening, and surreptitious entry); and proposes new restrictions upon the use of other covert techniques, particularly informants.
+Recommendation 41. -- The FBI should be prohibited from engaging on its own or through informants or others, in any of the following activities directed at Americans:
+(a) Disseminating any information to the White House, any other federal official, the news media, or any other person for a political or other improper purpose, such as discrediting an opponent of the administration or a critic of an intelligence or investigative agency.
+(b) Interfering with lawful speech, publication, assembly, organizational activity, or association of Americans.
+(c) Harassing individuals through unnecessary overt investigative techniques[42] such as interviews or obvious physical surveillance for the purpose of intimidation.
+Recommendation 41. -- The Bureau should be prohibited from maintaining information on the political beliefs, political associations, or private lives of Americans except that which is clearly necessary for domestic security investigations as described in Part c.[43]
+<em>c.</em> <em>Authorized Scope of Domestic Security Investigations</em>
+The Committee sought three objectives in defining the appropriate jurisdiction of the FBI. First, we sought to carefully limit any investigations other than traditional criminal investigations to five defined areas: preventive intelligence investigations (in two areas closely related to serious criminal activity -- terrorist and hostile foreign intelligence activities), civil disorders assistance, background investigations, security risk investigations, and security leak investigations.
+Second, we sought substantially to narrow, and to impose special restrictions on the conduct of, those investigations which involved the most flagrant abuses in the past: preventive intelligence investigations and civil disorders assistance. Third, we sought to provide a clear statutory foundation for those investigations which the Committee believes are appropriate to fill the vacuum in FBI legal authority.
+Achieving the first and second objectives will have the most significant impact upon the FBI's domestic intelligence program and indeed, could eliminate almost half its workload. Recommendations 44 through 46 impose two types of restrictions upon the conduct of intelligence investigations and civil disorders assistance. First, the scope of intelligence investigations is limited to terrorist activities or espionage, and the scope of civil disorders assistance is limited to civil disorders which may require federal troops. Second, the Committee suggests that the threshold for initiation of a full intelligence investigation be "reasonable Suspicion."[44] Preliminary intelligence investigations -- limited in scope, duration, and investigative technique -- could be opened upon a "specific allegation or specific or substantiated information." A written finding by the Attorney General of a likely need for federal troops is required for civil disorders assistance.
+The Committee's approach to FBI domestic security investigations is basically the same as that adopted by the Attorney General's guidelines for domestic security investigations. Both are cautious about any departures from former Attorney General Stone's maxim that the FBI should only conduct criminal investigations. For example, neither the Committee nor the Attorney General would condone investigations which are totally unrelated to criminal statutes (e.g., the FBI's 1970 investigation of all black student unions).
+However, the Committee views its recommendations as a somewhat more limited departure from former Attorney General Stone's line than the present Attorney General's guidelines. First, the Committee would only permit intelligence investigations with respect to hostile foreign intelligence activity and terrorism. The Attorney General's guidelines have been read by FBI officials as authorizing intelligence investigations of "subversives" (individuals who may attempt to overthrow the government in the indefinite future). While the Justice Department, under its current leadership, might not adopt such an interpretation, a different Attorney General might. Second, the guidelines on their face appear to permit investigating essentially local civil disobedience (e.g., "use of force" to interfere with state or local government which could be construed too broadly).
+There are two reasons why the Committee would prohibit intelligence investigations of "subversives" or local civil disobedience. First, those investigations inherently risk abuse because they inevitably require surveillance of lawful speech and association rather than criminal conduct. The Committee's examination of forty years of investigations into "subversion" has found the term to be so vague as to constitute a license to investigate almost any activity of practically any group that actively opposes the policies of the administration in power.
+A second reason for prohibiting intelligence investigations of "subversion" and local civil disobedience is that both can be adequately handled by less intrusive methods without unnecessarily straining limited Bureau resources. Any real threats to our form of government can be best identified through intelligence investigations focused on persons who may soon commit illegal violent acts. Local civil disobedience can be best handled by local police. Indeed, recent studies by the General Accounting Office suggest that FBI investigations in these areas result in very few prosecutions and little information of help to authorities in preventing violence.
+The FBI now expends more money in its domestic security program than it does in its organized crime program, and, indeed, twice the amount on "internal security" informant operations as on organized crime informant coverage. "Subversive investigations" and "civil disorders assistance" represent almost half the caseload of the FBI domestic security program. The national interest would be better served if Bureau resources were directed at terrorism, hostile foreign intelligence activity, or organized crime, all more serious and pressing threats to the nation than "subversives" or local civil disobedience.
+For similar reasons, the Committee, like the Attorney General's guidelines, requires "reasonable suspicion" for preventive intelligence investigations which extend beyond a preliminary stage. Investigations of terrorism and hostile foreign intelligence activity which are not limited in time and scope could lead to the same abuses found in intelligence investigations of subversion or local civil disobedience. However, an equally important reason for this standard is that it should increase the efficiency of Bureau investigations. The General Accounting Office found that when the FBI initiated its investigations on "soft evidence" -- evidence which probably would not meet this "reasonable suspicion" standard - - it usually wasted its time on an innocent target. When it initiated its investigation on harder evidence, its ability to detect imminent violence improved significantly.
+The Committee's recommendations limit preventive intelligence investigations to situations where information indicates that the prohibited activity will "soon" occur, whereas the guidelines do not require that the activity be imminent. This limit is essential to prevent a return to sweeping, endless investigations of remote and speculative "threats." The Committee's intent is that, to open or continue a full investigation, there should be a substantial indication of terrorism or hostile foreign intelligence activity in the near future.
+The Committee's restrictions are intended to eliminate unnecessary investigations and to provide additional protections for constitutional rights. Shifting the focus of Bureau manpower in domestic security investigations from lawful speech and association to criminal conduct by terrorists and foreign spies provides further protection for constitutional rights of Americans as well as serving the nation's interest in security.
+<em>1.</em> <em>Investigations of Committed or Imminent Offenses</em>
+Recommendation 42. -- The FBI should be permitted to investigate a committed act which may violate a federal criminal statute pertaining to the domestic security to determine the identity of the perpetrator or to determine whether the act violates such a statute.
+Recommendation 43. -- The FBI should be permitted to investigate an American or foreigner to obtain evidence of criminal activity where there is "reasonable suspicion" that the American or foreigner has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a specific act which violates a federal statute pertaining to the domestic security.[45]
+<em>2.</em> <em>Preventive Intelligence Investigations</em>
+Recommendation 44. -- The FBI should be permitted to conduct a preliminary preventive intelligence investigation of an American or foreigner where it has a specific allegation or specific or substantiated information that the American or foreigner will soon engage in terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity. Such a preliminary investigation should not continue longer than thirty days from receipt of the information unless the Attorney General or his designee finds that the information and any corroboration which has been obtained warrants investigation for an additional period which may not exceed sixty days. If, at the outset or at any time during the course of a preliminary investigation the Bureau establishes "reasonable suspicion" that an American or foreigner will soon engage in terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity, it may conduct a full preventive intelligence investigation. Such full investigation should not continue longer than one year except upon a finding of compelling circumstances by the Attorney General or his designee.
+In no event should the FBI open a preliminary or full preventive intelligence investigation based upon information that an American is advocating political ideas or engaging in lawful political activities or is associating with others for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of grievances or other such constitutionally protected purpose.
+The second paragraph of Recommendation 44 will serve as an important safeguard if enacted into any statute authorizing preventive intelligence investigations. It would supplement the protection that would be afforded by limiting the FBI's intelligence investigations to terrorist and hostile foreign intelligence activities. It re-emphasizes the Committee's intent that the investigations of peaceful protest groups and other lawful associations should not recur. It serves as a further reminder that advocacy of political ideas is not to be the basis for governmental surveillance. At the same time Recommendation 44 permits the initiation of investigations where the Bureau possesses information consisting of a "specific allegation or specific or substantiated information that [an] American or foreigner will soon engage in terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity."
+This recommendation has been among the most difficult of the domestic intelligence recommendations to draft. It was difficult because it represents the Committee's effort to draw the fine line between legitimate investigations of conduct and illegitimate investigations of advocacy and association. Originally the Committee was of the view that a threshold of "reasonable suspicion" should apply to initiating even limited preliminary intelligence investigations of terrorist or hostile foreign intelligence activities. However, the Committee was persuaded by the Department of Justice that, having narrowly defined terrorist and hostile foreign intelligence activities, a "reasonable suspicion" threshold might be unworkable at the preliminary stage. Such a threshold might prohibit the FBI from investigating an allegation of extremely dangerous activity made by an anonymous source or a source of unknown reliability. The "reasonable suspicion" standard requires that the investigator have confidence in the reliability of the individual providing the information and some corroboration of the information.
+However, the Committee is cautious in proposing a standard of "specific allegation or specific or substantiated information" because it permits initiation of a preliminary investigation which includes the use of physical surveillance and a survey of, but not targeting of, existing confidential human sources. The Committee encourages the Attorney General to work with the Congress to improve upon the language we recommend in Recommendation 44 before including it in any legislative charter. If adopted, both the Attorney General and the appropriate oversight committees should periodically conduct a careful review of the application of the standard by the FBI.
+The ultimate goal which Congress should seek in enacting such legislation is the development of a standard for the initiation of intelligence investigations which permits investigations of credible allegations of conduct which if uninterrupted will soon result in terrorist activities or hostile foreign intelligence activities as we define them. It must not permit investigations of constitutionally protected activities as the Committee described them in the last paragraph of Recommendation 44. The following are examples of the Committee's intent.
+Recommendation 44 would prohibit the initiation of an investigation based upon "mere advocacy:"
+-An investigation could not be initiated, for example, when the Bureau receives an allegation that a member of a dissident group has made statements at the group's meeting that "America needs a Marxist-Leninist government and needs to get rid of the fat cat capitalist pigs."
+The Committee has found serious abuses in past FBI investigations of groups. In the conduct of these investigations, the FBI often failed to distinguish between members who were engaged in criminal activity and those who were exercising their constitutional rights of association. The Committee's recommendations would only permit investigation of a group in two situations: first, where the FBI receives information that the avowed purpose of the group is "soon to engage in terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity"; or second, where the FBI has information that unidentified members of a group are "soon to engage in terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity". In both cases the FBI may focus on the group to determine the identity of those members who plan soon to engage in such activity. However, in both cases the FBI should minimize the collection of information about law-abiding members of the group or any lawful activities of the group.
+-Where the FBI has information that certain chapters of a political organization had "action squads," the purpose of which was to commit terrrorist acts, the FBI could investigate all members of a particular "action squad" where it had an allegation that this "action squad" planned to assassinate, for example, Members of Congress.
+-An investigation could be initiated based upon specific information obtained by the FBI that unidentified members of a Washington, D.C., group are planning to assassinate Members of Congress.
+The Committee's recommendations would not permit investigation of mere association:
+-The FBI could not investigate an allegation that a member of the Klan has lunch regularly with the mayor of a southern community.
+-The FBI could not investigate the allegation that a U.S. Senator attended a cocktail party at a foreign embassy where a foreign intelligence agent was present.
+However, when additional facts are added indicating conduct which might constitute terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity, investigation might be authorized:
+-The FBI could initiate an investigation of a dynamite dealer who met with a member of the "action squad" described above.
+-Likewise, the FBI could initiate an investigation of a member of the National Security Council staff who met clandestinely with a known foreign intelligence agent in an obscure Paris restaurant.
+Investigations of contacts can become quite troublesome when the contact takes place within the context of political activities or association for the purpose of petitioning the government. Law-abiding American protest groups may share common goals with groups in other countries. The obvious example was the widespread opposition in the late 1960's, at home and abroad, to America's role in Vietnam.
+Furthermore, Americans should be free to communicate about such issues with persons in other countries, to attend international conferences and to exchange views or information about planned protest activities with like-minded foreign groups. Such activity, in itself, would not be the basis for a preliminary investigation under these recommendations:
+-The FBI could not open an investigation of an anti-war group because "known communists" were also in attendance at a group meeting even if it had reason to believe that the communists' instructions were to influence the group or that the group shared the goals of the Soviet Union on ending the war in Vietnam.
+-The FBI could not open an investigation of an anti-war activist who attends an international peace conference in Oslo where foreign intelligence agents would be in attendance even if the FBI had reason to believe that they might attempt to recruit the activist. Of course, the CIA would riot he prevented from surveillance of the foreign agent's activities.
+However, if the Bureau had additional information suggesting that the activities of the Americans in the above hypothetical cases were more than mere association to petition for redress of grievances, an investigation would be legitimate.
+-Where the FBI had received information that the anti-war activist traveling to Oslo intended to meet with a person he knew to be a foreign intelligence agent to receive instructions to conduct espionage on behalf of a hostile foreign country, the FBI could open a preliminary investigation of the activist.
+The Committee cautions the Department of Justice and FBI that in opening investigations of conduct occurring in the context of political activities, it should endeavor to ensure that the allegation prompting the investigation is from a reliable source.
+Certainly, however, where the FBI has received a specific allegation or specific or substantiated information that an American or foreigner will soon engage in hostile foreign intelligence activity or terrorist activity, it may conduct an investigation. For example, it could do so:
+-Where the FBI receives information that an American has been recruited by a hostile intelligence service;
+-Where the FBI receives information that an atomic scientist has had a number of clandestine meetings with a hostile foreign intelligence agent.
+Recommendation 45. -- The FBI should be permitted to collect information to assist federal, state, and local officials in connection with a civil disorder either
+(i) After the Attorney General finds in writing that there is a clear and immediate threat of domestic violence or rioting which is likely to require implementation of 10 U.S.C. 332 or 333 (the use of federal troops for the enforcement of federal law or federal court orders), or likely to result in a request by the governor or legislature of a state pursuant to 140 U.S.C. 331 for the use of federal militia or other federal armed forces as a countermeasure;[45] or
+(ii) After such troops have been introduced.
+Recommendation 46. -- FBI assistance to federal, state, and local officials in connection with a civil disorder should be limited to collecting information necessary for
+<em>1)</em> ) the President in making decisions concerning the introduction of federal troops;
+<em>2)</em> ) military officials in positioning and supporting such troops; and
+<em>3)</em> ) state and local officials in coordinating their activities with such military officials.
+<em>4)</em> <em>Background Investigations</em>
+Recommendation 47 -- The FBI should be permitted to participate in the federal government's program of background investigations of federal employees or employees of federal contractors. The authority to conduct such investigations should not, however, be used as the basis for conducting investigations of other persons. In addition, Congress should examine the standards of Executive Order 10450, which serves as the current authority for FBI background investigations, to determine whether additional legislation is necessary to:
+(a) modify criteria based on political beliefs and associations unrelated to suitability for employment; such modification should make those criteria consistent with judicial decisions regarding privacy of political association,[46] and
+(b) restrict the dissemination of information from name checks[47] of information related to suitability for employment.
+<em>5)</em> <em>Security Risk Investigations</em>
+Recommendation 48. -- Under regulations to be formulated by the Attorney General, the FBI should be permitted to investigate a specific allegation that an individual within the Executive branch with access to classified information is a security risk as described in Executive Order 10450. Such investigation should not continue longer than thirty days except upon written approval of the Attorney General or his designee.
+<em>6)</em> <em>Security Leak Investigations</em>
+Recommendation 49. -- Under regulations to be formulated by the Attorney General, the FBI should be permitted to investigate a specific allegation of the improper disclosure of classified information by employees or contractors of the Executive branch.[48] Such
+investigation should not continue longer than thirty days except upon written approval of the Attorney General or his designee.
+<em>d. Authorized Investigative Techniques</em>
+The following recommendations contain the Committee's proposed controls on the use of investigative techniques in domestic security investigations which would be authorized herein. There are three types of investigative techniques: (1) overt techniques (e.g., interviews), (2) name checks (review of existing government files), and (3) covert techniques (which range, for example, from electronic surveillance and informants to the review of credit records).
+The objective of these recommendations, like the Attorney General's domestic security guidelines, is to ensure that the more intrusive the technique, the more stringent the procedural checks that will be applied to it. Therefore, the recommendation would permit overt techniques and name checks in any of the investigative areas described above.
+With respect to covert technique, the Committee decided upon procedures to apply to the use of a particular covert technique based upon three considerations: (1) its potential for abuse, (2) the practicability of applying the procedure to the technique, and (3) the facts and circumstances giving rise to the request for use of the technique (whether the facts warrant a full investigation or only a preliminary investigation). The most intrusive covert techniques (electronic surveillance, mail opening, and surreptitious entry) would be permissible only if a judicial warrant were obtained as required in Recommendations 51 through 54. FBI requests to target paid or controlled informants, to review tax returns, to use mail covers, or to use any other covert techniques in domestic security investigations would be subject to review and in some cases to prior approval by the Attorney General's office, as described in Recommendations 55 through 62.[49]
+The judicial warrant requirement the Committee recommends for electronic surveillance is similar in many respects to the Administration's bill, which is a welcome departure from past practice. The Committee, like the Administration, believes that there should be no electronic surveillance within the United States which is not subject to a judicial warrant procedure. Both would also authorize warrants for electronic surveillance of foreigners who are officers, agents, or employees of foreign powers, even though the government could not point to probable cause of criminal activity.
+However, while the constitutional issue has not been resolved, the Committee does not believe that the President has inherent power to authorize the targeting of an American for electronic surveillance without a warrant, as suggested by the Administration bill. Certainly, if Congress requires a warrant for the targeting of an American for traditional electronic surveillance or for the most sophisticated NSA techniques, at home or abroad, then the dangerous doctrine of inherent Executive power to target an American for electronic surveillance can be put to rest at last.[49] The Committee also would require that no American be targeted for electronic surveillance except upon a judicial finding of probable criminal activity. The Administration bill would permit electronic surveillance in the absence of probable crime if the American is engaged in (or aiding or abetting a person engaged in) "clandestine intelligence activity" (an undefined term) under the direction of a foreign power. Targeting an American for electronic surveillance in the absence of probable cause to believe he might commit a crime is unwise and unnecessary.
+In Part X, the Committee recommends that Congress consider amending the Espionage Act to cover modern forms of industrial, technological, or economic espionage not now prohibited. At the same time, electronic surveillance targeted at an American should be authorized where there is probable cause to believe he is engaged in such activity. Thus, the Committee agrees with the Attorney General that such activity may subject an American to electronic surveillance. But, as a matter of principle, the Committee believes that an American ought not to be targeted for surveillance unless there is probable cause to believe he may violate the law. The Committee's record suggests that use Of undefined terms, not tied to matters sufficiently serious to be the subject of criminal statutes, is a dangerous basis for intrusive investigations.
+The paid and directed informant was a principal source of excesses revealed in our record. However, we do not propose the application of a judicial warrant procedure to informants. Instead, we propose a requirement of approval by the Attorney General based upon a probable cause standard. Because of the potential for abuse, however, we believe the warrant issue should be thoroughly reviewed after two years' experience.
+There are some differences between the Attorney General and the Committee on the use of informants.[50] The Attorney General would permit the FBI to make unrestricted use of existing informants in a preliminary intelligence investigation. The Committee recognizes the legitimacy of using existing informants for certain purposes -- for example, to identify a new subject who has come to the attention of the Bureau. However, the Committee believes there should be certain restrictions for existing informants. Indeed, almost all of the informant abuses -- overly broad reporting, the ghetto informant program, agents provocateur, etc. -- involved existing informants.
+The real issue is not the development of new informants, but the sustained direction of informants, new or old, at a new target. Therefore, the restrictions suggested in Recommendations 55 through 57 are designed to impose standards for the sustained targeting of informants against Americans.
+The Committee requires that before an informant can be targeted in an intelligence investigation the Attorney General or his designee must make a finding that he has considered and rejected less intrusive techniques and that targeting the informant is necessary to the investigation. Furthermore, the Committee would require that the informant cannot be targeted for more than ninety days[51] in the intelligence investigation unless the Attorney General finds that there is "probable cause" that the American will soon engage in terrorist or hostile foreign intelligence activity, except that if the Attorney General finds compelling circumstances he may permit an additional sixty days.
+Other than the restrictions upon the use of informants, the Committee would permit basically the same techniques in preliminary and full investigations as the Attorney General's guidelines, although the Committee would require somewhat closer supervision by the Attorney General or his designee. Interviews (including interviews of existing informant's), name checks (including checks of local police intelligence files), and physical surveillance and review of credit and telephone records would be permitted during the preliminary investigation. The Attorney General or his designee would have to review that investigation within one month. Under the guidelines, preliminary investigations do not require approval by the Attorney General or his designee and can continue for as long as ninety days with an additional ninety-day extension. The remainder of the covert techniques would be permitted in full intelligence investigations. Under the Attorney General's guidelines, the Attorney General or his designee only become involved in the termination of such investigations (at the end of one year), while the Committee's recommendations would require the Attorney General or his designee to authorize the initiation of the full investigation and the use of covert techniques in the investigation.
+<em>1.</em> <em>Overt Techniques and Name Checks</em>
+Recommendation 50. -- Overt techniques and name checks should be permitted in all of the authorized domestic security investigations described above, including preliminary and full preventive intelligence investigations.
+<em>2.</em> <em>Covert Techniques</em>
+<em>a.</em> <em>Covert Techniques Covered</em>
+This section covers the standards and procedures for the use of the following covert techniques in authorized domestic security investigations:
+(i) electronic surveillance,
+(ii) search and seizure or surreptitious entry;
+(iii) mail opening;
+(iv) informants and other covert human sources;
+(v) mail surveillance;
+(vi) review of tax returns and tax-related information;
+(vii) other covert techniques -- including physical surveillance, photographic surveillance, use of body recorders and other consensual electronic surveillance, and use of sensitive records of state and local government, and other institutional records systems pertaining to credit, medical history, social welfare history, or telephone calls.[52]
+<em>b.</em> <em>Judicial Warrant Procedures (Electronic Surveillance, Mail Opening, Search and Seizure, and Surreptitious Entry)</em>
+The requirements for judicial warrants, set forth below, are not intended to cover NSA communication intercepts. Recommendations 14 through 18 contain the Committee's recommendations pertaining to NSA intercepts, the circumstances in which a judicial warrant is required and the standards applicable for the issuance of such a warrant.
+Recommendation 51. -- All non-consensual electronic surveillance, mail-opening, and unauthorized entries should be conducted only upon authority of a judicial warrant.
+Recommendation 52. -- All non-consensual electronic surveillance should be conducted pursuant to judicial warrants issued under authority of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
+The Act should be amended to provide, with respect to electronic surveillance of foreigners in the United States, that a warrant may issue if
+<em>(a)</em> There is probable cause that the target is an officer, employee, or conscious agent of a foreign power.
+<em>(b)</em> The Attorney General has certified that the surveillance is likely to reveal information necessary to the protection of the nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of force of a foreign power; to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States; or to protect national security information against hostile foreign intelligence activity.
+<em>(c)</em> With respect to any such electronic surveillance, the judge should adopt procedures to minimize the acquisition and retention of non-foreign intelligence information about Americans.
+<em>(d)</em> Such electronic surveillance should be exempt from the disclosure requirements of Title III of the 1968 Act as to foreigners generally and as to Americans if they are involved in hostile foreign intelligence activity.[53]
+As noted earlier, the Committee believes that the espionage laws should be amended to include industrial espionage and other modern forms of espionage not presently covered and Title III should incorporate any such amendment. The Committee's recomendation is that both that change and the amendment of Title III to require warrants for all electronic surveillance be promptly made.
+Recommendation 53. -- Mail opening should be conducted only pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause of criminal activity as described in Recommendation 37.
+Recommendation 54. -- Unauthorized entry should be conducted only upon judicial warrant issued on probable cause to believe that the place to be searched contains evidence of a crime, except unauthorized entry, including surreptitious entry, against foreigners who are officers, employees, or conscious agents of a foreign power should be permitted upon judicial warrant under the standards which apply to electronic surveillance described in Recommendation 52.
+<em>(e)</em> <em>Administrative Procedures (Covert Human Sources, Mail Surveillance, Review of Tax Returns and Tax-Related Information, and Other Covert Techniques)</em>
+Recommendation 55. -- Covert human sources may not be directed[54] at an American except:
+(1) In the course of a criminal investigation if necessary to the investigation provided that covert human sources should not be directed at an American as a part of an investigation of a committed act unless there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the American is responsible for the act and then only for the purpose of identifying the perpetrators of the act.
+(2) If the American is the target of a full preventive intelligence investigation and the
+Attorney General or his designee makes a written finding that[55] (i) he has considered and rejected less intrusive techniques; and (ii) he believes that covert human sources are necessary to obtain information for the investigation.
+Recommendation 56. -- Covert human sources which have been directed at an American in a full preventive intelligence Investigation should not be used to collect information on the activities of the American for more than 90 days after the source is in place and capable of reporting, unless the Attorney General or his designee finds in writing either that there are "compelling circumstances" in which case they may be used for an additional 60 days, or that there is probable cause that the American will soon engage in terrorist activities or hostile foreign intelligence activities.
+Recommendation 57. -- All covert human sources used by the FBI should be reviewed by the Attorney General or his designee as soon as practicable, and should be terminated[56] unless the covert human source could be directed against an American in a criminal investigation or a full preventive intelligence investigation under these recommendations.
+Recommendation 58. -- Mail surveillance and the review of tax returns and tax-related information should be conducted consistently with the recommendations contained in Part iii. In addition to restrictions contained in Part iii, the review of tax returns and tax-related information, as well as review of medical or social history records, confidential records of private institutions and confidential records of Federal, state, and local government agencies other than intelligence or law enforcement agencies may not be used against an American except:
+(1) In the course of a criminal investigation if necessary to the investigation;
+(2) If the American is the target of a full preventive intelligence investigation and the Attorney General or his designee makes a written finding that 57 (i) he has considered and rejected less intrusive techniques; and (ii) he believes that the covert technique requested by the Bureau is necessary to obtain information necessary to the investigation.
+Recommendation 59. -- The use of physical surveillance and review of credit and telephone records and any records of governmental or private institutions other than those covered in Recommendation 58 should be permitted to be used against an American, if necessary, in the course of either a criminal investigation or a preliminary or full preventive intelligence investigation.
+Recommendation 60. -- Covert techniques should be permitted at the scene of a potential civil disorder in the course of preventive criminal intelligence and criminal investigations as described above. Non-warrant covert techniques may also be directed at an American during a civil disorder in which extensive acts of violence are occurring and Federal troops have been introduced. This additional authority to direct such covert techniques at Americans during a civil disorder should be limited to circumstances where Federal troops are actually in use and the technique is used only for the purpose of preventing further violence.
+Recommendation 61. -- Covert techniques should not be directed at an American in the course of a background investigation without the informed written consent of the American.
+Recommendation 62. -- If Congress enacts a statute attaching criminal sanctions to security leaks, covert techniques should be directed at Americans in the course of security leak investigations only if such techniques are consistent with Recommendation 55 (1),[58] (1) or 59. With respect to security risks, Congress might consider authorizing covert techniques, other than those requiring a judicial warrant, to be directed at Americans in the course of security risk 58 investigations, but only upon a written finding of the Attorney General that (1) there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual is a security risk, (ii) he has considered and rejected less intrusive techniques, and (iii) he believes the technique requested is necessary to the investigation.
+<em>d)</em> <em>) Incidental Overhears</em>
+Recommendation 63. -- Except as limited elsewhere in these recommendations or in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, information obtained incidentally through an authorized covert technique about an American or a foreigner who is not the target of the covert technique can be used as the basis for any authorized domestic security investigation.
+<em>e)</em> <em>Maintenance and Dissemination of Information</em>
+The following limitations should apply to the maintenance and dissemination Information collected as a result of domestic security investigations.
+<em>1.</em> <em>Relevance</em>
+Recommendation 64. -- Information should not be maintained except where relevant to the purpose of an investigation.
+<em>2.</em> <em>Sealing or Purging</em>
+Recommendation 65. -- Personally identifiable information on Americans obtained in the following kinds of investigations should be sealed or purged as follows (unless it appears on its face to be necessary for another authorized investigation):
+(a) Preventive intelligence investigations of terrorist or hostile foreign intelligence activities -- as soon as the investigation is terminated by the Attorney General or his designee pursuant to Recommendation 45 or 69.
+(b) Civil disorder assistance -- as soon as the assistance is terminated by the Attorney General or his designee pursuant to Recommendation 69, provided that where troops have been introduced such information need be sealed or purged only within a reasonable period after their withdrawal.
+Recommendation 66. -- Information previously gained by the FBI or any other intelligence agency through illegal techniques should be sealed or purged as soon as practicable.
+<em>3.</em> <em>Dissemination</em>
+Recommendation 67. -- Personally identifiable information on Americans from domestic security investigations may be disseminated outside the Department of Justice as follows:
+(a) Preventive intelligence investigations of terrorist activities -- personally identifiable information on Americans from preventive criminal intelligence investigations of terrorist activities may be disseminated only to:
+(1) A foreign or domestic law enforcement agency which has jurisdiction over the criminal activity to which the information relates; or
+(2) To a foreign intelligence or military agency of the United States, if necessary for an activity permitted by these recommendations; or
+(3) To an appropriate federal official with authority to make personnel decisions about the subject of the information; or
+(4) To a foreign intelligence or military agency of a cooperating foreign power if necessary for an activity permitted by these recommendations to similar agencies of the United States; or
+(5) Where necessary to warn state or local officials of terrorist activity likely to occur within their jurisdiction; or
+(6) Where necessary to warn any person of a threat to life or property from terrorist activity.
+(b) Preventive intelligence investigations of hostile foreign intelligence activities -personally identifiable information on Americans from preventive criminal intelligence investigations of hostile intelligence activities may be disseminated only:
+(1) To an appropriate federal official with authority to make personnel decisions about the subject of the information; or
+(2) To the National Security Council or the Department of State upon request or where appropriate to their administration of U.S. foreign policy; or
+(3) To a foreign intelligence or military agency of the United States, if relevant to an activity permitted by these recommendations; or
+(4) To a foreign intelligence or military agency of a cooperating foreign power if relevant to an activity permitted by these recommendations to similar agencies of the United States.
+(c) Civil disorders assistance -- personally identifiable information on Americans involved in an actual or potential disorder, collected in the course of civil disorders assistance, should not be disseminated outside the Department of Justice except to military officials and appropriate state and local officials at the scene of a civil disorder where federal troops are present.[59]
+(d) Background investigations -- to the maximum extent feasible, the results of background investigations should be segregated within the FBI and only disseminated to officials outside the Department of Justice authorized to make personnel decisions with respect to the subject.
+(e) All other authorized domestic security investigations -- to governmental officials who are authorized to take action consistent with the purpose of an investigation or who have statutory duties which require the information.
+<em>4.</em> <em>Oversight Access</em>
+Recommendation 68. -- Officers of the Executive branch, who are made responsible by these recommendations for overseeing intelligence activities, and appropriate congressional committees should have access to all information necessary for their functions. The committees should adopt procedures to protect the privacy of subjects of files maintained by the FBI and other agencies affected by the domestie intelligence recommendations.
+<em>f. Attorney General Oversight of the FBI, Including Termination of Investigations and Covert Techniques</em>
+Recommendation 69. -- The Attorney General should:
+(a) Establish a program of routine and periodic review of FBI domestic security investigations to ensure that the FBI is complying with all of the foregoing recommendations; and
+(b) Assure, with respect to the following investigations of Americans that:
+(1) Preventive intelligence investigations of terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity are terminated within one year, except that the Attorney General or his designee may grant extensions upon a written finding of "compelling circumstances";
+(2) Covert techniques are used in preventive intelligence investigations of terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity only so long as necessary and not beyond time limits established by the Attorney General except that the Attorney General or his designee may grant extensions upon a written finding of "compelling circumstances";
+(3) Civil disorders assistance is terminated upon withdrawal of federal troops or, if troops were not introduced. within a reasonable time after the finding by the Attorney General that troops are likely to be requested, except that the Attorney General or his designee may grant extensions upon a written finding of "compelling circumstances;"
+*** v. The Responsibility and Authority of the Attorney General for Oversight of Federal Domestic Security Activities Must Be Clarified and General Counsels and Inspectors General of Intelligence Agencies Strengthened
+The Committee's Recommendations give the Attorney General broad oversight responsibility for federal domestic security activities. As the chief legal officer of the United States, the Attorney General is the most appropriate official to be charged with ensuring that the intelligence agencies of the United States conduct their activities in accordance with the law. The Executive Order, however, places primary responsibility for oversight of the intelligence agencies with the newly created Oversight Board.
+Both the Recommendations and the Order recognize the Attorney General's primary responsibility to detect, or prevent, violations of law by any employee of intelligence agencies. Both charge the head of intelligence agencies with the duty to report to the Attorney General information which relates to possible violations of law by any employee of the respective intelligence agencies. The Order also requires the Oversight Board to report periodically, at least quarterly, to the Attorney General on its findings and to report, in a timely manner, to the Attorney General, any activities that raise serious questions about legality.
+<em>a.</em> <em>Attorney General Responsibility and Relationship With Other Intelligence Agencies</em>
+These recommendations are intended to implement the Attorney General's responsibility to control and supervise all of the domestic security activities of the federal government and to oversee activities of any agency affected by the Domestic Intelligence Recommendations:
+Recommendation 70. -- The Attorney General should review the internal regulations of the FBI and other intelligence agencies engaging in domestic security activities to ensure that such internal regulations are proper and adequate to protect the constitutional rights of Americans.
+Recommendation 71. -- The Attorney General or his designee (such as the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice) should advise the General Counsels of intelligence agencies on interpretations of statutes and regulations adopted pursuant to these recommendations and on such other legal questions as are described in b. below.
+Recommendation 72. -- The Attorney General should have ultimate responsibility for the investigation of alleged violations of law relating to the Domestic Intelligence Recommendations.
+Recommendation 73. -- The Attorney General should be notified of possible alleged violations of law through the Office of Professional Responsibility (described in c. below) by agency heads, General Counsel, or Inspectors General of intelligence agencies as provided in B. below.
+Recommendation 74. -- The heads of all intelligence agencies affected by these recommendations are responsible for the prevention and detection of alleged violations of the law by, or on behalf of, their respective agencies and for the reporting to the Attorney General of all such alleged violations.[60] Each such agency head should also assure his agency's cooperation with the Attorney General in investigations of alleged violations.
+<em>b.</em> <em>General Counsel and Inspectors General of Intelligence</em>
+The Committee recommends that the FBI and each other intelligence agency should have a general counsel nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. There is no provision in the Executive Order making General Counsels of intelligence agencies subject to Senate confirmation. The Committee believes that the extraordinary responsibilities exercised by the General Counsel of these agencies make it very important that these officials are subject to examination by the Senate prior to their confirmation. The Committee further believes that making such positions subject to Presidential appointment and senatorial confirmation will increase the stature of the office and will protect the independence of judgment of the General Counsel.
+The Committee Recommendations differ from the Executive Order in two other important respects. The Recommendations provide that the General Counsel should review all significant proposed agency activities to determine their legality. They also provide a mechanism whereby the Inspector General or General Counsel of an intelligence agency can, in extraordinary circumstances, and if requested by an employee of the Agency, provide information directly to the Attorney General or appropriate congressional oversight committees without informing the head of the agency.
+The Committee Recommendations also go beyond the Executive Order in requiring agency heads to report to appropriate committees of the Congress and the Attorney General on the activities of the Office of the General Counsel and the Office of the Inspector General. The Committee believes that the reporting requirements will facilitate oversight of the intelligence agencies and of those important offices within them.
+Recommendation 75. -- To assist the Attorney General and the agency heads in the functions described in a. above, the FBI and each other intelligence agency should have a General Counsel, nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and an Inspector General appointed by the agency bead.
+Recommendation 76. -- Any individual having information on past, current, or proposed activities which appear to be illegal, improper, or in violation of agency policy should be required to report the matter immediately to the Agency head, General Counsel, or Inspector General. If the matter is not initially reported to the General Counsel, he should be notified by the Agency head or Inspector General. Each agency should regularly remind employees of their obligation to report such information.
+Recommendation 77. -- As provided in Recommendation 74, the heads of the FBI and of other intelligence agencies are responsible for reporting to the Attorney General alleged violations of law. When such reports are made, the appropriate congressional committees should be notified.[61]
+Recommendation 78. -- The General Counsel and Inspector General of the FBI and of each other intelligence agency should have unrestricted access to all information in the possession of the agency and should have the authority to review all of the agency's activities.[62] The Attorney General, or the Office of Professional Responsibility on his behalf, should have access to all information in the possession of an agency which, in the opinion of the Attorney General, is necessary for an investigation of illegal activity.
+Recommendation 79. -- The General Counsel of the FBI and of each other intelligence agency should review all significant proposed agency activities to determine their legality and constitutionality.
+Recommendation 80. -- The Director of the FBI and the heads of each other intelligence agency should be required to report, at least annually, to the appropriate committee of the Congress, on the activities of the General Counsel and the Office of the Inspector General.[63]
+Recommendation 81. -- The Director of the FBI and the heads of each other intelligence agency should be required to report, at least annually, to the Attorney General on all reports of activities which appear illegal, improper, outside the legislative charter, or in violation of agency regulations. Such reports should include the General Counsel's findings concerning these activities, a summary of the Inspector General's investigations of these activities, and the practices and procedures developed to discover activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.
+<em>c.</em> <em>Office of Professional Responsibility</em>
+Recommendation 82. -- The Office of Professional Responsibility created by Attorney General Levi should be recognized in statute. The director of the office, appointed by the Attorney General, should report directly to the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General. The functions of the office should include:
+(a) Serving as a central repository of reports and notifications provided the Attorney General; and
+(b) Investigation, if requested by the Attorney General of alleged violations by intelligence agencies of statutes enacted or regulations promulgated pursuant to these recommendations.[64]
+<em>d.</em> <em>Director of the FBI and Assistant Directors of the FBI</em>
+Recommendation 83. -- The Attorney General is responsible for all of the activities of the FBI, and the Director of the FBI is responsible to, and should be under the supervision and control of, the Attorney General.
+Recommendation 84. -- The Director of the FBI should be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate to serve at the pleasure of the President for a single term of not more than eight years.
+Recommendation 85. -- The Attorney General should consider exercising his power to appoint Assistant Directors of the FBI. A maximum term of years should be imposed on the tenure of the Assistant Director for the Intelligence Division.[64]
+*** vi. Administrative Rulemaking and Increased Disclosure Should Be Required
+<em>a.</em> <em>Administrative Rulemaking</em>
+Recommendation 86. -- The Attorney General should approve all administrative regulations required to implement statutes created pursuant to these recommendations.
+Recommendation 87. -- Such regulations, except for regulations concerning investigations of hostile foreign intelligence activity or other matters which are properly classified, should he issued pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act and should be subject to the approval of the Attorney General.
+Recommendation 88. -- The effective date of regulations pertaining to the following matters should be delayed ninety days, during which time Congress would have the opportunity to review such regulations:[65]
+(a) Any CIA activities against Americans, as permitted in ii.a. above;
+(b) Military activities at the time of a civil disorder;
+(c) The authorized scope of domestic security investigations, authorized investigative techniques, maintenance and dissemination of information by the FBI; and
+(d) The termination of investigations and covert techniques as described in Part iv.
+<em>b.</em> <em>Disclosure</em>
+Recommendation 89. -- Each year the FBI and other intelligence agencies affected by these recommendations should be required to seek annual statutory authorization for their programs.
+Recommendation 90. -- The Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552 (b)) and the Federal Privacy Act, (5 U.S.C. 552 (a)) provide important mechanisms by which individuals can gain access to information on intelligence activity directed against them. The Domestic Intelligence Recommendations assume that these statutes will continue to be vigorously enforced. In addition, the Department of Justice should notify all readily identifiable targets of past illegal surveillance techniques, and all COINTELPRO victims, and third parties who had received anonymous COINTELPRO communications, of the nature of the activities directed against them, or the source of the anonymous communication to them.[65]
+*** vii. Civil Remedies Should Be Expanded
+Recommendation 91 expresses the Committee's concern for establishing a legislative scheme which will afford effective redress to people who are injured by improper federal intelligence activity. The recommended provisions for civil remedies are also intended to deter improper intelligence activity without restricting the sound exercise of discretion by intelligence officers at headquarters or in the field.
+As the Committee's investigation has shown, many Americans have suffered injuries from domestic intelligence activity, ranging front deprivation of constitutional rights of privacy and free speech to the loss of a job or professional standing, break-up of a marriage, and impairment of physical or mental health. But the extent, if any, to which an injured citizen can seek relief either monetary or injunctive -- from the government or from an individual intelligence officer is far front clear under the present state of the law.
+One major disparity in the current state of the law is that, under the Reconstruction era Civil Rights Act of 1871, the deprivation of constitutional rights by an officer or agent of a state government provides the basis for a suit to redress the injury incurred;[66] but there is no statute which extends the same remedies for identical injuries when they are caused by a federal officer.
+In the landmark Bivens case, the Supreme Court held that a federal officer could be sued for money damages for violating a citizen's Fourth Amendment rights.[67] Whether monetary damages can be obtained for violation of other constitutional rights by federal officers remains unclear.
+While we believe that any citizen with a substantial and specific claim to injury from intelligence activity should have standing to sue, the Committee is aware of the need for judicial protection against legal claims which amount to harassment or distraction of government officials, disruption of legitimate investigations, and wasteful expenditure of government resources. We also seek to ensure that the creation of a civil remedy for aggrieved persons does not impinge upon the proper exercise of discretion by federal officials.
+Therefore, we recommend that where a government official -- as opposed to the government itself -- acted in good faith and with the reasonable belief that his conduct was lawful, he should have an affirmative defense to a suit for damages brought under the proposed statute. To tighten the system of accountability and control of domestic intelligence activity, the Committee proposes that this defense be structured to encourage intelligence officers to obtain written authorization for questionable activities and to seek legal advice about them.[68]
+To avoid penalizing federal officers and agents for the exercise of discretion, the Committee believes that the government should indemnify their attorney fees and reasonable litigation costs when they are held not to be liable. To avoid burdening the taxpayers for the deliberate misconduct of intelligence officers and agents, we believe the government should be able to seek reimbursement from those who willfully and knowingly violate statutory charters or the Constitution.
+Furthermore, we believe that the courts will be able to fashion discovery procedures, including inspection of material in chambers, and to issue orders as the interests of justice require, to allow plaintiffs with substantial claims to uncover enough factual material to argue their case, while protecting the secrecy of governmental information in which there is a legitimate security interest.
+The Committee recommends that a legislative scheme of civil remedies for the victims of intelligence activity be established along the following lines to clarify the state of the law, to encourage the responsible execution of duties created by the statutes recommended herein to regulate intelligence agencies, and to provide relief for the victims of illegal intelligence activity.
+Recommendation 91. -- Congress should enact a comprehensive civil remedies statute which would accomplish the following:[69]
+(a) Any American with a substantial and specific claim[70] to an actual or threatened injury by a violation of the Constitution by federal intelligence officers or agents[71] acting under color of law should have a federal cause of action against the government and the individual federal intelligence officer or agent responsible for the violation, without regard to the monetary amount in controversy. If actual injury is proven in court, the Committee believes that the injured person should be entitled to equitable relief, actual, general, and punitive damages, and recovery of the costs of litigation.[72] If threatened injury is proven in court, the Committee believes that equitable relief and recovery of the costs of litigation should be available.
+(b) Any American with a substantial and specific claim to actual or threatened injury by violation of the statutory charter for intelligence activity (as proposed by these Domestic Intelligence Recommendations) should have a cause of action for relief as in (a) above.
+(c) Because of the secrecy that surrounds intelligence programs, the Committee believes that a plaintiff should have two years from the date upon which he discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the facts which give rise to a cause of action for relief from a constitutional or statutory violation.
+(d) Whatever statutory provision may be made to permit an individual defendant to raise an affirmative defense that he acted within the scope of his official duties, in good faith, and with a reasonable belief that the action he took was lawful, the Committee believes that to ensure relief to persons injured by governmental intelligence activity, this defense should be available solely to individual defendants and should not extend to the government. Moreover, the defense should not be available to bar injunctions against individual defendants.
+*** viii. Criminal Penalties Should Be Enacted
+Recommendation 92. -- The Committee -believes that criminal penalties should apply, where appropriate, to willful and knowing violations of statutes enacted pursuant to the Domestic Intelligence Recommendations.
+*** ix. The Smith Act and the Voorhis Act Should Either Be Repealed or Amended
+Recommendation 93. -- Congress should either repeal the Smith Act (18 U.S.C. 2385) and the Voorhis Act (18 U.S.C. 2386), which on their face appear to authorize investigation of "mere advocacy" of a political ideology, or amend those statutes so that domestic security investigations are only directed at conduct which might serve as the basis for a constitutional criminal prosecution, under Supreme Court decisions interpreting these and related statutes.[73]
+*** x. The Espionage Statute Should be Modernized
+As suggested in its definition of "hostile foreign intelligence activity" and its recommendations on warrants for electronic surveillance, the Committee agrees with the Attorney General that there may be serious deficiencies in the Federal Espionage Statute (18 U.S.C. 792 et seq.). The basic prohibitions of that statute have not been amended since 1917 and do not encompass certain forms of industrial, technological, or economic espionage. The Attorney General in a recent letter to Senator Kennedy (Reprinted on p. S3889 of the Congressional Record of March 23, 1976) describes some of the problem areas of the statute, including industrial espionage (e.g., a spy obtaining information on computer technology for a foreign power). The Committee took no testimony on this subject and, therefore, makes no specific proposal other than that the appropriate committees of the Congress explore the necessity for amendments to the statute.
+Recommendation 94. -- The appropriate committees of the Congress should review the Espionage Act of 1917 to determine whether it should be amended to cover modern forms of foreign espionage, including industrial, technological or economic espionage.
+*** xi. Broader Access to Intelligence Agency Files Should be Provided to GAO, as an Investigative Arm of the Congress
+Recommendation 95. -- The appropriate congressional oversight committees of the Congress should, from time to time, request the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct audits and reviews of the intelligence activities of any department or agency of the United States affected by the Domestic Intelligence Recommendations. For such purpose, the Comptroller General, or any of his duly authorized representatives, should have access to, and the right to examine, all necessary materials of any such department or agency.
+*** xii. Congressional Oversight Should Be Intensified
+Recommendation 96. -- The Committee reendorses the concept of vigorous Senate oversight to review the conduct of domestic security activities through a new permanent intelligence oversight committee.
+*** xiii. Definitions
+For the purposes of these recommendations:
+A. "Americans" means U.S. citizens, resident aliens and unincorporated associations, composed primarily of U.S. citizens or resident aliens; and corporations, incorporated or having their principal place of business in the United States or having majority ownership by U.S. citizens, or resident aliens, including foreign subsidiaries of such corporations provided, however, "Americans" does not include corporations directed by foreign governments or organizations.
+B. "Collect" means to gather or initiate the acquisition of information, or to request it from another agency.
+C. A "covert human source" means undercover agents or informants who are paid or otherwise controlled by an agency.
+D. "Covert techniques" means the collection of information, including collection from record sources not readily available to a private person (except state or local law enforcement files), in such a manner as not to be detected by the subject.
+E. "Domestic security activities" means governmental activities against Americans or conducted within the United States or its territories, including enforcement of the criminal laws, intended to:
+. protect the United States from hostile foreign intelligence activity including espionage;
+. protect the federal, state, and local governments from domestic violence or rioting; and
+. protect Americans and their government from terrorists.
+F. "Foreign communications," refers to a communication between, or among, two or more parties in which at least one party is outside the United States, or a communication transmitted between points within the United States if transmitted over a facility which is under the control of, or exclusively used by, a foreign government.
+G. "Foreigners" means persons and organizations who are not Americans as defined above.
+H. "Hostile foreign intelligence activities" means acts, or conspiracies, by Americans or foreigners, who are officers, employees, or conscious agents of a foreign power, or who, pursuant to the direction of a foreign power, engage in clandestine intelligence activity,[74] or engage in espionage, sabotage or similar conduct in violation of federal criminal statutes.
+I. "Name checks" means the retrieval by an agency of information already in the possession of the federal government or in the possession of state or local law enforcement agencies.
+J. "Overt investigative techniques" means the collection of information readily available from public sources, or available to a private person, including interviews of the subject or his friends or associates.
+K. "Purged" means to destroy or transfer to the National Archives all personally identifiable information (including references in any general name index).
+L. "Sealed" means to retain personally identifiable information and to retain entries in a general name index but to restrict access to the information and entries to circumstances of "compelling necessity."
+M. "Reasonable suspicion" is based upon the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and means specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion that specified activity has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur.
+N. "Terrorist activities" means acts, or conspiracies, which: (a) are violent or dangerous to human life; and (b) violate federal or state criminal statutes concerning assassination, murder, arson, bombing, hijacking, or kidnapping; and (c) appear intended to, or are likely to have the effect of:
+(1) Substantially disrupting federal, state or local government; or
+(2) Substantially disrupting interstate or foreign commerce between the United States and another country; or
+(3) Directly interfering with the exercise by Americans, of Constitutional rights protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1968, or by foreigners, of their rights under the laws or treaties of the United States.
+O. "Unauthorized entry" means entry unauthorized by the target.
+[1] Robert H. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of Government (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1955, 1963), pp. 70-71.
+[2] De Gregory v. New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966) ; NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 298 (1964) ; Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Commission, 372 U.S. 539,546 (1962) ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,488 (1960).
+[3] Madison, Federalist No.[ 51. Madison made the point with grace:
+"If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions."
+[4] Directed primarily at foreigners abroad.
+[5] "Domestic security activities" means federal governmental activities, directed against Americans or conducted within the United States or its territories, including enforcement of the criminal law, intended to (a) protect the United States from hostile foreign intelligence activity, including espionage; (b) protect the federal, state, and local governments from domestic violence or rioting; and (c) protect Americans and their government from terrorist activity. See Part xiii of the recommendations and conclusions for all the definitions used in the recommendations.
+[6] "Americans" means U.S. citizens, resident aliens and unincorporated associations, composed primarily of U.S. citizens or resident aliens; and corporations, incorporated or having their principal place of business in the United States or having majority ownership by U.S. citizens, or resident aliens, including foreign subsidiaries of such corporations, provided, however, Americans does not include corporations directed by foreign governments or organizations.
+[7] "Foreigners" means persons and organizations who are not Americans as defined above.
+[8] These terms, which cover the two areas in which the Committee recommends authorizing preventive intelligence investigations, are defined on pp. 340-341.
+[9] S. Res.[ 21, See. 5; 2 (12).
+[10] See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
+[11] "Covert human sources," means undercover agents or informants who are paid or otherwise controlled by an agency.
+[12] As noted in the Report on CHAOS, former Directors have had differing interpretations of the mandate of the 1947 Act, to the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods. The Committee agrees with former Director William Colby that the 1947 Act only authorizes the Director to perform a "coordinating" and not an "operational" role.
+[13] The activity completely prohibited to CIA includes only the interception of communications restricted under the 1968 Safe Streets Act, and would not limit the use of body recorders, or telephone taps or other electronic surveillance where one party to the communication has given his consent. For example, electronic coverage of a case officer's meeting with his agent would not be included. The prohibition also is not intended to cover the testing of equipment in the United States, when done with the written approval of the Attorney General and under procedures he has approved to minimize interception of private communications and to prevent improper dissemination or use of the communications which are unavoidably intercepted in the testing process. Nor does the prohibition preclude the use of countermeasures to detect electronic surveillance mounted against the CIA, when conducted under general procedures, and safeguards approved in writing by the CIA General Counsel.
+[14] Unauthorized entry" means entry unauthorized by the target.
+[15] As part of the CIA's responsibility for its own security, however, appropriate personnel should be permitted to carry firearms within the United States not only for courier protection of documents, but also to protect the Director and Deputy Director and defectors and to guard CIA installations.
+[16] "Covert techniques" means the collection of information including collection from records sources not readily available to a private person (except state or local law enforcement files) in such a manner as not to be detected by the subject. Covert techniques do not include a check of CIA or other federal agency or state and local police records, or a check of credit bureaus for the limited purpose of obtaining non-financial biographical data, i.e., date and place of birth, to facilitate such name checks, and the subject's place of employment. Nor do "covert techniques" include interviews with persons knowledgeable about the subject conducted on a confidential basis to avoid disclosure of the inquiry to others or to the subject, if he is not yet aware of CIA interest in a prospective relationship, provided the interview does not involve the provision of information from medical, financial, educational, phone or other confidential records.
+[17] For purposes of this section employees includes those employees or contractors who work regularly at CIA facilities and have comparable access or freedom of movement at CIA facilities as employees of CIA.
+[18] Recommendation 7(c) does permit background and other security investigations conducted with government credentials which do not reveal CIA involvement and, in extremely sensitive cases commercial or other private identification to avoid disclosure of any government connection.
+It would also permit CIA investigators to check the effectiveness of cover operations, without revealing their affiliation, by means of inquiries at the vicinity of particularly sensitive CIA projects. If in the course of such inquiries, unidentified CIA employees or contractors' employees are observed to be endangering the project's cover, they may be the subject of limited physical surveillance at that time for the sole purpose of ascertaining their identity so that they may be subsequently contacted.
+[19] Such action poses serious danger of misuse. The preparation may involve the agent reporting on his associates so that the CIA can assess his credentials and his observation and reporting ability. This could become an opportunity to collect domestic intelligence on the infiltrated group even when an investigation of that group could not otherwise be commenced under the applicable standards. Obviously, without restrictions the intelligence community could use this technique to conduct domestic spying, arguing that the agents were not being "targeted" against the group but were merely preparing for an overseas operation.
+This was done, for example, in the use by Operation CHAOS of agents being provided with radical credentials for use in "Project 2," a foreign intelligence operation abroad. (See the CHAOS Report and the Rockefeller Commission Report.)
+One alternative would be to let the FBI handle the agent while he is preparing for overseas assignment. On balance, however, that seems less desirable. The temptation to use the agent to collect domestic intelligence might be stronger for the agency with domestic security responsibilities than it would for the area division of the CIA concerned with foreign intelligence. Also, improper use of the agent to collect such information would be more readily identifiable in the context of the foreign intelligence operation run by the CIA than it would in the context of an agent operation run by the Intelligence Division of the FBI.
+[19]  Any further investigations conducted in connection with (b) or (c) should be conducted by the FBI, and only if authorized by Part iv.
+[20] In addition, the FBI should be notified of such insertions.
+[21] "Collect" means to gather or initiate the acquisition of information, or to request it from another agency. It does not include dissemination of information to CIA by another agency acting on its own initiative.
+[22] "Employees," as used in this recommendation, would include members of the employee's immediate family or prospective spouse.
+[23] In the case of persons unknown to the CIA who volunteer to provide information or otherwise request contact with CIA personnel, the agency may conduct a name check before arranging a meeting.
+[24] The CIA may only conduct a name check and confidential interviews of persons who know the subject, if the subject is unaware of CIA interest in him.
+[25] The CIA may only collect information by means of a name check.
+[26] The CIA may make a name check and determine the place of employment of persons residing or working in the immediate vicinity of sensitive sites, such as persons residing adjacent to premises used for safe houses or defector resettlement, or such as proprietors of businesses in premises adjacent to CIA offices in commercial areas.
+[27] The counterintelligence component of the CIA would be able to call to the attention of the FBI any patterns of significance which the CIA thought warranted opening an investigation of an American.
+[28] The guidelines state:
+A. "Whenever information is uncovered as a byproduct result of CIA foreign targeted intelligence or counterintelligence operations abroad which makes American, suspect for security or counterintelligence reasons ... such information will be reported to the FBI ... specific CIA operations will not be mounted against such individuals; CIA responsibilities thereafter will be restricted to reporting any further intelligence or counterintelligence aspects to the specific case which comes to CIA's attention as a byproduct of its continuing foreign targeted operational activity. If the FBI, on the basis of the receipt of the CIA information, however, specifically requests further information on terrorist or counterintelligence matters relating to the private American citizens . . . CIA may respond to written requests by the FBI for clandestine collection abroad by CIA of information on foreign terrorist or counterintelligence matters involving American citizens." 29 William Nelson testimony, 1/28/76, pp. 33-34. Mr. Nelson was not addressing procedures to obtain a judicial warrant; but the time required for an ex parte application on an expedited basis to a Federal Court in Washington, D.C., would not be excessive for the investigative time frames which Nelson described.
+Furthermore, the present wiretap statute authorizes electronic surveillance (for 48 hours) on an emergency basis prior to judicial authorization.
+[30] Recommendation 8, p.[ 303.
+[30]  "Terrorist activities" means acts, or conspiracies, which: (a) are violent or dangerous to human life; and (b) violate federal or state criminal statutes concerning assassination, murder, arson, bombing, hijacking, or kidnaping; and (c) appear intended to, or are likely to have the effect of:
+(1) Substantially disrupting federal, state or local government; or
+(2) Substantially disrupting interstate or foreign commerce between the United States and another country; or
+(3) Directly interfering with the exercise by Americans, of Constitutional rights protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1968, or by foreigners, of their rights under the laws or treaties of the United States.
+[30]  Hostile foreign intelligence activities" means acts, or conspiracies, by Americans or foreigners, who are officers, employees, or conscious agents of a foreign power, or who, pursuant to the direction of a foreign power, engage in clandestine intelligence activity, or engage in espionage, sabotage or similar conduct in violation of federal criminal statutes. (The term "clandestine intelligence activity" is included in this definition at the suggestion of officials of the Department of Justice. Certain activities engaged in by conscious agents of foreign powers, such as some forms of industrial, technological, or economic espionage, are not now prohibited by federal statutes. It would be preferable to amend the espionage laws to cover such activity and eliminate this term. As a matter of principle, intelligence agencies should not investigate activities of Americans which are not violations of federal criminal statutes. Therefore, the Committee recommends (in Recommendation 94) that Congress immediately consider enacting such statutes and then eliminating this term.)
+[31] If the CIA believes that an investigation of an American should be opened but the FBI declines to do so, the CIA should be able to appeal to the Attorney General or to the appropriate committee of the National Security Council.
+[32] Such information would include material volunteered by a foreign intelligence service independent of any request by the CIA.
+[33] See Recommendation 7, p.[ 302.
+[34] None of the Committee's recommendations pertaining to NSA should be construed as inhibiting or preventing NSA from protecting U.S. communications against interception or monitoring by foreign intelligence services.
+[35] "Foreign communications," as used in this section, refers to a communication between or among two or more parties in which at least one party is outside the United States, or a communication transmitted between points within the United States only if transmitted over a facility which is under the control of, or exclusively used by, a foreign government.
+[36] In order to ensure that this recommendation is implemented, both the Attorney General and the appropriate oversight committees of the Congress should be continuously apprised of, and periodically review, the measures taken by NSA pursuant to this recommendation.
+[37] The Committee believes that in the case of interceptions authorized to obtain information about hostile foreign intelligence, there should be a presumption that notice to the subject of such intercepts, which would ordinarily be required under Title I I 1 (18 U. S. C.[ 2518 (8) (d) ), is not required, unless there is evidence of gross abuse.
+[38] The Executive Order places no such restriction on the dissemination of information by NSA. Under the Executive Order, NSA is not required to delete names or destroy messages which are personally identifiable to Americans. As long as these messages fall within the categories established by the Order, the names of Americans could be transmitted to other intelligence agencies of the Government.
+[39] Based upon its study of the IRS, the Committee believes these recommendations might properly be applied beyond the general domestic security scope of the recommendations.
+[40] "Request" as used in the recommendations concerning the Internal Revenue Service should not include circumstances in which the agency is acting with the informed written consent of the taxpayer.
+[41] See recommendation 94 for the committee's recommendation that Congress consider amending the Espionage Act so as to cover modern forms of espionage not now criminal.
+[42] "Overt investigative techniques" means the collection of information readily available from public sources or to a private person (including interviews of the subject or his friends or associates).
+[43] Thus, the Bureau would have an obligation to review any such information before it is placed in files and to review the files, thereafter, to remove it if no longer needed. This obligation does not extend to files sealed under Recommendation 65.
+[44] "Reasonable suspicion" is based Upon the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and means specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion that specified activity has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur.
+[45] This includes conspiracy to violate a federal statute pertaining to the domestic security. The Committee, however, recommends repeal or amendment of the Smith Act to make clear that "conspiracy" to engage in political advocacy cannot be investigated. (See Recommendation 93.)
+[45]  This recommendation does not prevent the FBI from conducting criminal investigations or preventive intelligence investigations of terrorist acts in connection with a civil disorder.
+[46] For example, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) ; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
+[47] See definition of "name checks" at p.[ 340.
+[48] If Congress enacts a security leak criminal statute, this additional investigative authority would be unnecessary. Security leaks would be handled as traditional criminal investigations as described in Recommendations 42 and 43 above.
+[49] Review of tax returns and mail covers would also be subject to the Post Office and IRS procedures described in earlier recommendations.
+[49]  "When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb . . . . " (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, G37 (1952), Justice Jackson concurring.)
+[50] The Attorney General is considering additional guidelines on informants.
+[51] The period of ninety days begins when the informant is in place and capable of reporting.
+[52] The Committee has not taken extensive testimony on these "other covert techniques" and therefore, aside from the general administrative procedures contained in c. below, makes no recommendations designed to treat these techniques fully.
+[53] Except where disclosure is called for in connection with the defense in the case of criminal prosecution.
+[54] A "covert human source" is an undercover agent or informant who is paid or otherwise controlled by the agency. A cooperating citizen is not ordinarily a covert human source. A covert human source is "directed" at an American when the intelligence agency requests the covert human source to collect new information on the activities of that individual. A covert human source is not "directed" at a target if the intelligence agency merely asks him for information already in his possession, unless through repeated inquiries, or otherwise, the agency implicitly directs the informant against the target of the investigation.
+[55] The written finding must be made prior to the time the covert human source is directed at an American, unless exigent circumstances make application impossible, in which case the application must be made as soon thereafter as possible.
+[56] Termination requires cessation of payment or any other form of direction or control.
+[57] The written finding must be made prior to the time the technique is used against an American, unless exigent circumstances make application impossible, in which case the application must be made as soon thereafter as possible.
+[58] If Congress does not enact a security leak criminal statute, Congress might consider authorizing covert techniques in the same circumstances as security risk investigations either as an interim measure or as an alternative to such a statute.
+[59] Personally identifiable information on terrorist activity which pertains to a civil disorder could still be disseminated pursuant to (a) above.
+[60] This recommendation must be read along with recommendations contained in Part ii, limiting the authority of foreign intelligence and military agencies to investigate security leaks or security risks involving their employees and centralizing those investigations in the FBI.
+[61] The Inspector General and General Counsel should have authority, in extraordinary circumstances, and if requested by an employee of the agency providing information, to pass the information directly to the Attorney General and to notify the appropriate congressional committees without informing the head of the agency. Furthermore, nothing herein should prohibit an employee from reporting on his own such information directly to the Attorney General or an appropriate congressional oversight committee.
+[62] The head of the agency should be required to provide to the appropriate oversight committees of the Congress and the Executive branch and the Attorney General an immediate explanation, in writing, of any instance in which the Inspector General or the General Counsel has been denied access to information, has been instructed not to report on a particular activity or has been denied the authority to investigate a particular activity.
+[63] The report should include: (a) a summary of all agency activities that raise questions of legality or propriety and the General Counsel's findings concerning these activities; (b) a summary of the Inspector General's investigations concerning any of these activities; (c) a summary of the practices and procedures developed to discover activities that raise questions of legality or propriety; (d) a summary of each component, program or issue survey, including the Inspector General's recommendations and the Director's decisions; and (e) a summary of all other matters handled by the Inspector General.
 <br>
+<br>The report should also include discussion of: (a) major legal problems facing the Agency; (b) the need for additional statutes; and (c) any cases referred to the Department of Justice.
+[64] The functions of the Office should not include: (a) exercise of routine supervision of FBI domestic security investigations; (b) making requests to other agencies to conduct investigations or direct covert techniques at Americans; or (c) involvement in any other supervisory functions which it might ultimately be required to investigate.
+[64]  It is not proposed that this recommendation be enacted as a statute.
+[65] This review procedure would be similar to the procedure followed with respect to the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure.
+[65] It is not proposed that this recommendation be enacted as a statute.
+[66] 42 U.S.C. 1983.
+[67] Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
+[68] One means of structuring such a defense would be to create a rebuttable presumption that an individual defendant acted so as to avail himself of this defense when he proves that he acted in good faith reliance upon: (1) a written order or directive by a government officer empowered to authorize him to take action ; or (2) a written assurance by an appropriate legal officer that his action is lawful.
+[69] Due to the scope of the Committee's mandate, we have taken evidence only on constitutional violations by intelligence officers and agents. However, the anomalies and lack of clarity in the present state of the law (as discussed above) and the breadth of constitutional violations revealed by our record, suggest to us that a general civil remedy would be appropriate. Thus, we urge consideration of a statutory civil remedy for constitutional violations by any federal officer; and we encourage the appropriate committees of the Congress to take testimony on this subject.
+[70] The requirement of a substantial and specific claim is intended to allow a judge to screen out frivolous claims where a plaintiff cannot allege specific facts which Indicate that be was the target of illegal intelligence activity.
+[71] "Federal intelligence officers or agents" should include a person who was an intelligence officer, employee, or agent at the time a cause of action arose. "Agent" should include anyone acting with actual, implied, or apparent authority.
+[72] The right to recover "costs of litigation" is intended to include recovery of reasonable attorney fees as well as other litigation costs reasonably incurred.
+[73] E.g. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) ; Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) ; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
+[74] The term "clandestine intelligence activity" is included in this definition at the suggestion of officials of the
+Department of Justice. Certain activities engaged in by the conscious agents of foreign powers, such as some forms of industrial, technological, or economic espionage, are not now prohibited by federal statutes. It would be preferable to amend the espionage laws to cover such activity and eliminate this term. As a matter of principle, intelligence agencies should not investigate activities of Americans which are not federal criminal statutes. Therefore, the Committee recommends (in Recommendation —) that Congress immediately consider enacting such statutes and then eliminating this term.
+* Appendix A: 94th Congress 1st Session S.Res.21
+In the Senate of the United States
+January 21,1975
+Mr; Pastore submitted the following resolution ; which was ordered to be placed
+<br>on the calendar (under general orders)
+January 27,1975
+Considered, amended, and agreed to
+** Resolution
+To establish a select committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study with respect to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.
+<em>Resolved,</em> To establish a select committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study of governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities and of the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government or by any persons, acting individually or in combination with others, with respect to any intelligence activity carried out by or oh behalf of the Federal Government; be it further
+<em>Resolved,</em> That (a) there is hereby established a select committee of the Senate which may be called, for convenience of expression, the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities to conduct an investigatioruand study of the .extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any agency or by any persons, acting either’ individually or in combination with others, in carrying out any intelligence or surveillance activities by or on behalf of any agency of the Federal Government.
+(b) The select committee created by this resolution- shall consist of eleven Members of the .Senate, six.to be appointed by the President of the Senate from the majority Members of the Senate upon, the recommendation of the majority leader of the Senate, and five minority Members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate upon the recommendation of the minority leader of -the Senate. For the purposes of paragraph 6 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate, service of a Senator as a member, chairman, or vice chairman of the select committee shall not be taken into account.
+(c) The majority members of the committee shall seleot a chairman and the minority members shall select a vice chairman and the committee shall adopt rules and procedures to govern its-proceedings. The vice chairman shall preside over meetings of the select committee during the absence of the chairman, and discharge such other responsibilities as may be assigned to him by the select committee <strong>or the</strong> chairman. Vacancies in the membership of the select <strong>com</strong>mittee shall not affect the authority of the remaining members to execute the functions of the select committee and shall be filled in the same manner as original appointment? to it are made.
+(d) A majority of the members of the select committee shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business huh the select committee may affix a lesser number as a quorum for the purpose of taking testimony or depositions.
+Sec. 2. The select committee is authorized and directed to do everything necessary or appropriate to make the investigations and study specified in subsection (a) of the first section. Without abridging in any way the authority conferred upon the select committee by the preceding sentence, the Senate further expressly authorizes and directs the select committee to make a complete investigation and study of the activities of any agency or of any and all persons or groups of persons or organizations of any kind whi& have any tendency to reveal the full facts with respect to the following matters or questions:
+(1) Whether the Central Intelligence Agency <strong>has</strong> conducted an illegal domestic intelligence operation in the United States.
+(2) The conduct of domestic intelligence or counterintelligence operations against United States citizens by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other Federal agency.
+(3) The origin and disposition of the so-called Huston Plan to apply United States intelligence agency capabilities against individuals or organizations within the United States.
+(4) The extent to which the Federal Bureau, of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other Federal law enforcement or intelligence agencies coordinate their respective activities, any agreements- which govern that coordination, and the extent to which a lack of coordination Inas contributed to activities or actions which are illegal, improper, inefficient, unethical, or contrary to the intent of Congress.
+(5) The extent to which the operation of domestic intelligence or counterintelligence activities and the operation of any other activities within the United States by the Central Intelligence Agencj' conforms to the legislative charter of that Agency and the Intent rtf the Congress.
+(6) The past and present interpretation by the Director of Central Intelligence of the responsibility protect intelligence sources and methods as it relates the provision in section 102 (d) (3) of Sie <strong>National</strong> Security Act of 19'47 (50 U.S.C-. 4Q3'(d)- (3)) tW w... that the agency shall have no police-, subpena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions.. . J*
+(7) Nature and extent of executive branch oversight of all United States intelligence activities.
+(8) The need for specific legislative authority to govern the operations of any intelligence agencies Of the Federal Government now existing without thsfc explicit statutory authority, including but not limited tangencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency anil the National Security Agency.
+The nature and extent to which Federal agencies- Cooperate and exchange intelligence information and, the adequacy of any regulations or statutes which govern such cooperation and exchange of intelligence information.
+(9) The extent to which United States mtelligenSb agencies are governed by Executive orders, rules, Upregulations either published or secret arid the extent to which those Executive orders, rules’, or regulation^ interpret, expand, or are in Conflict with specific legs- lative authority.
+(10) The violation or suspected violation of Ufly State or Federal statute by any intelligence agency or by Any person by or on behalf of any intelligence agency of the Federal Government including but not limited, .to surreptitious entries, surveillance, wiretaps, or eavesdropping, illegal opening of the United States mail, OBf the monitoring of the United States mail.
+(11) The need for improved, strengthened, or conr solidated oversight of United States intelligence activities by the Congress.
+(12) Whether any of the existing laws of the United States are inadequate, either in their provisions or manner of enforcement, to safeguard the rights of American citizens, to improve executive and legislative control of intelligence and related activities, and to resolve uncertainties as to the authority of United Statds intelligence and related agencies.
+(13) Whether there is unnecessary duplication of expenditure and effort in the collection and processing of intelligence information by United States agencies.
+(14) The extent and necessity of overt and covert intelligence activities in the United States and abroad.
+(15) Such other related matters as the committee.' deems necessary in order to carry out its responsibility under section (a).
+Sec. 3. (a) To enable the select committee to make the investigation and study authorized and directed by this resolution, the Sena te hei'eby empowers the select committed •as an agency of the Senate (1) to employ and fix the compensation of such clerical,, investigatory, legal, technical, and other assistants as it deems necessary or appropriate^ but it may not exceed the normal Senate salary schedules: (2) to sit and act at any time or place during sessions, recesses, and adjournment periods of the Senate.; (3) to hold hearings for taking testimony on oath or to receive documentary or physical evidence relating to the matters and questions it is authorized to investigate or study; (4) to require by subpena or otherwise the attendance as witnesses- of any persons who the select committee believes have- knowledge or information concerning any of the matters- 01’ questions it is authorized to investigate and study; (5) to require by subpena or order any department, agency, officer, or employee of the executive branch of the United States Government, or any private person, firm, or corporation, to produce for its consideration or for use as evidence in its investigation and study any books, checks, canceled checks, correspondence, communications, document, papers, physical evidence, records, recordings, tapes, or materials relating to any of the matters or questions it is authorized to investigate and study which they or any of them may have in their custody or under their control; (6) to make to tire Senate any recommendations it deems appropriate in respect to the willful failure or refusal of any person to answer <pi68- Hons or give testimony in his character as a witness during his appearance before it or in respect to the willful failure or refusal of any officer or employee of the executive branch, of the United States Government or any person, firm, Of corporation to produce before the committee any books, checks; -canceled checks, correspondence, communications, document, financial records, papers, physical evidence, records, recordings, tapes, or materials in obedience to ally Subpena or order; (7) to take depositions and other testimony on oath anywhere within the United States or in any Other country; (8) to procure the temporary or inteniligent services of individual consultants, or organizations there of, in the same manner and under the same conditions <em>&S'</em> a standing committee of the Senate may procure such services under section 202 (i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946; (9) to use on a reimbursable.basis, "with the prior consent of the Committee on Rules and Adminis-- , tration, the services of personnel of any such department or agency; (10) to use on a reimbursable basis orofltor- wise with the prior consent of the chairman of any Subcommittee of any committee of the Senate the facilities 0T.‘ services of any members of the staffs of such, other Senate committees or any subcommittees of such other Senate COIU-' mittees whenever the select committee or its chairman-deems that such action is necessary or appropriate to enable the select committee to make the investigation and study authorized and directed by this resolution; (11) to have direct; access through the agency of any members of the select committee or any of its investigatory or legal assistants' designated by it or its chairman or the ranking minority member to any data, evidence, information, report, analysis; or document or papers, relating to any of the matters OK questions which it is authorized and directed to investigate and study in the custody or under the control of any department, agency, officer, or employee of the executive branch, of Ilie United (States Government, including any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States Government having the power under the laws of the United States to investigate any alleged criminal activities or to prosecute, persons charged with crimes against the United States anti any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United. States Government having the authority to conduct intelligence- or surveillance within or outside the United States; without regard Io the jurisdiction or authority of any Other Senate committee, which will aid the select committee £o prepare for or conduct the investigation and study authorized, and directed by this resolution; and (12) to expend to the. extent it determines necessary or appropriate any moneys made available to it by the Senate to perform the-.duties and exercise the powers conferred upon it by this resolution and to make the investigation and study it is authorized- by this resolution to make.
+(b) Sitbpenas may be issued by the select, committee- geting through the chgiijnan or;any other member designated, by him, and may be .served by any person designated- by BUjCh.chairman or other member anywhere within.tbc borders of flic United States. The chairman of the select committee, or any other member thereof, is hereby authorized to. administer oaths to any witnesses appearing, before the committee,
+(c) In preparing for or. conducting the investigation, and study .authorized and directed by this resolution, tho- Select committee shall be empowered to exercise the powers- conferred upon- committees of the Senate by section 6002 of title 18, United States Code, or any other. Act of Congress regulating the granting of immunity to witnesses.
+Sec. 4. The select committee shall have authority <strong>to</strong> recommend the enactment <em>of</em> any new legislation or the amendment of any existing statute which it considers necessary or desirable to strenghen or clarify the national security, intelligence, or surveillance activities of the United States and to protect the rights of United States citizens. with regard to those activities,
+Sec. 5. The select committee shall make a final report Qf-the results of the investigation and study conducted by it-pursuant to this resolution, together with its findings and its recommendations as to new congressional legislation it deems necessary or desirable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but no later than September 1, 1975.- Tho select committee may also submit to tho Senate such interim reports as it considers appropriate. After submission of its final report, the select committee shall have three calendar months to close its affairs, and on the expiration of- sudz three calendar months shall cease to exist.
+Sec. G. The expenses of the select committee through September 1, 1975, under this resolution shall not exceed §750,000 of which amount not to exceed §100,000 shall b& available for the procurement of the services of individual consultants or organizations thereof. Such expenses shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon V0Uchcr& approved by the chairman of the select committee.
+Sec. 7. The select committee shall institute and eany out such rules and procedures as it may deem necessary <strong>to</strong> prevent (1) the disclosure, outside the select committee, <strong>of</strong> any information relating to the activities of the Centred Intelligcnce Agency or any other department or agency of th& Federal Government engaged in intelligence activities, obtained by <em>the select committee</em> during the course of its study and investigation, not authorized by the select committee to be disclosed; and (2.) the disclosure, outside the select committee, of any information, which would adversely affect the intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in foreign countries or the intelligence activities in foreign countries of any other department or agency of the Federal Government.
+SEC. 8. As a condition for employment as described in section 3 of this resolution, each person shall agree not to accept any honorarium, royalty or other payment for a. speaking engagement, magazine article, book, or other endeavor connected with the investigation and study undertaken by this committee.
+SEC. 9. No employee of the select committee or any ^person engaged by contract or otherwise to perform services for the select committee shall be given access to any classified information by the select committee unless such employee or person has received an appropriate security clearance as determined by the select committee. The type of Security clearance to he required in the case of any such- employee or person shall, within the determination of the Select committee, he commensurate with the sensitivity of. the classified information to which such employee or person. "Will be given access by the select committee,
+* Appendix B: Previously Issued Reports and Hearings of the Senate Select Committee
+<em>A.</em> <em>Reports</em>
+. Senate Report: “Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders”, November 20, 1975.
+. Staff Report: “Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973”, December 18, 1975.
+<em>B.</em> <em>Hearings</em>
+. “Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents”, Volume 1, September 16,17 and 18,1975.
+. “Huston Plan”, Volume 2, September 23, 24 and 25, 1975.
+. “Internal Revenue Service”, Volume 3, October 2, 1975.
+. “Mail Opening”, Volume 4, October 21, 22 and 24, 1975.
+. “The National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights”, Volume 5, October 29 and November 6, 1975.
+. “Federal Bureau of Investigation”, Volume 6, November 18 and 19, December 2, 3,9,10 and 11,1975.
+. “Covert Action”, Volume 7, December 4 and 5, 1975.
+* Appendix C: Staff Acknowledgments: Final Report on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans
+The volume of the final report which summarizes the Committee’s inquiry into domestic intelligence activity and sets forth its findings ana recommendations was written and edited, along with the supple- mentary detailed reports, under the supervision of Chief Counsel Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., and Counsel to the Minority Curtis R. Smothers. The work of the entire staff of the Committee—over the long course of investigation, research and hearings—was channeled into the final report. The staff members listed below made major contributions to the writing and editing of this volume.
+<center>
+<em>Principal Authors</em>
+</center>
+James Dick
+<br>Mark Gitenstein
+<br>Robert Kelley
+<center>
+<em>General Editors</em>
+</center>
+Paul Michel
+<br>Andrew Postal
+<br>Walter Ricks
+<br>Burton Wides
+<center>
+<em>Research Coordination</em>
+</center>
+Lawrence Kieves
+<center>
+<em>Contributing Authors, Editors, and Investigators</em>
+</center>
+Jim Johnston
+<br>Chris Pyle
+<br>Eric Richard
+<br>Lester Seidel
+<br>Patrick Shea
+<br>Elizabeth P. Smith
+<br>John Smith
+<br>Britt Snider
+<br>Athan Theoharris
+<br>Paul Wallach
+<center>
+<em>Research Assistance</em>
+</center>
+Phebe Zimmerman
+<br>James Turner
+<br>
+<center>
+Supplementary Detailed Reports
+</center>
+<br>
+COINTELPRO: The FBI’s Covert Action Programs Against American Citizens.
+The FBI’s Efforts to Disrupt and Neutralize the Black Panther Party.
+Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Case Study.
+CIA and FBI Mail Opening.
+Warrantless Electronic Surveillance.
+The Use of Informers in FBI Intelligence Investigations.
+Warrantless Surreptitious Entries : FBI “Black Bag” Break- ins and Microphone Installations.
+The Development of FBI Domestic Intelligence Investigations.
+The Internal Revenue Service: An Intelligence Resource and Collector.
+National Security Agency Surveillance Affecting Americans.
+Improper Surveillance of Private Citizens by the Military.
+CIA Intelligence Collection About Americans: The CHAOS Program and the Office of Security.
+National Security, Civil Liberties, and the Collection of Intelligence : A Report on the Huston Plan.
+Paul Michel Rhett Dawson Michael Madigan
+<center>
+<em>Principal Staff Authors</em>
+</center>
+Barbara Banoff, assisted by Phebe Zimmerman and Mary DeOreo.
+Arthur Jefferson, Gordon Rhea.
+Michael Epstein, Gordon Rhea, assisted by Mary DeOreo and Dan McCorkle.
+James Dick, Paul Wallach, assisted by Thomas Dawson and Edward Griessing.
+James Dick, John Elliff.
+Robert Kelley, assisted by Jeffrey Kayden and Thomas Dawson.
+Frederick Baron.
+JohnElliff
+Walter Ricks, Arthur Harrigan, assisted by Thomas Dawson.
+Peter Fenn, Britt Snider, James Turner, assisted by Judi Mason.
+Britt Snider, assisted by James Turner.
+Burton Wides, assisted by Jeffrey Kayden.
+Loch Johnson, assisted by Margaret Carpenter and Daniel Dwyer.
+<br>
+* ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR PHILIP A. HART
+The Committee’s proposal on domestic intelligence is a carefully crafted system of controls to prevent abuse and preserve vigorous dissent in America. The report lays out the issues, notes the problems, and suggests solutions. Committee members and staff, under Senator Mondale’s conscientious leadership, grappled with the exceedingly difficult task of shaping broad principles into workable safeguards.
+The recommendations would narrow the scope of permissible intelligence, set standards and time limits for investigations, control dissemination, and provide civil remedies for improprieties.
+This comprehensive scheme may be the best we can do to set the delicate balance wheel between liberty and security. It is a considerable accomplishment, and I endorse its consideration by the appropriate legislative committees. I do so, however, with misgivings that the Committee’s record fails to justify even this degree of preventive intelligence investigation of American citizens.
+Unlike investigation of committed crimes, “preventive intelligence” means investigating persons thought likely to commit particularly serious acts; it is intended to prevent them. Providing, for the first time, statutory authorization of such surveillance is a dramatic and dangerous step. Congress should take that step with the utmost caution.
+It is appealing to say we should let the FBI do everything possible to avert bombing of the Capitol or other terrorist acts. But in America we must refuse to let the Government “do everything possible.” For that would entail spying on every militant opponent of official policy, just in case some of them may resort to violence. We would become a police state. The question, then, is whether a limited form of preventive intelligence, consistent with preserving our civil liberties, can be justified by the expected benefits and can also be kept under effective control.
+The Committee was reluctant to authorize any investigations except those of committed or imminent criminal acts. Nevertheless, our Report concludes that some preventive intelligence is justified because it might prevent a significant amount of terrorist activity without posing unacceptable risks for a free society.
+However, the shocking record of widespread abuse suggests to me that before Congress endorses a blueprint for preventive intelligence, we need a more rigorous presentation of the case for it than was offered to this Committee.
+The FBI only provided the Committee with a handful of substantiated cases—out of the thousands of Americans investigated—in which preventive intelligence produced warning of terrorist activity. Further, most of those few investigations which did detect terrorism could not have been opened under the Committee’s proposed restrictions.[1] In short, there is no substantial record before the Committee that preventive intelligence, under the restrictions we propose, would enable the Government to thwart terrorism.
+Essentially, we are asking the American people to accept the risks of preventive intelligence on the hypothetical possibility that the worst imaginable terrorist acts might be averted. Faced with the specter of bombings or assassination plots, we may be in danger of sanctioning domestic spying without any significant prospect that such intelligence activities will in fact prevent them.
+It might be argued that with adequate restraints to focus on hard core terrorism, preventive intelligence should be authorized even though we cannot demonstrate it is likely to prevent much violence. In that view, some insurance would be worth the limited cost.
+Assuming that premise, there are two overriding issues:
+—When may the Government investigate the activities of Americans engaged in political dissent; and
+—When may the Government use informants to spy on those Americans?
+If we are to have a preventive intelligence program at all, then I believe the Committee’s recommendations on both these issues require refinement.
+The Committee found that most improper investigations have been commenced merely on the basis of political advocacy or association, rather than on specific information about expected terrorist activity. The recommendations would preclude mere advocacy or association as a predicate for investigating Americans. In practice, however, that would simply require specific allegations that an unpopular dissident group was planning terrorist violence.
+Of course, if the FBI receives a tip that John Jones may resort to bombing to protest American involvement in Vietnam, the Bureau should not be forced to sit on its hand until the blast. But our proposals would permit more than review of federal and local records on John Jones a ad interviews of his associates, even in a preliminary investigation. On the basis of an anonymous letter, with no supporting information—let alone any indication of the source’s reliability—the FBI could conduct secret physical surveillance and ask existing informants about him for up to three months, with the Attorney General’s approval.
+The Committee was concerned about authorizing such extensive investigations before there is even a “reasonable basis of suspicion” the subject will engage in terrorism. The Report offers examples of how this recommendation would work, and indicates our desire to insulate lawful political activity from investigation of violent terrorism. But these very examples illustrate how inextricable the two may be at the outset of an inquiry into an allegation or ambiguous information. The task of finding out whether a dissident is contemplating violence or is only involved in vigorous protest inevitably requires investigation of his protest activities. In the process, the FBI could follow the organizers of a Washington peace rally for three months on the basis of an allegation they might also engage in violence.
+The second major issue is the use of paid Government informants to spy upon Americans. The great majority of abuses uncovered in domestic intelligence involved the pervasive use of informants against dissident political groups. The Committee defers the question of whether judicial approval should be required for targeting informants, until review by the Attorney General alone has been tested.
+In my view, control of informants and control of wiretapping can be distinguished only on the basis of present constitutional doctrine; the Supreme Court has not found the use of informants to violate Fourth Amendment guarantees against Government intrusion. However, in terms of the values underlying both the First and Fourth Amendments, our record shows that the use of informants can, if anything be even more intrusive and more easily abused than electronic surveillance. As a matter of policy, they should be stringently controlled.
+From the prosecutor’s viewpoint, a wiretap is more precise and reliable than an informant. The accuracy of an informant witness may be vulnerable to challenge. But as a source of intelligence, informants can be directed at all of the subject’s associates. They can follow the subject from place to place and can even be asked to elicit information through specific questions. In effect, a well-placed informant can be a “walking, thinking ‘bug’.” The use of such informants is at the heart of the chilling effect which preventive intelligence has on political dissent.
+Whether informant penetrations are to be approved by the Attorney General or by a judge, the Committee report recognizes the great dangers they pose.[2] We recommend a high standard for their use: Probable cause to believe the target soon will engage in terrorist activity. My concern is that, in an effort, to accommodate the realities of preventive intelligence, our proposals may render this standard illusory.
+The FBI argued that, in the case of tightly knit conspiracies, it could not meet that standard without the initial resort to informants.
+Therefore, the Committee would permit “temporary” targeting of informants for up to five months. In effect, the FBI could bootstrap its investigation by employing informants to collect enough information to justify their use. The Committee does require that this use of informants be terminated if probable cause cannot be established within five months. But it is doubtful that such termination would be effective to provide the high standard of protection the Committee feels is necessary for the use of such an intrusive technique.[3]
+To a great extent, our proposals for controlling preventive intelligence ultimately rely upon the Attorney General and congressional oversight committees. In view of the performances of the Congress and the Justice Department for the past two decades, it is not easy to have full confidence in their ability to prevent abuses of domestic intelligence without precise detailed statutory prohibitions.
+Moreover, our task is not to fashion legislation which seems adequate for the present period of national calm and recent revelations of intelligence abuses. We do not need to draft safeguards for an Attorney General who makes clear—as Attorney General Levi has done—his determination to prevent abuse. We must legislate for the next periods of social turmoil and passionate dissent, when the current outrage has faded and those in power may again be tempted to investigate their critics in the name of national security.
+In a time of crisis, acts of violence by a tiny minority of those engaged in political protest will again place intense pressures on officials in the Department of Justice to stretch any authority we provide to its limits. For these reasons we must be extremely careful not to build too much flexibility and discretion into a system of preventive intelligence which can be used against domestic dissidents. As the Supreme Court has wisely observed:
+The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government. <em>{DeJong</em> v. <em>Oregon,</em> 299 U.S. 353, 365.)
+<right>
+Philip A. Hart.
+</right>
+** Additional Statement of Senator Robert Morgan
+In 1776 the citizens of a new America, in declaring their independence from a Repressive government, set forth the goals, ideals and standards of their new government in the Declaration of Independence. As we prepare to celebrate the 200th anniversary of the birth of our country later this year, we will reaffirm the beliefs of our forefathers that America will be a free country, with a government of laws and not one of men. That the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has completed its year-long investigation into the secret activities of this country’s intelligence agencies and is releasing this Report is a great testament to the freedom for which America stands.
+During the course of the past year, the Committee has discovered and revealed to the American people many actions of agencies of our government which were undertaken in complete disregard for the principles of our democratic society. The Committee’s Report documents many of these abuses, basing its findings directly on the admissions of officials of the governmental agencies being investigated and upon information taken directly from the files of those agencies.
+The Report also analyzes those findings and recommends guidelines and procedures designed to protect the rights of American citizens in the future, while at the same time ensuring that our intelligence agencies maintain the capability to function effectively. I fully support the findings, analyses and recommendations, and make this additional statement only for the purpose of sharing with the readers of this Report some of my personal thoughts on the significance of the Committee’s work and where we go from here.
+The Committee has approached the performance of its obligation mandated by Sen. Res. 21 with an abundance of caution. Many of the Committee’s executive session hearings, because of the sensitive nature of the subject matter, were even restricted to Members and only those staff who were assigned specific duties relevant to the inquiry. Because of the dedication of the Members and staff to the seriousness of the undertaking, we are approaching the completion of our work with a remarkably clean record as far as leaks of classified material detrimental to the security of the country are concerned.
+From the beginning of our work until the end, the Committee has gone beyond the dictates of normal congressional investigation to try to accommodate concerns of the agencies under investigation for the security of material requested by the Committee. To this end, long hours were spent negotiating over what material would be made available to the Committee in response to its requests and in what form that material would be given to the Committee once access to it had been acquired. Nevertheless, on many occasions the Committee received material from which significant details had been deleted, necessitating further negotiations with the responsible agencies and, in some cases, severely hampering the Committee’s inquiry into important and significant areas.
+While it is understandable that executive agencies whose very operations are secret would be in some respect resistant to senatorial inquiry into their activities, I can only interpret the strong resistance to some Committee demands and inquiries as being symptomatic of the atmosphere within the agencies which contributed to the occurrence of abuse in the first instance—one of the basic distrusts of the actions of fellow American citizens who have as their goals the strengthening of this nation’s ideals, of its moral fiber.
+Just as the American citizen was denied the right to decide for himself what was or was not in the best interest of the country, or what actions of a foreign government or domestic dissident threatened the national security, the impression has been generated by some that the Congress cannot be trusted with the nation’s crucial secrets. As the elected representative of the citizens of my state, I am entrusted with the right and duty to properly conduct the business of our government. Without knowledge of governmental actions or effective means of overseeing those actions, my efforts to fulfill the requirements of that obligation are, at least, severely hampered; at most, impossible, and the successful implementation of an adequate system of checks and balances, as set forth in our Constitution, is effectively negated.
+The Committee’s Report contains clear examples of the denial of the rights of American citizens to determine the course of American history. While the FBI’s counterintelligence activities directed at American citizens on many occasions violated the rights of the targets of the programs, a greater abuse was the belief fostered that the ordinary American citizen was not competent enough to, independently of governmental actions, decide, given full knowledge of all facts, what was in his or her best interest or in the best interest of the country. The judicial process, to which we turn for settlement of our disputes and punishment of criminals, was also largelv ignored. FBI action was based, for example, on the assumption that all Americans opposed to this country’s participation in the Vietnam War might one day take to the streets in violent protest, thereby threatening our national security. It was assumed, for example, that right-wing, anti-communist groups in the 1960s would gain the sympathies of too many Americans thereby impeding policies of the then administration, so their taxes were checked. It was assumed, for example, that every black student on every college campus in America would resort to violence, so procedures were undertaken to establish files on all of them.
+All of these actions deny Americans the right to decide for themselves what will not be tolerated in a free society. Justice Douglas, defending the freedom of speech in his dissenting opinion in <em>Dennis</em> v. Z7.&, 341 U.S. 494, spoke words which vividly reflect the necessity that we, to remain free, must hold high this basic right of selfdetermination which has enabled us to attain the strength and prosperity that we as a nation now enjoy. Justice Douglas wrote,
+Full and free discussion has indeed been the first article of . our faith. We have founded our political system on it. It has been the safeguard of every religious, political, philosophical, economic, and racial group amongst us. We have counted on it to keep us from embracing what is cheap and false; <em>we have trusted the common sense of our people to choose the doctrine true to our genius and to reject the rest. This has been the outstanding tenet that has made our institutions the symbol of freedom and equality.</em> We have deemed it more costly to liberty to suppress a despised minority than to let them vent their spleen. We have above all else feared the political censor. We have wanted a land where our people can be exposed to all the diverse creeds and cultures of the world. [Emphasis added.]
+Furthermore, just as the American citizen must be given the right to validly assess the significance and merit of political change sought by others, the elected representatives of the people must have knowledge of governmental action to properly determine which perceived threats to our way of life are real, Justice Brandeis, in <em>01/mstead</em> v. <em>U.S.,</em> 277 U.S. 438, said, “The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
+The continued existence of our democracy demands that we zealously protect the inherent right of all Americans to be free from unwarranted intrustion into their lives by governmental action. History has demonstrated, from the time of the founding of Christianity through the founding of these United States, through today, that there is a place for differences of opinion among our citizenry; for new, bold and innovative ideas. Thomas Jefferson wrote that “the republican is the only form of government which is not eternally at . open or secret war with the rights of mankind.” To maintain our Republic, we must be willing to tolerate the right of every American citizen to, within the confines of the law, be different.
+Throughout the existence of the Committee, I have often said that while the occurrence of the events which gave rise to the investigation were unfortunate and are, in many instances, embarrassing to our country and some of its agencies, public disclosure was necessary in order to clear the air so that the agencies could devote their full attention to properly carrying out their important duties. I feel the Committee as a whole shares this view and has attempted to enhance the performance of the functions of the agencies by making specific recommendations which, when implemented and coupled with the establishment of an effective oversight committee, will guarantee that our country will not be subverted, nor subvert its ideals in the name of national security or other improperly perceived threats. It is my sincere hope that our citizens will view this Report as one of the many expressions of freedom we will make this year and that it will rekindle in each of us the belief that perhaps our greatest strength lies - in our ability to deal frankly, openly, and honestly with the problems of our government.
+<right>
+Robert Morgan.
+</right>
+* INTRODUCTION TO SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATORS JOHN TOWER, HOWARD H, BAKER, JR., AND BARRY M. GOLDWATER
+Our mutual concern that certain remedial measures proposed by this Committee threaten to impose undue restrictions upon vital and legitimate intelligence functions prevents us, in varying degrees, from rendering an unqualified endorsement to this Committee’s findings and recommendations in their entirety. We also perceive a need to emphasize areas of common agreement such as our unanimous endorsement of intelligence reforms heretofore outlined by the President.
+Therefore, we have elected to articulate our common concerns and observations, as viewed from our individual perspectives, in separate views which follow.
+John Tower, <em>Vice Chairman.</em>
+Howard <strong>H.</strong> Baker, Jr.
+Barry <strong>M.</strong> Goldwater.
+(867)
+* SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATOR JOHN G. TOWER, VICE CHAIRMAN
+When the Senate mandated this Committee to conduct an investigation and study of activities of our Nation’s intelligence community, it recognized the need for congressional participation in decisions which impact virtually every aspect of American life. The gravamen of our charge was to examine the Nation’s intelligence needs and the performance of agencies charged with intelligence responsibilities, and to make such assessments and recommendations as in our judgment are necessary to maintain the delicate balance between individual liberties and national security. I do not believe the Committee’s reports and accompanying staff studies comply fully with the charge to maintain that balance. The Committee’s recommendations make significant departures from an overriding lesson of the American experience— the right of American citizens to be free is inextricably bound to their right to be secure.
+I do not question the existence of intelligence excesses—the abuses of power, both foreign and domestic, are well documented in the Committee’s report.
+Nor do I question the need for expanded legislative, executive, and judicial involvement in intelligence policy and practices—the “uncertainties as to the authority of United States intelligence and related agencies” were explicitly recognized by Senate Resolution 21.
+Nevertheless, I question, and take exception to, the Committee’s report to the extent that its recommendations are either unsupported by the factual record or unduly restrict attainment of valid intelligence objectives.
+I believe that the 183 separate recommendations proposing new detailed statutes and reporting procedures not only exceed the number and scope of documented abuses, but represent over-reaction. If adopted in their totality, they would unnecessarily limit the effective- . ness of the Nation’s intelligence community.
+In the area of foreign intelligence, the Committee was specifically mandated to prevent “.. . disclosure, outside the Select Committeej of any information which would adversely affect the intelligence activities ... of the Federal Government.” In his separate view, Senator Barry Goldwater clearly points up the damage to our efforts in Latin America occasioned by release of the “staff report” on covert action in Chile. I objected to releasing the Chile report and fully support Senator Goldwater’s assessment of the adverse impact of this “ironic” and ill-advised disclosure.
+(369)
+Another unfortunate aspect of the Committee’s foreign report is its response to incidents of lack of accountability and control by recommending the imposition of a layering of Executive Branch reviews at operational levels and needless bifurcation of the decisionmaking process. The President’s reorganization which centralizes foreign intelligence operations and provides for constant review and oversight, is termed “ambiguous.” Yet the Committee’s recommended statutory changes would [in addition to duplication and multiplication of decisions] add little except to insure that the existing functions set up by the President’s program were “explicitly empowered,” “reaffirmed” or provided with “adequate staff.” By concentration upon such details as which cabinet officer should chair the various review groups or speak for the President, the Committee’s approach unnecessarily restricts Presidential discretion, without enhancing efficiency, control, or accountability. The President’s reorganization is a thorough, comprehensive response to a long-standing problem. It should be supported, not pilloried with statutory amendments amounting to little more than alternative management techniques. It is far more appropriate for the Congress to place primary legislative emphasis on establishing a structure for Congressional Oversight which is compatible with the Executive reorganization while eliminating the present proliferation of committees and subcommittee’s asserting jurisdiction over intelligence activities.
+Another area in which I am unable to agree with the Committee’s approach is covert action. It would be a mistake to attempt to require that the Congress receive prior notification of <em>all</em> covert activities. Senator Howard Baker repeatedly urged the Committee to adopt the more realistic approach of obligating the Executive to keep the Congress “fully and currently informed”. I believe any attempt by the legislative branch to impose a strict prior notification requirement upon the Executive’s foreign policy initiatives is neither feasible nor consistent with our constitutionally mandated separation of powers.
+On the domestic front the Committee has documented flagrant abuses. Of particular concern were the political misuses of such agencies as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Internal Revenue Service. However, while thoroughly probing these reprehensible activities and recommending needed changes in accountability mechanisms, the Committee’s “corrective” focus is almost exclusively on prohibitions or limitations of agency practices. I hope this approach to remedial action will not be read as broad criticism of the overall performance of the intelligence community or a minimization of the Committee’s own finding that “. . . a fair assessment must place a major part of the blame upon the failures of senior executive officials and Congress.” In fact, I am persuaded that the failure of high officials to investigate these abuses or to terminate them when they learned of them was almost as reprehensible as the abuses themselves.
+A further objectionable aspect of the Committee’s approach is the scope of the proposed limitations on the use of electronic surveillance and informants as investigative techniques. With respect to electronic surveillance of Americans suspected of intelligence activities inimical to the national interest, the Committee would limit authority for such probes to violations of specific criminal statutes. This proposal fails to address the real problem of utilizing electronic surveillance against myriad forms of espionage. A majority of the Committee recommended this narrow standard while acknowledging that existing statutes offer inadequate coverage of “modem forms of espionage.” The Committee took no testimony on revision of the espionage laws and simply proposed that another committee “explore the necessity for amendments.” To prohibit electronic surveillance in these cases pending such revision is to sanction an unnecessary risk to the national security. In adopting this position the Committee not only ignores the fact that appellate courts in two federal circuits have upheld the Executive’s inherent authority to conduct such surveillance, but also fails to endorse the Attorney General’s comprehensive proposal to remedy objection to current practices. The proposed safeguards, which include requirements for the Attorney General’s certification of hostile foreign intelligence involvement and issuance of a judicial warrant as a condition precedent to electronic surveillance, represent a significant expansion of civil liberties protections. The proposal enjoys bi-partisan support in Congress and I join those members urging prompt enactment.
+I am also opposed to the methods and means proposed by the Committee to regulate the use of informants. Informants have been in the past and will remain in the future a vital tool of law enforcement. To adopt the Committee’s position and impose stringent, mechanical time limits on the use of informants—particularly regarding their use against terrorist or hostile foreign intelligence activities in the United States—would be to place our faith in standards which are not only illusory, but unworkable.
+In its overly broad approach to eliminating intelligence abuses, the Committee report urges departure from the Congress’ role as a partner in national security policy and comes dangerously close to being a blueprint for authorizing Congressional management of the day-to- day affairs of the intelligence community. Whether this management is attempted through prior notification of a shopping list of prohibitive statutes and regulations, it is a task for which the legislative branch of government is ill-suited. I believe the adverse impact which would be occasioned by enactment of all the Committee recommendations would be substantial.
+Substantial segments of the Committee’s work product will assist this Congress in proceeding with the task of insuring the conduct of necessary intelligence activities in a manner consistent with our obligation to safeguard the rights of American citizens. However, we must now step back from the klieg lights and abuse-dominated atmosphere, and balance our findings and recommendations with a recognition that our intelligence agencies and the men and women who serve therein have been and will always be essential to the existence of our nation.
+This Committee was asked to provide a constitutionally acceptable framework for Congress to assist in that mission. We were not mandated to render our intelligence systems so constrained as to be fit for employment only in an ideal world.
+In addition to the above remarks I generally endorse the positions set forth in Senator Baker’s individual views. I specifically endorse:
+His views stating the need for legislation making it a criminal offense to publish the name of a United States intelligence officer stationed abroad under cover.
+His position that there must be a system of greater accountability by our intelligence operations to the United States Congress and the American people.
+His concern that the Congress exercise caution to insure that a proper predicate exists before any recommendations for permanent reforms are enacted into law.
+His view that there be careful study before endorsing the Committee’s far reaching recommendations calling for an alteration of the intelligence community structure. I also support the individual views of Senator Goldwater.
+Further, I specifically endorse:
+His assessment that only a small segment of the American public has ever doubted the integrity of our Nation’s intelligence agencies.
+His opinion that an intelligence system, however secret, does not place undue strain on our nation’s constitutional government.
+His excellent statement concerning covert action as an essential tool of the President’s foreign policy arsenal.
+His opposition to the publication of an annual aggregate figure for United States intelligence and his reasons therefor.
+His views and comments on the Committee’s recommendations regard the National Security Council and the Office of the President. Specifically, comments number 12,13 and 14.
+His views challenging the proposed limitations concerning the recruitment of foreigners by the Central Intelligence Agency.
+His views and general comments concerning the right of every American, including academics, clergymen, businessmen and others, to cooperate with his government in its lawful pursuits.
+For the reasons stated above, I regret that I am unable to sign the final report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities.
+<right>
+John <strong>G.</strong> Tower,
+</right>
+<right>
+<em>Vice Chairman.</em>
+</right>
+SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
+At the close of the Senate Watergate Committee, I felt that there was a compelling need to conduct a thorough examination of our intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA and the FBI. Congress never had taken a close look at the structure or programs of either the CIA or the FBI, since their inception in 1947 and 1924, respectively.[1]
+Moreover, there never had been a congressional review of the intelligence community as a whole. Therefore, I felt strongly that this Committee’s investigation was necessary. Its time had come. Like the Watergate investigation, however, for me it was not a pleasant assignment. I say that because our investigation uncovered many actions by agents of the FBI and of the CIA that I would previously have not thought possible <em>(e.g.,</em> crude FBI letters to break up marriages or cause strife between Black groups and the CIA assassination plots) in our excellent intelligence and law enforcement institutions. Despite these unsavory actions, however, I do not view either the FBI or CIA as evil or even basically bad. Both agencies have a long and distinguished record of excellent service to our government. With the exception of the worst of the abuses, the agents involved truly believed they were acting in the best interest of the country. Nevertheless, the abuses uncovered can not be condoned and should have been investigated long ago.
+I am hopeful, now that all these abuses have been fully aired to the American people through the Committee’s Hearings and Report, that this investigation will have had a cathartic effect; that the FBI and CIA will now be able to grow rather than decline. Such growth with a healthy respect for the rule of law should be our goal; a goal which I am confident can be attained. It is important for the future of this country that the FBI and CIA not be cast as destroyers of our constitutional rights but rather as protectors of those rights. With the abuses behind us this can be accomplished.
+<center>
+Long-Term Improvement of Intelligence Community
+</center>
+On balance, I think the Committee carried out its task responsibly and thoroughly. The Committee’s report on both the Foreign and Domestic areas are the result of extensive study and deliberation, as well as bipartisan cooperation in its drafting. The Report identifies many of the problems in the intelligence field and contains positive suggestions for reform. I support many of the proposed reforms, while differing, at times, with the means we should adopt to attain those reforms. In all candor, however, one must recognize that an investigation such as this one, of necessity, will cause some short-term damage to our intelligence apparatus. A responsible inquiry, as this has been, will in the long run result in a stronger and more efficient intelligence community. As my colleague Senator Morgan recently noted at a Committee meeting, such short-term injury will be outweighed by longterm benefits gained from the re-structuring of the intelligence community with more efficient utilization of our intelligence resources. Former Director William Colby captured this sentiment recently in a New York Times article:
+Intelligence has traditionally existed in a shadowy field outside the law. This year’s excitement has made clear that the rule of law applies to all parts of the American Government, including intelligence. In fact, this will strengthen American intelligence. Its secrets will be understood to be necessary ones for the protection of our democracy in tomorrow’s world, not covers for mistake or misdeed. The guidelines within which it should and should not operate will be clarified for those in intelligence and those concerned about it. Improved supervision will ensure that the intelligence agencies will remain within the new guidelines.
+The American people will understand and support their intelligence services and press their representatives to give intelligence and its officers better protection from irresponsible exposure and harassment. The costs of the past year were high, but they will be exceeded by the value of this strengthening of what was already the best intelligence service in the world.[2]
+The Committee’s investigation, as former Director Colby points out, has probed areas in which reforms are needed not to prevent abuses, but to better protect and strengthen the intelligence services. For example, it is now clear that legislation is needed to make it a criminal offense to publish the name of a United States intelligence officer stationed abroad.[3] Moreover, the Committee’s investigation convinced me that the State Department should revise its publication of lists from which intelligence officers overseas predictably and often easily can be identified.
+Yet we have not been able, in a year’s time, to examine carefully all facets of the United States’ incredibly important and complex intelligence community.[4] We have established that in some areas problems exist which need intensive long-term study. Often these most important and complex problems are not ones which lend themselves to quick or easy solutions. As Ambassador Helms noted in his testimony during the Committee’s public hearings:
+... I would certainly agree that in view of the statements made by all of you distinguished gentlemen, that some result from this has got to bring about a system of accountability that is going to be satisfactory to the U.S. Congress and to the American people.
+Now, exactly how you work out that accountability in a secret intelligence organization, I think, is obviously going to take a good deal of thought and a good deal of work and I do not have any easy ready answer to it because I assure you it is not an easy answer. In other words, there is no quick fix. (Hearings, Vol. I, 9/17/75, p. 124).
+<center>
+Thorough Study Necessary in Several Areas
+</center>
+The areas which concern me the most are those on which we as a Committee have been able to spend only a limited amount of time,[5] i.e., espionage, counterintelligence, covert action, use of informants, and electronic surveillance. It is in these areas that I am concerned that the Committee be extremely careful to ensure that the proper thorough investigatory predicate exist before any permanent reform recommendations be enacted into law.
+Our investigation, however, has provided a solid base of evidence from which a permanent oversight committee can and should launch a lengthy and thorough inquiry into the best way to achieve permanent restructuring in these particularly sensitive areas. It is my view that such a study is necessary before I am able to endorse some of the Committee’s recommendations which suggest a far reaching alteration of the structure of some of the most important facets of our intelligence system.
+Therefore, while I support many of the Committee’s major recommendations, I find myself unable to agree with all the Committee’s findings and recommendations in both the foreign and domestic areas. Nor am I able to endorse every inference, suggestion, or nuance contained in the findings and supporting individual reports which together total in the thousands of pages. I do, however, fully support all of the factual revelations which our report contains concerning the many abuses in the intelligence field. It is important to disclose to the American people all of the instances of wrongdoing we discovered. With such full disclosure, it is my hope that we can turn the corner and devote our attention in the future to improving our intelligence gathering capability. We must have reform, but we must accomplish it by improving, not limiting, our intelligence productivity. I am confident this can be done.
+<center>
+Cumulative Effect of Recommendations
+</center>
+With regard to the totality of the Committee’s recommendations, I am afraid that the cumulative effect of the numerous restrictions which the report proposes to place on our intelligence community may be damaging to our intelligence effort. I am troubled by the fact that some of the Committee’s recommendations dip too deeply into many of the operational areas of our intelligence agencies. To do so, I am afraid, will cause practical problems. The totality of the proposals may decrease instead of increase our. intelligence product. And, there
+may be serious ramifications of some proposals which will, I fear, spawn problems which are as yet unknown. I am unconvinced that the uncertain world of intelligence can be regulated with the use of rigid or inflexible standards.
+Specifically, I am not convinced that the answers to all our problems are found by establishing myriad Executive Branch boards, committees, and subcommittees to manage the day-to-day operations of the intelligence community. We must take care to avoid creating a Rube Goldberg maze of review procedures which might result in a bureaucratic morass which would further increase the burden on our already heavily overburdened tax dollar.
+We should not over-reform in response to the abuses uncovered. This is not to say that we do not need new controls, because we do. But, it is to say that the controls we impose should be well reasoned and add to, not detract from the efficiency of our intelligence gather- ering system.
+Increased Executive Branch controls are only one-half of the solution. Congress for too long has neglected its role in monitoring the intelligence community. That role should be significant but not all- encompassing. Congress has a great many powers which in the past it has not exercised. We must now do our share but, at the same time, we must be careful, in reacting to the abuses uncovered, that we not swing the pendulum back too far in the direction of Congress. Both wisdom and the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers dictate that Congress not place itself in the position of trying to manage and control the day-to-day business of the intelligence operations of the Executive Branch. Vigorous oversight is needed, but it should be carefully structured in a new powerful oversight committee. I believe this can be achieved if we work together to attain it.
+In moving toward improving our intelligence capability, we must also streamline it. It is in this approach that my thoughts are somewhat conceptually different from the approach the Committee is recommending. I am concerned that we not overreact to the past by creating a plethora of rigid “thou shalt not” statutes, which, while prohibiting the specific hypothetical abuse postured in the Report, cast a wide net which will catch and eliminate many valuable intelligence programs as well.
+The Committee Report recommends the passage of a large number of new statutes to define the functions of and further regulate the intelligence community. I am troubled by how much detail should be used in spelling out the functions and limitations of our intelligence agencies for all the world to see. Do we want to outline for our adversaries just how far our intelligence agencies can go? Do we want to define publicly down to the last detail what they can and cannot do ? I am not sure we do. I rather think the answer is found in establishing carefullv structured charter? for the intelligence agencies with accountability and responsibility in the Executive Branch and vigilant oversight within the Legislative Branch.
+<center>
+President’s Program
+</center>
+It is my view that we need to take both a moderate and efficient course in reforming our intelligence gathering system. In that regard, I think President Ford’s recent restructuring of the intelligence community was an extraordinarily good response to the problems of the past. The President’s program effected a massive reorganization of our entire intelligence community. It was a massive reaction to a massive problem which did not lend itself to easy solution. I am pleased that many of the Committee’s recommendations for intelligence reform mirror the President’s program in format. Centralizing the command and control of the intelligence community, as the President’s program does, is the best way to ensure total accountability and yet not compromise our intelligence gathering capability.
+Therefore, I endorse the basic framework of intelligence reform, outlined by President Ford, as embodying: (1) a single permanent oversight committee in Congress, with strong and aggressive staff, to oversee the intelligence community;[6] (2) the Committee on Foreign Intelligence to manage the day-to-day operation of the intelligence community; (3) the re-constituted Operations Advisory Group to review and pass upon all significant covert actions projects;[7] and (4) the Intelligence Oversight Board to monitor any possible abuses in the future, coordinating the activities and reports of what I am confident will be the considerably strengthened offices of General Counsel and Inspector General. This framework will accomplish the accountability and responsibility we seek in the intelligence community with both thoroughness and efficiency. Within this framework, Attorney General Levi’s new guidelines in the Domestic Security area will drastically alter this previously sparsely supervised field. These guidelines will centralize responsibility for domestic intelligence within the Department of Justice and will preclude abuses such as COINTELPRO from ever reoccurring.[8]
+<center>
+Specific Reforms
+</center>
+Within this basic framework, we must look to how we are going to devise a system that can both effectively oversee the intelligence community and yet not impose strictures which will eliminate its productivity. It is to this end that I suggest we move in the following direction:
+(1) Demand responsibility and accountability from the Executive Branch by requiring all major policy decisions and all major intelligence action decisions be in writing, and therefore retrievable.[9]
+(2) I recommend, as <em>I</em> have previously, that Congress enact a variation of S. 400, which I had the privilege to cosponsor. S. 400 is the Government Operations Committee bill which would create a permanent oversight committee to review the intelligence community. The existing Congressional oversight system has provided infrequent and ineffectual review. And, many of the abuses revealed might have been prevented had Congress been doing its job. The jurisdiction of the new committee should include both the CIA and the FBI, and the committee should be required to review and report periodically to the Senate on all aspects of the intelligence community’s operations. In particular, I recommend that the Committee give specific careful attention to how we might improve as well as control our intelligence capability in the counterintelligence and espionage areas.
+(3) Simultaneously with the creation of a permanent oversight committee, Congress should amend the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act, § 662, which now requires the intelligence community to brief 6 committees of the Congress on each and every major intelligence action. Former Director Colby strikes a responsive chord when he complains that the present system will lead to leaking of vital intelligence information. We must put a stop to this. This can be done by allowing the intelligence community to report only to a single secure committee.
+(4) Concomitantly with improved oversight, we in Congress must adopt stringent procedures to prevent leaks of intelligence information. In this regard, I recommend we create a regular remedy to prevent the extraordinary remedy of a single member of Congress disclosing the existence of a covert intelligence operation with which he does not agree. Such a remedy could take the form of an appeal procedure within the Congress so that a single member, not satisfied with a Committee’s determination that a particular program is in the national interest, will be provided with an avenue of relief. This procedure, however, must be coupled with stringent penalties for any member of Congress who disregards it and discloses classified information anyway. I intend to offer an amendment to institute such a remedy when S. 400 reaches the Senate floor.[10]
+(5) The positions of General Counsel and Inspector General in the intelligence agencies should be elevated in importance and given increased powers. I feel that it is extraordinarily important that these positions, particularly that of General Counsel, be upgraded. For that reason, I think that it is a good idea to have the General Counsel, to both the FBI and the CIA, subject to Senate confirmation. This adds another check and balance which will result in an overall improvement of the system.[11] Additionally, I feel that it is equally important to provide both the General Counsel and Inspector General with unrestricted access to all raw files within their respective agencies.[12] This was not always done in the past and will be a healthy addition to the intraagency system of checks and balances.
+(6) I am in favor of making public the aggregate figure for the budget of the entire intelligence community. I believe the people of the United States have the right to know that figure.[13] The citizens of this country have a right to know how much of their money we are spending on intelligence production. But, they also want to get their money’s worth out of that tax dollar. They do not want to spend that money for intelligence production which is going to be handicapped; which is going to produce poor or inaccurate intelligence. Therefore, I am opposed to any further specific delineation of the intelligence community budget. Specifically, I am opposed to the publication of the CIA’s budget or the NSA’s budget. It seems to me we are dealing with the world of the unknown in predicting what a foreign intelligence service can or cannot extrapolate from these budget figures. We received no testimony which guaranteed that, if Congress were to publish the budget figure for the CIA itself, a hostile intelligence organization could not extrapolate from that figure and determine much more accurately what the CIA capabilities are in any number of vital areas. Without such testimony, I am not prepared to go that far. The public’s right to know must be balanced with the efficiency and integrity of our intelligence operations. I think we can accomplish both by taking the middle road; publishing the aggregate figure for the entire intelligence community. It is this proposal that I have voted in favor of.
+There are a number of other specific findings and recommendations, supported by a majority of the Committee, which require additional brief comment.
+<center>
+Foreign Intelligence Recommendations
+</center>
+<center>
+(1) COVERT ACTION
+</center>
+I believe the covert action capability of our intelligence community is vital to the United States. We must maintain our strength in this capacity, but, we must also control it. The key and difficult question, of course, is how we can control it without destroying or damaging its effectiveness. In my view, the best way to both maintain strength and yet insure accountability is to have strict control of the covert action programs through the Operations Advisory Group, with parallel control and supervision by the proposed permanent congressional oversight committee.
+Covert action is a complex United States intelligence capability. Covert action provides the United States with the anility to react to changing situations. It is built up over a long period of time. Potential assets are painstakingly recruited all over the world. Having reviewed the history of covert action since its inception, I do not look upon the intelligence agents involved in covert action as a modern day group of bandits who travel the world murdering and kidnapping people. Rather, a vast majority of covert action programs are not only valuable but well thought approaches through media placement and agents of influence which produce positive results.
+Covert action programs cannot be mounted instantly upon a crisis. It is naive to think that our intelligence community will be able to address a crisis without working years in advance to establish sources in the various countries in which a crisis might occur. These sources provide what is referred to as the “infrastructure,” which must necessarily be in place throughout the world so that the United States can <em>predict</em> and <em>prevent</em> actions abroad which are inimical to our national interest.[14] I believe that, were we to completely abolish covert action or attempt to remove it from the CIA and place it in a new separate agency, these sources would dry up; and, when a crisis did come, our intelligence community would not be able to meet it effectively. Not only do I question the effectiveness a new separate agency for covert action would have, but such a re-structuring would unnecessarily increase our already burgeoning bureaucracy.
+I think that it is important to realize that covert action cannot be conducted in public. We cannot take a Gallup Poll to determine whether we should secretly aid the democratic forces in a particular country. I do not defend some of the covert action which has taken place in Chile. But, the fact remains that we cannot discuss publicly the many successes, both major and minor, which the United States has achieved through the careful use of covert action programs. Many individuals occupy positions of power in the world today as a direct result of aid given through a covert action program. Unfortunately, we cannot boast of or even mention these significant achievements. In short, we cannot approach covert action from a public relations point of view. We should not forget that we must deal with the world as it is today—with our adversaries employing their equivalent of covert action. We must either say that the intelligence community should have the power to address world problems in this manner, under the strict control of the President and Congress, or we should take away that power completley. I cannot subscribe to the latter.
+Finally, the issue remains as to how we can best control covert action through statutory reform. First, I believe the Executive Branch can and should carefully review each significant covert action proposal. This will be accomplished through the Operations Advisory Group under the program outlined by President Ford.
+Second, Congress can control covert action by passing legislation requiring that the new oversight committee be kept “fully and currently informed.” This, I believe, is the appropriate statutory language to apply to covert action . I do not agree with the Committee’s recommendation that “prior notice” be given to Congress for each and every covert action project. As a matter of practice, the important and signif- cant covert action programs will be discussed with the oversight committee in a form of partnership; and this is the way it should be. “Fully and currently informed” is language which has served us well in the atomic energy area. It has an already existing body of precedent that may be used as a guide for the future. It is flexible, like the Constitution, and provides a strong, broad base to work from. I am not prepared to say, however, that in the years ahead there may not be some vitally sensitive situation of which Congress and the oversight committee should not be told in advance. While the likelihood of this occurring is not great, we should never foreclose with rigid statutory language possibilities which cannot be foreseen today. Our statutory language must be flexible enough to encompass a variety of problems and potential problems, yet rigid enough to ensure total accountability. “Fully and currently informed” accomplishes both purposes.
+<center>
+(2) CIA PUBLISHING RESTRICTIONS
+</center>
+In the area of restrictions on the CIA’s publishing of various materials, I am in complete agreement that anything published in the United States by the CIA, or even sponsored indirectly by the CIA through a proprietary, front, or any other means, must be identified as coming from the CIA. Publications overseas are another matter. We should allow the Agency the flexibility, as we have in our recommendations, to publish whatever they want to overseas and to publish under whatever subterfuge is necessary and thought advisable.[15]
+<center>
+Domestic Intelligence Recommendations
+</center>
+While the Committee’s Domestic Intelligence Report represents an excellent discussion of the problems attendant to that field of intelligence, I feel several of the recommendations may present practical problems. Although our objective of achieving domestic intelligence reforms is the same, I differ with the majority of the Committee in how best to approach the achievement of this goal.
+<br>
+(1) INVESTIGATIVE STANDARDS
+<em>Scope, of Domestic Security Investigations</em>
+At the outset, I note that most of my concern with the standards for investigations in the domestic security area stem from the fact that “domestic security” is defined by the Committee to include both the “terrorism” and “espionage” areas of investigation. Severe limitations, proscribing the investigation of student groups, are more readily acceptable when they do not also apply to terrorist groups and foreign and domestic agents involved in espionage against the United States. To include these disparate elements within the same “domestic security” rubric, it seems to me, will create unnecessary problems when it comes to the practical application of the theoretical principles enunciated in the Committee’s recommendations.
+(a) <em>Preventive intelligence investigations—</em>The Committee’s recommendations limit the FBI’s permissible investigations in these critical areas of terrorism and espionage under standards for what the Committee delineates as preventive intelligence investigations. Under these standards the FBI can only investigate where:
+it has a specific allegation or specific or substantiated information that (an) American or foreigner <em>will soon engage</em> in terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity [emphasis added.][16]
+In am not convinced that this is the best way to approach the real problem of limiting domestic intelligence investigations. While in theoretical terms the standards of the recommendations may seem appropriate, I fear the inherent practical consequences of their application to the cold, real world of terrorism and espionage. The establishment of an imminency requirement by not permitting <em>any</em> investigation by the FBI unless the allegation or information received establishes that the person or group will “soon engage” in certain activity might prohibit any number of legitimate and necessary FBI investigations. For example, an allegation of an assassination attempt on a public figure at an unspecified date in the future could be precluded from investigation; or, vague information received by the FBI that there was a plan to obtain some nuclear components, but no indication of when or how, could also be prohibited from investigation. Surely, matters such as these should be the valid subjects of investigation—no matter how vague or piecemeal the information is.[17]
+(b) <em>Time limits—</em>The Committee’s recommendations would limit any preliminary FBI investigation of an allegation of wrongdoing in the Domestic. Security area to 30 days from the receipt of the information, unless the Attorney General “finds”[18] that the investigation need be extended for an additional 60 days. The FBI investigation may continue beyond 90 days only if the investigatory efforts establish “reasonable suspicion” that the person or group “will soon engage in” terrorist or foreign espionage activities.[19] And, even a full preventive intelligence investigation is not permitted to continue beyond “one year,” except upon a finding by the Attorney General of “compelling circumstances.”[20]
+While well-intentioned, I am not persuaded that these are workable standards. I just don’t think we can categorize all investigations into these rigid time frames. Investigations just are not conducted that way. Thirty days, for example, is probably not even enough time to obtain a license check return from some states. Moreover, limiting an investigation to one year may not be realistic when it applies to investigating a violence prone group like the SLA or a Soviet Union espionage ring. These investigations are not easily or quickly accomplished. I do not believe that the creation of artificial time limits is the best way to approach the real concern of the Committee, which is that we establish institutional controls on domestic security investigations. I would prefer approaching the control and accountability problems by providing periodic Department of Justice reviews of <em>all</em> categories of domestic intelligence investigations; not by imposing specific time limits upon all investigations.
+<center>
+(2) INFORMANTS
+</center>
+The Committee recommends broad new restrictions on the use of informants by the FBI. While our investigation has established that, in the domestic intelligence field, there have been numerous abuses in the use of informants, I do not think that the proposed recommen-' dations are the best vehicles to achieve the needed reform. I cannot subscribe to recommendaitons limiting the use of informants to stringent time standards.[21] To limit use of informants to periods of “90 days” [22] unless the Attorney General finds “probable cause” that an American will “soon” engage in terrorist or hostile foreign intelligence activity is impractical and unworkable. When groups such as the SLA attempt to rob, kill, or blow up buildings, it is clearly necessary to cultivate informants who may provide some advance warning. I am concerned that the Committee’s recommendations will preclude this vital function of the FBI. Moreover, specific time limits, it seems to me, will prove to be impractical. For example, at the end of the prescribed time, with not enough evidence for arrests, will informant X be terminated and replaced by informant Y who starts anew, or are informants thereafter banned from penetrating the particular group— even if violence prone or involved in espionage ?
+It should be remembered that informants are the single most important tool of the FBI, and local police for that matter, in the fight against terrorism and espionage, as well as organized crime, narcotics, and even the ever pervasive street crimes of murder, rape, and robbery. Indeed, they are the very lifeblood of such investigations. Moreover, informants are involved in a wide spectrum of activities from attending public meetings to actual penetration attempts. I am concerned that theoretical and abstract restrictions designed only for “domestic intelligence”, if enacted, would soon limit our legitimate law enforcement efforts in many other fields as well. People and actions do not always fit nicely in neat little boxes labeled “domestic intelligence,” particularly in the terrorist and espionage areas to which the proposed restrictions on informants would apply. Congress should carefully consider the scope and ramifications of any recommendations with respect to informants.
+It is my view that the better way to approach the problems encountered in the use of informants is to put their use under strict supervision of the Department of Justice. Creation of a special staff or committee for this purpose, centralized in the Department of Justice, would provide effective controls over the potential abuses in the use of informants, yet not hamstring their legitimate and valuable use.[23]
+<center>
+(3) ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
+</center>
+I wholeheartedly support S. 3197, the new electronic surveillarice bill sent to the Congress by President Ford.[24] It needs consolidated bipartisan support because it represents a significant advance from existing practice. For the first time, it will bring all governmental electronic surveillance under the scrutiny of judicial warrant procedures. I commend the efforts of President Ford in taking this extraordinary step forward in the regulation of electronic surveillance.
+In supporting S. 3197, I do not regard the existing wiretaps presently maintained under the direction and control of Attorney General Levi as being in violation of the Constitution. The present practice of electronic surveillance authorization and implementation rests upon a long-standing body of precedent which provides a firm constitutional base for their continued maintenance. The President’s approach is to move from the present practice toward better practices and procedures for authorization. The abuses of electronic surveillance of the past clearly dictate a need for a system of judicial warrant approval. Under the President’s proposal the American people will be able to rest easy— assured that electronic surveillance will be employed carefully, yet when needed to combat serious criminal and espionage activity.
+I differ with a majority of the Committee insofar as they recommend that before a judge can issue a warrant for electronic surveillance he must find <em>more</em> than that an American is a conscious agent of a foreign power engaged in clandestine intelligence activities. The Committee would require that probable cause be established for “criminal activity” before a wiretap can be authorized. I think this departure from the S. 3197 standard would be a dangerous one because it would eliminate certain areas of espionage, particularly industrial espionage, from electronic surveillance. Many areas of espionage do not involve clearly criminal activity. Indeed, forms of espionage may not constitute a criminal offense, but should be the valid target of an espionage investigation. For example, a situation such as American oil company executives providing unclassified but important oil reserve information to a Soviet agent might not be a permissible subject of electronic surveillance if “criminal activity,” rather than hostile foreign intelligence, were the standard.[25] I think the Committee proposed standard would harm the FBI’s espionage efforts and would therefore be a mistake.
+<center>
+(4) CIVIL REMEDIES STATUTE
+</center>
+I oppose any broad new civil remedies statute in the field of domestic intelligence as both dangerous and unnecessary. It is dangerous because it could easily open the flood gates for numerous lawsuits filed seeking injunctive relief in the courts to thwart legitimate investigations. It is unnecessary because any substantial actions are already permitted under present Supreme Court decisions, such as <em>Bivens</em> v. <em>United States,</em> for violation of constitutional rights. There is simply no valid reason to carve out a broad new category of lawsuits for those not only injured by domestic intelligence methods but “threatened with injury.”[26] No such statutory provisions are available for “victims” in any other specific category of activity. The present avenues of relief provided by law today are clearly sufficient to address any future abuses in the domestic intelligence field. I note that we have not had the benefit of any sworn testimony from the many constitutional and criminal law. experts in the country, either pro or con such a proposal. Without the benefit of an adequate record and with my concern about the practical results of such a statute, I cannot support its enactment.
+<center>
+(5) CIVIL DISORDERS
+</center>
+A final recommendation which requires brief comment in the Committee’s proposed standards permitting the FBI to assist “federal, state, and local officials in connection with a civil disorder.” The Committee’s recommendation will not allow any investigation by the F.B.I., not even preliminary in nature, unless the Attorney General finds in writing that “there is a clear and immediate threat of domestic violence” which will require the use of Federal troops.
+My reservation about this recommendation is that I think it deprives the Attorney General of the necessary flexibility in dealing with these delicate matters (i.e., civil disturbances) and might tend to exacerbate a possibly explosive situation. If the Attorney General is not allowed to dispatch FBI agents to the scene of disorders it seems to me that we deprive him of the very means he needs to make the extraordinarily important decision as to whether Federal troops are likely to be used.
+I believe the better practice would be to permit preliminary investigation by the FBI of potentially volatile situations so that the Attorney General might make the most reasoned decision possible with respect to what I consider the drastic step of deploying Federal troops to quell a civil disorder in one of our cities.
+** WATERGATE-RELATED INQUIRY
+Finally, I wish to address briefly an area of the Committee’s investigation which I pursued for the most part independently. At the close of the Senate Watergate investigation I filed a report as part of my individual views[27] which outlined remaining areas of investigation with respect to the relationships between the Central Intelligence Agency and the former CIA employees who participated in the Watergate break-in.[28] By virtue of my membership on this Select Committee, I have been able to pursue a further inquiry into these matters, and wish to thank the Chairman and the Vice Chairman for the staff assistance and latitude provided me to pursue this area of investigation.
+Many of the concerns raised in the Watergate Committee investigation have been overtaken by time and events. For example, the reported references to illegal CIA domestic activities have now been confirmed, as described in detail in the Committee’s Report. The reference to the CIA maintaining a file on Jack Anderson [29] proved to be part of a lengthy investigation and physical surveillance of Anderson by the CIA during a “leak” inquiry. Similarly, the detailing of Howard Hunt’s post-retirement contacts with the CIA has been supplemented with still more such contacts.[30] Since July 1974, we have witnessed a variety of other disclosures relative to the CIA’s domestic activities; indeed, the creation of our Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities was due in part to the continuing public concern about these matters.
+Unlike the Watergate Committee investigation of CIA activities, which largely was terminated because of the refusal of the CIA to turn over documents,[31] this investigation was conducted in an atmosphere of cooperation. After some initial difficulties, which the Committee encountered in a variety of areas, the cooperation afforded by the CIA was exemplary. In particular, I especially want to express my appreciation to former Director William Colby and present Director George Bush for cooperating to the fullest extent in this investigation. I also want to thank Ambassador Richard Helms and former Counterintelligence Chief James Angleton for their patience and extensive assistance in numerous conferences, in trying to reconstruct the elusive details of this significant period.
+In pursuing this area of inquiry, the Committee staff examined a great volume of highly sensitive material, much of which contained speculative matters and a multitude of information of marginal relevance. This information, which had not been made available in large part to the Separate Watergate Committee, was examined in raw form and without sanitization deletions. Because of the sensitivity of the material, it was reviewed on the Central Intelligence Agency premises. Thus, it was in a spirit of cooperation that this examination was accommodated ; and, this experience indicates that the Congress and the intelligence community can cooperate in an investigation without incurring unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information.[32]
+At the close of this Committee’s examination of the available record, I wish to state my belief that the sum total of the evidence does not substantiate a conclusion that the CIA per se was involved in the range of events and circumstances known as Watergate.[33] However, there was considerable evidence that for much of the post-Watergate period the CIA itself was uncertain of the ramifications of the various involvements, witting or otherwise, between members of the Watergate burglary team and members or components of the Agency. Indeed, the CIA was apparently at times as perplexed as Congressional investigators.[34] It should 'be noted that the Agency undertook an extensive internal inquiry in an effort to resolve these uncertainties.
+The investigation of Watergate and the possible relationship of the Central Intelligence Agency thereto, produced a panoply of puzzlement. While the available information leaves nagging questions and contains bits and pieces of intriguing evidence, fairness dictates that an assessment be rendered on the basis of the present record. An impartial evaluation of that record compels the conclusion that the CIA, as an institution, was not involved in the Watergate break-in.
+<right>
+Howard H. Baker, Jr.
+</right>
+* INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF SENATOR GOLDWATER
+For over a year the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities has been conducting hearings and taking testimony. Almost six months of this time was frittered away in an unproductive investigation into alleged assassinations (see my individual views accompanying the foreign section of this report).
+Thanks to extensive and often sensationalized public hearings, the deficiencies of our domestic intelligence agencies have now been exposed, labelled, and largely admitted to. In response, the individual agencies have undertaken substantial reforms and the Administration itself has piloted corrections by a thoughtful and detailed Executive Order 11905,2/18/76.
+Not satisfied, however, the Select Committee’s Report sets forth a voluminous and rambling treatise which pillories the nation’s domestic intelligence agencies, fixes individual culpability, ignores agency efforts at reform, and urges the adoption of recommendations and findings unsubstantiated by fact.
+The Report sets forth frequent and unfounded criticism of “executive power.” Ignoring both past and present efforts by the Executive to provide guidance and reform, the Report voices theoretical objection to the conduct of intelligence activities by the “Chief Executive and his surrogates.” Unhappily, the sweeping dissatisfaction of theoreticians and academicians is not reflected in the record of the Select Committee’s proceedings and is almost wholly unsupported by testimony. The pronouncements within the Report deal in a high-handed manner with matters that received little or no attention by the Committee and are, consequently, utterly devoid of an adequate record.
+The free-wheeling, self-righteous, and frequently moralizing thrust of the Report therefore assures recommendations which are bottomed in wish and speculation rather than in fact or testimony. Recommendations, for example, that civil remedies be expanded to cover parties alleging “injuries” from domestic intelligence activity; that statutes be enacted to create a cause of action for those allegedly so aggrieved; that criminal sanctions be enacted for willful violation of recommended statutes; and that the Smith and Voorhis Acts be repealed or amended, are all glibly presented without so much as a shred of evidence having been entered into the record in their support.
+Although the Report has flatly assured its readers that “the scope of our recommendations coincides with the scope of our investigation”, such assurances are clearly hollow when, for instance, the Report affirms in preamble to certain recommendations that the President has no inherent power to conduct a wiretap without a warrant. Repeatedly and without qualification, the Report reiterates such a proposition, without referring to the unsettled state of the case law, the views of legal scholars, or the relative silence of the Supreme Court on the matter. When, further, the Report counsels restrictions on, say, the use of informants or the surveillance of foreign intelligence activities, it goes beyond restrictions already in the Attorney General’s Guidelines with scant attention to the effectiveness of the guidelines or their application.
+Again and again the Report makes far-reaching recommendations which are unsubstantiated by the evidence. Thus the Report urges that the FBI not attempt frustration of hostile foreign intelligence activities by “specialized” techniques unless approved by the Attorney General upon advice of the Secretary of State. What the Report omits, however, is any showing that the Attorney General or the Secretary of State is available, capable, or prepared, to undertake such a role.
+In similar fashion, the Report’s Recommendations are frequently critical of the Executive Order’s determination to repose all domestic oversight in a Board rather than vest it exclusively or principally with the Attorney General. The apparent basis for the Report’s preference (and hence its criticism of the Administration’s Executive Order) is the brief and fairly bald conclusion that the Attorney General is the “most appropriate official charged with ensuring that the intelligence agencies of the United States conduct their activities in accordance with the law.” No examination of feasibility, organization, or jurisdiction, buttresses the Report’s conclusion in this respect.
+The Report likewise recommends almost wholesale enactment of legislation to prevent recurrence of abuses and repetition of improprieties in the domestic area. In this respect the Report exhibits a decidedly hasty and almost exclusive preference for statute where Order, Rule, or Regulation would provide more expeditious, more particularized, and more flexible remedies. In view of the tentative and even halting nature of so many of the Committee’s conclusions, the clamor for statutes is premature and ill-advised. To urge the quick enactment of criminal provisions is even more injudicious, and, in some cases, verges on the fatuous.
+To be precise: the Select Committee has endorsed Recommendation 52, which reads: “All non-consensual electronic surveillance should be conducted pursuant to warrants issued under authority of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.” At the same time, however, the Select Committee admits that “industrial espionage and other modern forms of espionage (are) not presently covered” by the criminal law, and that “there may be serious deficiencies in the Federal Espionage Statute (18 U.S.C. 792 et seq.).” In fact, the Report is constrained to admit that it “took no testimony on this subject.” Nonetheless, in the very teeth of its own admission, the Select Committee endorses a Recommendation that would restrict <em>all</em> electronic surveillance to the narrow and exclusive confines of the criminal law. At Select Committee direction, our counter-intelligence efforts would be forbidden by law to avail themselves of electronic surveillance in the as yet undefined, but admittedly vital, areas of economic, technological, and industrial espionage. With virtual impunity an American could pass, deliver, or sell to the agent of a hostile foreign power any and all secrets of industrv or technology—however important to the nation’s economy or well-being—while the FBI would be effectively precluded from action. As criminal sanctions do not attach—and, in fact, may very well be incapable of attaching—to “industrial espionage”, electronic surveillance would be denied the nation’s intelligence agencies in any effort to forestall, prevent or even monitor, hostile foreign intelligence activity in the economic or technological sphere. While the Report blithely recommends that the espionage laws be modernized to include technological or industrial espionage, it nowhere confronts the massive practical difficulties in such a suggestion.
+** Federal Bureau of Investigation
+During the last decade or so of Mr. Hoover’s tenure abuses crept into the operations of the Bureau. Because these are thoroughly ventilated, if not overdrawn, in the Majority Report, I shall not dwell on them here, with one exception: at times, suggestions from the White House or the conjectures of Presidential aides directly sparked eavesdropping and interference with the political process.
+Almost invariably, however, Bureau impropriety can be attributed— whether directly or by implication—to higher authority. As in the foreign sector, the record of domestic abuse and excess is a commentary on improper or deficient guidance. While particular programs or personnel cannot be spared their proportionate share of responsibility for impropriety, ultimate accountability for Bureau excesses must rest with a negligent Executive and an inattentive Congress.
+While I concur in the general objectives of the Committee to insure no repetition of abuses of which the FBI may have been guilty in the past, I strongly disagree with certain specific recommendations in the Committee’s report.
+I do not feel the best interests of this country would be served by imposing extraordinary curbs on the FBI or by opening additional channels through which political influence could flow into the inner workings of the FBI. And to a certain extent, the recommendations I find objectionable would tend to accomplish exactly that.
+I refer specifically to Recommendation 85, which encourages the Attorney General to exercise his authority to appoint executives in the FBI at the level of Assistant Director.
+The Attorneys General, with rare exceptions, have historically been political supporters of the President and his party. By exhorting an Attorney General to by-pass the Director of the FBI and appoint Assistant Directors, we run the risk of further extending White House intrusion into the daily operations of the FBI. FBI Assistant Directors take part in 'administrative decisions and policy-making, and they exercise day-to-day authority over the operations of their respective divisions. Traditionally, they have been professionals who advanced through the ranks of the FBI. Their law enforcement expertise, combined with administrative ability, are qualities needed by the Director of the FBI in discharging his duties. Moreover, any chief executive officer of a line agency should have flexibility in choosing his principal assistants.
+The Office of the General Counsel of the FBI is a career position; and the person who occupies that office has traditionally been selected by the Director. No valid reasons have 'been given to require his nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate. As a general rule, the Director or Administrator of a bureau or agency is permitted to choose his own General Counsel.
+Personal integrity cannot be assured through such measures as Recommendation 85. Proper supervision by the Attorney General and effective Congressional oversight can, and should, however, serve to discourage abuses of the sort that concern all of us.
+I take exception, also, to Recommendations 45, 55-A and 55-B, that impose constraints on preventive intelligence investigations and use of informants. The work of the FBI in this area is far too vital to the security of the American people to impose such stringently restrictive requirements and time limitations on its investigative efforts.
+With domestic terrorism burgeoning in this country, I submit it is very risky to forbid the FBI to conduct preliminary investigations of foreigners or citizens unless there is a “specific allegation” or proof that such individuals “will soon engage in terrorist activity or hostile foreign intelligence activity.” Here, again, as in some of the foreign recommendations we seem to be saying. “Don’t put out the fire while it is small; wait until it becomes a conflagration.”
+Hostile forces at home and abroad are bound by no such chains. And, I don’t want to be party in hamstringing the FBI so that it cannot effectively frustrate those who would espouse the bomb and the gun to impose their evil will on America.
+How in the world is the FBI to substantiate information that terrorists and enemy agents will act against Americans without at least preliminary investigation ? To require them to have such proof in hand before even initiating investigation seems unrealistic and is potentially injurious to our security.
+The recommendation also states that such preliminary investigation must be concluded within 30 days, unless the Attorney General or his designee finds that the facts warrant additional investigation up to 60 days.
+Are we truly prepared to say to the FBI: you must conclude your preventive intelligence investigations within 30 or 90 days unless you establish “reasonable suspicion” that individuals <em>will in fact</em> commit a terrorist act or engage in hostile foreign intelligence, activity?
+And, even then, a time limit of one year is recommended for a full preventive intelligence investigation, barring a finding of “compelling circumstances” by the Attorney General. Can we be assured that our enemies will be so obliging as to commit an act within the time span we prescribe ?
+And I question the effectiveness of the recommended measures in preventing abuses of Americans’ privacy or in assuring non-violent dissenters in our country that they will not be inhibited by FBI actions.
+I submit that effective and proper Congressional oversight and supervision by the Attorney General obviates the necessity of stringent standards and time limitations where a quick response by the FBI may be needed to avert disaster.
+While I tend to agree with the motives and objectives of my colleagues on the Committee on Recommendations 55-A and B, I maintain the requirements and limitations imposed on the FBI’s use of informants go beyond what is necessary.
+How can we possibly expect the FBI to develop instant security informants, use them for 90 days, and then turn them off like a light switch ?
+Are we truly qualified to dictate to a professional law enforcement agency under what circumstances it can use security informants and for how long? The value of such informants has been demonstrated over and over again. Good, stable, effective informants with proved credibility are not easy to come by.
+The fact is that their cooperation must be cultivated. Their credibility must be tested. Their stability must be evaluated. Time and patience are essential. Does it make sense to state exactly under what circumstances and for how long a period the FBI will be permitted to accomplish these aims?
+The stakes are too high to risk imposing unworkable or cumbersome restrictions—the stakes being human lives and the security of our country.
+I have misgivings regarding Recommendation 90-B, which provides a new civil action recourse to Americans who feel that their Constitutional rights have suffered actual or even <em>threatened,</em> violation by Federal officers or agents in intelligence investigations. This provision would have the effect of injecting the courts into the investigative process, even at early stages of investigations when attempts are being made to substantiate or disprove specific allegations of actions requiring legitimate investigation.
+We would open the way for individuals and agents hostile to our country and its lawful government to impede and tie up in prolonged litigation investigations required to preserve national security and prevent violence.
+Turmoil, upheaval, and readjustment have taken their toll of the FBI. Fortunately for the nation, the many high-caliber and patriotic men and women who are the FBI have continued to serve with dedication and loyalty.
+** Internal Revenue Service
+Nowhere has the perversion of domestic intelligence been more vividly demonstrated than in the Select Committee’s investigation of the Internal Revenue Service. With much relish but no excuse, IRS functionaries have pried and spied on countless organizations and activities. Intelligence components of the IRS have indiscriminately investigated hundreds of thousands of taxpayers and have amassed reams of information wholly irrelevant to the IRS’s narrow responsibility for collecting the taxes. IRS agents have for decades conducted intrusive campaigns of snooping virtually without let or hindrance, and certainly without justification in fact or in law.
+In 1961, for instance, the IRS initiated a program to conduct a test audit of various “right-wing” organizations. Termed the “Ideological Organizations Audit Program,” the project attempted intensive investigation of 10,000 tax-exempt organizations that was far removed from even-handed enforcement of the internal revenue laws. Precedent having been established, a Special Services Staff was organized in 1969 to conduct audits of “activist” and “ideological” taxpayers. Audits were run without reference to established tax criteria and the “special service” rendered the nation was the unwarranted targeting of 18,000 individuals and 3,000 groups. Its insatiable appetite still unsatisfied, the IRS next established an “Information Gathering and Retrieval System” (IGRS) in order to garner still more general intelligence. IGRS was hatched in 1973, and, during its two years of life, proceeded to gather and store information in voracious fashion. Some 465,442 individuals or organizations were examined before the program was terminated in 1975.
+Operating secretly and without standards or safeguards, IGRS was typical of the arrogance of the tax collectors. Abuses uncovered in connection with the IRS’s Operation Leprechaun (1969-1972) merely represent the expected and logical extension of policies which are as profoundly contemptuous of the American taxpayer as they are characteristic of the IRS’s perennial efforts to transform itself into a repository of domestic intelligence.
+I have refused to sign the final report of the Select Committee on Intelligence Operations in the belief that it can cause severe embarrassment, if not grave harm, to the Nation’s foreign policy. The domestic part of the report has a strong dose of 20-20 hindsight. It will raise more questions than it answers. Reputations will suffer and little will have been gained.
+When the resolution creating the Select Committee was presented to the Senate, I endorsed it because I felt it was necessary to conduct such an investigation into any possible abuses on the privacy of American citizens. I thoroughly expected that the Committee would concentrate its efforts in this particular field, but very little work was done On it. Not much can be gained from reading the report as a result of this, and I am, frankly, disappointed that we don’t know more today than we did a year and a half ago about questions raised on this subject.
+<right>
+Barry Goldwater.
+</right>
+<br>
+** Supplemental Views of Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.
+I fully support the Final Report and the Findings and Recommendations of the Select Committee on Intelligence.
+The reaffirmation of Constitutional government requires more than rhetoric. It involves, at a minimum, the rendering of accounts by those who have held public trust. It also demands that we renew those principles that are at the center of our democracy. In my view, the Select Committee’s Report is a critical contribution to the process of Constitutional government.
+Those who won our independence 200 years ago understood the need to ensure “domestic tranquility” and to “provide for the common defense.” Our intelligence services have played a valuable role in the attainment of those goals.
+The Founders of our Nation also understood the need to place governmental power under the rule of law. They knew that power carried with it the seed of abuse. In framing the Constitution, they created a system of checks and balances that would preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. For they recognized that the exercise of power by individuals must be constrained. As Jefferson wrote, “In questions of power, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down by the chains of the Constitution.”
+When Senator Mansfield and I first proposed the creation of a Select Committee on Intelligence in the wake of Watergate, we were not seeking to weaken the nation’s intelligence service but to strengthen it. Effective government rests on the confidence of the people. In the aftermath of Watergate and charges of domestic spying and misuse of the intelligence agencies, that confidence was severely strained. And in the face of excessive claims of presidential prerogative, Congress had abdicated its Constitutional responsibilities to oversee and check the exercise of executive power in the intelligence operations of the government.
+Secrecy and democratic government are uneasy partners. Intelligence operations are in essence secret operations. But that does not mean that they can be immune from the rule of law and the standards our system of government places on all government operations.
+If we can lose our liberties from a too-powerful Government intruding into our lives through burdensome taxes or an excess of regulations, we can surely lose them from government agencies that collect vast amounts of information on the lawful activities of citizens in the interest of “domestic intelligence.” The excessive breadth of domestic intelligence operations investigated by the Committee and many of the techniques used against Americans can severely chill First Amendment rights and deeply infringe upon personal privacy.
+The Framers of our Constitution recognized that the vitality of our civil life depends on free discussion. They also recognized that the right of privacy is fundamental to the sanctity of the individual. That is why we have the First and Fourth Amendments. Speech and political ideas are often unsettling. But it is only through free debate and the free exchange of ideas that the people can inform themselves and make their government responsive. And it is through the protection of privacy that we nourish the individual spirit. These are the characteristics that set us apart from totalitarian regimes.
+In this, our Bicentennial year, Americans have a special opportunity to reaffirm the values of our forebears. We haveT emerged from the dangers of the post-war era and the trauma of the last decade not by forsaking those values but by adhering to them. To be worthy of our forebears and ourselves, we need only have the courage to keep to the course. By bringing the intelligence arm of the government within our constitutional system, correcting abuses, and checking excesses, we will enable the proper range of intelligence activity to go forward under law in the service of the country.
+<right>
+Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.
+</right>
+<center>
+o
+</center>
+[1] In most of those cases warning came through informant penetration of local chapters of a national organization undertaken because some of the national leaders had indicated a willingness to use violent means. The Committee’s guidelines preclude investigating an organization’s entire membership throughout the country on the basis of specific information about some individuals.
+<br>
+<br>In the most sinister terrorist conspiracies, only penetration of the inner circle is likely to provide advance warning of an assassination or kidnapping plot. Our record suggests that the only way for the FBI to have much chance to detect such plots in advance wou’d be blanket penetration of every militant protest group in the country. And that would mean a return to precisely the kind of Big Brother government which was attempted in the past.
+[2] Some of the “practical” reasons advanced against judicial warrants for informants do not bear close scrutiny. The Committee was told there is no fixed point when a potential source becomes an “informant,” comparable to installation of a wiretap. It was also urged that full supervision of an informant requires day-to-day monitoring of his activities; and that the Attorney General could exercise more comprehensive control. But our proposals do identify a specific event, targeting the informant on particular persons, which requires a decision by the Attorney General. The basic wisdom of the Fourth Amendment is its insistence that a disinterested party apply the appropriate standard rather than the head of an investigative agency. The Attorney General’s ongoing supervision of informant use could supplement the threshold decision of a neutral magistrate, just as it would for wiretaps. There is no need to choose between them.
+[3] The informant would still be in a position to report and the FBI could continue to ask him questions, as they could of any citizen. Indeed, he might volunteer information in order to re-establish a paying relationship. The only constraint is that the FBI could no longer give him direction. After five months, however, even the most unsophisticated informant would be aware of those subjects and targets in which the Bureau was interested.
+[1] Upon the expiration of the Watergate Committee in September 1974, I had the privilege to consponsor with Senator Weicker, S. 4019, which would have created a joint committee on Congress to oversee all intelligence activities.
+[2] New York Times, Jan. 26,1976.
+[3] I intend to propose an amendment to S. 400 to make it a criminal offense to publish the name of a United States intelligence officer who is operating in a cover capacity overseas.
+[4] For many months, the Committee thoroughly and exhaustively investigated the so-called “assassination plots” which culminated with the filing of our report on November 18, 1975. This Investigation was vitally important in order to clear the air and set the record straight. And, it was instructive as to how “sensitive” operations are conducted within our intelligence structure. But, it necessarily shortened the time available to the Committee to investigate the intelligence community as a whole.
+[5] The Committee’s mandate from Congress dictated that the abuses at home and abroad be given detailed attention. And, there are only a finite number of important problems which can be examined and answered conclusively in a year’s time.
+[6] My original support for a single joint committee of Congress has evolved, somewhat as affected by the events of this past year’s House Intelligence Committee investigation, to support for a single Senate committee. However, I also favor the mandate of the new committee including, as does the present S. 400, a charge to consider the future option of merging into a permanent joint committee upon consultation with and action by the House of Representatives. The moment for meaningful reform is now and we must not lose it by waiting for a joint committee to be approved by both Houses of Congress.
+[7] I think a rule of reason should apply here. All significant projects certainly should receive careful attention from the Group. On the other hand, I would not require a formal meeting with a written record to authorize the payment of 2 sources in X country at $50 per month to be changed to the payment of 3 sources in X country at $40 per month.
+[8] I applaud the detailed guidelines issued by the Attorney General to reform the Department’s entire domestic intelligence program. I think he is moving in the right direction by requiring, the FBI to meet a specific and stringent standard for opening an intelligence , investigation, i.e., the <em>Terry</em> v. <em>Ohio</em> standard.
+[9] Never again should we be faced with the dilemma we faced in the assassination investigation. We climbed the ladder of authority only to reach a point where there were no more written rungs. Responsibility ceased; accountability ceased; and, in the end, we could not say whether some of the most drastic actions our intelligence community or certain components of it had ever taken against a foreign country or foreign leader were approved of or even known of by the President who was in office at the time.
+[10] I would favor a procedure, within the Congress, which would in <em>effect</em> create an avenue of appeal for a member dissatisfied with a Committee determination on a classification issue. Perhaps an appeal committee made up of the Majority and Minority leaders and other appointed members would be appropriate. Leaving the mechanics aside, however, I believe the concept is important and can be implemented.
+[11] I differ with the Committee in that I would not have the General Counsel and Inspector General file reports and/or complaints concerning possible abuses with the Attorney General. Rather, I think the more appropriate interface in a new oversight system would be for both to take complaints to the Intelligence Oversight Board and the new congressional oversight committee. The Attorney General would remain the recipient of any and all complaints regarding possible violations of law.
+[12] I support the Committee’s recommendation that agency employees report any irregularities directly to the Inspector General without going through the chain of command, i.e. through the particular division chief involved.
+[13] I do not feel that, despite my personal view that the aggregate 'budget figure should be disclosed to the public, only six to eleven members of the Senate have the right to release unilaterally the actual budget figures. A majority of both Houses of Congress should be necessary to release such information. And, while I would cast my vote in favor of the release of the aggregate budget figure, I am troubled that there may be no such vote. I am not sure the “right” result, justifies the “wrong” procedures, because the next time the wrong procedure can just as easily be utilized to reach the wrong result.
+[14] For example, testimony before the Committee established that the CIA’s failure to act more positively in Portugal was a direct result of an absence of sufficient clandestine infrastructure. William E. Colby testimony, 10/23/75; William Nelson testimony, 11/7/75.
+[15] I do not view the “domestic fallout” as a real problem. To be sure, some publications by the CIA abroad will find their way back to the United States. However, to try to impose severe restrictions to prevent such fallout would cause unnecessary damage to the CIA’s valid production of propaganda and other publications abroad.
+[16] Committee Domestic Report, p. 320.
+[17] My experience dictates that many investigations are begun with very limited or sketchy information. FBI agents and investigators in general are not always or even often immediately presented with information which constitutes probable cause of a crime. Probable cause is often established only through painstaking investigation; putting bits and pieces together. I think we must take this into consideration when formulating threshold investigatory standards.
+[18] It is unclear what standard is to be the predicate for any such finding.
+[19] Committee Domestic Report, pp. 320-323.
+[20] Compelling circumstances is not further defined, so it is unclear what standards should be applied in making such a determination.
+[21] My concerns here parallel those I have with respect to the general investigatory standards recommended.
+[22] The Committee allows an additional 60 days if the Attorney General finds “compelling circumstances.”
+[23] Attorney General Levi is in the process of establishing guidelines to regulate the use of informants. I recommend, however, that these guidelines be enforced through some appropriate form of Department of Justice review of the FBI’s use of informants.
+[24] The bill enjoyed a bipartisan co-sponsorship of Senators.
+[25] Those Involved in the obtaining of information about our industrial processes, vital to our national security, for our adversaries should be the legitimate subject of electronic surveillance, notwithstanding that no criminal statute is violated. I do not think we can afford to wait for exhaustive reform of our espionage laws. I note that the section of the proposed S.l dealing with espionage reform has presented great difficulty to the drafters. Indeed, drafting espionage into a criminal statute presents some of the same overbreadth problems that the Committee has been concerned with in the domestic intelligence area.
+[26] For example, would a cause of action exist simply because X notices a federal agent following him in an automobile, notwithstanding the nature or status of the particular investigation?
+[27] Senate Watergate Committee Final Report, S. Res. 93-981, pp. 1105-1165.
+[28] <sub>The</sub> Required” section of the report, at pages 1150-1157, enumerated unresolved matters and identified materials not provided to the Watergate Committee by the CIA.
+[29] Senate Watergate Committee Final Report, p. 1128.
+[30] For example this disclosure of personal correspondence (detailing certain of Hunt’s activities in 1971 and 1972) between Hunt and the CIA secretary stationed in Paris whom Hunt sought to have reassigned to work for him at the White House.
+[31] By letter of March 7,1974, former Director Colby informed the Senate Watergate Committee that certain items of requested information would not be made available to that committee. Such a withholding of timely information, including that which was totally exculpatory, unnecessarily focused an aura of suspicion and guilt.
+[32] For example, the staff was given access to the Martinez contact reports (to which access was refused during the Watergate Committee investigation) in their entirety. This review was accomplished in secure facilities at the CIA, and no notes were taken of sensitive information contained in the reports not related to Hunt or in some other way relevant to the Committee’s inquiry. I cite this as an example of how a Congressional investigation can be thorough and yet not threaten the integrity of CIA secret documentation, containing names of officers and other highly classified information.
+[33] I am filing with the Committee the detailed results of this investigation in the form of classified memoranda. These memoranda will be turned over to the successor permanent oversight committee to be kept in its secure files. No useful purpose would be served in further publicizing the contents, because much of it is fragmentary and its sum total reinforces the findings stated herein.
+[34] For example, a Colby to Helms letter of 28 January, 1974, references seven to nine communications from Hunt while he was at the White House to Helms’ secretary, with the query: “Can you give us some idea as to what they were about?”