Revision as of 12:01, 27 October 2017

Note: This article is a work in progress

So called #NameTheTrait was(is?) a logically invalid (non sequitur) argument with implicitly logically contradictory (inherently false) premises for veganism created by vegan Youtuber Isaac Brown a.k.a. "Ask Yourself", and popularized by his pupil Richard Burgess a.k.a. "Vegan Gains" a vegan bodybuilder and Youtuber.

The formal argument was structured as such:

Argument for animal moral value:
P1 - Humans are of moral value
P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless.
C - Therefore without establishing the absence of such a trait in animals, we contradict ourselves by deeming animals valueless
Argument for veganism from animal moral value:
P1 - Animals are of moral value.
P2 - There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause us to consider anything short of non-exploitation to be an adequate expression of respect for human moral value.
C - Therefore without establishing the absence of such a trait in animals, we contradict ourselves by considering anything short of non-exploitation(veganism) to be an adequate expression of respect for animal moral value.

To explain the primary non sequitur fallacy simply: C does not follow from P1 and P2 because nothing in the argument asserts that moral value must be based on a material trait as P2 implies. You can agree with P1 and P2 and still reject the suggested conclusion (that animals are of moral value) without any contradiction.

There are numerous other fallacies, contradictions, ambiguities, and instances of intellectually dishonest word usage in the argument which this article will outline (there are more problems with the argument than there are statements in it). This article will explain in detail how the argument fails, and why it should not be used.

The argument CAN be corrected (see correction) by adding in missing premises and clarifying the meanings of certain terms, as well as replacing the second half, but it remains confusing and cumbersome, and there are better and simpler arguments for animal moral value available which should be preferred.

Burden of Proof

As an outreach argument, the burden of proof for answering criticism from a growing number of vegans and non-vegans and demonstrating how this argument is sound falls upon Isaac. If people perceive the argument as invalid, it fails at its goal regardless of its validity: that is if the argument's purpose is to convince people to go vegan rather than providing the basis for operating a cult (in which case, as with internal theistic arguments, it does not need to be sound, it only needs to be confusing enough for people to convince themselves it is sound if they want to believe it in order to establish a self-congratulatory in-group who sees "the truth", and an out-group of deniers, which is what seems to be happening with Isaac's fan-base).

Isaac has consistently failed to engage with formal and symbolic examinations of his argument, calling them equivalent to "Chinese" and insisting on blind faith that they have been translated incorrectly without understanding them. It must be stressed that his inability to back up his argument and respond to criticism is not an excuse for failing in his obligation to do so. Beyond that, he has also engaged in blocking critics and misrepresenting arguments presented in "plain English" he asks for against #NameTheTrait, responding selectively when he does by dismissing them as "retards" or with the same responses on loop that those same critics have already addressed as fallacious.

Extraordinary Claims

In defending #NameTheTrait Isaac makes a number of extraordinary claims which make his arguments less plausible and increase the need for evidence (extraordinary evidence) that these arguments are valid beyond what would be required for more modest arguments.

Isaac believes that he, as somebody not educated in philosophy (and who doesn't understand the meanings of philosophical terms), has at the age of 24 after recently going vegan come up with the best argument ever conceived for veganism, and so has done what no other professional philosopher in thousands of years of history has been able to do (from Pythagoras to Voltaire to Singer). A critical part of this purported superiority is the argument's claimed meta-ethical independence.

According to Isaac, it doesn't matter if somebody is a realist, an irrealist, a subjectivist, a relativist: his argument purports to work no matter your assumptions as long as you believe humans (or even just yourself; you can substitute "I have moral value" in P1) have moral value, and by that in practice he means that as long as you would protest or resist somebody killing you (this is not something he defined in the argument, but an assumption he sneaks in during debate).

If true, this would be the the most revolutionary philosophical argument in history of any kind, not just for veganism, and would send shockwaves around the world. The equivalent of building a perpetual motion machine in physics.

As it turns out, his confidence and confusion are a product of his ignorance (via the Dunning Kruger effect) because he confuses "double standard" in the colloquial sense with "logical contradition" in the philosophical sense, among a series of other mistakes as laid out here (below).

To be clear, within a specific and defined meta-ethical foundation from deontological to consequentialist frameworks, realist, irrealist, naturalist and not, such arguments are relatively common and can be compelling. Where the nature of moral properties and action is delineated through a number of mutual assumptions, strong arguments can be made leveraging those assumptions and building on them to show either through duty or outcome with the addition of empirical data that veganism is beneficial and morally preferable to certain alternatives.

What is extraordinary about #NameTheTrait is not a claim to be an irrefutable argument for veganism within such a context, but its claim to validity despite a paucity of premises that provide the meta-ethical context to give it weight and make the conclusion follow from the empirical premise, and its attempt to address all actors regardless of their beliefs of morality beyond the assertions of P1 (that humans, or that they specifically, have moral value).

Symbolic Logic

Recent attempt:

P1: ∀x∈H: M(x)
P2: ∄t∈T: (∀x∈H: (-F(x,t) -> -M(x)))
C: ∀y∈A: M(y)

H is the set of all humans
A is the set of all animals
T is the set of all traits absent in animals

M(x): x has moral value
F(x,t): x has trait t

P1: All humans have moral value
P2: There exists no trait absent in animals, that if absent in humans would cause them to have no moral value.
C: All animals have moral value

Issues

With the argument itself

All Humans

1. P1 only says humans have moral value (implicitly all humans), not that only some humans do. Human may range from vegetative states to a fertilized egg. This in itself seems to contradict the notion of a value giving trait other than the arbitrary "human" status.
If you want value to be based on another trait, your first premise can't make that impossible.
Isaac has permitted that other premises be substituted in for P1 (such as "I am of moral value") and maintained that the same conclusions can be reached. This premise is easy enough to correct, although the argument still fails even when limited to personal moral value.

P2 Inconsequential

2. P2 says there is no trait of such description, but even if so, there is no premise that says moral value must be based on such a trait at all or that it can not be an arbitrary one. Moral value could just be fiat, or the tautological and irreducible non-natural trait "moral value" itself.
As such, the conclusion does not follow from the premises; the argument is a non sequitur.
Isaac asserts, in a manner indicating that he doesn't understand literally the first thing about logical arguments (the function of premises), that "arbitrary" can be eliminated as a possibility by "feeding it back through the argument". His claim is that arbitrary creates a contradiction because, paraphrasing "You wouldn't accept arbitrary reasons to kill you, so you can't use arbitrary".
First, that isn't the argument; this golden rule aspect never manifests nor is it supported by any of the premises.
Second, this is not how logic works. You can't support a failed premise by appealing to another unstated variation on that premise (or another version of the argument in entirety) to provide the support it needs, using some kind of circular reference.
This premise must be supported by additional premises which outline the need for non-arbitrary traits to justify moral value.

Existential Meaning

3. "Human" and "we" in this argument has no clear meaning, and any example of a trait applied to you (like having your consciousness transferred into a biologically non-human body) might just cause us to change our understanding of what human means (anything with a human consciousness) to maintain consistency so that nothing could cause you to stop being human, even "once human always human", thus making "human" an unfalsifiable answer for moral value, or the change may cause us to reject the application of "we" to the new entities (e.g. reduced to the intelligence and capacity of a cow, we may consider what makes us ourselves to be gone and this to be equivalent to death anyway), such that the opponent need take no issue with the loss of moral value.
Isaac is concerned with the "hard problem" of consciousness, so he probably isn't prepared to tackle this issue. The easiest way to fix this problem is to avoid is by defining clearly the behavioral implications of "lacking moral value", or just scratch this confusing wording and substitute in directly the golden rule. Unfortunately, this runs into the next problem which Isaac is unwilling to address:

Meaning of "moral value"

4. "Moral value" has no clear meaning or material implications. This is easy to fix, as noted above: it just needs to be grounded in some meta-ethical premise.
Unfortunately, Isaac seems to believe it is the subjectivity of this provision that makes the argument work for subjectivists. He thinks it's up to whatever "you" think gives moral value, and you just have to be "logically consistent" with that.
In practice, it's this ambiguity in the argument he uses to manipulate his opponents, supplanting his own unique definition of consistency/contradiction to relate to double standards in imposing your will upon others in ways you wouldn't want to be imposed on. Instead of being honest enough to just put that in the argument as a premise (as recommended above) he changes the rules of logic itself and the very definition of "contradiction" to suit his agenda.
Obviously, in philosophy a "logical contradiction" is not the same thing as a double standard.
Isaac does not understand the definition of a logical contradiction, or chooses to ignore the definition substituting in his folk definition instead. Isaac believes, or claims to believe, that folk definitions of technical vernacular are perfectly fine to use in a philosophical context even if they completely rewrite the rules of logic and argumentation in the process; if that's the case with this substitution, this is not only malpractice, it's transparent intellectual dishonesty; a pseudo-philosophy of the worst kind, a conscious twisting of definitions as incredible as the pseudo-scientific machinations of Deepak Chopra.
Once you have so flippantly thrown out the fundamental rules and definitions in philosophy and substituted in your own custom "logic" for the real thing, there's just no arguing the case. Isaac wholly rejects logic and supplants his own creation to prop up his fallacious arguments and trick people.

All/Some Animals

5. Given the qualifier "All" for animals (there is no trait absent in all animals which if absent in humans) P2 is trivially true, because humans are by definition included in the group "all animals". Given the qualifier "some", P2 is clearly false when non-sentient animals are included (assuming the premise about human value were corrected). Animals range from sponges to humans, and do not broadly share any trait beyond phylogeny (like with "humans" as a blind category).
Isaac means the argument to prove moral value for all animals that lack moral value giving traits, but the argument does not do this. If he wanted to do this, the argument should be formed very differently.
The argument could also be corrected by specifying it should be applied to individual animals, or those in like groups based on the evaluative trait.
Like the issue with "human" in P1, this is not a difficult issue, but the lack of rigor here generates ambiguities and contradictions in the argument. Of course, this may seem like a rather minor issue after point #4, but no fallacy is too small.

Part 2 Same Problems

6. The second part of the argument fails in the same ways the first part does, in addition to:

Value Spectrum

7. The first part of the argument, if corrected, might establish animals have some value, but does not establish equal value in part one. Part two then attempts to take that spectrum of value and convert it into an absolute: non-exploitation. It should convert a spectrum of value into a spectrum of acceptable exploitation, from no value = total exploitation fine to fully functioning human level value = no exploitation acceptable. Logically, animals like cows would lie somewhere in between where some exploitation would be acceptable, while their interests would also have to be considered somewhat to limit that exploitation (i.e. animal welfare, which already exists and does not necessarily conclude in veganism).

P2 Empirically False

8. P2 in the second part is also just outright empirically false. Human "exploitation" is considered acceptable and within limits even desirable; we agree to this when we act in society. That exploitation is just limited to certain pragmatic bounds by law in modern democracies, not for moral reasons so much as because people don't want to be unduly exploited, e.g. contract law, no human trafficking, etc.
While there are vegans involved in social justice who would disagree (And I would be surprised to learn that after all of his criticism of "SJW"s Isaac is one), the fact of people buying and selling cows does not seem in any readily apparent way to increase the chances of you being bought and sold. Empirically, justice does not seem to be an all or nothing game, and at least most people don't think it is one.
The trait: societal membership and pragmatic human rights.
This is obviously not an issue with the validity of the argument, but the soundness. Also, when a premise is this obviously incorrect for the vast majority who don't hold absolute views it creates problems for the perception of the argument (you might as well include a premise about the Earth being flat).
Isaac would argue that if you don't want to be bought and sold, that creates a contradiction if you would permit others to be (based on #NameTheTrait) unless there's a trait that separates you and the others that if true of you would make you OK with being bought and sold.
It should go without repeating, but it will be repeated anyway: #NameTheTrait is not a valid argument. It doesn't contain premises that forbid arbitrary distinctions, and it doesn't contain premises that necessitate naming traits (it only meaninglessly claims there isn't one). Appealing to another iteration of a broken argument in order to fix holes in the same broken argument doesn't work. Just saying there isn't a trait is fundamentally different from claiming moral value must be justified by such a trait, and different again from claiming that behavior like this must be justified by one regardless of moral value.
Even if we added in the necessary premises to make this P2 and the P2 from the first argument function, and fixed all of the other problems, you're still left with the fact mentioned above of the gradient of moral value. The only "fixing" of this argument to avoid that is to either normalize moral value by somehow asserting all beings of moral consideration have the same moral value, or by ignoring it completely and normalizing outcome despite drastic differences in moral value (which obviously makes the spectrum of "moral value" irrelevant).
Neither of those outcomes are desirable unless you're trying to create an army of fundamentalists.
The only way you would really "fix" this argument is by throwing it out and retaining only the corrected first half of the argument.

In practice, and with the defense of the argument

Most of these issues have been covered in brief above, but since they're tucked into the discussion of Isaacs claims about the problems this section will outline them openly and in more detail

Circular References

1. Isaac claims you don't need more premises to require a non-arbitrary trait for P2, because you can take something like "arbitrary value" or "fiat" and just "feed it through the argument" to show a contradiction.
This is comparable to the theological circular reference to prove god from scripture and scripture from god, e.g. justifying the existence of God by referring to the Bible, and giving the Bible authority because it's God's word.

Meta-Ethical Independence

2. Isaac claims this argument works in any meta-ethical system (subjectivist, objectivist, whatever), because it's just a "consistency test". He doesn't realize the meta-ethical implications of his hidden premises. (He claims to be a subjectivist, although his definition of these terms is colloquial and incorrect in the context of philosophy because it generates contradictions and false dichotomies of its own)

Logical Consistency Meaning

3. Isaac seems to believe "logical inconsistency" means the same thing as a double standard. His followers have claimed this explicitly, and he regularly uses this example to dispute "human" as the source of moral value (paraphrasing):
"What if aliens came to Earth to eat Humans, would that be OK? Would you give in and let them eat you, or resist them? If you would resist, you're contradicting yourself."
He is not understanding that the claim that the value is "humanity" is absolute; the aliens are wrong according to that, the value given is not "is a different species". He tries to generalize the statements like that, by saying "species" instead of specifically "human species", because it seems he believes the issue of contradiction comes down to double standards (or he's trying to play word games and misrepresent people's answers to trick them).

Dissonant Actions

4. As per above, he also doesn't seem to understand that people can accept something as ethical but still not do it. This is ALSO not a "logical contradiction"; it means people have multiple values that compete for our behavior, and the most ethical option doesn't always win.
Even if we believed aliens were in the right to come to Earth and eat us, that doesn't mean we wouldn't try to save our lives despite that. It also doesn't mean we'd be in the wrong to save our own lives (people usually don't claim farmed animals are in the wrong for resisting) so these actions may not even be dissonant at all based on a more complex definition of moral action (one that nothing in the argument's premises rebuts).
To make that line of "would you resist the aliens?" reasoning work, a premise would have to be added to alter the argument, defining "consider ourselves valueless" clearly in behavioral terms as "not try to defend our own interests". And of course that really narrows down the meta-ethics the argument applies to.

Correction

WIP

Argument for sentient animal moral value:
P1 - Sentient Humans are of moral value
P3 - Arbitrary assertions of moral value are not acceptable, moral value must be justified by some relevant non-arbitrary trait. (I.E. rejection of moral relativism)
P4 - In order to be relevant, a trait must be one that would cause us to deem ourselves valueless if we lacked it. (I.E. The Golden Rule, an assertion of Universalism/Moral Realism)
P2 - There is no trait absent in sentient non-human animals which if absent in sentient humans would cause us to deem ourselves valueless.
P5 - Any attempted defense of personal interests is an indication of self-value. (I.E. Rejection of subjectivism through objective behavioral indication of value)
C - Sentient non-human animals are of some moral value (not necessarily equal to humans)
Argument for veganism from animal moral value:
P1 - Sentient Animals are of moral value.
P2 - Current animal agriculture practices are harmful to their moral interests.
P3 - Current animal agriculture practices are also harmful to human moral interests: Environmental harm (which harms humans too) Resource waste (in developed countries) Zoonotic plague source Antibiotic resistant bacteria
P4 - Benefits of current animal agriculture practices are small and limited to avoiding short term inconvenience in the developed world. (Markets adapt, tastes change)
P5 - The morality of actions is dependent on the consequences of those actions in terms of the moral harms and benefits that result. (I.E. consequentialism)
P6 - Morality is other directed, not selfish (I.E. Altruistic) Personal pleasure is not a moral justification for causing harm to others.
P7 - In the developed world, purchasing and supporting the production of most animal products has net negative consequences for others.
P8 - Nobody is perfect, but a good person is the kind of person who aspires to do better and works on becoming a better person day by day.
C - Therefore, if you are a moral person, it is a moral imperative to work on moving away from consumption of most animal products and toward plant based staples (with the ultimate and non-exclusive consumer goal of going "vegan" or "ostrovegan")

Conclusion

Note how the corrected argument establishes the necessary meta-ethical assumptions to make the argument itself valid (Rejects subjectivism, establishes Universalism based on the Golden Rule, rooted in behavioral qualities to avoid existential ambiguity or dependence on subjective value claims).

Naturally for every premise introduced the potential audience the argument can appeal to is reduced (because they have more premises to reject), but failing to do so creates a non sequitur which reduces the audience of competent logicians to zero.

A bad argument for veganism can occasionally trick reluctant people into temporarily accepting it, but this only works as long as that person is under your control (in a cult setting this can be effective). As soon as the person shares these reasons with friends and family, it becomes vulnerable to any number of counterarguments which demonstrate the holes in its logic. For a bad argument, being shared more broadly makes it less effective rather than more.

The apparent strength of #NameTheTrait is that it is worded in such a confusing way using double negatives and a conclusion which isn't straight forward (rather than saying animals have moral value, it makes redundant claims about contradiction) that it's difficult for most people to immediately recognize the fallacious logic. However, most people don't have to recognize the problems: one person has to. At this point, dozens have, independently citing different problems with the argument. An invalid argument is never a strong argument in a free speech environment. Just as bad theistic arguments come on the internet to die, so do bad arguments like these. The end result is only to make vegans look irrational and/or dishonest in a way comparable to theistic apologists who make poor arguments for god (such as the ontological argument).

Debunking bad arguments for veganism helps to make sure vegans are using good arguments that will stand the test of time and reduce recidivism, as well as buys good will from carnists who may be encouraged to reconsider their beliefs that vegans are dishonest and take into consideration the good arguments for veganism.

Criticism of Criticism

To date, no credible or coherent criticism has been offered against the logical problems with #NameTheTrait (some have been offered against the correction, which has been updated to incorporate it). Speculatively, this is why fellow youtuber Unnatural Vegan offered to make a video about #NameTheTrait if Isaac could find one philosophy professor who would vouch for its credibility: [picture of tweet] This was a wager she probably knew she'd never have to pay out on, because no respectable professional would tarnish his or her reputation by backing up such an obviously fallacious argument.

Isaac's own incredibly incoherent (but predictable) responses have been preemptively incorporated into and debunked in the arguments in this article.

None the less, there are some concerns indirectly related to the issue:

These discussions should be private

It's common for vegans to claim disagreements between vegans should be worked out privately to present a united front, and that public bickering is bad for veganism.

This is a dubious claim, since a unified front despite ridiculous arguments and bad behavior from some vegans can appear cult-like. Compare to the criticism that more Muslims aren't vocal against terrorism, or that Catholics aren't vocal enough against bad practices in Africa. Criticism of particularly bad arguments or pseudo-scientific claims of vegans FROM vegans can buy good will from carnists and help dispel notions that we're all dishonest or crazy.

That said, we would love to have settled this privately, but Isaac refused after a couple relatively short exchanges with one member, claiming we're "not worth his time", and further expressing his certainty that he's right and that he charges people for tutoring sessions with him (as though the discussion is a request for him to teach us how to use logic). We are unwilling to pay Isaac $100 an hour to attempt to teach him philosophy 101, and attempt to convince him of the many obvious problems with his argument that he insists with such absolute certainty is valid.

Isaac has made very clear that he does not respect the intelligence of anybody who disagrees with him; he blocks them and brands them "retards" when they don't assent to what he calls his "murkage".

Diplomacy was attempted, but this is not somebody with whom one can engage in productive private dialogue (or public dialogue, he will not change his mind, but the hope is that those he influences can be persuaded to abandon the argument and think twice about his credibility).

It's wrong to bully the young/mentally ill

We agree, to an extent, but this isn't bullying.

Analogies of this issue have been made to the internet bullying of autistic Christian Weston Chandler of Sonichu fame, who has been broadly criticized for his copyright infringement while promoting misunderstandings of copyright, racist remarks, and other hostile behavior in response to criticism.

There are several key differences: 1. While it is widely believed that Isaac suffers from narcissistic personality disorder, we are not aware of any professional diagnosis, and there is no evidence that he suffers from social disability on the level of Christian Chandler. We don't believe he's autistic, and to a significant degree "narcissist" is just the professional diagnosis of being an asshole (you can label every aspect of personality as a disorder, but it doesn't make criticism unfair). If we are made aware of a more serious clinical issue from a credible source, we may reconsider some aspects of this article. 2. While, as in the case of Chandler, we agree the hostility Isaac displays is not a justification in itself to publicly criticize him, there are serious reasons to address this criticism. The broad promotion of his arguments by his pupil Richard Burgess to his sizable platform and in debates with carnists to even larger audiences is significant a way Sonichu comics and a little internet trolling are not. It's something that demanded answer because this was how veganism was being promoted on youtube, and it was what people were seeing as The logical argument for veganism (a problem, given its obvious failings). 3. This article is primarily focused on the arguments themselves, attempting only to address Isaac's behavior and other claims (including those of aberrant definitions) where useful for context. With respect to the extraordinary nature of his claim, for example, his age and complete inexperience is relevant (just as how the inventors of perpetual motion machines are never psysicists; it's not surprising that a person inventing such an argument as #NameTheTrait would be a victim of the Dunning Kruger effect, and this is the more reasonable assumption).

It's not a formal argument

It takes the form of a formal argument, using philosophical vernacular and labeling propositions/premises and conclusion, P1, P2, C. If it's not a formal argument, it's masquerading as one, and that's another form of dishonesty.

Consider how you would react if presented with what appeared to be an agreement, printed in legal vernacular, and with two signature lines at the bottom for each party. Now consider how you would react to being told that this is not a legal contract, and in fact it's just a casual informal sort of flexible understanding, not to be strictly enforced.

This is what's being done here.

Either it's a failed attempt at a formal argument in which case Isaac should have the courage to be honest about that, admit the mistake, and then either correct it or stop using it, or it's something worse: a dishonest piece of intentional nonsense meant to confuse people, and then allow the creator to slither out of admitting the fallacies by claiming it's not meant to be a formal argument.