Revision as of 10:21, 24 March 2019

• Work In progress
• Version 5 of NTT renders most of this criticism obsolete. Skip to here for the last point of substantive and relevant criticism. Article will be updated in the next few days with an outline of V5.

History

The previous incarnation of Name The Trait had several issues (as discussed in that article) which led to us recommending strongly against its usage. The new formalization of Name The Trait (discussed here) has corrected for these issues and is formally valid. While a number of unofficial fixes have been recommended, this article covers the new versions recognized by the original author as authoritative.

Whether this formalization represents a new argument in terms of structure that replaces an invalid original argument or represents only a formalization of the original argument that corrects for informal semantic issues is moot. Arguments for the former appeal to early comments and original usage/presentation (discussed briefly in the old article), while arguments for the latter appeal to stated authorial intent. Given that the argument is valid now, its pedigree or relationship to the previous argument isn't particularly relevant to its current force or persuasive ability.

The formalization discussed here was endorsed by the original author Isaac Brown (A.K.A. Ask Yourself) in consultation with or including corrections from discord users Dr. Avi, _jhc, and Alex Malpass. The degree to which Brown's argument can be said to have been "fixed for him", which arguably implies him not being very instrumental in its correction, is also insubstantial and not topical to this article. At risk of labouring the point, the argument is valid now and that is what matters.

While some practical limitations (in terms of audience) may still apply, this argument could serve as a compelling one for veganism within its niche (which is speculated to be most strongly applicable be non-theistic subjectivists who want to be generalists) and deserves some discussion.

This article will begin by presenting the argument, explaining how it is formally valid, and conclude by discussing potential pros and cons to its usage and which audiences may be most likely to be swayed to veganism by the argument and those it generates. This page will also keep track of future iterations of or improvements to the argument.

Formal Argument

Version 5

P1) If your view affirms a given human is trait-equalizable to a given nonhuman animal while retaining moral value, then your view can only deny the given

nonhuman animal has moral value on pain of P∧~P.

P2) Your view affirms a given human is trait-equalizable to a given nonhuman animal while retaining moral value.

C) Therefore, your view can only deny the given nonhuman animal has moral value on pain of P∧~P

This argument is a simple Modus Ponens. Put simply: If A then B. A, therefore B. While the premises (P1 and P2) may be challenged, the conclusion must follow if both premises are true.

The argument is designed so as to channel any meaningful challenge into P2, specifically encouraging the interlocutor to "Name the trait" which would cause human beings to lose moral value if changed. P1 is virtually impossible to challenge, although some theological metaphysics may attempt to do so.

Version 5 of the argument eliminates unnecessary and potentially confusing wording around "category x" in Version 3 seen below, substituting it for a substantive claim about the interlocutor's views, and in the process also avoids any potential challenges about the argument being question begging.

Version 3

This is the most well known outdated version of the argument since V2. The presence of language involving "category x" creates issues which have since been resolved in Version 5 (above)

P1) If all views in category x are all views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value, all views in category x can only deny the given animal has moral value on pain of p^-P.

P2) All views in category x are all views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value

c) Therefore, all views in category x can only deny the given animal has moral value on pain given p^-P.

It is important to use the most recent version of the argument, because Version 3 contained several weaknesses:

Rejecting Category X definition

In Version 3 P2 took what seemed to be a rather unusual form of being a category definition rather than a substantive claim, which if true would make it functionally impossible to refute. However, this was ambiguous.

P2) All views in category x are all views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value

IF the argument meant to make an empirical claim about a literal defined "category X", then such an objection could be credible. This is one interpretation (and it's an interpretation that the creator of the argument has recognized as valid).

This would be along the lines of rejecting a premise such as: "The category "Mammals" contains the set of all fish and insects." We could redefine Mammals for the sake of argument, but there's no reason we should be expected to do so when such a definition is already established and redefining it only serves to sew confusion.

This introduces a potential red herring to the argument by which it could be dismissed without substantive engagement into the issues the argument is meant to address.

So such an objection would run along the lines of rejecting P2 with: "No, I Google searched "category X" and it is defined as the category of drugs that should not be taken during pregnancy" If "category x" is taken literally, then this Name The Trait argument fails due to a false premise.

Rejecting the argument as Question Begging

The literal interpretation of "category x" above appears very silly since based on the argument's wording and usage, and the typical use of variables in arguments, what the category is called does not seem to be an essential part of the argument: category y, z, a, b, 198hdf784tfuy, etc. would all seem to be acceptable.

If what the argument actually means is not a literal "category x" but "any given conceivable category of ideas labeled arbitrarily for the purpose of this discussion", then there are a seemingly infinite number of potential conceptual categories and respective names for those categories. As long as the category can exist, that's all that's needed.

If "category X" is not meant to be taken literally, then the refutation that P2 isn't substantive (that it's derived from information present in P1) suggests that the argument may not be much of an argument at all.

Try replacing "category x" with another term -- the charitable term that makes the argument work.

p1) If all views in "all^∗ views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value" are all^∗ views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value, all views in "all^∗ views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value" can only deny the given animal has moral value on pain of p^-P.

P2) All views in "all^∗ views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value" are all^∗ views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value

c) Therefore, all views in "all^∗ views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value" can only deny the given animal has moral value on pain given p^-P.

^∗ "all" here means only or exclusively, not a complete set of those views; see original context.

With this swap P2 becomes trivial, since that much should have been obvious from P1. It can be eliminated, and P1 can be simplified.

In other words, the argument could reduce to:

p1) For any given category of views that contains only views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value, all views in that category can only deny the given animal has moral value on pain of p^-P.

c) Therefore, all views in any such category (those that contain only views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value) can only deny the given animal has moral value on pain given p^-P.

Where the premise and conclusion say the same thing in slightly different words.

P1 may be true (and also the conclusion may be true), but this kind of "argument" would be question-begging, and might not be very persuasive (or in the very least doesn't make very good argument form). It's really just a obfuscated assertion. Issues with the argument being question begging are another means of potentially avoiding the substantive discussion the argument is meant to generate.

Compare a rough theological equivalent:

P1) If God is God, then God exists.
P2) God is God.
C) Therefore, God exists.

Obviously there are serious problems with that argument. Note how the second premise is unnecessary given the law of identity. It can be simplified to:

P1) God exists.
C) Therefore, God exists.

Is this a convincing argument? Typically not, and that's the issue Name The Trait had in Version 3.

Obviously not all modus ponens arguments are question begging. This is distinct from more substantive uses, such as:

p1) If Dogs are mammals, then baby Dogs drink milk.
p2) Dogs are mammals.
c) Therefore, baby Dogs drink milk.

We can try to argue that being a mammal is part of the definition of a Dog, but it is not only that. Being a mammal is also a substantive claim that could conceivably be argued. It would seem odd to argue that Dogs are not mammals given how common knowledge that claim is, but it is conceivable that lacking the relevant empirical information it could be in question.

Not so with P2 from Name The Trait; if it is merely a matter of arbitrary categorical definition and offers nothing substantive to be argued at all then it is trivially true. There is no arguing against X is X. That makes it arguably bad form to offer it as a premise (much like the "God is God" premise in the theological equivalent).

It's important to make clear that validity is not in question (question begging arguments, and those containing circular logic *are* still technically valid), it is just that it is possible that the argument could be seen as question begging due to its structure and definitions.

What does it mean to be question begging? In short, it would mean the argument is less of an argument and more of an assertion (P1 encapsulating the entirety of the substantive content). But that does NOT make it false.

Does this make it less persuasive? Probably, although if the first premise is true then that alone could be compelling. But if you agree with the first premise then you already agree with the conclusion, so that's not much help. To be productive, the form of the argument should be better focused on proving the claim of the first premise, or offering something more.

This is how Version 5 resolved the issue:

P1) If your view affirms a given human is trait-equalizable to a given nonhuman animal while retaining moral value, then your view can only deny the given

nonhuman animal has moral value on pain of P∧~P.

P2) Your view affirms a given human is trait-equalizable to a given nonhuman animal while retaining moral value.

C) Therefore, your view can only deny the given nonhuman animal has moral value on pain of P∧~P

With this relatively small variation, P2 is substantive and arguable, and that's important because it's the point the presenter of the argument wants the interlocutor to argue.

A minor change like this retains the force of the argument, as well as its intent. If you want to reject P2 then you need to "Name The Trait" that you think, when switched, causes the human to lose moral value -- or otherwise explain why your views are not in line with P2. For more on these arguments see #Named_Traits.

Without such a modification, if "category x" isn't a literal predefined "category X", then the argument can absolutely be rejected -- as a non-argument.

However, just because the argument is rejected as an argument does not defeat the assertion in P1. If that assertion holds true, there may yet be some implications from that. Those implications just aren't explored well in this version of Name The Trait. Additional arguments would have to pick up the slack and provide force.

Attempted Refutations of P1

P1 is constructed in such a way that if "trait" is taken to have a certain meaning it appears to be irrefutable. Here we will examine why that is.

P1) If your view affirms a given human is trait-equalizable to a given nonhuman animal while retaining moral value, then your view can only deny the given nonhuman animal has moral value on pain of P∧~P.

If "trait" means any and every conceivable characteristic, natural or otherwise, then it also includes "has moral value" as a trait.

If we start with this information:

• Animal Moral Value = ?
• Human Moral Value = True

And the status of moral value is equalized between a human and animal:

• Animal Moral Value = Human Moral Value

And the Human still retains moral value despite this equalization.

• Animal Moral Value = Human Moral Value = True

Then animals must have moral value.

• Animal Moral Value = True

Or in other words: If human moral value can be made identical to animal moral value and the result is that humans still have moral value, that reveals that animals had moral value all along.

Depending on your perspective, this claim is probably pretty obvious and not at all interesting. Indeed, it is meant to be obvious and uncontroversial.

Humans are irreducible to animals

The first way to dismiss the argument, and to avoid the trait naming part, is to deny that humans are in fact reducible to animals by trait switching. This would be a negation of the first part of the "category" description:

a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value

This can be done by referring to essential features of the group that are logically impossible to change.

For example, the trait of "Having been conceptually derived from a reduced version of a human via trait switching"

The given animal lacks that trait; it has always been conceived as that animal. But the given human has the trait, and it can not be taken away because it's the very distinction the argument itself uses to refer to the entity or concept under consideration.

That is, traits that relate to how we're talking about these things in the argument are impossible to change because we create them by making the argument itself, and changing them would mean rewriting the argument such that no distinction is given... which might in the process make the argument incoherent.

It's arguably a paradox on the order of "this statement is a lie"; if true, it's not a lie, thus it's a lie, which makes it true, etc.

This relates back to the identity of indiscernibles issue discussed in the previous article, and the question-begging result of rewording the argument to account for it (See Here)

This version of the argument corrects for the more serious issues this caused in the earlier version by dealing with categories of views rather than factual claims of reality. Views can be internally inconsistent, and thus the existence of impossible to switch traits doesn't render the argument internally contradictory. The fact of these impossible to change traits existing thus doesn't even render P1 false, because the category of views could still exist (not unlike the category of views affirming the existence of square circles).

However, the existence of these impossible to change traits may provide an easy-out for those who find that they don't agree that those views represent their own.

In fact, even accepting "a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching)" may in itself only be done 'on pain of P^-P'. Due to this, it could be argued that for anybody who is already invested in such a contradiction, the threat of any additional contradictions probably isn't very concerning and may be meaningless due to the principle of explosion. It's like the empty threat of killing a dead man.

Fortunately for users of #NameTheTrait, this issue is easily avoided in many different ways. One way, for example, is excluding those essential/impossible to change properties:

a given human is reducible in every morally significant way to a given animal (via non-essential trait switching) while retaining moral value

In this case, the only protest could be found in value narcissism (the belief that it's those essential/unchangeable properties that bestow morality). Value Narcissism is an atrocious belief system that's relatively easy to challenge, but would remain an "out" for the argument with a modification as above. See discussion on essential traits here for more.

It's likely that no argument is going to be applicable to everybody, but it may be preferable to have those attempting to sidestep the argument making the ridiculous claim of value narcissism, rather than the correct observation that such a trait-switching reducibility is logically impossible.

Humans would lose moral value

The second way to reject the argument is to engage with the trait naming the argument strives for: it is to name a trait, which if true of humans, would cause them to lose moral value.

Getting the interlocutor to name traits, then addressing and debunking them or revealing them to be psychotic denials of human moral value, is the purpose of the argument. This is exactly not a point of criticism: The argument is working properly is the interlocutor is attempt to name traits.

However, if we are attempting to promote veganism with these arguments we should recognize that it's most effective for certain people where challenging those named traits is productive.

Niche

Assuming trait naming isn't avoided entirely:

First, this argument as formulated is most suited for those people who believe animals do not have moral value at all and that humans do. Most people already agree animals have at least some moral value, so for them it's probably more effective to argue from that assumption as to whether we should be eating them -- or modify the argument to say "retain sufficient moral value to not be eaten" or something along those lines.

While the logic still holds, if it's used to persuade people of veganism the argument is also ill suited to people who would name supernatural traits like "has a soul" because this is very difficult to argue. It's also an answer those theists who use it may feel very comfortable with even for humans. The question "If a human didn't have a soul would it be OK to kill him or her" can be answered "Yeah, that's a zombie or something, you should kill it! Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live!" etc.

So for the most part, the argument is more suited to non-theists or rational theists who will engage with reason and empirical justification.

Those who can name traits that would make them appear to be complacent moral monsters may also not be persuaded to veganism by the argument (for example those who would endorse raising, killing, and eating mentally challenged humans on the basis of an IQ trait). Such a rejection isn't useful for 1:1 conversation, but may be useful in convincing a less ego-invested audience of a debate to go vegan when the non-vegan is seemingly willing to bite such an abhorrent bullet in order to avoid veganism.

In 1:1 conversation, if the argument works as intended, it can go either way: accept veganism, or reject some level of human rights. This poses some risk of unintended consequences.

Worst case, most people exposed to the argument reject human rights for sake of eating meat, and the world becomes a worse place because of it. Best case, most people exposed to the argument accept veganism for sake of being consistent with human rights, and the world becomes a better place because of it.

The balance of these two inform whether the argument is good for the world or not. This is an empirical matter that's hard to assess, but it's important to keep in mind just as health arguments for veganism may lead people to reject beef (the worst offender) and eat more chicken as a "middle ground" despite the consumption of chicken leading to more animals being killed.

Thus: knowing your audience is important. If it's somebody who is very involved and dedicated to human rights, NTT may be a very safe bet. If it's somebody who you know leans a little on the psychopath side of the spectrum, it may be best to avoid it unless you have a public stage to convert audience members to veganism when they witness the deranged conclusions your opponent will support to avoid veganism.

Named Traits