Revision as of 06:59, 21 March 2019

• Work In progress

History

The previous incarnation of Name The Trait had several issues (as discussed in that article) which led to us recommending strongly against its usage. The new formalization of Name The Trait (discussed here) has largely corrected for these and is formally valid. While a number of unofficial fixes have been recommended, this article covers the new versions recognized by the original author as authoritative.

Whether this formalization represents a new argument in terms of structure that replaces an invalid original argument or represents only a formalization of the original argument that corrects for informal semantic issues is moot. Arguments for the former appeal to early comments and original usage/presentation (discussed briefly in the old article), while arguments for the latter appeal to stated authorial intent. Given that the argument is valid now, its pedigree or relationship to the previous argument isn't particularly relevant to its current force or persuasive ability.

The formalization discussed here was endorsed by the original author Isaac Brown (A.K.A. Ask Yourself) in consultation with or including corrections from discord users Dr. Avi, _jhc, and Alex Malpass. The degree to which Brown's argument can be said to have been "fixed for him", which arguably implies him not being very instrumental in its correction, is also insubstantial and not topical to this article. At risk of labouring the point, the argument is valid now and that is what matters.

While some practical limitations (in terms of audience) may still apply, this argument could serve as a compelling one for veganism within its niche (which is speculated to be most strongly applicable be non-theistic subjectivists who want to be generalists) and deserves some discussion.

This article will begin by presenting the argument, explaining how it is formally valid, and conclude by discussing potential pros and cons to its usage and which audiences may be most likely to be swayed to veganism by the argument and those it generates. This page will also keep track of future iterations of or improvements to the argument.

Formal Argument

P1) If all views in category x are all views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value, all views in category x can only deny the given animal has moral value on pain of p^-P.

P2) All views in category x are all views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value

c) Therefore, all views in category x can only deny the given animal has moral value on pain given p^-P.

This argument is a simple Modus Ponens. Put simply: If A then B. A, therefore B. While the premises (P1 and P2) may be challenged, the conclusion must follow if both premises are true.

Rejecting P2 as false

P2) All views in category x are all views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value

P2 appears to take a rather unusual form of being a category definition rather than a substantive claim, which if true would make it functionally impossible to refute. Even if there is internal inconsistency in the view that humans and other animals can be made equivalent by trait swapping, category X could still contain those views since they're only contradictory conceptions rather than true contradictions. The claim appears logically unassailable in itself.

Somebody could attempt deny the name for that category (category x) on the basis that category x means something else or has another definition.

IF the argument meant to make an empirical claim about a literal defined "category X", then such an objection could be credible. This is one interpretation (and it's an interpretation that the creator of the argument has recognized as valid).

This would be along the lines of rejecting a premise such as: "The category "Mammals" contains the set of all fish and insects." We could redefine Mammals for the sake of argument, but there's no reason we should be expected to do so when such a definition is already established and redefining it only serves to sew confusion.

So such an objection would run along the lines of rejecting P2 with: "No, I Google searched "category X" and it is defined as the category of drugs that should not be taken during pregnancy"

If "category x" is taken literally, then this Name The Trait argument fails due to a false premise.

However, this interpretation appears very silly since based on the argument's wording and usage, and the typical use of variables in arguments, what the category is called does not seem to be an essential part of the argument: category y, z, a, b, 198hdf784tfuy, etc. would all seem to be acceptable.

If what the argument actually means is not a literal "category x" but "any given conceivable category of ideas labeled arbitrarily for the purpose of this discussion", then there are a seemingly infinite number of potential conceptual categories and respective names for those categories. As long as the category can exist, that's all that's needed.

To deny that there is any category available to classify these views would be a very bizarre claim; as though all possible categories are already named, filled, and accounted for. Any effort to prove such a claim (consistently demonstrating a complete accounting of an infinite number of sets) might run afoul of Godel's incompleteness, but that's another matter of contention and it's probably sufficient to just say the claim that there's not a conceptual set available for any given notion is unsubstantiated and seems apparently false given we can name the category precisely what it contains. The category we call "All red apples" contains all red apples, and the category "only views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value" contains only views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value.

However, IF category X is an open ended variable as mentioned, what isn't a far fetched refutation is that P2 isn't substantive, and that it could (and perhaps should) just be a definition for a term in P1.

Rejecting the argument because P2 is trivial

If "category X" is not meant to be taken literally, then the refutation that P2 isn't substantive (that it's derived from information present in P1) suggests that the argument may not be much of an argument at all.

Try replacing "category x" with another term -- the charitable term that makes the argument work.

p1) If all views in "all^∗ views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value" are all^∗ views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value, all views in "all^∗ views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value" can only deny the given animal has moral value on pain of p^-P.

P2) All views in "all^∗ views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value" are all^∗ views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value

c) Therefore, all views in "all^∗ views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value" can only deny the given animal has moral value on pain given p^-P.

^∗ "all" here means only or exclusively, not a complete set of those views; see original context.

With this swap P2 becomes trivial, since that much should have been obvious from P1. It can be eliminated, and P1 can be simplified.

In other words, the argument could reduce to:

p1) For any given category of views that contains only views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value, all views in that category can only deny the given animal has moral value on pain of p^-P.

c) Therefore, all views in any such category (those that contain only views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value) can only deny the given animal has moral value on pain given p^-P.

Where the premise and conclusion say the same thing in slightly different words.

P1 may be true (and also the conclusion may be true), but this kind of "argument" would be question-begging, and might not be very persuasive (or in the very least doesn't make very good argument form). It's really just a obfuscated assertion. It may be a good or compelling assertion, but shaping it in the form of an argument by hiding the question begging nature of its structure is suspect.

Labeling and exporting the definition of category x to P2 in this case only serves to shoehorn the essential claim of P1 into a classical form of argument. It makes it look like something it isn't, at least in any substantive way. The argument is merely coy about what "category x" really means as an abstraction, exploiting an ambiguity to create the appearance of a substantive set of premises (as described previously).

Compare a rough theological equivalent:

P1) If God is God, then God exists.
P2) God is God.
C) Therefore, God exists.

Obviously there are serious problems with that argument. Note how the second premise is unnecessary given the law of identity. It can be simplified to:

P1) God exists.
C) Therefore, God exists.

Is this a convincing argument? Typically not, and that's the issue Name The Trait has here. Name The Trait just has a more complicated wording that is better at hiding this issue.

Obviously not all modus ponens arguments are question begging. This is distinct from more substantive uses, such as:

p1) If Dogs are mammals, then baby Dogs drink milk.
p2) Dogs are mammals.
c) Therefore, baby Dogs drink milk.

We can try to argue that being a mammal is part of the definition of a Dog, but it is not only that. Being a mammal is also a substantive claim that could conceivably be argued. It would seem odd to argue that Dogs are not mammals given how common knowledge that claim is, but it is conceivable that lacking the relevant empirical information it could be in question.

Not so with P2 from Name The Trait; if it is merely a matter of arbitrary categorical definition and offers nothing substantive to be argued at all then it is trivially true. There is no arguing against X is X. That makes it arguably bad form to offer it as a premise (much like the "God is God" premise in the theological equivalent).

It's important to make clear that validity is not in question (question begging arguments, and those containing circular logic *are* still technically valid), it is just that it is possible that the argument could be seen as question begging due to its structure and definitions.

What does it mean to be question begging? In short, it would mean the argument is less of an argument and more of an assertion (P1 encapsulating the entirety of the substantive content). But that does NOT make it false.

Does this make it less persuasive? Probably, although if the first premise is true then that alone could be compelling. But if you agree with the first premise then you already agree with the conclusion, so that's not much help. To be productive, the form of the argument could be better focused on proving the claim of the first premise, or offering something more.

For example, introducing a substantive P2 the argument could be represented (roughly) as:

p1) If you hold views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value, then you can only deny the given animal has moral value on pain of p^-P.

P2) You hold views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value.

c) Therefore, you can only deny the given animal has moral value on pain given p^-P.

With this relatively small variation, P2 is substantive and arguable.

A minor change like this retains the force of the argument, as well as its intent. If you want to reject P2 then you need to "Name The Trait" that you think, when switched, causes the human to lose moral value -- or otherwise explain why your views are not in line with P2. For more on these arguments see #non-applicability.

Without such a modification, if "category x" isn't a literal predefined "category X", then the argument can absolutely be rejected -- as a non-argument.

However, just because the argument is rejected as an argument does not defeat the assertion in P1. If that assertion holds true, there may yet be some implications from that. Those implications just aren't explored well in this version of Name The Trait. Additional arguments would have to pick up the slack and provide force.

Refuting P1

P1 is constructed in such a way that if "trait" is taken to have a certain meaning it appears to be irrefutable. Here we will examine why that is.

P1) If all views in category x are all views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value, all views in category x can only deny the given animal has moral value on pain of p^-P.

If "trait" means any and every conceivable characteristic, natural or otherwise, then it also includes "has moral value" as a trait.

If we start with this information:

• Animal Moral Value = ?
• Human Moral Value = True

And the status of moral value is equalized between a human and animal:

• Animal Moral Value = Human Moral Value

And the Human still retains moral value despite this equalization.

• Animal Moral Value = Human Moral Value = True

Then animals must have moral value.

• Animal Moral Value = True

Or in other words: If human moral value can be made identical to animal moral value and the result is that humans still have moral value, that reveals that animals had moral value all along.

Depending on your perspective, this claim is probably pretty obvious and not at all interesting. Indeed, it is meant to be obvious and uncontroversial. It appears the claim may also to be trivially true, which because we expect premises to be substantive this fact may also play into the "this is not an argument" response. However, whether the "argument" is more of an assertion or even observation than an argument may not matter if it's convincing.

Is it convincing? That much is unclear. The structure is valid, and question-begging or not the premises are true, so the argument (if it's an argument) is sound. The biggest question to ask would be applicability. Because there's nothing to tie the argument back to the beliefs of the interlocutor (like a P2 of "you hold such beliefs") a response of "so what?" would seem to dodge any force the argument might have otherwise had. In short, just saying something is a contradiction without challenging somebody as having such beliefs and being in contradiction may not be a very compelling way to engage in these kinds of discussions.

Nonetheless, an interlocutor engaging charitably in the discussion may take it upon his or herself to assess the applicability to his or her own beliefs. And in those cases we have to examine how "Category x" may not reflect those beliefs, and there are two ways that may be.

Human are irreducible to animals

The first way to dismiss the argument, and to avoid the trait naming part, is to deny that humans are in fact reducible to animals by trait switching. This would be a negation of the first part of the "category" description:

a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value

This can be done by referring to essential features of the group that are logically impossible to change.

For example, the trait of "Having been conceptually derived from a reduced version of a human via trait switching"

The given animal lacks that trait; it has always been conceived as that animal. But the given human has the trait, and it can not be taken away because it's the very distinction the argument itself uses to refer to the entity or concept under consideration.

That is, traits that relate to how we're talking about these things in the argument are impossible to change because we create them by making the argument itself, and changing them would mean rewriting the argument such that no distinction is given... which might in the process make the argument incoherent.

It's linguistic a paradox on the order of "this statement is a lie"; if true, it's not a lie, thus it's a lie, which makes it true, etc.

This relates back to the identity of indiscernibles issue discussed in the previous article, and the question-begging result of rewording the argument to account for it (https://philosophicalvegan.com/wiki/index.php/NameTheTrait#This_Alternative_Version_of_NTT_Begs_the_Question)

Humans would lose moral value

The second way to reject the argument is to engage with the trait naming the argument strives for: it is to name a trait, which if true of humans, would cause them to lose moral value.

Niche

While the logic still holds, those who can name traits that would make them appear to be complacent moral monsters may not be persuaded to veganism by the argument (for example those who would endorse raising, killing, and eating mentally challenged humans on the basis of an IQ trait).