Revision as of 00:39, 12 January 2019

• Work In progress

History

The previous incarnation of Name The Trait had several issues (as discussed in that article) which led to us recommending strongly against its usage. The new formalization of Name The Trait (discussed here) has largely corrected for these and is formally valid. While a number of unofficial fixes have been recommended, this article covers the new versions recognized by the original author as authoritative.

Whether this formalization represents a new argument in terms of structure that replaces an invalid original argument or represents only a formalization of the original argument that corrects for informal semantic issues is moot. Arguments for the former appeal to early comments and original usage/presentation (discussed briefly in the old article), while arguments for the latter appeal to stated authorial intent. Given that the argument is valid now, its pedigree or relationship to the previous argument isn't particularly relevant to its current force or persuasive ability.

The formalization discussed here was endorsed by the original author Isaac Brown (A.K.A. Ask Yourself) in consultation with or including corrections from discord users Dr. Avi, _jhc, and Alex Malpass. The degree to which Brown's argument can be said to have been "fixed for him", which arguably implies him not being very instrumental in its correction, is also insubstantial and not topical to this article. At risk of labouring the point, the argument is valid now and that is what matters.

While some practical limitations (in terms of audience) may still apply, this argument could serve as a compelling one for veganism within its niche (which is speculated to be most strongly applicable be non-theistic subjectivists who want to be generalists) and deserves some discussion.

This article will begin by presenting the argument, explaining how it is formally valid, and conclude by discussing potential pros and cons to its usage and which audiences may be most likely to be swayed to veganism by the argument and those it generates. This page will also keep track of future iterations of or improvements to the argument.

Formal Argument

p1) If all views in category x are all views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given human animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value, all views in category x can only deny the given animal has moral value on pain of p^-P.

P2) All views in category x are all views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value

c) Therefore, all views in category x can only deny the given animal has moral value on pain given p^-P.

This argument is a simple Modus Ponens. Put simply: If A then B. A, therefore B. While the premises (P1 and P2) may be challenged, the conclusion must follow if both premises are true.

Rejecting P2

P2 takes a rather unusual form of being a category definition rather than a substantive claim, which makes it functionally impossible to refute.

Somebody could attempt deny the name for that category (category x) on the basis that category x means something else or has another definition, but that's not an essential part of the argument: category y, z, a, b, 198hdf784tfuy, etc. would all be acceptable. There are a seemingly infinite number of potential conceptual categories. Do deny that there is any category available to classify these views would be a very bizarre claim; as though all possible categories are already named, filled, and accounted for. Such a claim would likely run afoul of Godel's incompleteness and amount to an impossible assertion.

However, what isn't a far fetched refutation is that P2 isn't substantive, and that it could (and perhaps should) just be a definition for a term in P1.

In other words, the argument would reduce to:

p1) Because category x contains only views that affirm a given human is reducible to a given human animal (via trait switching) while retaining moral value, all views in category x can only deny the given animal has moral value on pain of p^-P.

c) Therefore, all views in category x can only deny the given animal has moral value on pain given p^-P.

Which is question-begging, and might not be very persuasive (or in the very least doesn't make very good argument form).

Exporting P2 in this case only serves to shoehorn the essential claim of P1 into a classical form of argument.

This is distinct from more substantive uses, such as:

p1) If Dogs are mammals, then baby Dogs drink milk.

p2) Dogs are mammals.

c) Therefore, baby Dogs drink milk.

We can say that being a mammal is part of the definition of a Dog, but it is not only that. Being a mammal is also a substantive claim that could conceivably be argued. It would seem odd to argue that Dogs are not mammals given how common knowledge that claim is, but it is conceivable that lacking the relevant empirical information it could be in question.

Not so with P2 from Name The Trait; it is merely a matter of arbitrary categorical definition, and offers nothing substantive to be argued at all. It is trivially true, which makes it arguably bad form to offer it as a premise.

It's important to make clear that validity is not in question (question begging arguments, and those containing circular logic *are* still technically valid), it is just that it is possible that the argument could be seen as question begging due to its structure and definitions.

Does this make it less persuasive? Possibly, but also possibly not. If the first premise is true then that alone could be compelling. The issue is more that the form of the argument could be better focused on proving the claim of the first premise, or offering something more.

Niche

While the logic still holds, those who can name traits that would make them appear to be complacent moral monsters may not be persuaded to veganism by the argument (for example those who would endorse raising, killing, and eating mentally challenged humans on the basis of an IQ trait).