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Praise for culture and technology
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'''CURRICULUM OF'''<br />
 +
'''THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF MARXISM-LENINISM'''<br />
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'''PART 1'''
  
"With its disarmingly modest tone-----always attentive to the needs of the theoretically uninitiated, always ready with contemporary and captivating examples, always extending a hand to readers at every stage to join up as fellow travelers, Jennifer Daryl Slack and J. Macgregor Wise have written ‘a primer’ of the best sort. Their book is an open invitation to begin (or, for the initiated, to begin again with fresh eyes) an expertly mapped trek across a set of trajectories that reveals the twists and turns of the animating discourses knotted at the intersection of culture and technology. But more than this, Slack and Wise deftly show how knowledge gained can become knowledge for engaging-------------------from background primer to timely intervention. The task of turning its readers into practical social actors in the everyday is truly this text’s great accomplishment."
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'''THE WORLDVIEW AND PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY OF MARXISM-LENINISM'''
  
Gregory Seigworth, Millersville University
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''For University and College Students''
  
"Culture and Technology: A Primer offers a major theoretical synthesis in the guise of an easy-to-use textbook. If you want to understand why culture matters for the study of technology and what a cultural studies approach brings to our understandings of technology, this book is essential. In clear and thoughtful prose, Jennifer Daryl Slack and J. Macgregor Wise begin with a critique of the standard assumptions about technology and culture and their dangerous political and environmental consequences. They then synthesize some of the key insights from cultural studies with work in actor-network theory, science and technology studies and the philosophy of technology. Culture and Technology offers a program for studying technologies as at once artifacts of human action, actors in their own right, and part of larger forces in the world. I assigned the first edition to undergraduates, placed it on Ph.D. students’ comprehensive examination lists, and recommended it to senior science and technology studies scholars who wanted to understand what cultural studies can contribute to their work. The second edition includes a host of nice updates that make it an even better teaching resource. It will continue to be of great use for many years in all of the fields that it touches."
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''Not Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought''
  
Jonathan Sterne, author of MP3: The Meaning of a Format and The Audible Past: Cultural Origins of Sound Reproduction
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'''FIRST ENGLISH EDITION'''
  
This book is part of the Peter Lang Media and Communication list. Every volume is peer reviewed and meets the highest quality standards for content and production.
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Translated and Annotated by Luna Nguyen
  
PETER LANG
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Foreword by Dr. Vijay Prashad
  
New York • Bern • Frankfurt • Berlin
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Introduction by Dr. Taimur Rahman
  
Brussels • Vienna • Oxford • Warsaw
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Edited, Annotated, and Illustrated by Emerican Johnson
  
jenniFeR DaRYL SLacx cC j. maccRecoR wise
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Proofread by David Peat
  
TeCHnOLOGY
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Additional Contributions and Editorial Support by Iskra Books
  
A PRIMER
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Published in association with ''The International Magazine''
  
second edition
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-2.png]]
  
PETER LANG
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=== License ===
  
New York • Bern • Frankfurt • Berlin
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This work is licensed under a<br />
 +
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
  
Brussels • Vienna • Oxford • Warsaw
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You are free to:
  
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
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'''Share''' — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format
  
Slack, Jennifer Daryl.
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'''Adapt''' — remix, transform, and build upon the material
  
[Culture + technology]
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The licensor cannot revoke these freedoms as long as you follow the license terms.
  
Culture and technology: a primer / Jennifer Daryl Slack & J. Macgregor Wise. -Second edition. pages cm
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Under the following terms:
  
Second edition of Culture + technology / Jennifer Daryl Slack, J. Macgregor Wise. 2005. Includes bibliographical references and index.
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'''Attribution''' — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.
  
1. Technology---Philosophy. 2. Technology----Social aspects. 3. Technology and civilization.
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'''NonCommercial''' — You may not use the material for commercial purposes.
  
I. Wise, J. Macgregor (John Macgregor) II. Title.
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'''ShareAlike''' — If you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you must distribute your contributions under the same license as the original.
  
T14.S58 303.48’3-----dc23 2014033105
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'''No additional restrictions''' — You may not apply legal terms or technological measures that legally restrict others from doing anything the license permits.
  
ISBN 978-1-4331-0775-7 (paperback) ISBN 978-1-4539-1450-2 (e-book)
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The full text of this license is available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
  
Bibliographic information published by Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the "Deutsche Nationalbibliografie"; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de/.
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<br />
  
© 2015 Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., New York 29 Broadway, 18th floor, New York, NY 10006 www.peterlang.com
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<blockquote>
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“Step by step, along the struggle, by studying Marxism-Leninism parallel with participation in practical activities, I gradually came upon the fact that only socialism and communism can liberate the oppressed nations and the working people throughout the world from slavery.
  
All rights reserved.
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''- Ho Chi Minh''
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</blockquote>
  
Reprint or reproduction, even partially, in all forms such as microfilm, xerography, microfiche, microcard, and offset strictly prohibited.
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=== Support for This Work ===
  
For
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Translating, annotating, and typesetting this book has taken three years, which would not have been possible without the support of our supporters on GoFundMe. GoFundMe is also the reason we are able to make the digital version of this entire text available for free online. We would therefore like to recognize all of our supporters:
  
Lawrence Grossberg and Stuart Hall Teachers and mentors without peer
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Figure 1: Industry
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There is still plenty of work to be done to complete the translation of this entire curriculum. If you would like to financially support our efforts, you can support us at:
  
Source: Linocut attributed to James Belvedito, 1933, Library of Congress, Harmon Foundation Inc, Records: http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/91783820/
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BanyanHouse.org
  
Contents
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=== Dedication and Gratitude ===
  
List of Illustrations ........................................ ix
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This book is dedicated to all the backers of the GoFundMe campaign that raised the funds to allow me to translate this text. What I initially believed would be a straightforward three-month process of translating ended up taking over three ''years'' of not just translation but also research, study, review, annotation, editing, proofreading, peer review, and more — with the incredible support of a full team of talented comrades — in order to make sure that everything would be digestible and intelligible for audiences outside of Vietnam. So, sincerely, thank you to everyone who backed this project for your patience, support, and encouragement.
  
Acknowledgments .............................................. xi
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Thank you to my husband and comrade, Emerican Johnson, who helped me throughout the translation process, and who did such a fantastic job editing, annotating, and illustrating this text. He was my constant dialectical companion as we grappled together with the spirit and meaning of the writings of Marx, Lenin, and Engels that are the bedrock of this text.
  
Introduction: On the Need for a Primer ........................ 1
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Thank you, also, to Iskra Books for the absolutely vital work they have done in helping us to edit this book and hold it to a high standard. We literally could not have done it without you. In particular, thank you to Ben Stahnke for organizing and cheerleading us through to the end, and to David Peat, for the painstaking, meticulous, and no-doubt frustrating work of proofreading our very, very, very imperfect writing!
  
I: Culture and Technology: The Received View............... 3
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Thanks also to ''The International Magazine'', who have provided guidance and suggestions throughout the process of developing this translation. I have had the opportunity to work with ''The International Magazine'' on various projects and I can recommend no better monthly periodical for internationalist communists to learn about socialist movements around the world.
  
1. The Power and Problem of Culture, The Power
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We owe a great deal of gratitude to Dr. Vijay Prashad and Dr. Taimur Rahman for taking the time to read through our translation and, in addition to providing their feedback and encouragement, also taking the time to write the foreword and introduction to the text. I know that you are both extremely busy with your own important literary, academic, and political work, so this assistance is so very much appreciated.
  
and Problem of Technology ........................... 5
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Finally, I would like to thank the Vietnamese intellectuals and experts who have done such an amazing job at taking hundreds of texts and distilling them down into the original volume which I have translated here. The elegance and precision with which they have been able to capture the essence of Marxism-Leninism is a monumental contribution to the workers of the world, and I only hope my translation does their work justice.
  
2. Progress ......................................... 13
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March, 2023<br />
 +
Luna Nguyen
  
3. Convenience ...................................... 33
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=== Foreword ===
  
4. Determinism ...................................... 49
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In December 1998, Fidel Castro addressed the Young Communist League’s 7<sup>th</sup> Congress in Havana, Cuba. The Soviet Union and the Communist state system in Eastern Europe had collapsed, which greatly weakened the cause of socialism. Not only was Cuba hit hard by the loss of its major trading partners and political ally, but socialists in general were penalised by the lethal argument made by the imperialist sections that “socialism had been defeated.” After 1991, Fidel revived the phrase “Battle of Ideas,” which was had been used in The German Ideology by Marx and Engels. To the Young Communists, Fidel said:
  
5. Control........................................... 59
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<blockquote>
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We must meet, in the heat of the battle, with the leading cadres to discuss, analyse, expand on, and draft plans and strategies to take up issues and elaborate ideas, as when an army’s general staff meets. We must use solid arguments to talk to members and non-members, to speak to those who may be confused or even to discuss and debate with those holding positions contrary to those of the Revolution or who are influenced by imperialist ideology in this great battle of ideas we have been waging for years now, precisely in order to carry out the heroic deed of resisting against the most politically, militarily, economically, technologically and culturally powerful empire that has ever existed. Young cadres must be well prepared for this task.
 +
</blockquote>
  
II: Representative Responses to the Received View ......... 75
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Bourgeois ideology had tried to sweep aside its most fundamental critique – namely Marxism – by saying that “socialism had been defeated” and that Marxism was now obsolete. Marxist criticisms of the “casino of capitalism” – as Fidel called it – were being set aside both inside and outside the academy, with neoliberal policy confident enough to ignore each and every criticism. Fidel argued that young communists must learn the fundamentals of Marxism – including both dialectical and historical materialism – and must learn this in a way that was not religious thinking but would allow them to become “new intellectuals” of the movement, not those who repeat dogma but who learn to understand the conjuncture and become “permanent persuaders” for socialism (the two phrases in quotations are from Gramsci’s prison notebooks). The general ideological confidence of the cadre was not clear, and that confidence and their clarity needed to be developed in a project that Fidel called the Battle of Ideas.
  
6. Luddism........................................... 77
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During this period, communists around the world conceded that the demise of the Soviet Union had created a serious dilemma for the left. Not only were we penalised by the argument that “socialism has been defeated,” but our own arguments to explain the turbo-charged drive toward globalisation and neoliberalism and to make the case for a socialist alternative were not strong enough. One indication of that weakness was the 2001 World Social Forum meeting held in Brazil, which promoted the slogan – Another World is Possible, a weak slogan in comparison to a more precise slogan, such as – Socialism is Necessary. Young people drifted into our ranks in this decade, angered by the wretched social conditions created by the permanent austerity of neoliberalism, but bewildered about how to transform the political environment. The lack of Marxist political education was felt by socialist forces across the world, which is why many parties around the world began to revive a conversation about internal political education for cadre and active engagement with other social forces regarding the pressing issues of our time. Fidel called these two processes – internal education for the Party and external engagement on the dilemmas of humanity – the Battle of Ideas.
  
7. Appropriate Technology ........................... 87
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In line with this broad direction, the government of Vietnam worked with the national publishing house Sự Thật (The Truth) to develop a curriculum for universities and colleges in the country. They developed this order of study along five subject areas: Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Marxist-Leninist Political Economy, Scientific Socialism, Vietnamese Communist Party History, and Ho Chi Minh Thought. This project worked to educate an entire population that would be able to understand the world in a rational and factual manner, outside the illusions of bourgeois ideology. Four years later, Communist Party of Vietnam adopted a resolution to take this work forward, and – under the leadership of Professor Nguyễn Viết Thông – produced this textbook that brought together the many themes of Marxism into focus for the introductory student and cadre. A book such as this is never easy to create, since it must introduce a form of thought that is critical of the foundations of bourgeois ideology – so it is a critique – but at the same time it provides a worldview to understand the actual world in which we live – so it is a science. The text must, therefore, show how bourgeois thought is partial and at the same time how socialist thought, creatively applied, will allow one to have a firmer grip of reality and be able to participate in fighting to transcend the obstinate facts of human indignity that are reproduced by capitalism. No manual such as this is without its flaws and without its limitations, but no education can start without a manual such as this one. The Vietnamese comrades have done a great service to the left movement by producing a text such as this, which can be used for study and then used as a model to develop similar texts in different parts of the world.
  
8. The Unabomber .................................... 97
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Ho Chi Minh, whose interpretation of Marxism and whose ideas about the Vietnamese Revolution, are all over this text once said: “Study and practice must always go together. Study without practice is useless. Practice without study leads to folly.” There can be no better injunction to get to work, to study and develop one’s theoretical armour and to use that theory as the guide to one’s work in the Battle of Ideas and in the battle for the streets, because this unity between theory and action is indeed praxis (thực tiễn), not just practice, but conscious human activity. That is what Fidel encouraged in his lectures on the Battle of Ideas.
  
III: Cultural Studies on Technological Culture............ 105
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Dr. Vijay Prashad.<br />
 +
5 March 2023<br />
 +
Caracas, Venezuela.
  
9. Meaning.......................................... 107
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=== Preface to the First English Edition ===
  
10. Causality........................................ 117
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The text of this book constitutes part one of a four-part curriculum on Marxism-Leninism developed and published by the Ministry of Education and Training of Vietnam. This curriculum is intended for students who are not specializing in the study of Marxism-Leninism, and is intended to give every Vietnamese student a firm grounding in the political philosophy of scientific socialism.
  
11. Agency .......................................... 137
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The entire curriculum consists of:
  
12. Articulation and Assemblage...................... 149
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Part 1: Dialectical Materialism (this text)
  
13. Politics and Economics .......................... 165
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Part 2: Historical Materialism
  
14. Space and Time .................................. 179
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Part 3: Political Economy
  
15. Identity......................................... 197
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Part 4: Scientific Socialism
  
16. Critical Conjunctures ........................... 215
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In Vietnam, each part of the curriculum encompasses one full semester of mandatory study for all college students. Each part builds upon the previous, meaning that this text is the foundation for all political theory education for most college students in Vietnam.
  
Notes ....................................................... 231
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However, it is important to note that this is not the first encounter with dialectical materialism which Vietnamese students wil have had with these ideas, because Vietnamese students also study dialectical materialism, historical materialism, political economy, and scientific socialism from primary school all the way through high school.
  
References .................................................. 243
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As such, the text of this book — in and of itself — would probably seem overwhelmingly condensed to most foreign readers who are new to studying dialectical materialism. Therefore, we have decided to extensively annotate and illustrate this text with the information which would have been previously obtained in a basic Vietnamese high school education and/or provided by college lecturers in the classroom.
  
Index ....................................................... 259
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It is our desire that these annotations will be helpful for students who hope to learn these principles for application in political activity, but we should also make it clear to academic researchers and the like that our annotations and illustrations are ''not'' present in the original Vietnamese work.
  
Illustrations
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We hope that this book will be useful in at least three ways:
  
Figure 1: Industry ....................................... vi
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* As a comprehensive introductory textbook on dialectical materialism and for selfstudy, group study, classroom use, cadre training, etc.
 +
* As a quick and easy to reference handbook for reviewing the basic concepts of dialectical materialism for students of theory who are already familiar with dialectical materialism.
 +
* As a companion book for further reading of theory and political texts rooted in dialectical materialist philosophy.
  
Figure 2: Potomac Electric Power Co. Electric Appliances. Waffle Iron .................................... x
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Also, please note: because this book is intended to be used as a quick reference and handbook for further study, there are many instances where we duplicate references, quotations, and other such information. We hope that this repetition may be an aid for study by reinforcing important concepts and quotations.
  
Figure 3: Bibel und Brille des Kanonikus ................ xii
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This book — Part 1 of the curriculum, which focuses on the universal philosophical system of dialectical materialism — serves as the foundation of all political theory and practice in the Vietnamese educational system as well as in the Communist Party of Vietnam and other organizations such as the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, the Women’s Union, the Farmer’s Union, the Worker’s Union, etc. Dialectical materialism is the framework for theory and practice as well as the common lens through which Vietnamese socialists relate, communicate, and work together.
  
Figure 4: Chrysler Tank Arsenal............................ 3
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This book focuses almost exclusively on the written works of three historical figures:
  
Figure 5: Compact Fluorescent ............................. 4
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''Karl Marx'' and ''Friedrich Engels''... who initially developed the universal philosophy of dialectical materialism by synthesizing various pre-existing philosophical, political, economic, and historical tendencies including the idealist dialectical system of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the political economics of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the materialist positions of Ludwig Feuerbach, and countless others.
  
Figure 6: Conical Parachute .............................. 12
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''...and Vladimir Illyich Lenin'', who further developed and defended dialectical materialism, expanded the analysis of imperialism, demonstrated how to apply dialectical materialism to local material conditions specific to Russia at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and made many other important contributions to dialectical materialist theory and practice.
  
Figure 7: Cafetière Vesuviana ............................ 32
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Obviously, there are countless other writers, revolutionaries, philosophers, and scientists who have contributed to dialectical materialism and scientific socialism. This book focuses primarily on Marx, Engels, and Lenin, because these figures laid the foundations and formulated the basic principles of the philosophy of dialectical materialism and the methodology of materialist dialectics which are most universally applicable in all endeavors.
  
Figure 8: Nazca Lines Labyrinth........................... 48
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It is our desire that translating this important work into English will lead to further study, understanding, and appreciation of dialectical materialism as an applied philosophy which socialists can find value in returning to periodically. At the end of the book, we offer a glossary of terms which doubles as an index, appendices with summaries of important concepts and principles, and an afterword, in which we offer advice for further study and application of dialectical materialism.
  
Figure 9: Anchor Chain for Brush Control.................. 58
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At the time of publication, we are already in the process of translating and annotating Part 2 of this curriculum, which focuses on historical materialism, with the hopes of eventually releasing the full curriculum. Once it is complete, it will also be made available at ''BanyanHouse.org'' — where we also invite questions, constructive feedback, and suggestions.
  
Figure 10: Old Water Wheel on Creek to North of Convent................................................. 75
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=== Introduction ===
  
Figure 11: A Sledge Hammer in the Hands of a
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Just a generation ago, Vietnam was the site of the most brutal war of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. More tonnage of bombs were dropped on the Vietnamese people than were dropped by all sides combined throughout the Second World War. In addition, countless acts of cruelty were used to scorch the very soil of the nation. By the end of Vietnam’s Resistance War Against Imperialist USA (known to the world as “the Vietnam War”), Agent Orange, napalm, and unexploded munitions had left a land deeply scarred and a people traumatised by decades of death and murder. The impression one had was that although Vietnam had won the war, it was so badly devastated that it could not hope to win the peace. But, miraculously, Vietnam is winning this war today, as the Vietnamese economy has become one of the fastest growing in the world and quality of life for the people is improving at a pace which could scarcely have been predicted in 1975.
  
Husky Iron Worker ............................... 76
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No one could have imagined that Vietnam would turn around so dynamically and rapidly. How did they achieve this economic miracle? How could this nation — so recently devastated by imperialism and war — possibly be able to reconstruct, revive, rejuvenate, and rebuild? That story is now unfolding before our eyes.
  
Figure 12: Nature Meets Technology ........................ 86
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Vietnam’s development has not come without hardship, struggle, setbacks, and mistakes. The people of Vietnam have had to learn hard lessons through struggle and practice to develop and strengthen ideological and theoretical positions. In this manner, the philosophical development of Vietnam deserves study and attention from socialists around the world. To outsiders, Vietnam can appear to be rife with contradictions. As depicted by Western journalists, Vietnam is simultaneously a success story driven by capitalist markets and a failing socialist state. Every victory is chalked up to private enterprise, while every setback is attributed to socialism. In this sense, the media has failed to understand the essential character of the core contradictions which drive the development of Vietnam politically, socially, and economically.
  
Figure 13: Ted Was Right .................................. 96
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Luna Nguyen has used social media and played an incredibly important role in helping the English speaking world understand the complexities of such contradictions that beguile so many academics and experts. She has helped to give an insider’s perspective on her own country’s path of development towards socialism.
  
Figure 14: Electric Oven. Setting Electric Oven II...... 105
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Nguyen’s translation of Part 1 of this influential work, ''Introduction to the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism'', a textbook studied by university and college students across Vietnam, is yet another big step in the direction of making Vietnam’s understanding of their own country’s development available to the English reading world.
  
Figure 15: All in All Just Another Hole in the Table...... 106
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For me, as an outsider, it is fascinating not only to see how deeply Vietnamese society takes an interest in European philosophical development (referencing Hume, Hegel, Descartes, Marx, Engels, and so many other Europeans, almost as if they are figures seated in some ancient monastery in Fansipan), but, even more importantly, how they have assimilated that knowledge into the wider context of their own history, society, and culture. The textbook truly comes alive in all the parts where these ideas are shown to be relevant to Vietnam itself. For instance, the textbook stands out with discussions of Ho Chi Minh’s concept of “proletarian piety,” which artfully blends elements of Vietnamese culture with Marxist concepts of class consciousness, or the story of Chi Pheo, who stands as a sympathetic stand-in for the interpretation of the unique characteristics of the Vietnamese Lumpenproletariat. The book itself is an instance of the dialectic of the universal and the particular, the abstract and the concrete.
  
Figure 16: Train Wreck at Montparnasse Station ....... 116
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Just as importantly, it shows that, in Vietnam, Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought are not mere perfunctory rituals that are repeated like a learnt formula for this or that exam; but that although the Vietnamese political economy in its current form certainly contains contradictions which must be negated in the process of building the lower stage of socialism, the government remains seriously committed to the goals, theory, and practice of Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought.
  
Figure 17: Footprint on Earth............................. 136
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Hence, I highly recommend this book, not merely because it is a well-illustrated and easy-to-read book on the principles of dialectical materialism, but more importantly because it offers an insight into how the Vietnamese government collects and synthesises the philosophical developments that are, on the one hand, the collective legacy of all of humanity, and, on the other hand, the concrete manifestations of a revolutionary theory of (and for the oppressed yearning for) freedom in every corner of the world.
  
Figure 18: Dew on Spider Web ............................. 148
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March, 2023
  
Figure 19: Workers at Work ............................... 164
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Dr. Taimur Rahman<br />
  
Figure 20: Space and Time ................................ 178
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=== Editor’s Note ===
  
Figure 21: MMW ........................................... 196
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Working on this project has been one of the most illuminating experiences of my life. In translating this work, Luna has opened a door for English speakers into the wide world of Vietnamese scholarship and pedagogy as it relates to socialist theory and philosophy.
  
Figure 22: Power House Mechanic Working on
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Luna and I have done our best to capture the original meaning and spirit of the text. Furthermore, as we have mentioned elsewhere, our annotations and illustrations are intended only to contextualize and expand on the core information of the original text similarly to the class/lecture setting for which the curriculum is intended.
  
Steam Pump ..................................... 214
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In their lives, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were never able to finish clarifying and systematically describing the philosophy of dialectical materialism which their work was built upon. Engels attempted to structurally define the philosophy in Dialectics of Nature, but unfortunately that work was never completed since he decided to prioritize publishing the unfinished works of Marx after his untimely death.
  
Figure 23: Miscellaneous Subjects. Telephone, Directory and Globe ................................................ 230
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I believe that this text is a great step forward in that work of systematically describing the philosophical system of dialectical materialism and the methodological system of materialist dialectics. I also believe it’s worth noting how the Vietnamese scholars who crafted this curriculum have embedded the urgent necessity of action — of creative application of these ideas — throughout the text in a way that I find refreshing and reflective of the works of Marx and Engels themselves.
  
Figure 2: Potomac Electric Power Co. Electric Appliances. Waffle Iron
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As the text will explain, dialectical materialism is a universal system of philosophy which can be utilized to grapple with any and every conceivable problem which we humans might encounter in this universe. In Vietnam, dialectical materialism has been used to delve into matters of art, ethics, military science, and countless other fields of inquiry and endeavor. It is my hope that this book will, likewise, lead to a wider and fuller understanding and (more importantly) application of dialectical materialism in the Western world.
  
Source: Photography by Theodor Horydczak, ca. 1920, Library of Congress, Horydczak Collection: http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/thc1995000607/PP/
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March, 2023
  
Acknowledgments
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Emerican Johnson
  
OUR DEBTS ARE MANY. Our families, first and foremost, deserve our sustained gratitude for, well, just about everything. Jennifer thanks Kenny Svenson, Pam Pels, Joe Pels, Linda Jantzen, Sue Slack, Laura Pagel, and a whole pack of dogs. Greg thanks Elise Wise, Catherine Wise, Brennen Wise; Donna and Tracy Wise; Sue and Carl Dimon; two dogs, and one cat.
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=== A Message From ''The International Magazine'' ===
  
The scholarly friends who have inspired and supported us constitute the most treasured part of the intellectual life. Thank you to Lawrence Grossberg, Stuart Hall, James Carey, Langdon Winner, Patty Sotirin, Kim Sawchuk, Sarah Sharma, Matt Soar, Jonathan Sterne, Anne Balsamo, Gil Rodman, Greg Seigworth, John Nguyet Erni, Mark Andrejevic, Steve Wiley, Ted Striphas, Charles Stivale, James Hay, Gordon Coonfield, Toby Miller, Andrew Herman, Ron Greene, Mehdi Semati, Meaghan Morris, Paul Bowman, Jody Berland, Jeremy Packer, Melissa Adams, Bryan Behrenhausen, Phaedra Pezzullo, Rob Poe, and Rob Spicer. Jennifer thanks the Department of Humanities at Michigan Technological University, especially her colleagues and graduate students in communication and cultural studies. Jennifer thanks Kette Thomas, Sue Collins, Stefka Hristova, Randy Harrison, Nate Carpenter, Mies Martin, Becky Soderna, and Wenjing Liu. She also thanks the Communication Department at North Carolina State University for support as a visiting professor. Greg thanks the faculty and staff of the New College of Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences at Arizona State University, especially the folks in Communication Studies.
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''The International Magazine'' began in 2020 to connect international socialist movements and to strengthen the voice of oppressed people across the globe. We have been following the work of Vietnamese communists in their unique path towards peace, prosperity, and the construction of socialist values with a keen eye and much interest. It is with this spirit of international solidarity and a deep desire to learn from and share wisdom from our comrades around the world that we celebrate the release of this First English Edition of The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism-Leninism Part 1: The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism-Leninism.
  
For enduring friendship outside the academy that brings balance and perspective to our lives, Jennifer thanks Melvi Grosnick, Terry Daulton, and Kathy and Chuck Wicker. Greg thanks all the Allens, Christians, Figueroas, Gelvins, Grells, Keiths, Marxs, Melchers, Villegas’es, Watsons, and Youngs, not to mention the wonderful folks at Dance Theater West (especially Frances Smith Cohen and Susan Sealove Silverman) for being our village. In addition, Greg would like to thank Sherrie and the good folks at White Cup Coffee for letting him camp out there for long stretches of time during the final editing of this book.
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Ho Chi Minh once said: “In order to build socialism, first and foremost, we need to have socialist people who understand socialist ideology and have socialist values.
  
Figure 3: Madonna des Kanonikus Georg van der Paele, Detail: Bibel und Brille des Kanonikus
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To this end, Vietnamese communists have expended tremendous resources building a curriculum on Marxist-Leninist philosophy and analysis which includes dialectical materialism, materialist dialectics, scientific socialism, historical materialism, and political economy. These topics are taught in primary and secondary schools and are mandatory subjects for all students attending public universities in Vietnam. Beyond that, Vietnam offers free degrees to students who wish to study Marxist theory and philosophy and Ho Chi Minh Thought (defined as the application of Marxist philosophy to the unique material conditions of Vietnam). In this manner, Vietnam has demonstrated a steadfast commitment to developing “socialist people” “with socialist values.”
  
Source: Painting by Jan van Eyck, 1943, Wikimedia Commons, The Yorck Project, ZenodotVerlagsgesellschaftmbH wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Jan_van_Eyck_059.jpg
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We are, therefore, extremely excited to have worked with Luna Nguyen on the translation and annotation of Part 1 of the Vietnamese university curriculum on the worldview and philosophical methodology of Marxism-Leninism into English, which will make this unique perspective of socialist theory available to comrades around the world for the first time.
  
Introduction
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After having read through this volume, which outlines the fundamentals of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics, we find the most important lesson to be the relationship between theory and practice. According to the Vietnamese scholars who authored the original text, Marxist-Leninist philosophy must be considered a living, breathing philosophy which requires application in the real world — through practice — in order to be made fully manifest.
  
On the Need for a Primer
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We hope that readers of this volume will carry forward this guidance through practice which suits your material conditions, wherever you are in the world.
  
TECHNOLOGICAL CULTURE HAS the power to shape attitudes and practices, but its power often goes unnoticed or is underappreciated. Every day it becomes increasingly important to understand and alter our relationship with technological culture. This is especially true when, as is so often the case, technological culture is shaping attitudes and practices that do not serve the interests of sustainability, equality, and peace. The scramble for non-renewable resources that both constitute and fuel technologies has contributed to strife, and sometimes war, of global proportions. New digital media technologies have enabled surveillance at a scale previously unimaginable. Inequitable delivery of health care is exacerbated, as expensive techniques of biotechnology are made unevenly available. Technological trash salts the earth and skies with pollution and provides toxic work for the most disadvantaged laborers on the planet. Global climate change, the fallout from all this technological madness, is widely denied in practice as the human imagination lives out the fantasy of unstoppable and infinite growth.
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If you would like to learn the perspective of socialists from other nations around the world, we invite you to visit our website at InternationalMagz.com — the home of ''The International Magazine'' online. There, you will find articles written by comrades from a wide variety of backgrounds and nationalities with a clear bias towards anti-capitalism, anti-fascism, and anti-imperialism!
  
The stories that dominate education and the media are those that assert that technology is all good, all about progress, all about becoming superior kinds of human beings. That there is good is undeniable, but we have collectively lost perspective, lost the ability to critique the complexities of the technological culture in which we are immersed. Perhaps we haven’t lost it, because we may never really have had it. But now, with the consequences so seriously global, we need desperately to acquire this skill. We offer this book as a primer for that project.
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In solidarity,
  
Culture and Technology is a primer in three senses: 1) it is an introduction to the contributions of many generations of scholars and engaged individuals who provide helpful guidance for understanding technological culture, 2) it is an introduction to a coherent cultural studies approach to understanding and critiquing technological culture, and 3) it is a spark to light the fire of conscious and responsible engagement with technological culture.1
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The Editorial Team of ''The International Magazine''
  
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=== Notes on Translation ===
  
INTRODUCTION
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Vietnamese is a very different language from English, which has presented many challenges in translating this book. Whenever possible, I have tried to let the “spirit” of the language guide me, without altering the structure, tone, and formatting of the book.
  
This is a much revised and expanded second edition. A lot has happened in the world since the publication of the first edition in 2005, and we have responded accordingly. We, Greg and Jennifer, have also learned a lot from the students who have used the first edition and from readers from all over the world who have sent us feedback.
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One thing you will likely notice right away: this book is highly condensed! This is because most Vietnamese students are already familiar with these concepts. We have added annotations to try to make the book more digestible for those of you who are new to Marxism-Leninism, and these annotations are explained on the next page.
  
A new first chapter considers more explicitly how we use a cultural studies concept of culture. A new final chapter adds the concept of the conjuncture as a tool for analyzing technological culture, a change that results in a transformed conclusion. In addition to these new chapters, we have completely rewritten most of Part III, which lays out our approach to cultural studies as it applies to technological culture. Two glaring lacunae in the first edition have been corrected: the chapter on space has become space and time; the chapter on politics has become economics and politics. What were two chapters on identity have been reconsidered as one. And the chapter on definitions has been corrected to reflect its real intention: it is about meaning. Throughout the book, we have updated examples where newer ones were more useful for understanding contemporary experience. We have incorporated many new technological developments: new social media, cloud computing, biomedia, Edward Snowden’s revelations about NSA surveillance, the proliferation of e-waste, climate change, and so on. New research by remarkable scholars has been added, for example Sarah Sharma’s work on time and Natasha Dow Schüll’s work on addiction to machine gambling.
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I have worked hard to try to make the language in this book consistent with the language used in popular translations of works from Marx, Lenin, etc., that would be familiar to English-language students of Marxism-Leninism. That said, different translators have been translating these texts into English for over a century, such that different word choices have been used to relate the same concepts, and even Marx, Engels, and Lenin used different terms to describe the same concepts in many instances (not to mention the fact that Marx and Engels wrote primarily in German, whereas Lenin wrote primarily in Russian).
  
We do not profess to, or even attempt to, place before you contemporary technological culture in all its Technicolor intricacies. That isn’t possible. Instead there is a fourth sense in which we offer our work here as a primer. When painting a room that that is already painted in strong colors, you begin by applying a primer, a first thin coating of paint, after which you paint with a fully new color. The primer conditions the surface so that it is receptive to the new paint. This book is meant to be such an initial coating. It engages the brightly colored stories that currently color our understanding of technology and culture. It applies the primer, on top of which you are encouraged to contribute colorful new paint: to engage technological culture in your own circumstances, whatever and wherever they are, with theory, tools, and strategies meant to make the world a better place.
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As such, I have made it my first priority to keep the language of this translation internally consistent to avoid confusion and, again, to match the spirit of the original text as much as possible. As a result, you may find differences between the translation choices made in this text and other translations, but it is my hope that the underlying meaning of each translation is properly conveyed.
  
Part I
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March, 2023
  
Culture and Technology
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Luna Nguyen
  
The Received View
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=== Guide to Annotations ===
  
Figure 4: Chrysler Tank Arsenal
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This book was written as a textbook for Vietnamese students who are not specializing in Marxism-Leninism, and so it is meant to be a simple and condensed survey of the most fundamental principles of dialectical materialism to be used in a classroom environment with the guide of an experienced lecturer. That said, a typical Vietnamese college student will already have been exposed to many of the concepts presented herein throughout twelve years of primary and secondary education. As such, in translating and preparing this book for a foreign audience who are likely to be reading it without the benefit of a lecturer’s in-person instruction, we realized that we would need to add a significant amount of annotations to the text.
  
Source: Photography by Alfred T. Palmer, ca. 1940–1946, Library of Congress, Farm Security Administration, Office of War Information Photography Collection: http://www. loc.gov/pictures/item/oem2002009934/PP/
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These annotations will take the following forms:
  
Figure 5: Compact Fluorescent
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* Short annotations which we insert into the text itself [will be included in square brackets like these].
  
Source: Photograph by Giligone, 2008, Wikimedia Commons
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http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Compact_Fluorescent-bw.jpg
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Longer annotations which add further context and background information will be included in boxes like this.
  
Chapter One
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The Power and Problem of Culture, The Power and Problem of Technology
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We have also added diagrams to our annotations, as well as a detailed glossary/index and appendices, which are located in the back of the book. We hope these will resources will also be of use in studying other texts which are rooted in dialectical materialist philosophy.<br />
  
WHAT YOU KNOW TO BE TRUE MATTERS. When you know something, you act in accordance: your beliefs and actions support what you know to be true, correct, and good; your beliefs and actions resist what you know to be false, wrong, and bad. Once you really know something, it is difficult to shake loose from the power of those convictions that guide thinking and behavior to learn something new or different. What is true for the individual is even more pronounced at the broader cultural level. When a culture accepts that something is true, its political structure, economic structure, institutions, laws, beliefs, everyday practices, and systems of reward and punishment will be shaped in that knowledge.
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=== Original Vietnamese Publisher’s Note ===
  
Unfortunately, what is widely accepted as true does not always serve us well. When everyone knew that the universe was geocentric, it made good sense to arrest Galileo Galilei and repress his heliocentric cosmology. It took generations to achieve general cultural acceptance of the knowledge that the earth revolves around the sun. But before heliocentrism became widely accepted, certain religious institutions maintained power over thought and practice, and scientific enterprise was marginalized and discredited. Sometimes, in spite of broad cultural consensus, it pays to struggle with complacent knowing and “worry” your way to better stories about how the world works.
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In 2004, under the direction of the Central Government, the Ministry of Education and Training, in collaboration with Sự Thật [Vietnamese for “The Truth,” the name of a National Political Publishing House], published a [political science and philosophy] curriculum for universities and colleges in Vietnam. This curriculum includes 5 subjects: Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Marxist-Leninist Political Economy, Scientific Socialism, Vietnamese Communist Party History, and Ho Chi Minh Thought. This curriculum has been an important contribution towards educating our students — the young intellectuals of the country — in political reasoning, so that the next generation will be able to successfully conduct national innovation.
  
The knowledge you are least likely to question is often based on what you accept as true without question, because that knowledge is most strongly supported by the structures of culture and everyday life. The more powerfully aligned the structures and beliefs of a culture are, the more difficult the opportunities for change, even when change is, in practice, positive. Two things you probably know a lot about constitute the topic of this book: culture and technology. You know a
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With the new practice of education and training, in order to thoroughly grasp the reform of the Party’s ideological work and theory, and to advocate for reform in both teaching and learning at universities and colleges in general, on September 18<sup>th</sup>, 2008, the Minister of Education and Training, in collaboration with Sự Thật, have issued a new program and published a textbook of political theory subjects for university and college students who are not specialized in Marxism — Leninism with Associate Professor and Doctor of Philosophy Nguyen Viet Thong as chief editor. There are three subjects:
  
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Curriculum of the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
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Curriculum of Ho Chi Minh Thought
  
lot about culture, and you know a lot about technology. However, we submit that much of what you know about them does not, in all likelihood, serve you—or the broader culture—well. We offer some alternatives that we believe will serve us all better.
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Curriculum of the Revolutionary Path of the Communist Party of Vietnam.
  
You Know a Lot About Culture
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Curriculum of the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism was compiled by a collective of scientists and experienced lecturers from a number of universities, with Pham Van Sinh, Ph.D and Pham Quang Phan, Ph.D as co-editors. This curriculum has been designed to meet the practical educational requirements of students.
  
We all use the word “culture” often and commonly, as if we understand what it means. But do we really know what we are talking about? Raymond Williams’s insight ought to give us pause: “Culture is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language.”1 In tracing the use of the term, Williams considers its many historical and contemporary meanings, including: the implication of tending or cultivating (as in agri-culture); the distinctions between human (cultural) and material realities, between symbolic (cultural) production and material production, between culture and society, between culture and structure; the attribution of having something special when one is cultured; the designation of a separate popular culture as opposed to high culture; the characterization of national differences (as in German versus French culture); and the related naming of subgroups or subcultures within a national culture (as in hipsters or rural America). Sociologists have a number of quite different definitions for culture, as do anthropologists. There is very little agreement, it seems, when it comes down to it as to what culture means.
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We hope this book will be of use to you.
  
Let’s look at some aspects of Williams’s definitions. Despite differences there seems general agreement that culture is the domain of human organization and activity in engaging the “rest” of reality. However, in practice we hear the occasional assertion that some animals have culture too (from complex social organization to active learning and change to artistic practice). Some definitions imply some discrimination, expressed in the differentiation of either humans from others or between human groups. And there is not only differentiation but clear hierarchies implied: there is one culture over here, another over there; or this group has culture (and power and status) and that group does not; or culture is over here and over there is something else such as something material (like a technology), a structure (like an institution), a non-human being (like an animal), or a human considered less than cultured (like a homeless person).
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April, 2016
  
In cutting through the discriminatory aspects of these uses of culture (especially the dichotomy of high versus low or mass culture), while honoring its history, Williams argues for using the term culture in a way we generally subscribe to and promote in this book. Culture, he argues is “a whole way of life” and it is “ordinary.”2
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NATIONAL POLITICAL PUBLISHING HOUSE — SỰ THẬT
  
By describing culture as “a whole way of life,” Williams means that it is the formation, arrangement, and organization of what we think, believe, value, feel, and do. However, culture is never static; rather, it is a process that entails changing relationships between what is old, what is new, and what is being reconfigured (the term we will introduce later is rearticulated). The process can
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=== Original Vietnamese Preface ===
  
The Power and Problem of Culture
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To implement the resolutions of the Communist Party of Vietnam, especially the 5<sup>th</sup>
  
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Central Resolution on ideological work, theory, and press, on September 18<sup>th</sup>, 2008, The Ministry of Education and Training has issued Decision Number 52/2008/QD-BGDDT, issuing the subject program: The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism for Students Non-Specialised in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought. In collaboration with Truth — the National Political Publishing House — we published the Curriculum of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism for Students Non-Specialised in MarxismLeninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought.
  
be seen as driven by the interrelated work of tradition and selection. On the one hand, culture is shaped by the work of tradition: that is, the meanings, values, artifacts, and practices that are handed down to us, that we learn (and learn about) from families, churches, schools, and so on. These include works of art and expression that are said to contain the values and worldview of a culture. On the other hand, culture is shaped by the work of selection: the selecting, challenging, arranging, and living of the artifacts and ideas in everyday life in the interactions with changing material conditions. Culture is thus a process whereby tradition is reconfigured in historical conditions of everyday life. Culture is both the traditions we are born into and how these are challenged (or reinforced) through our experiences of the world (and changing social, historical, and material conditions). At any particular time in the process of change, culture will express dominant values, feelings, beliefs, affects, and practices, but it will also carry with it residual features from earlier times or social formations (for example, there are still people who believe that the earth is flat) and emergent features that are new ideas and processes (for example, biotechnology is introducing new conceptions and practices of what it means to be human).3 The particular formation manifest by the relationship of dominant, residual, and emergent processes at a particular point in time is what Williams means by culture as “a whole way of life.
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The authors of this text have drawn from the contents of the Central Council’s previous programs (Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Marxist-Leninist Political Economy, and Scientific Socialism) and compiled them into national textbooks for Marxist-Leninist science subjects and Ho Chi Minh Thought, as well as other curriculums for the Ministry of Education and Training. The authors have received comments from many collectives, such as the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics and Administration, the Central Propaganda Department, as well as individual scientists and lecturers at universities and colleges throughout the country. Notably:
  
To claim that “culture is ordinary” is to acknowledge that these cultural processes occur within the variety of practices that constitute everyday life. These include the whole range of activities in which people engage and within which people make meanings in their lives: from everyday expressions and practices such as a conversation over dinner or commenting on a tweet, to institutional structures and activities such as education or the practice of designing a new technology. Everyone participates in culture, therefore, because everyone engages in the practices that constitute their lives in relation to the lives of others. Culture is not the sole purview of the “cultured,” and popular culture (like reality television) is as much culture as high culture (like opera). The work of culture is thus pervasive: there is no culture over here and material reality over there. There is no culture over here and society over there. Culture is the process that connects the elements of everyday life, whether symbolic, structural, material, or affective.
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Associate Professor To Huy Rua, Ph.D, Professor Phung Huu Phu, Ph.D, Professor Nguyen Duc Binh, Professor Le Huu Nghia, Ph.D, Professor Le Huu Tang, Ph.D,
  
The approach to culture advocated here requires sensitivity to the way in which contemporary culture has been shaped by tradition and selection. Tradition and the work of selection are powerful, in that they shape what we know to be true and influence everyday life in myriad ways. This approach also requires a willingness to recognize that culture changes. It changes in ongoing processes of selection, in the ways that tradition is challenged by our experiences, and will continue to change in directions of which we cannot be certain. The shape and direction of change are the result of individual changes of mind, of the efforts of individuals and organizations to do things differently, of structural changes in institutions, and of responses to changes in material circumstances (for example, the depletion of a natural resource).
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Professor Vo Dai Luoc, Ph.D, Professor Tran Phuc Thang, Ph.D, Professor Hoang
  
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Chi Bao, Ph.D, Professor Tran Ngoc Hien, Ph.D, Professor Ho Van Thong, Associate
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
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Professor Duong Van Thinh, Ph.D, Associate Professor Nguyen Van Oanh, Ph.D,
  
We advocate this view of culture because it will help you see why you believe what you do about technology, why you do what you do in relationship with technology, and how culture is organized to promote particular values, feelings, beliefs, affects, and practices involving technology at the expense of others. We call this configuration of beliefs and practices the received view. Interrogating it will help you see that these relationships are contingent, that is, they could be otherwise, and they can be changed. Just as people once came to accept a heliocentric cosmology, we can come to accept a more complex role for technology in everyday life.
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Associate Professor Nguyen Van Hao, Ph.D, Associate Professor Nguyen Duc Bach, PhD. Pham Van Chin, Phung Thanh Thuy, M.A., and Nghiem Thi Chau Giang, M.A.
  
You Know a Lot About Technology
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After a period of implementation, the contents of the textbooks have been supplemented and corrected on the basis of receiving appropriate suggestions from universities, colleges, the contingent of lecturers of political theory, and scientists. However, due to objective and subjective limitations, there are still contents that need to be added and modified, and we would love to receive more comments to make the next edition of the curriculum more complete.
  
It is astonishing how much you likely know about technology that was not taught in any official way. The knowing begins in childhood, where technologies (from toys to everyday objects) are objects of desire, vehicles for play, and artifacts of value. This knowing is differentially available because, after all, not every child gets a parent’s iPhone to play with. If you are rewarded for technological prowess (as a child or adult), you learn that mastery of technology is culturally valued.
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MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING
  
Formal schooling still teaches that technologies are the spawn of genius inventors: Eli Whitney invented the cotton gin, Gutenberg invented the printing press, and so on. You know you are supposed to know them, that list of often-memorized inventors. You may or may not know what a cotton gin is. You may or may not know that Gutenberg really developed a particular version of moveable type and that print technology is centuries older. The details are less important than the lesson you learned about where technology comes from: invention is the purview of individuals, geniuses for the most part.
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=== Table of Contents ===
  
Schooling also teaches that technology is central to what it means to be human, because it teaches that as we develop new technologies we become different kinds of human beings. You likely learned that we have moved through technological ages that produce different versions of who and what we are: Stone Age, Bronze Age, Iron Age, Industrial Age, Electronic Age, Information Age, and now the Digital Age. Technology is depicted as the causal agent of these ages. The ability to craft stone produces the Stone Age. The development of industrial machines produces the Industrial Age. The computer produces the Information Age. The cultural transformations, however, are not simply from one kind of human to another, but from an inferior to a superior kind of human culture, and thus a superior human being. We age. We evolve. We mature. We are currently becoming surely superior digital human beings.
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'''Introduction to The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism'''
  
Because these lessons are often combined—the desirability of the object and the belief in the technologically driven evolution of the human into a superior being—you have likely learned that, as James W. Carey once said, “Technology is the central character and actor in our social drama, an end as well as a means.” He added, “at each turn of the historical cycle it appears center stage, in a different guise promising something totally new.”4
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'''I. Brief History of Marxism Leninism'''
  
The Power and Problem of Culture
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1. Marxism and the Three Constituent Parts
  
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2. Summary of the Birth and Development of Marxism-Leninism
  
Immersed as we all are in the contemporary “new,” we are bombarded with stories and guided toward practices that elevate technology to a central role in delivering progress and the good life: STEM (science, technology, engineering, math) education is highly valued, depicted as crucial for economic well being; STEM-educated people are promised high salaries; advertising for new technologies is pervasive; books, magazines, films, websites, and blogs regularly feature the promise of new technology; and, really, we truly are seduced by all that new, beautiful, elegant technology. Given all this, how could you possibly not have learned that technology is the goal and driver of progress, economic well-being, the good life, and our evolution into superior human beings?
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'''II. Objects, Purposes, and Requirements for Studying the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism'''
  
You have also likely learned, crucially, that technology and culture are two separate things. That is why, for example, this book is titled Culture and Technology; it’s a familiar construction. In this case, however, the West’s scientific orientation, with its propensity to compartmentalize things into mutually exclusive categories, renders most people ill-equipped to understand interconnections, interrelationships, and the ways that any identity, artifact, or practice can be multiply inflected. Culture and technology are not identical, but they are not independent, isolated phenomena either. Of all the arguments we make in this book, this is no doubt the most difficult to learn anew. But without understanding interconnection, what we introduce later as articulation, we might as well be living on a metaphorically flat earth. The challenge we set out for you as you work your way through this book is to consider the ways that technology is cultural (and culture is technological), that is, the multiple ways that they are connected—articulated—to the values, feelings, beliefs, affects, institutions, and practices that constitute everyday life. We also encourage you to consider why and how that matters and how it might be different.
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1. Objects and Purposes of Study
  
Technological Culture
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2. Some Basic Requirements of the Studying Method
  
The stories we tell about technology, as illustrated above, matter. Stories about technology and culture look and feel different than stories of technological culture. Although the term is unfortunately clunky and inelegant, we use the term technological culture specifically to encourage resistance to compartmentalizing culture and technology. The term is meant to promote an understanding that culture has always been technological, and technologies have always been cultural. Technologies are integral to culture and not separate from it. There was no, is no, “technological age.” Human culture has always existed in relation to what we understand to be technologies: from voice, stone, and fire, to clock, computer, and nanotechnology.
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3. Excerpt from ''Modifying the Working Style''
  
Because the stories matter, because the stories are part of the received tradition (our elaboration of Williams’s concept of tradition), they remain powerful. Thus, if you want to understand contemporary technological culture, you have to understand the power of the received tradition (what we call in this book, the received view of culture and technology) as well as its problems. It is important to look at the work performed by the received
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'''Chapter I: Dialectical Materialism'''
  
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'''I. Materialism and Dialectical Materialism'''
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
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1. The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues
  
tradition of culture and technology. Our goal is to provide you with an alternative to these stories, an alternative called technological culture. Technological culture acknowledges interrelations and interconnections. While we wish to emphasize this alternative, we also want to leave you with an appreciation of how powerful and tenacious the stories (that is, the construction of “culture and technology”) are.
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2. Dialectical Materialism — the Most Advanced Form of Materialism
  
This primer is divided into three parts. This first part maps the received tradition. By mapping we mean exploring the cultural context, that is, the interconnections and interrelationships among values, feelings, beliefs, affects, institutions, and practices that have contributed to the formation of contemporary technological culture. To do this, we locate major themes, threads, questions, and contradictions in the way our (primarily American) culture deals with technology. In particular we explore the power of conceptions and practices of progress, convenience, determinism, and control. We explore their development in relation to a changing landscape of other cultural forces. We recognize that this received tradition is extremely powerful, but it is also one that warrants resistance.
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'''II. Dialectical Materialist Opinions About Matter, Consciousness, and the Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'''
  
Part II illustrates the fact that there has been, and indeed there is, resistance to the received tradition. We have chosen to illustrate this through consideration of representative kinds of resistance: Luddism, Appropriate Technology, and the Unabomber. In discussing each of these responses, we consider the ways they variously take up and resist the themes and practices in Part I. We point to the strengths and weaknesses of each of these forms of resistance. We also use them to “set the stage” for the intervention we propose in Part III. Some of what we learn from these forms of resistance is very useful, but some of what we learn we quite clearly dismiss as unacceptable or problematic.
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1. Matter
  
Part III explores our proposed cultural studies approach to technological culture. It is an approach deeply steeped in theory that originates in cultural studies, but which has been developed by looking specifically at the concrete case of technology. We approach this task through the elaboration of key concepts in cultural studies with an emphasis on how they can be used to understand technological culture: meaning, causality, agency, articulation and assemblage, politics and economics, space and time, identity, and the conjuncture. It will be clear to the reader that throughout this book, from this first chapter on, we have been working with and building a case for the approach we advance specifically in Part III.
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2. Consciousness
  
We conclude the primer with suggestions for engaging the future with the powerful tools which cultural studies provides. We look at issues (called problematics) which crop up across our contemporary technological culture, and discuss strategies of intervention. The goal is to better understand our contemporary conjuncture so that we may work to transform it in ways that are more just and equitable.
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3. The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness
  
Figure 6: Conical Parachute
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4. Meaning of the methodology
  
Source: Unknown artist, ca 1470s, Photograph by Lynn White, 1968, British Museum
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'''Chapter 2: Materialist Dialectics'''
  
Wikimedia Commons: commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Conical_Parachute,_1470s, British_Museum_Add._MSS_34,113,_fol._200v.jpg
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'''I. Dialectics and Materialist Dialectics'''
  
Chapter Two
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1. Dialectics and Basic Forms of Dialectics
  
Progress
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2. Materialist Dialectics
  
The Meanings of Progress
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'''II. Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics'''
  
IMAGINE IF YOU WILL, standing at the ribbon-cutting ceremony for the launch of a new ocean liner. This is a proud moment: a crowd is cheering, a band is playing. Why is this such an important event? Is it that the ship is the biggest ever, or the most luxurious, or the most sophisticated? Is it that the ship uses the latest instrumentation for guidance or the most efficient and powerful engines? Perhaps it is all of these things and more. But this ship launching is also an important moment because it is an example of progress. This new machine is evidence that the human race has moved forward, a sign that the race as a whole has improved, that life is now somehow better because this ship is in the world.
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1. The Principle of General Relationships
  
Perhaps this example of an ocean liner has reminded you of the story of the Titanic, which in 1912 was the biggest, fastest, most luxurious ship ever launched. It was the unsinkable ship. When the Titanic sank on its maiden voyage, it seemed a slap in the face of progress. Some wondered if we had overreached our place in the world and trusted technology too much.
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2. Principle of Development
  
In US culture, the idea of progress has been closely allied with the idea of technology, and vice versa: technology is progress, just as progress suggests more and new technology. But we have also begun to question this relationship between technology and progress. Is more technology always better? Is the world a better place now than it used to be? The purpose of this chapter is to examine the idea of progress: what progress means, and how technology gets involved. We will look at the story of progress that has been central to the telling of a US story (a story of the Industrial Revolution and the new frontier), and we will also look at how this story is often used as an argument to sell us new technologies, to denigrate other countries and peoples who do not share this story, and to control populations. Finally, we address the fact that it is largely seen as heresy to question the idea of progress and its relation to technology. Indeed, it is easy to dismiss ideas simply by claiming that they oppose progress, and it is easy to condemn a person simply by saying that he or she is standing in the way of progress.
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'''III. Basic Pairs of Categories of Materialist Dialectics'''
  
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1. Private and Common
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
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2. Reason and Result
  
Defining Progress
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3. Obviousness and Randomness
  
The dictionary definition of progress is to move forward. If we are walking, we’re said to progress down the street. If we’re beginning to accomplish a task, we are said to be making progress. When you have read the first chapter of this book, you have made progress. That is, you’ve done more than before and are on your way to completing the project.
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4. Content and Form
  
The dictionary meaning is, however, only the beginning of what progress means in an everyday cultural sense. To move forward is to move in one direction: forward as opposed to backward. Consequently, movement forward implies a direction or goal. Similarly, making progress toward the completion of a task implies an end point. Progress, then, in its cultural use, is not just movement forward, but movement toward something: a goal or endpoint. If a patient is said to be making progress, they are moving toward the goal of health. If a disease is said to be progressing, it is advancing, presumably, toward death.
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5. Essence and Phenomenon
  
In broad cultural terms, progress is often used to underscore the belief that humankind, as a whole, moves forward. Robert Nisbet, a sociologist who wrote extensively on progress, put it this way:
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6. Possibility and Reality
  
Simply stated, the idea of progress holds that mankind has advanced in the past— from some aboriginal condition of primitiveness, barbarism, or even nullity—is now advancing, and will continue to advance through the foreseeable future.1
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'''IV. Basic Laws of Materialist Dialectics'''
  
In addition, as Nisbet sees it, this advancing is not mere movement, but a movement toward something. We aren’t marching blindly into a future. Rather, we are advancing toward what we envision as a utopia on Earth. Things will get better and better, and eventually we will achieve what we understand to be “the good life.” Progress shows us how far we’ve come, what we’ve achieved, and how much better life is now than it used to be. It also reveals to us where we think we are going.
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1. Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality
  
The Goals of Progress
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2. Law of Unification and Contradiction Between Opposites
  
The goals or endpoints of progress may be strongly felt, but they are usually unstated, left for the cultural critic to determine by carefully “reading” the culture. However, whether a goal is stated or not, it typically takes the form of what is considered to be “the good life.” Most people have a sense of what, for them, the good life entails. It typically involves some of the following: family, community, happiness, leisure, health, wealth, harmony, adventure, and the accumulation of things, though not necessarily in these terms or in this order. Overall, however, two types of goals are associated with progress: material betterment and moral betterment. Material betterment might mean that life is more comfortable, that we are healthier, and that we have more things, more conveniences perhaps, as we discuss in Chapter 3. Moral betterment might mean that spiritually we are more enlightened and that we treat each other better and with more tolerance.
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3. Law of Negation of Negation
  
The goals of progress (again, usually assumed as part of unstated cultural knowledge) usually match the fundamental values of a society. Progress at a particular moment in the development of culture could be “a chicken in every pot,”
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'''Chapter 3: Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism'''
  
Progress
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1. Praxis, Consciousness, and the Role of Praxis in Consciousness
  
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2. Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth
  
indicating a democratic value of universal health and physical well-being; “a car in every garage,” indicating the values of widespread personal mobility and private ownership; the absence of war or violence, indicating the value of peace and spiritual enlightenment, or a combination of all three. In any given historical context, understanding the assumed goals of progress is crucial to understanding that culture. Consequently, cultural critics who want to understand technological culture must focus on the everyday practice of culture in order to determine what people think the good life is and the role technologies play in attaining it.
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'''Afterword'''
  
In examining the contemporary relationship between culture and technology, one tendency that has been identified by cultural critics is that people often conflate or collapse the sense of progress as something merely new (merely moving) with progress as material and moral betterment (moving toward utopia). For example, using e-mail is said to be progress in relation to the postal service; that is, it is something new, a moving forward. But this newness tends to be equated—without questioning—with the sense of progress as material and moral betterment. Thus, it is assumed, life is better and we are better people with e-mail as part of our cultural experience. When we make this assumption explicit, we can see that the equation is not necessarily true. However, culturally, the tendency to equate the development of new technology with material and moral betterment typically operates without making the assumptions explicit. In part, that is how assumptions gain their power. To interrogate them explicitly is to demystify their power. To facilitate that process and untangle the confusion, we will explore two issues. First, we work to untangle the conflation of newness with material and moral betterment by examining the issue of criteria for measuring progress. Second, we explore the history of the idea of progress as it has come down to us in order to reveal the way this conflation has come about. And, finally, we explore the consequences of this tendency toward conflation.
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'''Appendices'''
  
The Importance of Criteria
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Appendix A: Basic Pairs of Categories Used in Materialist Dialectics
  
How do we know if we are moving forward or not? How do we know if life is better? How do we know if we have progressed? In short, how do we measure progress? Measurement always involves criteria: the standards of reference that allow you to judge. A yardstick is a standard of reference that allows you to determine if one machine is taller than another. But finding an appropriate yardstick to measure progress is especially difficult given the qualitative nature of many of the goals of progress. How does one measure betterment? Happiness? Harmony? Spirituality? Morality?
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Appendix B: The Two Basic Principles of Dialectical Materialism
  
Because it is much easier to count tangible things, it became common to use the measure of more things as a measure of progress. For example, if we produce more grain than we used to, that’s progress. Or, now that more than 80% of US households have a computer, that’s progress. Sometimes a measure of more (or fewer) occurrences of something indicates progress. For example, if the Internet has more traffic, that must be progress. However, if the mortality rate declines, that is, if fewer people are dying, that too would be considered progress.
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Appendix C: The Three Universal Laws of Materialist Dialectics
  
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Appendix D: Forms of Consciousness and Knowledge
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
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Appendix E: Properties of Truth
  
The problem with relying on the numbers of things or occurrences as a measure of progress is that doing so reduces progress to those things that can be counted, losing sight of the qualitative, moral dimensions of progress. Simply put, more is not necessarily better. For example, technology writer Kevin Kelly presents an argument for progress based almost solely on quantifiable criteria. To the objection that material advances are not meaningful and “only intangibles like meaningful happiness count,” he writes: “Meaningfulness is very hard to measure, which makes it very hard to optimize. So far anything we can quantify has been getting better over the long term.”2 But just because a task is difficult, like considering “meaningfulness,” doesn’t mean that it’s not worth doing.
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Appendix F: Common Deviations from Dialectical Materialism
  
More technology and new technology have been widely used as the yardsticks for progress. There are at least two reasons for this. First, because we most often think of technologies as things (as opposed to processes or practices, see Chapter 9), they are easily measured. To the degree that the culture accepts that more things equals progress, more technology is equated unproblematically with progress. Second, technologies in our culture are often identified as exhibiting and promoting still-potent key values of the European Enlightenment of the eighteenth century: notably, scientific objectivity, efficiency, and rationality. When we value science and scientific objectivity, it is a small step to value its applications. More and new technologies—as applications of science—come to mean progress. When we value efficiency, it makes sense to value the technologies that allow us to produce more and to undertake new tasks more efficiently; that is, to achieve maximum output for minimum work with minimum resources. To the extent that technologies are about achieving efficiency, technology is progress. Finally, technologies are themselves seen as rational objects. They objectify the power of reason and ratiocination to order the world and achieve particular ends. These ends can be measured; we can chart their progress. As Braden Allenby and Daniel Sarewitz summarize: “For many, technology embodies the modern ideal of applying rationality to the betterment of humankind.”3
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'''Glossary and Index'''
  
From those criteria considered above, a main criterion for measuring technological progress has been the value of efficiency, the ability to complete a task with minimal energy, effort, and expenditure. A vehicle is more efficient if it goes farther on less fuel. We work more efficiently if it takes us less effort to achieve the same results. The measurement of efficiency often takes the form of a cost/ benefit analysis and this is often related to issues of profit. Modern studies of efficiency can be traced back to the work of Frederick Taylor in the early 1900s.4 Taylor observed, measured, and timed factory workers as they did their tasks, and then worked out ways for them to do their jobs with less effort more quickly and thereby produce more.
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<br />
  
The focus on efficiency as the criterion of technological progress has led to complaints of the dehumanization of workers. Machines are more efficient than humans, so humans are urged to become more machinelike in order to become more efficient. Workers in factories are often taught to perform a task in a particular—efficient—way. They perform a task, and only that task, over and over throughout the day. However, humans are ultimately considered far less efficient
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-3.png|''“Great Victory for the People and Army of South Vietnam!”'']]
  
Progress
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<br />
  
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= Introduction to the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism =
  
than machines: humans require greater and less-predictable energy input in the form of food, rest, entertainment, and so on. Consequently, replacing humans with machines is often seen as embracing efficiency, that is, as progress.
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== I. Brief History of Marxism-Leninism ==
  
Given the widespread cultural commitments to scientific objectivity, efficiency, rationality, and the ease with which one can see, measure, and count technologies, it is hardly surprising that the mere existence of more and new technology often becomes the only, or primary, yardstick of progress. It is also not in the interest of those who benefit from the production of technologies to call into question the goals of all this progress. This leads the culture to focus more on the criteria than the goal. In other words, we assume that the means of achieving progress (technology) is actually the goal itself. We say, “progress equals more technology,” not “progress equals the better world created by means of technology.”
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=== 1. Marxism and the Three Constituent Parts ===
  
When technology is seen as the driving force of progress, and this concept is linked to the position that technology shapes culture (a widely held position, as we discuss in Chapter 4), the outcome is a moral imperative on behalf of technology. Technology, and only technology, is what makes the world better. We often hear, “you can’t stop progress;” but what is often meant is, “you shouldn’t stop progress.” To the degree that progress is measured by technology, we are told that we should not stand in the way of technology. We are thus taught to accept things in this culture in the name of progress, even if what we are accepting is harmful to ourselves. David Noble provides the following example:
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Marxism-Leninism is a system of scientific opinions and theories which were built by Karl Marx<ref>Karl Marx, 1818–1883 (German): Theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, political economist, founder of scientific socialism, leader of the international working class.</ref> and Friedrich Engels<ref>Friedrich Engels, 1820–1895 (German): Theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, leader of the international working class, co-founder of scientific socialism with Karl Marx.</ref>, and defended and developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin<ref>Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1870–1924 (Russian): Theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, defender and developer of Marxism in the era of imperialism, founder of the Communist Party and the government of the Soviet Union, leader of Russia and the international working class.</ref>. Marxism-Leninism was formed and developed by interpreting reality as well as building on preceding ideas. It provides the fundamental worldview* and methodology of scientific awareness and revolutionary practice. It is a science that concerns the work of liberating the proletariat from all exploitative regimes with the ambition of liberating all of humanity from all forms of oppression.
  
A few years ago my mother lost her job to a computer. A legal secretary, she had worked for the same firm for nearly twenty years before being unceremoniously “scrapped” with two days’ notice and no pension. The computer created jobs for less-skilled workers and eliminated those of the more-skilled people, like my mother, for whom “retraining” would have meant unlearning. (She was too old to “retool” anyway.) So there she was, home on a Monday morning for the first time in many years, reflecting upon her all-too-familiar plight. She complained about having no job, about the way she was fired after all those years, about the new workers who do not know half of what she knows, about having no pension and the fact that she wasn’t getting any younger. But, for all her anger, she was resigned. Shrugging her shoulders, she repeated to herself as if she had to convince herself, “Well, I guess that’s progress.”5
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Marxism-Leninism is made up of three basic theories which have strong relationships with each other. They are: ''Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, Marxist-Leninist Political Economics,'' and ''Scientific Socialism''.
  
Progress and technology have become articles of near-religious faith held in the heart of North American culture. To question them, to stand in the way of progress and technology, is considered to be heresy. We will return to this notion of heresy at the end of this chapter. But first, to fully appreciate how seriously this heresy is taken, we underscore the importance of the story of progress and technology in the development of American culture.
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''Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism'' studies the basic principles of the movement and development of nature, society and human thought. It provides the fundamental worldview and methodology of scientific awareness and revolutionary practice.
  
The Story of Progress in American Culture
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Based on this philosophical worldview and methodology, ''Marxist-Leninist Political Economics'' studies the economic rules of society, especially the economic rules of the birth, development, and decay of the capitalist mode of production, as well as the birth and development of a new mode of production: the communist mode of production.
  
James Carey and John Quirk once wrote, “America was dreamed by Europeans before it was discovered by Columbus.”6 The United States was to be the place where excesses were held in balance: balance between industrial technology
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''Scientific Socialism''** is the inevitable result of applying the philosophical worldview and methodology of Marxism-Leninism, as well as Marxist-Leninist Political Economics, to reveal the objective rules of the socialist revolution process: the historical step from capitalism into socialism, and then communism.
  
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THE RECEIVED VIEW
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==== Annotation 1 ====
  
and nature, balance between technological betterment and moral betterment, and balance between what has been called “works” (better technology) and “days” (a better life). In this section we chart the development of this story of balance.
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<nowiki>*</nowiki> A ''worldview'' encompasses the whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about ourselves as human beings, and about life and the position of human beings in the world.  
  
By the time Columbus accidentally stumbled upon the Americas, Europe had already had a long and violent history. Civilizations had grown, expanded, and collapsed into darkness again, while new empires had risen. America was seen as a place where civilization could start anew, released from the burden of wars and empires. The Americas were also seen as a new Eden, untouched by the crowding and pollution of European cities. This was a pure place of nature that could redeem Europe. Though the Americas were used primarily as a source of material wealth and resources for war, industry, and empire in Europe, the idea of America as a special place has remained.
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<nowiki>**</nowiki> The word “science,and, by extension, “scientific” in Marxism-Leninism has specific meaning. Friedrich Engels was the first to describe the philosophy which he developed with Marx as “Scientific Socialism” in his book Socialism: Utopian and Scientific.  
  
When the United States fought for independence, the struggle was seen not only as a political one, as in the creation of a new state, but as a revolution in the conditions of humankind advocating the principles of democracy, freedom, and liberty. Although these principles were echoed in the French Revolution of 1789, the American Revolution was different in that it occurred in the New World. Whereas nature had been exploited and despoiled in Europe, the new country was to embody a balance between nature and the best of what manufacturing technology could offer. Thomas Jefferson wrote, “Let our workshops remain in Europe.”7 Historian Leo Marx famously referred to this balance as the ideal of “the machine in the garden.”8 In the New World, technology and nature would work in harmony.
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However, it should be noted that the English phrase “scientific socialism” comes from
  
US leaders such as Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin were not naive, however. They knew that this balance would not happen on its own and were well aware of the dangers and damages that industrialism could cause.9 There were those who saw technology and industry as ends in themselves, but Jefferson knew that this viewpoint would upset the balance. He emphasized that technology was a means of achieving progress, not an end in itself. A balance had to be struck between material prosperity as the mark of progress and moral and spiritual growth as a mark of progress. The implication is that the nation needed to focus on the goals of progress rather than solely on the means. Franklin, for his part, refused to take out individual patents on his inventions, arguing that the good of society was more important than individual gain.10
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Engels’ use of the German phrase “wissenschaftlich sozialismus.
  
Unfortunately, the idealism of these founders was diluted. The lure of profit and material wealth became too strong. As the eighteenth century turned into the nineteenth, the Industrial Revolution was heating up. Industry expanded, more goods were produced more cheaply, and soon canals and railways opened the country up to the easy movement of goods and people. Life was prosperous, and the new machines were the most obvious sign of this prosperity. In these times, the view of progress that prevailed was highly technocratic; that is, the adoption of technology was seen as inherently good. Steam engines and railways meant progress in themselves, and the country lost sight of the moral and spiritual dimensions of the term. Ralph Waldo Emerson asked in 1857:
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“Wissenschaft” is a word which can be directly translated as “knowledge craft” in German, and this word encompasses a much more broad and general concept than the word “science” as it’s usually used in English.
  
Progress
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In common usage, the word “science” in English has a relatively narrow definition, referring to systematically acquired, objective knowledge pertaining to a particular subject. But “wissenschaft” refers to a systematic pursuit of knowledge, research, theory, and understanding. “Wissenschaft” is used in any study that involves systematic investigation. And so, “scientific socialism” is only an approximate translation of “wissenschaftlich sozialismus.” So, “scientific socialism” can be understood as a body of theory which analyzes and interprets the natural world to develop a body of knowledge, which must be constantly tested against reality, with the pursuit of changing the world to bring about socialism through the leadership of the proletariat.
  
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What have these [mechanic] arts done for the character, for the worth of mankind? Are men better?... ’Tis too plain that with the material power the moral progress has not kept pace. It appears that we have not made a judicious investment. Works and days were offered us, and we took works.11
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Even though these three basic theories of Marxism-Leninism deal with different subjects, they are all parts of a unified scientific theory system: the science of liberating the proletariat from exploitative regimes and moving toward human liberation.
  
The rapid geographical expansion of the country aided this strong sense of progress, the idea that the United States was constantly moving forward into the future. The frontier experience shaped the character of US culture in crucial ways. As it was seen at the time, civilization strode across the continent, taming nature, the landscape, and the inhabitants with a sense of Manifest Destiny, which is the belief that the continuing expansion of the country across the continent was ordained by God.
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=== 2. Summary of the Birth and Development of Marxism-Leninism ===
  
One of the first great symbols of this progress was the steam railroad conquering the frontier, a “machine in the garden.” Historian Merritt Roe Smith describes a popular allegorical painting of the 1870s titled American Progress. The painting depicts a beautiful woman floating across the landscape, a star on her forehead. This figure has been—and still is—used to depict liberty, as she does in the Statue of Liberty, but she was also made to stand for progress. In her right hand is a book; with her left hand she is laying telegraph wire. At her feet are stagecoaches and covered wagons. Behind her follow three railways, and back in the distance, bathed in the rising sun, are an iron bridge and a city. Before her, running away into the darkness, are Native Americans, bear, and buffalo.12
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There have been two main stages of the birth and development of Marxism-Leninism:
  
Underpinning this vision of Manifest Destiny and progress is evangelical Protestantism. In particular, Calvinism taught the principle of predestination: that there were a chosen few who would inevitably succeed because they had been chosen by God. Applied at a national level, this meant that the United States was God’s chosen land, which infused the national character with a fundamental optimism about the future.13
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''1.'' ''Stage of formation and development of Marxism'', as developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.
  
The promise of the machine in the garden was tarnished as the nineteenth century progressed, and the pollution, environmental destruction, and slums of Europe were recreated in the New World. In addition, the bloodiness and destruction of the Civil War shook the faith in the country as a place of peace and prosperity. With its brutal war and industrial machines, how could the United States be regarded as the land of progress?
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''2.'' ''Stage of defense and developing Marxism into Marxism-Leninism'', as developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.
  
In spite of setbacks the notion of technological progress remained strong, largely due to the excitement over yet another new technology as a symbol of progress: electricity. Unlike the menace of large machines, electricity appeared clean, mysterious, even supernatural. When applied to communication, first in the form of the telegraph, electricity was seen as revolutionizing the country. Prior to the telegraph, communication had been synonymous with transportation. Messages traveled at the speed of horses, carts, ships, or trains. But with the telegraph, one could communicate instantaneously with people hundreds of miles away. One became aware of a sense of simultaneity, the knowledge that others were living their lives at that moment across the nation. The telegraph also made a profound impact on the economy in that it helped to create a national market for
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==== a. Conditions and Premises of the Birth of Marxism ====
  
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THE RECEIVED VIEW
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==== Annotation 2 ====
  
goods and enabled arbitrage, the practice of buying low and selling high. Before the telegraph, it was difficult to find out how a crop was doing in Ohio or how production was at a factory in Pennsylvania. The telegraph provided the commodity market with more accurate and immediate information.14
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The following sections will explain the conditions which led to the birth of Marxism. First, we will examine the Social-Economic conditions which lead to the birth of Marxism, and then we will examine the theoretical premises upon which Marxism was built. Later, we will also discuss the impact which 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century advances in natural science had on the development of Marxism.
  
Electricity transformed street lights, shop-window displays, department stores, drawing rooms, and thereby the nature of city life, both public and pri-vate.15 Light sources changed from hazardous torches, open flames, or gas lights to relatively safe lightbulbs and filaments. As we moved from the “primitiveness” of the open flame to the science of electric light, we experienced progress for which technology was deemed responsible.
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''- Social-Economical Conditions''
  
Electricity continued to be the symbol of progress through the middle of the twentieth century. The electrification of more and new technologies, in particular household appliances, and the growing availability of electricity to many parts of the nation were taken as evidence of progress. Large-scale projects like the Hoover Dam, completed in 1936, provided electric power to the Southwest. In 1933 President Roosevelt created the Tennessee Valley Authority, a Federal corporation charged to develop the Tennessee River system to promote navigation, flood control, and the production and distribution of electricity to wide regions of the Southeast. Projects such as these can be seen as a continuation of electricity as the primary symbol for progress. Eventually, in the wake of concern over atmospheric pollution caused by coal-burning power plants and the environmental destruction caused by electricity-producing dams, electricity began to wane as a symbol of progress.
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Marxism was born in the 1840s. This was a time when the capitalist mode of production was developing strongly in Western Europe on the foundation of the industrial revolution which succeeded first in England at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Not only did this industrial revolution mark an important step forward in changing from handicraft cottage industry capitalism into a more greatly mechanized and industrialized capitalism, it also deeply changed society, and, above all, it caused the birth and development of the proletariat.
  
Nuclear power, awesome in its own right, replaced electricity as the dominant symbol of progress and continued the tradition. Eventually, nuclear power too revealed a darker side to technological progress in the form of the nuclear bomb and the threat of radioactive contamination. The debate over the status of nuclear energy as progress (or not) is still quite obvious. For example, Japan is currently struggling over how much to rely on nuclear energy in the wake of the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster.
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The most recent symbol of progress is the digital computer, which has dominated the American imagination since the 1950s. The computer differentiates itself from other electrical technologies in that it, unlike technologies that mimic the physical work of humans, supposedly mimics the work of the mind.16 The progress implicitly embodied in the digital computer is the ability to process more data and an expansion of the concept of thinking. There are people who argue that computers may some day progress so far beyond human capabilities that we could create—some say have already created—technological super-intelligences that surpass the capabilities of any human, what has been called by some the “Singularity.”17 Though this possibility is the stuff of fantasies and nightmares, as articulated in any number of science-fiction novels and films, there are those who see the surpassing of the human as a positive development. Humans are hindered from evolving or progressing further, these people argue, by the limitations of the human body. The true goal of human progress is the expansion of the mind according to some; and if we could somehow abandon the body, we would truly evolve.18 We would become “post-human.”19
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==== Annotation 3 ====
  
Progress
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Marx saw human society under capitalism divided into classes based on their relation to the means of production.
  
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''Means of production'' are physical inputs and systems used in the production of goods and services, including machinery, factory buildings, tools, and anything else used in producing goods and services. ''Capitalism'' is a political economy defined by private ownership of the means of production.
  
Beyond the more fantastic images of the post-human, digital technologies allow us to progress because, as MIT professor Nicholas Negroponte has put it, what we used to accomplish by physically moving atoms around—for example, shipping books or delivering newspapers—we can now accomplish by sending bits of electronic information instantaneously and cheaply from place to place.20 Instead of having to work with physical models of cars, buildings, or even bodies, we can create virtual representations of them in computers and submit them to any number of virtual tests and stresses.
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Within the framework of Dialectical Materialism, all classes are defined by internal and external relationships [see ''The Principle of General Relationships'', p. 107]; chiefly, classes are defined by their relations to the means of production and to one another.
  
Two Concepts That Underpin and Help to Sustain This Story: Evolution and the Sublime
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The ''proletariat'' are the working class — the people who provide labor under capitalism, but who do not own their own means of production, and must therefore sell their labor to those who ''do'' own means of production: the ''bourgeoisie''. As the owners of the means of production, the bourgeoisie are the ruling class under capitalism.
  
In the stories of these American revolutions, from 1776 to the information revolution of today, technology has played a principal (determining) role in our conceptions of progress, to the extent that we have confused the profusion of technologies with progress. The machines themselves, not the goals of progress, have come to play center stage. This story of progress has been given additional heft because it draws on two other powerful concepts: evolution and the sublime.
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According to Marx and Engels, there are other classes within the capitalist political economy. Specifically, Marx named the ''petty'' ''bourgeoisie'' and the ''lumpenproletariat''. Marx defined the ''petty bourgeoisie'' as including semi-autonomous merchants, farmers, and so on who are self-employed, own small and limited means of production, or otherwise fall in between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.
  
Progress and evolution are often conflated, in part due to a pervasive conflation of conflicting definitions of evolution. A pre-Darwinian meaning asserts that as we evolve we are likewise progressing; that is, we are becoming better, more perfect human beings. In other words, as we progress toward something, we are evolving into something better or more advanced. Evolution is thus given a “pro-gressivist” twist in this version, a meaning that still does linger today. But this understanding of evolution is not consistent with the Darwinian theory of evolution. We think of it as the misunderstood version of evolution. Raymond Williams writes, “as the new understanding of the origin of species spread, evolution lost in biology its sense of inherent design.”21 That is, the older, progressivist version of evolution presumed that we were progressing towards a particular state of being, following an inherent design. Darwin’s theory removed this sense of design or ideal future form. Evolution according to Darwin is the slow adaptation of living creatures to environmental conditions over the course of generations. Groups that survive are “selected” on the basis of randomly occurring genetic mutations. Those that do not survive do not adapt to changing environmental conditions and do not pass on their particular genetic attributes to future generations and thus are not “selected.” The idea of natural selection is often oversimplified to the idea of “the survival of the fittest,” which purports that surviving generations are better and more advanced: stronger, faster, smarter, and more complex. But this is not necessarily the case. They are instead merely better adapted. In general, the direction of evolution has been from the simple to the complex, from single-celled organisms to multi-celled ones. However, this in no way guarantees the survival of better or even the most complex organisms in the face of changing environmental conditions. Cockroaches are, after all, more “fit” to survive a nuclear war than humans. So even though less complex organisms might be better adapted to changing environmental conditions, we are unlikely to evolve back into single-celled creatures anytime in the near future. Consequently, evolutionary theory resists
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In the ''Manifesto of the Communist Party,'' Marx described the petty bourgeoisie as:
  
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<blockquote>
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... fluctuating between proletariat and bourgeoisie, and ever renewing itself as a supplementary part of bourgeois society... The individual members of this class, however, are being constantly hurled down into the proletariat by the action of competition, and, as modern industry develops, they even see the moment approaching when they will completely disappear as an independent section of modern society, to be replaced in manufactures, agriculture and commerce, by overlookers, bailiffs and shopmen.
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</blockquote>
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
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Vietnam’s Textbook of History for High School Students gives this definition of the petty bourgeoisie in the specific context of Vietnamese history:
  
the notion that humans are necessarily better or more advanced than other species. We have merely evolved differently.
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<blockquote>
 +
The petty bourgeois class includes: intellectuals, scientists, and small business owners, handicraftsmen, doctors, lawyers, and civil servants. The vast majority of contemporary intellectuals before the August Revolution of 1945, including students, belonged to the petty bourgeoisie. In general, they were also oppressed by imperialism and feudalism, often unemployed and uneducated.
  
Evolution, in its misunderstood, pre-Darwinian version, underpinned the idea of progress in the nineteenth century and beyond by providing a scientific version of the principle of Manifest Destiny and evangelical Protestantism. According to this version of evolution, it was “natural” that the nation would achieve greatness since it was, as was widely believed, at the forefront of technological development. Further, technological and national “might,” linked to this misunderstood idea of evolution, promoted the belief that “might makes right,” for only the fittest survive.
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The petty bourgeoisie were intellectually and politically sensitive. They did not directly exploit labor. Therefore, they easily absorbed revolutionary education and went along with the workers and peasants.
  
The second concept that undergirds progress is the notion of the sublime. The idea of the sublime involves a glimpse of perfection, the sense that one is viewing God or God’s work. The sublime is awe inspiring, an overpowering combination of two seemingly contradictory affects: dread and reverence.22 Dread of overwhelming power, majesty, and perfection, and reverence for it. David Nye points out that there is a particularly American turn of the concept, which concerns us here. The sublime becomes a means of bonding individuals into a greater unity. This sublime is often marked by ritualistic invocations in public life and secular pilgrimages (that is, they become vacation destinations). He writes,
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However, the intelligentsia and students often suffer from great weaknesses, such as: theory not being coupled with practice, contempt for labor, vague ideas, unstable stances, and erratic behavior in political action.
  
Americans have long found the sublime more necessary than Europeans, so much so that they have devised formations of the sublime appropriate to their pluralistic, technological society. Precisely because American society is so pluralistic, no single religion could perform that function. Instead, ever since the early national period the sublime has served as an element of social cohesion, an element that was already quite evident when the first canals were dug and steam engines were first harnessed to trains.23
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Some other petty bourgeoisie (scientists and small businessmen, freelancers, etc.) were also exploited by imperialism and feudalism. Their economic circumstances were precarious, and they often found themselves unemployed and bankrupt. Therefore, the majority also participated in and supported the resistance war and revolution. They are also important allies of the working class.
  
The United States possesses its share of sublime wonders such as Niagara Falls, the Grand Canyon, and the Rocky Mountains. Leo Marx saw behind his idea of the machine in the garden another type of sublime: the technological sublime. The advance of technology at the time seemed divinely inspired, and people stood in awe of the large steam engines or of electricity itself. The technological sublime thus refers to the almost religious-like reverence paid to machines. These machines were much more powerful and majestic than individual humans and held out the promise of being able to achieve perfection. Whereas hand-made goods have irregularities and imperfections, those made by machines, potentially, do not. The technological sublime, then, carries with it a fear of being overwhelmed, an attraction to the beauty of the perfection of the machine and its products, and, most of all, a reverence for the awesome power of the machine.
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In general, these members of the petty bourgeoisie had a number of weaknesses: self-interest, fragmentation, and a lack of determination. Therefore, the working class has a duty to agitate and spread propaganda to such members of the petty bourgeoisie, organize them, and help them to develop their strong points while correcting their weaknesses. It is necessary to skillfully lead them, make them determined to serve the people, reform their ideology, and unite with the workers and peasants in order to become one cohesive movement. Then, they will become a great asset for the public in resistance war and revolution.
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</blockquote>
  
The technological sublime that Marx described was what we would call the “mechanical sublime,” the divine nature of large, industrial machines. But when the machine began to fail as an untarnished symbol of progress after the Civil War, electricity took on the mantle of the sublime, what James Carey and John Quirk call “the electronic sublime.”24 In contrast to the smoke, soot, and grease of mechanical engines, electricity seemed pure and clean. Electricity is intangible;
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Marx defined the “lumpenproletariat” as another class which includes the segments of society with the least privilege — most exploited by capitalism — such as thieves, houseless people, etc.
  
Progress
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In the ''Manifesto of the Communist Party,'' Marx defined the lumpenproletariat as: “The ‘dangerous class’ (''lumpenproletariat''), the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of the old society.” Marx did not have much hope for the revolutionary potential of the lumpenproletariat, writing that they “may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.”
  
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''Political Theories'', an official journal of the Ho Chi Minh National Institute of Politics, discussed the lumpenproletariat in the specific context of Vietnamese revolutionary history:
  
its nature is almost mystical. People even feared the new electrical telegraph lines that sprang up in the mid-nineteenth century. It was said that when the wind blew over the electric lines they produced an eerie moaning sound, and people went out of their way to avoid them.
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<blockquote>
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It should be noted that Marxism-Leninism has never held that the historical mission of the working class is rooted in poverty and impoverishment. Poverty and low standards of living make workers hate the regime of capitalism, and causes disaster for workers, but the basic driving force behind the revolutionary struggle of the working class lies in the very nature of capitalist production and from the irreconcilable contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie.
  
More recently, as the symbols of progress have shifted yet again and electricity has become commonplace, our feelings about electric technologies have shifted. For the most part, electricity is now seen as polluting, and nuclear generators as dangerous. Where once we waxed poetic about turbines and railroads, electrical dams, dynamos, and nuclear reactors, our imaginations now soar with effusive paeans to digital technologies, especially as they relate to the Internet, smart phones, and cloud computing. We are faced with what we may call the “digital sublime.”25
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Moreover, it should not be conceived that a class is capable of leading the revolution because it is the poorest class. In the old societies, there were classes that were extremely poor and had to go through many struggles against the ruling class, but they could never win and keep power, and did not become the ruling class of society.
  
We discuss these notions of evolution and the sublime here to better understand the power of the story of progress. Why would so many people accept technology as progress without question, even if it damaged them, as it did David Noble’s mother in the earlier example? We are persuaded by progress because we are persuaded by the logic (logos) of the argument that it is better to be efficient, rational, and scientific. We are also persuaded by the ethic (ethos) of the argument of evolution that progress is inevitable and necessarily good, because we trust science and scientists, and believe in a misunderstood conception of evolution. And finally, we are persuaded by the deeply emotional argument (pathos) of the sublime; persuaded by our own feelings of fear, awe, and expectation.
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History has proven that the class that represents newly emerging productive forces which are able to build a more advanced mode of production than the old ones can lead the revolution and organize society into the regime they represent. Fetishizing poverty and misery is a corruption of Marxism-Leninism...
  
The Uses of the Progress Story
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The very existence of the lumpenproletariat is strong evidence of the inhumane nature of capitalist society, which regularly recreates a large class of outcasts at the bottom of society.
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</blockquote>
  
Stories are not neutral. We tell stories to make a point, to educate, to persuade, to entertain. Stories have their uses. It is important to emphasize that what we have sketched above is a story, though it might seem like history. Culturally, we are all acclimated to accepting history as the “Truth” about the way things actually happened. But in telling history, one is telling a story. History, like any story, is always told by someone to someone else for a particular purpose. Told by someone else, the story might be different. For example, a Native American, Canadian, or Mexican version of American progress since the settling of the New World would be different from what we have described. Stories are told for different reasons: to persuade us to go to war, to persuade us to buy a product, to convince us that what our ancestors did was correct and justified, or to make us feel comfortable (or uncomfortable) with our place in the world. We have told the story above as much as possible in the terms in which it is usually related; this does not mean that we agree with this story or the justifications that it provides. It is, however, a powerful story with powerful cultural uses and consequences.
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In the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, millions of Vietnamese people were forced to leave their homes in rural farmlands to work for plantations and factories which were owned by French colonialists. These workers were functionally enslaved, being regularly physically abused by colonial masters, barred from any education whatsoever, and receiving only the bare minimum to survive. As a result, under French colonial rule, about 90% of Vietnamese were illiterate and the French aimed to indoctrinate Vietnamese people into believing that they were inferior to the French.
  
The story of progress as told above has been put to four major uses in the United States: to promote a version of “a better life,to sell us things, to judge others, and to control populations.
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The French colonialists also worked with Vietnamese landlords to exploit peasants in rural areas. Those peasants received barely enough to survive and, like the plantation slaves, were prohibited from receiving education. Because Vietnamese peasants and colonial slaves composed the majority of workers while being so severely oppressed and living in conditions of such abject poverty, it was difficult to fully distinguish between the proletariat and the lumpenproletariat in Vietnam during the colonial era.
  
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During this time, Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese communists developed the philosophy of “Proletarian Piety.” The word “piety,” here, is a translation of the Vietnamese word ''hiếu'', which originally comes from the Confucianist philosophy of “filial piety.” Filial piety demanded children to deeply respect, honor, and obey their parents. Through the concept of Proletarian Piety, Ho Chi Minh adapted this concept to proletarian revolution, calling for communists to deeply love, respect, and tirelessly serve the oppressed masses. This philosophical concept sought to unite the proletariat, lumpenproletariat, and petty bourgeoisie into one united revolutionary class. Even some feudal landlords and capitalists — who were, themselves, oppressed by the colonizing French — were willing to fight for communist revolution and were welcomed into the revolutionary movement if they were willing to adhere to the principle of proletarian piety. The working class and peasantry would lead the revolution, the more privileged classes would follow, and all communist revolutionists would serve the oppressed masses through sacrifice and struggle.
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
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During this period, many novels were written and circulated widely which featured main characters who were members of the lumpenproletariat or enslaved by the French, such as ''Bỉ'' ''Vỏ,'' a story about a beautiful peasant girl who was forced to become a thief in the city, and ''Chí Phèo'', the story of a peasant who worked as a servant in a feudal landlord’s house who was sent to prison and became a destitute alcoholic after being released. The purpose of these stories was to show the cruelty of the colonialist-capitalist society of Vietnam in the 1930’s and to inspire proletarian piety, including empathy and respect for the extreme suffering and oppression of the lumpenproletariat, peasantry, and colonial slaves. These stories also presented sympathetic views of intellectuals and members of the petty bourgeoisie: for instance, in the novel ''Lão'' ''Hạc'', the son of a peasant leaves to work for a French plantation and the father never sees him again. The aged peasant becomes extremely poor and sick without the support of his son, and the only person in the village who helps him is a teacher, representing the intellectual segment of the petty bourgeoisie.
  
Promoting a Better Life
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The writers of these novels were communists who wanted to promote the principles of proletarian piety. Rather than looking down on the most oppressed members of society, and rather than sewing distrust and contempt for the petty bourgeoisie, Vietnamese communists inspired solidarity and collaboration between all of the oppressed peoples of Vietnam to overthrow French colonialism, feudalism, and capitalism. Proletarian piety was crucial for uniting the divided and conquered masses of Vietnam and successfully overthrowing colonialism. Note that these strategies were developed specifically for colonial Vietnam. Every revolutionary struggle will take place in unique ''material conditions''<ref>Material conditions include the natural environment, the means of production and the economic base of human society, objective social relations, and other externalities and systems which affect human life and human society. See Annotation 79, p. 81.</ref>, and the composition and characteristics of each class will vary over time and from one place to another. It is important for revolutionists to carefully apply the principles of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics to accurately analyze class conditions in order to develop strategies and plans which will most suitably and efficiently lead to successful revolution.
  
Robert Nisbet argues that the progress story emphasizes that change is good and that change promotes a better life. He believes that as long as we continue to tell, believe in, and live the progress story, our culture will not stagnate but will continue to strive for perfection. The progress story is essentially a revolutionary story; it promoted, and continues to promote, both political and technological change. Many positive outcomes, services, and products can be attributed to telling, believing, and living the progress story, including democracy, sanitation, education, computing, and life-saving medical advances.26 The progress story thus promotes a particular version of a better life and underpins the affect to work toward it.
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The deep contradictions* between the socialized production force** and the capitalist relations of production*** were first revealed by the economic depression of 1825 and the series of struggles between workers and the capitalist class which followed.
  
Selling Us Something
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Merritt Roe Smith relates that in the mid-nineteenth century the working classes spoke out against progress because it was being used as an excuse to install new machines in the factories, thus putting them out of work. They understood that it is crucial to ask the questions: Progress for whom? Who benefits? And the answer was that it wasn’t them. But at the same time that they were contesting progress in the workplace, they were eagerly buying the new products that were being produced by these new machines. By purchasing these products, not only were these people supporting the country’s economy but also actively participating in what they saw as the future. In other words, they could put aside their own individual issues and participate in the broader sense of Manifest Destiny and progress.27
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==== Annotation 4 ====
  
Technological progress is often a theme of advertising. We purchase things because they are New! Advanced! Improved! We purchase new computers because they are faster than old computers. We may also purchase a technological object because of its beauty or power (hence, part of the success of Apple computers). Look at advertisements for cars, smart phones, and home entertainment systems; they are replete with claims of new improvements, new possibilities, and awesome appearances.
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<nowiki>*</nowiki> See: ''Definition of Contradiction and Common Characteristics of Contradiction'', p. 175.  
  
Interestingly, explicit appeals to progress as a justification for buying seem to be diminishing. In fact, it would seem quaint, or old-fashioned, to defend one’s purchase of a new car as “progress.” However, Audi recently ran a television ad showing their newest vehicles as literally the latest step in human evolution, ending with the tagline: “Progress isn’t a philosophy, it’s a force of nature.” So the term still has a popular appeal. In general, however, appeals to progress and the sublime have taken a new form. We are now inclined to purchase technologies, not for a sense of the progress of civilization or for the appreciation of grandeur, but for their contemporary manifestation. The “cool,” the “neat,” the “rad,” or the “awesome” (depending on your generation) are what we think of as versions of the new mini-sublime. Think about the stores that cater to tantalizing buyers with gadgets: from the high-tech of Sky Mall catalogs to the low-tech pleasures of office-supply stores, cooking-supply stores, and hardware stores. Just think about how often, when presented with a new device, the response is simply this: “Cool!” “Neat!” “Rad!” “Awesome!”
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<nowiki>**</nowiki> In Marxism, “socialization” is simply the idea that human society transforms labor and production from a solitary, individual act into a collective, social act. In other words, as human society progresses, people “socialize” labor into increasingly complex networks of social relations: from individuals making their own tools, to agricultural societies engaged in collective farming, to modern industrial societies with factories, logistical networks, etc.  
  
Progress
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The production force is the combination of the means of production and workers within any society. The “Socialized Production Force,” therefore, is a production force which has been socialized — that is to say, a production force which has been organized into collective social activity. Under capitalism, the “Socialized Production Force” consists of the proletariat, or the working class, as well as means of production which are owned by capitalists.
  
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<nowiki>***</nowiki> Marx and Engels defined “relations of production” as the social relationships that human beings must accept in order to survive. Relations of production are, by definition, not voluntary, because human beings must enter into them in order to receive material needs in order to survive within a given society. Under capitalism, the relations of production require the working class to rent their labor to capitalists to receive wages which they need to procure material needs like food and shelter. This is an inherent contradiction because a small minority of society (the capitalist class) own the means of production while the vast majority of society (the working class) must submit to exploitation through wage servitude in order to survive.
  
In addition to the appeal of the awesome, a more considered justification for buying is frequently convenience. One might easily defend the purchase of a new car for its conveniences: air conditioning, remote starting, GPS locating, and so on. The ascendance of convenience, the topic of the next chapter, does not mean that progress is becoming passé; rather, it suggests that what constitutes progress has become closely allied with the value of convenience. While progress is still what is more, new, advanced, better, cool, neat, rad, or awesome, it is also more convenient.
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Examples of such early struggles include: the resistance of workers in Lyon, France in 1831 and 1834; the Chartist movement in Britain from 1835 to 1848; the workers’ movement in Silesia (Germany) in 1844, etc. These events prove as historical evidence that the proletariat had become an independent political force which pioneered the fight for a democratic, equal, and progressive society.
  
Judging and Controlling Others
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Civilized and Primitive: When Western European explorers first encountered the cultures of the Americas, Africa, and the South Seas, they were perplexed. These cultures were so very different from their own. The people had much less technology than the Europeans. Rather than concluding that these others were simply different and leaving it at that, Western Europeans drew on the story of progress to explain the situation.
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==== Annotation 5 ====
  
In the received view, the story of progress presents a linear view of cultural development: It moves from simple to complex, and from less technologically advanced to more technologically advanced. It also concludes that every culture must progress in this way: first because progress is universal, and second because it is divinely inspired. The assumption is that these other cultures must be at an earlier stage on the same line as Western progress. Furthermore, these cultures could be expected to progress in the same way that Europe did until they eventually reached the level of European culture. Therefore, the story goes, they were deemed primitives who would one day be civilized; the criterion by which the progress of their civilization could be measured was, predictably, the technologies they embraced.
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Here are some brief descriptions of the early working class movements mentioned above:
  
The progress narrative, then, was used to label cultures as either civilized or primitive. Those labeled primitive were considered less intelligent, less cultured, and beneath European culture. Colonization of primitives was not merely justified, it was considered a moral responsibility; for with assistance, primitives might be brought into the fold of a better, more evolved, civilized life. Hand in hand with colonization, labeling cultures primitive or civilized fed into the rise of nationalism on the one hand and on the forced technological development of cultures on the other.
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'''Resistance of Workers in Lyon, France:'''
  
Nationalism: A nation is a group of people recognized as having shared characteristics that unify them as a single entity. The group as a whole seems to have a unified identity. Beyond the less formal categories of membership or citizenship, being a member of a nation involves a shared identity and an emotional bond. For example, we may be citizens of the United States, but we might think of our nationality as American. Nationalism is devotion to one’s nation, a pride in one’s national accomplishments. Two fundamental aspects of the nation are, on the one hand, the recognition that there are thousands if not millions of others with whom you share this identity and, on the other hand, the recognition that there are millions of others who do not. Nation is not only a label indicating membership; it is
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In 1831 in France, due to heavy exploitation and hardship, textile workers in Lyon revolted to demand higher wages and shorter working hours. The rebels took control of the city for ten days. Their determination to fight is reflected in the slogan: “Live working or die fighting!”
  
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This resistance was brutally crushed by the government, which supported the factory owners. In 1834, silk mill workers in Lyon revolted again to demand the establishment of a republic. The fierce struggle went on for four days, but was extinguished in a bloody battle against the French army. About 10,000 insurgents were imprisoned or deported.
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
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'''The Chartist Movement in Britain:'''
  
a means of differentiating us from them. The progress narrative is easily used as a means to differentiate nations, particularly to denigrate some and elevate others, and levels of technology have become part of the yardstick by which to measure and compare.
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Chartism was a working class movement in the United Kingdom which rose up in response to anti-worker laws such as the Poor Law Amendment of 1834, which drove poor people into workhouses and removed other social programs for the working poor. Legislative failure to address the demands of the working poor led to a broadly popular mass movement which would go on to organize around the People’s Charter of 1838, which was a list of six demands which included extension of the vote and granting the working class the right to hold office in the House of Commons.
  
The practice of measuring the progress of nations with technology is dramatically illustrated by the great industrial expositions and world’s fairs of the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Much like the modern Olympic Games, these events were opportunities for all nations to gather peacefully with an attitude of good will to share in the best of what each nation had to offer. But also like the Olympic Games, there was competition behind the exhibition.
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In 1845, Karl Marx visited Britain for the first time, along with Friedrich Engels, to meet with the leaders of the Chartist movement (with whom Engels had already established a close relationship). After various conflicts and struggles, Chartism ultimately began to decline in 1848 as more socialist-oriented movements rose up in prominence.
  
The first major industrial exposition, and the model for those that followed, was the Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations, which opened in London in 1851. The Great Exhibition, as it was called, was held in a newly constructed building made entirely of glass and iron, which was referred to as the Crystal Palace. The Crystal Palace was an accomplishment in itself, the first building made almost entirely of prefabricated parts. Each nation was allotted a space to display inventions, innovations, machines, and the products of machines such as textiles and artwork. Because the Great Exhibition was held in London, the British claimed a good portion of the floor space for their products and those of their colonies, such as India. In a didactic move, India was placed at the center of the hall, but the selection and arrangement of the display emphasized the humble nature of the inventions, innovations, machines, and products of India. The Great Exhibition was thus an opportunity for Britain to show off its technological superiority. In addition it was an opportunity to show off its superior cultural character. While Europe before 1851 was characterized by violent revolution, Britain alone was at peace with others and with its own working classes. The Crystal Palace, dubbed in the press as “The Palace of Peace,” was meant to fuse the ideas of British national character, moral and cultural superiority, industrial superiority, and progress.28
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'''Workers’ Movement in Silesia, Germany:'''
  
Other international expositions followed: 1853 in New York; 1867 in Paris; the Centennial Exposition in 1876 in Philadelphia; and 1889 in Paris, for which the Eiffel Tower was built. However, the strongest assertion of the technological-progress story occurred at the Chicago World’s Fair in 1933. The fair’s guidebook stated: “Science discovers, genius invents, industry applies, and man adapts himself to, or is moulded by, new things.” It summarized: “Science finds—Industry applies—Man conforms.”29 Across the varied exhibits of the fair were similar statements, reinforcing not only a belief in technological determinism, that is, a belief that technology drives culture, but a belief in technological progress, that is, a belief that technology drives civilization. The superiority of nations had become a matter of fusing technology, progress, national character, and moral character.
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In June, 1844, disturbances and riots occurred in the Prussian province of Silesia, a major center of textile manufacturing. In response, the Prussian army was called upon to restore order in the region. In a confrontation between the weavers and troops, shots were fired into the crowd, killing 11 protesters and wounding many others. The leaders of the disturbances were arrested, flogged, and imprisoned. This event has gained enormous significance in the history of the German labor movement.
  
Development: The story of technological progress was not just used for national self-aggrandizement. According to the linear view of progress, these other, primitive cultures would eventually progress or develop to the levels
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In particular, Karl Marx regarded the uprising as evidence of the birth of a German workers’ movement. The weavers’ rebellion served as an important symbol for later generations concerned with poverty and oppression of the working class in German society.
  
Progress
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It quickly became apparent that the revolutionary practice of the proletariat needed the guidance of scientific theories. The birth of Marxism was to meet that objective requirement; in the meantime, the revolutionary practice itself became the practical premise for Marxism to continuously develop.
  
O 27
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''- Theoretical Premises''
  
of the industrialized countries. So why not help them along? Working under the assumption that all nations inevitably will become technologized (and want to become technologized), Westerners advanced the idea that these countries could be helped by being given or loaned advanced technologies. More technology would help these nations “leap-frog” over the intervening stages of technological development, contribute to cultural progress, and render them civilized sooner. “Development” is the term that was widely used to describe this process.
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The birth of Marxism not only resulted from the objective requirement of history, it was also the result of inheriting the ''quintessence''* of various previously established frameworks of human philosophical theory such as German classical philosophy, British classical political economics, and utopianism in France and Britain.
  
The term development has much in common with the term progress. Like progress, development assumes a constant move forward toward some goal. For example, one develops into something: a boy into a man, a kitten into a cat, a pupa into a butterfly. However, the meaning of development carries with it a stronger sense of inevitability than progress. We can label the stages of development— infant, child, adolescent, adult—and be pretty certain that each person will move though these stages toward the inevitable conclusion. When this idea was applied to nations, each was depicted as located at a particular stage of development: some were developed, some were less developed, and some were undeveloped—the so-called Third World. European and North American programs designed to help nations develop were based on the assumption that all less- and undeveloped countries would eventually look like the countries of Europe or North America, and that they would want to. This is an egocentric assumption, at best.
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Large development programs were put into place worldwide in the midtwentieth century. For example, India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, in the late 1940s and 1950s, tied his ideas of nationalist development to that of technological development, especially that of large scale projects like dams, electrification schemes, and agricultural programs. Such projects, implemented across the Third World in the 1950s and 1960s, were put in place with little regard for local cultures or social norms. Some were successful, but many were not. Across the board, however, the most prevalent result of these programs was the plunging of the Third World into incredible debt. In addition, when traditional farming practices were replaced with industrial farming practices that focused on cash crops for export—such as cotton, coffee, or bananas—many countries found it difficult to feed their own people. As a result, these countries became dependent on the West for food, resources, and technical know-how. The progress story thus discriminates among different cultures, promotes a particular version of technological development for those “less civilized,” and generates problematic dependencies among nations.
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==== Annotation 6 ====
  
Because of these problems and resulting dependencies, the term development has acquired strong negative connotations. For many, the failings of development result from its top-down approach, where decisions are made by an elite at the top of a nation’s social hierarchy, or by a few technical experts from an industrialized country, and then imposed on the rest of the population without their input or consent. More recently, there has been a move to rehabilitate the term development by presenting a grassroots model of development, in which technological and cultural change is instigated at a local level with local input and consent. The
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<nowiki>*</nowiki> In the original Vietnamese, the word ''tinh'' ''hoa'' is used, which we roughly translate to the word ''quintessence'' throughout this book. Literally, it means “the best, highest, most beautiful, defining characteristics” of a concept, and, unlike the English word ''quintessence'', it has an exclusively positive connotation. ''Quintessence'' should not be confused with the universal category of ''Essence'', which is discussed on p. 156.  
  
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German classical philosophy, especially the philosophies of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel<ref>Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 1770 — 1831 (German): Philosophy professor, an objective idealistic philosopher — representative of German classical philosophy.</ref> and Ludwig Feuerbach<ref>Ludwig Feuerbach, 1804 — 1872 (German): Philosophy professor, materialist philosopher.</ref>, had deeply influenced the formation of the Marxist worldview and philosophical methodology.
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
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grassroots model of development seeks to distance itself from the progress model, in that the final shape and character of a nation would be determined internally and not by the external imperative of technology. The grassroots model seeks to do away with the predetermined outcome of development and substitutes moral or cultural criteria, in addition to technological criteria such as efficiency, to point in a direction of desired development.30
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==== Annotation 7 ====
  
Politics: We have seen in the discussion above how the technological progress narrative is used in international politics, but it is also used to influence politics within a nation. When people are willing to believe that technology drives progress and that technological change is inevitable and good, people are more willing to accept the advice of the experts, that is, the technologists who claim to know how technological change is accomplished.31 People become geared to expect and accept technological change. When, in addition, technological progress is seen as inevitable, there is no need to shape or guide science and technology. Major technological decisions become mere technical matters that do not demand or justify the consultation of nonexperts. Consequently, the technological progress story has been used to promote more authoritarian and technocratic decision making and to suppress democratic decision making. We will return to the ideas of technological politics later on in this book, but it is important to emphasize here that when someone begins to discuss progress, the political and cultural implications are likely to be significant and controversial.
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German classical philosophy was a movement of ''idealist'' philosophers of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Idealism is a philosophical position that holds that the only reliable experience of reality occurs within the human consciousness. Idealists believe that human reason is the best way to seek truth, and that consciousness is thus the only reliable source of knowledge and information.
  
New Technology Equals Progress: To Question This Is Heresy
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One of Hegel’s important achievements was his critique of the metaphysical method.
  
“Technological progress,” a term that equates the development of new technology with progress, is a powerful term with quasi-religious undertones. It should be clear how important this concept has been in the formation of the national identities of those who live in the United States, and to a considerable degree in all Western industrialized countries. However, by now it should be abundantly clear that there are serious problems with the idea of progress, especially when equated to technological development.
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The term “heresy” refers to ideas or beliefs that are held in opposition to widely held, dominant beliefs of religious or quasi-religious importance. It is a powerful term: people deemed heretics have been variously burned at the stake, excommunicated, ostracized, or vilified. It is unfortunately true that in contemporary culture, ideas that are depicted as resisting progress are dismissed with scorn, and people who propose alternatives to blind adherence to the progress narrative are vilified as standing in the way of progress. Even more extreme, as David Noble has pointed out, it is very nearly a heretical act just to question the equation of technological development with progress.32 It is almost as if it is un-American, destructive, backwards, and dangerous to even ask: Is the development of new technology necessarily progress? Perhaps this is because to do so invariably raises questions about how structures of power work, how our sense of identity ties us
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==== Annotation 8 ====
  
Progress
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Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy that attempts to explain the fundamental nature of reality by classifying things, phenomena, and ideas into various categories. Metaphysical philosophy has taken many forms through the centuries, but one common shortcoming of metaphysical thought is a tendency to view things and ideas in a static, abstract manner. Metaphysical positions view nature as a collection of objects and phenomena which are isolated from one another and fundamentally unchanging. Engels explained the problems of metaphysics in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
  
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<blockquote>
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The analysis of Nature into its individual parts, the grouping of the different natural processes and objects in definite classes, the study of the internal anatomy of organized bodies in their manifold forms — hese were the fundamental conditions of the gigantic strides in our knowledge of Nature that have been made during the last 400 years.
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</blockquote>
  
emotionally to these same structures, what the national and international implications of this power are, who benefits from technological development and who does not, and whether the implied assumption of the “good life” is a desirable one. But question we must.
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<blockquote>
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But this method of work has also left us as legacy the habit of observing natural objects and processes in isolation, apart from their connection with the vast whole; of observing them in repose, not in motion; as constraints, not as essentially variables; in their death, not in their life. And when this way of looking at things was transferred by Bacon and Locke from natural science to philosophy, it begot the narrow, metaphysical mode of thought peculiar to the last century.
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</blockquote>
  
To understand the power of the equation that new technology equals progress, there are two compelling questions that merit asking any time the progress story is aired. We end this chapter by posing these two questions: Progress for whom? And progress for what?
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Francis Bacon (1561 — 1626) is considered the father of empiricism, which is the belief that knowledge can only be derived from human sensory experience [see Annotation 10, p. 10]. Bacon argued that scientific knowledge could only be derived through inductive reasoning in which specific observations are used to form general conclusions. John Locke (1632 — 1704) was another early empiricist, who was heavily influenced by Francis Bacon. Locke, too, was an empiricist, and is considered to be the “father of liberalism.
  
Progress for Whom?
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Engels was highly critical of the application of metaphysical philosophy to natural science. As Engels continues in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:''
  
Who really benefits if we believe the story of technological progress as it has been told to us? The answer to this question will vary depending on circumstances, but most often those who benefit are those who control the technologies or who make a direct profit from their use. The story provides popular support (more powerful than advertisers could ever hope to achieve) for the projects of science, technology, and industry. When the railroad was the symbol of progress, the railroad business was booming and fortunes were made. When electricity was the symbol of progress and projects like Hoover Dam and Tennessee Valley Authority were begun, power companies reaped the benefits.
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<blockquote>
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To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes — ideas — are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses... For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other.
  
Also, apart from the idea of direct benefit (power and profit), progress favors some sections of the population over others. If a computer is a mark of progress, those with the resources to own and operate the newest computers benefit. However, those without access to the newest technologies are shut out, unable to benefit from or share in the vision of the good life.
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At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things, it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees.
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</blockquote>
  
We also have to keep in mind that progress for some may mean a burden for others. For example, for some it may seem like progress that so much more and new information can be processed and accessed by computers. But how does all that information get there? Low-paying, grueling data-entry work is the price some pay in order for others to progress. And what of the secretarial jobs that are lost because every boss now has his or her own capacity to compute? What work remains open for those displaced secretaries? Data entry perhaps? Online customer service? And what of the less-developed nations where increasingly data entry and customer service are being outsourced? For many of these countries development has come to mean producing sophisticated technologies and products as well as services (such as data entry and customer service) for consumption in the developed nations. Thus, the menial, low-paying work of many people in the world in often horrifying conditions supports much of the technological progress enjoyed by others.
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Dialectical Materialism stands in contrast to metaphysics in many ways. Rather than splitting the world into distinct, isolated categories, Dialectical Materialist philosophy seeks to view the world in terms of relationships, motion, and change. Dialectical Materialism also refutes the hard empiricism of Bacon and Locke by describing a dialectical relationship between the material world and consciousness [see: ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88].
  
Call center work, for example, is often highly scripted, culturally sensitive (workers in India must perfect American accents and use American vernacular), emotionally taxing (this is the affective labor of managing a customer’s emotions), and physically demanding (since workers have to work night shifts to be up when customers in different time zones on the other side of the globe are up).33 This type of labor has been called immaterial labor in that it is not about making material products but providing services to others. But conditions for more traditional
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30 O
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For the first time in the history of human philosophy, Hegel expressed the content of dialectics in strict arguments with a system of rules and categories.
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
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material labor can be much, much worse. The New York Times recently set out the appalling worker conditions at electronics factories in China, like Foxconn where many Apple products are manufactured.34 Ironically for a factory that produces products with touch screens, the loss of fingertips is a common workplace injury. More serious, however, was the rash of suicides in 2010 (at least seventeen in eight months) at a Foxconn factory that brought factory conditions to international attention: substandard pay, crowded housing, and brutal, repetitive Taylorist work expectations (e.g., a worker installing 5,800 small screws a day).35 Much of this labor is unskilled and unautomated, despite the high tech nature of the product, so workers can easily be replaced if they fall behind or complain. In what sense is this progress? It is thus always critical to assess who benefits from the progress narrative and who does not.
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Progress for What?
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==== Annotation 9 ====
  
It is also critical to assess the typically unexamined goals implied by the progress narrative and reassess them. What is the implied concept of the “good life” being promoted? To that end it is insufficient to simply return to the Jeffersonian balance of material and moral progress, or Emerson’s choice between works and days. In addition, we ought to seek out other goals that enlarge the range of options from which to choose. Such goals might focus on democracy, community, sustainability, conviviality, spirituality, and so on. We will address some of these goals later in this book, but suffice it to say here that as we change our goals, technology’s role in culture changes. It is possible—perhaps necessary—to devise different ways of assessing progress.
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Dialectics is a philosophical methodology which searches for truth by examining contradictions and relationships between things, objects, and ideas. Ancient dialecticians such as Aristotle and Socrates explored dialectics primarily through rhetorical discourse between two or more different points of view about a subject with the intention of finding truth.
  
Take, for example, a passage from Raymond Williams, writing in response to literary critics who dismiss the Industrial Revolution and valorize a romanticized agrarian past. Williams says that “at home we were glad of the Industrial Revolution, and of its consequent social and political changes” because the Industrial Revolution gave them, the agrarian working class, “one gift that was overriding, one gift which at any price we would take, the gift of power that is everything to men who have worked with their hands.” In the passage that follows, note how Williams uses the term, progress.
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In this classical form of dialectics, a thesis is presented. This thesis is an opening argument about the subject at hand. An antithesis, or counter-argument, is then presented. Finally, the thesis and antithesis are combined into a synthesis, which is an improvement on both the thesis and antithesis which brings us closer to truth.
  
It was slow in coming to us, in all its effects, but steam power, the petrol engine, electricity, these and their host of products in commodities and services, we took as quickly as we could get them, and were glad. I have seen all these things being used, and I have seen the things they have replaced. I will not listen with patience to any acid listing of them—you know the sneer you can get into plumbing, baby Austins, aspirin, contraceptives, canned food. But I say to these Pharisees: dirty water, an earth bucket, a four-mile walk each way to work, headaches, broken women, hunger and monotony of diet. The working people, in town and country alike, will not listen (and I support them) to any account of our society which supposed that these things are not progress: not just mechanical, external progress either, but a real service of life. Moreover, in the new conditions, there was more real freedom to dispose of our lives, more real personal grasp where it mattered, more real say. Any account of our culture which explicitly or implicitly denies the value of an industrial society is really irrelevant: not in a million years would you make us give up this power.36
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Hegel resurrected dialectics to the forefront of philosophical inquiry for the German Idealists. As Engels wrote in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
  
Progress
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<blockquote>
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Hegel’s work’s greatest merit was the taking up again of dialectics as the highest form of reasoning. The old Greek philosophers were all born natural dialecticians, and Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic of them, had already analyzed the most essential forms of dialectic thought.
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</blockquote>
  
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Hegel’s great contribution to dialectics was to develop dialectics from a simple method of examining truth based on discourse into an organized, systematic model of nature and of history. Unfortunately, Hegel’s dialectics were idealist in nature. Hegel believed that the ideal served as the primary basis of reality. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels strongly rejected Hegel’s idealism, as well as the strong influences of Christian theology on Hegel’s work, but they also saw great potential in his system of dialectics, as Marx explained in ''Capital (Volume 1)'':
  
Progress in this passage is accompanied by explicit values: “a real service of life.” There is political freedom and change in life conditions. This, for us as well, is real progress, not as rhetoric, but as careful measure of quality of life. The problem comes when the “careful measure” of the real quality of real people’s lives is abandoned in favor of the unexamined affective power of the language of progress that can be used to degrade that very same quality of life.
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<blockquote>
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The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.
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</blockquote>
  
Although the progress narrative is alive and well in cultural practice and imagination—particularly in the form of the “cool,”the “neat,” the “rad,” and the “awesome”—progress no longer seems to be the term of choice when thoughtfully justifying technological decisions. It is still used to dismiss troublesome thoughts about technological decisions, as in “well, that’s progress,” usually accompanied by a shrug and a sense of irony. But it is less likely to be used as an explicit reason for explaining technological decisions such as purchasing a new technology. For example, we aren’t likely to justify the decision to purchase a cell phone by saying, “I bought a cell phone; that’s progress!” The term used this way sounds more than a bit old-fashioned. Far more likely is the justification, “I bought a smart phone; it’s awesome!” However, augmenting “progress,” and to some degree supplanting it, the term “convenience” incorporates and in some ways refines the notion of progress. It makes good contemporary sense to justify, say, the expense of buying a smart phone by saying “I bought it because it’s really convenient.” We turn then in the next chapter to the concept of convenience to explore its story and its role in technological culture.
 
  
Figure 7: Cafetière Vesuviana
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Source: Photography by Coyau, 2012, Wikimedia Commons:
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Starting with a critique of the mysterious idealism of Hegel’s philosophy, Marx and Engels inherited the “rational kernel” of Hegelian dialectics and successfully built materialist dialectics.
  
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cafetière_Vesuviana_04.jpg
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Chapter Three
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Convenience
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==== Annotation 10 ====
  
Convenience Is Another Story
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In order to understand the ways in which the critique of Hegel’s philosophy by Marx and Engels led to the development of dialectical materialism, some background information on materialism — and the conflicts between idealist and materialist philosophy in the era of Marx and Engels — is needed.
  
THE SCENE: A BEAUTIFUL SUMMER DAY in a suburb with neatly
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Materialism is a philosophical position that holds that the material world exists outside of the mind, and that human ideas and thoughts stem from observation and sensory experience of this external world. Materialism rejects the idealist notion that truth can only be sought through reasoning and human consciousness. The history and development of both idealism and materialism are discussed more in the section ''The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues'' on page 48.
  
clipped hedges and grass, lots of houses close together, and no sign of people. Focus: a house with an automobile parked on a blacktop driveway. A woman emerges from the front door, walks over to the automobile, and gets in. Quickly she backs the automobile out of the driveway, drives about ten feet to the mailbox, reaches out, gets her mail, backs up, pulls back in the driveway, gets out, and returns to her house. End of scene.
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In the era of Marx and Engels, the leading philosophical school of materialism was known as ''empiricism''. Empiricism holds that we can ''only'' obtain knowledge through human sense perception. Marx and Engels were materialists, but they rejected empiricism (see Engels’ critique of empiricism in Annotation 8, p. 8).
  
This vignette, from the cult film The Gods Must Be Crazy, never fails to draw laughs.1 Why, you are meant to wonder, didn’t she just walk to the mailbox? It might have taken a bit more time to walk to the mailbox and back, but it might actually have taken less! Present in the laughter is recognition. People in the audience invariably recognize the woman’s acts as representing their own. They see in her actions their own habitual uses of technology. Why drive the automobile to the mailbox? The answer is simple: because it is more convenient. It keeps her from having to exert energy. It allows her to move faster. It makes covering distance, however short, faster. The automobile makes life easier, and that is what it is supposed to do. Why walk when you don’t have to? Furthermore, convenience has become habit. When most people have to go somewhere they habitually choose some form of mechanical transportation: private automobiles, taxis, busses, subways, airplanes, maybe a limo if they are lucky.
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One reason Marx and Engels opposed the strict empiricist view was that it made materialism vulnerable to attack from idealists, because it ignored objective relations and knowledge that went beyond sense data. The empiricist point of view also provided the basis for the ''subjective idealism'' of George Berkeley [see Annotation 32, p. 27] and the ''skepticism'' of David Hume. Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism is empiricist in that it supports the idea that humans can only discover knowledge through direct sense experience. Therefore, Berkeley argues, individuals are unable to obtain any real knowledge about abstract concepts such as “matter.
  
Is driving to the mailbox progress? The story of progress, as we discussed in the previous chapter, offers some explanation for choosing to drive to the mailbox rather than walk. Technologies are developed to do things for you that you might otherwise have to do for yourself, and that’s progress. But to raise once again the difficult question we raised in the previous chapter, does it make life better? Is life better if you can take the car to the mailbox rather than walk? Many people would argue that it’s not. People in the medical professions might say that you need that walk, because life is better when you exercise properly. Environmentalists might
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Similarly, David Hume’s radical skepticism, which Engels called “agnosticism,” denied the possibility of possessing any concrete knowledge. As Hume wrote in ''A Treatise on Human Nature'': “I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another.” Hume’s radical skepticism lay in his empiricist belief that the only source of knowledge is sense experience; but Hume went a step further, doubting that even sense experience could be reliable, adding: “The essence and composition of external bodies are so obscure, that we mustnecessarily, in our reasonings, or rather conjectures concerning them, involveourselves in contradictions and absurdities.
  
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Later, in the appendix of the same text, Hume argues that conscious reasoning suffers from the same unreliability: “I had entertained some hopes (that) the intellectual world ... would be free from those contradictions, and absurdities, whichseem to attend every explication, that human reason can give of the material world.”
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
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Engels dismissed radical skepticism as “scientifically a regression and practically merely a shamefaced way of surreptitiously accepting materialism, while denying it before the world.” Engels directly refutes radical skepticism in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:''
  
say that you should walk, because life is better when you don’t let automobiles use up non-renewable resources, produce harmful emissions, and contribute to global climate change. Psychologists might say that you need that walk, because life is better when you take the time to slow down and engage the world. Community activists might say that you need that walk, because life is better when you meet and interact with neighbors. If you grant credence to just some of these arguments, driving to the mailbox cannot be explained solely in terms of progress. There is clearly more to your relationship with technology than the story of progress alone can account for. At least part of the relationship has to do with a deeply-felt, but largely unexamined commitment to convenience.
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... how do we know that our senses give us correct representations of the objects we perceive through them? ... whenever we speak of objects, or their qualities, of which (we) cannot know anything for certain, but merely the impressions which they have produced on (our) senses. Now, this line of reasoning seems undoubtedly hard to beat by mere argumentation. But before there was argumentation, there was action... And human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we turn to our own use these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perception.
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</blockquote>
  
The value and practice of convenience, the story of the desire for and attainment of comfort and ease, is another story that plays an important role in technological culture. In some ways the commitment to convenience contributes to the story of progress. But because convenience tells its own story, it can also undermine progress. Progress is a grand and formal story that accompanies feelings about big events; like the feelings of pride accompanying the announcement of the human genome sequence in June 2000. But convenience is a mundane story, an everyday, garden-variety warrant for decisions involving technology at its most banal. Convenience, more often than not, is the everyday motivation that justifies ongoing choices involving the role of technology in everyday life. The woman drives to the mailbox, not because it is progress to do so, but because it is convenient. The importance of this story in everyday life obliges us to take a closer look at the meaning and practice of convenience.
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This concept of determining the truth of knowledge and perception through practical experience is fundamental to dialectical materialist philosophy and the methodology of materialist dialectics, and is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3, p. 204.
  
What Is Convenience?
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Another weakness of empiricism is that it denies the objectiveness of ''social relations'', which cannot be fully and properly analyzed through sensory experience and observation alone. Marx saw that social relations are, indeed, objective in nature and can be understood despite their lack of sensory observability, and that doing so is vital in comprehending subjects such as political economy, as he observes in ''Capital Volume I'':
  
Convenience, like progress, parades itself initially in fairly uncomplicated dress. The story goes like this: Technologies make life better because they make life more convenient; that is, they save time, conquer space, and create comfort. Technologies perform tasks we might otherwise have to do for ourselves. They relieve us from drudgery, labor, and physical exertion. They make it easier to go to more places faster. They minimize the everyday struggles that were commonplace for our ancestors. In all, they make life easier.
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(The true) reality of the value of commodities contrasts with the gross material reality of these same commodities (the reality of which is perceived by our bodily senses) in that not an atom of matter enters into the reality of value. We may twist and turn a commodity this way and that — as a thing of value it still remains unappreciable by our bodily senses.
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</blockquote>
  
There is, however, much more to the story. Thomas F. Tierney, in The Value of Convenience: A Genealogy of Technical Culture, lays out a richer, more complex version of the story of convenience.2 He argues that the desire for ease, what he calls the value of convenience, is integral to understanding the modern self and modern technological culture.
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In other words, Marx pointed out that no amount of sense data about a commodity will fully explain its value. One can know the size, weight, hardness, etc., of a commodity, but without analyzing the social relations and other aspects of the commodity which can’t be directly observed with the senses, one can never know or understand the true value of the commodity. The materialism of Marx and Engels acknowledges the physical, material world as the ''first basis'' for reality, but Marx and Engels also understood that it was vital to account for other aspects of rational knowledge (such as social relations). Marx and Engels believed that empiricist materialism had roughly the same flaw as idealism: a lack of a connection between the material and consciousness. While the idealists completely dismissed sense data and relied exclusively on reasoning and consciousness, the empiricists dismissed conscious thought to focus solely on what could be sensed.
  
As Tierney explains, convenience in and of itself is not undesirable. Indeed, it can be quite liberating, and it accounts for many of the improvements in the quality of life that characterize the contemporary world. Raymond Williams’s impatience with those who would minimize the contributions of industrial technologies, discussed in the previous chapter, speaks to the very real improvements made in people’s lives by technologies of convenience. However, convenience becomes a problem when the value of convenience and the desire to achieve convenience come
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It is important to note that, while Marx and Engels rejected ''empiricism,'' they did not reject ''empirical knowledge'' nor ''empirical data'' which is collected from scientific observation [see Annotation 216, p. 210]. On the contrary, empirical data was key to the works of Marx and Engels in developing dialectical materialism. As Lenin explained: “(Marx) took one of the economic formations of society – the system of commodity production – and on the basis of a vast mass of data which he studied for not less than twenty-five years gave a most detailed analysis of the laws governing this formation and its development.” And so, the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels served to bridge the gap between idealism and materialism. They believed that our conscious thoughts are derived from ''material'' processes, but that consciousness can also influence the material world. This is discussed in more detail in the section ''“Materialism and Dialectical Materialism”'' on page 48.
  
Convenience
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Marx and Engels also criticized many limitations of Feuerbach’s methodology and viewpoint* — especially Feuerbach’s prescriptions for how to deal with social problems — but they also highly appreciated the role of Feuerbach’s thought in the fight against idealism and religion to assert that nature comes first, and that nature is permanent and independent from human willpower.
  
to dominate technological culture. Far from being merely liberating, the effects of the quest for convenience have had widespread and disturbing effects.
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The modern dominance of the value of convenience is related to a significant shift in the meaning of convenience. Convenient, before the seventeenth century, meant that something was in accordance with, in agreement with, suitable or appropriate to a given situation or circumstance. It also meant something was morally appropriate.3 A convenience would thus have been something that was suitable. If something fit the circumstances, it was convenient. For example, serious winter clothing for those living in the Far North is a convenience. A board of just the right size, used to suit the requirements of a building project, is a convenience.
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==== Annotation 11 ====
  
This notion of suitability differs dramatically from our contemporary notion of convenience. The contemporary meaning of convenience continues to denote a sense of suitability but radically redefines its connotations. Now something is convenient only if it is suitable to one’s personal comfort or ease. A dictionary definition indicates that agreement, harmony, and congruity are obsolete definitions. Suitability heads the list of definitions, buts its meaning shifts—modified by additional definitions—to insist on personal ease and comfort. Those definitions include:
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<nowiki>*</nowiki> Viewpoint, point of view, or perspective, is the starting point of analysis which determines the direction of thinking from which problems are considered. Marx and Engels were critical of Feurbach’s hyper-focused ''humanist'' viewpoint.  
  
fitness or suitability for performing some action or fulfilling some requirement...a favorable or advantageous condition, state, or circumstance...something that provides comfort or advantage: something suited to one’s material wants...an arrangement, appliance, device, material, or service conducive to personal ease or comfort...freedom from difficulty, discomfort, or trouble.4
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Feuerbach’s atheism and materialism offered an important foundation for Marx and Engels to develop from an idealist worldview into a materialist worldview, which led them directly to developing the philosophical foundation of communism.
  
Personal comfort obviously plays a crucial role in the connotations of convenience, and the meaning of comfort has shifted along with the meaning of convenience. Tierney points out that, before the fifteenth century, comfort referred to strength and support. To comfort, “meant to support, strengthen, or bolster, in either a physical or mental sense.” In the fifteenth century, comfort also began to mean removing pain or physical discomfort. But by the nineteenth century, comfort came to mean “a state of physical and material well-being, with freedom from pain and trouble, and satisfaction of bodily needs.”5 To be comfortable, to experience ease and convenience, one must thus be free from pain and trouble and have all bodily needs satisfied. This is the current expectation most people have of technologies: Make us comfortable. Make life easy. Make life pain and trouble free. Meet all bodily needs. This last point, satisfying bodily needs, is crucial for Tierney, for whom understanding the changing nature of bodily needs is key to understanding the uniqueness of the contemporary role of technology.
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Convenience and the Body: From Meeting the Demands of the Body to Overcoming the Limits of the Body
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==== Annotation 12 ====
  
The changing meanings of convenience and comfort correspond to significant changes in the way people relate to their bodies. Tierney argues that between
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Ludwig Feuerbach was one of the “Young Hegelians” who adapted and developed the ideals of Hegel and other German Idealists. Feuerbach was a humanist materialist: he focused on humans and human nature and the role of humans in the material world. Like Marx and Engels, Feuerbach dismissed the religious mysticism of Hegel. Importantly, Feuerbach broke from Hegel’s religious-mystical belief that humans descended from supernatural origins, instead describing humans as originating from the natural, material world.
  
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Feuerbach also distinguished between the objectivity of the material external world and the subjectivity of human conscious thought, and he drew a distinction between external reality as it really exists and external reality as humans perceive it. Feuerbach believed that human nature was rooted in specific, intrinsic human attributes and activities. As Feuerbach explains in ''The Essence of Christianity'': “What, then, is the nature of man, of which he is conscious, or what constitutes the specific distinction, the proper humanity of man? Reason, Will, Affection.”
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
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Feuerbach explained that the actions of “thinking, willing, and loving,” which correspond to the essential characteristics of “reason, will, and love,” are what define humanity, continuing: “Reason, Will, Love, are not powers which man possesses, for he is nothing without them, he is what he is only by them; they are the constituent elements of his nature, which he neither has nor makes, the animating, determining, governing powers — divine, absolute powers — to which he can oppose no resistance.”
  
the time of the ancient Greeks and the present, the perception of what the body needs has changed dramatically. The ancient Greek household—made up of the Greek male citizen, wife, children, animals, and slaves—was organized to produce what was necessary for survival. The body made certain demands—for shelter, food, clothing, water, and so on—and it was the task of the household to meet, or satisfy, those demands. Because Greek male citizens participated in the life of the polis—the political arena that has come down to us as characterizing Greek life—some scholars have suggested that they did not participate much in or value the life of the household. However, the evidence, according to Tierney, points to the fact that even the male citizens placed great value on performing the activities of the household and meeting the demands of the body.
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In his ''Collected Works'', Feuerbach further explains that materialism is supported by the fact that nature predates human consciousness:
  
Tierney contrasts this Greek value of meeting the demands of the body with the contemporary value of overcoming the limits of the body. Where the Greek body was seen as making demands, the contemporary body is seen as having limits. Where the Greek body was more or less a given with certain requirements, the contemporary body presents problems that need to be overcome. If we think of our bodies as having limits, we see them as lacking something, as having limitations, as falling short, as having problems that demand solutions. Our bodies get tired and sore, they can’t be in two places at one time, they don’t move very fast, they break down, they age, and ultimately they die. Clearly Greek bodies did this too, but the difference, according to Tierney, is that the Greeks viewed this as a simple fact of the body, whereas we view this as a problem. If having these limits is a problem, then we take it as our destiny to solve the problem. We do this by attempting to overcome the limits. We strive to find ways to not get tired and sore, to be in two places at one time, to move faster, to not break down, not age, and ultimately, to not die. And we strive to do this conveniently, that is, without pain or discomfort, without unnecessary exertion.
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<blockquote>
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Natural science, at least in its present state, necessarily leads us back to a point when the conditions for human existence were still absent, when nature, i.e., the earth, was not yet an object of the human eye and mind, when, consequently, nature was an absolutely non-human entity (''absolut'' ''unmenschliches Wesen''). Idealism may retort: but nature also is something thought of by you (''von dir gedachte''). Certainly, but from this it does not follow that this nature did not at one time actually exist, just as from the fact that Socrates and Plato do not exist for me if I do not think of them, it does not follow that Socrates and Plato did not actually at one time exist without me.
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</blockquote>
  
The interesting thing about limits is that once you conceive of the body as having limits to overcome, you are doomed to never be able to overcome them. Why? Because once you overcome a limit you automatically establish a new limit. Overcome the next one and you automatically establish another. A limit, like the horizon, always lurks out there before you, no matter what you accomplish. Take sports records as an example. Once people thought that no human being could run the mile in less than four minutes. That was the limit. Roger Bannister overcame that limit in 1954. Bannister’s new record of 3 minutes 59.4 seconds was then broken by John Landy, also in 1954. Landy’s new record of 3 minutes 58 seconds was also eventually broken. Currently, top male runners regularly run the mile in less than 3 minutes 50 seconds, and the record as we write is 3:34.13 (note its measurements in the tenths of a second) set by Hicham El Guerrouj in 1999. Whatever the present record, runners are out there still trying to overcome it. The current record is nothing more than a limit horizon taunting runners to overcome their imperfect bodies and exceed the limit. Once they do, however, the limit horizon will merely move its location a little further down the road and continue to taunt runners for their limitations. Whereas the Greeks satisfied bodily demands by careful household planning, we rely heavily on the development and use of
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Marx and Engels were heavily influenced by Feuerbach’s materialism, but they took issue with Feuerbach’s sharp focus on human attributes and activities in isolation from the external material world. As Marx wrote in ''Theses on Feuerbach:'' “The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that... reality... is conceived only in the form of the object... but not as sensuous human activity.
  
Convenience
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“Sensuous human activity” has a very specific meaning to Marx; it grew from two conflicting schools of thought:
  
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The idealists believed the external world can only be understood through the ''active'' subjective thought processes of human beings, while the empiricist materialists believed that human beings are ''passive'' subjects of the material world. Marx synthesized these contradicting ideas into what he called “sensuous activity,” which balanced idealist and materialist philosophical concepts.
  
technologies to overcome bodily limits. In the case of running faster, more advanced training technologies, new high-tech shoes, new high-tech running clothes, or new pharmaceuticals might be just the ticket to push past that limit. Records are meant to be broken. Limits are meant to be overcome. New technologies promise to overcome the receding limit horizon.
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According to Marx, humans are simultaneously ''active'' in the world in the sense that our conscious activity can transform the world, and ''passive'' in the sense that all human thoughts fundamentally derive from observation and sense experience of the material world (see Chapter 2, p. 53). So, Marx and Engels believed that Feuerbach was misguided in defining human nature by our traits alone, portraying “the essence of man” as isolated from the material world and from social relations. In addition, Feuerbach’s humanism was based on an abstract, ideal version of human beings, whereas the humanism of Marx and Engels is firmly rooted in the reality of “real men living real lives.” As Engels wrote in ''Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'':
  
According to Tierney, the desire to overcome bodily limits has taken two forms primarily: the desire to overcome the limits of space and the desire to overcome the limits of time. The two are closely connected, though not identical. On the one hand, we have become increasingly frustrated with the limitations of our bodies to take us further than we have already been in a more convenient fashion (a limit of space). On the other hand, we have become increasingly frustrated with the limitations of our bodies to get us to all those places more quickly than we have been able to in a more convenient fashion (a limit of time).
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<blockquote>
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He (Feuerbach) clings fiercely to nature and man; but nature and man remain mere words with him. He is incapable of telling us anything definite either about real nature or real men. But from the abstract man of Feuerbach, one arrives at real living men only when one considers them as participants in history... The cult of abstract man, which formed the kernel of Feuerbach’s new religion, had to be replaced by the science of real men and of their historical development. This further development of Feuerbach’s standpoint beyond Feuerbach was inaugurated by Marx in 1845 in ''The Holy Family''.<ref>''The Holy Family'' is a book co-written by Marx and Engels which critiqued the Young Hegelians, including Feuerbach.</ref>
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</blockquote>
  
Because we make space a problem, we continue to develop modes of transportation that originally were designed to exceed the limit of how far a person could walk or run in a day or a season. Now, however, the limit horizon demands that we develop technologies to take us beyond the limits of outer space. We routinely expect our transportation technologies to make it easier and more comfortable to take a quick weekend vacation on the other side of the continent, or the other side of the world. Business travel often requires people to be in one city in the morning, another in the afternoon, and perhaps a third by nightfall.
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Marx and Engels believed that human nature could only be understood by examining the reality of actual humans in the real world through our relationships with each other, with nature, and with the external material world. Importantly, it was Marx’s critique of Feuerbach which led him to define political action as the key pursuit of philosophy with these immortal words from ''Theses on Feuerbach:'' “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.
  
Because we make time a problem, we continue to develop technologies to get us to those places faster. Since time spent traveling is a bodily inconvenience and contemporary life demands that we get to places and back again in a limited amount of time, we have to be able to go and return quickly. Those quick weekends on the other side of the continent or world are only possible if we can do it in a weekend. We’ve got to be back to work on Monday, after all! Perhaps one of the most resistant time-related limits to the human body is the need for sleep and the “waste” of all that time. So it is not surprising, as Jonathan Crary documents in his book, 24/7, that there are ongoing efforts to develop (pharmaceutical) technologies that eliminate the need for sleep. It is also the case that, as humans have pushed the limit of available time back, we have adapted to living with less sleep: from ten hours in the early twentieth century, to eight hours, and currently to approximately six and a half.6
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Another limit we must contend with is one that clearly combines the limits of time and space: the need to be physically present at a particular place at a particular time. Routinely, we expect our communication technologies to make it easier and more comfortable to stay in touch with any other person or place we can imagine, regardless of where we or they might be: the bath, the car, the swimming pool, the jungle, the mountaintop, or the space station. The challenge for new technologies is to collapse space and time so that the communicator/traveler can be everywhere at once without exertion. We have come to place a high value on being somewhere without having to go there. You can sit in the comfort of your chair and go to the Library of Congress to look up a book, or go to the AfriCam web site and check out the animals at your favorite watering hole in Africa. You
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The British classical political economics, represented by such economists as Adam Smith<ref>Adam Smith, 1723 — 1790 (British): Logic professor, moral philosophy professor, economist.</ref> and David Ricardo<ref>David Ricardo, 1772 — 1823 (British): Economist.</ref>, also contributed to the formation of Marxism’s historical materialist conception [see p. 23].
  
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Smith and Ricardo were some of the first to form theories about labor value in the study of political economics. They made important conclusions about value and the origin of profit, and about the importance of material production and rules that govern economies. However, because there were still many limitations in the study methodology of Smith and Ricardo, these British classical political economists failed to recognise the historical characteristic of value*; the internal contradictions of commodity production**; and the duality of commodity production labor***.
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
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can experience both, with a split screen, and thus be in three places at once: the Library of Congress, Africa, and home. By collapsing time and space in this way, technologies work toward (but never entirely succeed at) making all spaces equally and instantaneously present with complete comfort and ease.
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==== Annotation 13 ====
  
Enter the need and desire for communication technologies to stand in as surrogates for our bodies in what has come to be known as “telepresence.” Again, the limits have been dramatically reconfigured. Early communication technologies were designed to detach the message from the sender and send it over the hill, as with a smoke signal, or as far as a person could walk, as with a written message sent with a messenger. Now, however, the limit horizon requires that we develop technologies that allow us to communicate with others long distance in ways that reproduce our actual presence. Some of the research that is the farthest out there, closing in on the current limit horizon, is about linking virtual bodies anywhere at any time, thus enabling a variety of human interactions without interference from either time or space. These technologies would not only allow us to communicate easily over distance but to perceive the distant place as if we were there, manipulate objects there, and, eventually, be able to touch and feel at a distance.7
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<nowiki>*</nowiki> '''Historical Characteristic of Value'''
  
The ultimate limit of the body is the limit of its lifetime. All living bodies, at least as we write, will die. Death is the ultimate inconvenience because there is widespread suspicion that we can do nothing that will ever allow us to overcome that limit. Conveniences can only band-aid our lives with ease and comfort within the limits of a lifetime of unpredictable length. The fact that this makes us pretty uncomfortable is evident in a variety of cultural venues. For example, the development and use of medical technologies are designed to prolong life. Advertisements for medicines and supplements sometimes suggest that one might live forever. In science fiction, people live forever in virtual reality. Cloning technologies are frequently talked about as if they were a means to immortality. If you can be cloned, isn’t there a sense in which you can live forever? If death is the ultimate limit of the body, the ultimate technology will be the one that overcomes death. Certainly for as long as we have both been alive, there have been technological promises of immortality readily in circulation. But, perhaps, this is like the four-minute mile, and once that limit is overcome, a new limit horizon will stretch out before the inhabitants of the future.
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Marx generally admired the work of Smith and Ricardo, but saw major flaws which undermined the utility of their classical economic theories. Perhaps chief among these flaws, according to Marx, was a tendency for Smith and Ricardo to uphold an ''ahistoric'' view of society and capitalism. In other words, classical economists see capitalism as existing in harmony with the eternal and universal laws of nature, rather than seeing capitalism as a result of historical processes of development [see Annotation 114, p. 116]. Marx did not believe that the economic principles of capitalism resulted from nature, but rather, from historical conflict between different classes. He believed that the principles of political economies changed over time, and would continue to change into the future, whereas Smith and Ricardo saw economic principles as fixed, static concepts that were not subject to change over time. As Marx explains in ''The Poverty of Philosophy:''
  
In the meantime, we develop and use technologies to extend our lives and make us as comfortable as possible. The eyeglasses some of us wear are conveniences that allow us to negotiate the terrain with far more ease than if we went strolling around without them. Laser eye surgery offers even more convenience, because we won’t have to deal with the inconveniences of eyeglasses. We won’t have to feel their irritating weight, remember to clean them periodically, wrestle with them as we put on a pullover sweater, or wipe off the steam when we go skiing on a cold winter’s night.
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<blockquote>
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Economists express the relations of bourgeois production, the division of labour, credit, money, etc. as fixed, immutable, eternal categories... Economists explain how production takes place in the above mentioned relations, but what they do not explain is how these relations themselves are produced, that is, the historical movement that gave them birth... these categories are as little eternal as the relations they express. They are historical and transitory products.
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</blockquote>
  
Life, most of us would agree, is definitely better with all the conveniences of transportation technology, medical technology, household technology, communication technology, farming technology, industrial technology, and so on. But is that the whole story? No, we think not. Nothing, of course, is that simple; and beyond a doubt, the role of technology in our lives is not that simple.
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<nowiki>**</nowiki> '''Internal Contradictions of Commodity Production'''
  
Convenience
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In Marxist terms, a commodity is specifically something that has both a use value and a value-form (see Annotation 14, p. 16), but in simpler terms, a commodity is anything that can be bought or sold. Importantly, capitalism transforms human labor into a commodity, as workers must sell their labor to capitalists in exchange for wages. Marx pointed out that contradictions arise when commodities are produced under capitalism: because capitalists, who own the means of production, decide what to produce based solely on what they believe to be most profitable, the commodities that are being produced do not always meet the actual needs of society. Certain commodities are under-produced while others are over-produced, which leads to crisis and instability.
  
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<nowiki>***</nowiki> Duality of Commodity Production Labor
  
Wants and Needs
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In ''Capital'', Marx describes commodity production labor as existing in a duality — that is to say, it exists with two distinct aspects:
  
Convenience does not in any incontrovertible way make life better. Like the old story of the blind men led up to different parts of an elephant and asked to touch it and describe it, how you describe the role of technologies of convenience in culture depends on where you stand in relation to their many parts. The part that most people fail to see relates to the changing nature of needs that accompany the changing limit horizon of the body.
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First, there is ''abstract labor'', which Marx describes as “labor-power expended without regard to the form of its expenditure.” This is simply the expenditure of human energy in the form of labor, without any regard to production or value of the labor output. Second, there is ''concrete labor'', which is the aspect of labor that refers to the production of a specific commodity with a specific value through labor.
  
It is true that bodies have needs that absolutely must be met. Scholars in the social sciences often debate about the exact nature of basic bodily needs, but they are generally biological and include shelter, food, water, clothing, sleep, affiliation, and procreation. These are the sort of basic needs that the Greek household, according to Tierney, was organized to deliver. Surely the Greeks had wants— that is, things they desired that were not absolute necessities—but life was organized more around the needs rather than the wants.
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Marx argues that human labor, therefore, is simultaneously, an activity which will produce some specific kind of product, and also an activity that generates value in the abstract. Marx and Engels were the first economists to discuss the duality of labor, and their observations on the duality of labor were closely tied to their theories of the different aspects of value (use value, exchange value, etc.), which was key to their analysis of capitalism.
  
Contemporary human beings continue to have the very same biological needs, but over time, as we began to develop a sense of bodily limits, what we needed expanded to include nonbiological, culturally produced needs. Things that formerly seemed to be wants became, in fact, needs. Air travel provides a good example. At one time in history, nobody needed to travel by air. People certainly dreamed of the possibility and longed to be able to travel by air. But it was a want, not a need. It was a tantalizing limit out there waiting to be overcome. Once the limit was overcome and travel by airplane became possible, it became a luxury. In fact, for many people, air travel still seems like a luxury, and their survival does not seem to be connected to it. However, in several very interesting ways, air travel has become a necessity.
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Earlier we mentioned that business travelers are often in one city in the morning, in another by midday, and in yet another by night. If you travel in an airplane during the week, you will likely be seated among these same business travelers doing what they must, that is, working hard to overcome the limits of time and space by flying from city to city as required. Do they have to fly? Is flying a necessity? Certainly flying is not a necessity in any simple biological sense. But, if they want to keep their jobs, if they want to feed themselves and their families, if they want to fit into the mainstream of how things are done, they have to fly. Surely, you might protest, they could quit and take a job that does not require them to fly. This is certainly true, and there are plenty of people who choose not to take jobs because they would be required to fly. Okay, so what job do they take then? Perhaps they take a job that requires them to drive. But driving is not a biological necessity either, is it? So, if they don’t take that job, what is open to them? We can play this game for a long while, tracking down ways that any job they might take can make a necessity out of something that is not a biological necessity. In the end, you might say the person has the right to choose to not work! And, again, you would be correct. But what kind of life is open to a person in this culture who chooses not to work? The point is, to be a fully functioning adult member of the culture, you are likely to have accepted as necessities various technologies and
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Smith and Ricardo also failed to distinguish between simple commodity production and capitalist commodity production*, and could not accurately analyse the form of value** in capitalist commodity production.
  
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THE RECEIVED VIEW
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==== Annotation 14 ====
  
technological practices that are not biological, but are rather cultural necessities. They are necessities, nonetheless.
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<nowiki>*</nowiki> '''Commodity Production'''
  
In this way, wants and luxuries become necessities. They become habits deeply entrenched in the way that culture is organized. Food is doubtless a necessity, but refrigeration is not. However, once urban and rural areas are organized as geographically distinct areas with distinct tasks, and there is no space in the city to garden, and it takes a long time to get food from the country to the city, then refrigeration becomes more like a necessity than a luxury. The necessity seems cultural rather than biological, but in the end the implications are biological as well. What happens if you can’t get fresh food in a hot summer in a city without the aid of refrigeration? What happens to the body as it learns to function with less sleep?
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''Simple commodity production'' (also known as ''petty commodity production'') is the production of commodities under the conditions which Marx called the “Simple Exchange” of commodities. ''Simple exchange'' occurs when individual producers trade the products they have made directly, themselves, for other commodities. Under simple exchange, workers directly own their own means of production and sell products which they have made with their own labor.
  
It is interesting to speculate a little further about what happens when wants and luxuries become necessities, and these necessities entail overcoming the limits of space and time. In short, culture becomes organized around the project of overcoming the limits of the body. We increasingly need to expand our sense of the spaces we maneuver in, and we increasingly need to do everything faster. Again, business travel provides a pertinent example. In an increasingly global market, business must be able to move, and move quickly (virtually or bodily), if it is to keep up with trends. For an excellent example of this imperative, we suggest flipping through Bill Gates’s aptly titled Business @ the Speed of Thought: Succeeding in the Digital Economy.8 Almost every contemporary activity involves the need to collapse time and space by overcoming their limits. Researchers interested in eradicating viral disease must contend and compete with the speed at which diseases travel on global transportation systems. (The Ebola outbreak of 2014 is an example of this.) Parents must contend and compete with the rapid-fire exposure to a nearly full array of worldly activities children encounter through television and the Internet. Employees have to contend with demands to relocate on short notice or travel long distance. Teachers must contend with pressures to offer courses online using distance-education technologies. Students and workers in high stress environments increasingly feel the need to use “smart drugs” (pharmaceutical technologies) to enhance memory, the speed of thought, and overall intelligence in order to compete better in the 24/7 world where a body’s limits, whatever they might be, are simply unacceptable. What we want and need, and what we must respond to, increasingly relate to the value of convenience—to the desire to overcome the bodily limits of time and space—and technology is integral to the process.
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Simple commodity production and simple exchange use what Marx referred to as “C'''→'''M'''→'''C mode of circulation” [see Annotation 60, p. 59]. Circulation is simply the way in which commodities and money are exchanged for one another.
  
When Convenience Isn’t
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'''C→M→C stands for:'''
  
The story we tell ourselves about convenience, the story built right into the meaning of the term, is that it makes life easier and more comfortable. We might think that some of the demands made on us, like having to travel by airplane or to restrict children’s access to the home computer, or learning to live with less sleep, are the necessary side effects that we must accept in order to overcome bodily limits with comfort and ease. They are “the price we pay,” so to speak. That’s certainly a powerful story,
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Commodity '''→''' Money '''→''' Commodity
  
Convenience
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So, with simple commodity production and simple exchange, workers produce commodities, which they then sell for money, which they use to buy other commodities which they need. For example, a brewer might make beer, which they sell for money, which they use to buy food, housing, and other commodities which they need to live.
  
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In the C'''→'''M'''→'''C mode of circulation, the producers and consumers of commodities have a direct relationship to the commodities which are being bought and sold. The sellers have produced the commodities sold with their own labor, and they directly consume the commodities which they purchase with the money thus obtained.
  
but one that, again, sees only part of the elephant. Sometimes it makes more sense to recognize that convenience isn’t always so convenient!
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''Capitalist commodity production'' and ''capitalist exchange'', on the other hand, are based on the M'''→'''C'''→'''M’ mode of circulation.
  
In a classic study of housework and household technology, one that we will return to later in this book, Ruth Schwartz Cowan looks closely at the relationship between household conveniences and the changing nature of work in the American home.9 Her study suggests that using convenience technologies does not always mean that life is altogether easier. Modern household conveniences— washing machines, refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, dishwashers, microwaves, bread machines, and so on—certainly have been marketed as labor-saving devices, promising more leisure time and less physical exertion. Cowan concurs that these conveniences are part of an overall rise in our standard of living and that they do reduce the drudgery of particular tasks. It is, after all, physically very easy to walk over to the washing machine and throw in a load of clothes; but these technologies do not eliminate labor. In fact, as a part of a changing technological system, they contribute to an increase in women’s labor.
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'''M→C→M’ stands for:'''
  
If you look past the idea that technology is just the physical stuff—the washing machine or the bread machine—you will see that household conveniences are part of a network of connections that tell a different story, one in which, as Cowan’s book title tells us, there is actually More Work for Mother. Cowan describes the changing nature of household technology as a process of industrialization of the household, where both the work of production and its products change. As part of this process, men were gradually eliminated from household production, as was hired household help. Eventually, as Cowan argues, the technological systems that define the household are “built on the assumption that a full-time housewife would be operating them.”10 Accompanying this shift, the standards of cleanliness and health increase and become the sole responsibility of the housewife. Guilt, embarrassment, and insecurity drive household labor. Cowan claims that:
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Money '''→''' Commodity '''→''' More Money
  
the hard-pressed housewife was being told that if she failed to feed her babies special foods, to scrub behind the sink with special cleaners, to reduce the spread of infection by using paper tissues, to control mouth odor by urging everyone to gargle and body odor by urging everyone to bathe, to improve her children’s schoolwork by sending them off with a good breakfast, or her daughter’s “social rating” by sending her off to parties with polished white shoes—then any number of woeful events would ensue and they would all be entirely her fault.11
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Under this mode of circulation, capitalists spend money to buy commodities (including the commodified labor of workers), with the intention of selling commodities for MORE MONEY than they began with. The capitalist has no direct relationship to the commodity being produced and sold, and the capitalist is solely interested in obtaining ''more money.''
  
Consequently, clothes have to be washed more often, more elaborate meals have to be produced, more cleaning has to be done, and more products have to be purchased. From this perspective, the conveniences no longer look so convenient.
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Capitalist commodity production, therefore, uses the M'''→'''C'''→'''M’ mode of circulation, in which capitalists own the means of production and pay wages to workers in exchange for their labor, which is used to produce commodities. The capitalists then sell these commodities for profits which are not shared with the workers who provided the labor which produced the commodities.
  
The popularity of bread machines illustrates how more labor is demanded as part of the desire to better provide for the household with modern conveniences. If you want your family to eat healthful bread and to have it fresh and warm and lovingly presented, buy a bread machine! Oh yes, and then buy the right kind of flour, yeast, and the special ingredients for all the speciality breads that you will make if you really love your family. Oh yes, and make it fresh every day. That, after all, is what the machine is
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<nowiki>**</nowiki> '''Value-Form'''
  
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This is one of the most important, and potentially most confusing, concepts in all of Marx’s analysis of capitalism. Marx explains these principles at length in ''Appendix of the 1<sup>st</sup> German Edition of Capital, Volume 1'', but here are some of the fundamentals:
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
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One of Marx’s key breakthroughs was understanding that commodities have many different properties which have different effects in political economies.
  
designed for. Oh yes, and clean the machine parts after use, and dust it when you clean the counters now cramped with other labor-saving conveniences. This convenience, like all household conveniences, is part of a technological system that makes us more comfortable in some senses. However, the network of connections that constitutes this technological system does not, in the end, reduce labor and save time; instead, the network of connections is part of a shifting burden in which the demands to collapse time (you can make that bread now!) and space (you can make that bread here!) become, in a sense, an inconvenience. These contemporary demands are burdens, responsibilities, and stresses that can only be called uncomfortable. These burdens constitute a contemporary form of dis-ease.
+
Just as Commodity Production Labor exists in a duality of Concrete Labor and Abstract Labor (see Annotation 13, p. 15), commodities themselves also exist in duality according to Marx:
  
As with household technologies, so it is with transportation technologies (remember those business travelers!), communication technologies (check that e-mail or text on the go, on your phone), medical technologies (take that drug to be smarter or stay awake longer), even recycling technologies (buy that special five-gallon composter designed especially for use in cities!). Increasingly, we need technologies that perform convenient tasks, and those technologies are part of technological processes that are, in turn, part of changing labor processes that actually demand considerable exertion.
+
Commodities have both “use-value” and “value.
  
Industrial production, in the more traditional sense of factory production, plays an important role in changing labor processes in three ways. First, industry constantly retools to anticipate, produce, and market new and (now) much-needed conveniences: bread makers, yogurt makers, composters, air purifiers, tablet and wearable computers, smart phones, new and fancier automobiles, artificial limbs and designer drugs. The survival of industry depends on the timely promotion of, and adaptability to, change.
+
Use-Value (which corresponds to Concrete Labor) is the commodity’s ''tangible form'' of existence; it is what we can physically sense when we observe a commodity. By extension, use-value encompasses how a commodity can be used in the material world.
  
Second, industrial production becomes organized internally around the value of convenience, with consequences for virtually all labor throughout the culture. In particular the practice of scientific management, sometimes called Taylorism after Frederick Winslow Taylor, began to transform the workplace in the early 1900s. Speed and efficiency are the key concepts in scientific management. Its goal, according to Taylor, is to train each individual “so that he can do (at his fastest pace and with the maximum of efficiency) the highest class of work for which his natural abilities fit him.”12 Efficiency, for scientific managers, means completing a desired task with the minimum input of energy, time, materials, and money. With this goal in mind, the results of time and motion studies of particular tasks were used to redesign production processes to maximize the output of human energy at the fastest pace sustainable. The production process itself thus became organized around the ideal of convenience: overcoming the limits of space and time with maximum comfort and minimum effort.
+
Value, or the Value-Form, is the ''social form'' of a commodity, which is to say, it represents the stable relationships intrinsic to the commodity [see ''Content and Form'', p. 147].
  
Third, industrial production is significantly transformed by Fordism, named after Henry Ford. Fordism utilized innovations in mechanization, combined mechanism with Taylorism, and instituted the continuous assembly line. As Tierney discusses this phenomenon, Fordism has significant implications for the value of convenience and for the consumption of conveniences.13 The most
+
Note that this relates to the dialectical relationship between the material and the ideal [see ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88].
  
Convenience
+
Value-forms represent relational equivalencies of commodities, i.e.: '''20 yards of linen = 10 pounds of tea'''
  
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These relational equivalencies are tied to the equivalent labor value (see Annotation 15 below, and Annotation 26, p. 23) used to produce these commodities. The value-form of a commodity is the ''social form'' because it embodies relational equivalencies:
  
significant implication is that, by rationalizing the pace of work, industry was able to increase production, generate capital quicker, and therefore retool quickly when necessary to respond to and capture a changing market. In other words, industry too could offer more, newer conveniences by operating more conveniently. Further, by demanding a steady and intense work pace throughout the workday, workers need to recuperate at home, rendering them more likely to rely on conveniences to get through to the next day. Overall, the changing nature of industrial work creates a ready market for the conveniences that industry is increasingly geared up to produce.
+
1. The value-form represents the relationship between the commodity and the labor which was used to produce the commodity.
  
Neither the material things themselves nor some essential truth about human beings has determined that these conveniences should become needs. Rather, they are part of a changing configuration of contingent connections, which suggests that life could be otherwise, given other choices. Cowan argues, for example, that “[t]echnological systems that might have truly eliminated the labor of housewives could have been built...but such systems would have eliminated the [single-family] home as well—a result that...most Americans were consistently and insistently unwilling to accept.”14 Alternative technological systems that would have eliminated the need for the single-family home, privately owned tools, and the servitude of the housewife include commercial or communal housekeeping arrangements, kitchens, food delivery services, laundries, child care, gardens, boarding houses, and apartment hotels: all with appropriately designed and sized technologies to perform the necessary supportive tasks. Many of these—and other—alternative technological systems have been variously promoted, instituted, and largely rejected.15 The issue of choice is not always obvious. Does giving up the single-family home, with its excess of privately owned tools, seem like a choice? It is, but because it has become a cultural habit, it doesn’t seem like a choice. When cultural habits become ingrained, when media offer up versions of what life should be like, when everyday economic circumstances encourage certain choices, when peer expectations exert pressure, and when political rhetoric and political practices assume one direction and not another, the chosen path may seem like the only way to go.
+
2. The value-form represents the relationship between a commodity and one or more other commodities.
  
The Time and Space of Consumption
+
As Marx explains in ''Appendix to the 1<sup>st</sup> German Edition of Capital'': “Hence by virtue of its value-form the (commodity) now stands also in a social relation no longer to only a single other type of commodity, but to the world of commodities. As a commodity it is a citizen of this world.”
  
The path we continue to take with fervor—the path of convenience—has had monumental implications for the nature of private and public spaces and on the role of consumption. Both Tierney’s and Cowan’s treatments of the changing nature of household production and its relationship to technology reveal some of these changes. The household becomes a very private space; it becomes the production site for the work of the housewife, who in turn becomes a consumer of convenience technologies to help her carry on her productive tasks. Public spaces become dedicated to performing specialized tasks that are no longer part of the household. Factory workers produce clothes, prepared foods, modes of transportation, tools, lumber, machines, industrial household technologies, and pharmaceuticals, many of which are designed for private consumption. Retail operations, which are
+
Understanding the social form of commodities — the value-form — was crucial for Marx to develop a deeper understanding of money and capitalism. Marx argued that classical economists like Ricardo and Smith conflated economic categories such as “exchange value,” “value,” “price,” “money,” etc., which meant that they could not possibly fully understand or analyze capitalist economies.
  
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THE RECEIVED VIEW
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British classical political economists like Ricardo and Smith outlined the scientific factors of the theories of labor value* and contributed many progressive thoughts which Marx adapted and further developed.
  
increasingly centralized, sell the goods produced by industry. Public schools educate children. Public utilities deliver power and collect garbage. Mass media deliver news and entertainment.
+
==== Annotation 15 ====
  
Another way to look at this is to see it as part of a process of moving away from a culture organized around subsistence and toward a culture organized around interlocking dependency. As part of the relations of dependence, one of our major tasks as citizens in the process is consumption. This is especially true of the household, which becomes a primary, privatized site of consumption. But let’s unpack this claim.
+
<nowiki>*</nowiki> Adam Smith and David Ricardo revolutionized the labor theory of value, which held that the value of a good or service is determined by the amount of human labor required to produce it.  
  
At first blush, it seems obvious that we have moved from a subsistence economy to a market economy. However, for a very long time, people have bartered goods and services. The North American Indian peoples, often popularly thought of as living a subsistence life, had extensive trade routes throughout the continent long before the arrival of Europeans. Coastal tribes traded fish for buffalo meat. Tribes from the area now known as the Upper Peninsula of Michigan bartered copper for products from the South. Throughout the continent, ivory, bone, and medicinal plants were traded. In popular myth as well, the American colonists lived a subsistence life, but that too is overstated. Cowan, in A Social History of American Technology, maintains that while self-sufficiency was a highly regarded value even in colonial America, “no colonial family could have produced all that it needed for its own sustenance.”16 These observations should be taken as cautionary notes. A move away from self-sufficiency is not simply a feature of contemporary technological culture. Humans, after all, are social animals, and it is probably a rare case in any era for a lone individual to have had no contact and exchange with any other human. If, however, we envision a sliding scale rather than a simple binary distinction between subsistence culture and a trade or market culture, we can appreciate the magnitude of what has changed. Specifically, what has changed is that limit horizon. Expectations about what technologies are supposed to do for us have become increasingly more demanding, with enormous consequences for the nature and quality of cultural life. It is as though we are no longer trying to run the four-minute mile, but a three-and-a-half–minute mile.
+
Thus, Marx was able to solve the contradictions that these economists could not solve and he was able to establish the theory of surplus value*, scientific evidence for the exploitative nature of capitalism, and the economic factors which will lead to the eventual fall of capitalism and the birth of socialism.
  
In some of the most compelling arguments in his book, Tierney describes the changing configuration of public and private spaces and the role of consumption in a discussion of the changing nature and role of agricultural technologies in the settlement of the western United States. The settlement of the West was largely controlled by government land sales. While the acreage requirements varied, minimum plot size was quite large: 640 acres in 1789; 320 acres in 1800; and 150 acres in 1804. A settler-farmer interested in living more toward the subsistence end of the scale would probably want about five acres of good land; but if they wanted to buy land, they had to buy the larger amount. Prices varied, but in 1789 the cost was $1 plus $1 per acre, for a total of $641. This was a substantial amount of money, and very likely it was borrowed, with interest due. That meant settler-farmers had to make the land productive fast in order to repay their debt. They did this primarily by purchasing, again on loan, farm equipment designed to handle a lot of ground fast.17 Already, at this early point in the story, farming
+
==== Annotation 16 ====
  
Convenience
+
<nowiki>*</nowiki> David Ricardo developed the concept of surplus value. Surplus value is the difference between the amount of income made from selling a product and the amount it costs to produce it. Marx would go on to expand on the concept of surplus value considerably.
  
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Utopianism'''' had been developing for a long time and reached its peak in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century with famous thinkers such as Henri de Saint-Simon<ref>Claude Henri de Rouvroy Saint Simon, 1760 — 1825 (French): Philosopher, economist, utopianist activist.</ref>, François Marie Charles Fourier<ref>Charles Fourier, 1772 — 1837 (French): Philosopher, economist, utopianist activist.</ref> and Robert Owen<ref>Robert Owen, 1771 — 1858 (British): Utopianist activist, owner of a cotton factory.</ref>. Utopianism sought to elevate the humanitarian spirit and strongly criticised capitalism by calling attention to the misery of the working class under capitalism. It also offered many far-ranging opinions and analyses of the development of human history and laid out some basic foundational factors and principles for a new society. However, Utopianism could not scientifically address the nature of capitalism. It failed to detect the Law of Development of Capitalism<ref>The Law of Development of Capitalism referenced here is the Theory of Accumulation/Surplus Value, which holds that the capitalist class gains wealth by accumulating surplus value (i.e., profits) and then reinvesting it into more capital to gain even further wealth; thus the goal of the capitalist class is to accumulate more and more surplus value which leads to the development of capitalism. Over time, this deepens the contradictions of capitalism. This concept is related to the M'''→'''C'''→'''M mode of circulation, discussed in Annotation 14, p. 16, and is discussed in detail in Part 3 of the book this text is drawn from (Political Economy) which we hope to translate in the future.</ref> and also failed to recognise the roles and missions of the working class as a social force that can eliminate capitalism to build an equal, non-exploitative society.
  
had moved far away from the subsistence end of the scale. It is “quaint” to think of early-American farmers as living subsistence lives; but they were already debtors and major consumers of farm equipment.
+
==== Annotation 17 ====
  
The situation continued to develop away from the subsistence end of the scale. Farm equipment continued to get more specialized, bigger, and more expensive. It was designed to cover more ground faster and more comfortably, that is, more conveniently. This, in conjunction with the dependence on and cost of rail transport to get goods to market, the vagaries of the market’s ups and downs, inevitable crop failures, and increasing land taxes, moved farming further from the subsistence end of the scale. It is a rare family farm in contemporary America that does not have at least one member working as a wage earner outside the home— most likely the “housewife,” who, as Cowan points out in More Work for Mother, would still be primarily responsible for the housework. In this situation, the need for more convenience technologies increases. It makes sense in these circumstances to purchase a dishwasher, a microwave oven, and factory-made clothes. Who has time to do otherwise?
+
The early industrial working class existed in miserable conditions, and the political movement of utopianism was developed by people who believed that a better world could be built. The utopianists believed they could create “a New Moral World” of happiness, enlightenment, and prosperity through education, science, technology, and communal living. For instance, Robert Owen was a wealthy textile manufacturer who tried to build a better society for workers in New Harmony, Indiana, in the USA. Owen purchased the entire town of New Harmony in 1825 as a place to build an ideal society. Owen’s vision failed after two years for a variety of reasons, and many other wealthy capitalists in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century drew up similar plans which also failed.
  
The trend has continued in the direction of transforming farmers into consumers. In fact, most farmland is now in corporate hands. Farming has become predominantly industrial, and most of those who would be farmers have become consumers of factory-farmed food. The shift in the population away from farms is staggering:
+
Utopianism was one of the first political and industrial movements that criticized the conditions of capitalism by exposing the miserable situations of poor workers and offering a vision of a better society, and was one of the first movements to attempt to mitigate the faults of capitalism in practice.
  
1910–1920 32 million farmers living on farms
+
Unfortunately, the utopianists were not ideologically prepared to replace capitalism, and all of their attempts to build a better alternative to capitalism failed. Marx and Engels admired the efforts of the utopianist movement, and studied their attempts and failures closely in developing their own political theories, concluding that the utopianists failed in large part because they did not understand how capitalism developed, nor the role of the working class in the revolution against capitalism.
  
1950 23 million
+
As Engels wrote in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:''
  
1991 4.6 million
+
<blockquote>
 +
(The) historical situation also dominated the founders of Socialism. To the crude conditions of capitalistic production and the crude class conditions correspond crude theories. The solution of the social problems, which as yet lay hidden in undeveloped economic conditions, the Utopians attempted to evolve out of the human brain. Society presented nothing but wrongs; to remove these was the task of reason. It was necessary, then, to discover a new and more perfect system of social order and to impose this upon society from without by propaganda, and, wherever it was possible, by the example of model experiments. These new social systems were foredoomed as Utopian; the more completely they were worked out in detail, the more they could not avoid drifting off into pure phantasies.
 +
</blockquote>
  
In 1993 the United States Census Bureau announced that it would no longer count the number of people who lived on farms. Clearly for some this is “progress,” but for others it is an enormous loss. As Wendell Berry argues, “Good farmers, like good musicians, must be raised to the trade.” Eventually, he argues, consumers will feel and pay the price.18
+
Engels is explaining, here, that — in a sense — the utopian socialists were victims of arriving ''too early''. Capitalism had not yet developed enough for its opponents to formulate plans based on actual material conditions, since capitalism was only just emerging into a stable form. Without a significant objective, material basis, the utopians were forced to rely upon reasoning alone to confront capitalism.
  
As it goes with farming, so it goes with many of the technological skills we depend on. Few carpenters anymore know how to do more than install mass-produced factory-made units. Far fewer home and apartment dwellers know how to fix anything that goes wrong. When it comes to conveniences, the reasonable choice seems to be to toss it and consume something new. Fewer people sew their own clothes, and fabric stores are going the way of the full-service gas station. People who work at retail stores and gas stations typically know very little about the products they sell. Fewer people make their own music anymore; most depend largely on consuming mass-mediated, highly manipulated music produced in a competitive “star” system. Even in the DIY (“Do It Yourself”) Internet music environment, few small independent musicians succeed by traditional economic measures. For some this kind of progress delivers wonders that we could not produce on our own, and that is certainly true; it also represents an enormous loss of community interaction, skill, and talent. The individual talents that do remain have become focused on learning to become good and canny consumers of convenience. As Tierney and others have argued, the household in general is transformed from being a site of production
+
In this sense, the early historical utopianists fell into ''philosophical utopianism'' in its broader sense — defined by the mistaken assertion that the ideal can determine the material [see Annotation 95, p. 94]. In believing that they could build a perfect society based on ideals and “pure fantasy” alone without a material basis for development, the utopians were, in essence, idealists. As Engels explained: “from this nothing could come but a kind of eclectic, average Socialism.” Engels concluded that in order to successfully overthrow capitalism, revolution would need to be grounded in materialism: “To make a science of Socialism, it had first to be placed upon a real basis.”
  
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THE RECEIVED VIEW
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The humanitarian spirit and compassionate analysis which the utopians embodied in their efforts to lay out concrete features of a better future society became important theory premises for the birth of the scientific theory of socialism in Marxism.
  
to a site of consumption. What we do in our homes, indeed in our lives overall, is consume rather than create. Arguably, this is changing with web 2.0, which we will discuss in Part III.
+
''- Natural Science Premise:''
  
A Perpetual State of Dissatisfaction
+
Along with social-economic conditions and theory premises, the achievements of the natural sciences were also foundational to the development of arguments and evidence which assert the correctness of Marxism’s viewpoints and methodology.
  
A perpetual state of dissatisfaction with who and what we are is a final consequence of conceiving of the body as having limits to overcome. We can never get to where we are going fast enough. We can never go everywhere there is to go. We can never be healthy enough, beautiful enough, smart enough, or rich enough. We can never own enough stuff. We can never have enough technology. And we can never be satisfied with the fact that we die. This perpetual state of dissatisfaction fuels, and is fueled by, the production and marketing of conveniences of all kinds. Technologies of beauty promise improved textures, odors, colors, sizes, and shapes of various body parts. Medical technologies not only replace aging hip joints, but reshape noses, enhance breast size, and promise to make us smarter and more alert. Exercise technologies promise trimmer, healthier, more beautiful bodies, without the stigma of exercise we might get through work. Educational technologies promise to make people smarter with less effort on the part of the learner. Money-generating technologies promise wealth without work. Isn’t this, after all, the promise held out by playing the stock market or the lottery? Science fiction offers us fantastic images of escaping the body and the inevitability of its death. Convenience, in the extreme forms we encounter in contemporary culture, offers the ultimate quick fix that is doomed to leave us needing yet another. Our technologies are shaped in part by that desire; they hold out promise, and they inevitably, in some form or another, fail us. There is always the next limit horizon to reach for.
+
==== Annotation 18 ====
  
What the Future Holds
+
''Natural science'' is science which deals with the natural world, including chemistry, biology, physics, geology, etc.
  
It is an interesting situation to be in, isn’t it: to be committed to conveniences that aren’t always convenient, and to strive for what is perpetually out of reach? Why, we have to wonder, do we persist in our commitment to this contradiction? It might be because yet another cultural value is slowly replacing both progress and convenience as the dominant explanatory value behind the cultural commitment to technological development. Rosalind Williams in Retooling argues that the “progress talk” that once dominated technological discussions has been replaced by what she calls “change talk.”19 The simple, primary value of change renders irrelevant any expectation that change is supposed to get us something: the good life as progress would have it, or ease as convenience would have it. Instead, the “change journey,” a journey with no reason or end other than itself, is what matters. To change, in this view, is the point, pure and simple. The value of change can also be seen as merely the imperative to move, to act, where the goal of the good life is entirely supplanted by the means. In The New Spirit
+
Three major scientific breakthroughs which were important to the development of Marxism include:
  
Convenience
+
''•'' ''The law of conservation and transformation of energy'' scientifically proved the inseparable relationships and the mutual transformation and conservation of all the forms of motion of matter in nature.
  
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''•'' ''The theory of evolution'' offered a scientific basis for the development of diverse forms of life through natural selection.
  
of Capitalism, Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello suggest that this is exactly what is happening. Movement for its own sake is what matters: “To always be doing something, to move, to change—this is what enjoys prestige, as against stability, which is often synonymous with inaction.”20 To the degree that the commitment to change rearticulates both progress and convenience, we are likely to witness a culture investing heavily in technological development with rampant disregard for any ill effects in its wake.
+
''•'' ''Cell theory'' was a scientific basis proving unity in terms of origins, physical forms and material structures of living creatures. It also explained the development of life through those relationships.
  
Figure 8: Nazca Lines Labyrinth
+
These scientific discoveries led to the rejection of theological and metaphysical viewpoints which centered the role of the “creator” in the pursuit of truth.
  
Source: Illustration by SiGarb, 2009, Wikimedia Commons:
+
==== Annotation 19 ====
  
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nazca_Lines_Labyrinth_Peru.jpg
+
For centuries in Europe, natural science and philosophy had been heavily dominated by theological viewpoints which centered God in the pursuit of truth. Descartes, Kant, Spinoza, and many other metaphysical philosophers who developed the earliest theories of modern natural science centered their religious beliefs in their philosophies. These theological viewpoints varied in many ways, but all shared a characteristic of centering a “creator” in the pursuit of philosophical and scientific inquiry.
  
Chapter Four
+
Together, the law of conservation and transformation of energy, the theory of evolution, and cell theory provided an alternative viewpoint which allowed scientists to remove the “creator” from the scientific equation. For the first time, natural scientists and philosophers had concrete theoretical explanations for the origin and development of the universe, life, and reality which did not rely on a supernatural creator.
  
Determinism
+
Marx and Engels closely observed and studied the groundbreaking scientific progress of their era. They believed strongly in materialist scientific methods and the data which they produced, and based their analysis and philosophical doctrines on such observations. They recognized the importance and validity of the scientific achievements of their era, and they developed the philosophy of Dialectical Materialism into a system which would help humans study and understand the whole material world.
  
IN HIS COMEDY ROUTINES, British comedian Eddie Izzard carries on a running gag about the National Rifle Association’s attacks on gun control. In response to the NRA’s claim that “guns don’t kill people, people do,” Izzard quips, “but I think...the gun helps, you know? I think it helps.Just standing there going ‘bang!’…. That’s not going to kill too many people, is it?”1 Izzard takes the ribbing even further when he asks, what if you gave a gun to a monkey? What would happen then? The NRA would have to amend the argument to say that “guns don’t kill people, people and monkeys kill people.”2 In yet another flight of Izzard antics, he points to the fact that it isn’t really even guns, or people, or monkeys presumably, that kill people, but bullets ripping through flesh!3 Izzard has a point: The gun makes a particular kind of killing possible; and it is a lot easier to kill someone with a gun than with an icy glare or even with your bare hands. But so too does the NRA have a point: Guns don’t go roaming around the world on their own killing people. People use them. They pick them up, aim them, pull their triggers, and, if their aim is good or if they are just lucky (or unlucky), they kill someone. On the other hand, Izzard has yet another valid point: Guns are often involved in killings where there was no intention to kill. You have to wonder if children, like monkeys, would be considered responsible for the deaths they might cause with a gun in their hands? Also, who or what is responsible if a gun falls over, fires, and kills someone? Nobody, in this case, even pulled the trigger. With regard to guns, how do you sort out these questions: What causes what? Who or what is responsible?
+
In ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'', Engels explained that ancient Greek dialecticians had correctly realized that the world is “an endless entanglement of relations and reactions, permutations and combinations, in which nothing remains what, where and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes away.
  
It is unfortunate that people sometimes think that simple slogans, like “guns don’t kill people—people do,” provide answers to these complex questions. Slogans like these get used—like weapons—as though they settled everything. If you talk about gun control with someone who is opposed to it, they will often offer up the slogan, “guns don’t kill people, people do,” as though it ended the argument. Like magic, slogans conceal the complexity of the arguments buried deep within these serious and sometimes humorous exchanges.
+
Engels goes on to explain that it was understandable for early natural scientists to break their inquiries and analysis down into specialized fields and categories of science to focus on precise, specific, narrow subject matters so that they could build up a body of empirical data. However, as data accumulated, it became clear that all of these isolated, individual fields of study must somehow be unified back together coherently and cohesively in order to obtain a deeper and more useful understanding of reality.
  
50 O
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As Engels wrote in ''On Dialectics:''
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
+
<blockquote>
 +
Empirical natural science has accumulated such a tremendous mass of positive material for knowledge that the necessity of classifying it in each separate field of investigation systematically and in accordance with its inner inter-connection has become absolutely imperative. It is becoming equally imperative to bring the individual spheres of knowledge into the correct connection with one another. In doing so, however, natural science enters the field of theory and here the methods of empiricism will not work, here only theoretical ''thinking'' can be of assistance.
 +
</blockquote>
  
In fact, the issues raised by Izzard’s imagined exchange with the NRA reveal a lot about how most people understand the relationship between culture and technology. Most significantly, it reveals the degree to which questions of causality dominate what matters in this relationship. First, something causes (or determines) something else: Guns kill people (a pro gun-control position). Or people kill people using neutral instruments like guns (the NRA position). Or a kind of partnership between the gun and humans kills people (the Izzard position). Second, the attribution of causal power is what permits the distribution of blame or praise: Guns are to blame. Or people are to blame. Or the gun/people nexus is to blame.
+
As science grows increasingly complex, a necessity develops for a philosophical and cognitive framework which can be used to make sense of the influx of information from disparate fields. In ''Dialectics of Nature,'' Engels explains how dialectical materialism is the perfect philosophical foundation for unifying scientific fields into one cohesive framework'':''
  
Regardless of these differences in the attribution of the causal agent, and in the distribution of blame or praise, the fact remains that understanding technology in terms of such attribution and distribution is the predominant way that the relationship between culture and technology is understood. As Langdon Winner wrote in his classic work on technology, Autonomous Technology: “In a fundamental sense, of course, determining things is what technology is all about.”4 This is as true for guns as it is for any other technology. All technologies are widely understood as being significant in terms of the effects that they have, or in terms of being effects themselves. For example, automobiles are associated with a range of effects worthy of both praise and blame: shortening travel time, increasing mobility, causing accidents, creating pollution, and so on. Alternatively, automobiles can be seen as the effect of the expansion of the cities, the movement of populations to suburbs, and the isolation of the individual in capitalism. Televisions are associated with providing access to information, educating children, entertaining the population, encouraging violence and promiscuity, lowering standards of taste and intellect, and contributing to the isolation of the population. Alternatively, televisions can be seen as the effect of increased leisure time, the need to create a national identity, and the industrialized production of communication technologies.
+
<blockquote>
 +
Dialectics divested of mysticism becomes an absolute necessity for natural science, which has forsaken the field where rigid categories sufficed, which represent as it were the lower mathematics of logic, its everyday weapons.
 +
</blockquote>
  
In Metaphors We Live By, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argue that causation, the idea that there are causes and effects, is one of those basic human concepts “most used by people to organize their cultural and physical realities.”5 This is certainly confirmed by the prevailing tendency to think of the relationship between culture and technology in terms of causality. While it is simply not the case that determining things is necessarily what technology is all about, conceiving of the relationship between culture and technology in causal terms plays such a powerful cultural role that it deserves careful scrutiny.
+
So, Marx and Engels developed Dialectical Materialism not in opposition to science, but as a way to make better use of scientific data, and to analyze the complex, dynamic, constantly changing systems of the world in motion. While distinct scientific discoveries and empirical data are invaluable, each data point only provides a small amount of information within a single narrow, specific field of science. Dialectical Materialism allows humans to view reality — as a whole — in motion, and to examine the interconnections and mutual developments between different fields and categories of human knowledge.
  
In this chapter, then, we look at the commitment our culture has made to think of and respond to technology in causal terms: to the questions of what causes what, and who or what is responsible. First, we look at the dominant variant of the causal relationship between technology and culture: that technology causes effects. This approach is sometimes called technological determinism. Second, we consider the flip side of that commitment: the variant that holds that culture causes technology. This approach is sometimes called cultural determinism, sometimes instrumentalism or (in a particular variant) social constructivism.
+
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Determinism
+
These scientific principles confirmed the correctness of the dialectical materialist view of the material world, with such features as: endlessness, self-existence, self-motivation, and self-transformation. They also confirmed the scientific nature of the dialectical materialist viewpoint in both material processes and thought processes.
  
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We conclude with a critique of the limitations of thinking in these particular causal terms as we work toward an enriched sense of technological culture.
+
==== Annotation 20 ====
  
Technology as Cause: Technological Determinism
+
''Endlessness'' refers to the infinite span of space and time in our universe. ''Self-existence'' means that our universe exists irrespective of human consciousness; it existed before human consciousness evolved and it will continue to exist after human consciousness becomes extinct. ''Self-motivation'' and ''Self-transformation'' refer to the fact that motion and transformation exist within the universe independent of human consciousness.
  
As stated above, thinking in terms of causation is a widespread cultural practice. So it is not surprising that thinking about technology usually invokes causal thinking. The most common form it takes is called technological determinism, which means that technology is understood to have effects and that technological change is the principal determinant of cultural change. It stands to reason that if you think that technology is central to an understanding of culture, as we discussed in the introduction to Part One of this book, technological change will be seen as the major determinant of cultural change. Langdon Winner explains that technological determinism is a belief that depends on two hypotheses:
+
Engels wrote of the scientific nature of the dialectical materialist viewpoint in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
  
(1) that the technical base of a society is the fundamental condition affecting all patterns of social existence and
+
<blockquote>
 +
Nature is the proof of dialectics, and it must be said for modern science that it has furnished this proof with very rich materials increasingly daily, and thus has shown that... Nature works dialectically and not metaphysically; that she does not move in the eternal oneness of a perpetually recurring circle, but goes through a real historical evolution.
 +
</blockquote>
  
(2) that changes in technology are the single most important source of change in society.6
 
  
The first hypothesis asserts the strongly held cultural belief that technology is central to defining what culture is. The second hypothesis asserts the strongly held cultural belief that technologies cause effects and that technological change is the primary cause of cultural change. From a technological determinist position, certain key technologies are even considered to be “revolutionary.” They define culture and have the power to completely change it. We’ve seen this belief demonstrated in reporting on the “Arab Spring” uprisings of 2010–2011 in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere, in arguments that these revolutions were caused by Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and other social media. Social media, then, are considered “revolutionary” in and of themselves. Their mere presence guarantees, ultimately, certain effects (like democracy).
+
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Belief in technological determinism is widely held in Western culture. For a very long time, in fact for as long as there has been recorded history, people have been thinking about technology as primarily responsible for major cultural change. As long ago as the fourth century BC, when Greece was shifting from a culture based on oral communication to a culture based on writing, Plato expressed concern that writing might cause people to lose their memories. He wrote: “If men learn this [writing technology], it will implant forgetfulness in their souls: they will cease to exercise memory because they rely on that which is written, calling things to remembrance no longer from within themselves, but by means of external marks.”7 The argument unfolds thus: When people no longer practice their memory skills, they will no longer be able to rely on their memories to make judgments about the world. Instead, they will be forced to rely on external marks (such as writing) and the arguments of others to develop judgments. This situation renders them vulnerable to the persuasive techniques
+
In conclusion, the birth of Marxism is a phenomenon which is compatible with scientific principles; it is the product of the social-economic conditions of its time of origin, of the human knowledge expressed in science at that time, and it is also the result of its founders’ creative thinking and humanitarian spirit.
  
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==== b. The Birth and Development Stage of Marxism ====
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
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Marx and Engels initiated the birth and development stage of Marxism from around 1842~1843 through around 1847~1848. Later, from 1849 to 1895, Marxism was developed to be more thorough and comprehensive, but in this early period of birth and development, Marx and Engels engaged in practical activities [Marx and Engels were not just theorists, but also actively supported and participated with various revolutionary and working class organizations including the Chartists, the League of the Just, the Communist League, the International Workingmen’s Association, etc.] and studied a wide range of human thought from ancient times on through to their contemporaries in order to methodically reinforce, complement and improve their ideas.
  
(either written or spoken) of unscrupulous individuals. Plato feared that writing technology, as a form of persuasion, would change Greek culture significantly and for the worse.
+
Many famous works such as ''The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts'' (Marx, 1844), ''The Holy Family'' (Marx and Engels, 1845), ''Thesis on Feuerbach'' (Marx, 1845), ''The German Ideology'' (Marx and Engels, 1845–1846), and so on, clearly showed that Marx and Engels inherited the quintessence [see Annotation 6, p. 8] of the dialectical and materialist methods which they received from many predecessors. This philosophical heritage led to the development of the dialectical materialist viewpoint and materialist dialectics.
  
Notice the construction: It (writing technology) is the cause of major cultural change. Writing technology implants forgetfulness, it makes people mentally lazy, it causes people to cease using their memories, it makes people susceptible to persuasion, and finally, it causes major shifts in the way culture is organized and in the quality of cultural life. Eric Havelock, writing in the 1980s about the introduction of the Greek alphabet during Plato’s time, claims that the alphabet was revolutionary in its effects on human culture: “The Greek alphabet...impinges on the Greek scene, as a piece of explosive technology, revolutionary in its effects on human culture.” The Greek alphabet, for Havelock, caused people to have a completely “new state of mind,” and thus a whole new way of life.8
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The list of technologies that have supposedly caused revolutionary change of this magnitude is almost as long as the number of technologies you can name. Here are just a few of the more obvious examples:
+
==== Annotation 21 ====
  
Printing press: Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, in The Printing Press as an Agent of Change, traces the effects of printing technology. In more than 700 pages of text, she depicts the printing press as having “left no field of human enterprise untouched.”9
+
There is a subtle, but important, distinction between Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics. This will be explained further in chapters I (p. 48) and II (p. 98).
  
Industrial technology: That the term “Industrial Revolution” is so common is testament to the fact that people have thoroughly internalized the belief that industrial technology transformed the world, forever affecting the shape, pace, and quality of life.
+
With works such as ''The Poverty of Philosophy'' (Marx, 1847) and ''The Manifesto of the Communist Party'' (Marx and Engels, 1848), Marxism was presented as a complete system of fundamental views with three theoretical component parts.
  
Computers: People claim that computer technologies are in the process of revolutionizing every aspect of culture. This revolution has produced an industry in prophesying the effects of the new technologies.
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Social media: We hear often of the democratizing tendency of computer mediated communication, mobile devices, and other social media.
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==== Annotation 22 ====
  
It is interesting, however, that it is not just the really big technologies (writing, automobiles, industrial technology, computers, nanotechnology, biotechnology, and so on) that tend to be understood in terms of technological determinism. Highly significant cultural effects are often attributed to lesser technologies. A student in one of Jennifer’s classes insisted passionately that even the toothpaste pump was revolutionary in its effects (does anybody even use them anymore?). It is as though our habits of mind have become technologically determinist to such an extent that all technologies are seen as inherently world-changing.
+
According to Lenin, the three component parts of Marxism (and, by extension, of Marxism-Leninism) are:
  
What is important here are less the details of the specific effects new technologies are said to produce, but that the significance of these technologies tends to be understood in terms of the effects that they have. Whether the technologies
+
<blockquote>
 +
1. The Philosophy of Marxism: Including Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism
  
Determinism
+
2. The Political Economy of Marxism: A system of knowledge and laws that define the production process and commodity exchange in human society.
  
O 53
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3. Scientific Socialism: The system of thought pertaining to the establishment of the communist social economy form.
 +
</blockquote>
  
in question are writing technologies, printing presses, automobiles, computers, electronic technologies, medical technologies, industrial technologies, biotechnologies, or nanotechnologies, they are understood as changing the culture in highly significant ways. The culture changes from one kind to another, pushed and prodded by changing technologies.
+
These are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, p. 38.
  
If you bring this discussion back to the gun, you can see that from a technological determinist position, the gun is indeed responsible for massive cultural effects. The gun introduced revolutionary new ways to kill: quickly, with minimal effort or skill, and from a safe distance. This changed the face of combat: It is more likely to be mortal combat. This changed the way that differences are settled: There is always the reasonably accessible possibility of threatening to kill. From a technological deterministic position, it is almost as though the gun does roam about in the world on its own, affecting culture in such a way that killing with the gun is inevitable. Countless times, people have told us that the important thing to know about technology is that “once you have it, you have to use it.” There is “no going back,” “no regressing,” “no going back to the cave.” People have no power to change or control things; only technology changes and controls things. If this is the case, if technological determinism is right, then guns do kill people, pure and simple.
+
In the book ''The Poverty of Philosophy'', Marx proposed the basic principles of Dialectical Materialism and Scientific Socialism,* and gave some initial thoughts about surplus value. ''The Manifesto of the Communist Party'' laid the first doctrinal foundation of communism. In this book, the philosophical basis was expressed through the organic unity between the economical viewpoint and socio-political viewpoint.
  
Technological determinism is a belief that may feel true in our contemporary experience; but it is hardly fact. Technologies do not, in and of themselves, determine effects. People create and use technologies. Effects are not imposed on us by the technologies themselves. Automobiles did not drop from the sky and force people to drive them. Televisions did not simply appear and make people watch them. Microwaves do not force people to change their eating habits. Rather, technologies do require various forms of involvement or participation of people at various stages of their development and use. There may be, as Thomas Hughes argues, a feeling of “technological momentum,” that is, a powerful sense of inertia when technologies are developed and deployed that shapes, guides, or even pushes the further development and use of technology.10 The sense of technological momentum is real: Technologies, once in place, do seem to encourage the alignment of all sorts of possibilities. But this feeling of and tendency toward momentum fall far short of the belief in a hard-and-fast technological determinism.
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That being said, it is important to note how often technological determinist statements are expressed in popular discourse. Think how often you hear statements such as “computers are revolutionizing culture” or “Google is making us stupid”11 or “computers are changing what it means to be human” or “television is causing violence” or “genetic engineering will create a better world.” Thus, despite its inadequacies, technological determinism often organizes the way people understand and act in the relationship between technology and culture.
+
==== Annotation 23 ====
  
Technology as Effect: Cultural Determinism
+
<nowiki>*</nowiki> Scientific Socialism is a series of socio-political-economic theories intended to build socialism on a foundation of science within society’s current ''material conditions'' [see Annotation 79, p. 81]. Scientific Socialism is the topic of Part 3 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.
  
Cultural determinism reverses the attribution of causal agency, so that culture is understood to be the cause and technology to be the effect. Although it is perhaps
+
''The Manifesto of the Communist Party'' outlined the laws of movement in history,* as well as the basic theory of socio-economic forms.
  
54 O
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THE RECEIVED VIEW
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==== Annotation 24 ====
  
less evident in popular discourse than technological determinism, cultural determinism is also quite prevalent in the ways that people understand and act in the relationship between culture and technology.
+
<nowiki>*</nowiki> The laws of movement in history are the core principles of ''historical materialism'', which is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.  
  
Cultural determinism depends on assumptions that are almost exactly opposite to those of technological determinism:
+
The basic theory of socio-economic forms dictates that material production plays a decisive role in the existence and development of a society, and that the material production methods decide both the political and ''social consciousness'' of a society.
  
(1) that the values, feelings, beliefs, and practices of the culture cause particular technologies to be developed and used;
+
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(2) that changes in culture result in changes in technology.
+
==== Annotation 25 ====
  
According to this understanding, as culture changes, it needs and develops new technologies to accomplish its goals. The nature of the technology thus necessarily responds to and reflects the nature of the culture.
+
''Social consciousness'' refers to the collective experience of consciousness shared by members of a society, including ideological, cultural, spiritual, and legal beliefs and ideas which are shared within that society. This is related to the concept of base and superstructure, which is discussed later in this chapter.
  
For example, from a cultural determinist understanding, the culture is clearly responsible for both the appearance of the gun and the effects of the gun. The gun is understood to have been developed because there was, and is, a need, a desire, a value that necessitates developing a technology to kill quickly and conveniently. The gun was invented and is used in response to that need and desire. The effects of the gun—that is, killing and/or violence—follow directly from that cultural need and desire. People kill people.
+
''The Manifesto of the Communist Party'' also showed that for as long as classes have existed, the history of the development of human society is the history of class struggle. Through class struggle, the proletariat can liberate ourselves only if we simultaneously and forever liberate the whole of humanity. With these basic opinions, Marx and Engels founded Historical Materialism.
  
An effect of thinking as a cultural determinist is the displacement of responsibility totally away from the technology. Whereas from the technological determinist position, technology is totally to blame or credit and culture is let entirely off the hook, the cultural determinist position blames or credits culture and lets technology totally off the hook. In this position, then, people, not guns, kill people. The technology is almost incidental, the mere instrument of a cultural need and desire. When people believe in this position, they often argue that it wouldn’t matter if you eliminated a particular technology (like the gun) because the culture would come up with an alternative to accomplish the same end. If not the gun, then some other instrument to kill conveniently.
+
By applying Historical Materialism to the comprehensive study of the capitalist production method, Marx made an important discovery: separating workers from the ownership of the means of production through violence was the starting point of the establishment of the capitalist production method. Workers do not own the means of production to perform their labor activities for themselves, so, in order to make income and survive, workers have to sell their labor to capitalists. Labor thus becomes a special commodity, and the sellers of labor become workers for labor-buyers [the proletariat and capitalist class respectively]. The value that workers create through their labor is higher than their wage. And this is how surplus value* is formed. Importantly, this means that the surplus value belongs to people who own the means of production — the capitalists — instead of the workers who provide the labor.
  
Critiquing the cultural determinist position is a little more complicated than refuting technological determinism. At the most rudimentary level, clearly, the technology can’t be let off the hook entirely. As Izzard suggests, the gun “helps.” It is possible to kill with the gun in ways that are unique and can’t be replicated with some other technology. Killing with a gun is different than killing with a sword, slingshot, or nuclear bomb. Thus, when someone kills with a gun, the gun bears some responsibility. So, as with technological determinism, there is an important relationship between people and technology that the cultural determinist position is ill equipped to understand.
+
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In addition, it is possible to critique the cultural determinist position by challenging the assumption that technologies, in any straightforward manner, reflect the needs and desires of the culture. As the cultural determinist position implies, the effects of technologies ought to fall completely within the range of our intentions. They do, after all, reflect needs or desires. To put it bluntly, this is all too obviously not the case. Setting aside the problem of whether or not it is even
+
==== Annotation 26 ====
  
Determinism
+
<nowiki>*</nowiki> Surplus value is equal to labor value (the amount of value workers produce through labor) minus wages paid to workers. Under capitalism, this surplus value is appropriated as profit by capitalists after the products which workers created are sold.
  
O 55
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So, in discovering the origin of surplus value, Marx pointed out the exploitative nature of capitalism [because capitalists essentially steal surplus labor value from workers which is then transformed into profits], though this exploitative nature is concealed by the money-commodity relationship.
  
possible to identify real intentions, technologies always surprise an unprepared populace with effects that were not purported to be intended. Did anyone intend automobiles to produce greenhouse gasses, or nuclear power plants to blow up in our faces, or computer keyboards to produce carpal tunnel syndrome? How can these effects be explained from a cultural determinist position?
+
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Indeed, a cultural determinist has difficulty explaining these problematic effects. To account for these rogue effects, people have developed complex causal categories. Foreseen effects are called intended effects, primary effects, or simply effects. But those other effects, unforeseen and sometimes undesirable, are called unintended effects, secondary effects, side effects, or even revenge effects. Edward Tenner, in his humorously titled book, Why Things Bite Back, makes very fine distinctions between different kinds of unintended effects. Side effects, according to Tenner, are effects that are unrelated to the intended effects of the technology. Side effects are trade-offs. Revenge effects, which might be desirable or undesirable, are unforeseen consequences that are directly linked to the intended effects. These are not exactly trade-offs but “ironic” effects that almost always sneak in the back door with the successful implementation of the technology. He gives the example of a chemotherapy treatment for cancer. If, on the one hand, the treatment produces baldness, that is a side effect, a trade-off for a cure. If, on the other hand, the treatment causes another, lethal cancer, that is a revenge effect. Tenner breaks down revenge effects even further to capture an imaginative range of ironic effects. These include rearranging effects, repeating effects, recomplicating effects, regenerating effects, and recongesting effects.12
+
==== Annotation 27 ====
  
The meticulous, imaginative, dedicated effort to classify differences among intended and unintended effects directs the focus away from the decisive assumption that operates in making that initial distinction between intended and unintended effects: that the culture fundamentally, though imperfectly, gives shape to these technologies, which in turn do our bidding. It is as though the “real,” “significant,” or “primary” effects are the intended effects. The unintended effects are somehow less real, a sort of irritating excess of the real. This is an odd contradiction, however; for aren’t those unintended effects just as real? Effects are all equally effects, whether you like them or not, whether you intended them or not. And if some effects aren’t intended, then the culture no longer seems to be in complete control of technologies and their effects. Thus, the proclivity to differentiate between effects and side effects tells us less about the cultural work performed by technologies than it does about our own cultural desire to believe in cultural determinism at the same time that we acknowledge its failure.
+
Under capitalism, a worker’s labor is a commodity which capitalists pay for with money in the form of wages. Workers never know how much of their labor value is being withheld by employers, which conceals the nature of capitalist wage-theft.
  
A final problem with cultural determinism is that it discourages any response except optimism regarding technological change, no matter the unintended effects. Indeed, as Tenner argues, “Optimists welcome [crisis] as an injection of innovatory stimulus.”13 The trick, for Tenner, is to learn to “practice the ability to recognize bad surprises early enough to do something about them.”14 Responding creatively to revenge effects stimulates further technological development, and that, if undertaken thoughtfully, can only be good, since it is a further reflection of the potential to give shape to the world. “In the long run,” he concludes, revenge effects “are going to be
+
The theory of surplus value was deeply and comprehensively researched and presented in ''Capital''<ref>''Das Kapital:'' Karl Marx’s most important contribution to political economy. It is composed of four volumes. It is the work of Marx’s whole career and an important part of Engels’ career, as well. Marx started writing ''Das Kapital'' in the 1840s and continued writing until he died (1883). ''Das Kapital I'' was published in 1867. After Marx’s death, Engels edited and published the second volume in 1885 and the third volume in 1894. The Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the USSR edited and published ''Das Kapital IV'', also known as ''Theories of Surplus-Value'', in the 1950s, long after the death of Marx and Engels.</ref> by Marx and Engels. This work not only paves the way to form a new political-economic theory system based on the working class’s viewpoint, it also firmly consolidates and develops the historical-materialist viewpoint through the theory of socio-economic forms.
  
56 O
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THE RECEIVED VIEW
+
==== Annotation 28 ====
  
good for us.”15 We are, in the end, only always moving ahead. Differentiating between effects and side effects thus has the power to minimize whatever is undesirable about technology by favoring and highlighting the potential for positive change.
+
Karl Marx explained that the goal of writing ''Capital'' was “to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society.” By “laws of motion,” Marx refers to the origins and motivations for change within human society. Historical materialism holds that human society develops based on internal and external relationships within and between aspects of society. Historical materialism is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.
  
Technological versus Cultural Determinism
+
According to the theory of socio-economic forms [which is the basis of historical materialism], the movements and developments of human society are natural-historical processes based on dialectical interactions between forces of production and relations of production; between infrastructure basis [commonly referred to as “base” in English] and superstructure.
  
It is interesting that very few people will maintain a purely technological determinist position if you can get them thinking about it at least a little bit. On a theoretical level, most people will acknowledge that in most cases somebody has to pick up and use the gun for it to do anything. If you find a gun and put it in a closet, you might keep it from doing something. You know that the gun does not have a completely independent will. You know that the NRA is in a way correct to say, “Guns don’t kill people.” Similarly you know, at some level, that even though the computer seems to be changing cultural life rather dramatically, there are places that it cannot touch without your participation. For example, provided that you choose to do so, you can retain spiritual beliefs that are unaffected by the computer.
+
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Similarly, very few people will maintain a purely cultural determinist position if you can get them thinking about it at least a little bit. Doesn’t the theoretical distinction between intended and unintended effects really undermine the very notion that technology is merely an instrument of cultural intentions? Technologies do seem to participate in changes in our lives, whether those changes were intended or not. It doesn’t matter whether you call an effect an unintended effect, a side effect, or a revenge effect. Equally, they are all effects. Both intended and unintended effects make demands on, and reconfigure, cultural life. The gun in the hand of a child can kill unintentionally, but what difference does the distinction make? The gun certainly doesn’t care if it was intentional or not; and the intentions of the one pulling the trigger don’t alter the fact that the person killed is dead either way.
+
==== Annotation 29 ====
  
Further, the fact that unintended effects can only be identified in retrospect suggests that the cultural imagination and its goals are hopelessly limited. No technology can ever be purely a response to easily identifiable, straightforward cultural intentions. Technologies are not mere tools fashioned just to serve culturally acknowledged needs and goals. Nowhere is that more obvious than in the myriad examples of unintended effects.
+
The forces of production consist of the combination of means of production and workers within society. Under capitalism, the production force consists of the proletariat (working class) and means of production which are owned by the bourgeoisie (capitalist class).
  
In spite of the fact that most people would be willing to admit to these observations on a theoretical level, most people still live as though one or the other—technological determinism or cultural determinism—were true. There is a tendency to see technology as either pushing culture along or responding to our cultural will. And for the most part, people come down on the side of technological determinism. But the very forced choice between technological determinism and cultural determinism is, we think, a sort of “Hobson’s choice,” meaning that a person must choose between options whose difference is superficial. 16 In making the choice, you’ve been forced into an undesirable position. You may be forced to make a choice, whether you like it or not, but in the absence of meaningful alternatives,
+
Marx viewed society as composed of an ''economic base'' and a ''social superstructure''. The base of society includes the material relationships between humans and the means of productions and the material processes which humans undertake to survive and transform our environment. The superstructure of society includes all components of society not directly relating to production, such as media institutions, music, and art, as well as other cultural elements like religion, customs, moral standards, and everything else which manifests primarily through conscious activity and social relations.
  
Determinism
+
In the preface to ''A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy'', Marx explained:
  
O 57
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<blockquote>
 +
In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society — the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life determines the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.
 +
</blockquote>
  
both choices are equally bad. For example, in the movie Sophie’s Choice, a woman is forced to choose which of her two children will be put to death.17 In this Hobson’s choice, the superficial appearance of choice is meaningless: Either choice is equally horrible; her alternatives do not make a real choice possible.
+
RELIGION GOVERNMENT EDUCATION
  
If technological determinism and cultural determinism are the only choices open to you, you have no real alternatives. Both of these positions rely on a simple determinism that quickly fails to provide the nuances required by responses to real-life situations. What choice do you have if you must decide whether guns kill people or people kill people? This Hobson’s choice leaves no way to understand how it is that people come to develop and use guns or how guns and people play roles in a struggle to define what it means to kill, or for that matter, what it means to own a gun. To put this very concretely, technological determinism and cultural determinism would not help you parse out responsibility in the 2012 Sandy Hook Elementary School massacre in Newtown, Connecticut, where a lone gunman besieged the school and killed—with guns—twenty children and six staff members, in addition to killing his mother and himself. Is the culture the cause and therefore responsible? Are the guns the cause and therefore responsible? Neither of these choices seems entirely satisfactory. We submit that thinking so restrictively—in terms of simple cause and effect—is an insufficient way to understand the complex processes within which guns (or any other technology) play a cultural role. Determinism is, simply put, not a helpful way to get at the questions that matter about technological culture.
+
POLITICAL ECONOMY NATURE
  
So the good news is you don’t have to decide between technological determinism and cultural determinism. This is not to say, however, that you can simply vacillate between the two positions based on the argument you want to make at a particular moment. Many people do this in everyday life without acknowledging the incommensurable nature of their positions. The challenge for us is to provide you with a better way of understanding the role of technology in culture so that you no longer need to resort to the determinisms. We introduce this option in Part III of this book. Nonetheless, it is important to realize and observe how pervasive are the assertions of these two positions. Both technological and cultural determinism are prevalent in everyday discourse, and when they are, questions of who or what is in control dominate concerns about technology. In the next chapter, then, we turn to the issue of control, to highlight the workings of the widely held commitment to determinist discourses.
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-4.png|''The base of society includes material-based elements and relations including political economy, means of production, class relations, etc. The superstructure includes human-consciousness-based elements and relations including government, culture, religion, etc.'']]
  
Figure 9: Anchor Chain for Brush Control
+
In other words, Marx argued that superstructure (which includes social consciousness) is shaped by the infrastructural basis, or base, of society. This reflects the more general dialectical relationship between matter and consciousness, in which the material, as the first basis of reality, determines consciousness, while consciousness mutually impacts the material [see ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88]. So, the base of society — being material in nature — ''determines'' the superstructure, while the superstructure ''impacts'' the base. It couldn’t possibly be the other way around, according to the dialectical materialist worldview, because the primary driving forces of conscious activity are rooted in material needs.
  
Source: Photograph by Bureau of Land Management, 2013, Wikimedia Commons: commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Anchor_Chain_for_Brush_Control_%289824905163% 29.jpg
+
The theory of socio-economic forms proves that the materialist viewpoint of history is not just a hypothesis, but a scientifically-proven principle.
  
Chapter Five
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Control
+
==== Annotation 30 ====
  
VICTOR FRANKENSTEIN HAS A PROBLEM—several problems actually. He is being shunned at school, his health is failing, his fiancée of many years wants him to come home, and then there’s his work. Frankenstein has created a monster, literally, out of pieced-together corpses, and he has managed to breathe life into it. The creature, however, is not what he expected, and he has fled in horror, leaving the creature to perish. It hasn’t perished. Rather, it has survived and thrived, and now it promises to wreak vengeance on its creator, to be there on Frankenstein’s wedding night and destroy his family.
+
As Lenin explains in ''What the “Friends of the People” Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats:''
  
It’s a familiar story, told again and again through films and popular culture over the last two centuries. We often mistakenly think that Frankenstein is the name of the monster; but in this perhaps we are not far off. The Frankenstein story, written by Mary Shelley and published in 1818, has become emblematic of a particular problem: the belief that we have no control over the things we create.1 We learn this lesson first with children, of course, who refuse to obey us (“How sharper than a serpent’s tooth it is to have a thankless child!” complained King Lear). But this analogy is carried further to other creations of humankind. Frankenstein was not the first such story. Fables about magically conjured creatures, such as golems, stretch back into mythology. The Frankenstein story has stuck with us for almost two hundred years, partly because the creature in question is the creation of science, not magic. It is a fable about the ethics of science and the control of technology. The irony here is that modern science and technology often intend to control nature or culture. Thus, to lose control of the very things that promise control seems dire.
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<blockquote>
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Now — since the appearance of Capital — the materialist conception of history is no longer a hypothesis, but a scientifically proven proposition. And until we get some other attempt to give a scientific explanation of the functioning and development of some formation of society — formation of society, mind you, and not the way of life of some country or people, or even class, etc. — another attempt just as capable of introducing order into the “pertinent facts” as materialism is, that is just as capable of presenting a living picture of a definite formation, while giving it a strictly scientific explanation -until then the materialist conception of history will be a synonym for social science. Materialism is not ‘primarily a scientific conception of history’... but the only scientific conception of it.
  
In this chapter we discuss both halves of this argument: how technologies are perceived as the means of controlling nature and culture and how technologies are perceived as escaping human control. After setting out the groundwork with these two positions, we visit a particularly potent metaphor for our relationship with technology: the Master and the Slave. Through this metaphor we discuss the ideas of technological autonomy, technological dependence, and trust. Even in an era of new technology—of artificial intelligence, expert
+
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''Capital'' is Marx’s main work which presents Marxism as a social science by illuminating the inevitable processes of birth, development, and decay of capitalism; the replacement of capitalism with socialism; and the historical mission of the working class — the social force that can implement this replacement. Marx’s materialist conception of history and proletarian revolution continued to be developed in ''Critique of Gotha Programme'' (Marx, 1875). This book discusses the dictatorship of the proletariat, the transitional period from capitalism to socialism, and phases of the communism building process, and several other premises. Together, these premises formed the scientific basis for Marx’s theoretical guidance for the future revolutionary activity of the proletariat.
 +
</blockquote>
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
 
  
systems, nano-technology, and biotechnology—the ghost of Frankenstein rears its head.
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The popular version of the Frankenstein story conveyed by dozens of films (including James Whale’s elegant films of the 1930s, the Hammer horror films of the 1950s and 1960s, Mel Brooks’ comedic yet impassioned and surprisingly respectful parody, and Kenneth Branagh’s torrid version) is a simple monster-on-the-loose or revenge story.2 But Shelley’s book (and Branagh’s film touches on this) is more significantly about the question of humans’ responsibility for their creations. After his “birth,” the creature confronts Frankenstein to request information about his existence. He asks Frankenstein to show compassion and create a companion to assuage his loneliness, but Frankenstein will have none of it. The havoc that occurs is not entirely the creature’s fault, but neither is it entirely the creator’s fault. The lesson to be learned is that we cannot disown the things we create. Langdon Winner crystallizes the lesson of Frankenstein with this statement: “the invention of something powerful and novel is not enough. Thought and care must be given to its place in the sphere of human relationships.”3 Technologies, the fable teaches, are never neutral or autonomous objects. They are, instead, more like creatures themselves. Only by (incorrectly and naively) viewing technology as neutral and autonomous can the creator be let off the hook. Only, for example, if the gun is neutral and autonomous, can gun manufacturers be considered completely innocent of what people do with their products. If we consider technology to be culturally embedded, we cannot so easily wash the blood off our hands.
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==== Annotation 31 ====
  
Yes, We Have Mastery of Our Tools
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When Marx refers to a “dictatorship of the proletariat,” he does ''not'' mean “dictatorship” to mean “totalitarian” or “authoritarian.” Rather, here “dictatorship” simply refers to a situation in which political power is held by the working class (which constitutes the vast majority of society). “Dictatorship,” here, refers to full control of the means of production and government. This stands in contrast to capitalism, which is a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, in which capitalists (a small minority of society) have full control of the means of production and government.
  
Writing in the 1960s, Marshall McLuhan argued that technologies are extensions of human faculties. He argued that “the wheel is an extension of the foot, the book is an extension of the eye… clothing an extension of the skin… and electric circuitry, an extension of the central nervous system.”4 Technology becomes a means—a medium, in McLuhan’s phraseology—to carry out that faculty. The technologies of the world become a means of carrying out human will. McLuhan’s fundamental point is how technologies—media in particular—extend our influence on the world around us.
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==== c. The Defending and Developing Stage of Marxism ====
  
We typically think of technologies as being key to early human survival, for they allowed humans to gain control, first over their environment, and, second, over one another. Weapons helped humans kill game, and digging implements helped humans find roots to eat. Eventually tools helped humans systematize their food production: growing crops instead of finding them, and herding animals instead of hunting them. Construction of houses and buildings and the domestication of fire helped humans to shape the spaces in which they lived. In these ways technologies have given humans an advantage in the basic struggle against nature. Once the initial battle against nature was reasonably under control, humans began to devise ways to control each other. The following sections describe how the practice and perception of the control
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''- Historical Background and the Need for Defending and Developing Marxism''
  
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In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, capitalism developed into a new stage, called imperialism. The dominant and exploitative nature of capitalism became increasingly obvious. Contradictions in capitalist societies became increasingly serious — especially the class struggles between the proletariat and capitalists. In many colonised countries, the resistance against imperialism created a unity between national liberation and proletarian revolution, uniting people in colonised countries with the working class in colonial countries. The core of such revolutionary struggles at this time was in Russia. The Russian proletariat and working class under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party became the leader of the whole international revolutionary movement.
  
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During this time, both capitalist industry and natural sciences developed rapidly. Some natural scientists, especially physicists, lacked a grounding in materialist philosophical methodology and therefore fell into a viewpoint crisis. Idealist philosophers used this crisis to directly influence the perspective and activities of many revolutionary movements.
  
over nature and over one another continues to play out in relation to mastery over our tools.
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Control over Nature and the Environment
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==== Annotation 32 ====
  
Early in the twentieth century, the philosopher Max Scheler pointed out that science and technology were not exempt from a will to power, and that a will to power was connected to the fundamental values of that society. In the feudal period, he said, the power-drive was focused on other people (as we shall see below), but in the modern era the power-drive is focused on nature. The domination of nature, he argued, is a fundamental value of Western culture.5 This value is deeply embedded in the idea of progress, which we discussed in Chapter 2. This is made clear in ideas such as Manifest Destiny and in images such as that of Progress striding across the landscape bringing light, order, and technology to the wilds of nature.
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==== Imperialism ====
  
The examples of the technological domination of nature are numerous. We will begin with the largest, the reshaping of the landscape, and turn to the smallest, genetic manipulation. The control of nature is no more evident than in the building of large dams. The great rivers of the world—the Nile, the Mississippi, and so on—have been brought “under control.Unpredictable floods are mainly a thing of the past, rates of flow are carefully controlled, and the paths the rivers take are carefully managed. Even one of the natural wonders of the United States, Niagara Falls (a key example of the sublime: visitors flock to it to experience awe), can be shut off like a faucet. Other examples of the technological control of nature include agricultural technologies, forestry, and mining. At the smallest level, the mapping of the human genome and the capabilities of genetic manipulation have opened the possibility of instigating and controlling genetic mutation, allowing one, for example, to eliminate genetically transmitted disorders. It is predicted that nano-sized robots, about the size of a few molecules, will be able to enter bodies and cure and rebuild us cell by cell.6
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Lenin defined imperialism as “the monopoly stage of capitalism,” listing its essential characteristics as “finance capital (serving) a few very big monopolist banks, merged with the capital of the monopolist associations of industrialists” and “a colonial policy of monopolist possession of the territory of the world, which has been completely divided up.
  
What aided this view was the objectification of nature. Rational, scientific methods made it seem possible to turn nature into an object of study. The task of objective science was to unlock the secrets of nature—the nature of life and death, how things work, how things are related—by systematizing information and carrying out carefully planned and recorded experiments. Scientific observation requires that we set something at a physical distance (even if it is the distance in a microscope) and a psychological distance. By observing nature and other humans in this way, they become mere objects to be manipulated and understood, and not agents in their own right. It also separates humans from nature, which, supported by Judeo-Christian religion, progress stories, and economics, facilitates the view that nature is intended for human use.7
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==== Subjective and Empiricist Idealism ====
  
When we think of nature as a resource, we participate in this view. The term “natural resources”—meaning oil, lumber, ore, and so on—belies a view that is both economic and utilitarian. Utilitarianism focuses on the use-value of objects (and people) and asks what profit can be made from something, or how something can be useful. We ignore things we think are use-less—things that don’t have a
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In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, natural scientists were exploring various philosophical bases for scientific inquiry. One Austrian physicist, Ernst Mach, attempted to build a philosophy of natural science based on the works of German-Swiss philosopher Richard Avenarius known as “Empirio-Criticism.” Empirio-Criticism, which also came to be known as Machism, has many parallels with the philosophy of George Berkeley. Berkeley (1685 — 1753) was an Anglo-Irish philosopher whose main philosophical achievement was the formulation of a doctrine which he called “immaterialism,” and which later came to be known as “Subjective Idealism.” This doctrine was summed up by Berkeley’s maxim: “''Esse est percipi''” — “To be is to be perceived.” Subjective Idealism holds that individuals can only directly perceive and know about physical objects through direct sense experience. Therefore, individuals are unable to obtain any real knowledge about abstract concepts such as “matter”.
  
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The philosophy of Empirio-Criticism, which was developed by Avenarius and Mach, also holds that the only reliable human knowledge we can hold comes from our sensations and experiences. Mach argued that the only source of knowledge is sense data and “experience,” but that we can’t develop any actual knowledge of the actual external world. In other words, Mach’s conception of empirio-criticism holds all knowledge as essentially subjective in nature, and limited to (and by) human sense experience. Mach’s development of Empirio-Criticism (which can also be referred to as ''empirical idealism'' or ''Machism'')'''' was therefore a continuation of Berkeley’s subjective idealism. Both Berkeley’s Immaterialism and Empirio-Criticism are considered to be ''subjective idealism'' because these philosophies deny that the external world exists — or otherwise assert that it is unknowable — and, as such, hold that all knowledge stems from experiences which are essentially ''subjective'' in nature.
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
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Mach argued that reality can only be defined by our sensual experiences of reality, and that we can never concretely know anything about the objective external world due to the limitations of sense experience. This stands in direct contradiction to dialectical materialism, which holds that we can develop accurate knowledge of the material world through observation and practice. Whereas Berkeley developed subjective idealist theological arguments to defend the Christian faith, Mach employed subjective idealism for purely secular purposes as a basis for scientific inquiry.
  
specific purpose or function for that society. When we think of the use value of nature we are likely to ask economic questions: How much is it worth? How can it be used to generate wealth? Many contemporary environmental struggles are over just this view. One group looks at a forest and sees it as so much lumber (a useful object) that can be sold for a particular profit. Another group sees a forest as being a home for wildlife or as a producer of oxygen to keep the earth in balance. These are very different value systems.
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''Note: all quotations below come from Lenin’s book:'' Materialism and Empirio-Criticism''.''
  
Typically, the rational application of scientific principles, often cited as the definition of technology, is based on the idea of the domination of nature although not necessarily as a natural resource. Technology as a product of scientific principles is assumed to be a rational system of domination and control. This was Frankenstein’s view as a scientist: He figured out scientifically how to re-animate a human body. The supposed infallibility of his view—his faith in science as producer of true, rational knowledge, his logical deductions about the nature of the being he was to create—kept him from considering the possibility that the creature he created might be something other than what he envisioned, and that it might not obey.
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Vladimir Lenin strongly opposed Empirio-Criticism and, by extension, Machism, which was becoming popular among communist revolutionists in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, because it pushed forward idealist principles which directly opposed the core tenets of dialectical materialism.
  
Social Control
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Lenin believed that revolutionaries should be guided not by idealism, but by dialectical materialism. He believed that Empirio-Criticism and Machism consisted of mysticism which would mislead political revolutionaries.
  
The scientific framework for viewing the world encourages and allows us to organize and control nature rationally: to classify nature into categories such as genus and species, to manipulate its raw materials into all manner of synthetic structures, and to exert control over other organisms with reckless abandon. It also allows us to control each other. Historian Lewis Mumford has argued that we should think of early cultures as a type of machine to do just that:
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Lenin outlined Machian arguments against materialism:
  
Now to call these collective entities machines is no idle play on words. If a machine be defined, more or less in accord with the classic definition of Franz Reuleaux, as a combination of resistant parts, each specialized in function, operating under human control, to utilize energy and to perform work, then the great labor machine was in every aspect a genuine machine: all the more because its components, though made of human bone, nerve, and muscle, were reduced to their bare mechanical elements and rigidly standardized for the performance of their limited tasks. The taskmaster’s lash ensured conformity. Such machines had already been assembled if not invented by kings in the early part of the Pyramid Age, from the end of the Fourth Millennium.8
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<blockquote>
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The materialists, we are told, recognise something unthinkable and unknowable — ’things-in-themselves’ — matter ‘outside of experience’ and outside of our knowledge [see: Annotation 72, p. 68]. They lapse into genuine mysticism by admitting the existence of something beyond, something transcending the bounds of ‘experience’... When they say that matter, by acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensations, the materialists take as their basis the ‘unknown,’ nothingness; for do they not themselves declare our sensations to be the only source of knowledge?
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</blockquote>
  
The coordination of populations in the accomplishment of a task (for example, building a pyramid) is an example of what Mumford would call a megamachine. The model for this kind of control was the military, where ranks of soldiers work together, like an efficient machine, toward one task. Mumford writes, “[T]hrough the army, in fact, the standard model of the megamachine was transmitted from culture to culture.”9 To aid in the function of this megamachine, each element in it (each person) was given a particular position and function. A rigid hierarchy was put in place, and each level was given different responsibilities. Units specialized in particular tasks and were trained to perform their duties efficiently.
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Lenin argued that this new form of Machist subjective idealism was, in fact, simply a rehashing of “old errors of idealism,” disguised and dressed up with new terminology. As such, Lenin simply reiterated the longstanding, bedrock dialectical materialist arguments against idealism [see Annotation 10, p. 10]. He was especially upset that contemporary Marxists of his era were being swayed by Machist Empirio-Criticism because he found it to be in direct conflict with dialectical materialism, writing: “(These) would-be Marxists… try in every way to assure their readers that Machism is compatible with the historical materialism of Marx and Engels.
  
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Lenin goes on to describe the work of philosophers such as Franz Blei, who critiqued Marxism with Machist arguments, as “quasi-scientific tomfoolery decked out in the terminology of Avenarius.” He saw Empirio-Criticism as completely incompatible with communist revolution, since idealism had historically been used by the ruling class to deceive and control the lower classes. In particular, he believed that Machist idealism was being used by the capitalist class to preach bourgeois economics, writing that “the professors of economics are nothing but learned salesmen of the capitalist class.”
  
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Lenin was deeply concerned that prominent Russian socialist philosophers were adopting Machist ideas and claiming them to be compatible with Marxism, writing:
  
The connection of the military to control is much more than an historical aside. Technologies of destruction allow leaders to intimidate and threaten populations into submission. State organizations like the military and police take advantage of these technologies for maintaining control. It is not a coincidence that great technological strides are often made during times of war. Standardized production, the practice of triaging patients in medical care, and the development of penicillin are all indebted to war.
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<blockquote>
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The task of Marxists in both cases is to be able to master and adapt the achievements of these ‘salesmen’... and to be able to lop off their reactionary tendency, to pursue your own line and to combat the whole alignment of forces and classes hostile to us. And this is just what our Machians were unable to do, they slavishly follow the lead of the reactionary professorial philosophy.
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</blockquote>
  
Less corporeal means of controlling the population were developed toward the end of the eighteenth century, when control was established through the means of surveillance. We often think of surveillance as simply watching someone, which in itself can be an effective means of control. But it can also refer to the gathering of information on people through means other than direct observation.
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Lenin further explains how Empirio-Criticism serves the interests of the capitalist class:
  
In order to better control their workers, who often worked on their own time in their own homes, capitalists created the factory, which brought all the workers under one roof. In this way workers and the work process could be regulated and controlled. Distractions could be minimized and workers could be required to put in their time under constant observation. The ultimate expression of this kind of control is the panopticon designed by Jeremy Bentham. Inspired by the plans of a relative’s new workshop, Bentham created what he felt would be the perfect machine of social control. He designed a unique prison, which he called the panopticon (meaning all seeing). The prison was designed as a circle or semicircle with the cells lining the walls. In the middle of the building was a central guard tower. The interior of each cell was readily observable from the central guard tower; and by means of reflectors and lights, each cell could be immediately illuminated. At the same time it was impossible for the cells’ occupants to see into the central tower. The prisoners knew that they could be watched at any moment of the day or night, but they could never be sure when they were being observed. The threat of inspection rather than the threat of direct violence was thus the means of control. Constant illumination and the threat of constant inspection meant that prisoners would have to behave correctly at all times and that these behaviors would have to become habit. The prisoners would internalize the control and discipline themselves.
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<blockquote>
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The empirio-criticists as a whole... claim to be non-partisan both in philosophy and in social science. They are neither for socialism nor for liberalism. They make no differentiation between the fundamental and irreconcilable trends of materialism and idealism in philosophy, but endeavor to rise above them. We have traced this tendency of Machism through a long series of problems of epistemology, and we ought not to be surprised when we encounter it in sociology.
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</blockquote>
  
Bentham believed that the idea of the panopticon applied beyond the walls of a prison. He believed his machine would ensure social control in workshops, schools, and virtually every other institution or setting. He even devised plans for a series of panoptic villages. French philosopher Michel Foucault, commenting on Bentham’s invention, writes, “Whenever one is dealing with a multiplicity of individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behaviour must be imposed, the panoptic schema may be used.”10
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In the conclusion of the same text, Lenin explains why communists should reject Empirio-Criticism and Machism with four “standpoints,” summarized here:
  
Sociologist Max Weber described a further development in the technologies of social control: bureaucracy.11 There are two primary elements of bureaucracy: the rational organization of an institution and the collection of information. Both involve technology in significant ways. Like the rational organization of the military, bureaucracies strive to organize their workforces according to the principles of rationality and efficiency. Rigid hierarchies are maintained, each
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1. The theoretical foundations of Empirio-Criticism can’t withstand comparison with those of dialectical materialism. Empirio-Criticism differs little from older forms of idealism, and the tired old errors of idealism clash directly with Marxist dialectical materialism. As Lenin puts it: “only utter ignorance of the nature of philosophical materialism generally and of the nature of Marx’s and Engels’ dialectical method can lead one to speak of ‘combining’ empirio-criticism and Marxism.
  
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2. The philosophical foundations of Empirio-Criticism are flawed. “Both Mach and Avenarius started with Kant (see: Annotation 72, p. 68) and, leaving him, proceeded not towards materialism, but in the opposite direction, towards Hume and Berkeley (see: Annotation 10, p. 10)... The whole school of Mach and Avenarius is moving more and more definitely towards idealism.”
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
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3. Machism is little more than a relatively obscure trend which has not been adopted by most scientists; a “reactionary (and) transitory infatuation.” As Lenin puts it: “the vast majority of scientists, both generally and in this special branch of science... are invariably on the side of materialism.”
  
employee has a particular task or set of tasks, and work proceeds in an ordered manner. A particularly potent variation on rational bureaucracy is Frederick Taylor’s notion of scientific management, introduced in Chapters 2 and 3, which focused on the organization and division of labor and the observation and training of laborers. Scientific management, or Taylorism, is, in short, an attempt by management to control what workers do. One of its fundamental principles is the removal of decision-making abilities from the shop floor. Only managers make decisions; laborers only carry out their orders. The reasoning is this: A worker will only work at maximum efficiency if constantly observed and if not interrupted by the need to make decisions.
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4. Empirio-Criticism and Machism reflect the “tendencies and ideology of the antagonistic classes in modern society.” Idealism represents the interests of the ruling class in modern society, and is used to subjugate the majority of society. Idealist philosophy “stands fully armed, commands vast organizations and steadily continues to exercise influence on the masses, turning the slightest vacillation in philosophical thought to its own advantage.” In other words, idealism is used by the ruling class to manipulate our understanding of the world, as opposed to materialism (and especially dialectical materialism) which illuminates the true nature of reality which would lead to the liberation of the working class.
  
By removing decision-making powers, management engages in what is called the deskilling of the workforce. A knowledgeable, decision-making skilled worker is never fully under management’s control. Therefore it is in management’s interests to learn the worker’s skills, train others in those skills, or, better yet, create a machine to replicate those skills. The most dramatic examples of deskilling workers as a means of controlling the workforce involve the introduction of machinery in the workplace, especially more modern introductions of computer-driven robotic machines.12 Langdon Winner tells the story of the McCormick Reaper Manufacturing Plant, which installed expensive manufacturing machines on the shop floor so it could fire key workers and break the influence of the workers’ union. Once the union was destroyed and management regained control over the workers, the machines were removed, because they were too expensive to run and produced a product inferior to what the workers produced. Although the cost was great, gaining control must have been considered worth it.13
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At this time, Marxism was widely disseminating throughout Russia, which challenged the social positions and benefits of capitalists. In reaction to Marxism, many ideological movements such as empiricism, utilitarianism, revisionism, etc. [see: Appendix F, p. 252] rose up and claimed to renew Marxism, while in fact they misrepresented and denied Marxism.
  
What is collectively referred to as “paperwork” is another significant aspect of bureaucratic control and entails principles of rationality and efficiency in the collection of information. Paperwork refers to the records and information collected by an organization, which is designed to make it function more efficiently. Information, whether gathered through panoptic inspection or through the careful accrual of bureaucratic dossiers, must be collected, stored, and made (selectively) accessible if it is to serve a control function. This means that information technologies—including filing cabinets, recording devices, and the computer— are in another way the tools of social control.
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In this context, new achievements of natural science needed to be analyzed and summarized in order to continue the authentic development of Marxist viewpoints and methodologies. Theoretical principles to fight against the misrepresentation of Marxism needed to be developed in order to bring Marxism into the new era. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin would fulfill this historical requirement with his theoretical developments.
  
As extensions of our human faculties and as tools of social control used in the interest of surveillance and bureaucracy, technologies seem to do our bidding. They seem, for better or for worse, to give us control over nature and society. Yes, it seems that we have mastery of our tools.
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''- The Role of Lenin in Defending and Developing Marxism.''
  
No, Our Tools Are Out of Control
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Lenin’s process of defending and developing Marxism can be separated into three periods: first, from 1893 to 1907; next, from 1907 to 1917; and finally from the success of the October socialist revolution in 1917 until Lenin’s death in 1924.
  
For almost every example of how technologies have allowed humans to gain control of nature and each other, we can think of counter-examples where technologies seem to have moved out of the control of individuals, sometimes creating disastrous unintended consequences. Whenever we’ve thought we understood
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From 1893 to 1907, Lenin focused on fighting against populists<ref>Populist faction: A faction within the Russian revolution which upheld an idealist capitalist ideology with many representatives such as Mikhailovsky, Bakunin, and Plekhanov. Populists failed to recognise the important roles of the people, of the farmers and workers alliance, and of the proletariat. Instead, they completely centered the role of the individual in society. They considered the rural communes as the nucleus of “socialism.” They saw farmers under the leadership of intellectuals as the main force of the revolution. The populists advocated individual terrorism as the primary method of revolutionary struggle.</ref>. His book ''What the Friends of the People are and How They Fight Against the Social Democrats (1894)'' criticized the serious mistakes of this faction in regards to socio-historical issues and also exposed their scheme of distorting Marxism by erasing the boundaries between Marxism’s materialist dialectics and Hegel’s idealist dialectics. In the same book, Lenin also shared many thoughts about the important roles of theory, reality, and the relationship between the two.
  
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==== Annotation 33 ====
  
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The ''populist'' philosophy was born in Russia in the 19<sup>th</sup> century with roots going back to the Narodnik agrarian socialist movement of the 1860s and 70s, composed of peasants who rose up in a failed campaign against the Czar. In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, a new political movement emerged rooted in Narodnik ideas and a new party called the Socialist Revolutionary Party was formed. The political philosophy of this movement, now commonly translated into English as “populism,” focused on an agrarian peasant revolution led by intellectuals with the ambition of going directly from a feudal society to a socialist society built from rural communes. This movement overtly opposed Marxism and dialectical materialism and was based on subjective idealist utopianism (see Annotation 95, p. 94).
  
nature, nature comes roaring back. For example, all our dams and floodcontrol technologies have not eliminated disastrous flooding, as the occasional, disastrous flooding of the Mississippi river illustrates. Indeed, often floodcontrol measures—once they fail—exacerbate floods. Also, whenever we feel that we have established sufficient social control, people rebel. Finally, our tools themselves sometimes seem to have lives of their own, suggesting that they are out of control. Who among us has not at some point complained about our computers giving us a hard time?
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With the book ''What is to be Done?'' (1902), Lenin developed Marxist viewpoints on the methods for the proletariat to take power. He discussed economic, political, and ideological struggles. In particular, he emphasized the ideological formation process of the proletariat.
  
Both perceptions—that technology is firmly in our control and that it is slipping out of our control—are widespread in our culture. We may even feel both ways at the same time, or feel differently in different contexts. Speaking metaphorically, when we feel in control we sometimes say that we are “in the driver’s seat,” and mean that the machine is under our control. To continue the metaphor, however, don’t we occasionally get the feeling that though we are in the driver’s seat, none of the pedals seems to work very well (the brakes are soft, the steering is loose) and the car seems to be driving itself? At other times don’t we feel like our cars are out to get us?
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==== Annotation 34 ====
  
One way to understand this is by utilizing Mumford’s idea of megatechnics, the notion that society can be viewed as a well-integrated megamachine. Recall from our earlier discussion of megatechnics that society as megamachine is a means of controlling a population; however, like the military, it is not a democratic means. The individual subjects who work in the megamachine, those who carry out its specific tasks and play its specific roles, don’t always have a say in what those tasks or roles entail. For the majority of the population, the megamachine is a way of being controlled, not of controlling. Technology is in someone else’s hands. Often it seems as if the system is running itself. Just as with modern bureaucracies, we cannot always identify the individuals on whose shoulders decision-making lies. The decisions are the result of the system itself, and it is difficult to argue with a system.
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In ''What is to be Done?,'' Lenin argues that the working class will not spontaneously attain class consciousness and push for political revolution simply due to economic conflict with employers and spontaneous actions like demonstrations and workers’ strikes. He instead insists that a political party of dedicated revolutionaries is needed to educate workers in Marxist principles and to organize and push forward revolutionary activity. He also pushed back strongly against the ideas of what he called “economism,as typified by the ideas of Eduard Bernstein, a German political theorist who rejected many of Marx’s theories.
  
We’ve shifted language here to use the more recent term “system” to describe both Mumford’s megamachine and modern bureaucracy. A system is a complex organization composed of interrelated, interdependent parts. As systems become more complex and more parts are added, it becomes harder to keep track of, and therefore keep control of, the work that it does. For example, as a corporation gets larger and adds employees and divisions, it becomes more difficult to keep track of who is doing what and how all the parts are connected. To use the example of a car engine, as more parts are added—fuel injectors, computerized monitoring, catalytic converters, and so on—the engine becomes more complex, and it becomes more difficult to keep track of what all the pieces are for and how they interact. If something happens to one part of a system, other parts are frequently affected; but it is often difficult to predict or track those effects. In a very complex system, it is often impossible to predict what effects a small change might have throughout the system.14 Complex technologies—including missile defense systems, computer systems, and bureaucratic structures—function beyond the immediate knowledge and control of, except perhaps for a few experts, any one person. If the experts, commonly called technocrats, are the only ones who understand the system, there
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Bernstein opposed a working class revolution and instead focused on reform and compromise. He believed that socialism could be achieved within the capitalist economy and the system of bourgeois democracy. Lenin argued that Bernstein and his economist philosophy was opportunistic, and accused economists of seeking positions within bourgeois democracies to further their own personal interests and to quell revolutionary tendencies. As Lenin explained in ''A Talk With Defenders of Economism:''
  
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The Economists limited the tasks of the working class to an economic struggle for higher wages and better working conditions, etc., asserting that the political struggle was the business of the liberal bourgeoisie. They denied the leading role of the party of the working class, considering that the party should merely observe the spontaneous process of the movement and register events. In their deference to spontaneity in the working-class movement, the Economists belittled the significance of revolutionary theory and class-consciousness, asserted that socialist ideology could emerge from the spontaneous movement, denied the need for a Marxist party to instill socialist consciousness into the working-class movement, and thereby cleared the way for bourgeois ideology. The Economists, who opposed the need to create a centralized working-class party, stood for the sporadic and amateurish character of individual circles. Economism threatened to divert the working class from the class revolutionary path and turn it into a political appendage of the bourgeoisie.
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</blockquote>
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
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''The Encyclopedic Dictionary of Vietnam'', published by the National Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, defines opportunism, in this context, as “a system of political opinions with no direction, no clear path, no coherent viewpoint, leaning on whatever is beneficial for the opportunist in the short term.”
  
is less opportunity and less willingness for others to influence decisions made regarding those technologies. This makes the system still more authoritarian and even less democratic.
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Lenin critiques opportunist socialism — referring to it as a “critical” trend in socialism — in ''What is to be Done?:''
  
As the system becomes more complex, new technologies have to be invented to control the megamachine. With the Industrial Revolution and the harnessing of steam power, machines literally began moving beyond human control. They were stronger and faster and capable of increasing destruction if control was lost. The railroad offers an illuminating example. The steam engine could propel a train faster than the fastest horses and for a longer period of time. So amazing was its power, it was considered the symbol of progress, as we discussed in Chapter 2. But once at full speed, a steam engine was almost impossible to catch up with to warn it of impending collisions. This situation created what has been called a crisis of control, where control over the technology seems lost.15 To win back control, a faster technology was needed to help coordinate and communicate with the trains, or at least with stations ahead of the train. Around this time, the development of the telegraph (originally a military invention for coordinating multiple distant armies) served this purpose. Other technologies of accounting were needed simply to keep track of where all the trains were at a given time, because the plethora of trains, tracks, and schedules contributed to the crisis of control. Historian James Beniger cites examples of perfectly good train cars sitting idle for months at a time because they had been lost by the system.16
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<blockquote>
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He who does not deliberately close his eyes cannot fail to see that the new “critical” trend in socialism is nothing more nor less than a new variety of opportunism. And if we judge people... by their actions and by what they actually advocate, it will be clear that “freedom of criticism” means “freedom for an opportunist trend in Social-Democracy, freedom to convert Social-Democracy into a democratic party of reform, freedom to introduce bourgeois ideas and bourgeois elements into socialism.
  
Modern technologies of management, communication, and information processing have become crucial in solving (at least to some extent) the ongoing crisis of control. With the recent growth in the Internet, World Wide Web, and information technologies, we are threatened with being swamped with more information than we can possibly process or judge. This too creates a crisis of control. To win back control, new information-filtering technologies, such as intelligent-agent software of the personalized algorithms of Google searches, are created to sort this information and give us just what we think we need. Again, these technologies are meant to solve (at least to some extent) this crisis of control which is increasingly being described as a problem of Big Data.
+
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Another way to understand our sense that technologies are no longer in our control is to focus on what Edward Tenner has called “the revenge of unintended consequences,” which occurs when technologies cause more problems than they solve, or when they solve the problem they were meant to solve but create new ones.17 For example, as we discussed in Chapter 3, the results of Ruth Schwartz Cowan’s research demonstrate that domestic technologies—designed to save labor in the household—actually increased the amount of time women spent on housework.18 Other examples raised by Tenner (his book is filled with fascinating examples) include the so-called paperless office,19 the idea that with the introduction of networked computers, all documents—memos, letters, forms, and so on— would be electronic and distributed electronically. There would be no need for the great piles of forms and papers that accumulate in the traditional office. However, Tenner points out that offices which have become computerized use more paper, not less. Why? Because computers and copying technologies have made it easier to
+
The first revolution of the Russian working class, from 1905 to 1907, failed. Lenin summarized the reality of this revolution in the book ''Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution'' (1905). In this book, Lenin explains that the capitalist class in Russia was actively engaged in its own revolution against Czarist feudalism. In this context of this ongoing bourgeois revolution, Lenin deeply developed Marxist concepts related to revolutionary methodologies, objective and subjective factors that will affect the working class revolution, the role of the people, the role of political parties etc.
 +
</blockquote>
  
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==== Annotation 35 ====
  
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From 1905 to 1907, Russia was beset by political unrest and radical activity including workers’ strikes, military mutinies, and peasant uprisings. Russia had just suffered a humiliating defeat in the Russo-Japanese war which cost tens of thousands of Russian lives without any benefits to the Russian people. In addition, the economic and political systems of Czarist Russia placed a severe burden on industrial workers and peasant farmers.
  
produce multiple copies and multiple versions of paperwork, and the reconfigured systems demand their production. Another example involves the intent to make work more convenient by telecommuting. Computers and the Internet make it possible for workers to work at home by dialing in to the office. Because there is no commuting involved and the worker is allowed to work at home (or elsewhere), the worker can manage time and resources better, work without direct supervision in relative comfort, and regulate their work schedule accordingly. However, research suggests that telecommuters end up spending significantly more time on work-related tasks than do people who go to the office. Rather than being a convenience (see Chapter 3) the new technologies make it easier—sometimes imperative—to continue to work on evenings and weekends.20 One final classic example of unintended consequences is the story of kudzu, a Japanese vine that grows rapidly and is excellent for shoring up poor soil. The US Army Corps of Engineers thought that this plant would help greatly with a soil-erosion problem in the southern United States, especially along roadsides where the clay soil washes away; so they planted kudzu across the South. The problem is, kudzu has no natural predators in the United States; and because of its rapid growth and hardiness (the qualities for which it was chosen), it has overtaken millions of acres of woods and fields. It is tenacious and very hard to kill: nature’s revenge!
+
In response, the Russian proletariat rose up in various uprisings, demonstrations, and clashes against government forces, landlords, and factory owners. In the end, this revolutionary activity failed to overthrow the Czar’s government, and the Czar remained firmly in power until the communist revolution of 1917.
  
Just as the previous section highlighted the argument that we do have control over our technologies, here we have highlighted the opposite: that our technologies have control over us. There is no simple resolution to the conundrum of control, no way to decide once and for all which is true, because to do so would depend on the misguided belief that technology and culture are separate from one another and that one or the other can exert complete domination over the other. Rather, as the metaphor of Master and Slave illustrates, the attempt to assign the status of dominant (autonomous) Master or subservient (dependent) Slave to either technology or culture, while a wide-spread and powerful cultural habit, is, in the end, futile.
+
Lenin wrote ''Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution'' in 1905 in
  
Master and Slave: Trust and the Machine
+
Geneva, Switzerland. In it, he argues forcefully against the political faction within the Russian socialist movement that came to be known as the “Mensheviks.” The Mensheviks, as well as the Bolsheviks (Lenin’s contemporary faction) emerged from a dispute within the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party which took place in 1903.
  
Autonomy
+
In the same text, Lenin argued that the Mensheviks misunderstood the forces that were driving revolutionary activity in Russia. While the Mensheviks believed that the situation in Russia would develop along similar lines to previous revolutionary activity in Western Europe, Lenin argued that Russia’s situation was unique and that Russian Marxists should therefore adopt different strategies and activities which reflected Russia’s unique circumstances and material conditions.
  
When you have a complex system that uses machines to control machines, the human is “once removed” (sometimes several steps removed) from direct control of a technology. For workers in the factories of the nineteenth century especially, the big machines seemed well out of their control. Workers often felt helpless in the face of those machines. In the terms of Karl Marx, these workers were alienated from the means of production, meaning that they had ultimately no sense of ownership or control over their own labor, over the machines or tools that they were using, or over the products they were producing. The labor, the tools, and the products were all owned by someone else and the workers were just like tools or machines themselves. Marx describes the overwhelming sense that the machines were out of worker control:
+
Specifically, the Mensheviks believed that the working class should ally with the bourgeoisie to overthrow the Czar’s feudalist regime, and then allow the bourgeoisie to build a fully functioning capitalist economy before workers should attempt their own revolution.
  
68 O
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Lenin, on the other hand, presented a completely different analysis of class forces in Russia. He believed the bourgeoisie would seek a compromise with the Czar, as both feudal and bourgeois classes in Russia feared a proletarian revolution.
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
+
It’s important to note that Russia’s industrial workforce was very small at this time, and most Russians were peasant farmers. The Mensheviks believed Russian peasants would not be useful in a proletarian revolution, which is why they argued for allowing capitalism to be fully established in Russia before pushing for a working class revolution. They believed it was prudent to wait until the working class became larger and more dominant in Russia before attempting to overthrow capitalism. They believed that the peasant class would not be useful in any such revolution.
  
An organized system of machines, to which motion is communicated by the transmitting mechanism from a central automaton, is the most developed form of production machinery. Here we have, in the place of the isolated machine, a mechanical monster whose body fills whole factory floors, and whose demon power, at first veiled under the slow and measured motions of his giant limbs, at length breaks out into the fast and furious whirl of his countless working organs.21
+
In contrast, Lenin believed that the peasants and industrial workers would have to work together to have any hope of a successful revolution. He further argued that an uprising of armed peasants and workers, fighting side by side, would be necessary for overthrowing the Czar.
  
It almost seems as if technology here has become autonomous: that it moves on its own, develops on its own, and controls itself. It is not only Marx who had this view. The idea of autonomous technology has a long history in the West. Langdon Winner, who has traced this history, argues that a sense of technological determinism, and the sense that technology is out of control, has played a prominent role in modern political thought.22 For many, the issue of control has shifted. Where once we felt that we were masters of our machines—we made them to work for us, machines were slaves—the continuing crisis of control makes it seem as though it is we who have become enslaved. We have become far too dependent on our machines.
+
From 1907 to 1917, there was a viewpoint crisis among many physicists. This strongly affected the birth of many idealist ideologies following Mach’s Positivism that attempted to negate Marxism [See: Annotation 32, p. 27]. Lenin summarized the achievements of natural science as well as historical events of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century in his book ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'' (1909). By giving the classical definitions of matter, proving the relationships between matter and consciousness and between social existence and social consciousness, and pointing out the basic rules of consciousness, etc., Lenin defended Marxism and carried it forward to a new level. Lenin clearly expressed his thoughts on the history, nature, and structure of Marxism in the book ''The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism'' (1913). He also talked about dialectics in ''Philosophical Notebooks'' (1914–1916) and expressed his thoughts about the proletarian dictatorship, the role of the Communist Party, and the path to socialism in his book ''The State and Revolution'' (1919).
  
Dependence
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The success of the October revolution in Russia in 1917 brought about a new era: the transitional period from capitalism to socialism on an international scale. This event presented new theoretical requirements that had not existed in the time of Marx and Engels’ time.
  
The idea of technological dependence is fairly simple: It is the belief that we rely on technologies in so many aspects of our lives that we cannot function or even survive without them. A fairly clear statement of technological dependence was made by Theodore Kaczynski, the Unabomber (more on him in Chapter 8), who wrote: “What we do suggest is that the human race might easily permit itself to drift into a position of such dependence on the machines that it would have no practical choice but to accept all of the machines’ decisions.”23
+
In a series of works including: “''Left-Wing” Communism: an Infantile Disorder'' (1920),
  
The panic around the so-called Y2K (or Millennium) Computer Bug is an example of this drift into dependence. The Bug was a software glitch produced because old software programs only recorded the date using the last two digits of the year (1987 became 87), which worked fine as long as the first two digits remained constant. With the turn of the last century, the old software programs could not distinguish between 2000 and 1900. Prior to the turn of the century, people were concerned that this glitch would cause errors, crashes, and even destruction: failed nuclear power stations, accidentally launched missiles, disappearing bank records, and so on. To combat the problem, almost every computer and software program had to be checked for the fault and then corrected. Some of these programs and computers were decades old, and the last programmers who understood them had long since moved on or died. In addition, the complexity of these programs often foiled attempts to fix them. Despite our assumptions about the logic and organization of engineering, modern software programs are written as millions of lines of code that are not always well organized. These programs are so complex that no one person understands how the whole program functions or how changes made in one part will affect the rest (a classic problem of a complex system). The result was that one could not quickly put one’s finger on the “date” section of the program to fix it.
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''Once Again on the Trade Unions'', ''The Current Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin'' (1921), ''The Tax in Kind'' (1921), etc., Lenin summarized the revolutionary practice of the people, continued defending Marxist dialectics, and uncompromisingly fought against eclecticism and sophistry.
  
There was a great deal of press attention to the problem in the years leading up to 2000, and considerable worry on the part of the population. Some even went so far as to purchase survival gear, guns, food, gas generators, and so forth. Part of
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==== Annotation 36 ====
  
C ontrol
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In ''Anti-Dühring'', Engels identifies the historical missions of the working class as:
  
O 69
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1. Becoming the ruling class by establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat.
  
the general cultural anxiety about the Y2K bug entailed a realization on the part of the population of just how much their lives depended on technologies, how many of these technologies had computers in them, and how far out of their control those technologies were. Suddenly, people were worried that their VCRs, coffee machines, bankcards, and telephones wouldn’t work anymore, that their everyday lives would at least be disrupted and perhaps collapse.
+
2. Seizing the means of production from the ruling class to end class society.
  
The arguments about our technological dependence stem from just this sort of realization: that we have become dependent on technologies we thought were created to serve us, and that this dependence could prove dangerous or even fatal to us. One bumper sticker during that era put it, “I’d never survive in the wild.” People were asking themselves, if the power goes out, can I survive? Pushed just a bit further, what seem like questions for philosophers or science-fiction artists become of paramount importance: As machines become more sophisticated and replace human workers in more and more capacities, could machines eventually replace the entire human race?
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''Eclecticism'' is an incoherent approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject, applying different theories in different situations without any consistency in analysis and thought. Eclectic arguments are typically composed of various pieces of evidence that are cherry picked and pieced together to form a perspective that lacks clarity. By definition, because they draw from different systems of thought without seeking a clear and cohesive understanding of the totality of the subject and its internal and external relations and its development over time, eclectic arguments run counter to the ''comprehensive'' and ''historical'' viewpoints [see p. 116]. Eclecticism bears superficial resemblance to dialectical materialism in that it attempts to consider a subject from many different perspectives, and analyzes relationships pertaining to a subject, but the major flaw of eclecticism is a lack of clear and coherent systems and principles, which leads to a chaotic viewpoint and an inability to grasp the true nature of the subject at hand.
  
The flip side of dependence is trust. The worries over Y2K make us question the trust that we have placed in our machines and in the megamachine in which we live. We realize just how much we trust bureaucracies, large organizations, and complex technologies. Sociologist Anthony Giddens argues that trust in abstract systems is characteristic of the experience of being modern.24 In modern industrial societies, we are obliged to trust in these systems. He labels these systems “abstract” because most of the workings of these systems are outside our immediate knowledge. For example, if I withdraw money from an Automated Teller Machine (ATM), I have to trust that the machine is functioning properly, that it is connected to the proper networks in a secure manner so that no one steals my money or identity, that the other networks to which it is connected will maintain my account properly, and that the transaction will be kept private. With modern electronic banking, I am no longer sure where my money actually is or even where the bank is. Is there a bank somewhere, or just a network of people and machines performing tasks? Who or what, exactly, has access to the facts of the transaction? Money itself, according to Giddens, has become an abstract system. We trust that these colored pieces of paper and stamped metal have value. But they only have value if the megamachine continues to process them as we trust it will. We trust that we understand the process that goes on when we undertake the transaction. But we clearly do not have access to what actually happens. Giddens says that we trust, not because we lack power, but because we lack sufficient knowledge of the system.25 Trust is not the same thing as faith that the system will work, but a degree of confidence in that faith. We must always remember, however, that trust is related to risk, whether we are conscious or unconscious of that risk. In short, we still engage in risk when we trust.
+
''Sophistry'' is the use of falsehoods and misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, and with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. This kind of bad faith argument has no place in materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics must, instead, be rooted in a true and accurate understanding of the subject, material conditions, and reality in general.
  
Master and Slave
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Simultaneously, Lenin also developed his Marxist viewpoint of the factors deciding the victory of a social regime, about class, about the two basic missions of the proletariat, about the strategies and tactics of proletarian parties in new historical conditions, about the transitional period, and about the plans of building socialism following the New Economic Policy (NEP), etc.
  
To understand technological dependence more fully, we need to understand the idea of absolute mastery, the idea that one can have complete control over others, including nature, technology, and people. The Slave is the figure with absolutely
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==== Annotation 37 ====
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
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The early 1920s were a period of great internal conflict in revolutionary Russia, with various figures and factions wanting to take the revolution in different directions. As such, Lenin wrote extensively on the direction he believed the revolution should be carried forth to ensure lasting victory against both feudalism and capitalism. He believed that the October, 1917 revolution represented the complete defeat of the Czar, however he believed the proletarian victory over the bourgeoisie would take more time. Russia was a poor, agrarian society. The vast majority of Russians under the Czar were poor peasants. Industry — and thus, the proletariat — was highly undeveloped compared to Western Europe. According to Lenin, a full and lasting proletarian victory over the bourgeoisie could only be won after the means of production were properly developed. In ''Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution'', Lenin wrote:
  
no control; it is completely at the will of the other. In The Phenomenology of Mind, philosopher G.W.F. Hegel tells a story about the Master and the Slave.26 It goes like this: The human condition is marked by the struggle of person against person to achieve dominance and control. The winner of this struggle becomes the Master; the loser is either killed or enslaved. The point of this struggle is not dominance for dominance’s sake, but to achieve the recognition that one is dominant. For the Master to achieve absolute mastery, it is not enough to have a Slave dependent on him; the Master also demands recognition of his superior position. But the quest for absolute mastery is self-defeating for several reasons. First, because the Slave is utterly defeated, his or her recognition is not considered worthy. Indeed, the Slave is not usually considered human by his or her Master. Second, because the Slave does all the work, the Master becomes dependent on the Slave. Third, because it is the Slave who understands how to work and what it means to work with material reality—the earth and tools—it is the Slave who comes to a true understanding of who he or she is in the world, something that the Master can never do. The quest for absolute mastery is self-defeating, since the Master is now dependent on the Slave and lacks the Slave’s knowledge of the world and sense of identity. Unlike the Master, who is not self-reflexive, the Slave realizes that we shall all die some day.
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<blockquote>
 +
This first victory [the October, 1917 revolution] is not yet the final victory, and it was achieved by our October Revolution at the price of incredible difficulties and hardships... We have made the start... The important thing is that the ice has been broken; the road is open, the way has been shown.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Karl Marx read into Hegel’s story of the Master and the Slave support for his notion that the proletariat, the slave-like working class, would one day not only achieve enlightenment (something that their bourgeois masters cannot achieve), but also would revolt against their masters. If the bourgeoisie are so dependent on the proletariat, where does the true power in society lie?27
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So, Lenin knew that the victory over the Czar and feudalism was only a partial victory, and that more work needed to be done to defeat the bourgeoisie entirely. He believed the key to this victory over the capitalist class would be economic development, since Russia was still a largely agrarian society with very little industrial or economic development compared to Western Europe:
  
This same metaphor of Master and Slave has been applied to technology. From the very first stories about living machines—either conjured creatures such as golems or artificial humans such as robots—the issue of whether or not these creatures would turn against us has been raised. We see this in Shelley’s Frankenstein, in Karel Capek’s play R.U.R. (which coined the term “robot”), and throughout the 1900s in short stories and films.28 For example, the Terminator films are based on the premise that a sentient defense computer figures that the greatest danger to it is humanity in general, begins a war against humans, and creates killer robots to exterminate the remains of human resistance.29 The film The Matrix is based on a similar premise: Our networked computers achieve a form of intelligence, struggle with humans for control of the planet, and enslave the humans. In fact, humans literally serve the machines by becoming the batteries that power the computers. Humans thus play a completely passive and dependent role. They are slaves to the technology.30 And we could go on: The remake of the television series Battlestar Galactica that ran from 2004 to 2009 has humans fighting for survival against the Cylons, intelligent machines they themselves created.31 More recently, our science fiction imaginary seems to focus its worry less on machines going out of control, but on the science and technologies of cloning (see, e.g., the television series Orphan Black [2013–]) or genetic manipulation.32 A rising number of zombie films over the last few years point to out-of-control viruses (either man made or of mysterious origin) creating the zombies that then seek to destroy all human life (see, e.g., 28 Days Later [2002] and World War Z [2013], and all those in between).33
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<blockquote>
 +
Our last, but most important and most difficult task, the one we have done least about, is economic development, the laying of economic foundations for the new, socialist edifice on the site of the demolished feudal edifice and the semi-demolished capitalist edifice.
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</blockquote>
  
C ontrol
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Lenin’s plan for rapidly developing the means of production was his New Economic Policy, or the NEP. The New Economic Policy was proposed to be a temporary economic system that would allow a market economy and capitalism to exist within Russia, alongside state-owned business ventures, all firmly under the control of the working-class-dominated state. As Lenin explains in ''Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution'':
  
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<blockquote>
 +
At this very moment we are, by our New Economic Policy, correcting a number of our mistakes. We are learning how to continue erecting the socialist edifice in a small-peasant country.
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</blockquote>
  
AI, Expert Systems, and Intelligent Agents
+
He continues later in the text:
  
Artificially intelligent computers (known as AI) may seem to be far off in the future, but those building their precursors still worry about issues of dependence and control, Master and Slave. For example, reflecting on advances in genetics, nanotechnology, and robotics, Bill Joy, co-founder and chief scientist of Sun Microsystems, asks the following question in his provocative essay, “Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us:” “As Thoreau said, ‘We do not ride on the railroad; it rides upon us’; and this is what we must fight, in our time. The question is, indeed, Which is to be master? Will we survive our technologies?”34 For Joy, one of the central issues about these new technologies (robotics, genetic engineering, and nanotechnology) is that they are potentially self-replicating, and rapidly so. It is not only that we may make a machine more powerful than ourselves, or that has the potential to undermine us, but that such a machine can easily and rapidly create more machines like itself or perhaps better than itself. A smart robot can build and program other robots; new pathogens can self-replicate and cross species barriers; and machines on the nanoscale could rapidly make millions more molecular machines in a process that we might be unable to stop. There are plenty of examples in popular culture that run with this fear of technology as self-replicating pathogen. Kurt Vonnegut’s 1963 novel, Cat’s Cradle, provided an early manifestation of this anxiety.35 In the novel, Ice-Nine is an altered molecular structure of water that acts as a seed crystal to freeze any water on contact. It cannot be contained and eventually threatens to freeze all the water on earth, which includes, of course, all living beings. Renewed interest in and the 2012 republication of Stephen King’s 1978 novel, The Stand, in which a military-developed, mutated strand of super-flu decimates the population, also speaks to this anxiety.36
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<blockquote>
 +
The proletarian state must become a cautious, assiduous and shrewd “businessman,” a punctilious wholesale merchant — otherwise it will never succeed in putting this small-peasant country economically on its feet. Under existing conditions, living as we are side by side with the capitalist (for the time being capitalist) West, there is no other way of progressing to communism. A wholesale merchant seems to be an economic type as remote from communism as heaven from earth. But that is one of the contradictions which, in actual life, lead from a small-peasant economy via state capitalism to socialism. Personal incentive will step up production; we must increase production first and foremost and at all costs. Wholesale trade economically unites millions of small peasants: it gives them a personal incentive, links them up and leads them to the next step, namely, to various forms of association and alliance in the process of production itself. We have already started the necessary changes in our economic policy and already have some successes to our credit; true, they are small and partial, but nonetheless they are successes. In this new field of “tuition” we are already finishing our preparatory class. By persistent and assiduous study, by making practical experience the test of every step we take, by not fearing to alter over and over again what we have already begun, by correcting our mistakes and most carefully analyzing their significance, we shall pass to the higher classes. We shall go through the whole “course,” although the present state of world economics and world politics has made that course much longer and much more difficult than we would have liked. No matter at what cost, no matter how severe the hardships of the transition period may be — despite disaster, famine and ruin — we shall not flinch; we shall triumphantly carry our cause to its goal.
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</blockquote>
  
Another example of where such anxiety can be found is in the work on intelligent agents. Intelligent agents are pieces of software that work on your behalf. They have the capability to learn your wants and needs in order to function on your behalf on the Internet. For example, an intelligent agent could be authorized by you to seek out particular types of information, to purchase particular products, or to negotiate a business deal for you. The agent acts like a virtual butler or lackey. Though this software is not yet very sophisticated, its relative autonomy raises questions. MIT professor William J. Mitchell writes:
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With these great works dedicated to the three component parts of Marxism [see Annotation 42, p. 38], the name Vladimir Ilyich Lenin became an important part of Marxism. It marked a comprehensive developing step from Marxism to Marxism-Leninism.
  
Even if our agents turn out to be very smart, and always perform impeccably, will we ever fully trust them? And how will we deal with the old paradox of the slave? We will want our agents to be as smart as possible in order to do our bidding most effectively, but the more intelligent they are, the more we will have to worry about losing control and the agents taking over.37
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==== d. Marxism-Leninism and the Reality of the International Revolutionary Movement ====
  
Marvin Minsky, co-founder of the Artificial Intelligence laboratory at MIT, writes:
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The birth of Marxism greatly affected both the international worker movements and communist movements. The revolution in March 1871 in France could be considered as a great experiment of Marxism in the real world. For the first time in human history, a new kind of state — the dictatorship of the proletariat state (Paris Commune) was established.
  
There’s the old paradox of having a very smart slave. If you keep the slave from learning too much, you are limiting its usefulness. But, if you help it to become smarter than you are, then you may not be able to trust it not to make better plans for itself that it does for you.38
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==== Annotation 38 ====
  
THE RECEIVED VIEW
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The Paris Commune was an important but short-lived revolutionary victory of the working class which saw a revolutionary socialist government controlling Paris from March 18 to May 28, 1871.
  
The above positions seem to assume that intelligence is the same thing as selfinterest, and therefore, that an intelligent machine will care more for its own interests than for others’. If that assumption is incorrect, the fears expressed may be overblown. Regardless, the cultural concern over the question of trust remains paramount: Can we trust our machines? And when we consider matters of trust, we do not have to venture into science fiction, with its killer robots, to touch highly significant cultural concerns. Matters of trust and anxiety over being enslaved by technology enter at a very mundane level: Will this machine work? Will it do what it is supposed to do? Can I trust that the bank computer will remember the deposit I made and not lose it? Will the computerized stoplights at that intersection really keep the train from crossing into automobile traffic?
+
During the brief existence of the Paris Commune, many important policies were set forth, including a separation of church and state, abolishment of rent, an end to child labor, and the right of employees to take over any business which had been abandoned by its owner. Unfortunately, the Paris Commune was brutally toppled by the French army, which killed between 6,000 and 7,000 revolutionaries in battle and by execution. The events of the Paris Commune heavily influenced many revolutionary thinkers and leaders, including Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and was referenced frequently in their works.
  
Matters of trust and anxiety over being enslaved by technology also enter at the level of extreme political significance and even at the level of life and death. Reactions to information leaked by Edward Snowden in 2013 about metadata collected by the US National Security Agency (NSA) reveal both a lack of trust and considerable anxiety about what technology can do to us.39 One government program Snowden warned us of is PRISM, a program instituted after passage of the Protect America Act of 2007. PRISM collects, without warrants, mass data through broad sweeps of telephone logs. Electronic surveillance of phone, email, and other communications of US citizens is apparently extensive and is not limited to those under some kind of formal investigation. While the government defense of the program has been largely a version of “we don’t use the data, we don’t even look at it, unless we need it,” much of the reaction has been negative. Apart from the mistrust people might feel about the potential political uses by real individuals, the data are being collected by networked machines, which, for some, is tantamount to enslavement. Julian Assange, the beleaguered founder of Wikileaks, was interviewed about surveillance while he was under house arrest in the United Kingdom in 2012. Those interviews were published as Cypherpunks: Freedom and the Future of the Internet. There he explains that “the control is built in:”
+
In August 1903, the very first Marxist proletariat party was established — the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. It was a true Marxist party that led the revolution in Russia in 1905. In October 1917, the victory of the socialist revolution of the proletariat in Russia opened a new era for human history.
  
When you communicate over the internet, when you communicate using mobile phones, which are now meshed to the internet, your communications are being intercepted by military intelligence organizations. It’s like having a tank in your bedroom….We are all living under martial law as far as our communications are concerned, we just can’t see the tanks—but they are there.40
+
In 1919, the Communist International* was held; in 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic was established. It marked the alliance of the proletariat of many countries. With the power of this alliance, the fight against Fascism not only protected the achievements of the proletariat’s revolution, but also spread socialism beyond the borders of Russia. Following the lead of the Soviet Union, a community of socialist countries was built, with revolutions leading to the establishment of socialism in the following countries [and years of establishment]: Mongolia [1921], Vietnam [1945], the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [1945], Yugoslavia [1945], Albania [1946], Romania [1947], Czechoslovakia [1948], East Germany [1949], China [1949], Hungary [1949], Poland [1956], and Cuba [1959].
  
In a very real sense, according to Assange, it doesn’t matter if and how the information is used, the tanks are already there in the form of a technology exercising control.
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A chilling example of how life and death get tangled up in matters of trust and the perception of enslavement to technology is the military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVS), better known as drones. Although it is difficult to get unbiased statistics, US CIA drone strikes in Pakistan alone from 2004 to 2013 may be as high as 370, killing as many as 3,500 people, including up to 900 civilians of which 200 were children, and injuring thousands more.41 Like the Mechanical Hound
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==== Annotation 39 ====
  
C ontrol
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<nowiki>*</nowiki> The First International, also known as the International Workingmen’s Association, was founded in London and lasted from 1864–1876. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were key figures in the foundation and operation of this organization, which sought better conditions and the establishment of rights for workers.
  
O 73
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The Second International was founded in Paris in 1889 to continue the work of the First International. It fell apart in 1916 because the members from different nations could not maintain solidarity through the outbreak of World War I.
  
in Ray Bradbury’s classic novel Fahrenheit 451, drones are programmed to strike: “Hell! It’s a fine bit of craftsmanship, a good rifle that can fetch its own target and guarantees a bull’s-eye every time.” Meant to function as our slave: “It doesn’t like or dislike. It just ‘functions.’ It’s like a lesson in ballistics. It has a trajectory we decide on for it.” But with programming (a mind?) of their own: “It follows through. It targets itself, homes itself, and cuts off….[W]hat does the Hound think about down there nights? Is it coming alive on us, really? It makes me cold….I wouldn’t want to be its next victim.”42
+
The Third International, also known as the Communist International (or the ComIntern for short), was founded in Moscow in 1919 (though many nations didn’t join until later in the 1920s). Its goals were to overthrow capitalism, build socialism, and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. It was dissolved in 1943 in the midst of the German invasion of Russia in World War II.
  
Conclusion
+
These great historical events strongly enhanced the revolutionary movement of the working class all around the whole world. The people awakened and encouraged the liberation resistance of many colonised countries. The guiding role of Marxism-Leninism brought many great results for a world of peace, independence, democracy, and social progress.
  
The question of control highlights the fundamental circularity of many of the arguments about technology and its relation to humans. We create technologies to establish control but then get upset that we are controlled by technologies. Technologies become a convenient scapegoat for problems that we have created. For example, media violence is blamed for increased violence in society, especially among youth. But why, we might ask, is the violence there to begin with? Who decided to write about, record, and air violent acts? And why? What do those decisions have to do with the culture of violence in which we live? In asking these questions, we are not denying that media have effects on their audience. Rather, we point to the variety of other sources of violence in society alongside of and with media: a troubled economy, lack of funds for schools, a shifting role of religion, shifting parental styles, the availability of weapons, a gun culture, and so on.
+
However, because of many internal and external factors, in the late 1980s, the socialist alliance faced a crisis and fell into a recession period. Even though the socialist system fell into crisis and was weakened, the socialist ideology still survived internationally. The determination of successfully building socialism was still very strong in many countries and the desire to follow the socialist path still spread widely in South America.
  
If technology is conceived as a matter of control and dependence, of Master and Slave, it is set apart from human culture, treated as autonomous, then either blamed or praised. Either we have control over technology or it has control over us; the effects in either case can be conceived as either worthy of praise or blame. Those are the only options. Either way we look at it, technology is considered as something apart from human culture. The question of control or determinism simply shifts weight and focus from one side to the other and back again. In the end, neither formulation of this relationship gets us very far in reflecting on culture and technology in ways that suggest new directions and new answers. Neither formulation provides an adequate map for understanding the complex web of corresponding, noncorresponding, and contradictory forces within which technologies emerge, develop, and have effects. It is time to shift our focus away from issues of control, dependence, and trust (as well as causality, progress, and convenience), to think about technology in new ways, to pose new questions, and to find, perhaps, new answers.
+
Nowadays, the main feature of our modern society is fast and varied change in many social aspects caused by technology and scientific revolution. But, no matter how quickly and diversely our society changes, the nature of the capitalist production method never changes. So, in order to protect the socialist achievements earned by the flesh and blood of many previous generations; and in order to have a tremendous development step in the career of liberating human beings, it is very urgent to protect, inherit and develop Marxism-Leninism and also innovate the work of building socialism in both theory and practice.
  
We begin this shift by first reviewing major critical positions that have developed in response to the positions, values, contradictions, and challenges that surround the discourses and practices of technology as we have described them in this first part of our argument. These critical responses are Luddism, Appropriate Technology, and the Unabomber. Then, in Part III of this book, we lay out a cultural studies approach that moves beyond these critical responses.
+
The Communist Party of Vietnam declared: “Nowadays, capitalism still has potential for development, but in nature, it’s still an unjust, exploitative, and oppressive regime. The basic and inherent contradictions of capitalism, especially the contradictions between the increasing socialization of the production force and the capitalist private ownership regime, will never be solved and will even become increasingly serious. The feature of the current period of our modern society is: countries with different social regimes and different development levels co-exist, co-operate, struggle and compete fiercely for the interests of their own nations. The struggles for peace, independence, democracy, development, and social progress of many countries will still have to cope with hardship and challenges but we will achieve new progress. ''According to the principles of historical development, human beings will almost certainly go forward to socialism.”''<ref>''Delegate Document of the 11<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.''</ref>
  
Part II
+
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Representative Responses to the Received View
+
==== Annotation 40 ====
  
Figure 10: Old Water Wheel on Creek to North of Convent
+
Historical materialism is the application of dialectical materialist philosophy and materialist dialectical methodology to the analysis of human history, society, and development. The principles of historical materialism, as developed by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, indicate that human society is moving towards socialism and will almost certainly — in time — develop into socialism, and then proceed towards a stateless, classless form of society (communism). These principles of historical materialism were initially formulated and discussed in several books by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, including:
  
Source: Spring Hill Avenue, Mobile, Mobile County, AL, Photograph by E.W. Russell, 1937, Library of Congress, Historic American Buildings Survey: http://www.loc.gov/pictures/ item/al0433.photos.005513p/
+
''•'' ''The German Ideology'', by Marx and Engels
  
Figure 11: A Sledge Hammer in the Hands of a Husky Iron Worker at TVA’s Watts Bar Dam Steam Plant
+
''•'' ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'', by Marx and Engels
  
Source: Tennessee Valley Authority. Watts Bar Dam hydroelectric plant. This plant will supplement the big hydroelectric installations at Watts Bar Dam, which has an authorized output of 90,000 kilowatts, and a possible ultimate of 150,000 kilowatts. Each of the four big turbo-generators in the steam plant is rated at 60,000 kilowatts. Photograph by Alfred T. Palmer, 1942, Library of Congress, Collection of the Farm Security Administration/Office of War Information Black-and-White Negatives, loc.gov/pictures/item/oem2002006580/PP/
+
''•'' ''Karl Marx'', by Lenin
  
Chapter Six
+
The Communist Party of Vietnam has also declared:
  
Luddism
+
“In the opinion of the Vietnam Communist Party, using Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought as the foundation for our ideology, the guideline for our actions is an important developmental step in cognition and logical thinking<ref>''Delegate document of the 9<sup>th</sup> national congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.''</ref>. Achievements that the Vietnamese people have gained in the war to gain our independence, in peace, and in the renovation era, are all rooted in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought. Therefore, we have to ‘creatively apply and develop Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought in the Party’s activities. We have to regularly summarise reality, complement and develop theory, and soundly solve the problems of our society.’”<ref>''Delegate document of the 10<sup>th</sup> national congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.''</ref>
  
IN PART I, WE INTRODUCED WHAT WE CALL the received view of technological culture: the beliefs, practices, and experiences that constitute the dominant cultural sense of culture and technology. It is the commonsense version that most of us have been exposed to, within which we negotiate a relationship with technology. That commonsense version, we have argued, posits technology as the source of inevitable progress, as the vehicle for making life better by making it more convenient, as the driving causative force of “civilized” Western culture, and as the mechanism for exercising control in and over the world. Even those who critique technology often launch their theories from within the commonsense version of the story. In such cases, the “problem” concerning technology is the fear that technology controls us, rather than the other way around, or that progress has undesirable “side effects” that we have to deal with. However, in the received view, these problems are seen as playing the role of minor nuisance in an overall endorsement of the storyline.
+
-----
  
We have offered criticisms of the received view as we introduced it and have begun to introduce our theoretical alternative to it; but we have not yet laid out for you the components of our proposed alternative, which we do in Part III. Here, in Part II, we take you through what we think of as an intermezzo: in musical terms, a short movement between the major sections of a composition. This movement is meant to acknowledge that historically there have been important critical responses to the received view that have not been argued from within its logic. While there certainly have been more than the three responses we consider here—Luddism, Appropriate Technology, and the Unabomber—we have chosen these three because they represent a range of responses from which there is something significant to learn. Each is problematic in its own way; but each also offers important insight: first, into the ways people have been blinded and/or blind-sided by the received view; and second, into some of the crucial components with which we construct our approach. Therefore, even if we do not identify with Luddites, Appropriate Technologists, or the Unabomber (indeed, least
+
==== Annotation 41 ====
  
78 O
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Ho Chi Minh Thought refers to a system of ideas developed by Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese communists which relate to the application of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and methodology to the specific material conditions of Vietnam during the revolutionary period.
  
REPRESENTATIVE RESPONSES
+
There is no universal road map for applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism. How the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism should be applied will vary widely from one time and place to another. This is why Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese communists had to develop Ho Chi Minh Thought: so that scientific socialism could be developed within the unique context of Vietnam’s particular historical development and material conditions.
  
of all the Unabomber), there is something that each of these responses can offer in piecing together a cultural studies approach to technological culture.
+
It is the duty of every revolutionary to study Marxism-Leninism as well as specific applied forms of Marxism-Leninism developed by revolutionaries for their own specific times and places, such as: Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam), Mao Zedong (China), Fidel Castro and Che Guevera (Cuba), etc. However, it must be recognized that the ideas, strategies, methodologies, and philosophies developed in such particular circumstances can’t be applied in exactly the same way in other times and places, such as our own contemporary material conditions.
  
To be labeled a Luddite, in common parlance, is to be accused of being rabidly and ignorantly anti-technology and anti-progress. Luddites, popular usage suggests, are machine haters, sometimes machine breakers, sometimes anarchists, but always dangerously misguided souls who would reverse the flow of progress and have us “go back to the cave.” Today they are often labeled as “terrorists.” For example, environmental activists opposing development projects are often called Luddites, implying that they are just simply and indiscriminately anti-technology, anti-development, anti-progress, and therefore, anti-the-good-life. If permitted their way, the story goes, they would destroy all the good that industrial progress has brought and render life, once again, mean, lean, and inhumane. Luddites would bring back the days of high rates of infant mortality, a short life expectancy, hard physical labor, debilitating pain, and suffering. While the efforts of Luddites may sometimes seem good natured or even quaint, they are, most people conclude, fundamentally misguided. Given the meanings the term is assigned, it is not surprising that the phrase, “I’m not a Luddite, but…” gets used often before critiquing technology, as if to be seen as a Luddite must be avoided at all costs.1 This characterization of Luddism as a technophobic response to new technology—and, therefore, to progress—is unfortunate, but it is hardly surprising. Given the power of the received view to frame any criticism of technology as irrational, futile, and fatuous, it makes a type of perverse sense that what is really a fascinating and instructive moment in the history of technological culture would be reduced and misunderstood in this way. An understanding of the Luddite movement, achieved by listening seriously to the issues it raised, rocks the received view to its core.
+
''The Renovation Era'' refers to the period of time in Vietnam from the 1980s until the early 2000s during which the Đổi Mới (renovation) policies were implemented. These policies restructured the Vietnamese economy to end the previous subsidizing model (which was defined by state ownership of the entire economy). The goals of the Renovation Era were to open Vietnam economically and politically and to normalize relations with the rest of the world. The Đổi Mới policies were generally successful and paved the way to ''the'' ''Path to Socialism Era'' which Vietnam exists in today. The goals of the Path to Socialism Era are to develop Vietnam into a modern, developed country with a strong economy and wealthy people, which will allow us to transition towards the lower stage of communism, which Lenin called “socialism.
  
To learn from the Luddites, we turn to the careful work of historians who have been willing to look past the summary dismissals of the Luddites—dismissals which were shaped by a blind commitment to the received view. To look with fresh eyes at the history of the Luddites, we draw, most notably, on the work of E.P. Thompson, in his monumental study The Making of the English Working Class, and Eric Hobsbawm, in his meticulously researched article “The Machine Breakers.”2
+
And, finally: “We have to be consistent with Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought. We have to creatively apply and develop the ideology correspondingly with the reality in Vietnam. We have to firmly aim for national independence and socialism.
  
Historical Luddism
+
== II. Objects, Purposes, and Requirements for Studying the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism ==
  
It is difficult to characterize the Luddites and the Luddite movement for several reasons. Foremost among them is the fact that it was dangerous—even illegal—to be a Luddite. During the height of the movement, Luddites were hanged. By necessity they were secretive about their activities. Second, there are no surviving, comprehensive, and written accounts by those who considered themselves Luddites, if indeed any were ever written. A few reminiscences written in the late 1800s claim to penned by or based on the stories of Luddites; but even if true, these accounts were constructed nearly sixty years after the fact.3 The histories of the Luddites on which we draw are the result of painstaking archival research sifting though letters, press coverage, public documents, and even literature written
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=== 1. Objects and Purposes of Study ===
  
Luddism
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The objects of study of this book, ''The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism,'' are the fundamental viewpoints of Marxism-Leninism in its three component parts.
  
O 79
+
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during the period. Third, evidence suggests that the Luddite movement might have consisted of different, perhaps even relatively autonomous movements, rather than a single movement with a single coherent story. Finally, the story of the Luddites was from its inception caught up in a difficult political moment in which an allegiance to the received view of technology and culture was already at stake. Interpretations of their story have always depended on where one stood politically with respect to that view. Consequently, accounts of historical Luddism that presume to dismiss them out of hand, or oversimplify their significance, should be held in suspicion.
+
==== Annotation 42 ====
  
Luddism refers to a movement or movements of skilled workers and artisans in England in 1811–1817 in the textile industry, principally croppers, stockingers, and weavers.4 The difficult political moment within which Luddism arose as a response involved a major shift in the nature of capitalism, the changing role of workers in the development of industrialism, and the development of new technology. Prior to this time, there was an understanding that the relationship between an industry and its workers was one of mutual support and obligation. Industry provided a livelihood for its workers; workers provided skill with dedication to the craft.5 Textile manufacturing was craft work, carried out by skilled laborers brought up through an apprentice system and protected by what Thompson calls “paternalistic legislation.”6 To be a craft worker meant that the workers themselves largely shaped the knowledge, execution, and control of the labor process. Craft work may be difficult, but it is nonetheless creative.
+
Remember that a viewpoint is the starting point of analysis which determines the direction of thinking and the perspective from which problems are considered. Also remember that Marxism-Leninism has three component parts:
  
A crisis in this situation was provoked by the gradual encroachment of the practice of laissez-faire capitalism, which shifts the idea of mutual support and obligation by arguing that, theoretically anyway, the overall economic situation of the country improves when the owners of industry are permitted free rein to maximize their profits, and when the quality of life and work of the individual worker is not given highest priority. It is not possible, however, to discount the motive of simple greed, which government policies and cultural practice had previously curbed. Nor is it possible to discount the motive of survival in what might have been, in effect, a coercive situation. As some manufacturers developed a competitive advantage using modern factory techniques, others might have felt “forced” to do so to survive.7 Whatever the mix of motives, the paternal relationship with workers and their independence as craft workers were seen as hindrances to the maximization of profits. In response, manufacturers fought— eventually with success—government intervention and sought to rationalize the production process to minimize their expenses. To that end, it was desirable to exert control over the labor process by developing a factory system, replacing workers with machines wherever possible, deskilling the nature of the work, and keeping the cost of labor low.
+
'''1. The Philosophy of Marxism:'''
  
The success of the manufacturers was hard won, and depended, in the end, on the voice and force of government adopting the voice and interests of the manu-facturers.8 It has been estimated that there were 12,000 troops deployed against the Luddites in the six counties where they were active,9 and a number of Luddites were killed. Laws were eventually passed that resulted in deportation, jailing, and
+
Including Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism
  
80 O
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'''2. The Political Economy of Marxism:'''
  
REPRESENTATIVE RESPONSES
+
A system of knowledge and laws that define the production process and commodity exchange in human society.
  
even hanging of many Luddites.10 The Luddites did not set out to kill anyone or to destroy property indiscriminately; their actions had, for the most part, all the marks of a defensive rather than an offensive strategy. So it is astonishing when you think about the fact that machine-breaking became a capital offense. It indicates just how strongly the culture of the time was threatened by the challenge to the narrative of progress.
+
'''3. Scientific Socialism'''
  
But what did the Luddites do? Although it is debatable just how well organized they were, they resisted the changes being imposed on them by the manufacturers. Thompson calls them a “quasi-insurrectionary movement, which continually trembled on the edge of ulterior revolutionary objectives.”11 They objected to the deskilling of their jobs, the replacement of workers by machines, the extraction of exorbitant rents on the machines they used, the reduction of wages, and their overall subjection to the modern factory system in which they were treated more like servants than craft workers. Their resistance took many forms: negotiating, bargaining, striking, burning, rioting, and machine-breaking. These last (what protesters today would call “direct action”) are what live in the popular memory as the legacy of the Luddites: riot and the destruction of machines. But in a very real sense, their insurrectionary resistance was part of a long tradition of “collective bargaining by riot” in which rioters would do whatever they deemed effective in their effort to gain concessions, including wrecking private property, finished goods, and machines.12 However, even though the motives of rioters would surely have been mixed, Luddite activities were characterized by legitimate motives that were widely shared. As Thompson writes:
+
The system of thought pertaining to the establishment of the communist social economy form.
  
What was at issue was the “freedom” of the capitalist to destroy the customs of the trade, whether by new machinery, by the factory-system, or by unrestricted competition, beating-down wages, undercutting his rivals, and undermining standards of craftsmanship. We are so accustomed to the notion that it was both inevitable and “progressive” that trade would have been freed in the early-nineteenth century from “restrictive practices,” that it requires an effort of imagination to understand that the “free” factory-owner or large hosier or cotton-manufacturer, who built his fortune by these means, was regarded not only with jealousy but as a man engaging in immoral and illegal practices.13
+
These objects of study stand as the viewpoints — the starting points of analysis — of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and the three component parts of which it’s composed.
  
Luddism was thus a highly significant “transitional” conflict, one that “looked backward to old customs and paternalist legislation which could never be revived.” At the same time, “it tried to revive ancient rights in order to establish new prec-edents.”14 Luddites were fighting for a way of life in a changing world, and they recognized that machines, and their incorporation into a system of work, were a crucial component of that way of life.
+
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It is perhaps a prejudice of twenty-first century Americans to think that industrial workers in the early 1800s were probably pretty slow witted. But the history of the Luddites suggests otherwise. As Thompson concluded:
+
In the scope of '''Marxist-Leninist Philosophy''' [the first component part of Marxism-Leninism], these objects of study are:
  
the character of Luddism was not that of a blind protest, or of a food riot......
+
* Dialectical Materialism — the fundamental and most universal worldview and methodologies which form the theoretical core of a scientific worldview*. [See Part 1, p. 44]
 +
* Materialist Dialectics — the science of development, of common relationships, and of the most common rules of motion and development of nature, society and human thought. [See Chapter 2, p. 98]
 +
* Historical Materialism — the application and development of Materialism and Dialectics in studying social aspects. [Historical materialism is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.]
  
Nor will it do to describe Luddism as a form of “primitive” trade unionism.......
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Luddism
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==== Annotation 43 ====
  
O 81
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<nowiki>*</nowiki> Remember that ''Scientific'' in Marxism-Leninism refers to a systematic pursuit of knowledge, research, theory, and understanding [see Annotation 1, p. 1]. Note, also, that ''Worldview'' refers to the whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about humans ourselves, and about life and the position of human beings in the world. This is discussed in more detail on page 44.
  
[T]he men who organized, sheltered, or condoned Luddism were far from primitive. They were shrewd and humorous; next to the London artisans, some of them were amongst the most articulate of the “industrious classes.” A few had read Adam Smith, more had made some study of trade union law. Croppers, stockingers, and weavers were capable of managing a complex organization; undertaking its finances and correspondence; sending delegates as far as Ireland or maintaining regular communication with the West Country. All of them had had dealings, through their representatives, with Parliament; while duly-apprenticed stockingers in Nottingham were burgesses and electors.15
+
Thus, a ''scientific worldview'' is a worldview that is expressed by a systematic pursuit of knowledge of definitions and categories that generally and correctly reflect the relationships of things, phenomena, and processes in the objective material world, including relationships between humans, as well as relationships between humans and the world.
  
Luddites did destroy machines, but for the most part only those machines that embodied the offenses of the way of life they saw being forced on them. In case after case, the Luddites thoughtfully discriminated regarding which machines were to be destroyed. As one account at the time in the Leeds Mercury reported:
+
In the scope of '''Marxist-Leninist Political Economics''' [the second component part of Marxism-Leninism], the objects of study are:
  
They broke only the frames of such as have reduced the price of the men’s wages; those who have not lowered the price, have their frames untouched; in one house, last night, they broke four frames out of six; the other two which belonged to masters who had not lowered their wages, they did not meddle with.16
+
* The theory of value and the theory of surplus value.
 +
* Economic theory about monopolist capitalism and state monopolist capitalism.
 +
* General economic rules about capitalist production methods, from the stage of formation, to the stage of development, to the stage of perishing, which will be followed by the birth of a new production method: the communist production method.  
  
The Luddites were not anti-technology; they were concerned, as Thompson concludes, that “industrial growth should be regulated according to ethical priorities and the pursuit of profit be subordinated to human needs.”17 That surely strikes us as an admirable goal.
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But what of the commonly held view, with its echoes in the present, that protest against progress is pointless, and that the efforts of the Luddites were futile? Was “the triumph of mechanization” inevitable, despite the fact that “all but a minority of favoured workers fought against the new system”?18 To these questions we have two responses, both of which contribute to the cultural studies approach to technological culture that we develop in Part III. First, it is incorrect to think that the Luddite movement was completely ineffective. While it certainly did not hold up the general advance of industrial capitalism, there were many small victories in which the voice of the workers mattered. For the most part, Luddism segued into legal parliamentary forms, thus making it difficult to determine how influential the Luddite spirit was in the troubled political landscape after 1818. The Corn Laws, passed in 1815, which kept corn prices artificially high, thus literally starving the working classes, were eventually repealed after a protracted struggle. Other reform bills during the 1820s and 1830s helped to alleviate deplorable working conditions and to assuage working-class resentment to the extent that England did not have a revolution, as did other European countries at that time.19 The efforts of the Luddites may have counted for something. Indeed, this is not a matter of the triumph of manufacturers versus the triumph of the workers. The role of workers in the evolving technological culture is never a “done deal,” but an ongoing and changing relationship, within which the sites of and reasons for struggle shift dramatically. There have always been those who have argued for prioritizing ethics and human needs over profit;
+
==== Annotation 44 ====
  
82 O
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Marxist-Leninist political economics is the topic of Part 3 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.
  
REPRESENTATIVE RESPONSES
+
In the scope of '''Scientific Socialism''' [the third component part of Marxism-Leninism], the objects of study are:
  
and their efforts, no doubt, have kept industrial capitalism from denigrating the life of workers more than it has. The Luddites exemplify the need to keep up the pressure.
+
* The historical mission of the working class and the progression of a socialist revolution.  
 +
* Matters related to the future formation and development periods of the communist socio-economic form.
 +
* Guidelines for the working class in implementing our historical mission.  
  
Second, the Luddites provided a potent alternative to the concept of technology and culture in the received view, at a time when the received view was gaining acceptance. They knew from their daily experience that technology is never neutral, never merely a tool. They knew that technology is woven into the fabric of daily life and that it is to be judged in relation to the quality of everyday life. It is never automatically progress. They knew that what constitutes convenience for some might have undesirable consequences for others. Further, as their activities make clear—activities in which they risked their lives—they knew that the development and implementation of technologies were not inevitable, and that human choices and actions are shaped by conscious political interventions. It is unfortunate that so much of what else they might have to say to us has been lost in the vicissitudes of political power, that their voices were silenced, and that they have not been taken more seriously. It is certainly within our power, however, to take seriously any lessons we have gleaned.
+
''The purposes'' of studying ''The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism'' are:'''' to master Marxist-Leninist viewpoints of science, revolution, and humanism*; to thoroughly understand the most important theoretical foundation of Ho Chi Minh Thought, the revolutionary path, and the ideological foundation of the Vietnam Communist Party. Based on that basis, we can build a scientific worldview and methodology and a revolutionary worldview; build our trust in our revolutionary ideals; creatively apply them in our cognitive and practical activities and in practicing and cultivating morality to meet the requirements of Vietnamese people in the cause of building a socialist Vietnam.
  
Contemporary Luddism
+
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Along with growing concerns about the effects of unbridled technological “progress,” and the revised understanding of the history of Luddism, Luddism has become something of a contemporary rallying cry for a number of individuals and groups engaged in analyzing and/or resisting technology in some form or another. There is at certain times even a certain cachet attached to the claim of being a Luddite. Kirkpatrick Sale draws the parameters of what he calls neo-Luddism with a broad brush, “ranging from narrow single-issue concerns to broad philosophical analyses, from aversion to resistance to sabotage, with much diversity in between.”20
+
==== Annotation 45 ====
  
When Nicols Fox went in search of modern-day Luddites, and wrote about them in Against the Machine: The Hidden Luddite Tradition in Literature, Art, and Individual Lives, she found:
+
<nowiki>*</nowiki> The humanism of Marxism-Leninism differs greatly from the humanism of Feuerbach discussed in Annotation 12, p. 13. Marxist-Leninist humanism concerns itself with the liberation of all humans. As Marx and Engels wrote in ''The Communist Manifesto:'' “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”
  
That what accommodations they make to civilization vary from individual to individual and from year to year. Sometimes the goal is to avoid certain technologies, sometimes it is independence, sometimes it is to live more lightly on the earth for environmental reasons. Other times it has nothing to do with the environment.21
+
=== 2. Some Basic Requirements of the Studying Method ===
  
It is important to remember that the Luddite movement was conjuncturally specific: It made sense within a particular historical moment, and that moment has passed. Today, those who claim allegiance to the Luddites occupy a spectrum so broad as to guarantee little about their position beyond a willingness to challenge technological development in some form. Consequently, it does not provide a platform on which to build a response to technological culture that can take us very far.
+
There are some basic requirements for studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism:
  
For example, Frank Webster and Kevin Robins conceptualize an analysis of information technology as “a Luddite analysis,” which, for them, means
+
First, Marxist-Leninist theses were conceptualized under many different circumstances in order to solve different problems, so the expressions of thought of Marxist-Leninists can vary. Therefore, students studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism must correctly understand its spirit and essence and avoid theoretical purism and dogmatism.
  
Luddism
+
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O 83
+
==== Annotation 46 ====
  
that it “refuses to extract technology from social relations,” and insists instead that technology “must be regarded as inherently social and therefore a result of values and choices.”22 In contrast to this more philosophic variant of neoLuddism, “ecotage” of the kind sometimes practiced by groups like Earth First! and romanticized by Edward Abbey in The Monkey Wrench Gang and other works, also receives the imprimatur of the Luddite.23 Mark Engler, Senior Analyst at Foreign Policy in Focus, writes that “Those of us who have been involved in global justice protests have gotten used to being labeled as Luddites by advocates of corporate globalization.”24
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Marxism-Leninism should be understood as an applied science, and application of this science will vary based on material conditions. As Engels wrote in a personal letter in 1887, remarking on the socialist movement in the USA: “Our theory is a theory of evolution, not a dogma to be learned by heart and to be repeated mechanically. The less it is drilled into the Americans from outside and the more they test it with their own experience... the deeper will it pass into their flesh and blood.
  
In June 2013, economist Paul Krugman expressed “Sympathy for the Luddites” in a New York Times Op-Ed Column in which he embraces an understanding of Luddism consistent with our own.25 He notes that since around 2000 the distribution of income in America has shifted significantly, with labor’s share falling sharply. Referring to the May 2013 McKinsey Global Institute Report on “Disruptive Technologies: Advances That Will Transform Life, Business, and the Global Economy,” Krugman notes that there are “a dozen major new technolo-gies…likely to be ‘disruptive,’ upsetting existing market and social arrangements” and that “some of the victims of disruption will be workers who are currently considered highly skilled, and who invested a lot of time and money in acquiring those skills.” He continues, still drawing on the report, “we’re going to be seeing a lot of ‘automation of knowledge work,with software doing things that used to require college graduates. Advanced robotics could further diminish employment in manufacturing, but it could also replace some medical professionals.” At stake is “a society in which ordinary citizens have a reasonable assurance of maintaining a decent life as long as they work hard and play by the rules.” He also notes that this is not a uniquely American phenomenon but a global technological trend. While he does not propose an activist response of the kind the historical Luddites engaged in, he does, in his calls for “a strong social safety net,” with guaranteed health care and minimum income, sound very much like a Luddite himself.
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As an example, Lenin tailored his actions and ideas specifically to suit the material conditions of Russia under the Czar and in the early revolutionary period. Russia’s material conditions were somewhat unique during the time of Lenin’s revolutionary activity, since Russia was an agrarian monarchy with a large peasant population and a relatively undeveloped industrial sector. As such, Lenin had to develop strategies, tactics, and ideas which suited those specific material conditions, such as determining that the industrial working class and agricultural peasants should work together. As Lenin explained in ''The Proletariat and the Peasantry'':
  
In fact it has become commonplace to consider “The Luddites Revisited” or to ask “Where Are the Modern Day Luddites?” or even “Is It OK to Be a Luddite?” because increasingly we recognize that they have something to teach us and some spirit that merits building upon.26
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<blockquote>
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Thus the red banner of the class-conscious workers means, first, that we support with all our might, the peasants’ struggle for full freedom and all the land; secondly, it means that we do not stop at this, but go on further. We are waging, besides the struggle for freedom and land, a fight for socialism.
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</blockquote>
  
The particular Luddite propositions with which we have most sympathy in developing an alternative to the received view are those proposed by Chellis Glendenning in 1990. Summarized here by Sale, Glendenning resists the blind allegiance to progress, rejects the sense that technologies are neutral tools, and calls for critique that places technology fully within its cultural context. She calls for:
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Obviously, this statement would not be specifically applicable to a society with highly developed industry and virtually no rural peasants (such as, for instance, the modern-day USA), just as Lenin’s remarks about the Czar would not be specifically applicable to any society that does not have an institution of monarchy.
  
1. Opposition to technologies “that emanate from a worldview that sees rationality as the key to human potential, material acquisition as the key to human fulfillment, and technological development as the key to social progress.
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As another example, take the works of Ho Chi Minh. Ho Chi Minh Thought is defined by the Communist Party of Vietnam as “a complete system of thought about the fundamental issues of the Vietnam revolution.” In other words, Ho Chi Minh Thought is a specific application of the principles of Marxism-Leninism to the material conditions of Vietnam.
  
2. Recognition that, since “all technologies are political, the technologies created by mass technological society, far from being “neutral tools that can be used for good or evil,” inevitably are “those that serve the perpetuation” of that society and its goals of efficiency, production, marketing, and profits.
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One unique aspect of Vietnam’s revolution which Ho Chi Minh focused on was colonization. As a colonized country, Ho Chi Minh realized that Vietnam had unique challenges and circumstances that would need to be properly addressed through revolutionary struggle. Another unique aspect of Vietnam’s material conditions was the fact that the colonial administration of Vietnam changed hands throughout the revolution: from France, to Japan, back to France, then to the USA. Ho Chi Minh was able to dynamically and creatively apply Marxism-Leninism to these shifting material conditions. For instance, in ''Founding of the Indochinese Communist Party,'' written in 1930, Ho Chi Minh explains some of the unique problems faced by the colonized people of Indochina (modern day Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) and proposes solutions specific to these unique material conditions:
  
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<blockquote>
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On the one hand, they (the French) use the feudalists and comprador bourgeoisie (of Vietnam) to oppress and exploit our people. On the other, they terrorize, arrest, jail, deport, and kill a great number of Vietnamese revolutionaries. If the French imperialists think that they can suppress the Vietnamese revolution by means of terror, they are grossly mistaken. For one thing, the Vietnamese revolution is not isolated but enjoys the assistance of the world proletariat in general and that of the French working class in particular. Secondly, it is precisely at the very time when the French imperialists are frenziedly carrying out terrorist acts that the Vietnamese Communists, formerly working separately, have united into a single party, the Indochinese Communist Party, to lead the revolutionary struggle of our entire people.
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</blockquote>
  
REPRESENTATIVE RESPONSES
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During this period, the nations of Indochina were predominantly agricultural, prompting Ho Chi Minh to suggest in the same text that it would be necessary “to establish a worker-peasant-soldier government” and “to confiscate all the plantations and property belonging to the imperialists and the Vietnamese reactionary bourgeoisie and distribute them to the poor peasants.” Obviously all of these considerations are specific to the material conditions of Indochina under French colonial rule in 1930.
  
3. Establishment of a critique of technology by “fully examining its sociological context, economic ramifications, and political meanings...from the perspective not only of human use” but of its impact “on other living beings, natural systems, and the environment.”27
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By 1939, the situation was changing rapidly. Ho Chi Minh was operating from China, which was being invaded by fascist Japan. He knew that it was only a matter of time before the Japanese imperial army would come to threaten Vietnam and the rest of Indochina. As such, Ho Chi Minh wrote a letter to the Indochinese Communist Party outlining recommendations, strategies, and goals pertaining to the precipitating material conditions. At that time, France had not yet been invaded by Germany, but Ho Chi Minh was very aware of the looming threat of fascism both in Europe and in Asia. He realized that rising up in revolutionary civil war against the French colonial administration would give fascist Japan the opportunity to quickly conquer all of Indochina, which is why he made the following recommendations in a letter to the Communist Party of Indochina in 1939:
  
We conclude, then, that we have much to learn from the Luddites about the possibilities of resisting progress blindly, about recognizing the political nature of technology, and about understanding and critiquing the integration of technology into everyday life. In Part III, we talk about this integration in terms of articulation and assemblage. However, it is important to recognize that Luddism, as a historical movement, must be understood within the historical conjuncture that made it a meaningful response. We can learn from the Luddites to keep asking important questions about contemporary technological culture; but the specific conjuncture within which we live requires responses crafted to address the present.
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<blockquote>
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Our party should not strive for demands which are too high, such as total independence, or establishing a house of representatives. If we do that, we will fall into the trap of fascist Japan. For now, we should only ask for democracy, freedom to organize, freedom to hold meetings, freedom of speech, and for the release of political prisoners. We should also fight for our party to be organized and to operate legally.
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</blockquote>
  
Figure 12: Nature Meets Technology
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Once France fell to Germany in 1940, Indochina was immediately handed over to Japanese colonial rule. The Japanese army was brutal in its occupation of Vietnam, and the French colonial administrators surrendered entirely to the Japanese empire and helped the Japanese to administer all of Indochina. Ho Chi Minh returned to Vietnam in January of 1941 and participated directly with the resistance struggle against Japan until 1945, when the situation once again changed dramatically due to the Japanese military’s surrender to allied forces and withdrawal from Vietnam. He immediately took advantage of this situation and held a successful revolution against both the Japanese and French administrators. In the Declaration of Independence for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh wrote:
  
Source: Photograph by Harald Hoyer, 2007, Wikimedia Commons: commons.wikimedia. org/wiki/File:Nature_meets_Technology_%282762672169%29.jpg
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<blockquote>
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After the Japanese had surrendered to the Allies, our whole people rose to regain our national sovereignty and to found the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The truth is that we have wrested our independence from the Japanese and not from the French. The French have fled, the Japanese have capitulated, Emperor Bao Dai has abdicated. Our people have broken the chains which for nearly a century have fettered them and have won independence for the homeland.
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</blockquote>
  
Chapter Seven
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As France began to make their intentions clear that they would be resuming their colonialist claim to Indochina, Ho Chi Minh began preparing the country for a new chapter in revolutionary struggle. In his 1946 letter to the people of Vietnam, entitled ''A Nationwide Call for Resistance'', Ho Chi Minh wrote:
  
Appropriate Technology
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<blockquote>
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We call everyone, man and woman, old and young, from every ethnic minority, from every religion, to stand up and fight to save our country. If you have guns, use guns. If you have swords, use swords. If you have nothing, use sticks. Everyone must stand up and fight.
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</blockquote>
  
APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY IS A DIRECT RESPONSE to the perceived failures of the widespread allegiance to and application of the received view of culture and technology on a global scale. Appropriate Technology rejects the idea and practice of large-scale, industrial megatechnology as indicative of progress; it rejects technological dependence in favor of autonomy; and it recognizes the integral nature of technology in the quality of everyday life. Unlike Luddism, discussed in the previous chapter, and the Unabomber, discussed in the next, the activities of appropriate technologists have the decided advantage of being legal, and the views and strategies of appropriate technologists are readily available for scrutiny.
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As these historical developments illustrate, Ho Chi Minh was able to creatively and dynamically apply the principles of Marxism-Leninism to suit the shifting material conditions of Vietnam, just as Lenin had to creatively and dynamically apply these principles to the emerging situation in Russia in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. So is the task of every student of Marxism-Leninism: to learn to apply these principles creatively and dynamically to the material conditions at hand.
  
Appropriate Technology (typically shortened to AT) refers to a particular kind of technology: that considered appropriate to achieving certain goals. It is also refers to a movement, akin in some ways to Luddism, that is concerned with making certain kinds of (appropriate) technological choices. It is, however, an even more diffuse movement than historical Luddism. Like any movement, AT is integrally related to the historical context within which it emerges: in this case at the nexus of the 1960s and 1970s counterculture, and the reactions against international development projects. It is a practice and a sensibility born of a particular era. While there are important lessons and strategies to be learned from it, its significant limitations necessitate the development of theory and practice beyond its confines.
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Sources and Varieties of AT
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Second, the birth and development of Marixst-Leninist theses is a process. In that process, all Marixst-Leninist theses have strong relationships with each other. They complement and support each other. Thus, students studying each Marxist-Leninist thesis need to put it in proper relation and context with other theses found within each different component part of Marxism-Leninism in order to understand the unity in diversity [see: Annotation 107, p. 110], the consistency of every thesis in particular, and the whole of Marxism-Leninism in general.
  
AT comes in many forms with many different names: appropriate technology, alternative technology, intermediate technology, radical technology, small-
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Third, an important goal of studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism is to understand clearly the most important theoretical basis of Ho Chi Minh Thought, of the Vietnam Communist Party and its revolutionary path. Therefore, we must attach Marxist-Leninist theses to Vietnam’s revolutionary practice and the world’s practice in order to see the creative application of Marxism-Leninism that President Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnam Communist Party implemented in each period of history.
  
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Fourth, we must study the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism to meet the requirements for a new Vietnamese people in a new era. So, the process of studying is also the process of self-educating and practicing to improve ourselves step-by-step in both individual and social life.
  
REPRESENTATIVE RESPONSES
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Fifth, Marxism-Leninism is not a closed and immutable theoretical system. On the contrary, it is a theoretical system that continuously develops based on the development of reality. Therefore, the process of studying Marxism-Leninism is also a process of reflection: summarizing and reviewing your own practical experiences and sharing what you’ve learned from these experiences in order to contribute to the scientific and humanist development of Marxism-Leninism. In addition, when studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, we need to consider these principles in the proper context of the history of the ideological development of humanity. Such context is important because Marxism-Leninism is quintessentially<ref>See Annotation 6, p. 8.</ref> the product of that history.
  
scale technology, convivial technology, environmentally friendly technology, sustainable technology, energy-efficient technology, low-impact technology, soft technology, people’s technology, liberatory technology, and so on.1 The theme is apparent in the list of names: AT is about making technological choices that resist the development of technology for technology’s sake, or in service of profit at the expense of quality of life. Instead, its guiding principle is to discern an acceptable or appropriate match between technologies and the structures of everyday life.
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These requirements have strong relationships with each other. They imbue the studying process with the quintessence of Marxism-Leninism. And more importantly, they help students apply that quintessence into cognitive and practical activities.
  
AT emerged in response to the proliferation of the ideas about development that we introduced in Chapter 3 on progress. In 1961, the United Nations passed a resolution declaring the “United Nations Development Decade: A Programme for International Economic Co-operation.” Its objectives included:
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==== Part I: The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism — Leninism ====
  
The achievement and acceleration of sound self-sustaining economic development in the less developed countries through industrialization, diversification and the development of a highly productive agricultural sector.2
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''Worldview'' refers to the whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about humans ourselves, and about life and the position of human beings in that world. Our worldview directs and orientates our life, including our cognitive and practical activities, as well as our self-awareness. Our worldview defines our ideals, our value system, and our lifestyle. So, a proper and scientific worldview serves as a foundation to establish a constructive approach to life. One of the basic criteria to evaluate the growth and maturity of an individual or a whole society is the degree to which worldview has been developed.
  
As a consequence, the UN supported the introduction of a range of First World technologies into the Third World: technologies of power, such as dams; technologies of transportation, such as railways; technologies of communication, such as radio and television; and technologies of agriculture, such as tractors, fertilizer, and new hybrid seeds, in what was called “the Green Revolution.”3 As many people have pointed out, the Development Decade was, for the great majority, a failure, and the Green Revolution had only partial success.4
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''Methodology'' is a system of reasoning: the ideas and rules that guide humans to research, build, select, and apply the most suitable methods in both perception and practice. Methodologies can range from very specific to broadly general, with ''philosophical methodology'' being the most general scope of methodology.
  
The problem was that technologies were introduced with insufficient attention to the role these technologies would play in the reorganization of everyday life. The disasters are mythic and include unfortunate events such as the 1980 explosion of the fertilizer plant located in a heavily populated area in Bhopal, India, and the marketing of canned milk to replace infant breastfeeding in poor areas in South America. But nowhere is the failure of development technology more dramatic than in the failures of the Green Revolution. Vandana Shiva, who has written a great deal about the consequences of the Green Revolution on women and peasants, summarized it this way:
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The Green Revolution has been a failure. It has led to reduced genetic diversity, increased vulnerability to pests, soil erosion, water shortages, reduced soil fertility, micronutrient deficiencies, soil contamination, reduced availability of nutritious food crops for the local population, the displacement of vast numbers of small farmers from their land, rural impoverishment and increased tensions and conflict. The beneficiaries have been the agrochemical industry, large petrochemical companies, manufacturers of agricultural machinery, dam builders and large landowners.The “miracle” seeds of the Green Revolution have become mechanisms for breeding new pests and creating new diseases.5
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While awareness of the failures of the Development Decade was widely shared from its onset, there seemed to be little alternative to it. Witold Rybczynski notes, “Even as advanced technology was criticized, it was apparent that it
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==== Annotation 47 ====
  
Appropriate Technology
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Tran Thien Tu, the vice-dean of the Department of Marxist-Leninist Theoretical Studies at the Le Duan Political Science University in Quang Tri, Vietnam, defines three degrees of scopes of Methodology. They are, from most specific to most general:
  
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'''1. Field Methodology'''
  
remained the only way to progress, and for most less developed countries, the only desired way.”6 There seemed, then, no real choice, even if that choice was a failure; the power of the received view seemed insurmountable. An alternative of some sort was needed.
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The most specific scope of methodology; a field methodology will apply only to a single specific scientific field.
  
In response to these failures of development technology, a group called the Intermediate Technology Development Group held a conference in 1968 in England. They called it the Conference on Further Development in the United Kingdom of Appropriate Technologies for, and Their Communication to, Developing Countries.7 Spreading out from the work of members of this group and participants of the conference, and connecting with the larger sense that technology was out of control, the AT movement emerged. The founder and director of the Intermediate Technology Development Group, Ernst Friedrich Schumacher, widely known as simply E.F. Schumacher, is often considered the father of the AT movement. His book Small Is Beautiful, first published in 1973, is likewise considered its manifesto.8
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'''2. General Methodology'''
  
While working as an economist and civil servant in Britain, Schumacher traveled to Burma and India, where his experiences made him question the focus on high technologies that he saw there. He acknowledged that there was a need for technology in the Third World but noted that the imported high technologies benefited a small elite and were of no use to the majority of the population. What they needed was to reorganize the workplaces in rural areas and small towns in response to their condition of being labor rich and capital poor. The overall task, as Schumacher saw it, was:
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A more general scope of methodology; a general methodology will be shared by various scientific fields.
  
First, that workplaces have to be created in the areas where the people are living now, and not primarily in metropolitan areas into which they tend to migrate.
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'''3. Philosophical Methodology'''
  
Second, that these workplaces must be, on average, cheap enough so that they can be created in large numbers without this calling for an unattainable level of capital formation and imports.
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The most general scope of methodology, encompassing the whole of the material world and human thought.
  
Third, that the production methods employed must be relatively simple, so that the demands for high skills are minimised, not only in the production process itself but also in matters of organisation, raw material supply, financial, marketing, and so forth.
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Fourth, that production should be mainly from local materials and mainly for local use.9
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''Worldview'' and ''philosophical methodology'' are the fundamental knowledge-systems* of Marxism-Leninism.
  
According to Schumacher, appropriate technology would be intermediate, that is, “more productive than the indigenous technology...but it would also be immensely cheaper than the sophisticated, highly capital-intensive technology of modern industry.”10 AT would be more democratic than capital-intensive technology; it would benefit most of the people and not just the elites; and it would be culturally sensitive to the organization of everyday life. Therefore, it would avoid the disruptions that can be brought on by the introduction of new technologies. AT, according to Schumacher, was not a return to a “primitive” past; AT does not have to be simple or traditional. It can be, and often must
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==== Annotation 48 ====
  
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<nowiki>*</nowiki> In the original Vietnamese, the word ''lý'' ''luận'' is used, which we roughly translate to the phrase “knowledge-system” throughout this book. Literally, ''lý luận'' is a combination of the words ''lý'' ''lẽ,'' which means “argument,” and ''bàn'' ''luận,'' which means “to infer.”
  
REPRESENTATIVE RESPONSES
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The full meaning of ''lý'' ''luận'' is: a system of ideas that reflect reality expressed in a system of knowledge that allows for a complete view of the fundamental laws and relationships of objective reality.
  
be, created anew, and scaled to meet local needs and conditions in a sensitive manner.
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<br />
  
It is noteworthy that another of the germinal works adopted by the AT movement was written by a thinker with vast international experience. Ivan Illich, the author of Tools for Conviviality,11 was born in Vienna in 1926, left there in 1941, and traveled widely until his death in 2002. He has been described as a “polymath and polemicist” whose work as a philosopher, Roman Catholic priest, and activist took him to Puerto Rico, Central and South America, and the United States. He founded the radical Intercultural Center for Documentation in Cuernavaca, Mexico, in 1961, which trained volunteers to work in Latin America. His work in the 1970s and 1980s focused on alternative versions of development, including schooling, economics, energy, transport, and technology.12
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==== The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism-Leninism ====
  
Illich, like Schumacher, objected to the imposition of high technology by experts and was in favor of promoting technologies that he considered “convivial.” He defined convivial thus:
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Marxist-Leninist worldview and philosophical methodology emerge from the quintessence [see Annotation 6, p. 8] of dialectical materialism, which itself developed from other forms of dialectics, which in turn developed throughout the history of the ideological development of humanity.
  
Tools foster conviviality to the extent to which they can be easily used, by anybody, as often or as seldom as desired, for the accomplishment of a purpose chosen by the user. The use of such tools by one person does not restrain another from using them equally. They do not require previous certification of the user. Their existence does not impose any obligation to use them. They allow the user to express his [sic] meaning in action.13
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Materialism is foundational to Marxism-Leninism in two important ways:
  
Convivial tools “give each person who uses them the greatest opportunity to enrich the environment with the fruits of his or her vision,” a goal that, according to Illich, is denied by industrial tools.14 Conviviality, for Illich, designates “the opposite of industrial productivity.”15
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''Dialectical Materialism'' is the ideological core of a scientific worldview.
  
Illich did not offer up designs for convivial tools, although he named some (motorized and non-motorized bicycles, power drills, mechanized pushcarts, and telephones); nor did he detail what a convivial society would look like. Rather, he recognized that, in part, some of the obstacles standing in the way of the coming of a convivial society are those of imagination. Simply put, it is difficult to imagine a transformation of this magnitude. What he did offer are tools for the imagination, criteria for discerning whether a tool is using a person or vice versa, and criteria for determining whether a system of technology fosters independence or dependence.
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''Historical Materialism'' is a system of dialectical materialist opinions about the origin of, motivation of, and the most common rules that dominate the movement and development of human society.
  
It is interesting to note that Illich’s Tools for Conviviality and Schumacher’s Small Is Beautiful were published in the same year. The awareness of the need for AT was clearly “in the air:” not just because of developments in the underdeveloped, developing, or Third World nations, but also because of what was happening in North American culture. The 1960s and 1970s rise of AT coincides with the rising interest in social-responsibility movements and with the emergence of what has been called the counterculture. Barrett Hazeltine and Christopher Bull point out that many socially responsible projects and groups formed in which the goals of AT were embraced. Such groups included the National Appropriate Technology Center; the projects of President Jimmy Carter and also those of California
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Dialectics are also foundational to Marxism-Leninism, specifically in the form of ''Materialist Dialectics,'' which Lenin defined as “the doctrine of development in its fullest, deepest and most comprehensive form, the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge.”<ref>''The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1913.</ref> Lenin also defined Materialist Dialectics as “what is now called theory of knowledge or epistemology.”<ref>''Karl Marx'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.</ref> [Note: Epistemology is the theoretical study of knowledge; for more information see ''Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism'', p. 204.]
  
Appropriate Technology
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==== Annotation 49 ====
  
Governor Jerry Brown; the Office of Technology Assessment; and even the projects of the USAID, the foreign-aid division of the State Department.16 But perhaps even more to the point is AT’s connection with the developing counterculture.
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For beginning students of Marxism-Leninism, distinguishing between ''Dialectical Materialism'' and ''Materialist Dialectics'' may at first be confusing. Here is an explanation of each concept and how they relate to one another:
  
During the 1960s and 1970s, a mélange of people (primarily youth), disenchanted with what they considered the “establishment,” sought alternatives to the dominant culture. These people, known widely as the counterculture, focused on creating alternative political structures based on anti-capitalist, anti-industrialist values such as personal growth, self-realization, self-expression, pleasure, and creativity. It’s easy to see how this movement articulates to the AT movement, because AT, as it was understood, tended to be anti–big industry and pro-community. Indeed, members of the counterculture carried around copies of Schumacher and Illich as if they were the maps they needed to make the world a better place. The AT movement thus can be seen more broadly as not being about particular machines, but about a frustration with the political system. Langdon Winner points out that AT takes off in the US precisely when the political movements of the 1960s (like Students for a Democratic Society) lose steam. Local, appropriate technologies become a way of doing politics by other means. Winner writes that AT’s “true purpose was not to produce energy from renewable resources, but to generate the hope of social renewal from the winds of despair.”17
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-5.png|''Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics.'']]
  
For the remainder of the twentieth century there persisted an active counterculture for whom the works of Schumacher and Illich served as canonical texts. This group tended to identify more with environmental causes than it did during the 1960s, but it also increasingly identified itself as Luddite or Neo-Luddite. For example, in 1978 Theodore Roszak’s book Person/Planet: The Creative Disintegration of Industrial Society, was identified with the counterculture.18 His 1994 book The Cult of Information identified itself in the subtitle as A Neo-Luddite Treatise.19 Similarly, when Nicols Fox went in search of Luddites in the early twenty-first century, as we discussed in the previous chapter, the people she designates as Luddite are indistinguishable from people most of us would understand to be members of the counterculture: They live lightly on the land, use alternative energy sources, don’t work nine-to-five, don’t watch television, resist succumbing to consumer culture, are anti-capitalist, and so on. In part, as we discuss below, the countercultural orientation of much of AT may have contributed to some of its limitations.
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''Dialectical Materialism'' is a scientific understanding of matter, consciousness and the relationship between the two. Dialectical Materialism is used to understand the world by studying such relationships.
  
If you are to believe Paul Polak, author of books such as Out of Poverty and, with Mal Warwick, The Business Solution to Poverty, the Appropriate Technology movement is dead. In 2010 he wrote that it “died peacefully in its sleep ten years ago.” Why? Twice he insists, just so you get it, “the appropriate technology movement died because it was led by well-intentioned tinkerers instead of hard-nosed entrepreneurs designing for the market.”20
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''Materialist Dialectics'' is a science studying the general laws of the movement, change, and development of nature, society and human thought.
  
It is true that, as Polak states, many AT organizations have closed their doors and that in their wake throughout the world there are “thousands of technically effective, often outrageously expensive tools…gathering dust on the shelf.”21 But what seems really to have happened is that the mantle of AT has been picked up by individuals and groups who name their projects differently: Design for the Other 90%, Design as Activism, Engineers Without Borders, Expanding Architecture,
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-6.png|''Relationship between Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics.'']]
  
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And so, we use Dialectical Materialism to understand the fundamental nature of reality. This understanding is used as a basis for changing the world, using Materialist Dialectics to guide our activities. We can then reflect on the results of our activities, using Dialectical Materialism, to further develop our understanding of the world.
  
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As Marxist-Leninists, we utilize this continuous cycle between studying and understanding the world through Dialectical Materialism and affecting change in the world through Materialist Dialectics with the goal of bringing about socialism and freeing humanity.
  
Sustainability, and so on.22 These efforts are sometimes entrepreneurial (as Polak insists is necessary) and sometimes are not (as are the Engineers Without Borders projects in Honduras, Guatemala, and Bolivia at Jennifer’s University, and in Ecuador and Kenya at Greg’s).23
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It is also important to understand the nature of ''dialectical relationships.''
  
All these efforts, in one form or another, are committed to designing technologies (whether in community-driven development programs or through marketing developed products) that are affordable, of appropriate scale, aid sustainability, and improve quality of life. The focus remains, as it was with AT in the previous century, on tools and the individual-tool interaction. Illich once wrote, “I will focus on the structure of tools, not on the character structure of their users,”24 and that focus is maintained in its newest design-engineering-architecture manifestations.
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A dialectical relationship is a relationship in which two things mutually impact one another. Dialectical materialism perceives all things in ''motion'' [see ''Mode and Forms of Existence of Matter'', p. 59] and in a constant state of ''change'', and this motion and change originates from relationships in which all things mutually move and change each other through interaction, leading to development over time.
  
There is an important insight for us to take from this: The tools do matter, as does the individual-tool interaction. It matters if a tool is large, unconvivial, complex, expensive, unmanageable, or dependent on absent and expert knowhow. However, it is never enough for a tool to be just small, convivial, simple, inexpensive, easily managed, or fostering of independence: not, that is, if such criteria are limited to characterizing the tool as an independent entity or as the individual-tool interaction. Why not? Because, we have also learned, almost ironically and accidently, that something much larger than tools and the individual-tool interaction also matters. Context matters. We know this because AT taught us that different tools were appropriate for different situations. We know this from failed development projects: You can’t simply put a technology developed in one context into another context and expect it to perform in the same way. Context matters. So how successfully does AT deal with context? Not all that well, as it turns out.
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AT and the Limited Understanding of Context
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Thoroughly understanding the basic content of the worldview and methodology of Marxism-Leninism is the most important requirement in order to properly study the whole theory system of Marxism-Leninism and to creatively apply it into cognitive and practical activities in order to solve the problems that our society must cope with.
  
When technologies are characterized and evaluated by a property—small, simple, inexpensive, easily managed, or supportive of decentralization, etc.— significant contextual features can be overlooked, with considerable consequences. In short, small is not always beautiful. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the now-legendary case of snowmobiles as used by the Skolt Lapps in a story told by Witold Rybczynski drawing from the account of Finnish anthropologist Pertii J. Pelto.25 By most AT criteria, a snowmobile is an appropriate technology: “it is small, easy to operate and maintain, encourages decentralization, and is not very expensive.” The Skolt Lapps of northeast Finland adopted snowmobiles to make the difficult task of herding their reindeer easier. This “was not imposed but freely chosen.”26
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The consequences of this have turned out to be considerable. The community changed markedly as a number of realities changed: Mechanized herding gave younger, less-skilled men an advantage they never had before. Herding could be done in much less time, freeing up time for other activities. Easier travel facilitated more socializing. The cost of maintaining snowmobiles increased financial pressures. A new social stratification emerged based on who owned or who did not own
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=== 3. Excerpt From ''Modifying the Working Style'' By Ho Chi Minh ===
  
Appropriate Technology
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-7.jpg|''Ho Chi Minh training cadres in 1959.'']]
  
O 93
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Training is a must. There is a proverb: “without a teacher, you can never do well;” and the expression: “learn to eat, learn to speak, learn to pack, learn to unpack.”
  
snowmobiles. And most interesting, all this has changed the relationship between the Lapp and the reindeer. Because snowmobile herding is stressful to the reindeer, the health and size of the herds may be compromised. But even more significant, where the relationship used to be proximate—based on the ability of skilled Lapps to tame their reindeer—the spatial and psychic distance has increased dramatically. The relationship of man to reindeer has been transformed. So much has changed, and perhaps not all for the better.
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Even many simple subjects require study, let alone revolutionary work and resistance work. How can you perform such tasks without any training?
  
What we can see in this example is the fact that the abstract nature of the criteria for appropriateness is not enough to really understand the complexities of technological culture. The search for, and satisfaction with, such criteria make the hard work of understanding seem easier than it really is. AT does not insist on thinking through the complex nature of context. That kind of attention to complexity is essential to the approach we propose in Part III.
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But training materials must be aimed at the needs of the masses. We must ask: after people receive their training, can they apply their knowledge immediately? Is it possible to practice right away?
  
When technologies are characterized and evaluated by the individual-tool interaction, the focus is on the individual (as is the tendency in countercultural politics), and not much beyond. Again, significant contextual features can be overlooked, with considerable consequences. We illustrate this inadequacy with an example from Illich, who claims that the telephone at that time was a convivial tool. Why? “Anybody can dial the person of his choice if he can afford a coin … The telephone lets anybody say what he wants to the person of his choice; he can conduct business, express love, or pick a quarrel. It is impossible for bureaucrats to define what people say to each other on the phone.”27 The analysis stops here, having satisfied the criteria for what makes a tool convivial and giving support to the notion that what matters is cheap, unfettered communication among individuals of one’s own choosing. If one has the perspicacity to look beyond the satisfaction of the individual, this characterization of telephone technology is woefully incomplete. What of the structure of ownership of the telephone industry? Who benefits financially? Who does and who does not have access to a telephone? Who does and who does not have those few coins to make the call? What role does the telephone play in the spatial organization of family and friends? What about telephone lines and cables, competition, investment, surveillance being conducted on all these calls, and on and on? There is simply so much more to consider beyond the individual act of picking up the phone and being free to talk to anyone. Again, in Part III we point the way to making sure that all those larger questions are part of how we understand technological culture.
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If training is not immediately practical, then years of training would be useless.
  
The logic of AT, with its focus on the tool and the individual-tool interaction, even its contemporary design-engineering-architecture manifestations, privileges the idea that how one lives one’s quotidian life is what matters. According to this logic one need not engage in politics on a larger scale. Human scale is all that matters. The tools one uses are the measure of one’s worth. This is where AT and the counterculture too easily dovetail with (“articulate to” is the term we will introduce later) new trends in consumerism. What matters is that you buy this or that product and that somebody profits. This is as true for the counterculture’s Whole Earth Catalogue as it is for Polak’s marketing schemes. This is where AT becomes the stuff you buy so you feel better about
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Unfortunately, many of our trainers do not understand this simple logic. That’s why there are cadres who train rural people in the uplands in the field of “economics!”
  
94 O
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In short, our way of working, organizing, talking, propagandizing, setting slogans, writing newspapers, etc., must all take this sentence as a model:
  
REPRESENTATIVE RESPONSES
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“From within the masses, back into the masses.”
  
your relation to your immediate environment. This is where you “save the earth” by buying something. And this is where somebody (and who that body is matters), somewhere (and where that somebody is matters) profits (and how much matters).
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No matter how big or small our tasks are, we must clearly examine and modify them to match the culture, living habits, level of education, struggling experiences, desire, will, and material conditions of the masses. On that basis we will form our ways of working and organizing. Only then can we have the masses on our side.
  
We argue, instead, that what is needed, and what AT cannot quite give us, is a map for fully engaging the multiple layers of connections among the tools and the user; among the device, its user, and the larger social structure within which it occurs. Without that map, an understanding of technological culture is not possible, and a technological politics will be severely limited.
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Otherwise, if you just do as you want, following your own thoughts, your subjectivity, and then force your personal thoughts upon the masses, it is just like “cutting your feet to fit your shoes.” Feet are the masses. Shoes are our ways of organizing and working.
  
With that limitation in mind, we conclude by acknowledging the enormous debt we owe to the AT movement. AT does challenge the blind allegiance to progress. It does insist on cultural sensitivity. It does strive for something quite admirable, which we wish to take along with us. That is, as Hazeltine and Bull put it, the concept “that the technology must match both the user and the need in complexity and scale.”28 We just want to think more broadly about the kind of complexity we consider, assess the concept of needs beyond the human–tool interaction, and expand the scale of our understanding.
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Shoes are made to fit people’s feet, not the other way around.
  
^V>WAS
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= Chapter 1: Dialectical Materialism =
  
MKK
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Dialectical Materialism, one of the materialist foundations of Marxism-Leninism, uses the materialist worldview and dialectical methods to study fundamental philosophical issues. Dialectical Materialism is the most advanced form of Materialism, and serves as the ''theoretical core of a scientific worldview.'' Therefore, thoroughly understanding the basic content of Dialectical Materialism is the essential prerequisite to study both the component principles of Marxism-Leninism in particular, and the whole of Marxism-Leninism in general.
  
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== I. Materialism and Dialectical Materialism ==
  
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=== 1. The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues ===
  
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''Philosophy is a system of the most general human theories and knowledge about our world, about ourselves, and our position in our world.''
  
Figure 13: Ted Was Right
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Philosophy has existed for thousands of years. Philosophy has different objects of study depending on different periods of time. Summarizing the whole history of philosophy, Engels said: “The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of more modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being<ref>''Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'', Friedrich Engels, 1886.</ref>.”
  
Source: Anonymous graffiti artist, Photography by Melissa Adams, 2012, Chapel Hill, North Carolina
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So, philosophy studies the relations between consciousness and matter, and between humans and nature.
  
Chapter Eight
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In philosophy, there are two main questions:
  
The Unabomber
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'''Question 1: The question of consciousness and matter: which came first; or, to put it another way, which one determines which one?'''
  
ON A WALL IN NORTH CAROLINA RECENTLY, someone spraypainted the image of a man with a mustache and dark glasses wearing a hooded sweatshirt, with the words, “Ted was right.” “Ted” refers to Ted Kaczynski, aka the Unabomber, and the image is based on the infamous FBI sketch of the Unabomber when he was still at large. “Ted was right” indicates that whoever drew this graffiti (possibly a local anarchist collective; for many anarchists, Kaczinski has become not only a folk hero but a political prisoner) agrees, we assume, with Kaczinski’s critique of modern technology—that it is robbing us of our humanity. But Kaczynski also argued, in his manifesto published by the mainstream press (under the name FC and under pressure from the FBI), that to correct the situation, to stop technology and our dehumanization, many people would have to die, and he carried out a wave of deadly bombings to begin this “revolution.” To the extent that his thinking led him to murder people, Ted was most definitely NOT right, in our minds. But why is his image appearing on walls? And what did he actually say? What might he have been right about?
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In attempting to answer this first question, philosophy has separated into two main schools: ''Materialism,'' and ''Idealism.''
  
Between 1978 and 1995 a man the FBI referred to as “the Unabomber” mailed a series of bombs to universities and corporations across the United States, resulting in the deaths of three men, and the injuries, some serious, of twenty-three others. He was referred to as the Unabomber because his victims seemed to be related either to academia (the university) or the airlines industry—thus, Un-A-Bomber. The victims were for the most part not major public figures. As Tim Luke has described them, they were part of a new class of “comparatively obscure administrators, agents, or academicians who were actively working in the applied sciences, computer sciences, or mathematical sciences for small firms or universities.”1
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'''Question 2: Do humans have the capacity to perceive the world as it truly exists?'''
  
In 1995 the bomber, referring to himself as “FC,which stood for Freedom Club, an organization to which he said he belonged, began writing public
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In answer to this second question, two schools: ''Intelligibility'' — which admits the human cognitive capacity to truly perceive the world — and ''unintelligibility'' — which denies that capacity.
  
98 O
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Materialism is the belief that the nature of the world is matter; that matter comes first; and that matter determines consciousness. People who uphold this belief are called materialists. Throughout human history, many different factions of materialists with various schools of materialist thought have evolved.
  
REPRESENTATIVE RESPONSES
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Idealism is the belief that the nature of the world is consciousness; consciousness precedes matter; consciousness decides matter. People who uphold this belief are called idealists. Like materialism, various factions of idealists with varying schools of idealist thought have also evolved throughout history.
  
letters to individuals and newspapers. He expressed frustration with the crushing alienation of industrial society. Later that year he offered to cease his bombing campaign if major newspapers would publish his 35,000-word essay expressing his views, and two 2,000-word essays, one each in subsequent years. On advice of the FBI, the Washington Post and the New York Times reluctantly published the essay titled “Industrial Society and Its Future,” which was quickly dubbed the Unabomber’s “Manifesto.”
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<br />
  
David Kaczynski read the essay and recognized in it key ideas and phrases similar to those that his brother had used in letters home. He related this information to the FBI, which subsequently arrested Theodore (“Ted”) Kaczynski for the Unabomber’s crimes.
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Idealism has cognitive origins and social origins.
  
We discuss the case of the Unabomber here because he represents one of the most extreme contemporary critiques of technological culture.2 Also, the Unabomber’s Manifesto “is the most widely circulated writing in the field of science, technology, and society” because of the notoriety and circumstances of its publication.3 Kaczynski has also become something of a myth: the insane hermit; the nut in the woods; a mythic archetype who resonates strongly with militia and survivalist groups, anarchists, and some Neo-Luddites who likewise reject society and take up armed resistance. He seems to fit within a frightening trend in society that has increased in the past two decades, a trend towards isolation and violence.4 What is especially disturbing about the Unabomber case is that many of the critiques of industrial society espoused in “Industrial Society and Its Future” are ones that we have written about ourselves, assigned as class reading, and consider to be classic statements in the field of technology studies. If we condemn the essay and its ideas in their entirety—as the work of a madman, as many are wont to do—then we will also have to condemn Jacques Ellul, Lewis Mumford, Herbert Marcuse, Ivan Illich, and many others. As Scott Corey argued, there had been a profound silence on the part of academics in responding to the Unabomber case—despite the fact that the essay is assigned as reading in classes across the country—perhaps because Kaczynski hits too close to home.5 If he is dismissed as an irrational nutcase (as many have dismissed the Luddites), we do not need to recognize or engage with what rings true, or at least what merits consideration in his ideas. Fortunately, the Unabomber has begun to be addressed by technology scholars such as Steven E. Jones in his book on NeoLuddism and popular writers like Kevin Kelly, who titles a chapter in his book, What Technology Wants, “The Unabomber Was Right.”6 This is in addition to a slew of popular biographies. Considerations of the Unabomber and his writings always include a distancing statement, parallel with the “I’m not a Luddite, but…” we discussed earlier. We did this ourselves in the first paragraph of this chapter.
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In this chapter, we first discuss the insistence that Kaczynski is insane, an insistence that permits many to dismiss his insights. Second, we view the despairing picture of a totalizing industrial society that drove him to commit the acts that he did. Throughout we consider what we can learn from Kaczynski about technological culture.
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==== Annotation 50 ====
  
The Unabomber
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''Cognitive origin'' refers to origination from the human consciousness of individuals.
  
O 99
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''Social origin'' refers to origination from social relations between human beings.
  
Kaczynski Must Be Insane
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So, idealism originates from both the conscious activity of individual humans as well as social activity between human beings.
  
The arrest of Theodore Kaczynski was an event for the media. The Unabomber’s seventeen-year reign of terror ended when the FBI raided the one-room cabin in Montana where he lived a hermit’s life. In all the press photos, Kaczynski looks wild-eyed, with long, unkempt beard and hair. He had been living for decades in self-imposed low-tech conditions, growing or hunting most of his food, with no running water or indoor sanitation facilities. As his background was uncovered, he was shown to have been a brilliant mathematician who entered Harvard at age sixteen and taught at the University of California at Berkeley before heading for his cabin in the woods. It was easy for the press to brand him as an extreme loner, a boy genius who had gone insane, existing far outside of society. Portraying him in these terms made it easy to dismiss Kaczynski as an aberration. This portrayal as an extreme loner served to disconnect him from anarchist movements, environmental movements, or even a long tradition of the critique of technological culture. In a way, the public needed him to be a loner so they would not have to consider his arguments as worthy of attention.
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These origins are ''unilateral consideration'' and ''absolutization'' of only one aspect or one characteristic of the whole cognitive process.
  
Although he was portrayed as insane, his insanity was never proven. As Alston Chase explains, most diagnoses of Kaczynski’s insanity came from two forms of analysis.7 First, diagnoses were based on superficial analyses of his lifestyle. Thus, to live alone, to live without much twentieth century technology, to be celibate, to be misanthropic, and to be a loner is to be insane. Second, diagnoses were based on examinations of his writings, which are inadequate bases for a genuine diagnosis of insanity. Some claimed that he was insane because he did not admit that he was insane or would not cooperate with experts who wished to declare him insane: a Catch-22 if ever there were one! To admit to being insane is to be insane; but to deny being insane is also to be insane! Even Kaczynski’s own lawyers, without his knowledge, based their case on an insanity defense. When Kaczynski found out, he tried to fire his lawyers, and failing that, asked to represent himself in court. The only court psychologist to examine Kaczynski in response to his own request, Sally Johnson, concluded that Kaczynski was competent to stand trial and to represent himself in court. She gave a provisional diagnosis of “paranoid schizophrenia,” but apparently did not think that this hindered his competency. The judge still refused to let Kaczynski represent himself, which, many suspected, would have led to a very public and political trial. Therefore, Kaczynski accepted a bargain to plead guilty and spend life in prison rather than face a trial in which he would have been presented as insane.8 Alston Chase concludes: “Although clearly neurotic, the best clinical evidence suggests he is quite sane. He willingly chose to kill, and his prideful intellect provided a rationale for doing do.”9 The Manifesto itself has been presented alternatively as the ramblings of a madman or a work of genius. Kirkpatrick Sale placed him within a long line of neoLuddites about whom Sale was just finishing a book, which we referred to in Chapter 7.10 But, initially at least, there was a reluctance to look at the Manifesto too closely, or to critique it on its own terms. Perhaps this is because if one were
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100 O
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==== Annotation 51 ====
  
REPRESENTATIVE RESPONSES
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''Unilateral consideration'' is the consideration of a subject from one side only.
  
to take his work seriously, even if aiming to discredit each of his arguments, one would have to acknowledge places where FC has a point about the technological nature of society and its restrictions on free will.11 To agree with any part of the Manifesto might be seen as agreeing with FC’s conclusions and methods (justifying his acts of terrorism and murder). But this need not be the case. Actually, Kaczynski was not quite the hermit and loner that most have portrayed. He traveled, read widely, and engaged in intense correspondence with many people throughout his time in Montana. This correspondence continued from prison.12 Indeed, when Steven Jones was interviewing a young antiglobalization protester for his book on Luddism, he was told he should just “write to Ted.” One can engage and even agree with points that FC makes without advocating murder or violence (as critiques by Jones, Kelly, Luke, and Corey have shown).13
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''Absolutization'' occurs when one conceptualizes some belief or supposition as ''always'' true in ''all'' situations ''without'' exception.
  
The Unabomber Manifesto
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Both unilateral consideration and absolutization fail to consider the dynamic, constantly changing, and interconnected relations of all things, phenomena, and ideas in our reality.
  
“Industrial Society and Its Future” is a fairly well-organized essay. Aside from its notable digressions against “The Left,” it warrants a closer look. Its argument is set out in the opening paragraphs:
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Idealism originates from unilateral consideration because idealists ignore the material world and consider reality ''only'' from the perspective of the human mind. It also originates from absolutism because idealists ''absolutize'' human reasoning as the ''only'' source of truth and knowledge about our world ''without exception.''
  
The Industrial Revolution and its consequences have been a disaster for the human race. They have greatly increased the life-expectancy of those of us who live in “advanced” countries, but they have destabilized society, have made life unfulfilling, have subjected human beings to indignities, have led to widespread psychological suffering (in the Third World to physical suffering as well) and have inflicted severe damage on the natural world. The continued development of technology will worsen the situation. It will certainly subject human beings to greater indignities and inflict greater damage on the natural world, it will probably lead to greater social disruption and psychological suffering, and it may lead to increased physical suffering even in “advanced” countries.
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As Lenin wrote in ''On the Question of Dialectics'': “Philosophical idealism is a unilateral development, an overt development, of one out of many attributes, or one out of many aspects, of consciousness.
  
The industrial-technological system may survive or it may break down. If it survives, it MAY eventually achieve a low level of physical and psychological suffering, but only after passing through a long and very painful period of adjustment and only at the cost of permanently reducing human beings and many other living organisms to engineered products and mere cogs in the social machine. Furthermore, if the system survives, the consequences will be inevitable: There is no way of reforming or modifying the system so as to prevent it from depriving people of dignity and autonomy.14
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Historically, idealism has typically benefitted the oppressive, exploitative class of society. Idealism and religions usually have a close relation with each other, and support each other to co-exist and co-develop.
  
Roughly, the argument of FC is that technological society works for its own ends and not for the real needs of the individual. The individual is shaped to meet society’s needs, and not vice versa. All aspects of modern society work to dehumanize and disempower the individual. The industrial system is due for a collapse, and the more humans are dependent on that system (and most are radically dependent on it), the harder that crash will be. It is FC’s goal to bring about the earlier rather than the later collapse of industrial society. He aims to bring humankind back into balance with nature and with personal autonomy, where individuals or small groups can exist without being subordinated to corporations,
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The Unabomber
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==== Annotation 52 ====
  
O 101
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Idealists, in absolutizing human consciousness, have a tendency to only give credence to the work of the mind and ignore the value of physical labor. This has been used to justify class structures in which religious and intellectual laborers are given authority and privilege over manual laborers.
  
bureaucracies, or any other system. Modern technologies are so thoroughly permeated with power and domination that they cannot be rearticulated for other democratic or libertarian uses. They must all be destroyed, and all the technical manuals burned.15
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This situation has also led to the idea that mental factors play a decisive role in the development of human society in particular and the whole world in general. This idealist view was supported by the ruling class and used to justify its own power and privilege in society. The dominant class has historically used such idealist philosophy as the justifying foundation for their political-social beliefs in order to maintain their ruling positions.
  
According to FC, industrial society and its future are marked by absolutes: “technicism” has penetrated all aspects of society and nature absolutely; technology and “wild nature” are in absolute opposition to one another; small-scale society and small-scale technology are absolutely good; large-scale society and large-scale technology are absolutely evil. There is no compromise and no possibility of compromise. Those who compromise are part of the problem, and since there is no compromise, FC sees no other solution than the path he has taken. As Luke explains:
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Marx discusses this tendency for rulers to idealistically justify their own rule in ''The German Ideology'':
  
No vocabulary is fully adequate for reiterating what the Unabomber attacks in his manifesto or for explaining how someone could commit this sort of violent action. On one level, it is about power and knowledge turning an individual against technoscientific structures because of the frictions felt by all individuals living within industrial, bureaucratic society. On another level, it is a plea to recollectivize people and things on a smaller scale, at a slower pace, and in simpler ways. And on a third level, it is a shallow justification for mayhem and murder.16
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<blockquote>
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The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an ‘eternal law.
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</blockquote>
  
As Corey describes, Kaczynski was profoundly influenced by the work of Jacques Ellul, especially Ellul’s groundbreaking book, The Technological Society, in which Ellul argues that modern society is characterized by all-encompassing technique, which permeates all aspects of modern life.17 So deep is the reach of technique that the only escape from such a society is radical catastrophe or the intervention of a loving God (Ellul was a priest). However, Ellul never advocated violent rebellion and even thought that political action was useless. Kaczynski wrote letters to Ellul in the early 1970s, though it is unknown if Ellul ever responded or even read them. What we do know is that by 1976, in his book The Ethics of Freedom, Ellul had “denounced virtually every FC position.”18 Kaczynski refused to acknowledge these dimensions of Ellul’s work.
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Marx goes on to explain how the idealist positions of the ruling class tend to get embedded in historical narratives:
  
FC’s rhetoric is shaped by the intellectual and social climate of the 1950s and 1960s, especially the idea that humankind is becoming dominated by an all-encompassing system. Such ideas were prevalent in William H. Whyte’s The Organization Man and Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man, both of which argued, in different ways, that humanity was being reduced by the focus on the practice of obedience to authority, the value of efficiency through technology, and the overarching goal of corporate profit.19 Taken out of the immediate context of their publication, many aspects of FC’s argument would have found their place in courses on technology and culture for the past 50 years. For example, consider a paragraph from Lewis Mumford’s The Myth of the Machine: The Pentagon of Power:
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<blockquote>
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Whilst in ordinary life every shopkeeper is very well able to distinguish between what somebody professes to be and what he really is, our historians have not yet won even this trivial insight. They take every epoch at its word and believe that everything it says and imagines about itself is true. This historical method which reigned in Germany, and especially the reason why, must be understood from its connection with the illusion of ideologists in general, e.g. the illusions of the jurist, politicians (of the practical statesmen among them, too), from the dogmatic dreamings and distortions of these fellows; this is explained perfectly easily from their practical position in life, their job, and the division of labour.
  
The business of creating a limited, docile, scientifically conditioned human animal, completely adjusted to a purely technological environment, has kept pace with the rapid transformation of that environment itself: partly this has been
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102 O
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In history, there are two main forms of idealism: ''subjective'' and ''objective''.
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</blockquote>
  
REPRESENTATIVE RESPONSES
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''Subjective idealism'' asserts that ''consciousness'' is the primary existence. It asserts that all things and phenomena can only be experienced as subjective sensory perceptions while denying the objective existence of material reality altogether.
  
effected, as already noted, by re-enforcing conformity with tangible rewards, partly by denying any real opportunities for choices outside the range of the megatechnic system. American children, who, on statistical evidence, spend from three to six hours a day absorbing the contents of television, whose nursery songs are advertisements, and whose sense of reality is blunted by a world dominated by daily intercourse with Superman, Batman, and their monstrous relatives, will be able only by heroic effort to disengage themselves from this system sufficiently to recover some measure of autonomy. The megamachine has them under its remote control, conditioned to its stereotypes, far more effectively than the most authoritative parent. No wonder the first generation brought up under this tutelage faces an “identity crisis.”20
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''Objective idealism'' also asserts the ideal and consciousness as the primary existence, but also posits that the ideal and consciousness are objective, and that they exist independently of nature and humans. This concept is given many names, such as “absolute concept”, “absolute spirit,” “rationality of the world,” etc.
  
The themes of the transformation of humans to the needs of the machine, the transformation of the environment, and the destruction of human dignity and autonomy are all themes in FC’s manifesto. The difference is that neither Mumford, nor Ellul, nor Whyte, nor Marcuse killed anyone or advocated killing anyone as a viable solution to society’s technological troubles. FC would undoubtedly argue that these figures simply lacked the courage of their convictions and that they were all a part of the too comfortable, academically ensconced “Left.”
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FC presents two major arguments that might explain, but not excuse, his violence. One is that FC felt that violence was the only way to gain attention:
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==== Annotation 53 ====
  
If we had never done anything violent and had submitted the present writings to a publisher, they probably would not have been accepted. If they had been accepted and published, they probably would not have attracted many readers, because it’s more fun to watch the entertainment put out by the media than to read a sober essay. Even if these writings had had many readers, most of these readers would soon have forgotten what they had read as their minds were flooded by the mass of material to which the media expose them. In order to get our message before the public with some chance of making a lasting impression, we’ve had to kill people.21
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''Primary existence'' is existence which precedes and determines other existences.
  
FC’s conclusion is obviously untenable, based on a number of unsupported assumptions. The most fundamental of these assumptions is that people would actually read the copy of the manifesto published in the newspapers, whereas it was more likely to be, as Luke surmised, “tossed away with the rest of the September 19, 1995, newspaper.”22 However, this wasn’t quite the case. Copies of the newspapers sold out, and extra issues were printed. A number of publishers have independently printed copies.23 But if gaining attention was FC’s sole objective, then he most likely would have targeted higher-profile people to kill.
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Idealists believe that consciousness has primary existence over matter, that the nature of the world is ideal, and that the ideal defines existence.
  
The Unabomber’s turn to violence is more likely the result of his despair at what he sees as the totalizing nature of technicism, the imperialism of the received view of culture and technology as applied to the whole of human experience, or the methodological application of a technical logic to what is not technical.24 The totalization of technicism, its intervention into every aspect of life, society, and nature, is a vision he draws from Ellul (even though his conclusions are rejected by Ellul, as we said above). Both FC and Ellul would agree with Mumford’s identification of a fatalism characteristic of modern society: the unquestioning acceptance of
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Materialists believe the opposite: that matter has primary existence over the ideal, and that matter precedes and determines consciousness.
  
The Unabomber
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Dialectical Materialism holds that matter and consciousness have a dialectical relationship, in which matter has primary existence over the ideal, though consciousness can impact the material world through willful conscious activity.
  
O 103
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The primary existence of matter within Dialectical Materialism is discussed further in ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88.
  
technology as the only true path to improve humanity’s lot, a “technological compulsiveness: a condition under which society meekly submits to every new technological demand.”25 What is key for Mumford is that this sycophantic attitude towards technology (and technocrats) is the product of a particular historic period and not innate to human beings. He points out several examples where scientists argue that it is simply human nature to pursue any technological or scientific possibility, no matter how destructive. This argument allows scientists, engineers, and technologists to completely ignore ethical and moral action. The problem with the fatalists, for Mumford, is that they simply cannot see any way of changing or reversing the seemingly inevitable conclusion of the technicist logic that they have accepted as gospel truth. As an historic phenomenon, this mindset can be opposed (and must be opposed), and he points to a contemporary “affirmation of the primal energies of the organism” that he sees in the counterculture of the 1960s.26 But rather than valorizing the counterculture, he warns that such forces can be just as destructive to humanity if left unchecked.
+
Willful activity (''willpower'') is discussed in ''Nature and Structure of Consciousness'', p. 79.
  
Chase argues that the roots of the Unabomber’s actions lie in the atmosphere of despair and desperation of the 1950s and 1960s.27 Though these forces did have, and continue to have, an influence on a whole generation, they are simply not an excuse for murder. The totalizing vision of technicism has found a ready audience again in the new millennium as information technologies record and control our lives in ways that Mumford foresaw but in areas and scope that he could not have foreseen.28 It is tempting to see overwhelming forces (for example, individual consumers being no match for giant multinationals with their corps of lawyers) as absolute because then it seems to give one’s struggle a moral force.
+
The key difference between ''subjective'' and ''objective'' idealists is this:
  
There are other violent responses to industrial society that approach the totalizing rhetoric of FC. Some base their actions on an appeal to religious grounds (such as the terrorism of 9/11 or the arming of fundamentalist groups such as the Branch Davidians), some appeal to ecological grounds (such as some of the factions of Earth First!), and others to political grounds (anarchist groups and libertarian survivalists). The cry from many such groups, articulated especially well by the Unabomber, is that there is no alternative and that industrial society is all encompassing: that modern technology is so thoroughly permeated by relations of domination and dehumanization that the only solution is society’s destruction.
+
Subjective idealists believe that there is no external material world whatsoever — that what we imagine as the material world is merely illusory — and that all reality is created by consciousness, whereas objective idealists believe that there ''is'' a material world outside of human consciousness, but it exists independently of human consciousness; therefore (according to objective idealists), since humans can only observe the world through conscious experience, the material world can never be truly known or observed by our consciousness.
  
Lessons to Learn
+
In opposition to Idealism, Materialism originated through practical experience and the development of science. Through practical experience and systematic development of human knowledge, Materialism has come to serve as a universally applicable theoretical system which benefits progressive social forces and which also orients the activities of those forces in both perception and practice.
  
To us, the death of billions of people in the collapse of global industrial society is completely untenable and immoral as a goal or a solution. Likewise, we decry risking the death or injury of anyone to make some political point. Like Lewis Mumford, we do not hold with the universalizing view of the dominance of industrial society, and we need to work hard against the despair that such visions cause. But we also do not pretend to ignore the ways in which technicism has permeated everyday life.
+
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104 O
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==== Annotation 54 ====
  
REPRESENTATIVE RESPONSES
+
Materialism benefits progressive social forces by showing reality as it is, by dispelling the idealist positions of the ruling class, and by revealing that society and the world can be changed through willful activity.
  
Kevin Kelly, who seems to agree with Kaczynski’s assessment of technology as autonomous, self-aggrandizing, and totalizing, disagrees with Kaczynski’s fundamental premise: that “technology robs people of freedom.” Kaczynski, Kelly argues, “confused latitude with freedom. He enjoyed great liberty within limited choices, but he erroneously believed this parochial freedom was superior to an expanding number of alternative choices that may offer less latitude within each choice.”29 That is, one might find more freedom and choice within industrial society than living in a one-room shack in the woods (which limits what one can accomplish in so many ways). We are reminded of Raymond Williams’s argument against the romantics who would overturn the industrial revolution, discussed in Chapter 2. Kaczynski, in this view, can be seen as a hopelessly lost and deadly romantic.
+
Materialism guides progressive social forces by grounding thought and activity in material reality, enabling strategies and outcomes that line up with the realities of the material world. For instance, we must avoid utopianism [see Annotation 17, p. 18] in which emphasis is placed on working out ideal forms of society through debate, conjecture, and conscious activity alone. Revolution against capitalism must, instead, focus on affecting material relations and processes of development through willful activity.
  
We are not naive in our faith in resistance to totalizing regimes, nor do we tout resistance as yet another inevitable feature of technological society. One of the purposes of this book is to provide readers some of the tools for recognizing the important cultural dimension of technology, the important technological dimension of culture, and to examine the effects and possibilities for both human and technological action in our everyday lives. To this end, we must be able to recognize what is legitimate in the Unabomber’s complaint, but incorporate it into a world view that better understands the possibilities for human action that reside in the complexities of technological culture. That is why, in Part III we propose a cultural studies approach to technology, which draws on concepts of meaning, causality, agency, articulation, assemblage, politics, economics, space, time, identity, and conjuncture. It is through these concepts that we can envision a more constructive path than the deadly alternative of the Unabomber.
+
As Engels pointed out in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'': “The final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men’s brains, not in men’s better insights into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange.
  
One possible outcome of the Unabomber story is this: Perhaps in those moments of recognition, when, in FC’s writings, we glimpse ourselves as academics, Luddites, political advocates, or environmentalists—in the moment before we look away, shut him up, and drive him and his arguments from our consider-ation—perhaps those moments might be profoundly disturbing enough for us to fundamentally reassess what it is we really want, and how we want to get there.
+
=== 2. Dialectical Materialism — the Most Advanced Form of Materialism ===
  
Part III
+
In human history, as human society and scientific understanding have developed, materialism has also developed through three forms: ''Primitive Materialism, Metaphysical Materialism,'' and ''Dialectical Materialism.''
  
Cultural Studies on
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''Primitive Materialism'' is the primitive form of materialism. Primitive materialism recognizes that matter comes first, and holds that the world is composed of certain elements, and that these were the first objects, the origin, of the world, and that these elements are the essence of reality. These Primitive Materialist concepts can be found in many ancient materialist theories in such places as China, India, and Greece. [These Primitive Materialist elemental philosophies are discussed more in ''Matter'', p. 53] Although it has many shortcomings, Primitive Materialism is partially correct at the most fundamental level, because it uses the material of nature itself to explain nature.
  
Technological Culture
+
''Metaphysical Materialism'' is the second basic form of Materialism. This form of materialism was widely discussed and developed in Western Europe in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. During this time, the metaphysical method of perceiving the world was applied to materialist philosophy. Although Metaphysical Materialism does not accurately reflect the world in terms of universal relations [see p. 108] and development, it was an important step forward in the fight against idealist and religious worldviews, especially during the transformational period from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance in many Western European countries.
  
Figure 14: Electric Oven. Setting Electric Oven II
+
==== Annotation 55 ====
  
Source: Photograph by Theodor Horydczak, ca. 1920–1950, Library of Congress, Horydczak Collection: http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/thc1995009281/PP/
+
Metaphysical materialism was strongly influenced by ''mechanical philosophy'', a scientific and philosophical movement popular in the 17<sup>th</sup> century which explored mechanical machines and compared natural phenomena to mechanical devices. Mechanical philosophy led to a belief that all things — including living organisms — were built as (and could theoretically be built by humans as) mechanical devices. Influenced by this philosophy, metaphysical materialists came to see the world as a giant mechanical machine composed of parts, each of which exists in an essentially isolated and static state.
  
Figure 15: All in All Just Another Hole in the Table
+
Metaphysical materialists believed that all change can exist only as an increase or decrease in quantity, brought about by external causes Metaphysical materialism contributed significantly to the struggle against idealistic and religious worldviews, especially during the historical transition period from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance in Western European countries. Metaphysical materialism also had severe limitations; especially in failing to understand many key aspects of reality, such as the nature of development through change/motion and relationships.
  
Source: Photograph by Cyron, 2005, Wikimedia Commons: commons.wikimedia.org/ wiki/File:All_in_all,_just_another_hole_in_the_table_%283601148%29.jpg
+
''Dialectical Materialism'' is the third basic form of materialism. It was founded by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and defended and developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin as well as many of his successors. By inheriting the quintessence of previous theories and thoroughly integrating contemporary scientific achievements, Dialectical Materialism immediately solved the shortcomings of the Primitive Materialism of ancient times as well as the Metaphysical Materialism of modern Western Europe. It reaches the highest development level of materialism so far in history.
  
Chapter Nine
+
By accurately reflecting objective reality with universal relations and development*, Dialectical Materialism offers humanity a great tool for scientific cognitive activities and revolutionary practice. The Dialectical Materialist system of thought was built on the basis of scientific explanations about matter, consciousness, and the relationship between the two.
  
Meaning
+
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WHEN YOU PAY ATTENTION to what people talk about—in casual conversations, in class, on radio and television, in books, online, and in films—you note that they are often talking about, writing about, thinking about, reacting to, or responding to technology. Many of these conversations involve life-giving, life-changing, and life-threatening matters; controversial topics include fracking (hydraulic fracturing in natural gas extraction), genetic engineering, media surveillance, the use of unmanned drones in war (or even domestically), the impact of videogames on violent behavior, global climate change, nuclear energy, and weapons of mass destruction. Technology clearly matters, and it matters enormously. In less dramatic ways, the topic of technology also pervades talk about what matters in everyday life: in discussions of social media habits, the development of self-driving cars, or even in discussions about purchasing a tablet computer or the latest smartphone. Sometimes the matters seem relatively trivial: such as expressions of frustration over spotty mobile phone coverage, ATMs that are out of service, and gas-guzzling SUVs. Sometimes we know that these matters are deadly serious: such as debates over which countries can legitimately develop nuclear technologies or “weapons of mass destruction.”
+
==== Annotation 56 ====
  
What is amazing about these conversations involving technology is how little agreement there is about what is at stake, that is, about what really matters. Especially when the topic is controversial, there is often little agreement as to what a technology is or what it does. When is nuclear technology energy-producing, and when is it a weapons manufacturing process? Let us consider a quite stark example of such a controversy. Beginning in the 1980s, US physician Jack Kevorkian began developing machines that hastened death. In doing so, he ignited a national debate over assisted suicide, or euthanasia. These simple machines were of two types. One was a set of intravenous bottles mounted on a metal frame with a mechanism that allowed the patient to turn on and trigger the flow of a series of drugs that would bring on death painlessly. The other was a tank of deadly gas and a mask with a
+
<nowiki>*</nowiki> Materialist Dialectical methodology explains the world in terms of relationships and development. This is discussed in ''Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics'', p. 106.  
  
108 O
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== II. Dialectical Materialist Opinions About Matter, Consciousness, and the Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness ==
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
+
=== 1. Matter ===
  
mechanism that allowed the patient to turn on and trigger the flow of gas that would similarly bring on death painlessly. Kevorkian and his machines were the cause of considerable public and legal controversy. Was Kevorkian a passionate physician or a cold-hearted murderer?
+
==== a. Category of “Matter” ====
  
Some people argued that the machines honored a person’s right to take control of his or her life and death. They believed that when people have experienced prolonged suffering, they ought to have the right to cease that suffering. From this perspective, Kevorkian was a virtual saint, bucking an uncompassionate legal establishment, and his machines were “assisted-suicide machines,” a compassionate way to help people gain control that would otherwise be denied them.
+
<br />
 +
''Matter'' is a philosophical subject which has been examined for more than 2,500 years. Since ancient times, there has been a relentless struggle between materialism and idealism around this subject. Idealism asserts that the world’s nature, the first basis of all existence, is consciousness, and that matter is only a product of that consciousness. Conversely, materialism asserts that nature, the entirety of the world, is composed of matter, that this material world exists indefinitely, and that all things and phenomena are composed of matter.
  
Other people argued that no human has the right to determine the moment of a human death, even one’s own. Some feared the possibility that, once allowed to kill legally, the machines would surely be used to justify killing those who were deemed undesirable—in the manner that fascist Germany used liberal euthanasia laws to justify killing Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, and the handicapped. To legalize Kevorkian’s machines would be to invite fallible humans—and eventually the state—to kill at will. From this perspective, Kevorkian was an agent of encroaching totalitarianism, and his machines were “killing machines,” an evil that would usher in legalized, political murder.
+
Before dialectical materialism was born, materialist philosophers generally believed that matter was composed of some self-contained element or elements; that is to say some underlying substance from which everything in the universe is ultimately derived. In ancient times, the five elements theory of Chinese philosophy held that those self-contained substances were ''metal — wood — water — fire — earth;'' in India, the Samkhya school believed that they were ''Pradhana'' or ''Prakriti''<ref>According to the Samkhya school, Pradhana is the original form of matter in an unmanifested,indifferentiated state; ''Prakriti'' is manifested matter, differentiated in form, which contains potential for motion.</ref>'';'' in Greece, the Milesian school believed they were ''water'' (Thales’s<ref>Thales, ~642 — ~547 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher, mathematician, astronomer, politician.</ref> conception) or ''air'' (Anaximene’s<ref>Anaximene, ~585 — ~525 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher.</ref> conception); Heraclitus<ref>Heraclitus, ~540 — ~480 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher, founder of ancient dialectics.</ref> believed the ultimate element was ''fire;'' Democritus<ref>Democritus, ~460 — ~370 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher, naturalist, a founder of atom theory.</ref> asserted that it was something called an “atom,”'''' etc. Even as recently as the 17<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> centuries, conceptions about matter belonging to modern philosophers such as Francis Bacon<ref>Francis Bacon, 1561 — 1626 (British): Philosopher, novelist, mathematician, political activist.</ref>, Renes Descartes<ref>Rene Descartes, 1596 — 1650 (Fench): Philosopher, mathematician, physicist.</ref>, Thomas Hobbes<ref>Thomas Hobbes, 1588 — 1679 (British): Political philosopher, political activist.</ref>, Denis Diderot<ref>Denis Diderot, 1713 — 1784 (French): Philosopher, novelist.</ref>, etc., still hadn’t changed much. They continued following the same philosophical tendency as ancient philosophers by focusing their studies of the material world through elemental phenomena.
  
From this case, we can see that this technology clearly mattered, and it mattered enormously (either in a positive or negative way). But there was little agreement about what was at stake, or what mattered: Does the individual have a right to choose the time of his or her death? Do states have a right to murder those deemed undesirable? These discussions often end frustratingly, at an impasse, without a way to reconcile what are seen as mutually exclusive stakes. There is seldom a shared framework for deciding, among the many decisions that might need to be made, if the machines should be legal or illegal.
+
These conceptions of matter which were developed by philosophers before Marx’s time laid a foundation for a tendency to use nature to explain nature itself, but that tendency still had many shortcomings, such as: oversimplification of matter into fictitious “elements;” failure to understand the nature of consciousness as well as the relationships between matter and consciousness; failure to recognize the significance of matter in human society, leading to a failure to solve social issues based on a materialist basis, etc.
  
This problem is enacted daily, at every level of conversation concerning technology, even at the most mundane level. For example, in discussing the desirability or undesirability of SUVs, what exactly matters? That there are too many polluting automobiles on the road? That people have the right to drive whatever they want? That restrictions on domestic drilling limit the availability of gas? That there are simply too many people in the world to use resources this way? That SUV drivers fare better than the drivers of smaller vehicles in crashes between them? That SUVs exemplify an unjustified disparity in income distribution?
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In conversations about these topics, the reason we fail to reach more constructive outcomes can be understood partly in terms of a very significant lack: the lack of a sophisticated and shared understanding of how to approach questions of technology. Even if all participants agree (explicitly or implicitly) to consider that the matter in question is technological, it is striking how little agreement there is about precisely what that means. What exactly are people talking about when they support or criticize the existence of Kevorkian’s machines or SUVs? What, after all, is technology, and how is it connected to our assessments of all the other aspects of daily life that matter? Without that key, that sense of common theoretical ground, we remain destined to discuss, argue, and live at
+
==== Annotation 57 ====
  
Meaning
+
Here are further explanations of these shortcomings of early materialists:
  
O 109
+
'''Oversimplification of matter into fictitious “elements”'''
  
cross-purposes in a communicative space where we cannot begin to sort out the basic terms of disagreement. Without that key, our mechanisms for achieving resolutions to technological matters of enormous importance remain hopelessly flawed.
+
Due to a lack of understanding and knowledge of matter, metaphysical materialists created erroneous conceptions of “elements” which do not accurately describe the nature of matter. By using such an erroneously conceived system of non-existing elements to describe nature, metaphysical materialists were prevented from gaining real insights into the material world which delayed and hindered scientific progress.
  
It is important to remember that reaching understanding of the meanings involved does not guarantee agreement on controversial matters. It is both unrealistic and foolish to expect agreement on all things, and this is not an approach designed to engineer such an agreement. It is an effort, however, to encourage thinking through the bases for our positions, and be willing to scrutinize and critique them, so that at least we can reach agreement about where we really disagree. If there is any hope for agreement on controversial matters, it might be achieved through this process.
+
'''Failure to understand the nature of consciousness as well as the relationships between matter and consciousness'''
  
So, Then, What Is Technology?
+
Many early materialists believed that consciousness was simply a mechanical byproduct of material processes, and that mental events (thoughts, consciousness) could not affect the material world, since these events were simply mechanically determined ''by'' the material world.
  
Part of the difficulty with reaching common ground in discussions concerning technology is that the term is used in so many different ways. One could turn to the dictionary, but dictionary definitions do not adequately capture the meanings of technology that people operate with in everyday life. If you take a group of people and ask each person to write down a definition of technology, you will get as many definitions as there are people in the group! This is often the case even when they are allowed time to consult sources (such as dictionaries) or experts. There do tend to be, however, some thematic similarities in the definitions people turn up. Here are some typical definitions. Drawing on Webster’s, technology is:
+
As a first principle, Dialectical Materialism does hold that consciousness is ''created by'' matter. However, Dialectical Materialism also holds that consciousness can ''influence'' the material world through conscious action. This constitutes a dialectical relationship.
  
1 a : the practical application of knowledge especially in a particular area: ENGINEERING 2 <medical technology> b : a capability given by the practical application of knowledge <a car’s fuel-saving technology>
+
As Lenin explains in ''Materialism and Empirio-criticism'': “Consciousness in general ''reflects'' being—that is a general principle of ''all'' materialism... social consciousness ''reflects'' social being.”
  
2 : a manner of accomplishing a task especially using technical processes, methods, or knowledge <new technologies for information storage>
+
Whereas early materialists erroneously held that consciousness is simply an “accidental” byproduct of matter, Dialectical Materialism holds that consciousness is a characteristic of the ''nature'' of matter. As Engels wrote in the notation of ''Dialectics of Nature'':
  
3 : the specialized aspects of a particular field of endeavor <educational technology>1
+
<blockquote>
 +
That matter evolves out of itself the thinking human brain is for mechanism a pure accident, although necessarily determined, step by step, where it happens. But the truth is that it is the nature of matter to advance to the evolution of thinking beings, hence this always necessarily occurs wherever the conditions for it (not necessarily identical at all places and times) are present.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Rhetoricians typically define technology by pointing to the Greek root, tekhne, which means art or craft. The suffix ology means “the study of.” When you put these two together, technology means the study of an art or craft. Cultural theorist Raymond Williams, in Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, writes that technology is used to “describe a systematic study of the arts...or the terminology of a particular art” and has had this meaning since the seventeenth century.2
+
Dialectical materialism also breaks from early materialism by positing that consciousness has a dialectical relationship with matter. Consciousness arises from the material world, but can also influence the material world through conscious action. In other words, mental events can trigger physical actions which affect the material world.
  
Interestingly, few people still make everyday use of the term technology in any of the above ways (if they ever did!). What is curious about these definitions is that they treat technology as application, capability, manner of doing, and specialized aspect, but not as a thing. When technology is referred to in popular discourse, however, it is almost always in reference to things (tractors, pacemakers, computers, and so on). Even more interesting then is the fact that the examples in the dictionary definitions suggest things: medical technologies (e.g., respirator),
+
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110 O
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As Marx explains in ''Theses on Feuerbach'':
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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<blockquote>
 +
The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of changed circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change [Selbstveränderung] can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice... Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.
 +
</blockquote>
  
fuel-saving technologies (e.g., catalytic converter), information storage technologies (e.g., computer), and educational technologies (e.g., computer set up for distance instruction). In our estimation, the most common meaning of technology in popular usage conceives technologies as “things that are useful;” that is, as things that have, as the dictionary puts it, some “practical application.” So technology is, at least in terms of its most popular usage, a constructed and useful thing.
+
Put more simply, we as humans are capable of “revolutionary practice” which can “change the world” because our consciousness allows us to “change circumstances.” This is discussed further in ''Nature and Structure of Consciousness'', p. 79.
  
What does it mean to treat technology as a “thing?” Or, as we prefer to think of it, in terms of its “thingness?” It means to understand and treat technology in terms of objects that have discrete boundaries precisely delimiting the objects and differentiating them from others. So, for example, a digital camera is a different technology than a film camera. Although they are related in some ways, it is possible to specify what makes each unique. Likewise, it is possible to differentiate technology from other kinds of things. In this way of thinking, technology (the camera, for example) is different from nature (a tree, for example) and different from culture (religion, for example). Each occupies its own separate space. Although they may have a relationship, they are each separately bounded and definable. A technology may exist in culture, but like an egg in a nest, it is an isolatable, discrete object. A technology may touch but not interpenetrate the other object: culture. Where one begins and the other ends is always decidable, a mere matter of calculation, measurement, and discernment.
+
<blockquote>
 +
Failure to recognize the significance of matter in human society, leading to a failure to solve social issues based on a materialist basis
 +
</blockquote>
  
Most often, technological objects are understood to be constructed, solid, and nonliving, although biotechnology is increasingly adding living things to the category of technology. Technological objects are understood to be stable masses, that is, particular arrangements of matter that can be described in terms of their mass (large, small, heavy, light, soft, hard, dense, and so on). Technologies are artifacts, instruments, tools, machines, structures, and constructions; they are detached and different from other things. In this sense, they are discrete, isolatable objects, correlates of natural objects, but not natural. Examples of such things include cameras, paperclips, scissors, generators, automobiles, bridges, buildings, computers, televisions, overhead projectors, microscopes, MP3 players, CDs, assisted-suicide/killing machines, artificial limbs, and, increasingly, genetically modified structures.
+
Dialectical materialists believe that matter exists in many forms, and that human society is a special form of existence of matter. Lenin referred to the material existence of human society as ''social being'', which stood in contrast with human society’s ''social consciousness.'' Social being encompasses all of the material existence and processes of human society.
  
“Thingness,” however, also points to the fact that people often treat arrangements without solid mass as though they were things. An excellent example of this idea of technology is the Internet. While commonly thought of as a technology, the Internet does not occupy space in the same way that a computer monitor does. It is still commonly treated, however, as though it had a discrete, isolatable nature. Although the work of discernment is more difficult, it is possible to map its boundaries, to delimit what the Internet is and what it is not. It is a network that consists of certain components of hardware, software, and certain more ethereal components such as electrical connections, microwaves, satellite links, and clouds. It is not the computer monitor, the user, the software or hardware designers, or the companies that post Web pages. It is, rather, the network of connections among these (and other) sites. Note: not the sites themselves, but the network of connections among them. Thus, even though the Internet has no “weight” (or
+
As Lenin wrote in ''Materialism and Empirio-criticism'':
  
Meaning
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<blockquote>
 +
Social being is independent of the social consciousness of men. The fact that you live and conduct your business, beget children, produce products and exchange them, gives rise to an objectively necessary chain of events, a chain of development, which is independent of your social consciousness, and is never grasped by the latter completely. The highest task of humanity is to comprehend this objective logic of economic evolution (the evolution of social life) in its general and fundamental features, so that it may be possible to adapt to it one’s social consciousness and the consciousness of the advanced classes of all capitalist countries in as definite, clear and critical a fashion as possible.
 +
</blockquote>
  
O 111
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Early materialists failed to recognise the relationship between matter and consciousness — as Lenin puts it, specifically, between ''social being'' and ''social consciousness''. Thus in contemplating social issues, these early materialists were unable to find proper materialist solutions.
  
other such definitive measure of mass), it is a constructed, nonliving, arrangement that is contained by boundaries that define what it is and what it is not. It has an inside and an outside. While it is a complex network, it does not interpenetrate the other “things” that we understand to constitute culture.
+
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The cultural tendency to conceive of technology in terms of “thingness” has interesting and serious consequences. Significantly, as we have argued, it directs vision toward the “stuff” of technology: the solid, measurable things that are produced. In so doing, it deflects vision away from the interdependent relations among the living and nonliving within which these things are given form. To focus on bounded artifacts—on “thingness”—is to deflect understanding from the ongoing energies, activities, relations, interpenetrations, and investments within which these things appear, take flight, and have effects. Further, the formulation of technology as things that are “useful” deflects vision toward the tool-like use of these things, and away from the work or role of these things beyond matters of their usefulness.
+
These shortcomings resulted in a non-thorough materialist viewpoint: when dealing with questions about nature, the early materialists had a strong materialist viewpoint but when dealing with social issues, they “slipped” into an idealist viewpoint.
  
At the same time, the formulation of technology as things that are useful emphasizes the role of technology as a human-focused object. What matters in this formulation is what technology means for humans, in the human world. On the one hand, this is obvious because it would not be a technology without human3 action. A rock untouched by human hands is not a technology, but a rock bent to human purposes (a wall, a missile) is a technology. Technology involves human purpose and action. Ironically, by focusing on the human purposes it is possible to ignore the importance of an aspect of the thingness of technologies: their materiality, as objects of and for themselves quite apart from their function and meanings for humans.4 Please do not misunderstand. We are not saying that we should consider this version of material thingness alone (objects of and for themselves), that it is only their thingness that matters (this is the mistake made by recent trends in the philosophy of technology).5 We are saying that we cannot ignore their material thingness and focus only on the meanings and functions of technology for human life.
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In the remaining chapters of this book, we develop a way of understanding technology that foregrounds the interconnectedness within which things appear, are developed, and have effects. While the approach we develop relies on the theoretical concepts of articulation and assemblage, it owes a great debt to many scholars who have proposed alternative approaches to conceiving the interconnectedness of technological culture. For example, in his book Technology as Symptom and Dream, Robert D. Romanyshyn defines technology as “an enactment of the human imagination in the world.”6 Andrew Feenberg, in Critical Theory of Technology, defines it as a “process of development suspended between different possibilities.”7 Langdon Winner, in The Whale and the Reactor, defines technologies as “forms of life.”8 Elizabeth Grosz put it particularly elegantly. She writes in her essay titled “The Thing:” “Technology is that which ensures and continually refines the ongoing negotiations between bodies and things, the deepening investment of the one, the body, in the other, the thing.”9
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==== Annotation 58 ====
  
While these formulations may not yet make sense, they do point to flows, connections, relationships, and interpenetrations among the living, the nonliving,
+
Lenin explains this concept of “slipping into” idealism through a non-thorough materialist viewpoint in ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism:'' “Once you deny objective reality, given us in sensation, you have already lost every one of your weapons against fideism, for you have slipped into agnosticism or subjectivism — and that is all fideism wants.”
  
112 O
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''Note: fideism is a form of idealism which holds that truth and knowledge are received through faith or revelation. Subjectivism is the centering of one’s own self in conscious activities and perspective; see Annotation 222, p. 218.''
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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In the same work, Lenin upholds that objective reality can be known through sense perception:
  
producers, users, processes, possibilities, and energies—and not just to things. If we can learn to think with meanings such as these, we may be able to find productive common ground from which to speak about technological culture.10
+
<blockquote>
 +
We ask, is a man given objective reality when he sees something red or feels something hard, etc., or not? [...] If you hold that it is not given, you... inevitably sink to subjectivism... If you hold that it is given, a philosophical concept is needed for this objective reality, and this concept has been worked out long, long ago. This concept is matter. Matter is a philosophical category denoting the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Why Struggle with Meaning?
+
Lenin also explains that proper materialism must recognize objective/absolute truth:
  
There are several forms of resistance that you might be feeling to this call to learn a new—and decidedly more complicated—sense of technology. First, you might ask, with all the definitions of technology available, why propose another? Wouldn’t it make sense to simply advance the one that is “correct” or “best” and move on? Second, you may have a rather well-worked-out definition of technology with which you are satisfied. Perhaps you feel it has served you well up to now and see no need to abandon the comfort it offers. Third, you may challenge the idea that anyone has the “right” to simply develop (or “make up”) a new definition as they see fit. You may believe that language and meaning are fixed and absolute and don’t warrant such tinkering. As we argue below, grappling with the problems of what technology means, and the power that different definitions have, actually provides crucial insight into the character of technological culture.
+
<blockquote>
 +
To be a materialist is to acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind, is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth.
 +
</blockquote>
  
First, in response to the hope that we could simply choose the most comprehensive and useful definition of technology and move on, we maintain, as we have argued above, that there is no definition of technology that (as yet) seems to work consistently in everyday life. Dictionary definitions don’t match up very well to actual use, and popular usage is inconsistent. Working to develop a widely shared, sophisticated understanding of technological culture might help us solve significant problems involving technology. But, in the interest of achieving that understanding, we can’t simply jettison all the definitions and meanings of technology that have come before and that are a part of our culture. However inadequate or problematic they may be, they influence current understandings and actions—usually in inconsistent and contradictory ways. In a very real sense, all those definitions contribute to the shape of technological culture.
+
A failure to recognize the existence of such objective, absolute truth, according to Lenin, constitutes “relativism,a position that all truth is relative and can never be absolutely, objectively knowable.
  
Second, in response to those who are comfortable with a particular definition of technology, we encourage you to put your definition to the test, in light of what you’ve read thus far in this book. Has it always served you well, or have you had to change your concept of what technology is from time to time in order to grapple with the issues that have been raised here? We suspect that the latter is the case. Why? Technology is—and will likely continue to be—polysemic. Polysemy is a term that points to the fact that words can have many different meanings. The more potential meanings that can be attributed to a word, the more polysemic that word is. Some words, at particular historical moments, are highly polysemic. Terms such as love, life, liberal, conservative, democracy, freedom, and technology are currently highly polysemic terms in North American culture. An understanding of the work performed by the term “technology” should be broad enough to accommodate the fact that technology is likely to remain polysemic, for it is a site of significant cultural struggle and change.
+
<blockquote>
 +
It is unconditionally true that to every scientific ideology (as distinct, for instance, from religious ideology), there corresponds an objective truth, absolute nature. You will say that this distinction between relative and absolute truth is indefinite. And I shall reply: yes, it is sufficiently ‘indefinite’ to prevent science from becoming a dogma in the bad sense of the term, from becoming something dead, frozen, ossified; but it is at the same time sufficiently ‘definite’ to enable us to dissociate ourselves in the most emphatic and irrevocable manner from fideism and agnosticism, from philosophical idealism and the sophistry of the followers of Hume and Kant. Here is a boundary which you have not noticed, and not having noticed it, you have fallen into the swamp of reactionary philosophy. It is the boundary between dialectical materialism and relativism.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Meaning
+
In other words, while proper materialism must contain a degree of relativistic thinking sufficient to challenge assumptions and reexamine perceived truth periodically, materialists must not fall into complete relativism (such as that espoused by Hume and Kant) lest they fall into idealist positions. Ultimately, Absolute Truth — according to Lenin — constitutes the alignment of conscious understanding with objective reality (not to be confused with Hegel’s notion of Absolute Truth; see Annotation 232, p. 228).
  
O 113
+
Lenin recognized the development of Marx and Engels as “''modern materialism'', which is immeasurably richer in content and in comparably more consistent than all preceding forms of materialism,” in large part because Marx and Engels were able to apply materialism properly to social sciences by taking the “direct materialist road as against idealism.” He goes on to describe would-be materialists who fall to idealist positions due to relativism and other philosophical inadequacies as “a contemptible ''middle party'' in philosophy, who confuse the materialist and idealist trends on every question.”
  
Third, in response to skepticism you might have about our “right” to develop a definition of technology, we next explore a little bit about the nature of language and meaning, to clarify that change, not stasis, is more the rule than the exception.
+
Lenin warned that a failure to hold a thoroughly materialist viewpoint leads philosophers to become “ensnared in idealism, that is, in a diluted and subtle fideism; they became ensnared from the moment they took ‘sensation’ not as an image of the external world but as a special ‘element.’ It is nobody’s sensation, nobody’s mind, nobody’s spirit, nobody’s will — this is what one inevitably comes to if one does not recognise the materialist theory that the human mind reflects an objectively real external world.
  
Struggles over Meaning
+
In other words, idealist conceptions of sensation inject mysticism into philosophy by conceiving of sensation as otherworldly, supernatural, and detached from material human beings with material experiences in the material world.
  
Most people are familiar with the distinction between denotation and connotation. Denotative meaning implies that a word has a precise, unambiguous, or correct meaning. A word, in this case, signifies, or denotes, an explicit and culturally shared meaning. If, for example, you want the denotative meaning of the word technology, the best source is the dictionary, which delivers the “real” meaning. It is interesting how often students writing papers on controversial topics will go—naively—to the dictionary for the “real meaning” and hence the “final word” on some topic, as though the dictionary was the final authority on what something “really is.
+
The development of natural sciences in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries (especially the inventions of Roentgen<ref>Wilhelm Conrad Roentgen, 1845–1923 (German): Physicist.</ref>, Becquerel<ref>Henri Becquerel, 1852–1908 (French): Physicist.</ref>, Thomson<ref>Sir Joseph John Thomson, 1856–1940 (British): Physicist, professor at London Royal Institute.</ref> etc.), disproved the theories of “classical elements” such as fire, water, air, etc. [see ''Primitive Materialism'', p. 52]. These innovations led to a viewpoint crisis in the field of physical science. Many idealists used this opportunity to affirm the non-material nature of the world, ascribing the roles of supernatural forces to the birth of the world.
  
The dictionary, as we discussed above, is not the best place to look for the meanings of technology (or many other terms) used in everyday life. For that you need to understand connotative meanings: meanings that are implied by a word, meanings that are, in a sense, lived. Connotative meaning refers to the fact that words imply or evoke associations, memories, commitments, values, beliefs, and affects. These meanings are harder to track down than are denotative meanings, because they tend to be less consensual, less culturally explicit, and less likely to be “codified” in dictionaries. For many people, technology connotes progress; they encounter the word with enthusiasm, participating in a belief that new technologies make our lives better. For others, technology connotes economic hardship; they encounter the word with dread, believing that technology refers to the expensive things in life they would like to have but cannot afford, or to the objects responsible for the loss of a job. Connotative meanings such as these can vary dramatically, because they point to different—and often highly complex—ways of living in and experiencing the world.
+
-----
  
Although connotative meanings are more difficult to assess than denotative meanings, they often play the more powerful role in everyday life. This is clearly the case with technology, where, as we stated above, almost nobody actually uses or lives with the denotative dictionary definitions. As a result, it is a rather difficult to track what the powerful denotative definitions are and what cultural effects those definitions have.
+
==== Annotation 59 ====
  
This task is made more difficult by the fact that meanings change—even denotative definitions—and that there is traffic between denotative and conno-tative definitions. In actuality, the distinctions between denotation and connotation are not absolute. Language, after all, does change, and dictionaries—to some degree—reflect those changes. New meanings develop in a culture and sometimes make it into the dictionary. For example, you’ll find “Internet” only in a fairly new dictionary. Further, old meanings sometimes disappear. The Oxford English Dictionary is a resource that specializes in tracing the changing meanings of words. The changing meanings are significant because they demonstrate that
+
Lenin discussed this viewpoint crisis extensively in ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism''. Here Lenin discusses relativist reactions to new breakthroughs in natural science, which led even scientists (who proclaimed to be materialists) to take idealist positions:
  
114 O
+
<blockquote>
 +
We are faced, says Poincaré [a French scientist], with the “ruins” of the old principles of physics, “a general debacle of principles.” It is true, he remarks, that all the mentioned departures from principles refer to infinitesimal magnitudes; it is possible that we are still ignorant of other infinitesimals counteracting the undermining of the old principles... But at any rate we have reached a “period of doubt.” We have already seen what epistemological deductions the author draws from this “period of doubt:” “it is not nature which imposes on [or dictates to] us the concepts of space and time, but we who impose them on nature;” “whatever is not thought, is pure nothing.” These deductions are idealist deductions. The breakdown of the most fundamental principles shows (such is Poincaré’s trend of thought) that these principles are not copies, photographs of nature, not images of something external in relation to man’s consciousness, but products of his consciousness. Poincaré does not develop these deductions consistently, nor is he essentially interested in the philosophical aspect of the question.
 +
</blockquote>
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
+
Lenin concludes by stating that the non-thorough materialist position has lead directly to these idealist positions of relativism:
  
no denotative meaning is absolutely “True.” Rather, meanings are true—perhaps temporarily—simply because there is wide cultural agreement on a meaning and lexicographers have chosen to put those particular meanings in their dictionaries.
+
<blockquote>
 +
The essence of the crisis in modern physics consists in the breakdown of the old laws and basic principles, in the rejection of an objective reality existing outside the mind, that is, in the replacement of materialism by idealism and agnosticism.
 +
</blockquote>
  
In a sense, then, all meaning is connotative. All meanings are implied, subject to change, and liable to be legitimated (or not) in a complex process of cultural change. At different historical moments, different meanings will seem more or less contested, because, we remind you, there is often very much at stake in how you define something. It truly does matter, for example, whether you define Kevorkian’s machines as “killing machines” or as “assisted-suicide machines.” If you wanted to use one of these machines to terminate your life, it would matter. A killing machine might be illegal and difficult to locate, and those who helped you locate it would be criminals working outside the law. You too would be a criminal for using it. An “assisted-suicide machine” is more likely to be legal and easier to locate, and those administering it would be respected health care professionals earning salaries and paying taxes. You would be a patient rather than a criminal.
+
With this historical background, in order to fight against the distortions of many idealists and to protect the development of the materialist viewpoint, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin simultaneously summarized all the natural scientific achievements in late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century and built upon Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ thought to develop this definition of matter:
  
There are two interrelated definitional lessons to take from this example. First, changes in definition emerge within real cultural struggles. Kevorkian’s public flaunting of the use of his machines was clearly an attempt to force a legal and cultural change in what the machines meant and what mattered. His efforts, and the lawsuits and debates that involved his efforts, may significantly affect the ways that people understand life and death. All meaning changes in struggles like this, although the struggles are not always as dramatic. All meaning changes in struggles to make something mean in particular ways.
+
''“Matter is a philosophical category denoting objective reality which is given to man in his sensations, and which is copied, photographed, and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them.”''
  
Second, the definitional move we propose—away from the equation of technology with “thingness” and toward a notion of technology as articulation and assemblage—clearly matters. The two Kevorkian “machines”—the “killing machine” and the “assisted-suicide machine”—are only the same machine if you think solely in terms of their “thingness,” as discrete objects that exist apart from other objects and bodies. They are clearly different machines if you admit that what they “are” interpenetrates the lives, bodies, and objects of which they are a part, and that the forms of this interpenetration can differ. By understanding them as different machines, we are compelled to explore the culture, the cultural arrangement, and the flows and relationships within which these machines come to have a variety of meanings. We learn, as a result, more about everyday life, and more about technology as part of everyday life. Therefore, it is important to struggle with the problem of definitions, definitional change, and meaning. That is, in part, the way the world changes.
+
Lenin’s definition of matter shows that:
  
Figure 16: Train Wreck at Montparnasse Station, Paris, France, 1895
+
''First,'' we need to distinguish between the definition of “matter” as a philosophical category (the category that summarizes the most basic and common attributes of all material existence, and which was defined with the objective of solving the basic issues of philosophy) from the definition of “matter” that was used in specialized sciences (specific and sense-detectable substance).
  
Source: Photograph credited to the firm Lévy & fils, or to photographer Kuhn, 1895 Wikimedia Commons: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Train_wreck_at_
+
''Second,'' the most basic, common attribute of all kinds of matter [and under both definitions listed in the previous paragraph] is ''objective existence,'' meaning matter exists outside of human consciousness, independently of human consciousness, no matter whether humans can perceive it with our senses or not.
  
Montparnasse_1895.jpg
+
''Third,'' matter, with its specific forms, can cause and affect mental events in humans when it directly or indirectly impacts the human senses; human consciousness is the reflection of matter; matter is the thing that is reflected by human consciousness.
  
Chapter Ten
+
Lenin’s definition of matter played an important role in the development of materialism and scientific consciousness.
  
Causality
+
''First,'' by pointing out that the most basic, common attribute of matter is objective existence, Lenin successfully distinguished the basic difference between the definition of matter as a philosophical category and the definition of matter as a category of specialized sciences. It helped solve the problems of defining matter in the previous forms of materialism; it offered scientific evidence to define what can be considered matter; it layed out a theoretical foundation for building a materialist viewpoint of history, and overcame the shortcomings of idealist conceptions of society.
  
Beyond Determinism
+
''Second,'' by asserting that matter was ''“objective reality,” “given to man in his sensations,”'' and “''copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations,”'' Lenin not only confirmed the primary existence of matter and the secondary existence of consciousness [see ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88''] but he also affirmed that humans had the ability to be aware of objective reality through the “copying, photographing and reflection of our sensations” [in other words, sense perceptions].
  
AS DISCUSSED IN CHAPTER 4, technological determinism and cultural determinism represent two extreme positions with very few options for understanding how change happens. Most people, it turns out, think in more varied and often more complex ways about cultural and technological change. In her book Communication Technologies and Society, Jennifer described the most salient ways that people understand technology and change. She developed a way to explore the structures of thinking about causality used by people when they think about, make statements about, or take positions on technology.1 These positions are not necessarily held consciously, although they might be. Usually, however, it takes careful reflection (sometime self-reflection) to see the assumptions at work. It is also the case, as you will see, that it is not logically possible to operate with or believe more than one of these positions simultaneously. In the real world, however, people often take positions on technology that mix up these positions, which contributes to sloppy, unhelpful arguments. By carefully exploring the four positions, it is possible to unmask such sloppy thinking (including our own) and work toward conversations based on sound, critical thought. As we stated in the previous chapter, this, at the very least, enables identifying real bases for disagreement.
+
==== b. Mode and Forms of Existence of Matter ====
  
In her book, Jennifer proposed that the ways people really think about technology fall into two major categories (or perspectives): mechanistic perspectives on causality, and nonmechanistic perspectives on causality. Within each of these categories there are sub-categories (or perspectives): The two mechanistic perspectives are simple causality and symptomatic causality. The two nonmechanistic perspectives are expressive causality and articulation and assemblage.
+
According to the dialectical materialist viewpoint, ''motion'' is the mode of existence of matter; ''space'' and ''time'' are the forms of existence of matter.
  
118 O
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CULTURAL STUDIES
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==== Annotation 60 ====
  
Mechanistic Perspectives Nonmechanistic Perspectives
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<blockquote>
 +
Mode refers to the way or manner in which something occurs or exists. You can think of mode as pertaining to the “how,” as opposed to the “what.” For example, the ''mode'' of circulation refers to ''how'' commodities circulate within society [see Annotation 14, p. 16]; ''mode'' of production refers to ''how'' commodities are produced in society. So, mode of existence of matter refers to ''how'' matter exists in our universe.
  
Simple Causality Symptomatic Causality Expressive Causality Articulation and Assemblage
+
Form comes from the category pair [see ''Basic Pairs of Categories of Materialist Dialectics'', p. 126] of Content and Form [see p. 147]. Form refers to how we perceive objects, phenomena, and ideas. So, form of existence of matter refers to the ways in which we perceive the existence of matter [explained below] in our universe.
 +
</blockquote>
  
As you will see, this grid incorporates technological determinism and cultural determinism, but it transforms them in a way that makes it possible to characterize the more complex ways people think about culture and technology in everyday life.
+
''- Motion is the Mode of Existence of Matter''
  
Mechanistic Perspectives on Causality
+
As Friedrich Engels explained: ''“Motion, in the most general sense, conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute of matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe, from mere change of place right up to thinking.”''
  
When people understand change from a mechanistic perspective on causality, they think and act with four basic assumptions. It is important to remember that these assumptions are not necessarily held consciously, although they might be, and that it takes careful reflection (sometimes self-reflection) to see the assumptions at work. The four assumptions are as follows:
+
According to Engels, motion encompasses more than just positional changes. Motion embodies “all the changes and processes happening in this universe;” matter is always associated with motion, and matter can only express its existence through motion.
  
Assumption #1:
+
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Technologies Are Isolatable Objects, That Is, Discrete Things
+
==== Annotation 61 ====
  
The idea or definition of technology that comes into play when someone takes a mechanistic perspective on causality is that technologies are objects, artifacts, and things. Recalling the discussion of definitions in the previous chapter, technology here means “stuff,” with the consequence that it draws our attention away from the context within which the artifacts are produced and used. Technology is thus isolatable, meaning that we assume we can examine the technology itself, without having to consider, as part of what it is, the people who develop and use it, or the culture within which it is developed and used.
+
In Dialectical Materialist philosophy, “motion” is also known as “change” and it refers to the changes which occur as a result of the mutual impacts which occur in or between subjects through the negation of contradictions. Motion is a constant attribute of all things, phenomena, and ideas (see Characteristics of Development, p. 124).
  
Assumption #2:
+
Because matter is inseparable from motion (and vice versa), Engels defined motion as the ''mode'' of matter — the way or manner in which matter exists. It is impossible for matter in our universe to exist in completely static and unchanging state, isolated from the rest of existence; thus matter exists in the ''mode'' of motion. Over time, motion leads to ''development'' as things, phenomena, and ideas transition through various stages of quality change [see Annotation 117, p. 119].
  
Technologies Are Seen as the Cause of Change in Society
+
Matter exists objectively, therefore motion also exists objectively. The motion of matter is self-motion<ref>In the original Vietnamese, the word tự vận động is used here, which we roughly translate to the word ''self-motion'' throughout this book. Literally, tự vận động means: “it moves itself.”</ref>.
  
This assumption should now be familiar as a technological determinist position. When someone takes a mechanistic perspective on causality, discrete technological objects have effects on the culture and not the other way around.
+
-----
  
Assumption #3:
+
==== Annotation 62 ====
  
Technologies Are Autonomous in Origin and Action
+
It is important to note that “matter,” in the philosophical sense as used in dialectical materialist phlosophy, includes all that is “objective” (external) to individual human cosnciousness. This includes objective phenomena which human senses are unable to detect, such as objective social relations, objective economic values, etc. Objectiveness is discussed more in Annotation 108, p. 112; objective social relations are discussed more in Annotation 10, p. 10.
  
“Autonomous” means that something is separate, discrete, and independent. To say that technologies are autonomous is to say that they are discrete things that function independently. What they are and what they do does not depend on a relationship with anything else. To be autonomous in origin means that technologies come into being independently, that is, all by themselves. To be autonomous in action means that technologies act and have effects independently, that is, all by themselves.
+
In ''Dialectics of Nature'', Friedrich Engels discussed the properties of motion and explained that motion can neither be created nor destroyed. Therefore, motion can only change form or transfer from one object to another. In this sense, all objects are dynamically linked together through motion:
  
Causality
+
<blockquote>
 +
The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by bodies we understand here all material existence extending from stars to atoms... In the fact that these bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already becomes evident here that matter is unthinkable without motion. And if, in addition, matter confronts us as something given, equally uncreatable as indestructible, it follows that motion also is as uncreatable as indestructible. It became impossible to reject this conclusion as soon as it was recognised that the universe is a system, an interconnection of bodies.
 +
</blockquote>
  
O 119
+
In other words, every body of matter is in motion relative to other bodies of matter, and thus matter is inseparable from motion. Motion results from the interaction of bodies of matter. Because motion and matter define each other, and because motion can only exist in relation to matter and matter can only exist in relation to motion, the motion of matter can be described as “self-motion,” because the motion is not created externally but exists only within and in relation to matter itself. Engels further explains that if this were not true — if motion were external to matter — then motion itself would have had to have been created external to matter, which is impossible:
  
What does it look like to come into being autonomously? There are three ways that people talk about technology that suggest they assume it has autonomous origins: that it simply appears; that it arises in the mind of an inventor; and/ or that it is a self-generating force. First, people sometimes talk about technologies as though they simply appear: they materialize out of thin air, as though they dropped from the sky. They are the ultimate deus ex machina, literally in Latin, “the god in the machine.” This phrase refers to the practice in medieval theater of dropping a mechanical device with a “god” aboard it onto the stage. The god’s function was to resolve the conflict of the drama with no other apparent connection to the story (or context). Thus, no matter what seemingly irresolvable turn the story might take, the deus ex machina arrives “out of thin air” to set all things almost magically straight. In a similar way, people often assume that technologies appear as though motivated by some inertial force that exists apart from the goals, motivations, and desires of human beings and apart from the organization of culture. They are dropped from above to resolve (or create) conflict.
+
<blockquote>
 +
To say that matter during the whole unlimited time of its existence has only once, and for what is an infinitesimally short period in comparison to its eternity, found itself able to differentiate its motion and thereby to unfold the whole wealth of this motion, and that before and after this remains restricted for eternity to mere change of place — this is equivalent to maintaining that matter is mortal and motion transitory. The indestructibility of motion cannot be merely quantitative, it must also be conceived qualitatively; matter whose purely mechanical change of place includes indeed the possibility under favourable conditions of being transformed into heat, electricity, chemical action, or life, but which is not capable of producing these conditions from out of itself, such matter has forfeited motion; motion which has lost the capacity of being transformed into the various forms appropriate to it may indeed still have dynamis but no longer energeia, and so has become partially destroyed. Both, however, are unthinkable.
 +
</blockquote>
  
An additional image captures the way this belief in the autonomous deus ex machina works. Imagine for a moment that culture is a pool table covered with balls at rest. A new technology (the cue ball) drops on to the table, appearing from outside the culture. Once dropped, the technology/cue ball collides into the other balls, creating change. The new technology, like the cue ball, is understood as though it comes from somewhere outside culture, with no pre-existing relationship to the culture it affects.
+
So, motion can change forms and can transfer from one material body to another, but it can never be created externally from matter, and neither motion nor matter can be created or destroyed in our universe. Thus, matter exists in a state of “self-motion;” motion can never externally be created nor externally applied to matter.
  
Does the new technology simply appear, apart from the influence of culture? Most people would answer that it doesn’t; they will add that someone had to invent it, build it, use it, and so on. But if you listen to what people say about new technologies, and if you watch how they interact with them, you will see that they do in fact often assume that technologies appear in this autonomous way. A typical newspaper article on computers might begin with a statement like, “Computers have changed education since they were introduced into the schools in the 1980s.” The article then details various effects caused by the computer. But, we might ask, where did the computer come from? How was it developed and why? Who introduced it into the schools and why? How was it taken up and used in the schools? And, most important, in what ways do the answers to these questions offer insight into the effects that we observe? The impression that technologies arise autonomously is reinforced by the absence of such questions (and the absence of answers to these questions) in the discourse about technology.
+
To put it another way, motion results from the fact that all things, phenomena, and ideas exist as assemblages of relationships [see The Principle of General Relationships, p. 107], and these relationships contain opposing forces. As Lenin explained in his ''Philosophical Notebooks'':
  
The second way that the origins of technology are treated as autonomous occurs when people consider the beginning of the technology as though it were simply created whole-cloth in the imaginings of an inventor. Just as in a comic strip, where the convention used to indicate an idea is the dialogue balloon with a light bulb lighting up, new technologies are like lightbulbs in the mind of an inventor. They simply light up, go off, appear in a flash. They are autonomously born out of the air. In this case, the inventor, like the cue ball, is outside culture; the inventor is considered to be a unique being or a genius who simply comes up with ideas that appear like a flash.
+
<blockquote>
 +
The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their ‘self-movement,’ in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the ‘struggle’ of opposites.
 +
</blockquote>
  
120 O
 
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
+
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But do such inventors and their inventions appear apart from the influence of culture? Most people would answer, “of course not.” But, again, if you listen to what people say about technologies, and if you watch how they interact with technologies, you will see how pervasive is the belief in their autonomy. We learn this way of thinking about and interacting with technology in grade school, when we are taught, for example, that Eli Whitney invented the cotton gin in 1792, Robert Fulton invented the steamboat in 1802, Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone in 1876, and so on. We learn to associate particular technologies with individual inventors rather than with a particular cultural context within which technological solutions are searched for, invented, and developed.
+
Based on the scientific achievements which occurred in his lifetime, Engels classified motion into 5 basic forms: ''mechanical motion'' (changes in positions of objects in space); ''physical motion'' (movements of molecules, electrons, fundamental particles, thermal processes, electricity…); ''chemical motion'' (changes of organic and inorganic substances in combination and separation processes…); ''biological motion'' (changes of living objects, or genetic structure…); ''social motion'' (changes in economy, politics, culture, and social life).
  
The practice of granting patents reinforces this way of understanding the process of invention. Patent practice only recognizes individuals as inventors. Patent seekers must prove to the satisfaction of the patent office that the invention is truly theirs and theirs alone. Even though patent rights may be assigned or sold to a company, corporation, or other individuals, inventions are not understood to “belong” inherently to the culture within which the inventor lives and works. Rather, inventors have the right to prohibit others from using or producing the invention. When technologies are regarded and treated as unique acts of invention in the minds of isolated inventors, the culture reinforces the understanding that technologies arise autonomously, which reinforces, in turn, the privileging of the individual in culture generally.
+
These basic forms of motion are arranged into levels of advancement based on the level of complexity of matter that is affected.
  
The third way that technologies are understood as autonomous in origin is that technologies are sometimes seen as self-generating. In this way of thinking, technologies give birth to other technologies. Nobody, when pressed, would say that technologies actually give birth, yet it is common to hear people say that one invention gives rise to another: People make statements like, “the internal combustion engine gave rise to the automobile,” and “the radio begat television.” Without questioning what it means to “give rise to,” we often talk about technologies as if they give birth, without the aid of any cultural influences, or even inventors. Thus, technologies are treated as though they simply arise autonomously.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-8.png]]
  
If technologies are understood to arise autonomously in the above three ways, it follows logically that people would understand them to act autonomously as well. If the very appearance, or birth, of a technology, is free from cultural influence, it stands to reason that it does not need culture to do what it does. It acts independently, and its effects are the effects of the objects and artifacts, the stuff, the isolatable things, not the effects of cultural choices or arrangements. Further, because a technology acts autonomously, it acts with impunity, as an amoral force that cannot be held responsible for its effects, whether for good or evil. It simply exists, and, because it exists, it simply acts. Members of the culture upon which it acts are virtually helpless in the face of this enormous, autonomous force.
+
The basic forms of motion each affect different forms of matter, but these forms of motion do not exist independently from each other; they actually have strong relationships with each other, in which the more advanced forms of motion develop from lower forms of motion; the more advanced forms of motion also internally include lower forms of motion. [I.e., biological motion contains chemical motion; chemical motion contains physical motion; etc.]
  
Assumption #4:
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Every object exists with many forms of motion, but any given object is defined by its most advanced form of motion. [I.e., living creatures are defined in terms of biological motion, societies are defined in terms of social motion, etc.]
  
Culture Is Made Up of Autonomous Elements
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By classifying the basic forms of motion, Engels laid out the foundation for classification and synthesization of science. The basic forms of motion differ from one another, but they are also unified with each other into one continuous system of motion. Understanding this dialectical relationship between different forms of motion helped to overcome misunderstandings and confusion about motion.
  
Once you understand how technologies are seen to arise and operate autonomously, it is easier to understand how, when people think with and utilize a mechanistic
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Causality
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==== Annotation 63 ====
  
O 121
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In ''Dialectics of Nature'', Engels clears up a great deal of confusion and addresses many misconceptions about matter, motion, forces, energy, etc. which existed in both science and philosophy at the time by defining and explaining the dialectical nature of matter and motion.
  
perspective, every aspect of the culture is seen as autonomous. The image of the pool table can serve again to illustrate. Think of culture as all those individual pool balls lying at various positions on the pool table. Each component of culture—economics, politics, law, religion, the family, education, music, and so on— is understood, like a pool ball, to be a separate phenomenon, each without any intrinsic relation to the others. Music, for example, would be understood to develop in a particular way totally unrelated to politics or law or the family, and so on. One might have a momentary effect on another—like when a pool ball strikes another—but the essence of each remains intact. Family and religious values may have an effect on the law, which may have an effect on a music rating system, which may have an effect on music. But the music is still music; it isn’t in any intrinsic way about family values, religion, or the law. After the effect, music goes on in its own independent way.
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When Dialectical Materialism affirmed that motion was the mode of existence — the natural attribute of matter — it also confirmed that motion is absolute and eternal. This does not mean that Dialectical Materialism denies that things can become ''frozen;'' however, according to the dialectical materialist viewpoint, ''freezing is a special form of motion, it is motion in equilibrium'' and ''freezing is relative and temporary.''
  
This is important because, from a mechanistic perspective, the meaning, significance, and role of something such as music or technology are understood by focusing on the thing itself. To understand music, you would study music, not law. To study any component of culture, such as technology, you look at the thing itself, not law, not music, not the family, and so on. Even when you might have to acknowledge the momentary effects that other components of culture occasionally have on technology and the effects technology has on the other components of culture, it is as though culture is made up of all these independent entities sitting on the pool table waiting for technology (the cue ball) to come careening on the scene to put them all in motion in their own separate way.
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''Motion in equilibrium'' is motion that has not changed the positions, forms, and/or structures of things.
  
These four assumptions form the backbone of a mechanistic perspective on technology. But if you closely examine the way that people think with and make arguments from a mechanistic perspective, you will find that it takes two different forms: a simple causal form and a symptomatic causal form.
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Freezing is a ''relative'' phenomenon because freezing only occurs in some forms of motion and in some specific relations, it does not occur in all forms of motion and all kinds of relations. Freezing is a temporary phenomenon because freezing only exists for a limited period of time, it cannot last forever.
  
Both simple and symptomatic causality are mechanistic positions, and thus operate with the four assumptions discussed above. Where simple and symptomatic causality differ is in their understanding of the inevitability of effects. Simple causality assumes that effects are inherent in the technology and that precise effects are inevitable. Symptomatic causality assumes that broad parameters of effects are inherent in the technology, that a limited range of effects is inevitable, and that various social forces are responsible for steering, or choosing from among those effects in that limited range.
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Simple Causality
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==== Annotation 64 ====
  
As stated above, when someone thinks about or understands how technological change happens from a simple causal perspective, they assume that effects are inherent in the technology and that precise effects are inevitable. To say that the effects of technology are inherent in the technology implies that the effects are a natural and inseparable quality of the technology. To say that the precise effects are inevitable implies that once the technology appears it is absolutely certain that precise effects will follow. When you put these two assumptions together, it is the nature
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Equilibrium can exist at any advancement of motion. Lenin discussed ''equilibrium'' as it pertains to the social form of motion in discussing an equilibrium of forces existing in Russia in 1905 in this article, ''An Equilibrium of Forces:''
  
122 O
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<blockquote>
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1) The result to date (Monday, October 30) is an equilibrium of forces, as we already pointed out in Proletary, No. 23.
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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2) Tsarism is no longer strong enough, the revolution not yet strong enough, to win.
  
of the technology that determines these precise effects. If someone believes in this way, the effects are seen as “built in” to the technology; they are inevitable; and no force, no human, and no organization could shape or change them. The effects would therefore be unavoidable.
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3) Hence the tremendous amount of vacillation. The terrific and enormous increase of revolutionary happenings (strikes, meetings, barricades, committees of public safety, complete paralysis of the government, etc.), on the other hand, the absence of resolute repressive measures. The troops are wavering.
  
Recalling that the mechanistic perspective assumes that technologies arise and act autonomously, the simple causal perspective really understands technologies as coming out of nowhere to exert uncontrollable and precise effects on culture, without any form of cultural assistance. We could only be passive recipients of these effects. We might choose to accept them, or, as some people put it, we could simply be left behind. We can be “on the bus” or “off the bus,” but we can’t do anything other than accept the fact that the bus will roll on down the road, with or without us.
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4) The Tsar’s Court is wavering (The Times and the Daily Telegraph) between dictatorship and a constitution.
  
When we look at the theoretical logic in this way, it’s difficult to imagine that anyone could really believe in a simple causal perspective. We’ve never known anyone to actually admit to believing this “hook, line, and sinker.” However, when you look at the positions people take up in relation to technology—how they argue, what they say, what they do—evidence abounds that a simple causal perspective is quite widespread. For example, when we have asked computer and engineering students why they have chosen these professions, they often respond with a simple causal argument. They argue that the computer, by its very nature and over which they have no control, is creating a world that determines where they will have to work if they want to thrive. The computer, in this answer, is singularly responsible for the changing nature of the workforce, as though it were an entirely autonomous force. Statements such as “it is inevitable that the computer will change—indeed, is changing—the nature of employment” have become commonplace, and millions of people have made life choices based, at least partly, on that belief.
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The Court is wavering and biding its time. Strictly speaking, these are its correct tactics: the equilibrium of forces compels it to bide its time, for power is in its hands.
  
When looked at carefully, critically, and theoretically, as we advocate in this book, simple causality is quite simply indefensible. To go back to the example of the gun introduced in Chapter 4: Everyone knows that guns don’t simply materialize autonomously and kill people—someone has to manufacture one, pick one up, and use it. Remarkably, however, people do make these kinds of arguments. It is as though somewhere, deep down, many people believe that these technologies do have enormous power to appear autonomously and shape our lives all by themselves, and that there is absolutely nothing that anyone can do to alter their inevitable effects.
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The revolution has reached a stage at which it is disadvantageous for the counter-revolution to attack, to assume the offensive.
  
Symptomatic Causality
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For us, for the proletariat, for consistent revolutionary democrats, this is not enough. If we do not rise to a higher level, if we do not manage to launch an independent offensive, if we do not smash the forces of Tsarism, do not destroy its actual power, then the revolution will stop half way, then the bourgeoisie will fool the workers.
  
The symptomatic causal perspective probably represents the most commonly held position when people think about, talk about, and interact with technology. Though still a mechanistic perspective grounded in the four basic assumptions discussed above, it assumes a more sophisticated understanding of effects than the simple causal perspective. When people take a symptomatic perspective, they do not believe that precise effects are inherent in the technology and therefore exactly inevitable. Rather they believe that an inevitable but limited range of effects
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5) Rumour has it that a constitution has been decided upon. If that is so, then it follows that the Tsar is heeding the lessons of 1848 and other revolutions: he wants to grant a constitution without a constituent assembly, before a constituent assembly, apart from a constituent assembly. What kind of constitution? At best (for ’the Tsar) a Constitutional-Democratic constitution.
  
Causality
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This implies: achievement of the Constitutional-Democrats’ ideal, skipping the revolution; deceiving the people, for all the same there will be no complete and actual freedom of elections.
  
O 123
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Should not the revolution skip this granted constitution?
  
is inherent in the technology and that there are choices that can be made within that inevitable range of options. For example, a simple causal argument might maintain that it is inevitable that guns will kill. However, from a symptomatic perspective, there are options open to us among an inevitable range of possible effects. Yes, guns will kill (that much is inevitable), but there is also a limited range of possible effects, usually understood to be a range from good to evil effects. So, the range of possible effects might include: (1) killing game animals and not people, (2) killing game animals and people, (3) killing only criminals and not innocent people, and so on. In another example, a simple causal argument might maintain that computers will put people out of work. A symptomatic causal argument might agree that it is inherent in the computer to change the structure of jobs. However, the range of possible effects might include a good to evil range within which the resulting changed structure of jobs differs. So the range might include (1) increasing the number of unemployed people, (2) retraining those put out of work to take up new kinds of computer-related jobs, (3) retraining people to take up new kinds of non-computer related jobs. In this case, it is inevitable that the structure of jobs will change, but there is a limited range of ways that might happen.
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The difference between precise effects (in a simple causal perspective) and a range of effects (in a symptomatic causal perspective) is significant. While killing is an inevitable result of the gun (according to either perspective), only the symptomatic perspective assumes that there are any options to choose among regarding cultural responses to such killing. While the structure of jobs will change (according to either perspective), only the symptomatic perspective assumes that there are any options to choose among regarding the configuration of those jobs.
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''- Space and Time are Forms of Existence of Matter''
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</blockquote>
  
What then determines which effect within the limited range actually occurs? Remember those pool balls on the table? Like pool balls in motion, a variety of social forces (such as law, religion, economics, politics, family, etc.) may deflect the technology (the cue ball) so that one effect or the other occurs. So, for example, we might pass laws making killing other humans a mere misdemeanor, in effect encouraging people to use the gun to kill humans. We might develop a religious belief that renders it unthinkable to kill another human with a gun. In the first case, guns will kill game animals and humans; in the second case, the gun will kill only game animals. However, in both cases, the gun will inevitably kill, because, remember, this way of thinking still operates within the mechanistic causal framework. In the example of the computer and jobs, we might let those people who lose their jobs to computers fend for themselves. Alternatively, we might develop educational programs for retraining people to work with computers in new jobs or to take up new kinds of non-computer related jobs. In the first case the effect will be unemployment; in the second and third cases the effects will be different kinds of reemployment. However, in all three cases, the inevitable effect is that the computer will change the structure of jobs, because, again, remember, this way of thinking still operates within the mechanistic causal framework.
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Every form of matter exists in a specific position, with specific space particularity (height, width, length, etc.), in specific relation (in front or behind, above or under, to the left or right, etc.) with other forms of matter. These positional relations exist in what we call ''space.'' [Space is defined by positional relations of matter.]
  
124 O
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On the other hand, the existence of matter is also expressed in the speed of change and the order in which changes occur. These changes occur in what we call ''time.'' As Engels wrote: “For the basic forms of all existence are space and time, and a being outside of time is as absurd as an existence outside space.” Matter, space, and time are not separable; there is no matter that exists outside of space and time; there is also no space and time that exist outside of matter’s motion.
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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When people understand change from a symptomatic causal perspective, they see that our choices involve more than simply adapting (or not) to technology, being “on the bus” or “off the bus,” but steering, directing, or choosing within the inevitable, but limited, range of effects. The challenge is to figure out what that inevitable range of effects is, to evaluate those effects, and to develop creative ways to ensure that the better effect is the one that happens.
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==== Annotation 65 ====
  
It is worth recalling, however, that the symptomatic causal perspective, like the simple causal perspective (because they are both mechanistic), does not assume that we can initially encourage or interfere with the appearance of the technology. Neither does it assume that we could avoid the inevitable effects. Technology is still assumed to appear autonomously, and it is still the technology rather than the culture that is assumed to cause the effects. From this perspective, there is nothing, or nobody, to blame or praise for its appearance (except, perhaps, for that genius inventor) or for the fact that it has certain inevitable effects. From the symptomatic perspective, we do have some responsibility, for we are charged with shaping the outcome within the inevitable but limited range. We can only do so much, however, for we can only steer to one side or the other, to the “good” or “evil” options, as we careen down the road on which technologies inevitably take us.
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Space and time, as the forms of matter, i.e.: the ways in which we perceive the existence of matter. We are only able to perceive and understand material objects as they exist within space and time.
  
Soft Determinism: A Variant of Mechanistic Causality
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Space and time, as forms of existence of matter, exist objectively [see Annotation 108,
  
In response to the complexities of studying technology, scholars have come to resist thinking of technology as being either autonomous in origin or as the sole agent in causing effects. For example, a workshop at MIT on the question of determinism was held for a group of such scholars in 1989. Their discussions resulted in a provocative book that explores the problem, Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism. The introduction to the book, by Leo Marx and Merritt Roe Smith, proposes a two-stage causal process called “soft determinism.”2 The soft determinists recognize that “the history of technology is a history of human actions,” implying that every technology has an origin in human actions.3 The task of the soft determinist is to describe the particular action, or critical factor that gives rise to a technology to begin with. For the soft determinist, the critical factor is the original causal agent in a chain of causality. For example, the irrepressible human desire to create may be seen as the critical factor, or initial cause, of inventing the gun. After the gun is invented, though, it takes on a life of its own and has effects on its own. Thus, even if it had its origins in human actions and is not autonomous in origin, the technology still acts autonomously.
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p. 112], and are defined by matter. [Space is defined by the positional relations between material objects; time is defined by the speed of change of material objects and the order in which these changes occur.] Space has three dimensions: height, width, length; time has one direction: from the past to the future.
  
Soft determinism thus acknowledges—in a restricted way—the importance of the cultural context within which a technology originates. It tends to remain, however, a form of determinism, like simple and symptomatic causality, because there is, first, a single cause (not unlike the flash of inventive genius in the simple causal approach) and, second, because the technology acts with “a life of its own,” to generate effects. Although it is a significant attempt to resist the problems of mechanistic causality, soft determinism simply extends the cause-effect
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==== c. The Material Unity of the World ====
  
Causality
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Dialectical Materialism affirms that the nature of the world is matter, and the world is unified in its material properties. [In other words: the entire universe, in all its diversity, is made of matter, and the properties of matter are the same throughout the known universe.]
  
O 125
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The material nature of the world is proven on the following basis:
  
relationship back to particular critical factors (such as economic, demographic, intellectual, and cultural factors) that act as a prior cause.
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''First,'' there is only one world: the material world; the material world is the first existence [i.e., it existed before consciousness], it exists objectively, and independently, of human consciousness.
  
In response to the soft determinists, we might ask: How can a technology’s actions be autonomous if its origins are not? Don’t we deploy technologies in particular ways, steering their effects to some degree? Wouldn’t this imply partnership in the generation of effects? This is, after all, the implication of symptomatic causality: that effects can to a limited degree be steered. Marx and Smith realize that as soft determinists sort through the various social, economic, political, and cultural causes, they often end up describing a complex matrix within which technologies originate. It becomes difficult to identify a single critical factor in a simple causal chain in this situation. As Marx and Smith observe, causal agency becomes so deeply embedded in the larger social structure “as to divest technology of its presumed power as an independent agent initiating change.”4 If the origin of a technology is so caught up in a complex cultural context, how can it be said to have effects independent of this matrix? If, for example, the gun is developed because we are a hostile species inclined to kill those we perceive as enemies, and because we have a pressing need to kill a particular enemy, and because we have already developed gun powder, and because we revel in the intellectual challenge of invention, and because we have a religious sanction to kill, and so on, how then can we say that the gun causes killing, rather than the relationship between the gun and culture? This observation suggests that technology does not act autonomously. Consequently, if neither the origins nor the actions of technologies are autonomous, we unseat technology from its role as the central defining causal agent in cultural change.
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''Second,'' the material world exists eternally, endlessly, infinitely; it has no known beginning point and there is no evidence that it will ever disappear.
  
Technological determinism and its various forms quite simply are insufficient to explain the role of technology in culture. Instead, we need to know more about the context within which technologies are invented, developed, and used. We need a better way to understand the complex process within which there are effects. This is exactly what the nonmechanistic perspectives attempt to accomplish.
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''Third,'' all known objects and phenomena of the material world have objective relations with each other and all objects and phenomena exist in unity with each other. All of them are specific forms and structures of matter, or have material origin which was born from matter, and all are governed by the objective rules of the material world. In the material world, there is nothing that exists outside of the changing and transforming processes of matter; all of these processes exist as causes and effects of each other.
  
Nonmechanistic Perspectives of Causality
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When people understand change from a nonmechanistic perspective of causality, they think and act with three basic assumptions, which differ dramatically from the mechanistic assumptions of causality. Again, these assumptions will not necessarily be held consciously, although they might be. Again, it often takes careful reflection (sometimes self-reflection) to see that the assumptions are at work. The three assumptions are as follows.
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==== Annotation 66 ====
  
Assumption #1:
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The most important thing to understand here is that every object and phenomenon in the universe arises as matter, all material objects and phenomena are dynamically linked to one another in an infinite chain of causes and effects and changes and transformations, all governed by the material laws of our reality. This understanding is the material foundation of dialectical materialism.
  
Technology Is Not Autonomous, but Is Integrally Connected to the Context Within Which It Emerges, Is Developed, and Used
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=== 2. Consciousness ===
  
When people assume that technology is not autonomous, they assume that it is not a discrete isolatable thing. This is where definitions, as we discussed in the previous
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==== a. The Source of Consciousness ====
  
126 O
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According to the materialist viewpoint, consciousness has natural and social sources.
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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chapter, begin to matter enormously. If people define technology as integrally connected to the context within which it arises, it cannot (by definition) come from outside the culture. It cannot drop from the sky, appear like a bolt out of the blue, pop like a lightbulb in the head of an inventor, or emerge like a baby from another technology. It cannot be understood to be like a cue ball introduced onto the pool table from somewhere else. That is because there is no somewhere else. Technology, if it is not autonomous, is always already a complex set of connections, or relationships, within a particular culture—not an independent thing, but always already a structure of connections. Within these connections, things emerge and are used, but the “thingness” of a technology is only one aspect of what it is. The rest of what it is can only be understood by describing the nature of the connections within which it is developed and used. For example, rather than thinking of the gun as just a material object, it might be understood as a thing invented, developed, and used to kill enemies. That is what it is; it is the connection between the thing, the desire to kill, and the practice of killing enemies. It was invented, developed, and used within that set of relationships to do exactly that.
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==== Annotation 67 ====
  
Assumption #2:
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Consciousness arises from ''nature'', and from ''social'' activities and relations.
  
Culture Is Made Up of Connections
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''Natural'' refers to the material world. Without the material world of matter, material processes, and the evolution of material systems — up to and including the human brain — consciousness would never have formed.
  
When people assume a nonmechanistic perspective, not only is technology understood to be a structure of connections; culture too is understood to be a structure of connections. In this way of thinking, culture is not just a bunch of unrelated components that are scattered like pool balls on the table. Rather, culture is a complex set of connections or relationships: more like the formation of the balls on the table than the balls themselves. In fact, the usefulness of the image of the pool table drops out at this point, as it becomes misleading to imagine discrete objects or forces at all. In non-mechanistic causality, no particular cultural component, such as education or the economy, stands alone. What they are is the set of connections or relationships among forces. For example, if you wanted to understand education from this perspective, you must understand its connection to the economy, for education is integrally bound up with economic developments. You must understand its connection to technology, for education is integrally bound up with the role of technology in relation to the economy. A rich understanding of education would require understanding many more connections among the cultural forces that animate the practice we call education. From this perspective, then, culture is the constantly changing web constituted by these connections. Every phenomenon in the culture (including technology) would have to be understood as distributed in that complex web. That is how cultural studies understands context.
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''Social'' activities and relations also contributed to the development of consciousness. The social processes of labor and language were also prerequisites for the development of conscious activity in human beings.
  
Assumption #3:
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''- Natural Source of Consciousness''
  
Technologies Arise Within These Connections as Part of Them and as Effective Within Them
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There are many factors that form the natural sources for consciousness, but the two most basic factors are ''human brains'' and ''the relationship between humans and'' ''the objective world which makes possible creative and dynamic reflection.''
  
People who think with and use a nonmechanistic perspective do not regard technology as being either a simple cause or a simple effect. In fact, in a nonmechanistic perspective, the language of cause and effect no longer suffices. Rather, adherents to
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''About human brains:'' consciousness is an attribute of a highly organized form of matter, which is the brain. Consciousness is the function and the result of the neurophysiological activities of human brains. As human brains evolved and developed over time, their neurophysiological activities became richer, and, as these activities progressed, consciousness developed further and further over time. This explains why the human evolution process is also a process of developing the capacity for perception and thinking. Whenever human neurophysiological activities don’t function normally because of damaged brains, our mental life is also disturbed.
  
Causality
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''About the relationship between humans'' and ''the objective world which made possible creative and dynamic reflection:'' The relationship between humans and the objective world has been essential for as long as humans have existed. In this relationship, the objective world is reflected through human senses which interact with human brains and then form our consciousness.
  
O 127
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-9.png|''Consciousness exists as a dynamic set of relationships between the external material world, human sense perception, and the functions of the human brain.'']]
  
a nonmechanistic perspective draw attention to the ways that technologies emerge in shifting connections of forces and the ways that they are part of those connections and forces. In this view, technologies emerge from within a context, as part of that context, and in relationships that have effects. The relationships—not simple things—give rise to effects. The challenge for nonmechanistic thinking is to explain this complex process of affecting change.
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''Reflection'' is the re-creation of the features of one form of matter in a different form of matter which occurs when they mutually impact each other through interaction. Reflection is a characteristic of all forms of matter.
  
These three assumptions form the backbone of a nonmechanistic perspective on technology. But if you closely examine the way that people think with and make arguments from a nonmechanistic perspective, you will find that it takes at least two different forms with respect to understanding how the cultural context is put together: an expressive causal form and a form we call “articulation and assemblage.” These two perspectives differ principally in the way they understand how the cultural context is put together. When someone takes an expressive perspective, they believe that one force or connection takes center stage and gives a uniform, homogeneous shape to the context. When someone takes an articulation perspective, they believe that no single force or relationship takes center stage, and that the context is more heterogeneous. As a result, adherents to each of these perspectives understand both the nature of context and how change occurs differently. While adherents of each perspective will explain the emergence, development, and use of technologies as things as well as connections, each group conceives the process differently.
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There are many forms and levels of reflection such as [from more simple to more complex]: physical and chemical reflection, biological reflection, mental reflection, creative and dynamic reflection, etc.
  
Expressive Causality
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When people think with and understand culture and technology from an expressive causal perspective, they assume the three basic assumptions of a nonmecha-nistic perspective: that technology is not autonomous, but is integrally connected to the context within which it emerges, is developed, and used; that culture is made up of connections; and that technologies arise within these connections as part of them and are effective within them. Beyond that, there are two distinctive features of the expressive perspective: First, that there is one factor, or cause, what we call an essence, that drives absolutely everything else in the culture; and second, that the culture, the everything else as it were, is an homogenous totality, that is, that every aspect of culture shares that essence by reflecting, manifesting, and enhancing it.
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==== Annotation 68 ====
  
The Essence
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Change is driven by mutual impacts between or within things, phenomena, and/or ideas. Any time two such subjects impact one another, ''traces'' of some form or another are left on both interacting subjects. This characteristic of change is called ''reflection''.
  
What does it mean to say that culture has an essence? Think for a moment about how some people believe that individual human beings have an essence. Even though a baby and a full grown adult have little in common, there is, for many people, a belief that something about that person remains essentially the same for all their life: that they have a core, a center, that characterizes them, and all that individual’s actions can be understood as emerging from that core. There are many ways that people think of individuals as having an essence, or a core, to their beings. For example, many religious people believe that everyone is at their core good. That good is always in there, no matter how superficial actions may seem
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The concept of reflection, first proposed by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, has been advanced through the work of various Soviet psychologists, philosophers, and scientists (including Ivan Pavlov, Todor Pavlov, Aleksei Leontiev, Lev Vygotsky, Valentin Voloshinov, and others), and is used as a basis for scientific inquiry up to this day by mainstream researchers in Cuba, Vietnam, China, and Laos. The information provided below is somewhat simplified and generalized to give the reader a basic familiarity with the theory of reflection and the development of reflection in nature.
  
128 O
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Dialectical materialist scientists have developed a theory of the development of evolution of forms of reflection, positing that forms of reflection have become increasingly complex as organic processes and life have evolved and grown more complex over time.
  
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The chart below gives an idea of how different forms of reaction have evolved over time:
  
to hide it. They are always salvageable, because they are in essence good. But the essence is not always thought of as positive. When, for example, we put a criminal in prison for life without the possibility for parole, aren’t we enacting the belief that the person has a core (hardened criminal) that cannot possibly change? And don’t we often look back to that criminal’s childhood for evidence that they have always been that way? That sense of an individual’s irrecoverable nature is akin to believing that the person has an essence—criminal—that they were born with and will die with.
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-10.png|''This chart outlines the basic development tendency of Forms of Reflection in matter which lead from inorganic matter, to life, to human consciousness and society.'']]
  
When the belief in an essence is applied to culture, as opposed to simply an individual, it is assumed that there is one element, factor, or cultural arrangement that is the essence of that culture. So the culture, like an individual, has at its core a single essence. In some ways the essence for the expressive thinker is similar to the soft determinist’s “critical factor.” However, where for the soft determinist there might be different critical factors in relation to the development of different technologies, there is for the expressive thinker only one critical factor for all of culture in every instance. That means that every human action, every cultural force, every connection, every relationship, every technology, absolutely every thing is essentially, at its core, the same, in that they all share the same essence. Different theorists and different people will assume that the core is different (just as some people may think that everyone’s core is good, whereas others would disagree). There have been and are many ways that people think of culture as having an essence. The essence has been understood to be as varied as the following: creativity, capitalism, the contradiction between labor and capital, technique, standing reserve, greed, the drive to reproduce, aggression, even good. We consider below some examples of positions on technology that rely on this assumption of an essence, but before we do, the idea of culture as homogeneous warrants a little more explanation.
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Obviously, not all subjects develop completely along the path outlined above. Thus far, to our knowledge, only human beings have developed entirely to the level of consciousness and society. It is also unknown whether, or how, human society may develop into some future, as-yet-unknown, form.
  
Culture as Homogenous Totality
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It follows naturally that if everything in the culture shares the same essence, the culture is a kind of totality, a whole, almost like an organism in and of itself. Regardless of what the culture looks like, every aspect shares the same essence. That means that elements as seemingly diverse as these are essentially the same: law, the family, religion, politics, economics, art, education, and so on. The appearance of difference is superficial, even illusory. Think about good behavior exhibited by the “hardened criminal:” The criminal is still in essence a criminal and the good behavior might just be a cover for evil scheming. That is what we mean by the term homogeneous, that everything in its essence the same.
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''Physical and chemical reflection'' is the simplest form of reflection, dealing with the ways in which inorganic matter is reflected in human consciousness. Physical and chemical reflection is the reflection of mechanical, physical, and chemical changes and reactions of inorganic matter (i.e., changes in structures, positions, physical-chemical properties, and the processes of combining and dissolving substances). Physical and chemical reactions are passive: when two objects interact with each other physically or chemically, they do not do so consciously.
  
So for example, if capitalism was understood to be the essence, then everything in the culture could be explained in terms of capitalism. Law is designed to protect the interests of capital. The family is a way that culture creates new workers for a capitalist system. Religion teaches people to take up their place willingly in a capitalist structure. New technologies are created to make profit and will only succeed if they do so in a capitalist market. Etc. There is nothing that cannot be explained as being fundamentally about capitalism. And there is
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Causality
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==== Annotation 69 ====
  
O 129
+
Reflection occurs any time two material objects interact and the features of the object are transferred to each other. Below are some very simplified illustrations to relate the basic idea of the physical reflection of material objects.
  
no possible resistance to or escape from, for anything or anyone, the logic of capitalism.
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-11.png]]
  
If everything is the same, how does the expressive thinker account for change? Really, doesn’t it seem that if everything was always only the same, nothing could change? What would make it change? Change can’t really come from outside the totality, because everything is by definition within the totality. To explain change, it is helpful to think in terms of elements (such as law, the family or technology) of the totality in three ways: as reflecting the essence, as manifesting the essence, and as enhancing the essence. Let’s take the example of capitalism as the essence again, and the technology of the Internet as the element under investigation. To say that the Internet reflects the essence means that it emerges within a capitalist totality so it is clearly shaped by it. It is as though it shares the same genes; it is capitalistic, even though it has a unique appearance and role in the totality. The Internet also manifests the essence, which means that when it does its work, it is operating capitalistically. It functions as a capitalistic technology. Further, the Internet enhances the essence: It enhances capitalism, furthers the development of capitalism, and helps capitalism grow.
+
'''Reflection as Change in Position:'''
  
With these three roles—reflection, manifestation, and enhancement— elements such as technology contribute to the evolution of the totality, like a baby growing up, or a rosebud opening into a rose. The essence of the totality evolves, develops, becomes more of what it is, so that eventually, at least theoretically, the totality would be completely saturated with the maximum expression of the essence (an adult, a rose). Again, using the example of capitalism and technology, eventually capitalism would, with the help of technology (and everything else), develop and occupy every nook and cranny of the totality in its most evolved form. Nothing—no human action, cultural force, connection, relationship, technology, thing—would or could escape the logic of capitalism.
+
1. Round Object moves towards Square Object.
  
But how large is a totality? Are expressive causal thinkers positing their totalities as the whole world? The whole universe? For all time? Actually, the boundary and duration of a totality vary from one thinker to another. For some it is understood spatially and for others temporally; for most it is a combination of the two. Imagine that you are drawing a circle around the totality: Is it US culture? European culture? Western culture? Haitian culture? Gay culture? Urban culture? Etc. Often when people use these terms, they are thinking in terms of a spatially defined totality. And what about 1960s culture? Postindustrial culture? Early capitalist culture? Postcolonial culture? Etc. Terms such as these add a temporal dimension to the understanding of the totality.
+
2. Round Object impacts Square Object.
  
It is often, but not always, the case that expressive causal thinkers have criticisms of the totality they are investigating and look back to a “golden age,” before things “went wrong.” Those who argue this way, as you will see in the example of Jacques Ellul below, have a difficult time explaining how things could possibly move from one totality to another. If there is no escape from the logic of totality, how is it possible that one totality could give way to another?
+
3. Square Object changes position; Round Object “bounces” and reverses direction.
  
Let’s now turn to a couple of very famous examples of expressive causal thought with regard to technology.
+
4.Thus, Square Object’s change in position ''reflects'' the motion of Round Object (and vice-versa). Traces of both contradicting objects are reflected in the respective motion and position of each object.
  
130 O
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-12.png]]
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
+
'''Reflection as Change in Structure:'''
  
Martin Heidegger and Jacques Ellul
+
1. Round Object moves toward Square Object.
  
Perhaps the most famous philosopher who argues using the logic of expressive causality is Martin Heidegger. Heidegger’s well-known essay on technology, “The Question Concerning Technology,” seeks to discover what the essence of technology is. The essence of technology is not anything technological; technology is not technology in itself. The essence of technology is not an essence like you would get in a typology, like the essence of trees is a certain treeness that they all have in common. Likewise, the essence of technology is not mere means (technology as being the means to an end, an instrument). The essence of technology, for Heidegger, is a revealing, a revealing of Being. It thus has much in common with art. This perspective is that of expressive causality in that a core essence (which is not technological) is revealed in all technologies throughout the culture.
+
2. Round Object impacts Square Object.
  
The problem, for Heidegger, is that modern technology conceals this fact that technology is a revealing of Being. Modern technology tends to reveal itself as a certain way of framing (or Enframing) our relation with the world: Modern technology is a challenging of the world which turns the world into mere resources for our use (“standing reserve”). Heidegger writes, “The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such.”5 Modern technology, then, is about control of nature (as we discussed in chapter 5). There is profound danger here, warns Heidegger. Humans themselves easily become Enframed too, as simply “standing reserve” for modern technology (consisting of labor and resources and no more), and we lose sight of what we really are (“In truth, however, precisely nowhere does man today any longer encounter himself, i.e., his essence”6). We also lose sight of other ways of revealing, poiesis, which are at odds with the path modern technology has taken. These other ways of revealing “lets what presences come forth into appearance” but don’t seek to force, order, or control.7 We head down the dangerous path of modern technology when we see the use of technology only as the domination of nature; indeed, we have the hubris to think ourselves as being in control of all creation (even Being). This course is not inevitable (though it may present itself as such). Indeed, Heidegger basically argues that when we consider the question of technology, and the revealing of modern technology’s ways of transforming the world and ourselves into standing reserve, this may shock us into thought, into reflection. He writes that the essence of technology always includes a “saving power,” the “keeping watch over unconcealment…of all coming to presence on this earth.”8 And that our reflection on these processes might lead us (back) to other means of revealing and creating that are in better balance with Being.
+
3. Structural changes (traces) occur in both Round and Square Object as a result of impact.
  
Another very significant philosopher who considers technology using expressive causal assumptions is Jacques Ellul. For Ellul “technique” operates as the essence of the totality he critiques, even though he never uses the term “essence.” By “technique” he means “the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given state of development) in every field of human activity.”9 Technique is thus the application of rationality and efficiency. Ellul insists that technique is the essence of modern culture, which is temporally
+
4. These changes constitute structural, physical ''reflection''.
  
Causality
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-13.png]]
  
O 131
+
'''Chemical Reflection:'''
  
modern and spatially global: “Technique is not an isolated fact in society…but is related to every other factor in the life of modern man.”10 Thus, to understand technology, or the family, religion, politics, economics, or anything else, we must understand technique. He scorns this totality and longs for the “golden age” of the premodern totality.
+
1. Atom C is attached to Atom B.
  
Examining the implications for thinking about a technology like guns illustrates how the expressive logic works. Because technique permeates and defines everything, every thing—such as the gun—and every relationship—such as the relationship between the gun and politics—the implications must be explained in terms of technique. The gun can only emerge as reflecting technique, it can only manifest technique, and it can only enhance technique. Because its essence is technique, the gun is a rational and efficient method of doing things. That it kills, or is used to kill is almost not the point; that is a mere manifestation of efficiency and rationality. The pertinent question about killing could be to ask is, how is killing a reflection, manifestation, and enhancement of technique? The response would be, what more efficient way to rid yourself of enemies than to kill them? The significance of the gun is that it kills more rationally and efficiently than weapons that precede it. So, likewise, it enhances technique in the cultural totality. Because the totality is homogenous, there really is nothing that we can do about this situation; every facet of life is caught up in the inexorable march of our cultural totality toward increasing rationality and efficiency, that is, toward increasing technique. We can only stand by and observe. If we try to resist, we end up merely contributing to streamlining the process of enhancing technique.
+
2. Atom C detaches from Atom B and transfers to attach to Atom A.
  
The despair and/or hopelessness Ellul’s position gives rise to was too much for his readers, so he posited a somewhat magical solution to escape the logic of totality. In the 1964 revised American edition of The Technological Society, he offered these three ways that the situation could be changed (and note, they all originate from outside the totality):11 First, there could be a catastrophe so large that we would have to start all over again. But think about this: if there were one single remnant from the previous totality, and there would have to be to have something to start up with, why wouldn’t that manifest to simply give rise again to the same totality? Second, we could all at one time decide to jettison the old totality and start anew. But think about this: How could that desire and that level of coordination possibly emerge from within the logic of totality? Third, a god so kind could decide that this was going to change. Ellul, after all and in the end, was a priest.
+
3. This is a process of ''chemical reflection'', in which both molecules mutually reflect one another after A <sub>C</sub>B a process of chemical reaction (one molecule loses Atom C while the other gains Atom C).
  
If all of this sounds a little crazy and you are thinking that nobody but some philosopher (which Ellul and Heidegger were) could come up with something like expressive causality, stop and observe a bit more carefully. Here are some quick examples: The Unabomber’s fatalism, discussed in Chapter 8, can be attributed to his understanding the industrial-technological system in expressive causal terms. He was unable to imagine any way to change the cultural totality other than to dismantle or destroy it. Communication researchers James Katz and Mark Aakhus, in one of the first scholarly collections of research on mobile
+
As dialectical materialists, we must strive to develop our understanding of the reflections of physical and chemical changes and reactions so that our conceptions reflect the material world as accurately as possible. For example: we must not ascribe consciousness to physical processes. Example: a gambler who comes to believe that a pair of dice is “spiteful” or “cursed” is attributing conscious motivation to unconscious physical processes, which is an inaccurate ideological reflection of reality.
  
132 O
+
-----
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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''Biological reflection'' is a higher, more complex form of reflection [compared to physical reflection]. It deals with reflection of organic material in the natural world. As our observations of biological processes have become more sophisticated and complex [through developments in natural science, the development of better tools for observation such as microscopes and other technologies, and so on], our conscious reflections of the natural world have also become more complex.
  
phones in 2002, argued that we need to consider these developments in mobile media as expressions of a totalizing socio-logic they refer to as Apparatgeist, “the spirit of the machine that influences both the designs of the technology as well as the initial and subsequent significance accorded them by users, non-users, and anti-users.”12 The apparatgeist underlying mobile phones and similar devices they call “perpetual contact.” In 2010 technology writer Kevin Kelly coined the term technium to refer to the “idea of a self-reinforcing system of creation.”13 The tech-nium, for Kelly, encompasses all of contemporary technology (in its material and cultural aspects) as a whole, as an autonomous entity. The technium even has its own wants. But there are also plenty of examples of a less dramatic nature. If someone protests that the telephone, television, or computer systems are developed only to make money, the response is often to point out that in a capitalist system “that’s just the way it is.” All new communication technologies, it is often argued, must be developed as capitalist enterprises—they wouldn’t be viable otherwise. That is an expressive causal position. If the essence is capitalism, then every aspect of culture can only reflect, manifest, and enhance capitalism. The underlying assumptions are typically left unstated, unexplored, and unchallenged, but they function powerfully in arguments and practices involving the development and use of new technology. Recall, for example, in the chapter on AT, that Paul Polak insisted that the only way a technology could be a success was if it were designed and developed for profit. As with all the perspectives considered thus far in this chapter, assumptions such as this are invoked in day-to-day language and practice, but the assumptions on which they depend are rarely examined.
+
Biological reflection is expressed through ''excitation, induction,'' and ''reflexes.''
  
Articulation and Assemblage
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''Excitation'' is the reaction of simple plant and animal life-forms which occurs when they change position or structure as a direct result of physical changes to their habitat [i.e., a plant which moves toward the sun throughout the day].
  
The concepts of articulation and assemblage, as they have developed in cultural studies, provide an alternative to the perspectives on causality presented above. Because articulation and assemblage are so central to understanding the orientation of this book and the direction we propose, we discuss them more fully in a separate chapter: Chapter 12. But we take a little space here to point toward the direction we are moving.
+
''Induction'' is the reaction of animals with simple nerve systems which can sense or feel their environments. Induction occurs through unconditioned reflex mechanisms.
  
To think about technology as articulation and assemblage is to adopt a non-mechanistic perspective and thus operate with the three nonmechanistic assumptions discussed above. Articulation and assemblage assume: that technology is not autonomous, but is integrally connected to the context within which it is developed and used; that culture is made up of such connections; and that technologies arise within these connections as part of them and as effective within them.
+
-----
  
As such, articulation and assemblage share crucial features with an expressive perspective. However, articulation differs from expressive causality in significant ways. First, while it does hold that culture is made up of connections, it does not insist that all these connections are reducible to an essence or to a critical factor. Instead, culture is understood as being made up of myriad articulations (intermingling elements, connections, relationships) that make some things possible, others not. These articulations are sometimes corresponding, as they would be in an expressive perspective, where they share some common aspects (though not as
+
==== Annotation 70 ====
  
Causality
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''Unconditioned reflexes'' are characterized by permanent connections between sensory perceptions and reactions. Such reactions are not learned, but simply occur automatically based on physiological mechanisms occurring within the organism. An example of an unconditioned reflex response would be muscles in the leg twitching at the response of a tap on the knee. Such responses are purely physiological and are never learned (“conditioned” into us) — these reactions are simply ''induced'' physiologically.
  
O 133
+
''Mental reflections'' are reactions which occur in animals with central nervous systems. Mental reflections occur through conditioned reflex mechanisms.
  
an essence); but they are also sometimes noncorresponding or even contradictory (not sharing any aspects). Indeed, a single articulation could contain all three. Articulations are dynamic interminglings that can move in many and various directions, propelled by various and changing circumstances (of other articulations). The “web” of these articulations is what we call an assemblage.
+
-----
  
Within a particular assemblage, technologies are developed, used, and have effects. In so doing, new articulations are constituted in a revised (or rearticulated) assemblage. As Larry Grossberg has argued, “the path of causality is always mediated, which is to say, it is interrupted, intersected, magnified or diminished, transformed, bent, blocked, inflected, redirected, etc., by other practices and events.”14 As philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari put it, technologies exist “only in relation to the interminglings they make possible or that make them possible.”15 Because technologies only exist in relation to these articulations, they are themselves articulations. Technologies come into being, are developed, and are used in the dynamic movement of an assemblage. They are diffused in myriad ways within the assemblage. They are assemblage, in that they are made up of webs of corresponding, noncorresponding, and contradictory articulations. Therefore, no technology has one single essence, definition, purpose, role, or effect.
+
==== Annotation 71 ====
  
Thinking of technology as articulation and assemblage allows us at last to take seriously the implications of Eddie Izzard’s playful insights about guns raised in Chapter 4 and apply these insights to any and all technologies. We no longer need to decide if guns kill people or if people kill people, because we no longer see the problem as attributing causal power or responsibility to one or the other—to the technology or to the culture. Instead, the relevant task, when utilizing this perspective, is to map and critique the assemblage (what we have previously called context) within which different articulations are both possible and effective. A complex cultural assemblage produces technologies (such as guns) as particular, contingent kinds of tools to be used in particular, contingent ways. Similarly, a complex cultural assemblage takes up technologies (such as guns) and uses them in particular, contingent ways with particular, contingent effects. Because an assemblage is made up of multiple (corresponding, noncorresponding, and contradictory) articulations, change takes place in the dynamic tensions among the articulations that constitute an assemblage.
+
''Conditioned reflexes'' are reactions which are learned by organisms. These responses are acquired as animals learn to associate previously unrelated neural stimuli to elicit a particular reaction. The Russian psychologist Ivan Pavlov famously developed our understanding of conditioned responses by ringing a dinner bell shortly before giving dogs food. After a few repetitions, dogs would begin to salivate upon hearing the dinner bell being rung, even before any food was offered. Any dog which did not receive this conditioning would not salivate upon hearing a dinner bell. This is what makes it a learned, conditioned response — a type of mental reflection.
  
Clearly, this perspective is nonmechanistic. But what you have just read is, admittedly, a little difficult to “unpack.” The new vocabulary you need, the new concepts to work with—articulation, assemblage, and contingency—are explored in much more detail in Chapter 12. Regardless, it will be helpful to explore the concept of agency first, which we undertake in Chapter 11.
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''Dynamic and creative reflection'' is the most advanced form of reflection. It only occurs in matter that has the highest structural level, such as the human brain. Dynamic and creative reflection is done through the human brain’s nervous physiological activities whenever the objective world impacts human senses. This is a kind of reflection that actively selects and processes information to create new information and to understand the meaning of that information. This dynamic and creative reflection is called consciousness.
  
Conclusion
+
-----
  
It is important to remember that anyone who thinks or writes about technologies, anyone who makes a decision involving technologies, and anyone who interacts with technologies, lives out an understanding of one or some combination of the above perspectives on technology: simple, symptomatic, expressive, and
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==== Annotation 72 ====
  
134 O
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Remember Lenin’s definition of matter from ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'': “Matter is a philosophical category denoting objective reality which is given to man in his sensations, and which is copied, photographed, and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them.”
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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An intrinsic property of matter is that it can be sensed by human beings, and through this sensation, ''reflected'' in human consciousness. Thus, all forms of matter share the characteristic of being able to be reflected in the human mind.
  
articulation/assemblage. That is clearly true for all of us. Whether we think these matters through theoretically or not, we internalize a scheme of how technology works and what role it plays in our lives. Throughout the many years of listening to what people say about technology and watching them live out a relationship to it, we can say without hesitation that most people tend to be inconsistent in their understanding of what technology is and how it works. For example, a person might be against gun control because people, not guns, kill people (a symptomatic causal perspective), but they might be opposed to computerized banking because the machine depersonalizes banking (a simple causal perspective). This inconsistent thinking points to the likelihood that other cultural forces and connections (beyond the purely theoretical) come into play, that is, articulate, in the decisionmaking process. By thinking through the problem from the perspective of articulation and assemblage, we can begin to see the power with which some of these other forces and connections shape technological culture, our understanding of it, and, finally, our responses to it.
+
Criticizing Karl Pearson, who said that it was not logical to maintain that all matter had the property of being conscious, Lenin wrote in brackets: “But it is logical to suppose that all matter possesses a property which is essentially kindred to sensation: the property to reflect.” Understanding the concept of dynamic and creative reflection is critical to understanding the role of consciousness and the ideal in Dialectical Materialism. In particular, reflection differentiates Dialectical Materialism from the idealist form of dialectics used by Hegel [see Annotation 9, p. 10]. As Marx famously wrote in ''Capital Volume I'':
  
Figure 17: Footprint on Earth
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<blockquote>
 +
My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of ‘the Idea,’ he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos [craftsman/artisan/creator] of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea.’ With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.
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</blockquote>
  
Source: Photograph by Nevit Dilmen, 2001, Wikimedia Commons: commons.wikimedia. org/wiki/File:Maldives_00147_foot_print_on_earth.jpg
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In other words, Hegelian idealism saw human consciousness as defining the material world. Dialectical Materialism inverts this relationship to recognize that what we conceive in our minds is only a reflection of the material world. As Marx explains in ''The German Ideology'', all conscious thought stems from life processes through reflection:
  
Chapter Eleven
+
<blockquote>
 +
Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.
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</blockquote>
  
Agency
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Marx and Engels argued that consciousness arose from the ''life-processes'' of human beings. Life-processes are processes of motion and change which occur within organisms to sustain life, and these processes have a dialectical relationship with consciousness: the processes of life, therefore, reflect consciousness, just as consciousness reflects human life-processes. Conscious activities (such as being able to hunt, gather, and cook food, build shelter, and so on) improve the life-processes of human beings (by improving our health, extending our life-spans, etc.); and as our life-processes improved, our consciousness was able to develop more fully. As a concrete example of the dialectic between life processes and consciousness, it is now widely believed by scientists that the advent of cooking and preparing food (conscious activity) improved the functioning of the human brain<ref>Source: “Food for Thought: Was Cooking a Pivotal Step in Human Evolution?” by Alexandra Rosati, ''Scientific American'', February 26, 2018.</ref> (a life process) which, in turn, developed human consciousness, and so on. Life-processes thus determine ''how'' consciousness reflects reality, while consciousness impacts back on life-processes, reflecting the dialectical relationship between matter and consciousness [see p. 88] and between practical activities and consciousness [see Annotation 230, p. 226].
  
From Causality to Agency
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Because consciousness arose from life-processes of human beings in the material world, we know that the material world is reflected in our consciousness. However, these reflections do not ''determine'' the material world, and do not mirror the material world exactly [see Annotation 77, p. 79]. It is also important to understand that, since life-processes in the material world predate and determine consciousness, consciousness can never be a first basis of seeking truth about our world. As Marx further explains in ''The German Ideology:''
  
THERE IS A COMPUTER SITTING ON GREG’S DESK. This is hardly a surprising disclosure in this day and age. Actually, if we want to be accurate, there’s a computer monitor sitting on his desk; there’s a mouse and a mouse pad to the right of the monitor; there’s a keyboard mounted on a nifty sliding drawer just under the desktop; and the computer sits on the floor under his desk (unfortunately, just within range of his idly kicking foot).
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<blockquote>
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Since the Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, as the real chains of men (just as the Old Hegelians declared them the true bonds of human society) it is evident that the Young Hegelians have to fight only against these illusions of consciousness. Since, according to their fantasy, the relationships of men, all their doings, their chains and their limitations are products of their consciousness, the Young Hegelians logically put to men the moral postulate of exchanging their present consciousness for human, critical or egoistic consciousness, and thus of removing their limitations. This demand to change consciousness amounts to a demand to interpret reality in another way, i.e. to recognise it by means of another interpretation.
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</blockquote>
  
We begin with such a banal example because instances from everyday life allow us to address more easily the weaknesses of the received view of technology. For example, the received view of technological determinism would look at the scene described above and consider the computer to be the center of attention. It would focus on how the computer affects life: changes work habits, communication patterns, posture, and so forth. But this view ignores much of what else is going on: It ignores the yellow sticky notes attached to the monitor frame and screen, the orientation of the monitor to the door and window, the piles of papers blocking the mouse, the nature of the work being done, and so on. If it does notice these things, it sees them only as evidence of the effects of the computer on the way Greg works.
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In other words, Hegelian idealism makes the critical mistake of believing that the ideal — consciousness — is the first basis of reality, and that anything and everything can be achieved through mere conscious activity. Marx, on the other hand, argues that “life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life,and that we must understand the ways in which reality is reflected in consciousness before we can hope to affect change in the material conditions of human beings:
  
In contrast, the received view of cultural determinism would look at the scene in Greg’s office and focus on how the computer in general and this computer in particular have been developed in response to the needs of computer users such as Greg. The computer itself almost disappears from the picture, obscured by the functions for which it was developed and to which it is put. Here, the yellow sticky notes would be taken to represent some of those functions.
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<blockquote>
 +
In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here [in the materialist perspective] we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. In the first method of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; in the second method, which conforms to real life, it is the real living individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness.
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</blockquote>
  
What is problematic with both these views is that in restricting their view of the office in their particular ways, they are unable to grasp or even recognize the articulation of broader cultural forces at work. Despite their differences, both positions view this situation through the same lens: that of causality. They are
+
So, the work of the Dialectical Materialist is not to try to develop Utopian conceptions of reality first, to then proceed to try and force such purely ideal conceptions onto reality (see Annotation 17, p. 18).
  
138 O
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Rather, we must understand the material basis of reality, as well as the material processes of change and motion which govern reality, and only then can we search for ways in which human beings can influence material reality through conscious activity. As Marx explains, the revolutionary must not be fooled into believing we can simply conceive of an ideal world and then replicate it into reality through interpretation and conscious thought alone. Instead, we must start with a firm understanding of material conditions and, from that material basis, determine how to build our revolutionary movement through conscious impact of material relations and processes of development in the material world.
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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As Marx wrote in ''The German Ideology:'' “Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence.” This distinction may seem subtle at first, but it has massive implications for how Marx suggests we go about participating in revolutionary activity. For Marx, purely-idealist debates and criticisms are an unproductive waste of time:
  
restricted to asking questions only about one dimension of the situation. They can only ask, on the one hand, what does the computer cause to happen in Greg’s life? Or, on the other hand, how is the computer a response to the cultural wants and needs of people like Greg?
+
<blockquote>
 +
The Young-Hegelian ideologists, in spite of their allegedly ‘world-shattering’ statements, are the staunchest conservatives. The most recent of them have found the correct expression for their activity when they declare they are only fighting against ‘phrases.They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world. The only results which this philosophic criticism could achieve were a few (and at that thoroughly one-sided) elucidations of Christianity from the point of view of religious history; all the rest of their assertions are only further embellishments of their claim to have furnished, in these unimportant elucidations, discoveries of universal importance.
 +
</blockquote>
  
The causal approach has a certain universal undertone to it, meaning that its purported causal effects are assumed to be the same under any—and every— circumstance. The causal approach does not adequately grasp the particularities of situations. For example, it is ill-equipped to differentiate the significantly different office environments of the co-authors of this book, both of whom work with computers but in very different ways. The causal approach talks about the effects of the computer, but is less helpful in discussing the effectiveness of this or that computer. A causal approach is reductive; that is, it reduces the multiple elements that matter into a simple line of determination that holds “true” for all cases.
+
Marx also discusses the uselessness of idealist conjecture:
  
To obtain a richer view of the role and work of technology, we propose a multidimensional view that is sensitive to the contingent interplay of a wider variety of factors, what we call the work of articulation. To insist that the interplay is contingent is to recognize that culture (or technology) is not a set of stable, unchanging, and fixed elements or components, but rather a set of dynamic, changing, and interrelated connections or relations, within which elements and components (such as a computer) are produced and perform work. While we discuss articulation in greater depth in the next chapter, it is helpful to look first at the concept of agency. To do so makes clear that something like a field of forces requires our attention rather than a single line of determination.
+
<blockquote>
 +
Moreover, it is quite immaterial what consciousness starts to do on its own: out of all such muck we get only the one inference that these three moments, the forces of production, the state of society, and consciousness, can and must come into contradiction with one another, because the division of labour implies the possibility, nay the fact that intellectual and material activity — enjoyment and labour, production and consumption — devolve on different individuals, and that the only possibility of their not coming into contradiction lies in the negation in its turn of the division of labour. It is self-evident, moreover, that ‘spectres,’ ‘bonds,’ ‘the higher being,’ ‘concept,’ ‘scruple,’ [terms for idealist conceptions] are merely the idealistic, spiritual expression, the conception apparently of the isolated individual, the image of very empirical fetters and limitations, within which the mode of production of life and the form of intercourse coupled with it move.
 +
</blockquote>
  
What we mean by agency differs somewhat from the definition that is found in the dictionary. According to Webster’s, agency is
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What Marx means by this is that we should focus on the material processes and conditions of society if we intend to change society, because idealist speculation, conjecture, critique, and thought alone, at the individual level, will never be capable of affecting revolutionary change in our material world.
  
1 active force; action; power 2 that by which something is done; means; instrumentality 3 the business of any person, firm, etc. empowered to act for another 4 the business office or district of such a person, firm, etc. 5 an administrative division of government with specific functions 6 an organization that offers a particular kind of assistance [a social agency].
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Instead, we must focus on the material basis of reality, the material conditions of society, and seek revolutionary measures which are built upon materialist foundations. Only by understanding material processes of development, as well as the dialectical relationship between consciousness and matter, can we reliably and effectively begin to impact reality through conscious activity. This begins with the recognition that conscious thought itself is a ''reflection'' of material reality which developed and results from ''life-processes'' of material motion and processes of change within the human brain.
  
The emphasis in this definition, consistent with popular usage, is that agency is the power and ability to do something, and it assumes an agent that possesses that power. An agent, according to the same dictionary, is “generally, a person or thing that acts or is capable of acting, or…one who or that which acts, or is empowered to act, for another [the company’s agent]” to bring about a certain result.1 What is important about the dictionary meanings and popular usage of agent and agency is that they are ultimately defined in terms of the human realm and assume intent behind every action. For example, if your intention is to communicate with your mother, you can either send a friend over to her house to tell her something, write her a letter and drop it in the post and have the mail carrier deliver it, telephone her, text her, or walk over there yourself. The friend, the mail carrier, the letter, the telephone, the texting function, and even your own body can be called agents in this situation because each represents a
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This concept of reflection, pioneered by Marx and Engels, was significantly developed by V. I. Lenin in his response to Machian positivists who posited that what we perceive is not truly reality [see Annotation 32, p. 27]. In his ''Philosophical Notebooks,'' Lenin wrote: “Life gives rise to the brain. Nature is reflected in the human brain.
  
Agency
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In ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'', Lenin further defined the relationship between matter and consciousness through reflection.
  
O 139
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'''LENIN’S PROOF OF THE THEORY OF REFLECTION'''
  
possible means of achieving the original human intention. They are all intermediaries through which you exercise your agency. Agency in this view is thus almost something you possess. Possessing it allows you to get something done. It is measurable in the sense that you can have more or less of it. If you have more agency, you can get more done. Having access to intermediaries (other agents) is one way to increase your agency. Much of the world does not have access to many of these intermediary agents; thus their agency, their ability to secure a particular effect, is limited. The popular view of agency, as reflected by the dictionary, reduces agency to a thing, and further, as the possession of an agent, ultimately a human with intentions. It does not recognize, as well as explain, agency as a process or a relationship. The consequences of this oversimplification are significant.
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In ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism,'' Lenin offered the following arguments to back up the theory of reflection.
  
We propose two changes to this view of agency. First, agency is not just about human intention; many elements are involved in relations of agency, including technology. Second, agency is not a possession of agents; rather, it is a process and a relationship in which some elements are designated as agents, as having the power to act. The remainder of this chapter will set out each of these changes in turn.
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<blockquote>
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1) Things exist independently of our consciousness, independently of our perceptions, outside of us, for it is beyond doubt that alizarin [a chemical substance which was newly discovered at time of writing] existed in coal tar yesterday and it is equally beyond doubt that yesterday we knew nothing of the existence of this alizarin and received no sensations from it.
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</blockquote>
  
Technological Agency
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Lenin is saying that the material world must exist outside of and independent from our consciousness. He cites as evidence the discovery of a chemical substance which until recently we had no sensory perception of, noting that this substance must have existed long before we became aware of it through sensory observation.
  
First, in response to the assumption that agency ultimately resides in human intention, we propose that technologies are particularly important active participants in everyday life and can be seen as participating in relations of agency. Even though you are talking with someone on the telephone, isn’t the phone itself part of that conversation? We tend to ignore the phone, as though it were transparent, because we engage in the conversation and think of it in terms of its content (what is said). But just as the tenor of a conversation changes depending on the individuals involved, the tenor of the conversation changes depending on the technology involved. For example, you might have to shout because of static or a weak signal. You may have to be thoughtful about talking in turn because you are using a mobile phone. You might talk quickly because you are paying per minute of use. You might be able to walk around because the phone is cordless, and so on. The shape of the conversation in these cases cannot be reduced to simple human intentions. The technology matters quite apart from your intentions.
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<blockquote>
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2) There is definitely no difference in principle between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there can be no such difference. The only difference is between what is known and what is not yet known. And philosophical inventions of specific boundaries between the one and the other, inventions to the effect that the thing-in-itself is “beyond” phenomena (Kant) or that we can or must fence ourselves off by some philosophical partition from the problem of a world which in one part or another is still unknown but which exists outside us (Hume) — all this is the sheerest nonsense, [unfounded belief], trick, invention.
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</blockquote>
  
When we ignore the technologies, we typically treat them as intermediaries, conduits through which intention, power, or action are achieved. However, as Bruno Latour has argued, the technologies are actually mediators, not inter-mediaries.2 A mediator of a dispute is a person who steps between the parties involved and actively tries to get both sides to agree, to influence them in some way. A mediator is active and presumes a transformation: The demands of both sides in the dispute are altered to reach common ground. So in our example of a telephone conversation, the telephone (including both phones, their electronics, wires, switches, networks, satellites and transmissions in between) is a complex mediator; it is one of the factors transforming the conversation.
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Lenin is referencing a centuries-old debate about whether or not human beings are capable of having real knowledge of a “thing-in-itself,” or if we can only perceive ''phenomena'' of things (characteristics observable to our senses). The “thing-in-itself” refers to the actual material object which exists outside of our consciousness. So the question being posed is: can we REALLY have knowledge of material objects outside of our consciousness, or does consciousness itself act as a barrier to ever REALLY knowing anything about material objects and the material world outside of our consciousness?
  
140 O
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Immanuel Kant argued that we can never know the true nature of the material world, writing: “we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing-in-itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.” This idea that the senses could not be trusted to deliver accurate knowledge — and thus, the “thing-in-itself” is essentially unknowable — was carried forward by later empiricists such as Bacon and Hume [see Annotation 10, p. 10]. In ''Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'', Marx and Engels refute this notion, arguing that ''practice'' allows us to discover truth about “things-in-themselves:”
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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<blockquote>
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The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical crotchets is practice — namely, experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and making it serve our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end to the Kantian ungraspable “thing-in-itself”.
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</blockquote>
  
In another example, backaches are often related to the posture you take when you work at a computer. In this case, it doesn’t make sense to talk about either the user or the technology as consciously “intending” to give you a backache. Yet, the computer clearly plays a role in your backache. The technology adds something more than, apart from, or different from human intention. This is why it is incorrect to talk about technology as a mere “tool,” as though it were merely helping you realize your intention. It does something more, beyond, and apart from its intended “use.” For this reason, some theorists have developed the argument that technologies are also actors. One version of this perspective is called ActorNetwork Theory, and involves the concepts of actors (another term for agent), translation, delegation, and prescription, each of which we will discuss below. ActorNetwork Theory is a useful approach for beginning to think about how technology is involved in relations of agency. However, there are some problems with the way the approach has developed. So, we first explain the position and then attend to the problems in order to move beyond them.
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Lenin expanded on this argument, explaining that the phenomena of objects which we observe with our senses ''do'' accurately reflect material objects, even though we might not know everything about these objects at once. Over time, as we learn more and more about material objects and the material world through practice and repeated observation, we more fully and accurately come to understand “things-in-themselves, as he writes in ''Empirio-Criticism and Materialism:''
  
Actors
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<blockquote>
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3) In the theory of knowledge, as in every other branch of science, we must think dialectically, that is, we must not regard our knowledge as readymade and unalterable, but must determine how knowledge emerges from ignorance, how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete and more exact.
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</blockquote>
  
French sociologists Michel Callon and Bruno Latour define an actor as “[a]ny element which bends space around itself, makes other elements dependent upon itself and translates their will into a language of its own.”3 Let’s break this definition down and explore each part. First, “any element which bends space around itself.” What does it mean to bend space? Imagine that you see a strange dog snarling on the sidewalk. You might respond by slowing down, changing your path of travel, your attitude, and your behavior. That dog has altered, or bent, the space around it. Likewise, a computer shapes the space around it. While working at the computer, you assume a particular posture, even an attitude. You arrange the elements of your desk or table, place the desk or table close to an outlet, a router, and so on. You might wear particular glasses or hold your hands in a particular way. That computer has altered the space around it, bent space, and bent you as part of that space.
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Here, Lenin further elaborates on the dialectical nature of knowledge: we must simultaneously accept that our knowledge is never perfect and unchanging, but we must also recognize that we are capable of making our knowledge more exact and complete over time. To further defend his ideas about reflection, Lenin cited Czech philosopher Karl Kautsky’s argument against Kant:
  
Second, it “makes other elements dependent upon itself.” A technology is never alone or isolated; it is always connected with other actors, that is, with other technologies and beings in a network of relations. Any network of actors consists of an indeterminate number of relations of dependence and control. Technologies make other actors/elements dependent upon them, just as technologies depend on other actors/elements. The relations of dependence take different forms, at different strengths, throughout the network. For example, people become dependent on computers in many ways, such as to communicate with others via e-mail or instant messages, to check spelling and grammar, to pay bills, and to calculate math functions. Likewise, the computer is dependent on other actors in many ways, such as for repair, programming, start up, electricity, and general implementation.
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<blockquote>
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That I see green, red and white is grounded in my faculty of sight. But that green is something different from red testifies to something that lies outside of me, to real differences between the things... The relations and differences between the things themselves revealed to me by the individual space and time concepts are real relations and differences of the external world, not conditioned by the nature of my perceptive faculty... If this were really so [i.e., if Kant’s doctrine of the ideality of time and space were true], we could know nothing about the world outside us, not even that it exists.
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</blockquote>
  
Third, it “translates their will into a language of its own.” Translation implies an altering of form. In terms of actor-networks, to translate means to alter the form of something to bring it into alignment with the technology, system, or culture. For example, we translate a sentence from one language to another to
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Lenin followed from Marx and Engels that, in order to further develop our understanding and knowledge of the material world, it was necessary to engage in ''practice'' [see Annotation 211, p. 205]. Engels wrote in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
  
Agency
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<blockquote>
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The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we [use] these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perceptions. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is positive proof that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves.
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</blockquote>
  
O 141
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Notice that Engels is careful to use the words ''so far'': “its qualities, ''so far'', agree with reality outside ourselves.” Engels does not argue that human understanding of the material world is infallible: mistakes are often made. But over time, as such mistakes are discovered and our understanding improves, our knowledge of the material world develops. This is only possible if the phenomena of objects which we observe — the reflections within our consciousness — do actually and accurately represent material reality. Lenin elaborated on this necessity to constantly update and improve dialectical materialist philosophy as new information and knowledge became available:
  
facilitate understanding. Technologies translate crude oil into a form so that other machines can use it. Computers translate human language into machine language so that the computer can process it. When you write a letter on a computer you translate your thoughts into a particular posture as you sit at the keyboard and enact the particular movements of typing. When you take a multiple-choice exam, you translate the answers in your head into an appropriately filled bubble on the page. Translation is the process of transformation. The function of a mediator is to translate and transform. An actor—whether human or technology—is a mediator.
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<blockquote>
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Engels, for instance, assimilated the, to him, new term, energy, and began to employ it in 1885 (Preface to the 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. of Anti-Dühring) and in 1888 (Ludwig Feuerbach), but to employ it equally with the concepts of ‘force’ and ‘motion,’ and along with them. Engels was able to enrich his materialism by adopting a new terminology.
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</blockquote>
  
Delegation
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Engels provided further elaborations on how practical experience and mastery of the material world refutes the notion that it is impossible to have real knowledge of the material world in ''Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'':
  
In order to emphasize a different aspect of the process of translation, Latour gives another name to the process of translation: delegation. (Since this is quite a different way of talking about technology, theorists like to try out a number of different metaphors or terms to try to grasp just what it is they are getting at.) To be a delegate means that you are representing someone else (or many people), and speaking and acting (for example, voting) on their behalf, like a representative in a democracy. Delegates speak on our behalf to political conventions, international bodies such as the United Nations, or in peace negotiations. To delegate means to hand over a task or tasks to someone (or something) else. Tasks are delegated to humans or nonhumans, such as technologies. In the process of delegation, a translation occurs and the task is inscribed or incorporated in a new form.
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<blockquote>
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The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical fancies is practice, viz., experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and using it for our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end of the Kantian incomprehensible or ungraspable... The chemical substances produced in the bodies of plants and animals remained just such thingsin-themselves until organic chemistry began to produce them one after another, whereupon the thing-in-itself became a thing for us, as for instance, alizarin [a dye which was originally plant-based], which we no longer trouble to grow in in the field, but produce much more cheaply and simply from coal tar.
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</blockquote>
  
Humans delegate tasks to other beings (humans and other-than-humans) as well as to technologies. In this chapter we focus primarily on delegation involving humans and technology. In our culture, the goal of delegation is often understood to be to delegate from human to technology, since we believe (rightly or wrongly) that technologies are more reliable than humans or animals. But we would caution you to remember that in any network of agency and delegation there are other beings involved.
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So, dialectical materialism holds that there is a material world external from our consciousness; that conscious thoughts are reflections of this material world; that we can have real knowledge of the material world through sensory observation; and that our knowledge and understanding of the material world is best advanced through ''practice'' in the material world.
  
When humans delegate tasks to technologies, the technology does something a human used to do (direct traffic, open doors, assemble cars, carry a message) or performs a task that humans could not do but wished they could (fly). Let’s take the example of a bread machine. This is a machine to which a variety of tasks have been delegated. Tired of mixing ingredients, kneading dough, baking, and so on, humans invented a machine to do all this. All the human actor has to do is measure and pour in the ingredients, shut the lid, plug it in, turn it on, and the machine does the rest. So in this way a tiresome task has been delegated to a machine. We have translated much of the human work of making bread into a machine process by delegating the task to a machine.
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Latour gives the example of a door. In his analysis, a door is a technology that makes walls more convenient. Walls are wonderful at keeping things in (warm air, small children, prisoners) or out (wind, bugs, barbarians), but they also keep us in or out. If we need to enter or leave a room, we need a hole in the wall, which defeats the whole purpose of the wall: Now whatever is outside can come in (and vice versa). Latour argues that we take all the work of tearing a hole in the wall,
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''- Social Sources of Consciousness''
  
142 O
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There are many factors that constitute the social sources of consciousness. The most basic and direct factors are ''labor'' and ''language.''
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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''Labor'' is the process by which humans interact with the natural world in order to make products for our needs of existing and developing. Labor is also the process that changes the human body’s structure [i.e., muscles developing through exercise].
  
climbing through, and rebuilding it again and translate that work by delegating it to a door. Opening and close a door is much easier, much less time consuming, and much less messy than tearing down and rebuilding walls, but it also translates the nature of movement in and out. Once we designate agency to the door, a new form of passage is inscribed. It may be easier to move in and out, but we also need locks and keys to keep it from being too easy, which would once again forfeit the purpose of the wall in the first place.
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The effect of delegation in reinscribing forms is evident in the bread machine example as well. The machine is delegated all the tasks of making bread “by hand” and translates them into a form of bread “by machine.” A new form of bread is inscribed, because the tasks have been translated into a “language” the machine understands. The machine does not, indeed cannot, make just any or every kind of bread, but only a specific type of yeast-based loaf bread. This network of relations of delegation designates the bread machine as the producer of bread, the agent that has the ability to make a particular thing happen. It is a culturally specific machine performing a culturally specific task that produces a culturally specific loaf of bread.
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==== Annotation 73 ====
  
Prescription
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In ''Dialectics of Nature'', Engels describes the dialectical relationship between labor and human development:
  
When technologies delegate tasks to humans, Latour uses a different term to describe this process: prescription. According to Latour, once the technology has been inscribed with tasks and is released into the culture, it prescribes tasks back to us, with the inevitable work of translation. It is perhaps less obvious and more difficult for people to acknowledge, but tasks do get delegated by technologies and translated (inscribed or incorporated) into humans. For example, if we know how to drive a car, it is because the car has delegated certain tasks to us: a posture; a form of attention; the need to perform particular movements at particular times; knowledge of rules, regulations, and customs of the road; accepted practices of negotiating traffic; the need to carry a key; and so on. Those tasks take the form of habits and skills inscribed in our bodies. We certainly don’t need to be reminded of them at every turn and rarely even think about them, but we do perform them.
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<blockquote>
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Labour is the source of all wealth, the political economists assert. And it really is the source — next to nature, which supplies it with the material that it converts into wealth. But it is even infinitely more than this. It is the prime basic condition for all human existence, and this to such an extent that, in a sense, we have to say that labour created man himself.
  
Latour refers to prescription as “whatever a scene presupposed from its transcribed actors and authors.”4 He means by this that the newly prescribed tasks, once they become inscribed as habit are presupposed; that is, they are assumed to be natural and normal. To continue with the bread machine scenario: Once the machine has been inscribed with tasks and is released into the culture, or at least placed on our kitchen counters, it prescribes back to us what bread is, and presupposes an enormous range of behaviors, attitudes, and values. Some of these presupposed behaviors, attitudes, and values have to do with bread. The machine presupposes a desire for a quantity of a particular type of bread, the availability of particular ingredients, and a particular, narrowed, or shifted taste. In other words, the machine translates tastes into a form consistent with its function. It is quite a taskmaster as well, demanding exactitude in ingredients and proportions of ingredients, or else it will not produce “good” bread. It requires cleaning and it requires that its owner find a space for it somewhere. In other words, it
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Before the first flint could be fashioned into a knife by human hands, a period of time probably elapsed in comparison with which the historical period known to us appears insignificant. But the decisive step had been taken, the hand had become free and could henceforth attain ever greater dexterity; the greater flexibility thus acquired was inherited and increased from generation to generation.
  
Agency
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Thus the hand is not only the organ of labour, it is also the product of labour. Only by labour, by adaptation to ever new operations, through the inheritance of muscles, ligaments, and, over longer periods of time, bones that had undergone special development and the ever-renewed employment of this inherited finesse in new, more and more complicated operations, have given the human hand the high degree of perfection required to conjure into being the pictures of a Raphael, the statues of a Thorwaldsen, the music of a Paganini.
  
O 143
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But the hand did not exist alone, it was only one member of an integral, highly complex organism. And what benefited the hand, benefited also the whole body it served.
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</blockquote>
  
presupposes that you will be exacting in following directions, in maintaining and cleaning the machine; and it presupposes that you have space, ingredients, and a power source. It also presupposes that it was put together competently in the factory, that it was programmed correctly, that the delivery person did not drop it on the way to the store, and so on. The machine also prescribes behaviors, attitudes, and values having to do with technology, such as reinforcing the valuation of convenience and efficiency. It prescribes expectations for the proper household; if you have the machine you now are expected to produce fresh bread daily and eat it. In a sense, the machine demands that you make bread regularly to justify the machine.
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The mobile phone offers another example of the way that a technology prescribes or presupposes behaviors, attitudes, and values back onto humans. When a person wanted to use the phone before the invention of mobile phones, they had to get to a telephone. Now the mobile phone does the traveling for us. So, in a sense, people delegated the task of traveling to the phone to the mobile phone itself. But the mobile phone prescribes back a daunting range of behaviors, attitudes, and values. First it demands that a person carry it; if you don’t carry it, you can’t use it. Beyond simply carrying it, a person has to keep it charged, subscribe to a carrier, and pay regular monthly bills. The prescriptive work extends still further. Now a person is expected to use the mobile phone in places where there had been no telephone before: in restaurants, in automobiles, on vacations, while mountain climbing, and so on. People, when they wished, used to be able to be out of phone contact, but there is barely a place where that is possible anymore. The prescriptive pressure is to always be in contact and presupposes this as a cultural value. Thus, it becomes a good thing—if not a necessity—to have a mobile phone while mountain climbing or in an automobile, because a climber or motorist can call for help if need be. Thus, the mobile phone prescribes and presupposes the value of always being in contact, of always being “on call,” and works at obliterating privacy and the idea that privacy might be desirable. A whole new standard of expectations about being available is emerging as the mobile phone (and e-mail or messaging) gradually blankets the planet.
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Labor also allows us to discover the attributes, structures, motion laws, etc., of the natural world, via observable phenomena.
  
Network
 
  
We have been unable to talk about actors, delegation, and prescription without sneaking in the language of the network. Now we will look explicitly at the idea of a network. What do we mean by network in Actor-Network? A network is a “summing up” of the relations among actors in relation to processes of translation, delegation, and prescription. Networks are maps of these relations and connections, which involve both the processes and the effects. The term we introduce to describe the processes and effects of making these connections is articulation. The task of an Actor-Network scholar is to discover how such networks get built, how they are maintained and transformed, how the articulations are made and unmade, and what qualities comprise those articulations.
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We are being pretty abstract here; so we will give you an example. Let’s talk about making bread by hand, before those bread machines became so trendy.
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==== Annotation 74 ====
  
144 O
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We discover truth about the natural world through labor — through physical ''practice'' in the material world. See the discussion of ''practice'' in Annotation 211, p. 205.
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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All of these phenomena, through our human senses, impact our human brains. And through brain activity, knowledge and consciousness of the objective world are formed and developed.
  
You cannot make bread on your own, because it does not spring, fully baked, from your forehead! You need to gather the ingredients (eggs, flour, water, yeast), which you will articulate (connect) in a certain way to make bread. You also need to enlist the aid of other actors: a bowl or two, a rolling pin, a countertop, an oven, and so on. You are building a network right there in your kitchen. However, it does not stop there: For the eggs you need to enlist a chicken, which might mean walking next door to the barn and disturbing the chickens. Even if there are chickens waiting, you had to previously enlist a barn, chicken feed, and so on. For the flour, you might need to enlist the help of your pickup truck to get to the store to purchase it. The store didn’t make the flour, so you need to follow the network further to include the distributor, manufacturer, milling machines, engineers, granaries, farms, farm policy, government regulation, and so on. And you haven’t even started kneading, rolling, patting, or baking yet!
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''Language'' is a system of material signals that carries information with cognitive content. Without language, consciousness could not exist and develop.
  
Here is another banal example: One night Greg was heading out to teach his graduate seminar on technology; the topic was Actor-Network Theory, believe it or not. His hands were full, with a plastic-wrapped tuna sandwich on a plate, hot coffee, and books; and he found himself faced with a closed door. In order to get through the door, he enlisted the aid of a passing student, who kindly held it open for him. That is an obviously contingent articulation: He can’t assume that this student will always be there. It worked once; it might not work again. If we wanted to stabilize this articulation, it might be more reliable to delegate this task to a nonhuman. In this case, we could delegate the task to an electric door opener activated by a button near the door. This is a more stable network, although it too can still break down.
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The birth of language goes hand in hand with labor. From the beginning, labor was social. The relationships between people who perform labor processes require them to have means to communicate and exchange thoughts. This requirement caused language to arise and develop along with the working processes. With language, humans not only communicate, but also summarise reality and convey experience and thoughts from generation to generation.
  
Networks are more or less stable: The network of production and distribution of Pillsbury flour may be more stable and reliable than the network of production and distribution of eggs to a local farmer’s market. An electric eye may be more stable and reliable than a passing student. We often think that we can make a network more stable by adding more nonhumans to the mix. But with that stability and reliability come a plethora of prescriptions with which we must operate. The distribution of responsibility has merely shifted, albeit in significant ways and with consequences and, sometimes, with significant consequences.
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While we have chosen to explain Actor-Network Theory using rather mundane examples (to make the process obvious), it is possible, using ActorNetwork Theory, to talk about any phenomenon (Congress, electric cars, a war) using the same methods and terminology. In every case, each moment of enlisting is a process of delegation that prescribes back and presupposes a range of expectations and requirements that are more or less stable with consequences.
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==== Annotation 75 ====
  
Issues with Actor-Network Theory
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From ''Dialectics of Nature'':
  
You may have noticed that in our discussion of Actor-Network Theory we seem to have slipped into using a construction we initially objected to: referring
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<blockquote>
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It has already been noted that our simian ancestors were gregarious; it is obviously impossible to seek the derivation of man, the most social of all animals, from non-gregarious immediate ancestors. Mastery over nature began with the development of the hand, with labour, and widened man’s horizon at every new advance. He was continually discovering new, hitherto unknown properties in natural objects. On the other hand, the development of labour necessarily helped to bring the members of society closer together by increasing cases of mutual support and joint activity, and by making clear the advantage of this joint activity to each individual. In short, men in the making arrived at the point where they had something to say to each other. Necessity created the organ; the undeveloped larynx of the ape was slowly but surely transformed by modulation to produce constantly more developed modulation, and the organs of the mouth gradually learned to pronounce one articulate sound after another.
  
Agency
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Comparison with animals proves that this explanation of the origin of language from and in the process of labour is the only correct one. The little that even the most highly-developed animals need to communicate to each other does not require articulate speech. In its natural state, no animal feels handicapped by its inability to speak or to understand human speech. It is quite different when it has been tamed by man. The dog and the horse, by association with man, have developed such a good ear for articulate speech that they easily learn to understand any language within their range of concept. Moreover they have acquired the capacity for feelings such as affection for man, gratitude, etc., which were previously foreign to them. Anyone who has had much to do with such animals will hardly be able to escape the conviction that in many cases they now feel their inability to speak as a defect, although, unfortunately, it is one that can no longer be remedied because their vocal organs are too specialised in a definite direction. However, where vocal organs exist, within certain limits even this inability disappears. The buccal organs of birds are as different from those of man as they can be, yet birds are the only animals that can learn to speak; and it is the bird with the most hideous voice, the parrot, that speaks best of all. Let no one object that the parrot does not understand what it says. It is true that for the sheer pleasure of talking and associating with human beings, the parrot will chatter for hours at a stretch, continually repeating its whole vocabulary. But within the limits of its range of concepts it can also learn to understand what it is saying. Teach a parrot swear words in such a way that it gets an idea of their meaning (one of the great amusements of sailors returning from the tropics); tease it and you will soon discover that it knows how to use its swear words just as correctly as a Berlin costermonger. The same is true of begging for titbits.
  
O 145
+
First labour, after it and then with it speech — these were the two most essential stimuli under the influence of which the brain of the ape gradually changed into that of man, which, for all its similarity is far larger and more perfect. Hand in inevitably accompanied by a corresponding refinement of the organ of hearing, so the development of the brain as a whole is accompanied by a refinement of hand with the development of the brain went the development of its most immediate instruments — the senses. Just as the gradual development of speech is all the senses. The eagle sees much farther than man, but the human eye discerns considerably more in things than does the eye of the eagle. The dog has a far keener sense of smell than man, but it does not distinguish a hundredth part of the odours that for man are definite signs denoting different things. And the sense of touch, which the ape hardly possesses in its crudest initial form, has been developed only side by side with the development of the human hand itself, through the medium of labour.
 +
</blockquote>
  
to technologies as objects possessing agency. We did this in constructions such as “the mobile phone prescribes,” which suggests that the mobile phone possesses the ability to make people respond in a certain way. We have done this in order to make it clear that what technologies do is not that different from what humans do. Technologies are not mere tools that we use, but active forces in the world. In saying this, however, we could be accused of anthropomorphism, treating machines as if they have a will of their own, which is considered a “bad thing” if you are studying technology. Actually we are adopting a form of anthropomorphism here, but we don’t see that as a bad thing. In popular discourse, we think of anthropomorphism as referring to a dancing tea kettle in a Disney film: The tea kettle acts like a human; it has a face; it sings; it dances. But as Latour uses the term, anthropomorphism means “either what has human shape or what gives shape to humans.” So the mobile phone or bread machine is anthropomorphic because (a) “it has been made by men” [and women]; (b) “it substitutes for the actions of people;” and (c) “it shapes human activities by prescribing.”5
+
So, the most basic, direct and important source that decides the birth and development of language is labor. Language appeared later than labor but always goes with labor. Language and labor were the two main stimulations affecting the brains of the primates which evolved into humans, slowly changing their brains into human brains and transforming animal psychology into human consciousness.
  
The danger here is less that of falling into a Disney-like version of anthropomorphism than it is the risk of restricting the attribution of agency to technologies alone and ignoring the activity of the network. The danger of thinking of technologies (and humans, for that matter) as agents in a network is that we then tend to think of actors as points in a stable web, like knots in a fishing net. This, Latour points out in his later writing on Actor-Network Theory, leads us into the misguided practice of separating the agent from the structure. Rather, the actor/ agent is the structure (the network) and the structure is the actor/agent. There is no actor without a structure; there is no structure without actors. And neither are stable things; although some versions of Actor-Network Theory have treated them as such. There are, instead, ongoing processes of translation, delegation, and prescription. In fact, Latour came to dislike the very term actor-network, because of the tendency for people to use it to separate actor/agent and structure.6
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-14.png|''This diagram is based on work from an article titled'' “Evidence in Hand: Recent Discoveries and the Early Evolution of Human Manual Manipulation<ref>Written by Professor Tracy L. Kivell and published in ''The Royal Society''.</ref>.”''Modern research has discovered strong evidence<ref>''Stone Tools Helped Shape Human Hands'' by Sara Reardon, published in New Scientist Magazine.</ref> that the human hand evolved along with tool use, in line with Engels’ analysis in'' Dialectics of Nature.]]
  
The process of delegation does not just occur once, when the object is invented or manufactured, but over and over. When describing an actor-network or a map of articulations, we do not see a stable schematic before us, such as a map of the city or a diagram of a process, with all the elements and lines neatly and permanently set out. Instead, what we see is a series of constant movements, transformations, and circulations. We map brain to arm, to hand, to keyboard, to processor, to display, to server, to Internet, to education, to regulations, to politics, to something called the economy, and so on. We map a small packet of bread yeast to a store, to a distributor, to a manufacturer, to a bank, to a paper mill, to law and regulations, to something called the economy, to something called politics, to beliefs about the good life, and so on. (However, Latour would be quick to point out that before we can talk about “the economy” or “politics” we need to map the delegations and articulations of each and not leap too quickly to abstract entities or “black boxes.”7) Each connection “to” is a delegation—Latour says it’s like passing a ball in a sport.8 Each delegation, which is a process and not an event, is a transformation. When you enlist something, you transform it. When the stove enlists electricity to bake bread, it transforms electricity into heat. The
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146 O
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==== Annotation 76 ====
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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It is also worth noting that, just as human consciousness derived from labor and language ''and'' social activity, so too did society itself arise from language and labor, as Engels explained in ''Dialectics of Nature'':
  
grocer transformed a pack of yeast into a profit. Greg changed a student into a door opener. So while Actor-Network Theory sometimes encourages thinking in terms of actors and networks as both stable and separate, it is important to resist this tendency.
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<blockquote>
 +
The reaction on labour and speech of the development of the brain and its attendant senses, of the increasing clarity of consciousness, power of abstraction and of conclusion, gave both labour and speech an ever-renewed impulse to further development. This development did not reach its conclusion when man finally became distinct from the ape, but on the whole made further powerful progress, its degree and direction varying among different peoples and at different times, and here and there even being interrupted by local or temporary regression. This further development has been strongly urged forward, on the one hand, and guided along more definite directions, on the other, by a new element which came into play with the appearance of fully-fledged man, namely, society.
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</blockquote>
  
An additional and significant issue with Actor-Network Theory is that it tends to treat agency as if it were somehow universally available. In foregrounding a network as a web of translation, delegation, and prescription, the work of power in the ongoing process of maintaining or changing a network is somehow lost, or at least relegated to the background. Agency, in the sense of the ability to act, is actually bestowed or denied in real relations of power that bring elements of the network together or break them apart. We may think of an agent (say, for example, a person) as having power, but this is only an artifact of a network within which that agent is designated as having the power to act. To put it succinctly: Agency and power are not distributed equally throughout networks, and to understand stability and change in networks, to understand how networks privilege some possibilities and preclude others, we have to foreground the work of power in forging and breaking the relations and connections that constitute networks. In cultural studies, the concept of articulation, with its sense of “lines of tendential force,” is better at accounting for the unequal distribution of agency and power in networks. We turn to those concepts in the following chapter.
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In other words, these factors of human’s physical nature and human society have a dialectical relationship with one another. Elements of human nature — in particular labor and language — led to the development of human society, which in turned played a key role in the development of human language and labor.
  
Conclusion: Why Agency?
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-15.png|''Human language and human labor mutually develop one another through a dialectical process to develop human nature. Simultaneously, human nature and human society mutually develop one another through a dialectical process.'']]
  
In spite of the problematic tendencies that accrue to the concept of agency and of Actor-Network Theory, there are very important lessons to take away from their consideration. First, instead of human intention as the centerpiece in a relationship with technology, we now understand that technology is every bit as critical an actor as the human. Humans may delegate to technologies, but technologies invariably prescribe back.
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Elements of human nature — in particular labor and language — led to the development of human society, which in turned played a key role in the development of human language and labor.
  
Second, in the processes of delegation and prescription, translation occurs, and in the process of translation change occurs. Technologies are not mere tools that do our bidding, but mediators that perform tasks in ways that make presumptions about who we are and convey expectations on our behavior, attitudes, and values. When we think of ourselves as moving through everyday life, we tend to focus on encounters with other people and how those encounters alter the character of our day, our actions, and our behavior. If we acknowledge the agency of technology, we also have to ask: How do we choose to delegate to technologies (for example, choosing apps for our mobile phone or deciding to send production processes to factories in Cambodia)? What are the consequences of delegating or not delegating tasks to technologies? How do our interactions with technologies contribute to the shape of everyday life? How do the processes of translation, delegation, prescription, and inscription account for what we do, think, and feel? How do technologies reinforce or give shape to rules and values from the mundane (when to cross a street) to the extraordinary (how to make war)? How free are we to enlist technologies to perform other tasks? (You might be able to use
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Agency
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==== b. Nature and Structure of Consciousness ====
  
O 147
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''- Nature of Consciousness''
  
your bread machine as a mixer or doorstop but you can’t “scratch” it to make rap music; at least nobody has as yet.) A technology is never completely pliable to your will, as you are always engaged in a network of relations within which you are maintaining some connections or changing others.
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''Consciousness is the dynamic and creative reflection of the objective world in human brains; it is the subjective image of the objective world.'' [See discussion of dynamic and creative reflection on p. 68]
  
Third, with respect to actors in relations of agency among technologies and humans, one is not the cause and the other effect. It is the network that requires understanding; it is the network that is effective. If we continue to ask the question of which affects the other more, we end up in a sort of philosophical tennis match (they influence us, but we influence them) that doesn’t get us very far. We suggest a more useful approach: to set to the side traditional questions about the division between technology and human and concentrate on analyzing the cultural field within which we live – a field of forces, relations, processes, and affects. When we quibble about the origins of effects, we often ignore the real ways that life changes: how practices change, how values and beliefs shift, how power and responsibility are distributed, and how some possibilities are empowered and others disempowered. Those are issues that matter.
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''The dynamic and creative nature'' of reflection is expressed in human psycho-physiological activities when we receive, select, process, and save data in our brains. Within the human brain, we are able to collect data from the external material world. Based on this information, our brain is capable of creating new information, and we are able to analyze, interpret, and understand all of this information collectively within our consciousness.
  
Fourth, attention to agency in the sense of the ability to make things happen and linking that to a concept of the network absolutely demands that we address the mechanisms and work of power in networks. Although this is not foregrounded in most discussions of agency and in actor-network analyses, these are the issues we suggest need to be addressed more centrally. To do that we turn to the way these concerns are developed in cultural studies, particularly using the concepts of articulation and assemblage, which we turn to in the next chapter.
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The dynamic and creative nature of reflection is also expressed in several human processes:
  
Figure 18: Dew on Spider Web
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* The creation of ideas, hypotheses, stories, etc.
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* The ability to summarize nature and to comprehend the objective laws of nature.
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* The ability to construct models of ideas and systems of knowledge to guide our activities.
  
Source: Photograph by Luc Viatour, 2007, Wikimedia Commons. commons.wikimedia. org/wiki/File:Dew_on_spider_web_Luc_Viatour.jpg
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''Consciousness is the subjective image of the objective world.'' Consciousness is defined by the objective world in both Content and Form [see Annotation 150, p. 147]. However, consciousness does not perfectly reflect the objective world. It modifies information through the subjective lenses (thoughts, feelings, aspirations, experiences, knowledge, needs, etc.) of humans. According to Marx and Engels, ideas are simply “sublimates [transformations] of [the human brain’s]... material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises.”<ref>''The German Ideology'', Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 1846.</ref>
  
Chapter Twelve
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Articulation and
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==== Annotation 77 ====
  
Assemblage
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In ''The German Ideology'', Marx and Engels refer to ideas somewhat poetically as “the phantoms formed in the human brain,” and explains that ideas arise directly from material human life processes [see Annotation 72, p. 68]. Lenin makes it very clear in ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'' that consciousness is not a ''mirror image'', or ''exact'' reproduction of reality, quoting Engels:
  
ON MAY 1, 2010, A CAR BOMB WAS DISCOVERED in Times Square, New York City. Police scrutinized surveillance footage of the area and circulated an image of an unidentified man near the vehicle. As the investigation continued, another man, Faisal Shahzad, was arrested and charged with the crime (the unidentified man in the surveillance photo was not related to the crime). Of the many questions raised by the incident, one prominent one was how many surveillance cameras are there in Times Square?1 The answer: a lot. It was estimated that at that time there were 82 surveillance cameras owned by the city of New York in the Times Square area, not to mention all of the private cameras on banks, nightclubs, shops, and more. In 2005, the New York Civil Liberties Union counted over 4,000 cameras below 14th street, which was before a major multi-million dollar expansion of surveillance cameras in the city. Chicago, apparently, has more cameras than New York; and London, UK, has more than Chicago. In fact, the UK has a surveillance camera for every 14 people. China has even more. The city of Shenzhen alone was expected to install over 2 million cameras by 2011 (and nationally over 10 million cameras were planned as part of China’s “Golden Shield” project).2
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<blockquote>
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The great basic question of all philosophy,” Engels says, “especially of modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being,” of “spirit and nature.” Having divided the philosophers into “two great camps” on this basic question, Engels shows that there is “yet another side” to this basic philosophical question, viz., “in what relation do our thoughts about the world surrounding us stand to this world itself? Is our thinking capable of the cognition of the real world? Are we able in our ideas and notions of the real world to produce a correct reflection of reality?” “The overwhelming majority of philosophers give an affirmative answer to this question,” says Engels, “including under this head not only all materialists but also the most consistent idealists.
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</blockquote>
  
The proliferation of surveillance cameras is hardly surprising. After the terrorist attacks of 2001 and the subsequent economic downturn in the United States, surveillance technology was one of the few growth industries. Not only were CCTV systems expanded, but there were increases in the surveillance of all sorts of data, like traveler information. The US Government proposed programs to sift through electronic communications and economic transactions (sales, video rentals, and so on) looking for patterns that would indicate terrorist activity. Some accepted this burgeoning surveillance system as the price we pay for security; but others pointed with concern to similarities between the new forms of surveillance and Orwell’s novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four and the figure of Big Brother.
 
  
150 O
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CULTURAL STUDIES
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Of extra importance is Lenin’s footnote to the above passage, regarding what he purports to be Viktor Chernov’s mistranslation of Engels:
  
While the United States seemed to have backed off its post-9/11 campaign for Total Information Awareness, at least publicly, documents made public in June 2013, by Edward Snowden, an IT specialist for one of the National Security Agency’s (NSA) contractors, revealed massive government surveillance of US citizens. For example, the PRISM program allows the NSA access to information on the servers of Google, Apple, and other companies; another program gave the agency access to the phone records of millions of Americans; and it was reported that the NSA had actively undermined encryption programs used privately and commercially to insure that the NSA could decrypt it. Most recently it was revealed that the NSA and the British surveillance agency GCHQ collected images from the webcam chats of millions of unsuspecting Yahoo account holders.3
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<blockquote>
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Fr. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, etc., 4<sup>th</sup> Germ. ed., S. 15. Russian translation, Geneva ed., 1905, p. 12–13. Mr. V. Chernov translates the word Spiegelbild literally (a mirror reflection) accusing Plekhanov of presenting the theory of Engels “in a very weakened form” by speaking in Russian simply of a “reflection” instead of a “mirror reflection”. This is mere cavilling. Spiegelbild [mirror reflection] in German is also used simply in the sense of Abbild [reflection, image].
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</blockquote>
  
These surveillance systems are only one part of how surveillance occurs in our daily lives. Companies track our buying habits in order to sell to us better. They install “cookies” on our computers if we visit their websites, or track our purchases via frequent buyer cards. Mobile phones constantly transmit location data, and indeed there was some controversy when it was discovered that software on Apple iPhones was keeping records of an owner’s movements. More troubling were the revelations by Snowden that this record of our daily commercial and personal habits (from movements to web searches) held by the companies that provide these services (such as Facebook, Google, and others) were being handed over to the government through PRISM and other programs. In the months since these documents were made public, the IT companies have fallen all over themselves distancing themselves from such practices, but the fact remains that they gather and store such information in the first place.
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Here, Lenin reaffirms and clarifies Engels’ idea that consciousness is not a perfect, exact duplicate of reality; not a “mirror image.” This, however, does not contradict the fact that we can obtain real knowledge of the real world in our consciousness, and that this knowledge improves over time through practice and observation. Indeed, Lenin’s passage on practice cited first in this annotation directly follows the above passage in ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism''.
  
These examples, of both government and corporate surveillance, paint one picture of the situation: Large organizations and institutions use surveillance as a means to monitor and control the population, be it for security concerns or economic gain. As massive as the surveillance system in New York City is, it pales in comparison to the number of people with mobile phone cameras that pass through Times Square daily. It is estimated that on average 350,000 pedestrians pass through the square each day (up to 460,000 when it’s really busy), not to mention the estimated 236,000 who pass through its five subway stations and 115,000 who pass through in vehicles.4 How many of them have mobile phone cameras that could capture events that happen there? Given that in the United States we have more mobile phones than people, it would be safe to say that the majority of them would have a mobile phone camera.
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See: Natural Source of Consciousness, p. 64, and Annotation 32, 27.
  
On April 15, 2013, two bombs went off near the finish line of the Boston Marathon, killing three and injuring hundreds. In the investigation that followed, despite having access to the surveillance cameras of Boylston Avenue and Copley Square, the FBI solicited the public to submit their own videos and still pictures of the event. Photos and videos quickly flooded in to the investigators and were also posted online on social media sites such as Reddit and 4Chan where users began their own analyses.
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Articulation and Assemblage
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''Consciousness is a social phenomenon and has a social nature.'' Consciousness arose from real life activities. Consciousness is always ruled by natural law and by social law.
  
O 151
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When not made adjunct to criminal or terrorist investigation, the sheer numbers of mobile cameras would be an example not of an institution surveilling citizens, but of citizens surveilling each other (and institutions). When we surveil each other, it is called peer-to-peer (P2P) surveillance, which includes Googling each other for fun or tracking each other on social network sites like Facebook. When we surveil institutions (looking up at them, as it were), this has been termed sousveillance, surveillance from below.5 All these practices are surveillance, too, even though they differ from the CCTV cameras in Times Square.
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==== Annotation 78 ====
  
We raise the issue of surveillance technologies to begin this chapter because it illustrates the need for understanding technology in terms of the concepts of articulation and assemblage. If you were to approach surveillance from the received view of culture and technology, you would be left with a wholly inadequate picture of what is going on and extremely poor tools for influencing or changing the role of those technologies. Often, surveillance is treated as a purely technological question: The problem is the technology and its effects. Typical questions include: What is the impact of using surveillance technologies? Should there be cameras or not? Does face-recognition software work? This mechanistic, often technological deterministic, view cannot account for the reasons for the development of surveillance technologies to begin with, for their interpenetration in everyday life, or for the way they participate in the changing character of everyday life. When the origins of surveillance technologies are considered, they are typically done so in a cultural determinist, often expressive way: identifying the single cultural reason for their development. Some cite national security, especially in the wake of September 11. Some cite increased crime. Some point to the increasing isolation of individuals in contemporary culture, a situation that leads to suspicion. Others point to a growing culture of fear, especially fear of those who are different, sometimes referred to as “the other.” Some draw attention to the new forms of commerce that require more sophisticated marketing techniques. Some point to the development of the technologies as the effect of the corporate drive for profit. It is as though, at best, the causal tools that feel familiar lead us to find an explanation, including praise or blame, in either the autonomous technology or an autonomous cultural cause.
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''Natural law'' includes the laws of physics, chemistry, and other natural phenomena which govern the material world. Consciousness itself can never violate natural law as it arises from the natural processes of the natural world.
  
We assert that the technology alone cannot explain the myriad ways in which surveillance matters in everyday life. Nor is there is any single reason that explains the rise in the number of cameras or surveillance technologies or the relationships among them (especially once we add in P2P surveillance). Rather, there are multiple dimensions that need to be understood in order to get an adequate grasp of the place of surveillance technologies in contemporary culture. Articulation and assemblage provide tools to understand these dimensions and open up useful strategies for action in relation to surveillance technologies, indeed in relation to any technologies, with far more sophistication and hope of being able to make a difference. Articulation draws attention to the contingent relations among practices, representations, and experiences that make up the world. Assemblage draws attention to the structuring and
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''Social law'' includes the objective and universal relationships between social phenomena and social processes. Human society was created through labor, and this labor was performed in very specific material relations between humans and the natural world.
  
152 O
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''Note: social law is a key concept of historical materialism, which is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.''
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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In ''A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy'', Marx explains how social existence and social laws govern the consciousness of individuals:
  
affective nature and work of these articulations. Together they foreground the work of power on forging maintaining and altering the connections that constitute culture.
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<blockquote>
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In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.
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</blockquote>
  
This approach is nonmechanistic and thus operates with the three nonmech-anistic assumptions discussed in Chapter 10. The assumptions are: (1) that technologies are not autonomous, that they are integrally connected to the context within which they are developed and used; (2) that culture is made up of such connections; and (3) that technologies arise within these connections as part of them and as effective within them. However, this approach differs from expressive causality in significant ways. Primarily, while it does hold that culture is made up of connections, it does not insist that all these connections are reducible to an essence or attributable to a critical factor. Rather, culture is understood to consist of corresponding, noncorresponding, and even contradictory practices, representations, experiences, and affects. Note this last term: affects. We do not refer to effects, as in the outcome of a causal process, but to affects as a state: as disposition, tendency, emotion, and intensity.
 
  
Technology as Articulation
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Perhaps the crucial thing to understand about articulation is the assertion that culture is made up of articulations (or connections) that are contingent. Contingency implies that these articulations or connections are not necessary, and it is possible that they could connect otherwise. In explaining how articulation works, Stuart Hall once used the image of a truck.6 Imagine a semi with a cab and a trailer. The cab is articulated (connected) to the trailer. Together they constitute a connection, a relation, an articulation, and a unity: a truck. But this connection is not necessary. It is possible to disarticulate the cab and the trailer and rearticulate it by attaching a different cab or a different trailer. The newly configured truck is a new identity and a new unity, even though it too might still go by the name “truck.” All identities or unities are like this: they are made up of articulations, but these articulations are neither necessary nor permanent. Identities are thus contingent; in other words, they are dependent on the articulation of particular elements that could change, thereby changing the composition of the identity. Articulation can be understood as the contingent connection of different elements that, when connected in a particular way, form a specific unity.
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Consciousness is determined by the social communication needs of human beings as well as the material conditions of reality.
  
But what are these “elements” that get connected? The answer to this requires rethinking the term “element,” which is misleading in that it suggests only “things,” like cabs and trailers, or computers and video cameras. However, elements, understood as articulations, can be made of words, concepts, institutions, practices, and affects, as well as material things. Indeed, one can articulate an idea to an object to an affect, like connecting “progress” to automobiles to the affect “cool.”
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Every so-called element is itself an articulated identity, and therefore always part of a connection of still other “elements.” As Larry Grossberg has explained:
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==== Annotation 79 ====
  
Articulation and Assemblage
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The term ''material conditions'' refers to the external environment which humans inhabit. Material conditions include the natural environment, the means of production and the economic base<ref>See Annotation 3, p. 2 and Annotation 29, p. 24.</ref> of human society, and other objective externalities and systems which affect human life and society. Note that material conditions don’t refer to physical matter alone, but also include objective social relations and phenomena. In ''A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy'', Marx argues that “neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, but that on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life.”
  
O 153
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Consciousness is dynamic in nature, constantly learning and changing flexibly. Consciousness guides humans to transform the material world to suit our needs.
  
Articulation is the production of identity on top of difference, of unities out of fragments, of structures across practices. Articulation links this practice to that effect, this text to that meaning, this meaning to that reality, this experience to those politics. And these links are themselves articulated into larger structures, etc. Articulation is the construction of one set of relations out of another.7
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A car, for example, is a unit, but it articulates many elements: parts, processes, a manufacturing industry, roads, advertising, an ideology of individualism, the pleasure of speed, and so on. The idea of progress seems to be a simple concept, but it too is made up of many other ideas, practices, and affects: a belief in evolution, a manufacturing industry, a capitalist economic structure, the valuation of industrial technologies, the pleasure we take in gadgets, and so on. So rather than draw attention to the articulation of things, a cultural studies approach draws attention to the movement and the flows of relationships. Because language and popular philosophy have “taught” us to talk about and understand the world in terms of things, we tend to think and talk about things. But the challenge is to remember that even things are merely labels for momentarily frozen elements (misleadingly) isolated from the web of contingent relationships within which they are animated. Culture is better understood as the movement and flow of relationships within which things are created and animated, rather than as the accumulation of things.
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==== Annotation 80 ====
  
We propose that you think about technologies in terms of articulations among the physical arrangements of matter, typically labeled technologies, and a range of contingently related practices, representations, experiences, and affects. Thus, surveillance technologies in the United States post-9/11 would be understood as being the particular contingent relationships among (at least) the following: the physical arrangements of matter (such as the thing we might call the video camera); the fear of terrorism; the propensity to think of space as something that needs to be controlled; a desire to care for and protect citizens; the belief that cultural profiling can predict and prevent terrorism and crime; the acceptance of a level of racism, classism, and sexism; a popular culture that idolizes new technology as “cool;” the titillation typically felt when snooping in a culture in which much is kept private; a strong commitment to the technological fix; a belief in the equation of new technologies with progress; the existence of a physical infrastructure and knowledge necessary to produce increasingly complex technology; a global intelligence community; a governmental leadership that emphasizes a particular political agenda; a legal practice that operates within a framework of rights and laws that define privacy within particular parameters, and so on.
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Consciousness and material conditions have a dialectical relationship with one other, just as the base of society and the superstructure have a dialectical relationship with one other [see Annotation 29, p. 24]. Consciousness arises from material conditions, though conscious activity can affect material conditions.
  
It is possible to map these elements to one another to illustrate the nature of their connections. For example, the fear of terrorism leads the government to support the implementation of surveillance programs; those programs turn to the producers of technology to purchase video surveillance cameras; the producers turn to banks for loans to fund production; the banks fund these efforts because they believe in progress, are concerned about terrorism, and benefit financially from making such loans; students also take out loans to attend school to become engineers and make a lot of money in the burgeoning surveillance industry, and so on.
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As Marx explains in ''Capital Volume I'':
  
154 O
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<blockquote>
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At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realises a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordination is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process demands that, during the whole operation, the workman’s will be steadily in consonance with his purpose.
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</blockquote>
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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In ''A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy'', Marx explains how the development of material conditions eventually leads to conscious activity which will in turn lead to changes in society:
  
These articulations are not fixed for all time; they do not remain permanently in place but can and do change over time. But how and why do they change, and why and how do some change more easily and quickly than others? It is at this point that it becomes clear what articulation adds to the discussion of agency in the previous chapter.
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<blockquote>
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At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or — this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms — with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.
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</blockquote>
  
Articulation is not just a noun: a description of a connection already forged. It is also a verb: it is the work of articulating, of making connections, of constructing unities; and disarticulating is the work of breaking connections, of deconstructing unities. It is possible to map articulations as though they were little more than a captured moment: a web, a network of actors. But cultural studies insists on emphasizing the work of articulation, the real cultural work of articulating this to that, of “producing” connections or breaking them, of producing unities or dismantling them. That work, as Grossberg explains, entails “real historical individuals and groups, sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously or unintentionally, sometimes by their activity, sometimes by their inactivity, sometimes victoriously, sometimes with disastrous consequences, and sometimes with no visible result.”8 And while that work may connect to real historical events or actors, whether natural (a tsunami) or human-made (the 2001 destruction of the Twin Towers in New York), the work of naming them, categorizing them, and mapping them in a web of relations necessarily involves real historical individuals and groups.
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As Marx further explains, material conditions must first be met before such revolutionary social changes can be made through conscious activity:
  
The choice of the word “work” is purposeful; in fact the term “struggle” is often used to describe this work. Articulating connections (or disarticulating them) is not always easy, and there are almost always competing interests engaged in a struggle (whether consciously or not) to articulate alternatively. For example, consider the articulation in the United States between gun ownership and freedom. For many this is a firmly entrenched unity: freedom is gun ownership. The articulation is held in place by the work of many other articulations: for example, the work of gun manufacturers who want to keep gun ownership both desirable and easy in the service of profit; the work of patriot groups that identify with the militias that won freedom for the colonies from the tyranny of England; the work of individuals and groups who believe that governments shouldn’t regulate anything. Yet the National Rifle Association (NRA) has had to actively promote that articulation through lobbying efforts, promotional materials, and a variety of programs in ongoing efforts to articulate that “reality” as a natural “unity.” There are no guarantees that the articulation will be fixed for all time, and the NRA has taken up the task of keeping it in place. Indeed, it is challenged by the efforts of other individuals and groups to disarticulate the unity and assert otherwise: freedom is to be free from the threat of gun violence, and hence, easy gun ownership makes us less free. So if we point out that recent research has demonstrated that more gun ownership and a significantly increased murder rate resulted after Missouri repealed the requirement to undergo a background check to purchase a handgun, you would be correct to see that our offering that information might contribute to the effort to disarticulate gun ownership and freedom. You might, in fact, be correct to see that our offering that information in the way that we have as an effort to rearticulate unregulated
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<blockquote>
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No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.
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</blockquote>
  
Articulation and Assemblage
 
  
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gun ownership to an increase in violence. This is the strategy (again, whether conscious or not) of many individuals and groups who advocate for regulating gun ownership.9
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''- Structure of Consciousness''
  
Some articulations are powerfully forged, held firmly in place by the work of many articulations. Hall called these “lines of tendential force,” which draws attention to their tendency to remain articulated in spite of (less convincing, less powerful) efforts to disarticulate these connections.10 Others, however, might be less powerfully forged, more vulnerable to being broken, and thus subject to disarticulation and rearticulation. It all depends on the particulars of the nature and work of articulation at any particular historical moment. For example, legal efforts to protect the privacy of citizens, given their articulation to a political commitment to the rights of individuals expressed in the Bill of Rights and to Edward Snowden’s revelations about the extent to which these rights have been wantonly violated, might be successful in reshaping the legal framework of what constitutes unjust invasion of privacy and effectively curtail certain forms of surveillance. However, there are several powerful articulations working against the articulation of surveillance as an invasion of privacy: for example, the fear of terrorism linked to the power of surveillance to counter terrorism; the articulation of Snowden as a common criminal, which discredits and dismisses his “testimony;” and a deeply felt affective connection between technology and the good life.
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Consciousness has a very complicated structure, including many factors which have strong relationships with each other. The most basic factors are ''knowledge, sentiment'' and ''willpower.''
  
Articulation matters. The work of articulation, the forging of unities, the struggle over identities—all this matters. The work of articulation has effects: it empowers possibilities and disempowers others; legitimizes some identities and delegitimizes others; makes some things happen and other things not. For example, the articulation of gun ownership to freedom makes it difficult to regulate gun ownership. The articulation of responsible gun ownership to good citizenship makes it possible to regulate gun ownership. The articulation of gun ownership to irresponsible violence compels us to regulate gun ownership. The articulation of Edward Snowden to criminal makes it difficult for people to hear his warnings. The articulation of Edward Snowden to whistle-blower makes him audible. The articulation of Snowden to hero empowers his warnings with enormous potential to curtail government surveillance.
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To think of technology in relation to articulation (which is tantamount to articulating technology in a particular way) thus has several implications. First, it is no longer possible to think of technology as an isolatable thing in relation to a context out of which it emerges or into which it is put. Instead, technology as a general term and technologies in particular consist of complex articulations and processes of articulation. This is why, once again, we insist that that there is no culture and technology; rather there is technological culture. Second, the work of articulation is ongoing. While there are lines of tendential force that might fool us into believing that identities are fixed, there are always processes of disarticulation and rearticulation at work. What technology is, how a particular technology is constituted, and the role of a particular technology can always change. There are no guarantees; relations are contingent and subject to intervention. Such intervention is dependent on the real efforts of individuals and groups. Third, the articulations
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==== Annotation 81 ====
  
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As with the concept of reflection (see Annotation 68, p. 65), the analysis of the structure of consciousness which follows is rooted in ideas first proposed by Marx, Engels and Lenin, and later developed through the work of various Soviet psychologists, philosophers, and scientists including Ivan Pavlov, Todor Pavlov, Aleksei Leontiev, Lev Vygotsky, Valentin Voloshinov, and others, and is used as a basis for scientific inquiry and development up to this day. According to ''Where is Marx in the Work and Thought of Vygotsky?'' by Lucien Sève (2018), much of this work, such as the groundbreaking work of Lev Vygotsky, has been heavily “de-Marxized,” stripped of all aspects of Marxism and, by extension, dialectical materialism, in translation to English.
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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''Knowledge'' constitutes the understanding of human beings, and is the result of the cognitive process. Knowledge is the re-created image of perceived objects which takes the form of language. Knowledge is the mode of existence of consciousness and the condition for consciousness to develop.
  
that constitute the identity of technology and the work of articulation within which particular technologies operate have effects, often significant effects.
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While we have illustrated ways that multiple articulations constitute technologies and can account for variable effects, it is helpful to consider explicitly the structures that emerge in the work of multiple articulations. These structures, which we refer to as assemblages, allow us to focus on the effectiveness of structures that, while linked to what we traditionally think of as technology, resonate within the larger cultural context. Focusing on assemblages allows us to move out from the articulation of technology and technologies per se and address more profoundly technological culture.
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==== Annotation 82 ====
  
Technology as Assemblage
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Marx and Engels discussed the relationship between language and consciousness extensively in ''The German Ideology'', explaining that language — the form of knowledge which exists in human consciousness — evolved dialectically with and through social activity, and that consciousness also developed along with and through the material processes that gave rise to speech:
  
Technology as articulation draws attention to the practices, representations, experiences, and affects that constitute technology. Technology as assemblage adds to this understanding by drawing attention to the ways that these practices, representations, experiences, and affects articulate to take a particular dynamic form with broader cultural consequences. The concept of assemblage is drawn from the work of philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in their book A Thousand Plateaus.11 Although their understanding of assemblage is more richly philosophical than the version we present here, it is still a powerful concept in this somewhat scaled-down version.
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From the start the ‘spirit’ is afflicted with the curse of being ‘burdened’ with matter, which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of language. Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness that exists also for other men, and for that reason alone it really exists for me personally as well; language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men.”So, language, physical speech organs, and human society all developed in dialectic relations with one another. Since language is the form of knowledge in human consciousness, this means that knowledge arose directly from these dialectical processes:
  
The concept of assemblage might best be understood by thinking about the term “constellation” used by Deleuze and Guattari when they talk about assemblage. A constellation of heavenly bodies like the Big Dipper, for example, takes a particular form: It selects, draws together, stakes out, and envelops a territory. It is made up of imaginative, contingent articulations among myriad heterogeneous elements. The constellation includes some heavenly bodies and not others; these bodies only appear to be in proximity with one another given a particular act of imaginative gathering and the angle of our view across space. And, since both they and we are constantly moving, the relationship and angle change. Further, the particular collection of (moving) bodies is articulated to a particular image: a dipper and not, say, a cap or a bear.
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Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all. Consciousness is at first, of course, merely consciousness concerning the immediate sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with other persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious.
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</blockquote>
  
The constellation of our example could be said to territorialize the articulations of heavenly bodies, angles of relationships, space, atmospheric conditions, trajectories of movement, a way of seeing, and a way of experiencing the world and the universe. It is, in a sense, a contingent invention, both artificial and natural. However, once drawn into this form, the constellation exhibits some tenacity; it doesn’t simply appear and disappear. The constellation that is called the Big Dipper has been called that for a very long time. Further, the constellation matters, in that it has real effects on our lives: It is effective in terms of practices. For example, the practice of astrology relies on the designation of constellations. It is effective in terms of representations. For example, we teach our children to read the sky in terms of constellations. It is effective in terms of affective experience; we feel at home in the hemisphere where constellations are familiar. As Deleuze and
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The fact that knowledge has a language-form in human consciousness is also important to understand because it shows that consciousness arose dialectically as, and through, social activity, and indeed, language and social activity gave rise to consciousness as a replacement for animal instinct in our relations with nature.
  
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Man’s consciousness of the necessity of associating with the individuals around him is the beginning of the consciousness that he is living in society at all. This beginning is as animal as social life itself at this stage. It is mere herd-consciousness, and at this point man is only distinguished from sheep by the fact that with him consciousness takes the place of instinct or that his instinct is a conscious one.
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</blockquote>
  
Guattari put it, assemblages are “constellation[s] of singularities and traits deducted from the flow—selected, organized, stratified—in such a way as to converge … artificially and naturally.”12 For Deleuze and Guattari, an assemblage involves an intermingling of bodies, actions, and passions. In this sense, then, an assemblage is a particular constellation of articulations that selects, draws together, stakes out and envelops a territory that exhibits some tenacity and effectivity.
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And, as language and social activity dialectically developed through one another, human society became complex enough to give rise to human societies and human economies:
  
To this point we have talked in terms of the elements drawn together as practices, representations, experiences, and affects. But it might be helpful to expand a little on this list using terms from Deleuze and Guattari, who suggest that what is drawn together are both forms of content and forms of expression. Content includes what they call the “machinic assemblage of bodies, of actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies reacting to one another.” These bodies can be, of course, both human and nonhuman, heavenly and mundane. Expression includes what they call the “collective assemblage of enunciation, of acts and statements, of incorporeal statements attributed to bodies.”13 Thus, whether the cultural theorist looks for connections among practices, representations, experiences, and affects, or between forms of content and forms of expression, both acknowledge the work of the material and the imagined, the lived and the represented.
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<blockquote>
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This sheep-like or tribal consciousness receives its further development and extension through increased productivity, the increase of needs, and, what is fundamental to both of these, the increase of population. With these there develops the division of labour…
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</blockquote>
  
A technological assemblage will obviously select, draw together, stake out, and envelop a territory that includes the bodies of machines and structures. But it also includes a range of other kinds of bodies: human bodies, governmental bodies, economic bodies, geographical bodies, bodies of knowledge, and so on. It also includes the kinds of articulations listed in the previous section: actions, passions, practices, commitments, feelings, beliefs, affects, and so on, such as those that we argued give shape to the identity of surveillance technology.
 
  
In making the leap to technological assemblage, it is important to remember that a technological assemblage is not a simple accumulation of a bunch of articulations on top of one another, but a particular concrete constellation of articulations that assemble a territory that exhibits tenacity and effectivity. Thus, we may be able to characterize a surveillance assemblage post–9/11. To characterize that assemblage, we would have to do more than list its elements. We would be charged to “map” the territory with attention to the power of particular articulations to produce this constellation, to assemble specific bodies, actions, passions, and representations in particular ways, to give a world shape, so to speak, in a concrete and imaginative way, with concrete effects.
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Let us demonstrate with a different example. Over the last few years, selfservice checkout lanes have been introduced in supermarkets across the country. Rather than standing in line for a checker to scan and weigh items, bag them, and take payment, the customer can now stand in line to scan and weigh their own items, bag them, and pay the machine. This is said to be more convenient. Perhaps it’s even said to be progress. Be that as it may, the received view would look at the situation as the machines merely appearing in the supermarkets and then having effects: unemployment for store workers, increased employment for equipmentrepair folks, varied states of satisfaction and dissatisfaction of customers, increased or decreased profits for store owners and equipment manufacturers, and so on.
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Knowledge can be separated into two broad categories: knowledge of nature, and knowledge of human society. Each of these categories of knowledge reflects its corresponding entity in the external world.
  
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==== Annotation 83 ====
  
But to think about the self-service checkout assemblage, we have to begin mapping the articulations. At the most obvious these machines may be invented and developed with an eye toward making a profit for the manufacturers, purchased and implemented by organizations also hoping to make profits by eliminating labor and better controlling inventory and customers—all within a powerfully influential capitalist economic system. Beyond mapping the invention, design, and distribution of the machines, a still larger constellation of bodies is involved, only some of which are machines. For example, we need to consider the form and practices of the self-service machines and how they relate to, or resonate with, pay-at-the-pump gasoline, ATMs, vending machines, self-service machines in libraries, self-service machines at airports, and in other locations.
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-16.png|''Each category of knowledge reflects a corresponding entity in the external world.'']]
  
Beyond the physical machines, there are other bodies and articulations in this constellation. Beyond the more obvious role of drive for profits and the delegation of labor to machines in the name of progress, we should consider the idea of self-service itself and its articulations to ideas such as convenience and to do-it-yourself practices such as pumping your own gas, pouring your own drinks, and bussing your own table in a fast-food restaurant. Why do we do these things rather than have someone do them for us? We would also need to consider the articulation to the process of training customers and employees. People must be taught how to use the machines, but also to use the machines in the first place. Both these practices—to use and how to use—require training in new habits and practices. Customers have to be taught a whole new attitude toward purchasing and a whole new model of how to purchase. This attitude and the new practices articulate to an increasing “gamification” of culture, the use of game-like practices and affects in the service of non-game contexts. The expectations of the consumer and their relationship with store personnel must be dramatically altered. The assumption that a customer is “waited on” must be disarticulated, and the customer must be convinced that this is a convenience, a good thing, a pleasurable activity, and so on.14
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It’s also important to note that human society and nature have a dialectical relationship with each other and mutually impact one another, and, by extension, knowledge of nature and knowledge of human society also dialectically influence one another. So these categories of knowledge are not isolated from one another but rather dynamically shape and influence each other continuously through time.
  
So when we consider the self-service checkout-machine assemblage, we have to consider the effectivity of a whole array of machines, practices, habits, attitudes, ideas, and so on, which reach far beyond the effects of physical machines on cultural practices.
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Assemblages do not remain static, however, and a map of existing relationships will fail to capture the tensions and movements that undermine any assemblage’s stability. Assemblages are characterized by a constant process of transformation: what Deleuze and Guattari call processes of deterritorialization and reterritorial-ization. Deterritorialization describes the process by which an assemblage changes when certain articulations are disarticulated, disconnected, unhinged so to speak. Reterritorialization describes the process by which new articulations are forged, thus constituting a new assemblage or territory. Sometimes rearticulations can contribute to reterritorializing an assemblage in significant ways; sometimes the differences are effectively inconsequential. For example, it is clear that the surveillance assemblage post–9/11 is not the same as the surveillance assemblage pre–9/11. While many of its elements, taken in isolation, look the same, the overall
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Based on levels of cognitive development, we can also classify knowledge into categories of: daily life knowledge and scientific knowledge, experience knowledge and theory knowledge, emotional knowledge and rational knowledge.
  
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==== Annotation 84 ====
  
assemblage has changed. A video camera post–9/11 may look just like a video camera pre–9/11, but it is not the same from the perspective of the technological assemblage. In contrast, some of the technical features of video cameras post– and pre–9/11 may look dramatically different; but these differences may be relatively insignificant from the perspective of assemblage. When people get excited about the appearance of a new technology and begin to prophecy its effects, they may be missing the possibility that in terms of the effectivity of the assemblage overall, nothing really significant at all may be changing.
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The following information is from the ''Marxism-Leninism Textbook of Students Who Specialize in Marxism-Leninism'', released by Vietnam’s Ministry of Education and Training:
  
The argument we are making clearly connects with the insights about agency we raised in the previous chapter. As we argued there, it is not technologies or people that have and exercise agency. Rather agency—the ability to bend space, to make something happen—is possible or not possible depending on the particular assemblage. That assemblage may or may not assemble the world in such a way that agency is attributed to one thing or another. It just so happens that the assemblage within which we find ourselves—the technological culture of North Americans in the twenty-first century—assembles technological practices, technological representations, and experiences in such a way that we tend to think and feel that technology is a causal agent: the bearer of progress, the deliverer of convenience, the guarantor of the good life, and so on.
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'''Daily Life and Scientific Knowledge'''
  
There is still a danger here, however, a danger of misinterpretation, a danger to see assemblage as simply a collection of objects or as simply a newer way to talk about articulation. We see this danger in some of the ways assemblage has become a popular, critical, but vague, term in recent work. In a critique of this popularization, critical scholar N. Katherine Hayles wants to “recall that in Deleuze and Guattari, ‘assemblage’ is meant to subvert the notion of preexisting, intact human subjectivity.”15 That is, the agency active in any assemblage isn’t necessarily human agency, and that human subjectivity itself is an assemblage. It is this nonhuman aspect of assemblage we need to speak briefly about, because it also provides a further distinction between articulation and assemblage.
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-17.png]]
  
Articulation—as it has been theorized and mobilized in cultural studies work—relies too much on human agency. The articulation of words to practices to meanings to artifacts and so on presumes that the work of articulation is human driven. With assemblage this is not necessarily the case. While Deleuze does talk about an alcoholic and their preferred drink as an assemblage, Deleuze and Guattari’s work also references ticks and their environments, orchids and wasps, chemistry, biology, and geology. Let’s take crowd behavior as an example. When a critical mass of people is reached, the crowd itself seems to act as a single entity, like a swarm. The point here is that though the crowd is composed of humans, the crowd as assemblage is the emergence of a nonhuman entity that follows a nonhuman logic.16 To think of something as an assemblage is to see it as an emergence, but we must be cautious not to immediately attribute a human, political, ideological, cultural, or social logic to that emergence.
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''Daily Life Knowledge'' is the knowledge we acquire in our daily lives to deal with our daily tasks. From our interactions with nature and human society, we cultivate life experience and our understanding of every aspect of our daily lives in relation to human society and nature.
  
In terms of the ideas of assemblage and emergence, Philosopher Andy Clark has a useful image. He considers the mangrove swamps of the tropics, with tall mangrove trees rising up from little islands in murky water. He uses this
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''Scientific Knowledge'' arises from Daily Life Knowledge: as our daily lives become more complex, we develop a need to understand the material world and human society more deeply and comprehensively. Scientific Knowledge is thus a developed system of knowledge of nature and human society. Scientific Knowledge can be tested and can be applied to human life and activity in useful ways.
  
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'''Experience and Theory Knowledge:'''
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-18.png]]
  
image to test our assumptions—in this case, that trees grow on land, when in fact the islands and the trees emerge together as an assemblage. The process begins as floating seeds send down roots in shallow water and send up shoots that look like stilts. Eventually, dirt and debris begin to accumulate (or accrete) around the roots and the island begins to form. We have here a mangrove-water-island assemblage that emerges in the combination of its elements. Clark extends this example to question how we understand thinking—that words emerge from thought, where perhaps “[o]ur words and inscriptions are the floating roots that actively capture the cognitive debris from which we build new thoughts or ideas…[W]e may find whole edifices of thought and reason accreting only courtesy of the stable structures provided by words and texts.”17 Thinking with the concept of assemblage, we can begin to think of our everyday technological assemblages as accretions and emergences.
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''Experience Knowledge'' is cultivated from direct observation of nature and human society. This kind of knowledge is extremely diverse, and we can apply this kind of knowledge to guide our daily activities.
  
There is a trend in contemporary theory and philosophy that takes the focus on the nonhuman a bit too far (in our minds). This is what gets called Object-Oriented Philosophy (OOP) or OOO (Object-Oriented Ontology), philosophy from the perspective of objects.18 While admirable in reorienting, reconceptualizing, disorienting, and decentering our human assumptions, OOP, in its own focus on the thingness of things, omits the relationality of the full range of elements crucial in our approach (relations among nonhumans, among humans, and among humans and nonhumans). Though we wish to retain a healthy respect for the nonhuman, our investigations remain committed to addressing human affairs, if for no other reason than that our topic of study is technological culture, which always involves somewhere in the assemblage an element of the human.
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''Theory Knowledge'' arises from Experience Knowledge. Theory Knowledge is composed of abstract generalizations of Experience Knowledge. Theory Knowledge is more profound, accurate, and systematically organized than Experience Knowledge and gives us an understanding of the laws and dynamics of nature and human society.
  
Rearticulating Technological Culture
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'''Emotional and Rational Knowledge:'''
  
So what is there to do if you want to change the culture? What practical strategies follow from understanding technology as articulation and assemblage? The first lesson is to be certain that your analysis has been of the technological assemblage, and not of the technology as thing. If you don’t like what you see, don’t blame technology or the culture; understand the assemblage that maps technological culture. It is important for our argument to utilize both articulation and assemblage in our analysis and not simply proceed with one or the other. As David Featherstone has argued, thinking of both articulation and assemblage in tension brings to articulation the idea of “multiple trajectories” and brings to assemblage a way to more specifically “think through solidarities and alliances,” contributing “a directly political edge that usages of assemblage generally lack.”19
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-19.png]]
  
Then if you want to imagine or contribute to change, look more closely at the particular articulations that account for the particular constellation of the assemblage. Where are there powerful lines of tendential force, those articulations that you may not be able to disarticulate? There you may not be able to accomplish much. As Hall has written, “if you are going to try to break, contest or interrupt some of these tendential historical connections, you have to know when you are moving against the grain of historical formations.”20 But also consider where there
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Less Developed More Developed
  
Articulation and Assemblage
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''Emotional Knowledge'' is the earlier stage of cognitive processing. Emotional Knowledge comes directly to us from our human senses. We obtain emotional knowledge when we use our human senses to directly learn things about nature and human society. Emotional Knowledge is usually manifested as immediate cognitive responses such as pleasure, pain, and other such impulses.
  
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''Rational Knowledge'' arises from Emotional Knowledge. It is a higher stage of cognitive processing, involving abstract thought and generalization of emotional knowledge.
  
might be lines, connections, relationships, and articulations that could be altered, where the lines of force are less powerful, more vulnerable. Where might the topic of a college class matter? Where might a legal case make a difference? Where might saying “no” to a particular technology be significant? To answer questions such as these requires careful analysis of an assemblage and how in that assemblage the particular bodies we call technology fit. Thus, to build on the example of surveillance we developed earlier, it would probably be far more successful to work toward curtailing the growing pervasiveness of the surveillance assemblage by appealing to a commitment to the right to privacy guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, rather than trying to convince people that their blind love affair with new technology is serving to erode their privacy. The commitment to the Bill of Rights hits home affectively in the mainstream heart of the United States, even if real understanding of those rights is limited. And that affective response can articulate to the work of law, building on legal precedent to craft ways to protect privacy. Such a strategy is likely to be far more effective than trying to convince people to give up their unquestioning acceptance of technology as an inherent good.
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Rational Knowledge is usually manifested as definitions, conjectures, judgments, etc.
  
We see this very real situation in the effects of Edward Snowden’s leak of classified documents, when, in exposing the breadth and depth of NSA surveillance, he hopes to “open a dialog” on the appropriateness of the government’s surveillance practices. We see different articulations struggling to prevail: Secret surveillance is necessary to protect our safety vs. secret surveillance is an illegal violation of our privacy. Each version of this story seeks to capture popular opinion by articulating its position in relation to a range of other elements: asserting links to what is legal or illegal, asserting links to historical practices, asserting links to a trust or mistrust of government, asserting links to trust or mistrust of a technology, and asserting links to beliefs in the inevitability of technology. We submit that given the powerfully situated actors, beliefs, and practices that currently constitute the surveillance assemblage, current surveillance practices will not likely be significantly curtailed in North America, not until one addresses the decline of community and the isolation of individuals that lead to lack of trust, suspicion, and fear of others. That is a monumental task, but one worth addressing in our opinion.
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''See also: Principle of Development, p. 119; Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism, p. 204.''
  
Given the complexity of any technological assemblage, one can never be certain about what processes of rearticulation might make a significant difference. Sometimes the world throws curves, and the work of complex articulations that we haven’t noticed before comes screaming on the scene to remap the territory in significant ways. There were those few who predicted a terrorist attack on the magnitude of 9/11, but most people thought that possibility was out of the question. Once that attack happened, however, the surveillance assemblage took a turn few of us would have predicted. Similarly, processes of rearticulation can work for good ends: hence the commitment on the part of Jennifer and Greg to write this book. This book is testament to the belief that rearticulating people’s understandings of the relationship between culture and technology away from the idea that they are autonomous entities and toward the idea of technological culture or the technological assemblage can make a difference, even if that difference is down the road a ways. Sometimes the rearticulation of small matters will connect with larger ones,
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''Sentiment'' is the resonant manifestation of human emotions and feelings in our relationships. Sentiment is a special form of reality reflection [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. Whenever reality impacts human beings, we feel specific sensations and emotional reactions to those impacts. Over time, these specific sensations and emotions combine and dialectically develop into generalized human feelings, and we call these generalized feelings ''sentiment.'' Sentiment expresses and develops in every aspect of human life; it is a factor that improves and promotes cognitive and practical activities.
  
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and the world changes. As Deleuze once put it, “Our ability to resist control, or our submission to it, has to be assessed at the level of our every move.”21
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==== Annotation 85 ====
  
Conclusion: Why Articulation and Assemblage?
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As Marx explains in ''Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844:'' “Man as an objective, sensuous being is therefore a suffering being — and because he feels that he suffers, a passionate being. Passion is the essential power of man energetically bent on its object.” Marx further elaborates that sentimental emotion is essential to human nature: “The domination of the objective essence within me, the sensuous eruption of my essential activity, is emotion which thereby becomes the activity of my nature.”
  
Technology as articulation and assemblage offers a whole new way of posing the “problem” of culture and technology. No longer is it possible to think in terms of either technological determinism or cultural determinism, or for that matter, some hybrid of the two positions. By understanding assemblage, flow, relations, connections, and articulations as what matter and what are effective, the “things” themselves, the physical arrangements of matter, drift into helpful perspective. They are not unimportant; they are just no longer all-important. They do not act alone or independently. Assemblages—those imaginary yet concrete constella-tions—matter. To understand their structure, their work, their power, their reach, and their effects, is the task of the cultural theorist. To contribute to changing them in constructive directions is the goal of the cultural theorist.
+
Depending on the subjects that are perceived, as well as our human emotions about them, sentiments can be manifested in many different forms such as: moral emotion, aesthetic emotion, religious emotion, etc.
  
Therefore, we need to talk about politics and economics, and that’s the next chapter.
+
-----
  
Figure 19: Workers at Work, Most Are Sitting Behind Sewing Machines
+
==== Annotation 86 ====
  
Source: Photograph by Martha Cooper, 1994, Library of Congress. Working in Paterson
+
''Moral Emotion'' is the basic manifestation of moral consciousness at an emotional level. For example: when we see people helping other people, we have positive emotional responses, yet when we see people harming other people, we have negative emotional responses. ''(Source: Nguyen Thi Khuyen of the National Institute of Administration of Vietnam)''
  
Project Collection (AFC 1995/028) Loc.gov/item/afcwip002941/
+
''Aesthetic Emotion'' refers to the the resonant feelings which arise from our interaction with beauty, sadness, comedy, etc., in life and in art. For example: when humans encounter beauty, we feel positive emotional responses. When humans encounter ugliness, we feel negative emotional responses. When we witness pain, we feel sympathetic feelings of pain and a desire to help. When we witness comedy, we feel humorous emotions ourselves. ''(Source: Textbook of General Aesthetic Studies from the Ministry of''
  
Chapter Thirteen
+
''Education and Training of Vietnam)''
  
Politics and Economics
+
''Religious Emotion'' is the human belief in supernatural or spiritual forces which can’t be tested or proved through material practice or observation. However, belief in these forces can give human beings emotional responses such as hope, love, etc. ''(Source: Pham Van Chuc, Doctor of Philosophy, Central Theoretical Council of the Communist Party of Vietnam)''
  
ON THE FACE OF IT, THE ASSERTION THAT “technology is political and economic” seems neither controversial nor difficult to grasp. Prisons can be used to confine political prisoners; telephones can be used to raise political contributions; bombs can be dropped to win political advantage. Hence technologies are political in that they can be used for political ends. Computers can be sold to make a profit; self-service checkouts can be used to lay off workers and save money; factories can operate 24/7 to maximize economies of scale. Hence technologies are economic in that they can be used for economic ends.
+
These are just a few illustrative examples; there are many other ways in which human emotion and sentiment can manifest.
  
But this typical way of thinking about politics and economics is an oversimplification, and ultimately deceptive in three ways. First, it tends toward a symptomatic causal understanding, which posits the technology as a separate, neutral (innocent) entity that can be used in this way, or not: as if a prison is not made to incarcerate undesirables; as if a bomb is not made to explode. We offered a critique of this symptomatic tendency in Chapter 10 (on causality). Second, in relation to the first point, this typical way of thinking assumes that one can isolate technology as an identity separate from politics and economics. Third, it separates politics and economics: as if economics were not also political, as if politics did not entail economics. This book’s fundamental critique of the tendency to consider technology and culture as isolatable, separate entities holds just as true for interconnections among technology, politics, and economics.
+
''Willpower'' is the manifestation of one’s own strength used to overcome obstacles in the process of achieving goals. Willpower is a dynamic aspect of consciousness, a manifestation of human consciousness in the material world.
  
Politics and Economics as Assemblage
+
-----
  
Taking seriously our assemblage approach to technological culture means that we approach the issue of politics, economics, and technology not as the articulation of three separable and isolatable entities: a political system or practice, an
+
==== Annotation 87 ====
  
166 O
+
An unnamed poem by Ho Chi Minh, written in 1950 for the Revolutionary Youth Pioneers, addresses the phenomenon of willpower:
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
+
<blockquote>
 +
Nothing in this world must be difficult
  
economic system or practice, and a technology. Technology is not an element taken up and used by a political and/or economic system, nor does technology create a political and economic system. Rather, technology is integral to an assemblage in which political and economic work is performed. In other words, technological culture is political and it is economic. The task, then, is to examine how particular technological assemblages of technology, politics, and economics are constructed, what work they perform, and how they might be changed.
+
The only thing that we should fear is having a waivering heart
  
As part of this approach, the typical conceptions of politics and economics are necessarily transformed. By politics we mean much more than the electoral politics of political parties or the distinctions among left, right, and center. By economics we mean much more than “the bottom line” of a ledger or the distinctions among stereotypes of capitalism, socialism, and communism. In introducing a cultural studies understanding of technological culture in terms of articulation and assemblage, we have made it a point to emphasize the dimension of power. Assemblages are maps of power relations, which in turn work to shape and transform political and economic possibilities and relations of power and agency. The work of assemblage privileges some populations over others, privileges some possibilities over others, and distributes agency unevenly. It takes contextualized forms of power and agency to disarticulate and remake the articulations that constitute an assemblage.
+
We can dig up mountains and fill the sea
  
Politics, then, is the term for the work of generating, concretizing, and challenging positions of possibility, status, and relations of power and agency. Politics emerges within assemblages, operates within assemblages, and contributes to the persistence or transformation of assemblages.
+
Once we’ve willfully made a firm decision
 +
</blockquote>
  
Economics entails the production, distribution, and exchange of resources, which include human resources (for example, labor), natural resources (for example, copper), and informational resources (for example, knowledge). The character of production, distribution, and exchange is inexorably articulated to politics: to the contingent choices made with respect to what is produced, how and to whom it is distributed, and in what ways it serves relations of power, possibility, and agency. This is why, even though there is no agreed-upon definition of political economy,1 scholars have used the term “political economy” since the eighteenth century to examine the articulation of the two.
+
Today, this poem serves as the lyrics for anthem of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union (formerly the Revolutionary Youth Pioneers).
  
While it is difficult and somewhat artificial to separate out politics and economics for discussion, we proceed by highlighting the significance of each for the sake of working toward the significance of their integration. This is always a problem for cultural studies. When the task is to demonstrate the integral character of interconnections, that is, of articulation, in the work of assemblages, it is both necessary and misleading to consider particular components of the process. In the end, we must put politics and economics back together. You will notice that when talking about the one, the other often asserts its presence.
+
-----
  
Politics and Technology
+
Willpower arises from human self-awareness and awareness of the purposes of our actions. Through this awareness and through willpower, we are able to struggle against ourselves and externalities to successfully achieve our goals. We can consider willpower to be the power of conscious human activity; willpower controls and regulates human behaviors in order to allow humans to move towards our goals voluntarily; willpower also allows humans to exercise self-restraint and self-control, and to be assertive in our actions according to our views and beliefs.
  
Langdon Winner has been the most prominent and influential thinker to argue for the articulation of politics and technology. Although he does not use
+
-----
  
Politics and Economics
+
==== Annotation 88 ====
  
O 167
+
In ''Dialectics of Nature'', Engels explains how willpower developed in human beings as we separated from animals through the development of consciousness: “The further removed men are from animals, however, the more their effect on nature assumes the character of premeditated, planned action directed towards definite preconceived ends.”
  
the theoretical language of articulation and assemblage, we read him through that lens. For Winner “politics” means “arrangements of power and authority in human associations as well as the activities that take place within those arrangements.”2 Because these activities include both humans and nonhumans, we argue—and Winner implies—that both human and non-human associations constitute technological politics. Here is Winner on technological politics:
+
In ''Capital Volume I'', Marx explains how willpower uniquely allows humans to consciously change our own material conditions to suit our needs according to pre-conceived plans:
  
The things we call “technologies” are ways of building order in our world. Many technical devices and systems important in everyday life contain possibilities for many different ways of ordering human activity. Consciously or unconsciously, deliberately or inadvertently, societies choose structures for technologies that influence how people are going to work, communicate, travel, consume, and so forth over a very long time.Because choices tend to become strongly fixed in material equipment, economic investment, and social habit, the original flexibility vanishes for all practical purposes once the initial commitments are made. In that sense technological innovations are similar to legislative acts or political foundings that establish a framework for public order that will endure over many generations.3
+
<blockquote>
 +
Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material re-actions between himself and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature’s productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway. We are not now dealing with those primitive instinctive forms of labour that remind us of the mere animal. An immeasurable interval of time separates the state of things in which a man brings his labour-power to market for sale as a commodity, from that state in which human labour was still in its first instinctive stage. We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realises a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordination is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process demands that, during the whole operation, the workman’s will be steadily in consonance with his purpose. This means close attention. The less he is attracted by the nature of the work, and the mode in which it is carried on, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as something which gives play to his bodily and mental powers, the more close his attention is forced to be.
 +
</blockquote>
  
The things we call technologies are emergent and sometimes tenacious articulations. They are contingent structures that are constructed in particular contexts, the product of possibility and particular relations of power and agency. They are constructed for particular cultural, political, and economic reasons with particular cultural, political, economic goals. Some of these articulations are constructed of concrete and steel, some of processes, practices, and techniques, and others of discourses and conceptions of technology and culture.
 
  
When Winner asserts that technologies are “ways of building order in our world,” he means something more than that technologies make it possible to build order. Rather, by their very existence, they do work: they embody, impose, and enforce (instantiate) possibilities, arrangements, and order. For Winner, this means that technologies are actually “forms of life.”4 In Latour’s terms, technologies are “prescriptive.” In a sense, then, technologies are forms of law, legislative acts, and political institutions. However, there is an interesting and significant difference. The founding documents of the United States—the Constitution and the Bill of Rights—were crafted in processes of extensive deliberation; and laws passed by Congress are, for the most part, deliberated (the legal process acknowledges the importance of debate). But the assemblages we call technological, though they often have equal or greater impact on culture than laws do, are rarely deliberated. Instead, we seem to proceed in a state of what Winner calls, “technological somnambulism,” that is, sleepwalking through sweeping technological changes in everyday life.5
+
-----
  
Consequently, there is, according to Winner, a largely unexamined, political “de facto...sociotechnical constitution...of sorts” in place.6 This constitution, a tenacious assemblage, which gives meaning and shape to cultural relations, has been developed by economic and ideological interests, is embedded in structures, institutions, and practices, is the ongoing production of political struggles, and is
+
The true value of willpower is not only manifested in strength or weakness, but is also expressed in the content and meaning of the goals that we try to achieve through our willpower. Lenin believed that willpower is one of the factors that will create revolutionary careers for millions of people in the fierce class struggles to liberate ourselves and mankind.
  
168 O
+
-----
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
+
==== Annotation 89 ====
  
sustained by our acceptance of a particular political language and value structure. This constitution exhibits five interrelated characteristics:
+
In “''Left-Wing” Communism: an Infantile Disorder'', Lenin explains how revolutions are born from the collective willpower of thousands of people:
  
1. The “ability of technologies of transportation and communication to facilitate control over events from a single center or small number of centers.”7
+
<blockquote>
 +
History as a whole, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more multiform, more lively and ingenious than is imagined by even the best parties, the most class-conscious vanguards of the most advanced classes. This can readily be understood, because even the finest of vanguards express the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagination of tens of thousands, whereas at moments of great upsurge and the exertion of all human capacities, revolutions are made by the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagination of tens of millions, spurred on by a most acute struggle of classes. Two very important practical conclusions follow from this: first, that in order to accomplish its task the revolutionary class must be able to master all forms or aspects of social activity without exception (completing after the capture of political power — sometimes at great risk and with very great danger — what it did not complete before the capture of power); second, that the revolutionary class must be prepared for the most rapid and brusque replacement of one form by another.
 +
</blockquote>
  
2. The “tendency of new devices and techniques to increase the most efficient or effective size of organized human associations,” which leads to gigantic centralized corporations and organizations.8
 
  
3. The tendency to “produce its own distinctive form of hierarchical authority,” which in the workplace is “undisguisedly authoritarian.”9
+
-----
  
4. The tendency of “large, centralized, hierarchically arranged sociotechni-cal entities to crowd out and eliminate other varieties of human activity.”10
+
All of these factors [knowledge, sentiment, and willpower] which, together, create consciousness, have dialectical relationships with each other. Of these factors, knowledge is the most important, because it is the mode of existence of consciousness, and also the factor which guides the development of all the other factors, and it also determines how the other factors manifest.
  
5. The ability of “large sociotechnical organizations [to] exercise power to control the social and political influences that ostensibly control them. Human needs, markets, and political institutions that might regulate technology-based systems are often subject to manipulation by those very systems.”11
+
=== 3. The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness ===
  
Winner proposed the existence of this de facto constitution in 1986, but how well does it hold up today? Let’s bring this analysis down from the larger, more abstract assertions about the generalized technological assemblage to a particular, concrete, and current technological assemblage: the network.
+
The relationship between matter and consciousness is dialectical. In this relationship, ''matter comes first, and matter is the source of consciousness; it decides consciousness. However, consciousness is not totally passive, it can impact back to matter through the practical activities of human beings.''
  
Network Culture
+
-----
  
Networks are commonly thought (in a rather utopian fashion) to be technologies of a decentralized politics. The Internet, for example, is widely seen as birthing the 2.0 culture, where every user becomes (at least potentially) a producer, where the user/producer can get off the couch of passive reception and contribute to the creation of culture, thus exercising a new form of democratic politics. However, if we look more closely, the politics is not that simple. Yes, Alexander Galloway explains, there has been a technological transition from vertical, centralized control (of the kind that Winner depicts), but it is not toward a decentralized politics, which would make control of networks difficult. Rather, he argues, networks, such as the Internet, are “distributed not decentralized,” with the effect that they are “in fact highly controlled despite having few if any central points of control.”12
+
==== Annotation 90 ====
  
How does a distributed network embody control? To answer that, let’s look briefly at different models of networks, as explored by Galloway. First, in a centralized network there is a hub at the center and all elements of the periphery must link through the hub in order to (if they are to) connect. The classic case (besides that of the panopticon) is the way airlines connect through major hubs. If, for example, Jennifer wants to fly to Marquette, Michigan, which is 100 miles away from her home, she must first fly to the hub (Chicago) and then on to Marquette, which is a trip of over 800 miles. All connections or translations are controlled by
+
Engels explained in ''Dialectics of Nature'' that “matter evolves out of itself the thinking human brain,which means that matter must necessarily come prior to consciousness.
  
Politics and Economics
+
As Marx explains in ''Capital Volume I'', matter determines conscious activity:
  
O 169
+
<blockquote>
 +
The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. – real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.
 +
</blockquote>
  
the hub. A decentralized network would connect all sites directly to one another, with no interference or translation by a centralized hub. Jennifer could then fly from her home to Marquette, without any involvement of or control by Chicago. Decentralized networks are physically different, they have a different (arguably more democratic) politics, they make for different possibilities, and they have different requirements (in Latour’s terms, they prescribe differently).
+
However, it’s important to remember that the relationship between matter and consciousness is ''dialectical'', and that conscious activity — through the combination of willpower and labor — can also impact the material world; social change arises through the combined willpower of many human beings. See: Annotation 80, p. 81.
  
Few (if any) technological networks are truly decentralized; rather, they are distributed. In a distributed network there are no central hubs; and although many different connections are possible, particular connections become tenacious. This is like the ruts that form on a muddy road: if you are driving a car where those before have made significant ruts, you are likely to follow in their path. The example Galloway offers is the highway system built in the 1950s in the United States: “The highway system is a distributed network because it lacks any centralized hubs and offers direct linkages from city to city through a variety of highway combinations.”13 If one route is closed, it is usually possible to find an alternative route. There are, however, main routes, like the ruts that are most convenient to follow, and this is significant. Like lines of tendential force, we are urged by the politics of distributed networks toward particular possibilities and relations of power and agency. For example, some highways receive more investment and are widened, smoothed, and straightened. These do not connect every point, and, with limited on- and off-ramps, ignore many towns.
+
==== a. The Role of Matter in Consciousness ====
  
Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker have explored the politics of the distributed network further in their book The Exploit: A Theory of Networks. While it is tempting to see power and agency as distributed equally across the network, they remind us that “Human subjects constitute and construct networks, but always in a highly distributed and unequal fashion,”14 with differential and unequal effects.
+
Dialectical Materialism affirms that:
  
Power works in a network or assemblage through what Gilles Deleuze called control,15 by which he means something a little different than what we covered in Chapter 5. He means by control the constant structuring of possibilities, the tweaking and nudging of choices, a sense of freedom within limits we forget about. Deleuze invokes the idea of the freedom of the road, pointing out that when we drive on the highway, we feel free—though we must go along the highway, on the correct side, restricted by appropriate laws. Control doesn’t tell you what to do, but gives you options, choices, and suggestions (as when websites tell you that people who bought the thing you just bought also bought these other things). Control is subtle. Nodes form: that is, contingent articulations that exhibit tenacity, etched by practice and habit, with differential consequences. If, for example, you have a restaurant that is off on a side road beyond the interstate, it is more likely to fail, even if you do serve superior food.
+
'''• Matter is the first existence, and that consciousness comes after.'''
  
There are moments when control is being exercised, “when the network logic takes over,”16 when schemes of self-regulation and monitoring become “common sense” (hegemonic), when education is continuing education and one is always at work through the use of mobile computing and communication technologies, when
+
'''• Matter is the source of consciousness, it decides consciousness.'''
  
170 O
+
We know that matter determines consciousness because consciousness is the product of the high-level-structured matter such as the human brain. Consciousness itself can only exist after the development of the material structure of the human brain. Humans are the result of millions of years of development of the material world. We are, therefore, products of the material world. This conclusion has been firmly established through the development of natural science, which has given us great insight into the long history of the Earth and of the evolution of living organisms, including human beings.
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
+
All of this scientific evidence stands as the basis for the viewpoint: ''matter comes first, consciousness comes after'' [see Annotation 114, p. 116].
  
social networks of likes and recommendations are built to be surveilled and manipulated, when we begin to see a new sociotechnical constitution is being written.17
+
We have already discussed the factors which constitute the natural and social sources of consciousness:
  
Galloway and Thacker do not limit their understanding of networks to computer networks (or highways), but to “any system of interrelationality, whether biological or informatics, organic or inorganic, technical or natural,”18 with the ultimate goal of demonstrating that assertion of polarity between these terms is illusory. The network is the relationships, not the parts; and the degree to which individual parts have an identity, those identities are bestowed by the network. So, for example, the network bestows the identity of “side road” and “failing restaurant on side road.”
+
'''•''' Human brains
  
Galloway and Thacker argue that “[t]he network, as it appears, has emerged as a dominant form describing the nature of control today, as well as resistance to it.”19 We see, for example, the logic of the network exhibited in new global infectious diseases. These diseases are assemblages of, for example, “microbe-flea-monkey-human,”20 but also consist of airplanes, hotels, dense urban living conditions, and so on. The responses to such outbreaks are also networked: communication (news, scientific and medical data, logistical data), transport (of vaccines, health care workers), laboratories, health agencies, and quarantines.
+
'''•''' Impacts of the material world on human brains that cause reflections
  
Resisting networks is a monumental task. Consider, for example, how difficult it has been for Edward Snowden to resist the surveillance network. What and where exactly do people resist if they want to be effective against networks? Galloway and Thacker explain that one strategy that has been used is the cultivation of the exploit: “A resonant flaw designed to resist, threaten, and ultimately desert the dominant political diagram [in our terms, the assemblage]. Examples include the suicide bomber (versus the police), peer-to-peer protocols (versus the music conglomerates), guerrillas (versus the army), netwar (versus cyberwar), subcultures (versus the family), and so on.”21 What we need to find and cultivate is a new—ethical—exploit, which is not limited to the agency of humans: “It will have to consider the nonhuman within the human.”22 This includes nonhuman emergences such as swarms.23
+
'''•''' Labor
  
These, then, are some of the questions engendered by thinking about politics and technology: How do we design technological assemblages for a politics of the network? How do assemblages become territorialized into networks that are both flexible and rigid? How do we find the exploits, the human tactics and nonhuman emergences, which work to transform the assemblage of bodies? What new arrangements of people, things, agency, and power are possible?
+
'''•''' Language
  
Winner’s comparison of our legal constitution and our sociotechnical one should be taken seriously. A technological politics ought to debate over new technologies and technological assemblages in much the way that we debate new laws. This is more difficult than it may seem on first blush. It is not the case that we can simply set a device on a table and conduct a debate about its usefulness, because we need to see the device as assemblage and think of the articulations with assemblages—including devices, structures, languages, and practices. To debate technology, we are required to de-center technology, to contextualize its place in the assemblage.
+
[See Annotation 72, p. 68 and Annotation 73, p. 75]
  
Politics and Economics
+
All of these factors also assert that ''matter is the origin of consciousness.''
  
O 171
+
-----
  
The Amish, famously, do debate about the introduction of new technologies, and even include them in their practices on a trial basis, and consider whether the resulting assemblage hews to the values of their close-knit community, or changes the Amish-assemblage beyond their principles. Richard Sclove, founder of the Loka Institute, a nonprofit organization advocating democratic technologies, emphasizes this need to debate technologies. Sclove is committed to the idea of strong democracy, a term he borrows from political scientist Benjamin Barber.24 Strong democracy advocates that citizens should have a role in making decisions over matters that affect their well-being and way of life.25 Sclove even created a list of nine design criteria, which specify values and processes for more democratic decision making with regard to technology. But this direction of technological politics regresses to the conception of politics as (just) decision-making processes. It ignores that all parties here are assemblages, that politics is not just the values a technology reinforces as it prescribes action back on users or that the debate is about what the object should do and how it should be used. The politics at stake is everyday, as much about how a telephone networks from Michigan to Dubai as about who wins the next election.
+
==== Annotation 91 ====
  
How then do we rethink a deliberate politics along the lines of assemblage? One attempt to do so has been made by political theorist Jane Bennett in her book, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things.26 Bennett proposes a political ecology. Using (and tweaking) John Dewey’s notion of a public as a “confederation of bodies” that emerges in response to a problem, and a problem being the result of “conjoint action” by myriad actors, Bennett describes a political realm that is the dynamic interplay of multiple actants (both human and other than human). Bodies congregate and “seek to engage in new acts that will restore their power, protect against future harm, or compensate for damage done—in that consists their political action, which, fortunately or unfortunately, will also become conjoint action with a chain of indirect, unpredictable consequences.”27 As with articulation and assemblage in general, there are no guarantees, only strategic intervention based on sophisticated, concrete knowledge of the dynamics of politics within assemblage.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-20.png]]
  
Economics and Technology
+
The material basis of consciousness is rooted in the following phenomena:
  
To fully appreciate the economic in technological culture it is necessary to first acknowledge, and then resist, the reduction often performed by understandings of technology that define it as the (willing or unwilling) servant of particular economic systems: capitalism, socialism, communism, etc. For many people, the economic is sometimes as simple as understanding that because we live in a capitalist system, technologies will be designed to be profitable. If they aren’t, they will fail. End of story. For critics of capitalism, economic understanding of technology is sometimes as simple as pointing out that, once again, technologies are developed and implemented to extract as much wealth as possible and shuttle it upwards. As Lawrence Grossberg has said, “too often, this becomes simply another occasion to re-inscribe our…critiques of capitalism and suggest rather predictable ‘policy’ proposals.”28 The solution? Eliminate capitalism. Again, end of story. Capitalism
+
<ul>
 +
<li><ol style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;">
 +
<li><p>The material structure of the human brain.</p></li></ol>
 +
</li>
 +
<li><ol start="2" style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;">
 +
<li><p>Impacts from the material world cause reflections in human consciousness.</p></li></ol>
 +
</li>
 +
<li><ol start="100" style="list-style-type: upper-roman;">
 +
<li><p>Human Labor — physical process which dialectically develops consciousness.</p></li></ol>
 +
</li>
 +
<li><ol start="500" style="list-style-type: upper-roman;">
 +
<li><p>Human Speech — physical process which dialectically develops consciousness.</p></li></ol>
 +
</li>
 +
<li><ol start="5" style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;">
 +
<li><p>Evolution of human brains and consciousness through material processes of the material world.</p></li></ol>
 +
</li></ul>
  
172 O
+
For more information, see: Nature and Structure of Consciousness.
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
+
-----
  
becomes the justification or the brutal determinant for all that is desirable or undesirable about technology.
+
Consciousness is composed of reflections and subjective images of the material world, therefore ''the content of consciousness is decided by matter'' [see Annotation 68, p. 65]''.'' The development of consciousness is determined by natural laws and by social laws<ref>For a discussion of the material basis of social laws, see Annotation 10, p. 10, Annotation 78, p. 80, and Annotation 79, p. 81.</ref> as well as the material environment which we inhabit. All of these factors which determine consciousness are material in nature. Therefore, matter determines not only the content but also the development of consciousness.
  
Certainly, both of these positions have merit. Both go a long way to explaining which technologies are developed and which are not, which succeed and which fail, who benefits and who does not, and how—generally—technologies are caught up in efforts of economic development and/or exploitation. However, from a cultural studies perspective this approach sidelines a richer picture of the emergent economic significance of technological assemblages. Just as the network, discussed above, is more politically nuanced than simply centralized control versus democratic freedom, so too is a technological assemblage more economically nuanced. How, then, do we address the question of economics from the perspective of assemblage?
+
==== b. The Role of Consciousness in Matter ====
  
We begin by recognizing, following the work of Grossberg and others, that the economy, the economic, is not a pre-existing condition. An economy, and even the idea of economics, is produced in and through assemblages. Muniesa, Millo, and Callon, following Deleuze and Guattari’s original term for assemblage, refer to economic agencement. An economic agencement (or assemblage) “renders things, behaviors, and processes economic.”29 What is considered economic changes depending on the assemblage. They write, “It seems undeniable that, in so-called advanced liberal societies, ‘economic’ often refers to the establishing of valuation networks, that is, to pricing and to the construction of circuits of commerce that render things economically commensurable and exchangeable.”30 They continue: “the fact that an institution, an action, an actor or an object can be considered as being economic is precisely the result of this process of economization.”31 Not every agencement is economic, but an agence-ment can take an economic turn. They give the example of a sexual relation, which can be lived as a biological agencement, an affective agencement, or an economic agencement (when the relation is about exchange and valuation of the act). The economic, in short, is produced by arranging material elements (such as computers, order forms, machines, and so on), discursive elements (for example, naming practices—such as calling something “goods”—or codes, and so on), and, we would add, practices (such as cloning techniques, therapeutic sessions, experiments, and so on) in such a way that they perform economically.
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In relation to matter, ''consciousness can impact matter through human activities.''
  
Muniesa, Millo and Callon focus on a particular type of economic agencement that they call market devices. By market devices, they mean “the material and discursive assemblages that intervene in the construction of markets.”32 With market devices, “emphasis is put on the conception, production and circulation of goods, their valuation, the construction and subsequent transfer of property rights through monetary mediation, exchange mechanisms and systems of prices.”33 Market devices include such things as securities analysts’ reports, financial charts, purchasing centers, order forms, merchandising techniques, supermarkets, market research focus groups, consumer tests, quotas, financial derivatives, classification schemes, pricing, consumer credit scores, and more.34
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When we discuss consciousness we are discussing ''human'' consciousness. So, when we talk about the role of consciousness, we are talking about the role of human beings. Consciousness in and of itself cannot directly change anything in reality. In order to change reality, humans have to implement material activities. However, consciousness controls every human activity, so even though consciousness does not directly create or change the material world, it equips humans with knowledge about objective reality, and based on that foundation of knowledge, humans are able to identify goals, set directions, develop plans, and select methods, solutions, tools, and means to achieve our goals. So, consciousness manifests its ability to impact matter through human activities.
  
Take, as a hypothetical example, a fairly simple market agencement: a fish market. Here we are at the intersection of a number of assemblages, articulated
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The impact of consciousness on matter can have positive or negative results.
  
Politics and Economics
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==== Annotation 92 ====
  
in the market itself: the ship-net-fish-ocean assemblages, the distributor-container-transportation-warehouse-supermarket assemblages, government policy assemblages (for the fish quotas), government regulation assemblages (for licenses for fishing and shipping, for health regulations regarding the handling of fish and inspection for disease, for standards of weights and measures, and others), and (albeit rarely) investment assemblages in the exceptional cases where there is trading of fish futures (in which case, these fish have already been bought and sold months before in a speculative market). The fish market assemblage itself then includes buyers, sellers, inspectors, forms (which stand in for government regulations, the exchange of money via banks, and even the fish themselves), scales (for weight and measure), rubrics for grading quality, trucks, crates, air conditioning, water systems, banking systems, and more. The point here is not that the above assemblages (vastly over-simplified for effect) are working on behalf of the economic, but that they produce an economy by translating fish into value, exchanging product and money, transferring property, circulating value and materials, and so on.
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“Positive” and “negative,” in this context, are subjective and relative terms which simply denote “moving towards a goal” and “moving away from a goal,” based on a specific perspective.
  
The examples we could address in terms of market devices range from those concerning material goods, like fish in the above example, to those concerning more abstract forms, such as financial derivatives and related investment practices. Indeed, Donald MacKenzie argues that the financial models at the heart of futures trading do not only operate within a market, but work to create that market.35 They are part of the market that they purport to merely describe and respond to, and so perform the economic. MacKenzie speculates that because market devices are technologies that work as “engines” and not “cameras,” there is a possibility that markets and economic processes associated with them may get altered so that they better follow the abstract economic model.
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From the perspective of revolutionary communism, “positive” can be taken as moving towards the end goal of the liberation of the working class from capitalist oppression and the construction of a stateless, classless society. Likewise, “negative” can be taken as moving away from that goal. See: Annotation 114, p. 116.
  
In the beginning of this chapter we proposed a broad definition of economics as concerned with the production, distribution, and exchange of three different kinds of resources: human resources (for example, labor), natural resources (for example, copper), and informational resources (for example, knowledge). In the discussion of market devices above, it is relatively straightforward to see how objects and information (such as fish and investment practices) become resources, all of which articulate to produce an economy within which fish or financial instruments are translated into value. Less obvious is the role of human resources, especially the process whereby human labor becomes a resource to perform economics within a technological assemblage. Labor, then, deserves special attention.
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Humans have the ability to overcome all challenges in the process of achieving our goals and improving our world, so long as our conscious activities meet the following criteria:
  
To articulate, to make something anew, to transform something, is work, that is, the product of labor. When considering technology, we can think of machines, processes, and discourses in terms of labor: they were created by labor, they perform labor (tasks having been delegated to them), they replace labor, they require labor and resources to operate and maintain (they are prescriptive), and they have differential effects. DNA testing, for example, was developed by the labor of real people, it performs tasks such as identifying presence at a crime scene, it replaces labor such as that of eyewitnesses, and it requires the resources of a laboratory and the labor of real people to perform its work. It also affects people differentially.
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* We must perceive reality accurately.  
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* We must properly apply scientific knowledge, revolutionary sentiments, and directed willpower.  
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* We must avoid contradicting objective laws of nature and society.  
  
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Successfully achieving our goals and improving the world in this manner constitutes the ''positive'' outcome of human consciousness.
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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On the contrary, if human consciousness wrongly reflects objective reality, nature, and laws, then, right from the beginning, our actions will have negative results which will do harm to ourselves and our society.
  
Death Row prisoners who have been vindicated by DNA evidence and released through the efforts of The Innocence Project will attest to the differential effects of the existence of and access to the technology.36
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Therefore, by directing the activities of humans, consciousness can determine whether the results of human activities are beneficial or harmful. Our consciousness thus determines whether our activities will succeed or fail and whether our efforts will be effective or ineffective.
  
Some labor is waged labor, that is, it is part of jobs as factory workers, government workers, cleaning staff, media producers, and university professors, and we are compensated for it, usually through a wage or salary. Other labor is not waged. Planting our gardens is labor, but typically unwaged; raising children is labor, but typically unwaged. Sometimes very similarly appearing activities can be waged or unwaged, depending on the technological assemblage to which it contributes. One can clean houses for a living as wage labor or as part of everyday unpaid, unwaged home maintenance.
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By studying the matter, origin, and nature of consciousness, as well as the relationships between matter and consciousness, we can see that:
  
We can also differentiate material from immaterial labor. Material labor works on physical products: one makes things (cars, macramé curtains, keys, pantsuits, Hello Kitty coffee mugs). Immaterial labor is labor that works on symbolic products: one makes and manipulates symbols, ideas, and meanings. Economist Maurizio Lazzarato argues that we are seeing an increasing presence of immaterial forms of labor today. Such work includes writing, data entry, customer service, web design, and many other types. This is work that shapes cultural attitudes, fashions, tastes, and public opinions. Lazzarato says that immaterial labor includes the “informational content” and “cultural content” of commodities.37 We can also add to immaterial labor the idea of affective labor: work that produces and manipulates affect,38 from shaping the mood of an audience to mollifying an angry customer or easing the distress of the infirm.
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* Matter is the source of consciousness <ref>See: Annotation 72, p. 68.</ref>.
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* Matter determines the content and creative capacity of consciousness <ref>See: Annotation 90, p. 88.</ref>.
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* Matter is the prerequisite to form consciousness <ref>See: ''The Role of Matter in Consciousness,'' p. 89.</ref>.
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* Consciousness only has the ability to impact matter, and this impact is indirect, because it has to be done through human material activities within material reality <ref>See: ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness,'' p. 88.</ref>.
  
By pointing to these different forms of labor, we don’t mean to argue that one kind is better than another or that all labor should be compensated or have its value calculated (that would be to turn everything into economic exchange, creating a totalizing economic agencement). But we should be aware of how—within assem-blages—labor performs economically (or not): how it is shaped, transformed, and sometimes exploited, with benefits distributed differentially.
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-21.png|''Matter determines consciousness while consciousness impacts matter indirectly through human activity.'']]
  
Consider, for example, the labor of online environments. Such labor is variously waged, unwaged, material, immaterial, and affective. Some of it is grueling, tedious, and repetitive, like data entry or call center work, but some of it is creative and cool, like designing webpages, posting on social media, collaborating on wikis, managing discussion lists or fan sites, reviewing products on websites, or contributing to a crowdfunding effort. Many of these activities don’t even feel like work; they are enjoyable, fun, and entertaining. Although the labor is contributed willingly, with no expectation of compensation, it is nonetheless economic labor in that it works on behalf of the economic. It does not operate within an economy but produces an economy by translating play into value, performing the assemblage within which it then operates. So significant is this labor as constitutive of the technological assemblage, it merits its own name: “playbor.” Tiziana Terranova points out that great swaths of online life depend on this volunteer, unwaged labor, from contributions to open source software like Linux or collaborative knowledge products like Wikipedia, to adding value to sites by providing customer reviews (Amazon would not be Amazon without its customer reviews).39
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The strength with which consciousness can impact the material world depends on:
  
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* The accuracy of reflection of the material world in consciousness <ref>See:Annotation 68, p. 65.</ref>.
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* Strength of willpower which transmits consciousness to human activity <ref>See: ''Nature and Structure of Consciousness,'' p. 79.</ref>.
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* The degree of organization of social activity <ref>See: Annotation 93, below.</ref>.
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* Material conditions in which human activity occurs <ref>See: Annotation 10, p. 10.</ref>.
  
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Mark Andrejevic points out two ways value gets generated by this labor.40 The first is when active, voluntary, unwaged participation is appropriated by others for their own profit. An example of this is when the online news aggregator Huffington Post was bought by AOL in 2011. Many of the bloggers who contributed to the site voluntarily and helped create its value were given nothing in the deal, while Arianna Huffington walked away with $315 million.41 A second type of value generation is when information about online activities (what websites you visit, what links you click on, what videos you watch, who you email, what articles you read, what terms you search for, and so on) is collected. These profiling data are quite valuable to marketers (often as an aggregate—Big Data—more than just about you) and become their property to buy and sell. Your activity online is making money for someone else. As we go to press, Facebook is expected to roll out a new, big deal with major marketers to sell the data they collect on you. Andrejevic calls this the work of “being watched.”42 It is a huge economic resource to some and is built upon your volunteer, unwaged labor, without your consent.
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==== Annotation 93 ====
  
The take home, so to speak, is that we need to recognize, when encountering and analyzing technological culture, when, where, and how assemblages take an economic turn and, when they do, how they impact possibilities and relations of power and agency. Finally, we might consider how these assemblages, as contingent and variously tenacious articulations, might be changed. As with politics, there are no guarantees, only strategic interventions based on sophisticated, concrete knowledge of the dynamics of the assemblage.
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The importance of organization in determining the outcomes of human social activity is one of the most important concepts of Marxism-Leninism and is discussed frequently by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and nearly every other important communist revolutionary in history. Marx explains the connections between social organization and conscious human activity in ''Capital Volume I'' [see Annotation 80, p. 81].
  
Rearticulating Politics, Economics, Technology
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=== 4. Meaning of the methodology ===
  
The point of this chapter has not been to introduce politics and economics to the discussion of technology but to recognize how politics and economics are performed by technological assemblages. We would like to emphasize an observation with which we opened the book: how the received view of technology serves a particular political purpose. Arnold Pacey puts it this way:
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Dialectical Materialism builds the most basic and common methodological<ref>For discussion of the meaning of methodology, see ''Methodology,'' p. 44.</ref> principles for human cognitive and practical activities on the following bases:
  
When people think that the development of technology follows a smooth path of advance predetermined by the logic of science and technique, they are more willing to accept the advice of “experts” and less likely to expect public participation in decisions about technology policy.43
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* The viewpoint of the material nature of the world [''matter comes first, consciousness comes after''].
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* The dynamic and creative nature of consciousness <ref>See: ''Nature of Consciousness,'' p. 79.</ref>.
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* The dialectical relationship between matter and consciousness <ref>See: ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness,'' p. 88.</ref>.
  
The way we think about technologies affects what we think we can do about them. It makes sense to be passive if we think with the received view, for creative action is not supported by an unreflective commitment to progress, a goal of increased convenience, or a belief in technological determinism. In contrast, a cultural studies approach is capable of supporting creative intervention in the service of rearticulating the technological culture, by working through the critique of technological culture as it is manifested in everyday life. In doing so, it is important that we recognize the tenacity of the articulations that we
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All cognitive and practical activities of humans ''originate from material reality'' and ''must observe objective natural and social laws,'' however, our activities are capable of ''impacting the material world through dynamic and creative conscious activity''. [See ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88].
  
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==== Annotation 94 ====
  
tackle; the struggle to articulate and rearticulate technological culture is a long and involved one.
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The above paragraph summarizes an important methodological concept which is critical for undestanding the philosophical framework of Dialectical Materialism. Dialectical Materialism, as a philosophy, synthesizes earlier materialist and idealist positions by recognizing the fact that the material determines consciousness, while consciousness can impact the material world through willful activity.
  
Antonio Gramsci describes two types of warfare fought on the political plane, which can be applied to struggles with and within the technological assemblage: the war of movement or maneuver and the war of position.44 The war of maneuver refers to the concentration of forces in an all-out assault on one front that promises to breach the enemy’s defenses and achieve a quick and complete victory. Rarely does struggle in the realm of the technological assemblage work this way. Rather, the war of position is the rule. A war of position takes place across many fronts, at many sites of struggle and resistance, and no battle is decisive. It is a mostly slow, continuous struggle, with, at times, little movement to show for the struggle. Given the complex nature of the technological assemblage, made up of multiple, sometimes-contradictory contingencies, it makes sense that change is more likely to take place in this way. What is required is a reterritorialization of a complex assemblage: All manner of interventions will need to occur at all kinds of levels in all kinds of situations, to take advantage of emergences, affects, and those aspects of assemblage that can be hard to pin down or capture. Success in a war of position may come slowly, if at all, but what is ultimately at stake is a reconfiguration of a culture.
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From this philosophical basis, the methodology of Materialist Dialectics has been developed to provide a deeper understanding of dialectical development, which is rooted in contradiction and negation within and between subjects. Materialist Dialectics is the subject of Chapter 2, p. 98.
  
Our struggle within technological culture is that of a war of position, of small victories, of the slow reterritorialization of discourse, the gradual rearticulation of objects, practices, representations, habits, and affects in which even small moves may be significant. In this struggle, articulation becomes the political practice for engaging the assemblage, whether it be assemblages of genetically engineered seeds, pesticides, and farming practices; Twitter and the Arab Spring; or surveillance in its many formations. Part of this struggle is the call for new narratives and new stories about technological culture. Anne Balsamo described the project of feminist cultural studies in terms that apply equally here. The project, she writes, “is to write the stories and tell the tales that will connect seemingly isolated moments of discourse—histories and effects—into a narrative that helps us make sense of the transformations as they emerge.” New stories, she continues, “also serve as expressive resources that offer cognitive maps of emergent cultural arrangements.”45 Rather than distanced analyses, such stories are engagements; they provide tools, frameworks, and maps for others to take up, critique, or to use as springboards for new narratives, actions, politics, and economics.
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Figure 20: Space and Time
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According to this methodological principle [i.e., the Principle of the Dialectic Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness], if we hope to succeed in accomplishing our goals in the material world, then we must ''simultaneously'' meet two criteria:
  
Source: Photograph by Jennifer Daryl Slack, 2013
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1. We must ensure that our knowledge reflects the objective material world as much as possible, respecting the objective natural and social laws of the material world.
  
Chapter Fourteen
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2. We must simultaneously recognize the dynamic and creative nature of our conscious activity.
  
Space and Time
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When we say that human activities ''originate from material reality'' and ''must observe objective natural and social laws'' we'''' mean that human knowledge must originate from the material world. This means that if we hope to be successful in our activities, we should respect the natural and social laws of the material world.
  
THE WORLD IS GETTING SMALLER AND TIME IS SPEEDING UP. Technology is to blame; we “know” this to be true. Planes, trains, and automobiles have made anywhere on earth accessible in a very short time. The magic of telephony and the Internet, linked via wire, wireless, tower, and satellite, have made virtually instantaneous communication with that same “anywhere on earth” an everyday reality. Climbers now routinely take mobile phones with them when they climb; they can send on-the-spot photographs of their conquests and they can call for rescue from once-remote mountaintops using that mobile. Digital nomads boast that they can travel to anywhere and work from anywhere on earth; business is global and 24/7. Once delegated to the technology, being connected via mobile and working anywhere 24/7 are prescribed back, required. Globalization, the collapsing and shrinking of space and time, brought to you by technology, is the condition you are now required to live with, live for, and live up to. Some love it; some resist it; but we all must deal with it.
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This means that in our human perception and activities, we must determine goals, and set strategies, policies, and plans which are rooted firmly in objective material reality. Humans have to take objective material reality as the foundation of our activities and plans, and all of our activities must be carried out in the material world. Humans have to examine and understand our material conditions and transform them in ways that will help us to accomplish our goals.
  
That is the story, and it is a powerful and effective one. But while it is powerful, it is insufficient. By now it should be clear that at the very least this story relies on a problematic technological determinism: it is the planes, trains, automobiles, mobiles, and Internet that are credited or blamed. Where are the assemblages in this story? Where are the economic, political, and cultural contributions to globalization of which technologies are participants, not autonomous agents, but elevated to the status of agent?
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When we talk about ''impacting the material world through dynamic and creative conscious activity,'' we mean we must recognize the positive, dynamic, and creative roles of consciousness. We must recognize the role human consciousness plays in dynamically and creatively manifesting our will in the material world through labor. Impacting the material world through conscious activity at a revolutionary scale requires humans to respect and understand the role of scientific knowledge; to study laboriously to master such knowledge; and then to propagate such knowledge so to the masses to develop public knowledge and belief so as to guide the people’s action.
  
Space and Time as Assemblage
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Moreover, we also have to voluntarily study and practice<ref>See: Annotation 211, p. 205.</ref> in order to form and improve our revolutionary viewpoint<ref>See: Annotation 114, p. 116.</ref> and willpower<ref>See: ''Nature and Structure of Consciousness'', p. 79.</ref> in order to have both scientific and humanitarian activity guidelines.
  
Taking seriously our assemblage approach to technological culture means that we approach the issue of time, space, and technology not as the articulation of three separable and isolatable entities: a space, a time, a technology. Thinking in terms of assemblage requires understanding that technological culture is both spatialized
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To implement this principle [i.e., the Principle of the Dialectic Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness], we have to avoid, fight against, and overcome the diseases of subjectivism<ref>See: Annotation 222, p. 218.</ref> and idealism<ref>See: ''The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues,'' p. 48.</ref> through such errors as:
  
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* Attempting to impose idealist plans and principles [which are not rooted in material conditions] into reality.
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* Considering fantasy, illusion, and imagination instead of reality.
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* Basing policies and programs on subjective desires.
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* Using sentiment as the starting point for developing policies, strategies, etc.
  
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On the other hand, in cognitive and practical activities, we also have to fight against empiricism<ref>See: Annotation 10, p. 10.</ref>, which disregards scientific knowledge and theories, and which is also very conservative, stagnant and passive.
  
and temporalized. These are not elements of an assemblage, but what assemblage achieves.
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Consider for a moment a tragic head-on collision of two trains. Is the cause of the crash the space? They should not, after all, both have been there. No, they both had to be there, in that space, to get where they were going. That space isn’t the problem. Is the cause of the crash, then, the time? The time, after all, 14:06, was the problem, the moment it happened. No, they both had to get through 14:06 if time is to continue. That time isn’t the problem. Is the problem, then, the trains? It is true that if there were no trains, no such tragic accident could have occurred. But, similarly, if there were no space and no time, there would be no such accident. So such speculation is not dealing with the world as we know it, a world within which there are trains as well as space and time. So how do we understand this crash? There is an assemblage here that achieves the crash: a spatialized, temporalized, technological assemblage. In the articulation of this space, this time, and these two trains, the effect is a head-on collision. But we know from previous discussions, that the trains are not trains in and of themselves, but assemblages as well. So the crash assemblage must also consider the contributions of schedulers, engineers, the value of travel, conceptions of progress, and so on. But what about space and time? Would they not also require the same kind of scrutiny? Doesn’t the understanding of space and time also require thinking in terms of assemblage? We argue that this is the case, in that space and time are as deeply cultural as any other phenomenon. Space is much more than a place, and time is much more than the digital readout on your mobile phone.
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==== Annotation 95 ====
  
Recall from our discussion of assemblage that an assemblage asserts a territory, and, now we would suggest, that a territory is both spatialized and tem-poralized. That is, it is made to mean and function spatially and temporally. To make that argument we look separately at space and time as they articulate to technological culture. We do that knowing full well that it is as problematic to separate space and time as it is to separate technology and culture. So, note that space and time assert themselves in the consideration of the other. However, there are times when, for purposes of analysis, it is important to focus just on space and technology or just on time and technology, but when we do so we must not forget that they are space-time assemblages. In the end, we explicitly put time and space back together, as intertwined in complex ways, in the story of modes of communication and in the problem of addiction in relation to video gambling machines.
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Process of Developing Revolutionary Public Knowledge
  
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-22.png|''Developing revolutionary public knowledge must be preceded by mastery of knowledge and a firm grounding in the role and nature of knowledge.'']]
  
While space is typically used to mean a physical space, a container within which things happen, it is more appropriate to think in terms of everyday life being deeply spatialized, by which we mean that the spaces within which we live are always cultural; they are the production of relations and effects over time. Greg’s book Exploring Technology and Social Space has considered the significance of this insight, in what he calls “social space.” Here is his explanation of what makes space social:
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In ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'', Engels makes a scathing critique of idealist socialist revolutionary thought, writing:
  
Space and Time
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<blockquote>
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To all these [idealist socialists], Socialism is the expression of absolute truth<ref>See: Annotation 232 and ''The Properties of Truth,'' on p. 228.</ref>, reason and justice, and has only to be discovered to conquer all the world by virtue of its own power. And as an absolute truth is independent of time, space, and of the historical development of man, it is a mere accident when and where it is discovered. With all this, absolute truth, reason, and justice are different with the founder of each different school. And as each one’s special kind of absolute truth, reason, and justice is again conditioned by his subjective understanding, his conditions of existence, the measure of his knowledge and his intellectual training, there is no other ending possible in this conflict of absolute truths than that they shall be mutually exclusive of one another.
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</blockquote>
  
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What I mean by social space can perhaps best be approached negatively: it is not merely a constructed space like a room in a house or a lobby in a hotel or a city street. Likewise, it is not merely the meanings generated by any single human moving through that space (i.e., that the room seems comfortable, that it reminds one of corporations, that the greens in the wallpaper seem soothing, that it is a workplace or a home, private or public, that he or she is in a hurry, at ease, looking for the bathroom, etc.). Social space is the space created through the interaction of multiple humans over time. There is never a single social space, but always multiple social spaces. Social spaces are always open and permeable, yet they do have limits. It is important to remember at this point that the social is not unique to humans. Baboons, insects, and other creatures are social and could be said to move in social spaces.1
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In addition, as we have seen in Chapter 11 (on agency), any particular concrete local situation (an airport concourse, a classroom, and so forth) involves nonhuman actors as much as the human. Both contribute to the specific shaping of that space.
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Here, Engels points out the absurdity of the idea that some abstract, purely ideal “truth” could liberate workers in the material world. Engels continues on, explaining how such idealist socialism could never lead to meaningful revolutionary change:
  
What does it mean to shape space? Again, as we considered in the discussion on agency, one way that technologies shape space is, as Latour put it, by their capacity to bend space. Sometimes a technology bends the space by taking up space that displaces something else. For example, a big screen television might mean that furniture needs to be moved out of the way; a bread machine displaces a blender; a computer displaces a typewriter; and an e-mail displaces a letter. Technologies also contribute to reshaping human bodies and human movement in space. The shape of a keyboard influences how arms and hands move, a sidewalk steers people along particular trajectories, high-heeled shoes render certain kinds of movement more difficult than others, and so on.
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<blockquote>
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Hence, from this nothing could come but a kind of eclectic, average Socialism, which, as a matter of fact, has up to the present time dominated the minds of most of the socialist workers in France and England. Hence, a mish-mash allowing of the most manifold shades of opinion: a mish-mash of such critical statements, economic theories, pictures of future society by the founders of different sects, as excite a minimum of opposition; a mish-mash which is the more easily brewed the more definite sharp edges of the individual constituents are rubbed down in the stream of debate, like rounded pebbles in a brook.
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</blockquote>
  
The consequences of these processes of shaping spaces affect people differentially. If you are expected to wear high heels, you will be spatially limited in ways that those who are allowed to wear flats are not. For those required to work at computers for long hours, technologically derived complaints of muscle strain, carpal tunnel syndrome, eyestrain, and back pain are realities in ways that they are not for those not so required. The recognition of the power of the embodied shape taken by a technology gives rise to the field of ergonomics, a field of research concerned primarily with movement and spatial relations concerning human–technology interactions.
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In other words, idealist revolutionary movements only tend to result in endless debate and meaningless theories which are divorced from objective reality and material conditions. Such theories and idealist constructions do not lead to effective action in the real world. Socialism must become ''real'' (i.e., based in objective material conditions and praxis<ref>See: ''Praxis, Consciousness, and the Role of Praxis in Consciousness,'' p. 204.</ref> in the real world) to affect change in the material world, as Engels explains elsewhere in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'' [see Annotation 17, p. 18].
  
In addition to these more obvious ways of shaping space through the embodied effects of technological assemblages, there are other ways that space is shaped. French sociologist and philosopher Henri Lefebvre argued that space is shaped on many levels, in different ways, and offered three interrelated concepts of space to help us understand the articulation of space as we practice it, as we think it, and as we experience it. He calls these spatial practice, representations of space, and representational space.2
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In ''Critique of the Gotha Program'', Marx lays out an excellent case study of the failings of incoherent, idealist socialism. He begins by quoting the Gotha Program, which was an ideological program which the German Workers Party hoped to implement. In this text, Marx cites the Gotha Program line by line and offers his materialist critique of the idealist principles presented. In the following passage, Marx refutes some key errors caused by idealism and offers materialist correction:
  
Spatial practice—space as it is practiced—consists of the structures and activities that produce and shape space by articulating it in certain ways. Architecture is perhaps the most obvious form of spatial practice, but so too are practices such as the recurrent behaviors of the people in particular places, including behaviors
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<blockquote>
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Labor is not the source of all wealth. Nature is just as much the source of use values (and it is surely of such that material wealth consists!) as labor, which itself is only the manifestation of a force of nature, human labor power... But a socialist program cannot allow such bourgeois phrases to pass over in silence the conditions that lone give them meaning. And insofar as man from the beginning behaves toward nature, the primary source of all instruments and subjects of labor, as an owner, treats her as belonging to him, his labor becomes the source of use values, therefore also of wealth. The bourgeois have very good grounds for falsely ascribing supernatural creative power to labor; since precisely from the fact that labor depends on nature it follows that the man who possesses no other property than his labor power must, in all conditions of society and culture, be the slave of other men who have made themselves the owners of the material conditions of labor. He can only work with their permission, hence live only with their permission.
 +
</blockquote>
  
182 O
+
Here, Marx points out the importance of having a firm understanding of the material reality of ''labor'' and its relation to the material, natural world. Marx points out that the idea that labor, alone, is the source of all wealth is an idealist notion of the bourgeoisie, a false consciousness [see Annotation 235, p. 231] which prevents proper material analysis and props up the capitalist viewpoint. A failure to grasp the truth of the material basis of reality weakens the socialist position, and any movement built on such weak idealist foundations will lead to failure in trying to bring about revolutionary change.
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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We have already discussed the shortcomings of empiricism in Annotation 10, p. 10, but it might be helpful to see another case study, this time from Engels, pointing out the flaws of empiricist analysis in his text ''Anti-Dühring''. Engels begins by quoting the empiricist Eugen Dühring, who wrote:
  
such as hanging out, walking along a sidewalk, sitting at a computer terminal, and reading the monitors in airports or train stations.
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<blockquote>
 +
Philosophy is the development of the highest form of consciousness of the world and of life, and in a wider sense embraces the principles of all knowledge and volition. Wherever a series of cognitions or stimuli or a group of forms of being come to be examined by human consciousness, the principles underlying these manifestations of necessity become an object of philosophy. These principles are the simple, or until now assumed to be simple, constituents of manifold knowledge and volition. Like the chemical composition of bodies, the general constitution of things can be reduced to basic forms and basic elements. These ultimate constituents or principles, once they have been discovered, are valid not only for what is immediately known and accessible, but also for the world which is unknown and inaccessible to us. Philosophical principles consequently provide the final supplement required by the sciences in order to become a uniform system by which nature and human life can be explained. Apart from the fundamental forms of all existence, philosophy has only two specific subjects of investigation — nature and the world of man. Accordingly, our material arranges itself quite naturally into three groups, namely, the general scheme of the universe, the science of the principles of nature, and finally the science of mankind. This succession at the same time contains an inner logical sequence, for the formal principles which are valid for all being take precedence, and the realms of the objects to which they are to be applied then follow in the degree of their subordination.
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</blockquote>
  
Representations of space—space as it is conceived—refers to the concepts we use to think about space. This, as Lefebvre explains, is the dominant space of our understanding3 and includes the ways that scientists, engineers, planners, architects, and others understand and represent space as something to be lived. Maps, blueprints, architectural plans, rulers, and light-years are all representations of space that have a relationship to a variety of spatial practices.
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Engels then proceeds to critique this empiricist worldview, showing that it does not properly reflect the material world and amounts to idealism in its own right:
  
Representational space—space as it is lived—is the direct, lived bodily experience of space, which includes how we move in space, move through space, and experience space, including the semiotics of the space, the meanings we make of the signs and images in the space. It is our awareness of space as we variously accept, appropriate, and change space as a lived experience in the intersection of spatial practices and representations of space. It is what space “feels” like.
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<blockquote>
 +
What [Dühring] is dealing with are therefore principles, formal tenets derived from thought and not from the external world, which are to be applied to nature and the realm of man, and to which therefore nature and man have to conform. But whence does thought obtain these principles? From itself?
  
The particular arrangement of articulations among these three concepts will be unique to a particular technological assemblage. For example, to explore the space of an airport, we would consider spatial practices: the unique architecture, security checkpoints, surveillance machines, television monitors, restaurants, bars, and shops, and how they relate to traffic flows and behaviors such as waiting, sleeping, queuing, shopping, eating, surveilling, selling, and so on. We would consider spatial representations: the attendant concepts of this space as a place of transport, speed, affluence, technological sophistication, the servicing of business travel, or perhaps as a border space (entering or exiting a country), or as a federal space. We would consider experiences of and in the space: what the space feels like, and how those experiences are shaped by the funneling of our bodies into queues, the examination of our possessions and bodies in security checkpoints, the experience of shopping while sequestered in a confined area, and by representations of airports in news, film and television. We would consider how our experiences are shaped by the semiotics of the space: the colors, the signs, the shops, the announcements and ambient music, the scents, the movements of people and planes. What does it feel like? After September 11, 2001, issues of terrorism and security became prominent in the spatialized assemblage, such that airport practices, representations, and experiences have changed dramatically from the time before those events.
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No, for Herr Dühring himself says: the realm of pure thought is limited to logical schemata and mathematical forms (the latter, moreover, as we shall see, is wrong). Logical schemata can only relate to forms of thought; but what we are dealing with here is solely forms of being, of the external world, and these forms can never be created and derived by thought out of itself, but only from the external world. But with this the whole relationship is inverted: the principles are not the starting-point of the investigation, but its final result; they are not applied to nature and human history, but abstracted from them, it is not nature and the realm of man which conform to these principles, but the principles are only valid in so far as they are in conformity with nature and history. That is the only materialist conception of the matter, and Herr Dühring’s contrary conception is idealistic, makes things stand completely on their heads, and fashions the real world out of ideas, out of schemata, schemes or categories existing somewhere before the world, from eternity — just like a Hegel.
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</blockquote>
  
This way of thinking about space begins to get at the spatialized work of a technological assemblage in everyday life. But absent from Lefebvre’s three levels of space is cultural studies’ insistence on how power is spatialized in particular technological assemblages. The airport, as practiced, conceived, and lived is shot through with an economics and politics. It is a space of inclusion and exclusion, a space designed to make you do some things and not others; a space of transit in global struggles over the control of space; a space that asserts a way of living spatially that involves and affects people differentially, indeed unequally. The assemblage disciplines and rewards, reflects and resists, empowers some possibilities and disallows others. For example, there are many people for whom the airport is a space explicitly off limits: those, for example, on someone’s no fly list, for reasons that can vary dramatically. Those without tickets cannot get very far into an
+
Lenin also heavily criticized empiricism in his work ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'', which we discuss at length in Annotation 32, p. 27.
  
Space and Time
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= Chapter 2: Materialist Dialectics =
  
O 183
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Materialist dialectics is one of the basic theoretical parts that form the worldview and philosophical methodology of Marxism-Leninism. It is the “science of common relations” and also the “science of common rules of motion and development of nature, society, and human thoughts... Dialectics, as understood by Marx, and also in conformity with Hegel, includes what is now called the theory of knowledge, or epistemology.”<ref>''Karl Marx'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.</ref>
  
airport; so the space effectively excludes those who won’t fly, can’t fly, or can’t afford to fly. There are those, consequently, who cannot even get to see an airplane close up, let alone get inside one. This is a space that rewards, for example, the business traveler with special access to lounges for refreshment, connectivity, sleep, and similarly vetted company. They are granted freedom from noise, the traffic of the riff-raff, and competition for limited access to recharging stations. They are rewarded (by having the money to pay for it) with special seating on airplanes, special food, special treatment, and the ability to enter and exit the airplane in a marked-as-exclusive way. Other travelers, who nonetheless have not been excluded from the space of the airport, are restricted to other kinds of airport spaces: more noise, more queuing, more traffic, confinement in certain areas, more exposure to the multiple classes of people in the airport and the multiple reasons for being there. For those who work in it, the airport is spatialized differently yet again. There are certain doors they must walk through, with certain tags around their necks, certain places where they stay for the time of their shift, and, ironically, no place to go. For them the airport is not a space of transit, but a space of daily labor. The airport is thus a process of intersecting, multiple, relative, and differential spatial processes, not a container within which things happen. Each of these kinds of movements through space happens in the service of privileging some at the expense of others. For those beings moving in relation to that space, the airport is practiced, conceived, and experienced quite differently: empowering some, and disempowering others, in unique and significant spatialized ways.
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[Note: Epistemology is the theoretical study of knowledge; for more information see ''Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism'', p. 204.]
  
Time and Technology
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== I. Dialectics and Materialist Dialectics ==
  
Just as space is typically understood as a place, a container within which things happen, time is typically understood as a uniform, absolute, and shared phenomenon, marked by chronometers as it passes. It too is seen as a container within which things happen. But just as with space, it is more appropriate to think in terms of everyday life being deeply temporalized, by which we mean that the practices, representations, and experiences of time within which we live are always cultural; temporalities are productions of relations and effects in space. Sarah Sharma’s book, In the Meantime: Temporality and Cultural Politics, explores this insight in terms of what she calls power-chronography. Although less marked than the terminology of space offered by Lefebvre, she, like Lefebvre, explores practices of time, representations of time, and time as experienced. But always, her sense of power-chronography explicitly acknowledges the contributions of economics and politics, and the struggles and power-dynamics that are likely to occur in technological assemblages. Here is her description of this distinctively cultural studies way of understanding time:
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=== 1. Dialectics and Basic Forms of Dialectics ===
  
Power-chronography is based on a conception of time as lived experience, always political, produced at the intersections of a range of social differences and institutions, and of which the clock is only one chronometer….[D]iscourses about time
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==== a. Definitions of Dialectics and the Subjective Dialectic ====
  
184 O
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In Marxism-Leninism, the term ''dialectic'' refers to regular relationships, interactions, transformations, motions, and developments of things, phenomena, and processes in nature, society and human thought.<ref>See Annotation 9, p. 10.</ref>
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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There are two forms of dialectic: the ''objective dialectic'' and the ''subjective dialectic.'' The objective dialectic is the dialectic of the material world, while the subjective dialectic is the reflection of objective dialectic in human consciousness. [See Annotation 68, p. 65].
  
maintain lines of temporal normalization that elevate practices and relationships to time while devaluing others.4
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According to Engels, “Dialectics, so-called ''objective'' dialectics, prevail throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics (dialectical thought), is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature.”<ref>''Dialectics of Nature'', Friedrich Engels, 1883.</ref>
  
As with space, particular arrangements of articulations among temporal practices, representations of time, and the lived experiences of time are unique to particular technological assemblages in which power is temporalized differently and unequally.
+
-----
  
Although it has become highly naturalized in the West, the understanding of time as marked by the mechanical clock arose as part of what was once a new technological assemblage. Historian Lewis Mumford argued that one of the key places where this assemblage (our term, not his) emerged was in the monasteries of fourteenth-century Europe. An assertion of power over the bodies and behaviors of monks at prayer—in the service of order demanded by the Church—was obtained by synchronizing regularly spaced prayers. A mechanical clock could perform this work effectively, as it was not foiled by the clouds that could obscure the sundial or the cold temperatures that could freeze up the water clock. Mumford writes:
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==== Annotation 96 ====
  
Within the walls of the monastery was sanctuary: under the rule of the order surprise and doubt and caprice and irregularity were put at bay. Opposed to the erratic fluctuations and pulsations of the worldly life was the iron discipline of the rule. Benedict added a seventh period to the devotions of the day, and in the seventh century, by a bull of Pope Sabinianus, it was decreed that the bells of the monastery be rung seven times in twenty-four hours. These punctuation marks in the day were known as the canonical hours, and some means of keeping count of them and ensuring their regular repetition became necessary.5
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''Dialectics'' is an umbrella term which includes both forms of dialectical systems: ''subjective'' and ''objective'' dialectics.
  
Temporalized in this way, time might have been experienced by the monks as safe sanctuary from chaos, compartments that one moves through to punctuate the path to salvation. Although we cannot know with certainty what that temporal experience felt like, we can see that, once mechanized, the clock prescribes a highly disciplined body in the service of the ineffable. As Mumford implies, such a body is ideal for the servicing of the industrial revolution, a body in service of an equally ineffable goal, progress: the path to secular salvation. The clock, Mumford argues, is “the key machine of the modern industrial age.”6 It is, he asserts, a “power machine.”7
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''Objective dialectics'' are the dialectical processes which occur in the material world, including all motion, relationships, and dynamic changes which occur in space and time.
  
The drive for precision in the control of and over bodily movements has continued as evidenced in ongoing “refinements” of time. The scientific standard for time measurement is now the atomic clock: cesium clocks, laser clocks, and atomic fountains. An arrangement of such clocks at the United States Naval Observatory (USNO) can currently measure frequency to about 16 decimal points. This arrangement of clocks will supposedly not lose or gain a second in 300,000,000 years, making it the “most accurate measuring device operationally ever created by mankind to measure anything.” And what is a second in this reckoning of time? According to Demetrios Matsakis, Chief Scientist for Time
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''Subjective dialectics'', or ''dialectical thought'', is a system of analysis and organized thinking which aims to reflect the objective dialectics of the material world within human consciousness. Dialectical thinking has two component forms: dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics [see Annotation 49, p. 45].
  
Space and Time
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-----
  
O 185
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''Subjective dialectics'' is the theory that studies and summarises the [objective] dialectic of nature into a system with scientific principles and rules, in order to build a system of methodological principles of perception and practice. Dialectics is opposed to ''metaphysics'' — a system of thought which conceives of things and phenomena in the world in an isolated and unchanging state [See Annotation 8, p. 8].
  
Services at USNO, “a second is 9,192,631,770 periods of oscillation of an undisturbed cesium atom.”8
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==== b. Basic Forms of Dialectics ====
  
When addressing the question, what is time?, Matsakis says he doesn’t really know, but he understands how to measure it, the purpose of measuring it, and the necessity for disseminating it: “It’s no good to have the time here and not have it spread to the whole world. The whole purpose of making the time is coordinating the world.” While recognizing “that is a circular definition,” he uses an example to illustrate the need for such precision in the coordination and control of the world:
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Dialectics has developed into three basic forms and levels: ancient primitive dialectics, German idealist dialectics, and the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism.
  
If one GPS satellite is off by 1 billionth of a second, one nanosecond, then the GPS receiver will think it is one foot closer or further away from that satellite, and by the time it does all the math inside of it, its actual position could be off by two or three feet. So if you want to know where you are to the accuracy of two or three feet, so as to find your driveway, you have to have those GPS satellites synchronized to the nanosecond.
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''Ancient primitive dialectics'' is the earliest form of dialectics. It has developed independently in many philosophical systems in ancient China, India and Greece.
  
The need to know where your driveway is makes for an interesting choice in this example. Measuring time more precisely is justified as a necessary mechanism fixing you in space (How do I get to your house easily becomes how do I find you) and for differentiating spaces (The idea that my driveway is on my property not yours easily becomes this coordinate cannot be crossed by your airplanes). The distribution of temporalized space is critical in this power-chronography, and the effects extend far beyond keeping two trains from head-on collision.
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Chinese philosophy has two major forms of ancient primitive dialectics:
  
It is important to remember, as Sharma says, that temporality is not universally common or shared. In spite of the hegemony of clock time, there is no universal, common temporality, especially so if you consider the lived experience of time.9 Scientists at USNO may conceptualize time in terms of atomic time, and the movements of satellites and the work of positioning using GPS may occur in atomic time, but the experience of everyday life is not that of atomic time. At the level of experience, temporality consists in rhythms and intervals that vary dramatically, with differential effects on the bodies in question.
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* “Changing Theory” (a theory of common principles and rules pertaining to the changes in the universe)
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* The “Five Elements Theory” (a theory of the principles of mutual impact and transformation of the five elements of the universe) of the School of Yin-Yang. [See: ''Primitive Materialism'', p. 52]
  
The phrase 24/7 captures a belief that there is a reality, a practice, and a lived experience to which we must all conform. The demand to conform to the 24/7 world, within which time is fast, continuous, and without downtime, and in which all time is clock time, is conceived of as a technology-driven world. In the 24/7 world, according to Jonathan Crary in his book 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep, “the modeling of one’s personal and social identity, has been reorganized to conform to the uninterrupted operation of markets, information networks, and other systems.”10 The shared experience of modern life shaped by the 24/7, technology-driven world is, according to Ivor Southwood in his book Non-Stop Inertia, one of precariousness, in which we are required constantly to mobilize against inevitable change. He calls this “non-stop inertia” and describes it this way:
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In Indian philosophy, Buddhist philosophy is a quintessential [see Annotation 6, p. 8] form of ancient primitive dialectics, which includes such concepts as “selflessness,” “impermanence,and “predestination.
  
186 O
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An ancient, primitive form of dialectics also developed in Ancient Greek philosophy.
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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Friedrich Engels wrote: “The old Greek philosophers were all born natural dialecticians, and Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic of them, had already analyzed the most essential forms of dialectic thought… This primitive, naive, but intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus: everything is and is not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away.”<ref>''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'', Friedrich Engels, 1880.</ref>
  
This constant precariousness and restless mobility, compounded by a dependence upon relentlessly updating market-driven technology and the scrolling CGI of digital media, together suggest a sort of cultural stagflation, a population revving up without getting anywhere. The result is a kind of frenetic inactivity: we are caught in a cycle of non-stop inertia.11
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Engels also wrote of Greek dialectics: “Here, dialectical thought still appears in its pristine simplicity, as yet undisturbed by the charming obstacles which the metaphysicists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries — Bacon and Locke in England, Wolff in Germany — put in its own way... Among the Greeks — just because they were not yet advanced enough to dissect and analyse nature — nature is still viewed as a whole, in general. The universal connection of natural phenomena is not proved in regard to particular; to the Greeks it is the result of direct contemplation.”<ref>The Old Preface to ''Anti-Dühring'', Friedrich Engels, 1878.</ref>
  
This is a powerfully enforced story, a powerfully enforced temporality. Just think for a moment about how your understanding of what is expected of you in life is driven by the need for speed, for constant contact, for mobility, and by anxieties over unanticipated and unsettling change. But if we believe that this is a universal experience of time, we have made the mistake of taking the experiences of particular segments of a vastly diverse global population and universalizing them. In so doing, we miss that a speed-driven world serves some remarkably well in particular ways, affects others detrimentally in particular ways, and operates apart from the experience of many significant others.12
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Sharma’s explorations of the differential work of diverse temporalities make it clear that the hegemony of 24/7 time requires a variety of temporalities to function at all. The speed-driven world serves and empowers the business traveler. These are the people who achieve pleasure, wealth, and status by being in time with the 24/7 world. These are the people the airport is designed to serve. These are the people whose time is precious in service of the accumulation of capital for contemporary global corporations. These are the people for whom the time of many others is expected to support with their time. Other bodies are “recalibrated” to support the operation of the 24/7 world, which demands for its operation an army of workers living shift time or a nine-to-five “normal” temporality. Baggage handlers in airports operate in a nine-to-five temporality, which requires “down time” to restore exhausted muscles in readiness for the physical exertions of the next shift. For those sitting at desks doing the necessary but tedious data entry, yoga classes for desk workers train bodies to endure the demands of the nine-to-five temporality. Taxi drivers, Sharma illustrates, experience yet another temporal existence. Much of their work time is quite simply “waiting.” And often they are asked to “make time,” to save someone else’s time. Each of these temporal rhythms is peculiar and particular, and none of these is the same as the temporal experience of an ailing person of advanced age longing for death while living in a hospice facility dedicated to sustaining that temporal moment in one’s life.
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==== Annotation 97 ====
  
“Time,” Sharma tells us “is a structuring relation of power, exercised over the self and others.”13 Time is technological; it is not a technological measurement of what is fundamentally real; it is not a phenomenon caused by technological measurement. Rather, it is the temporal structuring of relations of power in multiple ways. Any “moment” in any “space” can be examined in terms of the articulation of multiple temporalities with multiple effects. Particular technologies—the airport, the factory, the Internet, the mobile—can be examined in terms of their articulation to multiple temporalities with multiple effects.
+
Engels, here, is explaining how the ancient Greek dialecticians were correct to view nature as a cohesive system, a “whole, in general,” which they determined through direct observation of the natural world. The major shortcoming of this ancient Greek form of dialectics was a lack of inquiry into the specific processes and principles of nature. Engels laments that seventeenth and eighteenth century metaphysicists took us backwards by disregarding this view of nature as a cohesive, general whole.
  
Space and Time
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Ancient, primitive dialectics had an accurate awareness of the dialectical characteristic of the world but with its primitive and naive perspective, it still lacked evidence-based forms of natural scientific achievements.
  
O 187
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Jumping forward to the late 16<sup>th</sup> century, natural sciences started developing rapidly in Europe. Scientists began deeply analysing and studying specific factors and phenomena of nature which led to the birth of modern European metaphysical analysis. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, metaphysics became the dominant methodology in philosophical thought and scientific study. However, when natural scientists moved from studying each subject separately to studying the unification of all those subjects in their relationships, the metaphysical method proved insufficient. Thus, European scientists and philosophers had to transition into a more advanced system of thought: dialectical thought.
  
Modes: The Biases of Space and Time
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''The classical German idealist dialectics'' were founded by Kant and completed by Hegel. According to Engels: ''“The second form of dialectics, which is the form that comes closest to the German naturalists [natural scientists], is classical German philosophy, from Kant to Hegel.”''<ref>The Old Preface to ''Anti-Dühring,'' Friedrich Engels, 1878.</ref>
  
You may have noticed that despite our intention in the last two sections to analyze space and time separately, time crept into the space section (the airport is as much about arranging and managing time as spatial flow) and space into the time section (GPS is about location and both business travelers and taxi drivers trace trajectories through space). It is important to emphasize space-time as an articulated concept. A space-time assemblage isn’t the result of the articulation of a space-assemblage to a time-assemblage but an assemblage in its own right. To consider further the implications of space-time assemblages, we turn now to an extended example of what have been called modes of communication.
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“No clock runs perfectly. Systems fail when clocks fail.” So said USNO Chief Scientist Matsakis, in defense of further work to render the measurement of time even more precise. For our purposes here, the statement provokes three significant claims about time as well as space in relation to technology: 1) that there are systems—assemblages—of spatiality and temporality, which can be understood as structuring relations of power exercised over self and others articulated to particular technologies; 2) that these assemblages do not last forever intact, that they can and do “fail” and change, and involve changes in technologies; and 3) extrapolating from the previous claims, that these assemblages are better understood as contested, that is, not as unified systems but as articulations of multiple spatialities and temporalities. Let’s look at each of these claims.
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==== Annotation 98 ====
  
1) That there are assemblages of spatiality and temporality, which can be understood as structuring relations of power exercised over self and others articulated to particular technologies.
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Engels discusses this history, and the shortcomings of the metaphysical philosophy of his era, in ''The Old Preface to Anti-Dühring.'' First, Engels explains why early modern natural scientists initially did not feel constrained by their adherence to metaphysics, since inquiries in the initial revolution of scientific study were limited to the narrow development of specific fields of inquiry by necessity:
  
A significant body of scholarship in a range of disciplines has addressed this claim in terms of three systems, ages, cultures, or modes of communication: orality, literacy, and the electronic.14 Because this scholarship was popularized in the mid-1900s, the term electronic, once appropriate, no longer serves very well. Other terms have been suggested, notably the information age or the digital age. Further, there is a case to be made that we are now entering another, 4th mode: the biotechnological age. What is most useful about these modes is how they are understood in terms of space and time in relation to technology. To explore that, we turn to the work of Harold Adams Innis.
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<blockquote>
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Empirical natural science has accumulated such a tremendous mass of positive material for knowledge that the necessity of classifying it in each separate field of investigation systematically and in accordance with its inner inter-connection has become absolutely imperative.
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</blockquote>
  
Innis, a Canadian economist writing in the mid-1900s, famously described different cultural systems in terms of space-time biases as they relate to different technologies.15 A culture that is biased toward time maintains cohesion by exerting control over time; its goal is the maintenance of society over time. The primary examples of time-biased cultures are those typically called oral cultures, which operate within a limited spatial context, rely on face-to-face, oral-aural communication, and manage memory and activities through keeping and
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Engels goes on to explain that at the time he was writing, enough knowledge had been accumulated within specific, distinct fields that it becomes necessary to begin studying the connections and overlaps between different fields, which called for theoretical and philosophical foundations:
  
188 O
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<blockquote>
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It is becoming equally imperative to bring the individual spheres of knowledge into the correct connection with one another. In doing so, however, natural science enters the field of theory and here the methods of empiricism will not work, here only theoretical thinking can be of assistance.
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</blockquote>
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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Unfortunately, natural scientists were held back by the existing metaphysical theoretical foundations which were dominant at the time as, according to Engels, “theoretical thinking is an innate quality only as regards natural capacity. This natural capacity must be developed, improved, and for its improvement there is as yet no other means than the study of previous philosophy.”
  
telling stories. Because utterances are not preserved in time, time is said to be collapsed into a perpetual present, obliterating the difference between what we typically understand now as past, present, and future. The technologies that articulate to time-biased cultures are the voice (spoken language, poetry, story, and song) and structures not easily moved (structures made of stone and landmarks made to function technologically). Because it is easier to remember narrative and rhythm than discrete facts, important information, such as when to plant crops, is “stored” in stories, rhyme, song, or carved into stone. Immovable landmarks such as mountains or the way shadows fall on landforms can also serve as memory devices. In such cultures, ritual storytelling is essential and there is an emphasis on the transmission of tradition. Consequently, those who remember (such as elders or designated keepers of stories) are revered and powerful, insofar as they contribute to group cohesion.
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Metaphysical theory and formal logic were in common use by natural scientists at the time. As Engels explained in ''On Dialectics'' and ''Dialectics of Nature,'' metaphysics and formal logic could never be as useful as dialectical analysis for examining and unifying concepts from wide-ranging dynamic systems of overlapping fields of inquiry.
  
An oral cultural assemblage is, then, an aggregate of bodies, sounds, rhythms, stories, structures, and rituals that empowers those who remember and those who have lived long enough to have long memories, and disempowers those who forget and those who are too young to have long memories. It empowers group cohesion. It empowers staying in place (or, at least, for nomadic peoples, staying proximate to one another) and in time and the technologies and practices that keep one there.
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Unfortunately, dialectics had not yet been suitably developed for use in the natural sciences before the work of Marx and Engels in developing dialectical materialism, as Engels explained in ''On Dialectics:''
  
A culture that is biased toward space is concerned with exerting control over space; its goal is the maintenance of society over distance. The primary examples of space-based cultures are those called literate cultures: cultures of notation, of reading, and writing. The critical technological development is the separation of the message from the sender, which permits the message to move independently in space. For this reason, literate culture is considered the age of empire, for now it is possible for religions, governments, and individuals to exercise influence and domination over individuals and populations at a distance with laws, letters, and records. Small group cohesion is diminished as control over groups and individuals is accomplished at a distance. The control over time is diminished as memory is displaced by the power of the recorded word. The recorded word, subject to interpretation, can now be consulted to serve as authoritative.
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<blockquote>
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Formal logic itself has been the arena of violent controversy from the time of Aristotle to the present day. And dialectics has so far been fairly closely investigated by only two thinkers, Aristotle and Hegel. But it is precisely dialectics that constitutes the most important form of thinking for present-day natural science, for it alone offers the analogue for, and thereby the method of explaining, the evolutionary processes occurring in nature, inter-connections in general, and transitions from one field of investigation to another.
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</blockquote>
  
Because recorded communication takes different physical forms, the balance between space and time varies in literate cultures. Writing that is slower to produce and more difficult to transport, such as writing on stone, is biased more toward time than space. Writing on lightweight papyrus and later paper contributes to a bias toward space. So significant is the technology of printing in the shift to space-biased culture that the literate mode is typically divided into the script and print eras.
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The Idealist Dialectics of Hegel [see Annotation 9, p. 10] constituted a major development of dialectics, but the idealist nature of Hegelian dialectics made them unsuitable for natural scientists, who therefore discarded “Old-Hegelian” dialectics and were thus left without a suitable dialectical framework. Again, from ''On Dialectics:''
  
A literate cultural assemblage is then an aggregate of bodies, texts, storage sites, and movements that empowers individuals who can read, write, interpret, and direct the transportation of messages. It also empowers the spaces occupied by messages (such as libraries) and technologies of reproduction and transportation. It disempowers memory, the voice, those who cannot read or write, and those who stay in place and in time. It empowers movement in space over the
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<blockquote>
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The year 1848, which otherwise brought nothing to a conclusion in Germany, accomplished a complete revolution there only in the sphere of philosophy [and] the nation resolutely turned its back on classical German philosophy that had lost itself in the sands of Berlin old-Hegelianism... But a nation that wants to climb the pinnacles of science cannot possibly manage without theoretical thought. Not only Hegelianism but dialectics too was thrown overboard — and that just at the moment when the dialectical character of natural processes irresistibly forced itself upon the mind, when therefore only dialectics could be of assistance to natural science in negotiating the mountain of theory — and so there was a helpless relapse into the old metaphysics.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Space and Time
+
Engels goes on to explain that, having rejected Hegel’s dialectics, natural scientists were set adrift, cobbling together theoretical frameworks from the works of philosophers which were plagued by idealism and metaphysics, and which were therefore not suitable for the task of unifying the disparate fields of natural sciences together:
  
O 189
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<blockquote>
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What prevailed among the public since then were, on the one hand, the vapid reflections of Schopenhauer, which were fashioned to fit the philistines, and later even those of Hartmann; and, on the other hand, the vulgar itinerant-preacher materialism of a Vogt and a Büchner. At the universities the most diverse varieties of eclecticism competed with one another and had only one thing in common, namely, that they were concocted from nothing but remnants of old philosophies and were all equally metaphysical. All that was saved from the remnants of classical philosophy was a certain neo-Kantianism, whose last word was the eternally unknowable thing-in-itself, that is, the bit of Kant [see Annotation 72, p. 68] that least merited preservation. The final result was the incoherence and confusion of theoretical thought now prevalent.
 +
</blockquote>
  
maintenance of time, and empowers the technologies and practices to get one there, including far-off and imaginary spaces (including spaces known as nations16) known only through writing.
+
Engels explains that this lack of a proper dialectical materialist framework had frustrated natural scientists of his era:
  
The electronic (and digital) mode reconfigures space and time yet again, but not so much by shifting the bias toward one over the other, but by “correcting” the bias toward space in literacy, restoring a balance between space and time and compressing both. The critical technological development is considered to be the separation of communication from transportation.17 This separation was perhaps first accomplished with smoke signals but electronically with the telegraph.18 The restored significance of time is illustrated in James Carey’s example of the way that the assemblage altered the economy by restructuring national stock and commodity markets. As Carey explains, whereas as once arbitrage prevailed (buying cheap here and selling high there), telegraphy made it possible to level markets in space, because prices could be easily compared in time. Thus, in order to gain advantage, markets shifted to speculating on futures, because the effects of change over time could not be controlled.19 In this case, time became a resource to control as important as (perhaps more important than) space.
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<blockquote>
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One can scarcely pick up a theoretical book on natural science without getting the impression that natural scientists themselves feel how much they are dominated by this incoherence and confusion, and that the so-called philosophy now current offers them absolutely no way out. And here there really is no other way out, no possibility of achieving clarity, than by a return, in one form or another, from metaphysical to dialectical thinking.
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</blockquote>
  
As with literacy, electronic communication takes different physical forms with variations in the production of spatiality and temporality. To the electronic transmission of coded messages, telephony adds the voice, the computer adds the image and physical sensation, and cellular and broadcast technologies add mobility. The computer is capable of transmitting oral, visual, and sensate messages anywhere instantaneously, producing a new kind of space, in articulation with literate spaces: cyberspace, which emerges in relation to networks of cables, routers, and computers but has the capacity to be everywhere and nowhere. The immediacy with which this is possible, articulated to the new cyberspace, produces a new temporality. This articulation is illustrated in the phenomenon of telepresence, where virtual presence has the capacity to command over distance and assert an immediacy analogous to face-to-face communication. Mobile technologies, perhaps the culmination of the digital mode, render this temporality and spatiality mobile. The mobile assemblage is strikingly different from the wired Internet of the 1990s. It affords quite different functions, agency, and affects. It is a different way of being and acting in the world, and a new way of engaging with space and time in the experience of everyday life. In an increasingly mobile world, location becomes both more and less important. Locative functions like “checking in” at different places via smart phone, tracking via smart phone, and communicating and working from just about anywhere at any time become the practices within which power is temporalized and spatialized. The demand for constant contact seems perfectly reasonable.20
+
After explaining that Hegel’s system of dialectics came closest to meeting the needs of contemporary science, Engels explains why Hegelian dialectics were ultimately rejected by the scientific community:
  
Marshall McLuhan, a student of Innis, predicted in the 1960s that this kind of instantaneous global communication would compel a kind of global village, putting us almost literally in each other’s backyards, thus forcing us to be as concerned with one another as was the case in traditional oral cultures.21 However, McLuhan minimized the ways that, like the head-on train crash, being in the same place at the same time can also cause enmity among neighbors, He also did not yet
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<blockquote>
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Just as little can it be a question of maintaining the dogmatic content of the Hegelian system as it was preached by the Berlin Hegelians of the older and younger line. Hence, with the fall of the idealist point of departure, the system built upon it, in particular Hegelian philosophy of nature, also falls. It must however be recalled that the natural scientists’ polemic against Hegel, in so far as they at all correctly understood him, was directed solely against these two points: viz., the idealist point of departure and the arbitrary, fact-defying construction of the system.”
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</blockquote>
  
190 O
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In other words, it was the idealism and the unworkable structuring of Hegelian dialectics that prevented its adoption by natural scientists. Engels finally explains how Marx was able to modify Hegel’s idealist dialectics into a materialist form which is suitable for empirical scientific inquiry:
  
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<blockquote>
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It is the merit of Marx that... he was the first to have brought to the fore again the forgotten dialectical method, its connection with Hegelian dialectics and its distinction from the latter, and at the same time to have applied this method in Capital to the facts of an empirical science, political economy.
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</blockquote>
  
know that because computer use is most often an intensely individual activity, we are likely to be further physically isolated and distanced from those who are otherwise close to us. This tension between distributed interpersonal connectivity and physical isolation has become one of the striking conditions characterizing the practices, representations, and experiences of the digital mode. McLuhan also did not foresee the mobile assemblage, which permits head-on crashes in virtual anytimes and anywheres.
 
  
An electronic (and digital) cultural assemblage is, then, an aggregate of electronic voice, text, sensation, bodies both virtual and real, storage mechanisms from hard drive to cloud, transmission technologies, and practices that empower a temporality based on speed and immediacy and a compressed spatiality that is both real and virtual. It empowers a 24/7 temporality and those with the fastest technologies to act in it in a completely accessible, compressed, global, and mobile spatiality. It disempowers slow, deliberate thought and practice, those with limited access to the technologies of speed. It empowers acting in time over moving in space, yet it empowers using time in the service of controlling space.
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2) That these assemblages do not last forever intact, that they can and do “fail” and change, and involve changes in technologies
+
These Classical German philosophers [Kant, Hegel, etc.<ref>Kant’s “transcendental dialectic” was used to critique rationalism and pure reason, but was not a fully developed dialectical system of thought. Hegel’s idealist dialectics were more universal in nature. See Annotation 9, p. 10.</ref>] systematically organized idealist dialectics into formal philosophies. Of particular note was Hegel’s belief that the dialectical process would eventually lead to an “absolute idea.” This foundational belief in an “absolute idea” is what chiefly defines Hegelian dialectics as idealist in nature [see Annotation 98, p. 100].
  
Of the three claims we are making about assemblages of space and time in relation to technology, this is the most straightforward, and should be obvious given the discussion of the first claim. Assemblages do not last forever. We no longer live in a pre-literate, primary oral culture. And if we were to rely on strictly face-to-face communication, we would be ill suited to function, for example, in the digital global business environment. Who or what exercises agency, and the technologies, temporalities, and spatialities they function in to do so, have changed dramatically. The priests of the literate age no longer exercise the kind of imperial control they once enjoyed by teaching people to read the gospels. High speed digital traders now exercise more influence over everyday life through manipulating financial markets than most of us would care to admit.
+
Hegel believed that the subjective dialectic is the basis of the objective dialectic. [In other words, Hegel believed that ''dialectical thought'' served as the ''objective dialectics'' of the material world.]
  
With a transition from one mode to another, we do not, however, leave the previous mode behind, because no mode is an intact and uncontested whole. Rather, change is better understood as the rearticulation of old modes as new ones emerge. Walter Ong recognized this in relation to the transition from preliterate, primary orality. As we develop literate and electronic technologies, we do not leave orality behind. Rather, it is reshaped and sustained by technologies that depend on literacy, including printing and electronic technologies. He named this “secondary orality,” in which we attend aurally as well as visually to communications aimed at groups. Mass broadcasting is the archetype technology here; Ong argued that it leads to a strong group sense that is more powerful in its size and in its ability to extend across space than is the group, time-bound sense of a primary oral culture. Furthermore, in secondary oral cultures, individuals (at least theoretically) have the choice of independence or group belonging.22 One may be group minded, but can be self-consciously so. This is not the case with primary
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According to Hegel, the “absolute idea” was the starting point of all existence, and that this “absolute idea,” after creating the natural world, then came to exist within human consciousness.
  
Space and Time
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Engels wrote that in Hegelian dialectics: “... spirit, mind, the idea, is primary and that the real world is only a copy of the idea.”<ref>''The Old Preface to Anti-Dühring, On Dialectics'', Friedrich Engels, 1878.</ref>
  
O 191
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oral cultures, where group belonging was a necessity of life. The possible dangers of secondary orality are exemplified in the rise of fascism in the 1930s, driven in part by the effective use of radio as a tool of propaganda. The character of fascism is to draw a dispersed but large population together around a core group identity.
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==== Annotation 99 ====
  
Recall from Chapter 1 that Raymond Williams once postulated that a helpful way to understand cultural change was to recognize that at any historical moment there are dominant, residual, and emergent cultural forms, and that these over-lap.23 This is a useful way to envision modal changes in spatial and temporal assemblages to avoid the mistake of expecting that one mode disappears and another appears whole cloth. Instead of revolutions, there are processes of disarticulation and rearticulation that account for changing spatialities and temporalities.
+
In the above quoted passage, Engels was explaining why Hegelian dialectics were unsuitable for use in natural sciences. Here is a longer excerpt:
  
3) That these assemblages are better understood as contested, that is, not as unified systems but as articulations of multiple spatialities and temporalities
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<blockquote>
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First of all it must be established that here it is not at all a question of defending Hegel’s point of departure: that spirit, mind, the idea, is primary and that the real world is only a copy of the idea... We all agree that in every field of science, in natural as in historical science, one must proceed from the given facts, in natural science therefore from the various material forms and the various forms of motion of matter; that therefore in theoretical natural science, too, the inter-connections are not to be built into the facts, but to be discovered in them, and when discovered to be verified as far as possible by experiment.
  
Raymond Williams’s insight about the overlapping of dominant, residual, and emergent cultures needs to be tweaked a little bit to emphasize that the very notion of a dominant mode or, for that matter, residual or emergent modes—both of which imply either past or future dominance—mask the fact that multiple intersecting spatialities and temporalities circulate simultaneously. Spatial and temporal practices, representations, and experiences may support, resist, or exist apart from the dominant mode. In cultural studies, we call that correspondence, contradiction, or non-correspondence. For example, in a recent Facebook status update a friend of a friend, wrote, “If you like the idea of being up at night reading, watching stuff, and occasionally comforting a distressed creature, then maybe having a kid is for you.”24 It is a playful and interesting update for several reasons. While we cannot attest to the experience of the poster with authority, the status suggests he is experiencing something unusual, outside his normal temporality and spatiality: staying up late at night, filling time with watching whatever is on, and the presence of a distressed creature who demands attention and comfort in their own time in a confined space of books, screen, and crib. This is neither “normal” nine-to-five time nor get ahead 24/7 time. The experience could certainly be understood in relation to those temporalities: perhaps the status expresses an experience of unfamiliarity, discomfort with, or perhaps even resistance to the dis-juncture with whatever time was dominant in the poster’s life. But, it also evokes the reality of an alternative, biological time, the time of parenting a newborn, a temporality with a completely different logic and a spatiality that demands presence. While that reality can be articulated to the dominant time, and seems to be in this status, it is in no way reducible to it. It neither corresponds nor contradicts; it simply is another temporality, another spatiality. In relation to nine-to-five or 24/7 temporality, the poster may be disempowered; in terms of newborn time, the poster may be empowered in ways he has never before imagined.
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The poster finds himself out of time, but we should also point out that he is out of space as well. He is neither in the 9-to-5 or 24/7 temporal rhythm nor in the geography of the working world either by not being in bed or in the office or in a
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The German idealists (most notably Hegel) built an idealist system of dialectics organized into categories and common laws along with a strict logic of consciousness.
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</blockquote>
  
192 O
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Lenin stated that: “Hegel brilliantly ''divined'' the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, ''nature'') in the dialectics of concepts.”<ref>''Conspectus of Hegel’s'' ''Science of Logic'', Vladimir Ilyich. Lenin, 1914.</ref>
  
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shop. Analytically we could approach the example from either the perspective of time or space, asking different questions and mapping different insights from each, though ultimately he is experiencing being out of space-time.
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==== Annotation 100 ====
  
As this example illustrates, not everyone in every instance moves at the same speed and in the space demanded by dominant modes. We submit that it is more appropriate to think with Sarah Sharma’s insistence that, to paraphrase her, what characterizes life are the differential and inequitable ways in which both time and space are made to matter and are experienced,25 what matters is how time and space are worked on and differentially experienced at the intersections of inequity,26 and how, in any particular assemblage, there are likely to be multiple spatialities and temporalities in articulation. It is thus more appropriate to think about orality, literacy, and the digital, as well as wholly other spatialities and temporalities, as, like the airport, processes of intersecting, multiple, relative, and differential spatial practices, representations, and experiences.
+
What Lenin means, here, is that Hegel inadvertently and unconsciously discovered the concept of reflection [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. Hegel intuitively understood that the material world was reflected in human consciousness, and, by extension, subjective dialectics (dialectical thought) reflected objective dialectics (of the material world). Hegel’s error was an inversion of the ideal and the material. As Marx later pointed out in the Afterword to the Second German Edition of ''Capital Volume I,'' it is the material which precedes the ideal, and not the other way around:
  
It’s Not Really a Gamble
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<blockquote>
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My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of ‘the Idea,’ he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos [craftsman/artisan/creator] of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea.’ With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.
  
We have drawn heavily on the work of Greg and Sarah Sharma to argue that power is spatialized and temporalized differently and unequally in technological assemblages. We want to end with a compelling example of intersecting, multiple, relative, and differential spatial and temporal practices, representations, and experiences as they relate to a particular technological assemblage. To do that we draw on Natasha Dow Schüll’s research on video gambling machines in her book Addiction by Design: Machine Gambling in Las Vegas.27
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Schüll’s research “explores the relationship between the technologies of the gambling industry and the experience of gambling addiction.”28 She rejects the view that video gambling machines are culpable entities that produce addicts as well as the view that there are addictive personalities that find their way to video gambling machines. She thus rejects both technological determinism and cultural determinism to explain the phenomenon of gambling addiction. Instead, she explores what she characterizes as “the asymmetric collusion between the gambling industry and gamblers,”29 which we would characterize as a technological assemblage within which the contributions and experiences of actors result in differential and unequal effects. The actors in this assemblage include the gamblers and machines, and what Schüll refers to loosely as the “gambling industry” and the “casino.” Because it is addiction that most captures her attention, the spatial and temporal experience of the gambler features extensively in her work, yet the research suggests multiple, intersecting spatialities and temporalities that constitute the assemblage of multiple actors in the “gambling industry.” This includes—nam-ing just the human actors—casino owners, casino investors, lobbyists, machine designers, factory workers who build the machines, researchers, architects, designers, construction companies, carpenters, accountants, tax attorneys, lawyers, addiction counselors, and the plethora of shift workers and nine-to-fivers whose lived experience of the casino is quite different from the two masters they serve: the gamblers and the management. They make change, bring drinks, clean toilets, cook food,
+
Engels also quoted and emphasized Marx’s thoughts [in ''the Old Preface to Anti-Dühring'', citing another quote of Marx from the ''Afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital Volume I,'' further quoted in Annotation 100 above]: “The mystification which dialectics suffers in Hegel’s hands by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.”<ref>Afterword to the Second German Edition of ''Capital Volume I'', Karl Marx, 1873.</ref>
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</blockquote>
  
Space and Time
 
  
O 193
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park cars, and stand watching. It would be possible and instructive to examine the particular spatial and temporal practices and experiences of each of these groups. Schüll focuses, however, on the practices and experiences of the gambler as existing in an asymmetric relationship with the deployment of the rest of the gambling industry assemblage in the search for profit. So, we too will highlight that particular aspect of the assemblage.
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==== Annotation 101 ====
  
Schüll asserts that because they are human, gamblers come with “a field of potential dependencies,”30 and, like other consumers, they learn to manage and “recalibrate their actions in response to environmental feedback.”31 For the gambler the “zone” is what keeps them playing, the time and space of plea-sure…and, coincidently, addiction: “A zone in which time, space, and social identity are suspended in the mechanical rhythm of a repeating process.”32 It is a world apart, a world insulated from the spatial and temporal demands and anxieties of the “real” world. It is a place of timelessness in an intimate spatial relationship between human and machine (as long as the money holds out). Industry actors understand the power of the zone and exploit it in every way they can.
+
In ''the Old Preface to Anti-Dühring,'' Engels explains some of the contemporary currents of science and philosophy of his era. Engels explains that Hegelian philosophy had been dismissed by a newer current of natural scientists who dismissed “the idealist point of departure and the arbitrary, fact-defying construction of the system.” In other words, the natural scientists rejected Hegelianism because it was both idealist and was not built on a foundation of objective facts.
  
The casino industry can be seen as the deployment of an assemblage of intersecting spatialities and temporalities in support of a particular configuration of the gambler-machine interface, one in which the industry elaborately provides what the gambler “wants,” measured by the ability to work the player to “extinction,” that is, to exhaust all the money the gambler has at their disposal. While many of the casino actors operate in the space and time of global capital, the high-finance economic and dizzying 24/7 world, they employ professionals, nine-to-fivers, and shift workers to work both in and outside the casino to engineer the interface. The exteriors and interiors of casinos are designed elaborately and differently depending on the type of gambler who frequents them: whether, for example, they are tourist gamblers or local gamblers. The movement of gamblers through casino space is carefully coaxed by what they see, hear, and smell. They are monitored at play, both to “improve” the casino and tailor “services” for the gambler. The machines themselves are artfully constructed, both internally and externally, to give the gambler the feel of control, while skillfully controlling them. The rhythms and the spaces where the work of management and design takes place are both quite different from the rhythms and spaces experienced by the gambler and are conducted out of sight, thus masking the asymmetry.
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Engels points out, however, that Marx “was the first to have brought to the fore again the forgotten dialectical method” of Hegel.
  
Schüll highlights the asymmetry in the differential relations of industry, gambler, and machine, which is also an asymmetry in practices and experiences of space and time. The casino gambling assemblage as it is currently articulated is coterminous with these asymmetries, with these differential spatial and temporal processes, experiences, and effects. In response to those who call for the promotion of “responsible gambling,” Schüll cites an author of a study on responsible gambling as saying “If responsible gaming were successful, then the industry would probably shut down for lack of income.”33
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The dialectical method was forgotten in the sense that the natural scientists ignored and dismissed dialectics along with the rest of Hegel’s philosophy. So, Engels is pointing out that one of the great contributions of Marx was salvaging the dialectical method from Hegel while rejecting the idealist and non-fact-based characteristics of Hegelian philosophy.
  
The zone is not inherently a space and time of exploitation. Articulated differently the zone can be the space and time of creativity, spiritual ecstasy, athleticism,
+
Marx, according to Engels, proved that the dialectical method could be separated from idealism by “[applying the dialectical method] in ''Capital'' to the facts of an empirical science, political economy.” This was the origin of dialectical materialism: the resurrection of the dialectical method and the development of a dialectical method in a materialist and scientific form.
  
194 O
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The idealist characteristics of classical German dialectics and Hegelian philosophy was a limitation that needed to be overcome [so that it could be utilized for scientific inquiry]. Marx and Engels overcame that limitation and in so doing developed ''materialist dialectics.'' This system of dialectics is the most advanced form of dialectics in the history of philosophy to date. It is the successor of previous systems of dialectics, and it arose as a critique of the classical German dialectics.
  
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Engels said: “Marx and I were pretty well the only people to rescue conscious dialectics from German idealist philosophy and apply it in the materialist conception of nature and history.”<ref>''Anti-Dühring'', The 1885 Preface, Friedrich Engels, 1878.</ref>
  
sexuality, music, and so on. The zone, like any spatial and temporal configuration is produced by particular assemblages within which technologies figure and contribute to differential and unequal effects.
+
=== 2. Materialist Dialectics ===
  
Conclusion: Why Space and Time?
+
==== a. Definition of Materialist Dialectics ====
  
Thinking of technology in terms of space and time provides at least three insights. The first emphasizes one of the primary themes of this book: We cannot consider technologies in isolation, but as part of assemblages. In this chapter we see that they exist and function in, and as a part of, culturally specific spatial and temporal relationships with differential and unequal effects. To ignore these dimensions is to seriously misunderstand the role and work of technology in everyday life.
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Materialist dialectics have been defined in various ways by many prominent Marxist-Leninist philosophers.
  
The second insight is an appreciation of practices, concepts, and experiences in technological assemblages. Technologies are not disconnected from the space of our everyday lives, and any analysis of technology should acknowledge what people do, what they think, and what they experience. Technological assemblages are not just about industrial technologies, factories, offices, battlefields, and so on. They are also about temporal and spatial practices, concepts, and experiences of everyday life. To understand a technological assemblage requires that we understand the work of articulation among these aspects of everyday life, with particular attention to their differential and unequal effects.
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Engels defined materialist dialectics as: “nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society, and thought.”<ref>''Anti-Dühring'', Friedrich Engels, 1878.</ref>
  
The third insight to be gained from thinking about technology in terms of space and time, and a consequence of the second point, is the realization that other articulations of technology are possible, both for us and for others. If we recognize the contingency of our practices, representations, and experiences, we are encouraged to question our assumptions about how things are “supposed to be,” and call into question the occasions when we accept an assemblage as somehow “natural.” We can recognize that others’ practices, representations, and experiences of technology may be at odds with ours but are also based on complex articulations that demand understanding and may, to varying degrees, be commensurate or incommensurate with our own. It is empowering to realize that change is possible and technological assemblages can be articulated differently for us and for others.
+
Engels also emphasized the role of the principle of general relations.<ref>See p. 107.</ref> As John Burdon
  
Figure 21: MMW
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Sanderson Haldane noted in the 1939 preface to ''Dialectics of Nature'': “In dialectics they
  
Source: Transportation Security Administration, 2009, Wikimedia Commons: commons. wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mmw_large.jpg
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[Marx and Engels] saw the science of the general laws of change.”<ref>''Dialectics of Nature'', Friedrich Engels, 1883.</ref>
  
Chapter Fifteen
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Lenin emphasized the important role of the principles of development<ref>See Annotation 117, p. 119.</ref> (including the theory of cognitive development) in the dialectics that Marx inherited from Hegelian philosophy.
  
Identity
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Lenin wrote: “The main achievement was ''dialectics'', i.e., the doctrine of development in its fullest, deepest, and most comprehensive form, the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge that provides us with a reflection of eternally developing matter.”<ref>''The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1913.</ref>
  
THERE IS A SAYING IN RUSSIA that predates even the Soviet Union. A Russian is body, soul, and passport. That is, an important aspect of who one is, is a technology, in this case, a passport: a system of identifying and tracking citizens. David Lyon, the pre-eminent scholar of surveillance studies, updates this by saying: today, we are body, soul, and credit card.1
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==== b. Basic Features and Roles of Materialist Dialectics ====
  
What these sayings are pointing to is the entanglement of identity and technology in technological culture, in this case the development of a second self, a shadow self made of data. Our data selves consist of all the dossiers, files, records, and reports kept on us by a dizzying array of public and private entities: government agencies in charge of voter and driver registrations and various licenses, not to mention passports; insurance companies; medical providers; marketing firms; credit reporting agencies; supermarkets (and, indeed, any business with a frequent shopper card); schools; Facebook and other social networking sites; your mobile phone company, and more. As these records have become digitized, they have also become increasingly interconnected, cross-referenced, and mined for what they may predict (for good or ill) about our future health, wealth, or lifestyle.
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There are two basic features of the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism:
  
The data self arose from a need for technologies of verification. Once we move beyond life in a simple village, where everyone knows, and can vouch for, everyone else, we need what Lyon has called “tokens of trust.”2 ID cards of all sorts become ways of verifying our identity, at the very least, of establishing our qualities (as in the case of a credit report). Entire institutions, bureaucracies, and technologies have been created to manage the verification processes (from credit reporting agencies like Equifax to state and federal agencies such as the Division of Motor Vehicles, the Social Security Administration, or the Transportation Security Administration). The documents attest to who we are. Trust is the key word here (and recall our discussion of trust in Chapter 5). Today our society has built systems that trust only this data self—the numbers appear to be objective, so they must be the truth; the person before you is obviously self-interested,
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''First, the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism is a system of dialectics that is based on the foundation of the scientific materialist viewpoint.''
  
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==== Annotation 102 ====
  
and therefore cannot be trusted. Lyon argues that surveillance systems bypass the speaking subject to trust/rely on only more “objective” accounts of who you are: computer files or chemical or biological markers (such as DNA, fingerprints, or other forms of biometrics). Systems based on science and technology are deemed to be neutral and objective and therefore more reliable than the subjective assessment of a human agent—though research has shown significant biases built into science and technology, like biometrics, especially when it comes to issues of race.3 Significant decisions about you, your family, your life, and your future are made solely by referring (and algorithmically manipulating) the data self, despite the fact that such information is often inaccurate (please check all your credit reports carefully!) or biased. A consequence of this situation is the rise of identity theft. Though we know, when we talk about identity theft, that you cannot be stolen (it’s kidnapping if it’s your body and something else if it’s your soul), we must acknowledge that some piece of you—something that helps make you who you are and allows you to live as you do—is gone.
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Remember that ''scientific'' in Marxism-Leninism refers broadly to a systematic pursuit of knowledge, research, theory, and understanding [see Objects and Purposes of Study, p. 38]. Remember also that ''materialism'' in Marxism-Leninism has specific meaning as well, which differentiates it from other forms of materialism [see ''Dialectical Materialism — the Most Advanced Form of Materialism'', p. 52]. Here, materialism includes an understanding that the material is the first basis of reality, meaning that the material determines the ideal (though human consciousness can impact the material world through willpower and labor [see ''Nature and Structure of Consciousness'', p. 79]). Materialism is also built upon scientific explanations (rooted in empirical data and practice, i.e. systematic experimentation and observation) of the world. And finally, remember that ''viewpoint'' is the starting point of inquiry [see Annotation 11, p. 12].
  
The lesson here is simple: identity and technology are intimately related. In this case, technologies of verification, data storage and analysis, finance, risk management, and others, both directly and indirectly impact our lives and indeed set the conditions and parameters for our existence: what type and amount of loan you can secure for education, housing, transportation, business; what insurance you can get; what resources are located near you; how you are regarded by police and other civic services; and so on. Indeed, even who you are determined to be (what race, gender, class, sexuality, citizenship, ability, and so on) is entangled in technological assemblages.
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Thus, a ''scientific materialist viewpoint'' is a perspective which begins analysis of the world in a manner that is both scientifically systematic in pursuit of understanding and firmly rooted in a materialist conception of the world.
  
Identity as Assemblage
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''Note:'' Materialist Dialectics contains ''Twelve Basic Pairs of Categories'', ''Two Basic Principles'' and ''Three Universal Laws''. These are summarized, respectively, in Appendix A (p. 246), Appendix B (p. 247), and Appendix C (p. 248), and explained in depth throughout the rest of this chapter.
  
Taking our assemblage approach to technological culture seriously means that we approach the issue of identity and technology not as the conjoining or articulation of two different artifacts (person and technology), but as an emerging assemblage. Identity is assemblage, it is the expression of an assemblage. It is not an element of the assemblage, not a product (effect) of the assemblage. It is what the assemblage achieves.
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In this way, materialist dialectics fundamentally differs from the classical German idealist dialectics, and especially differs from Hegelian dialectics<ref>See Annotation 98, p. 100.</ref> (as these dialectics were founded on idealist viewpoints).
  
What do we mean by identity? Identity is a sense of unity and coherence that can be felt, lived, and attributed. Personal identity consists of names, biography, features, and sense of self (that is, there is a me here, a you there). Broader identities include categories or groups that one belongs to, like race, nationality, gender, and so on (I am also American, I am human, you are Nicaraguan, you are an illegal immigrant, you are a corporation, you are a person). A sense of self, these senses of identity, do not exist a priori. Rather they are the expressions of assemblages. Deleuze was fond of writing that there is no “I,” only the habit of saying “I.” Similarly, there is no you, no them, only assemblages within which both you and the other is constructed.
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Moreover, it also has a higher level of development compared to other dialectical systems of thought found in the history of philosophy going back to ancient times. Such previous forms of dialectics were fundamentally based on materialist stances, however the materialism of those ancient times was still naive, primitive and surface-level.
  
We focus here in this chapter on one’s sense of self in relation to the technological assemblage because where the assemblage is currently most culturally
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''Second, the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism unifies dialectical materialist viewpoints and materialist dialectical methodology, so it not only explains the world, but is also a tool humans can use to perceive and improve the world.''
  
Identity
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Every principle and law of Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics is both:
  
O 199
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1. An accurate explanation of the dialectical characteristics of the world.
  
salient has to do with what is a person. What am I? What am I as a human being? What we mean by identity or the self is always already caught up in assemblages of technology. Consider, for example, the idea that gender is an assemblage. That is, one’s gender is a performance of scripts, signs, and codes. A gender is not what someone has, but what someone does (this is the insight of Judith Butler4). We are continually performing our versions of gender in our fashion, movement, language use, and interactions with others (where we may seek to police gender categories as well, by affirming or critiquing others’ performances). An individual does not perform gender in a vacuum, but that performance is an expression of an assemblage: bodies of discourses, codes, and social expectations that we take up, inhabit or challenge in some way, but also bodies of technologies which bend space, mediate action, and translate will. Technologies, for example, afford (suggest) certain uses by certain types of bodies. Gender assumptions are even built into our technologies. To explain this point we can reflect on the prescriptive aspects of technological agents (to use Latour’s language).
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2. A scientific methodology for perceiving and improving the world.
  
Those who delegate to a technology are not the only ones impinged on by it; once a technology is in place, it acts on all those who encounter it. Though this sounds egalitarian, remember that technologies are designed with sets of assumptions about their users: what they weigh, how tall they are, their abilities, their intelligence, and other demographic factors. The technology, in turn, assumes that all users match this profile, in spite of the fact that they will not all do so. For example, though we might think of a technology like photographic film as being neutral in that it simply captures the image of what is in front of the camera, Richard Dyer has persuasively argued that the chemical composition of what became standard film stock for still photography or films, plus standard lighting fixtures and practices and the structure of cameras, presume that the subject being photographed is white (that is, Caucasian), and so this assemblage does not capture the images of people of color as effectively.5 Similar constraints plague contemporary digital image-capture technologies, hampering (and adding substantial bias to) efforts to use biometric technologies like face recognition, which have significant problems with non-white faces.6
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By summarizing the general interconnections and development of all things — every phenomenon in nature, society and human thought — Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics provides the most general methodological principles for the process of perceiving and improving the world. They are not just objective methodological principles; they are a comprehensive, constantly developing, and historical methodology.
  
Technologies make two kinds of assumptions: what we will call design assumptions and system assumptions. Both figure significantly in matters of identity. By making assumptions, technologies not only prefer certain uses and users over others, they prescribe certain cultural (including gendered and raced) behaviors, attitudes, and practices. In other words, they contribute in very particular ways to the performance of identity. Design assumptions are the basic assumptions of an individual technology about the people using it, in other words, which users the technology seems to prefer. These assumptions usually go unnoticed unless you are someone for whom the technology was not designed. If you are left-handed, you know exactly what we mean: ladles pour from the wrong side, doors close from the wrong side, handle grips feel awkward, and writing on most school desks is a challenge. In another example, very tall, very large, or very short people can easily spot the limitations of automobile design. Most automobiles are
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This methodology can be used to analyze contradictions [see Annotation 119, p. 123] in order to find the basic origins and motivations of both motion and developmental processes. Therefore, materialist dialectics is a great scientific tool for the revolutionary class to perceive and improve the world.
  
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With these basic features, materialist dialectics plays a very important role in the worldview and philosophical methodology of Marxism-Leninism. Materialist dialectics are the foundation of the scientific and revolutionary characteristics of Marxism-Leninism and also offer the most general worldview and methodology for creative activities in scientific study and practical activities.
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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== II. Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics ==
  
built to accommodate “average”-sized people, discriminating somewhat against women, whose average height tends to be shorter than men. Seatbelts don’t fit, the mirrors are placed wrong, and the steering wheel is at the wrong angle, to list a few problems. Modern automobiles allow users to adjust the seat, steering column, and mirrors, but only within a limited range of possibility.
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By their very design, computers shape how we use them. Beth E. Kolko writes that, “technology interfaces carry the power to prescribe representative norms and patterns, constructing a self-replicating and exclusionary category of the ‘ideal’ user.”7 Most computers are constructed with the assumption that you have the use of both hands to type and use the mouse, that you can see the screen, and you have the mental capacity to negotiate its technical challenges. But computer design makes assumptions about more than just the physical and mental abilities of this ideal user. In fact, computers assume an awful lot. The computer assumes that you have a consistent and reliable power source, the money to pay for that power, a place to put the computer, an internet connection, reliable service, the money to pay for that service, the money to purchase software, the time off from work and other activities (making food, raising children) to learn how to use the computer, and so on. It also assumes that you have access to someone who can fix it when it breaks and update it when it’s obsolete. Computers assume, in short, much more than is accurate about the majority of the world’s population. But this discussion has moved us from a consideration of design assumptions to the second kind of assumptions that technologies make: system assumptions.
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==== Annotation 103 ====
  
Because technologies are not isolated tools but parts of systems of technologies, we can detect the work of system assumptions: the assumptions made by the system within which the technology functions. We can begin by looking at support systems (fuel costs, replacement costs, repair costs, supply costs) and how some technologies are connected to others.8 Fast-food systems provide an interesting and extended example of the consequences of systems assumptions. Think of the McDonald’s restaurant chain as a technology, or rather as a series of technologies connected together in a technological assemblage, the goal of which is to provide inexpensive hot food to a maximum number of people in a minimum time.9 This system works quite well for most of the population. As sociologist Susan Leigh Star puts it:
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-23.png|''The Principle of General Relationships and the Principle of Development are the most basic principles of materialist dialectics. These two principles are dialectically related to one another.'']]
  
McDonald’s appears to be an ordinary, universal, ubiquitous restaurant chain. Unless you are: vegetarian, on a salt-free diet, keep kosher, eat organic foods, have diverticulosis (where the sesame seeds on the buns may be dangerous for your digestion), housebound, too poor to eat out at all—or allergic to onions.10
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The following sections will outline the Principle of General Relationships and the Principle of Development, which are the most fundamental principles of materialist dialectics. These two concepts are closely (and dialectically) related:
  
If McDonald’s recognizes a significant market demand, it will alter its system to cater to these particularities: vegetarian burgers in some places, mutton burgers in others. However, no matter how many niche markets one identifies, there will always be people outside the system who are inconvenienced or even harmed by the system. Star was allergic to onions, even if cooked, and found that getting
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Identity
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=== 1. The Principle of General Relationships ===
  
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''a. Definition of Relationship and Common Relationship''
  
any food establishment (not just McDonald’s) to omit the onions (to not even put them “on the side”) an endless task. Greg is lactose intolerant and needs to police his food for milk products; you try ordering a pizza without cheese and see the looks you get. However, lactose intolerance in recent years has been more widely recognized as a common disorder and has become a niche more readily catered to than onion allergies.
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Star raised the point about being allergic to onions, not simply to draw attention to the potential cruelty and inconvenience of large-scale systems, or even to remind us that there will always be people outside the system, ignored by design practices, though these are important points. She emphasizes instead that we are all affected by such technological systems, that we must begin with “the fact of McDonald’s no matter where you fall on the scale of participation, since you live in a landscape with its presence, in a city altered by it, or out in the country, where you, at least, drive by it and see the red and gold against the green of the trees, hear the radio advertising it, or have children who can hum its jingle.”11 Technological assemblages thus impose and impinge on people who do not even consciously participate in those assemblages.
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==== Annotation 104 ====
  
The ways that we enter into assemblages, or are swept up in them, shape possibilities of behavior, thought, and language. If we think of the modern home as an assemblage, we can begin to see how the assumptions of that identity affect men and women differently, affording particular performances of gendered identity. In Chapter 3 we introduced Ruth Schwartz Cowan’s classic study, More Work for Mother, which traces the history of what have been called labor-saving technologies in the home: electric dishwashers, clothes washers and dryers, refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, and appliances in general. The purpose of these technologies was to accomplish strenuous tasks with less effort and time, and make life easier. Although most of these technologies were developed by men working outside the home, they affected women in the home. Since the tasks addressed by these technologies have traditionally been women’s tasks, these technologies impinged on women much more than on men. What Cowan discovered is that these technologies actually increased the amount of time women spent laboring in the home. They did not save labor, time, or effort for these women. Instead, the men’s inventions placed more demands on women and their work. How did this increase happen? Many tasks once outsourced to others, such as laundry and ironing, could now be done—and therefore had to be done—at home. Tasks that once included children and other family members—in such family efforts as “wash day”— could now be done by one person, and inevitably that one person was the mother. Furthermore, these technologies contributed to creating a higher standard of cleanliness than had been previously appreciated and expected. Because we could now conveniently and easily launder clothes on a daily basis, the technology contributed to the notion that we must launder them after every wearing to be considered clean. Carpet cleaning had once been a communal annual or semi-annual activity for the family. Carpets were rolled up, hauled outside, and beaten. With the introduction of the vacuum into the household, the carpet could suddenly be vacuumed and cleaned more frequently, a fact that contributed to the belief that it
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The ''Principle of General Relationships'' describes how all things, phenomena, and ideas are related to one another, and are defined by these internal and external relationships
  
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The ''Principle of Development'' relates to the idea that motion, change, and development are driven by internal and external relationships.
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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These two principles are dialectically linked: any given subject is defined by its internal relationships, and these same relationships drive the development of every subject.
  
must be vacuumed and cleaned more frequently. Sweeping the floor was no longer good enough. Now carpet cleaning with a vacuum is a solitary activity that can be performed far more often, even weekly or daily.
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Note: The foundation of the principles of Materialist Dialectics were laid out by
  
The technologies certainly did not achieve these effects “on their own.” The gendering of specific tasks (delegating tasks to one gender more than another) is definitely reinforced by advertisements, social expectations, habits, and cultural understandings. A technology is always developed in, or rises out of, particular circumstances, and its use is always introduced into a gendered environment. Ann Gray, for example, found that when videocassette recorders (VCRs) were introduced into homes in Britain in the 1980s, their use matched established gendered patterns for the use of household technol-ogies.12 Specifically, men tend to use technologies at home for specific limited tasks, such as fixing a leak, making bookshelves, or changing an automobile’s oil; whereas women tend to use technologies for ongoing day-to-day chores, such as housecleaning. In addition, “high-tech” devices tend to be male ter-ritory.13 Although leisure technologies in general tend to be gender-neutral, Gray found that it was the men who usually learned how to use the VCR first and remained the household experts on more advanced functions such as timed recording. Though the women in her study learned how to record, playback, and rewind a tape, they usually turned to their male partners if the machine needed to be programmed to record at a later date and time. Control issues are especially evident in the observation that if more than one person is watching television, the remote control is almost always in the hand of a male adult, or, if not, then a male child (this may be changing, finally).14 Further, the VCR became an element in a long-shifting negotiation of leisure space and time within the domestic environment, an environment in which it is much easier for men to establish “time out” for relaxation than it is for women, who are constantly concerned with domestic chores.
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Engels in ''Dialectics of Nature''. Engels began working on ''Dialectics of Nature'' in February, 1870 and had to stop in 1876 to work on ''Anti-Dühring''. He then restarted work on ''Dialectics of Nature'' in 1878 and continued working on it until 1883, when Karl Marx died. Engels felt that it was more important to try and put together Marx’s great unfinished works, ''Capital Volumes 2, 3, and 4'', and so stopped working on ''Dialectics of Nature'' once again. So, unfortunately, Engels died before this seminal work on Materialist Dialectics could be completed, and what we have instead is an unfinished assemblage of notes.
  
A similar set of issues arose when the personal computer became a fixture of many homes in the 1980s and 1990s. Marsha Cassidy describes how the personal computer was marketed predominantly to men in the 1980s, but with slowing sales and a desire to make PCs a common domestic appliance, marketers began targeting women in the 1990s.15 Following Cowan’s work, Cassidy points out that the PC was advertised as a laborsaving device, in particular saving the labor of women in the home. It did so by emphasizing the PC’s role in allowing women to work from home (telecommuting), manage the household (keeping track of shopping lists and family schedules), and enhance the children’s education. Like other domestic technologies before it, the PC also makes more work for mother by increasing her responsibilities (and potentially moving the working mother back out of the office and into the home, concentrating paid and unpaid work in the home).16 Cassidy’s research also touches on the spatial dimensions of technology in that she raises the question of where to put the PC in the home. Because there are few spaces in a typical home that are exclusively a woman’s (versus a man’s “den” or the children’s own rooms) the location of the PC and the gendered responsibilities
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What follows in the rest of this book is a cohesive system of Materialist Dialectics which was built upon the foundations laid out by Engels in ''Dialectics of Nature'' and many other works of political and scholarly writing from various sources. This is the system of Materialist Dialectics studied by Vietnamese students and applied by Vietnamese communists today.
  
Identity
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Because this text comes from predominantly Vietnamese scholarship and ideological development, we have had to translate some terms into English which are not derived from the “canon” of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. In some cases, various terms have been consolidated into one concept. For example: Engels used the term “interconnection” (German: ''innern'' ''Zusammenhang'', literally: “inner connections”) in ''Dialectics of Nature'', but Vietnamese political scientists use the term “relationship.” Where Engels uses the term “motion” (German: ''Bewegung'') modern Vietnamese communists tend to use the word “development.” Wherever this is the case, we have chosen to use the words in English which most closely match the language used in the original Vietnamese of this text.
  
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In materialist dialectics, the word ''relationship'' refers to the regulating principles, mutual interactions, and mutual transformations which exist between things, phenomena, and ideas, as well as those existing between aspects and factors within things, phenomena, and ideas.
  
for its use raise key questions about gender, labor, and technology in the domestic environment.
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These examples show how gender expectations and performances emerge alongside assemblages of devices, expectations, and so on, that is the domestic realm. We are often not aware that our senses of self and our way of life are expressions of our assemblages, though we become aware from time to time of how systems impinge on us.
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==== Annotation 105 ====
  
Differentiating Machines
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Throughout this book, ''phenomenon/phenomena'' simply refers to anything that is observable by the human senses.
  
Assemblages are discriminatory. That is, they are differentiating machines. And we see this nowhere more clearly than the case of identity. Identity gets caught up in technologies of categorization. For example, take the case of Caster Semenya, a young South African runner who won the women’s 800-meter race at the World Championships in 2009. She had to be submitted to a number of medical examinations to answer challenges that she was, indeed, female. The case sparked debates over what constituted femaleness and maleness, and what were appropriate means of testing one’s sex (physical features? DNA?). Semenya was eventually declared female, allowed to keep her medal, and continues to compete.
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Materialist dialectics examines relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas and ''within'' things, phenomena, and ideas. A relationship which occurs between two separate things or phenomena is referred to as an ''external relationship''. A relationship which occurs ''within'' a thing or phenomenon is referred to as an ''internal relationship''.
  
One of the legacies of the eighteenth century European Enlightenment was the idea that modern science was rational, ordered, and morally superior. It was believed that the world could be understood through rational means, by detached objective observation, and by the labeling and categorization of all things.17 Everything was said to have a distinct identity and to be related to other things in distinct ways. The grand schemes of scientific nomenclature derive from this era. For example, Linnaeus attempted to categorize all living things in terms of kingdom, phylum, genus, species, and so on. As rational and logical categories, these divisions were thought to be absolute: You were a plant or an animal, not both. (Scientists have since accepted several grey areas as categories, although that is not widely known.) Among the most obvious categories were male and female, though not all species made this distinction. In terms of humans, the male/female division seems self-evident. But this is not always the case. For example, a number of children are born each year bearing some physical characteristics of both sexes, and occasionally quite distinctive physical attributes such as the “wrong” genitalia. These children are referred to as being “intersexed.”
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These terms are relative; sometimes a relationship may be internal in one context but external in a different context. For example, consider a solar system:
  
This is where technology steps back into the picture. The scientific schemes for knowing and labeling the population become technologies of standardization and normalization, techniques for identifying the normal and the deviant through medical inspection. A child is declared normal or deviant, and those declared deviant have to be normalized. In the case of intersexed children, this can be as simple as purposefully ignoring the difference if it is slight, utilizing techniques to socialize the child “properly,” or using treatments as complex and radical as hormone therapy and corrective surgery. The chances of a child being intersexed in some way is one in two thousand (or about 65,000 per year).18 Until a few years ago, it
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When considering a solar system as a whole, the orbit of a moon around a planet may be considered as an internal relationship of the solar system. But when considering the moon as an isolated subject, its orbit around a planet may be seen as an external relationship which the moon has with the planet.
  
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-24.png]]
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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The diagram above illustrates different types of relationships:
  
was standard medical procedure to immediately perform corrective surgery on the infant—without even informing the parents.
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Object 1 has its own internal relationships (A), and, from its own perspective, it also has external relationships with Object 2 (B). From a wider perspective, the relationship between Object 1 and Object 2 (B) may be viewed as an internal relationship.
  
The presence of the “deviant” would suggest there is actually a continuum of body types from traditional male to traditional female (and not just a continuum of body types—there is a wider variety of chromosomal pairings beyond the XX and XY that most of us were taught in school). Cultural and medical technologies of normalization (and we mean those of categorization much more prevalently than those of surgery) work against that continuum and on the general population to identify, characterize, and reinforce discrete categories of physical characteristics and behavior. So when we identify ourselves as female or male, we do so as products of technological assemblages of cultural conditioning and medical technique.
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This ''system of relationships'' (between Object 1 and Object 2) will also have external relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas (C).
  
Like gender, race has been the object of intense scientific speculation and research. Despite the accepted scientific categories (Caucasoid, Negroid, and so on) there is no scientific, biological basis for racial differentiation. There are no physical traits that fall absolutely in only one category, and there is no DNA marker by which to differentiate the population. Racial categories and the characteristics attributed to different races are purely cultural.19 However, this does not mean that schemes of racial categorization don’t have real effects on real people. The technological assemblages of racial classification have tremendous impacts on citizenship, immigration, and quality of life within different countries.20 From access to jobs, education, and housing, to freedom of movement and rights within the legal system, racial classification systems have significant effects.
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Not only are there technological assemblages that produce the categories of race, gender, and class, and place us within them, but other technological assemblages discriminate based on these categories. Let us look at an example discussed by Langdon Winner: the case of Robert Moses, the architect who designed some of the major public works of New York from the 1920s through the 1970s.21 Moses was responsible for parkways, bridges, and other large constructions that we often take for granted. Indeed, we often do not consider such structures as technologies, though of course they are. One might assume that public works impinge on all users equally. After all, how can a road discriminate? Can’t we all drive on them equally? Ah, there is a lesson here in how we can be so easily deceived by the appearance of things.
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Relationships have a quality of ''generality'', which refers to how frequently they occur between and within things, phenomena, and ideas. When we refer to ''general relationships'', we are usually referring to relationships which exist broadly across many things, phenomena, and ideas. General relationships can exist both internally, ''within'' things, phenomena, and ideas, and externally, ''between'' things, phenomena, and ideas.
  
We focus on one of Moses’s public works: the bridges over the parkways on Long Island. These overpasses are amazingly low, in some places leaving only nine feet of clearance overhead. This does not hinder anyone driving a standard automobile, but the bridges effectively hinder the passage of taller vehicles, like trucks or busses. Therefore, the bridges discriminate against those who drive trucks or ride busses. Those who ride busses are less likely to own their own cars and more likely to come from the lower classes. Consequently, the lower classes have a more difficult time getting to Long Island. Minorities are also more likely to make use of public transportation, so their access is restricted as well.
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The most general relationships are ''universal relationships'': these are relationships that exist between and within ''everything'' and ''all phenomena'', and they are one of the two primary subjects of study of materialist dialectics. [The other primary subject of study is the ''Principle of Development''; see page 119.]
  
Are these bridges an unfortunate mistake or a thoughtless error? According to Moses’s biographer, Robert A. Caro, the bridges were deliberately designed to
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Identity
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==== Annotation 106 ====
  
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-25.png]]
  
hinder poor people and blacks, not only from using the parkways, but also from accessing Jones Beach, a park Moses designed. In this case, the task delegated to the technology was in part that of racial and class discrimination. The bridges continue to impinge this particular lesson back on all who drive (or who cannot drive) down the parkways of Long Island.
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The discussion of generality of relationships can seem confusing at first. What’s important to understand is that generality is a spectrum ranging from the least general relationships (''unique relationships'', which only occur between two ''specific'' things/phenomena/ideas) and the most general relationships (''universal relationships'', which occur between or within ''all'' things/phenomena/ideas).
  
Mobilizing Technologies to Rearticulate Identity
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Of particular importance in the study of materialist dialectics are ''universal'' relationships which exist within and between all things, phenomena, and ideas [see below].
  
Until now in this discussion, people, individuals, seem relatively passive—and are categorized, gendered, raced, classed, controlled, and manipulated based on gender and race. But at times people take up technologies more directly to address questions of identity. For example, technologies can be used to alter identities to either conform to or rebel against cultural norms. These “technologies of the body” range from makeup to surgery. Makeup is used to alter one’s appearance to fit within cultural norms of attractiveness and to exaggerate or emphasize gendered characteristics of appearance, such as the eyes or lips. But makeup is also used to alter racial characteristics. For example, skinlightening cream is used to change the color of one’s skin so that it better meets the cultural ideal of fair skin and “white” identity. Other cosmetic technologies that work to alter identity include surgical technologies such as liposuction, collagen implants, breast augmentation and reduction, face-lifts, nose jobs, and penis enhancement. Women are the predominant users of procedures like these, but men also use them. These surgeries can reinforce cultural standards of attractiveness.22 Cosmetic surgeries also alter racial characteristics. For example, such procedures are relatively common in Southeast Asia, where Asian women have cosmetic eyelid surgery to rid themselves of their epicanthic eyelid to take on the rounder eye shape of Western (Caucasian) standards of beauty. However, this example is more complicated, since women may undergo the operation in order to minimize the racist reactions that their epicanthic eyelids elicit (as a marker of racial difference) rather than explicitly to look white.23 As genetic science and technology become more sophisticated, the technology will be used to alter these identity characteristics on a genetic level by selecting out or altering the human genome.
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''Translation Note'': In the original Vietnamese, the word “universal” is not used. Instead, the compound term “phổ biến nhất” is used, which literally means “most general.” In Vietnamese, this phrasing is commonly used to describe the concept of “universal” and it is thus not confusing to Vietnamese speakers. For this translation, we have opted to use the word “universal” because we feel it is less confusing and better explains the concept in English.
  
Another sphere where we have been taking identity construction into our own hands has been online. For example, we create online versions of ourselves all the time, at times with characteristics and habits quite at odds with the “real” us. We have Facebook pages, Instagram profiles, Twitter feeds, webpages, blogs, avatars in the World of Warcraft, Minecraft, or Second Life, usernames with distinct identities in online forum on news sites, popular culture sites, and on and on.
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The construction of online identities has been a topic of much discussion since the 1990s. In her influential book, Life on the Screen, social psychologist Sherry Turkle interviewed students who spent a great deal of their time online.24 She found that text-based interactive environments such as MUDs (MultiUser Dimensions), MOOs (MUD, Object Oriented), and even chat rooms allowed the students the opportunity to “be” someone else, occasionally several
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The universal relationships include (but are not limited to):
  
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* Relationships between basic philosophical category pairs (Private and Common, Essence and Phenomenon, etc.). <ref>See ''Private and Common'', p. 128; ''Essence and Phenomenon'', p. 156.</ref>
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* Relationships between quantity and quality. <ref>See Annotation 117, p. 119.</ref>
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* Relationships between opposites. <ref>See Annotation 190, p. 181.</ref>
  
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Together, in all forms of relationships in nature, society and human thought (special, general, and universal) there is unity in diversity and diversity in unity.
  
other people, because such environments are created solely by textual description. Online a person can describe their appearance, feelings, actions, and environment however they choose. They can be tall, handsome, well built, beautiful, funny, smart, and self-assured; they don’t even have to be human. Beyond the initial description, they simply have to interact with others online according to their purported personality (confidently, quickly, intelligently, belligerently, humorously, and so forth). In engaging in these interactive role-playing scenarios over time, people often develop entirely different lives and identities for themselves. Some individuals run multiple characters on a single site, or different characters in different environments. In an oft-cited passage, early on in her book, Turkle quotes “Doug,” a midwestern college junior:
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I split my mind. I’m getting better at it. I can see myself as being two or three or more. And I just turn on one part of my mind and then another when I go from window to window [on my computer screen]. I’m in some kind of argument in one window and trying to come on to a girl in a MUD in another, and another window might be running a spreadsheet program or some other technical thing for school.. And then I’ll get a real-time message [that flashes on the screen as soon as it is sent from another system user], and I guess that’s RL [real life]. It’s just one more window...RL is just one more window, and it’s not usually my best one.25
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==== Annotation 107 ====
  
Online experiences such as these illustrate the limitations of the assumption that each of us has only a single core identity; although we didn’t need computers to point out that we have many sides and aspects to our identities and personalities. We only need to observe our own and others’ behaviors in different situations to witness dynamically different personalities coming to the fore. For example, you might be focused and serious in class, but fun and flirty in a bar. But the Internet allows you to completely rework appearance in an online environment by controlling nonverbal communication. You are free to describe how you look, your expressions, posture, gestures, reactions, and so on. You can “try on” other appearances and personalities that would be impossible (or embarrassing) to carry off in real life. So this rearticulation of identity goes far beyond dressing and acting differently for a particular occasion or event, where you would have far less control over the nonverbal aspects of who you are.
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==== Principle of General Relationships ====
  
The mode of communication facilitated by the Internet raises to new heights old questions about the cohesion of identity. Are we single selves or multiple beings? Can we change who we are? Online identities often seem independent and autonomous, just as cyberspace is sometimes seen as an independent and autonomous space. However, from the perspective of assemblage, we have to consider the myriad articulations between online happenings and offline events and how identity is challenged in and by this reconfigured space.
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According to ''Curriculum of the Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism For University and College Students Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought: “''Materialist dialectics upholds the position that all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in mutual relationships with each other, regulate each other, transform into each other, and that nothing exists in complete isolation. That is the core idea of the ''Principle of General Relationships''.
  
Digital You
+
From this Principle, we find the characteristics of ''Diversity in Unity'' and ''Unity in Diversity''; the basis of Diversity in Unity is the fact that every thing, phenomenon, or idea, contains many different relationships; the basis of Unity in Diversity is that many different relationships exist — unified — within each and every thing, phenomenon, and idea.
  
As Internet use becomes a daily activity for people, it is no longer a radically distinct, compartmentalized activity; and the play, experimentation, and activity
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==== Diversity in Unity ====
  
Identity
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There exist an infinite number of diverse relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas, but all of these relationships share the same foundation in the material world.
  
O 207
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-26.png|''An infinite diversity of relationships exist within the unity of the material world.'']]
  
that flow through these modes are surely sites of significant change in the shape of identity in technological culture. For example, now that we can access social networking sites such as Facebook or Twitter (or the hundreds of other networking sites) on our mobile phones, and not just at our desktop computers, they not only permeate, potentially, more hours and aspects of our waking day, they are seen less and less as being an “online” activity, separate from “offline” activities. Think of the number of ways that you may maintain your identity technologically: you may have created an avatar on a platform such as Second Life, World of Warcraft, or Minecraft; you may craft your Facebook Page with care; or you may maintain a blog or Twitter stream. These activities entail at times a significant investment of time and emotional energy to produce and maintain a particular version of you through the words of tweets or blogs, or the videos you post to YouTube or Vine, or the images accompanying your profile. This is the seemingly endless burden of reputation management. Some young people, for example, are continually updating their profile image as their mood or situation changes and have become quite adept at self-portraiture. But the maintenance of a carefully crafted image can also entail your commentary on friends’ pages and your involvement in the social network at large. It also entails a certain level of vigilance, since aspects of our online identity are outside of our control. For example, others can post comments about us or photos in which we are tagged, all of which go into the online profile of you. Students talk about searching out and untagging pictures from parties and other events with which they don’t necessarily want to be permanently associated.
+
The material world is not a chaotic and random assortment of things, phenomena, and ideas. Rather, it is a system of relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas. Likewise, since the material world exists as the foundation of all things, phenomena, and ideas, the material world is thus the foundation for all relationships within and between things, phenomena, and ideas. Because all relationships share a foundation in the material world, they also exist in unity, even though all relationships are diversified and different from one another.
  
And that’s another aspect of this online identity. It’s relatively permanent: Though you may delete comments, photos, even entire profiles, copies still exist on servers or in other databases of which you have no knowledge. And it continues after your body perishes. Indeed, one of the tasks now left to heirs once someone has passed on is hunting down and extinguishing traces: bank accounts, licenses, subscriptions, email accounts, Facebook pages, and more. And as more material goes online, such as old newspapers, yearbooks, and other documents, the Google search result, which is the way we are increasingly represented to others, incorporates all these. And the digital you grows, a digital you that is inseparable from the nondigital you. Online affairs have real world consequences on relationships. And online comments can open one to be fired from one’s workplace or even to be denied employment in the first place (employers Google prospective applicants routinely). And while we may want to discursively separate “us” from our data, they are inevitably entangled and pragmatically and materially articulated.
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Now, not everyone thinks that this accumulation of personal information is a problem. Marketers especially are more than happy to follow the digital trail of your habits, likes, and relations. But some researchers, such as Microsoft researchers Gordon Bell and Jim Gemmell, argue that there can be personal benefit to the digitizing of your life.26 In a project they call MyLifeBits they attempt to record every aspect of Bell’s daily life. A camera and microphone record his encounters with others and all images and sounds he comes across (from Muzak to TV).
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-27.png|''Universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas manifest in infinitely diverse ways.'']]
  
208 O
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'''Unity in Diversity'''
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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When we examine the universal relationships that exist within and between all different things, phenomena, and ideas, we will find that each individual manifestation of any universal relationship will have its own different manifestations, aspects, features, etc. Thus even the universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in infinite diversity.
  
All books and documents he reads are scanned, as are all receipts and photographs he collects. This practice is called lifelogging. All of this is then available to him as a searchable database. He can look up an acquaintance’s name that he’s forgotten, access old papers or passages whenever or wherever he needs them, or search for patterns (of relationships, health, spending…). Bell and Gemmell write that such a database provides a more objective view of your life which can help you make good decisions.
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''Paraphrased From: Curriculum of the Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism For University and College Students Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought''
  
MyLifeBits and lifelogging parallel a movement that goes under the name of The Quantified Self. Proponents of this movement argue that using mobile devices to monitor and record aspects of your body in everyday life (from your blood pressure and blood glucose to the miles you walk or run, the food you eat, the hours you sleep, your changing mood, your productivity) can provide accurate and objective data that can be used to diagnose health conditions, monitor fitness or weight loss, or alter habits. For some, such self-tracking (self-surveillance) is specific and goal-oriented: I want to lose weight, I want to quit smoking, I need to manage diabetes, I want to run a marathon. For others, the goal is a form of self-knowledge, almost self-actualization. We should note that the “self” being explored or actualized here is one based solely on physiological processes; we are our bodies and no more. This is a similar notion of “self” to what is used in biometric surveillance schemes: you are your body and the data your body generates.27
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Identity is an expression of an assemblage, in this case an assemblage of bodies, devices, data, and ideologies of individualism, self-reliance, and efficiency. It is an assemblage that renders aspects of identity quantifiable, visible, circulatable, and analyzable. Gilles Deleuze once wrote that we are no longer individuals in contemporary assemblages, but dividuals, a collection of endlessly fragmented and circulated bits that are tweaked, tracked, and controlled.28
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==== b. Characteristics of Relationships ====
  
The Distributed Self
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Objectiveness, generality, and diversity are the three basic characteristics of relationships.
  
In the previous examples of assemblages of identity we can see how our sense of identity is produced, extended, challenged, or managed by the arrangement of things and languages that make up the assemblage. Our digital doppelgangers prowl the Internet; our appliances reinforce gender norms, and so on. But if we are to take the idea of identity as assemblage seriously, we need to go a step further. It’s not just that we (our selves and our bodies) are caught up in assemblages, but that our very sense of self is already an assemblage, it is already an arrangement of things, expressions, affects, and so on, a part-hardwired/part-contingent collaboration of body, technology, and environment. In terms of the idea of self, this would include the idea that our sense of self extends beyond our mind and even beyond our bodies, to encompass tools and other features of our environment.
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''-'' ''The Characteristic of Objectiveness of Relationships''
  
For example, when we use a tool, from a stick to an automobile, at some point doesn’t it become part of us, part of our identity? Marshall McLuhan once wrote of technologies as extensions of humans: the wheel is the extension of the foot, and so on; that is, these technologies become an extension of our functioning.29 But in a felt sense as well as a functional sense, don’t we become
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According to the materialist dialectical viewpoint, relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas have objective characteristics.
  
Identity
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O 209
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==== Annotation 108 ====
  
part of the car when we sit in the driver’s seat? A classic example of this is from the philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty who talks about the use of a walking stick. After a while, we perceive that we are feeling the ground, when we are “actually” just feeling the vibrations through our hand of the impact of the stick on the ground. “The stick is no longer sensed for itself. For the person, the stick has ceased to be an object; it becomes part of the body.”30 Another way of thinking about this is the fact that we are often not aware of our shoes, they are just part of our feet, though our choice of shoe affects how we stand or move, affects our height or even how our feet relate to the ground (e.g., at an angle, through thick padding, and so on). As psychologist Naoya Hirose put it “Tools shift the boundary between the body and the environment.”31
+
In materialist dialectics, objectiveness is an abstract concept that refers to the relative externality of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Every thing, phenomena and idea exists externally to every other thing, phenomena, and idea. This means that to each individual subject (i.e., each individual thing/phenomena/idea), all other things, phenomena, and ideas are external objects
  
To continue the shoe example, think of the running shoe. If you are a runner, you are most often unaware of your shoes; they are extensions of you, of how you run. And while running seems natural, there are a number of different styles of running (which include posture, foot-strike, stride, and so on). Like almost anything having to do with our body, we need to learn how to run. Anthropologist Marcel Mauss once wrote that our bodies are the first technologies that we need to master. These “techniques of the body” (how we walk, swim, talk, run) are learned and relearned and become habits.32 In running you can “heel strike” (land on your heel and roll forward), “forefoot strike” (land on the ball of your foot), or “midfoot strike,” and there is a debate over which is more “natural” and/or less prone to injury—and there is little scientific evidence either way.33 Landing on the heel produces more force that the leg must absorb, but the great majority of runners today heel-strike.34 However, the great majority of runners also wear, and grew up wearing, what we might call “normal” running shoes: shoes with a higher heel with thick cushioning and arch support. These shoes were invented in the 1960s; before that runners ran in shoes much flatter and thinner. There has been a movement in the running community (inspired in part by Christopher McDougall’s bestselling book, Born to Run35) away from mainstream running shoes and toward shoes that approximate running barefoot, with a fore-foot strike. Mainstream running shoes, it is argued, delegate cushioning and balance control to the shoe itself, encouraging the runner to heel-strike. When many people run barefoot on a hard surface, they may avoid heel-striking because, simply, it hurts. Barefoot running (or running in flat, “minimalist” shoes), with a fore-foot strike, it is argued, distributes the function of cushioning and balance control across the muscles and tendons of the feet and legs. In addition, we could argue that running barefoot (or nearly so) allows one to feel closer to the environment. To shift to the new minimalist shoes means becoming aware of how you move your legs, how your foot contacts the earth, and the nature of the surface and environment in which you run.
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-28.png|''All things, phenomena, and ideas have the relative characteristic of objectiveness.'']]
  
So we have two assemblages, each with different postures, foot-strikes, shoes, relations of joints to stress, and discourses (stability, comfort, cushioning, and control on the one side and natural, health, and awareness on the other). Each argues that the other assemblage may cause more injuries (and given that about 30% of runners are injured each year, this is a significant issue36), though
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All together, the collection of all things, phenomena, and ideas in the universe create the external reality of any given subject. So, objectiveness is relative. In the case of human beings, every individual person exists as an individual subject to which all other things, phenomena, and ideas (including other human beings) have ''objective characteristics.''
  
210 O
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-29.png|''Alice and Bob are external to one another; each is objective from the other’s perspective.'']]
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
+
Of course, objectiveness is always relative. Something might be external from a certain perspective but not from another perspective. For example, say there are two people: Bob and Alice. From Bob’s perspective, Alice has objective characteristics. But from Alice’s perspective, Bob would have objective characteristics.
  
evidence on either side is slim. In May, 2014, Vibram, a maker of minimalist shoes, settled out of court a class-action lawsuit stating that the benefits of their shoes promised by their advertising (including increasing foot strength, decreasing injury rate, and others) lacked any scientific evidence and was therefore false. This led many to state that minimalist running was altogether fraudulent, a “scam.”37 However, that would be overstating the case.
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-30.png|''The relationship between Alice and Bob has objective characteristics to both Alice and Bob.'']]
  
The most recent, and most extensive, study of minimalist shoes stated that, according to a review of the medical literature, “From a clinical perspective…foot-wear minimalism (running barefoot) may be protective for injury.”38 This study went on to put a hundred runners in “regular,” minimalist, or quasi-minimalist shoes for 12 weeks. Runners in the minimalist shoe had more pain and injuries than those with regular shoes (who still had injuries), but less than those with the quasi-minimalist shoes. The authors decline to speculate on why the “half-way” shoes might cause more injuries, but perhaps with too little padding to cushion a heel-strike and too much padding to warn runners not to heel-strike, the shoes caught the runners between assemblages. In that the study was ultimately about the transition from one running assemblage to another, the authors cautioned runners moving to minimalist shoes to be aware of the danger of injury. To be fair, minimalist running websites (even Vibram’s) always caution a very slow transition from regular shoes to minimalist to allow your body (with its assemblage of muscles, bones, tendons, and joints) to adjust to the new uses and relationships. As the Atlantic’s James Fallows wrote, responding to the Vibram settlement: “If you’re a heel-strike runner, as many people who learned in the era of fatly padded shoes are destined to be, these are not the shoes for you.” But “if you run in the way these shoes favor, or if you’re able to shift your gait to a ‘forefoot-strike’ style, they’re great.”39
+
As all relationships are inherently external to any given subject (even subjects which are party to the relationship), relationships also have objective characteristics.
  
What this extended example is meant to point out is that assemblages can be tenacious, deeply embedded in the body, and can’t be changed on a whim. Even a seemingly superficial technology like a running shoe is an extension of our body’s functioning, and change deeply affects the body so extended (just as McLuhan argued that as our media extensions change, we change).
+
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Martin Heidegger once called “transparent equipment” those tools which we use with such skill we no longer notice (like a hammer in the hand, or a shoe on a foot).40 However, what we are talking about is not just that we begin to ignore our technologies, but that they extend our actions, our perceptions, and our perceptions of self. Technologies extend our bodies and how we act in and perceive the world. In this way, our identity always has a fluctuating boundary. Some technologies are more persistent additions (walking sticks, shoes, glasses, clothes) and some are temporary (automobiles), so our identity (in this case, our sense of body-self) is an ever-changing assemblage.
+
Whenever two things, phenomena, or ideas have a relationship with one another, they form a pair. The relationship is inherent to this pair and external to any subject which exists outside of the pair. The mutual interaction and mutual transformation which occurs to the things, phenomena, or objects within the pair as the result of the relationship are ''inherent'' and ''objective'' properties of the pair.
  
In the body of literature that addresses the intermingling of human and machine, the key figure is that of the cyborg. A cyborg (short for cybernetic organism) is an entity part human and part machine. In popular culture, cyborgs can be found in science fiction films and television shows (like the Terminator franchise). But we are all already cyborgs of one sort or another. Many people have
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Identity
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==== Annotation 109 Translation note: ====
  
O 211
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In the original Vietnamese text, the word for “objective” is ''“khách quan.”'' This is a compound word in which ''“khách”'' means “guest,” and ''“quan”'' means “point of view.” Therefore, ''“khách quan”'' literally means “the guest’s (or outsider’s) point of view.”
  
artificial hips, some have artificial hearts or heart valves, and some are periodically hooked up to dialysis machines that filter their blood. But on an even more banal level, many wear glasses or contact lenses, and there are few people who haven’t been subject to the technology of inoculation. Even more fundamentally, we wear clothes and shoes. To be a cyborg is not something new. Indeed, arguing from the logic of articulation and assemblage, which insists that we consist of a range of connections to language, technology, bodies, practices, and affects, we have always been cyborgs.41 Our bodies can change and incorporate technologies (this alters action and perception). We can grasp that idea pretty easily. Even more radical, however, is the idea that technologies extend how we think; that they are extensions of our mind.
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Thus we translate this to “objectiveness/objective,the characteristic of being viewed from the outside.
  
Language is a technology—it is an artificial system that we have to learn—and if we agree that language profoundly shapes the way we think (not to mention the things we think about, or even think we can think about), then our cognition depends on a technology. Once we take writing into account, it’s easier still. Complex (and at times not so complex) math equations or long sums are easier to figure out if we use pen and paper than if we keep it all in our heads. The same goes for mapping out an intricate logical argument or remembering what to buy at the store. The process of thinking, then, doesn’t occur solely in the brain but in an assemblage of brain, body, and various external objects and processes we’ve marshaled to the task: slips of paper, notebooks, encyclopedias, iPhones, computers.… Philosopher Andy Clark puts it this way:
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The word “inherent” in the original Vietnamese is ''“vốn có.”'' This is another compound word: ''“vốn”'' is a shortened form of the word ''“vốn dĩ,”'' which means “by or through nature,” “naturally,” and “intrinsically.” ''“Có”'' means “to have” or “to exist.” '''''“Vốn có”''''' thus means “already existing naturally” or “already there, through nature.
  
What the human brain is best at is learning to be a team player in a problemsolving field populated by an incredible variety of nonbiological props, scaffoldings, instruments, and resources. In this way ours are essentially the brains of natural-born cyborgs, ever-eager to dovetail their activity to the increasingly complex technological envelopes in which they develop, mature, and operate.42
+
So we use the word “inherent” to mean “existing intrinsically or naturally within, without external influence.
  
Clark terms our interactions with these external objects as scaffolding—together we build possibilities. Many help us figure things out (pen and paper, computers, models), many more help us remember (from sticky notes reminding us to buy cat food to libraries), and many help us move about or achieve other actions.
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Dovetailing is his term for the processes that the brain partners with to get things done. The pen and paper contribute to the scaffolds, but the process of writing and manipulating numbers on a page is what dovetails with our thoughts to solve the problem. The danger, people fear, is over-reliance on external processes to the detriment of our own cognitive abilities. To follow Clark’s example, he writes, “the reliable presence of such resources may become so deeply factored in that the biological brain alone is rendered unable to do the larger sums.”43 This parallels an ancient dilemma from the birth of the written word: over-reliance on writing, it was feared, would ruin our ability to think. Clark is not worried, however, since such dovetailing (and outright outsourcing) is one of the things the human brain has always done best, usually to its own advantage.
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Human beings can’t change or impact external things and phenomena — and the relationships between them — through human will alone. Humans are limited to perceiving relationships between things and phenomena and then impacting or changing them through our practical activities.
  
212 O
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''-'' ''The Characteristic of Generality of Relationships''
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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According to the dialectical viewpoint, there is no thing, phenomenon, nor idea that exists in absolute isolation from other things, phenomena and ideas.
  
Let us look at an example of all this scaffolding and dovetailing. Syndicated columnist David Brooks wrote an article a few years ago about the car he bought with GPS.44 With a GPS navigation system you can enter the address you wish to go to and the device verbally guides you there (“Stay left. In 100 yards, turn left on Elm.”). Brooks realized that the device relieved him of a tremendous amount of thought—from remembering addresses and routes to even the overall street layout of the city. He was ecstatic. Now, as with any technological system, we should always beware of accidents, and not just car accidents. If his device breaks, Brooks is not only lost, but lost without his previous knowledge and skills in navigating the city. Similarly, if our mobile phones break, do we remember anyone’s phone number? Further, such dependency can lead to disaster by allowing our reliance on technology to eclipse our ability to encounter what is before us. There have been several news reports of drivers following GPS instructions into bodies of water. The challenge to identity is this: Amidst these assemblages of scaffolded thinking and dovetailed processes, it’s still possible to believe in a core, essential human mind coordinating it all, or at least one core executive cognitive process that all this answers to – me, in other words. But Clark and many others (such as Daniel Dennett, Francisco Varela, and Alva Noë) ask, why? Many of our processes of coordination and action (e.g., reaching for a glass and picking it up) happen without our full conscious awareness. To the contrary:
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There is no self, if by self we mean some central cognitive essence that makes me who and what I am. In its place there is just the “soft self”: a rough-and-tumble, control-sharing coalition of processes—some neural, some bodily, some techno-logical—and an ongoing drive to tell a story, to paint a picture in which “I” am the central player.45
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==== Annotation 110 ====
  
In a highly renowned essay, Donna Haraway argued that such couplings and combinations of humans and technologies are potentially politically progressive because, in refusing to be just technology or just human, the cyborg rejects the cultural dichotomy between technology and human.46 When asked, “what are you, machine or man?” the cyborg states, “both and neither.” Haraway argues that in refusing to choose, the cyborg acts as an ironic political model for challenging other divisions of identity like race, gender, sexuality, and so on, thus overcoming the technologies of categorization we have been discussing. She makes “an argument for pleasure in the confusion of boundaries and for responsibility in their construction.”47
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Although all things, phenomena, and ideas have the characteristic of ''externality'' and ''objectiveness'' to all other things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 108, p. 112], this does not mean that they exist in ''isolation''. Isolation implies a complete lack of any relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas. On the contrary, according to the ''Principle of General Relationships'' [see p. 107], ''all'' things, phenomena, and ideas have relationships with ''all other'' things, phenomena, and ideas.
  
A key insight of an assemblage approach to technology and identity is that humans have co-evolved with our technologies and with other animals and environments. One of the boundaries that Haraway has been seeking to critique is that between human and animal. In The Companion Species Manifesto, she argues that humans and companion species (like dogs) have co-evolved.48 There has never been a human apart from its relationships with technologies, companion species, or the environment. Indeed, the human body itself is an assemblage of various relatively independent creatures—how far would you get without mitochondria or intestinal flora? Indeed, scientists have begun talking of the human body as
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Simultaneously, there is also no known thing, phenomenon, nor idea that does not have a systematic structure, including component parts which in turn have their own internal relationships. This means that every existence is a system, and, moreso, is an ''open'' system that exists in relation with other systems. All systems interact and mutually transform one another.
  
Identity
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O 213
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==== Annotation 111 ====
  
an ecosystem with different habitats or biomes. It is estimated that of the 100 trillion cells that make up each body, only 10% are human.49 Some might raise an objection stating that there is a biological essence to our bodies, despite all the bacteria—our DNA. Aren’t we told that each of us is unique, that if there is one thing that’s mine, it’s my DNA? After all, we use it to identify remains, solve crimes, and so on. Well, actually it is more common than you’d expect that a person would have more than one genome (or DNA sequence). For those people, what DNA is identified as theirs depends on from where the sample is taken.50
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As explained above, a ''systematic structure'' is a structure which includes within itself a system of ''component'' parts and relationships. It has been postulated by some scientific models that there may be some “fundamental base particle” (quarks, preons, etc.), which, if true, would mean that there is a certain basic material component which cannot be further broken down. However, this would not contradict the Principle of Materialist Dialectics of General Relationships (which states that all things, phenomena, and ideas interact with and mutually transform one another — see Annotation 107, p. 110).
  
Conclusion
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''- The Characteristic of Diversity of Relationships''
  
It should be clear by now that identity is an important lens through which to address our technological culture from a cultural studies perspective. What is at stake in how technological assemblages of identity function is nothing less than the social and political structure of our culture, not to mention our sense of who we are and what we can accomplish (that is, our agency). While some technologies can reinforce the most pernicious discrimination, others can be taken up to challenge these same categories of identity. An assemblage view of identity helps us question the boundaries of who we think we are. It should also help us realize the ways technologies change our notions of life and death.
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In addition to affirming the objectiveness<ref>See Annotation 108, p. 112.</ref> and generality<ref>See p. 108.</ref> of relationships, the dialectical viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism also emphasizes the ''diversity'' of relationships. The characteristic of diversity is defined by the following features:
  
For example, technologies of monitoring fetuses in pregnant women (electronic monitoring of fetal heartbeats or ultrasound imaging) have helped to change the status of both fetus and mother. Presenting tangible evidence of fetal life (Here’s the heartbeat! Here’s the 3-D video!) creates a technological quickening of the fetus much earlier than felt fetal movements and attributes subjectivity to the fetus much earlier as well. In other words, the fetus is more likely considered a person—from a medical standpoint a patient, and from a political standpoint a subject—long before the final trimester of pregnancy, long before the fetus is at a stage to survive outside the womb. As a consequence of these technologies, the pregnant woman herself can become more invisible, making it possible to restrict her rights in favor of the fetus’s.51
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* All things, phenomena, and ideas have different relationships. Every relationship plays a distinct role in the existence and development of the things, phenomena, and ideas which are included within.  
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* Any given relationship between things, phenomena, and ideas will have different characteristics and manifestations under different conditions and/or during different periods of motion and/or at different stages of development.  
  
And on the other end of life’s journey, machines can extend the body’s functions to the extent that we now can question when someone should be considered alive or dead. And technological futurists associated with the Singularity movement plan for the day that our consciousnesses can be uploaded to a machine, or to the Internet, where we can live forever. But would such an existence be considered that of being alive? Would we still be human?
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How could it be any clearer that technologies are not mere tools that we take up to accomplish particular ends? How could it be any clearer that technologies are not mere causes that have effects on what we do? In fact, the very (changing!) idea of who we are, how we think, and how we act is articulated within, caught up in a changing technological culture.
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==== Annotation 112 ====
  
Figure 22: Power House Mechanic Working on Steam Pump
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One of Marx’s most critical observations was that things are defined by their internal and external relationships, including human beings. For example, in ''Theses on Feuerbach,'' Marx wrote that “the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations.” It is only through relationships — through mutual impacts and transformations — that things, phenomena, and ideas (including human beings and human societies) change and develop over time. All of these relationships — which both define and transform all things, phenomena, and ideas in existence — exist in infinite diversity [see Annotation 107, p. 110].
  
Source: Photograph by Lewis Hine, 1920. Wikimedia Commons: commons.wikimedia. org/wiki/File:Lewis_Hine_Power_house_mechanic_working_on_steam_pump.jpg
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Just as things, phenomena, and ideas change and transform through the course of relations with one another, the nature of the relationships themselves also change and develop over time.
  
Chapter Sixteen
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''Characteristics'' refer to the features and attributes that exist ''internally'' within a given thing, phenomena, or idea.
  
Critical
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''Manifestation'' refers to ''how'' a given thing, phenomena, or idea is expressed ''externally'' in the material world.
  
Conjunctures
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For example, a ball may have the ''characteristics'' of being made of rubber, having a mass of 100 grams, and having a melting point of 260℃. It may ''manifest'' by bouncing on the ground, having a spherical shape, and having a red appearance to human observers.
  
SOMETIMES SCIENCE FICTION HAS THE CAPACITY to engage interest in technological culture more effectively than books such as this one. Science fiction has the benefit of being articulated to entertainment, disarticulated from any obligation to truth, but articulated historically to the reputation of prescience. We still use novels such as Frankenstein and 1984 and films such as Blade Runner, The Terminator, and The Matrix to look for insight in navigating the present. Each of these works articulated the culture of its present in significant ways, and like good science fiction often does, each still speaks to aspects of both contemporary technological culture and possible futures.
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If ten such balls exist, they will all be slightly different. Even if they have the same mass and material composition, they will have slightly different variations in size, shape, etc. Even if each ball will melt at 260℃, the melting will manifest differently for each ball — they will melt into slightly different shapes, at slightly different speeds, etc.
  
M. T. Anderson’s Feed provides one such a vision for our time, a vision that has proven quite useful in provoking thought and discussion in our classes.1 This 2002 young adult science fiction novel resonates in instructive ways with the challenges we face. Set in the far off future, mobile social media devices are embedded in the heads of most children at birth, so that phoning, texting, blogging, searching, and streaming music or video occurs directly in their heads. Almost everyone is in constant contact with their friends but also in constant contact with a feed that monitors thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, and responds accordingly. The feed sends out targeted advertising (it whispers in your head about sales of your favorite pants, or of the pants you just glanced at in the shop window) as easily as it sends out the police (you perform an anti-social behavior, it sends out the authorities) or a technopharmaceutical (you have a headache, it sends out a nerve block). At a loss for words? The feed will suggest something. It is an autocorrect for the mind. A record of memories, thoughts, feelings, and behaviors is kept, so that playback, sharing, broadcasting, and surveilling a person’s life are readily accessible. Not everyone in this world of the far-off future is implanted, resulting in an oppressive
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Relationships also have characteristics and manifestations. For example, the moon’s orbit around the Earth is a relationship. It has characteristics such as the masses of each related body, forces of gravity, and other factors which produce and influence the orbit. The same orbital relationship also has manifestations such as the duration of the moon’s orbit around the Earth, the size of its ellipse, the orbit’s effects on the tides of the Earth’s ocean, etc.
  
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''Characteristics'' and ''Manifestation'' correspond, respectively, to the philosophical category pair of ''Content'' and ''Form,'' which is discussed in section page 147.
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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Therefore, no two relationships are exactly the same, even if they exist between very similar things, phenomena, and ideas and/or in very similar situations.
  
hierarchy. Those without implants are in some sense free, but they are also denied connectivity, educational and employment opportunities, and acceptance; they are the outsiders and the outlaws. The events of the novel take place against the backdrop of a world so completely polluted and toxic that there is nothing of the natural landscape left: oceans are dead and burning and the air is not safe to breathe. The characters develop lesions that would lead to death without the intervention of advanced medical technologies, available to those who are connected. The feed distracts the public from worrying by making lesions fashionable, even marketing fake lesions. Feed thus entertains us with a mixture of some very real conditions and challenges characterizing contemporary technological culture involving surveillance, privacy, freedom, constant contact, consumerism, environmental degradation, healthcare, what it means to be human, and inequality. All of these are integral in some form to contemporary technological culture.
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It is also important to note that the characteristic of diversity also applies to things, phenomena, and ideas themselves. In other words, every individual thing, phenomenon, and idea in existence also manifests differently from every other thing, phenomenon, and idea in existence, even if they seem quite similar.
  
As good science fiction does, Feed resonates with our present, it makes affective sense; but it doesn’t explain the mechanisms whereby this fictional world is put together, and it doesn’t provide something for us to focus on, to fix, to envision a path forward. It casts a spell (like the marketing of fake lesions?) that provides some solace in its knowing that we are living in hard times, but we don’t really know what to do about it. The heroine, Violet, is dying in the end from complications from her too-late-in-life implant of the feed. It is as though her family’s resistance to progress by delaying giving it to her is what kills her. Violet herself has been resisting the feed by doing her best not to be profiled by the marketing software of the feed. But without a coherent profile, no organization will risk funding the treatment that would save her. Her own resistance kills her as well. As he watches her die, her boyfriend, Titus, discovers the desire to tell her a story (their own), which is one of the only creative acts in a world where the public is groomed to be unthinking, passive consumers. A creative act is an act of resistance. But given that the world in this novel is also in its final death throes, and that the feed is deeply imbricated in the functioning of that world, it is difficult to imagine what good this might do. Resistance here is mere affect, not a strategy to be emulated. Affect can certainly be articulated to constructive intervention, but not if it just sits there at the bedside of a dying heroine and a dying world. In reality, there must also be the hard work of understanding how the world is put together and moving forward.
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==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
  
So, while imaginative flights like Feed can provide images to think about, they leave us without tools to think with. To do that, we need, once again, to take a detour through theory. As Stuart Hall once said, “Theory is always a detour on the way to something more important.”2 That is what we set out to accomplish with this book: to work with what we know theoretically to engage technological culture constructively, to be able to think forward. In this chapter we specifically address the matter of thinking forward. To do that we need to introduce another concept: the conjuncture.
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Based on the objective and popular characteristics of relationships, we can see that in our cognitive and practical activities, we have to have a ''comprehensive viewpoint''.
  
From Articulation to Conjuncture
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Having a ''comprehensive viewpoint'' requires that in the process of perceiving and handling real life situations, humans have to consider the internal dialectical relationships between the component parts, factors, and aspects within a thing or phenomenon. We also need to consider the external mutual interactions they have with other things, phenomena, and ideas. Only on such a comprehensive basis can we properly understand things and phenomena and then effectively handle problems in real life. So, the comprehensive viewpoint is the opposite of a unilateral and/or metaphysical viewpoint [see Annotation 51, p. 49] in both perception and practice.
  
As we introduced in Chapter 12, “Articulation can be understood as the contingent connection of different elements that, when connected in a particular way, form
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Lenin said: “If we are to have true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all of its facets, its connections, and ‘mediacies [indirect relationships].’”<ref>''Once Again On The Trade Unions'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921.</ref>
  
Critical Conjunctures
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==== Annotation 113 ====
  
a specific unity.” In thinking about the unities that involve technology, we introduced the concept of the technological assemblage: “the ways that … practices, representations, experiences, and affects articulate to take a particular dynamic form with broader cultural consequences.” We have also seen that these articulations and assemblages change, and we have characterized the process of change as sites of struggle. Every culture in any historical moment (by which we mean more than a moment in time, but as occurring in a particular historical space and time) has its problems, crises, contradictions, and instabilities, and these are often the places where articulations and assemblages are on the move, where change is happening, where resistance is manifest, and where effective intervention might be possible. But of all the problems, crises, contradictions, and instabilities, how do we decide which is important to focus on? What is important to address in the interest of moving forward?
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-31.png|''The comprehensive viewpoint sees the subject in terms of all of its internal and external relationships.'']]
  
Cultural studies provides guidance by suggesting that what we do is map a conjuncture and the problematic or set of problematics that constitute it. Conjunctural analysis identifies and maps the connections among problems, crises, contradictions, and instabilities that appear across what might otherwise seem disparate issues and locations. Conjunctural analysis maps what is called the problematics, or problem spaces, of a culture. Not every problem in culture achieves the status of a problematic. A problematic is a “theme,” or set of “themes,” that emerges in a social formation, across a variety of sites, struggles, and concerns. It is therefore a “general” crisis,” but one that is “fought across the full spectrum of social issues and differences.”3 A problem, crisis, contradiction, or instability that achieves that magnitude of breadth and depth, or could have ramifications of that breadth and depth, is worthy of extensive cultural analysis.
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Consider a factory. A factory exists as a collection of internal relationships (between the workers, between machines, between the workers and the machines, etc.) and external relationships (between the factory and its suppliers, between the factory and its customers, between the factory and the city, etc.). In order to have a comprehensive viewpoint when examining the factory, one must consider and understand all of the internal and external relationships which define it.
  
While a problematic appears “at almost every point of the social formation: it does so in multiple forms.”4 Because a conjuncture—with its attendant problemat-ics—is constituted of numerous articulations and assemblages that manifest in local forms at different sites and locations, it is never a simple unity, but a complex and dynamic one. It is one in which there will always be relationships among what is old, what is new, and what is rearticulated.5 It is, as Lawrence Grossberg puts it, “a mobile multiplicity, the unity of which is always temporary and fractured.”6 An insistence on the complex multiplicity of a conjuncture cannot be overstated. As explained by Grossberg,
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A conjuncture is constituted by, at, and as the articulation of multiple, overlapping, competing, reinforcing, etc., lines of force and transformation, destabilization and (re-)stabilization, with differing temporalities and spatialities, producing a potentially but never actually chaotic assemblage or articulations of contradictions and contestations. Thus, it is always a kind of totality, always temporary, complex, and fragile, that one takes hold of through analytic and political work.7
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The diversified characteristic of relationships [see Annotation 107, p. 110] shows that in human cognitive and practical activities, we have to simultaneously use a comprehensive viewpoint and a historical viewpoint.
  
Mapping a conjuncture is a way of understanding context, a way of coming to a better understanding of “what’s going on.” Methodologically, you can accomplish this by, first, identifying powerful articulations that constitute a particular cultural problem, second, identifying the work of particular assemblages, third, identifying
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Having a ''historical viewpoint'' requires that, in perceiving and handling real life situations, we need to consider the specific properties of subjects, including their current stage of motion and development. We also need to consider that the exact same methods can’t be used to deal with different situations in reality — our methods must be tailored to suit the exact situation based on material conditions.
  
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==== Annotation 114 ====
  
the problematic or problematics that appear across sites and locations, and, fourth, considering how these articulate in the complex conjuncture of a particular historical moment. Part of that process is always to understand, as we said above, what is changing: what is old, what is new, what is rearticulated. Mapping a conjuncture makes it possible to begin to see where and how intervention might be desirable and successful, and how different interventions might influence change in one direction or another.
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While the ''comprehensive viewpoint'' focuses on internal and external ''relationships'' of subjects, the ''historical viewpoint'' focuses on the specific ''properties'' of subjects — especially the current stage of motion and development. In order to have a proper historical viewpoint, we must study and understand the way a subject has developed and transformed over time. To do this, we must examine the history of the subject’s changes over time, hence the term “historical viewpoint.” In addition, it’s important to understand that no two situations which we might encounter will ever be exactly the same. This is because the component parts and relationships that make up any given situation will manifest differently.
  
We use the term “mapping” the conjuncture because the cultural theorist asserts that the articulations, assemblages, and problematics are significant, that they are connected in particular ways and that they merit attention and intervention. We map what we claim to be the multiple, overlapping, competing lines of articulation; we map powerful assemblages; we map what we see as connected across sites and locations. This work has been described by Grossberg as telling a “better story” about what is happening, which means that it aims to offer a convincing account of the relationships that constitute the “complex realities of the context.”8 We map claims about what is desirable and undesirable in that story, and how change is possible. A better story might also “open up new possibilities, perhaps even new imaginations of possibilities, for changing that context.” Cultural studies thus tries to contribute to expanding what we can hope for.9
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So, in order to properly deal with situations, we have to understand the component parts and relationships of examined subjects as well as their histories of development so that we can develop plans and strategies that are suitable to the unique circumstances at hand.
  
This is difficult conceptual and empirical work, which in the very act of mapping contributes to the articulation of the conjuncture; that is, a cultural study in itself becomes a force articulating the struggles that have been identified. In this way, cultural studies acknowledges that scholarship does more than merely report on or describe what is supposedly already out there, but always necessarily intervenes in the production of knowledge about the struggles that constitute the social formation, thereby contributing potentially to cultural change.
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For example, it would be disastrous if communists today tried to employ the ''exact same'' methods which were used by the Communist Party of Vietnam in the 20<sup>th</sup> century to defeat Japan, France, and the USA. This is because the material conditions and relationships of Vietnam in the 20<sup>th</sup> century were very different from any material conditions existing on Earth today. It is possible to learn lessons from studying the methods of the Vietnamese revolution and to ''adapt'' some such methods to our modern circumstances, but it would be extremely ineffective to try to copy those methods and strategies — ''exactly'' as they manifested then and there — to the here and now.
  
The Current Conjuncture and Emergent Problematics
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This book has attempted to model what cultural studies does. We have mapped significant articulations that constitute the context within which we practice, represent, and live technological culture, and we have considered how these articulations have changed. We have tried to tell a better story about how technology articulates to progress, convenience, determinism, control, politics, economics, space, time, and identity; about how these articulate to the practices, beliefs, experiences, and materialities of technological culture; about how these have been rearticulated over time; and how these historical trajectories have contributed to the shapes of our lives. Each in relation to the other contributes significantly to what our culture believes about technological development (it is good; it is the cause of the good life); what we do with technology (support it, fund it, prioritize it; embrace it or be left behind); and how we experience it (cool; new; awesome, a sign of superiority). Each in relation underscores what we believe is possible or not, and what we can and can’t hope for (you can’t
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In order to come up with suitable and effective solutions to deal with real life problems, we must clearly define the roles and positions of each specific relationship that comes into play, and the specific time, place, and material conditions in which they exist.
  
Critical Conjunctures
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==== Annotation 115 ====
  
stop progress; technology can fix any problem we face, even those brought on by other technologies; if you do not embrace advanced technology, you have little to hope for). We have also considered along the way the inequalities that articulate to technological culture, who or what benefits (new media CEOs; the biotechnology industry) and who and what is left behind (“underdeveloped” nations; people with “outdated” skills).
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-32.png|''A historical viewpoint focuses on the roles and positions of relationships and properties of subjects as well as their development over time.'']]
  
Technological culture changes, which is perhaps the most difficult insight for us mere mortals to grasp. It is not just technologies that change, but much more significantly, technological culture that changes. The Luddites, the Appropriate Technologists, and the Unabomber understood that and in their ways (if not always effectively) they attempted to influence the direction of change. Other contemporary movements, groups, and individuals (Greg and Jennifer among them) continue to work consciously to influence the direction of technological culture, to disarticulate elements of it they find a problem and rearticulate more desirable ones.
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The role of a relationship has to do with how it functions within a system of relationships and the position refers to its placement amongst other subjects and relationships.
  
One of our intentions, that is, the intention of Greg and Jennifer, in writing this primer is to contribute to that work, by telling a better story. But this primer offers something less than the whole story. As a primer, we have self-consciously tried to provide, first, an introduction and, second, a preliminary mapping. We have not mapped the contemporary conjuncture fully, in a way that considers and connects all the relevant problematics. We can, however, offer direction for additional mapping that would contribute to that work. Building on the pieces we have put together, and drawing on our collective knowledge of technological culture, several problematics emerge. These, we submit, deserve our attention, for these do seem to be general crises that are being fought in multiple, interconnected forms across the full spectrum of the social formation. We refer to each as a “problematic” as shorthand; each, however, contains elements of problem, crisis, contradiction, and instability. Each portends enormous change in the cultural formation and thus warrants attention to where and how intervention might be advisable. We offer only the briefest of sketches for each; these are meant to be suggestive, urging future work.
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Consider once again the example of the factory [see Annotation 113]. In addition to its internal and external relationships, the factory also has various roles — it functions within various systems and from various perspectives. For instance, the factory may have the role of financial asset for the corporation that owns it, it may have the role of place of employment for the surrounding community, it may have the role of supplier for various customers, etc.
  
The Problematic of Knowledge Production
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The factory is also ''positioned'' among other subjects and relations. If it’s the only employer in town then it would have a position of great importance to the people of the community. If, on the other hand, if it’s just one of hundreds of factories in a heavily industrialized area, it may have a position of much less importance. It may have a position of great importance to an individual factory worker who lives in poverty in an economy where there are very few available jobs, but of less importance to a freelance subcontractor for whom the factory is just one of many customers, and so on.
  
Cultural studies itself responds to and contributes to a general crisis involving what constitutes knowledge, who produces it, and how it is produced. Cultural studies’ assertions that no element, neither knowledge nor even “truth,” “can be separated from its relations,” and that “those relations can be changed, and are constantly changing,”10 contribute to a radical rethinking of knowledge. This view and practice disarticulate knowledge from purely scientifistic conceptions of knowledge: descriptions of the natural world using tools of observation and experimentation presumed to be neutral. Scientists are presumed to be rational seekers of the Truth, and scientifistic knowledge assumes the ability to accurately and objectively “trace” what is already there, rather than map a convincing story within a particular context. The innocence of, and therefore the dominance of, this view of scientific knowledge has been challenged by what has been called the
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These positions and roles will change over time. For example, the factory may initially exist as a small workshop with a small handful of workers, but it may grow into a massive factory with hundreds of employees. It is vital to understand this Principle of Development, which is discussed in more detail on the next page.
  
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In summary, proper dialectical materialist analysis requires a ''comprehensive and historical viewpoint'' — we must consider subjects both ''comprehensively'' in terms of the internal and external relationships of the subject itself as well as ''historically'' in terms of roles and positions of subjects, as well as their relationships, material conditions, and development over time.
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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So, in both perception and practice, we have to avoid and overcome sophistry and eclectic viewpoints.
  
“cultural turn,” as well as, beginning in the 1960s, by science itself.11 In a dramatically different form, a challenge to the preeminence of scientific versions of knowledge has also emerged in relation to fundamentalist religious movements. Many of these movements reject scientific knowledge outright and maintain that authoritative knowledge can only come through some (technological) manifestation of their god: be that a book, a prophecy, or a revelation. From a slightly different direction we could point to a long history of populist anti-intellectualism in the United States, current manifestations of which are caught up in this problematic.
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The emergent popularity of the 2.0 and DIY conceptions of knowledge and knowledge production also respond to and contribute to the general crisis in a more obviously technological sphere. Web 2.0 is a term that, according to Wikipedia,
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==== Annotation 116 ====
  
describes World Wide Web sites that use technology beyond the static pages of earlier Web sites…. A Web 2.0 site may allow users to interact and collaborate with each other in a social media dialogue of creators of user-generated content in a virtual community, in contrast to Web sites where people are limited to the passive view of content.12
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''Sophistry'' is the use of falsehoods and misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, and with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. This kind of bad faith argument has no place in materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics must, instead, be rooted in a true and accurate understanding of the subject, material conditions, and reality in general.
  
Is this entry authoritative? In a 2.0 culture, the production of knowledge shifts from what were once considered “experts” and “professionals” to anyone who can generate content, which is made considerably easier than it was before the Internet, the World Wide Web, copying technologies, and mobile media. So, yes, in 2.0 culture the entry is authoritative, because it is there at the moment of this writing, even though it may be challenged, changed, and be a different expression of authoritative knowledge tomorrow. Importantly, such knowledge production is done publicly so that every edit, deletion, or addition is visible on the history page.13
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''Eclecticism'' is an incoherent approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject, applying different theories in different situations without any consistency in analysis and thought. Eclectic arguments are typically composed of various pieces of evidence that are cherry picked and pieced together to form a perspective that lacks clarity. By definition, because they draw from different systems of thought without seeking a clear and cohesive understanding of the totality of the subject and its internal and external relations and its development over time, eclectic arguments run counter to the comprehensive and historical viewpoints. Eclecticism is somewhat similar to dialectical materialism in that it attempts to consider a subject from many different perspectives, and analyzes relationships pertaining to a subject, but the major flaw of eclecticism is a lack of clear and coherent systems and principles, which leads to a chaotic viewpoint and an inability to grasp the true nature of the subject at hand.
  
DIY (Do It Yourself) culture, we are told, once again by Wikipedia, is “the method of building, modifying, or repairing something without the aid of experts or professionals.”14 2.0 and DIY privilege knowledge produced by anyone with access to a platform and who is not defined as an expert or a professional. To some extent, then, the technological platforms themselves (blogs; radio programs) bestow that authority.15 Other locations in the social formation where the crisis in expert knowledge versus user generated knowledge is emerging (in a variety of forms) are in the rise of alternative medicine and a corresponding resistance to traditional medicine (including vaccinations); in the popularity of technologies of collaborative learning in education; and perhaps even in the comfort with which people share knowledge about themselves.
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=== 2. Principle of Development ===
  
The appearance and general acceptance of the term Big Data point to another site in the crisis of knowledge production. New kinds and massive amounts of data are being generated using new technologies, much of it machinically generated without the intervention of individuals and beyond the capacity of individuals to manage. The search for new technological solutions
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==== a. Definition of Development ====
  
Critical Conjunctures
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According to the metaphysical viewpoint, development is simply a ''quantitative'' increase or decrease; the metaphysical viewpoint does not account for ''qualitative'' changes of things and phenomena. Simultaneously, the metaphysical viewpoint also views development as a process of continuous progressions which follow a linear and straightforward path.
  
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to storing, managing, and mining Big Data has become an industry in itself. What is perhaps the most interesting aspect of Big Data is that it suggests a technology that is newly “out of control,” a materially and affective form of knowledge that requires whole new ways of thinking and being, when, in fact, the crisis is far less new than the discourse suggests.
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==== Annotation 117 ====
  
Academic attention to the exploration of knowledge production has proliferated, which includes scholarship in the social sciences, the humanities, cognitive sciences, and brain sciences. It is as though, in this moment of crisis, work in the academy that argues that knowledge is produced and works in new ways gains in prominence, developing concepts such as collective intelligence, swarm intelligence, and collaborative learning to explain and explore this form of knowledge. Some in the academy, in this moment of crisis, “discover” that knowledge has always been produced in relation to technology, and that the brain has always evolved in a technological relation with technologies external to the body.16 Despite the variety, the problematic is a coherent unity.
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In materialist dialectics, it is important to distinguish between ''quantity'' and ''quality''.
  
To intervene in the problematic of knowledge production requires engaging particular articulations at sites where intervention might make a difference. We don’t “resist the feed” or, in this case, resist 2.0. Rather, we work to rearticulate relations at a particular site or location. If, for example, I am an educator concerned that the practice of collaborative learning is counter-productive in part because it relies on its articulation to a belief that knowledge is fundamentally user-produced, I might engage in or use research to convince educators that creativity relies more on individual activity, as is argued in the book Quiet by Susan Cain.17 The argument might be successful in that rearticulating learning to creativity is a reasonable articulation to make in the conjuncture that values creativity; and that rearticulation would disarticulate collaboration as a privileged path to learning.
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''Quantity'' describes the total ''amount'' of component parts that compose a subject.
  
The Problematic of Privacy and Surveillance
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''Quality'' describes the unity of component parts, taken together, which defines the subject and distinguishes it from other subjects.
  
While they could be treated as two separate problematics, privacy and surveillance have become so closely articulated that they almost demand being considered together (although all issues of surveillance are not necessarily about privacy, and vice versa). Assemblages involving new technologies, especially mobile devices such as smart phones, wearable computers like Google Glass, and technologies of electronic surveillance, raise pressing questions about privacy and surveillance— tantamount to a profound crisis. Unless we are hermits, we now live under the almost constant gaze of others and their devices. What we might characterize as a surveillance assemblage renders what the gaze sees recordable, persistent, and readily sharable, as Feed so effectively illustrates. We are urged by the assemblage to adjust to the constant potential of being observed and recorded, just as we have been adjusting to the potential to be contacted via mobile phone by anyone at any time.
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Both quantity and quality are dynamic attributes; over time, the quantity and quality of all things develop and change over time through the development of internal and external relationships. Quantity and quality itself form a dialectical relationship, and as quantity develops, quality will also develop. A given subject may be described by various quantity and quality relationships.
  
Big Data, which articulates to the issue of knowledge production discussed above, are used to manage and exploit the level of surveillance that is now possible. Big Data can be used to establish patterns to locate terrorists, to assess health
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'''''Example 1:'''''
  
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-33.png|''In the process of development, Quantity Change leads to Quality Change'']]
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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A single football player, alone, has the quantity value of 1 football player and the quality of ''a football player''. Eleven football players on a field would have the quantity value of 1 and will develop the quality of ''a football team''. This subject, ''football'' ''team'', is composed of the same component parts as the subject ''football player'', but the quantity change and other properties (being on a field, playing a game or practicing, etc.) change the quality of the component parts into a different stable and unified form which we call a ''football team''.
  
behaviors and risks, and to target individuals for marketing purposes. It is gathered at the institutional level for both government and corporate organizations as well as by individuals. Edward Snowden’s leaks of massive amounts of information about the scale and types of surveillance being conducted by the US National Security Agency offer a dramatic example of institutional power at work, as well as individual power, in that a single individual was able to access and share the information.18 Online firms such as Google conduct surveillance by tracking and mining search histories, email, and social media exchanges. While this is conducted in the service of commercial goals, it has the potential to be used by governments as well as by corporations to control populations in ways that escape protections afforded by government.19 Big Data are also gathered at the personal level; we do it ourselves. In what has been called the Quantified Self Movement, discussed in the last chapter, people track their own activities, biological data, moods, and so on, in a belief that the emerging self-improvement ethos, which articulates to DIY, can be actualized by producing what is ostensibly the cold, hard truth of numbers: How far did I run? How much did I eat? What did my sleep patterns look like? How has my blood pressure fluctuated throughout the day? How much work did I do?. Lifeloggers record, in addition to those data, all images, sounds, and events they encounter, making a permanent record of their everyday lives.20
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The relationship between quantity and quality is dynamic:
  
Subjection to surveillance and access to online resources, social networks, and rapidly circulating media are becoming what sociologists, following Durkheim, call a social fact, an accepted and assumed part of what it means to be a member of society.21 We are trained to accept, as explored in Feed, that there is little possibility or hope to opt out. Those who don’t have a coherent profile lose access to the resources available to those with established profiles within the social formation. Living as far “off the grid” as possible is a form of resisting the surveillance assemblage, but doing so puts you increasingly outside access to social interactions, insurance, media, healthcare, and even money itself.
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If one of the players doesn’t show up for practice, and there are only ten players on the field, it might still have the quality of ''football team'', but in a live professional game there will be a certain threshold — a minimum number of players who must be present to officially be considered a ''team''. If this number of players can’t be fielded then they will not be considered a full ''team'' and thus won’t be allowed to play.
  
To intervene in the problematic of privacy and surveillance requires engaging particular articulations at sites and locations where intervention might be effective. The diversity of such sites and locations is revealed by the analysis, and the kind of intervention possible is suggested by assessing what might be possible to disarticulate and rearticulate. For example, whether he has studied cultural studies or not, Edward Snowden is working to disarticulate NSA surveillance activities from the concept of safety, as in the belief that its activities are necessary to keep us safe. He is actively trying to rearticulate NSA surveillance activities to the violation of our personal freedoms, which could well be successful, given the power of the articulation of personal freedom to the identity of being American. We can also imagine rearticulating surveillance issues to discourses of justice, dignity, or human rights.
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Likewise, if there are only one or two players practicing together in a park, they would probably not be considered a ''football team'' (though they might be described in terms of having the quality of being ''on the same team).''
  
The Problematic of Environmental Degradation
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'''''Example 2:'''''
  
Given the powerful influence of the equation of the development of new technology with progress, it is not surprising that most people are incapable of taking seriously the environmental costs of technological assemblages. Richard Maxwell and Toby Miller write:
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Quantity: 1 O + 2 H atoms Quantity: Billions of H2O Molecules Quantity: ~5,000 Drops of Water Quality: Water Quality: Drop of Water Quality: Cup of Water
  
Critical Conjunctures
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DEVELOPMENT: QUANTITY CHANGE LEADS TO QUALITY CHANGE
  
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-34.png|''All of these have the quality of water because of the molecular quantities of hydrogen and oxygen atoms, however, from the perspective of volume, quantity changes still lead to quality changes.'']]
  
Perhaps the obsession with immediacy and interactivity via networks induces an ignorance of the intergenerational effects of consumption, inhibiting our awareness of the long-term harm to workers and the environment. Could constant connectedness be actively diminishing our ethical ability to dwell on the interconnections between the present and future, between media and the Earth?22
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The properties of quantity and quality are relative, depending on the viewpoint of analysis.
  
From industrial technology to virtual technology, technological assemblages involve mixtures of mining and using natural resources, building structures and machines, occupying the electromagnetic spectrum, disciplining bodies, and generating waste.23 In addition, the 24/7 lifestyle of on-demand media and Big Data means that massive datacenters use (and waste) staggering amounts of electricity for the computer servers and the air conditioning systems to cool them, the generation of which leads to additional pollution.24 There is a moment in Feed when the American president addresses the people and reassures them that American industry would not, could not, be responsible for the degradation of their health (for the lesions that have resulted from the degradation of the environment). He states that “we need to remember that America is the nation of freedom, and that freedom, my friends, freedom does not lesions make.”25 We would only add the invocation of progress to that story: “freedom and progress do not lesions make.” By invoking freedom and progress, which happens all the time in contemporary technological culture (from, for example, defending fracking to defending gold and silver mining), it is possible to overlook entirely a whole range of other articulations that warrant our attention.
+
A single molecule of water has a quantity of one in terms of molecules, but it still retains the quality of “water” because of the ''quantities'' of one oxygen atom and two hydrogen atoms per molecule which, in this stable form, give it the ''quality'' of water.
  
Attention to the crisis of environmental degradation is emerging in numerous spheres in diverse forms in contemporary technological culture. Locations that depend on tourism for their economic well-being are often the staunchest defenders of maintaining the health and diversity of the environment, as are hunters and fishers who want to protect the environment inhabited by the animals they hope will continue to be around so that they can kill them. Chefs often speak out in defense of environmental health and diversity in the interest of the continued availability of ingredients with which to cook. Scientists increasingly are concerned with preserving biodiversity in the interest of assuring access to possible cures for disease or biological organisms that might benefit the biotechnology industry. Even certain fundamentalist religious sects advocate for an unpolluted environment, because the food their god would have them eat should be pure and unsullied. The concerns and motivations of these groups differ wildly from the stereotypical “tree-hugging” environmentalists who defend the ideal of a wild and pristine wilderness over and against the perceived interests of human beings. Yet they all express versions of the problematic.
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A drop of water might have a quantity of many billions of molecules, but it would still have the quality of “water.” It would also now assume the quality of a “drop.
  
That the environment is being degraded has been quite widely accepted as a crisis, perhaps most notably expressed in concern over global climate change. Yet, articulated as they are to science, the arguments of climate scientists bump up against the blindness that accompanies the unexamined belief in progress and the powerful shifts in beliefs and practices of knowledge production we discussed above. Interestingly, however, the “non-believers” are as actively caught up in the
+
When you combine enough drops of water, you will eventually have a quality shift where the “drops” of water combine to form another quality — i.e., a “cup” of water. The quantity change leads to a change in quantity; we would no longer think of the water in terms of “drops” after the quantity rises to a certain level.
  
224 O
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In terms of ''temperature'' and physical properties, if the water is heated to a certain point it will boil and the water will become ''steam''. The quantity of water in terms of drops wouldn’t change, but the quantity-value of temperature would eventually lead to a quality value change from “water” to “steam.”
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
+
'''''Example 3:'''''
  
struggles over climate change, as demonstrated by their persistent efforts to offer alternative explanations for climate phenomena.
+
AS QUANTITY OF AGE INCREASES, QUALITY CHANGES
  
Again, intervention requires, first, careful analysis of the articulations that constitute the problematic at particular sites and locations, and then, the identification of locations where intervention might be successful. It could be, for example, that organizing hunters and fishers of North America would be more effective in working for remediation of climate change than working with self-identified environmental groups. Hunters and fishers articulate to powerful affects and practices of freedom and American identity and may be better connected to the political and corporate sources that produce and regulate offending technologies.
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-35.png|''The same human being will undergo various quality changes as age quantity increases over time.'']]
  
The Problematic of Being Human
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As humans age and the quantity of years we’ve lived builds up over time, our “quality” also changes, from baby, to child, to teenager, to young adult, to middle age, to old age, and eventually to death. The individual person is still the same human being, but the quality of the person will shift over time as the quantity-value of age increases.
  
Initially it may seem odd, even misguided, to elevate the question—“what is it to be human?”—to the status of a problematic of technological culture. However, it doesn’t take too much looking to see that what constitutes humanness is contested in diverse ways across the full spectrum of the social formation and is deeply connected to the technological.
+
'''Metaphysical vs. Dialectical Materialist Conceptions of Change'''
  
Take, for example contention over the legality of abortion. Much of this entails the question: Is a fetus human? Different answers to, or different ways of understanding, that question (yes; no; yes, but…) circulate in different forms at different sites in the social formation. The fact of the question’s importance in contemporary culture can be understood in terms of emerging technological as-semblages.26 The ultrasound, sonogram, amniocentesis, and assisted reproductive technologies contribute to creating and seeing something that was heretofore non-existent and invisible. Its newly visible existence demands a name and attendant concepts, practices, and affects, over which there is considerable cultural struggle, as we mentioned at the end of Chapter 15. Just as we have been taught to accept that images of the Earth from space changed our perception of our place on the Earth and in the universe, seeing the fetus through a sonogram in a particular setting works to shape perception and behavior in significant ways. A technological assemblage provides the framing, the editing, the story, and the affect.
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-36.png|''Metaphysics only consider linear properties of'' quantity''change; Materialist Dialectics takes'' quantity changes ''and'' quality shifts ''into consideration when considering change over time.'']]
  
In a different way, technologies deployed at the “end of life” contribute to questions about what is and is not human. The point at which a person is “dead” and when certain functions can/cannot/should/should not be supported by machines has become highly contested and of considerable concern for individuals, families, the medical profession, hospitals, insurance companies, and the law. Each has different motivations, concerns, and ways of framing the problematic. A recent case in which a pregnant woman “died” but was for months kept “alive” with technological intervention because she had a “live” fetus within her that “was not viable” provides a salient example of the degree to which struggles over the meanings of humanness are variously contested and entangled in overlapping and competing technological assemblages.27
+
Because the metaphysical perspective tries to define the world in terms of static, isolated subjects, only ''quantity'' is considered and ''quality shifts'' are not taken into account. Thus, metaphysical logic sees development as linear, simple, and straightforward. Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, sees development as a more complicated, fluid, and dynamic process involving multiple internal and external relationships changing in quantity and quality over time.
  
Biotechnology, both as an industry and as a science, contributes dramatically to the contested ground over what constitutes humanness. If the human body can take on new forms with pharmaceuticals and prostheses, is it still human? Is a human
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Critical Conjunctures
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In contrast to the metaphysical viewpoint, in materialist dialectics, ''development'' refers to the ''motion'' of things and phenomena with a forward tendency: from less advanced to more advanced, from a less complete to a more complete level.
  
O 225
+
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with a cow heart still human? If the body takes a new form through genetic manipulation, is it still human? Is a clone human? Is there a point where a line is crossed? These questions are struggled over, if not in explicitly philosophical form, then indirectly in a range of social practices. For example, the question of whether or not an athlete can compete under the influence of technopharmaceuticals (aka, drugs) or with prosthetic body parts is a struggle over whether or not these rearticulated creatures are “fully” human. Health insurance companies make determinations about humanness all the time in the exercise of their routine delineation of what is covered and what is not. While the logic of what they will and won’t cover doesn’t always seem “commonsensical,” they are more likely to cover what is considered restorative to “normal” human functioning, as in covering the cost of a prosthetic to replace an amputated limb, than to cover what is considered an “enhancement,” as in covering the cost of a breast enhancement or prosthetic legs to help an athlete run faster by replacing otherwise functioning (but inferior) legs.
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==== Annotation 118 ====
  
Typically we think of being human as having a body over which we have ownership and control. Classifying animals and despised races as not human has been used to justify ownership or control over them by those who are human. Surprisingly, those of us not-animal or not currently a despised race do not have ownership and control over our own bodies to the degree that we generally expect. The biotechnology industry, commerce, and the law are quietly participating in disarticulating that relationship between you and your body. In a pivotal legal decision in 1990 (Moore v. Regents), the US Supreme Court upheld a California statute regulating the disposal of biological waste, a statue that “eliminates so many of the rights ordinarily attached to property that one cannot simply assume that what is left amounts to ‘property’ or ‘ownership’ for purposes of conversion to law.”28 To translate: what your body sheds or what is removed from your body is not your property but can be claimed as property for research and commercial purposes. You do not own your amputated leg, the hair cut from your head, or the cells harvested from your organs. This is interesting given that in most states mechanics are required by law to return to owners parts removed from your automobile. A particularly famous case of the medical and scientific exploitation of body parts is that of the African American woman Henrietta Lacks, who died of cancer in 1951. While under treatment, her cancer cells were—without her knowledge—harvested and cultivated in the lab, creating what is now known as the HeLa cell line, which has become an invaluable global resource in medical research and commerce. People have become rich exploiting the HeLa cell line; Henrietta Lacks died in poverty.29 After her family learned of this treatment of Lacks’s body, they sought to gain some control over the cell line. After years of legal wrangling, they obtained only limited control over use of the cell line in 2013.30 In the meantime, harvesting organs for profit has become a global industry, even in countries such as the United States, where organ donation is strictly regulated. The practice is sufficiently common that it was covered by Newsweek in an article titled “Organ Trafficking Is No Myth.”31
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In materialist dialectics, ''motion (also known as change)'' is the result of mutual impacts between or within things, phenomena, and ideas, and all motion and change results from mutual impacts which themselves result from internal and external relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas. Any given ''motion/change'' leads to quantity changes, and these quantity changes cumulatively lead to quality changes [see Annotation 117, p. 119]. Grasping this concept — that development is driven by relations — is critically important for understanding materialist dialectics.
  
Cultural anxieties over the technological disruption of the human have been evident in popular culture at least since Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. Science fiction
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-37.png|''The concept of “change” in materialist dialectics centers on internal and external relationships causing mutual impacts which lead to quantity changes which build into quality shifts.'']]
  
226 O
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This process, taken in total, is referred to as ''development''. Development represents the entire process in which internal and external change/motion leads to changes in quantity which in turn lead to changes in quality over time. The process of development can be fast or slow, complex or simple, and can even move backwards, and all of these properties are relative. Development has a ''tendency'' to develop from less advanced to more advanced forms. The word ''tendency'' is used to denote phenomena, development, and motion which inclines in a particular direction. There may be exceptional cases which contradict such tendencies, but the general motion will incline towards one specific manner. Thus, it is important to note that “development” is not necessarily “good” nor “bad.” In some cases, “development” might well be considered “bad,” or unwanted. For example, rust developing on a car is typically not desired. So, the tendency of development from lower to higher levels of advancement implies a “forward motion,” though this motion can take an infinite number of forms, depending on the relative perspective. Development can also (temporarily) halt in a state of equilibrium [see Annotation 64, p. 62] or it can shift direction; though it can never “reverse,” just as time itself can never be “reversed.”
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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For example, during a flood, water may “develop” over the land, and as the floodwaters recede this may alternatively be viewed as another “forward” development process of ''recession'' — a development of the overall “flooding and receding” process. The flood is not actually “reversing” — the development is not being “undone.” Flood water may recede but it will leave behind many traces and impacts; thus it is not a true “reversal” of development.
  
novels and films are filled with images of cyborg beings. As we mentioned in Chapter 15 (on identity), a considerable segment of popular culture addresses the intermingling of human and machine. Films such as The Terminator (1984), The Matrix (1999), The Island (2005), and Transcendence (2014) take up the theme of what it means to be human. These popular expressions suggest a widespread engagement with what seemed initially an esoteric problematic.
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-38.png|''Both flooding and flood recession are development processes with the same forward tendency. Flood recession may appear to be a “reversal,” but it is in fact forward development.'']]
  
The academic world has responded and contributes to the emergence of this problematic with conferences, such as one on “The Non-Human Turn,”32 a body of scholarship on the cyborg,33 and a range of philosophical and theoretical explorations of what constitutes human life and human subjectivity.34
+
The false belief that development can be reversed is the root of conservative and reactionary positions [see Annotation 208].
  
Intervening in the problematic of being human, as with all the problematics discussed above, requires engaging particular articulations at sites and locations where intervention might make a difference. When we point out that the biotechnology industry, commerce, and the law are quietly participating in disarticulating a particular relationship between you and your body, we are pointing to the fact that these forces are intervening, though perhaps not in desirable ways. They are making a difference that, when examined closely, might not seem so innocent. From that realization, alternative ways of intervening might come into focus.
+
Development can be considered positive or negative, depending on perspective. Some ecosystems have natural flood patterns which are vital for sustaining life. For a person living in a flood zone, however, the flood would most likely be considered an unwanted development, whereas flood recession would be a welcomed development.
  
Ending with Moving Forward
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The problematics discussed above are not all those that constitute the current conjuncture, just the ones that seem most salient to us at this time. They all consist of sites and locations where problems, crises, contradictions, and instabilities are in evidence. And regardless of whether or not a person has studied cultural theory, intervention–both effective and ineffective–happens all the time. Remember that a conjuncture and its problematics do not constitute a fixed unity, but a site of struggles. That means that alternative positions, forces, and practices are always in play somewhere. By looking closely at these sites as sites of struggle, a person should be able identify potentials for effective intervention. Intervention, like all those identified above, can take many forms. It might look like any of the following: fighting a legal battle, singing a song, lobbying congress, teaching a class, writing a book (such as this one), making a film, passing a law, blowing a whistle, and on and on. Intervention does not take a single prescribed form, and the same action may be effective in one context and not in another. And there are no guarantees that any particular intervention will have its desired effect. So how does one go about “intervening”?
+
It is important to note that the definition of development is not identical to the concept of “motion” (change) in general. It is not merely a simple quantitative increase or decrease, nor a repetitive cyclic change in quantity. Instead, in materialist dialectics, development is defined in terms of ''qualitative'' changes with the direction of advancing towards higher and more advanced levels. [See diagram ''Relationship Between Motion,''
  
The concept and practice of resilience increasingly occupy talk about how to respond to changes in the social formation at sites as diverse as new media, education, and climate change. Try an Internet search for resilience and a topic of interest, and you will see this is so. So pervasive are the various manifestations of this talk that resilience could qualify as a problematic itself. We discuss it here, however, as a strategy for moving forward, in part because it strikes us as a sadly inadequate response. By comparing resilience to the potential available if you
+
''Quantity/Quality Shifts, and Dialectical Development'', Annotation 119, below]
  
Critical Conjunctures
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Development is also the process of creating and solving objective ''contradictions'' within and between things and phenomena. Development is thus the unified process of negating negative factors while retaining and advancing positive factors from old things and phenomena as they transform into new things and phenomena.
  
O 227
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work with the kinds of mapping strategies we have sketched above, you can see that the latter is far more likely to generate better stories for moving forward.
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==== Annotation 119 ====
  
The typical story of resilience goes like this: When faced with challenge, disturbance, problem, or crisis, some people fail, others thrive. Those who thrive have the capacity to bounce back because they have learned to adapt; they are resilient. After reviewing the use of resilience in both academic and popular literature, a group of scholars found that most conceptions of resilience
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A ''contradiction'' is a relationship in which two forces oppose one another. Although a contradiction might exist in ''equilibrium'' for some amount of time [see Annotation 64, p. 62], eventually, one force will overcome the other, resulting in a change of ''quality''. This process of overcoming is called ''negation''. In short, ''development'' is a process of change in a subject’s quantity as well as negation of contradictions within and between subjects, leading to quality shifts over time.
  
1) prioritize the heroic (self-sufficient) individual; 2) constitute resilience as a psychological or social property rather than a process; 3) fail to radically contextualize resilience…4) over-emphasize a return to a previous state or equilibrium…5) neglect relationally and mutuality as constitutive dynamics.35
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==== b. Characteristics of Development ====
  
Resilience thus has much in common with the symptomatic approach to causality we discussed in Chapter 10; both are reactive, responding to what already is and over which we have no control. All that we can change are our responses to circumstances beyond our control. In the case of resilience, the response is individual, rendering this approach even less culturally attuned than the symptomatic approach. The challenge, the disturbance, the crisis is inevitable; you can “adapt or die” (or “fail,” in current parlance). To adapt successfully is to “create new normalcies” according to a theorist of resilience.36 This logic is observable in discussions of climate change where remedies such as the following are all that is proposed: building higher sea walls, learning to live with less fresh water, not insuring structures in tornado alleys, developing plants that can survive drought, and so on.
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Every development has the characteristics of objectiveness,<ref>See: Annotation 108, p. 112.</ref> generality,<ref>See: Annotation 106, p. 109.</ref> and diversity.<ref>See: Annotation 107, p. 110.</ref>''The characteristic of objectiveness of development'' stems from the origin of motion.
  
We are not suggesting that resilience is somehow pernicious, although it can be. Rather, resilience is an insufficient response, in that it deflects attention away from the articulation of the challenge, disturbance, problem, or crisis to begin with. It does so because it accepts the condition as given or inevitable rather than understanding it conjuncturally, as constituted by articulations and assemblages that are contingent and non-necessary, and recognizing that they may be open to disarticulation and rearticulation in significant ways. In other words, resilience adjusts to the problem rather than intervening in the problem in order to change it. An interesting and easy example illustrates the difference: The demand for speed and constant contact in the 24/7 world is often blamed for high levels of increased stress that lead to health problems for many people who do the desk work in that world. A resilient response finds ways to manage the stress. Sarah Sharma, in her research on corporate yoga, as we discussed briefly in Chapter 14, argues that corporate yoga helps the body cope with stressful conditions by making “life at the desk temporally maintainable” but it also “further institutionalizes the space and time of work as being fundamental to a person’s identity.”37 So corporate yoga does not address the stressful situation at the source; instead, it institutionalizes its management in service of corporate profits.
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With regard to the problematic of privacy and surveillance, to take another example, a resilient response might be to strive to stay ahead of surveillance
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==== Annotation 120 ====
  
228 O
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Remember that, in materialist dialectics, objectiveness is the relative characteristic that every subject has of existing and developing externally to all other subjects [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. Since motion originates from mutual impacts which occur between external things, objects, and relationships, the motions themselves also occur externally (relative to all other things, phenomena, and objects). This gives motion itself objective characteristics.
  
CULTURAL STUDIES
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-39.png|''Dialectical Development consists of Quantity and Quality Shifts, which in turn derive from motion.'']]
  
technologically by constantly installing new encryption programs on your media. A conjunctural response might be to recognize the ways that surveillance is being built into the infrastructure of everyday life through the engineering of devices and software. Because those structures are contingent and non-necessary, we could undertake efforts to assure that those devices are designed otherwise. They don’t have to save data the way they do (or at all). They don’t have to save information to the cloud. The cloud doesn’t have to be a for profit off-site storage site that can mine your data. The technologies don’t have to have the capacity to track our locations. These are all choices and decisions that were made, and continue to be made, justified by commitments to progress, convenience, and control, as well as by the desire for security, efficiency, and profit. By carefully mapping these articulations, we might be able to locate places where they can be disarticulated and rearticulated; the assemblages can be assembled differently. Only by doing that work can we even comprehend that there are other ways our technologies and technological assemblages could be designed.
+
Development is derived from motion as a process of quality shifting which arise from quantity changes which arise from motion [see Annotation 117, p. 119]. Since development is essentially an accumulation of motion, and motion is objective, development itself must also be objective.
  
That this is hard work cannot be denied; it is easier to retreat to the symptomatic position of resilience. But doesn’t the potential to make the world a better and more equitable place for all of us who occupy it make it worth the effort? Stuart Hall once said that
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The ''Principle of Development'' states that development is a process that comes from within the thing-in-itself; the process of solving the contradictions within things and phenomena. Therefore, development is inevitable, objective, and occurs without dependence on human will.
  
There are few short cuts or ready-made recipes. It does not follow that, because our hearts are in the right place, we will win the struggle for “hearts and minds.” And even the best analysis of the current situation provides few absolute guidelines as to what we should do, in a particular situation.38
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As Hall said many times in his life, there are no guarantees; but we have written this book in the belief that the work is worth the effort.
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==== Annotation 121 ====
  
Figure 23: Miscellaneous Subjects: Telephone, Directory and Globe
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The “thing-in-itself” refers to the actual material object which exists outside of our consciousness [see Annotation 72, p. 68]. Development arises from motion and self-motion [see Annotation 62, p. 59] with objective characteristics. Although human will can impact motion and development through conscious activity in the material world [see ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88], motion and development can and does occur without being dependent on human will. Human will is neither a requirement nor prerequisite for motion and development to occur.
  
Source: Photograph by Theodor Horydczak, ca. 1920–1950 Library of Congress, Horydczak Collection: http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/thc1995009227/PP/
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Development has the ''characteristic of generality'' because development occurs in every process that exists in every field of nature, society, and human thought; in every thing, every phenomenon, and every idea and at every stage* of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Every transformation process contains the possibility that it might lead to the birth of a new thing, phenomenon, or idea [through a change in quality, i.e. development].
  
Notes
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Introduction: On the Need for a Primer
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==== Annotation 122 ====
  
1. Our thanks to Glen Fuller for pointing out this third meaning of “primer” in his review of the first edition of this book. See Fuller (2006).
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<nowiki>*</nowiki> In materialist dialectics, “stage” (or “stage of development”) refers to the current quantity and quality characteristics which a thing, phenomenon, or object possesses. Every time a quality change occurs, a new stage of development is entered into.
  
Chapter One: The Power and Problem of Culture, The Power and Problem of Technology
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1. Williams (1983), p. 87
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Development has the ''characteristic of diversity'' because every thing, phenomenon, and idea has its own process of development that is not totally identical to the process of development of any other thing, phenomenon, or idea. Things and phenomena will develop differently in different spaces and times. Simultaneously, within their own processes of development, things, phenomena, and ideas are impacted by other things, phenomena, and ideas, as well as by many other factors and historical conditions. Such impacts can change the direction of development of things, phenomena, and ideas. They can even temporarily set development back, and/or can lead to growth in one aspect but degeneration in another.
  
2. Williams (1989).
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3. Williams (1980).
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==== Annotation 123 ====
  
4. Carey (1997), p. 316.
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Because development has the characteristic of generality and the characteristic of diversity, the principle of diversity in unity and unity in diversity also applies to development [see: Annotation 107, p. 110].
  
Chapter Two: Progress
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==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
  
1. Nisbet (1980), pp. 4–5, italics removed.
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Materialist dialectics upholds that the principle of development is the scientific theoretical basis that we must use to guide our perception of the world and to improve the world. Therefore, in our perception and reality, we have to have a ''development viewpoint''.
  
2. Kelly (2010), p. 100.
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According to Lenin: “dialectical logic requires that an object should be considered in development, in change, in ‘self-movement.”<ref>''Once Again On The Trade Unions,'' Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921. See also: ''Mode and Forms of Matter'', p. 59.</ref>
  
3. Allenby & Sarewitz (2011), p. 32.
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This development viewpoint [which holds that all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly developing, and that development is thus unavoidable] requires us to overcome conservatism, stagnation<ref>See Annotation 62, p. 59.</ref>, and prejudice, which are all opposed to development.
  
4. Taylor (1947). The practice of increasing worker efficiency utilizing time and motion studies has become known as “Taylorism.”
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5. Noble (1982), p. xii.
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==== Annotation 124 ====
  
6. Carey and Quirk (1989), p. 118.
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Conservatism and prejudice are mindsets which seek to prevent and stifle development and to hold humanity in a static position. Not only is this detrimental to humanity, it is also ultimately a wasted effort, because development is inevitable in human society, as in all things, phenomena, and ideas. Therefore, we must avoid and fight against such stagnant mindsets.
  
7. Quoted in Marx (1987), p. 36.
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According to this development viewpoint, in order to perceive or solve any problem in real life, we must consider all things, phenomena, and ideas with their own forward tendency of development taken in mind. On the other hand, the path of development is a dialectical process that is reversible and full of contradictions. Therefore, we must be aware of this complexity in our analysis and planning. This means we need to have a ''historical viewpoint'' [see Annotation 114, p. 116] which accounts for the diversity and complexity of development in perceiving and solving issues in reality.
  
8. Marx (1964).
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9. Smith (1985; 1994).
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==== Annotation 125 ====
  
10. Marx (1987).
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Materialist dialectics requires us to consider the complexity and constant motion of reality. By comparison, the metaphysical viewpoint (which considers all things, phenomena, and ideas as static, isolated entities which have linear and simple processes of development) stands as a barrier to understanding this complexity and incorporating it into our worldview. Thus, it is vital that we develop comprehensive and historical viewpoints which acknowledge the diversity and complexity of reality.
  
11. Quoted in Smith (1985), p. 7.
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In summary, as a science of common relations and development, Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics serve a very important role in perception and practice. Engels affirmed the role of materialist dialectics in this passage:
  
12. Smith (1994), pp. 9–12.
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“An exact representation of the universe, of its evolution, of the development of mankind, and of the reflection of this evolution in the minds of men, can therefore only be obtained by the methods of dialectics, with its constant regard to the innumerable actions and reactions of life and death, of progressive or retrogressive changes.
  
13. Smith (1985).
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Lenin also said: “Dialectics requires an all-round consideration of relationships in their concrete development, but not a patchwork of bits and pieces.”<ref>''Once Again On The Trade Unions'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921.</ref>
  
14. Carey, “Technology and Ideology: The Case of the Telegraph,” in Carey (1989), pp. 201–230.
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== III. Basic Pairs of Categories of Materialist Dialectics ==
  
232 O
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''Category*'' is the most general grouping of aspects, attributes, and relations of things, phenomena, and ideas. Different specific fields of inquiry may categorize things, phenomena, and/or ideas differently from one another.
  
Notes
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15. Schivelbusch (1988).
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==== Annotation 126 ====
  
16. Lyon (1994), p. 46.
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<nowiki>*</nowiki> ''Translation note:'' In Vietnamese, the word “phạm trù” is used here, which translates in this context more closely to the English philosophical term “category of being,” which means “the most general, fundamental, or broadest class of entities.” “Category of being” is sometimes simplified in English-language philosophical discourse to “category,” which we have chosen to do here for ease of reading and to better reflect the way it reads in the original Vietnamese.
  
17. See, for example, Kurzweil (1999); (2005) and Vinge (1993).
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Every science has its own systems of categories that reflect the aspects, attributes, and basic relations that fall within its scope of study. For example, mathematics contains the categories “arithmetic,” “geometry,” “point,” “plane,” and “constant.” Physics contains the categories of “mass,” “speed,” “acceleration,” and “force,” and so on. Economics includes “commodity,” “value,” “price,” “monetary,and “profit” categories.
  
18. See Moravec (1988); Dery (1996); Kurzweil (1999).
+
Every such category reflects only the common relations found within the specific fields that fall within the scope of study of a specific science.
  
19. For an assessment of transhumanism and the idea of progress, see Allenby and Sarewitz (2011), Chapter Three.
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''Categories of materialist dialectics'', on the other hand, such as “matter,” “consciousness,” “motion,” “contradiction,” “quality,” “quantity,” “reason,” and “result,” are different. Categories of materialist dialectics reflect the most general aspects and attributes, as well as the most basic and general relations, of not just some specific fields of study, but of the whole of reality, including all of nature, society and human thought.
  
20. Negroponte (1995).
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Every thing, phenomenon, and idea has many properties, including: a reason for existing in its current form, a process of motion and change, contradictions, content, form, and so on. These properties are aspects, attributes, and relations that are reflected in the categories of materialist dialectics. Therefore, the relationship between the categories of specific sciences and categories of materialist dialectics is a dialectical relationship between the Private and the Common [see ''Private and Common,'' p. 128].
  
21. Williams (1983), p. 121.
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22. The discussion of the sublime draws on Nye (1994).
+
==== Annotation 127 ====
  
23. Nye (1994), p. xlv.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-40.png|''The categories of specific sciences are limited to the scope of study, while the categories of materialist dialectics encompass all things, phenomena, and ideas.'']]
  
24. Carey and Quirk (1989).
+
Unlike the categories contained within specific scientific fields, the philosophical categories of materialist dialectics can be used to analyze and define all things, phenomena, and ideas. The categories of specific scientific fields and the materialist dialectical categories have a Private/Common dialectical relationship [discussed on the next page].
  
25. Cf. Mosco (2005).
+
-----
  
26. Nisbet (1980).
+
As a science of general relations and development, materialist dialectics summarizes the most general relations of every field of nature, society, and human thought into basic category pairs: ''Private and Common, Reason and Result, Obviousness and Randomness, Content and Form, Essence and Phenomenon, Possibility and Reality.''
  
27. Smith (1985).
+
-----
  
28. See Piggott (2004) for documentation (including visual documentation) of the life of the Crystal Palace after the Great Exhibition.
+
==== Annotation 128 ====
  
29. Quoted in Pacey (1983), p. 25.
+
Every individual materialist dialectical category has a dialectical relationship with another materialist dialectical category. Thus, all categories in materialist dialectics are presented as ''category pairs.'' So, a ''category pair'' is simply a pair of categories within materialist dialectics which have a dialectical relationship with one another.
  
30. See Rogers (2003) for an insider’s analysis and critique of development.
+
Note that the this formalized system of category pairs reflects many decades of work by Vietnamese philosophical and political scientists based on the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other socialist thinkers. Also note that these are not the only category pairs that can be discussed; there are potentially an infinite number of categories which can be used in materialist dialectical analysis. However, universal category pairs, which can be applied to analyze any and all things, phenomena, and ideas, are much fewer and farther between. That said, the universal category pairs discussed in this book are the ones which have most often been used by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other prominent materialist dialecticians.
  
31. Pacey (1983), p. 26.
+
=== 1. Private and Common ===
  
32. Noble (1982).
+
==== a. Categories of Private and Common ====
  
33. See Mirchandani (2008) on call centers in India. On the shame and downward mobility of call center workers in Portugal, see Matos (2012).
+
The ''Private Category'' encompasses specific things, phenomena, and ideas; the ''Common Category'' defines the common aspects, attributes, factors, and relations that exist in many things and phenomena.
  
34. Duhigg and Barboza (2012).
+
Within every Private thing, phenomenon, and idea, there exists the Common, and also the Unique. The Unique encompasses the attributes and characteristics that exist in only one specific thing, phenomenon, or idea, and does not repeat in any other things, phenomena, or ideas.
  
35. On the new networked working class in China, see Qiu (2009), and on FoxConn in particular, see Qiu (2012).
+
-----
  
36. Williams (1989), p. 10.
+
==== Annotation 129 ====
  
Chapter Three: Convenience
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-41.png]]
  
1. Uys (1980).
+
The ''Private'' category includes specific individual things, phenomena and ideas.
  
2. Tierney (1993).
+
The ''Common'' category includes aspects, factors, and relations that exist in many things, phenomena, and ideas. For example, say there are two apples: Apple A and Apple B. Apple A is a specific individual object. Apple B is another distinct, separate object. In that sense, both apples are ''private'' apples, and fall within the ''Private'' category.
  
3. Tierney (1993), p. 39.
+
However, both Apple A and Apple B share common attributes. For instance, they are both fruits of the same type: “apple.” They may have other attributes in common: they may be the same color, they may have the same basic shape, they may be of similar size, etc. These are ''common'' attributes which they share. Thus, Apple A and Apple B will also fall within the ''common'' category, based on these common attributes.
  
4. Webster’s (1976).
+
Apple A and Apple B will also have ''unique'' attributes. Only Apple A has the exact molecules in the exact place and time which compose Apple A. There is no other object in the world which has those same molecules in that same place and time. This means that Apple A also has ''unique'' properties.
  
5. Tierney (1993), p. 40. The pre-fifteenth century meaning of comfort as giving support or strength is still in use in the treasonous charge of “giving aid and comfort to the enemy.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-42.png|''All private subjects have attributes in common with other private subjects.'']]
  
6. Crary (2013), pp. 1–4, 11.
+
The Common and Private categories have a dialectical relationship. The Common contains the Private, and the Private contains the Common. Every private subject has some attributes in common with other private subjects, and common attributes can only exist among private subjects. Thus every thing, phenomenon, and idea in existence contains internally within itself dialectical relationships between the Private and the Common, and has dialectical Private/Common relationships externally within other things, phenomena, and ideas.
  
7. Goldberg (2001).
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-43.png|''All private subjects have attributes in common with other private subjects.'']]
  
8. Gates (2000).
+
It is also true that every private subject contains within itself ''Unique'' attributes which it does ''not'' share with any other thing, phenomenon, or idea. For example, Mount Everest is unique in that it is 8,850 meters tall. No other mountain on Earth has that exact same height. Therefore, the private subject “Mount Everest” has unique properties which it does not share with any other subject, even though it has other attributes in common with countless other private entities.
  
9. Cowan (1983).
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-44.png|''All things, phenomena, and ideas contain the unique, the private, and the common.'']]
  
10. Cowan (1983), p. 211.
+
Whenever two individual subjects have a relationship with one another, that relationship is a ''unique relationship'' in the sense that it is a relationship that is shared only by those two specific subjects; however, there will also be common attributes and properties which any such relationship will share with other relationships in existence. This recalls the ''principle of Unity in Diversity and Diversity in Unity'' [see Annotation 107, p. 110]. So, every thing, phenomenon, and idea contains the Common ''and'' the Unique and has unique ''and'' common relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas.
  
11. Cowan (1983), p. 188.
+
This category pair is very useful in developing a comprehensive viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116]. Remember that a comprehensive viewpoint indicates an understanding of the internal and external relations of a given subject. This means that in order to develop a comprehensive viewpoint, you must know the private aspects of each individual relation, component, and aspect of the subject, and you must also study the commonalities of the subject as well. It’s also important to study a variety of ''private'' information sources or data points to look for ''commonalities'' between them. In other words, if you want to have a proper comprehensive viewpoint [see Annotation 113, p. 116] about any subject, you have to find and analyze as many ''private'' data points and pieces of evidence as possible.
  
12. Taylor (1947), p. 12.
+
For example: If a person only ever saw one apple, a green apple, then that person might believe that “all apples are green.” This conclusion would be premature: the person is attempting to make an assumption about the ''Common'' without examining enough ''Privates''. This is a failure of mistaking mistaking the ''Private'' for the ''Common'' which stems from a lack of a comprehensive viewpoint.
  
13. Tierney (1993), pp. 53–57.
+
Now, let’s take a look at an example of how the “Unique” can become “Common,” and vice-versa: 1947 TODAY
  
14. Cowan (1983), p. 101.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-45.png]]
  
15. See Cowan’s (1997) chapter on “Alternative Approaches to Housework,” pp. 102–150.
+
''“Unique” things, phenomena, and ideas can become “common” through development processes (and vice-versa).''
  
16. Cowan (1997), p. 43.
+
In 1941, a Soviet soldier named Mikhail Kalashnikov was in the hospital after being wounded in the Battle of Bryansk. Another soldier in the hospital said to Kalashnikov, “why do our soldiers only have one rifle for two or three of our men, while the Germans have automatics?” To solve this problem, Kalashnikov designed the AK-47 machine gun. When he finished making the first prototype, it was the only AK-47 in the world.
  
17. Tierney (1993), p. 75.
+
At this precise moment, the AK-47 was simultaneously ''Unique'', ''Private'', and ''Common.''
  
18. Berry (1995), pp. 8, 4.
+
It was ''Unique'' because it was the first and only AK-47 in the world, and no other object in the world had those properties. It was ''Private'' because it was a specific object with its own individual existence. It was ''Common'' — even though it was the only existing prototype — because it shared Common features with other rifles, and with other prototypes. It was the only AK-47 in existence.
  
19. Rosalind Williams (2002), p, 17.
+
Soon, however, the Soviet Union began manufacturing them, and they became very common. Now there are millions of AK-47s in the world. So, today, that prototype machine gun remains simultaneously ''Unique, Private,'' and ''Common,'' with some slight developments:
  
20. Boltanski and Chiapello (2007), p. 155.
+
It remains ''Private'' because it is a specific object with its own individual existence. Even though it is no longer the only AK-47 in existence, it remains ''Unique'' because it is still the very first AK-47 that was ever made, and even though there are now many other AK-47s, there is no other rifle in the universe that shares that same unique property. It remains ''Common'' because it still shares common features with other rifles and other prototypes, but it now also shares ''commonality'' with many other AK-47 rifles. It is no longer ''Unique'' for having the properties of an AK-47 in and of itself.
  
Notes
+
If someone were to destroy Kalashnikov’s prototype AK-47, the ''Private'' of that ''object'' would no longer exist — it would remain only as an ''idea'', and the Private would transform to whatever becomes of the material components of the rifle. The ''Unique'' would also no longer remain specifically as it was before being destroyed. However, there would still be many other AK-47s which would share common features related to that prototype; for instance, that they were all designed based on the prototype’s design.
  
O 233
+
''Translator’s Note:'' The words “Private,” “Common,” and “Unique” may seem unusual because they are direct translations from the Vietnamese words used to describe these concepts in the original text. Various other words have been used by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other materialist dialecticians when discussing the underlying concepts of these philosophical categories. For instance, in most translations of Lenin, his discussion of such topics is typically translated into English using words such as “universal,” “general,” “special,” “particular,” etc.
  
Chapter Four: Determinism
+
Example (from Lenin’s ''Philosophical Notebooks''): “Language in essence expresses only the universal; what is meant, however, is the special, the particular. Hence what is meant cannot be said in speech.” Here, “universal” refers to that which is ''Common'' in all things, phenomena, and ideas, and “special/particular” refers to the ''Private — s''pecific individual things, phenomena, and ideas — along with their ''Unique'' properties.
  
1.
+
Here are excerpts from Lenin’s ''Philosophical Notebooks'' discussing these concepts:
  
2.
+
<blockquote>
 +
(‘It?’ The most universal word of all.) Who is it? I. Every person is an I.
  
3.
+
Das Sinnliche? It is a universal, etc., etc. ‘This??’ Everyone is ‘this.’
  
4.
+
Why can the particular not be named? One of the objects of a given kind (tables) is distinguished by something from the rest...
  
5.
+
Leaves of a tree are green; John is a man; Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have dialectics (as Hegel’s genius recognised): the individual is the universal... And a naïve confusion, a helplessly pitiful confusion in the dialectics of the universal and the particular — of the concept and the sensuously perceptible reality of individual objects, things, phenomena.
  
6.
+
Further, the ‘subsumption’ under logical categories of ‘sensibility’ (Sensibilität), ‘irritability’ (irritabilität) — this is said to be the particular in contrast to the universal!! — and ‘reproduction’ is an idle game.
 +
</blockquote>
  
7.
+
Marx, too, discussed these concepts using words which are commonly translated into English using different terms. For example, in ''Capital'':
  
8.
+
<blockquote>
 +
The general form of relative value, embracing the whole world of commodities, converts the single commodity that is excluded from the rest, and made to play the part of equivalent – here the linen – into the universal equivalent.
 +
</blockquote>
  
9.
+
Here, “general form” refers to the ''commonalities'' of form that exist between all commodities. The “single commodity” refers to a private commodity; a specific commodity that exists separately from all other commodities. And when referring to a “universal equivalent,” Marx is referring to equivalence which such a commodity has in ''common'' with every other commodity.
  
10.
+
The rest of this passage continues as a materialist dialectical analysis of the ''Private, Common,'' and ''Unique'' features and aspects of commodities:
  
11.
+
<blockquote>
 +
The bodily form of the linen is now the form assumed in common by the values of all commodities; it therefore becomes directly exchangeable with all and every of them. The substance linen becomes the visible incarnation, the social chrysalis state of every kind of human labour. Weaving, which is the labour of certain private individuals producing a particular article, linen, acquires in consequence a social character, the character of equality with all other kinds of labour. The innumerable equations of which the general form of value is composed, equate in turn the labour embodied in the linen to that embodied in every other commodity, and they thus convert weaving into the general form of manifestation of undifferentiated human labour. In this manner the labour realised in the values of commodities is presented not only under its negative aspect, under which abstraction is made from every concrete form and useful property of actual work, but its own positive nature is made to reveal itself expressly. The general value form is the reduction of all kinds of actual labour to their common character of being human labour generally, of being the expenditure of human labour power. The general value form, which represents all products of labour as mere congelations of undifferentiated human labour, shows by its very structure that it is the social resumé of the world of commodities. That form consequently makes it indisputably evident that in the world of commodities the character possessed by all labour of being human labour constitutes its specific social character.
 +
</blockquote>
  
12.
+
We have chosen to use the terms “Private,” “Common,” and “Unique” in the translation of this text because they most closely match the words used in the original Vietnamese. In summary, it is important to realize that you may encounter the underlying ''concepts'' which are related by these words using various phrasings in the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, etc.
  
13.
+
==== b. Dialectical Relationship Between Private and Common ====
  
14.
+
According to the materialist dialectical viewpoint: the Private, the Common and the Unique exist objectively [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. The Common only exists within the Private. It expresses its existence through the Private.
  
15.
+
-----
  
16.
+
==== Annotation 130 ====
  
17.
+
The ''Common'' can’t exist as a specific thing, phenomenon, or idea. However, every specific thing, phenomenon, or idea exists as a ''private'' subject which has various features in ''common'' with other ''private'' things, phenomena, and ideas. We can therefore only understand the ''Common'' through observation and study of various ''private'' things, phenomena, and ideas. For example, a human can’t perceive with our senses alone the ''Common'' of apples. Only by observing many ''private'' apples can begin to derive an understanding of what all ''private'' apples have in ''common''.
  
Izzard (1999).
+
The Common does not exist in isolation from the Private. Therefore, commonality is inseparable from things, phenomena, and ideas. The Private only exists in relation to the Common. Likewise, there is no Private that exists in complete isolation from the Common.
  
Izzard (2000).
+
-----
  
Izzard (1999).
+
==== Annotation 131 ====
  
Winner (1977), p. 75.
+
No commonality can possibly exist outside of private things, phenomena, and ideas because commonality describes features which different things, phenomena, and ideas share. No private thing, phenomenon, or idea can possibly exist ''absolutely without'' commonality because there is no thing, phenomenon, or idea that shares ''absolutely no features'' with ''any other'' thing, phenomenon, or idea.
  
Lakoff and Johnson (1980), p. 69.
+
The Private category is more all-encompassing and diverse than the Common category; Common is a part of Private but it is more profound and more “essential” than the Private. This is because Private is the synthesis of the Common and the Unique; the Common expresses generality and the regular predictability of many Privates.
  
Winner (1977), p. 76.
+
-----
  
Plato (360 BC/1952), p. 157.
+
==== Annotation 132 ====
  
Havelock (1982), pp. 6, 7.
+
The Private encompasses all aspects of a specific, individual thing, phenomenon, or idea; thus it encompasses all aspects, features, and attributes of a given subject, including both the Common and the Unique. In this way, the Private is the synthesis of the Common and the Unique.
  
Eisenstein (1979), p. 7.
+
Common attributes require more consideration, effort, and study to properly determine, because multiple private subjects must be considered and analyzed before common attributes can be confidently discovered and understood. They offer us a more profound understanding of the essence [see ''Essence and Phenomenon,'' p. 156] and nature of things, phenomena, and ideas because they offer insights into the ''relationships'' between and within different things, phenomena, and ideas. As we discover more commonalities, and understand them more deeply, we begin to develop a more comprehensive perspective of reality. We begin to develop an understanding of the laws and principles which govern relations between and within things, phenomena, and ideas, and this gives us the power to more accurately predict how processes will develop and how things, phenomena, and ideas will change and mutually impact one another over time.
  
Hughes (1994), pp. 101–113.
+
Under specific conditions, the Common and the Unique can transform into each other [See Annotation 129, p. 128].
  
Carr (2008).
+
The dialectical relationship between Private and Common was summarised by Lenin:
  
Tenner (1997), pp. 8–11.
+
“Consequently, the opposites (the individual as opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other '''kinds''' of individuals (things, phenomena, ideas) etc.”<ref>''On the Question of Dialectics'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.</ref> [Note: “individual and universal” here refer the same underlying concepts of “Private and Common” (respectively); see translator’s note on p. 132].
  
Tenner (1997), p. 327.
+
==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
  
Tenner (1997), p. 353.
+
We must acknowledge and recognize the Common in order to study the Private in our cognitive and practical activities. If we fail to acknowledge the Common, then whenever we attempt to understand and comprehend any Private thing, phenomenon or idea, we will make mistakes and become disoriented. To understand the Common we have to study and observe the Private because the Common does not exist abstractly outside of the Private.
  
Tenner (1997), p. 348.
+
-----
  
The term Hobson’s choice is said to originate with Thomas Hobson (ca. 1544–1631), of Cambridge, England, who kept a livery stable and required every customer to take either the horse nearest the stable door or none at all.
+
==== Annotation 133 ====
  
Pakula (1982).
+
Our understanding of Common attributes arise from the observation and study of private things, phenomena, and ideas. At the same time, developing our understanding of Commonalities between and within Private subjects deepens our understanding of their essential nature [see: Essence and Phenomenon].
  
Chapter Five: Control
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-46.png|''Dialectical analysis of private and common characteristics involves observing private subjects to determine common attributes and considering common attributes to gain insights about private subjects.'']]
  
1. Shelley (1985), although the lesson of Shelley’s story is different; see below.
+
It is impossible to know anything at all about the Common without observing Private subjects, and attempting to understand Private subjects without taking into consideration the attributes and features which they have in Common with other Private subjects will lead to incomplete and erroneous analysis.
  
2. See, for example, Whale (1931; 1935); Brooks (1974); Branagh (1994); and from England’s Hammer Studios: Fisher (1957; 1958); Francis (1964).
+
-----
  
3. Winner (1977), p. 310.
+
In addition, we must identify the Common features and attributes of every specific Private subject we study. We must avoid being dogmatic, metaphysical, and inflexible in applying our knowledge of commonalities to solve problems and interpret the world.
  
4. McLuhan and Fiore (1967), pp. 31–40. This book, The Medium Is the Massage, is the classic statement of McLuhan’s position.
+
-----
  
5. Scheler’s position is discussed in Tierney (1993), pp. 4–5.
+
==== Annotation 134 ====
  
6. See, for example, Drexler’s (1986) influential predictions for the future of nanotechnology.
+
==== Dogmatism and Revisionism in Relation to the Private and Common ====
  
7. For a fascinating cultural studies perspective on this issue, see Sterne’s (2003) analysis of the ways that the scientific objectification of nature and the body crystallize in the development of sound-reproduction technologies.
+
''Dogmatism'' is the inflexible adherence to ideals as incontrovertibly true while refusing to take any contradictory evidence into consideration. Dogmatism stands in direct opposition to materialist dialectics, which seeks to form opinions and conclusions only after careful consideration of all observable evidence.
  
8. Mumford (1967), p. 191.
+
Dogmatism typically arises when the Common is overemphasized without due consideration of the Private. A dogmatic position is one which adheres to ideals about commonalities without taking Private subjects into consideration.
  
9. Mumford (1967), p. 192.
+
Dogmatism can be avoided by continuously studying and observing and analyzing
  
10. Foucault (1977), p. 205. Bentham’s conception of the panopticon is considered at length by Foucault, especially pp. 195–228.
+
Private subjects and taking any evidence which contradicts erroneous perceptions of “false commonalities” into consideration. This will simultaneously deepen our understanding of the Private while improving our understanding of the Common. For example: Sally might observe a few red apples and arrive at the conclusion: “all apples are red.” If Sally is then presented with a green apple, yet refuses to acknowledge it by continuing to insist that “all apples are red,” then Sally is engaging in dogmatism.
  
11. See, for example, Lyon’s (1994) discussion of Weber’s ideas.
+
According to Vietnam’s ''Curriculum of the Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism For University and College Students Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought,'' the opposite of Dogmatism is ''Revisionism''. Revisionism occurs when we overestimate the Private and fail to recognize commonalities. In failing to recognize common attributes and features between and within things, phenomena, and ideas, the Revisionist faces confusion and disorientation whenever they encounter any new things, phenomena, and ideas, because they lack any insight into essential characteristics of the subject and its relations with other subjects.
  
12. See, for example, Noble (1986).
+
For example: if Sally has spent a lot of time studying a red apple, she may start to become confident that she understands everything there is to know about apples. If she is then presented with a green apple, she might become confused and disoriented and draw the conclusion that she has to start all over again with her analysis, from scratch, thinking: “this can’t possibly be an apple because it’s not red. It must be something else entirely.” Sally can avoid this revisionist confusion by examining the other common features which the red and green apples share before making any conclusions.
  
13. Winner (1986), p. 24.
+
==== Metaphysical Perception of the Private and Common ====
  
14. Tenner (1997), p. 20.
+
The ''metaphysical'' position attempts to categorize things, phenomena, and ideas into static categories which are isolated and distinct from one another [see Annotation 8,
  
15. See Beniger (1986), especially Part II, on the crisis of control.
+
p. 8]. In this way, the metaphysical perception ultimately fails to properly understand the role of both the Private ''and'' the Common. Categories may be arranged in taxonomic configurations based on shared features, but ultimately every category is seen as distinct and isolated from every other category. This perspective severs the dialectical relationship between the Private, the Common, and the Unique, and thus leads to a distorted perception of reality. As Engels wrote in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
  
16. Beniger (1986), p. 227.
+
<blockquote>
 +
The analysis of Nature into its individual parts, the grouping of the different natural processes and objects in definite classes, the study of the internal anatomy of organized bodies in their manifold forms — these were the fundamental conditions of the gigantic strides in our knowledge of Nature that have been made during the last 400 years. But this method of work has also left us as legacy the habit of observing natural objects and processes in isolation, apart from their connection with the vast whole; of observing them in repose, not in motion; as constraints, not as essentially variables; in their death, not in their life. And when this way of looking at things was transferred by Bacon and Locke from natural science to philosophy, it begot the narrow, metaphysical mode of thought peculiar to the last century.
 +
</blockquote>
  
17. Tenner (1997).
+
In other words, Engels points out that separating and dividing Private subjects into distinct and isolated categories without acknowledging the dialectical nature of the Private and the Common leads to severe limitations on what we can learn about the world. Instead, we have to examine things, phenomena, and ideas ''in relation to one another'', which must include the analysis of Commonalities.
  
18. Cowan (1983).
+
Rather than divide subjects into distinct, separate categories, materialist dialectics seek to examine Private subjects as they really exist: as a synthesis of Unique and Common attributes; and simultaneously to examine commonalities as they really exist: as properties which emerge from the relations of Private objects.
  
19. Tenner (1997).
+
In our cognitive and practical activities, we must be able to take advantage of suitable conditions that will enable transformations from the Unique and the Common (and vice versa) for our specific purposes.
  
20. See Gregg (2011), for an account of the blending of work and home.
+
-----
  
21. Karl Marx is cited here by Winner (1977), pp. 36–37.
+
==== Annotation 135 ====
  
22. Winner (1977).
+
In advancing the cause of socialism, revolutionaries must work to transform our Unique positions into common positions. For instance, the process of developing revolutionary public knowledge [see Annotation 94, p. 93] begins with studying and understanding revolutionary knowledge. Initially, this knowledge will be ''unique'' to the socialist movement. By disseminating the knowledge to the public, we hope to transform this knowledge into ''common knowledge''.
  
234 O
+
Likewise, we hope to transform other common things, phenomena, and ideas back towards the Unique. For instance, the capitalist mode of production is currently the most common mode of production on Earth. In order to advance humanity towards communism, we must transition the capitalist mode of production from the Common towards the Unique, with the ambition of eventually eliminating this mode of production altogether.
  
Notes
+
=== 2. Reason and Result ===
  
23. “Industrial Society and Its Future” (1995), p. 6.
+
==== a. Categories of Reason and Result ====
  
24. Giddens (1990).
+
The ''Reason'' category is used to define the mutual impacts between internal aspects of a thing, phenomenon or idea, or between things, phenomena, or ideas, that bring about changes.
  
25. Giddens (1990), p. 33.
+
The ''Result'' category defines the changes that were caused by mutual impacts which occur between aspects and factors ''within'' a thing, phenomenon, or idea, or ''externally'' between different things, phenomena, or ideas.
  
26. Hegel (1949).
+
-----
  
27. Winner (1977), p. 188.
+
==== Annotation 136 ====
  
28. Shelley (1985); Cˆ apek (1923).
+
''Translation note:'' the Vietnamese words for “reason and result” can also be translated as “cause and effect.” We have chosen to use the words “reason and result” to distinguish materialist dialectical categories from metaphysical conceptions of development.
  
29. Cameron (1984; 1991).
+
In metaphysics [see Annotation 8, p. 8], any given ''effect'' is seen to have a single ''cause''. In materialist dialectics, we instead examine the ''mutual impacts'' which occur within and between subjects through motion and development processes.
  
30. Wachowski and Wachowski (1999).
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-47.png|''Metaphysical vs. Materialist Dialectical conceptions of development.'']]
  
31. Eick and Moore (2004–2009).
+
In the metaphysical conception of cause and effect, (A) causes effect (B), then effect (B) causes effect (C), and so on. Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, uses the model of ''development'' (see Annotation 117, p. 119), wherein objects (A) and (B) mutually impact one another, resulting in development (C). (C) will then have relations with other things, phenomena, and/or ideas, and the mutual impacts from these new relations will become the reasons for future results. Consider the following example:
  
32. Fawcett and Manson (2013-).
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-48.png|''Metaphysical vs. Materialist Dialectical conceptions of frying and eating an egg.'']]
  
33. Boyle (2002); Forster (2013).
+
In the metaphysical “cause and effect” model, putting an egg in a hot pan is the cause which results in the effect of producing a fried egg. The egg being fried has the effect of the egg now being suitable for eating, which is the cause of the egg being eaten by a hungry person.
  
34. Joy (2000), p. 256.
+
This is a simplification of the metaphysical conception of causes and effects, since metaphysics does recognize that one cause can have branches of multiple effects, but the essential characteristic of the metaphysical conception of causality is to break down all activity and change in the universe into static and distinct episodes of one distinct event causing one or more other distinct events.
  
35. Vonnegut (1963).
+
In contrast, the materialist dialectical model of development holds that every result stems from mutual impacts which occur relationally between things, phenomena, and ideas, and that the resulting synthesis — the newly developed result of mutual impacts — will then have new relations with other things, phenomena, and ideas, and that these ''relations'' will become new reasons for new results through ''mutual impact''.
  
36. King (2012/1978).
+
In this example, the egg and the hot pan will mutually impact each other. The frying pan will become dirty and need to be washed (the result of putting an egg in the frying pan); meanwhile, the egg will become a fried egg, which is fit for human consumption (the result of being cooked in the frying pan). The fried egg will then have a relationship with a hungry human, and this relationship will be a new reason which will lead to further results (i.e., the human eating and digesting the egg).
  
37. William Mitchell (1995), p. 146.
+
So, the key difference between the classical metaphysical conception of causality and the materialist dialectical model of development is that metaphysics focus more on individual events in time whereas materialist dialectics focus on the relations and mutual impacts between things, phenomena, and ideas over time.
  
38. Marvin Minsky is cited here by Riecken (1994), p. 25.
+
==== b. Dialectical relationship between Reason and Result ====
  
39. Greenwald (2014).
+
The relationship between Reason and Result is objective, and it contains inevitability: there is no Reason that does not lead to a Result; and likewise, there is no Result without any Reason.
  
40. Assange et al. (2012), pp. 29 & 33.
+
Reasons cause Results, which is why Reason always comes before Result, and Result always comes after Reason.
  
41. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (2013).
+
A Reason can cause one or many Results and a Result can be caused by one or many Reasons.
  
42. Bradbury (1991).
+
When many Reasons lead to a single Result, the impacts which lead to the Result are mutual between all things, phenomena, and ideas at hand. These mutual impacts can have many relational positions or roles, including: direct reasons, indirect reasons, internal reasons, external reasons, etc.
  
Chapter Six: Luddism
+
-----
  
1. Jones (2006), pp. 40ff discusses these claims further.
+
==== Annotation 137 ====
  
2. In addition to Thompson (1963) and Hobsbawm (1952), we draw on Thomis (1970), who has a very useful “Diary of Events, 1811–17,” pp. 177–186; and the generative research that has grown out of their work: research by Webster and Robins (1986); Noble (1993); Sale (1995b), who also has a helpful “timeline,” pp. 282–283; Robins and Webster (1999); Fox (2002); and Jones (2006).
+
As stated in the previous annotation, Reasons which lead to Results stem from mutually impacting relations between things, phenomena, and ideas. There is no way for one subject to affect another subject without also being affected itself in some way.
  
3. See Thompson (1963), pp. 496–497.
+
Reasons can take many forms, including (but not limited to):
  
4. Thompson (1963), p. 543. Thomis (1970) describes the nature of this work and the machines that were targeted. A cropper raised the nap of finished cloth and cut it level with specialized shears (p. 15, for pictures of the shears and the process see p. 33). The workers were replaced by the gig mill and the shearing frame (p. 50). Stockingers, or framework knitters, worked at frames for making hosiery and lace (p. 29, for a picture see p. 51). Handloom weavers were replaced by steam looms (p. 53).
+
'''Types of Reasons and Results'''
  
5. Thompson (1963), p. 544.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-49.png|''Direct Reasons stem from immediate relations.'']]
  
6. Thompson (1963), p. 543.
+
'''Direct Reasons''' are Reasons which stem from immediate relations, with no intervening relations standing between the Reason and Result.
  
7. Both Hobsbawm (1952) and Thompson (1963) offer considerable evidence to support these multiple motives. See Thompson’s chapter 15, “An Army of Redressers,” pp. 472–602.
+
For example, dropping a coffee cup causes an immediate relationship between the cup and the ground, and that relation leads directly to the Result of the coffee cup breaking to pieces.
  
8. Hobsbawm (1952), p. 66.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-50.png|''Indirect Reasons have an intervening relationship between the Reason and the Result.'']]
  
9. Hobsbawm (1952), p. 58; Thompson (1963), p. 564. Some estimates are higher. Sale (1995b) suggests figures of 14,400 troops and 20,000 voluntary militia; see pp. 148–149.
+
'''Indirect Reasons''' are Reasons which have intervening relations between a Reason and a Result.
  
10. At least 22 were hanged as Luddites (Thompson 1963, pp. 584–586). Others were killed, deported, and jailed.
+
For example, the dropped coffee cup above may have smashed into pieces directly because it hit the ground, but it may also have indirect Reasons. The person holding the cup may have been frightened because she heard a loud noise, and the loud noise was caused by a car backfiring, and the car backfiring was caused by the driver not maintaining his car engine.
  
11. Thompson (1963), p. 553.
+
In materialist dialectical terms, the driver’s relationship with his car would be an indirect Reason for the car backfiring; the relationship between the car (which backfired) and the person holding the coffee cup would be the direct Reason for dropping the cup; and the cup’s relationship with the ground would be the direct reason for the cup smashing. At the same time, the driver’s relationship with his car would be an indirect Reason for the Result of the coffee cup smashing to pieces.
  
12. Hobsbawm (1952), p. 59.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-51.png|''Internal Reasons stem from internal relationships.'']]
  
13. Thompson (1963), p. 549.
+
'''Internal Reasons''' are Reasons which stem from internal relations that occur between aspects and factors ''within'' a subject.
  
14. Thompson (1963), pp. 551–552.
+
For example, if a building collapses because the steel structure ''within'' the building rusts and fails, then that could be viewed as an ''internal Reason'' for the collapse.
  
Notes
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-52.png|''External Reasons stem from external relations.'']]
  
O 235
+
'''External Reasons''' are reasons which stem from external relations that occur between different things, phenomena, and ideas.
  
15. Thompson (1963), p. 543.
+
For example, if a building collapses because it is smashed by a wrecking ball, then that could be viewed as an ''external Reason'' for the collapse.
  
16. Quoted in Thompson (1963), p. 554.
+
All of these roles and positions can be viewed ''relatively''. From one viewpoint, a Reason may be seen as internal, but from another viewpoint, it might be viewed as external. For example, if a couple has a disagreement which leads to an argument, the disagreement may be seen as an external Reason from the perspective of each individual within the couple. But to a relationship counselor viewing the situation from the outside, the disagreement may be seen as an internal Reason which leads to ''the couple'' (a subject defined by the internal relationship between the husband and wife) arguing.
  
17. Thompson (1963), p. 552.
+
From one perspective, a government official ordering a building to be torn down may be seen as the direct Reason for the Result of the building being torn down. But from a different perspective, one can see many intervening relations: complaints from local residents may have led to the government official making the order, the order would be delivered to a demolition crew, the demolition crew would assign a crew member to operate a wrecking ball, the crew member would operate the wrecking ball, the wrecking ball would smash the building. All of these can be seen as intervening relations which constitute indirect reasons leading up to the direct Reason of the wrecking ball smashing the building. Choosing the right viewpoint during analysis is critical to make sure that Reason and Result relations are viewed properly and productively, and care must also be taken to ensure that the correct Reasons are attributed to Results (see ''Reason and Result'', p. 138).
  
18. Hobsbawm (1952), p. 57.
+
Likewise, a Reason can cause many Results, including primary and secondary Results.
  
19. See Hobsbawm (1952), pp. 66–67; Thompson (1963), pp. 601–602; and Trevelyan (1965), especially pp. 250–251, 287. Sale (1995b, p. 201) is not as generous in his assessment that “Luddism did, however, lose.”
+
-----
  
20. Sale (1995b), p. 241. His chapter on “The Neo-Luddites,” pp. 237–259, does a good job of characterizing the spectrum of contemporary neo-Luddites.
+
==== Annotation 138 ====
  
21. Fox (2002), p. 336. For her full account of meeting those she considered modern-day Luddites, see Chapter 11, “Looking for Luddites,” pp. 330–365.
+
'''Primary''' Results are Results which are more direct and predictable.
  
22. Webster and Robins (1986).
+
'''Secondary''' Results are Results which are indirect and less predictable.
  
23. Abbey (1978).
+
For example, an earthquake may have ''primary'' Results such as the ground shaking, buildings being destroyed, etc. ''Secondary'' Results from the earthquake might include flights being rerouted from local airports, shortages at grocery stores, etc.
  
24. Engler (2011).
+
In the motion of the material world, there is no known “first Reason” or “final Result.
  
25. Krugman (2013)
+
-----
  
26. Recently, Engler (2013) and Clarke (2012), and less recently Pynchon (1984).
+
==== Annotation 139 ====
  
27. Sale (1995b), pp. 237–238. Sale cites Glendenning (1990).
+
With our current understanding of the universe, it is uncertain what might have caused the creation of all existence. Was it the Big Bang? If so, did the Big Bang have some underlying reason? There is also no way to know if there will ever be a “final Result.” Will the heat death of the universe occur, and if so, will that end all transpiring of relations which would end the cycle of development — of Reasons and Results?
  
Chapter Seven: Appropriate Technology
+
As of now, we do not have solid answers to these questions. If and when answers arise, it is possible that the materialist dialectical framework will need to be updated to reflect new scientific knowledge, just as Marx, Engels, and Lenin have updated materialist dialectics in the past [see Annotation 72, p. 68]. What’s important to understand in the meantime is that within our realm of human experience and understanding, for all practical purposes, every Result which we live through and observe has some underlying Reason, and will itself lead to one or more Results.
  
1. Many of these are taken from Dickson (1975), p. 38.
+
Engels said: “we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis [see Annotation 200, p. 192], positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed, and that despite all their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate [are mixed together]. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa.”<ref>''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'', Friedrich Engels, 1880.</ref>
  
2. United Nations (1961), p. 18.
+
-----
  
3. Daniel Lerner’s book, The Passing of Traditional Society (1958), laid out the logic of the development mindset that devalued traditional culture in favor of the technological modern. Everett Rogers’s work on Diffusion of Innovations extends from that tradition. See Rogers’s last (2003) edition of this influential work.
+
==== Annotation 140 ====
  
4. For example, see Rybczynski (1980), pp. 10–11.
+
In the above passage, Engels is simply explaining that since all things, phenomena, and ideas are relationally linked and inter-related [see ''Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics'', p. 106], the mutual impacts and processes of change which lead to development (the reasons and results which transpire between all things, phenomena, and ideas) are also all linked and inter-related. What might be viewed as a Reason is also a Result of one or more prior Reasons, just as every Result is also a Reason for future Results.
  
5. Shiva (1991). Also see Shiva (1989), who addresses women and development in particular.
+
==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
  
6. Rybczynski (1980), p. 11.
+
Because the relationship between Reason and Result is objective and inevitable, we can’t ignore the relationship between Reason and Result in our perception and practice. In reality, there is no thing, phenomenon or idea that can exist without any underlying Reason or Reasons; and vice versa, there is no Reason that does not lead to any Result.
  
7. Rybczynski (1980), p. 3.
+
-----
  
8. Schumacher (1989), p. 186.
+
==== Annotation 141 ====
  
9. Schumacher (1989), p. 190.
+
In political activity, it is important to remember that ''every'' interaction within every relationship will lead to mutual impacts which will cause change and development; in other words, everything we choose to do will be the Reason for one or more Results. We must be aware of unintended or unpredicted Results from our activities.
  
10. Schumacher (1989), p. 190.
+
Reason-Result relationships are very complicated and diverse. Therefore, we must accurately identify the types of Reasons [direct, indirect, internal, external, etc.] so that we can come up with proper solutions which are suitable for the specific situation in both perception and practice. A Reason can lead to many results and, likewise, a Result can be caused by many Reasons, which is why we must have a comprehensive viewpoint and a historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116] in our perception of reality so we can properly analyse, solve and apply Reason-Result relationships.
  
11. Illich (1973).
+
-----
  
12. This biographical information draws on Todd and La Cecla (2002) and Martin (2002).
+
==== Annotation 142 ====
  
13. Illich (1973), p. 25.
+
It is critical to understand that there may be many events or relationships which might be falsely ascribed as Reasons for a given Result (and vice-versa).
  
14. Illich (1973), p. 22.
+
For example: in 1965, the United States of America officially declared war on North Vietnam after the so-called “Gulf of Tonkin Incident,” in which Vietnamese forces supposedly fired on a United States Navy ship in the Gulf of Tonkin. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident is often described as the “cause” or the “Reason” that the Vietnam War began.
  
15. Illich (1973), p. 11.
+
However, the real “Reason” why the USA declared war on North Vietnam had to do with the underlying contradiction between capitalist imperialism and communism in Vietnam. This contradiction had to be resolved one way or another. The United States of America willfully decided to try to negate this contradiction by instigating war, and this was the true reason the war began. In fact, the so-called “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” never even occurred as described — the attack on the USA’s ship never really occurred. A document released by the Pentagon in 2005 revealed that the incident was completely fabricated. So, saying that the “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” was the Reason for the war is nonsensical, since it’s an event which never even occurred in reality.
  
16. Hazeltine and Bull (1999), p. 4.
+
Understanding the true nature of Reason and Result is very important for making decisions and choosing a path forward in political action. Attributing the wrong Reason to a Result, or misunderstanding the Results which stem from a Reason, can lead to serious setbacks and failures. Therefore, it is vital for revolutionaries to properly identify and understand the ''actual'' Reasons and Results which drive development.
  
17. Winner (1986), pp. 64–65, 70.
+
=== 3. Obviousness and Randomness ===
  
18. Roszak (1978).
+
==== a. Categories of Obviousness and Randomness ====
  
19. Roszak (1994).
+
-----
  
20. Polak (2010a; 2010b).
+
==== Annotation 143 ====
  
21. Polak (2010a; 2010b).
+
In Vietnamese, the words for these categories are “tất nhiên” and “ngẫu nhiên,” which respectively translate to “obvious” and “random.” In socialist literature, various words have been used by different authors to convey the underlying meaning of these categories (Engels, for instance, used the terms “necessary” and “accidental” to mean “obvious” and “random,” respectively). We have chosen to use words which closely match the Vietnamese used in the original text, but the reader should be aware that these same concepts may be described using many different words in various English translations of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Ho Chi Minh, etc.
  
22. See, for example, Smith (2007); Bell (2008); Polak and Warwick (2013); Pilloton (2009); and Engineers Without Borders (www.ewb-usa.org).
+
The ''Obviousness'' category refers to events that occur because of the essential [see ''Essence and Phenomenon'', p. 156] internal aspects of the material structure of a subject. These essential internal characteristics become reasons for certain results under certain conditions: the Obvious ''has'' to happen in a certain way, it ''can’t'' happen any other way.
  
23. www.ewb.students.mtu.edu/, accessed July 27, 2013; and studentorgs.engineering.asu. edu/ewb, accessed September 10, 2013.
+
-----
  
24. Illich (1973), p. 16.
+
==== Annotation 144 ====
  
25. Rybczynski (1980), p. 159. For the original account, see Pelto (1973).
+
''Obviousness'' can only apply to material subjects in the material world and results which are certain to happen based on the material laws of nature. Obviousness arises from the internal aspects, features, and relations of physical objects. Paper ''will'' burn under certain specific conditions, due its internal material structure. If those conditions (i.e., temperature, the presence of oxygen, etc.) exist, then paper ''will'' catch fire predictably. In other words, paper will ''obviously'' burn under certain circumstances due to its internal composition,.
  
26. Rybczynski (1980), p. 160.
+
The ''Randomness'' category refers to things that happen because of external reasons: things that happen, essentially, by chance, due to impacts from many external relations. A Random outcome ''may'' occur or it ''may not'' occur; a Random outcome could happen ''this'' way or it could happen ''that'' way.
  
236 O
+
-----
  
Notes
+
==== Annotation 145 ====
  
27. Illich (1973), p. 23.
+
As we discussed above, paper ''will'' burn if it reaches a certain temperature — that much is ''obvious''. If your friend holds paper over the flame of the lighter, the paper ''will'' burn — that’s ''obvious''. But you can’t be certain whether your friend will actually hold the paper to the flame or not. This demonstrates ''Randomness''. Whether your friend will ultimately hold the paper to the flame or not depends on an external relation which is not defined by the internal structure of the paper, and which can’t be predicted with the same predictability as obvious events which are rooted in internal material aspects.
  
28. Hazeltine and Bull (1999), p. 3.
+
==== b. Dialectical relationship between Obviousness and Randomness ====
  
Chapter Eight: The Unabomber
+
Obviousness and Randomness both exist objectively and play an important role in the motion and development of things and phenomena. Obviousness plays the decisive role.
  
1. Luke (1999), p. 171.
+
-----
  
2. This is a claim made as well by Luke (1999), p. 171.
+
==== Annotation 146 ====
  
3. Shrum (2001), p. 99.
+
Obviousness plays the decisive role simply because Obviousness is far more predictable and the laws which govern material phenomena are essentially fixed. We can’t change the laws of physics, the nature of chemical reactions, etc.
  
4. See Castells (1997).
+
Obviousness and Randomness exist in dialectical unity; there is no pure Obviousness, nor pure Randomness. It is obvious that Randomness shall occur in our universe, however Obviousness clears a path through this Randomness.
  
5. Corey (2000).
+
-----
  
6. Kelly (2010).
+
==== Annotation 147 ====
  
7. Chase (2000), p. 46.
+
Our universe is incredibly complex and there are many different potential external relations which could impact any given situation, such that some degree of Randomness is always present in any situation; in other words, the presence of Randomness can be seen as Obvious.
  
8. See Corey (2000), pp. 180–181; Luke (1999), pp. 172–174.
+
In 1922, Ho Chi Minh identified objective internal characteristics of the working class of France and its colonies. He wrote: “The mutual ignorance of the two proletariats gives rise to prejudices. The French workers look upon the native as an inferior and negligible human being, incapable of understanding and still less of taking action. The natives regard all the French as wicked exploiters. Imperialism and capitalism do not fail to take advantage of this mutual suspicion and this artificial racial hierarchy to frustrate propaganda and divide forces which ought to unite.
  
9. Chase (2003), p. 362.
+
In this example, Ho Chi Minh identifies prejudice as an obvious outcome of mutual ignorance. The prejudice arises as a matter of course from internal objective aspects of the two proletarian groups. As long as French and native workers remain ignorant of one another, prejudice will arise. The specific forms which this prejudice will take, however, and their resulting impacts and developments, will be more or less Random because there are many external factors (including the external impacts of the capitalist class, which seeks to take advantage of these prejudices) which can’t be predicted. Therefore, it is necessary for political revolutionaries to account for both random and obvious factors in confronting such prejudice. Ho Chi Minh’s suggestion for overcoming these difficulties was concise and to-the-point: “Intensify propaganda to overcome them.” Only by negating the internal aspects of mutual ignorance through education and propaganda could communists hope to negate the resulting prejudice.
  
10. Sale (1995b) discusses the neo-Luddites. Sale (1995a) considers the case of Kaczynski.
+
As Engels said: “One knows that what is maintained to be necessary [''obvious''] is composed of sheer accidents, and that the so-called accidental [''random''] is the form behind which necessity hides itself — and so on.”<ref>''Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'', Friedrich Engels, 1886.</ref>
  
11. Strangely, despite the fact that handwritten drafts of the essay and early typescripts were found in Kaczynski’s cabin, and the fact that the copy sent to the newspapers was positively typed on one of his typewriters, Kaczynski has never publicly admitted to writing the essay, and neither defense nor prosecution has pressed this point (see Corey, 2000).
+
Obviousness and Randomness are not static properties: Randomness and Obviousness continuously change and develop over time. Under specific conditions, Obviousness and Randomness can transform into each other: Obviousness can become Random and Randomness can become obvious.
  
12. See Corey (2000) and Chase (2000).
+
-----
  
13. Jones (2006); Kelly (2010); Luke (1999); Corey (2000).
+
==== Annotation 148 ====
  
14. “Industrial Society and Its Future” (1995), p. 1.
+
Randomness can be introduced to an obvious situation: it may be obvious that a mineshaft will collapse, until human beings come along and intervene by repairing the structural integrity of the mineshaft. It may seem Random whether a city’s economy will grow or shrink, until a volcano erupts and buries the city in lava and ash, making it obvious that the economy will not grow because the city no longer exists.
  
15. “Industrial Society and Its Future” (1995), p. 1.
+
Most situations are in a flux, as Obviousness and Randomness dialectically develop and change over time, with outcomes becoming more or less obvious or Random over time. It is vital that we, as political revolutionaries, are able to distinguish between Obviousness and Randomness and to leverage this understanding to our advantage.
  
16. Luke (1999), pp. 174–175.
+
==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
  
17. Corey (2000), p. 159; Ellul (1964).
+
Basically, in our perception and reality, we have to base our plans, strategies, and actions as much as possible on the Obvious, not the Random. However, we must not ignore Randomness, nor try to separate the Obvious from the Random. When faced with situations which seem very Random, we must find ways to develop Obviousness. When faced with what seems obvious, we must keep an eye out for Randomness. Obviousness and Randomness can mutually transform, so we need to create suitable conditions to hinder or promote such transformation to suit our purposes.
  
18. Corey (2000), p. 160.
+
-----
  
19. Whyte (1956); Marcuse (1964).
+
==== Annotation 149 ====
  
20. Mumford (1964/1970), p. 284.
+
We must always remember that no situation is purely obvious, nor purely Random, and to take this into account in all of our planning and activity.
  
21. “Industrial Society and Its Future” (1995), p. 3.
+
A skyscraper made from heavy steel beams may seem quite sturdy and stable; it may appear obvious that the structure will remain stable and sound for decades. However, it is still important for engineers to periodically ''confirm'' that the steel is still sound through testing and observation. Engineers must also be prepared for Random events like lightning, earthquakes, storms, etc., which may affect the seemingly obvious structural integrity of the building.
  
22. Luke (1999), p. 176.
+
Likewise, when faced with extremely complex situations which seem completely Random, we must seek out (or bring about) the obvious. Wildfires are extremely chaotic and difficult to predict. However, firefighters can rely on certain obvious patterns and natural laws which govern the spread of fire. By digging trenches, lighting counter-fires, spraying water, and other such actions, firefighters can bring wildfires under control. This illustrates how humans are able to make situations less Random by bringing about an increasing amount of Obviousness over time through practical activity.
  
23. The Jolly Roger Press claimed to have sold over 12,000 copies less than a year after the manifesto appeared. See Rubin (1996).
+
=== 4. Content and Form ===
  
24. On this definition of technicism, see Stanley (1978), pp. xii–xiii.
+
==== a. Categories of Content and Form ====
  
25. Mumford (1964/1970), p. 291.
+
The ''Content'' category refers to the sum of all aspects, attributes, and processes that a thing, phenomenon, or idea is made from.
  
26. Mumford (1964/1970), p. 193.
+
The ''Form'' category refers to the mode of existence and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. ''Form'' thus describes the system of relatively stable relationships which exist internally within things, phenomena, and ideas.
  
27. Chase (2000).
+
-----
  
28. Mumford (1964/1970), especially pp. 274–276.
+
==== Annotation 150 ====
  
29. Kelly (2010), pp. 207, 206.
+
Content and Form can be difficult to comprehend at first because the ways in which Content and Form manifest and interact can vary wildly depending on the subject being discussed and the viewpoint from which the subject is being considered.
  
Chapter Nine: Meaning
+
<blockquote>
 +
Content represents the component things, materials, attributes, features, etc., which, together, make up a thing, phenomenon, or idea. You can think of it as the “ingredients” from which a subject is made.
  
1. Webster’s New Encyclopedic Dictionary (2002), p. 1896
+
Form refers to a stable system of internal relationships which compose a thing, phenomenon, or idea, as well as the mode of existence and development [see Annotation 60, p. 59] of those relations.
 +
</blockquote>
  
2. Williams (1983), p. 315.
+
Remember that from a dialectical materialist perspective, everything in our universe is defined by internal and external relations. If a thing, phenomenon, or idea has internal relations which are ''relatively'' stable, then it has a Form.
  
3. Or chimpanzee or other tool-using animal.
+
We would not call all of the assorted ingredients which are used to make a cake “a cake” unless they have been assembled together and baked into the stable form which we interpret as “a cake.” Once a portion is removed from the cake, the portion itself assumes a new stable form which we call “a slice of cake.” The slice of cake will maintain its relatively stable form until being eaten, discarded, or otherwise transitioning into some other form. It is only considered a “slice of cake” for as long as it maintains its own specific stable form.
  
4. See Bennett (2010).
+
Stability itself is also ''relative'': a “spray” of water may only last for a few seconds but we can still conceive of it as having Form. On the other hand, a mountain has a set of stable internal relations (a Form) which might last for millions of years.
  
5. We refer here to OOO, Object-Oriented Ontology, a philosophical approach to technology, not a cultural studies approach to technology, that has taken materiality off into interesting, but largely abstract, apolitical directions. See, for example, Bogost (2012).
+
We can think of Form as having two aspects: inner Form and outer Form.
  
6. Romanyshyn (1989), p. 10.
+
''Inner form'' refers to the internal stable relations which we have already discussed.
  
7. Feenberg (1991), p. 14.
+
''Outer form'' is how an object “appears” to human senses.
  
Notes
+
In this book, we are primarily concerned with the ''inner Form'' of subjects, however, in other contexts (such as art and design), the ''outer Form'' plays a more prominent role.
  
O 237
+
Now, let’s identify some of the common viewpoints from which Content and Form might be considered.
  
8. Winner (1986). See his discussion of “forms of life,” pp. 3–18.
+
'''Material vs. Ideal'''
  
9. Grosz (2001), p. 182. The essay in its entirety helps the reader to develop a feel for “thingness.” See pp. 166–183, 203–206.
+
When discussing the ''material'' — i.e., ''objective'' systems and objects<ref>See Annotation 10, p. 10 and Annotation 108, p. 112.</ref> — discussion of Content and Form is more straightforward.
  
10. Some scholars of technology try to accommodate these additional considerations and complications about the definition of technology by providing elaborate schemes or typologies of technology. For example, Allenby and Sarewitz (2011) delineate three levels of technology. Level I is “the reality of the immediate effectiveness of the technology itself as it is used by those trying to accomplish something.” Their example is a jet airplane. Level II technology is a “systemic complexity” such as the whole system of air travel, in all its complexity. Level III is more the level of social and cultural context (what they call an “Earth system”). Allenby and Sarewitz are not alone here. Economist W. Brian Arthur (2009, p. 28) proposes: (a) technologysingular (“technology as a means to fulfill a human purpose”), (b) technology-plural (“an assemblage of practices and components”) and (c) technology-general (“the entire collection of devices and engineering practices available to the culture”). Such schemes have their uses in parsing debates and particular technologies or technological systems (Allenby and Sarewitz are examining transhumanism). Our approach takes a different tack, and we present the idea of technology as assemblage, a term scalable from the individual interactions of Level I to the global ways of life at Level III.
+
'''Material'''
  
Chapter Ten: Causality
+
With material things and phenomena, the ''Content'' is what the thing is made out of: the physical parts, aspects, attributes, and processes that compose the subject. For example, the Content of a wooden chair might be the wood, nails, paint, and other materials which are used to create the chair.
  
1. Slack (1984a; 1984b; 1989). The four positions on causality developed in this chapter build on Slack’s work.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-53.png|''A material object can be described in terms of content, inner form, and outer form.'']]
  
2. Marx and Smith (1994), pp. ix–xv. The book is edited by Smith and Marx (1994).
+
The ''inner Form'' of a material object refers to ''stable internal relations'' which compose the object. The stable relationship between the wood and the nails — the nails bind the wood together, the wood is cut in certain patterns, the paint adheres to the wood through physical and chemical bonds, etc. ''Stability'' is, again, relative — over time, the paint will chip and flake, the wood will rot, the nails will rust, etc. Dialectical processes of change will eventually reduce the chair into something other than a chair (i.e., through rotting, burning, disassembly, etc.), but as long as the internal relations maintain the Form of a chair we conceive of it as a chair.
  
3. Marx and Smith (1994), p. xiii.
+
The ''outer Form'' of a material object refers to the way it appears to human consciousness. Its shape, aesthetics, etc.
  
4. Marx and Smith (1994), p. xiv.
+
==== Ideal ====
  
5. Heidegger (1977), p. 14.
+
With the ideal — i.e., ''abstract'' ideas and concepts — discussion of Content and Form becomes more complicated. As Vietnam’s ''Marxism-Leninism Textbook for Students Who Specialize in Marxism-Leninism'' explains:
  
6. Heidegger (1977), p. 27.
+
<blockquote>
 +
Many times, human consciousness has difficulty in trying to clearly define the Content of a subject — especially when the subject is an abstract idea. We often mistake Content with inner Form. Usually, in this situation, there is a strong combination and intertwining between both Content and Form. In such a situation, the Form can be referred to as the “inner Form,” or the “Content-Form.
  
7. Heidegger (1977), p. 27.
+
With physical things and phenomena, this type of Form usually belongs to a very specific Private, it doesn’t exist in any other Private, it is the Unique [see Annotation 129, p. 128].
 +
</blockquote>
  
8. Heidegger (1977), p. 32.
 
  
9. Ellul (1964), p. xxv.
+
-----
  
10. Ellul (1964), p. xxvi.
+
The reason the inner Form of physical objects usually exists in ''Private'' as the ''Unique'' is because the stable internal relations of any given physical object are equivalent to the specific material components which distinguish one physical object from all other physical objects. In other words, if you have two chairs which are exact copies of each other, made from the same kind of wood, cut into the same shape, using the same type and configuration of fasteners, etc., they are still not the exact same object. The internal relations of one chair are what make it ''that'' chair and distinguish it from all other objects in the universe. The ''outer Form'' of these chairs may have many commonalities (they look similar, they have the same color, etc.), but the ''inner Form'' is what distinguishes one chair from the other.
  
11. Ellul (1964), p. xxx.
+
<blockquote>
 +
However, within the realm of abstract ideas, there are also Forms which many abstract Privates share. In the context of abstract ideas, we call this kind of Form the “outer Form,” the “form-Form,” or the “common Form.
  
12. Katz and Aakhus (2002), p. 305
+
When we try to define the Content of a subject which is an abstract idea, our consciousness usually tries to answer the question: “what is the subject?”
 +
</blockquote>
  
13. Kelly (2010), p. 12.
+
This is usually a simple matter. Take, for example, the abstract idea of “freedom.” When we try to think of the Content of ''freedom'' we can answer it pretty easily. What is the subject of ''freedom''? It is the condition which allows humans to follow their own will, it is the absence of external coercion, etc., etc.
  
14. Grossberg (2010a), p. 191.
+
<blockquote>
 +
But, when we try to define the Form of an abstract idea, our consciousness tries to answer the question: “how is the subject?” — this is when we have to define the mode of existence (the Form) of that subject.
 +
</blockquote>
  
15. Deleuze and Guattari (1987), p. 90.
+
This is where things get more complicated. The mode of existence of an abstract idea can usually be considered to be language, since our ideas are usually expressed through language, but it can take on other modes of existence as well, such as visual media (paintings, photographs), physical motions of the human body (body language, dance), etc. This is how the field of art studies is concerned with the philosophical categories of Content and Form.
  
Chapter Eleven: Agency
+
==== Content and Form in Art ====
  
1. Webster’s New World College Dictionary (2002), pp. 25–26.
+
Many readers may already be familiar with the subject of Content and Form from studying art, design, communications, and related fields. At first glance, the definitions of Content and Form may seem different from what we’ve been discussing so far.
  
2. Latour (1993).
+
This is because art concerns itself with ''abstract ideas'' expressed through various Forms of ''physical representations.''
  
3. Callon and Latour (1981), p. 286.
+
These physical representations may include physical objects (photographs, paintings, sculptures), performed and/or recorded physical activities (dance, music, theater, film), human language recorded in stable physical Forms of written language (novels, poems, stories) or spontaneously performed oral language (storytelling, impromptu spoken-word poetry).
  
4. Latour (1988), p. 306.
+
Because the study of art is primarily concerned with interpreting and understanding ideas expressed through these physical manifestations, art is concerned with the ''stable inner relations'' of the ''ideas'' which artists imbue within their works of art — much more than the stable inner relations of the physical components of the object.
  
5. Latour (1988), p. 303.
+
According to the Vietnamese art textbook ''Curriculum of General Aesthetics'':
  
6. Latour, (1999), p. 16. However, Latour has more recently reconciled himself with the term. See his 2005 book, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (esp. p. 9, footnote 9).
+
<blockquote>
 +
What is the Form of a work of art? Form is the way to express the Content of an artwork. Form and Content within a work of art have a strong unity with each other and they regulate each other. Form is the organization, the inner structure of the Content of an artwork. Therefore, Form is the way that the Content expresses itself, and that way is described by two features. We must ask:
  
7. Latour (2005).
+
First: what expresses the Content of a work of art?
  
8. Latour (1993), p. 129.
+
Second: how is it expressed?
  
238 O
+
Art exists when two conditions are met: first, there must be a subject with an outer Form. Second, an artist must convey aesthetic meaning, or humanization, of that subject. This aesthetic meaning is the Content.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Notes
+
So, in studying works of art, we are less concerned with the ''physical content'' of the artwork (the canvas, paint, etc.) than we are with the ''abstract content'' of the artwork (the ideas which the artist imbues within the artwork).
  
Chapter Twelve: Articulation and Assemblage
+
As for Form, the ''inner Form'' of art represents the stable internal relations which compose the art (both ideal, i.e., the stable internal relations of the abstract ideas imbued within the art by the artist, as well as physical, i.e., the stable internal relations of the physical media of the art).
  
1. The New York Times, Slate, The Week, Popular Mechanics, and others asked this very question.
+
The ''outer Form'' of art represents how our human senses perceive the art, such as composition techniques, the use of color, etc.
  
2. Gilliom and Monahan (2012), p. 118.
+
The chart below breaks down the differences in a general, non-artistic viewpoint of physical objects and processes in materialist dialectical terms (i.e., the viewpoint an engineer might have), as compared with the artistic viewpoint of physical objects and processes (which an art critic might have). Some fields, such as designing products for human use, might draw from both viewpoints.
  
3. www.theguardian.com/world/the-nsa-files, accessed 4 June, 2014.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-54.png]]
  
4. www.timessquarenyc.org/do-business-here/advertising-sponsorships/index.aspx and www.timessquarenyc.org/do-business-here/market-facts/index.aspx, accessed 4 June, 2014.
+
==== Content and Form in Specific Artistic Media ====
  
5. See the work of Steve Mann, especially Mann (2001).
+
Every medium of art will interpret Content and Form in its own way. For example:
  
6. Hall (1996b), p. 141. See also Slack (1996).
+
'''Literature''' is a specific art discipline which deals with recorded human language in the Form of writing. In written literature, the Content would be the ideas expressed in a piece of writing; what the words say. The inner Form would be the way the ideas relate to each other — i.e., story structure, pacing, character development, etc. The outer form would be the physical format of the writing — i.e., manuscript, magazine article, paperback book, ebook, etc.
  
7. Grossberg (1992), p. 54.
+
'''Painting''' is a specific art discipline in which pigments are applied to objects to create images which convey ideas and emotions. In painting, the Content would be the meaning which an artist embodies in a work of art. The inner Form would include the stable internal relations within the artwork (i.e., the bonds and mixtures between the pigments, the canvas, etc.), while the outer Form would be how the artwork appears to human senses (composition, aesthetics, etc.). Generally speaking, the creator of the art will have to make decisions about the inner Form (i.e., selection of oil vs. acrylic vs. watercolor, selection of shade, tint, and hue, physical brush strokes, etc.) so as to produce the desired outer Form (the way the finished artwork will appear to viewers).
  
8. Grossberg (1992), pp. 54–55.
+
'''Theater''' is a specific art discipline in which human beings perform physical actions and use their voices to convey ideas to an audience. In theater, the Content includes the ideas which are being presented, such as the script, the musical score, the story, the performance choices of actors, costumes, props, etc. The inner Form would include the stable relations between the members of the cast, the director, the physical stage, the lighting, etc., and the outer Form would be the way the play appears to the audience.
  
9. Amos (2014).
+
These are just some examples. Each medium of expression will have its own variations in how Content and Form are considered.
  
10. Hall (1996b), p. 142.
+
Engels described the manifestation of Content and Form in ''Dialectics of Nature:''
  
11. Deleuze and Guattari (1987), pp. 406–407, 503–505.
+
<blockquote>
 +
The whole of organic nature is one continuous proof of the identity or inseparability of form and content. Morphological and physiological phenomena, form and function, mutually determine one another. The differentiation of form (the cell) determines differentiation of substance into muscle, skin, bone, epithelium, etc., and the differentiation of substance in turn determines difference of form.
 +
</blockquote>
  
12. Deleuze and Guattari (1987), p. 406.
+
Content and Form are discussed frequently in analysis of human social systems and objective relations which occur within society. For example, Marx made many criticial insights into economics by analyzing and explaining the form of value [see Annotation 14, p. 16] under capitalism.
  
13. Deleuze and Guattari (1987), p. 88.
+
Indeed, the entire capitalist system can be viewed in terms of content and form. The current form of human civilization is capitalism. That is to say, capitalism is the stable set of relations and characteristis of the current political economy which dominates the planet. The content of capitalism includes all the components of the base and superstructure, including the various classes (capitalists, working class, etc.), the means of production, government institutions, corporate institutions, etc. All of these elements are configured together into the relatively stable form which we call “capitalism.
  
14. “Gamification” as an explanation of this phenomenon became popular in 2010, encouraged by such scholars as Jane McGonigal (2011).
+
==== Other Viewpoints of Content and Form ====
  
15. Hayles and Wiley (2012), p. 24.
+
Of course, there are many other viewpoints for discussing Content and Form of abstract ideas. Every philosophical field will have its own unique ways of utilizing Content and Form analysis. One example is the concept of Content and Form in legal philosophy. Vietnamese legal expert Dinh Thuy Dung writes:
  
16. See Galloway and Thacker (2007).
+
<blockquote>
 +
The law has internal and external forms:
  
17. Clark (2003), p. 82.
+
The inner Form is the internal structure of the law, the relationships and the connections between the elements constituting the law. The inner Form of the law is called the legal structure, which includes the constituent parts of the legal system such as the branch of law, legal institutions, and legal norms.
  
18. See, for example, Bogost (2012) and Harman (2011).
+
The outer Form is the manifestation, or mode of existence, of the law. In other words, the outer Form of the law is how we view and understand the law [i.e., who enforces the law and what repercussions will occur if we violate the law]. Based on the outer Form of the law, one can know how it exists in reality, and where and to whom it applies. The external Form of the law is also approached in relation to its Content.
  
19. Featherstone (2011), p. 141.
+
According to this understanding, the Content of the law includes all the elements that make up the law, while the Form of the law is understood as the elements which contain or express the Content.
  
20. Hall (1996b), pp. 142–143.
+
If you understand that the Content of the law is the will of the state, then the legal Form is the way of expressing the will of the state.
 +
</blockquote>
  
21. Deleuze (1995), p. 176.
+
There are countless other ways in which Content and Form can be used to analyze and understand things, phenomena, and ideas. We hope that these examples have given you a better idea of the various ways in which Content and Form can be used to understand the world. In general, socialist texts deal with the ''inner Form'' of things, phenomena, and ideas. That is to say, the inner relations which compose the subject being considered. The outer form — how things appear to our senses — tends to be less relevant in analysis of human social systems, though it is often important in consideration of specialized fields of revolutionary activity such as aesthetics, propaganda, etc.
  
Chapter Thirteen: Politics and Economics
+
==== b. Dialectical relationship between Content and Form ====
  
1. For a discussion of different conceptions of political economy, see Mosco (1996).
+
Content and Form have a strong dialectical relationship with one other. There is no Form that does not contain any Content. Simultaneously, there is no Content that does not exist in a specific Form. The same Content can manifest in many Forms and a Form can contain many Contents.
  
2. Winner (1986), p. 22.
+
The relationship between Content and Form is a dialectical relationship in which Content decides Form and Form can impact Content.
  
3. Winner (1986), pp. 28–29.
+
-----
  
4. Winner (1986), Chapter One.
+
==== Annotation 151 ====
  
5. Winner (1986), p. 10. This echoes McLuhan (1964).
+
For example, if you want to make a table, and all you have available are wood and nails, then that Content (the wood and the nails) will determine the Form the table ends up taking. You are going to end up with a wooden table, and it will therefore have to have certain characteristics of Form.
  
6. Winner (1986), p. 47.
+
When Content changes, the Form must change accordingly. If, instead of wood, you have iron, then the table you end up building will have a much different Form. Form can also ''influence'' the Content, but not nearly as much as Content ''determines'' Form. For instance, if you have wood and nails, but you develop a technique for building a table that doesn’t need any nails, then the result (a wooden table without any nails) would be an example of a development in Form reflecting as a change in Content.
  
7. Winner (1986), p. 47.
+
The main tendency of Content is change. On the other hand, Form is relatively stable in every thing and phenomenon. As Content changes, Form must change accordingly. However, Content and Form are not always perfectly aligned.
  
8. Winner (1986), p. 47.
+
-----
  
9. Winner (1986), p. 48.
+
==== Annotation 152 ====
  
10. Winner (1986), p. 48.
+
Since all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly changing, it stands to reason that the internal components (things, phenomena, and ideas, and their relations) which compose the Content of a subject will constantly be undergoing processes of change and development. Thus, we say that the tendency of Content is change. Since the Form is based on the ''internal relations'' of the components of Content, it stands to reason that a change in Content will lead to change in Form. These kinds of changes in Content and Form also occur through the dialectical process: changes in quantity lead to changes in quality [see Annotation 117, p. 119].
  
11. Winner (1986), p. 48.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-55.png|''Quantity changes in Content lead to quality shifts in Form.'']]
  
12. Galloway (2004), p. 25.
+
As soon as a wooden chair is finished being built, the paint is already beginning to degrade. The wood is already beginning to rot. The iron nails are already beginning to rust. These changes may be imperceptibly slow — they may even take centuries to occur, if the chair is kept in a hospitable environment — but the changes are occurring, quantitatively, over time, none-the-less.
  
13. Galloway (2004), p. 35.
+
Eventually, changes in quantity will lead to changes in quality. At some point, the chair might weaken and begin to wobble whenever it’s sat in. Human beings might recognize this quality and begin to think of it as a “wobbly chair.” The chair might degrade to the point where it can’t be safely used at all, in which case it will have quality shifted into a “broken chair.” If the chair is repaired, that would represent another quality shift. If it is used for firewood, that would be another quality shift.
  
14. Galloway and Thacker (2007), p. 15.
+
Keep in mind that changes in Form do not directly cause changes in Content. If you disassemble a wooden chair into the constituent wood and nails, the wood and nails remain more or less unchanged. But if you burn a wooden chair, it’s the ''change in Content'' which leads to the change in Form from “chair” to “pile of ash.
  
15. Deleuze (1995).
+
Form simply represents the stable relationships between the component parts of the subject’s Content. The only way to change Form is to change those inner relations, or to change the components which are relating. There is no way to change Form without changing the Content, and changing the Content changes the Form by definition.
  
16. Galloway and Thacker (2007), p. 5.
+
Content determines Form, but Form is not ''fully'' decided by Content, and Form can impact back on Content. If a Form is suitable with its Content, it can improve the development of its Content. If a Form is not suitable with its Content, it can constrain the development of its Content.
  
17. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have sketched one version of what this sociotechnical constitution might entail. They call it Empire. See Hardt and Negri (2001; 2005; and 2011).
+
-----
  
18. Galloway and Thacker (2007), p. 28.
+
==== Annotation 153 ====
  
19. Galloway and Thacker (2007), p. 4.
+
The dialectical relationship between Content and Form is somewhat similar to the dialectical relationship between the material and the ideal (see ''Matter and Consciousness'',
  
20. Galloway and Thacker (2007), p. 86.
+
p. 88). Just as the material world ''determines'' consciousness while consciousness ''impacts'' the material world, the Content of a subject ''determines'' the Form while the Form ''impacts'' the Content.
  
Notes
+
''Suitability'' describes the applicability of a subject for a specific application or role. Whether or not something is “suitable” or not can be highly subjective (i.e., which music would be “suitable” to play at a party), or it can be more objective (i.e., what kind of batteries to use with an electronic device).
  
O 239
+
We might say that hardwood is “suitable” Content for the Form of a chair because it is durable, strong, relatively inexpensive, and long-lasting. It might be “unsuitable” to have a chair made of hardwood if it is to be used as an office chair, because the hard surfaces might cause strain and discomfort. However, we can utilize conscious activity to adjust and develop suitability between Content and Form. Changing the Content by adding cushioning or padding might make the Content and Form more suitable with each other. Similarly, changing the Form by designing contours and adding adjustability to the chair might make the Content and Form more suitable with each other for their intended application as an office chair.
  
21. Galloway and Thacker (2007), pp. 21–22.
+
If a Form is not suitable with the Content, it restrains the development of the Content. Just think of a shovel (Form) made of wood (Content), which will degrade very rapidly over time, vs. a shovel (Form) made of steel (Content) which will last much longer. This works in both directions. Consider the Content of drinking cups: a porcelain cup might last for a long time and even develop positively over time (by acquiring a desirable patina), while a cup made out of mild steel would not be desirable, as it would be highly prone to rust from extended use containing liquids.
  
22. Galloway and Thacker (2007), p. 22.
+
==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
  
23. Galloway and Thacker (2007), p. 98.
+
Content and Form always have a dialectical relationship with each other. Therefore, in our perception and practice, we must not try to separate Content and Form, nor should we solely focus on one and ignore the other.
  
24. Sclove (1995a; 1995b). Sclove also discusses the case of the Amish.
+
Because Content determines Form, whenever we are considering a thing, phenomenon, or idea, we must base our consideration first on its Content. If we want to change a thing or phenomenon, we have to change its Content first.
  
25. Barber (1984); see Sclove (1995a).
+
In reality, we must promote the positive impact of Form on Content by making the Form fit the Content. Likewise, we must also change the Form that is no longer suitable with its Content and therefore constrains the development of its Content.
  
26. Bennett (2010).
+
-----
  
27. Bennett (2010), p. 101.
+
==== Annotation 154 ====
  
28. Grossberg (2010b), p. 296.
+
In any analysis, it is very important that we carefully consider whether or not Content and Form are suitable with each other in our own projects and activities. We can learn a lot about suitability from observation and practice (see ''Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism'', p. 204) and improve suitability through conscious activity.
  
29. Muniesa, Millo and Callon (2007), p. 3.
+
Marx believed that it is vital to consider Content and Form when analyzing human society and political economy. One of his core critiques of political economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo was a failure to consider Content and Form when it comes to value, commodities, and money. He discusses this extensively in ''Capital Volume 1'', as in this excerpt:
  
30. Muniesa, Millo and Callon (2007), p. 3.
+
<blockquote>
 +
The value-form, whose fully developed shape is the money-form, is very elementary and simple. Nevertheless, the human mind has for more than 2,000 years sought in vain to get to the bottom of it all, whilst on the other hand, to the successful analysis of much more composite and complex forms, there has been at least an approximation. Why? Because the body, as an organic whole, is more easy of study than are the cells of that body. In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both.
 +
</blockquote>
  
31. Muniesa, Millo and Callon (2007), p. 3.
+
Marx, here, is saying that studying the economy is more difficult than studying the human body because it can’t be physically observed and dissected. Rather, we have to rely on abstraction, which leaves us prone to making many more mistakes in analyzing Content and Form.
  
32. Muniesa, Millo and Callon (2007), p. 2.
+
<blockquote>
 +
But in bourgeois society, the commodity-form of the product of labour – or value-form of the commodity – is the economic cell-form. To the superficial observer, the analysis of these forms seems to turn upon minutiae. It does in fact deal with minutiae, but they are of the same order as those dealt with in microscopic anatomy.
 +
</blockquote>
  
33. Muniesa, Millo and Callon (2007), p. 4.
+
Marx’s analysis of capitalism relies to great extent upon recognizing the commodity-form of the product (Content) of labor. Labor existed long before capitalism. Labor has existed for as long as humans have worked to change our own material conditions. But under capitalism, labor specifically takes on the Form of a ''commodity'' which is bought by capitalists. This becomes the basis for Marx’s entire critique of capitalism.
  
34. See the essays in Callon, Millo and Muniesa (2007).
+
Obviously, there is much more to Marx’s use of Content and Form in analyzing capitalism and human society, but this should hopefully give you some idea of the importance of Content and Form in analysis of human society and revolutionary activity.
  
35. MacKenzie (2008).
+
-----
  
36. The Innocence Project. http://www.innocenceproject.org.
+
=== 5. Essence and Phenomenon ===
  
37. Lazzarato, quoted in Terranova (2013), p. 40.
+
==== a. Categories of Essence and Phenomenon ====
  
38. Dean (2003), p. 268.
+
The ''Essence'' category refers to the synthesis of all the internal aspects as well as the obvious and stable relations that define the existence, motion and development of things, phenomena, and ideas.
  
39. Terranova (2013).
+
The ''Phenomenon'' category refers to the external manifestation of those internal aspects and relations in specific conditions.
  
40. Andrejevic (2013).
+
-----
  
41. Ross (2013).
+
==== Annotation 155 ====
  
42. Andrejevic (2003).
+
Understanding Essence and Phenomena can be challenging at first, but it is very important for materialist dialectical analysis.
  
43. Pacey (1983), p. 26.
+
Essence should not be confused with ''Form''. Form represents the stable internal relations of the component content of a subject, whereas Essence represents the ''synthesis'' of all internal aspects as well as all obvious and stable attributes which ''define the existence, motion, and development'' of a subject.
  
44. Gramsci (1971), pp. 229–239. Hall (1996a) discusses the war of maneuver and the war of position in relation to cultural studies; see especially pp. 426–428.
+
Phenomena are simply external manifestations of a subject which occur ''in specific conditions''.
  
45. Balsamo (1996), p. 161.
+
The Essence of a subject is not dependent on conditions, whereas in different conditions, the same subject will exhibit different Phenomena. For example, COVID-19 is, ''essentially'', a specific virus strain. That is to say, all of the internal aspects and stable relations that define the existence, motion, and development of COVID-19 are synthesized as a virus which we call COVID-19.
  
Chapter Fourteen: Space and Time
+
The ''Phenomena'' of COVID-19 which we can observe in patients would include symptoms such as fever, coughing, trouble breathing, etc.
  
1. Wise (1997), pp. xiii–xiv.
+
The Essence of a cloud is water vapor in the atmosphere: that is the synthesis, the coming-together, of all the internal stable relations and aspects which will determine how a cloud exists, moves, and develops over time.
  
2. Lefebvre (1991), pp. 38–39.
+
The Phenomena of clouds are all the things we can sense: the appearance of big fluffy white things in the air, shadows on the ground, and, sometimes, rain.
  
3. Lefebvre (1991), p. 34.
+
Essence defines Phenomenon: the internal attributes and stable relations will produce the Phenomena which we can observe. A cloud is not ''essentially defined'' as a fluffy white thing in the air; that is just the appearance a cloud has to our human senses in certain specific conditions.
  
4. Sharma (2014), p. 15.
+
==== b. Dialectical relationship between Essence and Phenomenon ====
  
5. Mumford (2010/1934), p. 13.
+
Essence and Phenomenon both exist objectively as two unified but opposing sides.
  
6. Mumford (2010/1934), p. 14.
+
''The unity between Essence and Phenomenon:'' Essence always manifests through Phenomena, and every Phenomenon is always the manifestation of a specific Essence. There is no pure Essence that exists separately from Phenomena and there is no Phenomenon that does not manifest from any kind of Essence.
  
7. Mumford (2010/1934), p. 15.
+
When Essence changes, Phenomena also change accordingly. When Essence appears, Phenomena also appear, and when Essence disappears, Phenomena also disappear. Therefore, Lenin said: “The Essence appears. The appearance is essential.”<ref>''Philosophical Notebooks'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914–16.</ref>
  
8. Atlantic Video, 2014.
+
''The Opposition of Essence and Phenomenon'': Essence is that which defines a thing, Phenomenon, or idea, while Phenomena are diversified and conditional. Essence is internal, while Phenomena are external. Essence is relatively stable, while Phenomena continuously change.
  
9. Cf. Levine (1997).
+
-----
  
10. Crary (2013), p. 9.
+
==== Annotation 156 ====
  
11. Southwood (2010), p. 11.
+
Essence and Phenomenon are simultaneously unified and opposite because neither can exist without the other, yet they have completely opposite features from one another.
  
12. Cf. Illich (1974).
+
Discussing the Essence and Phenomena of physical objects is relatively straight-forward. The Essence will typically encompass the physical object or system itself. For example, a car engine is ''essentially'' a machine; that is to say, the synthesis of all the internal aspects (the engine parts) as well as the obvious and stable relations (the relations between the parts of the engine; how they are assembled and work together in the engine system) that define the existence, motion and development of the engine (the way it works) are what ''essentially make it'' a car engine. All of these essential characteristics are internal, relatively stable, and remain the same regardless of the condition of the engine (i.e., they continue to exist whether the engine is turned on, turned off, inoperable, etc.).
  
13. Sharma (2014), p. 146.
+
The Phenomena of the car engine are all the things that we can sense from it, but this can vary a great deal depending on conditions. When the car engine is turned off, it will be silent. It may be cool to the touch. It will be at rest. If the engine is turned on, the parts will move, it will become hot, it will make noise. In some situations it might smoke or even catch on fire. All of these Phenomena are conditional, unstable, and external to the engine itself.
  
14. See Innis (1950; 1964); McLuhan (1964); Ong (1967; 1982); Havelock (1982); Eisenstein (1979).
+
With ''ideas'' and abstract thought, Essence and Phenomenon becomes more difficult to determine and analyze. Lenin discussed this in his ''Philosophical Notebooks'', beginning with a quote from Hegel:
  
15. Innis (1950; 1964). The key section on which we draw is “The Bias of Communication” in Innis (1964), pp. 33–60.
+
<blockquote>
 +
Dialectics in general is “the pure movement of thought in Notions“ (i.e., putting it without the mysticism of idealism: human concepts are not fixed but are eternally in movement, they pass into one another, they flow into one another, otherwise they do not reflect living life.
 +
</blockquote>
  
16. Anderson (1983).
+
Knowing that Hegel was an idealist, Lenin wanted to strip all idealism from his conception of dialectics, and thus made it clear that “the pure movement of thought” simply refers to the fact that human thoughts are constantly changing, always in motion, within the living human mind, writing:
  
17. Carey and Quirk (1989).
+
<blockquote>
 +
The analysis of concepts, the study of them, the “art of operating with them” (Engels) always demands study of the movement of concepts, of their interconnection, of their mutual transitions).
 +
</blockquote>
  
18. Headrick (2000), p. 204 discusses the development of the electronic telegraph and Morse’s contribution of the code.
+
This is a description of materialist dialectical analysis of human thought. We must understand that human thoughts are always in motion, always developing, and always mutually impacting other thoughts.
  
19. See “Technology and Ideology: The Case of the Telegraph” in Carey (1989), pp. 201–230, especially pp. 217–218.
+
<blockquote>
 +
In particular, dialectics is the study of the opposition of the Thing-in-itself, of the essence, substratum, substance — from the appearance, from “Being-for-Others.” (Here, too, we see a transition, a flow from the one to the other: the essence appears. The appearance is essential.) Human thought goes endlessly deeper from appearance to essence, from essence of the first order, as it were, to essence of the second order, and so on without end.
 +
</blockquote>
  
240 O
+
This is where Lenin introduces the concept of Essence and Phenomenon (or “appearance,” as Lenin puts it) as simultaneously oppositional and in unity. Essence refers to the qualities and nature of the “thing-in-itself” (its internal components, relations, etc.) while Phenomena represents “being-for-others” (that which external observers can sense or witness of a subject). However, as Lenin notes, Essence and Phenomena have a dialectical relationship with each other — a “flow from the one to the other.” The Essence “appears” by exuding Phenomena which we can sense.
  
Notes
+
Conscious thoughts also have Essence and Phenomena of their own. With thought, the development from Essence to Phenomena is constant and inevitable. The Essence of each thought leads to thought-Phenomena which develop in turn into the Essence of new thoughts in a constant flow.
  
20. See Gordon and de Souza e Silva (2011) on locative media, and Gregg (2011) on working at home. See also Farman (2012), McCullough (2013), and Hjorth, Burgess, and Richardson (2012).
+
In this sense, Essence and Phenomenon of abstract thought is somewhat different from Essence and Phenomenon of physical objects, but physical objects can have this same dialectical pattern of development. For example, the emissions from the engine of a car can be considered Phenomena of the engine, but as these Phenomena build up in the air (along with the emissions from many other cars), they can develop into a physical subject with a new Essence of its own, which we call “air pollution.
  
21. McLuhan and Fiore (1967).
+
We can also think of the light which comes from the sun. The light itself can be thought of as Phenomena of the sun, but the light energy can be captured by a solar panel and converted into energy, creating a new subject with its own Essence which we would describe as “solar energy.” In this sense, it is possible for Phenomena to have Phenomena. If you witness light waves in the desert which cause an optical illusion, then the illusion is a Phenomenon of the light waves (the light waves being the Essence which exuded the Phenomenon of illusion), and the light waves are the Phenomena of the sun (the essential subject which exudes the Phenomena of the light waves).
  
22. Ong (1982), p. 11.
+
Essence and Phenomena can also be contextual. In some contexts, physical objects which have their own Essence (and Phenomena) may be the Phenomena of some other entity. For example, archaeologists can’t observe prehistoric civilizations directly. They can only study the things which are left behind. In this sense, we can think of an archaeological artifact, like a stone tool, as a Phenomenon of a prehistoric civilization. The tool has its own Essence and Phenomena, but it is also itself a Phenomenon. A single stone tool can’t tell archaeologists much about an ancient civilization, however, archaeologists can gather many Phenomena (tools, structural ruins, nearby animal bones and seeds, human remains, etc.) to look for patterns which reveal more insights about the Essence of the prehistoric civilization which exuded those Phenomena.
  
23. Williams (1980).
+
<blockquote>
 +
Dialectics in the proper sense is the study of contradiction in the very essence of objects: not only are appearances transitory, mobile, fluid, demarcated only by conventional boundaries, but the essence of things is so as well.
 +
</blockquote>
  
24. Bryan Hadley Facebook Status Update (9 March, 2014).
+
Lenin, here, points out that proper analysis hinges on understanding the ''Essence'' of a subject, since the Phenomena are fleeting and subject to change. Most notably, we should look for ''contradictions'' within the subject (see ''Definition of Contradiction and Common Characteristics of Contradiction'', p. 175), because contradictions are what drive dialectical development of a subject over time.
  
25. Cf. Sharma (2014), p. 15.
+
-----
  
26. Cf. Sharma (2014), p. 14.
+
==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
  
27. Schüll (2012).
+
If we want to be accurately aware of things, phenomena, and ideas, we must not just stop at studying their Phenomena, we have to study their Essence. Only through examining many Phenomena of a subject can we fully and correctly understand the Essence of said subject.
  
28. Schüll (2012), p. vii.
+
-----
  
29. Schüll (2012), p. 165.
+
==== Annotation 157 ====
  
30. Schüll (2012), p. 244.
+
With physical objects, we must study the Phenomena to know anything about a subject, since Phenomena is, by definition, that which we can observe. Only through systematic, repeated observations can we come to understand the Essence of the object which exudes the Phenomena. Because Phenomena can change based on conditions, we must observe Phenomena under various conditions in a systematic way. This is the basis of all scientific inquiry.
  
31. Schüll (2012), p. 256.
+
This is also true for analyzing aspects of human society. To understand a social system, we must observe its Phenomena systematically over time and look for patterns which form under various conditions. We must also keep in mind that social systems develop and change over time, and so the Essence might develop with or without changes in certain Phenomena. For example, the phenomena of the United States of America have changed significantly over the years. The national flag, military uniforms, seals, and other iconography have changed throughout the history of the USA. Similarly, there have been many presidents, and the government and constitution have also been through many changes. That said, the essential nature of the USA’s political economy has not changed significantly since its foundation; the USA has been a capitalist bourgeois democracy since the beginning and remains so to this day. Regardless of which bourgeois-dominated political party holds power in the white house and congress — Whig, Republican, Democrat, or otherwise — the essential nature of the USA as a capitalist bourgeois democracy has remained the same.
  
32. Schüll (2012), p. 13.
+
According to Lenin: “Human thought goes endlessly deeper from appearance to essence, from essence of the first order, as it were, to essence of the second order, and so on, ''without end.''”<ref>''Philosophical Notebooks'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914–16.</ref> On the other hand, Essence is what defines a thing, phenomenon, or idea. Therefore, in our perception and practice, we must recognize a thing, phenomenon, or idea based on its Essence, not its Phenomena, to evaluate it correctly, and after that, we can make fundamental improvements.
  
33. Schüll (2012), p. 267.
+
-----
  
Chapter Fifteen: Identity
+
==== Annotation 158 ====
  
1. Lyon (1994). On passports, see also Robertson (2010).
+
For example: Thousands of years ago, people observed that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west everyday. Based on these Phenomena, many human civilizations developed the belief that the Essence of our solar system was that the earth was the center of the universe and the sun rotated around it. Today, thanks to scientific observation and practice, we have proven that the sun is the center of the solar system and that the earth is rotating around it, which is totally opposite to what many believed hundreds of years ago. In this case, the initially observed Phenomena were misleading, and it was only by getting a better grasp of the essential nature of the solar system that we could better comprehend its functioning.
  
2. Lyon (2009).
+
It is usually easy to observe Phenomena (since they are defined by being observable) but it’s also easy to misunderstand relationships between Essence and Phenomena. Sometimes people get a false perception of Essence from real Phenomena, such as believing the Sun revolves around the Earth. Sometimes people attribute the wrong Phenomena to Essences as well, such as believing that all poor people are lazy.
  
3. Magnet (2011); Pugliese (2010).
+
Phenomena can easily be mistaken for essence. For example, bourgeois liberal political parties often portray themselves as being pro-worker and therefore exhibit phenomena such as rhetoric, slogans, propaganda, and even platform positions which appeal to workers. These phenomena may confuse many into believing that they are workers’ parties when, in reality, they are essentially dominated by the capitalist class. The reverse can also occur. For example, workers may be fooled into believing that a ruthless capitalist politician or celebrity is “working class at heart,” falsely believing that the capitalist’s class position is merely a phenomenon when in fact it is essential.
  
4. See, e.g., Butler (1990).
+
Understanding true Essence based on real Phenomena is one of the most important aspects of analysis. It is the primary realm of science. In politics, misunderstanding or mischaracterizing Essence and Phenomena can reinforce false beliefs about the way society works which can lead to promulgation of dangerous and reactionary ideologies like neoliberalism and fascism amidst the working class. For this reason, we must avoid examining Phenomena alone. We have to dive deep to discover and understand the essential nature of things, phenomena, and ideas in our analysis.
  
5. Dyer (1997).
+
=== 6. Possibility and Reality ===
  
6. Pugliese (2010).
+
==== a. Categories of Possibility and Reality ====
  
7. Kolko (2000), p. 218.
+
The ''Possibility'' category refers to things that have not happened nor existed in reality yet, but that would happen, or would exist given necessary conditions.
  
8. See Star (1999) on studying infrastructure.
+
The ''Reality'' category refers to things that exist or have existed in reality and in human thought.
  
9. See Ritzer (1996) for a discussion of the way the system of McDonaldization works.
+
==== b. Dialectical Relationship Between Possibility and Reality ====
  
10. Star (1991), p. 38.
+
Possibility and Reality have a unified and inseparable relationship: Possibility can transform into Reality and Reality contains new Possibility; any given Possibility, under specific conditions, can transform into Reality.
  
11. Star (1991), p. 39.
+
Given specific conditions, there could be one or many possibilities for the development of any given thing, phenomenon, or idea: practical Possibility, random Possibility, obvious Possibility, abstract Possibility, near Possibility, far Possibility, etc.
  
12. Gray (1992).
+
-----
  
13. Gershuny (1982), cited in Gray (1992), p. 188.
+
==== Annotation 159 ====
  
14. Gray (1992), p. 248.
+
'''Excerpt From Marxism-Leninism Textbook of Students Who Specialize in Marxism-Leninism'''
  
15. Cassidy (2001).
+
''Editor’s notes in [brackets]''
  
16. See Gregg (2011) on the “convenience” of working from home.
+
Reality has many aspects. It also has many tendencies of development. These aspects and tendencies of Reality have different roles and positions in the development process of Reality. For example, manifesting any given Possibility into Reality requires us to change a specific subject from one status to a different status. Some subjects are easier to transform and others are more difficult to transform. Some require us to change quality, others only require quantity changes [see Annotation 117, p. 119].
  
17. See Bowker and Star (1999), especially the Introduction, pp. 1–32.
+
Because Reality has many aspects and tendencies of development, it is useful to classify Possibility. There are at least four types of Possibility, in two separate categories.
  
18. Nussbaum (2000). German law now recognizes “indeterminate” as an option on birth certificates. See Agius (2013).
+
[The categorization below draws a distinction between the ''obvious'' and the ''practical.''
  
19. For an example of work on the social construction of race, see Omi and Winant (1986).
+
The ''obvious'' is that which will ''certainly'' occur. If you drop an object, it will ''obviously'' fall. The ''practical'' is that which we ''certainly could make occur'' through human will. If you are holding an object, you could ''practically'' drop it.]
  
20. See, for example, Bowker and Star (1999) on race classification under apartheid, pp. 195–225. See also Omi and Winant (1993) in which they argue that the fact that race is socially constructed does not mean that it is pure ideology. Rather, race is “a fundamental principle of social organization and identity formation” that is always relational and in process, pp. 5–6.
+
'''Obvious Possibility and Random Possibility''' [see: Obviousness and Randomness, p. 144].
  
21. For discussion and examples of the impinging work of Moses’s design work, see Caro (1974), especially p. 318. For discussion and examples of the impinging work of Moses’s and others’ design work, see Winner’s “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” in Winner (1986), pp. 19–39 and p. 180 (fn 7). For unusual evidence of Moses’s explicit intentions to discriminate based on identity, see Hoving (1993), p. 245. Thomas Hoving, writing about his time as director of the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art, consulted Moses about building an underground garage. According to Hoving, Moses said: “Design it in such a way that no school buses or campers can enter. Buses drive away
+
''Obvious Possibility'' refers to Possibility that ''will'' happen, because conditions to make it happen are set in place so that the Possibility developing into Reality is unavoidable.
  
Notes
+
[If the conditions arise for a hurricane to form, it eventually becomes ''obvious'' that a hurricane will form.]
  
O 241
+
''Random Possibility'' is Possibility which may or may not happen depending on how external factors develop, our actions, the actions of others, etc. [Whether or not a hurricane may develop on any given day is, from our human perspective, random, since we do not have any technology to cause or prevent the development of hurricanes. Other events may be more or less random. We can, for instance, ''prepare'' for an incoming hurricane to minimize the risk of harm to human communities.]
  
revenues and, besides, all bus drivers pocket the money they get for parking.” Campers had to be discouraged because “squatters will stay for life.” Moses’s solution, which was adopted by the museum, was to lower the height of the entrance to the garage.
+
Second, based on the practical relationships between subjects, we have:
  
22. Balsamo (1996).
+
'''Practical Possibility vs. Abstract Possibility:'''
  
23. Yamamoto (1999).
+
''Practical Possibility'' means that conditions in Reality which ''could'' make something happen are already in place. [If you have all the ingredients, knowledge, and equipment needed to make a pie, you ''could'' make a pie. The material conditions are in place.]
  
24. Turkle (1995).
+
''Abstract Possibility'' is Possibility which may become Reality in the future but the conditions which would make this Possibility become Reality have not yet developed.
  
25. Turkle (1995), p. 13. The first and third editorial brackets are by the authors, the second is by Turkle.
+
[It is an abstract Possibility that you ''could'' make a pie, even if you don’t have the tools, ingredients, or knowledge. It is possible, in the abstract, that you could buy the ingredients and equipment and learn the necessary skills to make a pie. ''Near Possibility'' simply refers to Possibility which may become Reality in the shorter term, ''far Possibility'' refers to things which may happen in a more distant future, relative to the subject being discussed.]
  
26. Bell and Gemmell (2009).
+
-----
  
27. cf. Pugliese (2010).
+
In social life, in order to transform a Possibility into Reality, there must be objective conditions and subjective factors. Subjective factors include the ability of humans to change Possibility into Reality. Objective conditions refer to the situations needed to make such a change occur. [In other words, humans are able to ''subjectively'' change possibility into reality, but only when the ''objective'' circumstances exist in the external world.]
  
28. Deleuze (1995).
+
==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
  
29. McLuhan and Fiore (1967).
+
We must base our perception and practice on Reality.
  
30. Hirose (2002), p. 290.
+
Lenin said: “Marxism takes its stand on the facts, and not on possibilities. A Marxist must, as the foundation of his policy, put [forth] ''only'' precisely and unquestionably demonstrated ''facts''.”<ref>''To N. D. Kiknadze'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, written after November 5, 1916.</ref>
  
31. Hirose (2002), p. 291.
+
However, in our perception and practice, we also need to comprehensively recognize possibilities which could arise from Reality. This will allow us to develop methods of practical operation which are suitable to changes and developments which might occur. We must actively make use of subjective factors in perception and practice to turn Possibility into Reality whenever it would serve our purposes.
  
32. Mauss (1973).
+
-----
  
33. See, for example, the website of Harvard’s Daniel Lieberman et al. on the biomechanics of foot strikes, which has videos of each technique, presenting research funded by Harvard and Vibram, a maker of minimalist shoes. http://www.barefootrunning.fas. harvard.edu/index.html.
+
==== Annotation 160 ====
  
34. Reynolds (2013).
+
This idea is perhaps best exemplified in the traditional Vietnamese proverb: “you can’t just open your mouth and wait for fruit to drop into your mouth.” We have to actively apply our will, through practice and labor, to develop the best possibilities into manifested Reality. See more about subjective factors in Annotation 207, p. 202.
  
35. McDougall (2009).
+
== IV. Basic Laws of Materialist Dialectics ==
  
36. The incidence of injury among runners in general is high, but numbers vary. Taunton et al. (2003) found about 30%, Lieberman’s Harvard site mentions a range from 30– 75% (see note 33).
+
''Laws'' are the regular, common, obvious, natural, and objective relations between internal aspects, factors, and attributes of a thing or phenomenon or between things and phenomena.
  
37. See, for example, Schlanger (2014).
+
There are many types of laws in this world and they all have different prevalence, reach, characteristics, and roles in regard to the motion and development processes of things and phenomena in nature, society, and human thought. So, it is necessary to classify different laws for humans to understand and apply them effectively into practical activities. Classifying laws based on prevalence, we have: private laws, common laws, and universal laws [see: ''Private and Common'', p. 128].
  
38. Ryan, Elashi, Newsham-West, and Taunton (2013).
+
''Private laws'' are laws that only apply to a specific range of things and phenomena. For example: laws of mechanical motion, laws of chemical motion, laws of biological motion, etc.
  
39. Fallows (2014).
+
''Common laws'' are laws that apply to a broader range of subjects than ''private laws,'' and they impact many different subjects. For instance: the law of preservation of mass, the law of preservation of energy, etc.
  
40. Heidegger (1961/1927); cited in Clark (2008), p. 10.
+
''Universal laws'' are laws that impact every aspect of nature, society, and human thought. Materialist dialectics is the study of these universal laws.
  
41. For a discussion of the concept that we have always been cyborgs, see Clark (2003).
+
If we classify laws based on the ''reach of impact'', we will have three main groups: laws of nature, laws of society, and laws of human thought.
  
42. Clark (2003), p. 26.
+
''Laws of nature'' are laws that arise in the natural world, including within the human body. They are not products of human conscious activities.
  
43. Clark (2003), p. 6.
+
''Laws of society'' are the laws of human activity in social relations; these laws only apply to the conscious activities of humans, yet they are still objective.
  
44. Brooks (2007).
+
-----
  
45. Clark (2003), p. 138.
+
==== Annotation 161 ====
  
46. Haraway (1985).
+
We have already discussed how relations between human beings are objective [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. By extension, the human relations which compose human societies are objective, and thus, any laws which govern objective human relations must also be objective.
  
47. Haraway (1985), p. 66, emphasis in the original.
+
Marx’s assertion that human social relations are objective is critical to understanding his work. Marx pointed out that social relations may not be “physical,” in the sense that they can’t be observed directly with human senses, but that they still have an ''objective character'' — they exist externally to a given subject, and they have objective impacts on reality. For instance, the class relations between the capitalist class and the working class result in objective manifestations in reality, such as wealth accumulation, modes of circulation, etc.
  
48. Haraway (2003).
+
''Laws of human thought'' are laws of the intrinsic relationships between concepts, categories, judgments, inference, and the development process of human rational awareness.
  
49. Stein (2012; 2013).
+
As the science of common relations and development, materialist dialectics studies the ''universal laws'' that influence the entire natural world, human society, and human thought, all together as a whole.
  
50. Zimmer (2013).
+
These universal laws are:
  
51. Balsamo (1996), pp. 80–115; Cartwright (1998); Lupton (2013); and Mitchell and Georges (1998) raise this and related issues.
+
* The law of transformation between quantity and quality.  
 +
* The law of unification and contradiction between opposites.  
 +
* The law of negation of negation.  
  
Chapter Sixteen: Critical Conjunctures
+
-----
  
1. Anderson (2002).
+
==== Annotation 162 ====
  
2. Hall (1991).
+
Each of these laws is considered ''universal'' because they apply to all things, phenomena, and ideas, and all the internal and external relations thereof, in human perception and practice. All things, phenomena, and ideas change and develop as a result of mutual impacts and relationships in accordance with these universal laws. On a fundamental level, materialist dialectics is the study of these universal laws and their utility.
  
3. Grossberg (2010a), p. 42.
+
=== 1. Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality ===
  
4. Grossberg (2010a), p. 41.
+
The law of transformation between quantity and quality is a universal law which concerns the universal mode of motion and development processes of nature, society, and human thought.
  
5. Grossberg (2010a), p. 60.
+
-----
  
6. Grossberg (2010a), p. 41.
+
==== Annotation 163 ====
  
7. Grossberg (2010a), p. 41.
+
Remember that mode refers to ''how'' something exists, functions, and develops [see Annotation 60, p. 59]. The universal mode of motion and development processes thus refers to ''how'' all things, ideas, and phenomena move, change, and develop.
  
8. Grossberg (2010a), p. 27.
+
Friedrich Engels defined the law of transformation between quantity and quality in ''Dialectics of Nature'':
  
9. The concept that a culture can, in part, be understood in terms of what can be hoped for is explored by Grossberg (1992) and Hage (2000).
+
<blockquote>
 +
The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy).
 +
</blockquote>
  
242 O
+
In other words, ''quantitative'' changes of things, phenomena, and ideas lead to ''quality'' shifts.
  
Notes
+
-----
  
10. Grossberg (2010a), p. 20.
+
The universal mode of motion and development processes follows the law of transformation between quantity and quality, which states:
  
11. See, for example, Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970).
+
Qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of the quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and, ideas; and, vice versa: quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas.
  
12. “Web 2.0,” Wikipedia. Wikipedia.org, accessed 15 March, 2014.
+
-----
  
13. See danah boyd on this point: http://www.danah.org/papers/talks/Pearson2007.html; cited in Rheingold (2012), p. 185.
+
==== Annotation 164 ====
  
14. “DIY,” Wikipedia. Wikipedia.org, accessed 15 March, 2014.
+
Put simply: quantity changes develop into quality changes, and quality changes lead to quantity changes [see Annotation 117, p. 119]. We say that these changes to quantity and quality occur on the “inevitable basis” of one another because quality changes always, invariably, arise from quantity changes, and, likewise, quantity changes always, invariably, arise from quality changes.
  
15. See, for example, Andrew Keen (2008), The Cult of the Amateur. See also Howard Rheingold’s (2012) Net Smart: How to Thrive Online, where he argues for key literacies for this 2.0 culture including, crucially, what he calls “crap detection,” the skills to filter and fact check online sources to determine authority and credibility.
+
Just as quantity shifts lead to quality shifts, it is also true that quality shifts lead to quantity shifts. For example, if you have 11 donuts, then add 1 donut, you now have ''1 dozen'' donuts. If you add 12 more donuts, you would then have ''2 dozen''.
  
16. Cf. Clark (2003); Wolf (2007).
+
Another example of quality shift leading to quantity shift would be a pond filling with rain water. Once enough drops of water collect and the pond is considered full — that is to say, once it is considered to be “a pond” of water — we will no longer think of the pond in terms of “drops.” We would think of the pond as “filled,” “overfilled,” “underfilled,” etc.
  
17. Cain (2013).
+
Note that both of these examples are related to our human perceptions and understanding of the material world. The material world does not change based on our perceptions, nor how we classify the quantity or quality of a given subject. There are also objective aspects related to quality shifts leading to quantity shifts. For example, if we adjust the quantity of the temperature of a sheet of paper to the point of burning, and the paper burns, then the quantity of paper would be reduced from one sheet to zero sheets. In other words, the quality shift arising from temperature quantity increase (i.e., the paper burning into ash) results in a quantity shift in how many pieces of paper exist (from one sheet to zero sheets). However, even this is ultimately a subjective assessment rooted in human consciousness, since we subjectively think in terms of “sheets of paper,” and the concept of a “sheet of paper” is essentially a classification rooted in human consciousness. It is merely an abstract way of perceiving and considering the quantity and quality of the material subject which we think of as “paper.
  
18. Greenwald (2014); Kirk (2014).
+
The law of transformation between quantity and quality is an inevitable, objective, and universal relationship that repeats in every motion and development process of all things, phenomena, and ideas in nature, human society, and human thought.
  
19. See Smith (2014); Eggers (2013).
+
==== a. Definitions of Quality and Quantity ====
  
20. Bell and Gemmell (2009); Lupton (2012).
+
''- Definition of Quality''
  
21. Ling (2012).
+
''Quality'' refers to the organic unity which exists amongst the component parts of a thing, phenomenon, or idea that distinguishes it from other things, phenomena, and ideas.
  
22. Maxwell and Miller (2012), p. 4.
+
-----
  
23. See, for example, Royte (2005); Maxwell and Miller (2012); Gabrys (2013).
+
==== Annotation 165 ====
  
24. See, for example, Glanz (2012); Maxwell and Miller (2012); Mosco (2014).
+
Note: we have already given basic definitions of quantity and quality in Annotation 117, p. 119. What follows are more comprehensive philosophical definitions of quality and quantity. Our world exists as one continuity of matter. All things and phenomena in our universe exist essentially as one unified system — namely, the entity which we call “the universe.” This unified nature of existence is extremely difficult for human beings to comprehend. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel pointed out that, in this sense, the unity of “pure being” is indistinguishable from “nothingness.” In ''Science of Logic'', Hegel noted that if we try to comprehend pure material existence, as a whole, without distinguishing any component thing or phenomenon from any other, then all is incomprehensible. Human consciousness needs to delineate and distinguish the component parts of this unified system from each other in order to make sense of it all.
  
25. Anderson (2002), p. 70.
+
<blockquote>
 +
Pure light and pure darkness are two voids which are the same thing. Something can be distinguished only in determinate light or darkness... [F]or this reason, it is only darkened light and illuminated darkness which have within themselves the moment of difference and are, therefore, determinate being.
 +
</blockquote>
  
26. Cf. Deborah Lupton’s discussion of “unborn assemblages” in The Social Worlds of the Unborn (2013).
+
The human mind has evolved to perceive various things, phenomena, and ideas as ''differentiated''. Quality is the basis on which we perceive subjects as distinct from one another. Every thing, phenomenon, and idea is composed of internal components and relations. The unity of these internal components and relations is what we refer to as ''quality''. For example, a human being’s ''quality'' refers to the unity of all the internal components and relationships of which the human being is composed (i.e., the cells, organs, blood, etc., as well as the thoughts, memories, etc., which make the human) ''in unity''. Quality is also a subjective phenomenon: a ''reflection'' of the material world in human consciousness [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. Therefore we may conceive of various qualities for the same subject. We can think of 12 donuts as “a box of donuts,” “a dozen donuts,” or as 12 individual donuts. We could consider a building as “one apartment building” or “forty apartments,” depending on the viewpoint of analysis.
  
27. Hellerman, Morris, and Smith (2014).
+
-----
  
28. See Bowen (2005) for a discussion of the case.
+
So, objective and inherent attributes form the quality of things, phenomena, and ideas, but we must not confuse quality and attribute with one another. Every thing, phenomenon, and idea has both fundamental and non-fundamental attributes. Only fundamental attributes constitute the quality of things, phenomena and ideas. When the fundamental attributes change, the quality also changes. The distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental attributes of things, phenomena, and ideas must depend on the purpose of the analysis; the same attribute may be fundamental when analyzing with one purpose but non-fundamental when analyzing with another purpose.
  
29. Skloot (2010).
+
-----
  
30. Ritter (2013).
+
==== Annotation 166 ====
  
31. Interlandi (2009/2010).
+
Whether or not an attribute is considered “fundamental” depends entirely on conscious perspective. For example, one baker may consider chocolate chips to be “fundamental” for baking cookies while another baker may not. This subjective characteristic of what might be considered “fundamental” or not is reflected in how we consider quality. If you are trying to determine how much water you need to fill a swimming pool, you may think of a pool in terms of size (i.e., “this is an Olympic sized pool”), but if you just want to go for a swim, you are likely to just think in terms of the water level (i.e., “the pool is empty, we can’t swim”).
  
32. The Non-Human Turn, 3–5 May, 2012. Center for Twenty-First Century Studies. University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee.
+
If you are planning the construction of a school and want to know how many classrooms it will need, you might think in terms of “classrooms of students.” But if you are considering funding for a school year, you might consider the ''total number of students''.
  
33. Beginning with Haraway (1985).
+
The quality of a thing, phenomenon, or idea is determined by the qualities of its component parts.
  
34. See, for example, Rose (2007); Bennett (2010).
+
-----
  
35. Flynn, Sotirin, and Brady (2012), p. 5.
+
==== Annotation 167 ====
  
36. Buzzanell (2010).
+
Qualities are composed of qualities, combined, in unity. “A swimming pool” may consist of a certain amount of concrete in a specific configuration combined with 5,000 gallons of water. A car may be composed of a body, an engine, four tires, etc. Each individual component exists as a quality — a unity of component attributes — in and of itself.
  
37. Sharma (2014), pp. 105, 106.
+
Quality is also determined by the structures and connections between component parts which manifest in specific relations. Therefore, distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental attributes is also relative.
  
38. Hall (1981), pp. 28–29.
+
-----
  
References
+
==== Annotation 168 ====
  
Abbey, Edward. 1978. The monkey wrench gang. Edinburgh: Canongate Publishing. Agius, Silvan. 2013, 22 Aug. A step toward ending intersex discrimination. Spiegel
+
It’s not just the component parts of a subject which define its quality, but also the relations of those component parts. For instance, a quantity of wood and nails configured in one set of structural relations may have the quality of a chair, whereas the same component parts arranged with different structures and relations may have the quality of a table. In this sense, quality can be thought of as a synthesis of the Content and Form [see ''Content and Form'', p. 147] of a thing, phenomenon, or idea from a certain perspective.
  
Online. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/third-gender-option-in-germany-a-small-step-for-intersex-recognition-a-917650.html. Accessed 28 May, 2014.
+
For example, if we see two shoes, we may think of each shoe as an individual qualitative object (two shoes). On the other hand, we may think of the shoes, together, as a single qualitative “object” in terms of its utility and in terms of synthesis of content and form (“a pair of shoes”), so much so that if one shoe is lost then the remaining shoe is considered useless and discarded as trash.
  
Allenby, Braden and Daniel Sarewitz. 2011. The techno-human condition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+
Because there are countless ways in which quality — the configuration and relations and composition of constituent parts of any given subject — can manifest, we must recognize that quality itself, based on the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental attributes, is a relative and subjective phenomenon of human consciousness.
  
Amos, Jonathan. 2014. 17 Feb. Missouri gun murders “rose after law repeal.” BBC news. http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-26222578. Accessed 17 Feb. 2014.
+
Any given subject will have multiple qualities, depending on the relations which exist between and within that subject and other subjects.
  
Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. New York, NY: Verso.
+
-----
  
Anderson, M.T. 2002. Feed. Cambridge, MA: Candlewick.
+
==== Annotation 169 ====
  
Andrejevic, Mark. 2003. Reality TV: The work of being watched. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
+
Any thing, phenomenon, or idea may be perceived from various different perspectives which would cause us to consider it as having different qualities. A single shoe may be considered as: a shoe, 3 pounds of leather, half of a pair, etc., depending on its internal and external relations and the perspective of the person considering the shoe.
  
Andrejevic, Mark. 2013. Estranged free labor. In Digital labor: The internet as playground and factory, edited by Trebor Scholz. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 149–164.
+
We can’t consider things, phenomena, and ideas apart from quality. Quality exhibits a subject’s relative stability.
  
Arthur, W. Brian. 2009. The nature of technology: What it is and how it evolves. New York, NY: Free Press.
+
-----
  
Assange, Julian with Jacob Appelbaum, Andy Müller-Maguhn, and Jérémie Zimmerman. 2012. Cypherpunks. New York, NY: UR Books.
+
==== Annotation 170 ====
  
Atlantic Video, The. 2014, 27 Feb. Where time comes from. http://www. theatlantic.com/video/index/358609/where-time-comes-from/. Accessed 15 July, 2014.
+
Remember that ''quality'' is the way in which the human mind conceives of the world as a collection of distinct things, phenomena, and ideas. These perceptions of quality are purely relative, but they are important, because they are what allow us to develop an understanding of the complicated system of things, phenomena, and ideas which make up our universe. In our perception, quality represents the relative stability of a thing, phenomenon, or idea which makes it a subject that we can consider and analyze in and of itself. Understanding how we distinguish between different subjects is crucial in developing a scientific understanding of the world which is rooted in observation and practice.
  
Balsamo, Anne. 1996. Technologies of the gendered body: Reading cyborg women. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
+
''- Definition of Quantity''
  
Barber, Benjamin. 1984. Strong democracy: Participatory politics for a new age. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
+
''Quantity'' refers to the amount or extent of specific attributes of a thing, phenomenon, or idea, including but not limited to:
  
Bay, Michael, director. 2005. The Island. Dreamworks et al.
+
* The amount of component parts.  
 +
* Scale or size.  
 +
* Speed or rhythm of motion.  
  
244 O
+
A thing, phenomenon, or idea can have many quantities, with each quantity determined by different criteria. [i.e., a car may be measured by many criteria of quantity, such as: length in meters, weight in kilograms, speed in kilometers per hour, etc.]
  
References
+
Quality and quantity embody two different aspects of the same subject. Both quality and quantity exist objectively [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. However, the distinction between “quality” and “quantity” in the process of perceiving things, phenomena, and ideas has only relative significance: an attribute may be considered “quantity” from one perspective but “quality” from another perspective.
  
Bell, Bryan et al. 2008. Expanding architecture: Design as activism. New York, NY: Metropolis Books.
+
-----
  
Bell, Gordon, and Jim Gemmell. 2009. Total recall: How the e-memory revolution will change everything. New York, NY: Dutton Adult.
+
==== Annotation 171 ====
  
Beniger, James R. 1986. The control revolution: Technological and economic origins of the information society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
+
If you are filling a box with a dozen donuts, then once you add the 12<sup>th</sup> donut, one “dozen” may represent the ''quality'' which you seek. From the perspective of a customer buying donuts for a party, “dozen” may represent the “quantity.” In other words, you need to make an ''order'' (quality) of ''three dozen donuts'' (quantity). And the manager of the store, at the end of the day, may tally ''twenty'' ''orders'' (quantity) as the day’s ''sales goal'' (quality). Quantity and quality, therefore, are both considered ''relatively'', based on perspective and the purpose of analysis at hand.
  
Bennett, Jane. 2010. Vibrant matter: A political ecology of things. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
+
==== b. Dialectical Relationship Between Quantity and Quality ====
  
Berry, Wendell. 1995. Another turn of the crank. Washington, DC: Counterpoint.
+
Every thing, phenomenon, and idea exists as a unity of two aspects: quality and quantity. Quantity and quality do not exist separate from one another. Quantity and quality dialectically and mutually impact one other. Changes in quantity lead to changes in quality. However, not every change in quantity will cause a change in quality.
  
Bogost, Ian. 2012. Alien phenomenology: Or what it is like to be a thing. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
+
-----
  
Boltanski, Luc and Eve Chiapello. 2007. The new spirit of capitalism. London: Verso.
+
==== Annotation 172 ====
  
Bowen, Leslie. 2005. Reconfigured bodies: The problem of ownership. Communication Theory 15(1), pp. 23–38.
+
In order for quantity change to lead to quality change, a certain amount must be met.
  
Bowker, Geoffrey C. and Susan Leigh Star. 1999. Sorting things out: Classification and its consequences. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
+
This amount is called the ''threshold'', which is explained further below in this section. A threshold may be exact and known (i.e., it takes exactly 12 donuts to make a dozen donuts) or it may be relative and unknown (i.e., a certain quantity of air inflated into a balloon may cause it to burst, but the exact, specific quantity of air may be relative to other factors such as air temperature and may be unknown to the observer until the balloon actually bursts).
  
boyd, danah. 2007, 2 Nov. Information access in a networked world. Paper presented at Pearson Publishing, Palo Alto, CA. http://www.danah.org/ papers/talks/Pearson2007.html. Accessed 15 July, 2014.
+
With any given subject, there will be a range of quantity changes which can accumulate without leading to change in quality. This range is called the ''quantity range''.
  
Boyle, Danny, director. 2002. 28 days later. DNA films.
+
''Quantity range'' is defined as a relationship between quantity and quality: the range of intervals in which the change in quantity does not substantially change the quality of a given subject. Within the limits of a quantity range, the subject retains the same quality.
  
Bradbury, Ray. 1991. Fahrenheit 451. New York, NY: Random House. (Orig. 1953).
+
-----
  
Branagh, Kenneth, director. 1994. Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. American Zoetrope.
+
==== Annotation 173 ====
  
Brooks, David. 2007, 26 Oct. The outsourced brain. The New York Times. Online. www.nytimes.com/2007/10/26/opinion/26brooks.html. Accessed 15 July, 2014.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-56.png|''The quantity range is a range of quantities between quality shifts.'']]
  
Brooks, Mel, director. 1974. Young Frankenstein. 20th Century Fox.
+
Quantity range can be thought of as the range of quantities which exists between thresholds. For instance, between the qualities of “''one donut''” and “''one dozen donuts'',” there is a quantity range of 10 donuts (2 donuts through 11 donuts) which can be added before the quality shifts to “''one dozen donuts''.” You can keep adding additional donuts, up to the quantity of 11 donuts, without reaching the threshold of quality shift to “one dozen donuts.” This is the ''quantity range'' between the qualities of ''donut'' and ''one dozen donuts''. Again, the quantity range is relative to the perspective and the nature of analysis. One person may only be concerned with “dozens of donuts,” while another may consider the quality of “half dozens,” which would consider a quality shift to “one half-dozen donuts” to occur once the sixth donut (quantity) is added.
  
Bureau of Investigative Journalism, The. n.d. Leaked Pakistan’s report confirms high civilian death toll in CIA drone strikes. www.thebureauinvestigates.com/ category/projects/drones/. Accessed 27 July, 2013.
+
Motion and change usually begins with a change in quantity. When changes in quantity reach a certain amount, quality will also change. The amount, or degree, of quantity change at which quality change occurs is called the ''threshold.''
  
Butler, Judith. 1990. Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity. New York: Routledge.
+
-----
  
Buzzanell, Patrice M. 2010. Resilience: Talking, resisting, and imagining new normalcies into being. Journal of Communication 60, pp. 1–14.
+
==== Annotation 174 ====
  
Cain, Susan. 2013. Quiet: The power of introverts in a world that can’t stop talking. New York, NY: Random House.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-57.png]]
  
Callon, Michel and Bruno Latour. 1981. Unscrewing the big Leviathan: How actors macro-structure reality and how sociologists help them do so. In Advances in social theory and methodology: Toward an integration of micro- and macro-sociology, edited by K. Knorr-Cetina and A.V. Cicourel. Boston, London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 277–303.
+
Note that the threshold is an approximate range. At a certain quantity, a glass may be considered “half full” and at another certain quantity, after passing the threshold, the glass will be considered “full,” though there may be a wide range of quantities at which the glass would be considered to have the quality of being “full,” depending on perspective and purpose of analysis.
  
Callon, Michel, Yuval Millo and Fabian Muniesa, Eds. 2007. Market devices. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
+
When quantity change meets a threshold, within necessary and specific conditions, quality will change. This change in quality, which takes place in the motion and development process of things, phenomena, and ideas, is called a ''quality shift''.
  
Cameron, James, director. 1984. The terminator. Hemdale Film Corporation.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-58.png|''A quality shift occurs when a quantity changes beyond a threshold, leading to a change in quality.'']]
  
References
+
''Quality shifts'' inevitably occur as transformations in the development processes of things, phenomena, and ideas. Qualitative changes can be expressed or manifested through many forms of quality shifts which are determined by the contradictions, characteristics and conditions of a given subject, including such characteristics as: fast or slow, big or small, partial or entire, spontaneous or intentional.
  
O 245
+
-----
  
Cameron, James, director. 1991. Terminator 2: Judgment day. Carolco Pictures, Inc.
+
==== Annotation 175 ====
  
Cˆapek, K. 1923. R.U.R. (Rossum’s universal robots): A fantastic melodrama, translated by P. Selver. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
+
Quality shifts are ''inevitable'' because there is no thing, phenomenon, nor idea which can exist statically, forever, without ever undergoing change. Eventually, any given subject will undergo quality shifts, even if such transformation may take millions of years to occur.
  
Carey, James W. 1989. Communication as culture: Essays in media and society. Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman.
+
Quality shifts can take various forms, depending on the nature of internal and external relationships, contradictions, and mutual impacts. For instance, a river may dry up or it may flood depending on internal and external relations and characteristics, but it will not simply flow at the same level forever without ever undergoing any quality shifts.
  
Carey, James W. 1997. Afterword: The culture in question. In James Carey, edited by Eve Stryker Munson and Catherine A. Warren. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 308–339.
+
The rate and degree of quality shifts can vary considerably based on such internal and external factors, and may be “spontaneous,” that is to say, without human intervention, or may be the result of the intentional, conscious action of human beings.
  
Carey, James W. and John J. Quirk. 1989. The mythos of the electronic revolution. In Communication as culture: Essays on media and society by James W. Carey. Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, pp. 113–141.
+
''Quality shifts'' mark the end of one motion period and the start of a new motion period.
  
Caro, Robert A. 1974. The power broker: Robert Moses and the fall of New York. New York, NY: Knopf.
+
-----
  
Carr, Nicolas. 2008, 1 July. Is Google making us stupid?: What the internet is doing to our brains. The Atlantic. Online. http://www.theatlantic. com/magazine/archive/2008/07/is-google-making-us-stupid/306868/. Accessed 8 May, 2014.
+
==== Annotation 176 ====
  
Cartwright, Elizabeth. 1998. The logic of heartbeats: Electronic fetal monitoring and biomedically constructed birth. In Cyborg babies: From techno-sex to techno-tots, edited by Robbie Davis-Floyd and Joseph Dumit. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 240–254.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-59.png|''The Quantity Range (A) refers to the range of quantities between two qualities in the process of development. The Quality Shift (B) refers to the point at which quantity accumulates to the point of changing the Quality of the developing subject. The Period of Motion (C) includes both the quantity range and the quality shifts themselves.'']]
  
Cassidy, Marsha. 2001. Cyberspace meets domestic space: Personal computers, women’s work, and the gendered territories of the family home. Critical Studies in Media Communication 18(1): pp. 44–65.
+
''Period of motion'' refers to the development which occurs between two quality shifts, including the quality shifts themselves.
  
Castells, Manuel. 1997. The information age: Economy, society and culture: Volume II: The power of identity. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
+
''Period of motion'' differs from ''quantity range'' because quantity range only includes the range of quantity change which can occur ''between'' quality shifts, without including the quality shifts themselves.
  
Chase, Alston. 2000. Harvard and the making of the Unabomber. The Atlantic Monthly, June, pp. 41–65.
+
For example, a ''period of motion'' for a cup filling with water from a half cup would include all of the change which occurs from the cup being half full to the cup becoming entirely full. The ''quantity range'' of this same process would only include the quantities of water that stand between half-full and full, where the cup is neither considered to be “half full” or “full” but somewhere in between, i.e., between quality shifts.
  
Chase, Alston. 2003. Harvard and the Unabomber: The education of an American terrorist. New York, NY: WW Norton.
+
Quality shift represents ''discontinuity'' within the continuous development process of things and phenomena. In the material world, all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly undergoing continuous sequences of quantitative changes leading to quality shifts, creating an endless line of nodes, showing how all things, phenomena, and ideas move and develop to increasingly advanced degrees [see illustration on p. 121 for a visualization of this “endless line of nodes”].
  
Clark, Andy. 2003. Natural-born cyborgs: Minds, technologies, and the future of human intelligence. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
+
As Friedrich Engels summarised: “merely quantitative changes beyond a certain point pass into qualitative differences.”<ref>''Anti-Dühring'', Friedrich Engels, 1878.</ref>
  
Clark, Andy. 2008. Supersizing the mind: Embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
+
==== Annotation 177 ====
  
Clarke, John. 2012, 18 Dec. Where are the modern day luddites? Blog. Johnmichaelclarke.wordpress.com/2012/wordpress.com/2012/12/18/where-are-the-modern-day-luddites/. Accessed 27 July, 2013.
+
Processes of change and development in our universe are continuously ongoing. Whenever a quality shift occurs, it represents a brief ''discontinuity'' in the sense that we perceive a definite and ''distinct'' transformation from one thing, phenomenon, or idea into another; in other words, we can ''distinguish'' between the mode of existence of the thing, phenomenon, or idea before and after the quality shift.
  
Corey, Scott. 2000. On the Unabomber. Telos 118: pp. 157–182.
+
Take, for example, the “lifespan” of a house. A human being could easily distinguish between the empty land which exists before the house is built, the construction site which exists as it’s being built, and the house itself once construction is completed. In reality, this process of change is continuous, but to our human perception, each quality shift represents a definite and distinct period of change and discontinuity in terms of our perception of the “thing” which is the house.
  
Cowan, Ruth Schwartz. 1983. More work for mother: The ironies of household technology from the open hearth to the microwave. New York, NY: Basic Books.
+
This is related to the ''historic perspective'' of things, phenomena, and ideas, in which we recognize the continuity of existence between different stages of development of things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 201, p. 195].
  
Cowan, Ruth Schwartz. 1997. A social history of American technology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
+
When a quality shift occurs, there is an impact on the quantity. Quality impacts quantity in a number of ways, including [but not limited to]:
  
Crary, Jonathan. 2013. 24/7: Late capitalism and the ends of sleep. New York, NY: Verso.
+
* Changing the structure, scale, or level of the subject.  
 +
* Changing the rhythm or speed of the motion and development of the subject.  
  
246 O
+
''In summary,'' dialectical unity between quantity and quality exists in every thing, phenomenon, and idea. A gradual quantitative change [through the ''quantity range''] will eventually meet the ''threshold'', which will inevitably lead to a qualitative change through ''quality shift''. Simultaneously, the new quality will mutually impact the quantity, causing new quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas. This process takes place continuously, forming the fundamental and universal mode of movement and development processes of all things, phenomena, and ideas.
  
References
+
==== Annotation 178 ====
  
Dean, Jodi. 2003. The networked empire: Communicative capitalism and the hope for politics. In Empire’s new clothes: Reading Hardt and Negri, edited by Jodi Dean and Paul Passavant. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 267–290.
+
Transformation between quantity and quality is the mode of movement and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas, because it reflects the way in which human consciousness perceives movement and development.
  
Deleuze, Gilles. 1995. Negotiations: 1972–1990, translated by Martin Joughin. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
+
So, it is important to understand that there is no ''material manifestation'' of quantity and quality. They are simply mental constructs which reflect the ways in which we observe and understand change, motion, and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. Transformation processes in the material world are fully fluid and continuous, but our consciousness perceives change in ''stages of development''. Quality simply reflects how we distinguish one subject from another subject, as well as how we recognize the transformation process (and stages of development) of a single subject over time.
  
Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari. 1987. A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia, translated by Brian Massumi. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. (Orig. 1980).
+
There is no specific point, metaphysically distinct point at which a “puppy” becomes an “adult dog,” but human beings will distinguish between a puppy and an adult dog, or recognize at a certain point that a puppy has “become” an adult dog, based on observation of quality.
  
Dery, Mark. 1996. Escape velocity: Cyberculture at the end of the century. New York, NY: Grove Press.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-60.png|''Quality refers to the differences which are distinguished in human consciousness between one subject and another, or changes in a subject’s form over time.'']]
  
Dickson, David. 1975. The politics of alternative technology. New York, NY: Universe Books.
+
There is no metaphysically distinct point at which a “puppy” becomes an “adult dog,” but human beings will distinguish between a puppy and an adult dog, or recognize at a certain point that a puppy has “become” an adult dog, based on observation of quality. We create categories which reflect quality to organize and systematically understand the world around us, and to distinguish between different subjects, and to distinguish between different stages of development of a given subject.
  
Drexler, K. Eric. 1986. Engines of creation: The coming era of nanotechnology. New York, NY: Anchor Books.
+
We can also distinguish differences of quality between different subjects: we can distinguish a cat from a dog, and we can distinguish one dog from another dog. These distinguishing attributes constitute differences in quality. Note that this conception of differentiation of things, phenomena, and ideas into qualities which constantly change and develop over time is fundamentally distinct from ''metaphysical'' categorization, which seeks to divide all things, phenomena, and ideas into static, perpetually unchanging categories (see Annotation 8, p. 8).
  
Duhigg, Charles and David Barboza. 2012, 25 Jan. In China, human costs are built into an iPad. New York Times. A1.
+
Distinction within the human mind is reflected in the concept of quantity and quality. If we do not observe quality differences between subjects, then we would not be able to distinguish between different subjects at all. If we could not recognize the quality shifts of any given subject, then we would not be aware of change or motion at all.
  
Dyer, Richard. 1997. White. New York, NY: Routledge.
+
-----
  
Eggers, Dave. 2013. The circle. New York, NY: Random House.
+
==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
  
Eick, David and Roland D. Moore, executive producers. 2004–2009. Battlestar Galactica. Universal et al.
+
Every thing, phenomenon and idea has characteristics of quality and quantity which mutually impact and transform one another. Therefore, in perception and practice, we need to understand and take into account the law of transformation between quantity and quality in order to have a comprehensive viewpoint of things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 114, p. 116].
  
Eisenstein, Elizabeth. 1979. The printing press as an agent of change: Communications and cultural transformations in early-modern Europe. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
+
Quantitative changes of things, phenomena and ideas inevitably lead to qualitative changes in all things, phenomena, and ideas. Therefore, in our perception and practice, as we plan and enact change in our world and in human society, it is necessary to gradually accumulate changes in quantity in order to make changes in quality. At the same time, we must recognize and make use of the fact that quality shifts also lead to changes in quantity.
  
Ellul, Jacques. 1964. The technological society, translated by John Wilkinson. New York, NY: Vintage.
+
-----
  
Engler, Mark. 2011, 7 April. The luddites revisted. The Huffington Post. www. thehuffingtonpost.com/mark-engler/the-luddites-revisited_b_846098.html. Accessed 27 July, 2013.
+
==== Annotation 179 ====
  
Fallows, James. 2014, 10 May. Those Vibram shoe refunds? I’m not claiming one. The Atlantic. http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2014/05/ those_vibram_shoe_refunds/362026/. Accessed 15 July, 2014.
+
We have to understand and utilize the law of transformation between quantity and quality in our activities. For instance, if a group of activists hopes to address hunger in their community, they have to realize that they can’t immediately enact a quality shift which solves the entire problem of hunger across the city instantaneously. Instead, the activists must recognize that quantity shifts lead to quality shifts through stages of development. In planning and acting, they may need to set certain development targets, predict thresholds at which quality shifts will occur, etc.
  
Farman, Jason. 2012. Mobile interface theory: Embodied space and locative media. New York, NY: Routledge.
+
For instance, the first goal for these activists may be to provide free lunches to houseless people in a particular park every weekend. If they can accomplish this, then they will not have completely eliminated hunger in the city, but they will have reached a threshold — a quality shift — in that nobody in that specific park will be hungry at lunch time on weekends. From there, they can continue to build quality shifts through accumulation of changes in quantity, one stage of development at a time.
  
Fawcett, John and Graeme Manson, Creators. 2013-. Orphan Black. Temple Street Productions.
+
Quality shifts leading to quantity shifts must also be recognized and utilized in our planning and activities. For example, once an effective strategy is developed for eliminating hunger in one park through quantity changes leading to quality shifts, this strategy can then be implemented in other parks. Thus the quality shift of “eliminating hunger in one park” can lead to a quantity shift: “eliminating hunger in two parks, three parks, etc.,” until the quantity shift of “eliminating hunger in parks” leads to the quality shift of “eliminating hunger in all the parks in the city.” This entire process of enacting quantity changes to lead to quality shifts, and accumulating quality shifts to change quantity, are all focused toward the ultimate goal of achieving the quality shift of “eliminating hunger in the entire city.
  
Featherstone, David. 2011. On assemblage and articulation. Area 43(2): pp. 139–142.
+
In short, it’s vital for us to understand the ways in which quantity and quality mutually impact each other so that we can formulate plans and activities which will lead to motion and development which accomplish our goals, step by step, through one stage of development at a time.
  
Feenberg, Andrew. 1991. Critical theory of technology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
+
Changes in quantity can only lead to changes in quality provided the quantity accumulates to a certain threshold. Therefore, in practice, we need to overcome impatient, left-sided thought. Left-sided thinking refers to thinking which is overly subjective, idealistic, ignorant of the laws which govern material reality. Left-sided thinking neglects to acknowledge the necessity of quantity accumulation which precedes shifts in quality, focusing instead on attempting to perform continuous shifts in quality.
  
Fisher, Terence, director. 1957. The curse of Frankenstein. Hammer Film Productions Limited.
+
On the other hand, we must also recognize that once change in quantity has reached a threshold, it is ''inevitable'' that a quality shift will take place. Therefore, we need to overcome conservative and right-sided thought in practical work. Right-sided thinking is the expression of conservative, stagnant thought that resists or refuses to recognize quality shifts even as changes in quantity come to meet the threshold of quality shift.
  
Fisher, Terence, director. 1958. The revenge of Frankenstein. Hammer Film Productions Limited.
+
-----
  
Flynn, Elizabeth A., Patricia Sotirin, and Ann Brady, Eds. 2012. Feminist rhetorical resilience. Boulder, CO: University Press of Colorado.
+
==== Annotation 180 ====
  
Forster, Marc, director. 2013. World War Z. Paramount Pictures et al.
+
“Right-sided thinking” and “left-sided thinking” are Vietnamese political concepts which are rooted in the ideas of Lenin’s book: ''Leftwing Communism: an Infantile Disorder''. In Vietnamese political philosophy, “left-sided thinking” is a form of dogmatic idealism which upholds unrealistic conceptions of change and development. Left-sided thinkers don’t have the patience for quantity accumulation which are prerequisite to quality shifts, or expect to skip entire stages of development which are necessary to precipitate change in the real world. An example of left-sided thinking would be believing that a capitalist society can ''instantly'' transition into a stateless, classless, communist society, skipping over the transitions in quantity and quality which are required to bring such a massive transformation in human society to fruition.
  
References
+
“Right-sided thinking,” on the other hand, is conservate resistance to change. Right-sided thinkers resist quality changes to human society; they either want to preserve society as it exists right now, or reverse development to some previous (real or imagined) stage of development. Right-sided thinkers also refuse to acknowledge quality shifts once they’ve occurred, idealistically pretending that changes in material conditions have not occurred. For example, right-sided thinkers may refuse to recognize advances which have been made in the liberation of women, or even attempt to reverse those advances in hopes of returning to previous stages of development when women had fewer freedoms. Here is a practical example of these concepts in use, from the ''Vietnam Encyclopedia'', published by the Ministry of Culture and Information of Vietnam:
  
O 247
+
<blockquote>
 +
Opportunism is a system of political views that do not follow a clear direction nor a clear line, do not have a definite stance, and are inclined toward the immediate personal gain of the opportunist. In the proletarian revolutionary movement, opportunism is a politics of compromise, reform, and unprincipled collaboration with the enemy which run contrary to the basic interests of the working class and the working people. In practice, opportunism has two main trends, stemming from right-sided thinking and from left-sided thinking, respectively:
  
Foucault, Michel. 1977. Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison, translated by Alan Sheridan. Harmondsworth, UK: Peregrine Books.
+
Right-wing opportunism is reformist, favors undue compromise, and aims to peacefully “convert” capitalism into socialism while abandoning the struggle for meaningful victory of the working class. Right-wing opportunism, typified by Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky, has its origins in the Workers’ Parties of the Second International era and exists to this day.
  
Fox, Nicols. 2002. Against the machine: The hidden Luddite tradition in literature, art, and individual lives. Washington, DC: Island Press.
+
Left-wing opportunism is a mixture of extremism and adventurism, dogmatism, arrogance, subjectivity, cults of violence, and disregard for the objective situation.
  
Francis, Freddie, director. 1964. The evil of Frankenstein. Hammer Film Productions Limited.
+
Both “right” and “left” opportunism push the workers’ movement to futile sacrifice and failure.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Fuller, Glen. 2006, November. Review of Culture+Technology: A Primer. Reviews in Cyberculture Studies [online].
 
  
Gabrys, Jennifer. 2013. Digital rubbish: A natural history of electronics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
+
-----
  
Galloway, Alexander. 2004. Protocol: How control exists after decentralization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+
Quality shifts are diverse and plentiful, so we need to promote and apply quality shifts creatively and flexibly to suit the specific material conditions we face in a given situation. This is especially true in changing human society, as social development processes depend not only on objective conditions but also on subjective human factors. Therefore, we need to be active and take the initiative to promote the process of converting between quantity and quality in the most effective way.
  
Galloway, Alexander, and Eugene Thacker. 2007. The exploit. A theory of networks. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
+
-----
  
Gates, Bill. 2000. Business @ the speed of thought: Succeeding in the digital economy. New York, NY: Warner Books.
+
==== Annotation 181 ====
  
Gershuny, J. L. 1982. Household tasks and the use of time. In Living in South London, edited by S. Wallman and Associates. London, UK: Gower.
+
Put simply, we have to use our human will and labor to actively promote quantity changes which lead to quality changes, and quality changes which lead to quantity changes, which move us towards our goal of ending all forms of oppression in human society. This will involve not just objective factors<ref>See Annotation 108, p. 112.</ref> (i.e., material conditions which are necessary to accomplish something), but subjective factors<ref>See Annotation 207, p. 202.</ref> as well (factors which we, as a subject, are capable of impacting directly).
  
Giddens, Anthony. 1990. The consequences of modernity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
+
=== 2. Law of Unification and Contradiction Between Opposites ===
  
Gilliom, John and Torin Monahan. 2012. SuperVision: An introduction to the surveillance society. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
+
The law of unification and contradiction between opposites is the ''Essence'' of dialectics [see: ''Essence and Phenomenon'', p. 156]. According to Lenin: “In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the Essence of dialectics, but it requires explanations and development.”<ref>''Summary of Dialectics'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.</ref> According to the law of unification and contradiction between opposites, the fundamental, originating, and universal driving force of all motion and development processes is the inherent and objective contradiction which exists in all things, phenomena, and ideas.
  
Glanz, James. 2012, 22 Sept. Power, pollution, and the internet. The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/23/technology/data-centers-waste-vast-amounts-of-energy-belying-industrial-image.html. Accessed 15 July, 2014.
+
-----
  
Glendenning, Chellis. 1990. Notes toward a neo-Luddite manifesto. Utne Reader, March, pp. 50–53.
+
==== Annotation 182 ====
  
Goldberg, Ken, Ed. 2001. The robot in the garden: Telerobotics and telepistemology in the age of the internet. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+
In other words, ''contradiction'' (defined further in the next section) is the force which serves as the fundamental, originating, and universal force which drives all motion and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas.
  
Gordon, Eric and Adriana de Souza e Silva. 2011. Net locality: Why location matters in a networked world. Malden, MA: Blackwell/Wiley.
+
Contradiction is a ''fundamental driving force'' because it is the most basic driving force which all other forms of motion and development are based upon.
  
Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections from the prison notebooks, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. New York, NY: International Publishers.
+
Contradiction is the ''originating driving force'' because all motion and development arises from contradiction.
  
Gray, Ann. 1992. Video playtime: The gendering of a leisure technology. New York, NY: Routledge.
+
Contradiction is the ''universal driving force'' because ''all'' things, phenomena, and ideas — without exception — are driven to motion and development by contradiction.
  
Greenwald, Glenn. 2014. No place to hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the US Surveillance State. New York, NY: Metropolitan Books.
+
==== a. Definition of Contradiction and Common Characteristics of Contradiction ====
  
Gregg, Melissa. 2011. Work’s intimacy. Malden, MA: Polity.
+
''- Definition of Contradiction''
  
Grossberg, Lawrence. 1992. We gotta get out of this place: Popular conservatism and postmodern culture. New York, NY: Routledge.
+
In dialectics, the concept of contradiction is used to refer to the relationship, opposition, and transformation between opposites which takes place ''within'' all things, phenomena, and ideas, as well as ''between'' all things, phenomena, and ideas. This dialectical concept of contradiction is fundamentally different from the metaphysical concept of contradiction. The metaphysical concept of contradiction is an illogical conception of opposition without unity and without dialectical transformation between opposites.
  
Grossberg, Lawrence. 2010a. Cultural studies in the future tense. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
+
-----
  
Grossberg, Lawrence. 2010b. Modernity and commensuration. Cultural Studies 24(3): pp. 295–332.
+
==== Annotation 183 ====
  
248 O
+
A contradiction is, fundamentally, just a type of relationship. In a contradictory relationship, two things, phenomena, and/or ideas mutually impact one another, resulting in the eventual ''negation'' of one subject and the ''synthesis'' of the negator and the negated into some new form.
  
References
+
The metaphysical concept of contradiction is considered illogical because it establishes no connection between that which is negated and the resulting synthesis.
  
Grosz, Elizabeth. 2001. Architecture from the outside: Essays on virtual and real space. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-61.png|''In the metaphysical conception of contradiction, the negated “disappears” and is not represented in the resulting synthesis.'']]
  
Hage, Ghassan. 2000. White nation: Fantasies of white supremacy in a multicultural society. New York, NY: Routledge.
+
Metaphysical contradiction presents contradicting subjects as isolated from one another and completely distinct, when in reality the relationship between the negated and the negator essentially defines the contradiction. The negated subject is seen as completely negated; that is to say, it is conceived of as essentially “disappearing” into the synthesized result of the contradiction. In this sense, this metaphysical conception of negation is inaccurate in that it is represented as a complete, terminating process.
  
Hall, Stuart. 1981. The whites of their eyes: Racist ideology and the media. In Silver linings: Some strategies for the eighties, edited by George Bridges and Rosalind Brundt. London, UK: Lawrence and Wishart, pp. 28–52.
+
In the above example, once the fox eats the rabbit, the rabbit is considered “gone” after a terminal negation process (see Annotation 196, p. 188) ends the contradiction.
  
Hall, Stuart. 1991. Old and new identities, old and new ethnicities. In Culture, globalization, and the world-system, edited by A.D. King. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, pp. 41–68.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-62.png|''The materialist dialectical conception of contradiction recognizes that contradicting subjects are defined by their relationship and that the synthesis of the contradiction carries forward attributes and characteristics from both the negator and the negated.'']]
  
Hall, Stuart. 1996a. Gramsci’s relevance for the study of race and ethnicity. In Stuart Hall: Critical dialogues in cultural studies, edited by David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 411–440.
+
Materialist dialectical contradiction recognizes that every contradiction is defined by the relationship between the negated and the negator. Materialist dialectics also recognizes that attributes and characteristics of the negated subject are carried forward into the synthesized subject [see Annotation 203, p. 198]. Materialist dialectics also recognizes that contradiction continues indefinitely, as the negated becomes negated again, and so on, continuously, forever [see ''Negation of Negation'', p. 185].
  
Hall, Stuart. 1996b. On postmodernism and articulation: An interview with Stuart Hall, edited by Lawrence Grossberg. In Stuart Hall: Critical dialogues in cultural studies, edited by David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 131–150.
+
In the example on the previous page, the fox consuming the rabbit constitutes a negation process in which the fox takes on characteristics from the rabbit (i.e., nutritional and energy content, any diseases which may be carried forward to the fox, etc.).
  
Haraway, Donna. 1985. A manifesto for cyborgs: Science, technology, and socialist feminism in the 1980s. Socialist Review 80, pp. 65–107.
+
Contradiction arises from opposition which exists within or between things, phenomena, and ideas. The concept of opposing “sides” refers to such aspects, properties, and tendencies of motion which oppose one another, yet are, simultaneously, conditions and premises of the existence of one another. Examples include:
  
Haraway, Donna. 2003. The companion species manifesto: Dogs, people, and significant otherness. Chicago, IL: Prickly Paradigm Press.
+
* Negative charge and positive charge within atoms.
 +
* Anabolism and catabolism within living organisms [anabolism refers to the growth and building up of molecules within an organism, while catabolism refers to the digestion and breaking down of molecules within an organism].  
 +
* Production and consumption as socioeconomic activities.  
 +
* Trial and error which leads to cognitive development.  
  
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. 2001. Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
+
==== Annotation 184 ====
  
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. 2005. Multitude. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
+
All of the above forms of contradiction ''drive motion and development''. These processes exist in ''unity and opposition''. For example, in political economics, production is driven by consumption and consumption is facilitated by production. Even though these are fundamentally opposite forces (production adds to the total quantity of products, while consumption reduces the total quantity of products), they can’t exist without one another, and they drive each other forward. This is the dialectical nature of contradiction as the driving force of all motion and development as defined in materialist dialectics.
  
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. 2011. Commonwealth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
+
''- The General Properties of Contradictions''
  
Harman, Graham. 2011. The quadruple object. Alresford, UK: Zero books.
+
Contradiction is objective and universal. According to Friedrich Engels: “If simple mechanical change of position contains a contradiction, this is even more true of the higher forms of motion of matter, and especially of organic life and its development. We saw above that life consists precisely and primarily in this — that a being is at each moment itself and yet something else. Life is therefore also a contradiction which is present in things and processes themselves, and which constantly originates and resolves itself; and as soon as the contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to an end, and death steps in. We likewise saw that also, in the sphere of thought, we could not escape contradictions, and that, for example, the contradiction between man’s inherently unlimited capacity for knowledge and its actual presence only in men who are externally limited and possess limited cognition finds its solution in what is — at least practically, for us — an endless succession of generations, in infinite progress.”<ref>''Anti-Dühring'', Friedrich Engels, 1877.</ref>
  
Havelock, Eric A. 1982. The literate revolution in Greece and its cultural consequences. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
+
==== Annotation 185 ====
  
Hayles, N. Katherine with Stephen B. Crofts Wiley. 2012. Media, materiality, and the human: A conversation with N. Katherine Hayles. In Communication matters: Materialist approaches to media, mobility, and networks, edited by Jeremy Packer and Stephen B. Crofts Wiley. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 17–34.
+
Here, Engels is explaining how contradiction is the driving force in both material and conscious processes of motion and development. The process of life is a process of contradiction — all organic life forms must consume organic matter so that they can produce growth and offspring, must produce certain molecules and metabolic processes so that they can consume nutrients, and so on. Once these contradictory processes stop, as Engels says, “death steps in” (though even death is a transition forward).
  
Hazeltine, Barrett and Christopher Bull. 1999. Appropriate technology: Tools, choices, and implications. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
+
Conscious motion and development are also rooted in contradictory forces. Engels points out the contradiction between humanity’s seemingly infinite capacity for learning with the seemingly infinite amount of knowledge which can be obtained in the world. This great contradiction drives a seemingly endless process of expanding human knowledge, collectively, over countless generations.
  
Headrick, Daniel. 2000. When information came of age: Technologies of knowledge in the age of reason and revolution, 1700–1850. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
+
Contradictions are not only objective and universal, but also diverse and plentiful. The diverse nature of contradictions is evident in the fact that every subject can include many different contradictions and that contradictions manifest differently depending upon specific conditions. Contradictions can hold different positions and roles in the existence, motion, and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. These positions and roles include [but are not limited to]:
  
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1949. The phenomenology of mind, 2nd edition, translated by J.B. Baillie. London, UK: G. Allen & Unwin. (Orig. 1807).
+
* Internal and external contradictions
 +
* Fundamental and non-fundamental contradictions
 +
* Primary and secondary contradictions
  
Heidegger, Martin. 1961. Being and time. translated by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. New York, NY: Harper & Row. (Orig. 1927).
+
==== Annotation 186 ====
  
Heidegger, Martin. 1977. The question concerning technology and other essays. Translated by William Lovitt. New York, NY: Harper Torchbooks.
+
''Internal'' contradictions are contradictions which exist in the ''internal relations'' of a subject, while ''external'' contradictions exist ''between'' two or more subjects as external relations.
  
References
+
For example: a sports team might have ''internal contradictions'' between players, between the players and the coach, between the coach and management, etc. External contradictions might exist between the team and other teams, between the team and league officials, between the team and the landlords who own the team’s practice space, etc.
  
O 249
+
A ''fundamental'' contradiction is a contradiction which defines the Essence of a relationship [see ''Essence and Phenomenon'', p. 156]. Fundamental contradictions exist throughout the entire development process of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea. A ''non-fundamental'' contradiction exists in only one aspect or attribute of a thing, phenomenon, or idea. A non-fundamental contradiction can ''impact'' a subject, but it will not control or decide the essential development of the subject. Whether or not a contradiction is fundamental is relative to the point of view.
  
Hellerman, Caleb, Jason Morris, and Matt Smith. 2014, 27 Jan. Brain-dead Texas woman taken off ventilator. CSS. CNN.com. http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/26/ health/texas-pregnant-brain-dead-woman/. Accessed 16 March, 2014.
+
For example: the ''fundamental contradiction'' of one nation engaged in war against one another might be the war itself. There will exist many other contradictions; one nation at war might have a trade dispute with a third nation which is not participating in the war. From the “war perspective,” this contradiction is ''non-fundamental'', as it does not define the essential characteristic of the nation at war (though from the perspective of a diplomat charged with ending the trade dispute, the war may be seen as a non-fundamental contradiction while the dispute would be seen as fundamental).
  
Hirose, Naoya. 2002. An ecological approach to embodiment and cognition. Journal of Cognitive Systems Research 3(3), pp. 289–299.
+
In the development of things, phenomena, and ideas, there are many development stages. In each stage of development, there will be one contradiction which drives the development process. This is what we call the ''primary'' contradiction. ''Secondary'' contradictions include all the other contradictions which exist during that stage of development. Determining whether a contradiction is primary or secondary is relative: it depends heavily upon the material conditions and the situation.
  
Hjorth, Larissa, Jean Burgess, and Ingrid Richardson, Eds. 2012. Studying mobile media: Cultural technologies, mobile communication, and the iPhone. New York, NY: Routledge.
+
For example: when restoring an old car that doesn’t run any more, a mechanic may consider the ''primary contradiction'' to be the non-functioning engine. There may be many ''secondary contradictions'' which contribute to the problems with the car’s engine problems. The battery may be dead, the spark plugs may need to be bad, the tires may need replacement, the timing belt may be loose, etc. Those are all ''secondary contradictions'' which do not define the stage of development which is “repairing the engine.” Some of these secondary contradictions may need to be resolved (such as replacing the spark plugs) before the primary contradiction can be fully addressed; others, such as a cracked windshield, may not need to be addressed before the primary contradiction can be dealt with.
  
Hobsbawm, E. J. 1952. The machine breakers. Past and present 1, pp. 57–70.
+
On the other hand, a secondary contradiction may become the primary contradiction: if a mechanic resolves every problem with the engine ''except'' for one bad spark plug, then the bad spark plug will shift from being a secondary contradiction to being the primary contradiction: the bad spark plug is now the primary reason the car won’t start and this stage of development can’t be completed.
  
Hoving, Thomas. 1993. Making the mummies dance: Inside the Metropolitan Museum of Art. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
+
Within all the various fields of inquiry, there exist contradictions which have a diverse range of different properties and characteristics.
  
Hughes, Thomas P. 1994. Technological momentum. In Does technology drive history? The dilemma of technological determinism, edited by Merrit Roe Smith and Leo Marx. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 101–113.
+
==== Annotation 187 ====
  
Illich, Ivan. 1973. Tools for conviviality. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
+
Different fields of study will focus on different forms of contradictions, and any given thing, phenomenon, or idea may contain countless contradictions which can be analyzed and considered for different purposes. For example, consider a large city, which might contain far too many contradictions to count. Civil engineers may focus primarily on contradictions in traffic patterns, the structural integrity of bridges and roads, ensuring that buildings are safe and healthy for inhabitants, etc. Utilities departments will focus on contradictions related to sewage, electrical, and sanitation systems. The education system will focus on contradictions which prevent students from achieving success in schools.
  
Illich, Ivan. 1974. Energy and equity. Boston, MA: Marion Boyars.
+
All of these various methods of analysis may focus on specific forms of contradictions, though there will also be overlap. For instance, designing a school bus system will require the education system and civil engineers to discover and grapple with contradictions which might be hindrances for transporting students safely to school.
  
Industrial society and its future. 1995. Supplement to the Washington Post, September 19. Attributed to Theodore Kaczynski.
+
==== b. Motion Process of Contradictions ====
  
Innis, Harold A. 1950. Empire and communications. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.
+
In every contradiction, the opposing sides are united with each other and opposed to each other at the same time. The concept of “unity between opposites” refers to the fact that a contradiction is a binding, inseparable, and mutually impacting relationship which exists between opposites.
  
Innis, Harold A. 1964. The bias of communication. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press. (Orig. 1951).
+
-----
  
Interlandi, Jeneen. 2009, 9 Jan. Organ trafficking is no myth. Newsweek. Updated 20 July, 2010. http://www.newsweek.com/organ-trafficking-no-myth-78079. Accessed 17 March, 2014.
+
==== Annotation 188 ====
  
Izzard, Eddie. 1999. Dress to kill. Ella Publications. [DVD].
+
Contradictions are ''binding'' and ''inseparable'' because they hold a relationship together. If two opposing things, phenomena, or ideas simply ''separate'', then contradiction, by definition, no longer exists. For example, an economy is bound together by the contradiction of production and consumption; if production exists without consumption (or vice-versa), it can’t be considered to be an economy.
  
Izzard, Eddie. 2000, 17 June. Circle. Henry Fonda Theater, Los Angeles. [Performance].
+
Contradictions are said to be ''mutually impacting'' because any time a contradiction exists between two opposing sides, both sides are mutually impacted for as long as the contradiction exists and develops. Of course, it is possible for two opposing sides to separate from one another; for example, a factory which produced buggy whips may have failed to find consumers after the invention of the car. Thus, there would exist a situation in which production exists without consumption. In this situation, the termination of the contradiction between production and consumption leads to a new contradiction: the factory will now be in the midst of a crisis which will require it to either provide a different product or go out of business.
  
Jones, Steven E. 2006. Against technology: From the Luddites to Neo-luddism. New York, NY: Routledge.
+
Thus we see that production and consumption can’t be separated from one another without leading to a change in the essential nature of the relationship and the opposing subjects, and we see that the opposing sides mutually impact one another (a change in consumption will affect production, and vice-versa).
  
Joy, Bill. 2000. Why the future doesn’t need us. Wired 8 (4), pp. 238–262.
+
In any given contradictory relationship, each oppositional side is the premise for the other’s existence. Unity among opposites also defines the identity of each opposing side. Lenin wrote: “The identity of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their ‘unity,’—although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense, both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society).”<ref>''On the Questions of Dialectics'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.</ref>
  
Katz, James and Mark Aakhus, Eds. 2002. Perpetual contact: Mobile communication, private talk, public performance. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
+
-----
  
Keen, Andrew. 2008. The cult of the amateur. New York, NY: Doubleday.
+
==== Annotation 189 ====
  
Kelly, Kevin. 2010. What technology wants. New York, NY: Viking.
+
Here, Lenin is explaining that ''identity'' and ''unity'' are (more or less) the same concept when it comes to understanding the nature of contradiction between opposites. In material processes of nature, social processes, and processes of consciousness, we perceive and define oppositional forces by recognizing mutually exclusive and contradictory tendencies within and between things, phenomena, and ideas. In other words, whenever we think of an oppositional relationship, we ''define it'' in terms of the opposition.
  
King, Stephen. 2012. The stand. New York, NY: Bantam Doubleday Dell. (Orig.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-63.png|''War, disease, and economy are all examples of unity in contradiction.'']]
  
1978).
+
When we think of a war, we think of the contradictions which exist ''between'' the opposing nations. When we think of a disease, we define it by the oppositional forces ''between'' the ailment and the human body. When we think of an economy, we think of the oppositional forces of production and consumption ''within'' the economy.
  
Kirk, Michael, director. 2014, 13 May. United States of secrets (Part One): The program. Frontline. PBS.
+
In other words, the identity of contradictory relationships is ''defined'' by the ''unity'' of the opposing sides with one another.
  
Kolko, Beth E. 2000. Erasing @race: Going white in the (inter)face. In Race in cyberspace, edited by Beth E. Kolko, Lisa Nakamura and Gilbert Rodman. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 213–232.
+
The concept ''struggle of opposites'' refers to the tendency of opposites to eliminate and negate each other. There exist many diverse forms of struggle between opposites. Struggle can manifest in various forms based on:
  
Krugman, Paul. 2013, 13 June. Sympathy for the luddites. The New York Times. www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/opinion/krugman-sympathy-for-the-luddites.html?_r=0. Accessed 27 July, 2013.
+
* The nature of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea.  
 +
* Relationships within a thing, phenomenon, or idea (or between things, phenomena, and ideas).  
 +
* Specific material conditions [see Annotation 10, p. 10].  
  
250 O
+
The process of unity and struggle of opposites inevitably leads to a ''transformation between them''. The transformation between opposites takes place with rich diversity, and such transformations can vary depending on the properties of the opposite sides as well as specific material conditions.
  
References
+
-----
  
Kuhn, Thomas. 1970. The structure of scientific revolutions, 2nd edition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
+
==== Annotation 190 ====
  
Kurzweil, Ray. 1999. The age of spiritual machines. New York, NY: Penguin.
+
Opposing sides, by definition, ''oppose'' one another. If forces or characteristics which exist within or between things, phenomena, or ideas do ''not'' oppose one another, then they are not, by definition, ''opposites''. Thus, it can be understood that opposing sides have a tendency to ''struggle against'' one another. It is this very struggle which defines two sides as opposites, and as contradictory.
  
Kurzweil, Ray. 2005. The singularity is near: When humans transcend biology. New York, NY: Penguin.
+
Lenin explained that some contradicting opposite sides can exist in what he described as ''equilibrium'', but that this is only ever a temporary state of affairs, as exemplified in his article ''An Equilibrium of Forces.''
  
Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. 1980. Metaphors we live by. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
+
[See Annotation 64, p. 62 for relevant text and more info on equilibrium.]
  
Latour, Bruno [as Jim Johnson]. 1988. Mixing humans and nonhumans together: The sociology of a door-closer. Social Problems 35(3), pp. 298–310.
+
Clearly, Lenin sees that this equilibrium of contradictory forces is not permanently sustainable. Indeed, ''no'' equilibrium of contradictory forces can be permanent. Eventually, one opposing side will overtake the other, and eventually, any given contradiction will result in one opposing side overcoming the other.
  
Latour, Bruno. 1993. We have never been modern, translated by Catherine Porter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
+
According to the law of unification and contradiction between opposites, the struggle between two opposing sides is absolute, while the unity between them is relative, conditional, and temporary; in unity there is a struggle: a struggle in unity. According to Lenin: “The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.”<ref>''On the Questions of Dialectics'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.</ref>
  
Latour, Bruno. 1999. On recalling ANT. In Actor network theory and after, edited by John Law and John Hassard. Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 15–25.
+
-----
  
Latour, Bruno. 2005. Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network-theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
+
==== Annotation 191 ====
  
Lefebvre, Henri. 1991. The production of space, translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
+
“Absolute” and “Relative” are philosophical classifications which refer to interdependence. That which is ''absolute'' exists independently and with permanence. That which is ''relative'' is temporary, and dependent on other conditions or circumstances in order to exist.
  
Lerner, Daniel. 1958. The passing of traditional society: Modernizing the Middle East. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
+
So Lenin’s point is that ''unity'' exists temporarily in any given pair of opposing sides, as the unity only exists as long as the opposing sides are opposing one another. As soon as one side eliminates or negates the other, the unity subsides. However, ''opposition'' is considered absolute, because it is opposition which drives motion and change in all things, phenomena, and ideas through contradictory processes of opposing sides.
  
Levine, Robert. 1997. A geography of time. New York, NY: Basic Books.
+
In the same text quoted in the passage above, ''On the Questions of Dialectics,'' Lenin notes:
  
Ling, Rich. 2012. Taken for grantedness: The embedding of mobile communication into society. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+
<blockquote>
 +
The distinction between subjectivism (skepticism, sophistry, etc.) and dialectics, incidentally, is that in (objective) dialectics the difference between the relative and the absolute is itself relative. For objective dialectics there is an absolute within the relative. For subjectivism and sophistry the relative is only relative and excludes the absolute...
  
Luke, Timothy. 1999. Slowburn, fast detonation, killer fragments: Rereading the Unabomber manifesto. In Capitalism, democracy, and ecology: Departing from Marx. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, pp. 171–195.
+
Such must also be the method of exposition (i.e., study) of dialectics in general... To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., with any proposition: the leaves of a tree are green; John is a man: Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have dialectics (as Hegel’s genius recognised): the individual is the universal.
  
Lupton, Deborah. 2012, 4 Nov. The quantified self movement: Some sociological perspectives. This Sociological Life. Blog. http://simplysociology.wordpress. com/2012/11/04/the-quantitative-self-movement-some-sociological-perspectives. Accessed 15 July, 2014.
+
The individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes) etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs, the concepts of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say: John is a man, Fido is a dog, this is a leaf of a tree, etc., we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Lupton, Deborah. 2013. The social worlds of the unborn. New York, NY: Palgrave Pivot.
+
In other words, we must understand that in materialist dialectics, the absolute and the relative exist within one another; in other words, the absolute and the relative have a ''dialectical relationship'' with one another in all things, phenomena, and ideas.
  
Lyon, David. 1994. The electronic eye: The rise of surveillance society. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
+
''Relative unity'' refers to the nature of ''unity'' between contradictory subjects. Contradictory subjects are ''unified'' in the sense that any given contradiction is essentially defined by the contradiction between two subjects. Thus, the two subjects are ''unified'' in contradiction. However, this unity is ''relative'' in the sense that this unification is temporary (the unity will end upon negation and synthesis) and relative (i.e., defined by the relationship between the two contradicting subjects).
  
Lyon, David. 2009. Identifying citizens: ID cards as surveillance. Malden, MA: Polity.
+
''Absolute struggle'' refers to the fact that contradiction, negation, and synthesis will go on forever; in this sense, contradictory processes are ''absolute'' because such struggle exists ''permanently;'' struggle has no set beginning or end point, and exists independently of any specific thing, phenomenon, or idea.
  
MacKenzie, Donald. 2008. An engine, not a camera: How financial models shape markets. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-64.png|''Relative Unity refers to the temporary and relative nature of specific relationships which define and unify specific contradictions; Absolute Struggle refers to the permanent, constant nature of development through contradiction.'']]
  
Magnet, Shoshana. 2011. When biometrics fail: Gender, race, and the technology of identity. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-65.png|''The relationship between relative unity and absolute struggle defines and drives change, motion, and development through contradiction.'']]
  
Mann, Steve with Hal Niedzviecki. 2001. Cyborg: Digital destiny and human possibility in the age of the wearable computer. Toronto: Doubleday Canada.
+
This applies to contradictions. The ''relative unity'' and the ''absolute struggle'' between opposing sides have a dialectical relationship with one another. The permanent absoluteness of struggle — the fact that all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly undergoing processes of change through contradictory forces — can only manifest in the relative unity of opposing sides, which can only exist through the temporary existence of conditional relations between opposing sides.
  
Marcuse, Herbert. 1964. One-dimensional man. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
+
-----
  
Martin, Douglas. 2002. Ivan Illich, 76, philosopher who challenged status quo, is dead. New York Times, December 4. http://www.NYTimes.com. Accessed February 10, 2003.
+
The interaction that leads to the transformation between opposites is a process. At the beginning, contradictions manifest as differences and then develop into two opposing sides. When the two contradictions are fiercely matched and when the conditions are ripe, they will transform each other, and finally, the conflict will be resolved. As old contradictions disappear, new contradictions are formed and the process of mutual impact and transformation between opposites continues, which drives the motion and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas. The relationship, impact and transformation between opposites are the source and driving force of all movement and development in the world. Lenin affirmed: “Development is the ‘struggle’ of opposites.”<ref>''On the Questions of Dialectics'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.</ref>
  
References
+
-----
  
O 251
+
==== Annotation 192 ====
  
Marx, Leo. 1964. The machine in the garden: Technology and the pastoral ideal in America. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
+
Any given process of development — that is to say, of transformation or motion — can be seen as a struggle between opposites. Various forms of struggle can exist simultaneously for any given subject, and the way we interpret struggle can depend on our point of view.
  
Marx, Leo. 1987. Does improved technology mean progress? Technology Review, January, pp. 32–41, 71.
+
For an engineer, a car moving along a road might be seen as a struggle between the power generated by the engine against the mass of the car itself and the friction of the tires on the ground. The driver of the car might see the process in terms of the struggle between the driver and the environment as they navigate across town avoiding accidents and following traffic laws.
  
Marx, Leo and Merritt Roe Smith, Eds. 1994. Introduction. In Does technology drive history? The dilemma of technological determinism, edited by Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. ix–xv.
+
An organism’s life can be seen as a struggle between the organism’s life processes and its environment, or it might be seen as a struggle of contradictory forces within the organism itself (i.e., forces of consumption of nutrition vs. forces of expending energy to survive, forces of disease vs. forces of the organism’s immune system, etc.).
  
Matos, Patricia. 2012. Call center labor and the injured precariat: Shame, stigma, and downward social mobility in contemporary Portugal. Dialectical Anthropology 36(3–4), pp. 217–243.
+
Materialist dialectics requires us to identify, examine, and understand the opposing forces which drive all development in our universe. Only through understanding such contradictions can we intercede and affect changes in the world which suit our purposes.
  
Mauss, Marcel. 1973. Techniques of the body. Economy and Society 2(1), pp. 70–88.
+
For example, in order to fight against capitalism and other forms of oppression, we must first understand the contradictory forces which exist within and between those oppressive social structures. Only then can we determine how we might best apply our will, through labor processes, to dismantle such oppressive structures. We might do this by exacerbating existing contradictions within oppressive structures, by introducing new contradictions, by negating contradictions which inhibit our own progress, etc.
  
Maxwell, Richard and Toby Miller. 2012. Greening the media. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
+
==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
  
McCullough, Malcolm. 2013. Ambient commons: Attention in the age of embodied information. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+
Given that contradictions are objective and universal, and that they are the source and driving force of movement and development, it is therefore necessary to detect, recognize, and understand contradictions, to fully analyze opposing sides, and to grasp the nature, origin and tendencies of motion and development in our awareness and practice.
  
McDougall, Christopher. 2009. Born to run: A hidden tribe, super athletes, and the greatest race the world has never seen. New York, NY: Vintage.
+
Lenin said: “The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts… is the ''essence…'' of dialectics.”<ref>''On the Questions of Dialectics'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.</ref>
  
McGonigal, Jane. 2011. Reality is broken: Why games make us better and how they can change the world. New York, NY: Penguin.
+
-----
  
McLuhan, Marshall. 1964. Understanding media: The extensions of man. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
+
==== Annotation 193 ====
  
McLuhan, Marshall and Quentin Fiore. 1967. The medium is the massage: An inventory of effects. New York, NY: Bantam Books.
+
In other words, materialist dialectics is simply a system of understanding the world around us by viewing all things, phenomena, and ideas as collections of relationships and contradictions which exist within and between all things, phenomena, and ideas.
  
Mirchandani, Kiran. 2008. Practices of global capital: Gaps, cracks, and ironies in transnational call centers in India. In South Asian technospaces, edited by Radhika Gajjala & Venkataramama Gajjala. New York, NY: Peter Lang, pp. 226–248.
+
Since contradictions exist with such rich diversity, it is necessary to have a historical point of view [see Annotation 114, p. 116] — that is, to know how to analyze each specific type of contradiction and have appropriate methods for resolving them. In our perception and practice, it is necessary to properly distinguish the roles and positions of different types of contradictions in each situation and condition; we must also distinguish between different characteristics which contradictions might have in order to find the best method of resolving them.
  
Mitchell, Lisa M. and Eugenia Georges. 1998. Baby’s first picture: The cyborg fetus of ultrasound imaging. In Cyborg babies: From techno-sex to techno-tots, edited by Robbie Davis-Floyd and Joseph Dumit. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 105–124.
+
-----
  
Mitchell, William. 1995. City of bits. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+
==== Annotation 194 ====
  
Moravec, Hans. 1988. Mind children: The future of robot and human intelligence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
+
The historical viewpoint is vital because in order to fully understand any given contradiction, we must understand the process of development which led to its formation.
  
Mosco, Vincent. 1996. The political economy of communication. London: Sage.
+
For example, before a car engine can be repaired, we must first find out what caused the engine to stop working to begin with. If the car is out of fuel, we must determine what caused it to run out of fuel. Did the driver simply drive until the fuel tank was empty, or is there a hole or leak in a fuel line, in the tank, etc.?
  
Mosco, Vincent. 2005. The digital sublime: Myth, power, and cyberspace. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+
It is vital to know the history of development of a given pair of opposing sides, as well as the characteristics and other properties of both opposing sides, to fully understand the contradiction. Since all conscious activity (like all processes of motion and change) ultimately derives from the driving force of contradiction, it is vital for us to develop a historical and comprehensive perspective of any contradictions we hope to affect through our conscious activities.
  
Mosco, Vincent. 2014. To the cloud: Big data in a turbulent world. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
+
=== 3. Law of Negation of Negation ===
  
Mumford, Lewis. 2010. Technics and civilization. New York, NY: Harcourt Inc (Orig. 1934).
+
The law of negation of negation describes the fundamental and universal tendency of movement and development to occur through ''dialectical negation'', forming a cyclical form of development through what is termed “''negation of negation''.
  
Mumford, Lewis. 1964/1970. The myth of the machine: The pentagon of power. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich Inc.
+
==== a. Definition of Negation and Dialectical Negation ====
  
Mumford, Lewis. 1967. The myth of the machine: Technics and human development: Volume one. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich Inc.
+
The world continuously and endlessly changes and develops. Things, phenomena, and ideas that arise, exist, develop and perish, are replaced by other things, phenomena, and ideas; one form of existence is replaced with another form of existence, again and again, continuously, through this development process. This procedure is called ''negation''.
  
Muniesa, Fabian, Yuval Millo and Michel Callon. 2007. An introduction to market devices. In Market devices, edited by Michel Callon, Yuval Millo, and Fabian Muniesa. Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 1–12.
+
All processes of movement and development take place through negation. From certain perspectives, negations can be seen as end points to the development (and thus, existence) of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea [which we can think of as “terminal negations;” see Annotation below]. But from other perspectives, negations can also create the conditions and premises for new developments. Such negations, which create such conditions and premises for the development of things and phenomena, are called ''dialectical negation''.
  
252 O
+
-----
  
References
+
==== Annotation 195 ====
  
Negroponte, Nicholas. 1995. Being digital. New York, NY: Knopf.
+
''Negation'' refers to any act of motion or transformation which arises from contradiction. Specifically, negation is what occurs when one opposing side completely overcomes the other. Nothing in our universe can transform or move all by itself, without any contradiction. Thus, negation drives all development and motion of all things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 119, p. 123]. There are various forms of negation, and the same negation process may be seen to take different forms depending on viewpoint of analysis [see Annotation 11, p. 12, and Annotation 114, p. 116], as depicted in the diagram below.
  
Nisbet, Robert. 1980. History of the idea of progress. New York, NY: Basic Books.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-66.png|''An overview of various forms of negation as they relate to dialectical development.'']]
  
Noble, David. 1982. Introduction. In Architect or bee? The human/technology relationship, by Mike Cooley, edited by Shirley Cooley. Boston, MA: South End Press, pp. xi–xxi.
+
''Dialectical negation'' occurs when the end of development leads directly to some new development process. Dialectical negation occurs through quality shifts [see Annotation 117, p. 119], which, themselves, occur through negation of opposite sides.
  
Noble, David. 1986. Forces of production: A social history of industrial automation. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-67.png|''Replacement negation refers to the replacement of one thing, phenomenon, or idea with another through dialectical negation.'']]
  
Noble, David. 1993. Progress without people: In defense of Luddism. Chicago, IL: Charles H. Kerr Publishing.
+
'''Translation Note:''' ''The terms “terminal negation” and “replacement negation” do not appear in the original Vietnamese text. We chose to assign terms to these concepts for clarity.''
  
Nussbaum, Emily. 2000. A question of gender. Discover, January, pp. 92–99.
+
''Replacement negation'' occurs when one thing, phenomenon, or idea takes the place of another. Replacement negation is always a dialectical process, where one subject is replaced gradually by another. Replacement may be relatively fast or slow, but it is never instantaneous — nothing can pop in and out of existence instantaneously. For example: swords were gradually replaced by firearms as the primary weapons of war over the course of many centuries. Today, swords have been completely replaced by firearms on the battlefield. This was a process of ''replacement negation'' — weapons are still used in war, but the type of weapon used has been completely replaced. Development continues, even though development of swords as battle weapons has essentially ended.
  
Nye, David E. 1994. American technological sublime. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-68.png|''Terminal negation refers to the end of a specific cycle of development.'']]
  
Omi, Michael and Howard Winant. 1986. Racial formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s. New York, NY: Routledge.
+
''Terminal negation'' is what happens when development completely ends for a given thing, phenomenon, or idea. For example, from one viewpoint, the development of swords as weapons of war can be seen as having ended — having been ''terminally negated'' — due to the innovation of firearms. In essence, swords are no longer developed, nor implemented, in modern warfare.
  
Omi, Michael and Howard Winant. 1993. On the theoretical status of the concept of race. In Race, identity, and education in education, edited by Cameron McCarthy and Warren Crichlow. New York: NY: Routledge, pp. 3–10.
+
Replacement negation and terminal negation must be considered in relative terms. From one viewpoint, we can see the rise of firearms as the underlying reason for the ''terminal negation'' of military use of swords. Today, no army on Earth uses swords as primary battlefield weapons and militaries no longer develop sword technology for battlefield use. However, from another viewpoint, the development of battlefield weapons has continued on long after the end of the primacy of swords, and it could be said that firearms have ''replaced'' swords as the primary battlefield weapon.
  
Ong, Walter. 1967. The presence of the word: Some prolegomena for cultural and religious history. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
+
Consider the death of a human being. From one perspective, death is a ''terminal negation'' — the person’s consciousness has ended, and no further development of consciousness will occur for that individual. From other perspectives, development continues. The individual may have had children who will continue their familial lineage, they may have contributed ideas which will continue to impact other people for centuries to come, and so on. In that sense, replacement negation may be viewed as dialectical negation. For example, someone studying modes of transportation in the history of the USA may see the process of steam locomotives replacing horses, and then cars replacing steam locomotives, as processes of dialectical negation from the overarching perspective of the transportation system.
  
Ong, Walter. 1982. Orality and literacy: The technologizing of the word. New York, NY: Routledge.
+
-----
  
Orwell, George. 1949. Nineteen Eighty-Four. London, UK: Secker & Warburg.
+
Materialist dialectics is concerned with all forms of negation, but focuses primarily on dialectical negation. Therefore, materialist dialectics is not just a theory of transformation in general, but fundamentally a theory of development
  
Pacey, Arnold. 1983. The culture of technology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+
-----
  
Pakula, Alan J., director. 1982. Sophie’s choice. Incorporated Television Company.
+
==== Annotation 196 ====
  
Pelto, Pertii J. 1973. The snowmobile revolution: Technology and social change in the Arctic. Menlo Park, CA: Cummings.
+
All transformation is driven by negation. Development is a process, specifically, of ''dialectical'' negation, which is a specific form of transformation in which an end of development creates the conditions for new development, either through internal quality shifts or through replacement by some external subject.
  
Pfister, Wally, director. 2014. Transcendence. Alcon Entertainment.
+
Materialist dialectics is primarily concerned with dialectical negation (which drives development) because it is ''development'' which brings forth continuous change in our world. Terminal negations and other forms of transformation which do not drive further development are of limited utility, and can only represent certain limited viewpoints [i.e., the viewpoint of that which is terminated].
  
Piggott, J. R. 2004. Palace of the people: The crystal palace at Sydenham: 1854–1936. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
+
From a broader perspective, nearly all “terminations” are replaced in some way or another by some other form of development. For instance, even when a person dies, although the consciousness of that person may terminate, there will be continuous impacts which will be carried forward from the deceased person’s lifetime of consciousness, as well as from the developments which arise from the death itself.
  
Pilloton, Emily. 2009. Design revolution: 100 products that empower people. New York, NY: Metropolis Books.
+
This dialectical definition of negation differs greatly from metaphysical conceptions of development [see Annotation 201, p. 195], which are essentially viewed as terminal. From the metaphysical perspective, all things, phenomena, and ideas are viewed as separate from one another; therefore negations are viewed as terminal processes which bring development processes to their ends.
  
Plato. 1952. Phaedrus, translated by R. Hackforth. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-69.png|''The metaphysical perspective of terminal negation views negation as an essentially terminal process representing the end point of the existence of a static and isolated thing, phenomenon, or idea.'']]
  
Polak, Paul. 2009. Out of poverty: What works when traditional approaches fail. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers.
+
In the above example, the metaphysical framework would present smashing a vase with a hammer as a terminal negation from the perspective of the observer. Once the vase is smashed, the vase is considered to no longer exist, and the broken shards are not considered to be “a vase” any more. Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, view “the shards” as merely a developed form of the vase; a transition to a new stage of development; the negation was only terminal from the perspective of the vase itself.
  
Polak, Paul. 2010a. The death of appropriate technology I: If you can’t sell it don’t do it. Blog. The business solution to poverty. www.paulpolak.com/the-death-of-appropriate-technology-2/. Accessed July 27, 2013.
+
'''''Excerpt From'' Vietnam’s High School Freshman Civic Education textbook:'''
  
Polak, Paul. 2010b. Death of appropriate technology II: How to design for the market. Blog. The business solution to poverty. www.paulpolak.com/design-for-the-market/. Accessed 27 July, 2013.
+
Metaphysical and dialectical negation share one commonality: they both see development as the replacement of an old subject with a new subject. However, metaphysical negation happens when outside forces impact on a subject, deleting completely the existence of the old subject. According to this metaphysical perspective, the old subject and the new subject which replaces it do not have any connection.
  
Polak, Paul and Mal Warwick. 2013. The business solution to poverty: Designing products and services for three billion new customers. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers.
+
Dialectical negation fundamentally differs from metaphysical negation because it views development as a process of internal development. Dialectical negation does not view complete erasure or deletion of any former subject; instead, dialectical development sees the older subject, which is replaced (negated), as the premise or basis of existence for the new subject.
  
Pugliese, Joseph. 2010. Biometrics: Bodies, technologies, biopolitics. New York, NY: Routledge.
+
'''Comparison Examples:'''
  
References
+
{|
 +
| | '''Metaphysical Negation'''
 +
| '''Dialectical Negation'''
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | The earthquake destroyed the house.
 +
| The house was impacted by the external force of an earthquake, which caused it to collapse, due to internal characteristics of the house itself (which could not withstand the forces of the earthquake). The debris from the collapsed house will be cleared away, and will continue to develop. The space where the house stood will also continue to develop in some way, with the earthquake and the resulting collapse serving as the basis for this further development.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | Water eroded the mountain.
 +
| The external force of water caused erosion by transferring material away from the mountain, due to the internal characteristics of the mountain’s composite material. The water, the material which was washed away, and the mountain will all continue to develop. The erosion process will be the basis for this further development.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | The car has a new tire because it ran over a nail.
 +
| The external force of the nail caused the tire to permanently deflate, due to the internal characteristics of the tire, which could not withstand running over a nail. This served as the basis for further development: the old tire was removed and will be disposed of, which will serve as the basis for further development (i.e., the tire may be recycled or sent to a landfill); the removal of the tire serves as the basis for the further development of a new tire being installed.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | When you add water, sunlight, and nutrition to a seed, it will grow into a plant.
 +
| The seed went through a process of negation as a sprout grew, through various stages of development, into a plant, facilitated by outside forces (such as water, nutrition, sunlight, etc. — the seed would not grow in isolation) as well as the internal characteristics of the seed itself; the seed served as the basis of the sprout’s development. The sprout then served as the basis for the growth of a seedling, and the seedling served as the basis for the growth of a fully grown plant. All of this development was driven by negation processes as quantity shifts gradually led to quality shifts through those various stages of development.
 +
|
 +
|}
  
O 253
+
As you can see from the examples above, the metaphysical perspective focuses on external forces affecting a given subject and views every development process as terminal, with a beginning, middle, and end. The metaphysical perspective thus views negation as a termination of the subject (and, by extension, of development).
  
Pynchon, Thomas. 1984. Is it OK to be a Luddite? The New York Times. www.nytimes.com/books/97/05/18/reviews/pynchon-luddite.html. Accessed 4 June, 2014.
+
Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, views development as a continuous and never-ending process of mutual impact, negation, and further negation of each negation. A comprehensive and historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116] must thus be sought to fully comprehend development and negation processeses.
  
Qiu, Jack. 2009. Working-class network society: Communication technology and the information have-less in urban China. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+
Dialectical negation has two basic characteristics: ''objectivity'' and ''inheritance''.
  
Qiu, Jack. 2012. Network labor: Beyond the shadow of Foxconn. In Studying mobile media: Cultural technologies, mobile communication, and the iPhone, edited by Larissa Hjorth, Jean Burgess and Ingrid Richardson. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 173–189.
+
Dialectical negation is ''objective'' because negation arises from contradictions which exist between two opposite sides. These opposing sides may exist within a thing, phenomenon, or idea, but the opposing sides are still, by definition, externally opposed to one another from the perspective of either side.
  
Reynolds, Gretchen. 2013, 16 Oct. Pounding pavement by heel or toe. The New York Times. http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/16/pounding-pavement-by-heel-or-toe/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. Accessed 15 July, 2014.
+
-----
  
Rheingold, Howard. 2012. Net smart: How to thrive online. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+
==== Annotation 197 ====
  
Riecken, D. 1994. A conversation with Marvin Minsky about agents. Communications of the ACM 37 (7), pp. 23–9.
+
Though any given negation may be viewed as terminal from a certain perspective, materialist dialectics is most concerned with processes of development wherein the end of one stage of development creates the conditions for further development [see Annotation 117, p. 119].
  
Ritter, Malcolm. 2013, 7 Aug. Feds, family, reach deal on use of DNA information. AP Story. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/feds-family-reach-deal-use-dna-information. Accessed 17 March, 2014.
+
Therefore, every development is simultaneously an ''internal'' and an ''external process,'' depending on perspective. Development processes may, from certain perspectives, be seen to take place ''within'' a subject or ''between'' two subjects, but they are always ''external'' (and, therefore, objective — see Annotation 108, p. 112) from the perspective of either opposing side while simultaneously ''internal'' to the relationship.
  
Ritzer, George. 1996. The McDonaldization of society: An investigation into the changing character of contemporary social life. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
+
For example: The relationship between a husband and wife may be seen as an ''internal process of development'' of “the marriage” from the perspective of a marriage counselor. However, from their own perspectives, each “opposing side” (i.e., the husband and the wife) see one another as external to each other.
  
Robertson, Craig. 2010. The passport in America: The history of a document. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
+
Therefore, the development of a marriage may be seen as an internal process, but the mutual impacts and negations which occur within the relationship are objective and external forces from the perspective of either opposing side.
  
Robins, Kevin and Frank Webster. 1999. Times of the technoculture: From the information society to the virtual life. London, UK: Routledge.
+
This is important because it means that all development and all negation are essentially objective processes; therefore no entity has complete, omniscient control over any development process. We must, therefore, understand the nature of development and negation in order to be able to properly plan and affect change in our world.
  
Rogers, Everett M. 2003. Diffusion of innovations, 5th edition. New York, NY: Free Press.
+
Dialectical negation is, therefore, the result of the process of resolving inevitable contradictions within a subject [i.e., a relationship] itself. Dialectical negation allows for the old to be replaced by the new, thereby creating trends of development. Therefore, dialectical negation is also self-negation.
  
Romanyshyn, Robert D. 1989. Technology as symptom and dream. New York, NY: Routledge.
+
-----
  
Rose, Nikolas. 2007. The politics of life itself: Biomedicine, power, and subjectivity in the twenty-first century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
+
==== Annotation 198 ====
  
Ross, Andrew. 2013. In search of the lost paycheck. In Digital labor: The internet as playground and factory, edited by Trebor Scholz. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 13–32.
+
To reiterate: from the perspective of either opposing side, development is an ''external, objective'' process. From the perspective of the contradictory ''relationship'', processes of development are ''internal'' processes of ''self-negation''. Thus, dialectical negation is both an objective process which no entity can completely control, while, simultaneously, an internal process of self-negation and self-development.
  
Roszak, Theodore. 1978. Person/planet: The creative disintegration of industrial society. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
+
If two nations go to war, either nation may view the war as an objective, external development process, but from a wider perspective, the war is an internal development process of the diplomatic relationship between the two warring nations. This is drastically different from the metaphysical perspective, which views any negation process as a purely external process of development wherein one subject is permanently deleted from existence, then replaced by another subject [see Annotation 196, p. 188]. From the metaphysical perspective, a war is simply a conflict between two distinct and separate nations, and the conclusion of the war is a terminal negation which ends development of the war. From the materialist dialectical perspective, on the other hand, the end of the war would be seen as the basis of future development of the relationship between the two formerly warring nations.
  
Roszak, Theodore. 1994. The cult of information: A neo-Luddite treatise on high tech, artificial intelligence, and the true art of thinking, 2nd edition. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
+
Dialectical negation also has an ''inheritance'' characteristic: when one opposing side negates another, the remaining side inherits factors from the negated side which are suitable with present conditions.
  
Royte, Elizabeth. 2005. Garbage land: On the secret trail of trash. New York, NY: Little Brown.
+
-----
  
Rubin, Mark. 1996, 4 June. An explosive best seller. The Village Voice, p. 8.
+
==== Annotation 199 ====
  
Ryan, Michael, Maha Elashi, Richard Newsham-West and Jack Taunton. 2013. Examining injury risk and pain perception in runners using minimalist
+
Every negation process arises from contradictions between two opposing sides. Within any such negation process, we can think of one side as the “negator” and the other side as the “negated.” Negation, like all relational processes, leads to mutual impact between both sides [see Annotation 136, p. 138]. Therefore, the negated will impact the negator; in other words, the negated side will be somehow ''reflected'' in the negator [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. This means that the negator will inherit and carry forward certain attributes, factors, and characteristics which it receives from the negated side.
  
254 O
+
Again, consider a war between two nations. Even if one nation completely conquers and subjugates the other in total victory, the victorious nation will still inherit certain factors from the defeated nation. Which factors are inherited will depend on the conditions. The victorious nation may pick up some cultural aspects from the defeated nation, such as cuisine, fashion, etc., they may incorporate tactics and strategies which they observed the defeated enemy using on the battlefield, and so on. The point is that the victorious nation will be impacted in some way by the defeated nation.
  
References
+
The factors which are adopted will be ''suitable with the present conditions''. Take, for example, a car breaking down due to engine failure. This can be seen as an opposing relationship between the car itself and the car’s owner. If the present conditions are suitable [i.e., the owner has the funds and resources available, and the desire to repair the car], then the car may be repaired and continue operating for years to come. If, on the other hand, conditions aren’t suitable [i.e., the owner does not have the funds or resources or the owner no longer wants the car], then the car may be sent to the scrapyard.
  
footwear. British Journal of Sports Medicine. Published online: doi: 10.1136/ bjsports-2012-092061
+
As another example, if a fox eats a rabbit, it will inherit certain characteristics from the rabbit. It will inherit nutrition from the rabbit’s body. It may also inherit other characteristics, such as a disease the rabbit was carrying, if the conditions of the fox’s biological composition are suitable [i.e., if the disease can be transferred from the rabbit to the fox].
  
Rybczynski, Witold. 1980. Paper heroes: A review of appropriate technology. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.
+
Dialectical negation is not a complete negation [i.e., deletion] of the old. Rather, dialectical negation is a continuity of growth in which the old develops into the new. In processes of dialectical negation, “the new” forms and develops on its own [see Annotation 62, p. 59], through the process of filtering out unsuitable factors, while retaining suitable content. Vladimir Lenin described dialectical negation as:
  
Sale, Kirkpatrick. 1995a. Is there a method to his madness? The Nation, Sept. 25, pp. 305–311.
+
“Not empty negation, not futile negation, not skeptical negation, vacillation and doubt is characteristic and essential in dialectics — which undoubtedly contains the element of negation and indeed as its most important element — no, but negation as a moment of connection, as a moment of development, retaining the positive, i.e., without any vacillations, without any eclecticism.”<ref>''Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic,'' Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.</ref>
  
Sale, Kirkpatrick. 1995b. Rebels against the future: The Luddites and their war on the industrial revolution: Lessons for the computer age. New York, NY: Addison-Wesley.
+
-----
  
Schivelbusch, Wolfgang. 1988. Disenchanted night: The industrialization of light in the nineteenth century, translated by Angela Davies. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
+
==== Annotation 200 ====
  
Schlanger, Zoe. 2014, 8 May. Those barefoot sneakers might be a total scam. Newsweek. http://www.newsweek.com/vibram-caught-flat-footed-250388. Accessed 15 July, 2014.
+
The passage from Lenin above comes from Clemence Dutt’s popular English translation of one of Lenin’s notebooks. Below is our translation from the Vietnamese version of this text from the original text of this book, which we hope might be somewhat easier to understand:
  
Schüll, Natasha Dow. 2012. Addiction by design: Machine gambling in Las Vegas. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
+
<blockquote>
 +
Dialectical negation is not empty negation, it’s not negation without any thoughts, it’s not skeptical negation, it’s not hesitation. Skepticism is not a feature of the essence of the dialectic — of course, dialectics include the negative, it even plays as one of the important factors of a given subject — no, it is negation as the moment of development. Dialectical negation retains the positive, meaning there is no hesitation, there is no eclecticism.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Schumacher, Ernst Friedrich. 1989. Small is beautiful: Economics as if people mattered. New York, NY: Harper & Row. (Orig. 1973).
+
In order to understand what Lenin is saying here, we should first understand what Lenin is responding to. The above notes are referring to the chapter titled “The Absolute Ideal” within Hegel’s ''Science of Logic [see note at the end of this Annotation]''. In this chapter, Hegel recounts various critiques of dialectics and counters them.
  
Sclove, Richard. 1995a. Making technology democratic. In Resisting the virtual life: The culture and politics of information, edited by James Brook and Iain Boal. San Francisco, CA: City Lights, pp. 85–101.
+
''Skepticism'', here, refers to the tendency to address all human knowledge with doubt.
  
Sclove, Richard. 1995b. Democracy and technology. New York, NY: Guilford.
+
Philosophical skepticism never moves past two questions: 1. “Is this knowledge true?” 2. “Will human beings ever obtain true knowledge?” Skeptics of this nature engage in a sort of metaphysical inquisition in which every thesis that is ever encountered is immediately and utterly refuted and thus “negated” in the metaphysical sense of termination [see Annotation 196, p. 188].
  
Scott, Ridley, director. 1982. Blade runner. The Ladd Company.
+
''Eclecticism'' refers to philosophical and ideological conceptions which draw from a variety of theories, styles, and ideas in an unsystematic manner. Lenin contends that dialectical negation is non-eclecticist because it rises above mere rhetorical combativeness and “total negation.” [This concept is explained more below within this annotation.]
  
Sharma, Sarah. 2014. In the meantime: Temporality and cultural politics. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
+
With all this in mind, we see that Lenin is refuting the notion that dialectics are and can only be ''negative'' in nature. The metaphysical-skeptic conception of dialectics holds that negation takes the form of rhetorical arguing and refutation, in which one idea is presented, and a second idea is offered to counter the first idea, which completely and totally negates the first idea. According to this argument, dialectics is, therefore, a ''totally negative process''.
  
Shelley, Mary Wollstonecraft. 1985. Frankenstein, or the modern Prometheus. New York, NY: Penguin Books. (Orig. 1818).
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-71.png|''A common misperception of dialectical development is that it is “fully negative,” insomuch as the initial thesis (initial subject) is completely negated by the antithesis (impacting subject). In fact, characteristics from both the thesis and antithesis are carried forward into the synthesis.'']]
  
Shiva, Vandana. 1989. Staying alive: Women, ecology and development. London, UK: Zed Books.
+
In the chapter from ''Science of Logic'' which Lenin is responding to in the referenced text, Hegel is arguing that the conception of dialectics as ''only negative'' — i.e., a system of thinking in which counter-arguments are presented to completely negate initial arguments — is inaccurate. Hegel explains that when one opposing side negates another, it thereafter “contains in general the determination of the first [opposing side] within itself.” In other words, after one opposing side negates another, it retains features and aspects from the opposing side which was negated. Lenin found this particular point to be so important that he wrote “this is very important for understanding dialectics” in the margin of his notebook.
  
Shiva, Vandana. 1991. The green revolution in the Punjab. The Ecologist 21 (2). Accessed at http://livingheritage.org/green-revolution.htm. Accessed 8 February, 2004.
+
The reason both Hegel and Lenin found this idea, that the “negator” contains elements of the “negated” after negation [see Annotation 231, p. 227], is that this counters the accusation that dialectics are “only negative.” This is why Lenin’s notes highlight the importance of the negator “retaining the positive” after negation. Lenin is pointing out the importance of the retention of features of the negated in the negator because it is this retention which prevents dialectical development from becoming a purely negative process.
  
Shrum, Wesley. 2001. We were the Unabomber. Science, technology, and human values 26 (1), pp. 90–101.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-72.png|''In materialist dialectics, it is understood that negation is a process of retention: characteristics from both the thesis (initial subject) and antithesis (impacting subject) are retained in the resulting synthesis'']]
  
Skloot, Rebecca. 2010. The immortal life of Henrietta Lacks. New York, NY: Crown.
+
We must also understand what Lenin means when he refers to “skepticism” in his notes. Lenin, here, is referring to the philosophical view that we can never know whether or not our beliefs are true. This belief was popularly known as Machism, or Empirio-Criticism, in Lenin’s time (see Annotation 32, p. 27).
  
Slack, Jennifer Daryl. 1984a. Communication technologies and society: Conceptions of causality and the politics of technological intervention. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
+
A common critique of dialectics is that it is an inherently skeptical system of thought, since dialectics is seen as a process of presenting counter-arguments to suppositional arguments. Lenin, in his notes, presents the idea that such skepticism is “not a feature of dialectics” precisely because nothing is ever completely, totally, and entirely negated. In other words, the accusation that dialectical analysis is essentially skeptical is rooted in the mistaken notion that one opposing side (i.e., a counter-argument) ''completely negates'' the original supposition. In fact, according to materialist dialectics, the negator ''always'' retains features and aspects from the negated side, which counters this critique. Thus, dialectical development, which occurs through dialectical negation, is a process of forward motion — not a process of “vacillating” back and forth from one position to another — and there is no skeptical “hesitation” preventing forward progress.
  
Slack, Jennifer Daryl. 1984b. Surveying the impacts of communication technologies. In Progress in communication sciences: Volume 5, edited by Brenda Dervin and Melvin J. Voigt. Norwood, NJ: Ablex, pp. 73–109.
+
This same idea (that the negator retains features from the negated) also counters another common critique of materialist dialectics: that dialectical analysis is simply a system of rhetorical sophistry [see Annotation 36, p. 33] and eclecticism.
  
Slack, Jennifer Daryl. 1989. Contextualizing technology. In Rethinking communication: Volume 2: Paradigm exemplars, edited by Brenda Dervin, Lawrence Grossberg, Barbara J. O’Keefe and Ellen Wartella. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, pp. 329–345.
+
''Eclecticism'' is a conceptual approach that is completely unsystematic, drawing from a variety of theories, styles, and ideas without any cohesive and all-encompassing philosophical framework.
  
References
+
Some critics claim that dialectics must be eclecticist and sophistic in nature. These critics claim that dialectics is simply rhetorical disputation in which any given supposition is counter-argued, and that this counter-argument is negation. But materialist dialectics defines negation as one contradicting side overtaking the other while retaining traces and characteristics from the negated side — it is in no way simply an act of rhetorical dispute or refutation.
  
O 255
+
In summary, materialist dialectics upholds that nothing is ever completely and utterly deleted or erased from existence through negation. Instead, any time one opposing side negates another, aspects of the negated side are ''inherited'' by the negating side.
  
Slack, Jennifer Daryl. 1996. The theory and method of articulation in cultural studies. In Stuart Hall: Critical dialogues in cultural studies, edited by David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 112–127.
+
''Note:'' For reference, here is Hegel’s passage which Lenin is referring to from ''Science and Logic'' in the cited notes above:
  
Smith, Cynthia E. 2007. Design for the other 90%. New York, NY: Editions Assouline.
+
<blockquote>
 +
...a universal first, considered in and for itself, shows itself to be the other of itself. Taken quite generally, this determination can be taken to mean that what is at first immediate now appears as mediated, related to an other, or that the universal appears as a particular. Hence the second term that has thereby come into being is the negative of the first, and if we anticipate the subsequent progress, the first negative. The immediate, from this negative side, has been extinguished in the other, but the other is essentially not the empty negative, the nothing, that is taken to be the usual result of dialectic; rather is it the other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is therefore determined as the mediated — contains in general the determination of the first within itself. Consequently the first is essentially preserved and retained even in the other. To hold fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition; also only the simplest reflection is needed to furnish conviction of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement, while with regard to the examples of proofs, the whole of Logic consists of these.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Smith, Martin, writer and producer. 2014, 20 May. United States of secrets (Part 2): Privacy lost. Frontline. PBS.
 
  
Smith, Merritt Roe. 1985. Technology, industrialization, and the idea of progress in America. In Responsible science: The impact of technology on society, edited by Kevin B. Byrne. San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, pp. 1–30.
+
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Smith, Merritt Roe. 1994. Technological determinism in American culture. In Does technology drive history? The dilemma of technological determinism, edited by Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 1–35.
+
Therefore, dialectical negation is the inevitable tendency of progression of the inner relationship between the old and the new. It is the self-driving assertive force of all motion and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas.
  
Smith, Merritt Roe and Leo Marx, Eds. 1994. Does technology drive history? The dilemma of technological determinism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+
==== b. Negation of Negation ====
  
Southwood, Ivor, 2010. Non-stop inertia. Alresford, UK: Zero Books.
+
In the perpetual movement of the material world, dialectical negation is an inexhaustible process. It creates a development tendency of things from lower level to higher level, taking place in a cyclical manner in the form of a “spiral.
  
Stanley, Manfred. 1978. The technological conscience: Survival and dignity in an age of expertise. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
+
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Star, Susan Leigh. 1991. Power, technology, and the phenomenology of conventions: On being allergic to onions. In A sociology of monsters? Power, technology, and the modern world, edited by John Law. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, pp. 27–55.
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==== Annotation 201 ====
  
Star, Susan Leigh. 1999. The ethnography of infrastructure. American Behavioral Scientist 43(3), pp. 377–391.
+
The concept of the “spiral” form of development in dialectical materialist philosophy stands in contrast to the metaphysical conception of “linear” development.
  
Stein, Rob. 2012, 13 June. Finally, a map of all the microbes on your body. National Public Radio. www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/06/13/154913334/ finally-a-map-of-all-the-microbes-on-your-body. Accessed 15 July, 2014.
+
==== Metaphysical Conception of Linear Development ====
  
Stein, Rob. 2013, 9 Sept. From birth, our microbes become as personal as a fingerprint. National Public Radio. www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/ 09/09/21938174/from-birth-our-microbes-become-as-personal-as-a-fingerprint. Accessed 15 July, 2014.
+
The metaphysical viewpoint holds that development is more or less a straight line: as one subject is negated, it is replaced by another. This subject will then be negated by another, and so on, in what is essentially conceived of as a straight line of development [see Annotation 196, p. 188].
  
Sterne, Jonathan. 2003. The audible past: Cultural origins of sound reproduction. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-73.png|''The metaphysical “line development” model sees an initial form as being “replaced” or entirely negated into a completely distinct entity.'']]
  
Taunton, J. E., M.B. Ryan and D.B. Clement et al. 2003. A prospective study of running injuries: The Vancouver Sun Run “In training” clinics. British Journal of Sports Medicine 37, pp. 239–44.
+
In the above example, metaphysical line development simply sees raw aluminum as being negated and “replaced” in the real world. Once the aluminum can is created, the “raw aluminum” as a metaphysical entity is considered no longer to exist. Likewise, when the soda can is transformed into recycled aluminum, the can is considered “replaced,” and is no longer considered to have a metaphysical existence.
  
Taylor, Frederick W. 1947. The principles of scientific management. New York, NY: W. W. Norton. (Orig. 1911).
+
This conception of metaphysical line development directly contradicts the materialist dialectical concept of ''historical viewpoint'' [see Annotation 114, p. 116].
  
Tenner, Edward. 1997. Why things bite back: Technology and the revenge of unintended consequences. New York, NY: Vintage.
+
==== Dialectical Materialist Conception of Development ====
  
Terranova, Tiziana. 2013. Free labor. In Digital labor: The internet as playground and factory, edited by Trebor Scholz. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 33–57. (Orig. 2000).
+
The dialectical materialist conception of cyclical development stems from essential attributes of dialectical negation processes:
  
Thomis, Malcolm I. 1970. The Luddites: Machine-breaking in Regency England. Newton Abbot, UK: David & Charles Publishers, Ltd.
+
1. In every dialectical negation, the negating side inherits features and characteristics from the negated side.
  
256 O
+
2. When the negating side is, itself, negated (i.e., ''negation of the negation''), the new negating side will retain features and aspects of the old negator.
  
References
+
3. This development process will continue indefinitely, so that negation is not simply a straight line of complete negation, but rather takes the shape of a “spiral” of negations of negations which always inherit features from previous forms.
  
Thompson, E.P. 1963. The making of the English working class. New York, NY: Vintage.
+
Note that this conception of development as a spiral is simply an abstraction to help understand the essential characteristics of dialectical development and to distinguish this form of development from metaphysical conceptions of “linear development.
  
Tierney, Thomas F. 1993. The value of convenience: A genealogy of technical culture. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
+
In the example below, we see a depiction of the spiral development of aluminum through various stages of development. After raw aluminum is mined from the Earth, it begins a repeating spiral development process of being refined into usable goods, then recycled into raw material.
  
Todd, Andrew and Franco La Cecla. 2002. A polymath and polemicist, his greatest contribution was as an archaeologist of ideas, rather than an ideologue. The Observer, 8 December. Accessed via Guardian Unlimited: http:/www. guardian.co.uk. Accessed 6 February, 2003.
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-74.png|''The “Spiral Development” model of materialist dialectics sees every stage of development as a higher form of the previous stage which carries forward characteristics from previous stages.'']]
  
Trevelyan, G. M. 1965. British history in the nineteenth century and after: 1782–1919. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin.
+
The illustrated example on the previous page plots the spiral development of aluminum as it cycles between stages defined as raw materials and refined products. Another perspective might depict development differently. For example, if we are examining development in terms of external relations between aluminum other elements, the development pattern would look different. In reality, all subjects have countless internal and external relations and development processes which can be examined.
  
Turkle, Sherry. 1995. Life on the screen: Identity in the age of the internet. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
+
The “raw aluminum” stage of development pictured in the illustration is not truly the beginning of this development process; there were millions of years of development which occurred before it was first discovered by humans. Similarly, the landfill will not be the end of this development process; there will be continued development forever for as long as motion in the universe continues.
  
United Nations. 1961. 1710 (XVI). United Nations development decade: A programme for international economic co-operation. http://ods-dds-ny. un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/167/63/IMG/NR016763. pdf?OpenElement. Accessed 8 February, 2004.
+
This is a simplified and abstract model of development of aluminum. A more accurate representation might show any number of interim steps between each step depicted in the graphic above. For example: it must also be recognized that in reality the molecules of aluminum which the development process began with will be scattered and mixed with other subjects throughout the development process, and various other complexities exist in terms of the mutual impacts of internal and external relationships.
  
Uys, Jamie, director. 1980. The gods must be crazy. CAT Films.
+
Determining the amount of detail to include or exclude in materialist dialectical analysis is crucial: too much detail and analysis might become unwieldy; too little detail and analysis might become too abstract and idealized to be useful in the real world. So, the idea of development as a spiral should not be taken literally; it is simply a way of conceptualizing the differences between dialectical negation and development as opposed to “straight-line” development upheld by metaphysical conceptions of negation and development, always carrying forward traces of previous stages of development.
  
Vinge, Vernor. 1993. The coming technological singularity: How to survive in the post-human era. https://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/vinge/misc/singularity. html. Accessed 28 May, 2014.
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In the chain of negations that make up the development processes of things, phenomena, and ideas, each dialectical negation creates the conditions and premises for subsequent developments. Through many iterations of negation, i.e., “negations of negations,” dialectical negation will inevitably lead to a ''forward tendency of motion''.
  
Vonnegut, Kurt. 1963. Cat’s cradle. New York, NY: Delacorte.
+
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Wachowski, Andy and Larry Wachowski, directors. 1999. The matrix. Groucho II Film Partnership.
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==== Annotation 202 ====
  
Webster, Frank and Kevin Robins. 1986. Information technology: A Luddite analysis. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
+
The ''forward tendency of motion'' describes the tendency for things, phenomena, and ideas to move from less advanced to more advanced forms through processes of motion and development.
  
Webster’s new encyclopedic dictionary. 2002. Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster.
+
As a reminder, “lower level” and “higher level,” i.e., “less advanced” and “more advanced,” should not be taken to have any connotations of “good” and “bad,” nor of “desirable” and “undesirable,” nor even of “less complex” and “more complex.
  
Webster’s new world college dictionary, 4th edition. 2002. Cleveland, OH: Wiley.
+
Development from “lower levels” to “higher levels” is simply a shorthand for understanding the fact that development processes always move “forward,” that is to say, development can never happen in reverse, just as time itself can never be reversed. For example, society in Italy will never go back to the civilization of the Roman empire. It is conceivable that Italian society could develop to be ''more similar'' to Ancient Rome, but it would be impossible for Roman society to ever take on the ''exact characteristics'' of the Roman Empire ever again.
  
Webster’s third new international dictionary. 1976.
+
Cyclicality of development processes usually takes place in the form of a spiral, which is another result of “negation of negation.” Negations of negations lead to a development cycle in which things, phenomena, and ideas often undergo two fundamental negations carried through three basic forms. Through this negation pattern, basic features of the initial form are ultimately inherited by the “third form,” but at a higher level of development.
  
Whale, James, director. 1931. Frankenstein. Universal Pictures.
+
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Whale, James, director. 1935. Bride of Frankenstein. Universal Pictures.
+
==== Annotation 203 ====
  
Whyte, William H. 1956. The organization man. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
+
Dialectical development tends to take place through a cyclical pattern in which development is carried through a triad of forms which develop through a pair of dialectical negation processes:
  
Williams, Raymond. 1980. Base and superstructure in Marxist cultural theory. In problems in materialism and culture. London, UK: Verso, pp. 31–49.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-75.png|''The cyclical pattern of development is an abstract pattern of dialectical change over time.'']]
  
Williams, Raymond. 1983. Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society, revised edition. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
+
The graphic above illustrates this cyclical pattern, in which:
  
Williams, Raymond. 1989. Culture is ordinary. In Resources of hope: Culture, democracy, socialism, edited by Robin Gale. New York, NY: Verso, pp. 3–18. (Orig. 1958.)
+
1. The initial form (the Assertion) begins the pattern. Contradiction within the initial subject or between it and another subject leads to the first negation.
  
Williams, Rosalind. 2002. Retooling: A historian confronts technological change. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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2. The first negation leads to a second form (the Negation). This second form inherits some features or characteristics from the initial form.
  
Winner, Langdon. 1977. Autonomous technology: Technics-out-of-control as a theme in political thought. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
+
3. The second form then encounters opposition, which leads to a second negation.
  
Winner, Langdon. 1986. The whale and the reactor: A search for limits in the age of high technology. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
+
4. The second negation leads to a third form (Unity), which retains the features or characteristics of the second form, but now more closely resembles the first, initial form, only at a higher level of development.
  
REFERENCES O 257
+
Imagine a new car (initial form) crashes into another car (contradicting subject). The new car is dialectically developed (negated) into a second form: a wrecked car. This second form is now contradicted by a new subject — a recycling center — and negated into a third form: new steel. The third form possesses characteristics of the first form, but in a more developed form: after being recycled, the resulting steel it is newly made, in good condition for sale, etc., similarly to the first form of the new car.
  
Wise, J. Macgregor. 1997. Exploring technology and social space. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-76.png|''In this example, a new car goes through a cyclical pattern of development in which the third form (new steel) possesses characteristics of the first form (a new car).'']]
  
Wolf, Maryanne. 2007. Proust and the squid: The story and science of the reading brain. New York, NY: HarperCollins.
+
Keep in mind that this is relative to one’s perspective. If you consider the wrecked car to be the first form, then the steel would be the second form. The new steel will then need to be developed in some way (melted, hammered, cut, etc.) in order to be processed into some new product. From this perspective, the third form (i.e., molten steel) will have characteristics of the first form (i.e.: “unrefined”).
  
Yamamoto, Traise. 1999. Masking selves, making subjects: Japanese American women, identity, and the body. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
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According to Marx and Engels, the development of capitalism from feudalism assumed this cyclical pattern:
  
Zimmer, Carl. 2013, 16 Sept. DNA double take. The New York Times. www. nytimes.com/2013/09/17/science/dna-double-take.html. Accessed 15 July, 2014.
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-77.png|''The development of class structure is a dialectical process in which different classes synthesize to form the next era of class society. For example, the capitalist class emerged primarily as a synthesis of the feudal lords and peasants of the medieval era.'']]
  
Index
+
Note that this is only an abstract description of a tendency of dialectical development; exceptions can and do occur. Presumably, the development of communism as a stateless, classless society would constitute the negation of the “Class Society” form of human civilization. The Post-Class stage of development which follows would, itself, be a higher form — a unity — of pre-class human civilization, carrying forward traces from the Class Society stage of development.
  
24/7 37, 185
+
Also note that determining which form is the “first” or “initial” pattern is entirely relative. Using the example of the development of class society: from one perspective, the Patricians may be seen as the initial form, but from another perspective the Plebeians might be considered the initial form. This depends entirely on the viewpoint and purpose of analysis. These conceptions of “spirals of development” and the pattern of “three forms through two negations” are, in essence, models which describe general tendencies and patterns of development and which help us understand the basic characteristics of dialectical negation and development.
  
28 Days Later 70
+
Lenin describes this cycle of dialectical development as going “[f]rom assertion to negation — from negation to ‘unity’ with the asserted — without this, dialectics becomes empty negation, a game, skepsis [examination, observation, consideration].”<ref>''Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic,'' Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.</ref>
  
4Chan 150
+
-----
  
9/11 103, 150, 153, 157, 158, 159, 161, 182
+
==== Annotation 204 ====
  
Aakhus, Mark 131, 237
+
Here, “assertion” simply refers to the initial form of a dialectical development cycle. The negation is the second form, and the “unity” is the third form, which resembles the first form (the assertion) at a higher stage of development. So, in this quotation, Lenin is simply recounting the “three steps” of a typical dialectical development cycle, and indicating that it is necessary to recognize this process, which is rooted in the inheritance of properties of prior forms through development into ever-higher forms, to prevent dialectics from becoming “empty negation,” or otherwise falling prey to the critiques that dialectics are purely negative, skeptical, and eclectic in nature [see Annotation 200, p. 192 and Annotation 36, p. 33].
  
Abbey, Edward 83, 235
+
The law of negation of negation generalizes the pervasive nature of development: dialectical development does not take the form of a straight path, but rather in the form of a spiral path. Lenin summarised that this path is “[a] development that repeats, as it were, stages that have already been passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher basis (‘the negation of the negation’), a development, so to speak, that proceeds in spirals, not in a straight line…”<ref>''Karl Marx'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.</ref> The tendency to develop in a spiral curve demonstrates the dialectical nature of development; i.e., the cycle of inheritance, repetition, and progression. Each new round of the spiral appears to be repeating, but at a higher level. The continuation of the loops in a spiral reflects an endless progression from lower levels to higher levels of things, phenomena, and ideas.
  
Abortion 224
+
In short, the law of negation of negation in materialist dialectics reflects the dialectical relationship between the negative and the assertion [i.e., the second and first forms of a dialectical development cycle; see Annotation 203, p. 198] in the development process of things, phenomena and ideas. Dialectical development is driven by dialectical negation; in the development of all things, phenomena, and ideas, the new is the result of inheriting characteristics from prior forms. This process of inheritance, repetition, and progression through negation leads to cyclical development. Engels wrote: “what is the negation of the negation? An extremely general — and for this reason extremely far-reaching and important — law of development of nature, history, and thought.”<ref>''Anti-Dühring'', Friedrich Engels, 1878.</ref>
  
Actor-network theory 140, 144–146
+
-----
  
Actor 141–147, 154, 161, 171, 172,
+
==== Annotation 205 ====
  
181, 192, 193
+
In the same text quoted above, Engels elaborates that dialectical development is composed of “processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation.”
  
Defined 140
+
==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
  
See also Delegation; Inscription;
+
The law of negation of negation is the basis for correct perception of the tendency of motion and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. Development and motion processes do not take place in a straight line; rather, it is a winding, complex road, consisting of many stages, and each process can be broken down into many different sub-processes. However, it must be understood that this complexity of development is only the manifestation of the general tendency to move forward [see Annotation 118, p. 122]. It is important to understand the nature of motion and development so that we can systematically change the world according to our revolutionary viewpoint. In order to consciously impact the development of things, phenomena, and ideas, we need to know their characteristics, nature, and relationships so that we can influence their motion and development in the direction that suits our purposes. We must comprehend and leverage the tendency of forward movement — in accordance with a scientific and revolutionary worldview — in order to effectively and systematically change the world.
  
Mediator; Prescription;
+
-----
  
Translation
+
==== Annotation 206 ====
  
Addiction by Design 192
+
Understanding the forward tendency of motion is vital for cultivating a worldview which is both ''scientific'' and ''revolutionary.'' Such a worldview is ''scientific'' because it recognizes the material reality that all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly undergoing change and development. Nothing in our universe is static, and all things are connected and defined by internal and external relationships (which are also constantly developing). Furthermore, this development progresses with a ''forward tendency'', meaning that no process can be completely “reversed.” For example, you can clean rust from a car [which would be forward progress], but you can’t reverse the temporal process of rust.
  
Affect 7, 8, 9, 10, 22, 24, 31, 113, 147, 152,
+
Once we understand that all things, phenomena, and ideas in our universe are constantly developing and moving forward, we can then begin to find ways to ''impact'' motion and development systematically to consciously change the world around us. This is the foundation of a ''revolutionary'' worldview, since revolutionary change requires us to leverage and influence development processes to suit our needs and revolutionary ambitions. Thus, materialist dialectics are an applied system of observation and practice through which we seek to understand development processes and consciously impact them to suit our needs.
  
153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 161, 172,
+
According to the rule of negation of negation, in the objective world, the new must inevitably come to replace the old. In nature, the new develops according to objective laws. In social life, new things arise from the purposeful, self-conscious, and creative actions of human beings. Therefore, it is necessary to leverage ''subjective factors'' as we seek to consciously impact the development of things, phenomena, and ideas.
  
174, 176, 189, 208, 211, 216, 217,
+
-----
  
221, 224
+
==== Annotation 207 ====
  
AfriCam 37
+
Subjective factors are factors which we, as a subject, are capable of impacting. This may seem confusing, since we have previously established that all external things, phenomena, and ideas have ''objective'' relationships with all other things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 108, p. 112], meaning that any given subject is ''external'' to every other subject, and thus no subject can directly and completely control the motion and development of any other subject.
  
Against the Machine 82
+
However, from the perspective of any given individual, there are certain things, phenomena, and ideas [as well as processes of motion and development] which we can ''impact''. For example, if I see an apple on a table, the apple is ''objective'' to me. I can’t simply will the apple to move with my consciousness alone. However, I can ''impact'' the apple through conscious activity — I can consciously will my hand to pick up the apple and move it to another location.
  
Agencement; see Assemblage
+
Thus, factors which an individual can consciously impact are ''subjective factors''. As revolutionists, we must focus on subjective factors. In other words, we must concentrate on ''that which we are capable of changing'', since our purpose is to change the world. Focusing on factors which we can’t impact is a waste of time; we must simply determine what ''can be changed'' and then determine the most efficient and effective ways of impacting development processes and changing the world.
  
Agency 10, 55, 104, 125, 133, 137–147,
+
As revolutionists, we must have faith that we can introduce the “new,” faith in the success of the “new,” we must support the “new,” and fight for the victory of the “new.” Therefore, it is necessary to overcome conservative, stagnant, and dogmatic thoughts which restrain the development of the “new” and resist the law of negation of negation.
  
154, 159, 166, 167, 169, 170, 175, 181,
+
-----
  
189, 190, 213
+
==== Annotation 208 ====
  
Defined 138
+
Change is inevitable. All things, phenomena, and ideas undergo processes of motion and development. Any philosophy, ideology, or strategy which attempts to restrain motion and development is doomed to failure because change can neither be halted nor restrained. Thus, our strategies and actions must align with the material reality that change is inevitable, and we must seek to change the world by ''impacting'' processes of development and motion rather than attempting to reverse, restrain, or halt such processes.
  
Agent 138–139, 140, 142, 145, 146, 179,
+
Ideologies which erroneously strive to restrict change and development include ''rigidity'' (see Annotation 222, p. 218) and ''conservativism'' (see Annotation 236, p. 233).
  
198, 199
+
In the process of negating the old we must leverage the principle of inheritance with discretion: we must encourage the inheritance of factors that are beneficial to our goals as we simultaneously attempt to filter out, overcome, and reform factors which would negatively impact our goals.
  
Agius, Silvan 240
+
-----
  
Agriculture; see Farming
+
==== Annotation 209 ====
  
Air travel 39, 168
+
If we understand the principle of inheritance, we can impact inheritance processes which derive from negation. For example, when repairing a car, we can seek out parts of the car which do not function properly or which do not suit the use-case of the car and add or replace parts which are more suitable.
  
Airports 182–183, 186
+
In the same way, we can impact inheritence processes in our revolutionary political activities. We can seek to inherit characteristics from previous stages of development of our political organizations, social institutions, culture, etc., while simultaneously seeking to prevent the inheritence of traits and characteristics which are unsuitable for our revolutionary purposes. Over time, we can attempt to impact the inheritance of traits and aspects which are more conducive to our purposes while limiting and filtering out traits and aspects which are hindrances.
  
Alienation 67, 98
+
In an article titled “New Life” written in 1947, Ho Chi Minh wrote about the dialectical relationship between the new and the old in building a new society, writing:
  
Allenby, Braden 16, 231, 232, 237
+
<blockquote>
 +
Not everything old must be abandoned. We do not have to reinvent everything. What is old but bad must be abandoned. What is old but troublesome must be corrected appropriately. What is old but good must be further developed. What is new but good must be done.
  
Alphabet 52
+
... Growing up in the old society, we all carry within us more-or-less bad traces of the old society in terms of our ideas and habits... Habits are hard to change. That which is good and new is likely to be considered bad by the people because it is strange to them. On the contrary, that which is evil yet familiar is easily mistaken as normal and acceptable.
 +
</blockquote>
  
“Alternative Approaches to Housework” 232
+
Ho Chi Minh understood the principles of development very well, as well as the difficulties we will face as revolutionaries as we try to change ourselves and our society. We must strive to develop a similar understanding as we move forward and attempt to affect the development of our world through practice and struggle.
  
Amazon 174
+
-----
  
American Progress 19
+
= Chapter 3: Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism =
  
American Revolution 18, 21
+
In Marxism, epistemological reasoning (or epistemology) is the foundation of dialectics. Dialectical materialist epistemology is a theory of applying human cognitive ability to the objective world through practical activities. It explains the nature, path and general laws of the human process of perceiving truth and objective reality to serve human practical activities.
  
Amish 171, 239
+
-----
  
Amos, Jonathan 238
+
==== Annotation 210 ====
  
Anarchists 78, 97, 98, 99, 103
+
Epistemology is the theoretical study of knowledge. It also deals with the philosophical question of: “how do we know what is true?”
  
Anderson, Benedict 239
+
Throughout history, philosophers have tried to determine the nature of truth and knowledge. In the era of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, there was an ongoing dispute between the materialists, who believed that truth could only be sought through sense experience of the material world, and the idealists, who believed that truth could only be sought through reasoning within the human mind.
  
Anderson, M.T. 215, 241, 242
+
Marx and Engels developed the philosophical system of dialectical materialism to resolve this dispute. Dialectical materialism upholds that the material and the ideal have a dialectical relationship with one another: the material ''determines'' the ideal, while the ideal ''impacts'' the material [see ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88].
  
Andrejevic, Mark 175, 239
+
However, it’s important to understand that Marx and Engels didn’t develop the system of dialectical materialism simply to understand the world. As Marx wrote in ''Theses on Feuerbach:''
  
Anthropomorphism 145
+
<blockquote>
 +
The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Antiglobalization 100
+
So, Marxist dialectical materialist epistemology is developed specifically to enable human beings to not only perceive truth and objective reality, but to then be able to apply our conscious thought, through practical activity, in order to bring about change in the world.
  
AOL 175
+
-----
  
Apartheid 240
+
== 1. Praxis, Consciousness, and the Role of Praxis in Consciousness ==
  
Apparatgeist 132
+
=== a. Praxis and Basic Forms of Praxis ===
  
Apple computers 24, 30, 150
+
''Praxis'' includes all human material activities which have purpose and historical-social characteristics and which transform nature and society. Unlike other activities, praxis is activity in which humans attempt to materially impact the world to suit our purposes. Praxis activities define the nature of human beings and distinguish human beings from other animals. Praxis is objective activity, and praxis has been constantly developed by humans through the ages.
  
Appropriate technology 10, 73, 77, 87–94,
+
<br />
  
132, 219
+
-----
  
Alternative names for 87–88
+
==== Annotation 211 ====
  
Conference on Further Development in the United Kingdom of Appropriate Technologies 89
+
In English, the words “practice” and “praxis” are often distinguished from one another. “Practice” is often used to refer to human activity which provides more information about the world around us and improves our knowledge and understanding, whereas “praxis” often refers to conscious human activity which is intended to change the world in some manner. In their original German, Marx and Engels used the same German word — ''Praxis'' — to refer to both concepts. Similarly, in the original Vietnamese text of this book, the same word — ''thực tiễn'' — is used for both “practice” and “praxis.”
  
Intercultural Center for
+
One reason that these concepts are so closely related is that all conscious activity serves both rolls by simultaneously telling us more about reality ''and'' consciously changing reality in some way. For example, by pushing a heavy stone, you may be able to move the stone a small amount — constituting praxis — while simultaneously learning how heavy the stone is and how difficult it is to move — constituting practice. The main point of distinction, therefore, is ''intention''. Virtually all conscious activity is practice, but only activity which has ''purpose'' and ''historical-social characteristics'' might be considered praxis:
  
Documentation 90
+
''Purpose'' simply describes a goal or desired outcome; specifically: a desired change in nature or human society. Activities with ''historical-social characteristics'' are activities which contribute in some way to the development of human society.
  
Intermediate Technology
+
In this translation, we use “practice” and “praxis” interchangably to mean “conscious activity which improves our understanding, and which has purpose and historical-social characteristics.” You are likely to find these words used differently (as described above, or in other ways) in other texts. Engels explains the importance of practice/praxis in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
  
Development Group 89
+
<blockquote>
 +
The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we [use] these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perceptions. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is positive proof that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves.
 +
</blockquote>
  
National Appropriate Technology
+
Marx wrote in ''Theses on Feuerbach'' that “the coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice [German: ''revolutionäre Praxis''].” Engels further expounds upon this concept in ''Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'', writing:
  
Center 90
+
<blockquote>
 +
The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical fancies is practice [original German: Praxis], viz., experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and using it for our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end of the Kantian incomprehensible or ungraspable.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Office of Technology Assessment 91
+
Praxis defines the nature of human beings because human beings are (to our present knowledge) the only beings which undertake actions with conscious awareness of our desired outcomes and comprehension of the historical development of our own society, which distinguishes human beings from all other animals. Praxis is ''objective'' activity, meaning that all praxis activities are performed in relation to external things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 108, p. 112].
  
United Nations Development Decade 88
+
Praxis has been constantly developed by humans through the ages, meaning that as we learn more about the nature of reality, of human society, and the laws of nature, we are able to develop our praxis to become more efficient and effective.
  
USAID 91
+
Praxis activities are very diverse, manifesting with ever-increasing variety, but there are only three basic forms: material production activities, socio-political activities, and scientific experimental activities.
  
Arab Spring 51, 176
+
''Material production activity'' is the first and most basic form of praxis. In this form of praxis activity, humans use tools through labor processes to influence the natural world in order to create wealth and material resources and to develop the conditions necessary to maintain our existence and development.
  
Architecture 91–92, 93, 181, 182
+
''Socio-political activity'' includes praxis activity utilized by various communities and organizations in human society to transform political-social relations in order to promote social development.
  
“Army of Redressers, An” 234
+
''Scientific experimental activity'' is a special form of praxis activity. This includes human activities that resemble or replicate states of nature and society in order to determine the laws of change and development of subjects of study. This form of activity plays an important role in the development of society, especially in the current historical period of modern science and technological revolution.
  
260 O
+
-----
  
Index
+
==== Annotation 212 ====
  
Arthur, W. Brian 237
+
The three basic forms of praxis activities listed above obviously do not include all forms of human activity, as praxis only includes activities which have ''purpose'' and ''historical-social characteristics''.
  
Articulation 6, 9, 10, 84, 104, 111, 114, 117, 127, 132–133, 134, 137, 138, 143–147, 151, 152–162, 166, 167, 169, 170, 171, 175, 176, 179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 186, 187, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 198, 206, 211, 213, 216–217, 218, 221, 222, 223, 224, 226, 227, 228
+
''Material production activity'' has a very clear purpose: to improve the material conditions of an individual human being or a group of human beings. Material production activity has historical-social characteristics because developing material conditions for human beings leads directly to the development of human society. For example, as food production increases in terms of yield and efficiency, society can support a larger number of human beings and a wider range of human activities, which leads to the development of human society.
  
Defined 152
+
''Socio-political activity'' has the purpose of promoting social development, which is obviously inherently historical-social in nature. An example of socio-political activity would include any sort of political campaign, liberation struggle, political revolutionary activity, etc.
  
Artificial intelligence 71–73; see also Identity
+
''Scientific experimental activity'' has the purpose of expanding our understanding of nature and human society, which leads directly to historical-social development in a variety of ways. For example, improving our scientific understanding of medicine through scientific experimental activity leads to longer lives and improved quality of life. Improving our scientific understanding of chemistry through scientific experimental activity leads to all sorts of materials which improve the quality of life and enable human beings to solve a variety of social problems.
  
Assange, Julian 72, 234
+
In order to qualify as praxis activity, a given human activity must have a purpose and it must have historical-social characteristics. For instance, drawing is not always praxis in the sense of the word used in this text, but it would be praxis if it would qualify as material production activity (i.e., making art in order to sell, so as to make a living) or if the art is made with the intention of invoking social change.
  
Assemblage 10, 111, 117, 127, 132, 133, 147, 151, 156–160, 162, 165–166, 170, 171, 172, 173, 175, 179, 180, 187, 194, 201, 209–210, 217, 228
+
Every basic praxis activity form has an important function, and these functions are not interchangeable with each other. However, they have close relationships with each other and different praxis activity forms often interact with each other. In these relationships, material production is the most important form of praxis activity, playing a decisive role in determining other praxis activities because material production is the most primitive activity and exists most commonly in human life. Material production creates the most essential, decisive material conditions for human survival and development. Without material production there cannot be other praxis activities. After all, all other praxis activities arise from material production praxis and all praxis activities ultimately aim to serve material production praxis.
  
Bodies and 157
+
-----
  
Constellations as 156, 162
+
==== Annotation 213 ====
  
Defined 133, 156
+
Without material production activity, human beings would not be able to live at all.
  
Discrimination and 203, 213
+
Thus, material production activities make all other forms of human activities possible. In addition, the primary reason we participate in socio-political activity is to ensure material security (food, water, shelter, etc.) for members of society, which ultimately relies on material production activity. Therefore, the primary reason we engage in scientific experimental activity is to improve material production activities in terms of efficiency, yield, effectiveness, etc
  
Assisted-suicide machine 108, 114
+
Of course, we engage in scientific experimental activity and material production activity for other reasons (art, entertainment, recreation, etc.), but these activities require that material security be secured first for those participating in the production and consumption of such products. In other words, material production activity is a prerequisite for all other forms of activity, since without some measure of material security humans cannot survive.
  
Atlantic, The 210
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-78.png|''Material production activity has a dialectical relationship with all other praxis activity, with material production activity determining, while being impacted by, all other forms of praxis activity.'']]
  
Atlantic Video 239
+
Thus, material production activity has a dialectical relationship with other forms of praxis activities, in which material production activity determines both socio-political and scientific experimental activity while socio-political and scientific experimental activity impact material production activity.
  
Audi 24
+
-----
  
Automated teller machine (ATM) 69, 107, 156, 158
+
=== b. Consciousness and Levels of Consciousness ===
  
Automobile 33, 50, 110, 120, 142, 143, 152, 179, 199–200, 202, 204, 208, 210, 212, 225
+
The dialectical materialist perspective sees consciousness as a process of reflecting the objective world within the human brain on a practical basis to create knowledge about the objective world. Consciousness is a self-aware process that is productive and creative.
  
SUVs 107, 108
+
This view stems from the following basic principles:
  
Autonomous Technology 50
+
* The dialectical materialist worldview acknowledges that the material world exists objectively and independently of human consciousness.
 +
* The dialectical materialist worldview recognizes the following human abilities:
 +
** To perceive the objective world.
 +
** To reflect the objective world into the human mind, which enables human subjects to learn about external objects. [see Annotation 66, p. 64]
 +
** To admit that there are no material things nor phenomena which are unrecognizable, but only material things and phenomena that humans have not yet recognised. [see ''The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues,'' p. 48]
  
Autonomy 59, 67–68, 87, 100, 102, 118, 120–121
+
The dialectical materialist worldview affirms that conscious reflection [see Annotation 67, p. 64] of the objective world is a dialectical, productive, self-aware, and creative process. This reflection process develops from the unknown to the known, from knowing less to knowing more, from knowing less profoundly and less comprehensively to knowing more profoundly and more comprehensively.
  
Awesome, the 24–25, 31, 218
+
-----
  
Balsamo, Anne 176, 239, 241
+
==== Annotation 214 ====
  
Bannister, Roger 36
+
The above principle (that human knowledge develops from less, and less comprehensive, to more, and more comprehensive states) stands in contrast to various other philosophical systems of belief, including:
  
Barber, Benjamin 171, 239
+
Hegel’s ''Absolute Idealism'' upholds a belief in an “absolute ideal” which constitutes an ultimate limit or “end point” of knowledge which humanity is moving towards. Dialectical materialism upholds that there is no such absolute ideal and thus no such terminal end point of human understanding. [See Annotation 234, p. 230] As Engels wrote in ''Anti-Dühring'':
  
Barboza, David 232
+
<blockquote>
 +
If mankind ever reached the stage at which it should work only with eternal truths, with results of thought which possess sovereign validity and an unconditional claim to truth, it would then have reached the point where the infinity of the intellectual world both in its actuality and in its potentiality had been exhausted, and thus the famous miracle of the counted uncountable would have been performed.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Battlestar Galactica 70
+
''Fideism'', which is the belief that knowledge is received from some higher power [i.e., God]. Fideism upholds that all knowledge is pre-existing, and that humanity simply receives it from on high. Dialectical materialism, on the other hand, argues that knowledge is developed over time through dialectical processes of consciousness and human activity.
  
Being 130
+
''Positivism, or empiricist materialism'', which holds that there are hard limits to human knowledge, or that human knowledge — which can only be obtained from sense data — can’t be trusted. Dialectical materialism upholds that all things and phenomena can be known and understood, and that sense data can be trusted as an objective reflection of reality. For more information about skepticism about human sense data as well as positive and empiricist materialism, see Annotation 10, p. 10, and Annotation 58, p. 56].
  
Bell, Alexander Graham 120
+
-----
  
Bell, Bryan 235
+
The dialectical materialist worldview considers praxis as the primary and most direct basis of consciousness, and as the motive and the purpose of consciousness, and as the criterion for testing truth. [See: ''The Relationship Between Praxis and Consciousness'', p. 216]
  
Bell, Gordon 207, 241, 242
+
-----
  
Beniger, James 66, 233
+
==== Annotation 215 ====
  
Bennett, Jane 171, 236, 239, 242
+
Given the above principles — that human consciousness exists independently from the material world yet is capable of accurately perceiving and reflecting the material world, and that knowledge develops over time through a synthesis of consciousness and practical activity — we can conclude that consciousness is a self-aware process which is productive and creative.
  
Bentham, Jeremy 63, 233
+
Consciousness is productive and creative in the sense that conscious processes, in conjunction with practical experience and activity in the material world, leads to the development of knowledge and practical experience which allows humans to develop our understanding of the world as well as our own material conditions through the application of knowledge to our own labor activities.
  
Berry, Wendell 45, 232
+
Next, we will examine different ways of categorizing conscious activities as they pertain to developing knowledge and practical understanding of our world.
  
Bhopal 88
+
From the dialectical materialist point of view, consciousness is a process of development. Consciousness develops from ''empirical consciousness'' to ''theoretical consciousness''; and from ''ordinary consciousness'' to ''scientific consciousness''.
  
“Bias of Communication” 239
+
-----
  
Big Brother 149
+
==== Annotation 216 ====
  
Big Data 66, 175, 220–221, 222, 223
+
In dialectical materialist philosophy, all systems of relation exist as processes of development in motion [see Annotation 120, p. 124]. Thus, consciousness can be defined as a system of relations between human brain activity and two forms of data input:
  
Bill of Rights 161, 167
+
''•'' ''Sense experience'': observations of the external world detected by our senses.
  
Biometrics 198, 199, 208
+
''•'' ''Knowledge'': information which exists in the human mind as memories and ideas.
  
Biotechnology 1, 7, 52, 60, 110, 219, 223, 224, 225, 226
+
Consciousness is thus a process of the development of knowledge through a combination of human brain activity and human practical activity in the physical world (i.e., labor).
  
Black boxes 145
+
In the section below, we will explore different forms of consciousness, the development of consciousness, and the relationship between consciousness and knowledge. Note that these are ''abstractions'' of consciousness and knowledge, meant to help us understand how knowledge and consciousness develop over time. Thought processes are extremely complex, so we seek to develop a fundamental understanding of how consciousness develops and how knowledge develops because these processes are fundamental to the development of human beings and human societies.
  
Blade Runner 215
+
Just as consciousness is a process of developing knowledge through brain activity, consciousness itself also develops over time. The development of consciousness can be considered based on the criteria of ''concrete/abstract'' and of ''passive/active''.
  
Blogs 9, 205, 207, 220
+
Consciousness develops from a state of direct and immediate observation of the world which results in concrete knowledge to a higher stage which constitutes a more abstract and general understanding of the world. We call consciousness which is focused on direct, immediate, concrete, empirical observation of the world ''empirical consciousness'', and we call consciousness which is focused on forming abstract generalizations about the world ''theoretical consciousness''.
  
Body 20, 35–38, 39, 40, 46, 94, 111, 138, 184, 197, 198, 204, 208, 209, 210, 211, 224–225, 226, 227, 233
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-79.png]]
  
As assemblage 157, 212–213
+
Empirical consciousness is a process of collecting data about the world, which we call knowledge. We can gather two forms of knowledge through empirical consciousness: ordinary knowledge, and scientific knowledge.
  
As property 225
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-80.png]]
  
Bogost, Ian 236, 238
+
Ordinary knowledge is the knowledge we accumulate through our everyday experiences in the world. Scientific knowledge is gathered through more systematic scientific observations and experiments. Scientific knowledge usually develops from ordinary knowledge, as we begin to seek a more formal and systematic understanding of the things we witness in our daily lives.
  
Bolivia 92
+
According to ''Themes in Soviet Marxist Philosophy,'' edited by T. J. Blakely:
  
Boltanski, Luc 47, 232
+
<blockquote>
 +
Ordinary knowledge notes what lies on the very surface, what happens during a certain event. Scientific knowledge wants to know why it happens in just this way. The essence of scientific knowledge lies in the confirmed generalization of facts, where it becomes necessary rather than contingent, universal instead of particular, law-bound, and can serve as a basis for predicting various phenomena, events and objects...
  
Born to Run 209
+
The whole progress of scientific knowledge is bound up with growth in the force and volume of scientific prediction. Prediction makes it possible to control processes and to direct them. Scientific knowledge opens up the possibility not only of predicting the future but also of consciously forming it. The vital meaning of every science can be expressed as follows: to know in order to predict and to predict in order to act.
  
Boston Marathon bombing 150
+
An essential characteristic of scientific knowledge is that it is systematic, i.e., it is a set of information which is ordered according to certain theoretical principles. A collection of unsystematized knowledge is not yet science. Certain basic premises are fundamental to scientific knowledge, i.e., the laws which make it possible to systematize the knowledge. Knowledge becomes scientific when the collection of facts and their descriptions reach the level where they are included in a theory.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Bowen, Leslie 242
+
Theoretical consciousness arises from conscious reflection on accumulated knowledge, as human beings seek to develop general and abstract understanding of the underlying principles of processes we experience in the world. Once general principles of natural and social law are established, human beings then test those general conclusions against empirical reality through further observation (i.e., through empirical consciousness).
  
Bowker, Geoffrey C. 240
+
Thus, there is a dialectical relationship between empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness, as one form leads to another, back and forth, again and again, continuously.
  
boyd, danah 242
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-81.png|''Empirical and theoretical consciousness have a dialectical relationship in which empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness lead to and mutually develop one another.'']]
  
Boyle, Danny 234
+
Consciousness also develops from passive and surface-level observation and understanding of the world (i.e., simply considering what, where, and when things happen) to more active pursuit of the underlying meaning of the world (i.e., trying to understand how and why things happen).
  
Bradbury, Ray 72–73, 234
+
Consciousness which passively observes the world, directly, in daily life is referred to as ''ordinary consciousness''. Ordinary consciousness often develops into more active consciousness. This active pursuit of understanding through systematic observation and indirect experiences (i.e., experiences that do not occur in daily activity — such as scientific experimentation) is referred to as ''scientific consciousness''.
  
Brady, Ann 242
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-82.png]]
  
Branagh, Kenneth 60, 233
+
These concepts will be discussed in further detail below.
  
Branch Davidians 103
+
-----
  
Bread by hand 142
+
''Empirical consciousness'' is the stage of development of consciousness in which perceptions are formed via direct observations of things and phenomena in the natural world, or of society, or through scientific experimentation and systematic observation. Empirical consciousness results in ''empirical knowledge''.
  
Bread machine 41, 141, 142, 143, 145,
+
''Empirical knowledge'' has two types: ''ordinary empirical knowledge'' (knowledge obtained through direct observation and in productive labor) and ''scientific empirical knowledge'' (knowledge obtained by conducting scientific experiments). These two types of knowledge can be complementary, and can enrich one other.
  
147, 181
+
''Theoretical consciousness'' is the indirect, abstract, systematic level of perception in which the nature and laws of things and phenomena are generalized and abstracted.
  
Broadcasting 190
+
Empirical consciousness and Theoretical consciousness are two different cognitive stages but they have a dialectical relationship with each other. In this dialectical relationship, empirical consciousness is the basis of theoretical consciousness; it provides theoretical consciousness with specific, rich material [i.e., knowledge]. Empirical consciousness is linked closely to practical activities [since practical activity in the material world is the chief method of gathering knowledge through empirical consciousness], and forms the basis for checking, correcting, and supplementing existing theories and summarizing, and generalizing them into new theories. However, empirical consciousness is still limited in that empirical consciousness stops at the description and classification of data obtained from direct observation and experimentation. Therefore, empirical consciousness only brings understanding about the separate, superficial, discrete aspects of observed subjects, without yet reflecting the essence of those subjects nor the underlying principles or laws which regulate those subjects.
  
Brooks, David 212, 241
+
Therefore, empirical consciousness, alone, is not sufficient for determining the scientific laws of nature and society. To determine such laws and abstractions, theoretical consciousness must be applied. So, theoretical consciousness does not form spontaneously, nor directly from experience, although it is formed from the summation of experiences.
  
Brooks, Mel 60, 233
+
-----
  
Brown, Jerry 91
+
==== Annotation 217 ====
  
Bull, Christopher 90, 94, 235, 236
+
The knowledge we gain from our daily activity often inspires scientific inquiry and more systematic observation, which can yield scientific knowledge which will enrich and improve our daily practice and allow us to experience daily life with a deeper understanding of what we’re experiencing. Thus, the ordinary knowledge we gain through daily practice can enrich and yield scientific knowledge (and vice versa).
  
Bureau of Investigative Journalism 234
+
Empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness have a dialectical relationship with each other in which empirical consciousness provides the basis for theoretical consciousness. Theoretical consciousness attempts to derive general abstractions and governing principles from empirical knowledge which is gained through empirical consciousness. Once theoretical principles, generalities, and abstractions are determined, they are then tested against reality through empirical consciousness (i.e., practical observation and systematic experimentation) to determine if the theory is sound.
  
Bureaucracy 63–64, 65
+
''Empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness have a dialectical relationship with one another. Our observations of the material world lead to conscious activity which we then test in reality through conscious activity, and so on, in a never-ending cycle of dialectical development.''
  
Burgess, Jean 240
+
For example, a farmer may notice that plants grow better in locations where manure has been discarded — an act of empirical consciousness. The farmer might then form the theory that adding manure to the soil will help plants grow — an act of theoretical consciousness. This theory could then be tested against reality by mixing manure into the soil and observing the results, which would be another act of empirical consciousness. The farmer may then theorize that ''more'' manure will help plants grow ''even more'' — another act of theoretical consciousness — continuing the cycle of testing and observing.
  
Burma 89
+
This dialectical relationship between ordinary and theoretical consciousness is what allows human beings to develop and improve knowledge through practical experience, observation, and theoretical abstraction and generalization of knowledge.
  
Business @ The Speed of Thought 40
+
Theoretical consciousness is relatively independent from empirical consciousness. Therefore, theories can precede expectations and guide the formation of valuable empirical knowledge. Theoretical consciousness is what allows human beings to sort and filter knowledge so as to best serve practical activities and contribute to the transformation of human life. Through this process, knowledge is organized and therefore enhanced, and develops from the level of specific, individual, and solitary knowledge to a higher form of generalized and abstract knowledge [what we might call ''theoretical knowledge''].
  
Business Solution to Poverty, The 91
+
-----
  
Butler, Judith 199, 240
+
==== Annotation 218 ====
  
Buzzanell, Patrice 242
+
Knowledge which comes from empirical observations (empirical consciousness) is ''empirical knowledge.'' ''Theoretical knowledge'' is a product of theoretical consciousness. Over time, as repeated and varied observations are made through theoretical consciousness activities, knowledge becomes more generalized and abstract; this general and abstract knowledge is what we call ''theoretical knowledge''.
  
Cain, Susan 221, 242
+
Note that empirical and theoretical knowledge can be ''ordinary'' or ''scientific'' in nature; if the knowledge arises passively from daily life activities, it will be ordinary knowledge, regardless of whether or not it is empirical or theoretical in nature. If, on the other hand, the knowledge arises from methodological measurement and/or systematic observation, then it is scientific knowledge.vSo far, we have discussed ways of understanding consciousness based on the criteria of directness vs. abstractness. Next, we will discuss another way of looking at consciousness, based on the criteria of passiveness vs. activeness.
  
Call centers 29, 174, 232
+
''Ordinary consciousness'' refers to perception that is formed ''passively'' and ''directly'' from the daily activities of humans. Ordinary consciousness is a reflection of things, phenomena, and ideas, with all their observed characteristics, specific details, and nuances. Therefore, ordinary consciousness is rich, multifaceted, and associated with daily life. Therefore, ordinary consciousness has a regular and pervasive role in governing the activities of each person in society.
  
Callon, Michel 140, 172, 237, 239
+
''Scientific consciousness'' refers to perception formed ''actively'' and ''indirectly'' from the reflection of the characteristics, nature, and inherent relationships of research subjects. This reflection takes place in the form of logical abstraction. These logical abstractions include scientific concepts, categories, and laws. Scientific consciousness is objective, abstract, general, and systematic, and must be grounded in evidence.
  
Calvinism 19
+
Scientific consciousness utilizes systematic methodologies to profoundly describe the nature of studied subjects as well as the principles which govern them. Therefore, scientific consciousness plays an increasingly important role in practical activities, especially in the modern age of science and technology.
  
Cameron, James 234
+
-----
  
Capek, Karl 70, 234
+
==== Annotation 219 ====
  
Capitalism 50, 79, 81, 82, 128–129, 132, 166, 171
+
Logical abstraction refers to an understanding of the underlying rules which govern things, phenomena, and ideas which underly objective processes, relationships, and characteristics. Logical abstraction is the result of scientific inquiry. Over time, our understanding of the rules which govern the things, phenomena, and ideas in our lives become more reliable and applicable in practical activities. This attainment of understanding and practical ability through scientific practice is ''scientific consciousness''.
  
Carey, James W. 8, 17, 22, 189, 231,
+
Ordinary and scientific consciousness are two different qualitative steps of cognitive processes which, together, allow humans to discover truth about our world. Ordinary and scientific consciousness have a strong dialectical relationship with each other. In this relationship, ordinary consciousness precedes scientific consciousness, as ordinary consciousness is a source of material for the development of scientific consciousness.
  
232, 239
+
Although it contains the seeds of scientific knowledge, ordinary consciousness mainly stops at the reflection of superficial details, seemingly random events, and non-essential phenomena [see ''Essence and Phenomenon'', p. 156]. Ordinary consciousness, therefore, cannot transform effortlessly into scientific consciousness. To develop ordinary consciousness into scientific consciousness, we must go through the process of accurate summarizing, abstracting, and generalization using scientific methods. Likewise, once scientific consciousness has been developed, it impacts and pervades ordinary consciousness, and therefore develops ordinary consciousness. Scientific consciousness therefore enhances our everyday passive perception of the world.
  
Caro, Robert A. 204, 240
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-83.png|''Ordinary consciousness refers to the passive observation of reality which takes place in our daily lives. Scientific consciousness refers to the systematic application of consciousness to solve specific problems in a methodological manner.'']]
  
Carpal tunnel syndrome 55, 181
+
-----
  
Carr, Nicholas 233
+
==== Annotation 220 ====
  
Carter, Jimmy 90
+
For example, before developing scientific consciousness of farming, a farmer might go through daily life having no idea what makes plants grow to be larger and more healthy and might have no idea how to avoid common problems such as pests. After developing scientific consciousness of farming through scientific experimentation and other systematic methodologies, the farmer will look at things differently in daily life activities. They may see signs of pest infestation and immediately recognize it for what it is, and they may see other indications that plants are unhealthy and know exactly what to do to remedy the situation.
  
Index
+
In this way, scientific consciousness enhances ordinary consciousness. Meanwhile, ordinary consciousness — passive observation of the world during daily activities — will lead to scientific consciousness by inspiring us to actively seek understanding of the world through scientific consciousness.
  
O 261
+
=== c. The Relationship Between Praxis and Consciousness ===
  
Cartwright, Elizabeth 241
+
Praxis serves as the ''basis, driving force,'' and ''purpose'' of consciousness. Praxis serves as the criterion of truth by testing the truthfulness of our thoughts. [See Annotation 230, p. 226]
  
Casinos 192, 193
+
Praxis is able to serve these roles because reality is the direct starting point of consciousness; it sets out the requirements, tasks, and modes of consciousness, as well as the movement and development tendencies of consciousness. Humans have an objective and inherent need to explain the world and to transform it.
  
Cassidy, Marsha 202–203, 240
+
-----
  
Castells, Manuel 236
+
==== Annotation 221 ====
  
Categorization 203, 204, 212
+
Remember that the material world defines consciousness while consciousness allows us to impact the material world through conscious activity [see ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88]. Consciousness itself arose from the physical needs of the material world [see ''The Source of Consciousness'', p. 64], and these physical needs continue to serve as the basis and driving force for all conscious activities, as we must act consciously to survive.
  
Cat’s Cradle 71
+
Our inherent need to explain the world and to transform it arises from our material needs to eat, seek shelter, cure and prevent disease, and so on. These physical needs, which stem from the material world, drive conscious activity and lead to the development of consciousness and knowledge.
  
Causality 10, 50, 73, 104, 117–134,
+
Therefore, humans must necessarily impact things in the material world through our practical activities in order to survive. The impacts of our practical activities on the world cause things and phenomena to reveal their different properties, including their internal and external relationships [for example, hitting a rock will tell you properties about the rock; attempting to build something out of wood will provide data about the wood, etc.]. In this manner, praxis produces data for consciousness to process, and also helps consciousness to comprehend nature and the laws of movement and development which govern the world.
  
137–138, 167, 237
+
Scientific theories are formed on the basis of the dialectical relationship between practical activity and consciousness. For example: mathematics developed to allow us to count and measure things for practical activities such as agriculture, navigation, and building structures. Marxism also arose in the 1840’s from the practical activities of the struggles of the working class against the capitalist class at that time. Even recent scientific achievements arise from practical needs and activities. For example, the discovery and decoding of the human genome map was born from practical activities and needs, such as the need to develop treatments for incurable diseases. In the end, there is no field of knowledge that is not derived from reality. Ultimately, all knowledge arises from and serves practice. Therefore, if we were to break from reality or stop relying on reality, consciousness would break from the basis of reality that nurtures our growth, existence and development. Also, the cognitive subject cannot have true and profound knowledge about the world if it does not follow reality.
  
Articulation and assemblage; see individual entries
+
Practice also serves as the basis, driving force, and purpose of consciousness because, thanks to practical activities, our human ability to measure and observe reality improves increasingly over time; our logical thinking ability is constantly strengthened and developed; cognitive means become increasingly developed. All of these developments “extend” the human senses in perceiving the world [for example, by developing new tools to measure, perceive, and sense the world such as telescopes, radar, microscopes, etc.].
  
Expressive causality 117, 127–132,
+
Reality is not only the basis, the driving force, and the purpose of discovering truth but also serves as the ''standard of truth.'' Reality also serves as the basis for ''examining the truthfulness of the cognitive process'' [i.e., we can test whether our thoughts match material reality through experimentation and practice in the real world]. This means that practice is the measure of the value of the knowledge we gain through perception. At the same time, practice is constantly supplementing, adjusting, correcting, developing, and improving human consciousness. Marx said: “The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice.”<ref>''Theses On Feuerbach'', Karl Marx, 1845.</ref>
  
152
+
Thus, practice is not only the starting point of consciousness and a decisive factor for the formation and development of consciousness, it is also a target where consciousness must always aim to test the truth. To emphasize this role which practice plays, Lenin said: “The standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge.”<ref>''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1908.</ref>
  
Mechanistic perspectives 117,
+
The role of practice in consciousness requires that we always grasp the practical point of view. This point of view requires that we derive our ideas from practice, our ideas must be based on practice, and our ideas must deeply explore practice. In our conscious activities, we must attach a lot of importance to the summarization of practice [i.e., developing theoretical knowledge through theoretical consciousness which reflects practical experience]. Theoretical research must be related to practice, and learning must go hand in hand with practicing. If we diverge from practice, it will lead to mistakes of subjectivism, idealism, dogmatism, rigidity, and bureaucracy.
  
118–125, 151
+
-----
  
Non-mechanistic perspectives 117,
+
==== Annotation 222 ====
  
125–133, 152
+
''Subjectivism'' occurs when one centers one’s own self and conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test one’s own perceptions against material and social reality. Subjectivists tend to believe that they can independently reason their way to truth in their own minds without practical experience and activity in the material world. Related to subjectivism is ''solipsism'', a form of idealism in which one believes that the self is the only basis for truth. As Marxist ethicist Howard Selsam wrote in ''Ethics and Progress: New Values in a Revolutionary World'': “If I believe that I alone exist and that you and all your arguments exist only in my mind and are my own creations then all possible arguments will not shake me one iota. No logic can possibly convince [the] solipsist.”
  
Simple causality 117, 121–122
+
''Idealism'' has a strong connection with a failure to incorporate practical activity into theoretical consciousness, since idealism holds that conscious activity is the sole basis of discovering truth.
  
Soft determinism 124–125
+
''Dogmatism'' occurs when one only accounts for commonalities and considers theory itself as the sole basis of truth rather than practice [see Annotation 239, p. 235]. Dogmatists ignore practical experience and considering pre-established theory, alone, as unalterable truth. This results in a breakdown of the dialectical relationship between theoretical consciousness and empirical consciousness, which arrests the development process of knowledge and consciousness.
  
Symptomatic causality 117, 122–124,
+
''Rigidity'' is an unwillingness to alter one’s thoughts, holding too stiffly to established consciousness and knowledge, and ignoring practical experience and observation, which leads to stagnation of both knowledge and consciousness.
  
165, 227
+
''Bureaucracy'' arises when theory becomes overly codified and formalized, to the extent that practical considerations are ignored in favor of codified theory. Bureaucracy can be avoided by incorporating practical experience and observations continuously into the development of practical systems and methodologies so that theory and practice become increasingly aligned over time to continuously improve efficiency and effectiveness of practical activities in the material world.
  
Cell phone 31
+
On the contrary, if the role of practice is absolutized [to the exclusion of conscious activity], it will fall into pragmatism and empiricism.
  
Change talk 46
+
-----
  
Chase, Alston 99, 103, 236
+
==== Annotation 223 ====
  
Chiapello, Eve 47, 232
+
In this context, ''pragmatism'' refers to a form of subjectivism [see Annotation 222, above] in which one centers one’s own immediate material concerns over all other considerations. For example, workers may place their own immediate needs and desires above the concerns of their fellow workers as a whole. This may offer some temporary gains, but in the long run their lack of solidarity and class consciousness will be detrimental as workers collectively suffer from division, making all workers more vulnerable to exploitation and ill treatment by the capitalist class.
  
Chicago 149, 168, 169
+
''Empiricism'' is a faulty form of materialism in which ''only'' sense experience and practical experience are considered sources of truth. This is opposed to the dialectical materialist position that the material ''determines'' consciousness, while consciousness ''impacts'' the material world through conscious labor activity. [See ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88]
  
Chicago World’s Fair 26
+
Thus, the principle of the ''unification'' of practice and theory must be the basic principle in practical and theoretical activities. Theory without practice as its basis and criterion for determining its truthfulness is useless. Vice versa, practice without scientific and revolutionary theory will inevitably turn into blind practice. [As Ho Chi Minh once said: “Study and practice must always go together. Study without practice is useless. Practice without study leads to folly.”]
  
China 30, 149, 232
+
== 2. Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth ==
  
Citizenship 25, 155, 198, 204
+
=== a. Opinions of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin about the Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth ===
  
Civil War, American 19, 22
+
==== Annotation 224 ====
  
Civilized v. primitive 25
+
The section below outlines and explains ''the Universal Law of Consciousness'', which holds that consciousness is a process of dialectical development in which practical activity leads to conscious activity, which then leads back to practical activity, in a continuous and never-ending cycle, with a tendency to develop both practical and conscious activity to increasingly higher levels.
  
Clark, Andy 159–160, 211, 212, 238,
+
In his ''Philosophical Notebook'', Lenin generalized the dialectical path towards the realization of truth as development from vivid visualization to abstract thinking, and then from abstraction back to practice. This process, according to Lenin, is the dialectical path towards the realization of truth, and the realization of objective reality.
  
241, 242
+
According to this generalization, the dialectical path towards the realization of truth (“truth,” here, referring to a correct and accurate reflection of objective reality) is a process. It is a process that starts from “vivid visualization” (emotional consciousness) to “abstract thinking” (rational consciousness).
  
Clarke, John 235
+
-----
  
Class 24, 26, 30, 70, 81, 97, 153, 183, 198,
+
==== Annotation 225 ====
  
204–205, 232
+
Given that consciousness has a material basis, and that practical activities are the driving force of consciousness [see Annotation 230, p. 226], it follows that we must strive to align our conscious thoughts and ideas with the material world. The more accurately we can reflect reality in our consciousness, the more effectively and efficiently our practical activities can become.
  
Climate change 1, 2, 34, 107, 223–224,
+
For example, through learning more about the mechanical, material, and physical processes which take place inside of an automobile engine, the more we can improve engines to make them more efficient and effective for practical applications.
  
226, 227
+
Lenin explained that consciousness develops from “emotional consciousness” to “rational consciousness.” Thought about a subject begins at a base level of consciousness that is rooted in emotional and sense-oriented conscious activity, i.e, “vivid visualization,” which then leads to rational, abstract reflection.
  
Clocks 184–185, 187
+
By “vivid visualization,” Lenin is referring to the active, real-time experience of seeing (and hearing, smelling, and otherwise sensing) things and phenomena in the world.
  
Atomic clock 184
+
When a person experiences something through practical activity, the first conscious activity will tend to occur at the emotional and sensory level — in other words, the conscious activities which occur simultaneously along with practical activities. Only after this initial period of emotional consciousness will one be able to reflect on the experience on a more rational and abstract level.
  
Cloning 38, 70, 172
+
For example, if a zoologist in the field sees a species of bird they have never encountered before, their first conscious activity will be at the sensory-emotional level: they will observe the shape, coloration, and motion of the bird. They may feel excitement, happiness, and other emotions. This is emotional conscious activity.
  
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 149,
+
This emotional conscious activity will then develop into rational conscious activity, as the zoologist may begin to consider things more abstractly, attempting to interpret and understand this experience through reason and rational reflection, asking such questions as: “Where does this bird nest? What does it feed on? Is this a new discovery?” and so on.
  
151, 159
+
Such abstractions are not the end point of a cognitive cycle, because consciousness must then continue to develop through practice. It is through practice that perception tests and proves its own correctness so that it can then continue on to repeat the cycle.
  
Cloud computing 2, 23, 228
+
This is also the general rule of the human perception of objective reality.
  
Cognition 211
+
-----
  
Comfort 34–35, 232
+
==== Annotation 226 ====
  
Communication 19, 51, 52, 66, 72, 170,
+
Thus there is a dialectical relationship between emotional consciousness (linked to practical activity) and rational consciousness (linked to purely conscious activity).
  
180, 187–192
+
This dialectical relationship is a cycle, in which one engages in practical activity, which leads to emotional consciousness, which leads to rational consciousness, which then leads back to practical activity to test the correctness of the conclusions of rational conscious activity.
  
Technology 37, 38, 42, 50, 88, 93,
+
We call this cycle of development of consciousness the cognitive process.
  
132, 137, 168, 169
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-84.png|''The cognitive process is a continuous cycle which describes the dialectical development of consciousness and practical activity.'']]
  
As transportation 19
+
The cognitive process is explained in more detail below.
  
See also Modes of communication
+
-----
  
Communication Technologies and Society 117
+
'''- Development From Emotional Consciousness to Rational Consciousness'''
  
Community 14, 45, 91, 92, 161, 171
+
''Emotional consciousness is the lower stage of the cognitive process.'' In this stage of cognitive development, humans use — through practical activity — use our senses to reflect objective things and phenomena (with all their perceived specific characteristics and rich manifestations) in human consciousness. During this period, consciousness only reflects the phenomena [i.e, ''phenomena'', as opposed to ''essence'' — see ''Essence and Phenomenon'', p. 156] — the external manifestations — of the perceived subject. At this stage, consciousness has not yet reflected the ''essence'' — the nature, and/or the regulating principles — of the subject. Therefore, this is the lowest stage of development of the cognitive process. In this stage, consciousness is carried out through three basic phases: ''sensation'', ''conception'', and ''symbolization''.
  
Companion Species Manifesto, The 212
+
Human ''sensation'' of an objective thing or phenomenon is the simplest, most primitive phase of the emotional consciousness stage of the cognitive processes, but without it there would not be any perception of objective things or phenomena. Every human sensation of objective things and phenomena contains objective content [see Content and Form, p. 147], even though it arises as subjective human conscious reflection. Sensation is the subjective imagining of the objective world. It is the basis from which the next phase of emotional consciousness — ''conception'' — is formed.
  
Computer 8, 9, 15, 17, 20, 21, 24, 29,
+
''Conception'' is a relatively complete reflection within human consciousness of objective things and phenomena. Conception is formed on the basis of linking and synthesizing sensational experiences of things and phenomena [i.e., ''sensation'']. Compared with sensation, conception is a higher, fuller, richer form of consciousness, but it is still a reflection of the outward manifestations of objects. Conception does not yet reflect the essence, nature, and regulating principles of the perceived subject.
  
40, 42, 52, 53, 55, 56, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68–69, 70, 71, 72, 107, 109–110, 119, 122, 123, 137, 138, 140–141, 152, 165, 170, 172, 181, 189, 198, 200, 201–202, 206, 207, 211, 221, 223
+
''Symbolization'' is the representation of an objective thing or phenomenon that has been reflected by sensation and conception. It is the most advanced and most complex phase of the stage of emotional consciousness. At the same time, it also serves as the transitional step between emotional consciousness and rational consciousness. The defining characteristic of symbolism is the ability to reproduce symbolic ideas of objective things and phenomena within human consciousness. Symbolization describes the act of recreating the outward appearances of material things and phenomena within human consciousness, which is the first step of abstraction, and thus the first step towards rational consciousness.
  
Conference on Further Developments in The United Kingdom of Appropriate Technology; see Appropriate technology
+
-----
  
Conjuncture 2, 10, 84, 104, 216–218, 219, 221, 226
+
==== Annotation 227 ====
  
Conjunctural analysis 217
+
Here is an example of the three phases of the emotional consciousness stage of the cognitive process:
  
Mapping 217–218
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-85.png]]
  
Connotation 113, 114
+
''1.'' ''Sensation'': Jessica ''senses'' a cake in the window of a bakery. She ''sees'' the frosting, the shape of the cake, and the decorations which adorn the cake. She ''smells'' the cake. During this phase, objective data about the cake is received into her consciousness, developing into an immediate and subjective sense perception of the cake. The beginnings of this cognitive activity will be purely sensory in nature; she may have been thinking of other things as she walked by the bakery, but the sight and smell of the cake, upon registering in her mind, will lead to the beginning of a new cognitive process cycle.
  
Constitution 167–168, 170, 238
+
''2.'' ''Conception'': Jessica begins to ''conceive'' of the cake in her mind more fully. She will associate the immediate sense experiences of seeing and smelling the cake with other experiences she has had with cake, and a complete mental image and concept of the cake will form in her mind.
  
Consumption 42–46, 223
+
''3.'' ''Symbolization'': The word “cake” may now form in her mind, and she may begin thinking of the cake more abstractly, as “food,” as a “temptation,” and in other ways. This is the beginning of abstraction in Jessica’s mind, which will then lead to rational conscious activities.
  
Contingency 152
+
Note that all of these phases of emotional consciousness activity may take place very quickly, perhaps in a fraction of a second, and may coincide with other conscious activity (i.e., Jessica may simultaneously be thinking of a meeting she’s running late to and any number of other things). At this point, Jessica will transition to the ''rational consciousness'' stage of the cognitive process'','' which is explained in more detail below.
  
Control 10, 13, 23, 25–28, 29, 53, 55, 57, 59–73, 77, 79, 89, 103, 108, 122, 130, 140, 150, 162, 168, 169, 172, 184, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 193, 202, 205, 206, 208, 218, 221, 222, 225, 228
+
-----
  
Crisis of control 66, 233
+
By the end of the emotional stage of the cognitive process, consciousness has not yet reflected the essence — the nature, regulating principles, etc. — of the perceived subject. Therefore, at the emotional stage, consciousness is not yet able to properly ''interpret'' the reflected subject. That is to say, emotional conscious activity does not meet the cognitive requirements to serve practical activities, including the need to creatively transform the objective world. To meet these requirements, emotional consciousness must develop into ''rational consciousness''.
  
Convenience 10, 25, 31, 33–47, 67,
+
''Rational consciousness is the higher stage of the cognitive process.'' It includes the indirect, abstract, and generalized reflection of the essential properties and characteristics of things and phenomena. This stage of consciousness performs the most important function of comprehending and interpreting the ''essence'' of the perceived subject. Rational consciousness is implemented through three basic phases: ''definition'', ''judgment'', and ''reasoning''.
  
73, 82, 143, 158, 159, 175, 218,
+
''Definition'' is the first phase of rational consciousness. During this phase, the mind begins to interpret, organize, and process the basic properties of things and phenomena at a rational level into a conceptual whole. The formation of definition is the result of the summarization and synthesis of all the different characteristics and properties of the subject, and how the subject fits into the organized structure of knowledge which exists in the mind. Definition is the basis for forming judgments in the cognitive process.
  
228, 204
+
''Judgment'' is the next phase of rational consciousness, which arises from the definition of the subject — the linking of concepts and properties together — which leads to affirmative or negative ideation of certain characteristics or attributes of the perceived subject.
  
Defined 35
+
According to the level of development of consciousness, judgment may take one of three forms: unique judgment, general judgment, and universal judgment [see Annotation 105, p. 107]. Universal judgment is the form of judgement that expresses the broadest conception of objective reality.
  
Conviviality 30, 88, 90, 93
+
''Reasoning'' is the final phase of rational consciousness, formed on the basis of synthesizing judgments so as to extrapolate new knowledge about the perceived subject. Before reasoning can take place, judgments must be transformed into knowledge. A judgment can be transformed into knowledge through one of two logical mechanisms: deductive inference (which extrapolates the general from the specific), and inductive inference (which extrapolates the specific from the general).
  
Convivial tool, defined 90
+
-----
  
Cookies 150
+
==== Annotation 228 ====
  
Cool, the 24, 25, 31, 152, 153, 218
+
Here is an example of the three phases of the rational consciousness stage of the cognitive process, continuing from our previous example of the emotional consciousness stage [see Annotation 227, p. 222].
  
Corey, Scott 98, 100, 101, 236
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-86.png]]
  
Corn Laws 81
+
''1.'' ''Definition'': Jessica’s conception of the cake will transition into the rational conscious activity of ''definition''. Jessica will begin to define the concept of the cake more wholly and concretely, summarizing and synthesizing all of the features and characteristics of the cake into a cohesive mental reflection of the cake. The word “cake” may become more pronounced and defined in Jessica’s consciousness, prompting her to think of the object which she defines as a “cake” more fully and rationally.
  
Cosmetic surgery 205
+
''2.'' ''Judgment'': Jessica will begin to form basic judgments about the cake. “That cake looks good,” “that cake smells good,” and so on. Next, these judgments will begin to transform into knowledge through inductive or deductive inferences. An inductive inference might be: “I generally enjoy eating cakes, therefore, I might enjoy eating this cake!” An example of a deductive inference might be: “This cake looks very delicious, therefore, there might be other delicious things in this bakery!”
  
Cotton gin 8, 120
+
''3.'' ''Reasoning'': Processes of inductive and/or deductive inference will begin to transform Jessica’s judgments into the form of knowledge. For instance, she may now possess such knowledge as: “This bakery has delicious looking cakes, this is a cake I would like to eat,” and so on. With this newly acquired knowledge, Jessica can begin reasoning; that is to say, she can begin making rational conclusions and decisions. She might conclude: “I will go into this bakery and buy that cake.”
  
Counterculture 87, 90, 91, 93, 103
+
Note that this is not the “end” of the cognitive process, because the final phase of the reasoning stage of the cognitive process (reasoning) will lead directly into a new cycle of the cognitive process. In this example, Jessica might engage in the practical activity of checking her watch to see the time, which will begin a new cycle of cognitive process, beginning with the ''sensation'' phase of the emotional stage as the visual sense data of her watch and carrying through to the final ''reasoning'' phase of the rational stage, and so on.
  
Cowan, Ruth Schwartz 41, 43, 44, 45, 66,
+
It should also be noted that this is merely an abstraction of the cognitive process; in reality, the human mind is incredibly complex, capable of carrying out a variety of cognitive processes simultaneously. At any given moment, a person might be considering various different subjects, and each different subject might be at a different stage of the cognitive process. This abstract model of the cognitive process is presented to help us comprehend the component functions of consciousness more easily in the wider context of dialectical materialist philosophy.
  
201, 202, 232, 233
+
Specifically, this model of the cognitive process is intended to help us understand how human consciousness leads to “truth.” And “truth,” here, refers to the alignment of human consciousness with the material world, so that our perceptions and understanding of the world is accurate and representative of actual reality.
  
Crary, Jonathan 37, 185, 232, 239
+
''- The Relationship Between Emotional Consciousness, Rational Consciousness, and Reality''
  
Creativity 91, 128, 193, 221
+
Emotional consciousness and rational consciousness are stages that make up the cognitive cycle. In reality, they are often intertwined within the cognitive process, but they have different functions. If ''emotional consciousness'' is associated with reality, and with the impact of sense data received from observing the material world, and is the basis for cognitive reason, then ''rational consciousness'', based on higher cognitive understanding and abstraction, allows us to understand the essence, nature, regulating principles, and development processes of things and phenomena. Rational consciousness helps direct emotional consciousness in a more efficient and effective direction and leads to more profound and accurate emotional consciousness.
  
Critical factor 124–125, 128, 132, 152
+
-----
  
Critical Theory of Technology 111
+
==== Annotation 229 ====
  
Croppers 79
+
In other words, considering a subject at the level of rational consciousness allows us to then view the same subject, at an emotional consciousness level, with more depth and awareness.
  
Defined 234
+
For example, the more time we have spent rationally considering something like a bicycle, the more quickly and accurately we can examine a bicycle at the level of emotional consciousness. If someone is looking at a bicycle for the first time, they might not be able to distinguish its component parts or functions. On the other hand, if someone has spent more time considering bicycles at the level of rational consciousness, they may be able to immediately and rapidly understand and process a bicycle at the emotional conscious level, so that they can perceive and comprehend the different parts of a bicycle, as well as their functions, immediately and at the emotional-sensory level.
  
Crowd 159
+
However, if we stop at rational consciousness, we will only have knowledge about the subjects we perceive, but we still won’t really know if that knowledge is truly accurate or not. In order to be useful in practical activity, we must consciously determine whether knowledge is ''truth'' [i.e., whether the knowledge accurately reflects reality]. In order to determine the truth of knowledge, consciousness must necessarily return to reality. Consciousness must use reality as a criterion — a measurement — of the authenticity of knowledge gained through purely cognitive processes. In other words, all consciousness is ultimately derived from practical needs, and must also return to serve practical activities.
  
Crystal Palace 26, 232
+
-----
  
Cult of the Amateur, The 242
+
==== Annotation 230 ====
  
Cult of Information, The 91
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-87.png|''The dialectical relationship between consciousness and practical activities means that conscious activities develop practical activities, and vice versa, in a continuous feedback loop.'']]
  
Cultural determinism; see Determinism Cultural studies 1, 2, 10, 73, 78, 81, 104,
+
One of the fundamental principles of dialectical materialism is that the material determines the ideal, and the ideal impacts the material [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness]. The fact that the material determines consciousness is reflected in the fact that material needs led to the development of consciousness, and conscious activity stems from material needs [see Social Sources of Consciousness].
  
126, 132, 146, 147, 153, 154, 159, 166, 172, 175, 182, 183, 191, 213, 217, 218, 219, 233, 236, 239
+
The fact that the ideal impacts the material is reflected in the fact that consciousness must always return to the service of practical activities; as our consciousness develops (along with knowledge), our ability to impact and transform the material world becomes more efficient and effective.
  
262 O
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-88.png|''The dialectical relationship between consciousness and practical activity is what drives the development of humanity. We imagine better ways of doing things, then test those ideas against reality through practical activity.'']]
  
Index
+
This dialectical relationship between consciousness and practical activity is thus cyclical. Conscious activity arises from practical activity, and returns to practical activity, in an endless process of developing both conscious ability as well as practical ability.
  
Culture 6–8
+
-----
  
Defined 6
+
Therefore, it can be seen that the general, cyclical nature of the process of movement and development of consciousness develops from practice to consciousness — from consciousness to practice — from practical activity to the continued process of cognitive development, and so on. This process is repeated continuously, without end. The development level of consciousness and practice in the next cycle are often higher than in the previous cycle, and the cognitive process gradually develops more and more accuracy, as well as fuller and deeper knowledge about objective reality.
  
Dominant 7, 191
+
The universal law of consciousness [see Annotation 224, p. 219] is also a concrete and vivid manifestation of the universal laws of materialist dialectics, including: the law of negation of negation, the law of transformation between quantity and quality and the law of unity and contradiction between opposites. The process of cognitive motion and development, governed by these general laws, is the process of human progress towards absolute truth [see Annotation 232, p. 228].
  
Emergent 7, 191
+
-----
  
Residual 7, 191
+
==== Annotation 231 ====
  
Selective tradition 7
+
The universal law of consciousness is governed by the three universal laws of materialist dialectics:
  
Cyberspace 189, 206
+
''The Law of Negation of Negation'' dictates that the new will arise from the old, but will carry forward characteristics from the old. This is reflected in the universal law of consciousness in that conscious activity arises from practical activity. This conscious activity then develops into improved practical activity, and so on, in a never-ending cycle of development. Throughout this development process, characteristics of previous cycles of cognitive and practical activities are carried forward and transferred on to newer cycles of cognitive and practical activities.
  
Cypherpunks: Freedom and the Future of the
+
''The Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality'' recognizes that quantity changes develop into changes in quality, and vice versa. This is reflected in the universal law of consciousness in the development of both conscious and practical activities. Conscious development also develops from quantitative changes to quality changes, and vice versa. For example, once a person accumulates a certain quantity of knowledge, the quality of their knowledge will change. For example, once a person has learned the function of every component part of a car engine, they will have a ''quality shift'' in their understanding of car engines — they will now have competency of the functioning of the engine as a whole. This is also true of practical activities. A quantity of practical experience will lead to quality shifts in practical ability. For example, once a person has practiced riding a bicycle enough that they can reliably ride the bicycle without falling, we would say that the person “knows how to ride a bicycle,” which represents a quality shift from the state of “learning how to ride a bicycle.”
  
Internet 72
+
''The Law of Unity and Contradiction Between Opposites'' states that all things, phenomena, and ideas are defined by internal and external contradictions. This is reflected in the universal law of consciousness by the fact that practical needs serve as the basis for conscious activity, and that cognitive processes serve, in essence, to negate contradictions between consciousness and material reality through practical experience. In other words, the cognitive process is defined by a never-ending process of contradiction between the material and the ideal, as human beings seek to negate contradictions between our conscious understanding of the world and our practical experiences in search of ''truth -'' the accurate alignment of consciousness with the material world.
  
Darwin, Charles 21–22
+
=== b. Truth, and the Relationship Between Truth and Reality ===
  
Data entry 29, 174, 186
+
''- Definition of Truth''
  
Data self 197, 198
+
All cognitive processes lead to the creation of ''knowledge'', which is what we call human understanding of objective reality. But not all knowledge has content consistent with objective reality, because consciousness exists as the subjective reflection of objective reality in the human mind. The collective cognitive practice of all of humanity throughout history, as well as the cognitive practice of each individual human being, has demonstrated that the knowledge which people have gained and are gaining is not always consistent with objective reality. On the contrary, there are many cases of misalignment between consciousness and reality, and even complete contradiction between human thought and objective reality.
  
Dean, Jodi 239
+
Within the theoretical scope of Marxism-Leninism, the concept of ''truth'' is used to refer to knowledge which is aligned with objective reality. This alignment is tested and proven through practice. In this sense, the concept of truth is not identical with the concept of “knowledge,” nor with the concept of “hypothesis.” According to Lenin: “The coincidence of thought with the object is a '''process''': thought (= man) must not imagine truth in the form of dead repose, in the form of a bare picture (image), pale (matte), without impulse, without motion…”<ref>''Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic,'' Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.</ref>
  
Death 38, 224
+
-----
  
Delegation 140, 141–142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 158, 199
+
==== Annotation 232 ====
  
Deleuze, Gilles 133, 156–159, 162, 169,
+
Here, Lenin is dispelling Hegel’s conception of “absolute truth,” which is not to be confused with Lenin’s concept of “absolute truth” as “objective truth” which aligns consciousness with objective reality [see Annotation 58, p. 56]. For Hegel, “absolute truth” was the idea that there will eventually be some end point to the process of rational consciousness at which we will finally arrive at some final stage of knowledge and consciousness. This rational end point of consciousness, at which the dialectic ends and all contradictions are negated, is Hegel’s “absolute truth.”
  
172, 198, 208, 237, 238, 241
+
Lenin is also pushing back against the metaphysical conception that all “truths” exist as static categories of information which do not change. Instead, Lenin points out that seeking truth — i.e., aligning consciousness with material reality — is a never-ending process, in particular because reality is constantly developing and changing. Thus, the alignment of consciousness with reality — the pursuit of truth — is a living and dynamic process which will never end, since the development of reality will never end.
  
Democracy 18, 24, 30, 51, 112, 141
+
''- The Properties of Truth''
  
Dennett, Daniel 212
+
All truths are ''objective, relative, absolute,'' and ''concrete.''
  
Denotation 113, 114
+
The ''objectivity'' of truth is the independence of its content from the subjective will of human beings. The content of knowledge must be aligned with objective reality, not vice versa. This means that the content of accurate knowledge is not a product of pure subjective reasoning. Truth is not an arbitrary human construct, nor is truth inherent in consciousness. On the contrary, truth belongs to the objective world, and is determined by the objective world. The affirmation of the objectivity of truth is one of the fundamental points that distinguishes the concept of absolute truth of dialectical materialism from the concept of absolute truth of idealism and skepticism — the doctrines that deny the objective existence of the physical world and deny the possibility that humans are able to perceive the world.
  
Dependence 44, 45, 68–69, 71, 73, 90, 140
+
-----
  
Dery, Mark 232
+
==== Annotation 233 ====
  
Design as activism 91
+
The Dialectical Materialist conception of objective truth stands in contrast to ''idealism'', which states that conscious reasoning alone leads to truth, and that the subjective ideal determines material reality [see Annotation 7, p. 8].
  
Design assumptions 199–200
+
This objectivity of truth also refutes ''skepticism'', which states that truth is essentially undiscoverable, because human consciousness is ultimately unreliable and incapable of accurately reflecting material reality [see Annotation 32, p. 27].
  
Design for the Other 90% 91
+
Distinction must also be drawn between the concept of absolute truth as it is understood in dialectical materialist philosophy and the conception of absolute truth in Hegel’s idealist dialectics. Dialectical materialism defines absolute truth as “objective truth;” that is to say: a complete alignment between objective reality and human consciousness (as compared to relative truth, which is a partial alignment between consciousness and objective reality).
  
Deskilling 64, 79, 80
+
Hegel, on the other hand, views absolute truth as a final point at which human consciousness will have achieved absolute, complete, and final understanding of our universe (see Annotation 232, p. 228) with the ideal serving as the first basis and primary mechanism for bringing absolute truth to fruition.
  
de Souza e Silva, Adriana 240
+
Truth is not only objective, but also ''absolute'' and ''relative''. Absolute truth [see Annotation 58, p. 56] refers to truth which reflects a full and complete alignment of consciousness and reality. Theoretically, we can reach absolute truth. This is because, in the objective world, there exists no thing nor phenomenon which human beings are completely incapable of accurately perceiving. The possibility of acquiring absolute truth in the process of the development of conscious understanding is theoretically limitless. However, in reality, our conscious ability to reflect reality is limited by the specific material conditions of each generation of humanity, of practical limitations, and by the spatial and temporal conditions of reflected subjects. Therefore, truth is also ''relative''.
  
Determinism 218
+
-----
  
Cultural determinism 50, 53–57, 117–118, 137, 151, 162, 192
+
==== Annotation 234 ====
  
Technological determinism 26, 50, 51–54, 56–57, 68, 117–118, 125, 137, 151, 162, 175, 179, 192
+
Dialectical materialist philosophy recognizes that it must be theoretically possible to know everything there is to know about a given subject, since we are theoretically capable of accurately perceiving, sensing, and measuring all data which pertains to a subject. However, dialectical materialism also recognizes the practical limitations of human beings. As Engels writes in ''Anti-Dühring'':
  
Deterritorialization 158
+
<blockquote>
 +
If mankind ever reached the stage at which it should work only with eternal truths, with results of thought which possess sovereign validity and an unconditional claim to truth, it would then have reached the point where the infinity of the intellectual world both in its actuality and in its potentiality had been exhausted, and thus the famous miracle of the counted uncountable would have been performed.
  
Deus ex machina 119
+
But are there any truths which are so securely based that any doubt of them seems to us to be tantamount to insanity? That twice two makes four, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, that Paris is in France, that a man who gets no food dies of hunger, and so forth? Are there then nevertheless eternal truths, final and ultimate truths.
  
Development 26–29, 47, 78, 87, 88, 89, 90,
+
Certainly there are. We can divide the whole realm of knowledge in the traditional way into three great departments. The first includes all sciences that deal with inanimate nature and are to a greater or lesser degree susceptible of mathematical treatment: mathematics, astronomy, mechanics, physics, chemistry. If it gives anyone any pleasure to use mighty words for very simple things, it can be asserted that certain results obtained by these sciences are eternal truths, final and ultimate truths; for which reason these sciences are known as the exact sciences. But very far from all their results have this validity. With the introduction of variable magnitudes and the extension of their variability to the infinitely small and infinitely large, mathematics, usually so strictly ethical, fell from grace; it ate of the tree of knowledge, which opened up to it a career of most colossal achievements, but at the same time a path of error. The virgin state of absolute validity and irrefutable proof of everything mathematical was gone forever; the realm of controversy was inaugurated, and we have reached the point where most people differentiate and integrate not because they understand what they are doing but from pure faith, because up to now it has always come out right. Things are even worse with astronomy and mechanics, and in physics and chemistry we are swamped by hypotheses as if attacked by a swarm of bees. And it must of necessity be so. In physics we are dealing with the motion of molecules, in chemistry with the formation of molecules out of atoms, and if the interference of light waves is not a myth, we have absolutely no prospect of ever seeing these interesting objects with our own eyes. As time goes on, final and ultimate truths become remarkably rare in this field.
 +
</blockquote>
  
92, 130, 172, 232, 235
 
  
Dewey, John 171
+
-----
  
“Diary of Events, 1811–17” 234
+
Relative truth is truth which has developed alignment with reality without yet having reached ''complete'' alignment between human knowledge and the reality which it reflects. To put it another way, relative truth represents knowledge which incompletely reflects material subjects without complete accuracy. In relative truth, there is only partial alignment — in some (but not all) aspects — between consciousness and the material world.
  
Dickson, David 235
+
-----
  
Differentiating machines 203
+
==== Annotation 235 ====
  
Diffusion of Innovations 235
+
''False consciousness'' is consciousness which is incorrect and misaligned from reality. Discovering and rooting out false consciousness is one of the primary concerns of dialectical materialism, as false consciousness can be a serious impediment to human progress. The term “false consciousness” was first used by Friedrich Engels in a personal letter to Franz Mehring in 1893 (a decade after the death of Karl Marx), and in this letter Engels uses the term interchangeably with the word “ideology”* to describe conscious thought processes which do not align with reality:
  
Direct action 80
+
<blockquote>
 +
Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, indeed, but with a false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown to him, otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all. Hence he imagines false or apparent motives. Because it is a process of thought he derives both its form and its content from pure thought, either his own or that of his predecessors. He works with mere thought material which he accepts without examination as the product of thought, he does not investigate further for a more remote process independent of thought; indeed its origin seems obvious to him, because as all action is produced through the medium of thought it also appears to him to be ultimately based upon thought. The ideologist who deals with history (history is here simply meant to comprise all the spheres – political, juridical, philosophical, theological – belonging to society and not only to nature), the ideologist dealing with history then, possesses in every sphere of science material which has formed itself independently out of the thought of previous generations and has gone through an independent series of developments in the brains of these successive generations. True, external facts belonging to its own or other spheres may have exercised a co-determining influence on this development, but the tacit pre-supposition is that these facts themselves are also only the fruits of a process of thought, and so we still remain within that realm of pure thought which has successfully digested the hardest facts.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Disease 14, 40, 88, 170, 173, 223
+
Although the ''term'' “false consciousness” is not found in writing until after Marx’s death, the ''concept'' underlying the term “false consciousness” is found often in the works of Marx and Engels. For instance, in ''The Holy Family,'' Marx and Engels explain how communist, class conscious workers have been able to break free of false consciousness of capitalist society:
  
Dividual 208
+
<blockquote>
 +
They (the communist workers) are most painfully aware of the difference between being and thinking, between consciousness and life. They know that property, capital, money, wage-labor and the like are no ideal figments of the brain but very practical, very objective products of their self-estrangement.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Division of Motor Vehicles 197
+
This allusion to “the difference between being and thinking” recurs again and again in the works of Marx and Engels.
  
DNA 173, 174, 198, 203, 204, 213
+
<nowiki>*</nowiki> Lenin also discussed the concept of false consciousness extensively, and argued that dialectical materialism was the key to negating the false consciousness of the working class, writing in ''What the “Friends of the People” Are'':
  
“Do Artifacts Have Politics?” 240
+
<blockquote>
 +
It never has been the case, nor is it so now, that the members of society conceive the sum-total of the social relations in which they live as something definite, integral, pervaded by some principle; on the contrary, the mass of people adapt themselves to these relations unconsciously, and have so little conception of them as specific historical social relations that, for instance, an explanation of the exchange relations under which people have lived for centuries was found only in very recent times. Materialism removed this contradiction by carrying the analysis deeper, to the origin of man’s social ideas themselves; and its conclusion that the course of ideas depends on the course of things is the only one compatible with scientific psychology. Further, and from yet another aspect, this hypothesis was the first to elevate sociology to the level of a science.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Do It Yourself (DIY) 45, 220,
+
Note that this convention of using the word “ideology” to mean “false consciousness” has never been common, and Marx and Engels both used the word “ideology” more often in its more usual sense of “a system of ideas,” but it is still occasionally encountered in socialist literature, as Joseph McCarney explains in ''Marx Myths and Legends'':
  
222, 242
+
<blockquote>
 +
Marx never calls ideology ‘false consciousness’. Indeed, he never calls anything ‘false consciousness’, a phrase that does not occur in his work... The noun is almost always accompanied by an epithet such as ‘German’, ‘republican’, ‘political’ or ‘Hegelian’, or by a qualifying phrase, as in ‘the ideology of the bourgeoisie’ or ‘the ideology of the political economist’. More typical in any case is the adjectival usage in which such varied items as ‘forms’, ‘expressions’, ‘phrases’, ’conceptions’, ‘deception’, and ‘distortion’ are said to have an ‘ideological’ character. Even more distinctive is the frequency, amounting to approximately half of all references in the relevant range, of invocations of the ‘ideologists’, the creators and purveyors of the ideological forms.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Does Technology Drive History? 124
 
  
Door 141–142, 144, 146
+
-----
  
Dovetailing 211, 212
+
“Relative truth” and “absolute truth” do not exist separately, but have dialectical unity with each other. On the one hand, “absolute truth” is the sum of all “relative truths.” On the other hand, in all relative truths there are always elements of absolute truth.
  
Drexler, K. Eric 233
+
Lenin wrote that “absolute truth results from the sum-total of relative truths in the course of their development; [...] relative truths represent relatively faithful reflections of an object existing independently of man; [...] these reflections become more and more faithful; [...] every scientific truth, notwithstanding its relative nature, contains an element of absolute truth.”<ref>''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1908.</ref>
  
Drones 72–73, 107
+
Correct realization of the dialectical relationship between relative and absolute truth plays a very important role in criticizing and overcoming extremism and false consciousness in perception and in action. If we exaggerate the absoluteness of the truth of knowledge which we possess, or downplay its relativity, we will fall into the false consciousness of metaphysics, dogmatism, conservativism, and stagnation.
  
Duhigg, Charles 232
+
-----
  
Durkheim, Emile 222
+
==== Annotation 236 ====
  
Dyer, Richard 199, 240
+
Intentional or unintentional exaggeration of the absoluteness of truth — i.e., considering our knowledge to be more complete and/or aligned with reality than it actually is — leads to incorrect viewpoints and mindsets, including:
  
Earth First! 83, 103
+
''Metaphysics'' is a philosophical system which seeks truth through the systematic categorization of knowledge [see Annotation 8, p. 8]. This is a flawed method of seeking knowledge because it considers truth to be essentially static and unchanging, and upholds the erroneous notion that truth can be systematically broken down into discrete, isolated categories. In addition to being fundamentally incorrect about the nature of truth and knowledge, it leads to the incorrect presumption that such static categorization of knowledge can lead to truth ''at all''. Metaphysics fails to see truth and consciousness as a ''process'', and instead sees truth as a static assembly of categorized facts and data.
  
Ebola 40
+
''Dogmatism'' occurs when one only accounts for commonalities and considers theory itself as the sole basis of truth. Dogmatism inherently overstates the absoluteness of knowledge, as dogmatic positions uphold certain theoretical principles as complete, inviolable, and completely developed. This explicitly denies the continuously developing process of advancing knowledge and consciousness.
  
Economic agencement 172
+
''Conservativism'' includes any position that seeks to prevent change, or to undo change to return to an earlier state of development. Such positions deny the continuous development of consciousness, knowledge, and practice, and incorrectly assert incorrect positions; or mistake relative truth for absolute truth.
  
Economics 2, 10, 61, 90, 104, 121, 123, 128, 131, 162, 165, 166, 171–175, 176, 182, 183, 218
+
''Stagnation'' is an inability or unwillingness to change and adapt consciousness and practice in accordance with developing material conditions. Stagnation can stem from, or cause, overstatement of absolute truth in theory and forestall necessary development of both consciousness and practical ability.
  
Defined 166
+
On the contrary, if we exaggerate the relativity of the truth of knowledge which we possess, or downplay its absoluteness, we will fall into relativism, thereby leading to subjectivism, revisionism, sophistry, and skepticism.
  
Ecuador 92
+
-----
  
Education 1, 7, 9, 24, 40, 46, 110, 119, 121, 123, 126, 128, 145, 169, 198, 202, 204, 216, 220, 226
+
==== Annotation 237 ====
  
Effects 50–56, 65, 73, 111, 113, 118–125, 127, 133, 137–138, 143, 147, 151, 152, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 162, 169, 173, 174, 176, 180, 181, 183, 185, 186, 192, 193, 194, 204, 213
+
''Relativism'' is the belief that human consciousness can ''only'' achieve relative understanding of the world, and that truth can therefore never be objectively discovered. Relativism is, thus, the overstatement of the relative nature of truth and the denial of the existence of absolute truth. Relativism leads to such incorrect viewpoints and mindsets as:
  
Kinds of 55
+
''Subjectivism'': which occurs when one centers one’s own self and one’s own conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test their own perceptions against material and social reality [see Annotation 211, p. 205]. This position denies that truth can be discovered in the external material world, falsely believing that absolute truth stems only from conscious activity.
  
Side effects 40, 55–56, 77
+
''Revisionism'': a failure to recognize and accept commonalities in conscious activity, focusing only on the private [see ''Private and Common'', p. 128]. Revisionism leads to constant and unnecessary reassessment and reevaluation of both knowledge and practice. Revisionism, thus, is a position which overstates the relativity of truth and ignores truths which are more fully developed towards absoluteness.
  
Efficiency 16–17, 28, 42, 63, 64, 83, 101, 130, 131, 143, 208, 228, 231
+
''Sophistry:'' the use of falsehoods and fallacious arguments to deceive [see Annotation 116, p. 118]. Sophistry is, thus, the intentional denial of truth and the intentional mischaracterization of truths as either overly relative or as not truths at all.
  
Eggers, Dave 242
+
''Skepticism:'' the belief that truth is essentially undiscoverable, because human consciousness is ultimately unreliable and incapable of accurately reflecting material reality [see Annotation 200, p. 192]. By denying that truth is discoverable at all, skepticism explicitly rejects absolute truth and declares that all truth is relative and unreliable.
  
Egypt 51
+
-----
  
Eick, David 234
+
In addition to objectivity, absoluteness, and relativity, truth also has ''concreteness.'' The concreteness of truth refers to the degree to which a truth is attached to specific objects, in specific conditions, at a specific point in time. This means that all accurate knowledge always refers to a specific situation which involves specific subjects which exist in a specific place and time. The content of truth cannot be pure abstraction, disconnected from reality, but it is always associated with certain, specific objects and phenomena which exist in a specific space, time, and arrangement, with specific internal and external relationships. Therefore, truth is associated with specific historical conditions. This specificity to time, place, relations, etc., is what we call ''concreteness''.
  
Eiffel Tower 26
+
Knowledge, if detached from specific historical conditions, will fall into pure abstraction. Therefore, it will not be accurate — it will not align with reality — and such knowledge cannot be considered truth. When emphasizing this property, Lenin wrote: “Truth is always concrete, never abstract.”<ref>''Once Again On The Trade Unions,'' Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921.</ref> Mastering the principle of the concreteness of truth has an important methodological significance in cognitive and practical activities. It is required that consideration and evaluation of all things and phenomena must be based on a historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116]. In developing and applying theory, we must be conscious of specific historical conditions. According to Lenin, Marxism’s nature, its essence, lies in the concrete analysis of specific situations; Marx’s method is, above all, to consider the objective content of the historical process in a specific time.
  
Eisenstein, Elizabeth 52, 233, 239
+
-----
  
Elashi, Maha 241
+
==== Annotation 238 ====
  
Electricity 19–20, 22, 23, 29, 30, 140, 145, 223
+
In other words, Marxism is rooted in seeking truth by examining reality from a historical and comprehensive viewpoint. For more information, see Annotation 114, p. 116.
  
Electronic communication; see Modes of communication
+
''- The Role of Truth in Reality.''
  
El Guerrouj, Hicham 36
+
In order to survive and develop, humans must conduct practical activities. These activities involve transforming the environment, nature, and human society. At the same time, through these activities, humans perform — knowingly or unknowingly — the process of perfecting and developing our conscious and practical abilities. It is this process that helps human cognitive activities develop. Practical activities can only be successful and effective once humans apply accurate knowledge of objective reality to our practical activities. Therefore, truth is one of the prerequisites that ensure success and efficiency in practical activities.
  
Ellul, Jacques 98, 101, 102, 129, 130–131, 236, 237
+
The relationship between truth and practical activities is a dialectical relationship which serves as the basis for the movement and development of both truth and practical activity: truth develops through practice, and practice develops through the correct application of truth which people have gained through practical activities.
  
Email 15, 72, 175, 207, 222
+
-----
  
Emergence 159, 160, 170, 176
+
==== Annotation 239 ====
  
Emerson, Ralph Waldo 18
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-89.png|''Truth and Practical Activities have a dialectical relationship in which truth develops through practice, and practice develops through the correct application of truth.'']]
  
Empire 238
+
Practice only develops when truth about the universe is consciously applied to practical activities. For example, farm output increases as we learn more truth about the way crops grow and how land can be properly managed. Simultaneously, truth can only be developed through practical activity, as all ideas and knowledge must be tested through methodological observation, experimentation, and other forms of practical activity.
  
Encryption 150, 228
+
A ''theory'' is an idea or system of ideas intended to explain an aspect, characteristic, or tendency of objective reality. Theories are not inherently truthful; holding incorrect theories constitutes ''false consciousness''. ''Practice'' (or ''praxis'') is purposeful conscious activity which improves our understanding of the world. Theory and practice have a dialectical relationship with one another which, if understood, helps us to discover truth.
  
Enframing 130
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-90.png|''Truth and practical activities mutually develop one another over time.'']]
  
Engineers Without Borders 91, 92, 235
+
This dialectical relationship between theory and practical activities means that we must never favor theory over practice, nor practice over theory, but that we must rather balance development of theoretical understanding as we engage in practical activities to test our knowledge against reality and to develop our practice with ever-advancing understanding of the world. As practice and theory develop one another, our understanding of objective reality comes closer and closer to truth.
  
Engler, Mark 83, 235
+
In ''Theses on Feuerbach'', Marx summarizes the relationship between theory and practice, writing:
  
Enlightenment 16, 203
+
<blockquote>
 +
The problem of the external world is here put as the problem of its transformation: the problem of the cognition of the external world as an integral part of the problem of transformation: the problem of theory as a practical problem.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Environment 78, 82, 84, 88, 90, 91, 94, 99, 101, 102, 104, 159, 208, 209, 212, 216, 222–224
+
Here, Marx explains that theory is concerned with solving the “problem” of transforming the external world through practice, and that “cognition of the external world” is required to solve the “problem of transformation. In other words, we must improve our theory in order to improve our practical ability to transform our world, and we learn about the world (thus improving our theory) through those practical activities.
  
Index
+
Marx also writes in ''Theses on Feuerbach'' that:
  
O 263
+
<blockquote>
 +
The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory, but it is a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power... of his thinking.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Online 174, 205–206
+
This point is key for understanding the dialectical relationship between practice and theory: in order to be useful, theory must be ''proven through practice''. Thus, we must seek to develop our practice through theory, and our theory through practice.
  
Equifax 197
+
Engels summarizes these ideas a bit more colorfully in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
  
Ergonomics 181
+
<blockquote>
 +
Before there was argument there was action... In the beginning was the deed ... And human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Essence 127–128, 130
 
  
Ethics of Freedom, The 101
+
-----
  
Ethos 23
+
Engels wrote in ''Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'' of the uselessness of what might be called “pure theory,” divorced from practice, and the sort of radical skepticism which refutes that any practical knowledge can ever really be obtained by human beings:
  
Europe, role of in story of progress 17–18
+
<blockquote>
 +
There is yet a set of different philosophers — those who question the possibility of any cognition, or at least of an exhaustive cognition of the world... The most telling refutation of this (scepticism and agnosticism) as of all other philosophical crotchets, is praxis, namely experiment and industry.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Euthanasia 107
+
It is ''practice'', according to Engels, which proves the merit and utility of theory.
  
Everyday life 5, 7, 34, 82, 87, 88, 89, 103,
+
Through experiment and industry — through practical activities in the material world — we can test our ideas and dialectically develop both theory and practice. Lenin built upon these ideas in his own work, writing in ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'':
  
114, 146, 151, 185, 189, 194
+
<blockquote>
 +
The materialist theory, the theory of the reflection of objects by our mind, is here presented with absolute clarity: things exist outside us. Our perceptions and ideas are their images. Verification of these images, differentiation between true and false images, is given by practice.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Evolution 8, 9, 21–23, 24, 153
+
Here, Lenin explains how only a proper understanding and application of the dialectical relationship between theory and practice can lead to the negation of false consciousness [see Annotation 235, p. 231] and the dialectical development of both practice and theory. Simply arguing and debating about ideas without relating them directly to practice will never lead to truth, nor will such pure-theory argumentation develop theory or practice in any meaningful way.
  
E-waste 2
+
This brings to mind another line from Marx’s ''Theses on Feuerbach'':
  
Expanding Architecture: Design as
+
<blockquote>
 +
The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Activism 91
+
The philosophy of dialectical materialism and the system of materialist dialectics are designed specifically to produce ''action'' and to avoid such “scholastic questions” and “pure-theory argumentation.”
  
Expert systems 71
+
Ho Chi Minh summarized these ideas perhaps most clearly and precisely of all in the very title of his article: ''Practice Generates Knowledge, Understanding Advances Theory, Theory Leads to Practice:''
  
Exploit 170
+
<blockquote>
 +
Knowledge comes from practice. And through practice, knowledge becomes theory. That theory, again, has to be put into practice. Knowledge advances not just from thought to theory, but, above all, from applying theory to revolutionary practice. Once the world’s law is fully grasped as theory, it is critical to put that theory into practice by changing the world, by increasing production, and by practicing class struggle and struggling for national self-determination. This is a continuous process of obtaining knowledge.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Exploit, The 169
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-91.png|''“If Uncle Ho says we will win, we will win!” — Propaganda poster from the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1984).'']]
  
Exploring Technology and Social Space 180
+
= Afterword =
  
Eye surgery 38
+
If it seems that this book has come to an end somewhat abruptly, it’s because this is really just the first of four major sections of the full volume from which this text is drawn. If you are reading this afterword after reading the entirety of the preceding contents, then congratulations, you have completed the equivalent to a full semester’s coursework for a class on dialectical materialist philosophy which all Vietnamese college students are required to take!
  
Eyeglasses 38
+
The next sections in this curriculum, each covered in the original full volume, include:
  
Facebook 51, 150, 151, 175, 191, 197,
+
=== Part 2: Historical Materialism ===
  
205, 207
+
This section covers the definition and basic principles of historical materialism, which is the field of work dedicated to applying dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics to human history and human society. In the West, historical materialism and dialectical materialism are often conflated, but this is in error. Historical materialism is an ''applied field'' of dialectical materialist philosophy and materialist dialectical methodology which is used in the pursuit of understanding and interpreting human history.
  
Factory 16, 20, 30, 42, 43, 45, 63, 68, 79,
+
=== Part 3: Political Economy ===
  
80, 174, 186, 192
+
This section condenses the three cardinal volumes of ''Capital'' by Karl Marx and covers three primary doctrines:
  
Fahrenheit 451, 72–73
+
1. The doctrine of value.
  
Fallows, James 210, 241
+
2. The doctrine of surplus value.
  
Farman, Jason 240
+
3. The doctrines of monopolist capitalism and state monopolist capitalism.
  
Farming 27, 38, 44–45, 176
+
Political Economy, in this course, can be considered the application of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics to the analysis and understanding of the capitalist mode of production from the perspective of the socialist revolutionary movement.
  
Fascism 191
+
=== Part 4: Scientific Socialism ===
  
Fawcett, John 234
+
This section relies on an established understanding of dialectical materialism, historical materialism, and political economy as a foundation for developing socialist revolution. The three chapters of this section on Scientific Socialism are:
  
FC (Freedom Club); see Unabomber
+
1. The Historical Mission of the Working Class and the Socialist Revolution
  
Featherstone, David 160, 238
+
2. The Primary Social-Political Issues of the Process of Building a Socialist Revolution 3. Realistic Socialism and Potential Socialism
  
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
+
=== Moving Forward ===
  
97–98, 99, 150
+
We are already working on the translation of Part 2 of this curriculum, and we hope to complete it as quickly as possible. In the meantime, we believe this book provides the reader with enough of a foundation to continue studying and to begin applying the principles of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics in political struggle.
  
Feed 215–216, 221, 222, 223
+
We highly discourage readers from self-study in isolation, just as we discourage individual political action. The best way to study socialism is ''alongside other socialists''.
  
Feenberg, Andrew 111, 236
+
Depending on where you live, you may be able to find political education resources provided by communist parties, socialist book clubs, or other organizations. If such resources aren’t available, it should be fairly easy to find study groups, workshops, and affinity groups online where you can study with like-minded comrades. Of course, socialist revolution requires more than just study, as we hope this book has thoroughly explained. Theory ''must'' be coupled with practice. As Ho Chi Minh wrote: “If you read a thousand books, but you fail to apply theory into practice, you are nothing but a bookshelf.”
  
Feminist cultural studies 176
+
To avoid atrophying into the proverbial bookshelf, we encourage you to go out into the world and apply these ideas creatively and collectively with other socialists. Dialectical materialism is a philosophy that was developed from the ground up for ''application in the real world''. Dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics provide a functional model of reality, a way of looking at highly complicated systems, with all their dynamic internal and external relations. Dialectical materialist philosophy demands that we see human systems as processes in motion. In order to fully comprehend such dynamic processes, we must engage with them, which is why Ho Chi Minh taught that “we are not afraid to make mistakes; we would only be afraid of making mistakes if we were not determined to correct them.”<ref>''Revolutionary Ethics,'' Ho Chi Minh, December 1958.</ref>
  
Fetus 213, 224
+
As we mentioned in the foreword, many socialists in the West suffer from a lack of practical ''engagement''. Far too many socialists fall into utopianism, idealism, and social chauvinism and we believe this largely stems from failures to test ideas against reality through ''praxis''. We hope that this book has impressed upon the reader that simply arguing about pure theory is a useless and futile pursuit. Indeed, sparring verbally over such “scholastic questions,” as Marx described them, is counter-productive. Marx and Engels defined such failure to engage in theory as “critical criticism” — that is to say, criticism for the sake of criticism. As Marx and Engels wrote in ''The Holy Family,'' such critical criticism is futile, as we will never ''think'' our way to revolution:
  
Film 199
+
<blockquote>
 +
According to Critical Criticism, the whole evil lies only in the workers’ “thinking”. It is true that the English and French workers have formed associations in which they exchange opinions not only on their immediate needs as workers, but on their needs as human beings. In their associations, moreover, they show a very thorough and comprehensive consciousness of the “enormous” and “immeasurable” power which arises from their co-operation. But these mass-minded, communist workers, employed, for instance, in the Manchester or Lyons workshops, do not believe that by “pure thinking” they will be able to argue away their industrial masters and their own practical debasement. They are most painfully aware of the difference between being and thinking, between consciousness and life. They know that property, capital, money, wage-labour and the like are no ideal figments of the brain but very practical, very objective products of their self-estrangement and that therefore they must be abolished in a practical, objective way for man to become man not only in thinking, in consciousness, but in mass being, in life. Critical Criticism, on the contrary, teaches them that they cease in reality to be wage-workers if in thinking they abolish the thought of wage-labour; if in thinking they cease to regard themselves as wage-workers and, in accordance with that extravagant notion, no longer let themselves be paid for their person. As absolute idealists, as ethereal beings, they will then naturally be able to live on the ether of pure thought.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Fiore, Quentin 233, 240, 241
+
Engels expressed his frustration with such endless, utopian, idealist debates in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
  
Fisher, Terence 233
+
<blockquote>
 +
Hence, from this nothing could come but a kind of eclectic, average Socialism, which, as a matter of fact, has up to the present time dominated the minds of most of the socialist workers in France and England. Hence, a mish-mash allowing of the most manifold shades of opinion: a mish-mash of such critical statements, economic theories, pictures of future society by the founders of different sects, as excite a minimum of opposition; a mish-mash which is the more easily brewed the more definite sharp edges of the individual constituents are rubbed down in the stream of debate, like rounded pebbles in a brook.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Flynn, Elizabeth A. 242
+
Engels concludes by punctuating ''why'' he and Marx had developed dialectical materialism as a praxis-oriented philosophical foundation for scientific socialism: “To make a science of Socialism, it had first to be placed upon a real basis.” We hope that the readers of this text will seek out real bases for your development in theory and praxis, and we trust that you will quickly discover that developing practice develops theory, and vice-versa.
  
Foot strike 209, 241
+
Remember that Marx and Engels, themselves, were not just theorists who scribbled down their thoughts in an “scholarly” vacuum. They were revolutionists themselves, highly engaged in political struggle and, in so struggling, they risked their lives and freedom over the course of many decades. This struggle is what led to the change and development of their ideas over time. The same can be said for every other successful socialist revolutionary in history.
  
Forefoot strike 209, 210
+
Vo Nguyen Giap, the great general who led Vietnam’s military forces through resistance wars against fascist Japan, colonialist France, and the imperialist USA, describes how he applied such principles on the battlefield in his book ''People’s War, People’s Army'':
  
Heel strike 209, 210
+
<blockquote>
 +
During the Resistance War, owing to constant fighting, the training of our troops could not be carried out continuously for a lengthy period but only between battles or campaigns. We actively implemented the guiding principles ‘To train and to learn while we fight.’ After the difficult years at the beginning of the Resistance War, we succeeded in giving good training to our army. The practical viewpoint in this training deserves to be highlighted. The content of training became most practical and rich. Training was in touch with practical fighting: the troops were trained in accordance with the next day’s fighting, and victory or defeat in the fighting was the best gauge for the control and assessment of the result of the training. On the basis of gradual unification of the organisation and its equipment, the content of training in the various units of the regular army was also systematised step by step.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Midfoot strike 209
+
Here, Vo Nguyen Giap has provided a concrete example of the dialectical relationship between theory and practice, and their inseparability. This fundamental aspect of dialectical materialist philosophy demands that we think and act like ''scientists'' to change the world, rather than simply speculating and imagining ineffectually like armchair philosophers. As Marx wrote in ''Theses on Feuerbach'' “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.” We encourage you to apply what you learn in this and other books to ''change the world.''
  
Ford, Henry 42
+
=== Advice on Further Study ===
  
Fordism 42
+
As you advance in your studies of socialist literature and theory, we offer the following advice:
  
Foreign Policy in Focus 83
+
First, you must recognize that the specific language used by revolutionary leaders and thinkers may vary widely across time and around the world. Fashions in language develop over time, and many contributions — like the text you’ve just read — come to us through translation from countless languages. This is why we believe it critical to develop an understanding of the ''spirit'' of the ideas of any particular text, and not to get bogged down in semantics and terminology. Liberal ideologists have done much to distract and divert intellectual energy with endless metaphysical altercation over the “proper” usage of this or that word. We caution strongly against this attitude, which makes us susceptible to sophistry, opportunism, and the sewing of undue conflict and division amidst the working class. We have pointed out various instances where Marx, Engels, and Lenin used different language to describe the same concepts. We also offer the reminder that Marx, Engels, and Lenin were writing in different languages at different times, just as socialists around the world have different linguistic and cultural backgrounds. As socialism is an international movement, we must stress the importance of avoiding linguistic barriers by engaging with one another in good faith and testing conflicting ideas and interpretations of theory against one another through practice instead of getting bogged down with “critical criticism.”
  
Forms of content 157
+
Next, we encourage students of socialist philosophy to always keep in mind that the doctrines and philosophies of revolutionary figures are products of the times and places in which they were conceived. It would be a mistake to view the works of any revolutionary figure as a road map or a set of instructions to follow by rote. Even Marx and Engels changed and developed their own ideas over the decades they were active, as they addressed in the 1872 preface to ''The Communist Manifesto'':
  
Forms of expression 157
+
<blockquote>
 +
The practical application of the principles will depend, as the Manifesto itself states, everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being existing, and, for that reason, no special stress is laid on the revolutionary measures proposed at the end of Section II. That passage would, in many respects, be very differently worded today. In view of the gigantic strides of Modern Industry since 1848, and of the accompanying improved and extended organization of the working class, in view of the practical experience gained, first in the February Revolution, and then, still more, in the Paris Commune, where the proletariat for the first time held political power for two whole months, this programme has in some details been antiquated. One thing especially was proved by the Commune, viz., that “the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.” (See The Civil War in France: Address of the General Council of the International Working Men’ s Association, 1871, where this point is further developed.) Further, it is self-evident that the criticism of socialist literature is deficient in relation to the present time, because it comes down only to 1847; also that the remarks on the relation of the Communists to the various opposition parties (Section IV), although, in principle still correct, yet in practice are antiquated, because the political situation has been entirely changed, and the progress of history has swept from off the earth the greater portion of the political parties there enumerated.”
 +
</blockquote>
  
Forms of life, technology as 111, 167, 237
+
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and Ho Chi Minh also frequently took pains to point out that their revolutionary theories were devised specifically to suit the particular objective conditions of their own respective times and places. For example, in ''What is to be Done'', Lenin discusses the question of secrecy in revolutionary activity. Lenin recognizes that secrecy is not always necessary, such as in the more liberal social democracies which existed in Europe in his era. In Russia, however — with its autocratic monarchy — material conditions called for more covert activity:
  
Forster, Marc 234
+
<blockquote>
 +
In countries where political liberty exists the distinction between a trade union and a political organisation is clear enough, as is the distinction between trade unions and Social-Democracy. The relations between the latter and the former will naturally vary in each country according to historical, legal, and other conditions; they may be more or less close, complex, etc. (in our opinion they should be as close and as little complicated as possible); but there can be no question in free countries of the organisation of trade unions coinciding with the organisation of the Social-Democratic Party. In Russia, however, the yoke of the autocracy appears at first glance to obliterate all distinctions between the Social-Democratic organisation and the workers’ associations, since all workers’ associations and all study circles are prohibited, and since the principal manifestation and weapon of the workers’ economic struggle — the strike — is regarded as a criminal (and sometimes even as a political!) offence.”
 +
</blockquote>
  
Foucault, Michel 63, 233
+
Ho Chi Minh was even more explicit about the requirement to tailor theory to current and local material conditions in a speech to the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1950:
  
Fox, Nichols 82, 91, 234, 235
+
<blockquote>
 +
Studying Marxism-Leninism is not just a matter of repeating the slogan ‘workers of the world, unite’ like a parrot. We must unify Marxism-Leninism with the reality of Vietnam’s revolution. Talking about Marxism-Leninism in Vietnam is talking about the specific guidelines and policies of the Communist Party of Vietnam. For example, our priority now is: great solidarity!
 +
</blockquote>
  
Foxconn 30, 232
+
In a 2001 document, the Communist Party of Vietnam explained how Ho Chi Minh tailored lessons learned from prior revolutionaries to the specific material conditions of revolutionary Vietnam:
  
Fracking 107, 223
+
<blockquote>
 +
Ho Chi Minh’s thought is... the creative application and development of Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of our country. Ho Chi Minh learned profound lessons from Lenin and the Russian October Revolution, but he did not simply use those lessons as a template, nor did he just copy that foundation. Instead, he absorbed the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. Lenin’s thesis allowed Ho Chi Minh to see what was necessary for the Vietnamese people — the path of national liberation. Ho Chi Minh had creative arguments that contributed to enriching Marxism-Leninism in the issue of national liberation revolution, building a new democratic regime and the transitional path to socialism in an Eastern, semi-feudal colony which was still very backward: Vietnam.
 +
</blockquote>
  
Francis, Freddie 233
+
As you find your own revolutionary path, you must carefully examine the objective conditions of your own time and place, and work collectively and collaboratively with your fellow revolutionists to decide how theory and lessons gleaned from history apply to your own circumstances. And, of course, you must test the validity of your conclusions against reality through ''practice''.
  
Frankenstein 59, 60, 62, 70, 215, 225
+
=== Creative Application of Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics ===
  
Franklin, Benjamin 18
+
Finally, we implore you to apply dialectical materialism ''creatively''. Don’t look at this (or any other) book as a set of static instructions. Dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics are living, breathing systems of thought which benefit from the ideas and imagination of comrades working and struggling together. Seek the ''spirit'' of these ideas, study revolutionary theory and history, then ''apply'' what you learn in your daily life. Combat dogmatism and avoid arguments over pure theory. Determine what works and what doesn’t through activity in the real world, and apply what you learn from practical experience to your theoretical development. Over time, you will begin to see how practice and theory impact and develop one another. When you are struggling with a particular problem in revolutionary practice, you will find yourself reading theory in a new light, discovering information and ideas which might be applicable to your immediate circumstances. And as you study theory, you will find that it also impacts your practice, giving you tools and perspective and methodologies for action which you might never have imagined on your own.
  
French Revolution 18
+
We have tried to make this book a useful companion for further study. We have also made the digital version available for free online. If you have found it useful, we hope you will share it freely and widely.
  
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
+
=== In Closing ===
  
Station 20
+
One last time we would like to thank Dr. Vijay Prashad and Dr. Taimur Rahman for their wonderful insights on our translation, and to acknowledge the monumental work of the Vietnamese scholars who wrote and revised the original text from which this volume is drawn. We also want to recognize once more the donors and supporters who have given us the precious resource of time to translate and annotate this work. Finally, we want to thank the teams at the Iskra Books and The International Magazine, who have provided invaluable editing and peer review services, promotion, and guidance. You can find all their publications, respectively, at:
  
Fuller, Glen 231
+
IskraBooks.org
  
Fulton, Robert 120
+
InternationalMagz.com
  
Gabrys, Jennifer 242
+
If you would like to download the free digital version of this book, support future translation work, or if you would like to get in touch, you can visit our website:
  
Galilei, Galileo 5
+
BanyanHouse.org
  
Galloway, Alexander 168–170, 238, 239
+
We will leave you, now, with the immortal words of the Manifesto:
  
Gambling addiction 192
+
'''Workers of the world, unite!'''
  
Gamification 158, 238
+
You have nothing to lose but your chains.
  
Gaming 193
+
=== In Solidarity, ===
  
Gates, Bill 40, 232
+
''-'' ''Luna Nguyen, Translator &amp; Annotations''
  
Gemmell, Jim 207–208, 241, 242
+
''-'' ''Emerican Johnson, Editor, Illustrator, &amp; Annotations''
  
Gender 41, 198, 199, 201, 202, 203, 204,
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-92.jpg|''“Marxism-Leninism — Long Live the Victories” — a demonstration to welcome the liberation army in the South of Vietnam on April 30, 1975.'']]
  
205, 208, 212
+
<br />
  
Genetic engineering; see Biotechnology
+
= [Appendices] =
  
Georges, Eugenia 241
+
== Appendix A: Basic Pairs of Categories Used in Materialist Dialectics ==
  
Gershuny, J.L. 240
+
This is a summary of the basic pairs of universal categories and their characteristics which are discussed in depth starting on p. 126.
  
Giddens, Anthony 69, 234
+
{|
 +
| | '''Private'''
 +
| '''Common'''
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | A specific item, event, or process.
 +
| The properties that are shared between Private things, phenomena, and ideas.
 +
|
 +
|}
  
Gilliom, John 238
+
''Private'' is commonly referred to in literature as ''Special/Specific'' while ''Common'' is commonly called ''General''. ''Note:'' When an aspect or characteristic is not held in common with anything else in existence, it is considered ''Unique''. The Unique can become Common, just as the Common can become Unique. Example: a Unique design for an object may be replicated, making it Common. A type of item that is Common may gradually disappear until there is only one example left, making it Unique. ''See p. 128.''
  
Glanz, James 242
+
{|
 +
| | '''Reason'''
 +
| '''Result'''
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | Mutual impact between things, phenomena, or ideas which causes each to change.
 +
| The change caused by a Reason.
 +
|
 +
|}
  
Glendenning, Chellis 83–84, 235
+
''Reason'' and ''Result'' may be referred to as ''Cause'' and ''Effect'', respectively, though this should lead to confusion with metaphysical conceptions of cause and effect. ''Note:'' Reasons can be Direct or Indirect. ''See p. 138''
  
Global Positioning System (GPS) 25, 185,
+
{|
 +
| | '''Obviousness'''
 +
| '''Randomness'''
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | Refers to events that always and predictably happen due to factors of internal material structure.
 +
| Events caused by external impacts and interactions which are thus not completely predictable.
 +
|
 +
|}
  
187, 212
+
''Obvious'' may be referred to as ''Necessary,'' while ''Randomness'' may be referred to as ''Accidental. See p. 145.''
  
Global village 189
+
{|
 +
| | '''Content'''
 +
| '''Form'''
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | What something is made of.
 +
| The shape that contains content.
 +
|
 +
|}
  
Globalization 83, 179
+
Ways in which Content and Form are discussed and perceived can can vary wildly depending on the subject being discussed and the viewpoint from which the subject is being considered. ''See p. 145.''
  
Gods Must Be Crazy, The 33
+
{|
 +
| | '''Essence'''
 +
| '''Phenomena'''
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | Features that make something develop a certain way.
 +
| The expression of the essence in certain conditions.
 +
|
 +
|}
  
Goldberg, Ken 232
+
''See p. 156.''
  
Golden Shield 149
+
{|
 +
| | '''Possibility'''
 +
| '''Reality'''
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | What may happen, or might exist, in the future, if certain developments take place.
 +
| What is happening, or what exists, at the present moment.
 +
|
 +
|}
  
Google 53, 66, 150, 207, 222
+
''See p. 160.''
  
Google Glass 221
+
== Appendix B: the Two Basic Principles of Dialectical Materialism ==
  
Gordon, Eric 240
+
'''The Principle of General Relationships''' This principle states that:
  
Government Communications
+
“Materialist dialectics upholds the position that all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in mutual relationships with each other, regulate each other, transform into each other, and that nothing exists in complete isolation.”
  
Headquarters (GCHQ) 150
+
From this Principle, we find the characteristics of ''Diversity in Unity'' and ''Unity in Diversity''; the basis of Diversity in Unity is the fact that every thing, phenomenon, and idea contains many different relationships; the basis of Unity in Diversity is that many different relationships exist — unified — within each and every thing, phenomenon, and idea.
  
Gramsci, Antonio 176, 239
+
'''''The Characteristic of Diversity in Unity''''' is derived from the fact that there exist an infinite number of diverse relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas, but all of these relationships share the same foundation in the material world.
  
Gray, Ann 202, 240
+
'''''The Characteristic of Unity in Diversity''''' is derived from the fact that when we examine the universal relationships that exist within and between all different things, phenomena, and ideas, we will find that each individual manifestation of any universal relationship will have its own different manifestations, aspects, features, etc. Thus even the universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in infinite diversity.
  
Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry
+
'''The Principle of Development''' This principle states that:
  
of All Nations 26, 232
+
'''“'''Development is a process that comes from within the thing-in-itself; the process of solving the contradictions within things and phenomena. Therefore, development is inevitable, objective, and occurs without dependence on human will.”
  
Greece 36, 39, 51–52, 109
+
'''''The Characteristic of Objectiveness of Development''''' stems from the origin of motion. Since motion originates from mutual impacts which occur between external things, objects, and relationships, the motions themselves also occur externally (relative to all other things, phenomena, and objects). This gives motion itself objective characteristics.
  
Green Revolution 88
+
'''''The Characteristic of Generality of Development''''' stems from the fact that development occurs in every process that exists in every field of nature, society, and human thought; in every thing, every phenomenon, and every process and stage of these things and phenomena.
  
Greenwald, Glenn 234, 242
+
'''''The Characteristic of Diversity of Development''''' stems from the fact that every thing, phenomenon, and idea has its own process of development that is not totally identical to the process of development of any other thing, phenomenon, or idea.
  
Gregg, Melissa 233, 240
+
== Appendix C: the Three Universal Laws of Materialist Dialectics ==
  
Grossberg, Lawrence 133, 152, 154, 171,
+
=== The Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality ===
  
172, 217, 218, 237, 238, 239, 241, 242
+
The law of transformation between quantity and quality is a universal law which concerns the universal mode of motion and development processes of nature, society, and human thought. The law was formulated by Friedrich Engels in ''Dialectics of Nature'', and states that:
  
264 O
+
“In nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion.” ''See more on p. 163.''
  
Index
+
=== The Law of Unification and Contradiction Between Opposites ===
  
Grosz, Elizabeth 111, 237
+
The law of unification and contradiction between opposites is the essence of dialectics. It states, as formulated by V. I. Lenin in ''Summary of Dialectics'':
  
Guatemala 92
+
“The fundamental, originating, and universal driving force of all motion and development processes is the inherent and objective contradiction which exists in all things, phenomena, and ideas.” ''See more on p. 175.''
  
Guattari, Félix 133, 156, 159, 172,
+
=== The Law of Negation of Negation ===
  
237, 238
+
The law of negation of negation describes the fundamental and universal tendency of movement and development to occur through a cyclical form of development through what is termed “negation of negation.” Formulated by Friedrich Engels in ''Anti-Dühring,'' it states:
  
Guns 49–50, 53, 54, 56, 57, 60, 122, 123,
+
“The true, natural, historical, and dialectical negation is (formally) the moving source of all development--the division into opposites, their struggle and resolution, and what is more, on the basis of experience gained, the original point is achieved again (partly in history, fully in thought), but at a higher stage.” ''See more on p. 185.''
  
124, 126, 128, 131, 133, 134, 154, 155
+
== Appendix D: Forms of Consciousness and Knowledge ==
  
Gutenberg, Johannes 8
+
''Consciousness'' refers to the self-aware, productive, and creative motion and activity of the human brain. Practical activity is the most direct basis, motive, and purpose of consciousness, and is the criterion for testing truth. See: ''The Relationship Between Praxis and Consciousness'', p. 216.
  
Hadley, Brian 240
+
''Knowledge'' is the content of consciousness. Knowledge includes data about the world, such as ideas, memories, and other thoughts which are derived by direct observation and practical activities in the material world, through scientific experiments, or through abstract reflection of practical and scientific activities which occur within consciousness.
  
Hage, Ghassan 241
+
Consciousness and Knowledge have a dialectical relationship with one another: knowledge is developed within consciousness, and consciousness develops to higher levels as knowledge is accumulated and tested against reality (which also develops knowledge itself). In this manner, consciousness and knowledge develop into higher forms over time in individual consciousness and human society. Thus, consciousness and knowledge can be considered as existing in various forms which represent stages of development in dialectical processes of development.
  
Hall, Stuart 152, 155, 160, 216, 228, 238,
+
Note that the development processes of knowledge and consciousness are dialectical in nature, not linear. For example, after empirical consciousness develops into theoretical consciousness, theoretical consciousness will then impact empirical consciousness, developing empirical consciousness into a higher stage of development. This is true for all development processes related to empirical and theoretical consciousness. These development processes and forms of consciousness and knowledge are explained in more detail in Chapter 3: Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism, starting on page 204.
  
239, 241, 242
+
=== Forms of Consciousness ===
  
Hammer Studios 60, 233
+
Consciousness is a process of the development of knowledge through a combination of human brain activity and human practical activity in the physical world (i.e., labor). The development of consciousness can be considered on the criteria of ''concrete/abstract'' and of ''passive/active''. For more information, see Annotation 216, p. 210.
  
Hand looms 234
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-99.png]]
  
Haraway, Donna 212, 241, 242
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-100.png]]
  
Hardt, Michael 238
+
=== The Cognitive Process ===
  
Harman, Graham 238
+
The Cognitive Process is a model developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin which represents the dialectical path of consciousness to truth. For more information, see ''Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth'' on page 219.
  
Havelock, Eric 52, 233, 239
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-101.png]]
  
Hayles, N. Katherine 159, 238
+
=== Forms of Knowledge ===
  
Hazeltine, Barrett 90, 94, 235, 236
+
''For more information see Annotation 218, p. 214.''
  
Headrick, Daniel 239
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-102.png]]
  
Hegel, G.W.F. 70, 234
+
== Appendix E: Properties of Truth ==
  
Heidegger, Martin 130, 131, 210, 237, 241
+
Truth is the alignment of consciousness with objective reality. All truths are objective, relative, absolute, and concrete. Truths also have characteristics of concreteness and abstractness.
  
HeLa cell line 225
+
'''Objectivity:''' The content of truth is external to the subjective will of human beings. The content of knowledge must be aligned with objective reality, not vice versa. This means that the content of accurate knowledge is not a product of pure subjective reasoning but is objective in nature.
  
Heliocentrism 5
+
'''Absoluteness:''' Absolute truth<ref>Note: Absolute Truth in dialectical materialist philosophy should not be confused with Hegel’s conception of Absolute Truth as a final point at which human consciousness will have achieved absolute, complete, and final understanding of our universe.</ref> is derived from the complete alignment between objective reality and human consciousness. The possibility of acquiring absolute truth in the process of the development of conscious understanding is theoretically limitless. However, in reality, our conscious ability to reflect reality is limited by the specific material conditions of each generation of humanity, of practical limitations, and by the spatial and temporal conditions of reflected subjects. Therefore, truth is also ''relative''.
  
Hellerman, Caleb 242
+
'''Relativity:''' Relative truth is truth which has developed alignment with reality without yet having reached ''complete'' alignment. To put it another way, relative truth represents knowledge which incompletely reflects material subjects without complete accuracy. In relative truth, there is only partial alignment — in some (but not all) aspects — between consciousness and the material world.
  
Heresy 13, 17, 28
+
'''Dialectical Relationship Between Absolute and Relative Truth:''' Relative truth and absolute truth do not exist separately, but have dialectical unity with each other. On the one hand, “absolute truth” is the sum of all “relative truths.” On the other hand, in all relative truths there are always elements of absolute truth.
  
Highway 169–170
+
'''Concreteness:''' The concreteness of truth refers to the degree to which a truth is attached to specific objects, in specific conditions, at a specific point in time. This means that all accurate knowledge always refers to a specific situation which involves specific subjects which exist in a specific place and time. The content of truth cannot be pure abstraction, disconnected from reality, but it is always associated with certain, specific objects and phenomena which exist in a specific space, time, and arrangement, with specific internal and external relationships. Therefore, truth is associated with specific historical conditions. This specificity to time, place, relations, etc., is ''concreteness''.
  
Hirose, Naoya 209, 241
+
'''Abstractness:''' Abstract knowledge is knowledge which is not attached (or less attached) to specific times, places, relations, etc. Some degree of abstraction is necessary to develop theoretical understanding of general laws and the nature of objective reality, but care should be taken knowledge does not become completely detached from specific historical conditions, as this will result in ''pure abstraction''. Knowledge which is purely abstract will not align with reality, and such knowledge cannot be considered truth.
  
Hjorth, Larissa 240
+
== Appendix F: Common Deviations From Dialectical Materialism ==
  
Hobsbawm, Eric 78, 234, 235
+
Throughout the history of the development of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics, there have been many philosophical and methodological deviations which have derived from incorrect analysis, interpretation, and a failure to properly link theory and practice. Below are descriptions of some of the more common deviations which the reader should be aware of.
  
Hobson’s Choice 56–57, 233
+
'''Bureaucracy:''' An expression of ''dogmatism'' which arises when theory becomes overly formalized, to the extent that practical considerations are ignored in favor of codified theory.
  
Honduras 92
+
'''Conservativism:''' A mindset which seeks to prevent and stifle development and to hold humanity in a static position. Not only is this detrimental to humanity, it is also ultimately a wasted effort, because development is inevitable in human society, as in all things, phenomena, and ideas.
  
Hoover Dam 20, 29
+
'''Dogmatism:''' A breakdown of the dialectical relationship between theoretical consciousness and empirical consciousness, which arrests the development process of knowledge and consciousness. Usually the result of: failure to seek commonalities; considering theory itself as the sole basis of truth rather than practice; ignoring practical experience and considering pre-established theory, alone, as unalterable truth.
  
Housework 41, 43, 45, 66, 201
+
'''Eclecticism:''' An approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject; the philosophical error of inconsistently applying different theories and principles in different situations. Empiricism: A broad philosophical position which holds that only experience (including internal experience) can be held as a source of knowledge or truth. Though nominally opposed to idealism, it is considered a faulty (or naive) form of materialism, since it sees the world as only unconnected, static appearances and ignores the reality of dialectical (changing) relationships between objects.
  
Hoving, Thomas 240
+
'''Idealism:''' A philosophical position which holds that the only reliable experience of reality occurs within human consciousness. Idealists believe that relying on human reason exclusively or as a first basis is the best way to seek truth. Various forms of idealism exist, broadly broken down into subjective idealism, which denies the existence of an external objective world, and objective idealism, which accepts that an external objective world exists, but denies that knowledge can be reliably gained about it through sense perception.
  
Huffington, Arianna 175
+
'''Opportunism:''' A system of political opinions with no direction, no clear path, no coherent viewpoint, leaning on whatever is beneficial for the opportunist in the short term.
  
Huffington Post, The 175
+
'''Revisionism:''' A failure to recognize and accept commonalities in conscious activity, focusing only on the private. Revisionism leads to constant and unnecessary reassessment and reevaluation of both knowledge and practice. Revisionism, thus, is a position which overstates the relativity of truth and ignores truths which are more fully developed towards absoluteness.
  
Hughes, Thomas 53, 233
+
'''Rigidity:''' An unwillingness to alter one’s thoughts, holding too stiffly to established consciousness and knowledge, and ignoring practical experience and observation, which leads to stagnation of both knowledge and consciousness.
  
Human, as problematic 224–226
+
'''Skepticism:''' The belief truth is essentially undiscoverable, because human consciousness is ultimately unreliable and incapable of accurately reflecting material reality. By denying that truth is discoverable at all, skepticism explicitly rejects absolute truth and declares that all truth is relative and unreliable. Solipsism: A form of idealism in which one believes that the self is the only basis for truth. As Marxist ethicist Howard Selsam wrote in ''Ethics and Progress: New Values in a Revolutionary World'': “If I believe that I alone exist and that you and all your arguments exist only in my mind and are my own creations then all possible arguments will not shake me one iota. No logic can possibly convince [the] solipsist.”
  
Human genome 61, 205
+
'''Sophistry:''' The use of falsehoods and misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, and with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. This kind of bad faith argument has no place in materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics must, instead, be rooted in a true and accurate understanding of the subject, material conditions, and reality in general.
  
Identity 10, 197–213, 218
+
'''Subjectivism:''' The centering of one’s own self and conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test one’s own perceptions against material and social reality. Subjectivists tend to believe that they can independently reason their way to truth in their own minds without practical experience and activity in the material world.
  
And assemblage 198
+
'''Utilitarianism:''' An ethical philosophical theory founded by Jeremy Bentham which seeks to maximize “utility,” which is considered to be a metaphysical property embodying “benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness.” Karl Marx dismissed utilitarianism as overly abstract, in that it reduces all social relationships to the single characteristic of “utility.” He also viewed utilitarianism as metaphysically static and tied to the status quo of current society, since utilitarianism does not address class dynamics and views all relations in the current status quo of society, making utilitarianism an essentially conservative theory. Marx also pointed out that Utilitarianism essentially views individuals as private individuals, not as social individuals, and seeks to work out solutions to the practical problems of human society through reasoning alone without examining material conditions and processes, and without taking into consideration practice and development, writing:
  
Cards 198
+
<blockquote>
 +
“The whole criticism of the existing world by the utility theory was... restricted within a narrow range. Remaining within the confines of bourgeois conditions, it could criticise only those relations which had been handed down from a past epoch and were an obstacle to the development of the bourgeoisie... the economic content gradually turned the utility theory into a mere apologia for the existing state of affairs, an attempt to prove that under existing conditions the mutual relations of people today are the most advantageous and generally useful.”
 +
</blockquote>
  
Cyborg 210–211
 
  
Defined 198
+
= [Back Matter] =
  
Online 205–206
+
== Glossary &amp; Index ==
  
Theft 198
+
{|
 +
| | '''Absolute Truth'''
 +
| Absolute Truth can refer to:<br />
 +
<br />
 +
1. The recognition that objective and accurate truth can be drawn from sense perception of the material world along with labor and practice activities in the material world. The opposite of this position is Relativism. See p. 56, 94, 194, 228–229, 232–234.<br />
 +
<br />
 +
2. Hegel’s notion of Absolute Truth: that there will eventually be some end point of to the process of rational consciousness at which point humanity will arrive at a final stage of knowledge and consciousness. See p. 228.<br />
 +
<br />
 +
See also: Relative Truth, Relativism, Stagnation, Truth.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Absolutization'''
 +
| To hold a belief or supposition as always true in all situations and without exception. See p. 49.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Abstract Labor'''
 +
| The abstract conception of expenditure of human energy in the form of labor, without taking into account the value of labor output. When the value of labor output ''is'' taken into consideration, it is referred to as ''concrete labor''. See p. 15, 17.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Adam Smith'''
 +
| (1723–1790) British logic professor, moral philosophy professor, and economist. Along with David Ricardo, Adam Smith was one of the founders of ''political economy'', which Marx both drew from and critiqued in his analysis and critique of capitalism. See p. 14, 155.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Ahistoric Perspective'''
 +
| A perspective which considers aspects of human society without due consideration of historical processes of development. For example, Adam Smith and David Ricardo viewed political economy ahistorically, viewing capitalism as a static, universal, and eternal product of natural law rather than seeing capitalism as a product of historical processes of development which would change and develop over time. See p. 116.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Base'''
 +
| Also known as: Economic Base; Economic Basis. The material processes which humans undertake to survive and transform our environment to support our ways of living. In the dialectical relationship between base and ''superstructure'', the base refers to the relationship which humans have with the means of production, including the ownership of the means of production and the organization of labor. See p. 23. See also: Superstructure.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Biological Motion'''
 +
| One of the five basic forms of motion described by Engels in ''Dialectics of Nature''. Biological motion refers to changes and development within living objects and their genetic structure. See p. 61.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Biological Reflection'''
 +
| A complex form of reflection found within organic subjects in the natural world and expressed by ''excitation'', ''induction'', and ''reflexes''. See p. 65.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Bourgeoisie'''
 +
| The owners of the means of production and the ruling class under capitalism; also known as the capitalist class. See p. 3, 23, 30, 41, 50, 63, 96. See also:<br />
 +
<br />
 +
Proletariat, Petty Bourgeoisie.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Bureaucracy'''
 +
| An expression of dogmatism which arises when theory becomes overly formalized, to the extent that practical considerations are ignored in favor of codified theory. See p. 217–218.<br />
 +
C→→M→→C C = A Commodity<br />
 +
M = The Money Commodity<br />
 +
The mode of circulation described by Marx as occurring under pre-capitalist economies of simple exchange, in which the producers and consumers of commodities have a direct relationship to the commodities which are being bought and sold. The sellers have produced the commodities with their own labor, and they directly consume the commodities which they purchase. See also: M→C→M’<br />
 +
Marx called this mode of circulation “simple commodity production.” See p. 16.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Capitalism'''
 +
| The current stage of human political economy, defined by private ownership of the means of production. ''Referenced throughout.''
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Capitalist Class'''
 +
| See: Bourgeoisie
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Capitalist Commodity Production'''
 +
| The capitalist mode of production which utilizes the M→C→M’ mode of circulation, in which capitalists own the means of production and pay wages to workers in exchange for their labor, which is used to produce commodities. Capitalists then sell these commodities for profits which are not shared with the workers who provided the labor. See p. 15.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Category'''
 +
| The most general grouping of aspects, attributes, and relations of things, phenomena, and ideas. Different specific fields of inquiry may categorize things, phenomena, and/or ideas differently from one another. See p. 126.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Category Pair'''
 +
| A pair of philosophical categories within materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics tend to focus on ''universal category pairs'' which can be used to examine the characteristics, relations, and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Examples of category pairs include: private and common; content and form; reason and result; essence and phenomena. See p. 127.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Characteristics'''
 +
| The features and attributes that exist internally — within — a given thing, phenomena, or idea. See p. 115.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Chemical Motion'''
 +
| Changes of organic and inorganic substances in processes of combination and separation. See p. 61.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Chemical Reflection'''
 +
| The reflection of mechanical, physical, and chemical changes and reactions of inorganic matter (i.e., changes in structures, position, physical-chemical properties, and the processes of combining and dissolving substances). See p. 65–66.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Circulation'''
 +
| The way in which commodities and money are exchanged for one another. See p. 16.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Commodity'''
 +
| In Marxist political economy, commodities include anything which can be bought and sold, with both a use value (i.e. it satisfies a need of any kind) and a value-form (aka. ‘Exchange value’ and understood as the average socially necessary labour time needed to produce this object). Under capitalism, more and more human activity and production is ‘commodified’ (mediated through market exchange). See p. 15, 87, 133.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Common'''
 +
| See: Private and Common
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Common Laws'''
 +
| Laws (of nature and/or human society) that are applicable to a broader range of subjects than ''private laws'', and which impact many different subjects. For instance: the law of preservation of mass, the law of preservation of energy, etc. See p. 162.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Comprehensive Viewpoint'''
 +
| A ''viewpoint'' which seeks to consider the internal dialectical relationships between the component parts, factors, and aspects within a thing or phenomenon, and which considers external mutual interactions with with other things, phenomena, and ideas. Dialectical materialist philosophy demands a comprehensive basis in order to fully and properly understand things and phenomena in order to effectively solve problems in real life and develop humanity towards communism. See p. 115, 172, 235.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Conception'''
 +
| A relatively complete ''reflection'' within human consciousness of objective things and phenomena. See p. 221–22.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Concrete Labor'''
 +
| The production of a specific commodity with a specific value through labor. When labor is considered without the consideration of output value, it is referred to as ''abstract labor''. See p. 15, 17.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Conditioned Reflex'''
 +
| Conditioned reflexes are reactions which are learned by organisms. These responses are acquired as animals associate previously unrelated neural stimuli with a particular reaction. See p. 66, 68.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Consciousness'''
 +
| The dynamic and creative reflection of the objective world in human brains; the subjective image of the objective world which is produced by the human brain. See p. 68–69, 70.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Content'''
 +
| See: Content and Form.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Content and Form (Category Pair)'''
 +
| Content is the philosophical category which refers to the sum of all aspects, attributes, and processes that a thing, phenomenon, or idea is made from. The Form category refers to the mode of existence and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. Form thus describes the system of relatively stable relationships which exist internally within things, phenomena, and ideas.<br />
 +
<br />
 +
Content and Form have a dialectical relationship with one another, in which content determines form and form impacts back on content. See p. 115, 147155, 166.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Contradiction'''
 +
| A contradiction is a relationship in which two forces oppose one another, leading to mutual development. See p. 123, 159, 163, 169, 175–191.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Consciousness'''
 +
| The self-aware, productive, creative motion and activity of the human brain. See p. 216, 249.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Conservativism'''
 +
| Also referred to as Prejudice; a mindset which seeks to prevent and stifle development and to hold humanity in a static position. Not only is this detrimental to humanity, it is also ultimately a wasted effort, because development is inevitable in human society, as in all things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 125, 233.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''David Hume'''
 +
| (1711 — 1776) Scottish philosopher who developed radical skepticism as a philosophy of empiricist rejection of human knowledge. See p. 11, 29, 56, 7273.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''David Ricardo'''
 +
| (1772 — 1823) British economist who, along with Adam Smith, was one of the key figures in the development of Political Economy which was a basis for much of the work of Marx and Engels. See p. 14, 18, 155.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Deductive Inference'''
 +
| Logical inference which extrapolates from the general to the specific. See p. 224.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Definition'''
 +
| The first phase of rational consciousness. During this phase, the mind begins to interpret, organize, and process the basic properties of things and phenomena at a rational level into a conceptual whole. See p. 224.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Development'''
 +
| The change and motion of things, phenomena, and ideas with a forward tendency: from less advanced to more advanced; and/or from a less complete to a more complete level. See p. 38, 45–46, 52, 55, 61, 65, 76–96, 105–107, 114118, 119–127, 131–132, 138–140, 143, 147, 154, 155–165, 169–175, 177–181, 183–207, 210, 213, 216–223, 225–229, 233, 235–237.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Development Viewpoint'''
 +
| A viewpoint which considers that, in order to perceive or solve any problem in real life, we must consider all things, phenomena, and ideas with their own forward tendency of development taken in mind.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Dialectic; Dialectical; Dialectics'''
 +
| In Marxism-Leninism, the term dialectic (adjective: dialectical) refers to regular and mutual relationships, interactions, transformations, motions, and developments of things, phenomena, and processes in nature, society and human thought. “Dialectics” refers to a dialectical system. See p. 3, 9–11, 47.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Dialectical Materialism'''
 +
| A universal philosophical and methodological system which forms the theoretical core of a scientific worldview. Dialectical Materialism was first developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels with the express goal of achieving communism. Dialectical Materialism has since been defended and developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin as well as many others. See: p. 3, 6, 1011, 19–21, 27–30, 33, 38, 45–47, 48–97, 101, 104, 204, 209, 226, 228, 230–232, 237.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Dialectical Negation'''
 +
| A stage of development in which a new subject arises from a contradiction between two previous subjects; dialectical negation is never an endpoint of development, as every dialectical negation creates conditions for further development and negation. See p. 123, 175–176, 183, 185–195, 197–202, 227.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Dialectical Relationship'''
 +
| A relationship in which two things, phenomena, or ideas mutually impact one another, leading to development and negation. See p. 47, 51, 62.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''(Characteristic of) Diversity'''
 +
| The characteristic which all things, phenomena, and ideas share, dictating that no two subjects (and no two relationships between any two subjects) are exactly the same, even if they exist between very similar things, phenomena, and ideas and/or in very similar situations. See p. 114–115, 125.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Diversity in Unity'''
 +
| The universal principle which states that even though all relationships are diverse and different from one another, they also exist in unity, because all relationships share a foundation in the material world. See p. 109–110, 125, 130.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Dogmatism'''
 +
| An inflexible adherence to ideals as incontrovertibly true while refusing to take any contradictory evidence into consideration. Dogmatism stands in direct opposition to materialist dialectics, which seeks to form opinions and conclusions only after careful consideration of all observable evidence. See p. 136–137, 174, 217–218, 233.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Duality of Labor'''
 +
| The Marxist economic concept which recognizes labor as having two intrinsic and inseparable aspects: abstract labor and concrete labor. See p. 15.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Dynamic and Creative Reflection'''
 +
| The most advanced form of reflection, which only occurs in matter that has the highest (known) level of structural complexity, such as the human brain. See p. 68–69, 79.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Eclecticism'''
 +
| An approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject; the philosophical error of inconsistently applying different theories and principles in different situations. See p. 32–33, 101, 118, 192, 194.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Economic Base'''
 +
| See: Base
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Economism'''
 +
| Economism is a style of political activism, typified by the ideas of German political theorist Eduard Bernstein, which stresses directing the struggle towards short-term political/economic goals (such as higher wages for workers) at the expense of the larger socialist revolutionary project. See p. 30.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Eduard Bernstein'''
 +
| (1850 — 1932) German political theorist who rejected many of Marx’s theories. See p. 30, 174.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Emotional Consciousness'''
 +
| The lower stage of the cognitive process. In this stage of cognitive development, humans, through practical activities, use our senses to reflect objective things and phenomena (with all their perceived specific characteristics and rich manifestations) in human consciousness. See p. 219224.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Empirical Consciousness'''
 +
| Empirical consciousness is the stage of development of consciousness in which perceptions are formed via direct observations of things and phenomena in the natural world, or of society, or through scientific experimentation and systematic observation. Empirical Consciousness results in Empirical Knowledge. See p. 210–214.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Empirical Knowledge'''
 +
| Knowledge which results from processes of empirical consciousness and which is characterised by rich and detailed, but still incomplete, understanding of phenomena. It can be utilized for practical ends, but still falls short of full theoretical analysis and comprehension. See p. 212–214.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Empiricism'''
 +
| A broad philosophical position which holds that only experience (including internal experience) can be held as a source of knowledge or truth. Though nominally opposed to idealism, it is considered a faulty (or naive) form of materialism, since it sees the world as only unconnected, static appearances and ignores the reality of dialectical (changing) relationships between objects. See p. 9–12, 29, 94, 96–97, 100, 218.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Empirio-criticism'''
 +
| A more developed form of empiricism, proposed by Ernst Mach, which holds that sense data and experience are the sole sources of knowledge and that no concrete knowledge of the external material world can ever be obtained due to the limitations of human senses. See p. 26–29, 32, 54, 55–57, 68.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Epistemology'''
 +
| The theoretical study of knowledge. It primarily deals with the philosophical question of: “how do we know what we know?” See p. 45, 98, 204.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Ernst Mach'''
 +
| (1838 — 1916) Austrian physicist who attempted to build a philosophy of natural science based on the works of German philosopher Richard Avenarius’ philosophical system of Empirio-Criticism. See p. 27–29, 32, 52, 72, 193.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Equilibrium'''
 +
| A state of motion in which one or more subjects are not undergoing changes in position, form, and/or structure. Equilibrium is only ever a temporary stasis of development which will eventually yield to motion, development, and/or negation. See p. 62–63, 122–123, 181.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Essence'''
 +
| See: Essence and Phenomena
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Essence and Phenomena (Category Pair)'''
 +
| The Essence category refers to the synthesis of all the internal aspects as well as the obvious and stable relations that define the existence, motion and development of things and ideas. The Phenomena category refers to the external manifestation of those internal aspects and relations in specific conditions. Essence always determines which phenomena appear, but phenomena do not always accurately reflect essence in human perception; in other words, it is possible to misinterpret phenomena, leading to a misunderstanding of essence, or to mistake phenomena for essence. See p. 156–160.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Exchange Value'''
 +
| A quantity relationship which describes the ratios of exchangeability between different commodities, with Marx’s famous example of 20 yards of linen being equivalent in exchange value to one coat. Through analysis Marx shows that in reality the thing being compared is the amount of socially necessary labour required to make the commodities being compared. See p. 15, 18.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Excitation'''
 +
| Reactions of simple plant and animal life-forms which occur when they change position or structure as a direct result of physical changes in their habitat. See p. 66, 68.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''External Contradictions'''
 +
| See: Internal and External Contradictions.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''False consciousness'''
 +
| Forms of consciousness (ideas, thoughts, concepts, etc.) which are incorrect and misaligned from reality. Equated with ‘ideology’ by Engels, it refers to an idealistic, dogmatic perspective which will inevitably result in errors of analysis and therefore practice. See p. 231–233, 237.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''First International'''
 +
| Also known as the International Workingmen’s Association; was founded in London and lasted from 1864–1876. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were key figures in the foundation and operation of this organization, which sought better conditions and the establishment of rights for workers. See p. 35
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''(Basic) Forms of Motion'''
 +
| Engels broke motion down into five basic forms which are dialectically linked; the different forms of motion differ from one another, but they are also unified with each other into one continuous system of motion. Understanding this dialectical relationship between different forms of motion helped to overcome misunderstandings and confusion about motion and development. See p. 61–62.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Form'''
 +
| See: Content and Form.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Form of existence of matter'''
 +
| The ways in which we perceive the existence of matter in our universe; specifically, matter in our universe has the form of existing in space and time. See p. 59.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Form of Value'''
 +
| See: Value-Form
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Forward Tendency of Motion'''
 +
| The tendency for things, phenomena, and ideas to move from less advanced to more advanced forms through processes of motion and development. See p. 197.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Friedrich Engels'''
 +
| (1820–1895) a German theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, leader of the international working class, &amp; co-founder of scientific socialism with Karl Marx. ''Referenced throughout.''
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Fundamental and Non-Fundamental Contradictions'''
 +
| A fundamental contradiction defines the essence of a relationship. Fundamental contradictions exist throughout the entire development process of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea. A non-fundamental contradiction exists in only one aspect or attribute of a thing, phenomenon, or idea. A nonfundamental contradiction can impact a subject, but it will not control or decide the essential development of the subject. See p. 178–179.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''(Characteristic of) Generality'''
 +
| A universal characteristic which holds that all things, phenomena, and ideas interact and mutually transform one another. See p. 108–109, 111, 114, 124125.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''General Relationship'''
 +
| Relationships which exist broadly across many things, phenomena, and ideas. General relationships can exist both internally, within things, phenomena, and ideas, and externally, between things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 106–110, 114.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Generality (of relationships)'''
 +
| Relationships can exist with across a spectrum of generality; this spectrum ranges from the least general relationships (''unique relationships'' — which only occur between two specific things/phenomena/ideas) to the most general relationships (''universal relationships'' — which occur between or within all things/phenomena/ideas). See p. 109.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''George Berkeley'''
 +
| (1685 — 1753) An Anglo-Irish philosopher whose main philosophical achievement was the formulation of a doctrine which he called “immaterialism,” and which later came to be known as “Subjective Idealism.” This doctrine was summed up by Berkeley’s maxim: “''Esse est percipi''” — “To be is to be perceived.” See p. 11, 27, 29.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel'''
 +
| (1770 — 1831) German philosophy professor &amp; objective idealistic philosopher; developed the system of idealist dialectics which Marx and Engels used as a basis for developing materialist dialectics. See p. 8–11, 29, 69–71, 97, 98, 100–105, 132, 157, 165, 182, 192, 193–194, 209, 228.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Historical Materialism'''
 +
| The application of materialist dialectics and dialectical materialism to the study of human history. See p. 21–23, 27, 36, 38, 45, 80.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Historical Viewpoint'''
 +
| A viewpoint which demands that subjects be considered in their current stage of motion and development, while also taking into consideration the development and transformation of the subject over time. See p. 116–118, 125–126, 143, 185, 234.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Idealism'''
 +
| A philosophical position which holds that the only reliable experience of reality occurs within human consciousness. Idealists believe that human reason exclusively or as a first basis is the best way to seek truth. See p. 8–12, 26–29, 48–51, 53, 56–58, 69–70, 96, 101–102, 104, 157, 174, 209, 218, 228.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Immanuel Kant'''
 +
| (1724 — 1804) German philosopher who developed a system of idealist dialectics which were later completed by Hegel and whose metaphysical philosophies of epistemology and rationalism served as the basis for later empiricists such as Bacon and Hume. See p. 20, 29, 56, 72–74, 100–102, 205.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Induction'''
 +
| The reaction of animals with simple nervous systems which can sense or feel their environments. Induction occurs through unconditioned reflex mechanisms. See p. 66, 68.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Inductive Inference'''
 +
| Logical inference which extrapolates from specific observations to general conclusions. See p. 223–224.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Intelligibility'''
 +
| The human cognitive capacity to accurately perceive the external material world. See p. 48.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Internal Contradictions'''
 +
| See: Internal and External Contradictions.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Internal and External Contradictions'''
 +
| Internal contradictions are contradictions which exist within the internal relations of a subject, while external contradictions exist between two or more subjects as external relations. See p. 178–179.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Judgment'''
 +
| The phase of rational consciousness which arises from the definition of the subject — the linking of concepts and properties together — which leads to affirmative or negative ideation of certain characteristics or attributes of the perceived subject. See p. 223.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Karl Marx'''
 +
| (1818–1883) German theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, political economist, founder of scientific socialism, and leader of the international working class. ''Referenced throughout''.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Knowledge'''
 +
| The content of consciousness; data about the world, such as: ideas, memories, and other thoughts which are derived through direct observation and practical activities in the material world, through scientific experiments, or through abstract reflection of practical and scientific activities which occur within consciousness.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Labor Value'''
 +
| The amount of value which workers produce through labor. See p. 14, 17–18, 23.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Law of Negation of Negation'''
 +
| A universal law of materialist dialectics which states that the fundamental and universal tendency of motion and development occurs through a cycle of dialectical negation, wherein each and every negation is, in turn, negated once more. See p. 163, 185, 195, 198, 200, 201, 202, 227.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality'''
 +
| The universal law of dialectical materialism which concerns the universal mode of motion and development processes of nature, society, and human thought, which states that qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of the quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and, ideas, and, vice versa, quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 163–165, 172–173, 227.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Law of Unification Contradiction Between Opposites'''
 +
| and The universal law of dialectical materialism which states that the fundamental, originating, and universal driving force of all motion and development processes is the inherent and objective contradictions which exists in all things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 163, 175, 181.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Law of Development of Capitalism'''
 +
| Also known as Theory of Accumulation and Theory of Surplus Value. The dynamic through which the capitalist class gains wealth by accumulating surplus value (i.e., profits) and then reinvesting it into more capital to gain even further wealth; thus the goal of the capitalist class is to accumulate more and more surplus value which leads to the development of capitalism. See p. 18.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Laws'''
 +
| In dialectical materialism, laws are the regular, common, obvious, natural, objective relations between internal aspects, factors, and attributes of a thing or phenomenon or between things and phenomena. See p. 162.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Laws of Nature'''
 +
| Laws that arise in the natural world, including within the human body (and are never products of human conscious activities). Such law includes the laws of physics, chemistry, and other natural phenomena which govern the material world. See p. 162, 213.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Laws of Society'''
 +
| Laws of human activity in social relations; such laws are unable to manifest beyond the conscious activities of humans, but they are still objective. See p. 162–163.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Laws of Human Thought'''
 +
| Laws which govern the intrinsic relationships between concepts, categories, judgments, inference, and the development process of human rational awareness. See p. 163.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Life-Process'''
 +
| Processes of motion and change which occur within organisms to sustain life. See p. 69–72, 79, 88.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Ludwig Feuerbach'''
 +
| (1804 — 1872) German philosophy professor, materialist philosopher; Marx and Engels drew many of their ideas from the works of Feuerbach (whom they also criticized). See p. 8, 11–13, 21, 55, 74, 80, 114, 205, 237.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''M→→C→→M’'''
 +
| The mode of circulation described by Marx as existing under capitalism, in which capitalists spend money to buy commodities (including the commodified labor of workers), with the intention of selling those commodities for ''more money'' than they began with. The capitalist has no direct relationship to the commodity being produced and sold, and the capitalist is solely interested in obtaining more money. See p. 16. See also: C→M→C
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Machism'''
 +
| See: Empirio-Criticism.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Manifestation'''
 +
| How a given thing, phenomenon, or idea is expressed externally in the material world. See p. 115.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Marxism-Leninism'''
 +
| A system of scientific opinions and theories focused on liberating the working class from capitalism and achieving a stateless, classless, communist society. The core ideas of this system were first developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, then defended and further developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. See. p. 1.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Material Conditions'''
 +
| The material external environment in which humans live, including the natural environment, the means of production and the economic base of human society, objective social relations, and other externalities and systems which affect human life and human society. See p. 6, 22, 40–42, 70–72, 80–81, 87, 92–95, 116–118, 161, 174, 179, 181, 206–207, 210, 229.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Material Production Activity'''
 +
| Material production activity is the first and most basic form of ''praxis''. In this form of praxis activity, humans use tools through labor processes to influence the natural world in order to create wealth and material resources and to develop the conditions necessary to maintain our existence and development. See p. 206–208.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Materialism'''
 +
| A philosophical position that holds that the material world exists outside of the mind, and that human ideas and thoughts stem from observation and sense experience of this external world. Materialism rejects the idealist notion that truth can only be sought solely through reasoning and human consciousness. See p. 10–13, 48.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Materialist Dialectics'''
 +
| A scientific system of philosophy concerned with motion, development, and common relationships, and with the most common rules of motion and development of nature, society, and human thought. See p. 10, 21, 45–47, 98202, 227, 237.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Matter'''
 +
| A philosophical category denoting things and phenomena, existing in objective external reality, which human beings access through our sense perceptions. See p. 26, 27, 32, 48, 51–52, 53–69, 72, 88–95, 97, 103, 164–165.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Means of Production'''
 +
| Physical inputs and systems used in the production of goods and services, including: machinery, factory buildings, tools, equipment, and anything else used in producing goods and services. See p. 2–3, 7, 14–16.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Mechanical Motion'''
 +
| Changes in positions of objects in space. See p. 61.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Mechanical Philosophy'''
 +
| A scientific and philosophical movement popular in the 17<sup>th</sup> century which explored mechanical machines and compared natural phenomena to mechanical devices, resulting in a belief that all things — including living organisms — were built as (and could theoretically be built by humans as) mechanical devices.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Mental Reflection'''
 +
| Reactions which occur in animals with central nervous systems. Mental reflections occur through conditioned reflex mechanisms through learning. See p. 65, 68, 224.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Metaphysical Materialism'''
 +
| Metaphysical materialism was strongly influenced by the metaphysical, mechanical thinking of ''mechanical philosophy'', which was a scientific and philosophical movement which explored mechanical machines and compared natural phenomena to mechanical devices. Metaphysical materialists believed that all change can exist only as an increase or decrease in quantity, brought about by external causes.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Metaphysics'''
 +
| A branch of philosophy that attempts to explain the fundamental nature of reality. Metaphysical philosophy has taken many forms through the centuries, but one common shortcoming of metaphysical thought is a tendency to view things and ideas in a static, abstract manner. Generally speaking, metaphysics presents nature as a collection of objects and phenomena which are isolated from one another and fundamentally unchanging. See p. 52.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Methodology'''
 +
| A system of reasoning: the ideas and rules that guide humans to research, build, select, and apply the most suitable methods in both perception and practice. Methodologies can range from very specific to broadly general, with philosophical methodology being the most general scope of methodology. See p. 44.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Mode'''
 +
| The way or manner in which something occurs or exists. See p. 19–20.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Mode of Existence of Matter'''
 +
| Refers to how matter exists in our universe; specifically, matter exists in our motion in a mode of ''motion.'' See p. 59.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Motion'''
 +
| Also known as “change;” motion/change occurs as a result of the mutual impacts which occur between two things, phenomena, or ideas in relation with one another. See p. 23, 47, 59–63. 74, 106–107, 122–127, 145, 163–165, 169-173-186, 197, 201–202.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Motion in Equilibrium'''
 +
| Motion in equilibrium is motion that has not changed the positions, forms, and/or structures of things. Motion in Equlibrium is only ever temporary in nature; all motion will ''eventually'' lead to changes in position, form, and/or structure. See p. 62.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Narodnik'''
 +
| Agrarian socialist movement of the 1860s and 70s in the Russian Empire, composed of peasants who rose up in a failed campaign against the Czar. See p. 29–30.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Natural law'''
 +
| See: Laws of Nature.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Natural Science'''
 +
| Science which deals with the natural world, including chemistry, biology, physics, geology, etc. See p. 13, 19, 26, 103.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Negation'''
 +
| The development process through which two contradicting objects mutually develop one another until one is overtaken by the other. In dialectical materialism, negation takes the form of ''dialectical negation''. See p. 123, 175176, 183, 185–202.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''New Economic Policy'''
 +
| Also known as the NEP; this early Soviet policy was devised as Vladimir Illyich Lenin to be a temporary economic system that would allow a market economy and capitalism to exist within Russia, alongside state-owned business ventures, all firmly under the control of the working-classdominated state. See p. 33–34.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Objective Dialectics'''
 +
| The dialectical processes which occur in the material world, including all of the motion, relationships, and dynamic changes which occur in space and time. See p. 98, 102–103, 182.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Objective Existence'''
 +
| Existence which manifests outside of and independently of human consciousness, whether humans can perceive it or not. See p. 50, 58, 228.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Objective Idealism'''
 +
| A form of idealism which asserts that the ideal and consciousness are the primary existence, while also positing that the ideal and consciousness are objective, and that they exist independently of nature and humans. See p. 50.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Objectiveness'''
 +
| An abstract concept that refers to the relative externality of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Every thing, phenomena and idea exists externally to every other thing, phenomena, and idea. This means that to each individual subject, all other subjects exist as external objects. See p. 111–114, 124.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Obviousness'''
 +
| See: Obviousness and Randomness
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Obviousness and Randomness (Category Pair)'''
 +
| The philosophical category of Obviousness refers to events that occur because of the essential internal aspects of a subject which become reasons for certain results in certain conditions: the obvious has to happen in a certain way, it can’t happen any other way. The Randomness category refers to things that happen because of external reasons: things that happen, essentially, by chance, due to impacts from many external relations. A random outcome may occur or it may not occur, and may occur in many different ways. Obviousness and Randomness have a dialectical relationship with one another. See p. 144–146.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Opportunism'''
 +
| A system of political opinions with no direction, no clear path, and/or no coherent viewpoint, focusing on whatever actions or decisions might be beneficial for the opportunist in the short term. See p. 174.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Opposites'''
 +
| Such aspects, properties and tendencies of motion which oppose one another, yet are, simultaneously, conditions and premises of the existence of one another. See p. 61, 175–179, 181, 184, 190, 227.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Ordinary Consciousness'''
 +
| Perception that is formed passively, stemming from the daily activities of humans. See p. 210–216.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Period of Motion'''
 +
| Development which occurs between two quality shifts, including the quality shifts themselves. See p. 170.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Perspective'''
 +
| See: Viewpoint.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Petty Bourgeoisie'''
 +
| Semi-autonomous merchants, farmers, and so on who are self-employed, own small and limited means of production, or otherwise fall in between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Also called the petite bourgeoisie. See p. 3–6.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Petty Commodity Production'''
 +
| See: Simple Commodity Production.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Phenomena'''
 +
| Anything that is observable by the human senses. See p. 156. See also: Essence and Phenomena.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Physical Motion'''
 +
| Motion of molecules, electrons, fundamental particles, thermal processes, electricity, etc., in time and space. See p. 61.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Physical Reflection'''
 +
| Reflection which occurs any time two material objects interact and the features of the objects are transferred to one other. See p. 67–68.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Point of View'''
 +
| See: Viewpoint.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Populism'''
 +
| The political philosophy of the Narodnik movement; this political philosophy was focused on bringing about an agrarian peasant revolution led by intellectuals with the ambition of going directly from a feudal society to a socialist society built from rural communes. Populism overtly opposed Marxism and dialectical materialism and was based on subjective idealist utopianism. See p. 30.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Positivism'''
 +
| The belief that we can test scientific knowledge through scientific methods, and through logic, math, etc.; positivism tends to overlap significantly with ''empiricism'' in theory and practice. See p. 32, 209.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Possibility'''
 +
| See: Possibility and Reality.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Possibility and Reality (Category Pair)'''
 +
| The philosophical category of Possibility refers to things that have not happened nor existed in reality yet, but that would happen, or would exist given necessary conditions. The philosophical category of Reality refers to things that exist or have existed in reality and in human thought. See p. 160–162.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Practice'''
 +
| See: Praxis.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Pragmatism'''
 +
| Pragmatism refers to a form of subjectivism in which one centers one’s own immediate material concerns over all other considerations. See p. 218.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Praxis'''
 +
| Conscious activity which improves our understanding, and which has purpose and historical-social characteristics. Used interchangeably with the word “practice” in this text. See p. 205–206, 235.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Prejudice'''
 +
| See: Conservatism.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Primary and Secondary Contradictions'''
 +
| In the development of things, phenomena, and ideas, there are many development stages. In each stage of development, there will be one contradiction which drives the development process. This is what we call the primary contradiction. Secondary contradictions include all the other contradictions which exist during that stage of development. Determining whether a contradiction is primary or secondary is relative, and it depends heavily upon the material conditions and the situation being analyzed. See p. 178–179.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Primary Existence'''
 +
| Existence which precedes and determines other existences; materialists believe that the external material world is the primary existence which determines the ideal, while idealists believe that human consciousness (“the ideal”) is the primary existence from which truth is ultimately derived. See p. 50–51.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Primitive Materialism'''
 +
| An early form of materialism which recognizes that matter is the primary existence, and holds that the world is composed of certain elements, and that these were the first objects — the origin — of the world, and that these elements are the essence of reality. This was later developed into Metaphysical Materialism and, later, Dialectical Materialism. See p. 52.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Principle of General Relationships'''
 +
| A principle of dialectical materialism which states that all things, phenomena, and ideas are related to one another, and are defined by these internal and external relationships. See p. 106–107, 110, 114.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Private'''
 +
| See: Private and Common
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Private and Common (Category Pair)'''
 +
| The Private philosophical category encompasses specific things, phenomena, and ideas; the Common philosophical category defines the common aspects, attributes, factors, and relations that exist in many things and phenomena. Private and Common are relative in nature and have a dialectical relationship with one another. See p. 128–138.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Private Laws'''
 +
| Laws which apply only to a specific range of things and phenomena, i.e.: laws of mechanical motion, laws of chemical motion, laws of biological motion, etc. See p. 162.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Production Force'''
 +
| The combination of the means of production and workers within human society. See p. 6, 23, 36.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Proletariat'''
 +
| The people who provide labor under capitalism; the proletariat do not own their own means of production, and must therefore sell their labor to those who do own means of production; also called the Working Class. See also: Bourgeoisie, Petty Bourgeoisie. See p. 1–8, 22–23, 25–26, 29–31, 33–35, 40–41, 63, 231.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Quality'''
 +
| The unity of component parts, taken together, which defines a subject and distinguishes it from other subjects. See p. 119–121.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Quality Shift'''
 +
| A change in quality which takes place in the motion and development process of things, phenomena, and ideas, occurring when quantity change meets a certain perceived threshold. See p. 124, 153, 164, 168–174.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Quantity'''
 +
| The total amount of component parts that compose a subject. See p. 119–121.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Quantity range'''
 +
| The range of quantity changes which can accumulate without leading to change in quality related to any given thing, phenomenon, or idea. See p. 168–171.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Quintessence'''
 +
| Original Vietnamese word: ''tinh hoa''. Literally, it means “the best, highest, most beautiful, defining characteristics” of a concept, and, unlike the English word quintessence, it has an exclusively positive connotation. See p. 8, 21, 43, 45, 52.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Randomness'''
 +
| See: Obviousness and Randomness.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Rational Consciousness'''
 +
| The higher stage of the cognitive process, which includes the indirect, abstract, and generalized reflection of the essential properties and characteristics of things and phenomena. This stage of consciousness performs the most important function of comprehending and interpreting the essence of the perceived subject. See p. 219–225.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Reason'''
 +
| See: Reason and Result
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Reality'''
 +
| See: Possibility and Reality.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Reason and Result (Category Pair)'''
 +
| The Reason philosophical category is used to define the mutual impacts between internal aspects of a thing, phenomenon or idea, or between things, phenomena, or ideas, that bring about changes. The Result philosophical category defines the changes that were caused by mutual impacts which occur between aspects and factors within a thing, phenomenon, or idea, or externally between different things, phenomena, or ideas. Not to be confused with the metaphysical concept of “cause and effect,” which attributes a single cause to any given effect. See p. 138–144.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Reasoning'''
 +
| The final phase of rational consciousness, formed on the basis of synthesizing judgments so as to extrapolate new knowledge about the perceived subject. See p. 223–225, 228–229.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Reflection'''
 +
| The re-creation of the features of one form of matter in a different form of matter which occurs when they mutually impact each other through interaction. See p. 64–75, 79–80, 90–92, 103, 165, 208–211, 214–215, 219–224, 228, 232, 237.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Relative and Absolute'''
 +
| “Absolute” and “Relative” are philosophical classifications which refer to interdependence: That which is ''absolute'' exists independently and with permanence. That which is ''relative'' is temporary, and dependent on other conditions or circumstances in order to exist. See p. 56, 233. See also: Absolute Truth, Relative Truth, Relativism, Truth.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Relative Truth'''
 +
| Truth which has developed alignment with reality without yet having reached complete alignment between human knowledge and the reality which it reflects; knowledge which incompletely reflects material subjects without complete accuracy. See p. 230, 232. See also: Absolute Truth, Relative and Absolute, Relativism, Truth.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Relativism'''
 +
| A position that all truth is relative and that nothing can ever be absolutely, objectively known; that only Relative Truth can be found in our existence. See p. 56–58, 233–234. See also: Absolute Truth, Relative and Absolute, Relative Truth, Truth.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''René Descartes'''
 +
| (1596 — 1650) French metaphysical philosopher who developed early methods of scientific inquiry. See p. 20, 53.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Result'''
 +
| See: Reason and Result.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Richard Avenarius'''
 +
| (1843 — 1896) German-Swiss philosopher who developed a system of subjective idealism known as “Empirio-Criticism.” See p. 27–29.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Rigidity'''
 +
| An unwillingness to alter one’s thoughts, holding too stiffly to established consciousness and knowledge, and ignoring practical experience and observation, which leads to stagnation of both knowledge and consciousness. See p. 217–218.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Robert Owen'''
 +
| (1771 — 1858) Wealthy Welsh textile manufacturer who tried to build a better society for workers in New Hampshire, Indiana, in the USA by purchasing the town of New Harmony in 1825. Owen’s vision failed after two years, though many other wealthy capitalists in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century were inspired by Owen to try similar plans, which also failed.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Scientific'''
 +
| An adjective which describes methodologies, approaches, and practices of gaining knowledge and insight which are methodological and/or systematic in nature. See p. 1–2.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Scientific Consciousness'''
 +
| Conscious activities which actively gather information from the methodological and/or systematic observations of the characteristics, nature, and inherent relationships of research subjects. Scientific consciousness is considered ''indirect'' because it takes place outside of the course of ordinary daily activities. See p. 58, 210, 212, 215–216.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Scientific'''
 +
| Experimental Human activities that resemble or replicate states of nature and society
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Activity'''
 +
| in order to determine the laws of change and development of subjects of study. This form of activity plays an important role in the development of society, especially in the current historical period of modern science and technological revolution. See p. 206–208.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Scientific Materialist Viewpoint'''
 +
| A perspective which begins analysis of the world in a manner that is both scientifically systematic in pursuit of understanding and firmly rooted in a materialist conception of the world. See p. 105.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Scientific Socialism'''
 +
| A body of theory and knowledge (which must be constantly tested against reality) focused on the practical pursuit of changing the world to bring about socialism through the leadership of the proletariat. See p. 1–2, 21, 37–39.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Scientific Worldview'''
 +
| A worldview that is expressed by a systematic pursuit of knowledge that generally and correctly reflects the relationships of things, phenomena, and processes in the objective material world, including relationships between humans, as well as relationships between humans and the world. See p. 3839, 44–45, 48.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Second International'''
 +
| Founded in Paris in 1889 to continue the work of the First International; it fell apart in 1916 because members from different nations could not maintain solidarity through the outbreak of World War I. See p. 35, 174.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Self-motion'''
 +
| In the original Vietnamese, the word “''tự vận động''.” Literally meaning: “it moves itself.” See p. 59–60, 124.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Sensation'''
 +
| The subjective reflection of the objective world in human consciousness as perceived through human senses. See p. 27, 56–58, 68–69, 72, 85, 221–222.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Sensuous Human Activity; Sensuous Activity'''
 +
| A description of human activity developed by Marx which acknowledges that all human activity is simultaneously ''active'' in the sense that our conscious activity can transform the world, as well as ''passive'' in the sense in that all human thoughts fundamentally derive from observation and sense experience of the material world. See p. 13.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Simple Commodity Production'''
 +
| What Marx called the “C→M→C” mode of circulation. See p. 16–18.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Simple Exchange'''
 +
| When individual producers trade the products they have made directly, themselves, for other commodities. See p. 16–17.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Social Being'''
 +
| The material existence of human society, as opposed to ''social consciousness''. See also: Base. See p. 24, 54–55.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Social Consciousness'''
 +
| The collective experience of consciousness shared by members of a society, including ideological, cultural, spiritual, and legal beliefs and ideas which are shared within that society, as opposed to ''social being''. See p. 22, 24, 32, 54–55, 80. See also: Superstructure.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Social Motion'''
 +
| Changes in the economy, politics, culture, and social life of human beings. See p. 61–62.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Socialization'''
 +
| The idea that human society transforms labor and production from a solitary, individual act into a collective, social act. In other words, as human society progresses, people “socialize” labor into increasingly complex networks of social relations: from individuals making their own tools, to agricultural societies engaged in collective farming, to modern industrial societies with factories, logistical networks, etc. See p. 6, 36.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Socialized Production Force'''
 +
| A production force which has been socialized — that is to say, a production force which has been organized into collective social activity. See p. 6.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Socio-Political Activity'''
 +
| Praxis activity utilized by various communities and organizations in human society to transform political-social relations in order to promote social development. See p. 206–208.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Solipsism'''
 +
| A form of idealism in which one believes that the self is the only basis for truth. See p. 218.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Sophistry'''
 +
| The use of misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s’ dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. See p. 32–33, 56, 118, 182, 194.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Stage of Development'''
 +
| The current quantity and quality characteristics which a thing, phenomenon, or object possesses. Every time a quality change occurs, a new stage of development is entered into. See p. 24, 39, 125, 173–174, 179, 190, 196–197, 200, 212, 221.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Stagnation'''
 +
| An inability or unwillingness to change and adapt consciousness and practice in accordance with developing material conditions. Stagnation can stem from, or cause, overstatement of absolute truth in theory and forestall necessary development of both consciousness and practical ability. See p. 125, 218, 233. See also: Rigidity.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Struggle of Opposites'''
 +
| The tendency of opposites to eliminate and negate each other. See p. 61, 181, 184.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Subjective Factors'''
 +
| Factors which, from the perspective of a given subject, that same subject is capable of impacting. See p. 162–163, 175, 202.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Subjective Dialectics; Dialectical Thought'''
 +
| A system of analysis and organized thinking which aims to reflect the objective dialectics of the material world within human consciousness. Dialectical thinking has two component forms: dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics. See: p. 98–99, 103.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Subjective Idealism'''
 +
| Subjective idealism asserts that consciousness is the primary existence and that truth can be obtained only or primarily through conscious activity and reasoning. Subjective idealism asserts that all things and phenomena can only be experienced as subjective sensory perceptions, with some forms of subjective idealism even explicitly denying the objective existence of material reality altogether. See also: Empirio-Criticism, Objective Idealism. See p. 26–27, 50.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Subjectivism'''
 +
| A philosophical position in which one centers one’s own self and conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test their own perceptions against material and social reality. See p. 56, 182, 217–218, 233–234.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Suitability'''
 +
| The applicability of a subject for a specific application or role. See p. 154.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Superstructure'''
 +
| The ideal (non-material) components of human society, including: media institutions, music, and art, as well as other cultural elements like religion, customs, moral standards, and everything else which manifests primarily through conscious activity and social relations. See p. 23. See also: Base.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Surplus Value'''
 +
| The extra amount of value a capitalist is able to secure by exploiting wagelabourers (by paying workers less than the full value of their labour). Workers will spend part of their workday reproducing their own labourpower (through earning enough to eat, secure shelter and other cultural needs) and the rest of the time will be spent producing surplus value which is then appropriated by the capitalist as profit. See p. 18, 22–23, 39.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Symbolization'''
 +
| The representation of an objective thing or phenomenon in human consciousness which has been reflected by sensation and conception. See p. 221–222.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Systematic Structure'''
 +
| A structure which includes within itself a system of component parts and relationships. See p. 114.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Theoretical Consciousness'''
 +
| The indirect, abstract, systematic level of perception in which the nature and laws of things and phenomena are generalized and abstracted. See p. 210–214, 217–218.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Theoretical Knowledge'''
 +
| Knowledge which is abstract and generalized, resulting from theoretical conscious activities which include repeated and varied observations. See p. 214, 217.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Theory'''
 +
| An idea or system of ideas intended to explain an aspect, characteristic, or tendency of objective reality. See p. 235.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Theory of Accumulation/Surplus Value'''
 +
| See: Law of Development of Capitalism.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Thing-in-Itself'''
 +
| The actual material object which exists outside of our consciousness, ''as it exists outside of our consciousness''. See p. 72–74, 101, 158.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Third International'''
 +
| Also known as the Communist International (or the ComIntern for short); founded in Moscow in 1919, its goals were to overthrow capitalism, build socialism, and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. It was dissolved in 1943 in the midst of the German invasion of Russia in World War II. See p. 35.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Three Component Parts'''
 +
| The three essential elements of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, first identified of Marxism-Leninism by Lenin in ''The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism''. 1. The Philosophy of Marxism. 2. The Political Economy of Marxism. 3. Scientific Socialism.See p. 21, 32, 34, 38.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Threshold'''
 +
| The amount, or degree, of quantity change at which quality change occurs. Truth is primarily discovered through labor and practice in the physical world. See p. 120, 168–169, 171, 173.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Truth'''
 +
| A correct and accurate conscious reflection of objective reality. See p. 9–10, 49, 56, 70, 75, 94–96, 194, 204, 209, 215–219, 225–237. See also: Labor, Practice.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Unconditioned Reflex'''
 +
| Reactions which are not learned, but simply occur automatically based on physiological mechanisms occurring within an organism, characterized by permanent connections between sensory perceptions and reactions. See p. 66, 68.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Unilateral Consideration'''
 +
| The consideration of a subject from one side only. See p. 49.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Unintelligibility'''
 +
| A philosophical position which denies the human cognitive capacity to accurately perceive the external material world. See p. 48.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Unique Relationship'''
 +
| The least general form of relationship, which only occur between two specific things/phenomena/ideas. See p. 109, 130.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Unity in Diversity'''
 +
| A concept in materialist dialectics which holds that within universal relationships exist within and between all different things, phenomena, and ideas, we will find that each individual manifestation of any universal relationship will have its own different manifestations, aspects, features, etc. Thus even the universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in infinite diversity. See p. 42, 110–111, 114, 125, 130.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Universal Law of Consciousness'''
 +
| A universal law which holds that consciousness is a process of dialectical development in which practical activity leads to conscious activity, which then leads back to practical activity, in a continuous and never-ending cycle, with a tendency to develop both practical and conscious activity to increasingly higher levels. See p. 219.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Universal Laws'''
 +
| Laws that impact every aspect of nature, society, and human thought. Materialist dialectics is the study of these universal laws. See p. 15, 162–163, 227.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Universal Relationship'''
 +
| The most general kind of relationship; relationships that exist between and within every thing and all phenomena; along with ''development'', universal relationships are one of the two primary subjects of study of materialist dialectics. See p. 80, 108, 109, 111, 165.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Use Value'''
 +
| A concept in classical political economy and Marxist economics which refers to tangible features of a commodity (a tradable object) that can fulfill some human requirement or desire, or which serve a useful purpose. See p. 15–18, 95.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Utopianism'''
 +
| 1. A political and philosophical movement which held the belief that “a New Moral World” of happiness, enlightenment, and prosperity could be created through education, science, technology, and communal living. See p. 18. 2. The idealist philosophical concept which mistakenly asserts that the ideal can determine the material, and that ideal forms of society can be brought about without regard for material conditions and development processes. See p. 8, 17–18, 30, 94.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Value-Form'''
 +
| Also known as “form of value;” the social form of a commodity. Under capitalism, through the exchange of qualitatively different commodities, the money form of value is established as the general equivalent which can functionally be exchanged for all other values; money is therefore the most universal value-form under capitalism. See p. 15, 17, 155.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Viewpoint'''
 +
| Also known as point of view or perspective; the starting point of analysis which determines the direction of thinking from which phenomena and problems are considered. See p. 12, 20–21, 23, 25, 26, 30, 32–33, 38–39, 5559, 62, 64, 89, 93–94, 105, 111, 114–120, 122, 125–126, 130, 143, 147, 150, 172, 185–188, 195, 200–201, 233–235. See also: Comprehensive Viewpoint, Historical Viewpoint.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Viewpoint Crisis'''
 +
| A situation in which a specific viewpoint can’t be settled on, found, or agreed upon. See p. 26, 32–33.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Vladimir Ilyich Lenin'''
 +
| (1870 -1924) A Russian theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, defender and developer of Marxism in the era of imperialism, founder of the Bolsheviks, the Communist Party and the government of the Soviet Union, leader of Russia and the international working class. ''Referenced throughout.''
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Working Class'''
 +
| See: Proletariat
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Worldview'''
 +
| The whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about humans ourselves, and about life and the position of human beings in the world. See p. 1, 11, 37–39, 44–45, 48, 52, 96, 138, 201, 208–209, 218, 234. See also: Scientific Worldview.
 +
|
 +
|}
  
Illich, Ivan 90, 91, 92, 93, 98, 235, 236, 239
+
<br />
  
Immortality 38
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-2.png]]
  
India 26, 27, 29, 88, 89, 232
+
''For centuries, the banyan tree has been the symbol of communal life in Vietnam.''
  
Industrial Revolution 13, 18, 20, 30, 52,
+
''Traditionally, the entrance to a village is graced by a large and ancient banyan tree. It is in the shade of these trees that villagers gather to socialize, draw water from wells, and make collective decisions together. The drooping accessory trunks represent the longevity of villagers — and of the village itself — while the arching canopy represents the safety and protection of the village. The shape of the banyan tree is seen in the full moon, which casts peaceful light across the Earth to guide travelers in the dark of night.''
  
66, 100, 104, 184
+
''Vietnam’s revolution against Japanese fascism and French colonialism began in 1945 beneath the cover of the Tân Trào Banyan Tree, which still stands in the city of Tuyên Quang.''
  
“Industrial Society and Its Future;” see Unabomber
+
''It is in this deep-rooted, humanistic spirit of collective action that we founded Banyan House Publishing. We hope to deliver volumes which will inspire action and change throughout the village that is our world.''
  
Innis, Harold 187, 189, 239
+
''Visit us at:''<br />
 +
''BanyanHouse.org''
  
Innocence Project, The 174, 239
+
<br />
  
Inscription 146
+
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-103.png]]
  
Instagram 205
+
<br />
  
Instrumentalism; see Determinism,
+
<references />
 
 
cultural
 
 
 
Interlandi, Jeneen 242
 
 
 
Intelligent agents 66, 71
 
 
 
Intermediate Technology Development
 
 
 
Group; see Appropriate technology
 
 
 
International Center for Documentation;
 
 
 
see Appropriate technology
 
 
 
International expositions 26
 
 
 
Internet 15, 23, 40, 45, 66, 67, 71, 72, 110,
 
 
 
113, 129, 145, 168, 179, 186, 189, 200,
 
 
 
206, 208, 213, 220, 226
 
 
 
Intersex 203–204
 
 
 
In the Meantime 183
 
 
 
Invention 8, 119–120
 
 
 
iPhone 8, 150, 211
 
 
 
“Is It OK to Be a Luddite?” 83
 
 
 
Island, The 226
 
 
 
Izzard, Eddie 49, 50, 54, 133, 233
 
 
 
Jefferson, Thomas 18, 30
 
 
 
Johnson, Mark 50, 233
 
 
 
Johnson, Sally 99
 
 
 
Jolly Roger Press, The 236
 
 
 
Jones Beach 205
 
 
 
Jones, Steven E. 98, 100, 234, 236
 
 
 
Joy, Bill 71, 234
 
 
 
Kaczynski, David 98
 
 
 
Kaczynski, Ted 68, 97–104, 236; see also
 
 
 
Unabomber
 
 
 
Katz, James 131, 237
 
 
 
Keen, Andrew 242
 
 
 
Kelly, Kevin 16, 98, 100, 104, 132, 231,
 
 
 
236, 237
 
 
 
Kenya 92
 
 
 
Kevorkian, Jack 107–108, 114
 
 
 
Keywords 109
 
 
 
Killing machine 108, 110, 114
 
 
 
King, Stephen 71, 234
 
 
 
King Lear 59
 
 
 
Kirk, Michael 242
 
 
 
Knowledge production 219–221, 223
 
 
 
Kolko, Beth E. 200, 240
 
 
 
Krugman, Paul 83, 235
 
 
 
Kudzu 67
 
 
 
Kuhn, Thomas S. 241
 
 
 
Kurzweil, Ray 232
 
 
 
Index
 
 
 
O 265
 
 
 
Labor 41, 42, 43, 62, 64, 66, 67, 79, 83, 128, 130, 158, 166, 173–175, 183, 201, 203
 
 
 
Affective 29, 174
 
 
 
Immaterial 29, 174
 
 
 
Material 30, 174
 
 
 
Labor-saving devices 41, 42, 201
 
 
 
La Cecla, Franco 235
 
 
 
Lacks, Henrietta 225
 
 
 
Lactose intolerance 201
 
 
 
Laissez-faire capitalism 79
 
 
 
Lakoff, George 50, 233
 
 
 
Landy, John 36
 
 
 
Language as a technology 211
 
 
 
Lapps 92–93
 
 
 
Latour, Bruno 139, 140–142, 145, 167, 169, 181, 199, 237
 
 
 
Lazzarato, Maurizio 174, 239
 
 
 
Lefebvre, Henri 181–182, 183, 239
 
 
 
Left, the 100, 102
 
 
 
Lerner, Daniel 235
 
 
 
Levine, Robert 239
 
 
 
Library of Congress 37, 38
 
 
 
Libya 51
 
 
 
Lieberman, Daniel 241
 
 
 
Life on the Screen 205
 
 
 
Lifelogging 208, 222
 
 
 
Limit horizon 36, 37, 38, 39, 44, 46
 
 
 
Limits 36–38, 39, 46
 
 
 
Lines of tendential force 146, 155,
 
 
 
160, 169
 
 
 
Ling, Rich 242
 
 
 
Linneaus, Carl 203
 
 
 
Linux 174
 
 
 
Literacy; see Modes of communication
 
 
 
Logos 23
 
 
 
Loka Institute 171
 
 
 
Long Island Parkway bridges 204
 
 
 
“Looking for Luddites” 235
 
 
 
Luddism 10, 73, 77–84, 87, 91, 100, 104, 219, 234, 235
 
 
 
Neo-Luddism 82–83, 91, 98, 99, 235, 236
 
 
 
“Luddites Revisited, The” 83
 
 
 
Luke, Tim 97, 100, 101, 102, 236
 
 
 
Lupton, Deborah 241, 242
 
 
 
Luxuries 40
 
 
 
Lyon, David 197–198, 232, 233, 240
 
 
 
“Machine breakers, The” 78
 
 
 
Machine in the garden 18, 19, 22
 
 
 
MacKenzie, Donald 173, 239
 
 
 
Magnet, Shoshana 240
 
 
 
Makeup 205
 
 
 
Making of the English Working Class 78
 
 
 
Mangrove 159–160
 
 
 
Manifest destiny 19, 22, 24, 61
 
 
 
Mann, Steve 238
 
 
 
Manson, Graeme 234
 
 
 
Marcuse, Herbert 98, 101, 102, 236
 
 
 
Market devices 172, 173
 
 
 
Martin, Douglas 235
 
 
 
Marx, Karl 67–68, 70, 233
 
 
 
Marx, Leo 18, 22, 124, 125, 231, 237
 
 
 
Master and Slave 59, 67, 69–70, 71, 73
 
 
 
Matos, Patricia 232
 
 
 
Matrix, The 70, 215, 226
 
 
 
Matsakis, Demetrios 184–185, 187
 
 
 
Mauss, Marcel 209, 241
 
 
 
Maxwell, Richard 222, 242
 
 
 
McCormick Reaper Manufacturing 64
 
 
 
McCullough, Malcolm 240
 
 
 
McDonaldization 240
 
 
 
McDonald’s 200–201
 
 
 
McDougall, Christopher 209, 241
 
 
 
McGonigal, Jane 238
 
 
 
McKinsey Global Institute Report 83
 
 
 
McLuhan, Marshall 60, 189–190, 208, 210,
 
 
 
233, 238, 239, 240, 241
 
 
 
Meaning 10, 107–114
 
 
 
Means of production 67
 
 
 
Mediator 139, 141, 146
 
 
 
Medical technologies 38, 42, 46, 53, 109,
 
 
 
204, 216
 
 
 
Medium Is the Massage, The 233
 
 
 
Megamachine 62, 65, 66, 69, 102
 
 
 
Megatechnics 65
 
 
 
Memory 40, 51, 187, 188
 
 
 
Mercury Leeds 81
 
 
 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 209
 
 
 
Metaphors We Live By 50
 
 
 
Microsoft 207
 
 
 
Miller, Toby 222, 242
 
 
 
Millo, Yuval 172, 239
 
 
 
Minecraft 205, 207
 
 
 
Minsky, Marvin 71, 234
 
 
 
Mirchandani, Kiran 232
 
 
 
Mississippi River floods 65
 
 
 
Mitchell, Lisa 241
 
 
 
Mitchell, William J. 71, 234
 
 
 
Mobile phones 72, 132, 143, 150, 179, 186,
 
 
 
189, 197, 207, 212, 221
 
 
 
Modes of communication 187–192
 
 
 
Electronic 187, 189
 
 
 
Literacy 187, 188, 190
 
 
 
Orality 187, 188, 190
 
 
 
Print 188, 190
 
 
 
Monahan, Torin 238
 
 
 
266 O
 
 
 
Index
 
 
 
Monkey Wrench Gang 83
 
 
 
Moore, Ronald D. 234
 
 
 
Moore v. Regents 225
 
 
 
Moravec, Hans 232
 
 
 
More Work for Mother 41, 201
 
 
 
Morris, Jason 242
 
 
 
Morse, Samuel, and Morse Code 239
 
 
 
Mosco, Vincent 232, 238, 242
 
 
 
Moses, Robert 204–205, 240–241
 
 
 
MUDS and MOOs 205
 
 
 
Mumford, Lewis 62, 65, 98, 101–103, 184,
 
 
 
233, 236, 239
 
 
 
Muniesa, Fabian 172, 239
 
 
 
Music 45, 121, 170, 182, 194, 215
 
 
 
Muzak 208
 
 
 
MyLifeBits 207–208
 
 
 
Myth of the Machine 101–102
 
 
 
Nanotechnology 52, 71, 233
 
 
 
National Appropriate Technology Center;
 
 
 
see Appropriate technology
 
 
 
National Rifle Association (NRA) 49, 50,
 
 
 
56, 154
 
 
 
National Security Agency (NSA) 2, 72,
 
 
 
150, 161, 222
 
 
 
Nationalism 25
 
 
 
Nature 18–19, 24, 59, 60, 61–62, 64, 65,
 
 
 
67, 69, 100, 101, 102, 110, 130, 233
 
 
 
Neat, the 24, 25, 31
 
 
 
Negri, Antonio 238
 
 
 
Negroponte, Nicholas 21, 232
 
 
 
Nehru, Jawaharlal 27
 
 
 
Neo-Luddism; see Luddism
 
 
 
“Neo-Luddites, The” 235
 
 
 
Net Smart: How to Thrive Online 242
 
 
 
Network 41, 42, 69, 110, 111, 140–147,
 
 
 
154, 168–170, 172
 
 
 
Centralized 168
 
 
 
Decentralized 169
 
 
 
Distributed 169
 
 
 
Social 151, 170, 197, 207, 222
 
 
 
New Spirit of Capitalism, The 46–47
 
 
 
New York City 149, 150, 204
 
 
 
New York Civil Liberties Union 149
 
 
 
New York Metropolitan Museum of Art underground garage 240–241
 
 
 
New York Times 30, 83, 98, 238
 
 
 
Newsham-West, Richard 241
 
 
 
Newsweek 225
 
 
 
Niagara Falls 61
 
 
 
Nineteen Eighty-Four 149, 215
 
 
 
Nisbet, Robert 14, 24, 231, 232
 
 
 
Noble, David 17, 23, 28, 231, 232, 233, 234
 
 
 
Noë, Alva 212
 
 
 
“Non Human Turn, The” 212, 226
 
 
 
Nonhuman 159, 160, 167, 170
 
 
 
Non-Stop Inertia 185–186
 
 
 
Nuclear bomb 20, 54
 
 
 
Nuclear power 20, 23, 55, 68, 107
 
 
 
Nussbaum, Emily 240
 
 
 
Nye, David 22, 232
 
 
 
Object-oriented ontology 160, 236
 
 
 
Object-oriented philosophy 160
 
 
 
Office of Technology Assessment; see
 
 
 
Appropriate technology
 
 
 
Olympic Games 26
 
 
 
Omi, Michael 240
 
 
 
One-Dimensional Man 101
 
 
 
Ong, Walter 190, 239, 240
 
 
 
Onions, allergy to 200–201
 
 
 
Orality; see Modes of communication
 
 
 
“Organ Trafficking Is No Myth” 225
 
 
 
Organization Man, The 101
 
 
 
Orphan Black 70
 
 
 
Orwell, George 149
 
 
 
Out of Poverty 91
 
 
 
Oxford English Dictionary 113
 
 
 
Pacey, Arnold 175, 232, 239
 
 
 
Pakistan 72
 
 
 
Pakula, Alan J. 233
 
 
 
Panopticon 63, 168, 233
 
 
 
Paperwork 64, 67
 
 
 
Papyrus 188
 
 
 
Passing of Traditional Society, The 235
 
 
 
Patents 18, 120
 
 
 
Pathos 23
 
 
 
Pelto, Perrti J. 92, 235
 
 
 
Perpetual contact 132
 
 
 
Person/Planet 91
 
 
 
Pharmaceuticals 37, 43, 224, 225
 
 
 
Phenomenology of Mind 70
 
 
 
Piggott, J.R. 232
 
 
 
Pilloton, Emily 235
 
 
 
Plato 51–52, 233
 
 
 
Playbor 174
 
 
 
Poeisis 130
 
 
 
Polak, Paul 91, 92, 93, 132, 235
 
 
 
Political economy 166, 238
 
 
 
Politics 10, 28, 162, 165, 166–171, 182, 218
 
 
 
Defined 166, 167
 
 
 
Polysemy 112
 
 
 
Popular Mechanics 238
 
 
 
Portugal 232
 
 
 
Posthumanism 20
 
 
 
Power 146, 147, 166, 169
 
 
 
Power-chronography 183
 
 
 
Index
 
 
 
O 267
 
 
 
Prescription 142, 143, 146, 167, 169, 199
 
 
 
Primary orality 190
 
 
 
Primer 1, 2, 9
 
 
 
Primitive; see Civilized
 
 
 
Print; see Modes of communication
 
 
 
Printing press 8, 52, 53
 
 
 
Printing Press as Agent of Change 52
 
 
 
PRISM 72, 150
 
 
 
Privacy 143, 153, 155, 161, 216, 221–222, 227; see also Surveillance
 
 
 
Problematic 10, 217–219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 226, 227
 
 
 
Progress 1, 9, 10, 13–31, 33, 34, 45, 46, 47, 61, 66, 73, 87, 88, 94, 113, 152, 153, 157, 158, 159, 175, 180, 184, 216, 218, 219, 222, 223, 228, 232
 
 
 
Defined 14
 
 
 
Luddism and 77–84
 
 
 
Prosthetics 225
 
 
 
Protect America Act 72
 
 
 
Protestantism 19, 22
 
 
 
Pugliese, Joseph 240, 241
 
 
 
Pynchon, Thomas 235
 
 
 
Qiu, Jack 232
 
 
 
Quantified self 208, 222
 
 
 
Question Concerning Technology, The 130
 
 
 
Quiet 221
 
 
 
Quirk, John 17, 22, 231, 232, 239
 
 
 
Race 198, 204, 205, 212, 225, 240
 
 
 
Rad, the 24, 31
 
 
 
Railroad 18, 19, 23, 29, 66, 71, 88, 180
 
 
 
Rationality 16, 17, 62–64, 83, 130, 131
 
 
 
Real life (RL) 206
 
 
 
Rearticulate 6, 47, 101, 133, 152, 154, 176, 217–218, 219, 221, 222, 225
 
 
 
Reassembling the Social 237
 
 
 
Reddit 150
 
 
 
Reindeer 92–93
 
 
 
Religion 22, 61, 73, 110, 121, 123, 128, 131, 188
 
 
 
Resilience 226–228
 
 
 
Resistance 9, 10, 80, 82, 98, 104, 129, 170, 176, 191, 216, 217, 220
 
 
 
Reterritorialization 158, 176
 
 
 
Retooling 46
 
 
 
Reuleaux, Franz 62
 
 
 
Revolution 18, 19, 21, 24, 26, 52, 53, 80, 81, 97, 191
 
 
 
Revolutionary potential of technology 51
 
 
 
Reynolds, Gretchen 241
 
 
 
Rheingold, Howard 242
 
 
 
Richardson, Ingrid 240
 
 
 
Riecken, D. 234
 
 
 
Ritter, Malcolm 242
 
 
 
Ritzer, George 240
 
 
 
Robertson, Craig 240
 
 
 
Robins, Kevin 82, 234, 235
 
 
 
Robots, robotics 61, 64, 70, 71, 72, 83
 
 
 
Rogers, Everett 232, 235
 
 
 
Romanyshyn, Robert D. 111, 236
 
 
 
Roosevelt, Franklin 20
 
 
 
Rose, Nikolas 242
 
 
 
Ross, Andrew 239
 
 
 
Roszak, Theodore 91, 235
 
 
 
Royte, Elizabeth 242
 
 
 
Rubin, Mark 236
 
 
 
Running 209–210
 
 
 
Barefoot 209–210
 
 
 
Running styles; see Foot strike
 
 
 
RUR 70
 
 
 
Russia 197
 
 
 
Ryan, Michael 241
 
 
 
Rybczynski, Witold 88–89, 92, 235
 
 
 
Sale, Kirkpatrick 82, 83, 99, 234, 235, 236
 
 
 
Sandy Hook Elementary School 57
 
 
 
Sarewitz, Daniel 16, 231, 232, 237
 
 
 
Scaffolding 211, 212
 
 
 
Scheler, Max 61, 233
 
 
 
Schivelbusch, Wolfgang 232
 
 
 
Schlanger, Zoe 241
 
 
 
Science fiction 215–216, 225–226
 
 
 
Scientific management; see Taylorism
 
 
 
Schüll, Natasha Dow 2, 192, 240
 
 
 
Schumacher, Ernst Friedrich 89, 90, 91, 235
 
 
 
Sclove, Richard 171, 239
 
 
 
Second Life 205, 207
 
 
 
Secondary orality 190–191
 
 
 
Security 149, 150, 151, 182, 228
 
 
 
Self-service 157–158, 165
 
 
 
Semenya, Caster 203
 
 
 
September 11, 2001; see 9/11
 
 
 
Sex, determining 203–204
 
 
 
Shahzad, Faisal 149
 
 
 
Sharma, Sarah 2, 183, 185, 186, 192, 227,
 
 
 
239, 240, 242
 
 
 
Shelley, Mary 59, 60, 70, 225, 233, 234
 
 
 
Shenzhen 149
 
 
 
Shiva, Vandana 88
 
 
 
Shoes, running 209–210
 
 
 
Minimalist 209–210
 
 
 
Shrum, Wesley 236
 
 
 
Side effects; see Effects
 
 
 
Singularity 20, 213
 
 
 
Skloot, Rebecca 242
 
 
 
Sky Mall Catalog 24
 
 
 
268 O
 
 
 
Index
 
 
 
Slack, Jennifer Daryl 237, 238
 
 
 
Slate 238
 
 
 
Sleep 37, 40, 183, 208, 222
 
 
 
Small Is Beautiful 89, 90
 
 
 
Smart phone 23, 24, 31, 42, 107, 189, 221
 
 
 
Smith, Adam 81
 
 
 
Smith, Cynthia 235
 
 
 
Smith, Martin 242
 
 
 
Smith, Matt 242
 
 
 
Smith, Merritt Roe 19, 24, 124, 125, 231,
 
 
 
232, 237
 
 
 
Snowden, Edward 2, 72, 150, 155, 161,
 
 
 
170, 222
 
 
 
Snowmobile 92–93
 
 
 
Social constructivism; see Determinism, cultural
 
 
 
Social fact 222
 
 
 
Social History of American Technology 44
 
 
 
Social media 2, 51, 52, 107, 150, 174, 216,
 
 
 
220, 222
 
 
 
Social Security Administration 197
 
 
 
Social space 180–181
 
 
 
Social Worlds of the Unborn, The 242
 
 
 
Software 66, 68, 71, 83, 110, 150, 151, 174,
 
 
 
200, 216, 228
 
 
 
Sophie’s Choice 57
 
 
 
Sotirin, Patricia 242
 
 
 
Sound reproduction technologies 233
 
 
 
Sousveillance 151
 
 
 
Southwood, Ivor 185–186, 239
 
 
 
Space 2, 10, 34, 37–40, 42, 43, 60, 104,
 
 
 
140, 153, 159, 179–183, 185, 187, 189,
 
 
 
190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 199, 218
 
 
 
Bias 188
 
 
 
Limits of 37, 39, 40
 
 
 
Representational space 181, 182
 
 
 
Representations of space 181, 182
 
 
 
Spatial practice 181–182
 
 
 
Speed 42, 153, 182, 186, 190, 192, 227
 
 
 
Stand, The 71
 
 
 
Standing Reserve 130
 
 
 
Stanley, Manfred 236
 
 
 
Star, Susan Leigh 200–201, 240
 
 
 
Statue of Liberty 19
 
 
 
Steam loom 234
 
 
 
Steamboat 120
 
 
 
Stein, Rob 241
 
 
 
STEM 9
 
 
 
Sterne, Jonathan 233
 
 
 
Stockingers 79
 
 
 
Defined 234
 
 
 
Strong democracy 171
 
 
 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The 241
 
 
 
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) 91
 
 
 
Sublime 21–22, 23, 24, 61, 232
 
 
 
Digital 23, 25
 
 
 
Electronic 22
 
 
 
Mechanical 22
 
 
 
Mini 24
 
 
 
Technological 22
 
 
 
Subsistence 44–45
 
 
 
Sun Microsystems 71
 
 
 
Surveillance 1, 2, 63, 64, 72, 93, 107, 149–
 
 
 
151, 153, 155, 157, 158, 161, 170, 176, 182, 197, 198, 216, 221–222, 227–228; see also Sousveillance
 
 
 
P2P (Peer-to-peer) 151
 
 
 
Self surveillance 151, 208
 
 
 
Surveillance cameras; see CCTV
 
 
 
Sustainability 1, 30, 92
 
 
 
SUVs; see Automobiles
 
 
 
Swarm 159, 170, 221
 
 
 
“Sympathy for the Luddites” 83
 
 
 
Systems assumptions 199, 200
 
 
 
Taunton, J.E. 241
 
 
 
Taxi drivers 186, 187
 
 
 
Taylor, Frederick 16, 42, 64, 231, 232
 
 
 
Taylorism 30, 42, 64, 231
 
 
 
Technicism 101, 102, 103, 236
 
 
 
Technique, La 101, 130–131
 
 
 
Techniques of the body 209
 
 
 
Technium 132
 
 
 
Technological autonomy 59
 
 
 
Technological culture, defined 9
 
 
 
Technological dependence 59
 
 
 
Technological determinism; see
 
 
 
Determinism
 
 
 
Technological fix 153
 
 
 
Technological momentum 53
 
 
 
Technological Society, The 101, 131
 
 
 
Technological somnambulism 167
 
 
 
Technology, defining 109, 237
 
 
 
“Technology and Ideology: The Case of
 
 
 
the Telegraph” 239
 
 
 
Technology as Symptom and Dream 111
 
 
 
Telegraph 19, 20, 23, 66, 189, 239
 
 
 
Telephone 69, 90, 93, 120, 132, 138, 139,
 
 
 
143, 165, 171
 
 
 
Telepresence 38, 189
 
 
 
Television 40, 50, 53, 88, 102, 107, 110,
 
 
 
120, 132, 181, 182, 202
 
 
 
Tenner, Edward 55, 66, 233
 
 
 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
 
 
 
20, 29
 
 
 
Terminator 70, 210, 215, 226
 
 
 
Terranova, Tiziana 174, 239
 
 
 
Territorialization 156, 158, 176, 180
 
 
 
Index
 
 
 
O 269
 
 
 
Terrorism 78, 100, 103, 153, 155, 182
 
 
 
Thacker, Eugene 169–170, 238, 239
 
 
 
“Thing, The” 111
 
 
 
Thingness 110–111, 114, 126, 160, 237
 
 
 
Things 109–111, 162
 
 
 
Thomis, Malcolm I. 234
 
 
 
Thompson, E.P. 78, 79, 80, 81, 234, 235
 
 
 
Thoreau, Henry David 71
 
 
 
Thousand Plateaus, A 156
 
 
 
Tierney, Thomas F. 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 42,
 
 
 
43, 44, 45, 232, 233
 
 
 
Time 2, 10, 34, 37, 38, 42, 180, 183–194,
 
 
 
218
 
 
 
Bias 187
 
 
 
Limits of 37, 39, 40
 
 
 
Times Square 149, 150, 151
 
 
 
Titanic 13
 
 
 
Todd, Andrew 235
 
 
 
Tools for Conviviality 90
 
 
 
Total Information Awareness 150
 
 
 
Tradition, received 9
 
 
 
Transcendence 226
 
 
 
Transhumanism 232, 237
 
 
 
Translation 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146,
 
 
 
168, 169
 
 
 
Trevelyan, G.M. 235
 
 
 
Trust 59, 69, 71, 72, 73, 161, 197–198
 
 
 
Truth 23, 114, 197, 215, 219
 
 
 
Tunisia 51
 
 
 
Turkle, Sherry 205–206, 241
 
 
 
Twitter 51, 176, 205, 207
 
 
 
Ultrasound 213, 224
 
 
 
Unabomber 10, 68, 77–78, 87, 97–104,
 
 
 
131, 219; see also Kaczynski, Ted
 
 
 
Union busting 64
 
 
 
United Kingdom 72, 149
 
 
 
United Nations 88, 141, 235
 
 
 
United Nations Development Decade; see
 
 
 
Appropriate technology
 
 
 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV); see
 
 
 
Drones
 
 
 
US Naval Observatory 184, 185
 
 
 
US Supreme Court 225
 
 
 
USAID; see Appropriate technology
 
 
 
Utilitarianism 61
 
 
 
Uys, Jamie 232
 
 
 
Varela, Francisco 212
 
 
 
VCR 202
 
 
 
Vibram 210, 241
 
 
 
Vibrant Matter 171
 
 
 
Video gambling machines 180,
 
 
 
192–194
 
 
 
Video games 107
 
 
 
Vinge, Vernor 232
 
 
 
Vonnegut, Kurt 71, 234
 
 
 
Wachowski, Andy 234
 
 
 
Wachowski, Larry 234
 
 
 
War
 
 
 
Of movement or maneuver 176, 239
 
 
 
Of position 176, 239
 
 
 
Warwick, Mal 91, 235
 
 
 
Washington Post 98
 
 
 
Weapons of mass destruction 107
 
 
 
Weavers 79
 
 
 
Web 2.0 46, 168, 220, 221, 242
 
 
 
Webcams 150
 
 
 
Weber, Max 63, 233
 
 
 
Webster, Frank 82, 234, 235
 
 
 
Week, The 238
 
 
 
Whale, James 60, 233
 
 
 
Whale and the Reactor, The 111
 
 
 
What Technology Wants 98
 
 
 
“Where Are the Modern Day
 
 
 
Luddites?” 83
 
 
 
Whitney, Eli 8, 120
 
 
 
Whole Earth Catalog 93
 
 
 
“Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us” 71
 
 
 
Why Things Bite Back 55
 
 
 
Whyte, William H. 101, 102, 236
 
 
 
Wikileaks 72
 
 
 
Wikipedia 174, 220, 242
 
 
 
Wiley, Stephen B. Crofts 238
 
 
 
Williams, Raymond 6, 7, 9, 21, 30, 34, 104,
 
 
 
109, 191, 231, 232, 236, 240
 
 
 
Williams, Rosalind 46, 232
 
 
 
Winant, Howard 240
 
 
 
Winner, Langdon 50, 51, 60, 64, 68, 91,
 
 
 
111, 166–168, 170, 204, 233, 234, 235,
 
 
 
237, 238, 240
 
 
 
Wise, J. Macgregor 239
 
 
 
Wolf, Maryanne 242
 
 
 
World of Warcraft 205, 207
 
 
 
World War Z 70
 
 
 
World Wide Web (WWW) 66, 220
 
 
 
Writing 51–52, 188, 211
 
 
 
Y2K 68–69
 
 
 
Yahoo 150
 
 
 
Yamamoto, Traise 241
 
 
 
Yoga 186, 227
 
 
 
YouTube 51, 207
 
 
 
Zimmer, Carl 241
 
 
 
Zombie 70
 
 
 
Zone 193–194
 
 
 
From mobile phones to surveillance cameras, from fracking to genetically modified food, we live in an age of intense debate about technology’s place in our culture. Culture and Technology is an essential guide to that debate and its fascinating history. It is a primer for beginners and an invaluable resource for those deeply committed to understanding the new digital culture. The award-winning first edition (2005) has been comprehensively updated to incorporate new technologies and contemporary theories about them.
 
 
 
Slack and Wise untangle and expose cultural assumptions that underlie our thinking about technology, stories so deeply held we often don’t recognize their influence. The book considers the perceived inevitability of technological progress, the role of control and convenience, and the very sense of what technology is. It considers resistance to dominant stories by Luddites, the Unabomber, and the alternative technology movement. Most important, it builds an alternative, cultural studies approach for engaging technological culture, one that considers politics, economics, space, time, identity, and change. After all, what we think and what we do make a difference.
 
 
 
“Slack and Wise have written a primer of the best sort, an open invitation to begin an expertly mapped trek across a set of trajectories that reveals the twists and turns of the animating discourses knotted at the intersection of culture and technology. Slack and Wise deftly show how knowledge gained can become knowledge for engaging—from background primer to timely intervention. The task of turning readers into practical social actors in their daily lives is truly this text’s great accomplishment.”
 
 
 
Gregory Seigworth, Millersville University
 
 
 
“If you want to understand why culture matters for the study of technology and what a cultural studies approach brings to our understandings of technology, this book is essential. In clear, accessible prose, Slack and Wise offer readers a program for studying technologies as at once artifacts of human action, actors in their own right, and part of larger forces in the world.”
 
 
 
Jonathan Sterne, author of MP3: The Meaning of a Format and The Audible Past: Cultural Origins of Sound Reproduction
 
 
 
Jennifer Daryl Slack is Professor of Communication and Cultural Studies in the Department of Humanities at Michigan Technological University. She is the author of Communication Technologies and Society (1984), co-editor of The Ideology of the Information Age (1987), and editor of Thinking Geometrically (Peter Lang, 2002) and Animations (of Deleuze and Guattari) (Peter Lang, 2003).
 
 
 
J. Macgregor Wise is Professor of Communication Studies at Arizona State University. He is the author of Exploring Technology and Social Space (1997), Cultural Globalization: A User’s Guide (2008), co-author of MediaMaking (2nd ed., 2006), and co-editor of New Visualities, New Technologies: The New Ecstasy of Communication (2013).
 
 
 
www.peterlang.com
 

Latest revision as of 01:19, 4 August 2025

CURRICULUM OF
THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF MARXISM-LENINISM
PART 1

THE WORLDVIEW AND PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY OF MARXISM-LENINISM

For University and College Students

Not Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought

FIRST ENGLISH EDITION

Translated and Annotated by Luna Nguyen

Foreword by Dr. Vijay Prashad

Introduction by Dr. Taimur Rahman

Edited, Annotated, and Illustrated by Emerican Johnson

Proofread by David Peat

Additional Contributions and Editorial Support by Iskra Books

Published in association with The International Magazine

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“Step by step, along the struggle, by studying Marxism-Leninism parallel with participation in practical activities, I gradually came upon the fact that only socialism and communism can liberate the oppressed nations and the working people throughout the world from slavery.”

- Ho Chi Minh

Support for This Work

Translating, annotating, and typesetting this book has taken three years, which would not have been possible without the support of our supporters on GoFundMe. GoFundMe is also the reason we are able to make the digital version of this entire text available for free online. We would therefore like to recognize all of our supporters:

Zach L. Jake B. Katia S. Jimi C.
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There is still plenty of work to be done to complete the translation of this entire curriculum. If you would like to financially support our efforts, you can support us at:

BanyanHouse.org

Dedication and Gratitude

This book is dedicated to all the backers of the GoFundMe campaign that raised the funds to allow me to translate this text. What I initially believed would be a straightforward three-month process of translating ended up taking over three years of not just translation but also research, study, review, annotation, editing, proofreading, peer review, and more — with the incredible support of a full team of talented comrades — in order to make sure that everything would be digestible and intelligible for audiences outside of Vietnam. So, sincerely, thank you to everyone who backed this project for your patience, support, and encouragement.

Thank you to my husband and comrade, Emerican Johnson, who helped me throughout the translation process, and who did such a fantastic job editing, annotating, and illustrating this text. He was my constant dialectical companion as we grappled together with the spirit and meaning of the writings of Marx, Lenin, and Engels that are the bedrock of this text.

Thank you, also, to Iskra Books for the absolutely vital work they have done in helping us to edit this book and hold it to a high standard. We literally could not have done it without you. In particular, thank you to Ben Stahnke for organizing and cheerleading us through to the end, and to David Peat, for the painstaking, meticulous, and no-doubt frustrating work of proofreading our very, very, very imperfect writing!

Thanks also to The International Magazine, who have provided guidance and suggestions throughout the process of developing this translation. I have had the opportunity to work with The International Magazine on various projects and I can recommend no better monthly periodical for internationalist communists to learn about socialist movements around the world.

We owe a great deal of gratitude to Dr. Vijay Prashad and Dr. Taimur Rahman for taking the time to read through our translation and, in addition to providing their feedback and encouragement, also taking the time to write the foreword and introduction to the text. I know that you are both extremely busy with your own important literary, academic, and political work, so this assistance is so very much appreciated.

Finally, I would like to thank the Vietnamese intellectuals and experts who have done such an amazing job at taking hundreds of texts and distilling them down into the original volume which I have translated here. The elegance and precision with which they have been able to capture the essence of Marxism-Leninism is a monumental contribution to the workers of the world, and I only hope my translation does their work justice.

March, 2023
Luna Nguyen

Foreword

In December 1998, Fidel Castro addressed the Young Communist League’s 7th Congress in Havana, Cuba. The Soviet Union and the Communist state system in Eastern Europe had collapsed, which greatly weakened the cause of socialism. Not only was Cuba hit hard by the loss of its major trading partners and political ally, but socialists in general were penalised by the lethal argument made by the imperialist sections that “socialism had been defeated.” After 1991, Fidel revived the phrase “Battle of Ideas,” which was had been used in The German Ideology by Marx and Engels. To the Young Communists, Fidel said:

We must meet, in the heat of the battle, with the leading cadres to discuss, analyse, expand on, and draft plans and strategies to take up issues and elaborate ideas, as when an army’s general staff meets. We must use solid arguments to talk to members and non-members, to speak to those who may be confused or even to discuss and debate with those holding positions contrary to those of the Revolution or who are influenced by imperialist ideology in this great battle of ideas we have been waging for years now, precisely in order to carry out the heroic deed of resisting against the most politically, militarily, economically, technologically and culturally powerful empire that has ever existed. Young cadres must be well prepared for this task.

Bourgeois ideology had tried to sweep aside its most fundamental critique – namely Marxism – by saying that “socialism had been defeated” and that Marxism was now obsolete. Marxist criticisms of the “casino of capitalism” – as Fidel called it – were being set aside both inside and outside the academy, with neoliberal policy confident enough to ignore each and every criticism. Fidel argued that young communists must learn the fundamentals of Marxism – including both dialectical and historical materialism – and must learn this in a way that was not religious thinking but would allow them to become “new intellectuals” of the movement, not those who repeat dogma but who learn to understand the conjuncture and become “permanent persuaders” for socialism (the two phrases in quotations are from Gramsci’s prison notebooks). The general ideological confidence of the cadre was not clear, and that confidence and their clarity needed to be developed in a project that Fidel called the Battle of Ideas.

During this period, communists around the world conceded that the demise of the Soviet Union had created a serious dilemma for the left. Not only were we penalised by the argument that “socialism has been defeated,” but our own arguments to explain the turbo-charged drive toward globalisation and neoliberalism and to make the case for a socialist alternative were not strong enough. One indication of that weakness was the 2001 World Social Forum meeting held in Brazil, which promoted the slogan – Another World is Possible, a weak slogan in comparison to a more precise slogan, such as – Socialism is Necessary. Young people drifted into our ranks in this decade, angered by the wretched social conditions created by the permanent austerity of neoliberalism, but bewildered about how to transform the political environment. The lack of Marxist political education was felt by socialist forces across the world, which is why many parties around the world began to revive a conversation about internal political education for cadre and active engagement with other social forces regarding the pressing issues of our time. Fidel called these two processes – internal education for the Party and external engagement on the dilemmas of humanity – the Battle of Ideas.

In line with this broad direction, the government of Vietnam worked with the national publishing house Sự Thật (The Truth) to develop a curriculum for universities and colleges in the country. They developed this order of study along five subject areas: Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Marxist-Leninist Political Economy, Scientific Socialism, Vietnamese Communist Party History, and Ho Chi Minh Thought. This project worked to educate an entire population that would be able to understand the world in a rational and factual manner, outside the illusions of bourgeois ideology. Four years later, Communist Party of Vietnam adopted a resolution to take this work forward, and – under the leadership of Professor Nguyễn Viết Thông – produced this textbook that brought together the many themes of Marxism into focus for the introductory student and cadre. A book such as this is never easy to create, since it must introduce a form of thought that is critical of the foundations of bourgeois ideology – so it is a critique – but at the same time it provides a worldview to understand the actual world in which we live – so it is a science. The text must, therefore, show how bourgeois thought is partial and at the same time how socialist thought, creatively applied, will allow one to have a firmer grip of reality and be able to participate in fighting to transcend the obstinate facts of human indignity that are reproduced by capitalism. No manual such as this is without its flaws and without its limitations, but no education can start without a manual such as this one. The Vietnamese comrades have done a great service to the left movement by producing a text such as this, which can be used for study and then used as a model to develop similar texts in different parts of the world.

Ho Chi Minh, whose interpretation of Marxism and whose ideas about the Vietnamese Revolution, are all over this text once said: “Study and practice must always go together. Study without practice is useless. Practice without study leads to folly.” There can be no better injunction to get to work, to study and develop one’s theoretical armour and to use that theory as the guide to one’s work in the Battle of Ideas and in the battle for the streets, because this unity between theory and action is indeed praxis (thực tiễn), not just practice, but conscious human activity. That is what Fidel encouraged in his lectures on the Battle of Ideas.

Dr. Vijay Prashad.
5 March 2023
Caracas, Venezuela.

Preface to the First English Edition

The text of this book constitutes part one of a four-part curriculum on Marxism-Leninism developed and published by the Ministry of Education and Training of Vietnam. This curriculum is intended for students who are not specializing in the study of Marxism-Leninism, and is intended to give every Vietnamese student a firm grounding in the political philosophy of scientific socialism.

The entire curriculum consists of:

Part 1: Dialectical Materialism (this text)

Part 2: Historical Materialism

Part 3: Political Economy

Part 4: Scientific Socialism

In Vietnam, each part of the curriculum encompasses one full semester of mandatory study for all college students. Each part builds upon the previous, meaning that this text is the foundation for all political theory education for most college students in Vietnam.

However, it is important to note that this is not the first encounter with dialectical materialism which Vietnamese students wil have had with these ideas, because Vietnamese students also study dialectical materialism, historical materialism, political economy, and scientific socialism from primary school all the way through high school.

As such, the text of this book — in and of itself — would probably seem overwhelmingly condensed to most foreign readers who are new to studying dialectical materialism. Therefore, we have decided to extensively annotate and illustrate this text with the information which would have been previously obtained in a basic Vietnamese high school education and/or provided by college lecturers in the classroom.

It is our desire that these annotations will be helpful for students who hope to learn these principles for application in political activity, but we should also make it clear to academic researchers and the like that our annotations and illustrations are not present in the original Vietnamese work.

We hope that this book will be useful in at least three ways:

  • As a comprehensive introductory textbook on dialectical materialism and for selfstudy, group study, classroom use, cadre training, etc.
  • As a quick and easy to reference handbook for reviewing the basic concepts of dialectical materialism for students of theory who are already familiar with dialectical materialism.
  • As a companion book for further reading of theory and political texts rooted in dialectical materialist philosophy.

Also, please note: because this book is intended to be used as a quick reference and handbook for further study, there are many instances where we duplicate references, quotations, and other such information. We hope that this repetition may be an aid for study by reinforcing important concepts and quotations.

This book — Part 1 of the curriculum, which focuses on the universal philosophical system of dialectical materialism — serves as the foundation of all political theory and practice in the Vietnamese educational system as well as in the Communist Party of Vietnam and other organizations such as the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, the Women’s Union, the Farmer’s Union, the Worker’s Union, etc. Dialectical materialism is the framework for theory and practice as well as the common lens through which Vietnamese socialists relate, communicate, and work together.

This book focuses almost exclusively on the written works of three historical figures:

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels... who initially developed the universal philosophy of dialectical materialism by synthesizing various pre-existing philosophical, political, economic, and historical tendencies including the idealist dialectical system of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the political economics of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the materialist positions of Ludwig Feuerbach, and countless others.

...and Vladimir Illyich Lenin, who further developed and defended dialectical materialism, expanded the analysis of imperialism, demonstrated how to apply dialectical materialism to local material conditions specific to Russia at the turn of the 20th century, and made many other important contributions to dialectical materialist theory and practice.

Obviously, there are countless other writers, revolutionaries, philosophers, and scientists who have contributed to dialectical materialism and scientific socialism. This book focuses primarily on Marx, Engels, and Lenin, because these figures laid the foundations and formulated the basic principles of the philosophy of dialectical materialism and the methodology of materialist dialectics which are most universally applicable in all endeavors.

It is our desire that translating this important work into English will lead to further study, understanding, and appreciation of dialectical materialism as an applied philosophy which socialists can find value in returning to periodically. At the end of the book, we offer a glossary of terms which doubles as an index, appendices with summaries of important concepts and principles, and an afterword, in which we offer advice for further study and application of dialectical materialism.

At the time of publication, we are already in the process of translating and annotating Part 2 of this curriculum, which focuses on historical materialism, with the hopes of eventually releasing the full curriculum. Once it is complete, it will also be made available at BanyanHouse.org — where we also invite questions, constructive feedback, and suggestions.

Introduction

Just a generation ago, Vietnam was the site of the most brutal war of the 20th century. More tonnage of bombs were dropped on the Vietnamese people than were dropped by all sides combined throughout the Second World War. In addition, countless acts of cruelty were used to scorch the very soil of the nation. By the end of Vietnam’s Resistance War Against Imperialist USA (known to the world as “the Vietnam War”), Agent Orange, napalm, and unexploded munitions had left a land deeply scarred and a people traumatised by decades of death and murder. The impression one had was that although Vietnam had won the war, it was so badly devastated that it could not hope to win the peace. But, miraculously, Vietnam is winning this war today, as the Vietnamese economy has become one of the fastest growing in the world and quality of life for the people is improving at a pace which could scarcely have been predicted in 1975.

No one could have imagined that Vietnam would turn around so dynamically and rapidly. How did they achieve this economic miracle? How could this nation — so recently devastated by imperialism and war — possibly be able to reconstruct, revive, rejuvenate, and rebuild? That story is now unfolding before our eyes.

Vietnam’s development has not come without hardship, struggle, setbacks, and mistakes. The people of Vietnam have had to learn hard lessons through struggle and practice to develop and strengthen ideological and theoretical positions. In this manner, the philosophical development of Vietnam deserves study and attention from socialists around the world. To outsiders, Vietnam can appear to be rife with contradictions. As depicted by Western journalists, Vietnam is simultaneously a success story driven by capitalist markets and a failing socialist state. Every victory is chalked up to private enterprise, while every setback is attributed to socialism. In this sense, the media has failed to understand the essential character of the core contradictions which drive the development of Vietnam politically, socially, and economically.

Luna Nguyen has used social media and played an incredibly important role in helping the English speaking world understand the complexities of such contradictions that beguile so many academics and experts. She has helped to give an insider’s perspective on her own country’s path of development towards socialism.

Nguyen’s translation of Part 1 of this influential work, Introduction to the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism, a textbook studied by university and college students across Vietnam, is yet another big step in the direction of making Vietnam’s understanding of their own country’s development available to the English reading world.

For me, as an outsider, it is fascinating not only to see how deeply Vietnamese society takes an interest in European philosophical development (referencing Hume, Hegel, Descartes, Marx, Engels, and so many other Europeans, almost as if they are figures seated in some ancient monastery in Fansipan), but, even more importantly, how they have assimilated that knowledge into the wider context of their own history, society, and culture. The textbook truly comes alive in all the parts where these ideas are shown to be relevant to Vietnam itself. For instance, the textbook stands out with discussions of Ho Chi Minh’s concept of “proletarian piety,” which artfully blends elements of Vietnamese culture with Marxist concepts of class consciousness, or the story of Chi Pheo, who stands as a sympathetic stand-in for the interpretation of the unique characteristics of the Vietnamese Lumpenproletariat. The book itself is an instance of the dialectic of the universal and the particular, the abstract and the concrete.

Just as importantly, it shows that, in Vietnam, Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought are not mere perfunctory rituals that are repeated like a learnt formula for this or that exam; but that although the Vietnamese political economy in its current form certainly contains contradictions which must be negated in the process of building the lower stage of socialism, the government remains seriously committed to the goals, theory, and practice of Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought.

Hence, I highly recommend this book, not merely because it is a well-illustrated and easy-to-read book on the principles of dialectical materialism, but more importantly because it offers an insight into how the Vietnamese government collects and synthesises the philosophical developments that are, on the one hand, the collective legacy of all of humanity, and, on the other hand, the concrete manifestations of a revolutionary theory of (and for the oppressed yearning for) freedom in every corner of the world.

March, 2023

Dr. Taimur Rahman

Editor’s Note

Working on this project has been one of the most illuminating experiences of my life. In translating this work, Luna has opened a door for English speakers into the wide world of Vietnamese scholarship and pedagogy as it relates to socialist theory and philosophy.

Luna and I have done our best to capture the original meaning and spirit of the text. Furthermore, as we have mentioned elsewhere, our annotations and illustrations are intended only to contextualize and expand on the core information of the original text similarly to the class/lecture setting for which the curriculum is intended.

In their lives, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were never able to finish clarifying and systematically describing the philosophy of dialectical materialism which their work was built upon. Engels attempted to structurally define the philosophy in Dialectics of Nature, but unfortunately that work was never completed since he decided to prioritize publishing the unfinished works of Marx after his untimely death.

I believe that this text is a great step forward in that work of systematically describing the philosophical system of dialectical materialism and the methodological system of materialist dialectics. I also believe it’s worth noting how the Vietnamese scholars who crafted this curriculum have embedded the urgent necessity of action — of creative application of these ideas — throughout the text in a way that I find refreshing and reflective of the works of Marx and Engels themselves.

As the text will explain, dialectical materialism is a universal system of philosophy which can be utilized to grapple with any and every conceivable problem which we humans might encounter in this universe. In Vietnam, dialectical materialism has been used to delve into matters of art, ethics, military science, and countless other fields of inquiry and endeavor. It is my hope that this book will, likewise, lead to a wider and fuller understanding and (more importantly) application of dialectical materialism in the Western world.

March, 2023

Emerican Johnson

A Message From The International Magazine

The International Magazine began in 2020 to connect international socialist movements and to strengthen the voice of oppressed people across the globe. We have been following the work of Vietnamese communists in their unique path towards peace, prosperity, and the construction of socialist values with a keen eye and much interest. It is with this spirit of international solidarity and a deep desire to learn from and share wisdom from our comrades around the world that we celebrate the release of this First English Edition of The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism-Leninism Part 1: The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism-Leninism.

Ho Chi Minh once said: “In order to build socialism, first and foremost, we need to have socialist people who understand socialist ideology and have socialist values.”

To this end, Vietnamese communists have expended tremendous resources building a curriculum on Marxist-Leninist philosophy and analysis which includes dialectical materialism, materialist dialectics, scientific socialism, historical materialism, and political economy. These topics are taught in primary and secondary schools and are mandatory subjects for all students attending public universities in Vietnam. Beyond that, Vietnam offers free degrees to students who wish to study Marxist theory and philosophy and Ho Chi Minh Thought (defined as the application of Marxist philosophy to the unique material conditions of Vietnam). In this manner, Vietnam has demonstrated a steadfast commitment to developing “socialist people” “with socialist values.”

We are, therefore, extremely excited to have worked with Luna Nguyen on the translation and annotation of Part 1 of the Vietnamese university curriculum on the worldview and philosophical methodology of Marxism-Leninism into English, which will make this unique perspective of socialist theory available to comrades around the world for the first time.

After having read through this volume, which outlines the fundamentals of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics, we find the most important lesson to be the relationship between theory and practice. According to the Vietnamese scholars who authored the original text, Marxist-Leninist philosophy must be considered a living, breathing philosophy which requires application in the real world — through practice — in order to be made fully manifest.

We hope that readers of this volume will carry forward this guidance through practice which suits your material conditions, wherever you are in the world.

If you would like to learn the perspective of socialists from other nations around the world, we invite you to visit our website at InternationalMagz.com — the home of The International Magazine online. There, you will find articles written by comrades from a wide variety of backgrounds and nationalities with a clear bias towards anti-capitalism, anti-fascism, and anti-imperialism!

In solidarity,

The Editorial Team of The International Magazine

Notes on Translation

Vietnamese is a very different language from English, which has presented many challenges in translating this book. Whenever possible, I have tried to let the “spirit” of the language guide me, without altering the structure, tone, and formatting of the book.

One thing you will likely notice right away: this book is highly condensed! This is because most Vietnamese students are already familiar with these concepts. We have added annotations to try to make the book more digestible for those of you who are new to Marxism-Leninism, and these annotations are explained on the next page.

I have worked hard to try to make the language in this book consistent with the language used in popular translations of works from Marx, Lenin, etc., that would be familiar to English-language students of Marxism-Leninism. That said, different translators have been translating these texts into English for over a century, such that different word choices have been used to relate the same concepts, and even Marx, Engels, and Lenin used different terms to describe the same concepts in many instances (not to mention the fact that Marx and Engels wrote primarily in German, whereas Lenin wrote primarily in Russian).

As such, I have made it my first priority to keep the language of this translation internally consistent to avoid confusion and, again, to match the spirit of the original text as much as possible. As a result, you may find differences between the translation choices made in this text and other translations, but it is my hope that the underlying meaning of each translation is properly conveyed.

March, 2023

Luna Nguyen

Guide to Annotations

This book was written as a textbook for Vietnamese students who are not specializing in Marxism-Leninism, and so it is meant to be a simple and condensed survey of the most fundamental principles of dialectical materialism to be used in a classroom environment with the guide of an experienced lecturer. That said, a typical Vietnamese college student will already have been exposed to many of the concepts presented herein throughout twelve years of primary and secondary education. As such, in translating and preparing this book for a foreign audience who are likely to be reading it without the benefit of a lecturer’s in-person instruction, we realized that we would need to add a significant amount of annotations to the text.

These annotations will take the following forms:

  • Short annotations which we insert into the text itself [will be included in square brackets like these].

Longer annotations which add further context and background information will be included in boxes like this.


We have also added diagrams to our annotations, as well as a detailed glossary/index and appendices, which are located in the back of the book. We hope these will resources will also be of use in studying other texts which are rooted in dialectical materialist philosophy.

Original Vietnamese Publisher’s Note

In 2004, under the direction of the Central Government, the Ministry of Education and Training, in collaboration with Sự Thật [Vietnamese for “The Truth,” the name of a National Political Publishing House], published a [political science and philosophy] curriculum for universities and colleges in Vietnam. This curriculum includes 5 subjects: Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Marxist-Leninist Political Economy, Scientific Socialism, Vietnamese Communist Party History, and Ho Chi Minh Thought. This curriculum has been an important contribution towards educating our students — the young intellectuals of the country — in political reasoning, so that the next generation will be able to successfully conduct national innovation.

With the new practice of education and training, in order to thoroughly grasp the reform of the Party’s ideological work and theory, and to advocate for reform in both teaching and learning at universities and colleges in general, on September 18th, 2008, the Minister of Education and Training, in collaboration with Sự Thật, have issued a new program and published a textbook of political theory subjects for university and college students who are not specialized in Marxism — Leninism with Associate Professor and Doctor of Philosophy Nguyen Viet Thong as chief editor. There are three subjects:

Curriculum of the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism

Curriculum of Ho Chi Minh Thought

Curriculum of the Revolutionary Path of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

Curriculum of the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism was compiled by a collective of scientists and experienced lecturers from a number of universities, with Pham Van Sinh, Ph.D and Pham Quang Phan, Ph.D as co-editors. This curriculum has been designed to meet the practical educational requirements of students.

We hope this book will be of use to you.

April, 2016

NATIONAL POLITICAL PUBLISHING HOUSE — SỰ THẬT

Original Vietnamese Preface

To implement the resolutions of the Communist Party of Vietnam, especially the 5th

Central Resolution on ideological work, theory, and press, on September 18th, 2008, The Ministry of Education and Training has issued Decision Number 52/2008/QD-BGDDT, issuing the subject program: The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism for Students Non-Specialised in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought. In collaboration with Truth — the National Political Publishing House — we published the Curriculum of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism for Students Non-Specialised in MarxismLeninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought.

The authors of this text have drawn from the contents of the Central Council’s previous programs (Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Marxist-Leninist Political Economy, and Scientific Socialism) and compiled them into national textbooks for Marxist-Leninist science subjects and Ho Chi Minh Thought, as well as other curriculums for the Ministry of Education and Training. The authors have received comments from many collectives, such as the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics and Administration, the Central Propaganda Department, as well as individual scientists and lecturers at universities and colleges throughout the country. Notably:

Associate Professor To Huy Rua, Ph.D, Professor Phung Huu Phu, Ph.D, Professor Nguyen Duc Binh, Professor Le Huu Nghia, Ph.D, Professor Le Huu Tang, Ph.D,

Professor Vo Dai Luoc, Ph.D, Professor Tran Phuc Thang, Ph.D, Professor Hoang

Chi Bao, Ph.D, Professor Tran Ngoc Hien, Ph.D, Professor Ho Van Thong, Associate

Professor Duong Van Thinh, Ph.D, Associate Professor Nguyen Van Oanh, Ph.D,

Associate Professor Nguyen Van Hao, Ph.D, Associate Professor Nguyen Duc Bach, PhD. Pham Van Chin, Phung Thanh Thuy, M.A., and Nghiem Thi Chau Giang, M.A.

After a period of implementation, the contents of the textbooks have been supplemented and corrected on the basis of receiving appropriate suggestions from universities, colleges, the contingent of lecturers of political theory, and scientists. However, due to objective and subjective limitations, there are still contents that need to be added and modified, and we would love to receive more comments to make the next edition of the curriculum more complete.

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Table of Contents

Introduction to The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism

I. Brief History of Marxism Leninism

1. Marxism and the Three Constituent Parts

2. Summary of the Birth and Development of Marxism-Leninism

II. Objects, Purposes, and Requirements for Studying the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism

1. Objects and Purposes of Study

2. Some Basic Requirements of the Studying Method

3. Excerpt from Modifying the Working Style

Chapter I: Dialectical Materialism

I. Materialism and Dialectical Materialism

1. The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues

2. Dialectical Materialism — the Most Advanced Form of Materialism

II. Dialectical Materialist Opinions About Matter, Consciousness, and the Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness

1. Matter

2. Consciousness

3. The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness

4. Meaning of the methodology

Chapter 2: Materialist Dialectics

I. Dialectics and Materialist Dialectics

1. Dialectics and Basic Forms of Dialectics

2. Materialist Dialectics

II. Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics

1. The Principle of General Relationships

2. Principle of Development

III. Basic Pairs of Categories of Materialist Dialectics

1. Private and Common

2. Reason and Result

3. Obviousness and Randomness

4. Content and Form

5. Essence and Phenomenon

6. Possibility and Reality

IV. Basic Laws of Materialist Dialectics

1. Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality

2. Law of Unification and Contradiction Between Opposites

3. Law of Negation of Negation

Chapter 3: Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism

1. Praxis, Consciousness, and the Role of Praxis in Consciousness

2. Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth

Afterword

Appendices

Appendix A: Basic Pairs of Categories Used in Materialist Dialectics

Appendix B: The Two Basic Principles of Dialectical Materialism

Appendix C: The Three Universal Laws of Materialist Dialectics

Appendix D: Forms of Consciousness and Knowledge

Appendix E: Properties of Truth

Appendix F: Common Deviations from Dialectical Materialism

Glossary and Index


“Great Victory for the People and Army of South Vietnam!”


Introduction to the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism

I. Brief History of Marxism-Leninism

1. Marxism and the Three Constituent Parts

Marxism-Leninism is a system of scientific opinions and theories which were built by Karl Marx[1] and Friedrich Engels[2], and defended and developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin[3]. Marxism-Leninism was formed and developed by interpreting reality as well as building on preceding ideas. It provides the fundamental worldview* and methodology of scientific awareness and revolutionary practice. It is a science that concerns the work of liberating the proletariat from all exploitative regimes with the ambition of liberating all of humanity from all forms of oppression.

Marxism-Leninism is made up of three basic theories which have strong relationships with each other. They are: Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, Marxist-Leninist Political Economics, and Scientific Socialism.

Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism studies the basic principles of the movement and development of nature, society and human thought. It provides the fundamental worldview and methodology of scientific awareness and revolutionary practice.

Based on this philosophical worldview and methodology, Marxist-Leninist Political Economics studies the economic rules of society, especially the economic rules of the birth, development, and decay of the capitalist mode of production, as well as the birth and development of a new mode of production: the communist mode of production.

Scientific Socialism** is the inevitable result of applying the philosophical worldview and methodology of Marxism-Leninism, as well as Marxist-Leninist Political Economics, to reveal the objective rules of the socialist revolution process: the historical step from capitalism into socialism, and then communism.


Annotation 1

* A worldview encompasses the whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about ourselves as human beings, and about life and the position of human beings in the world.

** The word “science,” and, by extension, “scientific” in Marxism-Leninism has specific meaning. Friedrich Engels was the first to describe the philosophy which he developed with Marx as “Scientific Socialism” in his book Socialism: Utopian and Scientific.

However, it should be noted that the English phrase “scientific socialism” comes from

Engels’ use of the German phrase “wissenschaftlich sozialismus.”

“Wissenschaft” is a word which can be directly translated as “knowledge craft” in German, and this word encompasses a much more broad and general concept than the word “science” as it’s usually used in English.

In common usage, the word “science” in English has a relatively narrow definition, referring to systematically acquired, objective knowledge pertaining to a particular subject. But “wissenschaft” refers to a systematic pursuit of knowledge, research, theory, and understanding. “Wissenschaft” is used in any study that involves systematic investigation. And so, “scientific socialism” is only an approximate translation of “wissenschaftlich sozialismus.” So, “scientific socialism” can be understood as a body of theory which analyzes and interprets the natural world to develop a body of knowledge, which must be constantly tested against reality, with the pursuit of changing the world to bring about socialism through the leadership of the proletariat.


Even though these three basic theories of Marxism-Leninism deal with different subjects, they are all parts of a unified scientific theory system: the science of liberating the proletariat from exploitative regimes and moving toward human liberation.

2. Summary of the Birth and Development of Marxism-Leninism

There have been two main stages of the birth and development of Marxism-Leninism:

1. Stage of formation and development of Marxism, as developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.

2. Stage of defense and developing Marxism into Marxism-Leninism, as developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

a. Conditions and Premises of the Birth of Marxism


Annotation 2

The following sections will explain the conditions which led to the birth of Marxism. First, we will examine the Social-Economic conditions which lead to the birth of Marxism, and then we will examine the theoretical premises upon which Marxism was built. Later, we will also discuss the impact which 18th and 19th century advances in natural science had on the development of Marxism.

- Social-Economical Conditions

Marxism was born in the 1840s. This was a time when the capitalist mode of production was developing strongly in Western Europe on the foundation of the industrial revolution which succeeded first in England at the end of the 18th century. Not only did this industrial revolution mark an important step forward in changing from handicraft cottage industry capitalism into a more greatly mechanized and industrialized capitalism, it also deeply changed society, and, above all, it caused the birth and development of the proletariat.


Annotation 3

Marx saw human society under capitalism divided into classes based on their relation to the means of production.

Means of production are physical inputs and systems used in the production of goods and services, including machinery, factory buildings, tools, and anything else used in producing goods and services. Capitalism is a political economy defined by private ownership of the means of production.

Within the framework of Dialectical Materialism, all classes are defined by internal and external relationships [see The Principle of General Relationships, p. 107]; chiefly, classes are defined by their relations to the means of production and to one another.

The proletariat are the working class — the people who provide labor under capitalism, but who do not own their own means of production, and must therefore sell their labor to those who do own means of production: the bourgeoisie. As the owners of the means of production, the bourgeoisie are the ruling class under capitalism.

According to Marx and Engels, there are other classes within the capitalist political economy. Specifically, Marx named the petty bourgeoisie and the lumpenproletariat. Marx defined the petty bourgeoisie as including semi-autonomous merchants, farmers, and so on who are self-employed, own small and limited means of production, or otherwise fall in between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

In the Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx described the petty bourgeoisie as:

... fluctuating between proletariat and bourgeoisie, and ever renewing itself as a supplementary part of bourgeois society... The individual members of this class, however, are being constantly hurled down into the proletariat by the action of competition, and, as modern industry develops, they even see the moment approaching when they will completely disappear as an independent section of modern society, to be replaced in manufactures, agriculture and commerce, by overlookers, bailiffs and shopmen.

Vietnam’s Textbook of History for High School Students gives this definition of the petty bourgeoisie in the specific context of Vietnamese history:

The petty bourgeois class includes: intellectuals, scientists, and small business owners, handicraftsmen, doctors, lawyers, and civil servants. The vast majority of contemporary intellectuals before the August Revolution of 1945, including students, belonged to the petty bourgeoisie. In general, they were also oppressed by imperialism and feudalism, often unemployed and uneducated.

The petty bourgeoisie were intellectually and politically sensitive. They did not directly exploit labor. Therefore, they easily absorbed revolutionary education and went along with the workers and peasants.

However, the intelligentsia and students often suffer from great weaknesses, such as: theory not being coupled with practice, contempt for labor, vague ideas, unstable stances, and erratic behavior in political action.

Some other petty bourgeoisie (scientists and small businessmen, freelancers, etc.) were also exploited by imperialism and feudalism. Their economic circumstances were precarious, and they often found themselves unemployed and bankrupt. Therefore, the majority also participated in and supported the resistance war and revolution. They are also important allies of the working class.

In general, these members of the petty bourgeoisie had a number of weaknesses: self-interest, fragmentation, and a lack of determination. Therefore, the working class has a duty to agitate and spread propaganda to such members of the petty bourgeoisie, organize them, and help them to develop their strong points while correcting their weaknesses. It is necessary to skillfully lead them, make them determined to serve the people, reform their ideology, and unite with the workers and peasants in order to become one cohesive movement. Then, they will become a great asset for the public in resistance war and revolution.

Marx defined the “lumpenproletariat” as another class which includes the segments of society with the least privilege — most exploited by capitalism — such as thieves, houseless people, etc.

In the Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx defined the lumpenproletariat as: “The ‘dangerous class’ (lumpenproletariat), the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of the old society.” Marx did not have much hope for the revolutionary potential of the lumpenproletariat, writing that they “may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.”

Political Theories, an official journal of the Ho Chi Minh National Institute of Politics, discussed the lumpenproletariat in the specific context of Vietnamese revolutionary history:

It should be noted that Marxism-Leninism has never held that the historical mission of the working class is rooted in poverty and impoverishment. Poverty and low standards of living make workers hate the regime of capitalism, and causes disaster for workers, but the basic driving force behind the revolutionary struggle of the working class lies in the very nature of capitalist production and from the irreconcilable contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie.

Moreover, it should not be conceived that a class is capable of leading the revolution because it is the poorest class. In the old societies, there were classes that were extremely poor and had to go through many struggles against the ruling class, but they could never win and keep power, and did not become the ruling class of society.

History has proven that the class that represents newly emerging productive forces which are able to build a more advanced mode of production than the old ones can lead the revolution and organize society into the regime they represent. Fetishizing poverty and misery is a corruption of Marxism-Leninism...

The very existence of the lumpenproletariat is strong evidence of the inhumane nature of capitalist society, which regularly recreates a large class of outcasts at the bottom of society.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, millions of Vietnamese people were forced to leave their homes in rural farmlands to work for plantations and factories which were owned by French colonialists. These workers were functionally enslaved, being regularly physically abused by colonial masters, barred from any education whatsoever, and receiving only the bare minimum to survive. As a result, under French colonial rule, about 90% of Vietnamese were illiterate and the French aimed to indoctrinate Vietnamese people into believing that they were inferior to the French.

The French colonialists also worked with Vietnamese landlords to exploit peasants in rural areas. Those peasants received barely enough to survive and, like the plantation slaves, were prohibited from receiving education. Because Vietnamese peasants and colonial slaves composed the majority of workers while being so severely oppressed and living in conditions of such abject poverty, it was difficult to fully distinguish between the proletariat and the lumpenproletariat in Vietnam during the colonial era.

During this time, Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese communists developed the philosophy of “Proletarian Piety.” The word “piety,” here, is a translation of the Vietnamese word hiếu, which originally comes from the Confucianist philosophy of “filial piety.” Filial piety demanded children to deeply respect, honor, and obey their parents. Through the concept of Proletarian Piety, Ho Chi Minh adapted this concept to proletarian revolution, calling for communists to deeply love, respect, and tirelessly serve the oppressed masses. This philosophical concept sought to unite the proletariat, lumpenproletariat, and petty bourgeoisie into one united revolutionary class. Even some feudal landlords and capitalists — who were, themselves, oppressed by the colonizing French — were willing to fight for communist revolution and were welcomed into the revolutionary movement if they were willing to adhere to the principle of proletarian piety. The working class and peasantry would lead the revolution, the more privileged classes would follow, and all communist revolutionists would serve the oppressed masses through sacrifice and struggle.

During this period, many novels were written and circulated widely which featured main characters who were members of the lumpenproletariat or enslaved by the French, such as Bỉ Vỏ, a story about a beautiful peasant girl who was forced to become a thief in the city, and Chí Phèo, the story of a peasant who worked as a servant in a feudal landlord’s house who was sent to prison and became a destitute alcoholic after being released. The purpose of these stories was to show the cruelty of the colonialist-capitalist society of Vietnam in the 1930’s and to inspire proletarian piety, including empathy and respect for the extreme suffering and oppression of the lumpenproletariat, peasantry, and colonial slaves. These stories also presented sympathetic views of intellectuals and members of the petty bourgeoisie: for instance, in the novel Lão Hạc, the son of a peasant leaves to work for a French plantation and the father never sees him again. The aged peasant becomes extremely poor and sick without the support of his son, and the only person in the village who helps him is a teacher, representing the intellectual segment of the petty bourgeoisie.

The writers of these novels were communists who wanted to promote the principles of proletarian piety. Rather than looking down on the most oppressed members of society, and rather than sewing distrust and contempt for the petty bourgeoisie, Vietnamese communists inspired solidarity and collaboration between all of the oppressed peoples of Vietnam to overthrow French colonialism, feudalism, and capitalism. Proletarian piety was crucial for uniting the divided and conquered masses of Vietnam and successfully overthrowing colonialism. Note that these strategies were developed specifically for colonial Vietnam. Every revolutionary struggle will take place in unique material conditions[4], and the composition and characteristics of each class will vary over time and from one place to another. It is important for revolutionists to carefully apply the principles of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics to accurately analyze class conditions in order to develop strategies and plans which will most suitably and efficiently lead to successful revolution.

The deep contradictions* between the socialized production force** and the capitalist relations of production*** were first revealed by the economic depression of 1825 and the series of struggles between workers and the capitalist class which followed.


Annotation 4

* See: Definition of Contradiction and Common Characteristics of Contradiction, p. 175.

** In Marxism, “socialization” is simply the idea that human society transforms labor and production from a solitary, individual act into a collective, social act. In other words, as human society progresses, people “socialize” labor into increasingly complex networks of social relations: from individuals making their own tools, to agricultural societies engaged in collective farming, to modern industrial societies with factories, logistical networks, etc.

The production force is the combination of the means of production and workers within any society. The “Socialized Production Force,” therefore, is a production force which has been socialized — that is to say, a production force which has been organized into collective social activity. Under capitalism, the “Socialized Production Force” consists of the proletariat, or the working class, as well as means of production which are owned by capitalists.

*** Marx and Engels defined “relations of production” as the social relationships that human beings must accept in order to survive. Relations of production are, by definition, not voluntary, because human beings must enter into them in order to receive material needs in order to survive within a given society. Under capitalism, the relations of production require the working class to rent their labor to capitalists to receive wages which they need to procure material needs like food and shelter. This is an inherent contradiction because a small minority of society (the capitalist class) own the means of production while the vast majority of society (the working class) must submit to exploitation through wage servitude in order to survive.

Examples of such early struggles include: the resistance of workers in Lyon, France in 1831 and 1834; the Chartist movement in Britain from 1835 to 1848; the workers’ movement in Silesia (Germany) in 1844, etc. These events prove as historical evidence that the proletariat had become an independent political force which pioneered the fight for a democratic, equal, and progressive society.


Annotation 5

Here are some brief descriptions of the early working class movements mentioned above:

Resistance of Workers in Lyon, France:

In 1831 in France, due to heavy exploitation and hardship, textile workers in Lyon revolted to demand higher wages and shorter working hours. The rebels took control of the city for ten days. Their determination to fight is reflected in the slogan: “Live working or die fighting!”

This resistance was brutally crushed by the government, which supported the factory owners. In 1834, silk mill workers in Lyon revolted again to demand the establishment of a republic. The fierce struggle went on for four days, but was extinguished in a bloody battle against the French army. About 10,000 insurgents were imprisoned or deported.

The Chartist Movement in Britain:

Chartism was a working class movement in the United Kingdom which rose up in response to anti-worker laws such as the Poor Law Amendment of 1834, which drove poor people into workhouses and removed other social programs for the working poor. Legislative failure to address the demands of the working poor led to a broadly popular mass movement which would go on to organize around the People’s Charter of 1838, which was a list of six demands which included extension of the vote and granting the working class the right to hold office in the House of Commons.

In 1845, Karl Marx visited Britain for the first time, along with Friedrich Engels, to meet with the leaders of the Chartist movement (with whom Engels had already established a close relationship). After various conflicts and struggles, Chartism ultimately began to decline in 1848 as more socialist-oriented movements rose up in prominence.

Workers’ Movement in Silesia, Germany:

In June, 1844, disturbances and riots occurred in the Prussian province of Silesia, a major center of textile manufacturing. In response, the Prussian army was called upon to restore order in the region. In a confrontation between the weavers and troops, shots were fired into the crowd, killing 11 protesters and wounding many others. The leaders of the disturbances were arrested, flogged, and imprisoned. This event has gained enormous significance in the history of the German labor movement.

In particular, Karl Marx regarded the uprising as evidence of the birth of a German workers’ movement. The weavers’ rebellion served as an important symbol for later generations concerned with poverty and oppression of the working class in German society.

It quickly became apparent that the revolutionary practice of the proletariat needed the guidance of scientific theories. The birth of Marxism was to meet that objective requirement; in the meantime, the revolutionary practice itself became the practical premise for Marxism to continuously develop.

- Theoretical Premises

The birth of Marxism not only resulted from the objective requirement of history, it was also the result of inheriting the quintessence* of various previously established frameworks of human philosophical theory such as German classical philosophy, British classical political economics, and utopianism in France and Britain.


Annotation 6

* In the original Vietnamese, the word tinh hoa is used, which we roughly translate to the word quintessence throughout this book. Literally, it means “the best, highest, most beautiful, defining characteristics” of a concept, and, unlike the English word quintessence, it has an exclusively positive connotation. Quintessence should not be confused with the universal category of Essence, which is discussed on p. 156.

German classical philosophy, especially the philosophies of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel[5] and Ludwig Feuerbach[6], had deeply influenced the formation of the Marxist worldview and philosophical methodology.


Annotation 7

German classical philosophy was a movement of idealist philosophers of the 18th and 19th centuries. Idealism is a philosophical position that holds that the only reliable experience of reality occurs within the human consciousness. Idealists believe that human reason is the best way to seek truth, and that consciousness is thus the only reliable source of knowledge and information.

One of Hegel’s important achievements was his critique of the metaphysical method.


Annotation 8

Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy that attempts to explain the fundamental nature of reality by classifying things, phenomena, and ideas into various categories. Metaphysical philosophy has taken many forms through the centuries, but one common shortcoming of metaphysical thought is a tendency to view things and ideas in a static, abstract manner. Metaphysical positions view nature as a collection of objects and phenomena which are isolated from one another and fundamentally unchanging. Engels explained the problems of metaphysics in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

The analysis of Nature into its individual parts, the grouping of the different natural processes and objects in definite classes, the study of the internal anatomy of organized bodies in their manifold forms — hese were the fundamental conditions of the gigantic strides in our knowledge of Nature that have been made during the last 400 years.

But this method of work has also left us as legacy the habit of observing natural objects and processes in isolation, apart from their connection with the vast whole; of observing them in repose, not in motion; as constraints, not as essentially variables; in their death, not in their life. And when this way of looking at things was transferred by Bacon and Locke from natural science to philosophy, it begot the narrow, metaphysical mode of thought peculiar to the last century.

Francis Bacon (1561 — 1626) is considered the father of empiricism, which is the belief that knowledge can only be derived from human sensory experience [see Annotation 10, p. 10]. Bacon argued that scientific knowledge could only be derived through inductive reasoning in which specific observations are used to form general conclusions. John Locke (1632 — 1704) was another early empiricist, who was heavily influenced by Francis Bacon. Locke, too, was an empiricist, and is considered to be the “father of liberalism.”

Engels was highly critical of the application of metaphysical philosophy to natural science. As Engels continues in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes — ideas — are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses... For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other.

At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things, it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees.

Dialectical Materialism stands in contrast to metaphysics in many ways. Rather than splitting the world into distinct, isolated categories, Dialectical Materialist philosophy seeks to view the world in terms of relationships, motion, and change. Dialectical Materialism also refutes the hard empiricism of Bacon and Locke by describing a dialectical relationship between the material world and consciousness [see: The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88].


For the first time in the history of human philosophy, Hegel expressed the content of dialectics in strict arguments with a system of rules and categories.



Annotation 9

Dialectics is a philosophical methodology which searches for truth by examining contradictions and relationships between things, objects, and ideas. Ancient dialecticians such as Aristotle and Socrates explored dialectics primarily through rhetorical discourse between two or more different points of view about a subject with the intention of finding truth.

In this classical form of dialectics, a thesis is presented. This thesis is an opening argument about the subject at hand. An antithesis, or counter-argument, is then presented. Finally, the thesis and antithesis are combined into a synthesis, which is an improvement on both the thesis and antithesis which brings us closer to truth.

Hegel resurrected dialectics to the forefront of philosophical inquiry for the German Idealists. As Engels wrote in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

Hegel’s work’s greatest merit was the taking up again of dialectics as the highest form of reasoning. The old Greek philosophers were all born natural dialecticians, and Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic of them, had already analyzed the most essential forms of dialectic thought.

Hegel’s great contribution to dialectics was to develop dialectics from a simple method of examining truth based on discourse into an organized, systematic model of nature and of history. Unfortunately, Hegel’s dialectics were idealist in nature. Hegel believed that the ideal served as the primary basis of reality. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels strongly rejected Hegel’s idealism, as well as the strong influences of Christian theology on Hegel’s work, but they also saw great potential in his system of dialectics, as Marx explained in Capital (Volume 1):

The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.



Starting with a critique of the mysterious idealism of Hegel’s philosophy, Marx and Engels inherited the “rational kernel” of Hegelian dialectics and successfully built materialist dialectics.



Annotation 10

In order to understand the ways in which the critique of Hegel’s philosophy by Marx and Engels led to the development of dialectical materialism, some background information on materialism — and the conflicts between idealist and materialist philosophy in the era of Marx and Engels — is needed.

Materialism is a philosophical position that holds that the material world exists outside of the mind, and that human ideas and thoughts stem from observation and sensory experience of this external world. Materialism rejects the idealist notion that truth can only be sought through reasoning and human consciousness. The history and development of both idealism and materialism are discussed more in the section The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues on page 48.

In the era of Marx and Engels, the leading philosophical school of materialism was known as empiricism. Empiricism holds that we can only obtain knowledge through human sense perception. Marx and Engels were materialists, but they rejected empiricism (see Engels’ critique of empiricism in Annotation 8, p. 8).

One reason Marx and Engels opposed the strict empiricist view was that it made materialism vulnerable to attack from idealists, because it ignored objective relations and knowledge that went beyond sense data. The empiricist point of view also provided the basis for the subjective idealism of George Berkeley [see Annotation 32, p. 27] and the skepticism of David Hume. Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism is empiricist in that it supports the idea that humans can only discover knowledge through direct sense experience. Therefore, Berkeley argues, individuals are unable to obtain any real knowledge about abstract concepts such as “matter.”

Similarly, David Hume’s radical skepticism, which Engels called “agnosticism,” denied the possibility of possessing any concrete knowledge. As Hume wrote in A Treatise on Human Nature: “I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another.” Hume’s radical skepticism lay in his empiricist belief that the only source of knowledge is sense experience; but Hume went a step further, doubting that even sense experience could be reliable, adding: “The essence and composition of external bodies are so obscure, that we mustnecessarily, in our reasonings, or rather conjectures concerning them, involveourselves in contradictions and absurdities.”

Later, in the appendix of the same text, Hume argues that conscious reasoning suffers from the same unreliability: “I had entertained some hopes (that) the intellectual world ... would be free from those contradictions, and absurdities, whichseem to attend every explication, that human reason can give of the material world.”

Engels dismissed radical skepticism as “scientifically a regression and practically merely a shamefaced way of surreptitiously accepting materialism, while denying it before the world.” Engels directly refutes radical skepticism in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

... how do we know that our senses give us correct representations of the objects we perceive through them? ... whenever we speak of objects, or their qualities, of which (we) cannot know anything for certain, but merely the impressions which they have produced on (our) senses. Now, this line of reasoning seems undoubtedly hard to beat by mere argumentation. But before there was argumentation, there was action... And human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we turn to our own use these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perception.

This concept of determining the truth of knowledge and perception through practical experience is fundamental to dialectical materialist philosophy and the methodology of materialist dialectics, and is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3, p. 204.

Another weakness of empiricism is that it denies the objectiveness of social relations, which cannot be fully and properly analyzed through sensory experience and observation alone. Marx saw that social relations are, indeed, objective in nature and can be understood despite their lack of sensory observability, and that doing so is vital in comprehending subjects such as political economy, as he observes in Capital Volume I:

(The true) reality of the value of commodities contrasts with the gross material reality of these same commodities (the reality of which is perceived by our bodily senses) in that not an atom of matter enters into the reality of value. We may twist and turn a commodity this way and that — as a thing of value it still remains unappreciable by our bodily senses.

In other words, Marx pointed out that no amount of sense data about a commodity will fully explain its value. One can know the size, weight, hardness, etc., of a commodity, but without analyzing the social relations and other aspects of the commodity which can’t be directly observed with the senses, one can never know or understand the true value of the commodity. The materialism of Marx and Engels acknowledges the physical, material world as the first basis for reality, but Marx and Engels also understood that it was vital to account for other aspects of rational knowledge (such as social relations). Marx and Engels believed that empiricist materialism had roughly the same flaw as idealism: a lack of a connection between the material and consciousness. While the idealists completely dismissed sense data and relied exclusively on reasoning and consciousness, the empiricists dismissed conscious thought to focus solely on what could be sensed.

It is important to note that, while Marx and Engels rejected empiricism, they did not reject empirical knowledge nor empirical data which is collected from scientific observation [see Annotation 216, p. 210]. On the contrary, empirical data was key to the works of Marx and Engels in developing dialectical materialism. As Lenin explained: “(Marx) took one of the economic formations of society – the system of commodity production – and on the basis of a vast mass of data which he studied for not less than twenty-five years gave a most detailed analysis of the laws governing this formation and its development.” And so, the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels served to bridge the gap between idealism and materialism. They believed that our conscious thoughts are derived from material processes, but that consciousness can also influence the material world. This is discussed in more detail in the section “Materialism and Dialectical Materialism” on page 48.


Marx and Engels also criticized many limitations of Feuerbach’s methodology and viewpoint* — especially Feuerbach’s prescriptions for how to deal with social problems — but they also highly appreciated the role of Feuerbach’s thought in the fight against idealism and religion to assert that nature comes first, and that nature is permanent and independent from human willpower.


Annotation 11

* Viewpoint, point of view, or perspective, is the starting point of analysis which determines the direction of thinking from which problems are considered. Marx and Engels were critical of Feurbach’s hyper-focused humanist viewpoint.

Feuerbach’s atheism and materialism offered an important foundation for Marx and Engels to develop from an idealist worldview into a materialist worldview, which led them directly to developing the philosophical foundation of communism.


Annotation 12

Ludwig Feuerbach was one of the “Young Hegelians” who adapted and developed the ideals of Hegel and other German Idealists. Feuerbach was a humanist materialist: he focused on humans and human nature and the role of humans in the material world. Like Marx and Engels, Feuerbach dismissed the religious mysticism of Hegel. Importantly, Feuerbach broke from Hegel’s religious-mystical belief that humans descended from supernatural origins, instead describing humans as originating from the natural, material world.

Feuerbach also distinguished between the objectivity of the material external world and the subjectivity of human conscious thought, and he drew a distinction between external reality as it really exists and external reality as humans perceive it. Feuerbach believed that human nature was rooted in specific, intrinsic human attributes and activities. As Feuerbach explains in The Essence of Christianity: “What, then, is the nature of man, of which he is conscious, or what constitutes the specific distinction, the proper humanity of man? Reason, Will, Affection.”

Feuerbach explained that the actions of “thinking, willing, and loving,” which correspond to the essential characteristics of “reason, will, and love,” are what define humanity, continuing: “Reason, Will, Love, are not powers which man possesses, for he is nothing without them, he is what he is only by them; they are the constituent elements of his nature, which he neither has nor makes, the animating, determining, governing powers — divine, absolute powers — to which he can oppose no resistance.”

In his Collected Works, Feuerbach further explains that materialism is supported by the fact that nature predates human consciousness:

Natural science, at least in its present state, necessarily leads us back to a point when the conditions for human existence were still absent, when nature, i.e., the earth, was not yet an object of the human eye and mind, when, consequently, nature was an absolutely non-human entity (absolut unmenschliches Wesen). Idealism may retort: but nature also is something thought of by you (von dir gedachte). Certainly, but from this it does not follow that this nature did not at one time actually exist, just as from the fact that Socrates and Plato do not exist for me if I do not think of them, it does not follow that Socrates and Plato did not actually at one time exist without me.

Marx and Engels were heavily influenced by Feuerbach’s materialism, but they took issue with Feuerbach’s sharp focus on human attributes and activities in isolation from the external material world. As Marx wrote in Theses on Feuerbach: “The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that... reality... is conceived only in the form of the object... but not as sensuous human activity.”

“Sensuous human activity” has a very specific meaning to Marx; it grew from two conflicting schools of thought:

The idealists believed the external world can only be understood through the active subjective thought processes of human beings, while the empiricist materialists believed that human beings are passive subjects of the material world. Marx synthesized these contradicting ideas into what he called “sensuous activity,” which balanced idealist and materialist philosophical concepts.

According to Marx, humans are simultaneously active in the world in the sense that our conscious activity can transform the world, and passive in the sense that all human thoughts fundamentally derive from observation and sense experience of the material world (see Chapter 2, p. 53). So, Marx and Engels believed that Feuerbach was misguided in defining human nature by our traits alone, portraying “the essence of man” as isolated from the material world and from social relations. In addition, Feuerbach’s humanism was based on an abstract, ideal version of human beings, whereas the humanism of Marx and Engels is firmly rooted in the reality of “real men living real lives.” As Engels wrote in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy:

He (Feuerbach) clings fiercely to nature and man; but nature and man remain mere words with him. He is incapable of telling us anything definite either about real nature or real men. But from the abstract man of Feuerbach, one arrives at real living men only when one considers them as participants in history... The cult of abstract man, which formed the kernel of Feuerbach’s new religion, had to be replaced by the science of real men and of their historical development. This further development of Feuerbach’s standpoint beyond Feuerbach was inaugurated by Marx in 1845 in The Holy Family.[7]

Marx and Engels believed that human nature could only be understood by examining the reality of actual humans in the real world through our relationships with each other, with nature, and with the external material world. Importantly, it was Marx’s critique of Feuerbach which led him to define political action as the key pursuit of philosophy with these immortal words from Theses on Feuerbach: “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.”


The British classical political economics, represented by such economists as Adam Smith[8] and David Ricardo[9], also contributed to the formation of Marxism’s historical materialist conception [see p. 23].

Smith and Ricardo were some of the first to form theories about labor value in the study of political economics. They made important conclusions about value and the origin of profit, and about the importance of material production and rules that govern economies. However, because there were still many limitations in the study methodology of Smith and Ricardo, these British classical political economists failed to recognise the historical characteristic of value*; the internal contradictions of commodity production**; and the duality of commodity production labor***.


Annotation 13

* Historical Characteristic of Value

Marx generally admired the work of Smith and Ricardo, but saw major flaws which undermined the utility of their classical economic theories. Perhaps chief among these flaws, according to Marx, was a tendency for Smith and Ricardo to uphold an ahistoric view of society and capitalism. In other words, classical economists see capitalism as existing in harmony with the eternal and universal laws of nature, rather than seeing capitalism as a result of historical processes of development [see Annotation 114, p. 116]. Marx did not believe that the economic principles of capitalism resulted from nature, but rather, from historical conflict between different classes. He believed that the principles of political economies changed over time, and would continue to change into the future, whereas Smith and Ricardo saw economic principles as fixed, static concepts that were not subject to change over time. As Marx explains in The Poverty of Philosophy:

Economists express the relations of bourgeois production, the division of labour, credit, money, etc. as fixed, immutable, eternal categories... Economists explain how production takes place in the above mentioned relations, but what they do not explain is how these relations themselves are produced, that is, the historical movement that gave them birth... these categories are as little eternal as the relations they express. They are historical and transitory products.

** Internal Contradictions of Commodity Production

In Marxist terms, a commodity is specifically something that has both a use value and a value-form (see Annotation 14, p. 16), but in simpler terms, a commodity is anything that can be bought or sold. Importantly, capitalism transforms human labor into a commodity, as workers must sell their labor to capitalists in exchange for wages. Marx pointed out that contradictions arise when commodities are produced under capitalism: because capitalists, who own the means of production, decide what to produce based solely on what they believe to be most profitable, the commodities that are being produced do not always meet the actual needs of society. Certain commodities are under-produced while others are over-produced, which leads to crisis and instability.

*** Duality of Commodity Production Labor

In Capital, Marx describes commodity production labor as existing in a duality — that is to say, it exists with two distinct aspects:

First, there is abstract labor, which Marx describes as “labor-power expended without regard to the form of its expenditure.” This is simply the expenditure of human energy in the form of labor, without any regard to production or value of the labor output. Second, there is concrete labor, which is the aspect of labor that refers to the production of a specific commodity with a specific value through labor.

Marx argues that human labor, therefore, is simultaneously, an activity which will produce some specific kind of product, and also an activity that generates value in the abstract. Marx and Engels were the first economists to discuss the duality of labor, and their observations on the duality of labor were closely tied to their theories of the different aspects of value (use value, exchange value, etc.), which was key to their analysis of capitalism.


Smith and Ricardo also failed to distinguish between simple commodity production and capitalist commodity production*, and could not accurately analyse the form of value** in capitalist commodity production.


Annotation 14

* Commodity Production

Simple commodity production (also known as petty commodity production) is the production of commodities under the conditions which Marx called the “Simple Exchange” of commodities. Simple exchange occurs when individual producers trade the products they have made directly, themselves, for other commodities. Under simple exchange, workers directly own their own means of production and sell products which they have made with their own labor.

Simple commodity production and simple exchange use what Marx referred to as “CMC mode of circulation” [see Annotation 60, p. 59]. Circulation is simply the way in which commodities and money are exchanged for one another.

C→M→C stands for:

Commodity Money Commodity

So, with simple commodity production and simple exchange, workers produce commodities, which they then sell for money, which they use to buy other commodities which they need. For example, a brewer might make beer, which they sell for money, which they use to buy food, housing, and other commodities which they need to live.

In the CMC mode of circulation, the producers and consumers of commodities have a direct relationship to the commodities which are being bought and sold. The sellers have produced the commodities sold with their own labor, and they directly consume the commodities which they purchase with the money thus obtained.

Capitalist commodity production and capitalist exchange, on the other hand, are based on the MCM’ mode of circulation.

M→C→M’ stands for:

Money Commodity More Money

Under this mode of circulation, capitalists spend money to buy commodities (including the commodified labor of workers), with the intention of selling commodities for MORE MONEY than they began with. The capitalist has no direct relationship to the commodity being produced and sold, and the capitalist is solely interested in obtaining more money.

Capitalist commodity production, therefore, uses the MCM’ mode of circulation, in which capitalists own the means of production and pay wages to workers in exchange for their labor, which is used to produce commodities. The capitalists then sell these commodities for profits which are not shared with the workers who provided the labor which produced the commodities.

** Value-Form

This is one of the most important, and potentially most confusing, concepts in all of Marx’s analysis of capitalism. Marx explains these principles at length in Appendix of the 1st German Edition of Capital, Volume 1, but here are some of the fundamentals:

One of Marx’s key breakthroughs was understanding that commodities have many different properties which have different effects in political economies.

Just as Commodity Production Labor exists in a duality of Concrete Labor and Abstract Labor (see Annotation 13, p. 15), commodities themselves also exist in duality according to Marx:

Commodities have both “use-value” and “value.”

Use-Value (which corresponds to Concrete Labor) is the commodity’s tangible form of existence; it is what we can physically sense when we observe a commodity. By extension, use-value encompasses how a commodity can be used in the material world.

Value, or the Value-Form, is the social form of a commodity, which is to say, it represents the stable relationships intrinsic to the commodity [see Content and Form, p. 147].

Note that this relates to the dialectical relationship between the material and the ideal [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88].

Value-forms represent relational equivalencies of commodities, i.e.: 20 yards of linen = 10 pounds of tea

These relational equivalencies are tied to the equivalent labor value (see Annotation 15 below, and Annotation 26, p. 23) used to produce these commodities. The value-form of a commodity is the social form because it embodies relational equivalencies:

1. The value-form represents the relationship between the commodity and the labor which was used to produce the commodity.

2. The value-form represents the relationship between a commodity and one or more other commodities.

As Marx explains in Appendix to the 1st German Edition of Capital: “Hence by virtue of its value-form the (commodity) now stands also in a social relation no longer to only a single other type of commodity, but to the world of commodities. As a commodity it is a citizen of this world.”

Understanding the social form of commodities — the value-form — was crucial for Marx to develop a deeper understanding of money and capitalism. Marx argued that classical economists like Ricardo and Smith conflated economic categories such as “exchange value,” “value,” “price,” “money,” etc., which meant that they could not possibly fully understand or analyze capitalist economies.


British classical political economists like Ricardo and Smith outlined the scientific factors of the theories of labor value* and contributed many progressive thoughts which Marx adapted and further developed.

Annotation 15

* Adam Smith and David Ricardo revolutionized the labor theory of value, which held that the value of a good or service is determined by the amount of human labor required to produce it.

Thus, Marx was able to solve the contradictions that these economists could not solve and he was able to establish the theory of surplus value*, scientific evidence for the exploitative nature of capitalism, and the economic factors which will lead to the eventual fall of capitalism and the birth of socialism.

Annotation 16

* David Ricardo developed the concept of surplus value. Surplus value is the difference between the amount of income made from selling a product and the amount it costs to produce it. Marx would go on to expand on the concept of surplus value considerably.

Utopianism' had been developing for a long time and reached its peak in the late 18th century with famous thinkers such as Henri de Saint-Simon[10], François Marie Charles Fourier[11] and Robert Owen[12]. Utopianism sought to elevate the humanitarian spirit and strongly criticised capitalism by calling attention to the misery of the working class under capitalism. It also offered many far-ranging opinions and analyses of the development of human history and laid out some basic foundational factors and principles for a new society. However, Utopianism could not scientifically address the nature of capitalism. It failed to detect the Law of Development of Capitalism[13] and also failed to recognise the roles and missions of the working class as a social force that can eliminate capitalism to build an equal, non-exploitative society.

Annotation 17

The early industrial working class existed in miserable conditions, and the political movement of utopianism was developed by people who believed that a better world could be built. The utopianists believed they could create “a New Moral World” of happiness, enlightenment, and prosperity through education, science, technology, and communal living. For instance, Robert Owen was a wealthy textile manufacturer who tried to build a better society for workers in New Harmony, Indiana, in the USA. Owen purchased the entire town of New Harmony in 1825 as a place to build an ideal society. Owen’s vision failed after two years for a variety of reasons, and many other wealthy capitalists in the early 19th century drew up similar plans which also failed.

Utopianism was one of the first political and industrial movements that criticized the conditions of capitalism by exposing the miserable situations of poor workers and offering a vision of a better society, and was one of the first movements to attempt to mitigate the faults of capitalism in practice.

Unfortunately, the utopianists were not ideologically prepared to replace capitalism, and all of their attempts to build a better alternative to capitalism failed. Marx and Engels admired the efforts of the utopianist movement, and studied their attempts and failures closely in developing their own political theories, concluding that the utopianists failed in large part because they did not understand how capitalism developed, nor the role of the working class in the revolution against capitalism.

As Engels wrote in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

(The) historical situation also dominated the founders of Socialism. To the crude conditions of capitalistic production and the crude class conditions correspond crude theories. The solution of the social problems, which as yet lay hidden in undeveloped economic conditions, the Utopians attempted to evolve out of the human brain. Society presented nothing but wrongs; to remove these was the task of reason. It was necessary, then, to discover a new and more perfect system of social order and to impose this upon society from without by propaganda, and, wherever it was possible, by the example of model experiments. These new social systems were foredoomed as Utopian; the more completely they were worked out in detail, the more they could not avoid drifting off into pure phantasies.

Engels is explaining, here, that — in a sense — the utopian socialists were victims of arriving too early. Capitalism had not yet developed enough for its opponents to formulate plans based on actual material conditions, since capitalism was only just emerging into a stable form. Without a significant objective, material basis, the utopians were forced to rely upon reasoning alone to confront capitalism.

In this sense, the early historical utopianists fell into philosophical utopianism in its broader sense — defined by the mistaken assertion that the ideal can determine the material [see Annotation 95, p. 94]. In believing that they could build a perfect society based on ideals and “pure fantasy” alone without a material basis for development, the utopians were, in essence, idealists. As Engels explained: “from this nothing could come but a kind of eclectic, average Socialism.” Engels concluded that in order to successfully overthrow capitalism, revolution would need to be grounded in materialism: “To make a science of Socialism, it had first to be placed upon a real basis.”


The humanitarian spirit and compassionate analysis which the utopians embodied in their efforts to lay out concrete features of a better future society became important theory premises for the birth of the scientific theory of socialism in Marxism.

- Natural Science Premise:

Along with social-economic conditions and theory premises, the achievements of the natural sciences were also foundational to the development of arguments and evidence which assert the correctness of Marxism’s viewpoints and methodology.

Annotation 18

Natural science is science which deals with the natural world, including chemistry, biology, physics, geology, etc.

Three major scientific breakthroughs which were important to the development of Marxism include:

The law of conservation and transformation of energy scientifically proved the inseparable relationships and the mutual transformation and conservation of all the forms of motion of matter in nature.

The theory of evolution offered a scientific basis for the development of diverse forms of life through natural selection.

Cell theory was a scientific basis proving unity in terms of origins, physical forms and material structures of living creatures. It also explained the development of life through those relationships.

These scientific discoveries led to the rejection of theological and metaphysical viewpoints which centered the role of the “creator” in the pursuit of truth.

Annotation 19

For centuries in Europe, natural science and philosophy had been heavily dominated by theological viewpoints which centered God in the pursuit of truth. Descartes, Kant, Spinoza, and many other metaphysical philosophers who developed the earliest theories of modern natural science centered their religious beliefs in their philosophies. These theological viewpoints varied in many ways, but all shared a characteristic of centering a “creator” in the pursuit of philosophical and scientific inquiry.

Together, the law of conservation and transformation of energy, the theory of evolution, and cell theory provided an alternative viewpoint which allowed scientists to remove the “creator” from the scientific equation. For the first time, natural scientists and philosophers had concrete theoretical explanations for the origin and development of the universe, life, and reality which did not rely on a supernatural creator.

Marx and Engels closely observed and studied the groundbreaking scientific progress of their era. They believed strongly in materialist scientific methods and the data which they produced, and based their analysis and philosophical doctrines on such observations. They recognized the importance and validity of the scientific achievements of their era, and they developed the philosophy of Dialectical Materialism into a system which would help humans study and understand the whole material world.

In Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Engels explained that ancient Greek dialecticians had correctly realized that the world is “an endless entanglement of relations and reactions, permutations and combinations, in which nothing remains what, where and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes away.”

Engels goes on to explain that it was understandable for early natural scientists to break their inquiries and analysis down into specialized fields and categories of science to focus on precise, specific, narrow subject matters so that they could build up a body of empirical data. However, as data accumulated, it became clear that all of these isolated, individual fields of study must somehow be unified back together coherently and cohesively in order to obtain a deeper and more useful understanding of reality.

As Engels wrote in On Dialectics:

Empirical natural science has accumulated such a tremendous mass of positive material for knowledge that the necessity of classifying it in each separate field of investigation systematically and in accordance with its inner inter-connection has become absolutely imperative. It is becoming equally imperative to bring the individual spheres of knowledge into the correct connection with one another. In doing so, however, natural science enters the field of theory and here the methods of empiricism will not work, here only theoretical thinking can be of assistance.

As science grows increasingly complex, a necessity develops for a philosophical and cognitive framework which can be used to make sense of the influx of information from disparate fields. In Dialectics of Nature, Engels explains how dialectical materialism is the perfect philosophical foundation for unifying scientific fields into one cohesive framework:

Dialectics divested of mysticism becomes an absolute necessity for natural science, which has forsaken the field where rigid categories sufficed, which represent as it were the lower mathematics of logic, its everyday weapons.

So, Marx and Engels developed Dialectical Materialism not in opposition to science, but as a way to make better use of scientific data, and to analyze the complex, dynamic, constantly changing systems of the world in motion. While distinct scientific discoveries and empirical data are invaluable, each data point only provides a small amount of information within a single narrow, specific field of science. Dialectical Materialism allows humans to view reality — as a whole — in motion, and to examine the interconnections and mutual developments between different fields and categories of human knowledge.


These scientific principles confirmed the correctness of the dialectical materialist view of the material world, with such features as: endlessness, self-existence, self-motivation, and self-transformation. They also confirmed the scientific nature of the dialectical materialist viewpoint in both material processes and thought processes.


Annotation 20

Endlessness refers to the infinite span of space and time in our universe. Self-existence means that our universe exists irrespective of human consciousness; it existed before human consciousness evolved and it will continue to exist after human consciousness becomes extinct. Self-motivation and Self-transformation refer to the fact that motion and transformation exist within the universe independent of human consciousness.

Engels wrote of the scientific nature of the dialectical materialist viewpoint in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

Nature is the proof of dialectics, and it must be said for modern science that it has furnished this proof with very rich materials increasingly daily, and thus has shown that... Nature works dialectically and not metaphysically; that she does not move in the eternal oneness of a perpetually recurring circle, but goes through a real historical evolution.



In conclusion, the birth of Marxism is a phenomenon which is compatible with scientific principles; it is the product of the social-economic conditions of its time of origin, of the human knowledge expressed in science at that time, and it is also the result of its founders’ creative thinking and humanitarian spirit.

b. The Birth and Development Stage of Marxism

Marx and Engels initiated the birth and development stage of Marxism from around 1842~1843 through around 1847~1848. Later, from 1849 to 1895, Marxism was developed to be more thorough and comprehensive, but in this early period of birth and development, Marx and Engels engaged in practical activities [Marx and Engels were not just theorists, but also actively supported and participated with various revolutionary and working class organizations including the Chartists, the League of the Just, the Communist League, the International Workingmen’s Association, etc.] and studied a wide range of human thought from ancient times on through to their contemporaries in order to methodically reinforce, complement and improve their ideas.

Many famous works such as The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (Marx, 1844), The Holy Family (Marx and Engels, 1845), Thesis on Feuerbach (Marx, 1845), The German Ideology (Marx and Engels, 1845–1846), and so on, clearly showed that Marx and Engels inherited the quintessence [see Annotation 6, p. 8] of the dialectical and materialist methods which they received from many predecessors. This philosophical heritage led to the development of the dialectical materialist viewpoint and materialist dialectics.


Annotation 21

There is a subtle, but important, distinction between Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics. This will be explained further in chapters I (p. 48) and II (p. 98).

With works such as The Poverty of Philosophy (Marx, 1847) and The Manifesto of the Communist Party (Marx and Engels, 1848), Marxism was presented as a complete system of fundamental views with three theoretical component parts.


Annotation 22

According to Lenin, the three component parts of Marxism (and, by extension, of Marxism-Leninism) are:

1. The Philosophy of Marxism: Including Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism

2. The Political Economy of Marxism: A system of knowledge and laws that define the production process and commodity exchange in human society.

3. Scientific Socialism: The system of thought pertaining to the establishment of the communist social economy form.

These are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, p. 38.

In the book The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx proposed the basic principles of Dialectical Materialism and Scientific Socialism,* and gave some initial thoughts about surplus value. The Manifesto of the Communist Party laid the first doctrinal foundation of communism. In this book, the philosophical basis was expressed through the organic unity between the economical viewpoint and socio-political viewpoint.


Annotation 23

* Scientific Socialism is a series of socio-political-economic theories intended to build socialism on a foundation of science within society’s current material conditions [see Annotation 79, p. 81]. Scientific Socialism is the topic of Part 3 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.

The Manifesto of the Communist Party outlined the laws of movement in history,* as well as the basic theory of socio-economic forms.


Annotation 24

* The laws of movement in history are the core principles of historical materialism, which is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.

The basic theory of socio-economic forms dictates that material production plays a decisive role in the existence and development of a society, and that the material production methods decide both the political and social consciousness of a society.


Annotation 25

Social consciousness refers to the collective experience of consciousness shared by members of a society, including ideological, cultural, spiritual, and legal beliefs and ideas which are shared within that society. This is related to the concept of base and superstructure, which is discussed later in this chapter.

The Manifesto of the Communist Party also showed that for as long as classes have existed, the history of the development of human society is the history of class struggle. Through class struggle, the proletariat can liberate ourselves only if we simultaneously and forever liberate the whole of humanity. With these basic opinions, Marx and Engels founded Historical Materialism.

By applying Historical Materialism to the comprehensive study of the capitalist production method, Marx made an important discovery: separating workers from the ownership of the means of production through violence was the starting point of the establishment of the capitalist production method. Workers do not own the means of production to perform their labor activities for themselves, so, in order to make income and survive, workers have to sell their labor to capitalists. Labor thus becomes a special commodity, and the sellers of labor become workers for labor-buyers [the proletariat and capitalist class respectively]. The value that workers create through their labor is higher than their wage. And this is how surplus value* is formed. Importantly, this means that the surplus value belongs to people who own the means of production — the capitalists — instead of the workers who provide the labor.


Annotation 26

* Surplus value is equal to labor value (the amount of value workers produce through labor) minus wages paid to workers. Under capitalism, this surplus value is appropriated as profit by capitalists after the products which workers created are sold.

So, in discovering the origin of surplus value, Marx pointed out the exploitative nature of capitalism [because capitalists essentially steal surplus labor value from workers which is then transformed into profits], though this exploitative nature is concealed by the money-commodity relationship.


Annotation 27

Under capitalism, a worker’s labor is a commodity which capitalists pay for with money in the form of wages. Workers never know how much of their labor value is being withheld by employers, which conceals the nature of capitalist wage-theft.

The theory of surplus value was deeply and comprehensively researched and presented in Capital[14] by Marx and Engels. This work not only paves the way to form a new political-economic theory system based on the working class’s viewpoint, it also firmly consolidates and develops the historical-materialist viewpoint through the theory of socio-economic forms.


Annotation 28

Karl Marx explained that the goal of writing Capital was “to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society.” By “laws of motion,” Marx refers to the origins and motivations for change within human society. Historical materialism holds that human society develops based on internal and external relationships within and between aspects of society. Historical materialism is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.

According to the theory of socio-economic forms [which is the basis of historical materialism], the movements and developments of human society are natural-historical processes based on dialectical interactions between forces of production and relations of production; between infrastructure basis [commonly referred to as “base” in English] and superstructure.


Annotation 29

The forces of production consist of the combination of means of production and workers within society. Under capitalism, the production force consists of the proletariat (working class) and means of production which are owned by the bourgeoisie (capitalist class).

Marx viewed society as composed of an economic base and a social superstructure. The base of society includes the material relationships between humans and the means of productions and the material processes which humans undertake to survive and transform our environment. The superstructure of society includes all components of society not directly relating to production, such as media institutions, music, and art, as well as other cultural elements like religion, customs, moral standards, and everything else which manifests primarily through conscious activity and social relations.

In the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx explained:

In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society — the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life determines the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.

RELIGION GOVERNMENT EDUCATION

POLITICAL ECONOMY NATURE

The base of society includes material-based elements and relations including political economy, means of production, class relations, etc. The superstructure includes human-consciousness-based elements and relations including government, culture, religion, etc.

In other words, Marx argued that superstructure (which includes social consciousness) is shaped by the infrastructural basis, or base, of society. This reflects the more general dialectical relationship between matter and consciousness, in which the material, as the first basis of reality, determines consciousness, while consciousness mutually impacts the material [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88]. So, the base of society — being material in nature — determines the superstructure, while the superstructure impacts the base. It couldn’t possibly be the other way around, according to the dialectical materialist worldview, because the primary driving forces of conscious activity are rooted in material needs.

The theory of socio-economic forms proves that the materialist viewpoint of history is not just a hypothesis, but a scientifically-proven principle.


Annotation 30

As Lenin explains in What the “Friends of the People” Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats:

Now — since the appearance of Capital — the materialist conception of history is no longer a hypothesis, but a scientifically proven proposition. And until we get some other attempt to give a scientific explanation of the functioning and development of some formation of society — formation of society, mind you, and not the way of life of some country or people, or even class, etc. — another attempt just as capable of introducing order into the “pertinent facts” as materialism is, that is just as capable of presenting a living picture of a definite formation, while giving it a strictly scientific explanation -until then the materialist conception of history will be a synonym for social science. Materialism is not ‘primarily a scientific conception of history’... but the only scientific conception of it.


Capital is Marx’s main work which presents Marxism as a social science by illuminating the inevitable processes of birth, development, and decay of capitalism; the replacement of capitalism with socialism; and the historical mission of the working class — the social force that can implement this replacement. Marx’s materialist conception of history and proletarian revolution continued to be developed in Critique of Gotha Programme (Marx, 1875). This book discusses the dictatorship of the proletariat, the transitional period from capitalism to socialism, and phases of the communism building process, and several other premises. Together, these premises formed the scientific basis for Marx’s theoretical guidance for the future revolutionary activity of the proletariat.



Annotation 31

When Marx refers to a “dictatorship of the proletariat,” he does not mean “dictatorship” to mean “totalitarian” or “authoritarian.” Rather, here “dictatorship” simply refers to a situation in which political power is held by the working class (which constitutes the vast majority of society). “Dictatorship,” here, refers to full control of the means of production and government. This stands in contrast to capitalism, which is a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, in which capitalists (a small minority of society) have full control of the means of production and government.

c. The Defending and Developing Stage of Marxism

- Historical Background and the Need for Defending and Developing Marxism

In the late 19th century and early 20th century, capitalism developed into a new stage, called imperialism. The dominant and exploitative nature of capitalism became increasingly obvious. Contradictions in capitalist societies became increasingly serious — especially the class struggles between the proletariat and capitalists. In many colonised countries, the resistance against imperialism created a unity between national liberation and proletarian revolution, uniting people in colonised countries with the working class in colonial countries. The core of such revolutionary struggles at this time was in Russia. The Russian proletariat and working class under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party became the leader of the whole international revolutionary movement.

During this time, both capitalist industry and natural sciences developed rapidly. Some natural scientists, especially physicists, lacked a grounding in materialist philosophical methodology and therefore fell into a viewpoint crisis. Idealist philosophers used this crisis to directly influence the perspective and activities of many revolutionary movements.


Annotation 32

Imperialism

Lenin defined imperialism as “the monopoly stage of capitalism,” listing its essential characteristics as “finance capital (serving) a few very big monopolist banks, merged with the capital of the monopolist associations of industrialists” and “a colonial policy of monopolist possession of the territory of the world, which has been completely divided up.”

Subjective and Empiricist Idealism

In the late 19th century, natural scientists were exploring various philosophical bases for scientific inquiry. One Austrian physicist, Ernst Mach, attempted to build a philosophy of natural science based on the works of German-Swiss philosopher Richard Avenarius known as “Empirio-Criticism.” Empirio-Criticism, which also came to be known as Machism, has many parallels with the philosophy of George Berkeley. Berkeley (1685 — 1753) was an Anglo-Irish philosopher whose main philosophical achievement was the formulation of a doctrine which he called “immaterialism,” and which later came to be known as “Subjective Idealism.” This doctrine was summed up by Berkeley’s maxim: “Esse est percipi” — “To be is to be perceived.” Subjective Idealism holds that individuals can only directly perceive and know about physical objects through direct sense experience. Therefore, individuals are unable to obtain any real knowledge about abstract concepts such as “matter”.

The philosophy of Empirio-Criticism, which was developed by Avenarius and Mach, also holds that the only reliable human knowledge we can hold comes from our sensations and experiences. Mach argued that the only source of knowledge is sense data and “experience,” but that we can’t develop any actual knowledge of the actual external world. In other words, Mach’s conception of empirio-criticism holds all knowledge as essentially subjective in nature, and limited to (and by) human sense experience. Mach’s development of Empirio-Criticism (which can also be referred to as empirical idealism or Machism)' was therefore a continuation of Berkeley’s subjective idealism. Both Berkeley’s Immaterialism and Empirio-Criticism are considered to be subjective idealism because these philosophies deny that the external world exists — or otherwise assert that it is unknowable — and, as such, hold that all knowledge stems from experiences which are essentially subjective in nature.

Mach argued that reality can only be defined by our sensual experiences of reality, and that we can never concretely know anything about the objective external world due to the limitations of sense experience. This stands in direct contradiction to dialectical materialism, which holds that we can develop accurate knowledge of the material world through observation and practice. Whereas Berkeley developed subjective idealist theological arguments to defend the Christian faith, Mach employed subjective idealism for purely secular purposes as a basis for scientific inquiry.

Note: all quotations below come from Lenin’s book: Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.

Vladimir Lenin strongly opposed Empirio-Criticism and, by extension, Machism, which was becoming popular among communist revolutionists in the late 19th century, because it pushed forward idealist principles which directly opposed the core tenets of dialectical materialism.

Lenin believed that revolutionaries should be guided not by idealism, but by dialectical materialism. He believed that Empirio-Criticism and Machism consisted of mysticism which would mislead political revolutionaries.

Lenin outlined Machian arguments against materialism:

The materialists, we are told, recognise something unthinkable and unknowable — ’things-in-themselves’ — matter ‘outside of experience’ and outside of our knowledge [see: Annotation 72, p. 68]. They lapse into genuine mysticism by admitting the existence of something beyond, something transcending the bounds of ‘experience’... When they say that matter, by acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensations, the materialists take as their basis the ‘unknown,’ nothingness; for do they not themselves declare our sensations to be the only source of knowledge?

Lenin argued that this new form of Machist subjective idealism was, in fact, simply a rehashing of “old errors of idealism,” disguised and dressed up with new terminology. As such, Lenin simply reiterated the longstanding, bedrock dialectical materialist arguments against idealism [see Annotation 10, p. 10]. He was especially upset that contemporary Marxists of his era were being swayed by Machist Empirio-Criticism because he found it to be in direct conflict with dialectical materialism, writing: “(These) would-be Marxists… try in every way to assure their readers that Machism is compatible with the historical materialism of Marx and Engels.”

Lenin goes on to describe the work of philosophers such as Franz Blei, who critiqued Marxism with Machist arguments, as “quasi-scientific tomfoolery decked out in the terminology of Avenarius.” He saw Empirio-Criticism as completely incompatible with communist revolution, since idealism had historically been used by the ruling class to deceive and control the lower classes. In particular, he believed that Machist idealism was being used by the capitalist class to preach bourgeois economics, writing that “the professors of economics are nothing but learned salesmen of the capitalist class.”

Lenin was deeply concerned that prominent Russian socialist philosophers were adopting Machist ideas and claiming them to be compatible with Marxism, writing:

The task of Marxists in both cases is to be able to master and adapt the achievements of these ‘salesmen’... and to be able to lop off their reactionary tendency, to pursue your own line and to combat the whole alignment of forces and classes hostile to us. And this is just what our Machians were unable to do, they slavishly follow the lead of the reactionary professorial philosophy.

Lenin further explains how Empirio-Criticism serves the interests of the capitalist class:

The empirio-criticists as a whole... claim to be non-partisan both in philosophy and in social science. They are neither for socialism nor for liberalism. They make no differentiation between the fundamental and irreconcilable trends of materialism and idealism in philosophy, but endeavor to rise above them. We have traced this tendency of Machism through a long series of problems of epistemology, and we ought not to be surprised when we encounter it in sociology.

In the conclusion of the same text, Lenin explains why communists should reject Empirio-Criticism and Machism with four “standpoints,” summarized here:

1. The theoretical foundations of Empirio-Criticism can’t withstand comparison with those of dialectical materialism. Empirio-Criticism differs little from older forms of idealism, and the tired old errors of idealism clash directly with Marxist dialectical materialism. As Lenin puts it: “only utter ignorance of the nature of philosophical materialism generally and of the nature of Marx’s and Engels’ dialectical method can lead one to speak of ‘combining’ empirio-criticism and Marxism.”

2. The philosophical foundations of Empirio-Criticism are flawed. “Both Mach and Avenarius started with Kant (see: Annotation 72, p. 68) and, leaving him, proceeded not towards materialism, but in the opposite direction, towards Hume and Berkeley (see: Annotation 10, p. 10)... The whole school of Mach and Avenarius is moving more and more definitely towards idealism.”

3. Machism is little more than a relatively obscure trend which has not been adopted by most scientists; a “reactionary (and) transitory infatuation.” As Lenin puts it: “the vast majority of scientists, both generally and in this special branch of science... are invariably on the side of materialism.”

4. Empirio-Criticism and Machism reflect the “tendencies and ideology of the antagonistic classes in modern society.” Idealism represents the interests of the ruling class in modern society, and is used to subjugate the majority of society. Idealist philosophy “stands fully armed, commands vast organizations and steadily continues to exercise influence on the masses, turning the slightest vacillation in philosophical thought to its own advantage.” In other words, idealism is used by the ruling class to manipulate our understanding of the world, as opposed to materialism (and especially dialectical materialism) which illuminates the true nature of reality which would lead to the liberation of the working class.

At this time, Marxism was widely disseminating throughout Russia, which challenged the social positions and benefits of capitalists. In reaction to Marxism, many ideological movements such as empiricism, utilitarianism, revisionism, etc. [see: Appendix F, p. 252] rose up and claimed to renew Marxism, while in fact they misrepresented and denied Marxism.

In this context, new achievements of natural science needed to be analyzed and summarized in order to continue the authentic development of Marxist viewpoints and methodologies. Theoretical principles to fight against the misrepresentation of Marxism needed to be developed in order to bring Marxism into the new era. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin would fulfill this historical requirement with his theoretical developments.

- The Role of Lenin in Defending and Developing Marxism.

Lenin’s process of defending and developing Marxism can be separated into three periods: first, from 1893 to 1907; next, from 1907 to 1917; and finally from the success of the October socialist revolution in 1917 until Lenin’s death in 1924.

From 1893 to 1907, Lenin focused on fighting against populists[15]. His book What the Friends of the People are and How They Fight Against the Social Democrats (1894) criticized the serious mistakes of this faction in regards to socio-historical issues and also exposed their scheme of distorting Marxism by erasing the boundaries between Marxism’s materialist dialectics and Hegel’s idealist dialectics. In the same book, Lenin also shared many thoughts about the important roles of theory, reality, and the relationship between the two.

Annotation 33

The populist philosophy was born in Russia in the 19th century with roots going back to the Narodnik agrarian socialist movement of the 1860s and 70s, composed of peasants who rose up in a failed campaign against the Czar. In the late 19th century, a new political movement emerged rooted in Narodnik ideas and a new party called the Socialist Revolutionary Party was formed. The political philosophy of this movement, now commonly translated into English as “populism,” focused on an agrarian peasant revolution led by intellectuals with the ambition of going directly from a feudal society to a socialist society built from rural communes. This movement overtly opposed Marxism and dialectical materialism and was based on subjective idealist utopianism (see Annotation 95, p. 94).

With the book What is to be Done? (1902), Lenin developed Marxist viewpoints on the methods for the proletariat to take power. He discussed economic, political, and ideological struggles. In particular, he emphasized the ideological formation process of the proletariat.

Annotation 34

In What is to be Done?, Lenin argues that the working class will not spontaneously attain class consciousness and push for political revolution simply due to economic conflict with employers and spontaneous actions like demonstrations and workers’ strikes. He instead insists that a political party of dedicated revolutionaries is needed to educate workers in Marxist principles and to organize and push forward revolutionary activity. He also pushed back strongly against the ideas of what he called “economism,” as typified by the ideas of Eduard Bernstein, a German political theorist who rejected many of Marx’s theories.

Bernstein opposed a working class revolution and instead focused on reform and compromise. He believed that socialism could be achieved within the capitalist economy and the system of bourgeois democracy. Lenin argued that Bernstein and his economist philosophy was opportunistic, and accused economists of seeking positions within bourgeois democracies to further their own personal interests and to quell revolutionary tendencies. As Lenin explained in A Talk With Defenders of Economism:

The Economists limited the tasks of the working class to an economic struggle for higher wages and better working conditions, etc., asserting that the political struggle was the business of the liberal bourgeoisie. They denied the leading role of the party of the working class, considering that the party should merely observe the spontaneous process of the movement and register events. In their deference to spontaneity in the working-class movement, the Economists belittled the significance of revolutionary theory and class-consciousness, asserted that socialist ideology could emerge from the spontaneous movement, denied the need for a Marxist party to instill socialist consciousness into the working-class movement, and thereby cleared the way for bourgeois ideology. The Economists, who opposed the need to create a centralized working-class party, stood for the sporadic and amateurish character of individual circles. Economism threatened to divert the working class from the class revolutionary path and turn it into a political appendage of the bourgeoisie.

The Encyclopedic Dictionary of Vietnam, published by the National Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, defines opportunism, in this context, as “a system of political opinions with no direction, no clear path, no coherent viewpoint, leaning on whatever is beneficial for the opportunist in the short term.”

Lenin critiques opportunist socialism — referring to it as a “critical” trend in socialism — in What is to be Done?:

He who does not deliberately close his eyes cannot fail to see that the new “critical” trend in socialism is nothing more nor less than a new variety of opportunism. And if we judge people... by their actions and by what they actually advocate, it will be clear that “freedom of criticism” means “freedom for an opportunist trend in Social-Democracy, freedom to convert Social-Democracy into a democratic party of reform, freedom to introduce bourgeois ideas and bourgeois elements into socialism.”


The first revolution of the Russian working class, from 1905 to 1907, failed. Lenin summarized the reality of this revolution in the book Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution (1905). In this book, Lenin explains that the capitalist class in Russia was actively engaged in its own revolution against Czarist feudalism. In this context of this ongoing bourgeois revolution, Lenin deeply developed Marxist concepts related to revolutionary methodologies, objective and subjective factors that will affect the working class revolution, the role of the people, the role of political parties etc.

Annotation 35

From 1905 to 1907, Russia was beset by political unrest and radical activity including workers’ strikes, military mutinies, and peasant uprisings. Russia had just suffered a humiliating defeat in the Russo-Japanese war which cost tens of thousands of Russian lives without any benefits to the Russian people. In addition, the economic and political systems of Czarist Russia placed a severe burden on industrial workers and peasant farmers.

In response, the Russian proletariat rose up in various uprisings, demonstrations, and clashes against government forces, landlords, and factory owners. In the end, this revolutionary activity failed to overthrow the Czar’s government, and the Czar remained firmly in power until the communist revolution of 1917.

Lenin wrote Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution in 1905 in

Geneva, Switzerland. In it, he argues forcefully against the political faction within the Russian socialist movement that came to be known as the “Mensheviks.” The Mensheviks, as well as the Bolsheviks (Lenin’s contemporary faction) emerged from a dispute within the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party which took place in 1903.

In the same text, Lenin argued that the Mensheviks misunderstood the forces that were driving revolutionary activity in Russia. While the Mensheviks believed that the situation in Russia would develop along similar lines to previous revolutionary activity in Western Europe, Lenin argued that Russia’s situation was unique and that Russian Marxists should therefore adopt different strategies and activities which reflected Russia’s unique circumstances and material conditions.

Specifically, the Mensheviks believed that the working class should ally with the bourgeoisie to overthrow the Czar’s feudalist regime, and then allow the bourgeoisie to build a fully functioning capitalist economy before workers should attempt their own revolution.

Lenin, on the other hand, presented a completely different analysis of class forces in Russia. He believed the bourgeoisie would seek a compromise with the Czar, as both feudal and bourgeois classes in Russia feared a proletarian revolution.

It’s important to note that Russia’s industrial workforce was very small at this time, and most Russians were peasant farmers. The Mensheviks believed Russian peasants would not be useful in a proletarian revolution, which is why they argued for allowing capitalism to be fully established in Russia before pushing for a working class revolution. They believed it was prudent to wait until the working class became larger and more dominant in Russia before attempting to overthrow capitalism. They believed that the peasant class would not be useful in any such revolution.

In contrast, Lenin believed that the peasants and industrial workers would have to work together to have any hope of a successful revolution. He further argued that an uprising of armed peasants and workers, fighting side by side, would be necessary for overthrowing the Czar.

From 1907 to 1917, there was a viewpoint crisis among many physicists. This strongly affected the birth of many idealist ideologies following Mach’s Positivism that attempted to negate Marxism [See: Annotation 32, p. 27]. Lenin summarized the achievements of natural science as well as historical events of the late 19th century and early 20th century in his book Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1909). By giving the classical definitions of matter, proving the relationships between matter and consciousness and between social existence and social consciousness, and pointing out the basic rules of consciousness, etc., Lenin defended Marxism and carried it forward to a new level. Lenin clearly expressed his thoughts on the history, nature, and structure of Marxism in the book The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism (1913). He also talked about dialectics in Philosophical Notebooks (1914–1916) and expressed his thoughts about the proletarian dictatorship, the role of the Communist Party, and the path to socialism in his book The State and Revolution (1919).

The success of the October revolution in Russia in 1917 brought about a new era: the transitional period from capitalism to socialism on an international scale. This event presented new theoretical requirements that had not existed in the time of Marx and Engels’ time.

In a series of works including: “Left-Wing” Communism: an Infantile Disorder (1920),

Once Again on the Trade Unions, The Current Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin (1921), The Tax in Kind (1921), etc., Lenin summarized the revolutionary practice of the people, continued defending Marxist dialectics, and uncompromisingly fought against eclecticism and sophistry.

Annotation 36

In Anti-Dühring, Engels identifies the historical missions of the working class as:

1. Becoming the ruling class by establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat.

2. Seizing the means of production from the ruling class to end class society.

Eclecticism is an incoherent approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject, applying different theories in different situations without any consistency in analysis and thought. Eclectic arguments are typically composed of various pieces of evidence that are cherry picked and pieced together to form a perspective that lacks clarity. By definition, because they draw from different systems of thought without seeking a clear and cohesive understanding of the totality of the subject and its internal and external relations and its development over time, eclectic arguments run counter to the comprehensive and historical viewpoints [see p. 116]. Eclecticism bears superficial resemblance to dialectical materialism in that it attempts to consider a subject from many different perspectives, and analyzes relationships pertaining to a subject, but the major flaw of eclecticism is a lack of clear and coherent systems and principles, which leads to a chaotic viewpoint and an inability to grasp the true nature of the subject at hand.

Sophistry is the use of falsehoods and misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, and with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. This kind of bad faith argument has no place in materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics must, instead, be rooted in a true and accurate understanding of the subject, material conditions, and reality in general.

Simultaneously, Lenin also developed his Marxist viewpoint of the factors deciding the victory of a social regime, about class, about the two basic missions of the proletariat, about the strategies and tactics of proletarian parties in new historical conditions, about the transitional period, and about the plans of building socialism following the New Economic Policy (NEP), etc.


Annotation 37

The early 1920s were a period of great internal conflict in revolutionary Russia, with various figures and factions wanting to take the revolution in different directions. As such, Lenin wrote extensively on the direction he believed the revolution should be carried forth to ensure lasting victory against both feudalism and capitalism. He believed that the October, 1917 revolution represented the complete defeat of the Czar, however he believed the proletarian victory over the bourgeoisie would take more time. Russia was a poor, agrarian society. The vast majority of Russians under the Czar were poor peasants. Industry — and thus, the proletariat — was highly undeveloped compared to Western Europe. According to Lenin, a full and lasting proletarian victory over the bourgeoisie could only be won after the means of production were properly developed. In Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution, Lenin wrote:

This first victory [the October, 1917 revolution] is not yet the final victory, and it was achieved by our October Revolution at the price of incredible difficulties and hardships... We have made the start... The important thing is that the ice has been broken; the road is open, the way has been shown.

So, Lenin knew that the victory over the Czar and feudalism was only a partial victory, and that more work needed to be done to defeat the bourgeoisie entirely. He believed the key to this victory over the capitalist class would be economic development, since Russia was still a largely agrarian society with very little industrial or economic development compared to Western Europe:

Our last, but most important and most difficult task, the one we have done least about, is economic development, the laying of economic foundations for the new, socialist edifice on the site of the demolished feudal edifice and the semi-demolished capitalist edifice.

Lenin’s plan for rapidly developing the means of production was his New Economic Policy, or the NEP. The New Economic Policy was proposed to be a temporary economic system that would allow a market economy and capitalism to exist within Russia, alongside state-owned business ventures, all firmly under the control of the working-class-dominated state. As Lenin explains in Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution:

At this very moment we are, by our New Economic Policy, correcting a number of our mistakes. We are learning how to continue erecting the socialist edifice in a small-peasant country.

He continues later in the text:

The proletarian state must become a cautious, assiduous and shrewd “businessman,” a punctilious wholesale merchant — otherwise it will never succeed in putting this small-peasant country economically on its feet. Under existing conditions, living as we are side by side with the capitalist (for the time being capitalist) West, there is no other way of progressing to communism. A wholesale merchant seems to be an economic type as remote from communism as heaven from earth. But that is one of the contradictions which, in actual life, lead from a small-peasant economy via state capitalism to socialism. Personal incentive will step up production; we must increase production first and foremost and at all costs. Wholesale trade economically unites millions of small peasants: it gives them a personal incentive, links them up and leads them to the next step, namely, to various forms of association and alliance in the process of production itself. We have already started the necessary changes in our economic policy and already have some successes to our credit; true, they are small and partial, but nonetheless they are successes. In this new field of “tuition” we are already finishing our preparatory class. By persistent and assiduous study, by making practical experience the test of every step we take, by not fearing to alter over and over again what we have already begun, by correcting our mistakes and most carefully analyzing their significance, we shall pass to the higher classes. We shall go through the whole “course,” although the present state of world economics and world politics has made that course much longer and much more difficult than we would have liked. No matter at what cost, no matter how severe the hardships of the transition period may be — despite disaster, famine and ruin — we shall not flinch; we shall triumphantly carry our cause to its goal.

With these great works dedicated to the three component parts of Marxism [see Annotation 42, p. 38], the name Vladimir Ilyich Lenin became an important part of Marxism. It marked a comprehensive developing step from Marxism to Marxism-Leninism.

d. Marxism-Leninism and the Reality of the International Revolutionary Movement

The birth of Marxism greatly affected both the international worker movements and communist movements. The revolution in March 1871 in France could be considered as a great experiment of Marxism in the real world. For the first time in human history, a new kind of state — the dictatorship of the proletariat state (Paris Commune) was established.


Annotation 38

The Paris Commune was an important but short-lived revolutionary victory of the working class which saw a revolutionary socialist government controlling Paris from March 18 to May 28, 1871.

During the brief existence of the Paris Commune, many important policies were set forth, including a separation of church and state, abolishment of rent, an end to child labor, and the right of employees to take over any business which had been abandoned by its owner. Unfortunately, the Paris Commune was brutally toppled by the French army, which killed between 6,000 and 7,000 revolutionaries in battle and by execution. The events of the Paris Commune heavily influenced many revolutionary thinkers and leaders, including Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and was referenced frequently in their works.

In August 1903, the very first Marxist proletariat party was established — the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. It was a true Marxist party that led the revolution in Russia in 1905. In October 1917, the victory of the socialist revolution of the proletariat in Russia opened a new era for human history.

In 1919, the Communist International* was held; in 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic was established. It marked the alliance of the proletariat of many countries. With the power of this alliance, the fight against Fascism not only protected the achievements of the proletariat’s revolution, but also spread socialism beyond the borders of Russia. Following the lead of the Soviet Union, a community of socialist countries was built, with revolutions leading to the establishment of socialism in the following countries [and years of establishment]: Mongolia [1921], Vietnam [1945], the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [1945], Yugoslavia [1945], Albania [1946], Romania [1947], Czechoslovakia [1948], East Germany [1949], China [1949], Hungary [1949], Poland [1956], and Cuba [1959].


Annotation 39

* The First International, also known as the International Workingmen’s Association, was founded in London and lasted from 1864–1876. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were key figures in the foundation and operation of this organization, which sought better conditions and the establishment of rights for workers.

The Second International was founded in Paris in 1889 to continue the work of the First International. It fell apart in 1916 because the members from different nations could not maintain solidarity through the outbreak of World War I.

The Third International, also known as the Communist International (or the ComIntern for short), was founded in Moscow in 1919 (though many nations didn’t join until later in the 1920s). Its goals were to overthrow capitalism, build socialism, and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. It was dissolved in 1943 in the midst of the German invasion of Russia in World War II.

These great historical events strongly enhanced the revolutionary movement of the working class all around the whole world. The people awakened and encouraged the liberation resistance of many colonised countries. The guiding role of Marxism-Leninism brought many great results for a world of peace, independence, democracy, and social progress.

However, because of many internal and external factors, in the late 1980s, the socialist alliance faced a crisis and fell into a recession period. Even though the socialist system fell into crisis and was weakened, the socialist ideology still survived internationally. The determination of successfully building socialism was still very strong in many countries and the desire to follow the socialist path still spread widely in South America.

Nowadays, the main feature of our modern society is fast and varied change in many social aspects caused by technology and scientific revolution. But, no matter how quickly and diversely our society changes, the nature of the capitalist production method never changes. So, in order to protect the socialist achievements earned by the flesh and blood of many previous generations; and in order to have a tremendous development step in the career of liberating human beings, it is very urgent to protect, inherit and develop Marxism-Leninism and also innovate the work of building socialism in both theory and practice.

The Communist Party of Vietnam declared: “Nowadays, capitalism still has potential for development, but in nature, it’s still an unjust, exploitative, and oppressive regime. The basic and inherent contradictions of capitalism, especially the contradictions between the increasing socialization of the production force and the capitalist private ownership regime, will never be solved and will even become increasingly serious. The feature of the current period of our modern society is: countries with different social regimes and different development levels co-exist, co-operate, struggle and compete fiercely for the interests of their own nations. The struggles for peace, independence, democracy, development, and social progress of many countries will still have to cope with hardship and challenges but we will achieve new progress. According to the principles of historical development, human beings will almost certainly go forward to socialism.”[16]


Annotation 40

Historical materialism is the application of dialectical materialist philosophy and materialist dialectical methodology to the analysis of human history, society, and development. The principles of historical materialism, as developed by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, indicate that human society is moving towards socialism and will almost certainly — in time — develop into socialism, and then proceed towards a stateless, classless form of society (communism). These principles of historical materialism were initially formulated and discussed in several books by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, including:

The German Ideology, by Marx and Engels

Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, by Marx and Engels

Karl Marx, by Lenin

The Communist Party of Vietnam has also declared:

“In the opinion of the Vietnam Communist Party, using Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought as the foundation for our ideology, the guideline for our actions is an important developmental step in cognition and logical thinking[17]. Achievements that the Vietnamese people have gained in the war to gain our independence, in peace, and in the renovation era, are all rooted in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought. Therefore, we have to ‘creatively apply and develop Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought in the Party’s activities. We have to regularly summarise reality, complement and develop theory, and soundly solve the problems of our society.’”[18]


Annotation 41

Ho Chi Minh Thought refers to a system of ideas developed by Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese communists which relate to the application of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and methodology to the specific material conditions of Vietnam during the revolutionary period.

There is no universal road map for applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism. How the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism should be applied will vary widely from one time and place to another. This is why Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese communists had to develop Ho Chi Minh Thought: so that scientific socialism could be developed within the unique context of Vietnam’s particular historical development and material conditions.

It is the duty of every revolutionary to study Marxism-Leninism as well as specific applied forms of Marxism-Leninism developed by revolutionaries for their own specific times and places, such as: Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam), Mao Zedong (China), Fidel Castro and Che Guevera (Cuba), etc. However, it must be recognized that the ideas, strategies, methodologies, and philosophies developed in such particular circumstances can’t be applied in exactly the same way in other times and places, such as our own contemporary material conditions.

The Renovation Era refers to the period of time in Vietnam from the 1980s until the early 2000s during which the Đổi Mới (renovation) policies were implemented. These policies restructured the Vietnamese economy to end the previous subsidizing model (which was defined by state ownership of the entire economy). The goals of the Renovation Era were to open Vietnam economically and politically and to normalize relations with the rest of the world. The Đổi Mới policies were generally successful and paved the way to the Path to Socialism Era which Vietnam exists in today. The goals of the Path to Socialism Era are to develop Vietnam into a modern, developed country with a strong economy and wealthy people, which will allow us to transition towards the lower stage of communism, which Lenin called “socialism.”

And, finally: “We have to be consistent with Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought. We have to creatively apply and develop the ideology correspondingly with the reality in Vietnam. We have to firmly aim for national independence and socialism.”

II. Objects, Purposes, and Requirements for Studying the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism

1. Objects and Purposes of Study

The objects of study of this book, The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism, are the fundamental viewpoints of Marxism-Leninism in its three component parts.


Annotation 42

Remember that a viewpoint is the starting point of analysis which determines the direction of thinking and the perspective from which problems are considered. Also remember that Marxism-Leninism has three component parts:

1. The Philosophy of Marxism:

Including Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism

2. The Political Economy of Marxism:

A system of knowledge and laws that define the production process and commodity exchange in human society.

3. Scientific Socialism

The system of thought pertaining to the establishment of the communist social economy form.

These objects of study stand as the viewpoints — the starting points of analysis — of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and the three component parts of which it’s composed.


In the scope of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy [the first component part of Marxism-Leninism], these objects of study are:

  • Dialectical Materialism — the fundamental and most universal worldview and methodologies which form the theoretical core of a scientific worldview*. [See Part 1, p. 44]
  • Materialist Dialectics — the science of development, of common relationships, and of the most common rules of motion and development of nature, society and human thought. [See Chapter 2, p. 98]
  • Historical Materialism — the application and development of Materialism and Dialectics in studying social aspects. [Historical materialism is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.]

Annotation 43

* Remember that Scientific in Marxism-Leninism refers to a systematic pursuit of knowledge, research, theory, and understanding [see Annotation 1, p. 1]. Note, also, that Worldview refers to the whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about humans ourselves, and about life and the position of human beings in the world. This is discussed in more detail on page 44.

Thus, a scientific worldview is a worldview that is expressed by a systematic pursuit of knowledge of definitions and categories that generally and correctly reflect the relationships of things, phenomena, and processes in the objective material world, including relationships between humans, as well as relationships between humans and the world.

In the scope of Marxist-Leninist Political Economics [the second component part of Marxism-Leninism], the objects of study are:

  • The theory of value and the theory of surplus value.
  • Economic theory about monopolist capitalism and state monopolist capitalism.
  • General economic rules about capitalist production methods, from the stage of formation, to the stage of development, to the stage of perishing, which will be followed by the birth of a new production method: the communist production method.

Annotation 44

Marxist-Leninist political economics is the topic of Part 3 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.

In the scope of Scientific Socialism [the third component part of Marxism-Leninism], the objects of study are:

  • The historical mission of the working class and the progression of a socialist revolution.
  • Matters related to the future formation and development periods of the communist socio-economic form.
  • Guidelines for the working class in implementing our historical mission.

The purposes of studying The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism are:' to master Marxist-Leninist viewpoints of science, revolution, and humanism*; to thoroughly understand the most important theoretical foundation of Ho Chi Minh Thought, the revolutionary path, and the ideological foundation of the Vietnam Communist Party. Based on that basis, we can build a scientific worldview and methodology and a revolutionary worldview; build our trust in our revolutionary ideals; creatively apply them in our cognitive and practical activities and in practicing and cultivating morality to meet the requirements of Vietnamese people in the cause of building a socialist Vietnam.


Annotation 45

* The humanism of Marxism-Leninism differs greatly from the humanism of Feuerbach discussed in Annotation 12, p. 13. Marxist-Leninist humanism concerns itself with the liberation of all humans. As Marx and Engels wrote in The Communist Manifesto: “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”

2. Some Basic Requirements of the Studying Method

There are some basic requirements for studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism:

First, Marxist-Leninist theses were conceptualized under many different circumstances in order to solve different problems, so the expressions of thought of Marxist-Leninists can vary. Therefore, students studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism must correctly understand its spirit and essence and avoid theoretical purism and dogmatism.


Annotation 46

Marxism-Leninism should be understood as an applied science, and application of this science will vary based on material conditions. As Engels wrote in a personal letter in 1887, remarking on the socialist movement in the USA: “Our theory is a theory of evolution, not a dogma to be learned by heart and to be repeated mechanically. The less it is drilled into the Americans from outside and the more they test it with their own experience... the deeper will it pass into their flesh and blood.”

As an example, Lenin tailored his actions and ideas specifically to suit the material conditions of Russia under the Czar and in the early revolutionary period. Russia’s material conditions were somewhat unique during the time of Lenin’s revolutionary activity, since Russia was an agrarian monarchy with a large peasant population and a relatively undeveloped industrial sector. As such, Lenin had to develop strategies, tactics, and ideas which suited those specific material conditions, such as determining that the industrial working class and agricultural peasants should work together. As Lenin explained in The Proletariat and the Peasantry:

Thus the red banner of the class-conscious workers means, first, that we support with all our might, the peasants’ struggle for full freedom and all the land; secondly, it means that we do not stop at this, but go on further. We are waging, besides the struggle for freedom and land, a fight for socialism.

Obviously, this statement would not be specifically applicable to a society with highly developed industry and virtually no rural peasants (such as, for instance, the modern-day USA), just as Lenin’s remarks about the Czar would not be specifically applicable to any society that does not have an institution of monarchy.

As another example, take the works of Ho Chi Minh. Ho Chi Minh Thought is defined by the Communist Party of Vietnam as “a complete system of thought about the fundamental issues of the Vietnam revolution.” In other words, Ho Chi Minh Thought is a specific application of the principles of Marxism-Leninism to the material conditions of Vietnam.

One unique aspect of Vietnam’s revolution which Ho Chi Minh focused on was colonization. As a colonized country, Ho Chi Minh realized that Vietnam had unique challenges and circumstances that would need to be properly addressed through revolutionary struggle. Another unique aspect of Vietnam’s material conditions was the fact that the colonial administration of Vietnam changed hands throughout the revolution: from France, to Japan, back to France, then to the USA. Ho Chi Minh was able to dynamically and creatively apply Marxism-Leninism to these shifting material conditions. For instance, in Founding of the Indochinese Communist Party, written in 1930, Ho Chi Minh explains some of the unique problems faced by the colonized people of Indochina (modern day Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) and proposes solutions specific to these unique material conditions:

On the one hand, they (the French) use the feudalists and comprador bourgeoisie (of Vietnam) to oppress and exploit our people. On the other, they terrorize, arrest, jail, deport, and kill a great number of Vietnamese revolutionaries. If the French imperialists think that they can suppress the Vietnamese revolution by means of terror, they are grossly mistaken. For one thing, the Vietnamese revolution is not isolated but enjoys the assistance of the world proletariat in general and that of the French working class in particular. Secondly, it is precisely at the very time when the French imperialists are frenziedly carrying out terrorist acts that the Vietnamese Communists, formerly working separately, have united into a single party, the Indochinese Communist Party, to lead the revolutionary struggle of our entire people.

During this period, the nations of Indochina were predominantly agricultural, prompting Ho Chi Minh to suggest in the same text that it would be necessary “to establish a worker-peasant-soldier government” and “to confiscate all the plantations and property belonging to the imperialists and the Vietnamese reactionary bourgeoisie and distribute them to the poor peasants.” Obviously all of these considerations are specific to the material conditions of Indochina under French colonial rule in 1930.

By 1939, the situation was changing rapidly. Ho Chi Minh was operating from China, which was being invaded by fascist Japan. He knew that it was only a matter of time before the Japanese imperial army would come to threaten Vietnam and the rest of Indochina. As such, Ho Chi Minh wrote a letter to the Indochinese Communist Party outlining recommendations, strategies, and goals pertaining to the precipitating material conditions. At that time, France had not yet been invaded by Germany, but Ho Chi Minh was very aware of the looming threat of fascism both in Europe and in Asia. He realized that rising up in revolutionary civil war against the French colonial administration would give fascist Japan the opportunity to quickly conquer all of Indochina, which is why he made the following recommendations in a letter to the Communist Party of Indochina in 1939:

Our party should not strive for demands which are too high, such as total independence, or establishing a house of representatives. If we do that, we will fall into the trap of fascist Japan. For now, we should only ask for democracy, freedom to organize, freedom to hold meetings, freedom of speech, and for the release of political prisoners. We should also fight for our party to be organized and to operate legally.

Once France fell to Germany in 1940, Indochina was immediately handed over to Japanese colonial rule. The Japanese army was brutal in its occupation of Vietnam, and the French colonial administrators surrendered entirely to the Japanese empire and helped the Japanese to administer all of Indochina. Ho Chi Minh returned to Vietnam in January of 1941 and participated directly with the resistance struggle against Japan until 1945, when the situation once again changed dramatically due to the Japanese military’s surrender to allied forces and withdrawal from Vietnam. He immediately took advantage of this situation and held a successful revolution against both the Japanese and French administrators. In the Declaration of Independence for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh wrote:

After the Japanese had surrendered to the Allies, our whole people rose to regain our national sovereignty and to found the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The truth is that we have wrested our independence from the Japanese and not from the French. The French have fled, the Japanese have capitulated, Emperor Bao Dai has abdicated. Our people have broken the chains which for nearly a century have fettered them and have won independence for the homeland.

As France began to make their intentions clear that they would be resuming their colonialist claim to Indochina, Ho Chi Minh began preparing the country for a new chapter in revolutionary struggle. In his 1946 letter to the people of Vietnam, entitled A Nationwide Call for Resistance, Ho Chi Minh wrote:

We call everyone, man and woman, old and young, from every ethnic minority, from every religion, to stand up and fight to save our country. If you have guns, use guns. If you have swords, use swords. If you have nothing, use sticks. Everyone must stand up and fight.

As these historical developments illustrate, Ho Chi Minh was able to creatively and dynamically apply the principles of Marxism-Leninism to suit the shifting material conditions of Vietnam, just as Lenin had to creatively and dynamically apply these principles to the emerging situation in Russia in the early 20th century. So is the task of every student of Marxism-Leninism: to learn to apply these principles creatively and dynamically to the material conditions at hand.


Second, the birth and development of Marixst-Leninist theses is a process. In that process, all Marixst-Leninist theses have strong relationships with each other. They complement and support each other. Thus, students studying each Marxist-Leninist thesis need to put it in proper relation and context with other theses found within each different component part of Marxism-Leninism in order to understand the unity in diversity [see: Annotation 107, p. 110], the consistency of every thesis in particular, and the whole of Marxism-Leninism in general.

Third, an important goal of studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism is to understand clearly the most important theoretical basis of Ho Chi Minh Thought, of the Vietnam Communist Party and its revolutionary path. Therefore, we must attach Marxist-Leninist theses to Vietnam’s revolutionary practice and the world’s practice in order to see the creative application of Marxism-Leninism that President Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnam Communist Party implemented in each period of history.

Fourth, we must study the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism to meet the requirements for a new Vietnamese people in a new era. So, the process of studying is also the process of self-educating and practicing to improve ourselves step-by-step in both individual and social life.

Fifth, Marxism-Leninism is not a closed and immutable theoretical system. On the contrary, it is a theoretical system that continuously develops based on the development of reality. Therefore, the process of studying Marxism-Leninism is also a process of reflection: summarizing and reviewing your own practical experiences and sharing what you’ve learned from these experiences in order to contribute to the scientific and humanist development of Marxism-Leninism. In addition, when studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, we need to consider these principles in the proper context of the history of the ideological development of humanity. Such context is important because Marxism-Leninism is quintessentially[19] the product of that history.

These requirements have strong relationships with each other. They imbue the studying process with the quintessence of Marxism-Leninism. And more importantly, they help students apply that quintessence into cognitive and practical activities.

Part I: The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism — Leninism

Worldview refers to the whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about humans ourselves, and about life and the position of human beings in that world. Our worldview directs and orientates our life, including our cognitive and practical activities, as well as our self-awareness. Our worldview defines our ideals, our value system, and our lifestyle. So, a proper and scientific worldview serves as a foundation to establish a constructive approach to life. One of the basic criteria to evaluate the growth and maturity of an individual or a whole society is the degree to which worldview has been developed.

Methodology is a system of reasoning: the ideas and rules that guide humans to research, build, select, and apply the most suitable methods in both perception and practice. Methodologies can range from very specific to broadly general, with philosophical methodology being the most general scope of methodology.



Annotation 47

Tran Thien Tu, the vice-dean of the Department of Marxist-Leninist Theoretical Studies at the Le Duan Political Science University in Quang Tri, Vietnam, defines three degrees of scopes of Methodology. They are, from most specific to most general:

1. Field Methodology

The most specific scope of methodology; a field methodology will apply only to a single specific scientific field.

2. General Methodology

A more general scope of methodology; a general methodology will be shared by various scientific fields.

3. Philosophical Methodology

The most general scope of methodology, encompassing the whole of the material world and human thought.


Worldview and philosophical methodology are the fundamental knowledge-systems* of Marxism-Leninism.

Annotation 48

* In the original Vietnamese, the word luận is used, which we roughly translate to the phrase “knowledge-system” throughout this book. Literally, lý luận is a combination of the words lẽ, which means “argument,” and bàn luận, which means “to infer.”

The full meaning of luận is: a system of ideas that reflect reality expressed in a system of knowledge that allows for a complete view of the fundamental laws and relationships of objective reality.


The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism-Leninism

Marxist-Leninist worldview and philosophical methodology emerge from the quintessence [see Annotation 6, p. 8] of dialectical materialism, which itself developed from other forms of dialectics, which in turn developed throughout the history of the ideological development of humanity.

Materialism is foundational to Marxism-Leninism in two important ways:

Dialectical Materialism is the ideological core of a scientific worldview.

Historical Materialism is a system of dialectical materialist opinions about the origin of, motivation of, and the most common rules that dominate the movement and development of human society.

Dialectics are also foundational to Marxism-Leninism, specifically in the form of Materialist Dialectics, which Lenin defined as “the doctrine of development in its fullest, deepest and most comprehensive form, the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge.”[20] Lenin also defined Materialist Dialectics as “what is now called theory of knowledge or epistemology.”[21] [Note: Epistemology is the theoretical study of knowledge; for more information see Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism, p. 204.]


Annotation 49

For beginning students of Marxism-Leninism, distinguishing between Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics may at first be confusing. Here is an explanation of each concept and how they relate to one another:

Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics.

Dialectical Materialism is a scientific understanding of matter, consciousness and the relationship between the two. Dialectical Materialism is used to understand the world by studying such relationships.

Materialist Dialectics is a science studying the general laws of the movement, change, and development of nature, society and human thought.

Relationship between Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics.

And so, we use Dialectical Materialism to understand the fundamental nature of reality. This understanding is used as a basis for changing the world, using Materialist Dialectics to guide our activities. We can then reflect on the results of our activities, using Dialectical Materialism, to further develop our understanding of the world.

As Marxist-Leninists, we utilize this continuous cycle between studying and understanding the world through Dialectical Materialism and affecting change in the world through Materialist Dialectics with the goal of bringing about socialism and freeing humanity.

It is also important to understand the nature of dialectical relationships.

A dialectical relationship is a relationship in which two things mutually impact one another. Dialectical materialism perceives all things in motion [see Mode and Forms of Existence of Matter, p. 59] and in a constant state of change, and this motion and change originates from relationships in which all things mutually move and change each other through interaction, leading to development over time.


Thoroughly understanding the basic content of the worldview and methodology of Marxism-Leninism is the most important requirement in order to properly study the whole theory system of Marxism-Leninism and to creatively apply it into cognitive and practical activities in order to solve the problems that our society must cope with.


3. Excerpt From Modifying the Working Style By Ho Chi Minh

Ho Chi Minh training cadres in 1959.

Training is a must. There is a proverb: “without a teacher, you can never do well;” and the expression: “learn to eat, learn to speak, learn to pack, learn to unpack.”

Even many simple subjects require study, let alone revolutionary work and resistance work. How can you perform such tasks without any training?

But training materials must be aimed at the needs of the masses. We must ask: after people receive their training, can they apply their knowledge immediately? Is it possible to practice right away?

If training is not immediately practical, then years of training would be useless.

Unfortunately, many of our trainers do not understand this simple logic. That’s why there are cadres who train rural people in the uplands in the field of “economics!”

In short, our way of working, organizing, talking, propagandizing, setting slogans, writing newspapers, etc., must all take this sentence as a model:

“From within the masses, back into the masses.”

No matter how big or small our tasks are, we must clearly examine and modify them to match the culture, living habits, level of education, struggling experiences, desire, will, and material conditions of the masses. On that basis we will form our ways of working and organizing. Only then can we have the masses on our side.

Otherwise, if you just do as you want, following your own thoughts, your subjectivity, and then force your personal thoughts upon the masses, it is just like “cutting your feet to fit your shoes.” Feet are the masses. Shoes are our ways of organizing and working.

Shoes are made to fit people’s feet, not the other way around.

Chapter 1: Dialectical Materialism

Dialectical Materialism, one of the materialist foundations of Marxism-Leninism, uses the materialist worldview and dialectical methods to study fundamental philosophical issues. Dialectical Materialism is the most advanced form of Materialism, and serves as the theoretical core of a scientific worldview. Therefore, thoroughly understanding the basic content of Dialectical Materialism is the essential prerequisite to study both the component principles of Marxism-Leninism in particular, and the whole of Marxism-Leninism in general.

I. Materialism and Dialectical Materialism

1. The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues

Philosophy is a system of the most general human theories and knowledge about our world, about ourselves, and our position in our world.

Philosophy has existed for thousands of years. Philosophy has different objects of study depending on different periods of time. Summarizing the whole history of philosophy, Engels said: “The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of more modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being[22].”

So, philosophy studies the relations between consciousness and matter, and between humans and nature.

In philosophy, there are two main questions:

Question 1: The question of consciousness and matter: which came first; or, to put it another way, which one determines which one?

In attempting to answer this first question, philosophy has separated into two main schools: Materialism, and Idealism.

Question 2: Do humans have the capacity to perceive the world as it truly exists?

In answer to this second question, two schools: Intelligibility — which admits the human cognitive capacity to truly perceive the world — and unintelligibility — which denies that capacity.

Materialism is the belief that the nature of the world is matter; that matter comes first; and that matter determines consciousness. People who uphold this belief are called materialists. Throughout human history, many different factions of materialists with various schools of materialist thought have evolved.

Idealism is the belief that the nature of the world is consciousness; consciousness precedes matter; consciousness decides matter. People who uphold this belief are called idealists. Like materialism, various factions of idealists with varying schools of idealist thought have also evolved throughout history.


Idealism has cognitive origins and social origins.


Annotation 50

Cognitive origin refers to origination from the human consciousness of individuals.

Social origin refers to origination from social relations between human beings.

So, idealism originates from both the conscious activity of individual humans as well as social activity between human beings.

These origins are unilateral consideration and absolutization of only one aspect or one characteristic of the whole cognitive process.


Annotation 51

Unilateral consideration is the consideration of a subject from one side only.

Absolutization occurs when one conceptualizes some belief or supposition as always true in all situations without exception.

Both unilateral consideration and absolutization fail to consider the dynamic, constantly changing, and interconnected relations of all things, phenomena, and ideas in our reality.

Idealism originates from unilateral consideration because idealists ignore the material world and consider reality only from the perspective of the human mind. It also originates from absolutism because idealists absolutize human reasoning as the only source of truth and knowledge about our world without exception.

As Lenin wrote in On the Question of Dialectics: “Philosophical idealism is a unilateral development, an overt development, of one out of many attributes, or one out of many aspects, of consciousness.”

Historically, idealism has typically benefitted the oppressive, exploitative class of society. Idealism and religions usually have a close relation with each other, and support each other to co-exist and co-develop.


Annotation 52

Idealists, in absolutizing human consciousness, have a tendency to only give credence to the work of the mind and ignore the value of physical labor. This has been used to justify class structures in which religious and intellectual laborers are given authority and privilege over manual laborers.

This situation has also led to the idea that mental factors play a decisive role in the development of human society in particular and the whole world in general. This idealist view was supported by the ruling class and used to justify its own power and privilege in society. The dominant class has historically used such idealist philosophy as the justifying foundation for their political-social beliefs in order to maintain their ruling positions.

Marx discusses this tendency for rulers to idealistically justify their own rule in The German Ideology:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an ‘eternal law.’

Marx goes on to explain how the idealist positions of the ruling class tend to get embedded in historical narratives:

Whilst in ordinary life every shopkeeper is very well able to distinguish between what somebody professes to be and what he really is, our historians have not yet won even this trivial insight. They take every epoch at its word and believe that everything it says and imagines about itself is true. This historical method which reigned in Germany, and especially the reason why, must be understood from its connection with the illusion of ideologists in general, e.g. the illusions of the jurist, politicians (of the practical statesmen among them, too), from the dogmatic dreamings and distortions of these fellows; this is explained perfectly easily from their practical position in life, their job, and the division of labour.


In history, there are two main forms of idealism: subjective and objective.

Subjective idealism asserts that consciousness is the primary existence. It asserts that all things and phenomena can only be experienced as subjective sensory perceptions while denying the objective existence of material reality altogether.

Objective idealism also asserts the ideal and consciousness as the primary existence, but also posits that the ideal and consciousness are objective, and that they exist independently of nature and humans. This concept is given many names, such as “absolute concept”, “absolute spirit,” “rationality of the world,” etc.


Annotation 53

Primary existence is existence which precedes and determines other existences.

Idealists believe that consciousness has primary existence over matter, that the nature of the world is ideal, and that the ideal defines existence.

Materialists believe the opposite: that matter has primary existence over the ideal, and that matter precedes and determines consciousness.

Dialectical Materialism holds that matter and consciousness have a dialectical relationship, in which matter has primary existence over the ideal, though consciousness can impact the material world through willful conscious activity.

The primary existence of matter within Dialectical Materialism is discussed further in The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88.

Willful activity (willpower) is discussed in Nature and Structure of Consciousness, p. 79.

The key difference between subjective and objective idealists is this:

Subjective idealists believe that there is no external material world whatsoever — that what we imagine as the material world is merely illusory — and that all reality is created by consciousness, whereas objective idealists believe that there is a material world outside of human consciousness, but it exists independently of human consciousness; therefore (according to objective idealists), since humans can only observe the world through conscious experience, the material world can never be truly known or observed by our consciousness.

In opposition to Idealism, Materialism originated through practical experience and the development of science. Through practical experience and systematic development of human knowledge, Materialism has come to serve as a universally applicable theoretical system which benefits progressive social forces and which also orients the activities of those forces in both perception and practice.


Annotation 54

Materialism benefits progressive social forces by showing reality as it is, by dispelling the idealist positions of the ruling class, and by revealing that society and the world can be changed through willful activity.

Materialism guides progressive social forces by grounding thought and activity in material reality, enabling strategies and outcomes that line up with the realities of the material world. For instance, we must avoid utopianism [see Annotation 17, p. 18] in which emphasis is placed on working out ideal forms of society through debate, conjecture, and conscious activity alone. Revolution against capitalism must, instead, focus on affecting material relations and processes of development through willful activity.

As Engels pointed out in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific: “The final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men’s brains, not in men’s better insights into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange.”

2. Dialectical Materialism — the Most Advanced Form of Materialism

In human history, as human society and scientific understanding have developed, materialism has also developed through three forms: Primitive Materialism, Metaphysical Materialism, and Dialectical Materialism.

Primitive Materialism is the primitive form of materialism. Primitive materialism recognizes that matter comes first, and holds that the world is composed of certain elements, and that these were the first objects, the origin, of the world, and that these elements are the essence of reality. These Primitive Materialist concepts can be found in many ancient materialist theories in such places as China, India, and Greece. [These Primitive Materialist elemental philosophies are discussed more in Matter, p. 53] Although it has many shortcomings, Primitive Materialism is partially correct at the most fundamental level, because it uses the material of nature itself to explain nature.

Metaphysical Materialism is the second basic form of Materialism. This form of materialism was widely discussed and developed in Western Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. During this time, the metaphysical method of perceiving the world was applied to materialist philosophy. Although Metaphysical Materialism does not accurately reflect the world in terms of universal relations [see p. 108] and development, it was an important step forward in the fight against idealist and religious worldviews, especially during the transformational period from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance in many Western European countries.

Annotation 55

Metaphysical materialism was strongly influenced by mechanical philosophy, a scientific and philosophical movement popular in the 17th century which explored mechanical machines and compared natural phenomena to mechanical devices. Mechanical philosophy led to a belief that all things — including living organisms — were built as (and could theoretically be built by humans as) mechanical devices. Influenced by this philosophy, metaphysical materialists came to see the world as a giant mechanical machine composed of parts, each of which exists in an essentially isolated and static state.

Metaphysical materialists believed that all change can exist only as an increase or decrease in quantity, brought about by external causes Metaphysical materialism contributed significantly to the struggle against idealistic and religious worldviews, especially during the historical transition period from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance in Western European countries. Metaphysical materialism also had severe limitations; especially in failing to understand many key aspects of reality, such as the nature of development through change/motion and relationships.

Dialectical Materialism is the third basic form of materialism. It was founded by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and defended and developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin as well as many of his successors. By inheriting the quintessence of previous theories and thoroughly integrating contemporary scientific achievements, Dialectical Materialism immediately solved the shortcomings of the Primitive Materialism of ancient times as well as the Metaphysical Materialism of modern Western Europe. It reaches the highest development level of materialism so far in history.

By accurately reflecting objective reality with universal relations and development*, Dialectical Materialism offers humanity a great tool for scientific cognitive activities and revolutionary practice. The Dialectical Materialist system of thought was built on the basis of scientific explanations about matter, consciousness, and the relationship between the two.


Annotation 56

* Materialist Dialectical methodology explains the world in terms of relationships and development. This is discussed in Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics, p. 106.

II. Dialectical Materialist Opinions About Matter, Consciousness, and the Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness

1. Matter

a. Category of “Matter”


Matter is a philosophical subject which has been examined for more than 2,500 years. Since ancient times, there has been a relentless struggle between materialism and idealism around this subject. Idealism asserts that the world’s nature, the first basis of all existence, is consciousness, and that matter is only a product of that consciousness. Conversely, materialism asserts that nature, the entirety of the world, is composed of matter, that this material world exists indefinitely, and that all things and phenomena are composed of matter.

Before dialectical materialism was born, materialist philosophers generally believed that matter was composed of some self-contained element or elements; that is to say some underlying substance from which everything in the universe is ultimately derived. In ancient times, the five elements theory of Chinese philosophy held that those self-contained substances were metal — wood — water — fire — earth; in India, the Samkhya school believed that they were Pradhana or Prakriti[23]; in Greece, the Milesian school believed they were water (Thales’s[24] conception) or air (Anaximene’s[25] conception); Heraclitus[26] believed the ultimate element was fire; Democritus[27] asserted that it was something called an “atom,”' etc. Even as recently as the 17th-18th centuries, conceptions about matter belonging to modern philosophers such as Francis Bacon[28], Renes Descartes[29], Thomas Hobbes[30], Denis Diderot[31], etc., still hadn’t changed much. They continued following the same philosophical tendency as ancient philosophers by focusing their studies of the material world through elemental phenomena.

These conceptions of matter which were developed by philosophers before Marx’s time laid a foundation for a tendency to use nature to explain nature itself, but that tendency still had many shortcomings, such as: oversimplification of matter into fictitious “elements;” failure to understand the nature of consciousness as well as the relationships between matter and consciousness; failure to recognize the significance of matter in human society, leading to a failure to solve social issues based on a materialist basis, etc.


Annotation 57

Here are further explanations of these shortcomings of early materialists:

Oversimplification of matter into fictitious “elements”

Due to a lack of understanding and knowledge of matter, metaphysical materialists created erroneous conceptions of “elements” which do not accurately describe the nature of matter. By using such an erroneously conceived system of non-existing elements to describe nature, metaphysical materialists were prevented from gaining real insights into the material world which delayed and hindered scientific progress.

Failure to understand the nature of consciousness as well as the relationships between matter and consciousness

Many early materialists believed that consciousness was simply a mechanical byproduct of material processes, and that mental events (thoughts, consciousness) could not affect the material world, since these events were simply mechanically determined by the material world.

As a first principle, Dialectical Materialism does hold that consciousness is created by matter. However, Dialectical Materialism also holds that consciousness can influence the material world through conscious action. This constitutes a dialectical relationship.

As Lenin explains in Materialism and Empirio-criticism: “Consciousness in general reflects being—that is a general principle of all materialism... social consciousness reflects social being.”

Whereas early materialists erroneously held that consciousness is simply an “accidental” byproduct of matter, Dialectical Materialism holds that consciousness is a characteristic of the nature of matter. As Engels wrote in the notation of Dialectics of Nature:

That matter evolves out of itself the thinking human brain is for mechanism a pure accident, although necessarily determined, step by step, where it happens. But the truth is that it is the nature of matter to advance to the evolution of thinking beings, hence this always necessarily occurs wherever the conditions for it (not necessarily identical at all places and times) are present.

Dialectical materialism also breaks from early materialism by positing that consciousness has a dialectical relationship with matter. Consciousness arises from the material world, but can also influence the material world through conscious action. In other words, mental events can trigger physical actions which affect the material world.


As Marx explains in Theses on Feuerbach:

The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of changed circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change [Selbstveränderung] can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice... Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.

Put more simply, we as humans are capable of “revolutionary practice” which can “change the world” because our consciousness allows us to “change circumstances.” This is discussed further in Nature and Structure of Consciousness, p. 79.

Failure to recognize the significance of matter in human society, leading to a failure to solve social issues based on a materialist basis

Dialectical materialists believe that matter exists in many forms, and that human society is a special form of existence of matter. Lenin referred to the material existence of human society as social being, which stood in contrast with human society’s social consciousness. Social being encompasses all of the material existence and processes of human society.

As Lenin wrote in Materialism and Empirio-criticism:

Social being is independent of the social consciousness of men. The fact that you live and conduct your business, beget children, produce products and exchange them, gives rise to an objectively necessary chain of events, a chain of development, which is independent of your social consciousness, and is never grasped by the latter completely. The highest task of humanity is to comprehend this objective logic of economic evolution (the evolution of social life) in its general and fundamental features, so that it may be possible to adapt to it one’s social consciousness and the consciousness of the advanced classes of all capitalist countries in as definite, clear and critical a fashion as possible.

Early materialists failed to recognise the relationship between matter and consciousness — as Lenin puts it, specifically, between social being and social consciousness. Thus in contemplating social issues, these early materialists were unable to find proper materialist solutions.


These shortcomings resulted in a non-thorough materialist viewpoint: when dealing with questions about nature, the early materialists had a strong materialist viewpoint but when dealing with social issues, they “slipped” into an idealist viewpoint.


Annotation 58

Lenin explains this concept of “slipping into” idealism through a non-thorough materialist viewpoint in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism: “Once you deny objective reality, given us in sensation, you have already lost every one of your weapons against fideism, for you have slipped into agnosticism or subjectivism — and that is all fideism wants.”

Note: fideism is a form of idealism which holds that truth and knowledge are received through faith or revelation. Subjectivism is the centering of one’s own self in conscious activities and perspective; see Annotation 222, p. 218.

In the same work, Lenin upholds that objective reality can be known through sense perception:

We ask, is a man given objective reality when he sees something red or feels something hard, etc., or not? [...] If you hold that it is not given, you... inevitably sink to subjectivism... If you hold that it is given, a philosophical concept is needed for this objective reality, and this concept has been worked out long, long ago. This concept is matter. Matter is a philosophical category denoting the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them.

Lenin also explains that proper materialism must recognize objective/absolute truth:

To be a materialist is to acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind, is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth.

A failure to recognize the existence of such objective, absolute truth, according to Lenin, constitutes “relativism,” a position that all truth is relative and can never be absolutely, objectively knowable.

It is unconditionally true that to every scientific ideology (as distinct, for instance, from religious ideology), there corresponds an objective truth, absolute nature. You will say that this distinction between relative and absolute truth is indefinite. And I shall reply: yes, it is sufficiently ‘indefinite’ to prevent science from becoming a dogma in the bad sense of the term, from becoming something dead, frozen, ossified; but it is at the same time sufficiently ‘definite’ to enable us to dissociate ourselves in the most emphatic and irrevocable manner from fideism and agnosticism, from philosophical idealism and the sophistry of the followers of Hume and Kant. Here is a boundary which you have not noticed, and not having noticed it, you have fallen into the swamp of reactionary philosophy. It is the boundary between dialectical materialism and relativism.

In other words, while proper materialism must contain a degree of relativistic thinking sufficient to challenge assumptions and reexamine perceived truth periodically, materialists must not fall into complete relativism (such as that espoused by Hume and Kant) lest they fall into idealist positions. Ultimately, Absolute Truth — according to Lenin — constitutes the alignment of conscious understanding with objective reality (not to be confused with Hegel’s notion of Absolute Truth; see Annotation 232, p. 228).

Lenin recognized the development of Marx and Engels as “modern materialism, which is immeasurably richer in content and in comparably more consistent than all preceding forms of materialism,” in large part because Marx and Engels were able to apply materialism properly to social sciences by taking the “direct materialist road as against idealism.” He goes on to describe would-be materialists who fall to idealist positions due to relativism and other philosophical inadequacies as “a contemptible middle party in philosophy, who confuse the materialist and idealist trends on every question.”

Lenin warned that a failure to hold a thoroughly materialist viewpoint leads philosophers to become “ensnared in idealism, that is, in a diluted and subtle fideism; they became ensnared from the moment they took ‘sensation’ not as an image of the external world but as a special ‘element.’ It is nobody’s sensation, nobody’s mind, nobody’s spirit, nobody’s will — this is what one inevitably comes to if one does not recognise the materialist theory that the human mind reflects an objectively real external world.”

In other words, idealist conceptions of sensation inject mysticism into philosophy by conceiving of sensation as otherworldly, supernatural, and detached from material human beings with material experiences in the material world.

The development of natural sciences in the late 19th century and early 20th centuries (especially the inventions of Roentgen[32], Becquerel[33], Thomson[34] etc.), disproved the theories of “classical elements” such as fire, water, air, etc. [see Primitive Materialism, p. 52]. These innovations led to a viewpoint crisis in the field of physical science. Many idealists used this opportunity to affirm the non-material nature of the world, ascribing the roles of supernatural forces to the birth of the world.


Annotation 59

Lenin discussed this viewpoint crisis extensively in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Here Lenin discusses relativist reactions to new breakthroughs in natural science, which led even scientists (who proclaimed to be materialists) to take idealist positions:

We are faced, says Poincaré [a French scientist], with the “ruins” of the old principles of physics, “a general debacle of principles.” It is true, he remarks, that all the mentioned departures from principles refer to infinitesimal magnitudes; it is possible that we are still ignorant of other infinitesimals counteracting the undermining of the old principles... But at any rate we have reached a “period of doubt.” We have already seen what epistemological deductions the author draws from this “period of doubt:” “it is not nature which imposes on [or dictates to] us the concepts of space and time, but we who impose them on nature;” “whatever is not thought, is pure nothing.” These deductions are idealist deductions. The breakdown of the most fundamental principles shows (such is Poincaré’s trend of thought) that these principles are not copies, photographs of nature, not images of something external in relation to man’s consciousness, but products of his consciousness. Poincaré does not develop these deductions consistently, nor is he essentially interested in the philosophical aspect of the question.

Lenin concludes by stating that the non-thorough materialist position has lead directly to these idealist positions of relativism:

The essence of the crisis in modern physics consists in the breakdown of the old laws and basic principles, in the rejection of an objective reality existing outside the mind, that is, in the replacement of materialism by idealism and agnosticism.

With this historical background, in order to fight against the distortions of many idealists and to protect the development of the materialist viewpoint, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin simultaneously summarized all the natural scientific achievements in late 19th and early 20th century and built upon Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ thought to develop this definition of matter:

“Matter is a philosophical category denoting objective reality which is given to man in his sensations, and which is copied, photographed, and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them.”

Lenin’s definition of matter shows that:

First, we need to distinguish between the definition of “matter” as a philosophical category (the category that summarizes the most basic and common attributes of all material existence, and which was defined with the objective of solving the basic issues of philosophy) from the definition of “matter” that was used in specialized sciences (specific and sense-detectable substance).

Second, the most basic, common attribute of all kinds of matter [and under both definitions listed in the previous paragraph] is objective existence, meaning matter exists outside of human consciousness, independently of human consciousness, no matter whether humans can perceive it with our senses or not.

Third, matter, with its specific forms, can cause and affect mental events in humans when it directly or indirectly impacts the human senses; human consciousness is the reflection of matter; matter is the thing that is reflected by human consciousness.

Lenin’s definition of matter played an important role in the development of materialism and scientific consciousness.

First, by pointing out that the most basic, common attribute of matter is objective existence, Lenin successfully distinguished the basic difference between the definition of matter as a philosophical category and the definition of matter as a category of specialized sciences. It helped solve the problems of defining matter in the previous forms of materialism; it offered scientific evidence to define what can be considered matter; it layed out a theoretical foundation for building a materialist viewpoint of history, and overcame the shortcomings of idealist conceptions of society.

Second, by asserting that matter was “objective reality,” “given to man in his sensations,” and “copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations,” Lenin not only confirmed the primary existence of matter and the secondary existence of consciousness [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88] but he also affirmed that humans had the ability to be aware of objective reality through the “copying, photographing and reflection of our sensations” [in other words, sense perceptions].

b. Mode and Forms of Existence of Matter

According to the dialectical materialist viewpoint, motion is the mode of existence of matter; space and time are the forms of existence of matter.


Annotation 60

Mode refers to the way or manner in which something occurs or exists. You can think of mode as pertaining to the “how,” as opposed to the “what.” For example, the mode of circulation refers to how commodities circulate within society [see Annotation 14, p. 16]; mode of production refers to how commodities are produced in society. So, mode of existence of matter refers to how matter exists in our universe.

Form comes from the category pair [see Basic Pairs of Categories of Materialist Dialectics, p. 126] of Content and Form [see p. 147]. Form refers to how we perceive objects, phenomena, and ideas. So, form of existence of matter refers to the ways in which we perceive the existence of matter [explained below] in our universe.

- Motion is the Mode of Existence of Matter

As Friedrich Engels explained: “Motion, in the most general sense, conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute of matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe, from mere change of place right up to thinking.”

According to Engels, motion encompasses more than just positional changes. Motion embodies “all the changes and processes happening in this universe;” matter is always associated with motion, and matter can only express its existence through motion.


Annotation 61

In Dialectical Materialist philosophy, “motion” is also known as “change” and it refers to the changes which occur as a result of the mutual impacts which occur in or between subjects through the negation of contradictions. Motion is a constant attribute of all things, phenomena, and ideas (see Characteristics of Development, p. 124).

Because matter is inseparable from motion (and vice versa), Engels defined motion as the mode of matter — the way or manner in which matter exists. It is impossible for matter in our universe to exist in completely static and unchanging state, isolated from the rest of existence; thus matter exists in the mode of motion. Over time, motion leads to development as things, phenomena, and ideas transition through various stages of quality change [see Annotation 117, p. 119].

Matter exists objectively, therefore motion also exists objectively. The motion of matter is self-motion[35].


Annotation 62

It is important to note that “matter,” in the philosophical sense as used in dialectical materialist phlosophy, includes all that is “objective” (external) to individual human cosnciousness. This includes objective phenomena which human senses are unable to detect, such as objective social relations, objective economic values, etc. Objectiveness is discussed more in Annotation 108, p. 112; objective social relations are discussed more in Annotation 10, p. 10.

In Dialectics of Nature, Friedrich Engels discussed the properties of motion and explained that motion can neither be created nor destroyed. Therefore, motion can only change form or transfer from one object to another. In this sense, all objects are dynamically linked together through motion:

The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by bodies we understand here all material existence extending from stars to atoms... In the fact that these bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already becomes evident here that matter is unthinkable without motion. And if, in addition, matter confronts us as something given, equally uncreatable as indestructible, it follows that motion also is as uncreatable as indestructible. It became impossible to reject this conclusion as soon as it was recognised that the universe is a system, an interconnection of bodies.

In other words, every body of matter is in motion relative to other bodies of matter, and thus matter is inseparable from motion. Motion results from the interaction of bodies of matter. Because motion and matter define each other, and because motion can only exist in relation to matter and matter can only exist in relation to motion, the motion of matter can be described as “self-motion,” because the motion is not created externally but exists only within and in relation to matter itself. Engels further explains that if this were not true — if motion were external to matter — then motion itself would have had to have been created external to matter, which is impossible:

To say that matter during the whole unlimited time of its existence has only once, and for what is an infinitesimally short period in comparison to its eternity, found itself able to differentiate its motion and thereby to unfold the whole wealth of this motion, and that before and after this remains restricted for eternity to mere change of place — this is equivalent to maintaining that matter is mortal and motion transitory. The indestructibility of motion cannot be merely quantitative, it must also be conceived qualitatively; matter whose purely mechanical change of place includes indeed the possibility under favourable conditions of being transformed into heat, electricity, chemical action, or life, but which is not capable of producing these conditions from out of itself, such matter has forfeited motion; motion which has lost the capacity of being transformed into the various forms appropriate to it may indeed still have dynamis but no longer energeia, and so has become partially destroyed. Both, however, are unthinkable.

So, motion can change forms and can transfer from one material body to another, but it can never be created externally from matter, and neither motion nor matter can be created or destroyed in our universe. Thus, matter exists in a state of “self-motion;” motion can never externally be created nor externally applied to matter.

To put it another way, motion results from the fact that all things, phenomena, and ideas exist as assemblages of relationships [see The Principle of General Relationships, p. 107], and these relationships contain opposing forces. As Lenin explained in his Philosophical Notebooks:

The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their ‘self-movement,’ in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the ‘struggle’ of opposites.



Based on the scientific achievements which occurred in his lifetime, Engels classified motion into 5 basic forms: mechanical motion (changes in positions of objects in space); physical motion (movements of molecules, electrons, fundamental particles, thermal processes, electricity…); chemical motion (changes of organic and inorganic substances in combination and separation processes…); biological motion (changes of living objects, or genetic structure…); social motion (changes in economy, politics, culture, and social life).

These basic forms of motion are arranged into levels of advancement based on the level of complexity of matter that is affected.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-8.png

The basic forms of motion each affect different forms of matter, but these forms of motion do not exist independently from each other; they actually have strong relationships with each other, in which the more advanced forms of motion develop from lower forms of motion; the more advanced forms of motion also internally include lower forms of motion. [I.e., biological motion contains chemical motion; chemical motion contains physical motion; etc.]

Every object exists with many forms of motion, but any given object is defined by its most advanced form of motion. [I.e., living creatures are defined in terms of biological motion, societies are defined in terms of social motion, etc.]

By classifying the basic forms of motion, Engels laid out the foundation for classification and synthesization of science. The basic forms of motion differ from one another, but they are also unified with each other into one continuous system of motion. Understanding this dialectical relationship between different forms of motion helped to overcome misunderstandings and confusion about motion.


Annotation 63

In Dialectics of Nature, Engels clears up a great deal of confusion and addresses many misconceptions about matter, motion, forces, energy, etc. which existed in both science and philosophy at the time by defining and explaining the dialectical nature of matter and motion.

When Dialectical Materialism affirmed that motion was the mode of existence — the natural attribute of matter — it also confirmed that motion is absolute and eternal. This does not mean that Dialectical Materialism denies that things can become frozen; however, according to the dialectical materialist viewpoint, freezing is a special form of motion, it is motion in equilibrium and freezing is relative and temporary.

Motion in equilibrium is motion that has not changed the positions, forms, and/or structures of things.

Freezing is a relative phenomenon because freezing only occurs in some forms of motion and in some specific relations, it does not occur in all forms of motion and all kinds of relations. Freezing is a temporary phenomenon because freezing only exists for a limited period of time, it cannot last forever.


Annotation 64

Equilibrium can exist at any advancement of motion. Lenin discussed equilibrium as it pertains to the social form of motion in discussing an equilibrium of forces existing in Russia in 1905 in this article, An Equilibrium of Forces:

1) The result to date (Monday, October 30) is an equilibrium of forces, as we already pointed out in Proletary, No. 23.

2) Tsarism is no longer strong enough, the revolution not yet strong enough, to win.

3) Hence the tremendous amount of vacillation. The terrific and enormous increase of revolutionary happenings (strikes, meetings, barricades, committees of public safety, complete paralysis of the government, etc.), on the other hand, the absence of resolute repressive measures. The troops are wavering.

4) The Tsar’s Court is wavering (The Times and the Daily Telegraph) between dictatorship and a constitution.

The Court is wavering and biding its time. Strictly speaking, these are its correct tactics: the equilibrium of forces compels it to bide its time, for power is in its hands.

The revolution has reached a stage at which it is disadvantageous for the counter-revolution to attack, to assume the offensive.

For us, for the proletariat, for consistent revolutionary democrats, this is not enough. If we do not rise to a higher level, if we do not manage to launch an independent offensive, if we do not smash the forces of Tsarism, do not destroy its actual power, then the revolution will stop half way, then the bourgeoisie will fool the workers.

5) Rumour has it that a constitution has been decided upon. If that is so, then it follows that the Tsar is heeding the lessons of 1848 and other revolutions: he wants to grant a constitution without a constituent assembly, before a constituent assembly, apart from a constituent assembly. What kind of constitution? At best (for ’the Tsar) a Constitutional-Democratic constitution.

This implies: achievement of the Constitutional-Democrats’ ideal, skipping the revolution; deceiving the people, for all the same there will be no complete and actual freedom of elections.

Should not the revolution skip this granted constitution?


- Space and Time are Forms of Existence of Matter

Every form of matter exists in a specific position, with specific space particularity (height, width, length, etc.), in specific relation (in front or behind, above or under, to the left or right, etc.) with other forms of matter. These positional relations exist in what we call space. [Space is defined by positional relations of matter.]

On the other hand, the existence of matter is also expressed in the speed of change and the order in which changes occur. These changes occur in what we call time. As Engels wrote: “For the basic forms of all existence are space and time, and a being outside of time is as absurd as an existence outside space.” Matter, space, and time are not separable; there is no matter that exists outside of space and time; there is also no space and time that exist outside of matter’s motion.


Annotation 65

Space and time, as the forms of matter, i.e.: the ways in which we perceive the existence of matter. We are only able to perceive and understand material objects as they exist within space and time.

Space and time, as forms of existence of matter, exist objectively [see Annotation 108,

p. 112], and are defined by matter. [Space is defined by the positional relations between material objects; time is defined by the speed of change of material objects and the order in which these changes occur.] Space has three dimensions: height, width, length; time has one direction: from the past to the future.

c. The Material Unity of the World

Dialectical Materialism affirms that the nature of the world is matter, and the world is unified in its material properties. [In other words: the entire universe, in all its diversity, is made of matter, and the properties of matter are the same throughout the known universe.]

The material nature of the world is proven on the following basis:

First, there is only one world: the material world; the material world is the first existence [i.e., it existed before consciousness], it exists objectively, and independently, of human consciousness.

Second, the material world exists eternally, endlessly, infinitely; it has no known beginning point and there is no evidence that it will ever disappear.

Third, all known objects and phenomena of the material world have objective relations with each other and all objects and phenomena exist in unity with each other. All of them are specific forms and structures of matter, or have material origin which was born from matter, and all are governed by the objective rules of the material world. In the material world, there is nothing that exists outside of the changing and transforming processes of matter; all of these processes exist as causes and effects of each other.


Annotation 66

The most important thing to understand here is that every object and phenomenon in the universe arises as matter, all material objects and phenomena are dynamically linked to one another in an infinite chain of causes and effects and changes and transformations, all governed by the material laws of our reality. This understanding is the material foundation of dialectical materialism.

2. Consciousness

a. The Source of Consciousness

According to the materialist viewpoint, consciousness has natural and social sources.


Annotation 67

Consciousness arises from nature, and from social activities and relations.

Natural refers to the material world. Without the material world of matter, material processes, and the evolution of material systems — up to and including the human brain — consciousness would never have formed.

Social activities and relations also contributed to the development of consciousness. The social processes of labor and language were also prerequisites for the development of conscious activity in human beings.

- Natural Source of Consciousness

There are many factors that form the natural sources for consciousness, but the two most basic factors are human brains and the relationship between humans and the objective world which makes possible creative and dynamic reflection.

About human brains: consciousness is an attribute of a highly organized form of matter, which is the brain. Consciousness is the function and the result of the neurophysiological activities of human brains. As human brains evolved and developed over time, their neurophysiological activities became richer, and, as these activities progressed, consciousness developed further and further over time. This explains why the human evolution process is also a process of developing the capacity for perception and thinking. Whenever human neurophysiological activities don’t function normally because of damaged brains, our mental life is also disturbed.

About the relationship between humans and the objective world which made possible creative and dynamic reflection: The relationship between humans and the objective world has been essential for as long as humans have existed. In this relationship, the objective world is reflected through human senses which interact with human brains and then form our consciousness.

Consciousness exists as a dynamic set of relationships between the external material world, human sense perception, and the functions of the human brain.

Reflection is the re-creation of the features of one form of matter in a different form of matter which occurs when they mutually impact each other through interaction. Reflection is a characteristic of all forms of matter.

There are many forms and levels of reflection such as [from more simple to more complex]: physical and chemical reflection, biological reflection, mental reflection, creative and dynamic reflection, etc.


Annotation 68

Change is driven by mutual impacts between or within things, phenomena, and/or ideas. Any time two such subjects impact one another, traces of some form or another are left on both interacting subjects. This characteristic of change is called reflection.

The concept of reflection, first proposed by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, has been advanced through the work of various Soviet psychologists, philosophers, and scientists (including Ivan Pavlov, Todor Pavlov, Aleksei Leontiev, Lev Vygotsky, Valentin Voloshinov, and others), and is used as a basis for scientific inquiry up to this day by mainstream researchers in Cuba, Vietnam, China, and Laos. The information provided below is somewhat simplified and generalized to give the reader a basic familiarity with the theory of reflection and the development of reflection in nature.

Dialectical materialist scientists have developed a theory of the development of evolution of forms of reflection, positing that forms of reflection have become increasingly complex as organic processes and life have evolved and grown more complex over time.

The chart below gives an idea of how different forms of reaction have evolved over time:

This chart outlines the basic development tendency of Forms of Reflection in matter which lead from inorganic matter, to life, to human consciousness and society.

Obviously, not all subjects develop completely along the path outlined above. Thus far, to our knowledge, only human beings have developed entirely to the level of consciousness and society. It is also unknown whether, or how, human society may develop into some future, as-yet-unknown, form.


Physical and chemical reflection is the simplest form of reflection, dealing with the ways in which inorganic matter is reflected in human consciousness. Physical and chemical reflection is the reflection of mechanical, physical, and chemical changes and reactions of inorganic matter (i.e., changes in structures, positions, physical-chemical properties, and the processes of combining and dissolving substances). Physical and chemical reactions are passive: when two objects interact with each other physically or chemically, they do not do so consciously.


Annotation 69

Reflection occurs any time two material objects interact and the features of the object are transferred to each other. Below are some very simplified illustrations to relate the basic idea of the physical reflection of material objects.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-11.png

Reflection as Change in Position:

1. Round Object moves towards Square Object.

2. Round Object impacts Square Object.

3. Square Object changes position; Round Object “bounces” and reverses direction.

4.Thus, Square Object’s change in position reflects the motion of Round Object (and vice-versa). Traces of both contradicting objects are reflected in the respective motion and position of each object.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-12.png

Reflection as Change in Structure:

1. Round Object moves toward Square Object.

2. Round Object impacts Square Object.

3. Structural changes (traces) occur in both Round and Square Object as a result of impact.

4. These changes constitute structural, physical reflection.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-13.png

Chemical Reflection:

1. Atom C is attached to Atom B.

2. Atom C detaches from Atom B and transfers to attach to Atom A.

3. This is a process of chemical reflection, in which both molecules mutually reflect one another after A CB a process of chemical reaction (one molecule loses Atom C while the other gains Atom C).

As dialectical materialists, we must strive to develop our understanding of the reflections of physical and chemical changes and reactions so that our conceptions reflect the material world as accurately as possible. For example: we must not ascribe consciousness to physical processes. Example: a gambler who comes to believe that a pair of dice is “spiteful” or “cursed” is attributing conscious motivation to unconscious physical processes, which is an inaccurate ideological reflection of reality.


Biological reflection is a higher, more complex form of reflection [compared to physical reflection]. It deals with reflection of organic material in the natural world. As our observations of biological processes have become more sophisticated and complex [through developments in natural science, the development of better tools for observation such as microscopes and other technologies, and so on], our conscious reflections of the natural world have also become more complex.

Biological reflection is expressed through excitation, induction, and reflexes.

Excitation is the reaction of simple plant and animal life-forms which occurs when they change position or structure as a direct result of physical changes to their habitat [i.e., a plant which moves toward the sun throughout the day].

Induction is the reaction of animals with simple nerve systems which can sense or feel their environments. Induction occurs through unconditioned reflex mechanisms.


Annotation 70

Unconditioned reflexes are characterized by permanent connections between sensory perceptions and reactions. Such reactions are not learned, but simply occur automatically based on physiological mechanisms occurring within the organism. An example of an unconditioned reflex response would be muscles in the leg twitching at the response of a tap on the knee. Such responses are purely physiological and are never learned (“conditioned” into us) — these reactions are simply induced physiologically.

Mental reflections are reactions which occur in animals with central nervous systems. Mental reflections occur through conditioned reflex mechanisms.


Annotation 71

Conditioned reflexes are reactions which are learned by organisms. These responses are acquired as animals learn to associate previously unrelated neural stimuli to elicit a particular reaction. The Russian psychologist Ivan Pavlov famously developed our understanding of conditioned responses by ringing a dinner bell shortly before giving dogs food. After a few repetitions, dogs would begin to salivate upon hearing the dinner bell being rung, even before any food was offered. Any dog which did not receive this conditioning would not salivate upon hearing a dinner bell. This is what makes it a learned, conditioned response — a type of mental reflection.

Dynamic and creative reflection is the most advanced form of reflection. It only occurs in matter that has the highest structural level, such as the human brain. Dynamic and creative reflection is done through the human brain’s nervous physiological activities whenever the objective world impacts human senses. This is a kind of reflection that actively selects and processes information to create new information and to understand the meaning of that information. This dynamic and creative reflection is called consciousness.


Annotation 72

Remember Lenin’s definition of matter from Materialism and Empirio-Criticism: “Matter is a philosophical category denoting objective reality which is given to man in his sensations, and which is copied, photographed, and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them.”

An intrinsic property of matter is that it can be sensed by human beings, and through this sensation, reflected in human consciousness. Thus, all forms of matter share the characteristic of being able to be reflected in the human mind.

Criticizing Karl Pearson, who said that it was not logical to maintain that all matter had the property of being conscious, Lenin wrote in brackets: “But it is logical to suppose that all matter possesses a property which is essentially kindred to sensation: the property to reflect.” Understanding the concept of dynamic and creative reflection is critical to understanding the role of consciousness and the ideal in Dialectical Materialism. In particular, reflection differentiates Dialectical Materialism from the idealist form of dialectics used by Hegel [see Annotation 9, p. 10]. As Marx famously wrote in Capital Volume I:

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of ‘the Idea,’ he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos [craftsman/artisan/creator] of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea.’ With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.

In other words, Hegelian idealism saw human consciousness as defining the material world. Dialectical Materialism inverts this relationship to recognize that what we conceive in our minds is only a reflection of the material world. As Marx explains in The German Ideology, all conscious thought stems from life processes through reflection:

Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.

Marx and Engels argued that consciousness arose from the life-processes of human beings. Life-processes are processes of motion and change which occur within organisms to sustain life, and these processes have a dialectical relationship with consciousness: the processes of life, therefore, reflect consciousness, just as consciousness reflects human life-processes. Conscious activities (such as being able to hunt, gather, and cook food, build shelter, and so on) improve the life-processes of human beings (by improving our health, extending our life-spans, etc.); and as our life-processes improved, our consciousness was able to develop more fully. As a concrete example of the dialectic between life processes and consciousness, it is now widely believed by scientists that the advent of cooking and preparing food (conscious activity) improved the functioning of the human brain[36] (a life process) which, in turn, developed human consciousness, and so on. Life-processes thus determine how consciousness reflects reality, while consciousness impacts back on life-processes, reflecting the dialectical relationship between matter and consciousness [see p. 88] and between practical activities and consciousness [see Annotation 230, p. 226].

Because consciousness arose from life-processes of human beings in the material world, we know that the material world is reflected in our consciousness. However, these reflections do not determine the material world, and do not mirror the material world exactly [see Annotation 77, p. 79]. It is also important to understand that, since life-processes in the material world predate and determine consciousness, consciousness can never be a first basis of seeking truth about our world. As Marx further explains in The German Ideology:

Since the Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, as the real chains of men (just as the Old Hegelians declared them the true bonds of human society) it is evident that the Young Hegelians have to fight only against these illusions of consciousness. Since, according to their fantasy, the relationships of men, all their doings, their chains and their limitations are products of their consciousness, the Young Hegelians logically put to men the moral postulate of exchanging their present consciousness for human, critical or egoistic consciousness, and thus of removing their limitations. This demand to change consciousness amounts to a demand to interpret reality in another way, i.e. to recognise it by means of another interpretation.

In other words, Hegelian idealism makes the critical mistake of believing that the ideal — consciousness — is the first basis of reality, and that anything and everything can be achieved through mere conscious activity. Marx, on the other hand, argues that “life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life,” and that we must understand the ways in which reality is reflected in consciousness before we can hope to affect change in the material conditions of human beings:

In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here [in the materialist perspective] we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. In the first method of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; in the second method, which conforms to real life, it is the real living individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness.

So, the work of the Dialectical Materialist is not to try to develop Utopian conceptions of reality first, to then proceed to try and force such purely ideal conceptions onto reality (see Annotation 17, p. 18).

Rather, we must understand the material basis of reality, as well as the material processes of change and motion which govern reality, and only then can we search for ways in which human beings can influence material reality through conscious activity. As Marx explains, the revolutionary must not be fooled into believing we can simply conceive of an ideal world and then replicate it into reality through interpretation and conscious thought alone. Instead, we must start with a firm understanding of material conditions and, from that material basis, determine how to build our revolutionary movement through conscious impact of material relations and processes of development in the material world.

As Marx wrote in The German Ideology: “Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence.” This distinction may seem subtle at first, but it has massive implications for how Marx suggests we go about participating in revolutionary activity. For Marx, purely-idealist debates and criticisms are an unproductive waste of time:

The Young-Hegelian ideologists, in spite of their allegedly ‘world-shattering’ statements, are the staunchest conservatives. The most recent of them have found the correct expression for their activity when they declare they are only fighting against ‘phrases.’ They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world. The only results which this philosophic criticism could achieve were a few (and at that thoroughly one-sided) elucidations of Christianity from the point of view of religious history; all the rest of their assertions are only further embellishments of their claim to have furnished, in these unimportant elucidations, discoveries of universal importance.

Marx also discusses the uselessness of idealist conjecture:

Moreover, it is quite immaterial what consciousness starts to do on its own: out of all such muck we get only the one inference that these three moments, the forces of production, the state of society, and consciousness, can and must come into contradiction with one another, because the division of labour implies the possibility, nay the fact that intellectual and material activity — enjoyment and labour, production and consumption — devolve on different individuals, and that the only possibility of their not coming into contradiction lies in the negation in its turn of the division of labour. It is self-evident, moreover, that ‘spectres,’ ‘bonds,’ ‘the higher being,’ ‘concept,’ ‘scruple,’ [terms for idealist conceptions] are merely the idealistic, spiritual expression, the conception apparently of the isolated individual, the image of very empirical fetters and limitations, within which the mode of production of life and the form of intercourse coupled with it move.

What Marx means by this is that we should focus on the material processes and conditions of society if we intend to change society, because idealist speculation, conjecture, critique, and thought alone, at the individual level, will never be capable of affecting revolutionary change in our material world.

Instead, we must focus on the material basis of reality, the material conditions of society, and seek revolutionary measures which are built upon materialist foundations. Only by understanding material processes of development, as well as the dialectical relationship between consciousness and matter, can we reliably and effectively begin to impact reality through conscious activity. This begins with the recognition that conscious thought itself is a reflection of material reality which developed and results from life-processes of material motion and processes of change within the human brain.

This concept of reflection, pioneered by Marx and Engels, was significantly developed by V. I. Lenin in his response to Machian positivists who posited that what we perceive is not truly reality [see Annotation 32, p. 27]. In his Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin wrote: “Life gives rise to the brain. Nature is reflected in the human brain.”

In Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Lenin further defined the relationship between matter and consciousness through reflection.

LENIN’S PROOF OF THE THEORY OF REFLECTION

In Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Lenin offered the following arguments to back up the theory of reflection.

1) Things exist independently of our consciousness, independently of our perceptions, outside of us, for it is beyond doubt that alizarin [a chemical substance which was newly discovered at time of writing] existed in coal tar yesterday and it is equally beyond doubt that yesterday we knew nothing of the existence of this alizarin and received no sensations from it.

Lenin is saying that the material world must exist outside of and independent from our consciousness. He cites as evidence the discovery of a chemical substance which until recently we had no sensory perception of, noting that this substance must have existed long before we became aware of it through sensory observation.

2) There is definitely no difference in principle between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there can be no such difference. The only difference is between what is known and what is not yet known. And philosophical inventions of specific boundaries between the one and the other, inventions to the effect that the thing-in-itself is “beyond” phenomena (Kant) or that we can or must fence ourselves off by some philosophical partition from the problem of a world which in one part or another is still unknown but which exists outside us (Hume) — all this is the sheerest nonsense, [unfounded belief], trick, invention.

Lenin is referencing a centuries-old debate about whether or not human beings are capable of having real knowledge of a “thing-in-itself,” or if we can only perceive phenomena of things (characteristics observable to our senses). The “thing-in-itself” refers to the actual material object which exists outside of our consciousness. So the question being posed is: can we REALLY have knowledge of material objects outside of our consciousness, or does consciousness itself act as a barrier to ever REALLY knowing anything about material objects and the material world outside of our consciousness?

Immanuel Kant argued that we can never know the true nature of the material world, writing: “we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing-in-itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.” This idea that the senses could not be trusted to deliver accurate knowledge — and thus, the “thing-in-itself” is essentially unknowable — was carried forward by later empiricists such as Bacon and Hume [see Annotation 10, p. 10]. In Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Marx and Engels refute this notion, arguing that practice allows us to discover truth about “things-in-themselves:”

The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical crotchets is practice — namely, experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and making it serve our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end to the Kantian ungraspable “thing-in-itself”.

Lenin expanded on this argument, explaining that the phenomena of objects which we observe with our senses do accurately reflect material objects, even though we might not know everything about these objects at once. Over time, as we learn more and more about material objects and the material world through practice and repeated observation, we more fully and accurately come to understand “things-in-themselves, as he writes in Empirio-Criticism and Materialism:

3) In the theory of knowledge, as in every other branch of science, we must think dialectically, that is, we must not regard our knowledge as readymade and unalterable, but must determine how knowledge emerges from ignorance, how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete and more exact.

Here, Lenin further elaborates on the dialectical nature of knowledge: we must simultaneously accept that our knowledge is never perfect and unchanging, but we must also recognize that we are capable of making our knowledge more exact and complete over time. To further defend his ideas about reflection, Lenin cited Czech philosopher Karl Kautsky’s argument against Kant:

That I see green, red and white is grounded in my faculty of sight. But that green is something different from red testifies to something that lies outside of me, to real differences between the things... The relations and differences between the things themselves revealed to me by the individual space and time concepts are real relations and differences of the external world, not conditioned by the nature of my perceptive faculty... If this were really so [i.e., if Kant’s doctrine of the ideality of time and space were true], we could know nothing about the world outside us, not even that it exists.

Lenin followed from Marx and Engels that, in order to further develop our understanding and knowledge of the material world, it was necessary to engage in practice [see Annotation 211, p. 205]. Engels wrote in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we [use] these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perceptions. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is positive proof that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves.

Notice that Engels is careful to use the words so far: “its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves.” Engels does not argue that human understanding of the material world is infallible: mistakes are often made. But over time, as such mistakes are discovered and our understanding improves, our knowledge of the material world develops. This is only possible if the phenomena of objects which we observe — the reflections within our consciousness — do actually and accurately represent material reality. Lenin elaborated on this necessity to constantly update and improve dialectical materialist philosophy as new information and knowledge became available:

Engels, for instance, assimilated the, to him, new term, energy, and began to employ it in 1885 (Preface to the 2nd ed. of Anti-Dühring) and in 1888 (Ludwig Feuerbach), but to employ it equally with the concepts of ‘force’ and ‘motion,’ and along with them. Engels was able to enrich his materialism by adopting a new terminology.

Engels provided further elaborations on how practical experience and mastery of the material world refutes the notion that it is impossible to have real knowledge of the material world in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy:

The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical fancies is practice, viz., experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and using it for our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end of the Kantian incomprehensible or ungraspable... The chemical substances produced in the bodies of plants and animals remained just such thingsin-themselves until organic chemistry began to produce them one after another, whereupon the thing-in-itself became a thing for us, as for instance, alizarin [a dye which was originally plant-based], which we no longer trouble to grow in in the field, but produce much more cheaply and simply from coal tar.

So, dialectical materialism holds that there is a material world external from our consciousness; that conscious thoughts are reflections of this material world; that we can have real knowledge of the material world through sensory observation; and that our knowledge and understanding of the material world is best advanced through practice in the material world.


- Social Sources of Consciousness

There are many factors that constitute the social sources of consciousness. The most basic and direct factors are labor and language.

Labor is the process by which humans interact with the natural world in order to make products for our needs of existing and developing. Labor is also the process that changes the human body’s structure [i.e., muscles developing through exercise].


Annotation 73

In Dialectics of Nature, Engels describes the dialectical relationship between labor and human development:

Labour is the source of all wealth, the political economists assert. And it really is the source — next to nature, which supplies it with the material that it converts into wealth. But it is even infinitely more than this. It is the prime basic condition for all human existence, and this to such an extent that, in a sense, we have to say that labour created man himself.

Before the first flint could be fashioned into a knife by human hands, a period of time probably elapsed in comparison with which the historical period known to us appears insignificant. But the decisive step had been taken, the hand had become free and could henceforth attain ever greater dexterity; the greater flexibility thus acquired was inherited and increased from generation to generation.

Thus the hand is not only the organ of labour, it is also the product of labour. Only by labour, by adaptation to ever new operations, through the inheritance of muscles, ligaments, and, over longer periods of time, bones that had undergone special development and the ever-renewed employment of this inherited finesse in new, more and more complicated operations, have given the human hand the high degree of perfection required to conjure into being the pictures of a Raphael, the statues of a Thorwaldsen, the music of a Paganini.

But the hand did not exist alone, it was only one member of an integral, highly complex organism. And what benefited the hand, benefited also the whole body it served.


Labor also allows us to discover the attributes, structures, motion laws, etc., of the natural world, via observable phenomena.



Annotation 74

We discover truth about the natural world through labor — through physical practice in the material world. See the discussion of practice in Annotation 211, p. 205.

All of these phenomena, through our human senses, impact our human brains. And through brain activity, knowledge and consciousness of the objective world are formed and developed.

Language is a system of material signals that carries information with cognitive content. Without language, consciousness could not exist and develop.

The birth of language goes hand in hand with labor. From the beginning, labor was social. The relationships between people who perform labor processes require them to have means to communicate and exchange thoughts. This requirement caused language to arise and develop along with the working processes. With language, humans not only communicate, but also summarise reality and convey experience and thoughts from generation to generation.


Annotation 75

From Dialectics of Nature:

It has already been noted that our simian ancestors were gregarious; it is obviously impossible to seek the derivation of man, the most social of all animals, from non-gregarious immediate ancestors. Mastery over nature began with the development of the hand, with labour, and widened man’s horizon at every new advance. He was continually discovering new, hitherto unknown properties in natural objects. On the other hand, the development of labour necessarily helped to bring the members of society closer together by increasing cases of mutual support and joint activity, and by making clear the advantage of this joint activity to each individual. In short, men in the making arrived at the point where they had something to say to each other. Necessity created the organ; the undeveloped larynx of the ape was slowly but surely transformed by modulation to produce constantly more developed modulation, and the organs of the mouth gradually learned to pronounce one articulate sound after another.

Comparison with animals proves that this explanation of the origin of language from and in the process of labour is the only correct one. The little that even the most highly-developed animals need to communicate to each other does not require articulate speech. In its natural state, no animal feels handicapped by its inability to speak or to understand human speech. It is quite different when it has been tamed by man. The dog and the horse, by association with man, have developed such a good ear for articulate speech that they easily learn to understand any language within their range of concept. Moreover they have acquired the capacity for feelings such as affection for man, gratitude, etc., which were previously foreign to them. Anyone who has had much to do with such animals will hardly be able to escape the conviction that in many cases they now feel their inability to speak as a defect, although, unfortunately, it is one that can no longer be remedied because their vocal organs are too specialised in a definite direction. However, where vocal organs exist, within certain limits even this inability disappears. The buccal organs of birds are as different from those of man as they can be, yet birds are the only animals that can learn to speak; and it is the bird with the most hideous voice, the parrot, that speaks best of all. Let no one object that the parrot does not understand what it says. It is true that for the sheer pleasure of talking and associating with human beings, the parrot will chatter for hours at a stretch, continually repeating its whole vocabulary. But within the limits of its range of concepts it can also learn to understand what it is saying. Teach a parrot swear words in such a way that it gets an idea of their meaning (one of the great amusements of sailors returning from the tropics); tease it and you will soon discover that it knows how to use its swear words just as correctly as a Berlin costermonger. The same is true of begging for titbits.

First labour, after it and then with it speech — these were the two most essential stimuli under the influence of which the brain of the ape gradually changed into that of man, which, for all its similarity is far larger and more perfect. Hand in inevitably accompanied by a corresponding refinement of the organ of hearing, so the development of the brain as a whole is accompanied by a refinement of hand with the development of the brain went the development of its most immediate instruments — the senses. Just as the gradual development of speech is all the senses. The eagle sees much farther than man, but the human eye discerns considerably more in things than does the eye of the eagle. The dog has a far keener sense of smell than man, but it does not distinguish a hundredth part of the odours that for man are definite signs denoting different things. And the sense of touch, which the ape hardly possesses in its crudest initial form, has been developed only side by side with the development of the human hand itself, through the medium of labour.

So, the most basic, direct and important source that decides the birth and development of language is labor. Language appeared later than labor but always goes with labor. Language and labor were the two main stimulations affecting the brains of the primates which evolved into humans, slowly changing their brains into human brains and transforming animal psychology into human consciousness.

This diagram is based on work from an article titled “Evidence in Hand: Recent Discoveries and the Early Evolution of Human Manual Manipulation[37].”Modern research has discovered strong evidence[38] that the human hand evolved along with tool use, in line with Engels’ analysis in Dialectics of Nature.


Annotation 76

It is also worth noting that, just as human consciousness derived from labor and language and social activity, so too did society itself arise from language and labor, as Engels explained in Dialectics of Nature:

The reaction on labour and speech of the development of the brain and its attendant senses, of the increasing clarity of consciousness, power of abstraction and of conclusion, gave both labour and speech an ever-renewed impulse to further development. This development did not reach its conclusion when man finally became distinct from the ape, but on the whole made further powerful progress, its degree and direction varying among different peoples and at different times, and here and there even being interrupted by local or temporary regression. This further development has been strongly urged forward, on the one hand, and guided along more definite directions, on the other, by a new element which came into play with the appearance of fully-fledged man, namely, society.

In other words, these factors of human’s physical nature and human society have a dialectical relationship with one another. Elements of human nature — in particular labor and language — led to the development of human society, which in turned played a key role in the development of human language and labor.

Human language and human labor mutually develop one another through a dialectical process to develop human nature. Simultaneously, human nature and human society mutually develop one another through a dialectical process.

Elements of human nature — in particular labor and language — led to the development of human society, which in turned played a key role in the development of human language and labor.


b. Nature and Structure of Consciousness

- Nature of Consciousness

Consciousness is the dynamic and creative reflection of the objective world in human brains; it is the subjective image of the objective world. [See discussion of dynamic and creative reflection on p. 68]

The dynamic and creative nature of reflection is expressed in human psycho-physiological activities when we receive, select, process, and save data in our brains. Within the human brain, we are able to collect data from the external material world. Based on this information, our brain is capable of creating new information, and we are able to analyze, interpret, and understand all of this information collectively within our consciousness.

The dynamic and creative nature of reflection is also expressed in several human processes:

  • The creation of ideas, hypotheses, stories, etc.
  • The ability to summarize nature and to comprehend the objective laws of nature.
  • The ability to construct models of ideas and systems of knowledge to guide our activities.

Consciousness is the subjective image of the objective world. Consciousness is defined by the objective world in both Content and Form [see Annotation 150, p. 147]. However, consciousness does not perfectly reflect the objective world. It modifies information through the subjective lenses (thoughts, feelings, aspirations, experiences, knowledge, needs, etc.) of humans. According to Marx and Engels, ideas are simply “sublimates [transformations] of [the human brain’s]... material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises.”[39]


Annotation 77

In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels refer to ideas somewhat poetically as “the phantoms formed in the human brain,” and explains that ideas arise directly from material human life processes [see Annotation 72, p. 68]. Lenin makes it very clear in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism that consciousness is not a mirror image, or exact reproduction of reality, quoting Engels:

The great basic question of all philosophy,” Engels says, “especially of modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being,” of “spirit and nature.” Having divided the philosophers into “two great camps” on this basic question, Engels shows that there is “yet another side” to this basic philosophical question, viz., “in what relation do our thoughts about the world surrounding us stand to this world itself? Is our thinking capable of the cognition of the real world? Are we able in our ideas and notions of the real world to produce a correct reflection of reality?” “The overwhelming majority of philosophers give an affirmative answer to this question,” says Engels, “including under this head not only all materialists but also the most consistent idealists.



Of extra importance is Lenin’s footnote to the above passage, regarding what he purports to be Viktor Chernov’s mistranslation of Engels:

Fr. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, etc., 4th Germ. ed., S. 15. Russian translation, Geneva ed., 1905, p. 12–13. Mr. V. Chernov translates the word Spiegelbild literally (a mirror reflection) accusing Plekhanov of presenting the theory of Engels “in a very weakened form” by speaking in Russian simply of a “reflection” instead of a “mirror reflection”. This is mere cavilling. Spiegelbild [mirror reflection] in German is also used simply in the sense of Abbild [reflection, image].

Here, Lenin reaffirms and clarifies Engels’ idea that consciousness is not a perfect, exact duplicate of reality; not a “mirror image.” This, however, does not contradict the fact that we can obtain real knowledge of the real world in our consciousness, and that this knowledge improves over time through practice and observation. Indeed, Lenin’s passage on practice cited first in this annotation directly follows the above passage in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.

See: Natural Source of Consciousness, p. 64, and Annotation 32, 27.


Consciousness is a social phenomenon and has a social nature. Consciousness arose from real life activities. Consciousness is always ruled by natural law and by social law.


Annotation 78

Natural law includes the laws of physics, chemistry, and other natural phenomena which govern the material world. Consciousness itself can never violate natural law as it arises from the natural processes of the natural world.

Social law includes the objective and universal relationships between social phenomena and social processes. Human society was created through labor, and this labor was performed in very specific material relations between humans and the natural world.

Note: social law is a key concept of historical materialism, which is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.

In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx explains how social existence and social laws govern the consciousness of individuals:

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.



Consciousness is determined by the social communication needs of human beings as well as the material conditions of reality.


Annotation 79

The term material conditions refers to the external environment which humans inhabit. Material conditions include the natural environment, the means of production and the economic base[40] of human society, and other objective externalities and systems which affect human life and society. Note that material conditions don’t refer to physical matter alone, but also include objective social relations and phenomena. In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx argues that “neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, but that on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life.”

Consciousness is dynamic in nature, constantly learning and changing flexibly. Consciousness guides humans to transform the material world to suit our needs.


Annotation 80

Consciousness and material conditions have a dialectical relationship with one other, just as the base of society and the superstructure have a dialectical relationship with one other [see Annotation 29, p. 24]. Consciousness arises from material conditions, though conscious activity can affect material conditions.

As Marx explains in Capital Volume I:

At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realises a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordination is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process demands that, during the whole operation, the workman’s will be steadily in consonance with his purpose.

In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx explains how the development of material conditions eventually leads to conscious activity which will in turn lead to changes in society:

At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or — this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms — with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.

As Marx further explains, material conditions must first be met before such revolutionary social changes can be made through conscious activity:

No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.



- Structure of Consciousness

Consciousness has a very complicated structure, including many factors which have strong relationships with each other. The most basic factors are knowledge, sentiment and willpower.


Annotation 81

As with the concept of reflection (see Annotation 68, p. 65), the analysis of the structure of consciousness which follows is rooted in ideas first proposed by Marx, Engels and Lenin, and later developed through the work of various Soviet psychologists, philosophers, and scientists including Ivan Pavlov, Todor Pavlov, Aleksei Leontiev, Lev Vygotsky, Valentin Voloshinov, and others, and is used as a basis for scientific inquiry and development up to this day. According to Where is Marx in the Work and Thought of Vygotsky? by Lucien Sève (2018), much of this work, such as the groundbreaking work of Lev Vygotsky, has been heavily “de-Marxized,” stripped of all aspects of Marxism and, by extension, dialectical materialism, in translation to English.

Knowledge constitutes the understanding of human beings, and is the result of the cognitive process. Knowledge is the re-created image of perceived objects which takes the form of language. Knowledge is the mode of existence of consciousness and the condition for consciousness to develop.


Annotation 82

Marx and Engels discussed the relationship between language and consciousness extensively in The German Ideology, explaining that language — the form of knowledge which exists in human consciousness — evolved dialectically with and through social activity, and that consciousness also developed along with and through the material processes that gave rise to speech:

From the start the ‘spirit’ is afflicted with the curse of being ‘burdened’ with matter, which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of language. Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness that exists also for other men, and for that reason alone it really exists for me personally as well; language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men.”So, language, physical speech organs, and human society all developed in dialectic relations with one another. Since language is the form of knowledge in human consciousness, this means that knowledge arose directly from these dialectical processes:

Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all. Consciousness is at first, of course, merely consciousness concerning the immediate sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with other persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious.

The fact that knowledge has a language-form in human consciousness is also important to understand because it shows that consciousness arose dialectically as, and through, social activity, and indeed, language and social activity gave rise to consciousness as a replacement for animal instinct in our relations with nature.


Man’s consciousness of the necessity of associating with the individuals around him is the beginning of the consciousness that he is living in society at all. This beginning is as animal as social life itself at this stage. It is mere herd-consciousness, and at this point man is only distinguished from sheep by the fact that with him consciousness takes the place of instinct or that his instinct is a conscious one.

And, as language and social activity dialectically developed through one another, human society became complex enough to give rise to human societies and human economies:

This sheep-like or tribal consciousness receives its further development and extension through increased productivity, the increase of needs, and, what is fundamental to both of these, the increase of population. With these there develops the division of labour…



Knowledge can be separated into two broad categories: knowledge of nature, and knowledge of human society. Each of these categories of knowledge reflects its corresponding entity in the external world.


Annotation 83

Each category of knowledge reflects a corresponding entity in the external world.

It’s also important to note that human society and nature have a dialectical relationship with each other and mutually impact one another, and, by extension, knowledge of nature and knowledge of human society also dialectically influence one another. So these categories of knowledge are not isolated from one another but rather dynamically shape and influence each other continuously through time.


Based on levels of cognitive development, we can also classify knowledge into categories of: daily life knowledge and scientific knowledge, experience knowledge and theory knowledge, emotional knowledge and rational knowledge.


Annotation 84

The following information is from the Marxism-Leninism Textbook of Students Who Specialize in Marxism-Leninism, released by Vietnam’s Ministry of Education and Training:

Daily Life and Scientific Knowledge

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-17.png

Daily Life Knowledge is the knowledge we acquire in our daily lives to deal with our daily tasks. From our interactions with nature and human society, we cultivate life experience and our understanding of every aspect of our daily lives in relation to human society and nature.

Scientific Knowledge arises from Daily Life Knowledge: as our daily lives become more complex, we develop a need to understand the material world and human society more deeply and comprehensively. Scientific Knowledge is thus a developed system of knowledge of nature and human society. Scientific Knowledge can be tested and can be applied to human life and activity in useful ways.

Experience and Theory Knowledge:

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-18.png

Experience Knowledge is cultivated from direct observation of nature and human society. This kind of knowledge is extremely diverse, and we can apply this kind of knowledge to guide our daily activities.

Theory Knowledge arises from Experience Knowledge. Theory Knowledge is composed of abstract generalizations of Experience Knowledge. Theory Knowledge is more profound, accurate, and systematically organized than Experience Knowledge and gives us an understanding of the laws and dynamics of nature and human society.

Emotional and Rational Knowledge:

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-19.png

Less Developed More Developed

Emotional Knowledge is the earlier stage of cognitive processing. Emotional Knowledge comes directly to us from our human senses. We obtain emotional knowledge when we use our human senses to directly learn things about nature and human society. Emotional Knowledge is usually manifested as immediate cognitive responses such as pleasure, pain, and other such impulses.

Rational Knowledge arises from Emotional Knowledge. It is a higher stage of cognitive processing, involving abstract thought and generalization of emotional knowledge.

Rational Knowledge is usually manifested as definitions, conjectures, judgments, etc.

See also: Principle of Development, p. 119; Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism, p. 204.


Sentiment is the resonant manifestation of human emotions and feelings in our relationships. Sentiment is a special form of reality reflection [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. Whenever reality impacts human beings, we feel specific sensations and emotional reactions to those impacts. Over time, these specific sensations and emotions combine and dialectically develop into generalized human feelings, and we call these generalized feelings sentiment. Sentiment expresses and develops in every aspect of human life; it is a factor that improves and promotes cognitive and practical activities.


Annotation 85

As Marx explains in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844: “Man as an objective, sensuous being is therefore a suffering being — and because he feels that he suffers, a passionate being. Passion is the essential power of man energetically bent on its object.” Marx further elaborates that sentimental emotion is essential to human nature: “The domination of the objective essence within me, the sensuous eruption of my essential activity, is emotion which thereby becomes the activity of my nature.”

Depending on the subjects that are perceived, as well as our human emotions about them, sentiments can be manifested in many different forms such as: moral emotion, aesthetic emotion, religious emotion, etc.


Annotation 86

Moral Emotion is the basic manifestation of moral consciousness at an emotional level. For example: when we see people helping other people, we have positive emotional responses, yet when we see people harming other people, we have negative emotional responses. (Source: Nguyen Thi Khuyen of the National Institute of Administration of Vietnam)

Aesthetic Emotion refers to the the resonant feelings which arise from our interaction with beauty, sadness, comedy, etc., in life and in art. For example: when humans encounter beauty, we feel positive emotional responses. When humans encounter ugliness, we feel negative emotional responses. When we witness pain, we feel sympathetic feelings of pain and a desire to help. When we witness comedy, we feel humorous emotions ourselves. (Source: Textbook of General Aesthetic Studies from the Ministry of

Education and Training of Vietnam)

Religious Emotion is the human belief in supernatural or spiritual forces which can’t be tested or proved through material practice or observation. However, belief in these forces can give human beings emotional responses such as hope, love, etc. (Source: Pham Van Chuc, Doctor of Philosophy, Central Theoretical Council of the Communist Party of Vietnam)

These are just a few illustrative examples; there are many other ways in which human emotion and sentiment can manifest.

Willpower is the manifestation of one’s own strength used to overcome obstacles in the process of achieving goals. Willpower is a dynamic aspect of consciousness, a manifestation of human consciousness in the material world.


Annotation 87

An unnamed poem by Ho Chi Minh, written in 1950 for the Revolutionary Youth Pioneers, addresses the phenomenon of willpower:

Nothing in this world must be difficult

The only thing that we should fear is having a waivering heart

We can dig up mountains and fill the sea

Once we’ve willfully made a firm decision

Today, this poem serves as the lyrics for anthem of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union (formerly the Revolutionary Youth Pioneers).


Willpower arises from human self-awareness and awareness of the purposes of our actions. Through this awareness and through willpower, we are able to struggle against ourselves and externalities to successfully achieve our goals. We can consider willpower to be the power of conscious human activity; willpower controls and regulates human behaviors in order to allow humans to move towards our goals voluntarily; willpower also allows humans to exercise self-restraint and self-control, and to be assertive in our actions according to our views and beliefs.


Annotation 88

In Dialectics of Nature, Engels explains how willpower developed in human beings as we separated from animals through the development of consciousness: “The further removed men are from animals, however, the more their effect on nature assumes the character of premeditated, planned action directed towards definite preconceived ends.”

In Capital Volume I, Marx explains how willpower uniquely allows humans to consciously change our own material conditions to suit our needs according to pre-conceived plans:

Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material re-actions between himself and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature’s productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway. We are not now dealing with those primitive instinctive forms of labour that remind us of the mere animal. An immeasurable interval of time separates the state of things in which a man brings his labour-power to market for sale as a commodity, from that state in which human labour was still in its first instinctive stage. We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realises a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordination is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process demands that, during the whole operation, the workman’s will be steadily in consonance with his purpose. This means close attention. The less he is attracted by the nature of the work, and the mode in which it is carried on, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as something which gives play to his bodily and mental powers, the more close his attention is forced to be.



The true value of willpower is not only manifested in strength or weakness, but is also expressed in the content and meaning of the goals that we try to achieve through our willpower. Lenin believed that willpower is one of the factors that will create revolutionary careers for millions of people in the fierce class struggles to liberate ourselves and mankind.


Annotation 89

In “Left-Wing” Communism: an Infantile Disorder, Lenin explains how revolutions are born from the collective willpower of thousands of people:

History as a whole, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more multiform, more lively and ingenious than is imagined by even the best parties, the most class-conscious vanguards of the most advanced classes. This can readily be understood, because even the finest of vanguards express the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagination of tens of thousands, whereas at moments of great upsurge and the exertion of all human capacities, revolutions are made by the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagination of tens of millions, spurred on by a most acute struggle of classes. Two very important practical conclusions follow from this: first, that in order to accomplish its task the revolutionary class must be able to master all forms or aspects of social activity without exception (completing after the capture of political power — sometimes at great risk and with very great danger — what it did not complete before the capture of power); second, that the revolutionary class must be prepared for the most rapid and brusque replacement of one form by another.



All of these factors [knowledge, sentiment, and willpower] which, together, create consciousness, have dialectical relationships with each other. Of these factors, knowledge is the most important, because it is the mode of existence of consciousness, and also the factor which guides the development of all the other factors, and it also determines how the other factors manifest.

3. The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness

The relationship between matter and consciousness is dialectical. In this relationship, matter comes first, and matter is the source of consciousness; it decides consciousness. However, consciousness is not totally passive, it can impact back to matter through the practical activities of human beings.


Annotation 90

Engels explained in Dialectics of Nature that “matter evolves out of itself the thinking human brain,” which means that matter must necessarily come prior to consciousness.

As Marx explains in Capital Volume I, matter determines conscious activity:

The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. – real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.

However, it’s important to remember that the relationship between matter and consciousness is dialectical, and that conscious activity — through the combination of willpower and labor — can also impact the material world; social change arises through the combined willpower of many human beings. See: Annotation 80, p. 81.

a. The Role of Matter in Consciousness

Dialectical Materialism affirms that:

• Matter is the first existence, and that consciousness comes after.

• Matter is the source of consciousness, it decides consciousness.

We know that matter determines consciousness because consciousness is the product of the high-level-structured matter such as the human brain. Consciousness itself can only exist after the development of the material structure of the human brain. Humans are the result of millions of years of development of the material world. We are, therefore, products of the material world. This conclusion has been firmly established through the development of natural science, which has given us great insight into the long history of the Earth and of the evolution of living organisms, including human beings.

All of this scientific evidence stands as the basis for the viewpoint: matter comes first, consciousness comes after [see Annotation 114, p. 116].

We have already discussed the factors which constitute the natural and social sources of consciousness:

Human brains

Impacts of the material world on human brains that cause reflections

Labor

Language

[See Annotation 72, p. 68 and Annotation 73, p. 75]

All of these factors also assert that matter is the origin of consciousness.


Annotation 91

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-20.png

The material basis of consciousness is rooted in the following phenomena:

    1. The material structure of the human brain.

    1. Impacts from the material world cause reflections in human consciousness.

    1. Human Labor — physical process which dialectically develops consciousness.

    1. Human Speech — physical process which dialectically develops consciousness.

    1. Evolution of human brains and consciousness through material processes of the material world.

For more information, see: Nature and Structure of Consciousness.


Consciousness is composed of reflections and subjective images of the material world, therefore the content of consciousness is decided by matter [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. The development of consciousness is determined by natural laws and by social laws[41] as well as the material environment which we inhabit. All of these factors which determine consciousness are material in nature. Therefore, matter determines not only the content but also the development of consciousness.

b. The Role of Consciousness in Matter

In relation to matter, consciousness can impact matter through human activities.

When we discuss consciousness we are discussing human consciousness. So, when we talk about the role of consciousness, we are talking about the role of human beings. Consciousness in and of itself cannot directly change anything in reality. In order to change reality, humans have to implement material activities. However, consciousness controls every human activity, so even though consciousness does not directly create or change the material world, it equips humans with knowledge about objective reality, and based on that foundation of knowledge, humans are able to identify goals, set directions, develop plans, and select methods, solutions, tools, and means to achieve our goals. So, consciousness manifests its ability to impact matter through human activities.

The impact of consciousness on matter can have positive or negative results.


Annotation 92

“Positive” and “negative,” in this context, are subjective and relative terms which simply denote “moving towards a goal” and “moving away from a goal,” based on a specific perspective.

From the perspective of revolutionary communism, “positive” can be taken as moving towards the end goal of the liberation of the working class from capitalist oppression and the construction of a stateless, classless society. Likewise, “negative” can be taken as moving away from that goal. See: Annotation 114, p. 116.

Humans have the ability to overcome all challenges in the process of achieving our goals and improving our world, so long as our conscious activities meet the following criteria:

  • We must perceive reality accurately.
  • We must properly apply scientific knowledge, revolutionary sentiments, and directed willpower.
  • We must avoid contradicting objective laws of nature and society.

Successfully achieving our goals and improving the world in this manner constitutes the positive outcome of human consciousness.

On the contrary, if human consciousness wrongly reflects objective reality, nature, and laws, then, right from the beginning, our actions will have negative results which will do harm to ourselves and our society.

Therefore, by directing the activities of humans, consciousness can determine whether the results of human activities are beneficial or harmful. Our consciousness thus determines whether our activities will succeed or fail and whether our efforts will be effective or ineffective.

By studying the matter, origin, and nature of consciousness, as well as the relationships between matter and consciousness, we can see that:

  • Matter is the source of consciousness [42].
  • Matter determines the content and creative capacity of consciousness [43].
  • Matter is the prerequisite to form consciousness [44].
  • Consciousness only has the ability to impact matter, and this impact is indirect, because it has to be done through human material activities within material reality [45].

Matter determines consciousness while consciousness impacts matter indirectly through human activity.

The strength with which consciousness can impact the material world depends on:

  • The accuracy of reflection of the material world in consciousness [46].
  • Strength of willpower which transmits consciousness to human activity [47].
  • The degree of organization of social activity [48].
  • Material conditions in which human activity occurs [49].

Annotation 93

The importance of organization in determining the outcomes of human social activity is one of the most important concepts of Marxism-Leninism and is discussed frequently by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and nearly every other important communist revolutionary in history. Marx explains the connections between social organization and conscious human activity in Capital Volume I [see Annotation 80, p. 81].

4. Meaning of the methodology

Dialectical Materialism builds the most basic and common methodological[50] principles for human cognitive and practical activities on the following bases:

  • The viewpoint of the material nature of the world [matter comes first, consciousness comes after].
  • The dynamic and creative nature of consciousness [51].
  • The dialectical relationship between matter and consciousness [52].

All cognitive and practical activities of humans originate from material reality and must observe objective natural and social laws, however, our activities are capable of impacting the material world through dynamic and creative conscious activity. [See The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88].


Annotation 94

The above paragraph summarizes an important methodological concept which is critical for undestanding the philosophical framework of Dialectical Materialism. Dialectical Materialism, as a philosophy, synthesizes earlier materialist and idealist positions by recognizing the fact that the material determines consciousness, while consciousness can impact the material world through willful activity.

From this philosophical basis, the methodology of Materialist Dialectics has been developed to provide a deeper understanding of dialectical development, which is rooted in contradiction and negation within and between subjects. Materialist Dialectics is the subject of Chapter 2, p. 98.


According to this methodological principle [i.e., the Principle of the Dialectic Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness], if we hope to succeed in accomplishing our goals in the material world, then we must simultaneously meet two criteria:

1. We must ensure that our knowledge reflects the objective material world as much as possible, respecting the objective natural and social laws of the material world.

2. We must simultaneously recognize the dynamic and creative nature of our conscious activity.

When we say that human activities originate from material reality and must observe objective natural and social laws we' mean that human knowledge must originate from the material world. This means that if we hope to be successful in our activities, we should respect the natural and social laws of the material world.

This means that in our human perception and activities, we must determine goals, and set strategies, policies, and plans which are rooted firmly in objective material reality. Humans have to take objective material reality as the foundation of our activities and plans, and all of our activities must be carried out in the material world. Humans have to examine and understand our material conditions and transform them in ways that will help us to accomplish our goals.

When we talk about impacting the material world through dynamic and creative conscious activity, we mean we must recognize the positive, dynamic, and creative roles of consciousness. We must recognize the role human consciousness plays in dynamically and creatively manifesting our will in the material world through labor. Impacting the material world through conscious activity at a revolutionary scale requires humans to respect and understand the role of scientific knowledge; to study laboriously to master such knowledge; and then to propagate such knowledge so to the masses to develop public knowledge and belief so as to guide the people’s action.

Moreover, we also have to voluntarily study and practice[53] in order to form and improve our revolutionary viewpoint[54] and willpower[55] in order to have both scientific and humanitarian activity guidelines.

To implement this principle [i.e., the Principle of the Dialectic Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness], we have to avoid, fight against, and overcome the diseases of subjectivism[56] and idealism[57] through such errors as:

  • Attempting to impose idealist plans and principles [which are not rooted in material conditions] into reality.
  • Considering fantasy, illusion, and imagination instead of reality.
  • Basing policies and programs on subjective desires.
  • Using sentiment as the starting point for developing policies, strategies, etc.

On the other hand, in cognitive and practical activities, we also have to fight against empiricism[58], which disregards scientific knowledge and theories, and which is also very conservative, stagnant and passive.


Annotation 95

Process of Developing Revolutionary Public Knowledge

Developing revolutionary public knowledge must be preceded by mastery of knowledge and a firm grounding in the role and nature of knowledge.

In Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Engels makes a scathing critique of idealist socialist revolutionary thought, writing:

To all these [idealist socialists], Socialism is the expression of absolute truth[59], reason and justice, and has only to be discovered to conquer all the world by virtue of its own power. And as an absolute truth is independent of time, space, and of the historical development of man, it is a mere accident when and where it is discovered. With all this, absolute truth, reason, and justice are different with the founder of each different school. And as each one’s special kind of absolute truth, reason, and justice is again conditioned by his subjective understanding, his conditions of existence, the measure of his knowledge and his intellectual training, there is no other ending possible in this conflict of absolute truths than that they shall be mutually exclusive of one another.



Here, Engels points out the absurdity of the idea that some abstract, purely ideal “truth” could liberate workers in the material world. Engels continues on, explaining how such idealist socialism could never lead to meaningful revolutionary change:

Hence, from this nothing could come but a kind of eclectic, average Socialism, which, as a matter of fact, has up to the present time dominated the minds of most of the socialist workers in France and England. Hence, a mish-mash allowing of the most manifold shades of opinion: a mish-mash of such critical statements, economic theories, pictures of future society by the founders of different sects, as excite a minimum of opposition; a mish-mash which is the more easily brewed the more definite sharp edges of the individual constituents are rubbed down in the stream of debate, like rounded pebbles in a brook.

In other words, idealist revolutionary movements only tend to result in endless debate and meaningless theories which are divorced from objective reality and material conditions. Such theories and idealist constructions do not lead to effective action in the real world. Socialism must become real (i.e., based in objective material conditions and praxis[60] in the real world) to affect change in the material world, as Engels explains elsewhere in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific [see Annotation 17, p. 18].

In Critique of the Gotha Program, Marx lays out an excellent case study of the failings of incoherent, idealist socialism. He begins by quoting the Gotha Program, which was an ideological program which the German Workers Party hoped to implement. In this text, Marx cites the Gotha Program line by line and offers his materialist critique of the idealist principles presented. In the following passage, Marx refutes some key errors caused by idealism and offers materialist correction:

Labor is not the source of all wealth. Nature is just as much the source of use values (and it is surely of such that material wealth consists!) as labor, which itself is only the manifestation of a force of nature, human labor power... But a socialist program cannot allow such bourgeois phrases to pass over in silence the conditions that lone give them meaning. And insofar as man from the beginning behaves toward nature, the primary source of all instruments and subjects of labor, as an owner, treats her as belonging to him, his labor becomes the source of use values, therefore also of wealth. The bourgeois have very good grounds for falsely ascribing supernatural creative power to labor; since precisely from the fact that labor depends on nature it follows that the man who possesses no other property than his labor power must, in all conditions of society and culture, be the slave of other men who have made themselves the owners of the material conditions of labor. He can only work with their permission, hence live only with their permission.

Here, Marx points out the importance of having a firm understanding of the material reality of labor and its relation to the material, natural world. Marx points out that the idea that labor, alone, is the source of all wealth is an idealist notion of the bourgeoisie, a false consciousness [see Annotation 235, p. 231] which prevents proper material analysis and props up the capitalist viewpoint. A failure to grasp the truth of the material basis of reality weakens the socialist position, and any movement built on such weak idealist foundations will lead to failure in trying to bring about revolutionary change.

We have already discussed the shortcomings of empiricism in Annotation 10, p. 10, but it might be helpful to see another case study, this time from Engels, pointing out the flaws of empiricist analysis in his text Anti-Dühring. Engels begins by quoting the empiricist Eugen Dühring, who wrote:

Philosophy is the development of the highest form of consciousness of the world and of life, and in a wider sense embraces the principles of all knowledge and volition. Wherever a series of cognitions or stimuli or a group of forms of being come to be examined by human consciousness, the principles underlying these manifestations of necessity become an object of philosophy. These principles are the simple, or until now assumed to be simple, constituents of manifold knowledge and volition. Like the chemical composition of bodies, the general constitution of things can be reduced to basic forms and basic elements. These ultimate constituents or principles, once they have been discovered, are valid not only for what is immediately known and accessible, but also for the world which is unknown and inaccessible to us. Philosophical principles consequently provide the final supplement required by the sciences in order to become a uniform system by which nature and human life can be explained. Apart from the fundamental forms of all existence, philosophy has only two specific subjects of investigation — nature and the world of man. Accordingly, our material arranges itself quite naturally into three groups, namely, the general scheme of the universe, the science of the principles of nature, and finally the science of mankind. This succession at the same time contains an inner logical sequence, for the formal principles which are valid for all being take precedence, and the realms of the objects to which they are to be applied then follow in the degree of their subordination.

Engels then proceeds to critique this empiricist worldview, showing that it does not properly reflect the material world and amounts to idealism in its own right:

What [Dühring] is dealing with are therefore principles, formal tenets derived from thought and not from the external world, which are to be applied to nature and the realm of man, and to which therefore nature and man have to conform. But whence does thought obtain these principles? From itself?

No, for Herr Dühring himself says: the realm of pure thought is limited to logical schemata and mathematical forms (the latter, moreover, as we shall see, is wrong). Logical schemata can only relate to forms of thought; but what we are dealing with here is solely forms of being, of the external world, and these forms can never be created and derived by thought out of itself, but only from the external world. But with this the whole relationship is inverted: the principles are not the starting-point of the investigation, but its final result; they are not applied to nature and human history, but abstracted from them, it is not nature and the realm of man which conform to these principles, but the principles are only valid in so far as they are in conformity with nature and history. That is the only materialist conception of the matter, and Herr Dühring’s contrary conception is idealistic, makes things stand completely on their heads, and fashions the real world out of ideas, out of schemata, schemes or categories existing somewhere before the world, from eternity — just like a Hegel.

Lenin also heavily criticized empiricism in his work Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, which we discuss at length in Annotation 32, p. 27.

Chapter 2: Materialist Dialectics

Materialist dialectics is one of the basic theoretical parts that form the worldview and philosophical methodology of Marxism-Leninism. It is the “science of common relations” and also the “science of common rules of motion and development of nature, society, and human thoughts... Dialectics, as understood by Marx, and also in conformity with Hegel, includes what is now called the theory of knowledge, or epistemology.”[61]

[Note: Epistemology is the theoretical study of knowledge; for more information see Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism, p. 204.]

I. Dialectics and Materialist Dialectics

1. Dialectics and Basic Forms of Dialectics

a. Definitions of Dialectics and the Subjective Dialectic

In Marxism-Leninism, the term dialectic refers to regular relationships, interactions, transformations, motions, and developments of things, phenomena, and processes in nature, society and human thought.[62]

There are two forms of dialectic: the objective dialectic and the subjective dialectic. The objective dialectic is the dialectic of the material world, while the subjective dialectic is the reflection of objective dialectic in human consciousness. [See Annotation 68, p. 65].

According to Engels, “Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevail throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics (dialectical thought), is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature.”[63]


Annotation 96

Dialectics is an umbrella term which includes both forms of dialectical systems: subjective and objective dialectics.

Objective dialectics are the dialectical processes which occur in the material world, including all motion, relationships, and dynamic changes which occur in space and time.

Subjective dialectics, or dialectical thought, is a system of analysis and organized thinking which aims to reflect the objective dialectics of the material world within human consciousness. Dialectical thinking has two component forms: dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics [see Annotation 49, p. 45].


Subjective dialectics is the theory that studies and summarises the [objective] dialectic of nature into a system with scientific principles and rules, in order to build a system of methodological principles of perception and practice. Dialectics is opposed to metaphysics — a system of thought which conceives of things and phenomena in the world in an isolated and unchanging state [See Annotation 8, p. 8].

b. Basic Forms of Dialectics

Dialectics has developed into three basic forms and levels: ancient primitive dialectics, German idealist dialectics, and the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism.

Ancient primitive dialectics is the earliest form of dialectics. It has developed independently in many philosophical systems in ancient China, India and Greece.

Chinese philosophy has two major forms of ancient primitive dialectics:

  • “Changing Theory” (a theory of common principles and rules pertaining to the changes in the universe)
  • The “Five Elements Theory” (a theory of the principles of mutual impact and transformation of the five elements of the universe) of the School of Yin-Yang. [See: Primitive Materialism, p. 52]

In Indian philosophy, Buddhist philosophy is a quintessential [see Annotation 6, p. 8] form of ancient primitive dialectics, which includes such concepts as “selflessness,” “impermanence,” and “predestination.”

An ancient, primitive form of dialectics also developed in Ancient Greek philosophy.

Friedrich Engels wrote: “The old Greek philosophers were all born natural dialecticians, and Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic of them, had already analyzed the most essential forms of dialectic thought… This primitive, naive, but intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus: everything is and is not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away.”[64]

Engels also wrote of Greek dialectics: “Here, dialectical thought still appears in its pristine simplicity, as yet undisturbed by the charming obstacles which the metaphysicists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries — Bacon and Locke in England, Wolff in Germany — put in its own way... Among the Greeks — just because they were not yet advanced enough to dissect and analyse nature — nature is still viewed as a whole, in general. The universal connection of natural phenomena is not proved in regard to particular; to the Greeks it is the result of direct contemplation.”[65]


Annotation 97

Engels, here, is explaining how the ancient Greek dialecticians were correct to view nature as a cohesive system, a “whole, in general,” which they determined through direct observation of the natural world. The major shortcoming of this ancient Greek form of dialectics was a lack of inquiry into the specific processes and principles of nature. Engels laments that seventeenth and eighteenth century metaphysicists took us backwards by disregarding this view of nature as a cohesive, general whole.

Ancient, primitive dialectics had an accurate awareness of the dialectical characteristic of the world but with its primitive and naive perspective, it still lacked evidence-based forms of natural scientific achievements.

Jumping forward to the late 16th century, natural sciences started developing rapidly in Europe. Scientists began deeply analysing and studying specific factors and phenomena of nature which led to the birth of modern European metaphysical analysis. In the 18th century, metaphysics became the dominant methodology in philosophical thought and scientific study. However, when natural scientists moved from studying each subject separately to studying the unification of all those subjects in their relationships, the metaphysical method proved insufficient. Thus, European scientists and philosophers had to transition into a more advanced system of thought: dialectical thought.

The classical German idealist dialectics were founded by Kant and completed by Hegel. According to Engels: “The second form of dialectics, which is the form that comes closest to the German naturalists [natural scientists], is classical German philosophy, from Kant to Hegel.”[66]


Annotation 98

Engels discusses this history, and the shortcomings of the metaphysical philosophy of his era, in The Old Preface to Anti-Dühring. First, Engels explains why early modern natural scientists initially did not feel constrained by their adherence to metaphysics, since inquiries in the initial revolution of scientific study were limited to the narrow development of specific fields of inquiry by necessity:

Empirical natural science has accumulated such a tremendous mass of positive material for knowledge that the necessity of classifying it in each separate field of investigation systematically and in accordance with its inner inter-connection has become absolutely imperative.

Engels goes on to explain that at the time he was writing, enough knowledge had been accumulated within specific, distinct fields that it becomes necessary to begin studying the connections and overlaps between different fields, which called for theoretical and philosophical foundations:

It is becoming equally imperative to bring the individual spheres of knowledge into the correct connection with one another. In doing so, however, natural science enters the field of theory and here the methods of empiricism will not work, here only theoretical thinking can be of assistance.

Unfortunately, natural scientists were held back by the existing metaphysical theoretical foundations which were dominant at the time as, according to Engels, “theoretical thinking is an innate quality only as regards natural capacity. This natural capacity must be developed, improved, and for its improvement there is as yet no other means than the study of previous philosophy.”

Metaphysical theory and formal logic were in common use by natural scientists at the time. As Engels explained in On Dialectics and Dialectics of Nature, metaphysics and formal logic could never be as useful as dialectical analysis for examining and unifying concepts from wide-ranging dynamic systems of overlapping fields of inquiry.

Unfortunately, dialectics had not yet been suitably developed for use in the natural sciences before the work of Marx and Engels in developing dialectical materialism, as Engels explained in On Dialectics:

Formal logic itself has been the arena of violent controversy from the time of Aristotle to the present day. And dialectics has so far been fairly closely investigated by only two thinkers, Aristotle and Hegel. But it is precisely dialectics that constitutes the most important form of thinking for present-day natural science, for it alone offers the analogue for, and thereby the method of explaining, the evolutionary processes occurring in nature, inter-connections in general, and transitions from one field of investigation to another.

The Idealist Dialectics of Hegel [see Annotation 9, p. 10] constituted a major development of dialectics, but the idealist nature of Hegelian dialectics made them unsuitable for natural scientists, who therefore discarded “Old-Hegelian” dialectics and were thus left without a suitable dialectical framework. Again, from On Dialectics:

The year 1848, which otherwise brought nothing to a conclusion in Germany, accomplished a complete revolution there only in the sphere of philosophy [and] the nation resolutely turned its back on classical German philosophy that had lost itself in the sands of Berlin old-Hegelianism... But a nation that wants to climb the pinnacles of science cannot possibly manage without theoretical thought. Not only Hegelianism but dialectics too was thrown overboard — and that just at the moment when the dialectical character of natural processes irresistibly forced itself upon the mind, when therefore only dialectics could be of assistance to natural science in negotiating the mountain of theory — and so there was a helpless relapse into the old metaphysics.

Engels goes on to explain that, having rejected Hegel’s dialectics, natural scientists were set adrift, cobbling together theoretical frameworks from the works of philosophers which were plagued by idealism and metaphysics, and which were therefore not suitable for the task of unifying the disparate fields of natural sciences together:

What prevailed among the public since then were, on the one hand, the vapid reflections of Schopenhauer, which were fashioned to fit the philistines, and later even those of Hartmann; and, on the other hand, the vulgar itinerant-preacher materialism of a Vogt and a Büchner. At the universities the most diverse varieties of eclecticism competed with one another and had only one thing in common, namely, that they were concocted from nothing but remnants of old philosophies and were all equally metaphysical. All that was saved from the remnants of classical philosophy was a certain neo-Kantianism, whose last word was the eternally unknowable thing-in-itself, that is, the bit of Kant [see Annotation 72, p. 68] that least merited preservation. The final result was the incoherence and confusion of theoretical thought now prevalent.

Engels explains that this lack of a proper dialectical materialist framework had frustrated natural scientists of his era:

One can scarcely pick up a theoretical book on natural science without getting the impression that natural scientists themselves feel how much they are dominated by this incoherence and confusion, and that the so-called philosophy now current offers them absolutely no way out. And here there really is no other way out, no possibility of achieving clarity, than by a return, in one form or another, from metaphysical to dialectical thinking.

After explaining that Hegel’s system of dialectics came closest to meeting the needs of contemporary science, Engels explains why Hegelian dialectics were ultimately rejected by the scientific community:

Just as little can it be a question of maintaining the dogmatic content of the Hegelian system as it was preached by the Berlin Hegelians of the older and younger line. Hence, with the fall of the idealist point of departure, the system built upon it, in particular Hegelian philosophy of nature, also falls. It must however be recalled that the natural scientists’ polemic against Hegel, in so far as they at all correctly understood him, was directed solely against these two points: viz., the idealist point of departure and the arbitrary, fact-defying construction of the system.”

In other words, it was the idealism and the unworkable structuring of Hegelian dialectics that prevented its adoption by natural scientists. Engels finally explains how Marx was able to modify Hegel’s idealist dialectics into a materialist form which is suitable for empirical scientific inquiry:

It is the merit of Marx that... he was the first to have brought to the fore again the forgotten dialectical method, its connection with Hegelian dialectics and its distinction from the latter, and at the same time to have applied this method in Capital to the facts of an empirical science, political economy.



These Classical German philosophers [Kant, Hegel, etc.[67]] systematically organized idealist dialectics into formal philosophies. Of particular note was Hegel’s belief that the dialectical process would eventually lead to an “absolute idea.” This foundational belief in an “absolute idea” is what chiefly defines Hegelian dialectics as idealist in nature [see Annotation 98, p. 100].

Hegel believed that the subjective dialectic is the basis of the objective dialectic. [In other words, Hegel believed that dialectical thought served as the objective dialectics of the material world.]

According to Hegel, the “absolute idea” was the starting point of all existence, and that this “absolute idea,” after creating the natural world, then came to exist within human consciousness.

Engels wrote that in Hegelian dialectics: “... spirit, mind, the idea, is primary and that the real world is only a copy of the idea.”[68]


Annotation 99

In the above quoted passage, Engels was explaining why Hegelian dialectics were unsuitable for use in natural sciences. Here is a longer excerpt:

First of all it must be established that here it is not at all a question of defending Hegel’s point of departure: that spirit, mind, the idea, is primary and that the real world is only a copy of the idea... We all agree that in every field of science, in natural as in historical science, one must proceed from the given facts, in natural science therefore from the various material forms and the various forms of motion of matter; that therefore in theoretical natural science, too, the inter-connections are not to be built into the facts, but to be discovered in them, and when discovered to be verified as far as possible by experiment.


The German idealists (most notably Hegel) built an idealist system of dialectics organized into categories and common laws along with a strict logic of consciousness.

Lenin stated that: “Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts.”[69]


Annotation 100

What Lenin means, here, is that Hegel inadvertently and unconsciously discovered the concept of reflection [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. Hegel intuitively understood that the material world was reflected in human consciousness, and, by extension, subjective dialectics (dialectical thought) reflected objective dialectics (of the material world). Hegel’s error was an inversion of the ideal and the material. As Marx later pointed out in the Afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital Volume I, it is the material which precedes the ideal, and not the other way around:

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of ‘the Idea,’ he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos [craftsman/artisan/creator] of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea.’ With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.


Engels also quoted and emphasized Marx’s thoughts [in the Old Preface to Anti-Dühring, citing another quote of Marx from the Afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital Volume I, further quoted in Annotation 100 above]: “The mystification which dialectics suffers in Hegel’s hands by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.”[70]



Annotation 101

In the Old Preface to Anti-Dühring, Engels explains some of the contemporary currents of science and philosophy of his era. Engels explains that Hegelian philosophy had been dismissed by a newer current of natural scientists who dismissed “the idealist point of departure and the arbitrary, fact-defying construction of the system.” In other words, the natural scientists rejected Hegelianism because it was both idealist and was not built on a foundation of objective facts.

Engels points out, however, that Marx “was the first to have brought to the fore again the forgotten dialectical method” of Hegel.

The dialectical method was forgotten in the sense that the natural scientists ignored and dismissed dialectics along with the rest of Hegel’s philosophy. So, Engels is pointing out that one of the great contributions of Marx was salvaging the dialectical method from Hegel while rejecting the idealist and non-fact-based characteristics of Hegelian philosophy.

Marx, according to Engels, proved that the dialectical method could be separated from idealism by “[applying the dialectical method] in Capital to the facts of an empirical science, political economy.” This was the origin of dialectical materialism: the resurrection of the dialectical method and the development of a dialectical method in a materialist and scientific form.

The idealist characteristics of classical German dialectics and Hegelian philosophy was a limitation that needed to be overcome [so that it could be utilized for scientific inquiry]. Marx and Engels overcame that limitation and in so doing developed materialist dialectics. This system of dialectics is the most advanced form of dialectics in the history of philosophy to date. It is the successor of previous systems of dialectics, and it arose as a critique of the classical German dialectics.

Engels said: “Marx and I were pretty well the only people to rescue conscious dialectics from German idealist philosophy and apply it in the materialist conception of nature and history.”[71]

2. Materialist Dialectics

a. Definition of Materialist Dialectics

Materialist dialectics have been defined in various ways by many prominent Marxist-Leninist philosophers.

Engels defined materialist dialectics as: “nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society, and thought.”[72]

Engels also emphasized the role of the principle of general relations.[73] As John Burdon

Sanderson Haldane noted in the 1939 preface to Dialectics of Nature: “In dialectics they

[Marx and Engels] saw the science of the general laws of change.”[74]

Lenin emphasized the important role of the principles of development[75] (including the theory of cognitive development) in the dialectics that Marx inherited from Hegelian philosophy.

Lenin wrote: “The main achievement was dialectics, i.e., the doctrine of development in its fullest, deepest, and most comprehensive form, the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge that provides us with a reflection of eternally developing matter.”[76]

b. Basic Features and Roles of Materialist Dialectics

There are two basic features of the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism:

First, the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism is a system of dialectics that is based on the foundation of the scientific materialist viewpoint.


Annotation 102

Remember that scientific in Marxism-Leninism refers broadly to a systematic pursuit of knowledge, research, theory, and understanding [see Objects and Purposes of Study, p. 38]. Remember also that materialism in Marxism-Leninism has specific meaning as well, which differentiates it from other forms of materialism [see Dialectical Materialism — the Most Advanced Form of Materialism, p. 52]. Here, materialism includes an understanding that the material is the first basis of reality, meaning that the material determines the ideal (though human consciousness can impact the material world through willpower and labor [see Nature and Structure of Consciousness, p. 79]). Materialism is also built upon scientific explanations (rooted in empirical data and practice, i.e. systematic experimentation and observation) of the world. And finally, remember that viewpoint is the starting point of inquiry [see Annotation 11, p. 12].

Thus, a scientific materialist viewpoint is a perspective which begins analysis of the world in a manner that is both scientifically systematic in pursuit of understanding and firmly rooted in a materialist conception of the world.

Note: Materialist Dialectics contains Twelve Basic Pairs of Categories, Two Basic Principles and Three Universal Laws. These are summarized, respectively, in Appendix A (p. 246), Appendix B (p. 247), and Appendix C (p. 248), and explained in depth throughout the rest of this chapter.

In this way, materialist dialectics fundamentally differs from the classical German idealist dialectics, and especially differs from Hegelian dialectics[77] (as these dialectics were founded on idealist viewpoints).

Moreover, it also has a higher level of development compared to other dialectical systems of thought found in the history of philosophy going back to ancient times. Such previous forms of dialectics were fundamentally based on materialist stances, however the materialism of those ancient times was still naive, primitive and surface-level.

Second, the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism unifies dialectical materialist viewpoints and materialist dialectical methodology, so it not only explains the world, but is also a tool humans can use to perceive and improve the world.

Every principle and law of Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics is both:

1. An accurate explanation of the dialectical characteristics of the world.

2. A scientific methodology for perceiving and improving the world.

By summarizing the general interconnections and development of all things — every phenomenon in nature, society and human thought — Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics provides the most general methodological principles for the process of perceiving and improving the world. They are not just objective methodological principles; they are a comprehensive, constantly developing, and historical methodology.

This methodology can be used to analyze contradictions [see Annotation 119, p. 123] in order to find the basic origins and motivations of both motion and developmental processes. Therefore, materialist dialectics is a great scientific tool for the revolutionary class to perceive and improve the world.

With these basic features, materialist dialectics plays a very important role in the worldview and philosophical methodology of Marxism-Leninism. Materialist dialectics are the foundation of the scientific and revolutionary characteristics of Marxism-Leninism and also offer the most general worldview and methodology for creative activities in scientific study and practical activities.

II. Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics


Annotation 103

The Principle of General Relationships and the Principle of Development are the most basic principles of materialist dialectics. These two principles are dialectically related to one another.

The following sections will outline the Principle of General Relationships and the Principle of Development, which are the most fundamental principles of materialist dialectics. These two concepts are closely (and dialectically) related:


1. The Principle of General Relationships

a. Definition of Relationship and Common Relationship


Annotation 104

The Principle of General Relationships describes how all things, phenomena, and ideas are related to one another, and are defined by these internal and external relationships

The Principle of Development relates to the idea that motion, change, and development are driven by internal and external relationships.

These two principles are dialectically linked: any given subject is defined by its internal relationships, and these same relationships drive the development of every subject.

Note: The foundation of the principles of Materialist Dialectics were laid out by

Engels in Dialectics of Nature. Engels began working on Dialectics of Nature in February, 1870 and had to stop in 1876 to work on Anti-Dühring. He then restarted work on Dialectics of Nature in 1878 and continued working on it until 1883, when Karl Marx died. Engels felt that it was more important to try and put together Marx’s great unfinished works, Capital Volumes 2, 3, and 4, and so stopped working on Dialectics of Nature once again. So, unfortunately, Engels died before this seminal work on Materialist Dialectics could be completed, and what we have instead is an unfinished assemblage of notes.

What follows in the rest of this book is a cohesive system of Materialist Dialectics which was built upon the foundations laid out by Engels in Dialectics of Nature and many other works of political and scholarly writing from various sources. This is the system of Materialist Dialectics studied by Vietnamese students and applied by Vietnamese communists today.

Because this text comes from predominantly Vietnamese scholarship and ideological development, we have had to translate some terms into English which are not derived from the “canon” of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. In some cases, various terms have been consolidated into one concept. For example: Engels used the term “interconnection” (German: innern Zusammenhang, literally: “inner connections”) in Dialectics of Nature, but Vietnamese political scientists use the term “relationship.” Where Engels uses the term “motion” (German: Bewegung) modern Vietnamese communists tend to use the word “development.” Wherever this is the case, we have chosen to use the words in English which most closely match the language used in the original Vietnamese of this text.

In materialist dialectics, the word relationship refers to the regulating principles, mutual interactions, and mutual transformations which exist between things, phenomena, and ideas, as well as those existing between aspects and factors within things, phenomena, and ideas.


Annotation 105

Throughout this book, phenomenon/phenomena simply refers to anything that is observable by the human senses.

Materialist dialectics examines relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas and within things, phenomena, and ideas. A relationship which occurs between two separate things or phenomena is referred to as an external relationship. A relationship which occurs within a thing or phenomenon is referred to as an internal relationship.

These terms are relative; sometimes a relationship may be internal in one context but external in a different context. For example, consider a solar system:

When considering a solar system as a whole, the orbit of a moon around a planet may be considered as an internal relationship of the solar system. But when considering the moon as an isolated subject, its orbit around a planet may be seen as an external relationship which the moon has with the planet.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-24.png

The diagram above illustrates different types of relationships:

Object 1 has its own internal relationships (A), and, from its own perspective, it also has external relationships with Object 2 (B). From a wider perspective, the relationship between Object 1 and Object 2 (B) may be viewed as an internal relationship.

This system of relationships (between Object 1 and Object 2) will also have external relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas (C).


Relationships have a quality of generality, which refers to how frequently they occur between and within things, phenomena, and ideas. When we refer to general relationships, we are usually referring to relationships which exist broadly across many things, phenomena, and ideas. General relationships can exist both internally, within things, phenomena, and ideas, and externally, between things, phenomena, and ideas.

The most general relationships are universal relationships: these are relationships that exist between and within everything and all phenomena, and they are one of the two primary subjects of study of materialist dialectics. [The other primary subject of study is the Principle of Development; see page 119.]


Annotation 106

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-25.png

The discussion of generality of relationships can seem confusing at first. What’s important to understand is that generality is a spectrum ranging from the least general relationships (unique relationships, which only occur between two specific things/phenomena/ideas) and the most general relationships (universal relationships, which occur between or within all things/phenomena/ideas).

Of particular importance in the study of materialist dialectics are universal relationships which exist within and between all things, phenomena, and ideas [see below].

Translation Note: In the original Vietnamese, the word “universal” is not used. Instead, the compound term “phổ biến nhất” is used, which literally means “most general.” In Vietnamese, this phrasing is commonly used to describe the concept of “universal” and it is thus not confusing to Vietnamese speakers. For this translation, we have opted to use the word “universal” because we feel it is less confusing and better explains the concept in English.


The universal relationships include (but are not limited to):

  • Relationships between basic philosophical category pairs (Private and Common, Essence and Phenomenon, etc.). [78]
  • Relationships between quantity and quality. [79]
  • Relationships between opposites. [80]

Together, in all forms of relationships in nature, society and human thought (special, general, and universal) there is unity in diversity and diversity in unity.


Annotation 107

Principle of General Relationships

According to Curriculum of the Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism For University and College Students Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought: “Materialist dialectics upholds the position that all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in mutual relationships with each other, regulate each other, transform into each other, and that nothing exists in complete isolation. That is the core idea of the Principle of General Relationships.”

From this Principle, we find the characteristics of Diversity in Unity and Unity in Diversity; the basis of Diversity in Unity is the fact that every thing, phenomenon, or idea, contains many different relationships; the basis of Unity in Diversity is that many different relationships exist — unified — within each and every thing, phenomenon, and idea.

Diversity in Unity

There exist an infinite number of diverse relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas, but all of these relationships share the same foundation in the material world.

An infinite diversity of relationships exist within the unity of the material world.

The material world is not a chaotic and random assortment of things, phenomena, and ideas. Rather, it is a system of relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas. Likewise, since the material world exists as the foundation of all things, phenomena, and ideas, the material world is thus the foundation for all relationships within and between things, phenomena, and ideas. Because all relationships share a foundation in the material world, they also exist in unity, even though all relationships are diversified and different from one another.


Universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas manifest in infinitely diverse ways.

Unity in Diversity

When we examine the universal relationships that exist within and between all different things, phenomena, and ideas, we will find that each individual manifestation of any universal relationship will have its own different manifestations, aspects, features, etc. Thus even the universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in infinite diversity.

Paraphrased From: Curriculum of the Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism For University and College Students Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought


b. Characteristics of Relationships

Objectiveness, generality, and diversity are the three basic characteristics of relationships.

- The Characteristic of Objectiveness of Relationships

According to the materialist dialectical viewpoint, relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas have objective characteristics.


Annotation 108

In materialist dialectics, objectiveness is an abstract concept that refers to the relative externality of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Every thing, phenomena and idea exists externally to every other thing, phenomena, and idea. This means that to each individual subject (i.e., each individual thing/phenomena/idea), all other things, phenomena, and ideas are external objects

All things, phenomena, and ideas have the relative characteristic of objectiveness.

All together, the collection of all things, phenomena, and ideas in the universe create the external reality of any given subject. So, objectiveness is relative. In the case of human beings, every individual person exists as an individual subject to which all other things, phenomena, and ideas (including other human beings) have objective characteristics.

Alice and Bob are external to one another; each is objective from the other’s perspective.

Of course, objectiveness is always relative. Something might be external from a certain perspective but not from another perspective. For example, say there are two people: Bob and Alice. From Bob’s perspective, Alice has objective characteristics. But from Alice’s perspective, Bob would have objective characteristics.

The relationship between Alice and Bob has objective characteristics to both Alice and Bob.

As all relationships are inherently external to any given subject (even subjects which are party to the relationship), relationships also have objective characteristics.


Whenever two things, phenomena, or ideas have a relationship with one another, they form a pair. The relationship is inherent to this pair and external to any subject which exists outside of the pair. The mutual interaction and mutual transformation which occurs to the things, phenomena, or objects within the pair as the result of the relationship are inherent and objective properties of the pair.


Annotation 109 Translation note:

In the original Vietnamese text, the word for “objective” is “khách quan.” This is a compound word in which “khách” means “guest,” and “quan” means “point of view.” Therefore, “khách quan” literally means “the guest’s (or outsider’s) point of view.”

Thus we translate this to “objectiveness/objective,” the characteristic of being viewed from the outside.

The word “inherent” in the original Vietnamese is “vốn có.” This is another compound word: “vốn” is a shortened form of the word “vốn dĩ,” which means “by or through nature,” “naturally,” and “intrinsically.” “Có” means “to have” or “to exist.” “Vốn có” thus means “already existing naturally” or “already there, through nature.”

So we use the word “inherent” to mean “existing intrinsically or naturally within, without external influence.”


Human beings can’t change or impact external things and phenomena — and the relationships between them — through human will alone. Humans are limited to perceiving relationships between things and phenomena and then impacting or changing them through our practical activities.

- The Characteristic of Generality of Relationships

According to the dialectical viewpoint, there is no thing, phenomenon, nor idea that exists in absolute isolation from other things, phenomena and ideas.


Annotation 110

Although all things, phenomena, and ideas have the characteristic of externality and objectiveness to all other things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 108, p. 112], this does not mean that they exist in isolation. Isolation implies a complete lack of any relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas. On the contrary, according to the Principle of General Relationships [see p. 107], all things, phenomena, and ideas have relationships with all other things, phenomena, and ideas.

Simultaneously, there is also no known thing, phenomenon, nor idea that does not have a systematic structure, including component parts which in turn have their own internal relationships. This means that every existence is a system, and, moreso, is an open system that exists in relation with other systems. All systems interact and mutually transform one another.


Annotation 111

As explained above, a systematic structure is a structure which includes within itself a system of component parts and relationships. It has been postulated by some scientific models that there may be some “fundamental base particle” (quarks, preons, etc.), which, if true, would mean that there is a certain basic material component which cannot be further broken down. However, this would not contradict the Principle of Materialist Dialectics of General Relationships (which states that all things, phenomena, and ideas interact with and mutually transform one another — see Annotation 107, p. 110).

- The Characteristic of Diversity of Relationships

In addition to affirming the objectiveness[81] and generality[82] of relationships, the dialectical viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism also emphasizes the diversity of relationships. The characteristic of diversity is defined by the following features:

  • All things, phenomena, and ideas have different relationships. Every relationship plays a distinct role in the existence and development of the things, phenomena, and ideas which are included within.
  • Any given relationship between things, phenomena, and ideas will have different characteristics and manifestations under different conditions and/or during different periods of motion and/or at different stages of development.

Annotation 112

One of Marx’s most critical observations was that things are defined by their internal and external relationships, including human beings. For example, in Theses on Feuerbach, Marx wrote that “the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations.” It is only through relationships — through mutual impacts and transformations — that things, phenomena, and ideas (including human beings and human societies) change and develop over time. All of these relationships — which both define and transform all things, phenomena, and ideas in existence — exist in infinite diversity [see Annotation 107, p. 110].

Just as things, phenomena, and ideas change and transform through the course of relations with one another, the nature of the relationships themselves also change and develop over time.

Characteristics refer to the features and attributes that exist internally within a given thing, phenomena, or idea.

Manifestation refers to how a given thing, phenomena, or idea is expressed externally in the material world.

For example, a ball may have the characteristics of being made of rubber, having a mass of 100 grams, and having a melting point of 260℃. It may manifest by bouncing on the ground, having a spherical shape, and having a red appearance to human observers.

If ten such balls exist, they will all be slightly different. Even if they have the same mass and material composition, they will have slightly different variations in size, shape, etc. Even if each ball will melt at 260℃, the melting will manifest differently for each ball — they will melt into slightly different shapes, at slightly different speeds, etc.

Relationships also have characteristics and manifestations. For example, the moon’s orbit around the Earth is a relationship. It has characteristics such as the masses of each related body, forces of gravity, and other factors which produce and influence the orbit. The same orbital relationship also has manifestations such as the duration of the moon’s orbit around the Earth, the size of its ellipse, the orbit’s effects on the tides of the Earth’s ocean, etc.

Characteristics and Manifestation correspond, respectively, to the philosophical category pair of Content and Form, which is discussed in section page 147.

Therefore, no two relationships are exactly the same, even if they exist between very similar things, phenomena, and ideas and/or in very similar situations.

It is also important to note that the characteristic of diversity also applies to things, phenomena, and ideas themselves. In other words, every individual thing, phenomenon, and idea in existence also manifests differently from every other thing, phenomenon, and idea in existence, even if they seem quite similar.

c. Meaning of the Methodology

Based on the objective and popular characteristics of relationships, we can see that in our cognitive and practical activities, we have to have a comprehensive viewpoint.

Having a comprehensive viewpoint requires that in the process of perceiving and handling real life situations, humans have to consider the internal dialectical relationships between the component parts, factors, and aspects within a thing or phenomenon. We also need to consider the external mutual interactions they have with other things, phenomena, and ideas. Only on such a comprehensive basis can we properly understand things and phenomena and then effectively handle problems in real life. So, the comprehensive viewpoint is the opposite of a unilateral and/or metaphysical viewpoint [see Annotation 51, p. 49] in both perception and practice.

Lenin said: “If we are to have true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all of its facets, its connections, and ‘mediacies [indirect relationships].’”[83]


Annotation 113

The comprehensive viewpoint sees the subject in terms of all of its internal and external relationships.

Consider a factory. A factory exists as a collection of internal relationships (between the workers, between machines, between the workers and the machines, etc.) and external relationships (between the factory and its suppliers, between the factory and its customers, between the factory and the city, etc.). In order to have a comprehensive viewpoint when examining the factory, one must consider and understand all of the internal and external relationships which define it.


The diversified characteristic of relationships [see Annotation 107, p. 110] shows that in human cognitive and practical activities, we have to simultaneously use a comprehensive viewpoint and a historical viewpoint.

Having a historical viewpoint requires that, in perceiving and handling real life situations, we need to consider the specific properties of subjects, including their current stage of motion and development. We also need to consider that the exact same methods can’t be used to deal with different situations in reality — our methods must be tailored to suit the exact situation based on material conditions.


Annotation 114

While the comprehensive viewpoint focuses on internal and external relationships of subjects, the historical viewpoint focuses on the specific properties of subjects — especially the current stage of motion and development. In order to have a proper historical viewpoint, we must study and understand the way a subject has developed and transformed over time. To do this, we must examine the history of the subject’s changes over time, hence the term “historical viewpoint.” In addition, it’s important to understand that no two situations which we might encounter will ever be exactly the same. This is because the component parts and relationships that make up any given situation will manifest differently.

So, in order to properly deal with situations, we have to understand the component parts and relationships of examined subjects as well as their histories of development so that we can develop plans and strategies that are suitable to the unique circumstances at hand.

For example, it would be disastrous if communists today tried to employ the exact same methods which were used by the Communist Party of Vietnam in the 20th century to defeat Japan, France, and the USA. This is because the material conditions and relationships of Vietnam in the 20th century were very different from any material conditions existing on Earth today. It is possible to learn lessons from studying the methods of the Vietnamese revolution and to adapt some such methods to our modern circumstances, but it would be extremely ineffective to try to copy those methods and strategies — exactly as they manifested then and there — to the here and now.


In order to come up with suitable and effective solutions to deal with real life problems, we must clearly define the roles and positions of each specific relationship that comes into play, and the specific time, place, and material conditions in which they exist.


Annotation 115

A historical viewpoint focuses on the roles and positions of relationships and properties of subjects as well as their development over time.

The role of a relationship has to do with how it functions within a system of relationships and the position refers to its placement amongst other subjects and relationships.

Consider once again the example of the factory [see Annotation 113]. In addition to its internal and external relationships, the factory also has various roles — it functions within various systems and from various perspectives. For instance, the factory may have the role of financial asset for the corporation that owns it, it may have the role of place of employment for the surrounding community, it may have the role of supplier for various customers, etc.

The factory is also positioned among other subjects and relations. If it’s the only employer in town then it would have a position of great importance to the people of the community. If, on the other hand, if it’s just one of hundreds of factories in a heavily industrialized area, it may have a position of much less importance. It may have a position of great importance to an individual factory worker who lives in poverty in an economy where there are very few available jobs, but of less importance to a freelance subcontractor for whom the factory is just one of many customers, and so on.

These positions and roles will change over time. For example, the factory may initially exist as a small workshop with a small handful of workers, but it may grow into a massive factory with hundreds of employees. It is vital to understand this Principle of Development, which is discussed in more detail on the next page.

In summary, proper dialectical materialist analysis requires a comprehensive and historical viewpoint — we must consider subjects both comprehensively in terms of the internal and external relationships of the subject itself as well as historically in terms of roles and positions of subjects, as well as their relationships, material conditions, and development over time.

So, in both perception and practice, we have to avoid and overcome sophistry and eclectic viewpoints.


Annotation 116

Sophistry is the use of falsehoods and misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, and with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. This kind of bad faith argument has no place in materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics must, instead, be rooted in a true and accurate understanding of the subject, material conditions, and reality in general.

Eclecticism is an incoherent approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject, applying different theories in different situations without any consistency in analysis and thought. Eclectic arguments are typically composed of various pieces of evidence that are cherry picked and pieced together to form a perspective that lacks clarity. By definition, because they draw from different systems of thought without seeking a clear and cohesive understanding of the totality of the subject and its internal and external relations and its development over time, eclectic arguments run counter to the comprehensive and historical viewpoints. Eclecticism is somewhat similar to dialectical materialism in that it attempts to consider a subject from many different perspectives, and analyzes relationships pertaining to a subject, but the major flaw of eclecticism is a lack of clear and coherent systems and principles, which leads to a chaotic viewpoint and an inability to grasp the true nature of the subject at hand.

2. Principle of Development

a. Definition of Development

According to the metaphysical viewpoint, development is simply a quantitative increase or decrease; the metaphysical viewpoint does not account for qualitative changes of things and phenomena. Simultaneously, the metaphysical viewpoint also views development as a process of continuous progressions which follow a linear and straightforward path.


Annotation 117

In materialist dialectics, it is important to distinguish between quantity and quality.

Quantity describes the total amount of component parts that compose a subject.

Quality describes the unity of component parts, taken together, which defines the subject and distinguishes it from other subjects.

Both quantity and quality are dynamic attributes; over time, the quantity and quality of all things develop and change over time through the development of internal and external relationships. Quantity and quality itself form a dialectical relationship, and as quantity develops, quality will also develop. A given subject may be described by various quantity and quality relationships.

Example 1:

In the process of development, Quantity Change leads to Quality Change

A single football player, alone, has the quantity value of 1 football player and the quality of a football player. Eleven football players on a field would have the quantity value of 1 and will develop the quality of a football team. This subject, football team, is composed of the same component parts as the subject football player, but the quantity change and other properties (being on a field, playing a game or practicing, etc.) change the quality of the component parts into a different stable and unified form which we call a football team.

The relationship between quantity and quality is dynamic:

If one of the players doesn’t show up for practice, and there are only ten players on the field, it might still have the quality of football team, but in a live professional game there will be a certain threshold — a minimum number of players who must be present to officially be considered a team. If this number of players can’t be fielded then they will not be considered a full team and thus won’t be allowed to play.

Likewise, if there are only one or two players practicing together in a park, they would probably not be considered a football team (though they might be described in terms of having the quality of being on the same team).

Example 2:

Quantity: 1 O + 2 H atoms Quantity: Billions of H2O Molecules Quantity: ~5,000 Drops of Water Quality: Water Quality: Drop of Water Quality: Cup of Water

DEVELOPMENT: QUANTITY CHANGE LEADS TO QUALITY CHANGE

All of these have the quality of water because of the molecular quantities of hydrogen and oxygen atoms, however, from the perspective of volume, quantity changes still lead to quality changes.

The properties of quantity and quality are relative, depending on the viewpoint of analysis.

A single molecule of water has a quantity of one in terms of molecules, but it still retains the quality of “water” because of the quantities of one oxygen atom and two hydrogen atoms per molecule which, in this stable form, give it the quality of water.

A drop of water might have a quantity of many billions of molecules, but it would still have the quality of “water.” It would also now assume the quality of a “drop.”

When you combine enough drops of water, you will eventually have a quality shift where the “drops” of water combine to form another quality — i.e., a “cup” of water. The quantity change leads to a change in quantity; we would no longer think of the water in terms of “drops” after the quantity rises to a certain level.

In terms of temperature and physical properties, if the water is heated to a certain point it will boil and the water will become steam. The quantity of water in terms of drops wouldn’t change, but the quantity-value of temperature would eventually lead to a quality value change from “water” to “steam.”

Example 3:

AS QUANTITY OF AGE INCREASES, QUALITY CHANGES

The same human being will undergo various quality changes as age quantity increases over time.

As humans age and the quantity of years we’ve lived builds up over time, our “quality” also changes, from baby, to child, to teenager, to young adult, to middle age, to old age, and eventually to death. The individual person is still the same human being, but the quality of the person will shift over time as the quantity-value of age increases.

Metaphysical vs. Dialectical Materialist Conceptions of Change

Metaphysics only consider linear properties of quantitychange; Materialist Dialectics takes quantity changes and quality shifts into consideration when considering change over time.

Because the metaphysical perspective tries to define the world in terms of static, isolated subjects, only quantity is considered and quality shifts are not taken into account. Thus, metaphysical logic sees development as linear, simple, and straightforward. Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, sees development as a more complicated, fluid, and dynamic process involving multiple internal and external relationships changing in quantity and quality over time.


In contrast to the metaphysical viewpoint, in materialist dialectics, development refers to the motion of things and phenomena with a forward tendency: from less advanced to more advanced, from a less complete to a more complete level.


Annotation 118

In materialist dialectics, motion (also known as change) is the result of mutual impacts between or within things, phenomena, and ideas, and all motion and change results from mutual impacts which themselves result from internal and external relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas. Any given motion/change leads to quantity changes, and these quantity changes cumulatively lead to quality changes [see Annotation 117, p. 119]. Grasping this concept — that development is driven by relations — is critically important for understanding materialist dialectics.

The concept of “change” in materialist dialectics centers on internal and external relationships causing mutual impacts which lead to quantity changes which build into quality shifts.

This process, taken in total, is referred to as development. Development represents the entire process in which internal and external change/motion leads to changes in quantity which in turn lead to changes in quality over time. The process of development can be fast or slow, complex or simple, and can even move backwards, and all of these properties are relative. Development has a tendency to develop from less advanced to more advanced forms. The word tendency is used to denote phenomena, development, and motion which inclines in a particular direction. There may be exceptional cases which contradict such tendencies, but the general motion will incline towards one specific manner. Thus, it is important to note that “development” is not necessarily “good” nor “bad.” In some cases, “development” might well be considered “bad,” or unwanted. For example, rust developing on a car is typically not desired. So, the tendency of development from lower to higher levels of advancement implies a “forward motion,” though this motion can take an infinite number of forms, depending on the relative perspective. Development can also (temporarily) halt in a state of equilibrium [see Annotation 64, p. 62] or it can shift direction; though it can never “reverse,” just as time itself can never be “reversed.”

For example, during a flood, water may “develop” over the land, and as the floodwaters recede this may alternatively be viewed as another “forward” development process of recession — a development of the overall “flooding and receding” process. The flood is not actually “reversing” — the development is not being “undone.” Flood water may recede but it will leave behind many traces and impacts; thus it is not a true “reversal” of development.

Both flooding and flood recession are development processes with the same forward tendency. Flood recession may appear to be a “reversal,” but it is in fact forward development.

The false belief that development can be reversed is the root of conservative and reactionary positions [see Annotation 208].

Development can be considered positive or negative, depending on perspective. Some ecosystems have natural flood patterns which are vital for sustaining life. For a person living in a flood zone, however, the flood would most likely be considered an unwanted development, whereas flood recession would be a welcomed development.


It is important to note that the definition of development is not identical to the concept of “motion” (change) in general. It is not merely a simple quantitative increase or decrease, nor a repetitive cyclic change in quantity. Instead, in materialist dialectics, development is defined in terms of qualitative changes with the direction of advancing towards higher and more advanced levels. [See diagram Relationship Between Motion,

Quantity/Quality Shifts, and Dialectical Development, Annotation 119, below]

Development is also the process of creating and solving objective contradictions within and between things and phenomena. Development is thus the unified process of negating negative factors while retaining and advancing positive factors from old things and phenomena as they transform into new things and phenomena.


Annotation 119

A contradiction is a relationship in which two forces oppose one another. Although a contradiction might exist in equilibrium for some amount of time [see Annotation 64, p. 62], eventually, one force will overcome the other, resulting in a change of quality. This process of overcoming is called negation. In short, development is a process of change in a subject’s quantity as well as negation of contradictions within and between subjects, leading to quality shifts over time.

b. Characteristics of Development

Every development has the characteristics of objectiveness,[84] generality,[85] and diversity.[86]The characteristic of objectiveness of development stems from the origin of motion.


Annotation 120

Remember that, in materialist dialectics, objectiveness is the relative characteristic that every subject has of existing and developing externally to all other subjects [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. Since motion originates from mutual impacts which occur between external things, objects, and relationships, the motions themselves also occur externally (relative to all other things, phenomena, and objects). This gives motion itself objective characteristics.

Dialectical Development consists of Quantity and Quality Shifts, which in turn derive from motion.

Development is derived from motion as a process of quality shifting which arise from quantity changes which arise from motion [see Annotation 117, p. 119]. Since development is essentially an accumulation of motion, and motion is objective, development itself must also be objective.

The Principle of Development states that development is a process that comes from within the thing-in-itself; the process of solving the contradictions within things and phenomena. Therefore, development is inevitable, objective, and occurs without dependence on human will.


Annotation 121

The “thing-in-itself” refers to the actual material object which exists outside of our consciousness [see Annotation 72, p. 68]. Development arises from motion and self-motion [see Annotation 62, p. 59] with objective characteristics. Although human will can impact motion and development through conscious activity in the material world [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88], motion and development can and does occur without being dependent on human will. Human will is neither a requirement nor prerequisite for motion and development to occur.

Development has the characteristic of generality because development occurs in every process that exists in every field of nature, society, and human thought; in every thing, every phenomenon, and every idea and at every stage* of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Every transformation process contains the possibility that it might lead to the birth of a new thing, phenomenon, or idea [through a change in quality, i.e. development].


Annotation 122

* In materialist dialectics, “stage” (or “stage of development”) refers to the current quantity and quality characteristics which a thing, phenomenon, or object possesses. Every time a quality change occurs, a new stage of development is entered into.


Development has the characteristic of diversity because every thing, phenomenon, and idea has its own process of development that is not totally identical to the process of development of any other thing, phenomenon, or idea. Things and phenomena will develop differently in different spaces and times. Simultaneously, within their own processes of development, things, phenomena, and ideas are impacted by other things, phenomena, and ideas, as well as by many other factors and historical conditions. Such impacts can change the direction of development of things, phenomena, and ideas. They can even temporarily set development back, and/or can lead to growth in one aspect but degeneration in another.


Annotation 123

Because development has the characteristic of generality and the characteristic of diversity, the principle of diversity in unity and unity in diversity also applies to development [see: Annotation 107, p. 110].

c. Meaning of the Methodology

Materialist dialectics upholds that the principle of development is the scientific theoretical basis that we must use to guide our perception of the world and to improve the world. Therefore, in our perception and reality, we have to have a development viewpoint.

According to Lenin: “dialectical logic requires that an object should be considered in development, in change, in ‘self-movement.”[87]

This development viewpoint [which holds that all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly developing, and that development is thus unavoidable] requires us to overcome conservatism, stagnation[88], and prejudice, which are all opposed to development.


Annotation 124

Conservatism and prejudice are mindsets which seek to prevent and stifle development and to hold humanity in a static position. Not only is this detrimental to humanity, it is also ultimately a wasted effort, because development is inevitable in human society, as in all things, phenomena, and ideas. Therefore, we must avoid and fight against such stagnant mindsets.

According to this development viewpoint, in order to perceive or solve any problem in real life, we must consider all things, phenomena, and ideas with their own forward tendency of development taken in mind. On the other hand, the path of development is a dialectical process that is reversible and full of contradictions. Therefore, we must be aware of this complexity in our analysis and planning. This means we need to have a historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116] which accounts for the diversity and complexity of development in perceiving and solving issues in reality.


Annotation 125

Materialist dialectics requires us to consider the complexity and constant motion of reality. By comparison, the metaphysical viewpoint (which considers all things, phenomena, and ideas as static, isolated entities which have linear and simple processes of development) stands as a barrier to understanding this complexity and incorporating it into our worldview. Thus, it is vital that we develop comprehensive and historical viewpoints which acknowledge the diversity and complexity of reality.

In summary, as a science of common relations and development, Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics serve a very important role in perception and practice. Engels affirmed the role of materialist dialectics in this passage:

“An exact representation of the universe, of its evolution, of the development of mankind, and of the reflection of this evolution in the minds of men, can therefore only be obtained by the methods of dialectics, with its constant regard to the innumerable actions and reactions of life and death, of progressive or retrogressive changes.”

Lenin also said: “Dialectics requires an all-round consideration of relationships in their concrete development, but not a patchwork of bits and pieces.”[89]

III. Basic Pairs of Categories of Materialist Dialectics

Category* is the most general grouping of aspects, attributes, and relations of things, phenomena, and ideas. Different specific fields of inquiry may categorize things, phenomena, and/or ideas differently from one another.


Annotation 126

* Translation note: In Vietnamese, the word “phạm trù” is used here, which translates in this context more closely to the English philosophical term “category of being,” which means “the most general, fundamental, or broadest class of entities.” “Category of being” is sometimes simplified in English-language philosophical discourse to “category,” which we have chosen to do here for ease of reading and to better reflect the way it reads in the original Vietnamese.

Every science has its own systems of categories that reflect the aspects, attributes, and basic relations that fall within its scope of study. For example, mathematics contains the categories “arithmetic,” “geometry,” “point,” “plane,” and “constant.” Physics contains the categories of “mass,” “speed,” “acceleration,” and “force,” and so on. Economics includes “commodity,” “value,” “price,” “monetary,” and “profit” categories.

Every such category reflects only the common relations found within the specific fields that fall within the scope of study of a specific science.

Categories of materialist dialectics, on the other hand, such as “matter,” “consciousness,” “motion,” “contradiction,” “quality,” “quantity,” “reason,” and “result,” are different. Categories of materialist dialectics reflect the most general aspects and attributes, as well as the most basic and general relations, of not just some specific fields of study, but of the whole of reality, including all of nature, society and human thought.

Every thing, phenomenon, and idea has many properties, including: a reason for existing in its current form, a process of motion and change, contradictions, content, form, and so on. These properties are aspects, attributes, and relations that are reflected in the categories of materialist dialectics. Therefore, the relationship between the categories of specific sciences and categories of materialist dialectics is a dialectical relationship between the Private and the Common [see Private and Common, p. 128].


Annotation 127

The categories of specific sciences are limited to the scope of study, while the categories of materialist dialectics encompass all things, phenomena, and ideas.

Unlike the categories contained within specific scientific fields, the philosophical categories of materialist dialectics can be used to analyze and define all things, phenomena, and ideas. The categories of specific scientific fields and the materialist dialectical categories have a Private/Common dialectical relationship [discussed on the next page].


As a science of general relations and development, materialist dialectics summarizes the most general relations of every field of nature, society, and human thought into basic category pairs: Private and Common, Reason and Result, Obviousness and Randomness, Content and Form, Essence and Phenomenon, Possibility and Reality.


Annotation 128

Every individual materialist dialectical category has a dialectical relationship with another materialist dialectical category. Thus, all categories in materialist dialectics are presented as category pairs. So, a category pair is simply a pair of categories within materialist dialectics which have a dialectical relationship with one another.

Note that the this formalized system of category pairs reflects many decades of work by Vietnamese philosophical and political scientists based on the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other socialist thinkers. Also note that these are not the only category pairs that can be discussed; there are potentially an infinite number of categories which can be used in materialist dialectical analysis. However, universal category pairs, which can be applied to analyze any and all things, phenomena, and ideas, are much fewer and farther between. That said, the universal category pairs discussed in this book are the ones which have most often been used by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other prominent materialist dialecticians.

1. Private and Common

a. Categories of Private and Common

The Private Category encompasses specific things, phenomena, and ideas; the Common Category defines the common aspects, attributes, factors, and relations that exist in many things and phenomena.

Within every Private thing, phenomenon, and idea, there exists the Common, and also the Unique. The Unique encompasses the attributes and characteristics that exist in only one specific thing, phenomenon, or idea, and does not repeat in any other things, phenomena, or ideas.


Annotation 129

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-41.png

The Private category includes specific individual things, phenomena and ideas.

The Common category includes aspects, factors, and relations that exist in many things, phenomena, and ideas. For example, say there are two apples: Apple A and Apple B. Apple A is a specific individual object. Apple B is another distinct, separate object. In that sense, both apples are private apples, and fall within the Private category.

However, both Apple A and Apple B share common attributes. For instance, they are both fruits of the same type: “apple.” They may have other attributes in common: they may be the same color, they may have the same basic shape, they may be of similar size, etc. These are common attributes which they share. Thus, Apple A and Apple B will also fall within the common category, based on these common attributes.

Apple A and Apple B will also have unique attributes. Only Apple A has the exact molecules in the exact place and time which compose Apple A. There is no other object in the world which has those same molecules in that same place and time. This means that Apple A also has unique properties.

All private subjects have attributes in common with other private subjects.

The Common and Private categories have a dialectical relationship. The Common contains the Private, and the Private contains the Common. Every private subject has some attributes in common with other private subjects, and common attributes can only exist among private subjects. Thus every thing, phenomenon, and idea in existence contains internally within itself dialectical relationships between the Private and the Common, and has dialectical Private/Common relationships externally within other things, phenomena, and ideas.

All private subjects have attributes in common with other private subjects.

It is also true that every private subject contains within itself Unique attributes which it does not share with any other thing, phenomenon, or idea. For example, Mount Everest is unique in that it is 8,850 meters tall. No other mountain on Earth has that exact same height. Therefore, the private subject “Mount Everest” has unique properties which it does not share with any other subject, even though it has other attributes in common with countless other private entities.

All things, phenomena, and ideas contain the unique, the private, and the common.

Whenever two individual subjects have a relationship with one another, that relationship is a unique relationship in the sense that it is a relationship that is shared only by those two specific subjects; however, there will also be common attributes and properties which any such relationship will share with other relationships in existence. This recalls the principle of Unity in Diversity and Diversity in Unity [see Annotation 107, p. 110]. So, every thing, phenomenon, and idea contains the Common and the Unique and has unique and common relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas.

This category pair is very useful in developing a comprehensive viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116]. Remember that a comprehensive viewpoint indicates an understanding of the internal and external relations of a given subject. This means that in order to develop a comprehensive viewpoint, you must know the private aspects of each individual relation, component, and aspect of the subject, and you must also study the commonalities of the subject as well. It’s also important to study a variety of private information sources or data points to look for commonalities between them. In other words, if you want to have a proper comprehensive viewpoint [see Annotation 113, p. 116] about any subject, you have to find and analyze as many private data points and pieces of evidence as possible.

For example: If a person only ever saw one apple, a green apple, then that person might believe that “all apples are green.” This conclusion would be premature: the person is attempting to make an assumption about the Common without examining enough Privates. This is a failure of mistaking mistaking the Private for the Common which stems from a lack of a comprehensive viewpoint.

Now, let’s take a look at an example of how the “Unique” can become “Common,” and vice-versa: 1947 TODAY

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-45.png

“Unique” things, phenomena, and ideas can become “common” through development processes (and vice-versa).

In 1941, a Soviet soldier named Mikhail Kalashnikov was in the hospital after being wounded in the Battle of Bryansk. Another soldier in the hospital said to Kalashnikov, “why do our soldiers only have one rifle for two or three of our men, while the Germans have automatics?” To solve this problem, Kalashnikov designed the AK-47 machine gun. When he finished making the first prototype, it was the only AK-47 in the world.

At this precise moment, the AK-47 was simultaneously Unique, Private, and Common.

It was Unique because it was the first and only AK-47 in the world, and no other object in the world had those properties. It was Private because it was a specific object with its own individual existence. It was Common — even though it was the only existing prototype — because it shared Common features with other rifles, and with other prototypes. It was the only AK-47 in existence.

Soon, however, the Soviet Union began manufacturing them, and they became very common. Now there are millions of AK-47s in the world. So, today, that prototype machine gun remains simultaneously Unique, Private, and Common, with some slight developments:

It remains Private because it is a specific object with its own individual existence. Even though it is no longer the only AK-47 in existence, it remains Unique because it is still the very first AK-47 that was ever made, and even though there are now many other AK-47s, there is no other rifle in the universe that shares that same unique property. It remains Common because it still shares common features with other rifles and other prototypes, but it now also shares commonality with many other AK-47 rifles. It is no longer Unique for having the properties of an AK-47 in and of itself.

If someone were to destroy Kalashnikov’s prototype AK-47, the Private of that object would no longer exist — it would remain only as an idea, and the Private would transform to whatever becomes of the material components of the rifle. The Unique would also no longer remain specifically as it was before being destroyed. However, there would still be many other AK-47s which would share common features related to that prototype; for instance, that they were all designed based on the prototype’s design.

Translator’s Note: The words “Private,” “Common,” and “Unique” may seem unusual because they are direct translations from the Vietnamese words used to describe these concepts in the original text. Various other words have been used by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other materialist dialecticians when discussing the underlying concepts of these philosophical categories. For instance, in most translations of Lenin, his discussion of such topics is typically translated into English using words such as “universal,” “general,” “special,” “particular,” etc.

Example (from Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks): “Language in essence expresses only the universal; what is meant, however, is the special, the particular. Hence what is meant cannot be said in speech.” Here, “universal” refers to that which is Common in all things, phenomena, and ideas, and “special/particular” refers to the Private — specific individual things, phenomena, and ideas — along with their Unique properties.

Here are excerpts from Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks discussing these concepts:

(‘It?’ The most universal word of all.) Who is it? I. Every person is an I.

Das Sinnliche? It is a universal, etc., etc. ‘This??’ Everyone is ‘this.’

Why can the particular not be named? One of the objects of a given kind (tables) is distinguished by something from the rest...

Leaves of a tree are green; John is a man; Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have dialectics (as Hegel’s genius recognised): the individual is the universal... And a naïve confusion, a helplessly pitiful confusion in the dialectics of the universal and the particular — of the concept and the sensuously perceptible reality of individual objects, things, phenomena.

Further, the ‘subsumption’ under logical categories of ‘sensibility’ (Sensibilität), ‘irritability’ (irritabilität) — this is said to be the particular in contrast to the universal!! — and ‘reproduction’ is an idle game.

Marx, too, discussed these concepts using words which are commonly translated into English using different terms. For example, in Capital:

The general form of relative value, embracing the whole world of commodities, converts the single commodity that is excluded from the rest, and made to play the part of equivalent – here the linen – into the universal equivalent.

Here, “general form” refers to the commonalities of form that exist between all commodities. The “single commodity” refers to a private commodity; a specific commodity that exists separately from all other commodities. And when referring to a “universal equivalent,” Marx is referring to equivalence which such a commodity has in common with every other commodity.

The rest of this passage continues as a materialist dialectical analysis of the Private, Common, and Unique features and aspects of commodities:

The bodily form of the linen is now the form assumed in common by the values of all commodities; it therefore becomes directly exchangeable with all and every of them. The substance linen becomes the visible incarnation, the social chrysalis state of every kind of human labour. Weaving, which is the labour of certain private individuals producing a particular article, linen, acquires in consequence a social character, the character of equality with all other kinds of labour. The innumerable equations of which the general form of value is composed, equate in turn the labour embodied in the linen to that embodied in every other commodity, and they thus convert weaving into the general form of manifestation of undifferentiated human labour. In this manner the labour realised in the values of commodities is presented not only under its negative aspect, under which abstraction is made from every concrete form and useful property of actual work, but its own positive nature is made to reveal itself expressly. The general value form is the reduction of all kinds of actual labour to their common character of being human labour generally, of being the expenditure of human labour power. The general value form, which represents all products of labour as mere congelations of undifferentiated human labour, shows by its very structure that it is the social resumé of the world of commodities. That form consequently makes it indisputably evident that in the world of commodities the character possessed by all labour of being human labour constitutes its specific social character.

We have chosen to use the terms “Private,” “Common,” and “Unique” in the translation of this text because they most closely match the words used in the original Vietnamese. In summary, it is important to realize that you may encounter the underlying concepts which are related by these words using various phrasings in the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, etc.

b. Dialectical Relationship Between Private and Common

According to the materialist dialectical viewpoint: the Private, the Common and the Unique exist objectively [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. The Common only exists within the Private. It expresses its existence through the Private.


Annotation 130

The Common can’t exist as a specific thing, phenomenon, or idea. However, every specific thing, phenomenon, or idea exists as a private subject which has various features in common with other private things, phenomena, and ideas. We can therefore only understand the Common through observation and study of various private things, phenomena, and ideas. For example, a human can’t perceive with our senses alone the Common of apples. Only by observing many private apples can begin to derive an understanding of what all private apples have in common.

The Common does not exist in isolation from the Private. Therefore, commonality is inseparable from things, phenomena, and ideas. The Private only exists in relation to the Common. Likewise, there is no Private that exists in complete isolation from the Common.


Annotation 131

No commonality can possibly exist outside of private things, phenomena, and ideas because commonality describes features which different things, phenomena, and ideas share. No private thing, phenomenon, or idea can possibly exist absolutely without commonality because there is no thing, phenomenon, or idea that shares absolutely no features with any other thing, phenomenon, or idea.

The Private category is more all-encompassing and diverse than the Common category; Common is a part of Private but it is more profound and more “essential” than the Private. This is because Private is the synthesis of the Common and the Unique; the Common expresses generality and the regular predictability of many Privates.


Annotation 132

The Private encompasses all aspects of a specific, individual thing, phenomenon, or idea; thus it encompasses all aspects, features, and attributes of a given subject, including both the Common and the Unique. In this way, the Private is the synthesis of the Common and the Unique.

Common attributes require more consideration, effort, and study to properly determine, because multiple private subjects must be considered and analyzed before common attributes can be confidently discovered and understood. They offer us a more profound understanding of the essence [see Essence and Phenomenon, p. 156] and nature of things, phenomena, and ideas because they offer insights into the relationships between and within different things, phenomena, and ideas. As we discover more commonalities, and understand them more deeply, we begin to develop a more comprehensive perspective of reality. We begin to develop an understanding of the laws and principles which govern relations between and within things, phenomena, and ideas, and this gives us the power to more accurately predict how processes will develop and how things, phenomena, and ideas will change and mutually impact one another over time.

Under specific conditions, the Common and the Unique can transform into each other [See Annotation 129, p. 128].

The dialectical relationship between Private and Common was summarised by Lenin:

“Consequently, the opposites (the individual as opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, ideas) etc.”[90] [Note: “individual and universal” here refer the same underlying concepts of “Private and Common” (respectively); see translator’s note on p. 132].

c. Meaning of the Methodology

We must acknowledge and recognize the Common in order to study the Private in our cognitive and practical activities. If we fail to acknowledge the Common, then whenever we attempt to understand and comprehend any Private thing, phenomenon or idea, we will make mistakes and become disoriented. To understand the Common we have to study and observe the Private because the Common does not exist abstractly outside of the Private.


Annotation 133

Our understanding of Common attributes arise from the observation and study of private things, phenomena, and ideas. At the same time, developing our understanding of Commonalities between and within Private subjects deepens our understanding of their essential nature [see: Essence and Phenomenon].

Dialectical analysis of private and common characteristics involves observing private subjects to determine common attributes and considering common attributes to gain insights about private subjects.

It is impossible to know anything at all about the Common without observing Private subjects, and attempting to understand Private subjects without taking into consideration the attributes and features which they have in Common with other Private subjects will lead to incomplete and erroneous analysis.


In addition, we must identify the Common features and attributes of every specific Private subject we study. We must avoid being dogmatic, metaphysical, and inflexible in applying our knowledge of commonalities to solve problems and interpret the world.


Annotation 134

Dogmatism and Revisionism in Relation to the Private and Common

Dogmatism is the inflexible adherence to ideals as incontrovertibly true while refusing to take any contradictory evidence into consideration. Dogmatism stands in direct opposition to materialist dialectics, which seeks to form opinions and conclusions only after careful consideration of all observable evidence.

Dogmatism typically arises when the Common is overemphasized without due consideration of the Private. A dogmatic position is one which adheres to ideals about commonalities without taking Private subjects into consideration.

Dogmatism can be avoided by continuously studying and observing and analyzing

Private subjects and taking any evidence which contradicts erroneous perceptions of “false commonalities” into consideration. This will simultaneously deepen our understanding of the Private while improving our understanding of the Common. For example: Sally might observe a few red apples and arrive at the conclusion: “all apples are red.” If Sally is then presented with a green apple, yet refuses to acknowledge it by continuing to insist that “all apples are red,” then Sally is engaging in dogmatism.

According to Vietnam’s Curriculum of the Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism For University and College Students Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought, the opposite of Dogmatism is Revisionism. Revisionism occurs when we overestimate the Private and fail to recognize commonalities. In failing to recognize common attributes and features between and within things, phenomena, and ideas, the Revisionist faces confusion and disorientation whenever they encounter any new things, phenomena, and ideas, because they lack any insight into essential characteristics of the subject and its relations with other subjects.

For example: if Sally has spent a lot of time studying a red apple, she may start to become confident that she understands everything there is to know about apples. If she is then presented with a green apple, she might become confused and disoriented and draw the conclusion that she has to start all over again with her analysis, from scratch, thinking: “this can’t possibly be an apple because it’s not red. It must be something else entirely.” Sally can avoid this revisionist confusion by examining the other common features which the red and green apples share before making any conclusions.

Metaphysical Perception of the Private and Common

The metaphysical position attempts to categorize things, phenomena, and ideas into static categories which are isolated and distinct from one another [see Annotation 8,

p. 8]. In this way, the metaphysical perception ultimately fails to properly understand the role of both the Private and the Common. Categories may be arranged in taxonomic configurations based on shared features, but ultimately every category is seen as distinct and isolated from every other category. This perspective severs the dialectical relationship between the Private, the Common, and the Unique, and thus leads to a distorted perception of reality. As Engels wrote in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

The analysis of Nature into its individual parts, the grouping of the different natural processes and objects in definite classes, the study of the internal anatomy of organized bodies in their manifold forms — these were the fundamental conditions of the gigantic strides in our knowledge of Nature that have been made during the last 400 years. But this method of work has also left us as legacy the habit of observing natural objects and processes in isolation, apart from their connection with the vast whole; of observing them in repose, not in motion; as constraints, not as essentially variables; in their death, not in their life. And when this way of looking at things was transferred by Bacon and Locke from natural science to philosophy, it begot the narrow, metaphysical mode of thought peculiar to the last century.”

In other words, Engels points out that separating and dividing Private subjects into distinct and isolated categories without acknowledging the dialectical nature of the Private and the Common leads to severe limitations on what we can learn about the world. Instead, we have to examine things, phenomena, and ideas in relation to one another, which must include the analysis of Commonalities.

Rather than divide subjects into distinct, separate categories, materialist dialectics seek to examine Private subjects as they really exist: as a synthesis of Unique and Common attributes; and simultaneously to examine commonalities as they really exist: as properties which emerge from the relations of Private objects.

In our cognitive and practical activities, we must be able to take advantage of suitable conditions that will enable transformations from the Unique and the Common (and vice versa) for our specific purposes.


Annotation 135

In advancing the cause of socialism, revolutionaries must work to transform our Unique positions into common positions. For instance, the process of developing revolutionary public knowledge [see Annotation 94, p. 93] begins with studying and understanding revolutionary knowledge. Initially, this knowledge will be unique to the socialist movement. By disseminating the knowledge to the public, we hope to transform this knowledge into common knowledge.

Likewise, we hope to transform other common things, phenomena, and ideas back towards the Unique. For instance, the capitalist mode of production is currently the most common mode of production on Earth. In order to advance humanity towards communism, we must transition the capitalist mode of production from the Common towards the Unique, with the ambition of eventually eliminating this mode of production altogether.

2. Reason and Result

a. Categories of Reason and Result

The Reason category is used to define the mutual impacts between internal aspects of a thing, phenomenon or idea, or between things, phenomena, or ideas, that bring about changes.

The Result category defines the changes that were caused by mutual impacts which occur between aspects and factors within a thing, phenomenon, or idea, or externally between different things, phenomena, or ideas.


Annotation 136

Translation note: the Vietnamese words for “reason and result” can also be translated as “cause and effect.” We have chosen to use the words “reason and result” to distinguish materialist dialectical categories from metaphysical conceptions of development.

In metaphysics [see Annotation 8, p. 8], any given effect is seen to have a single cause. In materialist dialectics, we instead examine the mutual impacts which occur within and between subjects through motion and development processes.

Metaphysical vs. Materialist Dialectical conceptions of development.

In the metaphysical conception of cause and effect, (A) causes effect (B), then effect (B) causes effect (C), and so on. Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, uses the model of development (see Annotation 117, p. 119), wherein objects (A) and (B) mutually impact one another, resulting in development (C). (C) will then have relations with other things, phenomena, and/or ideas, and the mutual impacts from these new relations will become the reasons for future results. Consider the following example:

Metaphysical vs. Materialist Dialectical conceptions of frying and eating an egg.

In the metaphysical “cause and effect” model, putting an egg in a hot pan is the cause which results in the effect of producing a fried egg. The egg being fried has the effect of the egg now being suitable for eating, which is the cause of the egg being eaten by a hungry person.

This is a simplification of the metaphysical conception of causes and effects, since metaphysics does recognize that one cause can have branches of multiple effects, but the essential characteristic of the metaphysical conception of causality is to break down all activity and change in the universe into static and distinct episodes of one distinct event causing one or more other distinct events.

In contrast, the materialist dialectical model of development holds that every result stems from mutual impacts which occur relationally between things, phenomena, and ideas, and that the resulting synthesis — the newly developed result of mutual impacts — will then have new relations with other things, phenomena, and ideas, and that these relations will become new reasons for new results through mutual impact.

In this example, the egg and the hot pan will mutually impact each other. The frying pan will become dirty and need to be washed (the result of putting an egg in the frying pan); meanwhile, the egg will become a fried egg, which is fit for human consumption (the result of being cooked in the frying pan). The fried egg will then have a relationship with a hungry human, and this relationship will be a new reason which will lead to further results (i.e., the human eating and digesting the egg).

So, the key difference between the classical metaphysical conception of causality and the materialist dialectical model of development is that metaphysics focus more on individual events in time whereas materialist dialectics focus on the relations and mutual impacts between things, phenomena, and ideas over time.

b. Dialectical relationship between Reason and Result

The relationship between Reason and Result is objective, and it contains inevitability: there is no Reason that does not lead to a Result; and likewise, there is no Result without any Reason.

Reasons cause Results, which is why Reason always comes before Result, and Result always comes after Reason.

A Reason can cause one or many Results and a Result can be caused by one or many Reasons.

When many Reasons lead to a single Result, the impacts which lead to the Result are mutual between all things, phenomena, and ideas at hand. These mutual impacts can have many relational positions or roles, including: direct reasons, indirect reasons, internal reasons, external reasons, etc.


Annotation 137

As stated in the previous annotation, Reasons which lead to Results stem from mutually impacting relations between things, phenomena, and ideas. There is no way for one subject to affect another subject without also being affected itself in some way.

Reasons can take many forms, including (but not limited to):

Types of Reasons and Results

Direct Reasons stem from immediate relations.

Direct Reasons are Reasons which stem from immediate relations, with no intervening relations standing between the Reason and Result.

For example, dropping a coffee cup causes an immediate relationship between the cup and the ground, and that relation leads directly to the Result of the coffee cup breaking to pieces.

Indirect Reasons have an intervening relationship between the Reason and the Result.

Indirect Reasons are Reasons which have intervening relations between a Reason and a Result.

For example, the dropped coffee cup above may have smashed into pieces directly because it hit the ground, but it may also have indirect Reasons. The person holding the cup may have been frightened because she heard a loud noise, and the loud noise was caused by a car backfiring, and the car backfiring was caused by the driver not maintaining his car engine.

In materialist dialectical terms, the driver’s relationship with his car would be an indirect Reason for the car backfiring; the relationship between the car (which backfired) and the person holding the coffee cup would be the direct Reason for dropping the cup; and the cup’s relationship with the ground would be the direct reason for the cup smashing. At the same time, the driver’s relationship with his car would be an indirect Reason for the Result of the coffee cup smashing to pieces.

Internal Reasons stem from internal relationships.

Internal Reasons are Reasons which stem from internal relations that occur between aspects and factors within a subject.

For example, if a building collapses because the steel structure within the building rusts and fails, then that could be viewed as an internal Reason for the collapse.

External Reasons stem from external relations.

External Reasons are reasons which stem from external relations that occur between different things, phenomena, and ideas.

For example, if a building collapses because it is smashed by a wrecking ball, then that could be viewed as an external Reason for the collapse.

All of these roles and positions can be viewed relatively. From one viewpoint, a Reason may be seen as internal, but from another viewpoint, it might be viewed as external. For example, if a couple has a disagreement which leads to an argument, the disagreement may be seen as an external Reason from the perspective of each individual within the couple. But to a relationship counselor viewing the situation from the outside, the disagreement may be seen as an internal Reason which leads to the couple (a subject defined by the internal relationship between the husband and wife) arguing.

From one perspective, a government official ordering a building to be torn down may be seen as the direct Reason for the Result of the building being torn down. But from a different perspective, one can see many intervening relations: complaints from local residents may have led to the government official making the order, the order would be delivered to a demolition crew, the demolition crew would assign a crew member to operate a wrecking ball, the crew member would operate the wrecking ball, the wrecking ball would smash the building. All of these can be seen as intervening relations which constitute indirect reasons leading up to the direct Reason of the wrecking ball smashing the building. Choosing the right viewpoint during analysis is critical to make sure that Reason and Result relations are viewed properly and productively, and care must also be taken to ensure that the correct Reasons are attributed to Results (see Reason and Result, p. 138).

Likewise, a Reason can cause many Results, including primary and secondary Results.


Annotation 138

Primary Results are Results which are more direct and predictable.

Secondary Results are Results which are indirect and less predictable.

For example, an earthquake may have primary Results such as the ground shaking, buildings being destroyed, etc. Secondary Results from the earthquake might include flights being rerouted from local airports, shortages at grocery stores, etc.

In the motion of the material world, there is no known “first Reason” or “final Result.”


Annotation 139

With our current understanding of the universe, it is uncertain what might have caused the creation of all existence. Was it the Big Bang? If so, did the Big Bang have some underlying reason? There is also no way to know if there will ever be a “final Result.” Will the heat death of the universe occur, and if so, will that end all transpiring of relations which would end the cycle of development — of Reasons and Results?

As of now, we do not have solid answers to these questions. If and when answers arise, it is possible that the materialist dialectical framework will need to be updated to reflect new scientific knowledge, just as Marx, Engels, and Lenin have updated materialist dialectics in the past [see Annotation 72, p. 68]. What’s important to understand in the meantime is that within our realm of human experience and understanding, for all practical purposes, every Result which we live through and observe has some underlying Reason, and will itself lead to one or more Results.

Engels said: “we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis [see Annotation 200, p. 192], positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed, and that despite all their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate [are mixed together]. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa.”[91]


Annotation 140

In the above passage, Engels is simply explaining that since all things, phenomena, and ideas are relationally linked and inter-related [see Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics, p. 106], the mutual impacts and processes of change which lead to development (the reasons and results which transpire between all things, phenomena, and ideas) are also all linked and inter-related. What might be viewed as a Reason is also a Result of one or more prior Reasons, just as every Result is also a Reason for future Results.

c. Meaning of the Methodology

Because the relationship between Reason and Result is objective and inevitable, we can’t ignore the relationship between Reason and Result in our perception and practice. In reality, there is no thing, phenomenon or idea that can exist without any underlying Reason or Reasons; and vice versa, there is no Reason that does not lead to any Result.


Annotation 141

In political activity, it is important to remember that every interaction within every relationship will lead to mutual impacts which will cause change and development; in other words, everything we choose to do will be the Reason for one or more Results. We must be aware of unintended or unpredicted Results from our activities.

Reason-Result relationships are very complicated and diverse. Therefore, we must accurately identify the types of Reasons [direct, indirect, internal, external, etc.] so that we can come up with proper solutions which are suitable for the specific situation in both perception and practice. A Reason can lead to many results and, likewise, a Result can be caused by many Reasons, which is why we must have a comprehensive viewpoint and a historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116] in our perception of reality so we can properly analyse, solve and apply Reason-Result relationships.


Annotation 142

It is critical to understand that there may be many events or relationships which might be falsely ascribed as Reasons for a given Result (and vice-versa).

For example: in 1965, the United States of America officially declared war on North Vietnam after the so-called “Gulf of Tonkin Incident,” in which Vietnamese forces supposedly fired on a United States Navy ship in the Gulf of Tonkin. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident is often described as the “cause” or the “Reason” that the Vietnam War began.

However, the real “Reason” why the USA declared war on North Vietnam had to do with the underlying contradiction between capitalist imperialism and communism in Vietnam. This contradiction had to be resolved one way or another. The United States of America willfully decided to try to negate this contradiction by instigating war, and this was the true reason the war began. In fact, the so-called “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” never even occurred as described — the attack on the USA’s ship never really occurred. A document released by the Pentagon in 2005 revealed that the incident was completely fabricated. So, saying that the “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” was the Reason for the war is nonsensical, since it’s an event which never even occurred in reality.

Understanding the true nature of Reason and Result is very important for making decisions and choosing a path forward in political action. Attributing the wrong Reason to a Result, or misunderstanding the Results which stem from a Reason, can lead to serious setbacks and failures. Therefore, it is vital for revolutionaries to properly identify and understand the actual Reasons and Results which drive development.

3. Obviousness and Randomness

a. Categories of Obviousness and Randomness


Annotation 143

In Vietnamese, the words for these categories are “tất nhiên” and “ngẫu nhiên,” which respectively translate to “obvious” and “random.” In socialist literature, various words have been used by different authors to convey the underlying meaning of these categories (Engels, for instance, used the terms “necessary” and “accidental” to mean “obvious” and “random,” respectively). We have chosen to use words which closely match the Vietnamese used in the original text, but the reader should be aware that these same concepts may be described using many different words in various English translations of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Ho Chi Minh, etc.

The Obviousness category refers to events that occur because of the essential [see Essence and Phenomenon, p. 156] internal aspects of the material structure of a subject. These essential internal characteristics become reasons for certain results under certain conditions: the Obvious has to happen in a certain way, it can’t happen any other way.


Annotation 144

Obviousness can only apply to material subjects in the material world and results which are certain to happen based on the material laws of nature. Obviousness arises from the internal aspects, features, and relations of physical objects. Paper will burn under certain specific conditions, due its internal material structure. If those conditions (i.e., temperature, the presence of oxygen, etc.) exist, then paper will catch fire predictably. In other words, paper will obviously burn under certain circumstances due to its internal composition,.

The Randomness category refers to things that happen because of external reasons: things that happen, essentially, by chance, due to impacts from many external relations. A Random outcome may occur or it may not occur; a Random outcome could happen this way or it could happen that way.


Annotation 145

As we discussed above, paper will burn if it reaches a certain temperature — that much is obvious. If your friend holds paper over the flame of the lighter, the paper will burn — that’s obvious. But you can’t be certain whether your friend will actually hold the paper to the flame or not. This demonstrates Randomness. Whether your friend will ultimately hold the paper to the flame or not depends on an external relation which is not defined by the internal structure of the paper, and which can’t be predicted with the same predictability as obvious events which are rooted in internal material aspects.

b. Dialectical relationship between Obviousness and Randomness

Obviousness and Randomness both exist objectively and play an important role in the motion and development of things and phenomena. Obviousness plays the decisive role.


Annotation 146

Obviousness plays the decisive role simply because Obviousness is far more predictable and the laws which govern material phenomena are essentially fixed. We can’t change the laws of physics, the nature of chemical reactions, etc.

Obviousness and Randomness exist in dialectical unity; there is no pure Obviousness, nor pure Randomness. It is obvious that Randomness shall occur in our universe, however Obviousness clears a path through this Randomness.


Annotation 147

Our universe is incredibly complex and there are many different potential external relations which could impact any given situation, such that some degree of Randomness is always present in any situation; in other words, the presence of Randomness can be seen as Obvious.

In 1922, Ho Chi Minh identified objective internal characteristics of the working class of France and its colonies. He wrote: “The mutual ignorance of the two proletariats gives rise to prejudices. The French workers look upon the native as an inferior and negligible human being, incapable of understanding and still less of taking action. The natives regard all the French as wicked exploiters. Imperialism and capitalism do not fail to take advantage of this mutual suspicion and this artificial racial hierarchy to frustrate propaganda and divide forces which ought to unite.”

In this example, Ho Chi Minh identifies prejudice as an obvious outcome of mutual ignorance. The prejudice arises as a matter of course from internal objective aspects of the two proletarian groups. As long as French and native workers remain ignorant of one another, prejudice will arise. The specific forms which this prejudice will take, however, and their resulting impacts and developments, will be more or less Random because there are many external factors (including the external impacts of the capitalist class, which seeks to take advantage of these prejudices) which can’t be predicted. Therefore, it is necessary for political revolutionaries to account for both random and obvious factors in confronting such prejudice. Ho Chi Minh’s suggestion for overcoming these difficulties was concise and to-the-point: “Intensify propaganda to overcome them.” Only by negating the internal aspects of mutual ignorance through education and propaganda could communists hope to negate the resulting prejudice.

As Engels said: “One knows that what is maintained to be necessary [obvious] is composed of sheer accidents, and that the so-called accidental [random] is the form behind which necessity hides itself — and so on.”[92]

Obviousness and Randomness are not static properties: Randomness and Obviousness continuously change and develop over time. Under specific conditions, Obviousness and Randomness can transform into each other: Obviousness can become Random and Randomness can become obvious.


Annotation 148

Randomness can be introduced to an obvious situation: it may be obvious that a mineshaft will collapse, until human beings come along and intervene by repairing the structural integrity of the mineshaft. It may seem Random whether a city’s economy will grow or shrink, until a volcano erupts and buries the city in lava and ash, making it obvious that the economy will not grow because the city no longer exists.

Most situations are in a flux, as Obviousness and Randomness dialectically develop and change over time, with outcomes becoming more or less obvious or Random over time. It is vital that we, as political revolutionaries, are able to distinguish between Obviousness and Randomness and to leverage this understanding to our advantage.

c. Meaning of the Methodology

Basically, in our perception and reality, we have to base our plans, strategies, and actions as much as possible on the Obvious, not the Random. However, we must not ignore Randomness, nor try to separate the Obvious from the Random. When faced with situations which seem very Random, we must find ways to develop Obviousness. When faced with what seems obvious, we must keep an eye out for Randomness. Obviousness and Randomness can mutually transform, so we need to create suitable conditions to hinder or promote such transformation to suit our purposes.


Annotation 149

We must always remember that no situation is purely obvious, nor purely Random, and to take this into account in all of our planning and activity.

A skyscraper made from heavy steel beams may seem quite sturdy and stable; it may appear obvious that the structure will remain stable and sound for decades. However, it is still important for engineers to periodically confirm that the steel is still sound through testing and observation. Engineers must also be prepared for Random events like lightning, earthquakes, storms, etc., which may affect the seemingly obvious structural integrity of the building.

Likewise, when faced with extremely complex situations which seem completely Random, we must seek out (or bring about) the obvious. Wildfires are extremely chaotic and difficult to predict. However, firefighters can rely on certain obvious patterns and natural laws which govern the spread of fire. By digging trenches, lighting counter-fires, spraying water, and other such actions, firefighters can bring wildfires under control. This illustrates how humans are able to make situations less Random by bringing about an increasing amount of Obviousness over time through practical activity.

4. Content and Form

a. Categories of Content and Form

The Content category refers to the sum of all aspects, attributes, and processes that a thing, phenomenon, or idea is made from.

The Form category refers to the mode of existence and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. Form thus describes the system of relatively stable relationships which exist internally within things, phenomena, and ideas.


Annotation 150

Content and Form can be difficult to comprehend at first because the ways in which Content and Form manifest and interact can vary wildly depending on the subject being discussed and the viewpoint from which the subject is being considered.

Content represents the component things, materials, attributes, features, etc., which, together, make up a thing, phenomenon, or idea. You can think of it as the “ingredients” from which a subject is made.

Form refers to a stable system of internal relationships which compose a thing, phenomenon, or idea, as well as the mode of existence and development [see Annotation 60, p. 59] of those relations.

Remember that from a dialectical materialist perspective, everything in our universe is defined by internal and external relations. If a thing, phenomenon, or idea has internal relations which are relatively stable, then it has a Form.

We would not call all of the assorted ingredients which are used to make a cake “a cake” unless they have been assembled together and baked into the stable form which we interpret as “a cake.” Once a portion is removed from the cake, the portion itself assumes a new stable form which we call “a slice of cake.” The slice of cake will maintain its relatively stable form until being eaten, discarded, or otherwise transitioning into some other form. It is only considered a “slice of cake” for as long as it maintains its own specific stable form.

Stability itself is also relative: a “spray” of water may only last for a few seconds but we can still conceive of it as having Form. On the other hand, a mountain has a set of stable internal relations (a Form) which might last for millions of years.

We can think of Form as having two aspects: inner Form and outer Form.

Inner form refers to the internal stable relations which we have already discussed.

Outer form is how an object “appears” to human senses.

In this book, we are primarily concerned with the inner Form of subjects, however, in other contexts (such as art and design), the outer Form plays a more prominent role.

Now, let’s identify some of the common viewpoints from which Content and Form might be considered.

Material vs. Ideal

When discussing the material — i.e., objective systems and objects[93] — discussion of Content and Form is more straightforward.

Material

With material things and phenomena, the Content is what the thing is made out of: the physical parts, aspects, attributes, and processes that compose the subject. For example, the Content of a wooden chair might be the wood, nails, paint, and other materials which are used to create the chair.

A material object can be described in terms of content, inner form, and outer form.

The inner Form of a material object refers to stable internal relations which compose the object. The stable relationship between the wood and the nails — the nails bind the wood together, the wood is cut in certain patterns, the paint adheres to the wood through physical and chemical bonds, etc. Stability is, again, relative — over time, the paint will chip and flake, the wood will rot, the nails will rust, etc. Dialectical processes of change will eventually reduce the chair into something other than a chair (i.e., through rotting, burning, disassembly, etc.), but as long as the internal relations maintain the Form of a chair we conceive of it as a chair.

The outer Form of a material object refers to the way it appears to human consciousness. Its shape, aesthetics, etc.

Ideal

With the ideal — i.e., abstract ideas and concepts — discussion of Content and Form becomes more complicated. As Vietnam’s Marxism-Leninism Textbook for Students Who Specialize in Marxism-Leninism explains:

Many times, human consciousness has difficulty in trying to clearly define the Content of a subject — especially when the subject is an abstract idea. We often mistake Content with inner Form. Usually, in this situation, there is a strong combination and intertwining between both Content and Form. In such a situation, the Form can be referred to as the “inner Form,” or the “Content-Form.”

With physical things and phenomena, this type of Form usually belongs to a very specific Private, it doesn’t exist in any other Private, it is the Unique [see Annotation 129, p. 128].



The reason the inner Form of physical objects usually exists in Private as the Unique is because the stable internal relations of any given physical object are equivalent to the specific material components which distinguish one physical object from all other physical objects. In other words, if you have two chairs which are exact copies of each other, made from the same kind of wood, cut into the same shape, using the same type and configuration of fasteners, etc., they are still not the exact same object. The internal relations of one chair are what make it that chair and distinguish it from all other objects in the universe. The outer Form of these chairs may have many commonalities (they look similar, they have the same color, etc.), but the inner Form is what distinguishes one chair from the other.

However, within the realm of abstract ideas, there are also Forms which many abstract Privates share. In the context of abstract ideas, we call this kind of Form the “outer Form,” the “form-Form,” or the “common Form.”

When we try to define the Content of a subject which is an abstract idea, our consciousness usually tries to answer the question: “what is the subject?”

This is usually a simple matter. Take, for example, the abstract idea of “freedom.” When we try to think of the Content of freedom we can answer it pretty easily. What is the subject of freedom? It is the condition which allows humans to follow their own will, it is the absence of external coercion, etc., etc.

But, when we try to define the Form of an abstract idea, our consciousness tries to answer the question: “how is the subject?” — this is when we have to define the mode of existence (the Form) of that subject.

This is where things get more complicated. The mode of existence of an abstract idea can usually be considered to be language, since our ideas are usually expressed through language, but it can take on other modes of existence as well, such as visual media (paintings, photographs), physical motions of the human body (body language, dance), etc. This is how the field of art studies is concerned with the philosophical categories of Content and Form.

Content and Form in Art

Many readers may already be familiar with the subject of Content and Form from studying art, design, communications, and related fields. At first glance, the definitions of Content and Form may seem different from what we’ve been discussing so far.

This is because art concerns itself with abstract ideas expressed through various Forms of physical representations.

These physical representations may include physical objects (photographs, paintings, sculptures), performed and/or recorded physical activities (dance, music, theater, film), human language recorded in stable physical Forms of written language (novels, poems, stories) or spontaneously performed oral language (storytelling, impromptu spoken-word poetry).

Because the study of art is primarily concerned with interpreting and understanding ideas expressed through these physical manifestations, art is concerned with the stable inner relations of the ideas which artists imbue within their works of art — much more than the stable inner relations of the physical components of the object.

According to the Vietnamese art textbook Curriculum of General Aesthetics:

What is the Form of a work of art? Form is the way to express the Content of an artwork. Form and Content within a work of art have a strong unity with each other and they regulate each other. Form is the organization, the inner structure of the Content of an artwork. Therefore, Form is the way that the Content expresses itself, and that way is described by two features. We must ask:

First: what expresses the Content of a work of art?

Second: how is it expressed?

Art exists when two conditions are met: first, there must be a subject with an outer Form. Second, an artist must convey aesthetic meaning, or humanization, of that subject. This aesthetic meaning is the Content.

So, in studying works of art, we are less concerned with the physical content of the artwork (the canvas, paint, etc.) than we are with the abstract content of the artwork (the ideas which the artist imbues within the artwork).

As for Form, the inner Form of art represents the stable internal relations which compose the art (both ideal, i.e., the stable internal relations of the abstract ideas imbued within the art by the artist, as well as physical, i.e., the stable internal relations of the physical media of the art).

The outer Form of art represents how our human senses perceive the art, such as composition techniques, the use of color, etc.

The chart below breaks down the differences in a general, non-artistic viewpoint of physical objects and processes in materialist dialectical terms (i.e., the viewpoint an engineer might have), as compared with the artistic viewpoint of physical objects and processes (which an art critic might have). Some fields, such as designing products for human use, might draw from both viewpoints.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-54.png

Content and Form in Specific Artistic Media

Every medium of art will interpret Content and Form in its own way. For example:

Literature is a specific art discipline which deals with recorded human language in the Form of writing. In written literature, the Content would be the ideas expressed in a piece of writing; what the words say. The inner Form would be the way the ideas relate to each other — i.e., story structure, pacing, character development, etc. The outer form would be the physical format of the writing — i.e., manuscript, magazine article, paperback book, ebook, etc.

Painting is a specific art discipline in which pigments are applied to objects to create images which convey ideas and emotions. In painting, the Content would be the meaning which an artist embodies in a work of art. The inner Form would include the stable internal relations within the artwork (i.e., the bonds and mixtures between the pigments, the canvas, etc.), while the outer Form would be how the artwork appears to human senses (composition, aesthetics, etc.). Generally speaking, the creator of the art will have to make decisions about the inner Form (i.e., selection of oil vs. acrylic vs. watercolor, selection of shade, tint, and hue, physical brush strokes, etc.) so as to produce the desired outer Form (the way the finished artwork will appear to viewers).

Theater is a specific art discipline in which human beings perform physical actions and use their voices to convey ideas to an audience. In theater, the Content includes the ideas which are being presented, such as the script, the musical score, the story, the performance choices of actors, costumes, props, etc. The inner Form would include the stable relations between the members of the cast, the director, the physical stage, the lighting, etc., and the outer Form would be the way the play appears to the audience.

These are just some examples. Each medium of expression will have its own variations in how Content and Form are considered.

Engels described the manifestation of Content and Form in Dialectics of Nature:

The whole of organic nature is one continuous proof of the identity or inseparability of form and content. Morphological and physiological phenomena, form and function, mutually determine one another. The differentiation of form (the cell) determines differentiation of substance into muscle, skin, bone, epithelium, etc., and the differentiation of substance in turn determines difference of form.

Content and Form are discussed frequently in analysis of human social systems and objective relations which occur within society. For example, Marx made many criticial insights into economics by analyzing and explaining the form of value [see Annotation 14, p. 16] under capitalism.

Indeed, the entire capitalist system can be viewed in terms of content and form. The current form of human civilization is capitalism. That is to say, capitalism is the stable set of relations and characteristis of the current political economy which dominates the planet. The content of capitalism includes all the components of the base and superstructure, including the various classes (capitalists, working class, etc.), the means of production, government institutions, corporate institutions, etc. All of these elements are configured together into the relatively stable form which we call “capitalism.”

Other Viewpoints of Content and Form

Of course, there are many other viewpoints for discussing Content and Form of abstract ideas. Every philosophical field will have its own unique ways of utilizing Content and Form analysis. One example is the concept of Content and Form in legal philosophy. Vietnamese legal expert Dinh Thuy Dung writes:

The law has internal and external forms:

The inner Form is the internal structure of the law, the relationships and the connections between the elements constituting the law. The inner Form of the law is called the legal structure, which includes the constituent parts of the legal system such as the branch of law, legal institutions, and legal norms.

The outer Form is the manifestation, or mode of existence, of the law. In other words, the outer Form of the law is how we view and understand the law [i.e., who enforces the law and what repercussions will occur if we violate the law]. Based on the outer Form of the law, one can know how it exists in reality, and where and to whom it applies. The external Form of the law is also approached in relation to its Content.

According to this understanding, the Content of the law includes all the elements that make up the law, while the Form of the law is understood as the elements which contain or express the Content.

If you understand that the Content of the law is the will of the state, then the legal Form is the way of expressing the will of the state.

There are countless other ways in which Content and Form can be used to analyze and understand things, phenomena, and ideas. We hope that these examples have given you a better idea of the various ways in which Content and Form can be used to understand the world. In general, socialist texts deal with the inner Form of things, phenomena, and ideas. That is to say, the inner relations which compose the subject being considered. The outer form — how things appear to our senses — tends to be less relevant in analysis of human social systems, though it is often important in consideration of specialized fields of revolutionary activity such as aesthetics, propaganda, etc.

b. Dialectical relationship between Content and Form

Content and Form have a strong dialectical relationship with one other. There is no Form that does not contain any Content. Simultaneously, there is no Content that does not exist in a specific Form. The same Content can manifest in many Forms and a Form can contain many Contents.

The relationship between Content and Form is a dialectical relationship in which Content decides Form and Form can impact Content.


Annotation 151

For example, if you want to make a table, and all you have available are wood and nails, then that Content (the wood and the nails) will determine the Form the table ends up taking. You are going to end up with a wooden table, and it will therefore have to have certain characteristics of Form.

When Content changes, the Form must change accordingly. If, instead of wood, you have iron, then the table you end up building will have a much different Form. Form can also influence the Content, but not nearly as much as Content determines Form. For instance, if you have wood and nails, but you develop a technique for building a table that doesn’t need any nails, then the result (a wooden table without any nails) would be an example of a development in Form reflecting as a change in Content.

The main tendency of Content is change. On the other hand, Form is relatively stable in every thing and phenomenon. As Content changes, Form must change accordingly. However, Content and Form are not always perfectly aligned.


Annotation 152

Since all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly changing, it stands to reason that the internal components (things, phenomena, and ideas, and their relations) which compose the Content of a subject will constantly be undergoing processes of change and development. Thus, we say that the tendency of Content is change. Since the Form is based on the internal relations of the components of Content, it stands to reason that a change in Content will lead to change in Form. These kinds of changes in Content and Form also occur through the dialectical process: changes in quantity lead to changes in quality [see Annotation 117, p. 119].

Quantity changes in Content lead to quality shifts in Form.

As soon as a wooden chair is finished being built, the paint is already beginning to degrade. The wood is already beginning to rot. The iron nails are already beginning to rust. These changes may be imperceptibly slow — they may even take centuries to occur, if the chair is kept in a hospitable environment — but the changes are occurring, quantitatively, over time, none-the-less.

Eventually, changes in quantity will lead to changes in quality. At some point, the chair might weaken and begin to wobble whenever it’s sat in. Human beings might recognize this quality and begin to think of it as a “wobbly chair.” The chair might degrade to the point where it can’t be safely used at all, in which case it will have quality shifted into a “broken chair.” If the chair is repaired, that would represent another quality shift. If it is used for firewood, that would be another quality shift.

Keep in mind that changes in Form do not directly cause changes in Content. If you disassemble a wooden chair into the constituent wood and nails, the wood and nails remain more or less unchanged. But if you burn a wooden chair, it’s the change in Content which leads to the change in Form from “chair” to “pile of ash.”

Form simply represents the stable relationships between the component parts of the subject’s Content. The only way to change Form is to change those inner relations, or to change the components which are relating. There is no way to change Form without changing the Content, and changing the Content changes the Form by definition.

Content determines Form, but Form is not fully decided by Content, and Form can impact back on Content. If a Form is suitable with its Content, it can improve the development of its Content. If a Form is not suitable with its Content, it can constrain the development of its Content.


Annotation 153

The dialectical relationship between Content and Form is somewhat similar to the dialectical relationship between the material and the ideal (see Matter and Consciousness,

p. 88). Just as the material world determines consciousness while consciousness impacts the material world, the Content of a subject determines the Form while the Form impacts the Content.

Suitability describes the applicability of a subject for a specific application or role. Whether or not something is “suitable” or not can be highly subjective (i.e., which music would be “suitable” to play at a party), or it can be more objective (i.e., what kind of batteries to use with an electronic device).

We might say that hardwood is “suitable” Content for the Form of a chair because it is durable, strong, relatively inexpensive, and long-lasting. It might be “unsuitable” to have a chair made of hardwood if it is to be used as an office chair, because the hard surfaces might cause strain and discomfort. However, we can utilize conscious activity to adjust and develop suitability between Content and Form. Changing the Content by adding cushioning or padding might make the Content and Form more suitable with each other. Similarly, changing the Form by designing contours and adding adjustability to the chair might make the Content and Form more suitable with each other for their intended application as an office chair.

If a Form is not suitable with the Content, it restrains the development of the Content. Just think of a shovel (Form) made of wood (Content), which will degrade very rapidly over time, vs. a shovel (Form) made of steel (Content) which will last much longer. This works in both directions. Consider the Content of drinking cups: a porcelain cup might last for a long time and even develop positively over time (by acquiring a desirable patina), while a cup made out of mild steel would not be desirable, as it would be highly prone to rust from extended use containing liquids.

c. Meaning of the Methodology

Content and Form always have a dialectical relationship with each other. Therefore, in our perception and practice, we must not try to separate Content and Form, nor should we solely focus on one and ignore the other.

Because Content determines Form, whenever we are considering a thing, phenomenon, or idea, we must base our consideration first on its Content. If we want to change a thing or phenomenon, we have to change its Content first.

In reality, we must promote the positive impact of Form on Content by making the Form fit the Content. Likewise, we must also change the Form that is no longer suitable with its Content and therefore constrains the development of its Content.


Annotation 154

In any analysis, it is very important that we carefully consider whether or not Content and Form are suitable with each other in our own projects and activities. We can learn a lot about suitability from observation and practice (see Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism, p. 204) and improve suitability through conscious activity.

Marx believed that it is vital to consider Content and Form when analyzing human society and political economy. One of his core critiques of political economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo was a failure to consider Content and Form when it comes to value, commodities, and money. He discusses this extensively in Capital Volume 1, as in this excerpt:

The value-form, whose fully developed shape is the money-form, is very elementary and simple. Nevertheless, the human mind has for more than 2,000 years sought in vain to get to the bottom of it all, whilst on the other hand, to the successful analysis of much more composite and complex forms, there has been at least an approximation. Why? Because the body, as an organic whole, is more easy of study than are the cells of that body. In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both.

Marx, here, is saying that studying the economy is more difficult than studying the human body because it can’t be physically observed and dissected. Rather, we have to rely on abstraction, which leaves us prone to making many more mistakes in analyzing Content and Form.

But in bourgeois society, the commodity-form of the product of labour – or value-form of the commodity – is the economic cell-form. To the superficial observer, the analysis of these forms seems to turn upon minutiae. It does in fact deal with minutiae, but they are of the same order as those dealt with in microscopic anatomy.

Marx’s analysis of capitalism relies to great extent upon recognizing the commodity-form of the product (Content) of labor. Labor existed long before capitalism. Labor has existed for as long as humans have worked to change our own material conditions. But under capitalism, labor specifically takes on the Form of a commodity which is bought by capitalists. This becomes the basis for Marx’s entire critique of capitalism.

Obviously, there is much more to Marx’s use of Content and Form in analyzing capitalism and human society, but this should hopefully give you some idea of the importance of Content and Form in analysis of human society and revolutionary activity.


5. Essence and Phenomenon

a. Categories of Essence and Phenomenon

The Essence category refers to the synthesis of all the internal aspects as well as the obvious and stable relations that define the existence, motion and development of things, phenomena, and ideas.

The Phenomenon category refers to the external manifestation of those internal aspects and relations in specific conditions.


Annotation 155

Understanding Essence and Phenomena can be challenging at first, but it is very important for materialist dialectical analysis.

Essence should not be confused with Form. Form represents the stable internal relations of the component content of a subject, whereas Essence represents the synthesis of all internal aspects as well as all obvious and stable attributes which define the existence, motion, and development of a subject.

Phenomena are simply external manifestations of a subject which occur in specific conditions.

The Essence of a subject is not dependent on conditions, whereas in different conditions, the same subject will exhibit different Phenomena. For example, COVID-19 is, essentially, a specific virus strain. That is to say, all of the internal aspects and stable relations that define the existence, motion, and development of COVID-19 are synthesized as a virus which we call COVID-19.

The Phenomena of COVID-19 which we can observe in patients would include symptoms such as fever, coughing, trouble breathing, etc.

The Essence of a cloud is water vapor in the atmosphere: that is the synthesis, the coming-together, of all the internal stable relations and aspects which will determine how a cloud exists, moves, and develops over time.

The Phenomena of clouds are all the things we can sense: the appearance of big fluffy white things in the air, shadows on the ground, and, sometimes, rain.

Essence defines Phenomenon: the internal attributes and stable relations will produce the Phenomena which we can observe. A cloud is not essentially defined as a fluffy white thing in the air; that is just the appearance a cloud has to our human senses in certain specific conditions.

b. Dialectical relationship between Essence and Phenomenon

Essence and Phenomenon both exist objectively as two unified but opposing sides.

The unity between Essence and Phenomenon: Essence always manifests through Phenomena, and every Phenomenon is always the manifestation of a specific Essence. There is no pure Essence that exists separately from Phenomena and there is no Phenomenon that does not manifest from any kind of Essence.

When Essence changes, Phenomena also change accordingly. When Essence appears, Phenomena also appear, and when Essence disappears, Phenomena also disappear. Therefore, Lenin said: “The Essence appears. The appearance is essential.”[94]

The Opposition of Essence and Phenomenon: Essence is that which defines a thing, Phenomenon, or idea, while Phenomena are diversified and conditional. Essence is internal, while Phenomena are external. Essence is relatively stable, while Phenomena continuously change.


Annotation 156

Essence and Phenomenon are simultaneously unified and opposite because neither can exist without the other, yet they have completely opposite features from one another.

Discussing the Essence and Phenomena of physical objects is relatively straight-forward. The Essence will typically encompass the physical object or system itself. For example, a car engine is essentially a machine; that is to say, the synthesis of all the internal aspects (the engine parts) as well as the obvious and stable relations (the relations between the parts of the engine; how they are assembled and work together in the engine system) that define the existence, motion and development of the engine (the way it works) are what essentially make it a car engine. All of these essential characteristics are internal, relatively stable, and remain the same regardless of the condition of the engine (i.e., they continue to exist whether the engine is turned on, turned off, inoperable, etc.).

The Phenomena of the car engine are all the things that we can sense from it, but this can vary a great deal depending on conditions. When the car engine is turned off, it will be silent. It may be cool to the touch. It will be at rest. If the engine is turned on, the parts will move, it will become hot, it will make noise. In some situations it might smoke or even catch on fire. All of these Phenomena are conditional, unstable, and external to the engine itself.

With ideas and abstract thought, Essence and Phenomenon becomes more difficult to determine and analyze. Lenin discussed this in his Philosophical Notebooks, beginning with a quote from Hegel:

Dialectics in general is “the pure movement of thought in Notions“ (i.e., putting it without the mysticism of idealism: human concepts are not fixed but are eternally in movement, they pass into one another, they flow into one another, otherwise they do not reflect living life.

Knowing that Hegel was an idealist, Lenin wanted to strip all idealism from his conception of dialectics, and thus made it clear that “the pure movement of thought” simply refers to the fact that human thoughts are constantly changing, always in motion, within the living human mind, writing:

The analysis of concepts, the study of them, the “art of operating with them” (Engels) always demands study of the movement of concepts, of their interconnection, of their mutual transitions).

This is a description of materialist dialectical analysis of human thought. We must understand that human thoughts are always in motion, always developing, and always mutually impacting other thoughts.

In particular, dialectics is the study of the opposition of the Thing-in-itself, of the essence, substratum, substance — from the appearance, from “Being-for-Others.” (Here, too, we see a transition, a flow from the one to the other: the essence appears. The appearance is essential.) Human thought goes endlessly deeper from appearance to essence, from essence of the first order, as it were, to essence of the second order, and so on without end.

This is where Lenin introduces the concept of Essence and Phenomenon (or “appearance,” as Lenin puts it) as simultaneously oppositional and in unity. Essence refers to the qualities and nature of the “thing-in-itself” (its internal components, relations, etc.) while Phenomena represents “being-for-others” (that which external observers can sense or witness of a subject). However, as Lenin notes, Essence and Phenomena have a dialectical relationship with each other — a “flow from the one to the other.” The Essence “appears” by exuding Phenomena which we can sense.

Conscious thoughts also have Essence and Phenomena of their own. With thought, the development from Essence to Phenomena is constant and inevitable. The Essence of each thought leads to thought-Phenomena which develop in turn into the Essence of new thoughts in a constant flow.

In this sense, Essence and Phenomenon of abstract thought is somewhat different from Essence and Phenomenon of physical objects, but physical objects can have this same dialectical pattern of development. For example, the emissions from the engine of a car can be considered Phenomena of the engine, but as these Phenomena build up in the air (along with the emissions from many other cars), they can develop into a physical subject with a new Essence of its own, which we call “air pollution.”

We can also think of the light which comes from the sun. The light itself can be thought of as Phenomena of the sun, but the light energy can be captured by a solar panel and converted into energy, creating a new subject with its own Essence which we would describe as “solar energy.” In this sense, it is possible for Phenomena to have Phenomena. If you witness light waves in the desert which cause an optical illusion, then the illusion is a Phenomenon of the light waves (the light waves being the Essence which exuded the Phenomenon of illusion), and the light waves are the Phenomena of the sun (the essential subject which exudes the Phenomena of the light waves).

Essence and Phenomena can also be contextual. In some contexts, physical objects which have their own Essence (and Phenomena) may be the Phenomena of some other entity. For example, archaeologists can’t observe prehistoric civilizations directly. They can only study the things which are left behind. In this sense, we can think of an archaeological artifact, like a stone tool, as a Phenomenon of a prehistoric civilization. The tool has its own Essence and Phenomena, but it is also itself a Phenomenon. A single stone tool can’t tell archaeologists much about an ancient civilization, however, archaeologists can gather many Phenomena (tools, structural ruins, nearby animal bones and seeds, human remains, etc.) to look for patterns which reveal more insights about the Essence of the prehistoric civilization which exuded those Phenomena.

Dialectics in the proper sense is the study of contradiction in the very essence of objects: not only are appearances transitory, mobile, fluid, demarcated only by conventional boundaries, but the essence of things is so as well.

Lenin, here, points out that proper analysis hinges on understanding the Essence of a subject, since the Phenomena are fleeting and subject to change. Most notably, we should look for contradictions within the subject (see Definition of Contradiction and Common Characteristics of Contradiction, p. 175), because contradictions are what drive dialectical development of a subject over time.


c. Meaning of the Methodology

If we want to be accurately aware of things, phenomena, and ideas, we must not just stop at studying their Phenomena, we have to study their Essence. Only through examining many Phenomena of a subject can we fully and correctly understand the Essence of said subject.


Annotation 157

With physical objects, we must study the Phenomena to know anything about a subject, since Phenomena is, by definition, that which we can observe. Only through systematic, repeated observations can we come to understand the Essence of the object which exudes the Phenomena. Because Phenomena can change based on conditions, we must observe Phenomena under various conditions in a systematic way. This is the basis of all scientific inquiry.

This is also true for analyzing aspects of human society. To understand a social system, we must observe its Phenomena systematically over time and look for patterns which form under various conditions. We must also keep in mind that social systems develop and change over time, and so the Essence might develop with or without changes in certain Phenomena. For example, the phenomena of the United States of America have changed significantly over the years. The national flag, military uniforms, seals, and other iconography have changed throughout the history of the USA. Similarly, there have been many presidents, and the government and constitution have also been through many changes. That said, the essential nature of the USA’s political economy has not changed significantly since its foundation; the USA has been a capitalist bourgeois democracy since the beginning and remains so to this day. Regardless of which bourgeois-dominated political party holds power in the white house and congress — Whig, Republican, Democrat, or otherwise — the essential nature of the USA as a capitalist bourgeois democracy has remained the same.

According to Lenin: “Human thought goes endlessly deeper from appearance to essence, from essence of the first order, as it were, to essence of the second order, and so on, without end.[95] On the other hand, Essence is what defines a thing, phenomenon, or idea. Therefore, in our perception and practice, we must recognize a thing, phenomenon, or idea based on its Essence, not its Phenomena, to evaluate it correctly, and after that, we can make fundamental improvements.


Annotation 158

For example: Thousands of years ago, people observed that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west everyday. Based on these Phenomena, many human civilizations developed the belief that the Essence of our solar system was that the earth was the center of the universe and the sun rotated around it. Today, thanks to scientific observation and practice, we have proven that the sun is the center of the solar system and that the earth is rotating around it, which is totally opposite to what many believed hundreds of years ago. In this case, the initially observed Phenomena were misleading, and it was only by getting a better grasp of the essential nature of the solar system that we could better comprehend its functioning.

It is usually easy to observe Phenomena (since they are defined by being observable) but it’s also easy to misunderstand relationships between Essence and Phenomena. Sometimes people get a false perception of Essence from real Phenomena, such as believing the Sun revolves around the Earth. Sometimes people attribute the wrong Phenomena to Essences as well, such as believing that all poor people are lazy.

Phenomena can easily be mistaken for essence. For example, bourgeois liberal political parties often portray themselves as being pro-worker and therefore exhibit phenomena such as rhetoric, slogans, propaganda, and even platform positions which appeal to workers. These phenomena may confuse many into believing that they are workers’ parties when, in reality, they are essentially dominated by the capitalist class. The reverse can also occur. For example, workers may be fooled into believing that a ruthless capitalist politician or celebrity is “working class at heart,” falsely believing that the capitalist’s class position is merely a phenomenon when in fact it is essential.

Understanding true Essence based on real Phenomena is one of the most important aspects of analysis. It is the primary realm of science. In politics, misunderstanding or mischaracterizing Essence and Phenomena can reinforce false beliefs about the way society works which can lead to promulgation of dangerous and reactionary ideologies like neoliberalism and fascism amidst the working class. For this reason, we must avoid examining Phenomena alone. We have to dive deep to discover and understand the essential nature of things, phenomena, and ideas in our analysis.

6. Possibility and Reality

a. Categories of Possibility and Reality

The Possibility category refers to things that have not happened nor existed in reality yet, but that would happen, or would exist given necessary conditions.

The Reality category refers to things that exist or have existed in reality and in human thought.

b. Dialectical Relationship Between Possibility and Reality

Possibility and Reality have a unified and inseparable relationship: Possibility can transform into Reality and Reality contains new Possibility; any given Possibility, under specific conditions, can transform into Reality.

Given specific conditions, there could be one or many possibilities for the development of any given thing, phenomenon, or idea: practical Possibility, random Possibility, obvious Possibility, abstract Possibility, near Possibility, far Possibility, etc.


Annotation 159

Excerpt From Marxism-Leninism Textbook of Students Who Specialize in Marxism-Leninism

Editor’s notes in [brackets]

Reality has many aspects. It also has many tendencies of development. These aspects and tendencies of Reality have different roles and positions in the development process of Reality. For example, manifesting any given Possibility into Reality requires us to change a specific subject from one status to a different status. Some subjects are easier to transform and others are more difficult to transform. Some require us to change quality, others only require quantity changes [see Annotation 117, p. 119].

Because Reality has many aspects and tendencies of development, it is useful to classify Possibility. There are at least four types of Possibility, in two separate categories.

[The categorization below draws a distinction between the obvious and the practical.

The obvious is that which will certainly occur. If you drop an object, it will obviously fall. The practical is that which we certainly could make occur through human will. If you are holding an object, you could practically drop it.]

Obvious Possibility and Random Possibility [see: Obviousness and Randomness, p. 144].

Obvious Possibility refers to Possibility that will happen, because conditions to make it happen are set in place so that the Possibility developing into Reality is unavoidable.

[If the conditions arise for a hurricane to form, it eventually becomes obvious that a hurricane will form.]

Random Possibility is Possibility which may or may not happen depending on how external factors develop, our actions, the actions of others, etc. [Whether or not a hurricane may develop on any given day is, from our human perspective, random, since we do not have any technology to cause or prevent the development of hurricanes. Other events may be more or less random. We can, for instance, prepare for an incoming hurricane to minimize the risk of harm to human communities.]

Second, based on the practical relationships between subjects, we have:

Practical Possibility vs. Abstract Possibility:

Practical Possibility means that conditions in Reality which could make something happen are already in place. [If you have all the ingredients, knowledge, and equipment needed to make a pie, you could make a pie. The material conditions are in place.]

Abstract Possibility is Possibility which may become Reality in the future but the conditions which would make this Possibility become Reality have not yet developed.

[It is an abstract Possibility that you could make a pie, even if you don’t have the tools, ingredients, or knowledge. It is possible, in the abstract, that you could buy the ingredients and equipment and learn the necessary skills to make a pie. Near Possibility simply refers to Possibility which may become Reality in the shorter term, far Possibility refers to things which may happen in a more distant future, relative to the subject being discussed.]


In social life, in order to transform a Possibility into Reality, there must be objective conditions and subjective factors. Subjective factors include the ability of humans to change Possibility into Reality. Objective conditions refer to the situations needed to make such a change occur. [In other words, humans are able to subjectively change possibility into reality, but only when the objective circumstances exist in the external world.]

c. Meaning of the Methodology

We must base our perception and practice on Reality.

Lenin said: “Marxism takes its stand on the facts, and not on possibilities. A Marxist must, as the foundation of his policy, put [forth] only precisely and unquestionably demonstrated facts.”[96]

However, in our perception and practice, we also need to comprehensively recognize possibilities which could arise from Reality. This will allow us to develop methods of practical operation which are suitable to changes and developments which might occur. We must actively make use of subjective factors in perception and practice to turn Possibility into Reality whenever it would serve our purposes.


Annotation 160

This idea is perhaps best exemplified in the traditional Vietnamese proverb: “you can’t just open your mouth and wait for fruit to drop into your mouth.” We have to actively apply our will, through practice and labor, to develop the best possibilities into manifested Reality. See more about subjective factors in Annotation 207, p. 202.

IV. Basic Laws of Materialist Dialectics

Laws are the regular, common, obvious, natural, and objective relations between internal aspects, factors, and attributes of a thing or phenomenon or between things and phenomena.

There are many types of laws in this world and they all have different prevalence, reach, characteristics, and roles in regard to the motion and development processes of things and phenomena in nature, society, and human thought. So, it is necessary to classify different laws for humans to understand and apply them effectively into practical activities. Classifying laws based on prevalence, we have: private laws, common laws, and universal laws [see: Private and Common, p. 128].

Private laws are laws that only apply to a specific range of things and phenomena. For example: laws of mechanical motion, laws of chemical motion, laws of biological motion, etc.

Common laws are laws that apply to a broader range of subjects than private laws, and they impact many different subjects. For instance: the law of preservation of mass, the law of preservation of energy, etc.

Universal laws are laws that impact every aspect of nature, society, and human thought. Materialist dialectics is the study of these universal laws.

If we classify laws based on the reach of impact, we will have three main groups: laws of nature, laws of society, and laws of human thought.

Laws of nature are laws that arise in the natural world, including within the human body. They are not products of human conscious activities.

Laws of society are the laws of human activity in social relations; these laws only apply to the conscious activities of humans, yet they are still objective.


Annotation 161

We have already discussed how relations between human beings are objective [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. By extension, the human relations which compose human societies are objective, and thus, any laws which govern objective human relations must also be objective.

Marx’s assertion that human social relations are objective is critical to understanding his work. Marx pointed out that social relations may not be “physical,” in the sense that they can’t be observed directly with human senses, but that they still have an objective character — they exist externally to a given subject, and they have objective impacts on reality. For instance, the class relations between the capitalist class and the working class result in objective manifestations in reality, such as wealth accumulation, modes of circulation, etc.

Laws of human thought are laws of the intrinsic relationships between concepts, categories, judgments, inference, and the development process of human rational awareness.

As the science of common relations and development, materialist dialectics studies the universal laws that influence the entire natural world, human society, and human thought, all together as a whole.

These universal laws are:

  • The law of transformation between quantity and quality.
  • The law of unification and contradiction between opposites.
  • The law of negation of negation.

Annotation 162

Each of these laws is considered universal because they apply to all things, phenomena, and ideas, and all the internal and external relations thereof, in human perception and practice. All things, phenomena, and ideas change and develop as a result of mutual impacts and relationships in accordance with these universal laws. On a fundamental level, materialist dialectics is the study of these universal laws and their utility.

1. Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality

The law of transformation between quantity and quality is a universal law which concerns the universal mode of motion and development processes of nature, society, and human thought.


Annotation 163

Remember that mode refers to how something exists, functions, and develops [see Annotation 60, p. 59]. The universal mode of motion and development processes thus refers to how all things, ideas, and phenomena move, change, and develop.

Friedrich Engels defined the law of transformation between quantity and quality in Dialectics of Nature:

The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy).

In other words, quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas lead to quality shifts.


The universal mode of motion and development processes follows the law of transformation between quantity and quality, which states:

Qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of the quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and, ideas; and, vice versa: quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas.


Annotation 164

Put simply: quantity changes develop into quality changes, and quality changes lead to quantity changes [see Annotation 117, p. 119]. We say that these changes to quantity and quality occur on the “inevitable basis” of one another because quality changes always, invariably, arise from quantity changes, and, likewise, quantity changes always, invariably, arise from quality changes.

Just as quantity shifts lead to quality shifts, it is also true that quality shifts lead to quantity shifts. For example, if you have 11 donuts, then add 1 donut, you now have 1 dozen donuts. If you add 12 more donuts, you would then have 2 dozen.

Another example of quality shift leading to quantity shift would be a pond filling with rain water. Once enough drops of water collect and the pond is considered full — that is to say, once it is considered to be “a pond” of water — we will no longer think of the pond in terms of “drops.” We would think of the pond as “filled,” “overfilled,” “underfilled,” etc.

Note that both of these examples are related to our human perceptions and understanding of the material world. The material world does not change based on our perceptions, nor how we classify the quantity or quality of a given subject. There are also objective aspects related to quality shifts leading to quantity shifts. For example, if we adjust the quantity of the temperature of a sheet of paper to the point of burning, and the paper burns, then the quantity of paper would be reduced from one sheet to zero sheets. In other words, the quality shift arising from temperature quantity increase (i.e., the paper burning into ash) results in a quantity shift in how many pieces of paper exist (from one sheet to zero sheets). However, even this is ultimately a subjective assessment rooted in human consciousness, since we subjectively think in terms of “sheets of paper,” and the concept of a “sheet of paper” is essentially a classification rooted in human consciousness. It is merely an abstract way of perceiving and considering the quantity and quality of the material subject which we think of as “paper.”

The law of transformation between quantity and quality is an inevitable, objective, and universal relationship that repeats in every motion and development process of all things, phenomena, and ideas in nature, human society, and human thought.

a. Definitions of Quality and Quantity

- Definition of Quality

Quality refers to the organic unity which exists amongst the component parts of a thing, phenomenon, or idea that distinguishes it from other things, phenomena, and ideas.


Annotation 165

Note: we have already given basic definitions of quantity and quality in Annotation 117, p. 119. What follows are more comprehensive philosophical definitions of quality and quantity. Our world exists as one continuity of matter. All things and phenomena in our universe exist essentially as one unified system — namely, the entity which we call “the universe.” This unified nature of existence is extremely difficult for human beings to comprehend. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel pointed out that, in this sense, the unity of “pure being” is indistinguishable from “nothingness.” In Science of Logic, Hegel noted that if we try to comprehend pure material existence, as a whole, without distinguishing any component thing or phenomenon from any other, then all is incomprehensible. Human consciousness needs to delineate and distinguish the component parts of this unified system from each other in order to make sense of it all.

Pure light and pure darkness are two voids which are the same thing. Something can be distinguished only in determinate light or darkness... [F]or this reason, it is only darkened light and illuminated darkness which have within themselves the moment of difference and are, therefore, determinate being.

The human mind has evolved to perceive various things, phenomena, and ideas as differentiated. Quality is the basis on which we perceive subjects as distinct from one another. Every thing, phenomenon, and idea is composed of internal components and relations. The unity of these internal components and relations is what we refer to as quality. For example, a human being’s quality refers to the unity of all the internal components and relationships of which the human being is composed (i.e., the cells, organs, blood, etc., as well as the thoughts, memories, etc., which make the human) in unity. Quality is also a subjective phenomenon: a reflection of the material world in human consciousness [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. Therefore we may conceive of various qualities for the same subject. We can think of 12 donuts as “a box of donuts,” “a dozen donuts,” or as 12 individual donuts. We could consider a building as “one apartment building” or “forty apartments,” depending on the viewpoint of analysis.


So, objective and inherent attributes form the quality of things, phenomena, and ideas, but we must not confuse quality and attribute with one another. Every thing, phenomenon, and idea has both fundamental and non-fundamental attributes. Only fundamental attributes constitute the quality of things, phenomena and ideas. When the fundamental attributes change, the quality also changes. The distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental attributes of things, phenomena, and ideas must depend on the purpose of the analysis; the same attribute may be fundamental when analyzing with one purpose but non-fundamental when analyzing with another purpose.


Annotation 166

Whether or not an attribute is considered “fundamental” depends entirely on conscious perspective. For example, one baker may consider chocolate chips to be “fundamental” for baking cookies while another baker may not. This subjective characteristic of what might be considered “fundamental” or not is reflected in how we consider quality. If you are trying to determine how much water you need to fill a swimming pool, you may think of a pool in terms of size (i.e., “this is an Olympic sized pool”), but if you just want to go for a swim, you are likely to just think in terms of the water level (i.e., “the pool is empty, we can’t swim”).

If you are planning the construction of a school and want to know how many classrooms it will need, you might think in terms of “classrooms of students.” But if you are considering funding for a school year, you might consider the total number of students.

The quality of a thing, phenomenon, or idea is determined by the qualities of its component parts.


Annotation 167

Qualities are composed of qualities, combined, in unity. “A swimming pool” may consist of a certain amount of concrete in a specific configuration combined with 5,000 gallons of water. A car may be composed of a body, an engine, four tires, etc. Each individual component exists as a quality — a unity of component attributes — in and of itself.

Quality is also determined by the structures and connections between component parts which manifest in specific relations. Therefore, distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental attributes is also relative.


Annotation 168

It’s not just the component parts of a subject which define its quality, but also the relations of those component parts. For instance, a quantity of wood and nails configured in one set of structural relations may have the quality of a chair, whereas the same component parts arranged with different structures and relations may have the quality of a table. In this sense, quality can be thought of as a synthesis of the Content and Form [see Content and Form, p. 147] of a thing, phenomenon, or idea from a certain perspective.

For example, if we see two shoes, we may think of each shoe as an individual qualitative object (two shoes). On the other hand, we may think of the shoes, together, as a single qualitative “object” in terms of its utility and in terms of synthesis of content and form (“a pair of shoes”), so much so that if one shoe is lost then the remaining shoe is considered useless and discarded as trash.

Because there are countless ways in which quality — the configuration and relations and composition of constituent parts of any given subject — can manifest, we must recognize that quality itself, based on the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental attributes, is a relative and subjective phenomenon of human consciousness.

Any given subject will have multiple qualities, depending on the relations which exist between and within that subject and other subjects.


Annotation 169

Any thing, phenomenon, or idea may be perceived from various different perspectives which would cause us to consider it as having different qualities. A single shoe may be considered as: a shoe, 3 pounds of leather, half of a pair, etc., depending on its internal and external relations and the perspective of the person considering the shoe.

We can’t consider things, phenomena, and ideas apart from quality. Quality exhibits a subject’s relative stability.


Annotation 170

Remember that quality is the way in which the human mind conceives of the world as a collection of distinct things, phenomena, and ideas. These perceptions of quality are purely relative, but they are important, because they are what allow us to develop an understanding of the complicated system of things, phenomena, and ideas which make up our universe. In our perception, quality represents the relative stability of a thing, phenomenon, or idea which makes it a subject that we can consider and analyze in and of itself. Understanding how we distinguish between different subjects is crucial in developing a scientific understanding of the world which is rooted in observation and practice.

- Definition of Quantity

Quantity refers to the amount or extent of specific attributes of a thing, phenomenon, or idea, including but not limited to:

  • The amount of component parts.
  • Scale or size.
  • Speed or rhythm of motion.

A thing, phenomenon, or idea can have many quantities, with each quantity determined by different criteria. [i.e., a car may be measured by many criteria of quantity, such as: length in meters, weight in kilograms, speed in kilometers per hour, etc.]

Quality and quantity embody two different aspects of the same subject. Both quality and quantity exist objectively [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. However, the distinction between “quality” and “quantity” in the process of perceiving things, phenomena, and ideas has only relative significance: an attribute may be considered “quantity” from one perspective but “quality” from another perspective.


Annotation 171

If you are filling a box with a dozen donuts, then once you add the 12th donut, one “dozen” may represent the quality which you seek. From the perspective of a customer buying donuts for a party, “dozen” may represent the “quantity.” In other words, you need to make an order (quality) of three dozen donuts (quantity). And the manager of the store, at the end of the day, may tally twenty orders (quantity) as the day’s sales goal (quality). Quantity and quality, therefore, are both considered relatively, based on perspective and the purpose of analysis at hand.

b. Dialectical Relationship Between Quantity and Quality

Every thing, phenomenon, and idea exists as a unity of two aspects: quality and quantity. Quantity and quality do not exist separate from one another. Quantity and quality dialectically and mutually impact one other. Changes in quantity lead to changes in quality. However, not every change in quantity will cause a change in quality.


Annotation 172

In order for quantity change to lead to quality change, a certain amount must be met.

This amount is called the threshold, which is explained further below in this section. A threshold may be exact and known (i.e., it takes exactly 12 donuts to make a dozen donuts) or it may be relative and unknown (i.e., a certain quantity of air inflated into a balloon may cause it to burst, but the exact, specific quantity of air may be relative to other factors such as air temperature and may be unknown to the observer until the balloon actually bursts).

With any given subject, there will be a range of quantity changes which can accumulate without leading to change in quality. This range is called the quantity range.

Quantity range is defined as a relationship between quantity and quality: the range of intervals in which the change in quantity does not substantially change the quality of a given subject. Within the limits of a quantity range, the subject retains the same quality.


Annotation 173

The quantity range is a range of quantities between quality shifts.

Quantity range can be thought of as the range of quantities which exists between thresholds. For instance, between the qualities of “one donut” and “one dozen donuts,” there is a quantity range of 10 donuts (2 donuts through 11 donuts) which can be added before the quality shifts to “one dozen donuts.” You can keep adding additional donuts, up to the quantity of 11 donuts, without reaching the threshold of quality shift to “one dozen donuts.” This is the quantity range between the qualities of donut and one dozen donuts. Again, the quantity range is relative to the perspective and the nature of analysis. One person may only be concerned with “dozens of donuts,” while another may consider the quality of “half dozens,” which would consider a quality shift to “one half-dozen donuts” to occur once the sixth donut (quantity) is added.

Motion and change usually begins with a change in quantity. When changes in quantity reach a certain amount, quality will also change. The amount, or degree, of quantity change at which quality change occurs is called the threshold.


Annotation 174

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-57.png

Note that the threshold is an approximate range. At a certain quantity, a glass may be considered “half full” and at another certain quantity, after passing the threshold, the glass will be considered “full,” though there may be a wide range of quantities at which the glass would be considered to have the quality of being “full,” depending on perspective and purpose of analysis.

When quantity change meets a threshold, within necessary and specific conditions, quality will change. This change in quality, which takes place in the motion and development process of things, phenomena, and ideas, is called a quality shift.

A quality shift occurs when a quantity changes beyond a threshold, leading to a change in quality.

Quality shifts inevitably occur as transformations in the development processes of things, phenomena, and ideas. Qualitative changes can be expressed or manifested through many forms of quality shifts which are determined by the contradictions, characteristics and conditions of a given subject, including such characteristics as: fast or slow, big or small, partial or entire, spontaneous or intentional.


Annotation 175

Quality shifts are inevitable because there is no thing, phenomenon, nor idea which can exist statically, forever, without ever undergoing change. Eventually, any given subject will undergo quality shifts, even if such transformation may take millions of years to occur.

Quality shifts can take various forms, depending on the nature of internal and external relationships, contradictions, and mutual impacts. For instance, a river may dry up or it may flood depending on internal and external relations and characteristics, but it will not simply flow at the same level forever without ever undergoing any quality shifts.

The rate and degree of quality shifts can vary considerably based on such internal and external factors, and may be “spontaneous,” that is to say, without human intervention, or may be the result of the intentional, conscious action of human beings.

Quality shifts mark the end of one motion period and the start of a new motion period.


Annotation 176

The Quantity Range (A) refers to the range of quantities between two qualities in the process of development. The Quality Shift (B) refers to the point at which quantity accumulates to the point of changing the Quality of the developing subject. The Period of Motion (C) includes both the quantity range and the quality shifts themselves.

Period of motion refers to the development which occurs between two quality shifts, including the quality shifts themselves.

Period of motion differs from quantity range because quantity range only includes the range of quantity change which can occur between quality shifts, without including the quality shifts themselves.

For example, a period of motion for a cup filling with water from a half cup would include all of the change which occurs from the cup being half full to the cup becoming entirely full. The quantity range of this same process would only include the quantities of water that stand between half-full and full, where the cup is neither considered to be “half full” or “full” but somewhere in between, i.e., between quality shifts.

Quality shift represents discontinuity within the continuous development process of things and phenomena. In the material world, all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly undergoing continuous sequences of quantitative changes leading to quality shifts, creating an endless line of nodes, showing how all things, phenomena, and ideas move and develop to increasingly advanced degrees [see illustration on p. 121 for a visualization of this “endless line of nodes”].

As Friedrich Engels summarised: “merely quantitative changes beyond a certain point pass into qualitative differences.”[97]

Annotation 177

Processes of change and development in our universe are continuously ongoing. Whenever a quality shift occurs, it represents a brief discontinuity in the sense that we perceive a definite and distinct transformation from one thing, phenomenon, or idea into another; in other words, we can distinguish between the mode of existence of the thing, phenomenon, or idea before and after the quality shift.

Take, for example, the “lifespan” of a house. A human being could easily distinguish between the empty land which exists before the house is built, the construction site which exists as it’s being built, and the house itself once construction is completed. In reality, this process of change is continuous, but to our human perception, each quality shift represents a definite and distinct period of change and discontinuity in terms of our perception of the “thing” which is the house.

This is related to the historic perspective of things, phenomena, and ideas, in which we recognize the continuity of existence between different stages of development of things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 201, p. 195].

When a quality shift occurs, there is an impact on the quantity. Quality impacts quantity in a number of ways, including [but not limited to]:

  • Changing the structure, scale, or level of the subject.
  • Changing the rhythm or speed of the motion and development of the subject.

In summary, dialectical unity between quantity and quality exists in every thing, phenomenon, and idea. A gradual quantitative change [through the quantity range] will eventually meet the threshold, which will inevitably lead to a qualitative change through quality shift. Simultaneously, the new quality will mutually impact the quantity, causing new quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas. This process takes place continuously, forming the fundamental and universal mode of movement and development processes of all things, phenomena, and ideas.

Annotation 178

Transformation between quantity and quality is the mode of movement and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas, because it reflects the way in which human consciousness perceives movement and development.

So, it is important to understand that there is no material manifestation of quantity and quality. They are simply mental constructs which reflect the ways in which we observe and understand change, motion, and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. Transformation processes in the material world are fully fluid and continuous, but our consciousness perceives change in stages of development. Quality simply reflects how we distinguish one subject from another subject, as well as how we recognize the transformation process (and stages of development) of a single subject over time.

There is no specific point, metaphysically distinct point at which a “puppy” becomes an “adult dog,” but human beings will distinguish between a puppy and an adult dog, or recognize at a certain point that a puppy has “become” an adult dog, based on observation of quality.

Quality refers to the differences which are distinguished in human consciousness between one subject and another, or changes in a subject’s form over time.

There is no metaphysically distinct point at which a “puppy” becomes an “adult dog,” but human beings will distinguish between a puppy and an adult dog, or recognize at a certain point that a puppy has “become” an adult dog, based on observation of quality. We create categories which reflect quality to organize and systematically understand the world around us, and to distinguish between different subjects, and to distinguish between different stages of development of a given subject.

We can also distinguish differences of quality between different subjects: we can distinguish a cat from a dog, and we can distinguish one dog from another dog. These distinguishing attributes constitute differences in quality. Note that this conception of differentiation of things, phenomena, and ideas into qualities which constantly change and develop over time is fundamentally distinct from metaphysical categorization, which seeks to divide all things, phenomena, and ideas into static, perpetually unchanging categories (see Annotation 8, p. 8).

Distinction within the human mind is reflected in the concept of quantity and quality. If we do not observe quality differences between subjects, then we would not be able to distinguish between different subjects at all. If we could not recognize the quality shifts of any given subject, then we would not be aware of change or motion at all.


c. Meaning of the Methodology

Every thing, phenomenon and idea has characteristics of quality and quantity which mutually impact and transform one another. Therefore, in perception and practice, we need to understand and take into account the law of transformation between quantity and quality in order to have a comprehensive viewpoint of things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 114, p. 116].

Quantitative changes of things, phenomena and ideas inevitably lead to qualitative changes in all things, phenomena, and ideas. Therefore, in our perception and practice, as we plan and enact change in our world and in human society, it is necessary to gradually accumulate changes in quantity in order to make changes in quality. At the same time, we must recognize and make use of the fact that quality shifts also lead to changes in quantity.


Annotation 179

We have to understand and utilize the law of transformation between quantity and quality in our activities. For instance, if a group of activists hopes to address hunger in their community, they have to realize that they can’t immediately enact a quality shift which solves the entire problem of hunger across the city instantaneously. Instead, the activists must recognize that quantity shifts lead to quality shifts through stages of development. In planning and acting, they may need to set certain development targets, predict thresholds at which quality shifts will occur, etc.

For instance, the first goal for these activists may be to provide free lunches to houseless people in a particular park every weekend. If they can accomplish this, then they will not have completely eliminated hunger in the city, but they will have reached a threshold — a quality shift — in that nobody in that specific park will be hungry at lunch time on weekends. From there, they can continue to build quality shifts through accumulation of changes in quantity, one stage of development at a time.

Quality shifts leading to quantity shifts must also be recognized and utilized in our planning and activities. For example, once an effective strategy is developed for eliminating hunger in one park through quantity changes leading to quality shifts, this strategy can then be implemented in other parks. Thus the quality shift of “eliminating hunger in one park” can lead to a quantity shift: “eliminating hunger in two parks, three parks, etc.,” until the quantity shift of “eliminating hunger in parks” leads to the quality shift of “eliminating hunger in all the parks in the city.” This entire process of enacting quantity changes to lead to quality shifts, and accumulating quality shifts to change quantity, are all focused toward the ultimate goal of achieving the quality shift of “eliminating hunger in the entire city.”

In short, it’s vital for us to understand the ways in which quantity and quality mutually impact each other so that we can formulate plans and activities which will lead to motion and development which accomplish our goals, step by step, through one stage of development at a time.

Changes in quantity can only lead to changes in quality provided the quantity accumulates to a certain threshold. Therefore, in practice, we need to overcome impatient, left-sided thought. Left-sided thinking refers to thinking which is overly subjective, idealistic, ignorant of the laws which govern material reality. Left-sided thinking neglects to acknowledge the necessity of quantity accumulation which precedes shifts in quality, focusing instead on attempting to perform continuous shifts in quality.

On the other hand, we must also recognize that once change in quantity has reached a threshold, it is inevitable that a quality shift will take place. Therefore, we need to overcome conservative and right-sided thought in practical work. Right-sided thinking is the expression of conservative, stagnant thought that resists or refuses to recognize quality shifts even as changes in quantity come to meet the threshold of quality shift.


Annotation 180

“Right-sided thinking” and “left-sided thinking” are Vietnamese political concepts which are rooted in the ideas of Lenin’s book: Leftwing Communism: an Infantile Disorder. In Vietnamese political philosophy, “left-sided thinking” is a form of dogmatic idealism which upholds unrealistic conceptions of change and development. Left-sided thinkers don’t have the patience for quantity accumulation which are prerequisite to quality shifts, or expect to skip entire stages of development which are necessary to precipitate change in the real world. An example of left-sided thinking would be believing that a capitalist society can instantly transition into a stateless, classless, communist society, skipping over the transitions in quantity and quality which are required to bring such a massive transformation in human society to fruition.

“Right-sided thinking,” on the other hand, is conservate resistance to change. Right-sided thinkers resist quality changes to human society; they either want to preserve society as it exists right now, or reverse development to some previous (real or imagined) stage of development. Right-sided thinkers also refuse to acknowledge quality shifts once they’ve occurred, idealistically pretending that changes in material conditions have not occurred. For example, right-sided thinkers may refuse to recognize advances which have been made in the liberation of women, or even attempt to reverse those advances in hopes of returning to previous stages of development when women had fewer freedoms. Here is a practical example of these concepts in use, from the Vietnam Encyclopedia, published by the Ministry of Culture and Information of Vietnam:

Opportunism is a system of political views that do not follow a clear direction nor a clear line, do not have a definite stance, and are inclined toward the immediate personal gain of the opportunist. In the proletarian revolutionary movement, opportunism is a politics of compromise, reform, and unprincipled collaboration with the enemy which run contrary to the basic interests of the working class and the working people. In practice, opportunism has two main trends, stemming from right-sided thinking and from left-sided thinking, respectively:

Right-wing opportunism is reformist, favors undue compromise, and aims to peacefully “convert” capitalism into socialism while abandoning the struggle for meaningful victory of the working class. Right-wing opportunism, typified by Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky, has its origins in the Workers’ Parties of the Second International era and exists to this day.

Left-wing opportunism is a mixture of extremism and adventurism, dogmatism, arrogance, subjectivity, cults of violence, and disregard for the objective situation.

Both “right” and “left” opportunism push the workers’ movement to futile sacrifice and failure.



Quality shifts are diverse and plentiful, so we need to promote and apply quality shifts creatively and flexibly to suit the specific material conditions we face in a given situation. This is especially true in changing human society, as social development processes depend not only on objective conditions but also on subjective human factors. Therefore, we need to be active and take the initiative to promote the process of converting between quantity and quality in the most effective way.


Annotation 181

Put simply, we have to use our human will and labor to actively promote quantity changes which lead to quality changes, and quality changes which lead to quantity changes, which move us towards our goal of ending all forms of oppression in human society. This will involve not just objective factors[98] (i.e., material conditions which are necessary to accomplish something), but subjective factors[99] as well (factors which we, as a subject, are capable of impacting directly).

2. Law of Unification and Contradiction Between Opposites

The law of unification and contradiction between opposites is the Essence of dialectics [see: Essence and Phenomenon, p. 156]. According to Lenin: “In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the Essence of dialectics, but it requires explanations and development.”[100] According to the law of unification and contradiction between opposites, the fundamental, originating, and universal driving force of all motion and development processes is the inherent and objective contradiction which exists in all things, phenomena, and ideas.


Annotation 182

In other words, contradiction (defined further in the next section) is the force which serves as the fundamental, originating, and universal force which drives all motion and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas.

Contradiction is a fundamental driving force because it is the most basic driving force which all other forms of motion and development are based upon.

Contradiction is the originating driving force because all motion and development arises from contradiction.

Contradiction is the universal driving force because all things, phenomena, and ideas — without exception — are driven to motion and development by contradiction.

a. Definition of Contradiction and Common Characteristics of Contradiction

- Definition of Contradiction

In dialectics, the concept of contradiction is used to refer to the relationship, opposition, and transformation between opposites which takes place within all things, phenomena, and ideas, as well as between all things, phenomena, and ideas. This dialectical concept of contradiction is fundamentally different from the metaphysical concept of contradiction. The metaphysical concept of contradiction is an illogical conception of opposition without unity and without dialectical transformation between opposites.


Annotation 183

A contradiction is, fundamentally, just a type of relationship. In a contradictory relationship, two things, phenomena, and/or ideas mutually impact one another, resulting in the eventual negation of one subject and the synthesis of the negator and the negated into some new form.

The metaphysical concept of contradiction is considered illogical because it establishes no connection between that which is negated and the resulting synthesis.

In the metaphysical conception of contradiction, the negated “disappears” and is not represented in the resulting synthesis.

Metaphysical contradiction presents contradicting subjects as isolated from one another and completely distinct, when in reality the relationship between the negated and the negator essentially defines the contradiction. The negated subject is seen as completely negated; that is to say, it is conceived of as essentially “disappearing” into the synthesized result of the contradiction. In this sense, this metaphysical conception of negation is inaccurate in that it is represented as a complete, terminating process.

In the above example, once the fox eats the rabbit, the rabbit is considered “gone” after a terminal negation process (see Annotation 196, p. 188) ends the contradiction.

The materialist dialectical conception of contradiction recognizes that contradicting subjects are defined by their relationship and that the synthesis of the contradiction carries forward attributes and characteristics from both the negator and the negated.

Materialist dialectical contradiction recognizes that every contradiction is defined by the relationship between the negated and the negator. Materialist dialectics also recognizes that attributes and characteristics of the negated subject are carried forward into the synthesized subject [see Annotation 203, p. 198]. Materialist dialectics also recognizes that contradiction continues indefinitely, as the negated becomes negated again, and so on, continuously, forever [see Negation of Negation, p. 185].

In the example on the previous page, the fox consuming the rabbit constitutes a negation process in which the fox takes on characteristics from the rabbit (i.e., nutritional and energy content, any diseases which may be carried forward to the fox, etc.).

Contradiction arises from opposition which exists within or between things, phenomena, and ideas. The concept of opposing “sides” refers to such aspects, properties, and tendencies of motion which oppose one another, yet are, simultaneously, conditions and premises of the existence of one another. Examples include:

  • Negative charge and positive charge within atoms.
  • Anabolism and catabolism within living organisms [anabolism refers to the growth and building up of molecules within an organism, while catabolism refers to the digestion and breaking down of molecules within an organism].
  • Production and consumption as socioeconomic activities.
  • Trial and error which leads to cognitive development.

Annotation 184

All of the above forms of contradiction drive motion and development. These processes exist in unity and opposition. For example, in political economics, production is driven by consumption and consumption is facilitated by production. Even though these are fundamentally opposite forces (production adds to the total quantity of products, while consumption reduces the total quantity of products), they can’t exist without one another, and they drive each other forward. This is the dialectical nature of contradiction as the driving force of all motion and development as defined in materialist dialectics.

- The General Properties of Contradictions

Contradiction is objective and universal. According to Friedrich Engels: “If simple mechanical change of position contains a contradiction, this is even more true of the higher forms of motion of matter, and especially of organic life and its development. We saw above that life consists precisely and primarily in this — that a being is at each moment itself and yet something else. Life is therefore also a contradiction which is present in things and processes themselves, and which constantly originates and resolves itself; and as soon as the contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to an end, and death steps in. We likewise saw that also, in the sphere of thought, we could not escape contradictions, and that, for example, the contradiction between man’s inherently unlimited capacity for knowledge and its actual presence only in men who are externally limited and possess limited cognition finds its solution in what is — at least practically, for us — an endless succession of generations, in infinite progress.”[101]

Annotation 185

Here, Engels is explaining how contradiction is the driving force in both material and conscious processes of motion and development. The process of life is a process of contradiction — all organic life forms must consume organic matter so that they can produce growth and offspring, must produce certain molecules and metabolic processes so that they can consume nutrients, and so on. Once these contradictory processes stop, as Engels says, “death steps in” (though even death is a transition forward).

Conscious motion and development are also rooted in contradictory forces. Engels points out the contradiction between humanity’s seemingly infinite capacity for learning with the seemingly infinite amount of knowledge which can be obtained in the world. This great contradiction drives a seemingly endless process of expanding human knowledge, collectively, over countless generations.

Contradictions are not only objective and universal, but also diverse and plentiful. The diverse nature of contradictions is evident in the fact that every subject can include many different contradictions and that contradictions manifest differently depending upon specific conditions. Contradictions can hold different positions and roles in the existence, motion, and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. These positions and roles include [but are not limited to]:

  • Internal and external contradictions
  • Fundamental and non-fundamental contradictions
  • Primary and secondary contradictions

Annotation 186

Internal contradictions are contradictions which exist in the internal relations of a subject, while external contradictions exist between two or more subjects as external relations.

For example: a sports team might have internal contradictions between players, between the players and the coach, between the coach and management, etc. External contradictions might exist between the team and other teams, between the team and league officials, between the team and the landlords who own the team’s practice space, etc.

A fundamental contradiction is a contradiction which defines the Essence of a relationship [see Essence and Phenomenon, p. 156]. Fundamental contradictions exist throughout the entire development process of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea. A non-fundamental contradiction exists in only one aspect or attribute of a thing, phenomenon, or idea. A non-fundamental contradiction can impact a subject, but it will not control or decide the essential development of the subject. Whether or not a contradiction is fundamental is relative to the point of view.

For example: the fundamental contradiction of one nation engaged in war against one another might be the war itself. There will exist many other contradictions; one nation at war might have a trade dispute with a third nation which is not participating in the war. From the “war perspective,” this contradiction is non-fundamental, as it does not define the essential characteristic of the nation at war (though from the perspective of a diplomat charged with ending the trade dispute, the war may be seen as a non-fundamental contradiction while the dispute would be seen as fundamental).

In the development of things, phenomena, and ideas, there are many development stages. In each stage of development, there will be one contradiction which drives the development process. This is what we call the primary contradiction. Secondary contradictions include all the other contradictions which exist during that stage of development. Determining whether a contradiction is primary or secondary is relative: it depends heavily upon the material conditions and the situation.

For example: when restoring an old car that doesn’t run any more, a mechanic may consider the primary contradiction to be the non-functioning engine. There may be many secondary contradictions which contribute to the problems with the car’s engine problems. The battery may be dead, the spark plugs may need to be bad, the tires may need replacement, the timing belt may be loose, etc. Those are all secondary contradictions which do not define the stage of development which is “repairing the engine.” Some of these secondary contradictions may need to be resolved (such as replacing the spark plugs) before the primary contradiction can be fully addressed; others, such as a cracked windshield, may not need to be addressed before the primary contradiction can be dealt with.

On the other hand, a secondary contradiction may become the primary contradiction: if a mechanic resolves every problem with the engine except for one bad spark plug, then the bad spark plug will shift from being a secondary contradiction to being the primary contradiction: the bad spark plug is now the primary reason the car won’t start and this stage of development can’t be completed.

Within all the various fields of inquiry, there exist contradictions which have a diverse range of different properties and characteristics.

Annotation 187

Different fields of study will focus on different forms of contradictions, and any given thing, phenomenon, or idea may contain countless contradictions which can be analyzed and considered for different purposes. For example, consider a large city, which might contain far too many contradictions to count. Civil engineers may focus primarily on contradictions in traffic patterns, the structural integrity of bridges and roads, ensuring that buildings are safe and healthy for inhabitants, etc. Utilities departments will focus on contradictions related to sewage, electrical, and sanitation systems. The education system will focus on contradictions which prevent students from achieving success in schools.

All of these various methods of analysis may focus on specific forms of contradictions, though there will also be overlap. For instance, designing a school bus system will require the education system and civil engineers to discover and grapple with contradictions which might be hindrances for transporting students safely to school.

b. Motion Process of Contradictions

In every contradiction, the opposing sides are united with each other and opposed to each other at the same time. The concept of “unity between opposites” refers to the fact that a contradiction is a binding, inseparable, and mutually impacting relationship which exists between opposites.


Annotation 188

Contradictions are binding and inseparable because they hold a relationship together. If two opposing things, phenomena, or ideas simply separate, then contradiction, by definition, no longer exists. For example, an economy is bound together by the contradiction of production and consumption; if production exists without consumption (or vice-versa), it can’t be considered to be an economy.

Contradictions are said to be mutually impacting because any time a contradiction exists between two opposing sides, both sides are mutually impacted for as long as the contradiction exists and develops. Of course, it is possible for two opposing sides to separate from one another; for example, a factory which produced buggy whips may have failed to find consumers after the invention of the car. Thus, there would exist a situation in which production exists without consumption. In this situation, the termination of the contradiction between production and consumption leads to a new contradiction: the factory will now be in the midst of a crisis which will require it to either provide a different product or go out of business.

Thus we see that production and consumption can’t be separated from one another without leading to a change in the essential nature of the relationship and the opposing subjects, and we see that the opposing sides mutually impact one another (a change in consumption will affect production, and vice-versa).

In any given contradictory relationship, each oppositional side is the premise for the other’s existence. Unity among opposites also defines the identity of each opposing side. Lenin wrote: “The identity of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their ‘unity,’—although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense, both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society).”[102]


Annotation 189

Here, Lenin is explaining that identity and unity are (more or less) the same concept when it comes to understanding the nature of contradiction between opposites. In material processes of nature, social processes, and processes of consciousness, we perceive and define oppositional forces by recognizing mutually exclusive and contradictory tendencies within and between things, phenomena, and ideas. In other words, whenever we think of an oppositional relationship, we define it in terms of the opposition.

War, disease, and economy are all examples of unity in contradiction.

When we think of a war, we think of the contradictions which exist between the opposing nations. When we think of a disease, we define it by the oppositional forces between the ailment and the human body. When we think of an economy, we think of the oppositional forces of production and consumption within the economy.

In other words, the identity of contradictory relationships is defined by the unity of the opposing sides with one another.

The concept struggle of opposites refers to the tendency of opposites to eliminate and negate each other. There exist many diverse forms of struggle between opposites. Struggle can manifest in various forms based on:

  • The nature of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea.
  • Relationships within a thing, phenomenon, or idea (or between things, phenomena, and ideas).
  • Specific material conditions [see Annotation 10, p. 10].

The process of unity and struggle of opposites inevitably leads to a transformation between them. The transformation between opposites takes place with rich diversity, and such transformations can vary depending on the properties of the opposite sides as well as specific material conditions.


Annotation 190

Opposing sides, by definition, oppose one another. If forces or characteristics which exist within or between things, phenomena, or ideas do not oppose one another, then they are not, by definition, opposites. Thus, it can be understood that opposing sides have a tendency to struggle against one another. It is this very struggle which defines two sides as opposites, and as contradictory.

Lenin explained that some contradicting opposite sides can exist in what he described as equilibrium, but that this is only ever a temporary state of affairs, as exemplified in his article An Equilibrium of Forces.

[See Annotation 64, p. 62 for relevant text and more info on equilibrium.]

Clearly, Lenin sees that this equilibrium of contradictory forces is not permanently sustainable. Indeed, no equilibrium of contradictory forces can be permanent. Eventually, one opposing side will overtake the other, and eventually, any given contradiction will result in one opposing side overcoming the other.

According to the law of unification and contradiction between opposites, the struggle between two opposing sides is absolute, while the unity between them is relative, conditional, and temporary; in unity there is a struggle: a struggle in unity. According to Lenin: “The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.”[103]


Annotation 191

“Absolute” and “Relative” are philosophical classifications which refer to interdependence. That which is absolute exists independently and with permanence. That which is relative is temporary, and dependent on other conditions or circumstances in order to exist.

So Lenin’s point is that unity exists temporarily in any given pair of opposing sides, as the unity only exists as long as the opposing sides are opposing one another. As soon as one side eliminates or negates the other, the unity subsides. However, opposition is considered absolute, because it is opposition which drives motion and change in all things, phenomena, and ideas through contradictory processes of opposing sides.

In the same text quoted in the passage above, On the Questions of Dialectics, Lenin notes:

The distinction between subjectivism (skepticism, sophistry, etc.) and dialectics, incidentally, is that in (objective) dialectics the difference between the relative and the absolute is itself relative. For objective dialectics there is an absolute within the relative. For subjectivism and sophistry the relative is only relative and excludes the absolute...

Such must also be the method of exposition (i.e., study) of dialectics in general... To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., with any proposition: the leaves of a tree are green; John is a man: Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have dialectics (as Hegel’s genius recognised): the individual is the universal.

The individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes) etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs, the concepts of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say: John is a man, Fido is a dog, this is a leaf of a tree, etc., we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other.

In other words, we must understand that in materialist dialectics, the absolute and the relative exist within one another; in other words, the absolute and the relative have a dialectical relationship with one another in all things, phenomena, and ideas.

Relative unity refers to the nature of unity between contradictory subjects. Contradictory subjects are unified in the sense that any given contradiction is essentially defined by the contradiction between two subjects. Thus, the two subjects are unified in contradiction. However, this unity is relative in the sense that this unification is temporary (the unity will end upon negation and synthesis) and relative (i.e., defined by the relationship between the two contradicting subjects).

Absolute struggle refers to the fact that contradiction, negation, and synthesis will go on forever; in this sense, contradictory processes are absolute because such struggle exists permanently; struggle has no set beginning or end point, and exists independently of any specific thing, phenomenon, or idea.

Relative Unity refers to the temporary and relative nature of specific relationships which define and unify specific contradictions; Absolute Struggle refers to the permanent, constant nature of development through contradiction.

The relationship between relative unity and absolute struggle defines and drives change, motion, and development through contradiction.

This applies to contradictions. The relative unity and the absolute struggle between opposing sides have a dialectical relationship with one another. The permanent absoluteness of struggle — the fact that all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly undergoing processes of change through contradictory forces — can only manifest in the relative unity of opposing sides, which can only exist through the temporary existence of conditional relations between opposing sides.


The interaction that leads to the transformation between opposites is a process. At the beginning, contradictions manifest as differences and then develop into two opposing sides. When the two contradictions are fiercely matched and when the conditions are ripe, they will transform each other, and finally, the conflict will be resolved. As old contradictions disappear, new contradictions are formed and the process of mutual impact and transformation between opposites continues, which drives the motion and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas. The relationship, impact and transformation between opposites are the source and driving force of all movement and development in the world. Lenin affirmed: “Development is the ‘struggle’ of opposites.”[104]


Annotation 192

Any given process of development — that is to say, of transformation or motion — can be seen as a struggle between opposites. Various forms of struggle can exist simultaneously for any given subject, and the way we interpret struggle can depend on our point of view.

For an engineer, a car moving along a road might be seen as a struggle between the power generated by the engine against the mass of the car itself and the friction of the tires on the ground. The driver of the car might see the process in terms of the struggle between the driver and the environment as they navigate across town avoiding accidents and following traffic laws.

An organism’s life can be seen as a struggle between the organism’s life processes and its environment, or it might be seen as a struggle of contradictory forces within the organism itself (i.e., forces of consumption of nutrition vs. forces of expending energy to survive, forces of disease vs. forces of the organism’s immune system, etc.).

Materialist dialectics requires us to identify, examine, and understand the opposing forces which drive all development in our universe. Only through understanding such contradictions can we intercede and affect changes in the world which suit our purposes.

For example, in order to fight against capitalism and other forms of oppression, we must first understand the contradictory forces which exist within and between those oppressive social structures. Only then can we determine how we might best apply our will, through labor processes, to dismantle such oppressive structures. We might do this by exacerbating existing contradictions within oppressive structures, by introducing new contradictions, by negating contradictions which inhibit our own progress, etc.

c. Meaning of the Methodology

Given that contradictions are objective and universal, and that they are the source and driving force of movement and development, it is therefore necessary to detect, recognize, and understand contradictions, to fully analyze opposing sides, and to grasp the nature, origin and tendencies of motion and development in our awareness and practice.

Lenin said: “The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts… is the essence… of dialectics.”[105]


Annotation 193

In other words, materialist dialectics is simply a system of understanding the world around us by viewing all things, phenomena, and ideas as collections of relationships and contradictions which exist within and between all things, phenomena, and ideas.

Since contradictions exist with such rich diversity, it is necessary to have a historical point of view [see Annotation 114, p. 116] — that is, to know how to analyze each specific type of contradiction and have appropriate methods for resolving them. In our perception and practice, it is necessary to properly distinguish the roles and positions of different types of contradictions in each situation and condition; we must also distinguish between different characteristics which contradictions might have in order to find the best method of resolving them.


Annotation 194

The historical viewpoint is vital because in order to fully understand any given contradiction, we must understand the process of development which led to its formation.

For example, before a car engine can be repaired, we must first find out what caused the engine to stop working to begin with. If the car is out of fuel, we must determine what caused it to run out of fuel. Did the driver simply drive until the fuel tank was empty, or is there a hole or leak in a fuel line, in the tank, etc.?

It is vital to know the history of development of a given pair of opposing sides, as well as the characteristics and other properties of both opposing sides, to fully understand the contradiction. Since all conscious activity (like all processes of motion and change) ultimately derives from the driving force of contradiction, it is vital for us to develop a historical and comprehensive perspective of any contradictions we hope to affect through our conscious activities.

3. Law of Negation of Negation

The law of negation of negation describes the fundamental and universal tendency of movement and development to occur through dialectical negation, forming a cyclical form of development through what is termed “negation of negation.”

a. Definition of Negation and Dialectical Negation

The world continuously and endlessly changes and develops. Things, phenomena, and ideas that arise, exist, develop and perish, are replaced by other things, phenomena, and ideas; one form of existence is replaced with another form of existence, again and again, continuously, through this development process. This procedure is called negation.

All processes of movement and development take place through negation. From certain perspectives, negations can be seen as end points to the development (and thus, existence) of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea [which we can think of as “terminal negations;” see Annotation below]. But from other perspectives, negations can also create the conditions and premises for new developments. Such negations, which create such conditions and premises for the development of things and phenomena, are called dialectical negation.


Annotation 195

Negation refers to any act of motion or transformation which arises from contradiction. Specifically, negation is what occurs when one opposing side completely overcomes the other. Nothing in our universe can transform or move all by itself, without any contradiction. Thus, negation drives all development and motion of all things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 119, p. 123]. There are various forms of negation, and the same negation process may be seen to take different forms depending on viewpoint of analysis [see Annotation 11, p. 12, and Annotation 114, p. 116], as depicted in the diagram below.

An overview of various forms of negation as they relate to dialectical development.

Dialectical negation occurs when the end of development leads directly to some new development process. Dialectical negation occurs through quality shifts [see Annotation 117, p. 119], which, themselves, occur through negation of opposite sides.

Replacement negation refers to the replacement of one thing, phenomenon, or idea with another through dialectical negation.

Translation Note: The terms “terminal negation” and “replacement negation” do not appear in the original Vietnamese text. We chose to assign terms to these concepts for clarity.

Replacement negation occurs when one thing, phenomenon, or idea takes the place of another. Replacement negation is always a dialectical process, where one subject is replaced gradually by another. Replacement may be relatively fast or slow, but it is never instantaneous — nothing can pop in and out of existence instantaneously. For example: swords were gradually replaced by firearms as the primary weapons of war over the course of many centuries. Today, swords have been completely replaced by firearms on the battlefield. This was a process of replacement negation — weapons are still used in war, but the type of weapon used has been completely replaced. Development continues, even though development of swords as battle weapons has essentially ended.

Terminal negation refers to the end of a specific cycle of development.

Terminal negation is what happens when development completely ends for a given thing, phenomenon, or idea. For example, from one viewpoint, the development of swords as weapons of war can be seen as having ended — having been terminally negated — due to the innovation of firearms. In essence, swords are no longer developed, nor implemented, in modern warfare.

Replacement negation and terminal negation must be considered in relative terms. From one viewpoint, we can see the rise of firearms as the underlying reason for the terminal negation of military use of swords. Today, no army on Earth uses swords as primary battlefield weapons and militaries no longer develop sword technology for battlefield use. However, from another viewpoint, the development of battlefield weapons has continued on long after the end of the primacy of swords, and it could be said that firearms have replaced swords as the primary battlefield weapon.

Consider the death of a human being. From one perspective, death is a terminal negation — the person’s consciousness has ended, and no further development of consciousness will occur for that individual. From other perspectives, development continues. The individual may have had children who will continue their familial lineage, they may have contributed ideas which will continue to impact other people for centuries to come, and so on. In that sense, replacement negation may be viewed as dialectical negation. For example, someone studying modes of transportation in the history of the USA may see the process of steam locomotives replacing horses, and then cars replacing steam locomotives, as processes of dialectical negation from the overarching perspective of the transportation system.


Materialist dialectics is concerned with all forms of negation, but focuses primarily on dialectical negation. Therefore, materialist dialectics is not just a theory of transformation in general, but fundamentally a theory of development


Annotation 196

All transformation is driven by negation. Development is a process, specifically, of dialectical negation, which is a specific form of transformation in which an end of development creates the conditions for new development, either through internal quality shifts or through replacement by some external subject.

Materialist dialectics is primarily concerned with dialectical negation (which drives development) because it is development which brings forth continuous change in our world. Terminal negations and other forms of transformation which do not drive further development are of limited utility, and can only represent certain limited viewpoints [i.e., the viewpoint of that which is terminated].

From a broader perspective, nearly all “terminations” are replaced in some way or another by some other form of development. For instance, even when a person dies, although the consciousness of that person may terminate, there will be continuous impacts which will be carried forward from the deceased person’s lifetime of consciousness, as well as from the developments which arise from the death itself.

This dialectical definition of negation differs greatly from metaphysical conceptions of development [see Annotation 201, p. 195], which are essentially viewed as terminal. From the metaphysical perspective, all things, phenomena, and ideas are viewed as separate from one another; therefore negations are viewed as terminal processes which bring development processes to their ends.

The metaphysical perspective of terminal negation views negation as an essentially terminal process representing the end point of the existence of a static and isolated thing, phenomenon, or idea.

In the above example, the metaphysical framework would present smashing a vase with a hammer as a terminal negation from the perspective of the observer. Once the vase is smashed, the vase is considered to no longer exist, and the broken shards are not considered to be “a vase” any more. Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, view “the shards” as merely a developed form of the vase; a transition to a new stage of development; the negation was only terminal from the perspective of the vase itself.

Excerpt From Vietnam’s High School Freshman Civic Education textbook:

Metaphysical and dialectical negation share one commonality: they both see development as the replacement of an old subject with a new subject. However, metaphysical negation happens when outside forces impact on a subject, deleting completely the existence of the old subject. According to this metaphysical perspective, the old subject and the new subject which replaces it do not have any connection.

Dialectical negation fundamentally differs from metaphysical negation because it views development as a process of internal development. Dialectical negation does not view complete erasure or deletion of any former subject; instead, dialectical development sees the older subject, which is replaced (negated), as the premise or basis of existence for the new subject.

Comparison Examples:

Metaphysical Negation Dialectical Negation
The earthquake destroyed the house. The house was impacted by the external force of an earthquake, which caused it to collapse, due to internal characteristics of the house itself (which could not withstand the forces of the earthquake). The debris from the collapsed house will be cleared away, and will continue to develop. The space where the house stood will also continue to develop in some way, with the earthquake and the resulting collapse serving as the basis for this further development.
Water eroded the mountain. The external force of water caused erosion by transferring material away from the mountain, due to the internal characteristics of the mountain’s composite material. The water, the material which was washed away, and the mountain will all continue to develop. The erosion process will be the basis for this further development.
The car has a new tire because it ran over a nail. The external force of the nail caused the tire to permanently deflate, due to the internal characteristics of the tire, which could not withstand running over a nail. This served as the basis for further development: the old tire was removed and will be disposed of, which will serve as the basis for further development (i.e., the tire may be recycled or sent to a landfill); the removal of the tire serves as the basis for the further development of a new tire being installed.
When you add water, sunlight, and nutrition to a seed, it will grow into a plant. The seed went through a process of negation as a sprout grew, through various stages of development, into a plant, facilitated by outside forces (such as water, nutrition, sunlight, etc. — the seed would not grow in isolation) as well as the internal characteristics of the seed itself; the seed served as the basis of the sprout’s development. The sprout then served as the basis for the growth of a seedling, and the seedling served as the basis for the growth of a fully grown plant. All of this development was driven by negation processes as quantity shifts gradually led to quality shifts through those various stages of development.

As you can see from the examples above, the metaphysical perspective focuses on external forces affecting a given subject and views every development process as terminal, with a beginning, middle, and end. The metaphysical perspective thus views negation as a termination of the subject (and, by extension, of development).

Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, views development as a continuous and never-ending process of mutual impact, negation, and further negation of each negation. A comprehensive and historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116] must thus be sought to fully comprehend development and negation processeses.

Dialectical negation has two basic characteristics: objectivity and inheritance.

Dialectical negation is objective because negation arises from contradictions which exist between two opposite sides. These opposing sides may exist within a thing, phenomenon, or idea, but the opposing sides are still, by definition, externally opposed to one another from the perspective of either side.


Annotation 197

Though any given negation may be viewed as terminal from a certain perspective, materialist dialectics is most concerned with processes of development wherein the end of one stage of development creates the conditions for further development [see Annotation 117, p. 119].

Therefore, every development is simultaneously an internal and an external process, depending on perspective. Development processes may, from certain perspectives, be seen to take place within a subject or between two subjects, but they are always external (and, therefore, objective — see Annotation 108, p. 112) from the perspective of either opposing side while simultaneously internal to the relationship.

For example: The relationship between a husband and wife may be seen as an internal process of development of “the marriage” from the perspective of a marriage counselor. However, from their own perspectives, each “opposing side” (i.e., the husband and the wife) see one another as external to each other.

Therefore, the development of a marriage may be seen as an internal process, but the mutual impacts and negations which occur within the relationship are objective and external forces from the perspective of either opposing side.

This is important because it means that all development and all negation are essentially objective processes; therefore no entity has complete, omniscient control over any development process. We must, therefore, understand the nature of development and negation in order to be able to properly plan and affect change in our world.

Dialectical negation is, therefore, the result of the process of resolving inevitable contradictions within a subject [i.e., a relationship] itself. Dialectical negation allows for the old to be replaced by the new, thereby creating trends of development. Therefore, dialectical negation is also self-negation.


Annotation 198

To reiterate: from the perspective of either opposing side, development is an external, objective process. From the perspective of the contradictory relationship, processes of development are internal processes of self-negation. Thus, dialectical negation is both an objective process which no entity can completely control, while, simultaneously, an internal process of self-negation and self-development.

If two nations go to war, either nation may view the war as an objective, external development process, but from a wider perspective, the war is an internal development process of the diplomatic relationship between the two warring nations. This is drastically different from the metaphysical perspective, which views any negation process as a purely external process of development wherein one subject is permanently deleted from existence, then replaced by another subject [see Annotation 196, p. 188]. From the metaphysical perspective, a war is simply a conflict between two distinct and separate nations, and the conclusion of the war is a terminal negation which ends development of the war. From the materialist dialectical perspective, on the other hand, the end of the war would be seen as the basis of future development of the relationship between the two formerly warring nations.

Dialectical negation also has an inheritance characteristic: when one opposing side negates another, the remaining side inherits factors from the negated side which are suitable with present conditions.


Annotation 199

Every negation process arises from contradictions between two opposing sides. Within any such negation process, we can think of one side as the “negator” and the other side as the “negated.” Negation, like all relational processes, leads to mutual impact between both sides [see Annotation 136, p. 138]. Therefore, the negated will impact the negator; in other words, the negated side will be somehow reflected in the negator [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. This means that the negator will inherit and carry forward certain attributes, factors, and characteristics which it receives from the negated side.

Again, consider a war between two nations. Even if one nation completely conquers and subjugates the other in total victory, the victorious nation will still inherit certain factors from the defeated nation. Which factors are inherited will depend on the conditions. The victorious nation may pick up some cultural aspects from the defeated nation, such as cuisine, fashion, etc., they may incorporate tactics and strategies which they observed the defeated enemy using on the battlefield, and so on. The point is that the victorious nation will be impacted in some way by the defeated nation.

The factors which are adopted will be suitable with the present conditions. Take, for example, a car breaking down due to engine failure. This can be seen as an opposing relationship between the car itself and the car’s owner. If the present conditions are suitable [i.e., the owner has the funds and resources available, and the desire to repair the car], then the car may be repaired and continue operating for years to come. If, on the other hand, conditions aren’t suitable [i.e., the owner does not have the funds or resources or the owner no longer wants the car], then the car may be sent to the scrapyard.

As another example, if a fox eats a rabbit, it will inherit certain characteristics from the rabbit. It will inherit nutrition from the rabbit’s body. It may also inherit other characteristics, such as a disease the rabbit was carrying, if the conditions of the fox’s biological composition are suitable [i.e., if the disease can be transferred from the rabbit to the fox].

Dialectical negation is not a complete negation [i.e., deletion] of the old. Rather, dialectical negation is a continuity of growth in which the old develops into the new. In processes of dialectical negation, “the new” forms and develops on its own [see Annotation 62, p. 59], through the process of filtering out unsuitable factors, while retaining suitable content. Vladimir Lenin described dialectical negation as:

“Not empty negation, not futile negation, not skeptical negation, vacillation and doubt is characteristic and essential in dialectics — which undoubtedly contains the element of negation and indeed as its most important element — no, but negation as a moment of connection, as a moment of development, retaining the positive, i.e., without any vacillations, without any eclecticism.”[106]


Annotation 200

The passage from Lenin above comes from Clemence Dutt’s popular English translation of one of Lenin’s notebooks. Below is our translation from the Vietnamese version of this text from the original text of this book, which we hope might be somewhat easier to understand:

Dialectical negation is not empty negation, it’s not negation without any thoughts, it’s not skeptical negation, it’s not hesitation. Skepticism is not a feature of the essence of the dialectic — of course, dialectics include the negative, it even plays as one of the important factors of a given subject — no, it is negation as the moment of development. Dialectical negation retains the positive, meaning there is no hesitation, there is no eclecticism.

In order to understand what Lenin is saying here, we should first understand what Lenin is responding to. The above notes are referring to the chapter titled “The Absolute Ideal” within Hegel’s Science of Logic [see note at the end of this Annotation]. In this chapter, Hegel recounts various critiques of dialectics and counters them.

Skepticism, here, refers to the tendency to address all human knowledge with doubt.

Philosophical skepticism never moves past two questions: 1. “Is this knowledge true?” 2. “Will human beings ever obtain true knowledge?” Skeptics of this nature engage in a sort of metaphysical inquisition in which every thesis that is ever encountered is immediately and utterly refuted and thus “negated” in the metaphysical sense of termination [see Annotation 196, p. 188].

Eclecticism refers to philosophical and ideological conceptions which draw from a variety of theories, styles, and ideas in an unsystematic manner. Lenin contends that dialectical negation is non-eclecticist because it rises above mere rhetorical combativeness and “total negation.” [This concept is explained more below within this annotation.]

With all this in mind, we see that Lenin is refuting the notion that dialectics are and can only be negative in nature. The metaphysical-skeptic conception of dialectics holds that negation takes the form of rhetorical arguing and refutation, in which one idea is presented, and a second idea is offered to counter the first idea, which completely and totally negates the first idea. According to this argument, dialectics is, therefore, a totally negative process.

A common misperception of dialectical development is that it is “fully negative,” insomuch as the initial thesis (initial subject) is completely negated by the antithesis (impacting subject). In fact, characteristics from both the thesis and antithesis are carried forward into the synthesis.

In the chapter from Science of Logic which Lenin is responding to in the referenced text, Hegel is arguing that the conception of dialectics as only negative — i.e., a system of thinking in which counter-arguments are presented to completely negate initial arguments — is inaccurate. Hegel explains that when one opposing side negates another, it thereafter “contains in general the determination of the first [opposing side] within itself.” In other words, after one opposing side negates another, it retains features and aspects from the opposing side which was negated. Lenin found this particular point to be so important that he wrote “this is very important for understanding dialectics” in the margin of his notebook.

The reason both Hegel and Lenin found this idea, that the “negator” contains elements of the “negated” after negation [see Annotation 231, p. 227], is that this counters the accusation that dialectics are “only negative.” This is why Lenin’s notes highlight the importance of the negator “retaining the positive” after negation. Lenin is pointing out the importance of the retention of features of the negated in the negator because it is this retention which prevents dialectical development from becoming a purely negative process.

In materialist dialectics, it is understood that negation is a process of retention: characteristics from both the thesis (initial subject) and antithesis (impacting subject) are retained in the resulting synthesis

We must also understand what Lenin means when he refers to “skepticism” in his notes. Lenin, here, is referring to the philosophical view that we can never know whether or not our beliefs are true. This belief was popularly known as Machism, or Empirio-Criticism, in Lenin’s time (see Annotation 32, p. 27).

A common critique of dialectics is that it is an inherently skeptical system of thought, since dialectics is seen as a process of presenting counter-arguments to suppositional arguments. Lenin, in his notes, presents the idea that such skepticism is “not a feature of dialectics” precisely because nothing is ever completely, totally, and entirely negated. In other words, the accusation that dialectical analysis is essentially skeptical is rooted in the mistaken notion that one opposing side (i.e., a counter-argument) completely negates the original supposition. In fact, according to materialist dialectics, the negator always retains features and aspects from the negated side, which counters this critique. Thus, dialectical development, which occurs through dialectical negation, is a process of forward motion — not a process of “vacillating” back and forth from one position to another — and there is no skeptical “hesitation” preventing forward progress.

This same idea (that the negator retains features from the negated) also counters another common critique of materialist dialectics: that dialectical analysis is simply a system of rhetorical sophistry [see Annotation 36, p. 33] and eclecticism.

Eclecticism is a conceptual approach that is completely unsystematic, drawing from a variety of theories, styles, and ideas without any cohesive and all-encompassing philosophical framework.

Some critics claim that dialectics must be eclecticist and sophistic in nature. These critics claim that dialectics is simply rhetorical disputation in which any given supposition is counter-argued, and that this counter-argument is negation. But materialist dialectics defines negation as one contradicting side overtaking the other while retaining traces and characteristics from the negated side — it is in no way simply an act of rhetorical dispute or refutation.

In summary, materialist dialectics upholds that nothing is ever completely and utterly deleted or erased from existence through negation. Instead, any time one opposing side negates another, aspects of the negated side are inherited by the negating side.

Note: For reference, here is Hegel’s passage which Lenin is referring to from Science and Logic in the cited notes above:

...a universal first, considered in and for itself, shows itself to be the other of itself. Taken quite generally, this determination can be taken to mean that what is at first immediate now appears as mediated, related to an other, or that the universal appears as a particular. Hence the second term that has thereby come into being is the negative of the first, and if we anticipate the subsequent progress, the first negative. The immediate, from this negative side, has been extinguished in the other, but the other is essentially not the empty negative, the nothing, that is taken to be the usual result of dialectic; rather is it the other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is therefore determined as the mediated — contains in general the determination of the first within itself. Consequently the first is essentially preserved and retained even in the other. To hold fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition; also only the simplest reflection is needed to furnish conviction of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement, while with regard to the examples of proofs, the whole of Logic consists of these.



Therefore, dialectical negation is the inevitable tendency of progression of the inner relationship between the old and the new. It is the self-driving assertive force of all motion and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas.

b. Negation of Negation

In the perpetual movement of the material world, dialectical negation is an inexhaustible process. It creates a development tendency of things from lower level to higher level, taking place in a cyclical manner in the form of a “spiral.”


Annotation 201

The concept of the “spiral” form of development in dialectical materialist philosophy stands in contrast to the metaphysical conception of “linear” development.

Metaphysical Conception of Linear Development

The metaphysical viewpoint holds that development is more or less a straight line: as one subject is negated, it is replaced by another. This subject will then be negated by another, and so on, in what is essentially conceived of as a straight line of development [see Annotation 196, p. 188].

The metaphysical “line development” model sees an initial form as being “replaced” or entirely negated into a completely distinct entity.

In the above example, metaphysical line development simply sees raw aluminum as being negated and “replaced” in the real world. Once the aluminum can is created, the “raw aluminum” as a metaphysical entity is considered no longer to exist. Likewise, when the soda can is transformed into recycled aluminum, the can is considered “replaced,” and is no longer considered to have a metaphysical existence.

This conception of metaphysical line development directly contradicts the materialist dialectical concept of historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116].

Dialectical Materialist Conception of Development

The dialectical materialist conception of cyclical development stems from essential attributes of dialectical negation processes:

1. In every dialectical negation, the negating side inherits features and characteristics from the negated side.

2. When the negating side is, itself, negated (i.e., negation of the negation), the new negating side will retain features and aspects of the old negator.

3. This development process will continue indefinitely, so that negation is not simply a straight line of complete negation, but rather takes the shape of a “spiral” of negations of negations which always inherit features from previous forms.

Note that this conception of development as a spiral is simply an abstraction to help understand the essential characteristics of dialectical development and to distinguish this form of development from metaphysical conceptions of “linear development.”

In the example below, we see a depiction of the spiral development of aluminum through various stages of development. After raw aluminum is mined from the Earth, it begins a repeating spiral development process of being refined into usable goods, then recycled into raw material.

The “Spiral Development” model of materialist dialectics sees every stage of development as a higher form of the previous stage which carries forward characteristics from previous stages.

The illustrated example on the previous page plots the spiral development of aluminum as it cycles between stages defined as raw materials and refined products. Another perspective might depict development differently. For example, if we are examining development in terms of external relations between aluminum other elements, the development pattern would look different. In reality, all subjects have countless internal and external relations and development processes which can be examined.

The “raw aluminum” stage of development pictured in the illustration is not truly the beginning of this development process; there were millions of years of development which occurred before it was first discovered by humans. Similarly, the landfill will not be the end of this development process; there will be continued development forever for as long as motion in the universe continues.

This is a simplified and abstract model of development of aluminum. A more accurate representation might show any number of interim steps between each step depicted in the graphic above. For example: it must also be recognized that in reality the molecules of aluminum which the development process began with will be scattered and mixed with other subjects throughout the development process, and various other complexities exist in terms of the mutual impacts of internal and external relationships.

Determining the amount of detail to include or exclude in materialist dialectical analysis is crucial: too much detail and analysis might become unwieldy; too little detail and analysis might become too abstract and idealized to be useful in the real world. So, the idea of development as a spiral should not be taken literally; it is simply a way of conceptualizing the differences between dialectical negation and development as opposed to “straight-line” development upheld by metaphysical conceptions of negation and development, always carrying forward traces of previous stages of development.

In the chain of negations that make up the development processes of things, phenomena, and ideas, each dialectical negation creates the conditions and premises for subsequent developments. Through many iterations of negation, i.e., “negations of negations,” dialectical negation will inevitably lead to a forward tendency of motion.


Annotation 202

The forward tendency of motion describes the tendency for things, phenomena, and ideas to move from less advanced to more advanced forms through processes of motion and development.

As a reminder, “lower level” and “higher level,” i.e., “less advanced” and “more advanced,” should not be taken to have any connotations of “good” and “bad,” nor of “desirable” and “undesirable,” nor even of “less complex” and “more complex.”

Development from “lower levels” to “higher levels” is simply a shorthand for understanding the fact that development processes always move “forward,” that is to say, development can never happen in reverse, just as time itself can never be reversed. For example, society in Italy will never go back to the civilization of the Roman empire. It is conceivable that Italian society could develop to be more similar to Ancient Rome, but it would be impossible for Roman society to ever take on the exact characteristics of the Roman Empire ever again.

Cyclicality of development processes usually takes place in the form of a spiral, which is another result of “negation of negation.” Negations of negations lead to a development cycle in which things, phenomena, and ideas often undergo two fundamental negations carried through three basic forms. Through this negation pattern, basic features of the initial form are ultimately inherited by the “third form,” but at a higher level of development.


Annotation 203

Dialectical development tends to take place through a cyclical pattern in which development is carried through a triad of forms which develop through a pair of dialectical negation processes:

The cyclical pattern of development is an abstract pattern of dialectical change over time.

The graphic above illustrates this cyclical pattern, in which:

1. The initial form (the Assertion) begins the pattern. Contradiction within the initial subject or between it and another subject leads to the first negation.

2. The first negation leads to a second form (the Negation). This second form inherits some features or characteristics from the initial form.

3. The second form then encounters opposition, which leads to a second negation.

4. The second negation leads to a third form (Unity), which retains the features or characteristics of the second form, but now more closely resembles the first, initial form, only at a higher level of development.

Imagine a new car (initial form) crashes into another car (contradicting subject). The new car is dialectically developed (negated) into a second form: a wrecked car. This second form is now contradicted by a new subject — a recycling center — and negated into a third form: new steel. The third form possesses characteristics of the first form, but in a more developed form: after being recycled, the resulting steel it is newly made, in good condition for sale, etc., similarly to the first form of the new car.

In this example, a new car goes through a cyclical pattern of development in which the third form (new steel) possesses characteristics of the first form (a new car).

Keep in mind that this is relative to one’s perspective. If you consider the wrecked car to be the first form, then the steel would be the second form. The new steel will then need to be developed in some way (melted, hammered, cut, etc.) in order to be processed into some new product. From this perspective, the third form (i.e., molten steel) will have characteristics of the first form (i.e.: “unrefined”).

According to Marx and Engels, the development of capitalism from feudalism assumed this cyclical pattern:

The development of class structure is a dialectical process in which different classes synthesize to form the next era of class society. For example, the capitalist class emerged primarily as a synthesis of the feudal lords and peasants of the medieval era.

Note that this is only an abstract description of a tendency of dialectical development; exceptions can and do occur. Presumably, the development of communism as a stateless, classless society would constitute the negation of the “Class Society” form of human civilization. The Post-Class stage of development which follows would, itself, be a higher form — a unity — of pre-class human civilization, carrying forward traces from the Class Society stage of development.

Also note that determining which form is the “first” or “initial” pattern is entirely relative. Using the example of the development of class society: from one perspective, the Patricians may be seen as the initial form, but from another perspective the Plebeians might be considered the initial form. This depends entirely on the viewpoint and purpose of analysis. These conceptions of “spirals of development” and the pattern of “three forms through two negations” are, in essence, models which describe general tendencies and patterns of development and which help us understand the basic characteristics of dialectical negation and development.

Lenin describes this cycle of dialectical development as going “[f]rom assertion to negation — from negation to ‘unity’ with the asserted — without this, dialectics becomes empty negation, a game, skepsis [examination, observation, consideration].”[107]


Annotation 204

Here, “assertion” simply refers to the initial form of a dialectical development cycle. The negation is the second form, and the “unity” is the third form, which resembles the first form (the assertion) at a higher stage of development. So, in this quotation, Lenin is simply recounting the “three steps” of a typical dialectical development cycle, and indicating that it is necessary to recognize this process, which is rooted in the inheritance of properties of prior forms through development into ever-higher forms, to prevent dialectics from becoming “empty negation,” or otherwise falling prey to the critiques that dialectics are purely negative, skeptical, and eclectic in nature [see Annotation 200, p. 192 and Annotation 36, p. 33].

The law of negation of negation generalizes the pervasive nature of development: dialectical development does not take the form of a straight path, but rather in the form of a spiral path. Lenin summarised that this path is “[a] development that repeats, as it were, stages that have already been passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher basis (‘the negation of the negation’), a development, so to speak, that proceeds in spirals, not in a straight line…”[108] The tendency to develop in a spiral curve demonstrates the dialectical nature of development; i.e., the cycle of inheritance, repetition, and progression. Each new round of the spiral appears to be repeating, but at a higher level. The continuation of the loops in a spiral reflects an endless progression from lower levels to higher levels of things, phenomena, and ideas.

In short, the law of negation of negation in materialist dialectics reflects the dialectical relationship between the negative and the assertion [i.e., the second and first forms of a dialectical development cycle; see Annotation 203, p. 198] in the development process of things, phenomena and ideas. Dialectical development is driven by dialectical negation; in the development of all things, phenomena, and ideas, the new is the result of inheriting characteristics from prior forms. This process of inheritance, repetition, and progression through negation leads to cyclical development. Engels wrote: “what is the negation of the negation? An extremely general — and for this reason extremely far-reaching and important — law of development of nature, history, and thought.”[109]


Annotation 205

In the same text quoted above, Engels elaborates that dialectical development is composed of “processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation.”

c. Meaning of the Methodology

The law of negation of negation is the basis for correct perception of the tendency of motion and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. Development and motion processes do not take place in a straight line; rather, it is a winding, complex road, consisting of many stages, and each process can be broken down into many different sub-processes. However, it must be understood that this complexity of development is only the manifestation of the general tendency to move forward [see Annotation 118, p. 122]. It is important to understand the nature of motion and development so that we can systematically change the world according to our revolutionary viewpoint. In order to consciously impact the development of things, phenomena, and ideas, we need to know their characteristics, nature, and relationships so that we can influence their motion and development in the direction that suits our purposes. We must comprehend and leverage the tendency of forward movement — in accordance with a scientific and revolutionary worldview — in order to effectively and systematically change the world.


Annotation 206

Understanding the forward tendency of motion is vital for cultivating a worldview which is both scientific and revolutionary. Such a worldview is scientific because it recognizes the material reality that all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly undergoing change and development. Nothing in our universe is static, and all things are connected and defined by internal and external relationships (which are also constantly developing). Furthermore, this development progresses with a forward tendency, meaning that no process can be completely “reversed.” For example, you can clean rust from a car [which would be forward progress], but you can’t reverse the temporal process of rust.

Once we understand that all things, phenomena, and ideas in our universe are constantly developing and moving forward, we can then begin to find ways to impact motion and development systematically to consciously change the world around us. This is the foundation of a revolutionary worldview, since revolutionary change requires us to leverage and influence development processes to suit our needs and revolutionary ambitions. Thus, materialist dialectics are an applied system of observation and practice through which we seek to understand development processes and consciously impact them to suit our needs.

According to the rule of negation of negation, in the objective world, the new must inevitably come to replace the old. In nature, the new develops according to objective laws. In social life, new things arise from the purposeful, self-conscious, and creative actions of human beings. Therefore, it is necessary to leverage subjective factors as we seek to consciously impact the development of things, phenomena, and ideas.


Annotation 207

Subjective factors are factors which we, as a subject, are capable of impacting. This may seem confusing, since we have previously established that all external things, phenomena, and ideas have objective relationships with all other things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 108, p. 112], meaning that any given subject is external to every other subject, and thus no subject can directly and completely control the motion and development of any other subject.

However, from the perspective of any given individual, there are certain things, phenomena, and ideas [as well as processes of motion and development] which we can impact. For example, if I see an apple on a table, the apple is objective to me. I can’t simply will the apple to move with my consciousness alone. However, I can impact the apple through conscious activity — I can consciously will my hand to pick up the apple and move it to another location.

Thus, factors which an individual can consciously impact are subjective factors. As revolutionists, we must focus on subjective factors. In other words, we must concentrate on that which we are capable of changing, since our purpose is to change the world. Focusing on factors which we can’t impact is a waste of time; we must simply determine what can be changed and then determine the most efficient and effective ways of impacting development processes and changing the world.

As revolutionists, we must have faith that we can introduce the “new,” faith in the success of the “new,” we must support the “new,” and fight for the victory of the “new.” Therefore, it is necessary to overcome conservative, stagnant, and dogmatic thoughts which restrain the development of the “new” and resist the law of negation of negation.


Annotation 208

Change is inevitable. All things, phenomena, and ideas undergo processes of motion and development. Any philosophy, ideology, or strategy which attempts to restrain motion and development is doomed to failure because change can neither be halted nor restrained. Thus, our strategies and actions must align with the material reality that change is inevitable, and we must seek to change the world by impacting processes of development and motion rather than attempting to reverse, restrain, or halt such processes.

Ideologies which erroneously strive to restrict change and development include rigidity (see Annotation 222, p. 218) and conservativism (see Annotation 236, p. 233).

In the process of negating the old we must leverage the principle of inheritance with discretion: we must encourage the inheritance of factors that are beneficial to our goals as we simultaneously attempt to filter out, overcome, and reform factors which would negatively impact our goals.


Annotation 209

If we understand the principle of inheritance, we can impact inheritance processes which derive from negation. For example, when repairing a car, we can seek out parts of the car which do not function properly or which do not suit the use-case of the car and add or replace parts which are more suitable.

In the same way, we can impact inheritence processes in our revolutionary political activities. We can seek to inherit characteristics from previous stages of development of our political organizations, social institutions, culture, etc., while simultaneously seeking to prevent the inheritence of traits and characteristics which are unsuitable for our revolutionary purposes. Over time, we can attempt to impact the inheritance of traits and aspects which are more conducive to our purposes while limiting and filtering out traits and aspects which are hindrances.

In an article titled “New Life” written in 1947, Ho Chi Minh wrote about the dialectical relationship between the new and the old in building a new society, writing:

Not everything old must be abandoned. We do not have to reinvent everything. What is old but bad must be abandoned. What is old but troublesome must be corrected appropriately. What is old but good must be further developed. What is new but good must be done.

... Growing up in the old society, we all carry within us more-or-less bad traces of the old society in terms of our ideas and habits... Habits are hard to change. That which is good and new is likely to be considered bad by the people because it is strange to them. On the contrary, that which is evil yet familiar is easily mistaken as normal and acceptable.

Ho Chi Minh understood the principles of development very well, as well as the difficulties we will face as revolutionaries as we try to change ourselves and our society. We must strive to develop a similar understanding as we move forward and attempt to affect the development of our world through practice and struggle.


Chapter 3: Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism

In Marxism, epistemological reasoning (or epistemology) is the foundation of dialectics. Dialectical materialist epistemology is a theory of applying human cognitive ability to the objective world through practical activities. It explains the nature, path and general laws of the human process of perceiving truth and objective reality to serve human practical activities.


Annotation 210

Epistemology is the theoretical study of knowledge. It also deals with the philosophical question of: “how do we know what is true?”

Throughout history, philosophers have tried to determine the nature of truth and knowledge. In the era of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, there was an ongoing dispute between the materialists, who believed that truth could only be sought through sense experience of the material world, and the idealists, who believed that truth could only be sought through reasoning within the human mind.

Marx and Engels developed the philosophical system of dialectical materialism to resolve this dispute. Dialectical materialism upholds that the material and the ideal have a dialectical relationship with one another: the material determines the ideal, while the ideal impacts the material [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88].

However, it’s important to understand that Marx and Engels didn’t develop the system of dialectical materialism simply to understand the world. As Marx wrote in Theses on Feuerbach:

The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.

So, Marxist dialectical materialist epistemology is developed specifically to enable human beings to not only perceive truth and objective reality, but to then be able to apply our conscious thought, through practical activity, in order to bring about change in the world.


1. Praxis, Consciousness, and the Role of Praxis in Consciousness

a. Praxis and Basic Forms of Praxis

Praxis includes all human material activities which have purpose and historical-social characteristics and which transform nature and society. Unlike other activities, praxis is activity in which humans attempt to materially impact the world to suit our purposes. Praxis activities define the nature of human beings and distinguish human beings from other animals. Praxis is objective activity, and praxis has been constantly developed by humans through the ages.



Annotation 211

In English, the words “practice” and “praxis” are often distinguished from one another. “Practice” is often used to refer to human activity which provides more information about the world around us and improves our knowledge and understanding, whereas “praxis” often refers to conscious human activity which is intended to change the world in some manner. In their original German, Marx and Engels used the same German word — Praxis — to refer to both concepts. Similarly, in the original Vietnamese text of this book, the same word — thực tiễn — is used for both “practice” and “praxis.”

One reason that these concepts are so closely related is that all conscious activity serves both rolls by simultaneously telling us more about reality and consciously changing reality in some way. For example, by pushing a heavy stone, you may be able to move the stone a small amount — constituting praxis — while simultaneously learning how heavy the stone is and how difficult it is to move — constituting practice. The main point of distinction, therefore, is intention. Virtually all conscious activity is practice, but only activity which has purpose and historical-social characteristics might be considered praxis:

Purpose simply describes a goal or desired outcome; specifically: a desired change in nature or human society. Activities with historical-social characteristics are activities which contribute in some way to the development of human society.

In this translation, we use “practice” and “praxis” interchangably to mean “conscious activity which improves our understanding, and which has purpose and historical-social characteristics.” You are likely to find these words used differently (as described above, or in other ways) in other texts. Engels explains the importance of practice/praxis in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we [use] these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perceptions. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is positive proof that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves.

Marx wrote in Theses on Feuerbach that “the coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice [German: revolutionäre Praxis].” Engels further expounds upon this concept in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, writing:

The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical fancies is practice [original German: Praxis], viz., experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and using it for our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end of the Kantian incomprehensible or ungraspable.

Praxis defines the nature of human beings because human beings are (to our present knowledge) the only beings which undertake actions with conscious awareness of our desired outcomes and comprehension of the historical development of our own society, which distinguishes human beings from all other animals. Praxis is objective activity, meaning that all praxis activities are performed in relation to external things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 108, p. 112].

Praxis has been constantly developed by humans through the ages, meaning that as we learn more about the nature of reality, of human society, and the laws of nature, we are able to develop our praxis to become more efficient and effective.

Praxis activities are very diverse, manifesting with ever-increasing variety, but there are only three basic forms: material production activities, socio-political activities, and scientific experimental activities.

Material production activity is the first and most basic form of praxis. In this form of praxis activity, humans use tools through labor processes to influence the natural world in order to create wealth and material resources and to develop the conditions necessary to maintain our existence and development.

Socio-political activity includes praxis activity utilized by various communities and organizations in human society to transform political-social relations in order to promote social development.

Scientific experimental activity is a special form of praxis activity. This includes human activities that resemble or replicate states of nature and society in order to determine the laws of change and development of subjects of study. This form of activity plays an important role in the development of society, especially in the current historical period of modern science and technological revolution.


Annotation 212

The three basic forms of praxis activities listed above obviously do not include all forms of human activity, as praxis only includes activities which have purpose and historical-social characteristics.

Material production activity has a very clear purpose: to improve the material conditions of an individual human being or a group of human beings. Material production activity has historical-social characteristics because developing material conditions for human beings leads directly to the development of human society. For example, as food production increases in terms of yield and efficiency, society can support a larger number of human beings and a wider range of human activities, which leads to the development of human society.

Socio-political activity has the purpose of promoting social development, which is obviously inherently historical-social in nature. An example of socio-political activity would include any sort of political campaign, liberation struggle, political revolutionary activity, etc.

Scientific experimental activity has the purpose of expanding our understanding of nature and human society, which leads directly to historical-social development in a variety of ways. For example, improving our scientific understanding of medicine through scientific experimental activity leads to longer lives and improved quality of life. Improving our scientific understanding of chemistry through scientific experimental activity leads to all sorts of materials which improve the quality of life and enable human beings to solve a variety of social problems.

In order to qualify as praxis activity, a given human activity must have a purpose and it must have historical-social characteristics. For instance, drawing is not always praxis in the sense of the word used in this text, but it would be praxis if it would qualify as material production activity (i.e., making art in order to sell, so as to make a living) or if the art is made with the intention of invoking social change.

Every basic praxis activity form has an important function, and these functions are not interchangeable with each other. However, they have close relationships with each other and different praxis activity forms often interact with each other. In these relationships, material production is the most important form of praxis activity, playing a decisive role in determining other praxis activities because material production is the most primitive activity and exists most commonly in human life. Material production creates the most essential, decisive material conditions for human survival and development. Without material production there cannot be other praxis activities. After all, all other praxis activities arise from material production praxis and all praxis activities ultimately aim to serve material production praxis.


Annotation 213

Without material production activity, human beings would not be able to live at all.

Thus, material production activities make all other forms of human activities possible. In addition, the primary reason we participate in socio-political activity is to ensure material security (food, water, shelter, etc.) for members of society, which ultimately relies on material production activity. Therefore, the primary reason we engage in scientific experimental activity is to improve material production activities in terms of efficiency, yield, effectiveness, etc

Of course, we engage in scientific experimental activity and material production activity for other reasons (art, entertainment, recreation, etc.), but these activities require that material security be secured first for those participating in the production and consumption of such products. In other words, material production activity is a prerequisite for all other forms of activity, since without some measure of material security humans cannot survive.

Material production activity has a dialectical relationship with all other praxis activity, with material production activity determining, while being impacted by, all other forms of praxis activity.

Thus, material production activity has a dialectical relationship with other forms of praxis activities, in which material production activity determines both socio-political and scientific experimental activity while socio-political and scientific experimental activity impact material production activity.


b. Consciousness and Levels of Consciousness

The dialectical materialist perspective sees consciousness as a process of reflecting the objective world within the human brain on a practical basis to create knowledge about the objective world. Consciousness is a self-aware process that is productive and creative.

This view stems from the following basic principles:

  • The dialectical materialist worldview acknowledges that the material world exists objectively and independently of human consciousness.
  • The dialectical materialist worldview recognizes the following human abilities:
    • To perceive the objective world.
    • To reflect the objective world into the human mind, which enables human subjects to learn about external objects. [see Annotation 66, p. 64]
    • To admit that there are no material things nor phenomena which are unrecognizable, but only material things and phenomena that humans have not yet recognised. [see The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues, p. 48]

The dialectical materialist worldview affirms that conscious reflection [see Annotation 67, p. 64] of the objective world is a dialectical, productive, self-aware, and creative process. This reflection process develops from the unknown to the known, from knowing less to knowing more, from knowing less profoundly and less comprehensively to knowing more profoundly and more comprehensively.


Annotation 214

The above principle (that human knowledge develops from less, and less comprehensive, to more, and more comprehensive states) stands in contrast to various other philosophical systems of belief, including:

Hegel’s Absolute Idealism upholds a belief in an “absolute ideal” which constitutes an ultimate limit or “end point” of knowledge which humanity is moving towards. Dialectical materialism upholds that there is no such absolute ideal and thus no such terminal end point of human understanding. [See Annotation 234, p. 230] As Engels wrote in Anti-Dühring:

If mankind ever reached the stage at which it should work only with eternal truths, with results of thought which possess sovereign validity and an unconditional claim to truth, it would then have reached the point where the infinity of the intellectual world both in its actuality and in its potentiality had been exhausted, and thus the famous miracle of the counted uncountable would have been performed.

Fideism, which is the belief that knowledge is received from some higher power [i.e., God]. Fideism upholds that all knowledge is pre-existing, and that humanity simply receives it from on high. Dialectical materialism, on the other hand, argues that knowledge is developed over time through dialectical processes of consciousness and human activity.

Positivism, or empiricist materialism, which holds that there are hard limits to human knowledge, or that human knowledge — which can only be obtained from sense data — can’t be trusted. Dialectical materialism upholds that all things and phenomena can be known and understood, and that sense data can be trusted as an objective reflection of reality. For more information about skepticism about human sense data as well as positive and empiricist materialism, see Annotation 10, p. 10, and Annotation 58, p. 56].


The dialectical materialist worldview considers praxis as the primary and most direct basis of consciousness, and as the motive and the purpose of consciousness, and as the criterion for testing truth. [See: The Relationship Between Praxis and Consciousness, p. 216]


Annotation 215

Given the above principles — that human consciousness exists independently from the material world yet is capable of accurately perceiving and reflecting the material world, and that knowledge develops over time through a synthesis of consciousness and practical activity — we can conclude that consciousness is a self-aware process which is productive and creative.

Consciousness is productive and creative in the sense that conscious processes, in conjunction with practical experience and activity in the material world, leads to the development of knowledge and practical experience which allows humans to develop our understanding of the world as well as our own material conditions through the application of knowledge to our own labor activities.

Next, we will examine different ways of categorizing conscious activities as they pertain to developing knowledge and practical understanding of our world.

From the dialectical materialist point of view, consciousness is a process of development. Consciousness develops from empirical consciousness to theoretical consciousness; and from ordinary consciousness to scientific consciousness.


Annotation 216

In dialectical materialist philosophy, all systems of relation exist as processes of development in motion [see Annotation 120, p. 124]. Thus, consciousness can be defined as a system of relations between human brain activity and two forms of data input:

Sense experience: observations of the external world detected by our senses.

Knowledge: information which exists in the human mind as memories and ideas.

Consciousness is thus a process of the development of knowledge through a combination of human brain activity and human practical activity in the physical world (i.e., labor).

In the section below, we will explore different forms of consciousness, the development of consciousness, and the relationship between consciousness and knowledge. Note that these are abstractions of consciousness and knowledge, meant to help us understand how knowledge and consciousness develop over time. Thought processes are extremely complex, so we seek to develop a fundamental understanding of how consciousness develops and how knowledge develops because these processes are fundamental to the development of human beings and human societies.

Just as consciousness is a process of developing knowledge through brain activity, consciousness itself also develops over time. The development of consciousness can be considered based on the criteria of concrete/abstract and of passive/active.

Consciousness develops from a state of direct and immediate observation of the world which results in concrete knowledge to a higher stage which constitutes a more abstract and general understanding of the world. We call consciousness which is focused on direct, immediate, concrete, empirical observation of the world empirical consciousness, and we call consciousness which is focused on forming abstract generalizations about the world theoretical consciousness.

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Empirical consciousness is a process of collecting data about the world, which we call knowledge. We can gather two forms of knowledge through empirical consciousness: ordinary knowledge, and scientific knowledge.

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Ordinary knowledge is the knowledge we accumulate through our everyday experiences in the world. Scientific knowledge is gathered through more systematic scientific observations and experiments. Scientific knowledge usually develops from ordinary knowledge, as we begin to seek a more formal and systematic understanding of the things we witness in our daily lives.

According to Themes in Soviet Marxist Philosophy, edited by T. J. Blakely:

Ordinary knowledge notes what lies on the very surface, what happens during a certain event. Scientific knowledge wants to know why it happens in just this way. The essence of scientific knowledge lies in the confirmed generalization of facts, where it becomes necessary rather than contingent, universal instead of particular, law-bound, and can serve as a basis for predicting various phenomena, events and objects...

The whole progress of scientific knowledge is bound up with growth in the force and volume of scientific prediction. Prediction makes it possible to control processes and to direct them. Scientific knowledge opens up the possibility not only of predicting the future but also of consciously forming it. The vital meaning of every science can be expressed as follows: to know in order to predict and to predict in order to act.

An essential characteristic of scientific knowledge is that it is systematic, i.e., it is a set of information which is ordered according to certain theoretical principles. A collection of unsystematized knowledge is not yet science. Certain basic premises are fundamental to scientific knowledge, i.e., the laws which make it possible to systematize the knowledge. Knowledge becomes scientific when the collection of facts and their descriptions reach the level where they are included in a theory.

Theoretical consciousness arises from conscious reflection on accumulated knowledge, as human beings seek to develop general and abstract understanding of the underlying principles of processes we experience in the world. Once general principles of natural and social law are established, human beings then test those general conclusions against empirical reality through further observation (i.e., through empirical consciousness).

Thus, there is a dialectical relationship between empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness, as one form leads to another, back and forth, again and again, continuously.

Empirical and theoretical consciousness have a dialectical relationship in which empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness lead to and mutually develop one another.

Consciousness also develops from passive and surface-level observation and understanding of the world (i.e., simply considering what, where, and when things happen) to more active pursuit of the underlying meaning of the world (i.e., trying to understand how and why things happen).

Consciousness which passively observes the world, directly, in daily life is referred to as ordinary consciousness. Ordinary consciousness often develops into more active consciousness. This active pursuit of understanding through systematic observation and indirect experiences (i.e., experiences that do not occur in daily activity — such as scientific experimentation) is referred to as scientific consciousness.

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These concepts will be discussed in further detail below.


Empirical consciousness is the stage of development of consciousness in which perceptions are formed via direct observations of things and phenomena in the natural world, or of society, or through scientific experimentation and systematic observation. Empirical consciousness results in empirical knowledge.

Empirical knowledge has two types: ordinary empirical knowledge (knowledge obtained through direct observation and in productive labor) and scientific empirical knowledge (knowledge obtained by conducting scientific experiments). These two types of knowledge can be complementary, and can enrich one other.

Theoretical consciousness is the indirect, abstract, systematic level of perception in which the nature and laws of things and phenomena are generalized and abstracted.

Empirical consciousness and Theoretical consciousness are two different cognitive stages but they have a dialectical relationship with each other. In this dialectical relationship, empirical consciousness is the basis of theoretical consciousness; it provides theoretical consciousness with specific, rich material [i.e., knowledge]. Empirical consciousness is linked closely to practical activities [since practical activity in the material world is the chief method of gathering knowledge through empirical consciousness], and forms the basis for checking, correcting, and supplementing existing theories and summarizing, and generalizing them into new theories. However, empirical consciousness is still limited in that empirical consciousness stops at the description and classification of data obtained from direct observation and experimentation. Therefore, empirical consciousness only brings understanding about the separate, superficial, discrete aspects of observed subjects, without yet reflecting the essence of those subjects nor the underlying principles or laws which regulate those subjects.

Therefore, empirical consciousness, alone, is not sufficient for determining the scientific laws of nature and society. To determine such laws and abstractions, theoretical consciousness must be applied. So, theoretical consciousness does not form spontaneously, nor directly from experience, although it is formed from the summation of experiences.


Annotation 217

The knowledge we gain from our daily activity often inspires scientific inquiry and more systematic observation, which can yield scientific knowledge which will enrich and improve our daily practice and allow us to experience daily life with a deeper understanding of what we’re experiencing. Thus, the ordinary knowledge we gain through daily practice can enrich and yield scientific knowledge (and vice versa).

Empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness have a dialectical relationship with each other in which empirical consciousness provides the basis for theoretical consciousness. Theoretical consciousness attempts to derive general abstractions and governing principles from empirical knowledge which is gained through empirical consciousness. Once theoretical principles, generalities, and abstractions are determined, they are then tested against reality through empirical consciousness (i.e., practical observation and systematic experimentation) to determine if the theory is sound.

Empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness have a dialectical relationship with one another. Our observations of the material world lead to conscious activity which we then test in reality through conscious activity, and so on, in a never-ending cycle of dialectical development.

For example, a farmer may notice that plants grow better in locations where manure has been discarded — an act of empirical consciousness. The farmer might then form the theory that adding manure to the soil will help plants grow — an act of theoretical consciousness. This theory could then be tested against reality by mixing manure into the soil and observing the results, which would be another act of empirical consciousness. The farmer may then theorize that more manure will help plants grow even more — another act of theoretical consciousness — continuing the cycle of testing and observing.

This dialectical relationship between ordinary and theoretical consciousness is what allows human beings to develop and improve knowledge through practical experience, observation, and theoretical abstraction and generalization of knowledge.

Theoretical consciousness is relatively independent from empirical consciousness. Therefore, theories can precede expectations and guide the formation of valuable empirical knowledge. Theoretical consciousness is what allows human beings to sort and filter knowledge so as to best serve practical activities and contribute to the transformation of human life. Through this process, knowledge is organized and therefore enhanced, and develops from the level of specific, individual, and solitary knowledge to a higher form of generalized and abstract knowledge [what we might call theoretical knowledge].


Annotation 218

Knowledge which comes from empirical observations (empirical consciousness) is empirical knowledge. Theoretical knowledge is a product of theoretical consciousness. Over time, as repeated and varied observations are made through theoretical consciousness activities, knowledge becomes more generalized and abstract; this general and abstract knowledge is what we call theoretical knowledge.

Note that empirical and theoretical knowledge can be ordinary or scientific in nature; if the knowledge arises passively from daily life activities, it will be ordinary knowledge, regardless of whether or not it is empirical or theoretical in nature. If, on the other hand, the knowledge arises from methodological measurement and/or systematic observation, then it is scientific knowledge.vSo far, we have discussed ways of understanding consciousness based on the criteria of directness vs. abstractness. Next, we will discuss another way of looking at consciousness, based on the criteria of passiveness vs. activeness.

Ordinary consciousness refers to perception that is formed passively and directly from the daily activities of humans. Ordinary consciousness is a reflection of things, phenomena, and ideas, with all their observed characteristics, specific details, and nuances. Therefore, ordinary consciousness is rich, multifaceted, and associated with daily life. Therefore, ordinary consciousness has a regular and pervasive role in governing the activities of each person in society.

Scientific consciousness refers to perception formed actively and indirectly from the reflection of the characteristics, nature, and inherent relationships of research subjects. This reflection takes place in the form of logical abstraction. These logical abstractions include scientific concepts, categories, and laws. Scientific consciousness is objective, abstract, general, and systematic, and must be grounded in evidence.

Scientific consciousness utilizes systematic methodologies to profoundly describe the nature of studied subjects as well as the principles which govern them. Therefore, scientific consciousness plays an increasingly important role in practical activities, especially in the modern age of science and technology.


Annotation 219

Logical abstraction refers to an understanding of the underlying rules which govern things, phenomena, and ideas which underly objective processes, relationships, and characteristics. Logical abstraction is the result of scientific inquiry. Over time, our understanding of the rules which govern the things, phenomena, and ideas in our lives become more reliable and applicable in practical activities. This attainment of understanding and practical ability through scientific practice is scientific consciousness.

Ordinary and scientific consciousness are two different qualitative steps of cognitive processes which, together, allow humans to discover truth about our world. Ordinary and scientific consciousness have a strong dialectical relationship with each other. In this relationship, ordinary consciousness precedes scientific consciousness, as ordinary consciousness is a source of material for the development of scientific consciousness.

Although it contains the seeds of scientific knowledge, ordinary consciousness mainly stops at the reflection of superficial details, seemingly random events, and non-essential phenomena [see Essence and Phenomenon, p. 156]. Ordinary consciousness, therefore, cannot transform effortlessly into scientific consciousness. To develop ordinary consciousness into scientific consciousness, we must go through the process of accurate summarizing, abstracting, and generalization using scientific methods. Likewise, once scientific consciousness has been developed, it impacts and pervades ordinary consciousness, and therefore develops ordinary consciousness. Scientific consciousness therefore enhances our everyday passive perception of the world.

Ordinary consciousness refers to the passive observation of reality which takes place in our daily lives. Scientific consciousness refers to the systematic application of consciousness to solve specific problems in a methodological manner.


Annotation 220

For example, before developing scientific consciousness of farming, a farmer might go through daily life having no idea what makes plants grow to be larger and more healthy and might have no idea how to avoid common problems such as pests. After developing scientific consciousness of farming through scientific experimentation and other systematic methodologies, the farmer will look at things differently in daily life activities. They may see signs of pest infestation and immediately recognize it for what it is, and they may see other indications that plants are unhealthy and know exactly what to do to remedy the situation.

In this way, scientific consciousness enhances ordinary consciousness. Meanwhile, ordinary consciousness — passive observation of the world during daily activities — will lead to scientific consciousness by inspiring us to actively seek understanding of the world through scientific consciousness.

c. The Relationship Between Praxis and Consciousness

Praxis serves as the basis, driving force, and purpose of consciousness. Praxis serves as the criterion of truth by testing the truthfulness of our thoughts. [See Annotation 230, p. 226]

Praxis is able to serve these roles because reality is the direct starting point of consciousness; it sets out the requirements, tasks, and modes of consciousness, as well as the movement and development tendencies of consciousness. Humans have an objective and inherent need to explain the world and to transform it.


Annotation 221

Remember that the material world defines consciousness while consciousness allows us to impact the material world through conscious activity [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88]. Consciousness itself arose from the physical needs of the material world [see The Source of Consciousness, p. 64], and these physical needs continue to serve as the basis and driving force for all conscious activities, as we must act consciously to survive.

Our inherent need to explain the world and to transform it arises from our material needs to eat, seek shelter, cure and prevent disease, and so on. These physical needs, which stem from the material world, drive conscious activity and lead to the development of consciousness and knowledge.

Therefore, humans must necessarily impact things in the material world through our practical activities in order to survive. The impacts of our practical activities on the world cause things and phenomena to reveal their different properties, including their internal and external relationships [for example, hitting a rock will tell you properties about the rock; attempting to build something out of wood will provide data about the wood, etc.]. In this manner, praxis produces data for consciousness to process, and also helps consciousness to comprehend nature and the laws of movement and development which govern the world.

Scientific theories are formed on the basis of the dialectical relationship between practical activity and consciousness. For example: mathematics developed to allow us to count and measure things for practical activities such as agriculture, navigation, and building structures. Marxism also arose in the 1840’s from the practical activities of the struggles of the working class against the capitalist class at that time. Even recent scientific achievements arise from practical needs and activities. For example, the discovery and decoding of the human genome map was born from practical activities and needs, such as the need to develop treatments for incurable diseases. In the end, there is no field of knowledge that is not derived from reality. Ultimately, all knowledge arises from and serves practice. Therefore, if we were to break from reality or stop relying on reality, consciousness would break from the basis of reality that nurtures our growth, existence and development. Also, the cognitive subject cannot have true and profound knowledge about the world if it does not follow reality.

Practice also serves as the basis, driving force, and purpose of consciousness because, thanks to practical activities, our human ability to measure and observe reality improves increasingly over time; our logical thinking ability is constantly strengthened and developed; cognitive means become increasingly developed. All of these developments “extend” the human senses in perceiving the world [for example, by developing new tools to measure, perceive, and sense the world such as telescopes, radar, microscopes, etc.].

Reality is not only the basis, the driving force, and the purpose of discovering truth but also serves as the standard of truth. Reality also serves as the basis for examining the truthfulness of the cognitive process [i.e., we can test whether our thoughts match material reality through experimentation and practice in the real world]. This means that practice is the measure of the value of the knowledge we gain through perception. At the same time, practice is constantly supplementing, adjusting, correcting, developing, and improving human consciousness. Marx said: “The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice.”[110]

Thus, practice is not only the starting point of consciousness and a decisive factor for the formation and development of consciousness, it is also a target where consciousness must always aim to test the truth. To emphasize this role which practice plays, Lenin said: “The standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge.”[111]

The role of practice in consciousness requires that we always grasp the practical point of view. This point of view requires that we derive our ideas from practice, our ideas must be based on practice, and our ideas must deeply explore practice. In our conscious activities, we must attach a lot of importance to the summarization of practice [i.e., developing theoretical knowledge through theoretical consciousness which reflects practical experience]. Theoretical research must be related to practice, and learning must go hand in hand with practicing. If we diverge from practice, it will lead to mistakes of subjectivism, idealism, dogmatism, rigidity, and bureaucracy.


Annotation 222

Subjectivism occurs when one centers one’s own self and conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test one’s own perceptions against material and social reality. Subjectivists tend to believe that they can independently reason their way to truth in their own minds without practical experience and activity in the material world. Related to subjectivism is solipsism, a form of idealism in which one believes that the self is the only basis for truth. As Marxist ethicist Howard Selsam wrote in Ethics and Progress: New Values in a Revolutionary World: “If I believe that I alone exist and that you and all your arguments exist only in my mind and are my own creations then all possible arguments will not shake me one iota. No logic can possibly convince [the] solipsist.”

Idealism has a strong connection with a failure to incorporate practical activity into theoretical consciousness, since idealism holds that conscious activity is the sole basis of discovering truth.

Dogmatism occurs when one only accounts for commonalities and considers theory itself as the sole basis of truth rather than practice [see Annotation 239, p. 235]. Dogmatists ignore practical experience and considering pre-established theory, alone, as unalterable truth. This results in a breakdown of the dialectical relationship between theoretical consciousness and empirical consciousness, which arrests the development process of knowledge and consciousness.

Rigidity is an unwillingness to alter one’s thoughts, holding too stiffly to established consciousness and knowledge, and ignoring practical experience and observation, which leads to stagnation of both knowledge and consciousness.

Bureaucracy arises when theory becomes overly codified and formalized, to the extent that practical considerations are ignored in favor of codified theory. Bureaucracy can be avoided by incorporating practical experience and observations continuously into the development of practical systems and methodologies so that theory and practice become increasingly aligned over time to continuously improve efficiency and effectiveness of practical activities in the material world.

On the contrary, if the role of practice is absolutized [to the exclusion of conscious activity], it will fall into pragmatism and empiricism.


Annotation 223

In this context, pragmatism refers to a form of subjectivism [see Annotation 222, above] in which one centers one’s own immediate material concerns over all other considerations. For example, workers may place their own immediate needs and desires above the concerns of their fellow workers as a whole. This may offer some temporary gains, but in the long run their lack of solidarity and class consciousness will be detrimental as workers collectively suffer from division, making all workers more vulnerable to exploitation and ill treatment by the capitalist class.

Empiricism is a faulty form of materialism in which only sense experience and practical experience are considered sources of truth. This is opposed to the dialectical materialist position that the material determines consciousness, while consciousness impacts the material world through conscious labor activity. [See The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88]

Thus, the principle of the unification of practice and theory must be the basic principle in practical and theoretical activities. Theory without practice as its basis and criterion for determining its truthfulness is useless. Vice versa, practice without scientific and revolutionary theory will inevitably turn into blind practice. [As Ho Chi Minh once said: “Study and practice must always go together. Study without practice is useless. Practice without study leads to folly.”]

2. Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth

a. Opinions of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin about the Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth

Annotation 224

The section below outlines and explains the Universal Law of Consciousness, which holds that consciousness is a process of dialectical development in which practical activity leads to conscious activity, which then leads back to practical activity, in a continuous and never-ending cycle, with a tendency to develop both practical and conscious activity to increasingly higher levels.

In his Philosophical Notebook, Lenin generalized the dialectical path towards the realization of truth as development from vivid visualization to abstract thinking, and then from abstraction back to practice. This process, according to Lenin, is the dialectical path towards the realization of truth, and the realization of objective reality.

According to this generalization, the dialectical path towards the realization of truth (“truth,” here, referring to a correct and accurate reflection of objective reality) is a process. It is a process that starts from “vivid visualization” (emotional consciousness) to “abstract thinking” (rational consciousness).


Annotation 225

Given that consciousness has a material basis, and that practical activities are the driving force of consciousness [see Annotation 230, p. 226], it follows that we must strive to align our conscious thoughts and ideas with the material world. The more accurately we can reflect reality in our consciousness, the more effectively and efficiently our practical activities can become.

For example, through learning more about the mechanical, material, and physical processes which take place inside of an automobile engine, the more we can improve engines to make them more efficient and effective for practical applications.

Lenin explained that consciousness develops from “emotional consciousness” to “rational consciousness.” Thought about a subject begins at a base level of consciousness that is rooted in emotional and sense-oriented conscious activity, i.e, “vivid visualization,” which then leads to rational, abstract reflection.

By “vivid visualization,” Lenin is referring to the active, real-time experience of seeing (and hearing, smelling, and otherwise sensing) things and phenomena in the world.

When a person experiences something through practical activity, the first conscious activity will tend to occur at the emotional and sensory level — in other words, the conscious activities which occur simultaneously along with practical activities. Only after this initial period of emotional consciousness will one be able to reflect on the experience on a more rational and abstract level.

For example, if a zoologist in the field sees a species of bird they have never encountered before, their first conscious activity will be at the sensory-emotional level: they will observe the shape, coloration, and motion of the bird. They may feel excitement, happiness, and other emotions. This is emotional conscious activity.

This emotional conscious activity will then develop into rational conscious activity, as the zoologist may begin to consider things more abstractly, attempting to interpret and understand this experience through reason and rational reflection, asking such questions as: “Where does this bird nest? What does it feed on? Is this a new discovery?” and so on.

Such abstractions are not the end point of a cognitive cycle, because consciousness must then continue to develop through practice. It is through practice that perception tests and proves its own correctness so that it can then continue on to repeat the cycle.

This is also the general rule of the human perception of objective reality.


Annotation 226

Thus there is a dialectical relationship between emotional consciousness (linked to practical activity) and rational consciousness (linked to purely conscious activity).

This dialectical relationship is a cycle, in which one engages in practical activity, which leads to emotional consciousness, which leads to rational consciousness, which then leads back to practical activity to test the correctness of the conclusions of rational conscious activity.

We call this cycle of development of consciousness the cognitive process.

The cognitive process is a continuous cycle which describes the dialectical development of consciousness and practical activity.

The cognitive process is explained in more detail below.


- Development From Emotional Consciousness to Rational Consciousness

Emotional consciousness is the lower stage of the cognitive process. In this stage of cognitive development, humans use — through practical activity — use our senses to reflect objective things and phenomena (with all their perceived specific characteristics and rich manifestations) in human consciousness. During this period, consciousness only reflects the phenomena [i.e, phenomena, as opposed to essence — see Essence and Phenomenon, p. 156] — the external manifestations — of the perceived subject. At this stage, consciousness has not yet reflected the essence — the nature, and/or the regulating principles — of the subject. Therefore, this is the lowest stage of development of the cognitive process. In this stage, consciousness is carried out through three basic phases: sensation, conception, and symbolization.

Human sensation of an objective thing or phenomenon is the simplest, most primitive phase of the emotional consciousness stage of the cognitive processes, but without it there would not be any perception of objective things or phenomena. Every human sensation of objective things and phenomena contains objective content [see Content and Form, p. 147], even though it arises as subjective human conscious reflection. Sensation is the subjective imagining of the objective world. It is the basis from which the next phase of emotional consciousness — conception — is formed.

Conception is a relatively complete reflection within human consciousness of objective things and phenomena. Conception is formed on the basis of linking and synthesizing sensational experiences of things and phenomena [i.e., sensation]. Compared with sensation, conception is a higher, fuller, richer form of consciousness, but it is still a reflection of the outward manifestations of objects. Conception does not yet reflect the essence, nature, and regulating principles of the perceived subject.

Symbolization is the representation of an objective thing or phenomenon that has been reflected by sensation and conception. It is the most advanced and most complex phase of the stage of emotional consciousness. At the same time, it also serves as the transitional step between emotional consciousness and rational consciousness. The defining characteristic of symbolism is the ability to reproduce symbolic ideas of objective things and phenomena within human consciousness. Symbolization describes the act of recreating the outward appearances of material things and phenomena within human consciousness, which is the first step of abstraction, and thus the first step towards rational consciousness.


Annotation 227

Here is an example of the three phases of the emotional consciousness stage of the cognitive process:

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1. Sensation: Jessica senses a cake in the window of a bakery. She sees the frosting, the shape of the cake, and the decorations which adorn the cake. She smells the cake. During this phase, objective data about the cake is received into her consciousness, developing into an immediate and subjective sense perception of the cake. The beginnings of this cognitive activity will be purely sensory in nature; she may have been thinking of other things as she walked by the bakery, but the sight and smell of the cake, upon registering in her mind, will lead to the beginning of a new cognitive process cycle.

2. Conception: Jessica begins to conceive of the cake in her mind more fully. She will associate the immediate sense experiences of seeing and smelling the cake with other experiences she has had with cake, and a complete mental image and concept of the cake will form in her mind.

3. Symbolization: The word “cake” may now form in her mind, and she may begin thinking of the cake more abstractly, as “food,” as a “temptation,” and in other ways. This is the beginning of abstraction in Jessica’s mind, which will then lead to rational conscious activities.

Note that all of these phases of emotional consciousness activity may take place very quickly, perhaps in a fraction of a second, and may coincide with other conscious activity (i.e., Jessica may simultaneously be thinking of a meeting she’s running late to and any number of other things). At this point, Jessica will transition to the rational consciousness stage of the cognitive process, which is explained in more detail below.


By the end of the emotional stage of the cognitive process, consciousness has not yet reflected the essence — the nature, regulating principles, etc. — of the perceived subject. Therefore, at the emotional stage, consciousness is not yet able to properly interpret the reflected subject. That is to say, emotional conscious activity does not meet the cognitive requirements to serve practical activities, including the need to creatively transform the objective world. To meet these requirements, emotional consciousness must develop into rational consciousness.

Rational consciousness is the higher stage of the cognitive process. It includes the indirect, abstract, and generalized reflection of the essential properties and characteristics of things and phenomena. This stage of consciousness performs the most important function of comprehending and interpreting the essence of the perceived subject. Rational consciousness is implemented through three basic phases: definition, judgment, and reasoning.

Definition is the first phase of rational consciousness. During this phase, the mind begins to interpret, organize, and process the basic properties of things and phenomena at a rational level into a conceptual whole. The formation of definition is the result of the summarization and synthesis of all the different characteristics and properties of the subject, and how the subject fits into the organized structure of knowledge which exists in the mind. Definition is the basis for forming judgments in the cognitive process.

Judgment is the next phase of rational consciousness, which arises from the definition of the subject — the linking of concepts and properties together — which leads to affirmative or negative ideation of certain characteristics or attributes of the perceived subject.

According to the level of development of consciousness, judgment may take one of three forms: unique judgment, general judgment, and universal judgment [see Annotation 105, p. 107]. Universal judgment is the form of judgement that expresses the broadest conception of objective reality.

Reasoning is the final phase of rational consciousness, formed on the basis of synthesizing judgments so as to extrapolate new knowledge about the perceived subject. Before reasoning can take place, judgments must be transformed into knowledge. A judgment can be transformed into knowledge through one of two logical mechanisms: deductive inference (which extrapolates the general from the specific), and inductive inference (which extrapolates the specific from the general).


Annotation 228

Here is an example of the three phases of the rational consciousness stage of the cognitive process, continuing from our previous example of the emotional consciousness stage [see Annotation 227, p. 222].

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1. Definition: Jessica’s conception of the cake will transition into the rational conscious activity of definition. Jessica will begin to define the concept of the cake more wholly and concretely, summarizing and synthesizing all of the features and characteristics of the cake into a cohesive mental reflection of the cake. The word “cake” may become more pronounced and defined in Jessica’s consciousness, prompting her to think of the object which she defines as a “cake” more fully and rationally.

2. Judgment: Jessica will begin to form basic judgments about the cake. “That cake looks good,” “that cake smells good,” and so on. Next, these judgments will begin to transform into knowledge through inductive or deductive inferences. An inductive inference might be: “I generally enjoy eating cakes, therefore, I might enjoy eating this cake!” An example of a deductive inference might be: “This cake looks very delicious, therefore, there might be other delicious things in this bakery!”

3. Reasoning: Processes of inductive and/or deductive inference will begin to transform Jessica’s judgments into the form of knowledge. For instance, she may now possess such knowledge as: “This bakery has delicious looking cakes, this is a cake I would like to eat,” and so on. With this newly acquired knowledge, Jessica can begin reasoning; that is to say, she can begin making rational conclusions and decisions. She might conclude: “I will go into this bakery and buy that cake.”

Note that this is not the “end” of the cognitive process, because the final phase of the reasoning stage of the cognitive process (reasoning) will lead directly into a new cycle of the cognitive process. In this example, Jessica might engage in the practical activity of checking her watch to see the time, which will begin a new cycle of cognitive process, beginning with the sensation phase of the emotional stage as the visual sense data of her watch and carrying through to the final reasoning phase of the rational stage, and so on.

It should also be noted that this is merely an abstraction of the cognitive process; in reality, the human mind is incredibly complex, capable of carrying out a variety of cognitive processes simultaneously. At any given moment, a person might be considering various different subjects, and each different subject might be at a different stage of the cognitive process. This abstract model of the cognitive process is presented to help us comprehend the component functions of consciousness more easily in the wider context of dialectical materialist philosophy.

Specifically, this model of the cognitive process is intended to help us understand how human consciousness leads to “truth.” And “truth,” here, refers to the alignment of human consciousness with the material world, so that our perceptions and understanding of the world is accurate and representative of actual reality.

- The Relationship Between Emotional Consciousness, Rational Consciousness, and Reality

Emotional consciousness and rational consciousness are stages that make up the cognitive cycle. In reality, they are often intertwined within the cognitive process, but they have different functions. If emotional consciousness is associated with reality, and with the impact of sense data received from observing the material world, and is the basis for cognitive reason, then rational consciousness, based on higher cognitive understanding and abstraction, allows us to understand the essence, nature, regulating principles, and development processes of things and phenomena. Rational consciousness helps direct emotional consciousness in a more efficient and effective direction and leads to more profound and accurate emotional consciousness.


Annotation 229

In other words, considering a subject at the level of rational consciousness allows us to then view the same subject, at an emotional consciousness level, with more depth and awareness.

For example, the more time we have spent rationally considering something like a bicycle, the more quickly and accurately we can examine a bicycle at the level of emotional consciousness. If someone is looking at a bicycle for the first time, they might not be able to distinguish its component parts or functions. On the other hand, if someone has spent more time considering bicycles at the level of rational consciousness, they may be able to immediately and rapidly understand and process a bicycle at the emotional conscious level, so that they can perceive and comprehend the different parts of a bicycle, as well as their functions, immediately and at the emotional-sensory level.

However, if we stop at rational consciousness, we will only have knowledge about the subjects we perceive, but we still won’t really know if that knowledge is truly accurate or not. In order to be useful in practical activity, we must consciously determine whether knowledge is truth [i.e., whether the knowledge accurately reflects reality]. In order to determine the truth of knowledge, consciousness must necessarily return to reality. Consciousness must use reality as a criterion — a measurement — of the authenticity of knowledge gained through purely cognitive processes. In other words, all consciousness is ultimately derived from practical needs, and must also return to serve practical activities.


Annotation 230

The dialectical relationship between consciousness and practical activities means that conscious activities develop practical activities, and vice versa, in a continuous feedback loop.

One of the fundamental principles of dialectical materialism is that the material determines the ideal, and the ideal impacts the material [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness]. The fact that the material determines consciousness is reflected in the fact that material needs led to the development of consciousness, and conscious activity stems from material needs [see Social Sources of Consciousness].

The fact that the ideal impacts the material is reflected in the fact that consciousness must always return to the service of practical activities; as our consciousness develops (along with knowledge), our ability to impact and transform the material world becomes more efficient and effective.

The dialectical relationship between consciousness and practical activity is what drives the development of humanity. We imagine better ways of doing things, then test those ideas against reality through practical activity.

This dialectical relationship between consciousness and practical activity is thus cyclical. Conscious activity arises from practical activity, and returns to practical activity, in an endless process of developing both conscious ability as well as practical ability.


Therefore, it can be seen that the general, cyclical nature of the process of movement and development of consciousness develops from practice to consciousness — from consciousness to practice — from practical activity to the continued process of cognitive development, and so on. This process is repeated continuously, without end. The development level of consciousness and practice in the next cycle are often higher than in the previous cycle, and the cognitive process gradually develops more and more accuracy, as well as fuller and deeper knowledge about objective reality.

The universal law of consciousness [see Annotation 224, p. 219] is also a concrete and vivid manifestation of the universal laws of materialist dialectics, including: the law of negation of negation, the law of transformation between quantity and quality and the law of unity and contradiction between opposites. The process of cognitive motion and development, governed by these general laws, is the process of human progress towards absolute truth [see Annotation 232, p. 228].


Annotation 231

The universal law of consciousness is governed by the three universal laws of materialist dialectics:

The Law of Negation of Negation dictates that the new will arise from the old, but will carry forward characteristics from the old. This is reflected in the universal law of consciousness in that conscious activity arises from practical activity. This conscious activity then develops into improved practical activity, and so on, in a never-ending cycle of development. Throughout this development process, characteristics of previous cycles of cognitive and practical activities are carried forward and transferred on to newer cycles of cognitive and practical activities.

The Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality recognizes that quantity changes develop into changes in quality, and vice versa. This is reflected in the universal law of consciousness in the development of both conscious and practical activities. Conscious development also develops from quantitative changes to quality changes, and vice versa. For example, once a person accumulates a certain quantity of knowledge, the quality of their knowledge will change. For example, once a person has learned the function of every component part of a car engine, they will have a quality shift in their understanding of car engines — they will now have competency of the functioning of the engine as a whole. This is also true of practical activities. A quantity of practical experience will lead to quality shifts in practical ability. For example, once a person has practiced riding a bicycle enough that they can reliably ride the bicycle without falling, we would say that the person “knows how to ride a bicycle,” which represents a quality shift from the state of “learning how to ride a bicycle.”

The Law of Unity and Contradiction Between Opposites states that all things, phenomena, and ideas are defined by internal and external contradictions. This is reflected in the universal law of consciousness by the fact that practical needs serve as the basis for conscious activity, and that cognitive processes serve, in essence, to negate contradictions between consciousness and material reality through practical experience. In other words, the cognitive process is defined by a never-ending process of contradiction between the material and the ideal, as human beings seek to negate contradictions between our conscious understanding of the world and our practical experiences in search of truth - the accurate alignment of consciousness with the material world.

b. Truth, and the Relationship Between Truth and Reality

- Definition of Truth

All cognitive processes lead to the creation of knowledge, which is what we call human understanding of objective reality. But not all knowledge has content consistent with objective reality, because consciousness exists as the subjective reflection of objective reality in the human mind. The collective cognitive practice of all of humanity throughout history, as well as the cognitive practice of each individual human being, has demonstrated that the knowledge which people have gained and are gaining is not always consistent with objective reality. On the contrary, there are many cases of misalignment between consciousness and reality, and even complete contradiction between human thought and objective reality.

Within the theoretical scope of Marxism-Leninism, the concept of truth is used to refer to knowledge which is aligned with objective reality. This alignment is tested and proven through practice. In this sense, the concept of truth is not identical with the concept of “knowledge,” nor with the concept of “hypothesis.” According to Lenin: “The coincidence of thought with the object is a process: thought (= man) must not imagine truth in the form of dead repose, in the form of a bare picture (image), pale (matte), without impulse, without motion…”[112]


Annotation 232

Here, Lenin is dispelling Hegel’s conception of “absolute truth,” which is not to be confused with Lenin’s concept of “absolute truth” as “objective truth” which aligns consciousness with objective reality [see Annotation 58, p. 56]. For Hegel, “absolute truth” was the idea that there will eventually be some end point to the process of rational consciousness at which we will finally arrive at some final stage of knowledge and consciousness. This rational end point of consciousness, at which the dialectic ends and all contradictions are negated, is Hegel’s “absolute truth.”

Lenin is also pushing back against the metaphysical conception that all “truths” exist as static categories of information which do not change. Instead, Lenin points out that seeking truth — i.e., aligning consciousness with material reality — is a never-ending process, in particular because reality is constantly developing and changing. Thus, the alignment of consciousness with reality — the pursuit of truth — is a living and dynamic process which will never end, since the development of reality will never end.

- The Properties of Truth

All truths are objective, relative, absolute, and concrete.

The objectivity of truth is the independence of its content from the subjective will of human beings. The content of knowledge must be aligned with objective reality, not vice versa. This means that the content of accurate knowledge is not a product of pure subjective reasoning. Truth is not an arbitrary human construct, nor is truth inherent in consciousness. On the contrary, truth belongs to the objective world, and is determined by the objective world. The affirmation of the objectivity of truth is one of the fundamental points that distinguishes the concept of absolute truth of dialectical materialism from the concept of absolute truth of idealism and skepticism — the doctrines that deny the objective existence of the physical world and deny the possibility that humans are able to perceive the world.


Annotation 233

The Dialectical Materialist conception of objective truth stands in contrast to idealism, which states that conscious reasoning alone leads to truth, and that the subjective ideal determines material reality [see Annotation 7, p. 8].

This objectivity of truth also refutes skepticism, which states that truth is essentially undiscoverable, because human consciousness is ultimately unreliable and incapable of accurately reflecting material reality [see Annotation 32, p. 27].

Distinction must also be drawn between the concept of absolute truth as it is understood in dialectical materialist philosophy and the conception of absolute truth in Hegel’s idealist dialectics. Dialectical materialism defines absolute truth as “objective truth;” that is to say: a complete alignment between objective reality and human consciousness (as compared to relative truth, which is a partial alignment between consciousness and objective reality).

Hegel, on the other hand, views absolute truth as a final point at which human consciousness will have achieved absolute, complete, and final understanding of our universe (see Annotation 232, p. 228) with the ideal serving as the first basis and primary mechanism for bringing absolute truth to fruition.

Truth is not only objective, but also absolute and relative. Absolute truth [see Annotation 58, p. 56] refers to truth which reflects a full and complete alignment of consciousness and reality. Theoretically, we can reach absolute truth. This is because, in the objective world, there exists no thing nor phenomenon which human beings are completely incapable of accurately perceiving. The possibility of acquiring absolute truth in the process of the development of conscious understanding is theoretically limitless. However, in reality, our conscious ability to reflect reality is limited by the specific material conditions of each generation of humanity, of practical limitations, and by the spatial and temporal conditions of reflected subjects. Therefore, truth is also relative.


Annotation 234

Dialectical materialist philosophy recognizes that it must be theoretically possible to know everything there is to know about a given subject, since we are theoretically capable of accurately perceiving, sensing, and measuring all data which pertains to a subject. However, dialectical materialism also recognizes the practical limitations of human beings. As Engels writes in Anti-Dühring:

If mankind ever reached the stage at which it should work only with eternal truths, with results of thought which possess sovereign validity and an unconditional claim to truth, it would then have reached the point where the infinity of the intellectual world both in its actuality and in its potentiality had been exhausted, and thus the famous miracle of the counted uncountable would have been performed.

But are there any truths which are so securely based that any doubt of them seems to us to be tantamount to insanity? That twice two makes four, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, that Paris is in France, that a man who gets no food dies of hunger, and so forth? Are there then nevertheless eternal truths, final and ultimate truths.

Certainly there are. We can divide the whole realm of knowledge in the traditional way into three great departments. The first includes all sciences that deal with inanimate nature and are to a greater or lesser degree susceptible of mathematical treatment: mathematics, astronomy, mechanics, physics, chemistry. If it gives anyone any pleasure to use mighty words for very simple things, it can be asserted that certain results obtained by these sciences are eternal truths, final and ultimate truths; for which reason these sciences are known as the exact sciences. But very far from all their results have this validity. With the introduction of variable magnitudes and the extension of their variability to the infinitely small and infinitely large, mathematics, usually so strictly ethical, fell from grace; it ate of the tree of knowledge, which opened up to it a career of most colossal achievements, but at the same time a path of error. The virgin state of absolute validity and irrefutable proof of everything mathematical was gone forever; the realm of controversy was inaugurated, and we have reached the point where most people differentiate and integrate not because they understand what they are doing but from pure faith, because up to now it has always come out right. Things are even worse with astronomy and mechanics, and in physics and chemistry we are swamped by hypotheses as if attacked by a swarm of bees. And it must of necessity be so. In physics we are dealing with the motion of molecules, in chemistry with the formation of molecules out of atoms, and if the interference of light waves is not a myth, we have absolutely no prospect of ever seeing these interesting objects with our own eyes. As time goes on, final and ultimate truths become remarkably rare in this field.



Relative truth is truth which has developed alignment with reality without yet having reached complete alignment between human knowledge and the reality which it reflects. To put it another way, relative truth represents knowledge which incompletely reflects material subjects without complete accuracy. In relative truth, there is only partial alignment — in some (but not all) aspects — between consciousness and the material world.


Annotation 235

False consciousness is consciousness which is incorrect and misaligned from reality. Discovering and rooting out false consciousness is one of the primary concerns of dialectical materialism, as false consciousness can be a serious impediment to human progress. The term “false consciousness” was first used by Friedrich Engels in a personal letter to Franz Mehring in 1893 (a decade after the death of Karl Marx), and in this letter Engels uses the term interchangeably with the word “ideology”* to describe conscious thought processes which do not align with reality:

Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, indeed, but with a false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown to him, otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all. Hence he imagines false or apparent motives. Because it is a process of thought he derives both its form and its content from pure thought, either his own or that of his predecessors. He works with mere thought material which he accepts without examination as the product of thought, he does not investigate further for a more remote process independent of thought; indeed its origin seems obvious to him, because as all action is produced through the medium of thought it also appears to him to be ultimately based upon thought. The ideologist who deals with history (history is here simply meant to comprise all the spheres – political, juridical, philosophical, theological – belonging to society and not only to nature), the ideologist dealing with history then, possesses in every sphere of science material which has formed itself independently out of the thought of previous generations and has gone through an independent series of developments in the brains of these successive generations. True, external facts belonging to its own or other spheres may have exercised a co-determining influence on this development, but the tacit pre-supposition is that these facts themselves are also only the fruits of a process of thought, and so we still remain within that realm of pure thought which has successfully digested the hardest facts.

Although the term “false consciousness” is not found in writing until after Marx’s death, the concept underlying the term “false consciousness” is found often in the works of Marx and Engels. For instance, in The Holy Family, Marx and Engels explain how communist, class conscious workers have been able to break free of false consciousness of capitalist society:

They (the communist workers) are most painfully aware of the difference between being and thinking, between consciousness and life. They know that property, capital, money, wage-labor and the like are no ideal figments of the brain but very practical, very objective products of their self-estrangement.

This allusion to “the difference between being and thinking” recurs again and again in the works of Marx and Engels.

* Lenin also discussed the concept of false consciousness extensively, and argued that dialectical materialism was the key to negating the false consciousness of the working class, writing in What the “Friends of the People” Are:

It never has been the case, nor is it so now, that the members of society conceive the sum-total of the social relations in which they live as something definite, integral, pervaded by some principle; on the contrary, the mass of people adapt themselves to these relations unconsciously, and have so little conception of them as specific historical social relations that, for instance, an explanation of the exchange relations under which people have lived for centuries was found only in very recent times. Materialism removed this contradiction by carrying the analysis deeper, to the origin of man’s social ideas themselves; and its conclusion that the course of ideas depends on the course of things is the only one compatible with scientific psychology. Further, and from yet another aspect, this hypothesis was the first to elevate sociology to the level of a science.

Note that this convention of using the word “ideology” to mean “false consciousness” has never been common, and Marx and Engels both used the word “ideology” more often in its more usual sense of “a system of ideas,” but it is still occasionally encountered in socialist literature, as Joseph McCarney explains in Marx Myths and Legends:

Marx never calls ideology ‘false consciousness’. Indeed, he never calls anything ‘false consciousness’, a phrase that does not occur in his work... The noun is almost always accompanied by an epithet such as ‘German’, ‘republican’, ‘political’ or ‘Hegelian’, or by a qualifying phrase, as in ‘the ideology of the bourgeoisie’ or ‘the ideology of the political economist’. More typical in any case is the adjectival usage in which such varied items as ‘forms’, ‘expressions’, ‘phrases’, ’conceptions’, ‘deception’, and ‘distortion’ are said to have an ‘ideological’ character. Even more distinctive is the frequency, amounting to approximately half of all references in the relevant range, of invocations of the ‘ideologists’, the creators and purveyors of the ideological forms.



“Relative truth” and “absolute truth” do not exist separately, but have dialectical unity with each other. On the one hand, “absolute truth” is the sum of all “relative truths.” On the other hand, in all relative truths there are always elements of absolute truth.

Lenin wrote that “absolute truth results from the sum-total of relative truths in the course of their development; [...] relative truths represent relatively faithful reflections of an object existing independently of man; [...] these reflections become more and more faithful; [...] every scientific truth, notwithstanding its relative nature, contains an element of absolute truth.”[113]

Correct realization of the dialectical relationship between relative and absolute truth plays a very important role in criticizing and overcoming extremism and false consciousness in perception and in action. If we exaggerate the absoluteness of the truth of knowledge which we possess, or downplay its relativity, we will fall into the false consciousness of metaphysics, dogmatism, conservativism, and stagnation.


Annotation 236

Intentional or unintentional exaggeration of the absoluteness of truth — i.e., considering our knowledge to be more complete and/or aligned with reality than it actually is — leads to incorrect viewpoints and mindsets, including:

Metaphysics is a philosophical system which seeks truth through the systematic categorization of knowledge [see Annotation 8, p. 8]. This is a flawed method of seeking knowledge because it considers truth to be essentially static and unchanging, and upholds the erroneous notion that truth can be systematically broken down into discrete, isolated categories. In addition to being fundamentally incorrect about the nature of truth and knowledge, it leads to the incorrect presumption that such static categorization of knowledge can lead to truth at all. Metaphysics fails to see truth and consciousness as a process, and instead sees truth as a static assembly of categorized facts and data.

Dogmatism occurs when one only accounts for commonalities and considers theory itself as the sole basis of truth. Dogmatism inherently overstates the absoluteness of knowledge, as dogmatic positions uphold certain theoretical principles as complete, inviolable, and completely developed. This explicitly denies the continuously developing process of advancing knowledge and consciousness.

Conservativism includes any position that seeks to prevent change, or to undo change to return to an earlier state of development. Such positions deny the continuous development of consciousness, knowledge, and practice, and incorrectly assert incorrect positions; or mistake relative truth for absolute truth.

Stagnation is an inability or unwillingness to change and adapt consciousness and practice in accordance with developing material conditions. Stagnation can stem from, or cause, overstatement of absolute truth in theory and forestall necessary development of both consciousness and practical ability.

On the contrary, if we exaggerate the relativity of the truth of knowledge which we possess, or downplay its absoluteness, we will fall into relativism, thereby leading to subjectivism, revisionism, sophistry, and skepticism.


Annotation 237

Relativism is the belief that human consciousness can only achieve relative understanding of the world, and that truth can therefore never be objectively discovered. Relativism is, thus, the overstatement of the relative nature of truth and the denial of the existence of absolute truth. Relativism leads to such incorrect viewpoints and mindsets as:

Subjectivism: which occurs when one centers one’s own self and one’s own conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test their own perceptions against material and social reality [see Annotation 211, p. 205]. This position denies that truth can be discovered in the external material world, falsely believing that absolute truth stems only from conscious activity.

Revisionism: a failure to recognize and accept commonalities in conscious activity, focusing only on the private [see Private and Common, p. 128]. Revisionism leads to constant and unnecessary reassessment and reevaluation of both knowledge and practice. Revisionism, thus, is a position which overstates the relativity of truth and ignores truths which are more fully developed towards absoluteness.

Sophistry: the use of falsehoods and fallacious arguments to deceive [see Annotation 116, p. 118]. Sophistry is, thus, the intentional denial of truth and the intentional mischaracterization of truths as either overly relative or as not truths at all.

Skepticism: the belief that truth is essentially undiscoverable, because human consciousness is ultimately unreliable and incapable of accurately reflecting material reality [see Annotation 200, p. 192]. By denying that truth is discoverable at all, skepticism explicitly rejects absolute truth and declares that all truth is relative and unreliable.


In addition to objectivity, absoluteness, and relativity, truth also has concreteness. The concreteness of truth refers to the degree to which a truth is attached to specific objects, in specific conditions, at a specific point in time. This means that all accurate knowledge always refers to a specific situation which involves specific subjects which exist in a specific place and time. The content of truth cannot be pure abstraction, disconnected from reality, but it is always associated with certain, specific objects and phenomena which exist in a specific space, time, and arrangement, with specific internal and external relationships. Therefore, truth is associated with specific historical conditions. This specificity to time, place, relations, etc., is what we call concreteness.

Knowledge, if detached from specific historical conditions, will fall into pure abstraction. Therefore, it will not be accurate — it will not align with reality — and such knowledge cannot be considered truth. When emphasizing this property, Lenin wrote: “Truth is always concrete, never abstract.”[114] Mastering the principle of the concreteness of truth has an important methodological significance in cognitive and practical activities. It is required that consideration and evaluation of all things and phenomena must be based on a historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116]. In developing and applying theory, we must be conscious of specific historical conditions. According to Lenin, Marxism’s nature, its essence, lies in the concrete analysis of specific situations; Marx’s method is, above all, to consider the objective content of the historical process in a specific time.


Annotation 238

In other words, Marxism is rooted in seeking truth by examining reality from a historical and comprehensive viewpoint. For more information, see Annotation 114, p. 116.

- The Role of Truth in Reality.

In order to survive and develop, humans must conduct practical activities. These activities involve transforming the environment, nature, and human society. At the same time, through these activities, humans perform — knowingly or unknowingly — the process of perfecting and developing our conscious and practical abilities. It is this process that helps human cognitive activities develop. Practical activities can only be successful and effective once humans apply accurate knowledge of objective reality to our practical activities. Therefore, truth is one of the prerequisites that ensure success and efficiency in practical activities.

The relationship between truth and practical activities is a dialectical relationship which serves as the basis for the movement and development of both truth and practical activity: truth develops through practice, and practice develops through the correct application of truth which people have gained through practical activities.


Annotation 239

Truth and Practical Activities have a dialectical relationship in which truth develops through practice, and practice develops through the correct application of truth.

Practice only develops when truth about the universe is consciously applied to practical activities. For example, farm output increases as we learn more truth about the way crops grow and how land can be properly managed. Simultaneously, truth can only be developed through practical activity, as all ideas and knowledge must be tested through methodological observation, experimentation, and other forms of practical activity.

A theory is an idea or system of ideas intended to explain an aspect, characteristic, or tendency of objective reality. Theories are not inherently truthful; holding incorrect theories constitutes false consciousness. Practice (or praxis) is purposeful conscious activity which improves our understanding of the world. Theory and practice have a dialectical relationship with one another which, if understood, helps us to discover truth.

Truth and practical activities mutually develop one another over time.

This dialectical relationship between theory and practical activities means that we must never favor theory over practice, nor practice over theory, but that we must rather balance development of theoretical understanding as we engage in practical activities to test our knowledge against reality and to develop our practice with ever-advancing understanding of the world. As practice and theory develop one another, our understanding of objective reality comes closer and closer to truth.

In Theses on Feuerbach, Marx summarizes the relationship between theory and practice, writing:

The problem of the external world is here put as the problem of its transformation: the problem of the cognition of the external world as an integral part of the problem of transformation: the problem of theory as a practical problem.

Here, Marx explains that theory is concerned with solving the “problem” of transforming the external world through practice, and that “cognition of the external world” is required to solve the “problem of transformation. In other words, we must improve our theory in order to improve our practical ability to transform our world, and we learn about the world (thus improving our theory) through those practical activities.

Marx also writes in Theses on Feuerbach that:

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory, but it is a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power... of his thinking.

This point is key for understanding the dialectical relationship between practice and theory: in order to be useful, theory must be proven through practice. Thus, we must seek to develop our practice through theory, and our theory through practice.

Engels summarizes these ideas a bit more colorfully in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

Before there was argument there was action... In the beginning was the deed ... And human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating.



Engels wrote in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy of the uselessness of what might be called “pure theory,” divorced from practice, and the sort of radical skepticism which refutes that any practical knowledge can ever really be obtained by human beings:

There is yet a set of different philosophers — those who question the possibility of any cognition, or at least of an exhaustive cognition of the world... The most telling refutation of this (scepticism and agnosticism) as of all other philosophical crotchets, is praxis, namely experiment and industry.

It is practice, according to Engels, which proves the merit and utility of theory.

Through experiment and industry — through practical activities in the material world — we can test our ideas and dialectically develop both theory and practice. Lenin built upon these ideas in his own work, writing in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism:

The materialist theory, the theory of the reflection of objects by our mind, is here presented with absolute clarity: things exist outside us. Our perceptions and ideas are their images. Verification of these images, differentiation between true and false images, is given by practice.

Here, Lenin explains how only a proper understanding and application of the dialectical relationship between theory and practice can lead to the negation of false consciousness [see Annotation 235, p. 231] and the dialectical development of both practice and theory. Simply arguing and debating about ideas without relating them directly to practice will never lead to truth, nor will such pure-theory argumentation develop theory or practice in any meaningful way.

This brings to mind another line from Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach:

The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.

The philosophy of dialectical materialism and the system of materialist dialectics are designed specifically to produce action and to avoid such “scholastic questions” and “pure-theory argumentation.”

Ho Chi Minh summarized these ideas perhaps most clearly and precisely of all in the very title of his article: Practice Generates Knowledge, Understanding Advances Theory, Theory Leads to Practice:

Knowledge comes from practice. And through practice, knowledge becomes theory. That theory, again, has to be put into practice. Knowledge advances not just from thought to theory, but, above all, from applying theory to revolutionary practice. Once the world’s law is fully grasped as theory, it is critical to put that theory into practice by changing the world, by increasing production, and by practicing class struggle and struggling for national self-determination. This is a continuous process of obtaining knowledge.

“If Uncle Ho says we will win, we will win!” — Propaganda poster from the 30th anniversary of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1984).

Afterword

If it seems that this book has come to an end somewhat abruptly, it’s because this is really just the first of four major sections of the full volume from which this text is drawn. If you are reading this afterword after reading the entirety of the preceding contents, then congratulations, you have completed the equivalent to a full semester’s coursework for a class on dialectical materialist philosophy which all Vietnamese college students are required to take!

The next sections in this curriculum, each covered in the original full volume, include:

Part 2: Historical Materialism

This section covers the definition and basic principles of historical materialism, which is the field of work dedicated to applying dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics to human history and human society. In the West, historical materialism and dialectical materialism are often conflated, but this is in error. Historical materialism is an applied field of dialectical materialist philosophy and materialist dialectical methodology which is used in the pursuit of understanding and interpreting human history.

Part 3: Political Economy

This section condenses the three cardinal volumes of Capital by Karl Marx and covers three primary doctrines:

1. The doctrine of value.

2. The doctrine of surplus value.

3. The doctrines of monopolist capitalism and state monopolist capitalism.

Political Economy, in this course, can be considered the application of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics to the analysis and understanding of the capitalist mode of production from the perspective of the socialist revolutionary movement.

Part 4: Scientific Socialism

This section relies on an established understanding of dialectical materialism, historical materialism, and political economy as a foundation for developing socialist revolution. The three chapters of this section on Scientific Socialism are:

1. The Historical Mission of the Working Class and the Socialist Revolution

2. The Primary Social-Political Issues of the Process of Building a Socialist Revolution 3. Realistic Socialism and Potential Socialism

Moving Forward

We are already working on the translation of Part 2 of this curriculum, and we hope to complete it as quickly as possible. In the meantime, we believe this book provides the reader with enough of a foundation to continue studying and to begin applying the principles of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics in political struggle.

We highly discourage readers from self-study in isolation, just as we discourage individual political action. The best way to study socialism is alongside other socialists.

Depending on where you live, you may be able to find political education resources provided by communist parties, socialist book clubs, or other organizations. If such resources aren’t available, it should be fairly easy to find study groups, workshops, and affinity groups online where you can study with like-minded comrades. Of course, socialist revolution requires more than just study, as we hope this book has thoroughly explained. Theory must be coupled with practice. As Ho Chi Minh wrote: “If you read a thousand books, but you fail to apply theory into practice, you are nothing but a bookshelf.”

To avoid atrophying into the proverbial bookshelf, we encourage you to go out into the world and apply these ideas creatively and collectively with other socialists. Dialectical materialism is a philosophy that was developed from the ground up for application in the real world. Dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics provide a functional model of reality, a way of looking at highly complicated systems, with all their dynamic internal and external relations. Dialectical materialist philosophy demands that we see human systems as processes in motion. In order to fully comprehend such dynamic processes, we must engage with them, which is why Ho Chi Minh taught that “we are not afraid to make mistakes; we would only be afraid of making mistakes if we were not determined to correct them.”[115]

As we mentioned in the foreword, many socialists in the West suffer from a lack of practical engagement. Far too many socialists fall into utopianism, idealism, and social chauvinism and we believe this largely stems from failures to test ideas against reality through praxis. We hope that this book has impressed upon the reader that simply arguing about pure theory is a useless and futile pursuit. Indeed, sparring verbally over such “scholastic questions,” as Marx described them, is counter-productive. Marx and Engels defined such failure to engage in theory as “critical criticism” — that is to say, criticism for the sake of criticism. As Marx and Engels wrote in The Holy Family, such critical criticism is futile, as we will never think our way to revolution:

According to Critical Criticism, the whole evil lies only in the workers’ “thinking”. It is true that the English and French workers have formed associations in which they exchange opinions not only on their immediate needs as workers, but on their needs as human beings. In their associations, moreover, they show a very thorough and comprehensive consciousness of the “enormous” and “immeasurable” power which arises from their co-operation. But these mass-minded, communist workers, employed, for instance, in the Manchester or Lyons workshops, do not believe that by “pure thinking” they will be able to argue away their industrial masters and their own practical debasement. They are most painfully aware of the difference between being and thinking, between consciousness and life. They know that property, capital, money, wage-labour and the like are no ideal figments of the brain but very practical, very objective products of their self-estrangement and that therefore they must be abolished in a practical, objective way for man to become man not only in thinking, in consciousness, but in mass being, in life. Critical Criticism, on the contrary, teaches them that they cease in reality to be wage-workers if in thinking they abolish the thought of wage-labour; if in thinking they cease to regard themselves as wage-workers and, in accordance with that extravagant notion, no longer let themselves be paid for their person. As absolute idealists, as ethereal beings, they will then naturally be able to live on the ether of pure thought.

Engels expressed his frustration with such endless, utopian, idealist debates in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

Hence, from this nothing could come but a kind of eclectic, average Socialism, which, as a matter of fact, has up to the present time dominated the minds of most of the socialist workers in France and England. Hence, a mish-mash allowing of the most manifold shades of opinion: a mish-mash of such critical statements, economic theories, pictures of future society by the founders of different sects, as excite a minimum of opposition; a mish-mash which is the more easily brewed the more definite sharp edges of the individual constituents are rubbed down in the stream of debate, like rounded pebbles in a brook.

Engels concludes by punctuating why he and Marx had developed dialectical materialism as a praxis-oriented philosophical foundation for scientific socialism: “To make a science of Socialism, it had first to be placed upon a real basis.” We hope that the readers of this text will seek out real bases for your development in theory and praxis, and we trust that you will quickly discover that developing practice develops theory, and vice-versa.

Remember that Marx and Engels, themselves, were not just theorists who scribbled down their thoughts in an “scholarly” vacuum. They were revolutionists themselves, highly engaged in political struggle and, in so struggling, they risked their lives and freedom over the course of many decades. This struggle is what led to the change and development of their ideas over time. The same can be said for every other successful socialist revolutionary in history.

Vo Nguyen Giap, the great general who led Vietnam’s military forces through resistance wars against fascist Japan, colonialist France, and the imperialist USA, describes how he applied such principles on the battlefield in his book People’s War, People’s Army:

During the Resistance War, owing to constant fighting, the training of our troops could not be carried out continuously for a lengthy period but only between battles or campaigns. We actively implemented the guiding principles ‘To train and to learn while we fight.’ After the difficult years at the beginning of the Resistance War, we succeeded in giving good training to our army. The practical viewpoint in this training deserves to be highlighted. The content of training became most practical and rich. Training was in touch with practical fighting: the troops were trained in accordance with the next day’s fighting, and victory or defeat in the fighting was the best gauge for the control and assessment of the result of the training. On the basis of gradual unification of the organisation and its equipment, the content of training in the various units of the regular army was also systematised step by step.

Here, Vo Nguyen Giap has provided a concrete example of the dialectical relationship between theory and practice, and their inseparability. This fundamental aspect of dialectical materialist philosophy demands that we think and act like scientists to change the world, rather than simply speculating and imagining ineffectually like armchair philosophers. As Marx wrote in Theses on Feuerbach “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.” We encourage you to apply what you learn in this and other books to change the world.

Advice on Further Study

As you advance in your studies of socialist literature and theory, we offer the following advice:

First, you must recognize that the specific language used by revolutionary leaders and thinkers may vary widely across time and around the world. Fashions in language develop over time, and many contributions — like the text you’ve just read — come to us through translation from countless languages. This is why we believe it critical to develop an understanding of the spirit of the ideas of any particular text, and not to get bogged down in semantics and terminology. Liberal ideologists have done much to distract and divert intellectual energy with endless metaphysical altercation over the “proper” usage of this or that word. We caution strongly against this attitude, which makes us susceptible to sophistry, opportunism, and the sewing of undue conflict and division amidst the working class. We have pointed out various instances where Marx, Engels, and Lenin used different language to describe the same concepts. We also offer the reminder that Marx, Engels, and Lenin were writing in different languages at different times, just as socialists around the world have different linguistic and cultural backgrounds. As socialism is an international movement, we must stress the importance of avoiding linguistic barriers by engaging with one another in good faith and testing conflicting ideas and interpretations of theory against one another through practice instead of getting bogged down with “critical criticism.”

Next, we encourage students of socialist philosophy to always keep in mind that the doctrines and philosophies of revolutionary figures are products of the times and places in which they were conceived. It would be a mistake to view the works of any revolutionary figure as a road map or a set of instructions to follow by rote. Even Marx and Engels changed and developed their own ideas over the decades they were active, as they addressed in the 1872 preface to The Communist Manifesto:

The practical application of the principles will depend, as the Manifesto itself states, everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being existing, and, for that reason, no special stress is laid on the revolutionary measures proposed at the end of Section II. That passage would, in many respects, be very differently worded today. In view of the gigantic strides of Modern Industry since 1848, and of the accompanying improved and extended organization of the working class, in view of the practical experience gained, first in the February Revolution, and then, still more, in the Paris Commune, where the proletariat for the first time held political power for two whole months, this programme has in some details been antiquated. One thing especially was proved by the Commune, viz., that “the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.” (See The Civil War in France: Address of the General Council of the International Working Men’ s Association, 1871, where this point is further developed.) Further, it is self-evident that the criticism of socialist literature is deficient in relation to the present time, because it comes down only to 1847; also that the remarks on the relation of the Communists to the various opposition parties (Section IV), although, in principle still correct, yet in practice are antiquated, because the political situation has been entirely changed, and the progress of history has swept from off the earth the greater portion of the political parties there enumerated.”

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and Ho Chi Minh also frequently took pains to point out that their revolutionary theories were devised specifically to suit the particular objective conditions of their own respective times and places. For example, in What is to be Done, Lenin discusses the question of secrecy in revolutionary activity. Lenin recognizes that secrecy is not always necessary, such as in the more liberal social democracies which existed in Europe in his era. In Russia, however — with its autocratic monarchy — material conditions called for more covert activity:

In countries where political liberty exists the distinction between a trade union and a political organisation is clear enough, as is the distinction between trade unions and Social-Democracy. The relations between the latter and the former will naturally vary in each country according to historical, legal, and other conditions; they may be more or less close, complex, etc. (in our opinion they should be as close and as little complicated as possible); but there can be no question in free countries of the organisation of trade unions coinciding with the organisation of the Social-Democratic Party. In Russia, however, the yoke of the autocracy appears at first glance to obliterate all distinctions between the Social-Democratic organisation and the workers’ associations, since all workers’ associations and all study circles are prohibited, and since the principal manifestation and weapon of the workers’ economic struggle — the strike — is regarded as a criminal (and sometimes even as a political!) offence.”

Ho Chi Minh was even more explicit about the requirement to tailor theory to current and local material conditions in a speech to the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1950:

Studying Marxism-Leninism is not just a matter of repeating the slogan ‘workers of the world, unite’ like a parrot. We must unify Marxism-Leninism with the reality of Vietnam’s revolution. Talking about Marxism-Leninism in Vietnam is talking about the specific guidelines and policies of the Communist Party of Vietnam. For example, our priority now is: great solidarity!

In a 2001 document, the Communist Party of Vietnam explained how Ho Chi Minh tailored lessons learned from prior revolutionaries to the specific material conditions of revolutionary Vietnam:

Ho Chi Minh’s thought is... the creative application and development of Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of our country. Ho Chi Minh learned profound lessons from Lenin and the Russian October Revolution, but he did not simply use those lessons as a template, nor did he just copy that foundation. Instead, he absorbed the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. Lenin’s thesis allowed Ho Chi Minh to see what was necessary for the Vietnamese people — the path of national liberation. Ho Chi Minh had creative arguments that contributed to enriching Marxism-Leninism in the issue of national liberation revolution, building a new democratic regime and the transitional path to socialism in an Eastern, semi-feudal colony which was still very backward: Vietnam.

As you find your own revolutionary path, you must carefully examine the objective conditions of your own time and place, and work collectively and collaboratively with your fellow revolutionists to decide how theory and lessons gleaned from history apply to your own circumstances. And, of course, you must test the validity of your conclusions against reality through practice.

Creative Application of Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics

Finally, we implore you to apply dialectical materialism creatively. Don’t look at this (or any other) book as a set of static instructions. Dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics are living, breathing systems of thought which benefit from the ideas and imagination of comrades working and struggling together. Seek the spirit of these ideas, study revolutionary theory and history, then apply what you learn in your daily life. Combat dogmatism and avoid arguments over pure theory. Determine what works and what doesn’t through activity in the real world, and apply what you learn from practical experience to your theoretical development. Over time, you will begin to see how practice and theory impact and develop one another. When you are struggling with a particular problem in revolutionary practice, you will find yourself reading theory in a new light, discovering information and ideas which might be applicable to your immediate circumstances. And as you study theory, you will find that it also impacts your practice, giving you tools and perspective and methodologies for action which you might never have imagined on your own.

We have tried to make this book a useful companion for further study. We have also made the digital version available for free online. If you have found it useful, we hope you will share it freely and widely.

In Closing

One last time we would like to thank Dr. Vijay Prashad and Dr. Taimur Rahman for their wonderful insights on our translation, and to acknowledge the monumental work of the Vietnamese scholars who wrote and revised the original text from which this volume is drawn. We also want to recognize once more the donors and supporters who have given us the precious resource of time to translate and annotate this work. Finally, we want to thank the teams at the Iskra Books and The International Magazine, who have provided invaluable editing and peer review services, promotion, and guidance. You can find all their publications, respectively, at:

IskraBooks.org

InternationalMagz.com

If you would like to download the free digital version of this book, support future translation work, or if you would like to get in touch, you can visit our website:

BanyanHouse.org

We will leave you, now, with the immortal words of the Manifesto:

Workers of the world, unite!

You have nothing to lose but your chains.

In Solidarity,

- Luna Nguyen, Translator & Annotations

- Emerican Johnson, Editor, Illustrator, & Annotations

“Marxism-Leninism — Long Live the Victories” — a demonstration to welcome the liberation army in the South of Vietnam on April 30, 1975.


[Appendices]

Appendix A: Basic Pairs of Categories Used in Materialist Dialectics

This is a summary of the basic pairs of universal categories and their characteristics which are discussed in depth starting on p. 126.

Private Common
A specific item, event, or process. The properties that are shared between Private things, phenomena, and ideas.

Private is commonly referred to in literature as Special/Specific while Common is commonly called General. Note: When an aspect or characteristic is not held in common with anything else in existence, it is considered Unique. The Unique can become Common, just as the Common can become Unique. Example: a Unique design for an object may be replicated, making it Common. A type of item that is Common may gradually disappear until there is only one example left, making it Unique. See p. 128.

Reason Result
Mutual impact between things, phenomena, or ideas which causes each to change. The change caused by a Reason.

Reason and Result may be referred to as Cause and Effect, respectively, though this should lead to confusion with metaphysical conceptions of cause and effect. Note: Reasons can be Direct or Indirect. See p. 138

Obviousness Randomness
Refers to events that always and predictably happen due to factors of internal material structure. Events caused by external impacts and interactions which are thus not completely predictable.

Obvious may be referred to as Necessary, while Randomness may be referred to as Accidental. See p. 145.

Content Form
What something is made of. The shape that contains content.

Ways in which Content and Form are discussed and perceived can can vary wildly depending on the subject being discussed and the viewpoint from which the subject is being considered. See p. 145.

Essence Phenomena
Features that make something develop a certain way. The expression of the essence in certain conditions.

See p. 156.

Possibility Reality
What may happen, or might exist, in the future, if certain developments take place. What is happening, or what exists, at the present moment.

See p. 160.

Appendix B: the Two Basic Principles of Dialectical Materialism

The Principle of General Relationships This principle states that:

“Materialist dialectics upholds the position that all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in mutual relationships with each other, regulate each other, transform into each other, and that nothing exists in complete isolation.”

From this Principle, we find the characteristics of Diversity in Unity and Unity in Diversity; the basis of Diversity in Unity is the fact that every thing, phenomenon, and idea contains many different relationships; the basis of Unity in Diversity is that many different relationships exist — unified — within each and every thing, phenomenon, and idea.

The Characteristic of Diversity in Unity is derived from the fact that there exist an infinite number of diverse relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas, but all of these relationships share the same foundation in the material world.

The Characteristic of Unity in Diversity is derived from the fact that when we examine the universal relationships that exist within and between all different things, phenomena, and ideas, we will find that each individual manifestation of any universal relationship will have its own different manifestations, aspects, features, etc. Thus even the universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in infinite diversity.

The Principle of Development This principle states that:

Development is a process that comes from within the thing-in-itself; the process of solving the contradictions within things and phenomena. Therefore, development is inevitable, objective, and occurs without dependence on human will.”

The Characteristic of Objectiveness of Development stems from the origin of motion. Since motion originates from mutual impacts which occur between external things, objects, and relationships, the motions themselves also occur externally (relative to all other things, phenomena, and objects). This gives motion itself objective characteristics.

The Characteristic of Generality of Development stems from the fact that development occurs in every process that exists in every field of nature, society, and human thought; in every thing, every phenomenon, and every process and stage of these things and phenomena.

The Characteristic of Diversity of Development stems from the fact that every thing, phenomenon, and idea has its own process of development that is not totally identical to the process of development of any other thing, phenomenon, or idea.

Appendix C: the Three Universal Laws of Materialist Dialectics

The Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality

The law of transformation between quantity and quality is a universal law which concerns the universal mode of motion and development processes of nature, society, and human thought. The law was formulated by Friedrich Engels in Dialectics of Nature, and states that:

“In nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion.” See more on p. 163.

The Law of Unification and Contradiction Between Opposites

The law of unification and contradiction between opposites is the essence of dialectics. It states, as formulated by V. I. Lenin in Summary of Dialectics:

“The fundamental, originating, and universal driving force of all motion and development processes is the inherent and objective contradiction which exists in all things, phenomena, and ideas.” See more on p. 175.

The Law of Negation of Negation

The law of negation of negation describes the fundamental and universal tendency of movement and development to occur through a cyclical form of development through what is termed “negation of negation.” Formulated by Friedrich Engels in Anti-Dühring, it states:

“The true, natural, historical, and dialectical negation is (formally) the moving source of all development--the division into opposites, their struggle and resolution, and what is more, on the basis of experience gained, the original point is achieved again (partly in history, fully in thought), but at a higher stage.” See more on p. 185.

Appendix D: Forms of Consciousness and Knowledge

Consciousness refers to the self-aware, productive, and creative motion and activity of the human brain. Practical activity is the most direct basis, motive, and purpose of consciousness, and is the criterion for testing truth. See: The Relationship Between Praxis and Consciousness, p. 216.

Knowledge is the content of consciousness. Knowledge includes data about the world, such as ideas, memories, and other thoughts which are derived by direct observation and practical activities in the material world, through scientific experiments, or through abstract reflection of practical and scientific activities which occur within consciousness.

Consciousness and Knowledge have a dialectical relationship with one another: knowledge is developed within consciousness, and consciousness develops to higher levels as knowledge is accumulated and tested against reality (which also develops knowledge itself). In this manner, consciousness and knowledge develop into higher forms over time in individual consciousness and human society. Thus, consciousness and knowledge can be considered as existing in various forms which represent stages of development in dialectical processes of development.

Note that the development processes of knowledge and consciousness are dialectical in nature, not linear. For example, after empirical consciousness develops into theoretical consciousness, theoretical consciousness will then impact empirical consciousness, developing empirical consciousness into a higher stage of development. This is true for all development processes related to empirical and theoretical consciousness. These development processes and forms of consciousness and knowledge are explained in more detail in Chapter 3: Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism, starting on page 204.

Forms of Consciousness

Consciousness is a process of the development of knowledge through a combination of human brain activity and human practical activity in the physical world (i.e., labor). The development of consciousness can be considered on the criteria of concrete/abstract and of passive/active. For more information, see Annotation 216, p. 210.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-99.png

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-100.png

The Cognitive Process

The Cognitive Process is a model developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin which represents the dialectical path of consciousness to truth. For more information, see Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth on page 219.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-101.png

Forms of Knowledge

For more information see Annotation 218, p. 214.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-102.png

Appendix E: Properties of Truth

Truth is the alignment of consciousness with objective reality. All truths are objective, relative, absolute, and concrete. Truths also have characteristics of concreteness and abstractness.

Objectivity: The content of truth is external to the subjective will of human beings. The content of knowledge must be aligned with objective reality, not vice versa. This means that the content of accurate knowledge is not a product of pure subjective reasoning but is objective in nature.

Absoluteness: Absolute truth[116] is derived from the complete alignment between objective reality and human consciousness. The possibility of acquiring absolute truth in the process of the development of conscious understanding is theoretically limitless. However, in reality, our conscious ability to reflect reality is limited by the specific material conditions of each generation of humanity, of practical limitations, and by the spatial and temporal conditions of reflected subjects. Therefore, truth is also relative.

Relativity: Relative truth is truth which has developed alignment with reality without yet having reached complete alignment. To put it another way, relative truth represents knowledge which incompletely reflects material subjects without complete accuracy. In relative truth, there is only partial alignment — in some (but not all) aspects — between consciousness and the material world.

Dialectical Relationship Between Absolute and Relative Truth: Relative truth and absolute truth do not exist separately, but have dialectical unity with each other. On the one hand, “absolute truth” is the sum of all “relative truths.” On the other hand, in all relative truths there are always elements of absolute truth.

Concreteness: The concreteness of truth refers to the degree to which a truth is attached to specific objects, in specific conditions, at a specific point in time. This means that all accurate knowledge always refers to a specific situation which involves specific subjects which exist in a specific place and time. The content of truth cannot be pure abstraction, disconnected from reality, but it is always associated with certain, specific objects and phenomena which exist in a specific space, time, and arrangement, with specific internal and external relationships. Therefore, truth is associated with specific historical conditions. This specificity to time, place, relations, etc., is concreteness.

Abstractness: Abstract knowledge is knowledge which is not attached (or less attached) to specific times, places, relations, etc. Some degree of abstraction is necessary to develop theoretical understanding of general laws and the nature of objective reality, but care should be taken knowledge does not become completely detached from specific historical conditions, as this will result in pure abstraction. Knowledge which is purely abstract will not align with reality, and such knowledge cannot be considered truth.

Appendix F: Common Deviations From Dialectical Materialism

Throughout the history of the development of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics, there have been many philosophical and methodological deviations which have derived from incorrect analysis, interpretation, and a failure to properly link theory and practice. Below are descriptions of some of the more common deviations which the reader should be aware of.

Bureaucracy: An expression of dogmatism which arises when theory becomes overly formalized, to the extent that practical considerations are ignored in favor of codified theory.

Conservativism: A mindset which seeks to prevent and stifle development and to hold humanity in a static position. Not only is this detrimental to humanity, it is also ultimately a wasted effort, because development is inevitable in human society, as in all things, phenomena, and ideas.

Dogmatism: A breakdown of the dialectical relationship between theoretical consciousness and empirical consciousness, which arrests the development process of knowledge and consciousness. Usually the result of: failure to seek commonalities; considering theory itself as the sole basis of truth rather than practice; ignoring practical experience and considering pre-established theory, alone, as unalterable truth.

Eclecticism: An approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject; the philosophical error of inconsistently applying different theories and principles in different situations. Empiricism: A broad philosophical position which holds that only experience (including internal experience) can be held as a source of knowledge or truth. Though nominally opposed to idealism, it is considered a faulty (or naive) form of materialism, since it sees the world as only unconnected, static appearances and ignores the reality of dialectical (changing) relationships between objects.

Idealism: A philosophical position which holds that the only reliable experience of reality occurs within human consciousness. Idealists believe that relying on human reason exclusively or as a first basis is the best way to seek truth. Various forms of idealism exist, broadly broken down into subjective idealism, which denies the existence of an external objective world, and objective idealism, which accepts that an external objective world exists, but denies that knowledge can be reliably gained about it through sense perception.

Opportunism: A system of political opinions with no direction, no clear path, no coherent viewpoint, leaning on whatever is beneficial for the opportunist in the short term.

Revisionism: A failure to recognize and accept commonalities in conscious activity, focusing only on the private. Revisionism leads to constant and unnecessary reassessment and reevaluation of both knowledge and practice. Revisionism, thus, is a position which overstates the relativity of truth and ignores truths which are more fully developed towards absoluteness.

Rigidity: An unwillingness to alter one’s thoughts, holding too stiffly to established consciousness and knowledge, and ignoring practical experience and observation, which leads to stagnation of both knowledge and consciousness.

Skepticism: The belief truth is essentially undiscoverable, because human consciousness is ultimately unreliable and incapable of accurately reflecting material reality. By denying that truth is discoverable at all, skepticism explicitly rejects absolute truth and declares that all truth is relative and unreliable. Solipsism: A form of idealism in which one believes that the self is the only basis for truth. As Marxist ethicist Howard Selsam wrote in Ethics and Progress: New Values in a Revolutionary World: “If I believe that I alone exist and that you and all your arguments exist only in my mind and are my own creations then all possible arguments will not shake me one iota. No logic can possibly convince [the] solipsist.”

Sophistry: The use of falsehoods and misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, and with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. This kind of bad faith argument has no place in materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics must, instead, be rooted in a true and accurate understanding of the subject, material conditions, and reality in general.

Subjectivism: The centering of one’s own self and conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test one’s own perceptions against material and social reality. Subjectivists tend to believe that they can independently reason their way to truth in their own minds without practical experience and activity in the material world.

Utilitarianism: An ethical philosophical theory founded by Jeremy Bentham which seeks to maximize “utility,” which is considered to be a metaphysical property embodying “benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness.” Karl Marx dismissed utilitarianism as overly abstract, in that it reduces all social relationships to the single characteristic of “utility.” He also viewed utilitarianism as metaphysically static and tied to the status quo of current society, since utilitarianism does not address class dynamics and views all relations in the current status quo of society, making utilitarianism an essentially conservative theory. Marx also pointed out that Utilitarianism essentially views individuals as private individuals, not as social individuals, and seeks to work out solutions to the practical problems of human society through reasoning alone without examining material conditions and processes, and without taking into consideration practice and development, writing:

“The whole criticism of the existing world by the utility theory was... restricted within a narrow range. Remaining within the confines of bourgeois conditions, it could criticise only those relations which had been handed down from a past epoch and were an obstacle to the development of the bourgeoisie... the economic content gradually turned the utility theory into a mere apologia for the existing state of affairs, an attempt to prove that under existing conditions the mutual relations of people today are the most advantageous and generally useful.”


[Back Matter]

Glossary & Index

Absolute Truth Absolute Truth can refer to:


1. The recognition that objective and accurate truth can be drawn from sense perception of the material world along with labor and practice activities in the material world. The opposite of this position is Relativism. See p. 56, 94, 194, 228–229, 232–234.

2. Hegel’s notion of Absolute Truth: that there will eventually be some end point of to the process of rational consciousness at which point humanity will arrive at a final stage of knowledge and consciousness. See p. 228.

See also: Relative Truth, Relativism, Stagnation, Truth.

Absolutization To hold a belief or supposition as always true in all situations and without exception. See p. 49.
Abstract Labor The abstract conception of expenditure of human energy in the form of labor, without taking into account the value of labor output. When the value of labor output is taken into consideration, it is referred to as concrete labor. See p. 15, 17.
Adam Smith (1723–1790) British logic professor, moral philosophy professor, and economist. Along with David Ricardo, Adam Smith was one of the founders of political economy, which Marx both drew from and critiqued in his analysis and critique of capitalism. See p. 14, 155.
Ahistoric Perspective A perspective which considers aspects of human society without due consideration of historical processes of development. For example, Adam Smith and David Ricardo viewed political economy ahistorically, viewing capitalism as a static, universal, and eternal product of natural law rather than seeing capitalism as a product of historical processes of development which would change and develop over time. See p. 116.
Base Also known as: Economic Base; Economic Basis. The material processes which humans undertake to survive and transform our environment to support our ways of living. In the dialectical relationship between base and superstructure, the base refers to the relationship which humans have with the means of production, including the ownership of the means of production and the organization of labor. See p. 23. See also: Superstructure.
Biological Motion One of the five basic forms of motion described by Engels in Dialectics of Nature. Biological motion refers to changes and development within living objects and their genetic structure. See p. 61.
Biological Reflection A complex form of reflection found within organic subjects in the natural world and expressed by excitation, induction, and reflexes. See p. 65.
Bourgeoisie The owners of the means of production and the ruling class under capitalism; also known as the capitalist class. See p. 3, 23, 30, 41, 50, 63, 96. See also:


Proletariat, Petty Bourgeoisie.

Bureaucracy An expression of dogmatism which arises when theory becomes overly formalized, to the extent that practical considerations are ignored in favor of codified theory. See p. 217–218.

C→→M→→C C = A Commodity
M = The Money Commodity
The mode of circulation described by Marx as occurring under pre-capitalist economies of simple exchange, in which the producers and consumers of commodities have a direct relationship to the commodities which are being bought and sold. The sellers have produced the commodities with their own labor, and they directly consume the commodities which they purchase. See also: M→C→M’
Marx called this mode of circulation “simple commodity production.” See p. 16.

Capitalism The current stage of human political economy, defined by private ownership of the means of production. Referenced throughout.
Capitalist Class See: Bourgeoisie
Capitalist Commodity Production The capitalist mode of production which utilizes the M→C→M’ mode of circulation, in which capitalists own the means of production and pay wages to workers in exchange for their labor, which is used to produce commodities. Capitalists then sell these commodities for profits which are not shared with the workers who provided the labor. See p. 15.
Category The most general grouping of aspects, attributes, and relations of things, phenomena, and ideas. Different specific fields of inquiry may categorize things, phenomena, and/or ideas differently from one another. See p. 126.
Category Pair A pair of philosophical categories within materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics tend to focus on universal category pairs which can be used to examine the characteristics, relations, and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Examples of category pairs include: private and common; content and form; reason and result; essence and phenomena. See p. 127.
Characteristics The features and attributes that exist internally — within — a given thing, phenomena, or idea. See p. 115.
Chemical Motion Changes of organic and inorganic substances in processes of combination and separation. See p. 61.
Chemical Reflection The reflection of mechanical, physical, and chemical changes and reactions of inorganic matter (i.e., changes in structures, position, physical-chemical properties, and the processes of combining and dissolving substances). See p. 65–66.
Circulation The way in which commodities and money are exchanged for one another. See p. 16.
Commodity In Marxist political economy, commodities include anything which can be bought and sold, with both a use value (i.e. it satisfies a need of any kind) and a value-form (aka. ‘Exchange value’ and understood as the average socially necessary labour time needed to produce this object). Under capitalism, more and more human activity and production is ‘commodified’ (mediated through market exchange). See p. 15, 87, 133.
Common See: Private and Common
Common Laws Laws (of nature and/or human society) that are applicable to a broader range of subjects than private laws, and which impact many different subjects. For instance: the law of preservation of mass, the law of preservation of energy, etc. See p. 162.
Comprehensive Viewpoint A viewpoint which seeks to consider the internal dialectical relationships between the component parts, factors, and aspects within a thing or phenomenon, and which considers external mutual interactions with with other things, phenomena, and ideas. Dialectical materialist philosophy demands a comprehensive basis in order to fully and properly understand things and phenomena in order to effectively solve problems in real life and develop humanity towards communism. See p. 115, 172, 235.
Conception A relatively complete reflection within human consciousness of objective things and phenomena. See p. 221–22.
Concrete Labor The production of a specific commodity with a specific value through labor. When labor is considered without the consideration of output value, it is referred to as abstract labor. See p. 15, 17.
Conditioned Reflex Conditioned reflexes are reactions which are learned by organisms. These responses are acquired as animals associate previously unrelated neural stimuli with a particular reaction. See p. 66, 68.
Consciousness The dynamic and creative reflection of the objective world in human brains; the subjective image of the objective world which is produced by the human brain. See p. 68–69, 70.
Content See: Content and Form.
Content and Form (Category Pair) Content is the philosophical category which refers to the sum of all aspects, attributes, and processes that a thing, phenomenon, or idea is made from. The Form category refers to the mode of existence and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. Form thus describes the system of relatively stable relationships which exist internally within things, phenomena, and ideas.


Content and Form have a dialectical relationship with one another, in which content determines form and form impacts back on content. See p. 115, 147155, 166.

Contradiction A contradiction is a relationship in which two forces oppose one another, leading to mutual development. See p. 123, 159, 163, 169, 175–191.
Consciousness The self-aware, productive, creative motion and activity of the human brain. See p. 216, 249.
Conservativism Also referred to as Prejudice; a mindset which seeks to prevent and stifle development and to hold humanity in a static position. Not only is this detrimental to humanity, it is also ultimately a wasted effort, because development is inevitable in human society, as in all things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 125, 233.
David Hume (1711 — 1776) Scottish philosopher who developed radical skepticism as a philosophy of empiricist rejection of human knowledge. See p. 11, 29, 56, 7273.
David Ricardo (1772 — 1823) British economist who, along with Adam Smith, was one of the key figures in the development of Political Economy which was a basis for much of the work of Marx and Engels. See p. 14, 18, 155.
Deductive Inference Logical inference which extrapolates from the general to the specific. See p. 224.
Definition The first phase of rational consciousness. During this phase, the mind begins to interpret, organize, and process the basic properties of things and phenomena at a rational level into a conceptual whole. See p. 224.
Development The change and motion of things, phenomena, and ideas with a forward tendency: from less advanced to more advanced; and/or from a less complete to a more complete level. See p. 38, 45–46, 52, 55, 61, 65, 76–96, 105–107, 114118, 119–127, 131–132, 138–140, 143, 147, 154, 155–165, 169–175, 177–181, 183–207, 210, 213, 216–223, 225–229, 233, 235–237.
Development Viewpoint A viewpoint which considers that, in order to perceive or solve any problem in real life, we must consider all things, phenomena, and ideas with their own forward tendency of development taken in mind.
Dialectic; Dialectical; Dialectics In Marxism-Leninism, the term dialectic (adjective: dialectical) refers to regular and mutual relationships, interactions, transformations, motions, and developments of things, phenomena, and processes in nature, society and human thought. “Dialectics” refers to a dialectical system. See p. 3, 9–11, 47.
Dialectical Materialism A universal philosophical and methodological system which forms the theoretical core of a scientific worldview. Dialectical Materialism was first developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels with the express goal of achieving communism. Dialectical Materialism has since been defended and developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin as well as many others. See: p. 3, 6, 1011, 19–21, 27–30, 33, 38, 45–47, 48–97, 101, 104, 204, 209, 226, 228, 230–232, 237.
Dialectical Negation A stage of development in which a new subject arises from a contradiction between two previous subjects; dialectical negation is never an endpoint of development, as every dialectical negation creates conditions for further development and negation. See p. 123, 175–176, 183, 185–195, 197–202, 227.
Dialectical Relationship A relationship in which two things, phenomena, or ideas mutually impact one another, leading to development and negation. See p. 47, 51, 62.
(Characteristic of) Diversity The characteristic which all things, phenomena, and ideas share, dictating that no two subjects (and no two relationships between any two subjects) are exactly the same, even if they exist between very similar things, phenomena, and ideas and/or in very similar situations. See p. 114–115, 125.
Diversity in Unity The universal principle which states that even though all relationships are diverse and different from one another, they also exist in unity, because all relationships share a foundation in the material world. See p. 109–110, 125, 130.
Dogmatism An inflexible adherence to ideals as incontrovertibly true while refusing to take any contradictory evidence into consideration. Dogmatism stands in direct opposition to materialist dialectics, which seeks to form opinions and conclusions only after careful consideration of all observable evidence. See p. 136–137, 174, 217–218, 233.
Duality of Labor The Marxist economic concept which recognizes labor as having two intrinsic and inseparable aspects: abstract labor and concrete labor. See p. 15.
Dynamic and Creative Reflection The most advanced form of reflection, which only occurs in matter that has the highest (known) level of structural complexity, such as the human brain. See p. 68–69, 79.
Eclecticism An approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject; the philosophical error of inconsistently applying different theories and principles in different situations. See p. 32–33, 101, 118, 192, 194.
Economic Base See: Base
Economism Economism is a style of political activism, typified by the ideas of German political theorist Eduard Bernstein, which stresses directing the struggle towards short-term political/economic goals (such as higher wages for workers) at the expense of the larger socialist revolutionary project. See p. 30.
Eduard Bernstein (1850 — 1932) German political theorist who rejected many of Marx’s theories. See p. 30, 174.
Emotional Consciousness The lower stage of the cognitive process. In this stage of cognitive development, humans, through practical activities, use our senses to reflect objective things and phenomena (with all their perceived specific characteristics and rich manifestations) in human consciousness. See p. 219224.
Empirical Consciousness Empirical consciousness is the stage of development of consciousness in which perceptions are formed via direct observations of things and phenomena in the natural world, or of society, or through scientific experimentation and systematic observation. Empirical Consciousness results in Empirical Knowledge. See p. 210–214.
Empirical Knowledge Knowledge which results from processes of empirical consciousness and which is characterised by rich and detailed, but still incomplete, understanding of phenomena. It can be utilized for practical ends, but still falls short of full theoretical analysis and comprehension. See p. 212–214.
Empiricism A broad philosophical position which holds that only experience (including internal experience) can be held as a source of knowledge or truth. Though nominally opposed to idealism, it is considered a faulty (or naive) form of materialism, since it sees the world as only unconnected, static appearances and ignores the reality of dialectical (changing) relationships between objects. See p. 9–12, 29, 94, 96–97, 100, 218.
Empirio-criticism A more developed form of empiricism, proposed by Ernst Mach, which holds that sense data and experience are the sole sources of knowledge and that no concrete knowledge of the external material world can ever be obtained due to the limitations of human senses. See p. 26–29, 32, 54, 55–57, 68.
Epistemology The theoretical study of knowledge. It primarily deals with the philosophical question of: “how do we know what we know?” See p. 45, 98, 204.
Ernst Mach (1838 — 1916) Austrian physicist who attempted to build a philosophy of natural science based on the works of German philosopher Richard Avenarius’ philosophical system of Empirio-Criticism. See p. 27–29, 32, 52, 72, 193.
Equilibrium A state of motion in which one or more subjects are not undergoing changes in position, form, and/or structure. Equilibrium is only ever a temporary stasis of development which will eventually yield to motion, development, and/or negation. See p. 62–63, 122–123, 181.
Essence See: Essence and Phenomena
Essence and Phenomena (Category Pair) The Essence category refers to the synthesis of all the internal aspects as well as the obvious and stable relations that define the existence, motion and development of things and ideas. The Phenomena category refers to the external manifestation of those internal aspects and relations in specific conditions. Essence always determines which phenomena appear, but phenomena do not always accurately reflect essence in human perception; in other words, it is possible to misinterpret phenomena, leading to a misunderstanding of essence, or to mistake phenomena for essence. See p. 156–160.
Exchange Value A quantity relationship which describes the ratios of exchangeability between different commodities, with Marx’s famous example of 20 yards of linen being equivalent in exchange value to one coat. Through analysis Marx shows that in reality the thing being compared is the amount of socially necessary labour required to make the commodities being compared. See p. 15, 18.
Excitation Reactions of simple plant and animal life-forms which occur when they change position or structure as a direct result of physical changes in their habitat. See p. 66, 68.
External Contradictions See: Internal and External Contradictions.
False consciousness Forms of consciousness (ideas, thoughts, concepts, etc.) which are incorrect and misaligned from reality. Equated with ‘ideology’ by Engels, it refers to an idealistic, dogmatic perspective which will inevitably result in errors of analysis and therefore practice. See p. 231–233, 237.
First International Also known as the International Workingmen’s Association; was founded in London and lasted from 1864–1876. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were key figures in the foundation and operation of this organization, which sought better conditions and the establishment of rights for workers. See p. 35
(Basic) Forms of Motion Engels broke motion down into five basic forms which are dialectically linked; the different forms of motion differ from one another, but they are also unified with each other into one continuous system of motion. Understanding this dialectical relationship between different forms of motion helped to overcome misunderstandings and confusion about motion and development. See p. 61–62.
Form See: Content and Form.
Form of existence of matter The ways in which we perceive the existence of matter in our universe; specifically, matter in our universe has the form of existing in space and time. See p. 59.
Form of Value See: Value-Form
Forward Tendency of Motion The tendency for things, phenomena, and ideas to move from less advanced to more advanced forms through processes of motion and development. See p. 197.
Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) a German theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, leader of the international working class, & co-founder of scientific socialism with Karl Marx. Referenced throughout.
Fundamental and Non-Fundamental Contradictions A fundamental contradiction defines the essence of a relationship. Fundamental contradictions exist throughout the entire development process of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea. A non-fundamental contradiction exists in only one aspect or attribute of a thing, phenomenon, or idea. A nonfundamental contradiction can impact a subject, but it will not control or decide the essential development of the subject. See p. 178–179.
(Characteristic of) Generality A universal characteristic which holds that all things, phenomena, and ideas interact and mutually transform one another. See p. 108–109, 111, 114, 124125.
General Relationship Relationships which exist broadly across many things, phenomena, and ideas. General relationships can exist both internally, within things, phenomena, and ideas, and externally, between things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 106–110, 114.
Generality (of relationships) Relationships can exist with across a spectrum of generality; this spectrum ranges from the least general relationships (unique relationships — which only occur between two specific things/phenomena/ideas) to the most general relationships (universal relationships — which occur between or within all things/phenomena/ideas). See p. 109.
George Berkeley (1685 — 1753) An Anglo-Irish philosopher whose main philosophical achievement was the formulation of a doctrine which he called “immaterialism,” and which later came to be known as “Subjective Idealism.” This doctrine was summed up by Berkeley’s maxim: “Esse est percipi” — “To be is to be perceived.” See p. 11, 27, 29.
George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 — 1831) German philosophy professor & objective idealistic philosopher; developed the system of idealist dialectics which Marx and Engels used as a basis for developing materialist dialectics. See p. 8–11, 29, 69–71, 97, 98, 100–105, 132, 157, 165, 182, 192, 193–194, 209, 228.
Historical Materialism The application of materialist dialectics and dialectical materialism to the study of human history. See p. 21–23, 27, 36, 38, 45, 80.
Historical Viewpoint A viewpoint which demands that subjects be considered in their current stage of motion and development, while also taking into consideration the development and transformation of the subject over time. See p. 116–118, 125–126, 143, 185, 234.
Idealism A philosophical position which holds that the only reliable experience of reality occurs within human consciousness. Idealists believe that human reason exclusively or as a first basis is the best way to seek truth. See p. 8–12, 26–29, 48–51, 53, 56–58, 69–70, 96, 101–102, 104, 157, 174, 209, 218, 228.
Immanuel Kant (1724 — 1804) German philosopher who developed a system of idealist dialectics which were later completed by Hegel and whose metaphysical philosophies of epistemology and rationalism served as the basis for later empiricists such as Bacon and Hume. See p. 20, 29, 56, 72–74, 100–102, 205.
Induction The reaction of animals with simple nervous systems which can sense or feel their environments. Induction occurs through unconditioned reflex mechanisms. See p. 66, 68.
Inductive Inference Logical inference which extrapolates from specific observations to general conclusions. See p. 223–224.
Intelligibility The human cognitive capacity to accurately perceive the external material world. See p. 48.
Internal Contradictions See: Internal and External Contradictions.
Internal and External Contradictions Internal contradictions are contradictions which exist within the internal relations of a subject, while external contradictions exist between two or more subjects as external relations. See p. 178–179.
Judgment The phase of rational consciousness which arises from the definition of the subject — the linking of concepts and properties together — which leads to affirmative or negative ideation of certain characteristics or attributes of the perceived subject. See p. 223.
Karl Marx (1818–1883) German theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, political economist, founder of scientific socialism, and leader of the international working class. Referenced throughout.
Knowledge The content of consciousness; data about the world, such as: ideas, memories, and other thoughts which are derived through direct observation and practical activities in the material world, through scientific experiments, or through abstract reflection of practical and scientific activities which occur within consciousness.
Labor Value The amount of value which workers produce through labor. See p. 14, 17–18, 23.
Law of Negation of Negation A universal law of materialist dialectics which states that the fundamental and universal tendency of motion and development occurs through a cycle of dialectical negation, wherein each and every negation is, in turn, negated once more. See p. 163, 185, 195, 198, 200, 201, 202, 227.
Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality The universal law of dialectical materialism which concerns the universal mode of motion and development processes of nature, society, and human thought, which states that qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of the quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and, ideas, and, vice versa, quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 163–165, 172–173, 227.
Law of Unification Contradiction Between Opposites and The universal law of dialectical materialism which states that the fundamental, originating, and universal driving force of all motion and development processes is the inherent and objective contradictions which exists in all things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 163, 175, 181.
Law of Development of Capitalism Also known as Theory of Accumulation and Theory of Surplus Value. The dynamic through which the capitalist class gains wealth by accumulating surplus value (i.e., profits) and then reinvesting it into more capital to gain even further wealth; thus the goal of the capitalist class is to accumulate more and more surplus value which leads to the development of capitalism. See p. 18.
Laws In dialectical materialism, laws are the regular, common, obvious, natural, objective relations between internal aspects, factors, and attributes of a thing or phenomenon or between things and phenomena. See p. 162.
Laws of Nature Laws that arise in the natural world, including within the human body (and are never products of human conscious activities). Such law includes the laws of physics, chemistry, and other natural phenomena which govern the material world. See p. 162, 213.
Laws of Society Laws of human activity in social relations; such laws are unable to manifest beyond the conscious activities of humans, but they are still objective. See p. 162–163.
Laws of Human Thought Laws which govern the intrinsic relationships between concepts, categories, judgments, inference, and the development process of human rational awareness. See p. 163.
Life-Process Processes of motion and change which occur within organisms to sustain life. See p. 69–72, 79, 88.
Ludwig Feuerbach (1804 — 1872) German philosophy professor, materialist philosopher; Marx and Engels drew many of their ideas from the works of Feuerbach (whom they also criticized). See p. 8, 11–13, 21, 55, 74, 80, 114, 205, 237.
M→→C→→M’ The mode of circulation described by Marx as existing under capitalism, in which capitalists spend money to buy commodities (including the commodified labor of workers), with the intention of selling those commodities for more money than they began with. The capitalist has no direct relationship to the commodity being produced and sold, and the capitalist is solely interested in obtaining more money. See p. 16. See also: C→M→C
Machism See: Empirio-Criticism.
Manifestation How a given thing, phenomenon, or idea is expressed externally in the material world. See p. 115.
Marxism-Leninism A system of scientific opinions and theories focused on liberating the working class from capitalism and achieving a stateless, classless, communist society. The core ideas of this system were first developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, then defended and further developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. See. p. 1.
Material Conditions The material external environment in which humans live, including the natural environment, the means of production and the economic base of human society, objective social relations, and other externalities and systems which affect human life and human society. See p. 6, 22, 40–42, 70–72, 80–81, 87, 92–95, 116–118, 161, 174, 179, 181, 206–207, 210, 229.
Material Production Activity Material production activity is the first and most basic form of praxis. In this form of praxis activity, humans use tools through labor processes to influence the natural world in order to create wealth and material resources and to develop the conditions necessary to maintain our existence and development. See p. 206–208.
Materialism A philosophical position that holds that the material world exists outside of the mind, and that human ideas and thoughts stem from observation and sense experience of this external world. Materialism rejects the idealist notion that truth can only be sought solely through reasoning and human consciousness. See p. 10–13, 48.
Materialist Dialectics A scientific system of philosophy concerned with motion, development, and common relationships, and with the most common rules of motion and development of nature, society, and human thought. See p. 10, 21, 45–47, 98202, 227, 237.
Matter A philosophical category denoting things and phenomena, existing in objective external reality, which human beings access through our sense perceptions. See p. 26, 27, 32, 48, 51–52, 53–69, 72, 88–95, 97, 103, 164–165.
Means of Production Physical inputs and systems used in the production of goods and services, including: machinery, factory buildings, tools, equipment, and anything else used in producing goods and services. See p. 2–3, 7, 14–16.
Mechanical Motion Changes in positions of objects in space. See p. 61.
Mechanical Philosophy A scientific and philosophical movement popular in the 17th century which explored mechanical machines and compared natural phenomena to mechanical devices, resulting in a belief that all things — including living organisms — were built as (and could theoretically be built by humans as) mechanical devices.
Mental Reflection Reactions which occur in animals with central nervous systems. Mental reflections occur through conditioned reflex mechanisms through learning. See p. 65, 68, 224.
Metaphysical Materialism Metaphysical materialism was strongly influenced by the metaphysical, mechanical thinking of mechanical philosophy, which was a scientific and philosophical movement which explored mechanical machines and compared natural phenomena to mechanical devices. Metaphysical materialists believed that all change can exist only as an increase or decrease in quantity, brought about by external causes.
Metaphysics A branch of philosophy that attempts to explain the fundamental nature of reality. Metaphysical philosophy has taken many forms through the centuries, but one common shortcoming of metaphysical thought is a tendency to view things and ideas in a static, abstract manner. Generally speaking, metaphysics presents nature as a collection of objects and phenomena which are isolated from one another and fundamentally unchanging. See p. 52.
Methodology A system of reasoning: the ideas and rules that guide humans to research, build, select, and apply the most suitable methods in both perception and practice. Methodologies can range from very specific to broadly general, with philosophical methodology being the most general scope of methodology. See p. 44.
Mode The way or manner in which something occurs or exists. See p. 19–20.
Mode of Existence of Matter Refers to how matter exists in our universe; specifically, matter exists in our motion in a mode of motion. See p. 59.
Motion Also known as “change;” motion/change occurs as a result of the mutual impacts which occur between two things, phenomena, or ideas in relation with one another. See p. 23, 47, 59–63. 74, 106–107, 122–127, 145, 163–165, 169-173-186, 197, 201–202.
Motion in Equilibrium Motion in equilibrium is motion that has not changed the positions, forms, and/or structures of things. Motion in Equlibrium is only ever temporary in nature; all motion will eventually lead to changes in position, form, and/or structure. See p. 62.
Narodnik Agrarian socialist movement of the 1860s and 70s in the Russian Empire, composed of peasants who rose up in a failed campaign against the Czar. See p. 29–30.
Natural law See: Laws of Nature.
Natural Science Science which deals with the natural world, including chemistry, biology, physics, geology, etc. See p. 13, 19, 26, 103.
Negation The development process through which two contradicting objects mutually develop one another until one is overtaken by the other. In dialectical materialism, negation takes the form of dialectical negation. See p. 123, 175176, 183, 185–202.
New Economic Policy Also known as the NEP; this early Soviet policy was devised as Vladimir Illyich Lenin to be a temporary economic system that would allow a market economy and capitalism to exist within Russia, alongside state-owned business ventures, all firmly under the control of the working-classdominated state. See p. 33–34.
Objective Dialectics The dialectical processes which occur in the material world, including all of the motion, relationships, and dynamic changes which occur in space and time. See p. 98, 102–103, 182.
Objective Existence Existence which manifests outside of and independently of human consciousness, whether humans can perceive it or not. See p. 50, 58, 228.
Objective Idealism A form of idealism which asserts that the ideal and consciousness are the primary existence, while also positing that the ideal and consciousness are objective, and that they exist independently of nature and humans. See p. 50.
Objectiveness An abstract concept that refers to the relative externality of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Every thing, phenomena and idea exists externally to every other thing, phenomena, and idea. This means that to each individual subject, all other subjects exist as external objects. See p. 111–114, 124.
Obviousness See: Obviousness and Randomness
Obviousness and Randomness (Category Pair) The philosophical category of Obviousness refers to events that occur because of the essential internal aspects of a subject which become reasons for certain results in certain conditions: the obvious has to happen in a certain way, it can’t happen any other way. The Randomness category refers to things that happen because of external reasons: things that happen, essentially, by chance, due to impacts from many external relations. A random outcome may occur or it may not occur, and may occur in many different ways. Obviousness and Randomness have a dialectical relationship with one another. See p. 144–146.
Opportunism A system of political opinions with no direction, no clear path, and/or no coherent viewpoint, focusing on whatever actions or decisions might be beneficial for the opportunist in the short term. See p. 174.
Opposites Such aspects, properties and tendencies of motion which oppose one another, yet are, simultaneously, conditions and premises of the existence of one another. See p. 61, 175–179, 181, 184, 190, 227.
Ordinary Consciousness Perception that is formed passively, stemming from the daily activities of humans. See p. 210–216.
Period of Motion Development which occurs between two quality shifts, including the quality shifts themselves. See p. 170.
Perspective See: Viewpoint.
Petty Bourgeoisie Semi-autonomous merchants, farmers, and so on who are self-employed, own small and limited means of production, or otherwise fall in between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Also called the petite bourgeoisie. See p. 3–6.
Petty Commodity Production See: Simple Commodity Production.
Phenomena Anything that is observable by the human senses. See p. 156. See also: Essence and Phenomena.
Physical Motion Motion of molecules, electrons, fundamental particles, thermal processes, electricity, etc., in time and space. See p. 61.
Physical Reflection Reflection which occurs any time two material objects interact and the features of the objects are transferred to one other. See p. 67–68.
Point of View See: Viewpoint.
Populism The political philosophy of the Narodnik movement; this political philosophy was focused on bringing about an agrarian peasant revolution led by intellectuals with the ambition of going directly from a feudal society to a socialist society built from rural communes. Populism overtly opposed Marxism and dialectical materialism and was based on subjective idealist utopianism. See p. 30.
Positivism The belief that we can test scientific knowledge through scientific methods, and through logic, math, etc.; positivism tends to overlap significantly with empiricism in theory and practice. See p. 32, 209.
Possibility See: Possibility and Reality.
Possibility and Reality (Category Pair) The philosophical category of Possibility refers to things that have not happened nor existed in reality yet, but that would happen, or would exist given necessary conditions. The philosophical category of Reality refers to things that exist or have existed in reality and in human thought. See p. 160–162.
Practice See: Praxis.
Pragmatism Pragmatism refers to a form of subjectivism in which one centers one’s own immediate material concerns over all other considerations. See p. 218.
Praxis Conscious activity which improves our understanding, and which has purpose and historical-social characteristics. Used interchangeably with the word “practice” in this text. See p. 205–206, 235.
Prejudice See: Conservatism.
Primary and Secondary Contradictions In the development of things, phenomena, and ideas, there are many development stages. In each stage of development, there will be one contradiction which drives the development process. This is what we call the primary contradiction. Secondary contradictions include all the other contradictions which exist during that stage of development. Determining whether a contradiction is primary or secondary is relative, and it depends heavily upon the material conditions and the situation being analyzed. See p. 178–179.
Primary Existence Existence which precedes and determines other existences; materialists believe that the external material world is the primary existence which determines the ideal, while idealists believe that human consciousness (“the ideal”) is the primary existence from which truth is ultimately derived. See p. 50–51.
Primitive Materialism An early form of materialism which recognizes that matter is the primary existence, and holds that the world is composed of certain elements, and that these were the first objects — the origin — of the world, and that these elements are the essence of reality. This was later developed into Metaphysical Materialism and, later, Dialectical Materialism. See p. 52.
Principle of General Relationships A principle of dialectical materialism which states that all things, phenomena, and ideas are related to one another, and are defined by these internal and external relationships. See p. 106–107, 110, 114.
Private See: Private and Common
Private and Common (Category Pair) The Private philosophical category encompasses specific things, phenomena, and ideas; the Common philosophical category defines the common aspects, attributes, factors, and relations that exist in many things and phenomena. Private and Common are relative in nature and have a dialectical relationship with one another. See p. 128–138.
Private Laws Laws which apply only to a specific range of things and phenomena, i.e.: laws of mechanical motion, laws of chemical motion, laws of biological motion, etc. See p. 162.
Production Force The combination of the means of production and workers within human society. See p. 6, 23, 36.
Proletariat The people who provide labor under capitalism; the proletariat do not own their own means of production, and must therefore sell their labor to those who do own means of production; also called the Working Class. See also: Bourgeoisie, Petty Bourgeoisie. See p. 1–8, 22–23, 25–26, 29–31, 33–35, 40–41, 63, 231.
Quality The unity of component parts, taken together, which defines a subject and distinguishes it from other subjects. See p. 119–121.
Quality Shift A change in quality which takes place in the motion and development process of things, phenomena, and ideas, occurring when quantity change meets a certain perceived threshold. See p. 124, 153, 164, 168–174.
Quantity The total amount of component parts that compose a subject. See p. 119–121.
Quantity range The range of quantity changes which can accumulate without leading to change in quality related to any given thing, phenomenon, or idea. See p. 168–171.
Quintessence Original Vietnamese word: tinh hoa. Literally, it means “the best, highest, most beautiful, defining characteristics” of a concept, and, unlike the English word quintessence, it has an exclusively positive connotation. See p. 8, 21, 43, 45, 52.
Randomness See: Obviousness and Randomness.
Rational Consciousness The higher stage of the cognitive process, which includes the indirect, abstract, and generalized reflection of the essential properties and characteristics of things and phenomena. This stage of consciousness performs the most important function of comprehending and interpreting the essence of the perceived subject. See p. 219–225.
Reason See: Reason and Result
Reality See: Possibility and Reality.
Reason and Result (Category Pair) The Reason philosophical category is used to define the mutual impacts between internal aspects of a thing, phenomenon or idea, or between things, phenomena, or ideas, that bring about changes. The Result philosophical category defines the changes that were caused by mutual impacts which occur between aspects and factors within a thing, phenomenon, or idea, or externally between different things, phenomena, or ideas. Not to be confused with the metaphysical concept of “cause and effect,” which attributes a single cause to any given effect. See p. 138–144.
Reasoning The final phase of rational consciousness, formed on the basis of synthesizing judgments so as to extrapolate new knowledge about the perceived subject. See p. 223–225, 228–229.
Reflection The re-creation of the features of one form of matter in a different form of matter which occurs when they mutually impact each other through interaction. See p. 64–75, 79–80, 90–92, 103, 165, 208–211, 214–215, 219–224, 228, 232, 237.
Relative and Absolute “Absolute” and “Relative” are philosophical classifications which refer to interdependence: That which is absolute exists independently and with permanence. That which is relative is temporary, and dependent on other conditions or circumstances in order to exist. See p. 56, 233. See also: Absolute Truth, Relative Truth, Relativism, Truth.
Relative Truth Truth which has developed alignment with reality without yet having reached complete alignment between human knowledge and the reality which it reflects; knowledge which incompletely reflects material subjects without complete accuracy. See p. 230, 232. See also: Absolute Truth, Relative and Absolute, Relativism, Truth.
Relativism A position that all truth is relative and that nothing can ever be absolutely, objectively known; that only Relative Truth can be found in our existence. See p. 56–58, 233–234. See also: Absolute Truth, Relative and Absolute, Relative Truth, Truth.
René Descartes (1596 — 1650) French metaphysical philosopher who developed early methods of scientific inquiry. See p. 20, 53.
Result See: Reason and Result.
Richard Avenarius (1843 — 1896) German-Swiss philosopher who developed a system of subjective idealism known as “Empirio-Criticism.” See p. 27–29.
Rigidity An unwillingness to alter one’s thoughts, holding too stiffly to established consciousness and knowledge, and ignoring practical experience and observation, which leads to stagnation of both knowledge and consciousness. See p. 217–218.
Robert Owen (1771 — 1858) Wealthy Welsh textile manufacturer who tried to build a better society for workers in New Hampshire, Indiana, in the USA by purchasing the town of New Harmony in 1825. Owen’s vision failed after two years, though many other wealthy capitalists in the early 19th century were inspired by Owen to try similar plans, which also failed.
Scientific An adjective which describes methodologies, approaches, and practices of gaining knowledge and insight which are methodological and/or systematic in nature. See p. 1–2.
Scientific Consciousness Conscious activities which actively gather information from the methodological and/or systematic observations of the characteristics, nature, and inherent relationships of research subjects. Scientific consciousness is considered indirect because it takes place outside of the course of ordinary daily activities. See p. 58, 210, 212, 215–216.
Scientific Experimental Human activities that resemble or replicate states of nature and society
Activity in order to determine the laws of change and development of subjects of study. This form of activity plays an important role in the development of society, especially in the current historical period of modern science and technological revolution. See p. 206–208.
Scientific Materialist Viewpoint A perspective which begins analysis of the world in a manner that is both scientifically systematic in pursuit of understanding and firmly rooted in a materialist conception of the world. See p. 105.
Scientific Socialism A body of theory and knowledge (which must be constantly tested against reality) focused on the practical pursuit of changing the world to bring about socialism through the leadership of the proletariat. See p. 1–2, 21, 37–39.
Scientific Worldview A worldview that is expressed by a systematic pursuit of knowledge that generally and correctly reflects the relationships of things, phenomena, and processes in the objective material world, including relationships between humans, as well as relationships between humans and the world. See p. 3839, 44–45, 48.
Second International Founded in Paris in 1889 to continue the work of the First International; it fell apart in 1916 because members from different nations could not maintain solidarity through the outbreak of World War I. See p. 35, 174.
Self-motion In the original Vietnamese, the word “tự vận động.” Literally meaning: “it moves itself.” See p. 59–60, 124.
Sensation The subjective reflection of the objective world in human consciousness as perceived through human senses. See p. 27, 56–58, 68–69, 72, 85, 221–222.
Sensuous Human Activity; Sensuous Activity A description of human activity developed by Marx which acknowledges that all human activity is simultaneously active in the sense that our conscious activity can transform the world, as well as passive in the sense in that all human thoughts fundamentally derive from observation and sense experience of the material world. See p. 13.
Simple Commodity Production What Marx called the “C→M→C” mode of circulation. See p. 16–18.
Simple Exchange When individual producers trade the products they have made directly, themselves, for other commodities. See p. 16–17.
Social Being The material existence of human society, as opposed to social consciousness. See also: Base. See p. 24, 54–55.
Social Consciousness The collective experience of consciousness shared by members of a society, including ideological, cultural, spiritual, and legal beliefs and ideas which are shared within that society, as opposed to social being. See p. 22, 24, 32, 54–55, 80. See also: Superstructure.
Social Motion Changes in the economy, politics, culture, and social life of human beings. See p. 61–62.
Socialization The idea that human society transforms labor and production from a solitary, individual act into a collective, social act. In other words, as human society progresses, people “socialize” labor into increasingly complex networks of social relations: from individuals making their own tools, to agricultural societies engaged in collective farming, to modern industrial societies with factories, logistical networks, etc. See p. 6, 36.
Socialized Production Force A production force which has been socialized — that is to say, a production force which has been organized into collective social activity. See p. 6.
Socio-Political Activity Praxis activity utilized by various communities and organizations in human society to transform political-social relations in order to promote social development. See p. 206–208.
Solipsism A form of idealism in which one believes that the self is the only basis for truth. See p. 218.
Sophistry The use of misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s’ dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. See p. 32–33, 56, 118, 182, 194.
Stage of Development The current quantity and quality characteristics which a thing, phenomenon, or object possesses. Every time a quality change occurs, a new stage of development is entered into. See p. 24, 39, 125, 173–174, 179, 190, 196–197, 200, 212, 221.
Stagnation An inability or unwillingness to change and adapt consciousness and practice in accordance with developing material conditions. Stagnation can stem from, or cause, overstatement of absolute truth in theory and forestall necessary development of both consciousness and practical ability. See p. 125, 218, 233. See also: Rigidity.
Struggle of Opposites The tendency of opposites to eliminate and negate each other. See p. 61, 181, 184.
Subjective Factors Factors which, from the perspective of a given subject, that same subject is capable of impacting. See p. 162–163, 175, 202.
Subjective Dialectics; Dialectical Thought A system of analysis and organized thinking which aims to reflect the objective dialectics of the material world within human consciousness. Dialectical thinking has two component forms: dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics. See: p. 98–99, 103.
Subjective Idealism Subjective idealism asserts that consciousness is the primary existence and that truth can be obtained only or primarily through conscious activity and reasoning. Subjective idealism asserts that all things and phenomena can only be experienced as subjective sensory perceptions, with some forms of subjective idealism even explicitly denying the objective existence of material reality altogether. See also: Empirio-Criticism, Objective Idealism. See p. 26–27, 50.
Subjectivism A philosophical position in which one centers one’s own self and conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test their own perceptions against material and social reality. See p. 56, 182, 217–218, 233–234.
Suitability The applicability of a subject for a specific application or role. See p. 154.
Superstructure The ideal (non-material) components of human society, including: media institutions, music, and art, as well as other cultural elements like religion, customs, moral standards, and everything else which manifests primarily through conscious activity and social relations. See p. 23. See also: Base.
Surplus Value The extra amount of value a capitalist is able to secure by exploiting wagelabourers (by paying workers less than the full value of their labour). Workers will spend part of their workday reproducing their own labourpower (through earning enough to eat, secure shelter and other cultural needs) and the rest of the time will be spent producing surplus value which is then appropriated by the capitalist as profit. See p. 18, 22–23, 39.
Symbolization The representation of an objective thing or phenomenon in human consciousness which has been reflected by sensation and conception. See p. 221–222.
Systematic Structure A structure which includes within itself a system of component parts and relationships. See p. 114.
Theoretical Consciousness The indirect, abstract, systematic level of perception in which the nature and laws of things and phenomena are generalized and abstracted. See p. 210–214, 217–218.
Theoretical Knowledge Knowledge which is abstract and generalized, resulting from theoretical conscious activities which include repeated and varied observations. See p. 214, 217.
Theory An idea or system of ideas intended to explain an aspect, characteristic, or tendency of objective reality. See p. 235.
Theory of Accumulation/Surplus Value See: Law of Development of Capitalism.
Thing-in-Itself The actual material object which exists outside of our consciousness, as it exists outside of our consciousness. See p. 72–74, 101, 158.
Third International Also known as the Communist International (or the ComIntern for short); founded in Moscow in 1919, its goals were to overthrow capitalism, build socialism, and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. It was dissolved in 1943 in the midst of the German invasion of Russia in World War II. See p. 35.
Three Component Parts The three essential elements of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, first identified of Marxism-Leninism by Lenin in The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism. 1. The Philosophy of Marxism. 2. The Political Economy of Marxism. 3. Scientific Socialism.See p. 21, 32, 34, 38.
Threshold The amount, or degree, of quantity change at which quality change occurs. Truth is primarily discovered through labor and practice in the physical world. See p. 120, 168–169, 171, 173.
Truth A correct and accurate conscious reflection of objective reality. See p. 9–10, 49, 56, 70, 75, 94–96, 194, 204, 209, 215–219, 225–237. See also: Labor, Practice.
Unconditioned Reflex Reactions which are not learned, but simply occur automatically based on physiological mechanisms occurring within an organism, characterized by permanent connections between sensory perceptions and reactions. See p. 66, 68.
Unilateral Consideration The consideration of a subject from one side only. See p. 49.
Unintelligibility A philosophical position which denies the human cognitive capacity to accurately perceive the external material world. See p. 48.
Unique Relationship The least general form of relationship, which only occur between two specific things/phenomena/ideas. See p. 109, 130.
Unity in Diversity A concept in materialist dialectics which holds that within universal relationships exist within and between all different things, phenomena, and ideas, we will find that each individual manifestation of any universal relationship will have its own different manifestations, aspects, features, etc. Thus even the universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in infinite diversity. See p. 42, 110–111, 114, 125, 130.
Universal Law of Consciousness A universal law which holds that consciousness is a process of dialectical development in which practical activity leads to conscious activity, which then leads back to practical activity, in a continuous and never-ending cycle, with a tendency to develop both practical and conscious activity to increasingly higher levels. See p. 219.
Universal Laws Laws that impact every aspect of nature, society, and human thought. Materialist dialectics is the study of these universal laws. See p. 15, 162–163, 227.
Universal Relationship The most general kind of relationship; relationships that exist between and within every thing and all phenomena; along with development, universal relationships are one of the two primary subjects of study of materialist dialectics. See p. 80, 108, 109, 111, 165.
Use Value A concept in classical political economy and Marxist economics which refers to tangible features of a commodity (a tradable object) that can fulfill some human requirement or desire, or which serve a useful purpose. See p. 15–18, 95.
Utopianism 1. A political and philosophical movement which held the belief that “a New Moral World” of happiness, enlightenment, and prosperity could be created through education, science, technology, and communal living. See p. 18. 2. The idealist philosophical concept which mistakenly asserts that the ideal can determine the material, and that ideal forms of society can be brought about without regard for material conditions and development processes. See p. 8, 17–18, 30, 94.
Value-Form Also known as “form of value;” the social form of a commodity. Under capitalism, through the exchange of qualitatively different commodities, the money form of value is established as the general equivalent which can functionally be exchanged for all other values; money is therefore the most universal value-form under capitalism. See p. 15, 17, 155.
Viewpoint Also known as point of view or perspective; the starting point of analysis which determines the direction of thinking from which phenomena and problems are considered. See p. 12, 20–21, 23, 25, 26, 30, 32–33, 38–39, 5559, 62, 64, 89, 93–94, 105, 111, 114–120, 122, 125–126, 130, 143, 147, 150, 172, 185–188, 195, 200–201, 233–235. See also: Comprehensive Viewpoint, Historical Viewpoint.
Viewpoint Crisis A situation in which a specific viewpoint can’t be settled on, found, or agreed upon. See p. 26, 32–33.
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870 -1924) A Russian theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, defender and developer of Marxism in the era of imperialism, founder of the Bolsheviks, the Communist Party and the government of the Soviet Union, leader of Russia and the international working class. Referenced throughout.
Working Class See: Proletariat
Worldview The whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about humans ourselves, and about life and the position of human beings in the world. See p. 1, 11, 37–39, 44–45, 48, 52, 96, 138, 201, 208–209, 218, 234. See also: Scientific Worldview.


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For centuries, the banyan tree has been the symbol of communal life in Vietnam.

Traditionally, the entrance to a village is graced by a large and ancient banyan tree. It is in the shade of these trees that villagers gather to socialize, draw water from wells, and make collective decisions together. The drooping accessory trunks represent the longevity of villagers — and of the village itself — while the arching canopy represents the safety and protection of the village. The shape of the banyan tree is seen in the full moon, which casts peaceful light across the Earth to guide travelers in the dark of night.

Vietnam’s revolution against Japanese fascism and French colonialism began in 1945 beneath the cover of the Tân Trào Banyan Tree, which still stands in the city of Tuyên Quang.

It is in this deep-rooted, humanistic spirit of collective action that we founded Banyan House Publishing. We hope to deliver volumes which will inspire action and change throughout the village that is our world.

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  1. Karl Marx, 1818–1883 (German): Theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, political economist, founder of scientific socialism, leader of the international working class.
  2. Friedrich Engels, 1820–1895 (German): Theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, leader of the international working class, co-founder of scientific socialism with Karl Marx.
  3. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1870–1924 (Russian): Theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, defender and developer of Marxism in the era of imperialism, founder of the Communist Party and the government of the Soviet Union, leader of Russia and the international working class.
  4. Material conditions include the natural environment, the means of production and the economic base of human society, objective social relations, and other externalities and systems which affect human life and human society. See Annotation 79, p. 81.
  5. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 1770 — 1831 (German): Philosophy professor, an objective idealistic philosopher — representative of German classical philosophy.
  6. Ludwig Feuerbach, 1804 — 1872 (German): Philosophy professor, materialist philosopher.
  7. The Holy Family is a book co-written by Marx and Engels which critiqued the Young Hegelians, including Feuerbach.
  8. Adam Smith, 1723 — 1790 (British): Logic professor, moral philosophy professor, economist.
  9. David Ricardo, 1772 — 1823 (British): Economist.
  10. Claude Henri de Rouvroy Saint Simon, 1760 — 1825 (French): Philosopher, economist, utopianist activist.
  11. Charles Fourier, 1772 — 1837 (French): Philosopher, economist, utopianist activist.
  12. Robert Owen, 1771 — 1858 (British): Utopianist activist, owner of a cotton factory.
  13. The Law of Development of Capitalism referenced here is the Theory of Accumulation/Surplus Value, which holds that the capitalist class gains wealth by accumulating surplus value (i.e., profits) and then reinvesting it into more capital to gain even further wealth; thus the goal of the capitalist class is to accumulate more and more surplus value which leads to the development of capitalism. Over time, this deepens the contradictions of capitalism. This concept is related to the MCM mode of circulation, discussed in Annotation 14, p. 16, and is discussed in detail in Part 3 of the book this text is drawn from (Political Economy) which we hope to translate in the future.
  14. Das Kapital: Karl Marx’s most important contribution to political economy. It is composed of four volumes. It is the work of Marx’s whole career and an important part of Engels’ career, as well. Marx started writing Das Kapital in the 1840s and continued writing until he died (1883). Das Kapital I was published in 1867. After Marx’s death, Engels edited and published the second volume in 1885 and the third volume in 1894. The Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the USSR edited and published Das Kapital IV, also known as Theories of Surplus-Value, in the 1950s, long after the death of Marx and Engels.
  15. Populist faction: A faction within the Russian revolution which upheld an idealist capitalist ideology with many representatives such as Mikhailovsky, Bakunin, and Plekhanov. Populists failed to recognise the important roles of the people, of the farmers and workers alliance, and of the proletariat. Instead, they completely centered the role of the individual in society. They considered the rural communes as the nucleus of “socialism.” They saw farmers under the leadership of intellectuals as the main force of the revolution. The populists advocated individual terrorism as the primary method of revolutionary struggle.
  16. Delegate Document of the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.
  17. Delegate document of the 9th national congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.
  18. Delegate document of the 10th national congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.
  19. See Annotation 6, p. 8.
  20. The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1913.
  21. Karl Marx, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.
  22. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Friedrich Engels, 1886.
  23. According to the Samkhya school, Pradhana is the original form of matter in an unmanifested,indifferentiated state; Prakriti is manifested matter, differentiated in form, which contains potential for motion.
  24. Thales, ~642 — ~547 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher, mathematician, astronomer, politician.
  25. Anaximene, ~585 — ~525 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher.
  26. Heraclitus, ~540 — ~480 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher, founder of ancient dialectics.
  27. Democritus, ~460 — ~370 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher, naturalist, a founder of atom theory.
  28. Francis Bacon, 1561 — 1626 (British): Philosopher, novelist, mathematician, political activist.
  29. Rene Descartes, 1596 — 1650 (Fench): Philosopher, mathematician, physicist.
  30. Thomas Hobbes, 1588 — 1679 (British): Political philosopher, political activist.
  31. Denis Diderot, 1713 — 1784 (French): Philosopher, novelist.
  32. Wilhelm Conrad Roentgen, 1845–1923 (German): Physicist.
  33. Henri Becquerel, 1852–1908 (French): Physicist.
  34. Sir Joseph John Thomson, 1856–1940 (British): Physicist, professor at London Royal Institute.
  35. In the original Vietnamese, the word tự vận động is used here, which we roughly translate to the word self-motion throughout this book. Literally, tự vận động means: “it moves itself.”
  36. Source: “Food for Thought: Was Cooking a Pivotal Step in Human Evolution?” by Alexandra Rosati, Scientific American, February 26, 2018.
  37. Written by Professor Tracy L. Kivell and published in The Royal Society.
  38. Stone Tools Helped Shape Human Hands by Sara Reardon, published in New Scientist Magazine.
  39. The German Ideology, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 1846.
  40. See Annotation 3, p. 2 and Annotation 29, p. 24.
  41. For a discussion of the material basis of social laws, see Annotation 10, p. 10, Annotation 78, p. 80, and Annotation 79, p. 81.
  42. See: Annotation 72, p. 68.
  43. See: Annotation 90, p. 88.
  44. See: The Role of Matter in Consciousness, p. 89.
  45. See: The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88.
  46. See:Annotation 68, p. 65.
  47. See: Nature and Structure of Consciousness, p. 79.
  48. See: Annotation 93, below.
  49. See: Annotation 10, p. 10.
  50. For discussion of the meaning of methodology, see Methodology, p. 44.
  51. See: Nature of Consciousness, p. 79.
  52. See: The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88.
  53. See: Annotation 211, p. 205.
  54. See: Annotation 114, p. 116.
  55. See: Nature and Structure of Consciousness, p. 79.
  56. See: Annotation 222, p. 218.
  57. See: The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues, p. 48.
  58. See: Annotation 10, p. 10.
  59. See: Annotation 232 and The Properties of Truth, on p. 228.
  60. See: Praxis, Consciousness, and the Role of Praxis in Consciousness, p. 204.
  61. Karl Marx, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.
  62. See Annotation 9, p. 10.
  63. Dialectics of Nature, Friedrich Engels, 1883.
  64. Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Friedrich Engels, 1880.
  65. The Old Preface to Anti-Dühring, Friedrich Engels, 1878.
  66. The Old Preface to Anti-Dühring, Friedrich Engels, 1878.
  67. Kant’s “transcendental dialectic” was used to critique rationalism and pure reason, but was not a fully developed dialectical system of thought. Hegel’s idealist dialectics were more universal in nature. See Annotation 9, p. 10.
  68. The Old Preface to Anti-Dühring, On Dialectics, Friedrich Engels, 1878.
  69. Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic, Vladimir Ilyich. Lenin, 1914.
  70. Afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital Volume I, Karl Marx, 1873.
  71. Anti-Dühring, The 1885 Preface, Friedrich Engels, 1878.
  72. Anti-Dühring, Friedrich Engels, 1878.
  73. See p. 107.
  74. Dialectics of Nature, Friedrich Engels, 1883.
  75. See Annotation 117, p. 119.
  76. The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1913.
  77. See Annotation 98, p. 100.
  78. See Private and Common, p. 128; Essence and Phenomenon, p. 156.
  79. See Annotation 117, p. 119.
  80. See Annotation 190, p. 181.
  81. See Annotation 108, p. 112.
  82. See p. 108.
  83. Once Again On The Trade Unions, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921.
  84. See: Annotation 108, p. 112.
  85. See: Annotation 106, p. 109.
  86. See: Annotation 107, p. 110.
  87. Once Again On The Trade Unions, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921. See also: Mode and Forms of Matter, p. 59.
  88. See Annotation 62, p. 59.
  89. Once Again On The Trade Unions, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921.
  90. On the Question of Dialectics, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.
  91. Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Friedrich Engels, 1880.
  92. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Friedrich Engels, 1886.
  93. See Annotation 10, p. 10 and Annotation 108, p. 112.
  94. Philosophical Notebooks, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914–16.
  95. Philosophical Notebooks, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914–16.
  96. To N. D. Kiknadze, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, written after November 5, 1916.
  97. Anti-Dühring, Friedrich Engels, 1878.
  98. See Annotation 108, p. 112.
  99. See Annotation 207, p. 202.
  100. Summary of Dialectics, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.
  101. Anti-Dühring, Friedrich Engels, 1877.
  102. On the Questions of Dialectics, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.
  103. On the Questions of Dialectics, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.
  104. On the Questions of Dialectics, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.
  105. On the Questions of Dialectics, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.
  106. Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.
  107. Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.
  108. Karl Marx, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.
  109. Anti-Dühring, Friedrich Engels, 1878.
  110. Theses On Feuerbach, Karl Marx, 1845.
  111. Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1908.
  112. Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.
  113. Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1908.
  114. Once Again On The Trade Unions, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921.
  115. Revolutionary Ethics, Ho Chi Minh, December 1958.
  116. Note: Absolute Truth in dialectical materialist philosophy should not be confused with Hegel’s conception of Absolute Truth as a final point at which human consciousness will have achieved absolute, complete, and final understanding of our universe.