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'''CURRICULUM OF'''<br />
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'''THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF MARXISM-LENINISM'''<br />
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'''PART 1'''
  
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Foreword
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'''THE WORLDVIEW AND PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY OF MARXISM-LENINISM'''
  
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FOREWORD | THOUGH IT’s the first part of the book, this foreword is the last part to be written. Its purpose is only to tie up some loose ends.
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''For University and College Students''
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To begin with, while this book contains a great deal of autobiographical material, it is not an autobiography. At some later time I hope to tell the real story of my life, especially of my inner development and the changes in my outlook that took place over the decades.
 
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Before my arrest I never thought there was anything unusual about my long-term memory. I knew that I remembered things more accurately than my parents or my brother did, but that wasn't saying much. Since my arrest, however, several members of my defense team have told me that my long-term memory is unusually good. (See Appendix 10.) This is their opin~ ion; I am not in a position to prove to the reader that it is correct. There are a few items in this book for which I have relied entirely on memory and which someone who is not locked up would be able to check against docu­mentary evidence. If anyone should take the trouble to dig up the relevant documents, I hope I will prove to have been right with regard to most if not all of these items; but, whether that turns out to be the case or not, the number of such items is too small to provide a secure evaluation of my long-term memory.
 
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However, the point I want to make here is that even if the reader doubts the accuracy of my memories or my honesty in reporting them, enough of the material in this book is supported by documentary evidence and/or corroborating testimony to establish that media reports about me have been wildly unreliable, and that in its most important aspects my account of myself and my family relationships is substantially correct.
 
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As for my use of names, I almost always use the full names of persons who have spoken about me to the media. When referring to persons who have not spoken to the media I usually give names only in abbreviated form.
 
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In many cases I have identified persons only by fictitious names in order to provide maximum protection for their privacy. All fictitious names are introduced with a dagger symbol, and were chosen by a third party to rule out any connection between the actual person and their pseudonym.
 
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Some of the facts and incidents that I recount in this book will be embarrassing to the persons concerned. However, I assure the reader that my motive has not been to embarrass anyone, but to bring out the truth and correct false impressions, for which purpose it has sometimes been necessary to demonstrate the unreliability of an informant or show the fac­tors that may have distorted his reports. If I had wanted to embarrass peo­ple there are other facts I could have related that would have caused a good deal of additional embarrassment.
 
  
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''Not Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought''
  
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'''FIRST ENGLISH EDITION'''
  
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Table of Contents
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Translated and Annotated by Luna Nguyen
  
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Foreword by Dr. Vijay Prashad
  
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Introduction by Dr. Taimur Rahman
  
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A Note From The Publishers
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Edited, Annotated, and Illustrated by Emerican Johnson
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I
 
  
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Proofread by David Peat
  
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Foreword
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Additional Contributions and Editorial Support by Iskra Books
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III
 
  
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Published in association with ''The International Magazine''
  
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[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-2.png]]
  
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=== License ===
  
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This work is licensed under a<br />
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Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
  
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You are free to:
  
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'''Share''' — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format
  
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'''Adapt''' — remix, transform, and build upon the material
  
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Introduction
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The licensor cannot revoke these freedoms as long as you follow the license terms.
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1
 
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Chapter I
 
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“That hospital experience’’
 
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22
 
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Chapter II
 
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My early years
 
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33
 
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Chapter III
 
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My adolescence; family dysfunction; verbal abuse
 
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44
 
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Chapter IV
 
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My parents’ treatment of me during my adolescence, as discussed in the Family Letters
 
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55
 
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Chapter V
 
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Pressure to achieve; Harvard; how people saw me prior to my arrest
 
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66
 
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Chapter VI
 
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How people saw me after my arrest; false reports about me
 
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77
 
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Chapter VII
 
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My relations with my parents in adulthood
 
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88
 
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Chapter VIII
 
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My brother’s character
 
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99
 
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Chapter IX
 
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My brother’s ambivalent feelings toward me
 
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111
 
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Chapter X
 
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The Ellen Tarmichael affair
 
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122
 
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Chapter XI
 
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I hurt my brother’s feelings cruelly
 
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133
 
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Chapter XII
 
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My brother’s inconsistent attitudes toward mental illness
 
  
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Under the following terms:
  
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Chapter XIII
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'''Attribution''' — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.
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My brother’s writing
 
  
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'''NonCommercial''' — You may not use the material for commercial purposes.
  
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Chapter XIV
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'''ShareAlike''' — If you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you must distribute your contributions under the same license as the original.
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My brother’s relations with Linda Patrik; I break off with him
 
  
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'''No additional restrictions''' — You may not apply legal terms or technological measures that legally restrict others from doing anything the license permits.
  
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Chapter XV
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The full text of this license is available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
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How my brother’s attitudes changed under Linda Patrik’s influence; why he denounced me to the FBI
 
  
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<br />
  
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Chapter XVI
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<blockquote>
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The media
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“Step by step, along the struggle, by studying Marxism-Leninism parallel with participation in practical activities, I gradually came upon the fact that only socialism and communism can liberate the oppressed nations and the working people throughout the world from slavery.”
  
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''- Ho Chi Minh''
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</blockquote>
  
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=== Support for This Work ===
  
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Translating, annotating, and typesetting this book has taken three years, which would not have been possible without the support of our supporters on GoFundMe. GoFundMe is also the reason we are able to make the digital version of this entire text available for free online. We would therefore like to recognize all of our supporters:
  
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Notes and Documents
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{|
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| | ''Zach L.''
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| | ''K. Masunungure''
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| | ''Edil F.''
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| | ''Gideon S.''
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| ''Tarana'' ''I.-M.''
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| | ''Saumya I.''
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| ''Siddharth P.''
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| ''Sam P.''
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| | ''Jason G. A., Jr.''
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| ''Melinda K.''
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| ''Jillian R.''
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| | ''Richard H.''
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| | ''Lachlainn'' ''H.''
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| ''Marc G.''
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| ''Blaine H.''
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| ''The Slopstache''
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|}
  
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There is still plenty of work to be done to complete the translation of this entire curriculum. If you would like to financially support our efforts, you can support us at:
  
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Appendix 1
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BanyanHouse.org
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Further examples of my mother’s unreliability
 
  
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=== Dedication and Gratitude ===
  
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Appendix 2
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This book is dedicated to all the backers of the GoFundMe campaign that raised the funds to allow me to translate this text. What I initially believed would be a straightforward three-month process of translating ended up taking over three ''years'' of not just translation but also research, study, review, annotation, editing, proofreading, peer review, and more — with the incredible support of a full team of talented comrades — in order to make sure that everything would be digestible and intelligible for audiences outside of Vietnam. So, sincerely, thank you to everyone who backed this project for your patience, support, and encouragement.
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Francis E.X.Murphy, PhD, and his recent statements about me
 
  
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Thank you to my husband and comrade, Emerican Johnson, who helped me throughout the translation process, and who did such a fantastic job editing, annotating, and illustrating this text. He was my constant dialectical companion as we grappled together with the spirit and meaning of the writings of Marx, Lenin, and Engels that are the bedrock of this text.
  
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Appendix 3
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Thank you, also, to Iskra Books for the absolutely vital work they have done in helping us to edit this book and hold it to a high standard. We literally could not have done it without you. In particular, thank you to Ben Stahnke for organizing and cheerleading us through to the end, and to David Peat, for the painstaking, meticulous, and no-doubt frustrating work of proofreading our very, very, very imperfect writing!
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The N–43 clique
 
  
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Thanks also to ''The International Magazine'', who have provided guidance and suggestions throughout the process of developing this translation. I have had the opportunity to work with ''The International Magazine'' on various projects and I can recommend no better monthly periodical for internationalist communists to learn about socialist movements around the world.
  
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Appendix 4
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We owe a great deal of gratitude to Dr. Vijay Prashad and Dr. Taimur Rahman for taking the time to read through our translation and, in addition to providing their feedback and encouragement, also taking the time to write the foreword and introduction to the text. I know that you are both extremely busy with your own important literary, academic, and political work, so this assistance is so very much appreciated.
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‘’The Wild Colt”
 
  
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Finally, I would like to thank the Vietnamese intellectuals and experts who have done such an amazing job at taking hundreds of texts and distilling them down into the original volume which I have translated here. The elegance and precision with which they have been able to capture the essence of Marxism-Leninism is a monumental contribution to the workers of the world, and I only hope my translation does their work justice.
  
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Appendix 5
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March, 2023<br />
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Interviews with Joel Schwartz
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Luna Nguyen
  
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=== Foreword ===
  
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Appendix 6
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In December 1998, Fidel Castro addressed the Young Communist League’s 7<sup>th</sup> Congress in Havana, Cuba. The Soviet Union and the Communist state system in Eastern Europe had collapsed, which greatly weakened the cause of socialism. Not only was Cuba hit hard by the loss of its major trading partners and political ally, but socialists in general were penalised by the lethal argument made by the imperialist sections that “socialism had been defeated.” After 1991, Fidel revived the phrase “Battle of Ideas,” which was had been used in The German Ideology by Marx and Engels. To the Young Communists, Fidel said:
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Books about the Unabom case
 
  
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<blockquote>
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We must meet, in the heat of the battle, with the leading cadres to discuss, analyse, expand on, and draft plans and strategies to take up issues and elaborate ideas, as when an army’s general staff meets. We must use solid arguments to talk to members and non-members, to speak to those who may be confused or even to discuss and debate with those holding positions contrary to those of the Revolution or who are influenced by imperialist ideology in this great battle of ideas we have been waging for years now, precisely in order to carry out the heroic deed of resisting against the most politically, militarily, economically, technologically and culturally powerful empire that has ever existed. Young cadres must be well prepared for this task.
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</blockquote>
  
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Appendix 7
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Bourgeois ideology had tried to sweep aside its most fundamental critique – namely Marxism – by saying that “socialism had been defeated” and that Marxism was now obsolete. Marxist criticisms of the “casino of capitalism” – as Fidel called it – were being set aside both inside and outside the academy, with neoliberal policy confident enough to ignore each and every criticism. Fidel argued that young communists must learn the fundamentals of Marxism – including both dialectical and historical materialism – and must learn this in a way that was not religious thinking but would allow them to become “new intellectuals” of the movement, not those who repeat dogma but who learn to understand the conjuncture and become “permanent persuaders” for socialism (the two phrases in quotations are from Gramsci’s prison notebooks). The general ideological confidence of the cadre was not clear, and that confidence and their clarity needed to be developed in a project that Fidel called the Battle of Ideas.
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My high–school teachers’ reports on my personality
 
  
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During this period, communists around the world conceded that the demise of the Soviet Union had created a serious dilemma for the left. Not only were we penalised by the argument that “socialism has been defeated,” but our own arguments to explain the turbo-charged drive toward globalisation and neoliberalism and to make the case for a socialist alternative were not strong enough. One indication of that weakness was the 2001 World Social Forum meeting held in Brazil, which promoted the slogan – Another World is Possible, a weak slogan in comparison to a more precise slogan, such as – Socialism is Necessary. Young people drifted into our ranks in this decade, angered by the wretched social conditions created by the permanent austerity of neoliberalism, but bewildered about how to transform the political environment. The lack of Marxist political education was felt by socialist forces across the world, which is why many parties around the world began to revive a conversation about internal political education for cadre and active engagement with other social forces regarding the pressing issues of our time. Fidel called these two processes – internal education for the Party and external engagement on the dilemmas of humanity – the Battle of Ideas.
  
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Appendix 8
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In line with this broad direction, the government of Vietnam worked with the national publishing house Sự Thật (The Truth) to develop a curriculum for universities and colleges in the country. They developed this order of study along five subject areas: Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Marxist-Leninist Political Economy, Scientific Socialism, Vietnamese Communist Party History, and Ho Chi Minh Thought. This project worked to educate an entire population that would be able to understand the world in a rational and factual manner, outside the illusions of bourgeois ideology. Four years later, Communist Party of Vietnam adopted a resolution to take this work forward, and – under the leadership of Professor Nguyễn Viết Thông – produced this textbook that brought together the many themes of Marxism into focus for the introductory student and cadre. A book such as this is never easy to create, since it must introduce a form of thought that is critical of the foundations of bourgeois ideology – so it is a critique – but at the same time it provides a worldview to understand the actual world in which we live – so it is a science. The text must, therefore, show how bourgeois thought is partial and at the same time how socialist thought, creatively applied, will allow one to have a firmer grip of reality and be able to participate in fighting to transcend the obstinate facts of human indignity that are reproduced by capitalism. No manual such as this is without its flaws and without its limitations, but no education can start without a manual such as this one. The Vietnamese comrades have done a great service to the left movement by producing a text such as this, which can be used for study and then used as a model to develop similar texts in different parts of the world.
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The Tarmichael letters
 
  
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Ho Chi Minh, whose interpretation of Marxism and whose ideas about the Vietnamese Revolution, are all over this text once said: “Study and practice must always go together. Study without practice is useless. Practice without study leads to folly.” There can be no better injunction to get to work, to study and develop one’s theoretical armour and to use that theory as the guide to one’s work in the Battle of Ideas and in the battle for the streets, because this unity between theory and action is indeed praxis (thực tiễn), not just practice, but conscious human activity. That is what Fidel encouraged in his lectures on the Battle of Ideas.
  
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Appendix 9
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Dr. Vijay Prashad.<br />
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Reliability of investigators’ reports
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5 March 2023<br />
 +
Caracas, Venezuela.
  
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=== Preface to the First English Edition ===
  
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Appendix 10
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The text of this book constitutes part one of a four-part curriculum on Marxism-Leninism developed and published by the Ministry of Education and Training of Vietnam. This curriculum is intended for students who are not specializing in the study of Marxism-Leninism, and is intended to give every Vietnamese student a firm grounding in the political philosophy of scientific socialism.
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A note on my memory
 
  
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The entire curriculum consists of:
  
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Appendix 11
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Part 1: Dialectical Materialism (this text)
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A note on my brother’s memory
 
  
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Part 2: Historical Materialism
  
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Part 3: Political Economy
  
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Part 4: Scientific Socialism
  
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In Vietnam, each part of the curriculum encompasses one full semester of mandatory study for all college students. Each part builds upon the previous, meaning that this text is the foundation for all political theory education for most college students in Vietnam.
  
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However, it is important to note that this is not the first encounter with dialectical materialism which Vietnamese students wil have had with these ideas, because Vietnamese students also study dialectical materialism, historical materialism, political economy, and scientific socialism from primary school all the way through high school.
  
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Introduction
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As such, the text of this book — in and of itself — would probably seem overwhelmingly condensed to most foreign readers who are new to studying dialectical materialism. Therefore, we have decided to extensively annotate and illustrate this text with the information which would have been previously obtained in a basic Vietnamese high school education and/or provided by college lecturers in the classroom.
  
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It is our desire that these annotations will be helpful for students who hope to learn these principles for application in political activity, but we should also make it clear to academic researchers and the like that our annotations and illustrations are ''not'' present in the original Vietnamese work.
  
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A FRIEND says there are a lot of people who mistake their imagination for their memory. 1
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We hope that this book will be useful in at least three ways:
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Daily Oklahoman
 
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Introduction | I AM VERY OFTEN FAR from the kind of person that the media have portrayed with the help of my brother and my mother. The purpose of this book is to show that I am not as I have been described in the media, to exhibit the truth about my rela­tionship with my family, and to explain why my brother and my mother have lied about me.
 
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In fairness I should acknowledge that my brother and mother probably are not fully conscious of many of their own lies, since they both are adept at talking themselves into believing what they want to believe. Yet at least some of their lies must be conscious, as we shall see later.
 
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I consider it demeaning to expose one's private life to public view. But the media have already taken away my privacy, and there is no way I can refute the falsehoods that have been propagated about me except by dis­cussing publicly some of the most intimate aspects of my own life and that of my family.
 
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Ever since my early teens, my immediate family has been a millstone around my neck. I've often wondered how I had the bad luck to be born into such a nest of fools. My relations with them have been to me a con­stant source of irritation and disgust-and sometimes of very serious pain. For some forty years my brother and mother leaned heavily on me for the satisfaction of certain needs of theirs; they were psychological leeches.
 
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They loved me because they needed me, but at the same time they hated me because I didn't give them the psychological sustenance they were look­ing for; and they must have sensed my contempt for them. Thus their feel­ings toward me were, and remain, strongly conflicting. In my brother's case the conflict is extreme.
 
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I certainly can't claim that my own role in the life of my family has been a noble one. I had good justification for resenting my parents, but instead of making a clean break with them in early adulthood, as I should have done, I maintained relations with them: sometimes was kind to them, sometimes used them, sometimes squabbled with them over relatively minor matters, sometimes hurt their feelings intentionally, occasionally wrote them emotional letters expressing my bitterness over the way they had treated me and the way they had exploited my talents to satisfy their own needs. With my brother too I should have broken off early in life. The relationship wasn't good for either of us, but it was much worse for my brotherthan it was for me. Thisis a complicated matter that I will deal with at length further on.
 
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This book is carefully documented. It has to be because otherwise the reader would not know whether to believe my account or that of my brother and mother. Due to the continual need to quote documents and argue facts, the writing is dry and perhaps pedantic. All the same, I thinkthe book will attract many readers because of the intrinsic human interest of its content.
 
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The amount of material about me that has appeared in the media is enormous, and I have not read or seen more than a small fraction of it. Apart from some straightforward reports oflegal maneuvers or courtroom proceedings, most of what I have seen is loaded with errors and distortions, some of them trivial, some of them very serious indeed. Due to limitations on my own time, energy, and resources, the documents I've studied in preparing this book include from the media only a few items; principally the articles on my case that appeared in Newsweek, Time, U.S. News and World Report, and People on April 15th and 22, 1996; the "quickie" books that appeared within a few weeks after my arrest, Mad Genius and Unabomber; the articles based on interviews with my brother and mother that appeared in the New York Times, May 26, 1996, in the Washington Post, June 16, 1996, in the Sacramento Bee.January 19, 1997; and my mother's and brother's appear­ance on 60 Minutes, September 15, 1996. The latter cover all of the public statemencs about me made by my brother and my mother that I have seen up to the present date, March 5, 1998. (Added April 1, 1998: I've recently been reminded of some other remarks by my brother, brief ones that have appeared in various newspapers, but I don't think they contained anything that I need to address in this book.)
 
−
Apart from the published sources, I cite a large number of unpublished documents. It will of course be necessary at some point to make these doc­uments accessible for examination so that it can be verified that I have cited them accurately. But I don't expect to do this immediately on publication of this book. For one thing, some of the documents are still legally sensitive, and for another, I don't want journalists rummaging through my papers to get material for sensational articles. l hope to get the documents housed in a university library. and arrangements will be made so that some responsi­ble and unbiased party can examine them and verify that I have cited them correctly and have not unfairly taken any passage out of context. Eventu· ally some of the documents may be published. In any case, l will make every effort to see that the accuracy of my citations can be independently verified at the earliest possible time.
 
−
I also make use in this book of a few reports received orally from investi­gators who worked for my defense team. The investigators do not want their names revealed because the resulting publicity about them might interfere with their work as investigators. But at some point I expect to make arrangements so that the investigators can be consulted discreetly and confirm the oral information that they gave me. (But see below for my remarks on the reliability of this information.) In this book I refer to the investigators as Investigator #1, Investigator #2, etc.
 
−
Similar remarks apply to the psychologist whom I call Dr. K.
 
−
Needless to say; I am not able to provide documentary evidence to refute all of the false statements that have been made about me, or even all of those that have been made by my brother and my mother. But I am able to demonstrate that informants have been lying or mistaken in enough cases to show that statements made about me arc so unreliable that they should not be given any credence unless they are corroborated by docu­ments written at or near the time to which they refer.
 
−
In many cases I cite ·documents written by myself-principally my jour­nals, some autobiographical notes, and letters sent to my family. All of these were written at a time (prior to my arrest) when I had no motive to lie about the points that are now at issue. They were either seized by the FBI when they searched my cabin, or were in the custody of other persons at the time of my arrest. Since my arrest I have not had physical possession of any of these documents; l have worked from photocopies. Thus there can be no question of my having fabricated any of this material for the pur­poses of this book. (Exception: Notes that I took on information given to me orally by the investigators and by Dr. K. were of course written after my arrest and while I was preparing this book.) Moreover, some of these docu­ments, especially my 1979 autobiography. contain highly embarrassing admissions that show that I was striving to be as honest as possible. Some of the documents were written almost immediately after the events that they record; others, while not contemporary with the events, were written many years ago when my memory of the events was fresher, and hence they presumably provide more reliable evidence than someone else's recol­lections taken down within the last year or two.
 
−
In many cases I make use of sources of information that l know to be unreliable, such as media reports. The rationale for doing this is that if the reader has conceived a certain impression of me from unreliable sources, and if I can show by quoting those same sources that the impression is not to be trusted, then I will at any rate have demonstrated that the sources are unreliable and hence that the reader has no reason to believe them. As for statements of my brother and my mother that were quoted in the New Yort Ti~. the Washington Post, and the Sacramento Bt:e, my mother and brother presumably saw the articles based on their interviews, and, as far as I know, they never wrote letters to the newspapers in question correcting any errors, so they have to be considered responsible for their statements as quoted in the articles.
 
−
ln all cases when I have felt that a source was more or less unreliable, I have warned the reader of that fact in the Notes on Documents.
 
−
Quite apart from the unreliability of the media, I was appalled to learn how few people provided trustworthy information. A psychologist (Dr. K.) repeatedly interviewed my brother, my mother, and me. She gave me orally some items of information obtained from my brother, mother, and aunt, and I wrote these down at the time. But when I asked her to confirm some items of this information several months later, in three cases out of a total of nine she either said she couldn't remember any such information and couldn't find it in her notes, or she reworded the information in such a way as to change its meaning significantly. 2 Other shrinks misquoted me or gave seriously incorrect information in their reports. The investigators who worked for my defense team were much more reliable than the shrinks, but they too gave me orally a few items of information that they later had to correct, not because they had learned something new from further investi­gation but because they had reported to me carelessly in the first place. For this reason I have tried to rely as little as possible on information received orally. Wherever I have used such information the reader is made aware of it either in the text or in a footnote. I have cited oral information from
 
−
Or. K. or the investigators in only a few cases. It is possible that Or. K. or the investigators may decline to confirm some of this information if they are asked. Yet I was careful in recording the information and I am certain that I have accurately reported what I was told.
 
−
What really horrified me, though, was the nonsense reported to the media or to the investigators by people who knew me years or decades ago. The investigators have given me written reports of interviews conducted with approximately 150 people.3 Some of the information obtained in these interviews dealt with matters which reflect the facts of the informants' lives. Taking into consideration only matters of which I have direct knowl­edge and speaking in rough terms, I can say that something like 14.% of the informants gave reports the overall accuracy of which I was unable to judge; 6% gave reports about whose accuracy I was doubtful; 6% gave reports that were inaccurate in detail but provided an overall picture of me that was not far from the truth; 36% gave reports that were fairly accurate; 38% gave reports that were seriously inaccurate; and, of these last, eleven persons gave reports that were so far off that they were mere flights of fancy. More than that: of the reports that were fairly accurate, 72% were brief (one and a half pages or less); while fewer than one in four of the seri· ously inaccurate reports were bric£ So it seems that people who spoke care­fully and responsibly usually didn't have much information to give, while most of those who had {or thought they had) a good deal of information didn't know what they were talking about.
 
−
To judge from what I have seen of them, statements about me made to journalists by people who knew me, as quoted in the media, were even more inaccurate than what was reported to my investigators.
 
−
In some cases I have documentary evidence that shows that reports about me are false, but in the great majority of cases I am relying on mem­ory for the information that disproves the reports. Why do I assume, when my recollections disagree with someone else's, that mine are usually right?
 
−
First: In many cases I can be confident that I am right simply because I am in a better position· to know about the matter in question than arc the persons whose memories disagree with mine. For instance, if someone says that I used to wear a plaid sport jacket four decades ago, I can safely assume that he has me mixed up with someone else, because I have owned very few sport jackets in my life and I know that I have never had a plaid one.
 
−
Second: I have good evidence of the accuracy of my long-term memory.4
 
−
(A) Investigators working for my defense team who researched my past told me repeatedly that my long-term memory was remarkably sharp and accurate.5 This does not mean that I never made mistakes of memory, but that I did so seldom. See Appendix 10.
 
−
(B) In preparing this book I've studied hundreds of old family letters6 that my mother had saved, going all the way back to 1957, and I've found hardly anything to surprise me: to the extent that the matters covered in the letters overlapped with areas of which I have memories, my memories were confirmed with only minor discrepancies.
 
−
(C) During the 1990s, for reasons that I need not take the trouble to explain here, I obtained from Harvard a transcript of my record. Before looking at it, as a check on my memory. I wrote down on a sheet of paper the number-designations of the courses I took (e.g., "Math ra") and the grades I got in them. The FBI found this sheet of paper in my cabin and I have a copy of it. 7 Here is how it compares with the official transcripts 8 of my record:
 
−
General Education AHF (which everyone referred to as "Gen Ed /\'), Humanities 5, and Social Sciences 7 were courses lasting two semesters; all other courses were of one semester.
 
−
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT MY MEMORY
 
−
General Education AHF Gen Ed A mid-year grade (mid-year grade) B-not remembered
 
−
GermanR A GermanR A Mathematics Ia A Math ta A Humanities 5 (mid-year) c Hums c Social Sciences 7 (mid-year) c Soc Sci 7 c
 
−
General Education AHF c GenEdA c+ Physics u.a A Physics 12.a A Mathematics 1b A Math1b A Humanities 5 c+ Hums c+ Social sciences 7 B· Soc Sci 7 B-
 
−
Anthropology 1a B+ Anthro Ia B+ GermanDa B GermDa B Mathematics wa A Math20a A Physics I2c c Phys. I2C C-
 
−
Anthropology 10 B+ AnthroIO B+ Astronomy2 B+ Astron2 B Mathematics wb B Math20b B Mathematics IOI c Math101 c+
 
−
History ro9a B- History B·
 
−
Mathematics 105a A­ Math105a A-
 
−
Mathematics 106a A Mathro6a A
 
−
Philosophy 140 A Phil 140 A
 
−
History ro9b C· History C-
 
−
Mathematics 105b c+ Mathro5b C+
 
−
Mathematics 106b A· Mathro6b A·
 
−
Philosophy 141 B Phil I4I B+
 
−
History of Science 101 B+ Hist Sci 101 B+
 
−
Humanities 115 B- Hum(Ren) 9 c+
 
−
Mathematics 212.a B Math212a B+
 
−
Mathematics 25oa B Math25oa B
 
−
Anthropology 122 A· Anthro (hum gen) 10 A·
 
−
History l'.43 c+ Eng intel hist 11 c+
 
−
Mathematics 212b A Math212b A
 
−
Scandinavian 50 A­ Scand50 A·
 
−
As far as I can recall, I never saw a transcript of my Harvard grades from the time I left Harvard in 1962 until I wrote them down from memory in the early 1990s.
 
−
(D) In the other surviving documents I have found reasonably good agreement with my memories. When I have encountered a discrepancy between my memories and someone else's memories as reported in the media or to my investigators, and when some document was available that resolved the discrepancy. the discrepancy has always been resolved in my favor, with very few exceptions.12 (However, I can think of two cases-one trivial, one significant-in which my memory has disagreed with someone else's and I am sure that the other person is right because the matter is one about which she could hardly be mistaken.13 Also, when I recall things that I have read years previously in books and magazines, it is not uncommon for my memory of what I have read to be distorted; occasionally it is seri· ously wrong.14 On the other hand, my memory of things I have written or read in personal letters or heard in conversation seems to be pretty reliable, so far as surviving documents have made it possible to judge.}
 
−
Third: There is abundant evidence of the gross unreliability of the memories of me that have been reported to my investigators or have appeared in the media. In reference to the information given to the investi· gators, Investigator #2, who is very experienced, writes:
 
−
Lay wimess reports of Ted's behavior and functioning are extremely suspect given the high profile nature of his case. Many of their anecdotes and conclusions are most likely the result of planted memories and sugges­tions they've read, seen, or heard from others.15
 
−
There are three ways by which I have been able to establish that many reports are wrong. They may contradict information about which I am in a position to know so well that there is hardly any chance that my own mem­ory could be mistaken; they may contradict convincing documentary evi­dence; or the accounts of two different people may contradict one another, so that at least one of them must be wrong.
 
−
Throughout this book the reader will find examples of reports that are proved wrong. But it will be useful to give some examples here in the Intro­duction also, because, among other things, they will illustrate some of the ways in which false memories or false reports arise.
 
−
Some of the sources of falsehood or distortion can be identified with reasonable confidence: (a) Media planting. The informant "remembers" something because it has been suggested to him by the media. (b) Mistaken identity. The informant has me mixed up with someone else. (c) Remem­bering later years. The informant remembers the later years of his associa· tion with me, largely forgets the earlier ones, and attributes to the earlier years the same traits, relationships, orcircumstances that existedin the later years. ( d) Stereotyping. The informant sees that I have some ofthe traits of a given group, so he identifies me with that group and assumes that I have all of the traits that arc characteristic of it. (c) Lying. It is difficult to say how many of the falsehoods told about me are conscious lies. At least some of the things that my brother and my mother have said are conscious lies and not honest errors, and I can identify one otherindividual who definitely has been lying about me. But otherwise my guess is that conscious lying by informants has not played an important role; it is a matter, instead, of human fallibility and irrationality. On the other hand, some conscious lies by journalists can be clearly identified, and there is enough evidence of unscrupulousness and irresponsibility in the media to make it plausible that journalists may often lie when they think they won't get caught.
 
−
Apart from the factors we've just listed there are four others that may have helped to produce false reports in my case, but their existence is morc­or-less speculative and cannot be definitely proved. These are: (f) Projec· tion. People who themselves have mental or psychological problems are prone to see others as having such problems. (g) Personal resentment or jealousy. This factor is clearly present in the case of my brother and mother. In some other individuals its presence may be suspected, but this is specula­tive. (h) Mass hysteria, herd instinct. Under certain conditions, when an individual or a class of individuals within a society is pointed out as evil or worthy ofbeing cast out, an atmosphere develops in which other members of the society draw together defensively, gang up on the rejected person(s), and take satisfaction in reviling him or them. It becomes something like a fad. Possibly sadistic impulses are involved. Some such factor seems to be operating in my case, but it is difficult to prove this objectively. (i) Greed. People who appear on television talk shows often are paid for it. Presum­ably those who tell the most bizarre or exaggerated stories will be the most in demand by talk shows and therefore willmake the most money. One can­not exclude the possibility that this factor may have been responsible, in part, for some of the stories that were told about me.
 
−
Now some examples:
 
−
(a) Media planting: There are very many instances in which I am reason­ably sure that this has occurred, 16 but often I can't prove it definitely. For example, Leroy Weinberg. a neighbor of ours when I was a teenager, told investigators that when he said "hello" to me I always failed to rcspond. 17 I know that this is false, because my mother had me well trained to be polite to adults, and that included answering all greetings from them.18 It seems fairly obvious that Weinberg attributes this and other strange behavior to me because his memory of me has been warped by exposure to the media; but how can I be certain? Conceivably he might remember some instance in which I failed to respond to a greeting of his because I simply didn't hear it.
 
−
However, there arc some cases in which it does seem virtually certain that media planting has been at work.
 
−
Dr. L.Hz., a dentist who practices part of the time in Lincoln, Montana, told my investigators: "Ted must not have had much money because his mother usually paid his dental bills."19 My mother had provided me with a large sum of money from which I paid my dental bills among other things, but she never paid any of my dental bills directly. I deposited her money in a bank and paid Dr. L.Hz. either in cash or with checks on my own account. There is no way that Dr. L.Hz. could have known that the money came ulti­mately from my mother, because I was embarrassed about the fact I received money from her, and I was careful to conceal it from everyone. Certainly I would never have told Dr. L.Hz. about it. It is clear, therefore, that Dr. L.Hz. must have learned from the media after my arrest that I had been receiving money from my mother, and this information altered his memory of his own dealings with me.
 
−
Dr. L.Hz. also told my investigators: "Ted was an extremely quiet per­son, so quiet that Ted appeared odd. Ted was a kooky man.... Ted did not talk much."19 Media planting was probably involved here, too, as Or. L.Hz.'s account is contradicted by chat of his own dental assistant, R.Cb. According to my investigators, R.Cb. "described Ted as, 'a sweet, nice, pleasant guy' .... She said that Ted was 'friendly' and she would chat with him when he came into the office. She does not rememberwhat they talked about."20 Or. L.Hz. was present at most of my conversations with R.Cb. and he participated in them.
 
−
Another clear example of media planting is provided by Dale Eickel­man, whom I knew in junior high and high-school. Eickelman, now a pro­fessor at Dartmouth College, told my investigators that "Teddie did not have other friends [than Dale Eickelman] during the time that Dale knew Teddie from 5th grade until Teddie's sophomore year [of college)."21 In Chapter 3 of chis book (pp. 43, 48, 49} I mention eight people (other than Dale Eickelman), of approximately my own age or up to two years older, with whom I was friends during some part (or in one case almost all) of the period between fifth grade and the time I left high-school.22 These were good friends whom I genuinely liked, not just casual acquaintances or peo­ple (like Russell Mosny) with whom I spent time only because we were thrown together as outcasts.
 
−
Professor Eickelman is a highly intelligent man. He must realize that his house was at least a mile and a half from mine, and that after fifth grade we were never in any of the same classes at school. So how can he imagine that he knows whether I had any friends other than himself? The only evidence he cited was that when he visited my house (which was not very often) no other friends were present. 23 But it was equally true that when I visited Eickelman's house he never had any other friends there. Would this justify me in concluding that his only friend was myself?
 
−
Professor Eickelman's belief that he was my only friend clearly has no rational basis. Only one plausible explanation for this belief presents itself. It was suggested to him by the media portrayal of me as abnormally aso­cial. It is true that I was unsuccessful socially in junior high and high-school. Thus the media did not create Professor Eickelman's belief from nothing, but caused him to exaggerate grossly the accurate perception that I was less social than the average kid.
 
−
(b) Mistaken identity. In Chapter 6 the reader will find several examples of mistaken identity: cases in which it can be clearly shown that an infor­mant has made a false statement about me because he has confused me with someone else. We give another example here.
 
−
G.Wi.t owns a cabin not far from mine, though I haven't seen him for several years. According to investigators who interviewed him, "[G.Wi.] thinks that Ted was always looking over his shoulder. Sometime during the
 
−
1970s, Ted talked to [G.Wi.] about the KGB. Ted told (G.Wi.] he had a place he could hide in up [sic] Old Baldy where no one would ever find him."24
 
−
G.Wi. has me mixed up with Al Pinkston, a gentleman whom he and I met up in the Dalton Mountain or Sauerkraut Creek area about late December of1974. Pinkston (now deceased) was an obvious paranoiac who believed that the Lincoln area was infested with KGB agents. He told me he was hiding out up on the mountain because "they're gunnin' for my ass." I related the story of this encounter three months later in a letter to my parents.26
 
−
I never told G. Wi. or anyone else that I had a hiding place.
 
−
In this and in some other cases of mistaken identity, it is likely that media influence was at work. G.Wi. probably confused me with Al Pinkston because the media had portrayed me as crazy. like Pinkston.
 
−
(c) Remembering later years: In greater or lesser degree this phenomenon seems to affect a number of the reports made to my investigators by people who have known me. In some cases it is clear·cut. For example, Russell Mosny reported that he and I met through our membership in the high· school band, 27 hut actually I knew him from the time I entered seventh grade.28
 
−
In some cases it is difficult to disentangle the effect of "remembering later years" from that of "media planting." Thus Nancy Whitet, the daugh· ter of one of my father's best friends, told investigators: "Tedjr. was a very shy and quiet boy. He was introverted and only involved himself in things he could do alone."29 Here and throughout her interview, Nancy White exaggerates my shyness and introversion to the point of caricature. Most likely this is the result of media planting. Yet "remembering later years" would seem to be involved too, since Nancy White appears to have forgot­ten completely the earlier years when I was not particularly shy or intro· verted and we were lively playmates. I wrote the following in r979:
 
−
I might have been about 9 years old when the following incident occurred. My family was visiting the [WhitetJ family. The [Whites] had a little girl named [Nancy], about my own age. At that time she was very pretty. I was horsing around with her, and by and by I got to tickling her. I put my arms around her from behind and tickled her under the ribs. I tick­led and tick.led, and she squirmed and laughed. I pressed my body up against hers, and experienced a very pleasant, warm, affectionate sensation, distinctly sexual. Unfortunately. my mother caught on to the fact that our play was beginning to take on a sexual character. She got embarrassed and told me to stop tickling [Nancy]. [Nancy] said, 'No, don't make him stop! I liu it!' but, alas, my mother insisted, and I had to quit.30
 
−
The most important case of "remembering later years" involves my father's close friend Ralph Meister. On February 2, 1997 Dr. Meister signed for my investigators a declaration in which he outlined what he knew about me and my family life. The declaration is mostly accurate except in one respeet. Dr. Meister represents my mother and me as showing certain traits through the entire period of my childhood and adolescence, whereas in reality those traits were not shown until I was approaching adolescence. Thus, he writes: "Wanda put pressure on Teddy John to be an intellectual giant almost from the day he was born."31 Actually I never felt I was under much pressure to achieve until at least the age of eleven. Or. Meister also implies that I had difficulties with social adjustment from early childhood, 32 whereas in reality those difficulties did not begin until much later. All this will be shown in Chapters I through 5 of this book.
 
−
(d) Stereotyping: The most clear-cut example of this is that some people remember me as having used a pocket protector in high-school.33 I have never used a pocket protector in my life. But because I was identified with the "Briefcase Boys" (academically oriented students) and because some of these did wear pocket protectors, people remember me as having worn one too.
 
−
(e) Lying: Apart from my brother and my mother, the only informant whom I definitely know to be consciously lying is Chris Waits of Lincoln, Montana. Waits has been pretending that he knew me well.34 He used to say hello to me when he passed me on the road in his truck, and I would return his greeting. I don't remember ever accepting a ride from him, but it's conceivable that I may have done so on one or two occasions, not more. I once had a brief conversation with him at a garage sale. Apart from that I had no association or contact with him.
 
−
(f) Projection: It does appear to be true that persons who themselves have mental or psychological problems are prone to see others as having such problems, but it is difficult to say definitely that this factor has oper­ated in my case, since the people who portrayed me as strange, abnormal, or mentally ill may have done so under the influence of "media planting" or some other factor. But it is a fact that many of the people who portrayed me in this way had serious problems of their own. For the case of Joel Schwartz see Chapter 12 and Appendix 5. Many other examples can be found in the investigators' reports of the interviews that they conducted. 3S Here I will only discuss some of my suitemates from Eliot N-43 at Harvard who gave false information about me.
 
−
Robert Applethwaite t, Pat Mcintosh, John Masters, and Phil Alman t formed a close-knit clique within the suite. To all outward appearances they were thoroughly well-adjusted. They wore neatly kept suits and ties, their rooms were always tidy. they observed all of the expected social amenities, their attitudes, opinions, speech, and behavior were so conven­tional that I found them completely uninteresting. Yet three of the four gave my investigators a glimpse of their psychological problems.
 
−
Pat Mcintosh, according to the investigators' report, did a great deal of whining throughout his interview about how hard it was to survive acade­mically and psychologically at Harvard. For example: "[Pat] found life at Harvard to be extremely difficult . . . 36 Patrick [had) his own adolescent insecurities ... 37 Patrick was coo insecure and wrapped up in his own prob­lems ... 38 The faculty or administration at Harvard was ... unconcerned with students' emotional and psychological problems. Patrick did not know any students who actually sought and received emotional help ... At times, Patrick wanted help surviving himself, but he had no idea where to go.John Finley, the house master ... didn't want to recognize the serious difficulties that many of the students were having. "39
 
−
Mcintosh evidently assumes that I was having problems similar to his own: "One day during Patrick's second year at Harvard ... he saw a student beingtaken outon a stretcher. The student had slit his wrists after receiving a C on an exam ... Patrick... thought ofTed and worried that maybe Ted might end up like this kid."38
 
−
John Masters told the investigators that he "was two years old when the United States dropped the atomic bomb on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. After the bombing, he used to dream about the atomic bomb; these dreams sparked John's fantasies of becoming a nuclear physicist but after he barely earned a C in his freshman physics class at Harvard, he decided that he was not cut out for a career in the hard sciences .... 40 DuringJohn's first semes­ter of his sophomore year at Harvard, his family began to fall apart. He became very depressed for several months and started receiving therapy at the student health services."41
 
−
When John Masters first moved into Eliot N-43 he mentioned having been in "the hospital." I asked him what he had been in the hospital for, and he answered, "just nervousness." Like Mcintosh, Masters made false state­ments about me and exaggerated my solitariness. According to the investi­gators' report of his interview, "House Master Finley ... did not intervene on John's behalf when John needed counseling. The same was probably true for Ted. Ted's solitary narure was not enough to draw Master Finley's attention because diversity or unusual behavior was accepted at Harvard.
 
−
John believes that today Ted's solitary behavior would warrant some type of intervention; at the time, his behavior did not even raise an eyebrow. ... 42 John's solitary lifestyle meant that he did not make more than five friends while at Harvard."43
 
−
Robert Applethwaite "was shy and socially backward when he went to
 
−
Harvard and feared that he would never fully come out of his shell.... He had a strong desire to lead a normal life. [Robert Applethwaite) was an astronomy major. He originally intended to pursue astronomy on the grad­uate level but his fears drove him away from that goal. He saw that many of the astronomy graduate students at Harvard were not well-adjusted and he felt he would move further away from a normal life if he pursued astro­physics.
 
−
At the end of [Robert Applethwaite's] junior year, he dropped out of Harvard. He was confused as a college student and this confusion led him to drop out of school. [Robert Applethwaite] went to the Harvard health services for counseling before dropping out of Harvard. He thought the counseling was helpful . . . he returned to Harvard a year or two later. [Robert Applcthwaitc] did not last long at Harvard and soon droppe\i out again." 44
 
−
Robert Applethwaite too made false statements about me and exagger­ated my solitariness. "[Robert Applethwaite) and the others at N-43 were too young to realize how serious Ted's isolation was for him...." 4S
 
−
Thus Mcintosh, Masters, and Robert Applethwaite appear to have seen me as having problems or needs that were, in part, similar to their own. In reality I was psychologically self-reliant and felt neither insecure nor depressed, nor did I feel in need of help, nor did I find it hard to face the aca­demic challenges of Harvard. Nor did I feel troubled by loneliness. I did suf­fer from acute sexual starvation: I was in daily contact with smart, physically attractive Radcliffe women and I didn't know how to make advances to them. I did feel very frustrated with a few mathematics teach­ers whose lectures I considered to be ill-prepared. Apart from that there was just one other thing about which I felt seriously unhappy: It was a kind of nagging malaise the nature of which I never fully understood until I broke free of it once and for all in 1966. But that is a story that will be told else­where than in this book.
 
−
(g) Personal resentmfflt or jealousy. Only in the case of my brother and mother can resentment or jealously be clearly identified as a factor influ­encing reports given to investigators. However, this factor may be sus­pected in some other cases. Doris B.t (see Chapter 6) once told me that "everyone" was jealous of me, presumably referring to the people whom we both knew, including Greg Davis t and Russell Mosny, both of whom seemed to become cool toward me at about the time I moved a year ahead of them in school. In Greg Davis's opinion, ·~cademically and intellectu­ally, Ted was head and shoulders above the rest of the students at Evergreen Park High. His exceptional intelligence set him apart, even from a group of bright young men like the Briefcase Boys."46 "The Briefcase Boys" was a clique that included, among others, Greg Davis, Russell Mosny, and Roger Podcwell. According to Podewell, "It wasn't just Ted's shyness that set him apart from the Briefcase Boys. He was more intelligent than the others, a fact that made Roger a little jealous ...."47 I did not fail to josh Podewell and Mosny about their relatively dissappointing academic performance, but they didn't seem to find it amusing.
 
−
Greg Davis, Podcwcll, and Mosny ( especially the last) gave my investiga­tors unflattering and inaccurate accounts of me that exaggerated my social isolation. Is this due only to media planting or are dislike, resentment, or jealousy also involved? My guess is that no such factor is involved in Podewell's case but that it is involved in Mosny's. With Greg Davis it could be either way.
 
−
Patrick [Mcintosh] was jealous of Ted's prowess in mathematics .... 39 Did this influence Mcintosh's highly inaccurate and unflattering portrayal of me? There is no proof that it did. But it's a fact that a sense of inferiority can be one of the most powerful impulses to resentment. Especially when the person who appears to be more able is lacking in tact, as I'm afraid has sometimes been the case with me.
 
−
(h) Mass hysteria, herd instinct. This is a very vaguely defined factor that has probably been at work in my case, but it is impossible to separate from media planting or illustrate with specific examples.
 
−
(i) Greed. Although I know of at least one case of a person receiving pay­ment for an interview, I have no way of proving that people who told sensa­tional stories about me on television allowed themselves to alter their recollections in such a way as to make them more profitable financially or whether they were paid at all.
 
  
−
LET u s c o N c Lu DE with a few more examples that show the inaccu­racy of the reports made to investigators by people who have known me.
+
* As a comprehensive introductory textbook on dialectical materialism and for selfstudy, group study, classroom use, cadre training, etc.
−
My brother used to hold literary "colloquia," as he called them. He and a few friends would all read some piece of literature that one of them had selected, then they would get together and discuss it. The participants var­ied, but the most usual ones were my brother, my parents, Dirk West t, and Bill Wadhamt and Sally Baker t.48 I attended one and only one of these col­loquia. This was shortly after I arrived at my parents' home in Lombard, Illinois in 1978. To the investigators Dirk West described my behavior at this colloquium as follows:
+
* As a quick and easy to reference handbook for reviewing the basic concepts of dialectical materialism for students of theory who are already familiar with dialectical materialism.
−
On the first occasion (Dirk) met Ted, Wanda and Ted Sr. [my father},
+
* As a companion book for further reading of theory and political texts rooted in dialectical materialist philosophy.
−
Dave and he were discussing Plato, in connection with something they had read in their book club. Ted came out of his room and said there was no reason to read any early Greek philosophers like Plato because they had all been proven wrong. That was all Ted said before returning to his room or leaving the house.... [fed] never made eye contact, but just looked off blindly while he spoke.49"
 
−
Herc is how Sally Baker described my behavior at the same colloquium:
 
−
[Sally met Ted] one night when she and [Bill] were back at the Kaczyn­skis' house for another colloquy [sic]. When he was introduced to her, Ted made a disparaging comment about her and about women in general. She was completely shocked, but the nature of Ted's comment made her feel that there was no point in trying to get to know Ted. Later, when the group began the colloquy Ted participated at first, but [Sally] recalls that he soon disagreed with something in the discussion. He then became ner­vous and fidgety and kept getting up, walking out and coming back to the conversation.50
 
−
The reader will observe that the two accounts are inconsistent with one another. At least one of them must be false.
 
−
As a matter of fact, both are false. I remember the colloquium quite clearly. The participants were Dirk West, Bill Wadham and Sally Baker, my parents, my brother, and myself. I can state exactly where each of us was sitting, I can describe in a general way the demeanorofeach, and I can even recall some of the details of the conversation. The subject of the collo­quium was a dialogue of Plato that discussed happiness and love; Plato's conclusion was that true happiness lay in the love of wisdom.
 
−
I was present in the living room when the others entered. I did not make a disparaging comment about Sally personally. I did not make a disparaging comment about women in general when I was introduced to Sally, but it is conceivable that at some later point I may have made a comment about women that might have been felt as disparaging by a woman who was excessively sensitive about her gender. However, it's more likely that Sally is remembering a joking comment about women that I made in a letter to her husband, Bill, duringthe mid-198os.
 
−
I did not say that the early Greek philosophers had "been proven wrong." I did say that their methods of reasoning were naive by modern standards, hence they were worth reading today only for esthetic reasons or because of their historical interest, not as a source of rational under­standing.
 
−
I did not become "nervous" or "fidgety,'' and I did not leave the room at any time until all of the guests had left. I did repeatedly get up to take pieces
 
−
of snack food from a bowl that was on a table five or six feet from where I was sitting. It is probably some garbled memory of this that leads Sally to say that I kept gettingup and walking out.
 
−
Dirk West's statement that I "never made eye contact" with him is liter­ally true, but it was he, not I, who avoided eye contact. I looked at Dirk West's face a number of times during the evening, but he neverlooked back at me. I'm more than willing to put the matter to a test. I invite Mr. West to come and visit me in the presence of witnesses. Let the witnesses judge which of us has difficulty maintaining eye contact with the other.
 
−
Besides his evasion of eye contact, Dirk West seemed unable to deal with any challenge to his opinions. Twice during the evening I made so bold as to disagree with him. In each case, instead of answering my argu· ment, he just shut his mouth, elevated his nose, and looked away without saying anything.
 
−
Bill Wadham didn't give the investigators any account of mybehavior at the colloquium, or at least none is mentioned in the report that I have. He did have much else to say about me, however, and it is mostly fantasy. Unfortunately; no documents are available that confirm or refute his state­ments except in one case. According to the investigators' report of their interview with Bill Wadham and his wife Sally, "[Bill] and [Sally] compared Ted to [Sally's] brother [Richardt] who was severely mentally ill and killed himself in 1984. In fact, Dave [Kaczynski] also knew [Richard] and saw a clear parallel between [Richard] and Ted. [Richard] had extremely rigid opinions and was often intolerant and impatient of divergent views .... Dave, in fact, found [Richard] and Ted so similar that when [Richard] finally killed himself in 1984, he began to worry that Ted might do the same."Sl
 
−
But what my brother actually thought was quite different, as evidenced by a letter he wrote to me in 1984, shortly after Richard's suicide. In that let· ter, David speaks of his own feelings of depression, and wonders if Richard's suicide had not, in part, been the result of Bill's and David's fail­ure to grasp the message behind Richard's philosophizing. While David notes that Richard's family "prefers" for "obvious reasons" to attribute the suicide to "mental disease," David's own thoughts ran on "the sometimes dismal gulfs that isolate human beings from one another." Further, David states that Richard's fate reminds him "just a tad" of himself, and confesses that he feels "sometimes guilty" for his "unresponsiveness."52
 
−
In his interview Bill goes on and on about my supposed "intolerance" of other people's ideas (making, at the same time, many false statements about my behavior).S3 As a matter of fact, I never had more than a very lit­tle philosophical or intellectual discussion with Bill, but (though I was not knowingly tactless) that little apparently was enough to show him that I did not respect him or his ideas, which presumably is why he thought I was "intolerant." If the reader were to make Bill's acquaintance and familiarize himself with his ideas, he would be able to make his own judgment as to whether my lack of respect for them was due to intolerance or to the qual­ity of the ideas.
 
−
Bill used to read children's comic books and claimed that he found philosophical messages in them. 54 I once asked him whether he believed the messages were put there intentionally or whether he created them him­self out of the comic book material. He answered that he preferred not to discuss the question at that time.
 
  
−
AM o N G MA N Y other inaccuracies that appear in Professor Peter Duren's interview with the investigators, there is the following:
+
Also, please note: because this book is intended to be used as a quick reference and handbook for further study, there are many instances where we duplicate references, quotations, and other such information. We hope that this repetition may be an aid for study by reinforcing important concepts and quotations.
−
The last time that Professor Duren ever saw Ted was at the annual meeting of the American Math Society in San Francisco in 1968. Ted did not give a talk which was strange since professionally it was the right thing to do. Professor Duren saw Ted standing near the escalator. He went over to talk to Ted, and they had a very stiff, very brief conversation. The conversa­tion consisted of Professor Duren asking questions that Ted did notfeel like answering. Ted did not seem comfortable or happy.H
 
−
This may be a case of mistaken identity or it may be just fantasy. I was not a member of the American Mathematical Society in 1968 and I have never in my life attended any kind of mathematical meeting outside of a university where I was a student or faculty member. I just wasn't that inter­ested in mathematics. I suppose the names of participants in American Mathematical Society meetings are recorded, and if that is so, then it may be possible to get documentary proof that I was not at the 1968 meeting; but at present I am not able to provide such proof.
 
  
−
A FE w PE Rs o N s reported that in high-school I was once stuffed in a locker by some "tough" kids and left there. 56 If chis had ever happened, it wouldn't be the kind of thing I would be likely co forget. Nor would I con­ceal it; I reported other humiliating incidents in my 1979 autobiography, so why conceal this one? I'd guess that a combination of media planting and mistaken identity are involved here. Ray Janz, who told the story in the media,56 probably had me mixed up with someone else. Others, who knew that some student had been stuffed in a locker, heard Janz's story through the media and subsequently "remembered" that I was the victim.
+
This book — Part 1 of the curriculum, which focuses on the universal philosophical system of dialectical materialism — serves as the foundation of all political theory and practice in the Vietnamese educational system as well as in the Communist Party of Vietnam and other organizations such as the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, the Women’s Union, the Farmer’s Union, the Worker’s Union, etc. Dialectical materialism is the framework for theory and practice as well as the common lens through which Vietnamese socialists relate, communicate, and work together.
  
−
I N REFER EN c E To my brother's years at Evergreen Park High School, Dirk West (who was one of Dave's teachers there) told the investi­gators:
+
This book focuses almost exclusively on the written works of three historical figures:
−
Physically, ... Dave was much smaller than his classmates. He was also socially awkward. Dave was shy and quiet and tended to keep to himself [Dirk] never saw Dave hanging out with friends.... [S]ocially and physi­cally. he was behind [his classmates] .... Dave seemed socially and physi­cally awkward.57
 
−
Referring to the early 1970s, Dirk said:
 
−
Dave was still socially awkward and inept.... [W]hen [Dirk) and Dave went for walks in the Morton Arboretum, Dave made [Dirk] walk ahead of him so that Dave did not have to speak to any people they passed. He told [Dirk] he did nor wane to have to say hello to people. ss
 
−
Lois Skillen, guidance counselor at the school, described my brother during his high-school years as follows:
 
−
David was outgoing, friendly and sociable .... David had friends and played sports .... David was outgoing and happy.... David ... sat down in the living room with all the women and immediately started to chat with them. David was laughing and having a good time. He was sweet, friendly and social.59
 
−
The admirable consistency between Dirk West's description of my brother and Miss Sk.illen's should help the reader to estimate the value of these accounts.
 
−
Much of the information that Skillen gave my investigators is inaccu­rate, but on this particular point she is right and Dirk West is wrong. My brother is occasionally a little shy, and he wasn't socially polished, but he never had any trouble making friends. In high-school, if anything, he was more outgoing than he was later. I don't have Dave's medical records, but they would probably show that he was at least average height for his age. Anyone who thinks Dave is physically awkward will soon change his mind if he plays tennis or ping-pong with him. The Morton Arboretum incident may well have occurred, since my brother occasionally behaves a little oddly. But it does not fairly represent his usual social behavior.
 
  
−
I T I s I N T E R E sT I N G that there seems to be little relation between the intelligence of an informant and the accuracy of the reports that he gives about decades-old events. We've seen that an adequate university professor like Dr. Duren and an outstanding one like Dr. Bickelman60 were among those who gave seriously inaccurate accounts of my early years. Yet some people of modest intellectual attainments have given accounts that are fairly accurate. I suppose it's a matter of character. Some people refrain from speaking when they aren't sure, whereas others seem to let their imaginations run away with them.
+
''Karl Marx'' and ''Friedrich Engels''... who initially developed the universal philosophy of dialectical materialism by synthesizing various pre-existing philosophical, political, economic, and historical tendencies including the idealist dialectical system of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the political economics of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the materialist positions of Ludwig Feuerbach, and countless others.
−
I've shown that several factors have operated in producing false reports about me, but I have little doubt that media planting is the most important one. The fact that so many people's memories of me have been warped as badly as they have been shows the awesome power ofpropaganda.
 
−
Scientific American recently published an interesting article on memory­planting.61 The phenomenon is not hypothetical; its existence has been proved.
 
  
−
TH 1 s B o o K D EA Ls only with the way I have been misrepresented by my family and by the media. But the FBI, the prosecutors, and the shrinks have misrepresented mejust as badly, and I expect to take them on in some later writing.
+
''...and Vladimir Illyich Lenin'', who further developed and defended dialectical materialism, expanded the analysis of imperialism, demonstrated how to apply dialectical materialism to local material conditions specific to Russia at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and made many other important contributions to dialectical materialist theory and practice.
  
 +
Obviously, there are countless other writers, revolutionaries, philosophers, and scientists who have contributed to dialectical materialism and scientific socialism. This book focuses primarily on Marx, Engels, and Lenin, because these figures laid the foundations and formulated the basic principles of the philosophy of dialectical materialism and the methodology of materialist dialectics which are most universally applicable in all endeavors.
  
−
Chapter 1
+
It is our desire that translating this important work into English will lead to further study, understanding, and appreciation of dialectical materialism as an applied philosophy which socialists can find value in returning to periodically. At the end of the book, we offer a glossary of terms which doubles as an index, appendices with summaries of important concepts and principles, and an afterword, in which we offer advice for further study and application of dialectical materialism.
  
−
“That hospital experience’’
+
At the time of publication, we are already in the process of translating and annotating Part 2 of this curriculum, which focuses on historical materialism, with the hopes of eventually releasing the full curriculum. Once it is complete, it will also be made available at ''BanyanHouse.org'' — where we also invite questions, constructive feedback, and suggestions.
  
−
Chapter 1 | I WILL BEGIN with one of the biggest lies of all, a kind of family myth manufactured by my mother.
+
=== Introduction ===
−
I have only a vague recollection of the version of this story that I heard from my parents in childhood. In essence it was that as a baby I had been hospitalized with a severe case of hives (urticaria), and that I was so fright· ened by this separation from my parents that I was forever after excessively nervous about being left alone by them.
 
−
It is not clear to me why my parents thought I was unduly afraid of being separated from them. It may have been because they became accus­tomed to being away from their own parents at an especially early age-my mother's mother was a drunken, irresponsible slut1 who probably left her children unattended on frequent occasions, and my father was an extravert who spent much of his childhood running with gangs of boys rather than in the home (according to the stories he told me). In any case, as I look back on it now, I don't think I was any more anxious about being left alone than the average kid of my age. When I was perhaps six or seven years old, my mother began leaving me home alone for an hour or two at a time, and I did not find it difficult to adjust to this. At about the same age I once attended a movie with my father in a strange neighborhood far from home, and after the movie he left me standing alone outside the theater for ten or fifteen minutes while he went to get the car. I felt a good deal of anxiety while waiting for him, but I think not more than is normal for a kid of that age under such circumstances. I certainly did not feel panicky nor did I doubt that my father would return. He told me afterward that he had left me alone in order to help me get over what he called my fear of being away from my parents.
 
−
My parents retained their belief that I had an unusual fear of being sepa­rated from them until I was thirteen years old. ·At that age I was sent away to summer camp for two weeks. Though I was somewhat homesick, I had no serious difficulty in adjusting to the experience, 2 and after that, as far as I can remember, my parents never again mentioned my supposed fear of being "abandoned" by them-until many years later, when my mother resuscitated the myth of "that hospital experience" in exaggerated and melodramatic form. Her motives for doing so will be explained in Chapter
 
−
4. For the moment, I am concerned only to describe the myth itself and to refute it. Here is the myth in my mother's own words, from a letter that _she wrote to me on December 24, 1984:
 
−
[Your hatred of your parents] I think, I am convinced, has its source in your traumatic hospital experience in your first year of life. You had to be hospitalized with a sudden, very serious allergy that could have choked off your breath. In those days hospitals would not allow a parent to stay with a sick child, and visits were limited to one hour twice a week. I can still hear you screaming 'Mommy. Mommy!' in panic as the nurse forced me out of the room. My God! how I wept. My heart broke. I walked the floor all night weeping, knowing you were horribly frightened and lonely. Knowing you thought yourself abandoned and rejected when you needed your mother the most. How could you, at nine months, understand why-in your physi­cal misery-you were turned over to strangers. When I finally brought [you3] home you were a changed personality. You were a dead lump emo­tionally. You didn't smile, didn't look at us, didn't respond to us in any way. I was terrified. What had they done to my baby? Obviously. the emotional pain and shock you suffered those four days became deeply embedded in your brain-your sub-conscious. I think you rejected, you hated me from that time on. We rocked you, cuddled you, talked to you, read to you-did everything we could think of to stimulate you. How we loved you, yearned over you. Some said we spoiled you, were too lenient, doted on you too much. But you were our beloved son~ur first born and we wanted so much to have you love us back. But I think that emotional pain and fear never completely left you. Every now and then throughout your life, I saw it crop up....4 I was surprised when I saw that in this letter my mother described my" hospitalization as having lasted only four days. She had previously told me-repeatedly-that it had lasted a week,S and that I had been "inert," "a dead lump," for a month after I came home.
 
−
Herc is what my brother reportedly said about "that hospital experi­ence" when he was interviewed by the FBI:
 
−
TED had a severe allergic reaction and was hospitalized for several weeks. His parents were only allowed short daily visits and TED became unresponsive and withdrawn during his stay in the hospital.6
 
−
When TED was a year or so old, he was hospitalized after suffering a 'severe allergic reaction.' His parents were restricted from visiting him for more than a few minutes a day, and when he recovered and was taken home two or three weeks later they noticed that he was markedly unresponsive and displayed a significantly 'flat effect' [sic] (emotionless appearance). It took weeks and even months for his parents to re-establish a satisfactory relationship with TEO, and WANDA attributes much of TED's emotional disturbance as an adolescent to this early trauma.7
 
−
DAVE stated that on four distinct occasions, TED has displayed a type of 'almost catatonic' behavior which has long perplexed and mystified his family. The first was his withdrawal after a three-week hospital stay when he was an infant.8
 
−
Here is what my brother told the New York Times:
 
−
David, who had been told the story by his parents, said that the infant Teddy developed a severe allergy and was hospitalized for a week. 'There were rigid regulations about when parents could and couldn't visit,' David said. He recalled that on two occasions, his parents 'were allowed to visit him for one hour.'
 
−
After Teddy came home, 'he became very unresponsive,' David said. 'He had been a smiling, happy, jovial kind of baby beforehand, and when he returned from the hospital he showed little emotions [sic) for months.'9"
 
−
Newsweek cited information from federal investigators (who presum­ably were relaying information received from my mother or my brother) as follows:
 
−
The first clue is something that happened when Kaczynski was only 6 months old. According to federal investigators, little 'Teddy John,' as his parents called him, was hospitalized for a severe allergic reaction to a medi­cine he was taking. He had to be isolated-his parents were unable to see him or hold him for several weeks. After this separation, family members have told the Feds, the baby's personality, once bubbly and vivacious, seemed to go 'flat.'10
 
−
Time gave a similar report. 1 l
 
−
The FBI's "302" reports often contain inaccuracies, and (as we will show later) journalists' reports are extremely prone to gross inaccuracies that result from carelessness, incompetence, or intentional lying. But the fact that several different sources gave roughly similar accounts is a good in­dication of the kind of information my brother and mother had been giv­ing out.
 
−
Furthermore, on April 12, 1996, Investigator #1, an investigator for the Federal Defender's office at Helena, Montana, interviewed my mother in Washington, D.C. According to Investigator #x's notes, my mother gave her the story as follows:
 
−
When Ted was nine or 10 months old, he developed a severe and sud­den allergic reaction to something, his entire body swelled, and he had severe itching all over. Wanda walked with him the entire night, and took him to the University of Chicag~hildren's Teaching Hospital first thing in the morning. She described the hospital visit as very traumatic for both Ted and his mother. When they arrived, Ted was taken from Wanda by a nurse and put in a separate room. Ted started screaming and crying, calling nonstop for his mother, who also started crying .... That Friday the hospi­tal called Wanda and said she could come and pick Ted up, as the swelling had subsided. When Wanda arrived at the hospital, she was handed herson, who she described as 'a dead lump.' She said Ted would not respond to her or her husband at all for weeks after the hospital stay. Wanda and Theodore spent hours trying to bring Ted out ofhis shell, coaxing a smile, or attempt­ing to get him to play with a toy, mostly without success ....
 
−
After the stay in the hospital, Wanda described Ted as much more clingy, and less trusting of strangers. He would scream whenever he was taken into a strange building, fearful his parents were going to leave him. About four or five months after Ted was released from the hospital he fell while running in the house, and split his tongue. Wanda rushed him to the hospital, where he immediately began screaming and fighting ....
 
−
Ted's regular pediatric visits were always upsetting, as Ted acted terri­fied of doctors.""12"
 
−
How accurate is this picture? Fortunately that question is easy to resolve, because my mother kept a "Baby Book," or diary of my develop­ment as an infant. The book contained printed instructions and questions with blank spaces left for the parent to fill in. (When quoting from the Baby Book, I will put the printed matter in italics and material written by my mother in ordinary type.) The following excerpt from the Baby Book includes every word of my mother's account of "that hospital experience," from the first appearance of the symptoms to my apparently complete recovery.
 
−
My age at the time was just over nine months.
 
−
FORTf..FIRST WEEK. Dares, from Feb. 26 to Mar5 [1943)
 
−
Saturday. the 2701 [of February) Mother noticed small red splotches on" baby's stomach and neck, as the day progressed the splotches spread. In the evening we took him to the hospital. The doctor diagnosed them as hives. Sunday [February 28) the hives were worse but baby seemed not effected [sic] by them. We took him for a long ride in his buggy. Shortly after we returned we noticed the baby had a fever. Called the hospital and was told to give him frequent baths & ~ aspirin every 3 hrs. Monday morning [March 1] the baby was examined at Bobs Roberts [Hospital] by several doc· tors. The concensus [sic] of opinion was that baby had a bad case of urticaria [hives, rash] & should be left at the hospital. Wednesday [March 3], mother went to visit baby. The doctors still think he has an extreme case of urticaria but are not sure. The [sic] ommitted [sic] eggs from his diet. Mother felt very sad about baby. She says he is quite subdued, has lost his abandoned virve [sic] & aggressiveness and has developed an institutional­ized look..
 
−
FORTY·SECOND WEEK. Dates,from Mar. 5 to Mar. 12 [1943]
 
−
Baby's home from hospital. Perfectly healthy But quiet and unrespon· sive after his experience. Hope his sudden removal to hospital and conse· quent unhappiness will not harm him."
 
−
Later in the week-Baby is quite himself again. Vivacious and demanding. Says 'bye·bye' by waving his hand. [Etc.) 13
 
−
According to hospital records, 14 I was admitted on March 11 1943 and released on March 6, so I was hospitalized for five days. Since the statement that I was quite myself again could not have been written later than March 12, it took me at most six days (and possibly much less time) to make an apparently complete recovery. It should also be noted that a careful study of my medical records has turned up no mention of my supposed unrespon­siveness. Furthermore, on September 6, 1996, my Aunt Freda (Freda DombekTuominen) was interviewed in Gainesville, Florida by two investi­gators working on my case. She told them that she was away on a two­week vacation when I was hospitalized from March I to 6, 1943. When she returned, someone mentioned to her that I had been in the hospital, but after chat she heard nothing more about the episode until it was publicized in the media following my arrest.15 Since Freda was very close to my par· ents during the 1940s, this is a clear indication that at that time my mother did not attach much importance to the hospitalization and that the effect on me was not obviously serious.
 
−
What about my mother's statement that "Ted's regular pediatric visits were always upsetting, as Ted acted terrified of doctors"?12 That is another lie. The Baby Book and my medical records show four, and only four, instances in which I appeared to be afraid of doctors or nurses, and two of these occurred before "that hospital experience." Herc are the correspond­ing entries from the Baby Book and the medical records:
 
−
FIFTH WEEK. Dares,from]une 19 toJune 26 [1942)
 
−
... When the doctor was handling him today he cried a great deal .... Perhaps he was frightened of the unfamiliar surroundings and handling.""16 ""SEVENTEENTH WEEK. Dares,from Sept. n to Sept. 18 [1942) ""... Sept. 15. When taken for his periodic examination the child became" very frightened of the doctor." 17
 
−
In the medical records the two foregoing examinations are recorded, but no mention is made of my reaction to the doctor, 18 which probably indicates that the doctor did not consider my reaction unusual.
 
−
My hospitalization occurred during the latter part of my forty-first week. About a month later, the following reaction was reported in the Baby Book:
 
−
FORTY-SIXTH WEEK. Dares,from 4/2 to 4/9 [1943)
 
−
This week we visited the hospital with Teddy. When mother took him in to be undressed&: weighed Teddy saw the nurses in their white uniforms &: immediately HOWLED. It's evident he remembered his sojum [sic] in the hospital. It took about 10 min. for mother to calm him. When the doc­tor entered the little room that he was taken to after being weighed there was no definite reaction other than interest in her, but as soon as she attempted to examine him he yowled."" 19"
 
−
The hospital record of this examination docs not mention my fearful reaction.zo The last instance in which I showed fear of medical personnel is men­tioned in my medical records, but not the Baby Book (which docs not go beyond December 25, 1943): "June 27, 1944 ... Reluctant to carry examination. child [sic] is fearful of white coats since his visit for repair of his tongue."21
 
−
The reference is to an injury to my tongue22 that had occurred about two months earlier, on April 29, 1944. Note that this extract from the med­ical records clearly implies that prior to the tongue injury. I was not fearful of medical personnel. That I was not afraid of doctors or nurses for at least nine or ten months preceding my tongue injury is confirmed by the absence of any mention in the Baby Book or the medical records of any such fear on my part between April 9, 1943 (about a month after my hospi­talization) and April 29, 1944 (the date of my tongue injury), even though the medical records and the Baby Book report that I was examined at the University of Chicago clinics23 on May 18, 1943, June I3, I943, October I9, 1943,Januaryn, 1944, andJanuary IS, 1944. Moreover, the Baby Book's one· year inventory of the child's development (late May, 1943, less than three months after "thathospital experience") includes the question, "Does he [the baby] .show per.sirttntfear of anything?" My mother left the question blank. 24
 
−
After my tongue injury (which, by the way, did not require hospitaliza· tion), my mother told a doctor that I was "quite fearful of hospitals" (see extract below, April 4, 1945). But that I had no long-la.sting fear of doctors or hospitals is confirmed by the following extracts from the medical records:25
 
−
June 13, 1943.... Healthy w-d [well-developed?] well nourished infant. No pathological findings." ·
 
−
(No mention of unresponsiveness orfear of doctors.)
 
−
April 4, 1945 ... appetite excellent. Plays well with other children. Quite fearful(?) of hospitals."
 
−
(Evidently the doctor is recording information furnished by my mother. The question mark after "fearful" is in the original and possibly indicates skepticism on the part of the doctor. Further along in the report of this same examination:)
 
−
Sturdy, well nourished boy with good color who tries to manipulate his mother by temper[?] outbursts. Submits [illegible) but not quickly [or qui· etly?] to examination-after she is sent from the room. Quite agreeable at conclusion of examination.
 
−
(The foregoing entry contradicts my mother's claim that I was afraid of being left by my parents, since the departure of my mother calmed me and caused me to submit to the examination.)
 
−
January 4, 1946 . . . A well nourished [?] adequately muscled [?] very whiny little boy.
 
−
April 10, 1946 ... A whiny butfairly cooperative boy...."
 
−
October 16, 1947 ... A pleasant, quiet, alert, slender boy. ...
 
−
December 8, 1947 . . . A friendly, intelligent youngster who is not acutely ill. He is extremely inquisitive of all that is said and requests expla· nations.
 
−
The foregoing include all of the passages in my surviving medical records up to age 6 that have any bearing on my behavior in the presence of doctors or nurses. So much for my mother's claim that "Ted's regular pedi­atric visits were always upsetting, as Ted acted terrified of doctors."
 
−
According to the Washington Po.st, "Ted had an almost paralyzing uneasi· ness around strangers, a reaction, again, that Wanda traced back to Ted's childhood hospitalization."26
 
−
Apart from the few cases in which I showed fear of doctors or nurses, the Baby Book reports two, and only two, cases in which I was frightened by strangers, and both of these cases occurred before my "hospi· tal experience."
 
−
ELEVENTH WEEK. Dates, from July31 to Aug 7 [1942]
 
−
Twice this week the baby was on the verge of crying when approached by unfamiliar persons. After a bit of handling and talking to by the strangers he became very friendly. cooing and smiling in response to their overtures.''27"
 
−
How did I react to strangers (apart from doctors and nurses) after the "hospital experience?" Only two pages in the Baby Book provide relevant information. The one-year inventory of the child's development instructs the parent:
 
−
Underline each of the following tmns which seems descriptive of the child's behavior. Doubly underline those which are shown myfrequently or in a marked degree....
 
−
The Baby Book then lists thirteen terms. One of them is "shyness," and my mother underlined it once. (The other terms are "curiosity." which my mother underlined doubly; "excitability," "impulsiveness," "cautiousness," "jealousy." "srubbornness," "cheerfulness," "sensitiveness," 'boisterous­ness," all of which my mother underlined once; and "irritability," "listless­ness," "placidity," which my mother did not underline at all.28 The same terms were listed in the nine-month inventory. and there my motherunder­lined "curiosity" doubly. she underlined "excitability." "impulsiveness," "srubbornness," and 'boisterousness" once, and she underlined none of the others.)29
 
−
Further along in the one-year inventory we find:
 
−
Does child showgreater interest in children or inadults? Describe. Either def­initely likes or dislikes adults. Loves to russle with other children Is he USll· ally shy or.friendly with strange women? either men? either children? friendly Does he show any special preferences for certain persons? Yes Describe For unac­countable reasons will either be very friendly or unfriendly to strangers. But almost always friendly to people he knows.28
 
−
About seven weeks after the "hospital experience" and three weeks before the one-year inventory, we find in the Baby Book:
 
−
FORIT-NINTH WEEK. Dates,from 4h.3 to 4/ 30 [1943]
 
−
When the door buzzer rings Teddy, when in his walker, immediately skoots [sic] to the door, no matter what he's occupied with at the time. When not in the walker he insists on being carried or assisted in going himself""30"
 
−
Since I was so anxious to meet visitors, it's clear that I had no particular fear of strangers and was not excessively shy. The statement that I had "an almost paralyzing fear of strangers" going back to my "childhood hospital­ization" is another lie.
 
−
Did my hospitalization at the age of nine months have any lasting effect on my personality or behavior? I do not know the answer to that question. But it is obvious that if the experience tended to make me permanently fearful of doctors or of strangers, or ifit made me less social, then the effect was so mild that it is not clear whether there was any effect at all.
 
−
Psychologists consulted by my defense team searched the literature for reports of empirical studies of children who had suffered separation from their parents at an early age. They found only one study31 that was closely relevant to my case. This study shows that my reaction to hospitalization and my recovery from it were quite normal for an infant hospitalized under those conditions. While the study found that all "overt" effects of hospital­ization in such infants disappeared within So days, at most, and usually in a fraction of that time, the infants were not observed for a long enough period to determine whether there were any subtler, long-lasting effects.
 
−
Thus it remains an open question whether my hospitalization had any permanent effect on my personality. The aim of this chapter has not been to prove that there could not have been such an effect, but that whatever that effect may have been, it was not what my mother and brother have described.
 
−
My mother's and brother's motives for lying about me will be dealt with later. (See Appendix 1 for further evidence of my mother's untruthfulness.)
 
  
−
T H E PA s s A G B F Ro M the Baby Book that describes my "hospital experience" provides an example of the distortions that are typical of the media. In an article in the Wa.shington Post, journalists Serge F. Kovaleski and Lorraine Adams quoted the Baby Book as follows:
+
Just a generation ago, Vietnam was the site of the most brutal war of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. More tonnage of bombs were dropped on the Vietnamese people than were dropped by all sides combined throughout the Second World War. In addition, countless acts of cruelty were used to scorch the very soil of the nation. By the end of Vietnam’s Resistance War Against Imperialist USA (known to the world as “the Vietnam War”), Agent Orange, napalm, and unexploded munitions had left a land deeply scarred and a people traumatised by decades of death and murder. The impression one had was that although Vietnam had won the war, it was so badly devastated that it could not hope to win the peace. But, miraculously, Vietnam is winning this war today, as the Vietnamese economy has become one of the fastest growing in the world and quality of life for the people is improving at a pace which could scarcely have been predicted in 1975.
−
Feb. 27, 1943. Mother went to visit baby. ... Mother felt very sad about baby. She says he is quite subdued, has lost his verve and aggressiveness and has developed an institutionalized look.
 
−
March 12, 1943. Baby home from hospital and is healthy but quite unre­sponsive after his experience. Hope his sudden removal to hospital and con­sequent unhappiness will not harm him.''32
 
−
Compare this with the accurate transcription of the passage given a few pages back. Kovaleski and Adams have made important changes. On Febru­ary 27 I was still at home. I was not hospitalized until March I, and the entry that Kovaleski and Adams dated "Feb. 27" actually refers to March 3. Kovaleski and Adams assign the date March 12 to an entry that was obvi­ously written earlier, and they completely omit the entry that shows that on or before March u I had already recovered completely from "that hospital experience."
 
−
Kovaleski and Adams altered not only the dates but also the wording of the passage. The most important change was that, where the Baby Book states that I was "quiet and unresponsive," Kovaleski and Adams wrote that I was "quite unresponsive."33
 
−
The effect of these changes is to give the impression that the "hospital experience" and its consequences were much more long-lasting and severe than they really were. The reader can judge for himself whether the changes were intentional or merely the result of careless errors.
 
  
 +
No one could have imagined that Vietnam would turn around so dynamically and rapidly. How did they achieve this economic miracle? How could this nation — so recently devastated by imperialism and war — possibly be able to reconstruct, revive, rejuvenate, and rebuild? That story is now unfolding before our eyes.
  
−
Chapter 2
+
Vietnam’s development has not come without hardship, struggle, setbacks, and mistakes. The people of Vietnam have had to learn hard lessons through struggle and practice to develop and strengthen ideological and theoretical positions. In this manner, the philosophical development of Vietnam deserves study and attention from socialists around the world. To outsiders, Vietnam can appear to be rife with contradictions. As depicted by Western journalists, Vietnam is simultaneously a success story driven by capitalist markets and a failing socialist state. Every victory is chalked up to private enterprise, while every setback is attributed to socialism. In this sense, the media has failed to understand the essential character of the core contradictions which drive the development of Vietnam politically, socially, and economically.
  
−
My early years
+
Luna Nguyen has used social media and played an incredibly important role in helping the English speaking world understand the complexities of such contradictions that beguile so many academics and experts. She has helped to give an insider’s perspective on her own country’s path of development towards socialism.
−
C h ap t e r 2 I MY M OT H E R , my brother, and the media have portrayed me as socially isolated to an abnormal degree from earliest childhood. For example, shortly after my arrest, Time reported: "Investigators were told that in childhood Ted seemed to avoid human contact." 1
 
−
According to Investigator #i's interview with my mother,
 
−
As he grew older (age 2-4) Wanda spent a great deal oftime attempting to get Ted to play with other kids, mostly without success. Friends and relatives always told her Ted was too clingy, so she attempted to encourage his interaction with other children. She would invite children from the neigh· borhood over to play. only to have Ted leave the group and go to his room to play alone. She said he always managed to have one friend at a time, but would rebuff the attempts of friendship from all other children. Wanda also took Ted to a play school for children for an hour or so each week so that he could play with other kids. Ted didn't mind going, but would play alongside the other children instead of with them. Ted would get angry if another child tried to join or interfered with what he was doing. Ted went to preschool and kindergarten, and seemed to enjoy it. The teachers did not complain about his behavior, but did mention Ted always wanted to work on projects alone, and did not interact with other children. "2
 
−
The Washington Post told a similar talc on the basis ofan interview with mymothcr.3
 
−
Herc again the documentary evidence shows that my mother is lying. I will not try the reader's patience by addressing all of her false statements, but will stick to the essential point, that my interaction with other children was normal until, at about the age of 11, Ibegan to have serious social prob­lems for reasons that will be made clear later.
 
−
According to the pediatricians who examined me:
 
−
April 4, 1945 ... Plays well with other children...."
 
−
May 18, 1950 ... Healthy boy. Well adjusted ....
 
−
May 8, 1951 ... Plays well with children in school and neighborhood. Very happy.4
 
−
The doctors could have obtained this information about my social adjustment only from my mother. It was always she, and not my father, who took me to my examinations at the University of Chicago clinics.
 
−
Thus, statements of my mother's that were recorded during my child­hood clearly contradict her recent statements concerning my early social development. If she wasn't lying then, she is lying now. Either way. the record shows herto be a liar.
 
−
What then is the truth concerning my social adjustment in early child· hood? My mother's reports to doctors carry little weight because, as we will show later, she often did lie in order to present a favorable picture of me to persons outside the immediate family. But since the Baby Book was private there is no particular reason to doubt the statements she made there that show that I was not socially withdrawn.
 
−
It's true that at one point in the Baby Book my mother indicated I was somewhat shy.5 as notedin Chapter 1, and I myself have a vague memory of beinga little shy up to the age offive orso. Furthermore, I wrote in my 1959 autobiography:
 
−
As far as I can remember, I have always been socially reserved, and used to be rather unpleasantly conscious of the fact. For example, I remember that when I was very little, 3 or 4 years old, I was very concerned over the fact that when my mother bought me an ice cream-cone, I was always afraid to take it directly from the lady's hand; my mother had to take it from her and give it to me. Eventually I overcame this ....
 
−
I learned to whistle and to swim later than most of my companions, and I never did learn to skate. And it often bothered me that I was less socially active than the rest of the boys, which I think was partly due to shy­ness and partly due to a certain lack of interest in some of their activities. I've always kept to myself a lot. 6
 
−
The second paragraph of this passage evidently applies not to my earli­est years but to a much later period when I did indeed have social problems. As a result of these problems I began to take a perverse pride in being unso­cial, and this is probably what led me to imply (as I did in the first paragraph above) that I was "socially reserved" even in my earliest years.
 
−
But even if that first paragraph is taken at face value, there is plenty of evidence to show that my social interaction with other children was easily within the normal range until my real problems began in early adolescence. As we saw in Chapter 1, my mother indicated in the Baby Book that at the age ofone year I was consistently friendly to other children:
 
−
ls he WMally shy or friendly with strange women? either menr either chil­dren? friendly. ...s
 
−
From age one to three I developed a dose friendship with Adam.Ks., a boy about eight months olderthan I was. The attachment left a long-lasting impression on both of us. Adam was the son of the couple who occupied the first floor of the house of which my parents and I had the second story; when we moved to another house I was separated from him. 7
 
−
In the new house we again occupied the second story, and with the little girl downstairs, Barbara P., I formed another strong attachment, 8 though it was not as strong as my attachment to Adam. During this same period (age 3 to 4) I had at least one other frequent playmate, whose name, if I remem­bercorrectly. was Jackie. 9
 
−
Shortly before my fifth birthday we moved to a house on Carpenter Street (the first house that my parents owned), 10 and from that time until I entered Harvard I always had several friends. My friends on Carpenter Street indudedjohnny Kr., Bobby Th., Freddie Do.,Jimmy Bu., Larry La., and Mary Kay Fy.11 As long as we lived on Carpenter Street, I attended Sherman School, a unit of the Chicago public school system. All of my friends on Carpenter Street either attended the Catholic school or were a year older than I was, so that they were in a different grade. Consequently my school friends were not the same as those with whom I played near home. My school friends included Frank Ho., Terry La C., Rosario (an Ital· ian kid whose last name I do not remember) and Peter Ma.12
 
−
I not only had friends but, on a few occasions, exercised leadership. For example, I once came up with the idea of putting on a "carnival," as we called it. I persuaded Johnny Kr. and Bobby Th. to help me arrange games and simple entertainments, and after advertising the event by word of mouth for several days we made up tickets by hand, sold them to neighbor­hood kids, and made a modest profit.13
 
−
Thus there is no truth in my mother's portrayal of me as abnormally solitary from early childhood. There was no need for her to "invite children from the neighborhood over to play,"14 nor did she ever do so during these years as far as I can remember.
 
−
The first indication of any significant social difficulties on my part came when I was perhaps eight or nine years old, 15 and it very likely resulted from the face that our family was different from its neighbors. My father worked with his hands all his life; my mother, apart from teaching high­school English for two years during her fifties, never did anything more demanding than lower-level secretarial work; and our family always lived amongworking-class and lower-middle class people. Yet my parents always regarded themselves as a cut above their neighbors. They had intellectual pretensions, and though their own intellectual attainments were extremely modest, to say the least, they-especially my mother-looked down on their neighbors as "ignorant." (But they were usually careful not to reveal their snobbish attitudes outside the family.) 16
 
−
Our block of Carpenter Street was part of a working-class neighbor­hood that was just one step above the slums. As my playmates grew older some of them began engaging in behavior that approached or crossed the line dividing acceptable childhood mischief from delinquency.17 For exam­ple, two of them got into trouble for trying to set fire to someone's garage.15 I had been trained to a much more exacting standard ofbehavior and wouldn't participate in the other kids' mischief 18 Once, for instance, I was with a bunch of neighborhood kids who waited in ambush for an old rag-picker, pelted him with garbage when he came past, and then ran away. I stood back in the rear and refused to participate, and immediately after­ward I went home and told my mother what had happened, because I was shocked at such disrespect being shown to an adult-even if he was only a rag-picker.19
 
−
So it may be that the reason why I ceased to be fully accepted by my Carpenter-Street playmates at around the age of eight or nine was chat they saw me as too much of a "good boy." In any case they did seem to lose interest in my companionship-I was no longer one of the bunch.20 I con­tinued to get along well with the kids in school.21 Unlike some of the kids on my block they showed no tendency to serious mischief, either because they were better-behaved kids or because the supervised environment of school left few opportunities for misbehavior.
 
−
My parents noticed the face that I was becoming isolated from my Car­penter-Street friends, and they repeatedly expressed to me their concern that there might be something wrong with me because I was not social enough. ls To me it was acutely humiliating to be pushed out to the fringe by these kids with whom I had formerly associated on an equal basis, and I was too ashamed to tell my parents what was really happening, or even to admit it to myself until many years later. My mother invented an explana­tion for my isolation that was consistent with her intellectual pretensions: I wasn't playing with the other kids because I was so much smarter than they were that they bored me. This was absurd. I was bored with the other kids when (as often happened) they moped around aimlessly rather than pursu­ing some activity. but there can be no doubt that I wanted to continue play­ing with them and was deeply hurt by the fact that I was no longer fully accepted. Yet, because my mother's explanation soothed my vanity. I half. believed it myself. In a very brief (one and a quarter-page) autobiographical sketch that I wrote at the age offifteen, I said:
 
−
Beginning in the second or third grade I began to become somewhat unsocial, keeping to myself and seeking the companionship of my com­rades less often. This was probably due, in part, to the level of education and culture in my old neighborhood, where no one was interested in sci­ence, art, orbooks.22
 
−
Actually. I wasn't so terribly interested in science, art, or books myself. The autobiographical sketch was part of an application for admission to Harvard and therefore was written under the close supervision of my mother. Rereading it now I feel almost certain that the first paragraph of it was actually composed by her. That paragraph is written in a kind of lan­guage that I rarely use now and that I can hardly imagine myself having used at the age of fifteen; but it's just the sort of thing that my mother would write.23
 
−
I'm quite sure that my partial isolation from the Carpenter-Street kids did not begin before I was eight, at the earliest, and that I had no serious problems with the kids in school at the time. Yet the sketch refers to "the second or third grade," which would make me seven oreightyears old. Pos­sibly my mother's hand is seen here too.
 
−
Notwithstanding all of the foregoing, I think my parents had an inkling of the fact that the bad behavior of the otherkids had something to do with my isolation. Not long after my tenth birthday we moved to Evergreen Park, a suburb of Chicago, and my mother told me many years later that she and my father had decided to move mainly so that I "would have some decent kids to play with." Though my mother is hardly a reliable source of information, her statement is probably true in part; yet it's likely that there were also other reasons for the move. Not far from where we lived, a case of ''block-busting"24 gave rise to some very serious race-riots that were essen­tially territorial conflicts between the black and the white working class. All white householders in the area were put under pressure to place in their windows a small sign saying, "This property is not for sale," which was intended as a show of white solidarity against black "intrusion." My parents had very liberal attitudes about race and felt that it was against their princi· plcs to put up such a sign. But they received a threat, and, fearing that I might be attacked on my way to school, they gave in and placed the sign.25 This was extremely upsetting to them and it must have contributed to their decision to move out to the suburbs.
 
  
−
M BA N w H I LE , when I was a bit less than seven-and-a-half years old, I had acquired a baby brother. My brother David for many years has argued that I unconsciously hate him because the attention that my parents devoted to him on his arrival made me feel deprived of their affection.26
+
Nguyen’s translation of Part 1 of this influential work, ''Introduction to the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism'', a textbook studied by university and college students across Vietnam, is yet another big step in the direction of making Vietnam’s understanding of their own country’s development available to the English reading world.
−
The New York Times quoted my auntJosephine Manney, nee Kaczynski, as follows:
 
−
Before David was born, Teddy was different,' the aunt said. 'When they'd visit he'd snuggle up to me. Then, when David was born, something must have happened. He changed immediately. Maybe we paid too much attention to the new baby.' 27
 
−
Little did my auntJosephine know the real reason why I stopped snug­gling up to her! rn explain in a moment. But first let me make it clear that I'd never heard anything of this sort from Josephine before I read the New York Times article, and it's evident that my brother never heard it either, since, in our discussions of his theory about my reaction to his birth, he never mentioned any such statement on the part of our aunt;' nor did he ever cite any other rational evidence in support of his theory. The theory; apparently, grew entirely outof his own imagination.
 
−
As to the real reason why I stopped snugglingup to my aunt: Josephine was a good-looking woman; though she was over forty at the time of my brother's birth, she'd kept herself in shape and was still attractive. I don't know whether it was normal orprecocious, but by the age of about seven I already had a fairly strong interest in the female body. 28 Not long after my brother's birth, my family and I visited the apartment whereJosephine lived with her mother (my paternal grandmother). My aunt and I were sining on a couch, and, attracted by her breasts, I slid over against her, put my arm over her shoulder, and said, "Let's play girlfriend." Josephine laughed and put her arm around me, and I had the decided satisfaction of feeling her breast against my body. My aunt just thought it was cute, but my mother was sharp enough to see what was really going on. After a short interval she said, "I think I'll go to the store and get some ice cream" (or maybe it was candy or something else), and she invited me to come with her. I declined, but she insisted that I should come. As soon as she got me out of the house she gave me a tongue-lashing and a lecture on appropriate behavior with ladies. It will not surprise the reader that, from then on, I kept my distance from Josephine.
 
−
To return to my brother's theory that I resented his arrival in the family: He first indicated his suspicion that I unconsciously hated him in a letter to me written some time during the summer of 1982. That letter has not been preserved, but there is a reference to it in a letter that I sent to my brother in 1986. I wrote: "I recall that a few years ago you said you had feared that I had (as you put it) a hatred for you so great that even I was unable to acknowl­edge it."29
 
−
In a letter that he wrote to me in 1986, my brother expounded his the­ory David first proposes that I should have hated the new arrival as it might have "awakened [my] fears of abandonment"(My brother is here referring to the alleged "fear of abandonment" that I was supposed to have as a result of "that hospital experience.") But he notes that, according to our parents, I treated him with affection rather than withjealousy. This apparent paradox David resolves by recourse to "the Freudian theory of 'denial'." Citing a dream I once reported in which (as he misremembered it) I had a vision of "murdered babies in a Nazi camp" and "vowed to protect" my little brother with my own life, David then suggests that I was really vowing to protect him from mt:. He ends: "I have no idea how much or little truth there may be in this interpretation."30
 
−
The disclaimer in the last sentence is perhaps disingenuous, as my brother has clung to the theory persistently over the years. According to the New York Times, "David said his mother told him that she gradually encour­aged Ted to hold him and that 'from that time forward, he showed a great deal of gentleness toward me.' "31 The implication, that I had resented him at first, is contradicted by my brother's own statement, noted above. It is also contradicted by a statement of my mother's: "Ted seemed to easily accept having a brotherin the house, and liked to hold David when he was a baby."2
 
−
As I remember it, prior to my brother's birth my parents told me repeat­edly that the new baby. when it came, would require a great deal of care and attention, and that I must not feel that my parents loved me any less because they were devoting so much time to the baby. When David was born I wondered why my parents had put so much emphasis on this point, because I by no means felt Jett out or deprived of attention. As I wrote in my 1979 autobiography:
 
−
My brother David was born when I was 7~. I considered this a pleasant event. I was interested in the baby and enjoyed being allowed to hold it....
 
−
One reads much about 'sibling rivalry'-the older child supposedly resents the new baby because he feels it has robbed him of his parents' affection. I do not recall ever having had any such feeling about my baby brother. . . . I think my parents were aware of the problem of 'sibling rivalry' and made a conscious effort to avoid this problem when the new baby came.""32"
 
−
In those years my parents and I got all ourmedical care at the University of Chicago teaching hospitals, which were among the finest in America, and the docrors no doubt had talked to my parents about the way to handle my relationship with my new brother.
 
−
Why then docs my brother think that I have an intense, unconscious hatred for him? People often attribute their own motives and impulses (including unconscious ones) to other people. Further on in this book we will show that my brother has a hatred for me that he has not acknowl­edged-probably not even to himself At the same time he has a strong affection for me, and it appears that he has never faced up to the profound conflict between his love and his hatred. My brother habitually retreats from conflicts rather than strugglingwith them.
 
−
My feelings toward my brother in his infancy are well illustrated by a dream that I described to him in a letter that I sent him during the summer of 1982. After making some highly critical comments about his character, I wrote:
 
−
I am going to open to you the window to my soul as I would not open it to anyone else, by telling you two dreams that I've had about you. The first dream is simple. It is one I had more than thirty years ago, when I was maybe 7 or 8 years old and you were still a baby in your crib. Some time before, I had seen pictures of starving children in Europe taken shortly after world war II [sic)-thcy were emaciated, with arms like sticks, ribs protrud­ing, and guts hanging out. Well, I dreamed that there was a war in America and I saw you as one of these children, emaciated and starving. It affected me strongly and when I woke up I made up my mind that if there was ever a war in America I would do everything I possibly could to protect you. This illustrates the semi-maternal tenderness that I've often felt for you.33
 
−
In reply to the foregoing letter my brother wrote to me expressing his gratitude for the affection I had indicated, and for the fact that I "cared for [him] more than anyone else ever had." He then added the remark men­tioned earlier-that until then he had feared that I had a hatred for him so great that I could not acknowledge it. 34 I referred to this letter of my brother's in a note that I wrote him inf September 1982:
 
−
I received your last letter and note that it shows your usual generosity of character. Instead of being sore over the negative parts of my attitude toward you, you were favorably impressed by the positive parts.35
 
−
My brother does have a good deal of generosity in his character, but I now think that the nature of his reaction to my letter was less a result of generosity than of his tendency to retreat from conflict.
 
  
−
N o T Lo N G APT ER my brother's birth my mother's personality began to change. The cause may have been post-partum depression, a hormonal imbalance brought about by her pregnancy. or something else, but, what­ever the reason, she began to grow increasingly irritable. 36 The symptoms were relatively mild at first, but they worsened over the next several years so that, by the time I reached my teens, she was having frequent outbursts of rage that expressed themselves as unrestrained verbal aggression, some­times accompanied by minor physical aggression37 (though never enough of the latter to do any physical harm).
+
For me, as an outsider, it is fascinating not only to see how deeply Vietnamese society takes an interest in European philosophical development (referencing Hume, Hegel, Descartes, Marx, Engels, and so many other Europeans, almost as if they are figures seated in some ancient monastery in Fansipan), but, even more importantly, how they have assimilated that knowledge into the wider context of their own history, society, and culture. The textbook truly comes alive in all the parts where these ideas are shown to be relevant to Vietnam itself. For instance, the textbook stands out with discussions of Ho Chi Minh’s concept of “proletarian piety,” which artfully blends elements of Vietnamese culture with Marxist concepts of class consciousness, or the story of Chi Pheo, who stands as a sympathetic stand-in for the interpretation of the unique characteristics of the Vietnamese Lumpenproletariat. The book itself is an instance of the dialectic of the universal and the particular, the abstract and the concrete.
−
The change in my mother's personality affected my father and brought about a gradual deterioration of the family atmosphere. I described this in a 1986 letter to my brother:
 
−
You don't realize that the atmosphere in our home was quite different during the first few years of my life than it was later. You know how it was during my teens-people always squabbling, mother crabby and irritable, Dad morosely passive. Too much ice-cream, candy; and treats, parents fat and self-indulgent. A generally low-morale atmosphm. But it was very differ­ent up to the time when I was, say, Bor 9 years old. Until then, the home atmosphere was cheerful, there was hardly any quarrelling, and there was a generally high-morale atmosphere. Ice-cream and candy were relatively infrc. quent treats and were consumed in moderation . . . . Our parents were more alive and energetic. When punishment was necessary it was given with little or no anger and was used as a more-or-less rational means of training; whereas during my teens, when I was punished it was commonly an expression of anger or irritation on the part of our parents. Conse­quently this punishment was humiliating. The more-or-less rational punish­ment of the early years was not humiliating.38
 
  
 +
Just as importantly, it shows that, in Vietnam, Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought are not mere perfunctory rituals that are repeated like a learnt formula for this or that exam; but that although the Vietnamese political economy in its current form certainly contains contradictions which must be negated in the process of building the lower stage of socialism, the government remains seriously committed to the goals, theory, and practice of Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought.
  
−
Chapter 3
+
Hence, I highly recommend this book, not merely because it is a well-illustrated and easy-to-read book on the principles of dialectical materialism, but more importantly because it offers an insight into how the Vietnamese government collects and synthesises the philosophical developments that are, on the one hand, the collective legacy of all of humanity, and, on the other hand, the concrete manifestations of a revolutionary theory of (and for the oppressed yearning for) freedom in every corner of the world.
  
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My adolescence; family dysfunction; verbal abuse
+
March, 2023
  
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chap t e r 3 I A B O u T Ju N E I 9 5 2 my family and I moved to the suburb of Evergreen Park. 1 If my parents made the move in order to provide me with "some decent kids to play with," they did not choose the location well. The only kid in my age group on our block was 8.0., who was about a year younger than I was. He was a frequent play­mate of mine for one or two years after we came to Evergreen Park, but he was a rather obnoxious character as all the members of my family agreed.
+
Dr. Taimur Rahman<br />
−
Shortly after we arrived in Evergreen Park, my parents, in order to encourage me to be socially active, made me enroll in a summer program of organized recreation that was conducted at Evergreen Park Central School. I didn't like it, and soon stopped attending. At some later time my father forced me to enroll briefly in the Boy Scouts, and I didn't like that any better. I wrote in my 1979 autobiography. 'i\s a kid I usually didn't like activities that were organized and supervised by adults, other than my par­ents."2 Apparently this is typical for mathematically gifted kids. According to a book on the psychology of adolescence, ''.An interesting characteristic of mathematically gifted adolescents was their independence with regard to how they spent their out-of.class time. 'Though they played some indi­vidual sports and some musical instruments, they completely resisted any regimented activity in the way of planned recreation.' "3
 
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In September r952, I entered the fifth grade at Evergreen Park Central School. At Sherman School we had spent the whole school day in one class­room and with one teacher, but at Evergreen Park Central the students shifted from one classroom to another to be taught different subjects. Because of this new system and the unfamiliar people I felt very insecure at first, but after a few weeks I adjusted comfortably.2
 
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I made some friends at school, including Dave Jack.son t, Bill Moogt, Barbara B., Dale Eickclman, and Larry S. Larry S. was the best of these. The friendships with Dave Jackson and Bill Moog didn't last; the former turned out to be decidedly peculiar, and the latter was a boy with little self.. control who once tried (unsuccessfully) to get me to participate in a petty theft. Dale Eick.elman had a few peculiarities ofhis own, and I can't say that I ever really liked him, but I continued co associate with him throughout my grade-school and high-school years. My friendship with Barbara B. had nothing to do with sex. Her family moved away before we completed fifth grade, and thereafter I corresponded with her for a short time.4
 
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Also in fifth grade, I carried on an intense flirtation with a beautiful female classmate named Darlene Cy. Because she teased me and provoked me, I loved her and hated her at the same time. She gradually began to con­quer me, however, and love undoubtedly would have won out in the end if circumstances hadn't separated us. What happened was that upon complet­ing fifth grade I was placed directly in seventh, and after that I rarely saw Darlene.5
 
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Skipping a grade was a disaster for me. It came about as follows. While I was in fifth grade the school guidance counselor, Miss Vera Frye, gave some of us a battery of tests including a Stanford-Binet IQ test. On the latter, I scored very high,6 r67. The Washington Post quoted my mother as follows:
 
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i\school psychologist (Miss Frye] gave Ted a Stanford-Binet IQ test .... But his mother took more comfort in the results of a personality test, which showed him to be well-adjusted.
 
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For a while [Wanda said] all my uneasiness about these residual effects from his early childhood were laid to rest because this psychologist said, Oh, he is fine," .... In fact, she said he had a strong sense ofsecurity, which surprised me.... She said he could be whatever he wanted to be.... He was the cat's whiskers' ....
 
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rrhe family] now believe that perhaps Ted was smart enough to figure out the most appropriate answers to the test and outwit it.7
 
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Psychological tests include devices to detect cheating, and it is hardly likely that a ten-year-old (however bright) with no knowledge ofpsycholog­ical testing would be able to outwit such a test.
 
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In any case, Miss Frye telephoned my parents, informed them of my high IQ score, and (according to my mother's account) wentso far as to tell them that I had the potential to be "another Einstein."8 This was foolish, because there is a lot more to being an Einstein than scoring high on an IQ test. It's possible that Miss Frye may havebeen laying it on thick because she had previously encountered parents who had shrugged their shoulders at information about their children's IQ scores and she was therefore trying to impress my parents with the importance of what she had to say. If she had known something about my mother, she would have been much more cautious.
 
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My mother came from a very poor background-poor not only finan­cially but in every other respect.9 Her position at the bottom of the social scale had been very painful to her, and she saw academic achievement, much more than financial success, as the avenue to the social status that she craved. She had neither the intelligence nor the self-discipline to achieve anything herself, however, so she sought to fulfill her ambitions through her children.10 Duringmyearly years her expectations were reasonable and she put only very moderate pressure on me to perform well in school, but from the time of Miss Frye's phone call, she was filled with grandiose fan­tasies of what I was supposed to achieve.
 
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Even at that time I felt that my mother's reaction to Miss Frye's call was childish. Her excessive exhibitions of pleasure seemed ridiculous, and she immediately telephoned some ofour relativesinorder tobragto them. She told me a great deal that Miss Frye had asked her to keep secret from me. She admonished me not to reveal these things to anyone, because "Miss Frye says we're not supposed to tell you; but we feel that we can treatyou as an adult." It was from this time that I gradually began to lose respect for my parents.11
 
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It was essentially Miss Frye who decided that I should skip a grade. She had the consent of the school authorities and the enthusiastic support of my mother, but they relied on herjudgment as the supposed expert. Why did she make that decision? My mother told me at the time that it was because the tests showed that my greatest ability lay in the area of mathe­matics and physics, and(supposedly) mathematicians and physicists burned out young. Hence they were to be educated rapidly so that maximum use couldbe made of their ability while it lasted.
 
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Many years afterward, in a discussion with my mother, I bitterly criti· cized the decision to put me in seventh grade. At that time she tried to jus­tify the decision by claimingthat Miss Frye had said I was drawing "violent" pictures during my free time in school, and that pushing me a year ahead was somehow supposed to cure me of this.12 The proposition that acade­mic acceleration will cure anyone ofviolent fantasies seems dubious, to say the least. Anyway, I replied to my mother that drawing war pictures and the like was commonplace among boys of that age at that time and place, but she insisted that no, my drawings were different.13 I brought the subject up again in 1991 in a letter to my mother: "You claim that Miss Frye said I was drawing pictures of violence during my spare moments in school.... I'm not aware that I drew violent pictures any more often than the other boys. Miss Frye may have thought I did, but I certainly wouldn't trust her judg­ment. ..."14 My mother now changed her story. She wrote: "Mour mem­ory of Frye is faulty. She considered your drawings quite normal. Just drawings of battle scene strategy."15 This is a typical example of the way · my mother plays fast and loose with the truth in order to suit her purposes of the moment.
 
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Was I drawing abnormally violent pictures at the age of ten? All I can say is that I do not remember making any drawings that would be consid­ered unusual for a ten-year-old boy.16 And my mother's statement quoted above, that Miss Frye considered me "well-adjusted," weighs against the abnormal-drawing story (assuming, of course, that my mother's statement is true, which may not be the case).
 
  
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I T w As F R o M the time I skipped a grade that I began to have serious problems with social adjustment. I was not acceptedby the seventh-graders with whom I was put. I quickly slid down to near the bottom of the peck­ing order, and I stayed there until I graduated from high-school. I was often subjecred to insults or other indignities by the dominant boys.17 My attempts to make advances to girls had such humiliating results that for many years afterward, even until after the age of thirty, I found it excruciat­ingly difficult-almost impossible-to make advances to women.18
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=== Editor’s Note ===
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Investigators working for my defense team obtained the following information from Michael Johnson, an administrator at Evergreen Park Community High School.
 
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Johnson ... flatly declared that the experiment of skipping kids ahead grades was a huge failure. The experiment was a notable failure during the era that Ted Kaczynski was promoted. Johnson added that the experiment was most especially a disaster with boys and indicated that he could docu­ment the face that many of the boys who had been skipped ahead during Ted's era ended up as outcasts .... Less-bright kids become resentful of those boys who are advanced ahead, causing the smartand accelerated kids was somehow supposed co cure me of chis. 12 The proposition that acade­mic acceleration will cure anyone of violent fantaSies seems dubious, to say the least. Anyway. I replied to my mother that drawingwarpicrures and the like was commonplace among boys of that age at that time and place. but she insisted that no, my drawings were different. 13 I brought the subjccc up again in 1991 in a letter to my mother: "You claim that Miss Frye said I was drawing picrures of violence during my spare moments in school. ... I'm not aware that I drew violent picrures any more often than the other boys. Miss Frye may have thought I did, but I certainly wouldn't trust her judg­ment. ..."14 My mother now changed her story. She wrote: "[Y]our mem­ory of Frye is faulty. She considered your drawings quite normal Just drawing, of battle scene scracegy."U This is a typical enmple of the way · my mother plays fast and loose with the truth in order to suit her purposes of the moment.
 
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Was I drawing abnormally violent piccures at the age of ten? All I can say is that I do not remember making any drawings that-would be consid­ered unusual for a ten-year-old boy.16 And my mother's statement quoted above, that Miss Frye considered me "well-adjusted,'' weighs against the abnormal-drawing story (assuming. of course, that my mother's statement is true, which may not be the case).
 
  
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IT w As Fa o M the time I skipped a grade that I began to have serious problems with social adjusanent. I was not accepted by the sewmth·gradcrs with whom I was put. I quickly slid down to near the bottom of the peck­ing order, and I stayed there until I graduated from high-school I was often subjected to insults or other indignities by the dominant boys.17 My attempts to make advances to girls had such humiliating results that for many years afterward. even until after the age of thirty. I found it exauciat­ingly difficult-almostimpossible-to make advances to women. ts
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Working on this project has been one of the most illuminating experiences of my life. In translating this work, Luna has opened a door for English speakers into the wide world of Vietnamese scholarship and pedagogy as it relates to socialist theory and philosophy.
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Investigators working for my defense team obtained the following information from Michael Johnson, an administrator at Evergreen Park Comm.unity High School
 
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Johnson ... flatly declared that the experiment of skipping kids ahead grades was a huge failure. The experiment was a notable failure during the era that Ted Kaczynski was promoted. Johnson added that the experiment was most especially a disaster with boys and indicated that he could docu· ment the face that many of the boys who had been skipped ahead during Ted's era ended up as outcasts •... Less-bright kids become resentful of those boys who are advanced ahead, causing the smartand accelerated kids to be even more acutely ostracized from their peer groups. More impor­tant, Johnson added, girls do not go out with boys who are younger. Thus, these boys have been set up for failure, and fail they do. The act of pushing youngsters ahead is almost never done anymore as a result of these past experiments. In fact, the state of Illinois now requires kids to be older before they can be promoted ahead a year. 19"
 
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I was not the only kid who was rejected for being smart. There were several other boys who had a reputation for being academically oriented and as a result were harassed or treated with contempt by the "tough" kids.20 But in my case the problems were compounded by the fact that, dur­ing the same period. I was being subjected to psychological abuse by both my parents.21
 
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I've already described the change in my mother's personality that began not long after my brother's birth. By the time I was in my teens, she was having frequent outbursts of rage during which her face would become contorted and she would wave her clenched fists while unleashing a stream of unrestrained verbal abuse. 22 Even when she wasn't having one of her outbursts, she was often very irritable and would scold or make vicious remarks at the slightest provocation.
 
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The change in my mother affected my father. He became morose and pessimistic, and when family squabbles arose, he tended to sit in his easy chair and retreat behind a newspaper or book, ignoring the sordid turmoil around him. 23 Sometimes, however, his patience became exhausted and he would have angry arguments with my mother orwith me.
 
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But my father's moroseness was not exclusively an outcome of the fam­ily situation. I believe that he had deep-lying negative feelings about him­self, about people, and about life in general. When he was in his mid-sixties and more ready to express his feelings than he'd been when he was younger, he took a car-camping trip by himsel£ On returning he said, "I can't be alone, because I don't like myself." He tended to sec other people as dirty or sick. For example, when I visited my parents in 1978, my father described his empl~yer; Wm Pl., to me as a pathologically compulsive talker. Later I got to know Wm Pl. myself, and I found that he was rather talkative, but by no means abnormally so. My father also used to speak of some of our relatives and other people in terms that exaggerated their fail. ings and portrayed them as sick or repellent.
 
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Throughout my teens I was the wget of frequent verbal aggression (often unprovoked) from both my parents, especially my mother.21 The insults that cut me deepest were the imputations of mental illness or gross immaturity.24 I think it was my father who started these when I was about
 
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twelve years old. The rejection I experienced from my peers at school, in combination with the deteriorating family atmosphere, made me often sullen and cranky,25 and my father, characteristically. interpreted this in terms of psychopathology. He began calling me "sick" whenever he was annoyed with me. My mother imitated him in this respect, and from then on until I was about 2.I years old. both my parents would apply to me such epithets as "sick," "immarure," "emotionally disturbed." "creep," "mind of a two-year-old," or "anotherEugene P.t."21 (Eugene P. was a man we knew who ended up in a mental institution.) [twas always in an outburst of anger that my mother called me these things, but my father sometimes did so in a tone of cold contempt that cut worse than my mother's angry shouting.26 Neither of my parents ever suggested that I should be examined by a psy­chologist or psychiatrist.27 My mother never actually thought that there was anything wrong with me mentally. and I doubt that my father saw me as any sicker than he saw many other people.za In saying cruel thing:s to me my parents were only using me as a butt on which to take out their own frustrations.29
 
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Though the imputations of mental illness were what hurt me most, they comprised only a small part of the constant verbal bullying to which I was subjected day in and day out. My mother was continually shouting. scolding, insulting. and blaming me for everything that went wrong. regardless ofwhether I could have been responsible for it. During the sum­mer before I entered Harvard. she made an appointment for me to see a professional photographer for a picture that the university wanted for its records. When the day of the appointment arrived, as it happened. I had a pimple on the end of my nose. My motherangrily scolded me for it. "Look at you! Now you've got a pimple on your nose! You're going to lookterrible in your Harvard photo! ..."Andon and on, as ifit were my fault that I had a pimple.
 
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In another case my mother drove me and some other members of the high-school band to a ~usic lesson. On the way back, the other boys, who were older than I was, ·talked a good deal about cars and driving. It made me feel small, since I was still too young to drive. After she dropped the other boys off, my motherbegan scolding me angrily: "Whydon'tyou get a driver's license like the other kids so I won't have to be drivingyou all over the place all the time?" I quietly pointed out that I was only fifteen years old and couldn't get a license until I was sixteen. Instead ofacknowledgingthat she was wrong and apologizing, my mother answered in an angry tone, 'Well then, get a license as soon as you are sixteen! ... (etc.]"
 
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Once when I ~ade a negative remark about someone's competence, my father answered in a cold and sneering tone, "You'll never be half as competent as he is." My father did not typically lose his temper openly. Yet he sometimes did so; in a few cases, he shouted at me, ''I'll smash your face!" I didn't believe he would really smash my face, but still it was fright­ening to hear him say that.
 
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These are only a few examples of the kinds of things that went on constantly.
 
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Physical abuse was minimal. but there was a little of it. A couple of times my father threw me on the floor in the course of family squabbles. My mother occasionally would flail at me with her fists, but by that time I was old enough (and my mother was weak enough) so that she didn't hurt me.
 
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Contrary to what my motherand brotherhave told the media, up to the age or seventeen or so I was not socially isolated. Throughout my grade­school and high-school years I had several friends at all times.30 Though I was not accepted by most of the seventh-graders with whom I was put when I skipped a grade, I continued to associate with some of the friends and acquaintances I'd made in fifth grade. For cnmple, Larry S. was a patrol boy, and I used to stand on his comer with him during the lunch hour; and I continued to associate with Dale Eickclman3 l until I finished high-school Moreover, I soonbegan to make friends amongtheboys in my own grade;32 but most of these friends had low status among the other boys,33 and some ofthem, like me, hada reputation as ''brains".and for that reason were subjected to insults and indignities. On the other hand, one of my best friends had below-average intelligence. 34 Apartfrom those already mentioned, a list of my friends from seventh grade through high-school would include Bob Pe.,3S Tom Kn.,36 Felix Townst,37 and Greg DaviJ.37 I hung around with Russell Mosny38 quite a bit, but I never liked him much. We tended to be thrown together because we were in many of the same classes and were both "brains" who were treated with contempt by the "tough" kids. Both Mosny and Greg Davis seemed to become cool toward me during my last year or so of high-school,37 but at the same time I became closer to Bob Pc. andTom Kn., and I made a newfriend, Terry L.39
 
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Having these friends, however, by no means compensated me for the pain of the humiliatingly low status I had in school. I skipped my junior year in high-school,40 and after that I was with kids who were two years older than I was. Most of these kids didn't insult me, but they treated me with condescension,41 which was perhaps worse, and, with the exception ofTerry L., none of them hadany interestin making friends with me.
 
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Even though I hadfriends, I spenta gooddeal oftime alone. By the time I was in high-school, B.O. had moved away and four other boys in my age­ group had moved into our block. One of these was simply a jerk. The other three. the Tr. boys, were joclcs and belonged to the "set" in school by which I was intimidated; and moreover I had little in common with them. With the exception of Bob Pc., all of my friends lived far enough away so that vis­iting was inconvenient, and consequently we went to each other's homes only occasionally. Our activities tended to consist of aimless time-killing. We rarely engaged in athletics apart from occasional games of catch. we never undertook any significant joint projects, we never attended ~y sodal functions together. As I've already noted, most of my friends had low sta­tus, and. while I was in school with them. none was very active socially and none had girlfriends. Ifthey ever dated, they never mentioned it to me.
 
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The only serious activity I had was trombonC1)laying; my music lessons · brought me into contact with one of the very few adults I knew at the time whom I really respected, my teacher, Jaroslav Cimera. Two of my friends, Tom Kn. and Fellic Towns, also played the trombone, and I often played ducts with one or the other of them.
 
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Still, until I went to Harvard, my adolescence tended to be an alterna­tion among different kinds of boredom: A boring day in school, a boring visit with a friend. a few boring hours piddling around in my attic room, another boring day in school. This doesn't mean that I never had fun with my friends or alone, bur that boredom was a nagging problem for me. 42
 
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Now LBT • s ~o o It at the way my brother and mother have portrayed me and our family life during this period. rlffl, the entries in my med­ical records that are evidently based on my mother's statements to the doctors43:
 
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April 24, I9Sl. ... Appetite, activity and general adjustment arc all quite good...
 
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April I7, x953 ... He eats well. plays accively. presents no behavior problems. . ·~pril 27, t954 ... Now in ]th Grade and does well. Does well socially."" ·~ril 14, x955 ... Eighth grade. Good grades. Active in some sports. No further[?] problem except for some adolescent [illegible]"
 
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April 20. x956 ... He docs very well at school-not too much ofa social­izer, but is known as a 'brain'. Gets along well with others when he tries-­seems popular but a little aloof. ..
 
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June [?], x957 ... Accelerated in high-school and will finish next spring by going to summer school Has his eye on Harvard and [illegible] in physics and math.
 
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Health has been good but mother is concerned lest program be too strenuous for him. Appetite good. Not very much physical activity. No great interest in girls as yet."
 
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April 21, I958 ... Ted has been well during the past year. No problems.
 
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Is doing very well at school. ..."
 
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The reason why my mother gave rhe docrors a rosy picture of my adjustment (with barely a hint of social difficulties in the April :w. 1956 entry) is that she has always been enremely concerned with respecrability44 and with presenting to the world an attractive picrure of our family, and to this end she docs not hesitate to lie.
 
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In response to a request from Harvard. during the summer before I entered college she wrote a long (two single-spaced pages) letter in which she desaibed my personality. [n it she gives a fairy-tale portrait of me as a budding intelleaual For cnmplc. she speaks of my "serious goals" and "ivory·towerish intellectuality," when in reality I didn't have any clear goals at all and had little respect for intellectualism. In fairness to my moth~ I should mention that in this letter she probably was not lying calculatedly. She talked herself into believing all that crap before she wrote itdown and sent it to Harvard. Her capacity for self-deception is remarkable. What is significant for us here, though. is the way she desaibcd my psythological and social adjustment:
 
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Ted is strong. stable. and ha.s an acellent capacity for self-discipline. However. I feel that he may be lonlier [sic] than most boys the first few months away from home.
 
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... Ted does not respond quickly to friendly overtures. He is pleasant and polite. but reserved; and accepts only an occasional. individual as a friend. Once he does, however, the relationship is permanent. All of his friends share at least one of his strong interests. One of these friendships is based on a mutual fondness for exploring the countryside and searching for fossils, arrowheads, and unusual rocks .... He meets with another couple of friends because of a shared appreciation for listening to and making music. ... Ted is also very fond of another boy who shares with him a love for intelleccual sparring. witty exchange and endless polemics. The written and verbal communication of satire and analysis on innumerable subjects by these two boys would fill a volume. [My mother has surpassed herself here. The two musical friends must have been Tom Kn. and Felix Towns, but I have no idea who the other two friends could have been.}
 
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The fact that he taw so little initiative in finding friends. that he accepts the advances of so few people.4' and makes no attempt to join social groups makes us worry about the pombility of his being a pretty lonely boy (from our point of view-he claims he never feels lonely because there is so much to do.) .. .46" rred] has, as his counselor and teachers have said 'a delightful personal­ity. very witty and very clever' .... ... rred is] working successfully as a busboy this summer and being well-acceptedby the other people working there. 47
 
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One of the things that Ted's counselor hoped be would learn to do was bring 'his light out from under the gushcl (sic; bushel" is meant]'. He has always functioned naturally and creatively ... almost devoid of the desire to impress or communicate.... Perhaps the poor quality of the school and neighborhood cnviomment [sic] of his first ten years had something to do with this. Looking back, we realize how little stimulation and understand­ing he found there. Our own confusion, uncertainty, and worry about his ever-increasing propensity for solitary play didn't help matters. The high-­school counselor feels that Ted should become increasingly aware of the desircability [sic] of projecting his 'brilliance and wit.' More often now, he will be placed in situations in which a stranger may want to assess his tal­ents in half an hour's time. His whole future may depend on his ability and awareness of the need to project himself at will at a particular time."48
 
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Contrast the foregoing with my mother's portrayal of me in her inter· views with the Washington Post49 and on 6o Minuta,JO in which she depicted me as severely disnubed and almost completely isolated socially. You can believe one version orthe other, ifyou like. but you can't bcli~both, since they arc clearly inconsistent. Thus my mother is again shown to be a liar. For present purposes it is beside the point whether she lies cal· culatedly or talks herself into believing her own crap before she tells it to others.
 
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It is true, though. that my mother may not have realized the full extent of the social difficulties that I encountered from the time I skipped sixth grade. I said nothing to my parents about those difficulties because in our family talking about personal problems, particularly on the part of my brother and me, was almost taboo. n Tim was especially true in my case, because, ever since Miss Frye had told her about my high IQ score, my mother expected me to be her perfect little genius. If ever I revealed to her any failure, any weakness, it disappointed her and consequently her response was coldand aitical.52
 
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AccoRDING To the New Yorlc Tuna. my brother descibcd our father as "always gcncrous."'3 In his interview with the SIICr4fflffltD Bo:, my brother asserted that both our parents were "wmn and nurturing. "'4 According to the transaipt of the 6o Mimaa interview of my brother and my mother, Leslie Stahl stated:
 
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Ted's fancasies, his family says, included accusations that his parents had verbally abused and rejected him; accusations that became more and more bizarre. 55"
 
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Laterin the interview, my brother said:
 
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[Ted's) feelings about our family bear no relationship to the reality of the family life that we experienced. These were laving. supportive parcnts.56 But here is what my brother told the FBI. according to the latter's "302" reports of interviews with him:
 
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The relationship between TED Sc [Theodore R. Kaczynski, my father] and TED was mostly difficult and conflicted. ... DAVE remembers specifi. cally that his father often told TED, 'You're just like [EUGENE],' identify· ing[EUGENE] as a ca.worker ofhis father's at the sausage factory who was diagnosed schizophrenic. His father would often tell TED 'you have the mind of a two year-old' DAVE remembered a specific incident when TED ran to his father saying. 'Give me a kiss,' and was rebuffed; TED Sr. pushed him away and said. 'You're justlike a little girl. always wantingto kiss.' TED eventually 'got his kiss,' DAVE said. but he never remembered that TED asked his father ever again for affcaion. TED became increasingly redu· sive, and quarrelled constantly with his mothcc TED Sc's behavior toward his oldest son became increasingly cold and distant, and he 'mostly showed his disapproval' concerning TED.Ji
 
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Family members often ridiculed TED when they compared TED with DAVE who was well liked because he bad better social skills.58 [False; I was not ..ridiculed" for this.]
 
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DAVE noced that despite WANDXs concerns that certain actions she and her husband cook during TED's childhood must~ been at least partly responsible for TED's lifelong problems and isolation, WANDA is defensive of her own actions in general. and secs herself as having unfairly carried che main burdens of boch her family of origin and her own family. DAVE characterized his.mother as 'often difficult herself' ....5Sl
 
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Thus, my brother is. dearly shown to be a liar. It's true chat che FBI's "302" reports often have inaccuracies, and chat che foregoing passages contain significant errors. (Whether the errors originated with the FBI or with my brother is an open question.) But it is hardly likely chat che FBI wouldjust make all this up out of nothing; and. as a matter of fact, much of it is corroborated by my autobiographies and by family correspondence.60
 
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In my I979 autobiography, I wrote: "One day. when I might have been about 6 years old, my mother, father, and I were all set to go out somewhere. I was in a joyful mood. I ran up co
 
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my father and announced that I wanted to kiss him. He said. 'You're like a little girl. always wantingto kiss.· I immediately turned cold and drew back resentfully. My father immediately regretted what he had done and said, 'Oh, that's alright. You can kiss ifyou want co.' But there was no warmth in his voice. Of course, Ididn't kiss him then...."61
 
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1bis agrees fairly well with the account in the FBI report; but notice that the incident occurred when I was about six years old-before my brother's birth. Thus the FBI report's implication that my brother person­ally witnessed this incident is false. My 1979 autobiography continues:
 
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But the reader should be careful not to get an exaggerated idea of the coldness that my father occasionally exhibited-generally speaking I felt r had a good relationship with my parents that didn't show any serious dece-· rioration until I was aboutII years old.62
 
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My father didbecome rather cold toward me during my teens, though my brother's account, as reported by the PBI, somewhat overstates the case. I wrote in my I919 autobiography. rcmngto my teen years:
 
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[M]y father tended to be cold. Duringmy middle teens I felt there was an undercurrent of scorn in his attitude towardme...63
 
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My brother and my mother state (more-or-less correctly) that, during my adolescence, when visitors arrived at our house, I would often retreatto my room.64 Thus they unwittingly revealed information that helps to con­firm the abuse: According to investigators who have experience with cases thatinvolve child abuse, withdrawing from visitors is a common reaction of abused children.6S
 
  
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Luna and I have done our best to capture the original meaning and spirit of the text. Furthermore, as we have mentioned elsewhere, our annotations and illustrations are intended only to contextualize and expand on the core information of the original text similarly to the class/lecture setting for which the curriculum is intended.
  
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Chapter 4
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In their lives, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were never able to finish clarifying and systematically describing the philosophy of dialectical materialism which their work was built upon. Engels attempted to structurally define the philosophy in Dialectics of Nature, but unfortunately that work was never completed since he decided to prioritize publishing the unfinished works of Marx after his untimely death.
  
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My parents’ treatment of me during my adolescence, as discussed in the Family Letters
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I believe that this text is a great step forward in that work of systematically describing the philosophical system of dialectical materialism and the methodological system of materialist dialectics. I also believe it’s worth noting how the Vietnamese scholars who crafted this curriculum have embedded the urgent necessity of action — of creative application of these ideas — throughout the text in a way that I find refreshing and reflective of the works of Marx and Engels themselves.
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Chapter 4 j EVER APTERWARO,Inursedagrudge against my parents for the insults rd had to take from them as a teenager. But that wasn't the only source of my resenancnt against them. Thcic were other ways in which they had thrown burdens on me; for c:zample. they aied to exploit my talents to feed their vanity. And evm after I'd reached adulthood my mother's behavior continued to be troublesome. especially her nagging and her insults. Only in the case of my brother did I enjoy a relationship that was, from my point of view, more positive than negative; and with that relationship too thcic were very de~lying prob­lems that did not become fully apparent until much later. The fact is that I simply didn't fit with the other members of my family, and while my mem­ories of verbal abuse fot!Ilcd the focal point of my resentment, that resent· ment really had broader origins and was my respome to the unworkable relationship that I had with my parents and my brother.
 
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All this will be explained in due course. Our wk in the present chapter will be to review all of the survivingfamily correspondence that has abear­ing on my parents' treatment of me during my adolescence. Almost all of my discussion of this issue with them was carried on by letter from my cabin in Montana.
 
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It wasn't until about the beginning of March 1974 that l confronted my parents openly on this matter. The letter in which I did so has not been preserved, hue ic is referred to in a letter that I sent my brother several weeks later. rd been enjoying a solitary winter in my Montana cabin. I described to my brother what happened, as follows:
 
−
I suppose you know that I am noc on speaking terms with ourparents. In case they haven't given you the full story. here it is: I told them repeat­edly. in letters and on the telephone, 'Don't worry about me over the winter-you won't hear from me until I get out of here in the spring."" I made a particularpoint ofemphasizing this, because I know what motheris like. Some time in February I got a card from the old bag saying she was worried and wanted to hear from me. Then about the end of February I got a letter from them saying that if they didn't hear from me soon they wmdd conraa tu authoritia and have tlttm ch«lc up on nt£. The text ofthe let-· tcrstated (in effect) that it was from Dad, but the style and the worries were so like the old bag that I assume she induced him to write the letter. [Actu· ally. she probably wrote it herself and signed it ""Dad."" My mother's hand­writing is not very easy co distinguish from my father's.] So I had to get a letter out to them so as notto~the cops come up here to checkon me. This cost me considerable embarrassment and inconvenience [I had a roadside mailbm, but at that time I think I didn't know that I could use it to send mail as well as receive it, so I walked four mile:s to Lincoln to mail the letter], and worse still, itbroke into that sense ofisolation thatI so value up here. You may be sure that I cussed them out pretty thoroughly. 111is cussing out was further aggravated by some f'cstcring past n:sentments against them-some of recent origin and some going all the way back to myteens. ""1"
 
−
The recent resentments mentioned here had to do with difficult behav· ioron my mother's pare that we will speakoflacer.
 
−
My mother's first answer co my letter of March I974 was vituperative, but she soon followed it with another letter in which she attempted co mend fences with me. (Neither of these letters has been preserved.) I ignoredboth letters anf:l refused to communicate with my parents for more than a year, thougn they continued to write to me. F"mally I softened and wrote co them in March 1975, outlining my activities over the preceding year. My letter began:
 
−
I happen to be in a comparatively mellow mood, and besides, you have lately given some faint signs ofadmittingyour moral fallibility. thougn not nearly co the extent you should. So I decided co be nice and write you a letter."2
 
−
I do not nowremember what the nfaint signs ofadmitting ... moral fal. libilicy" were. I imagine my mother conceded that she and my father were less than perfcet parents, but I am certain chat she did not apologize for the verbal abuse or anything else.
 
−
My resentment of my parents' trcaancnc of me was ne%C referred co in a letter I wrote in r977. My mother had irritated me by sanctimoniously objecting to an obscene word that I'd used in an earlier letter. In reply I gave her a rich sample of insulting obscenity and explained:
 
−
The reason [for my hostile attitude] is that whenever you rub me the wrong way. it reminds me of all the old. old reasons I have for hating you, which I explained quite clearly in a letter some time ago.... Go ahead and call me an 'ungraceful monster.' You've called me that name before. and enough other names so that it doesn't bother me in the least any more...3
 
−
(The letter of some time ago"" referred to here was the 1974 lettcr that r mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.) My mother replied: ""Naturally we have been pretty depressed since your last letter. No one ever gets a perfect set of parents, nor do parents, for that matter, ever get a perfcet child....."
 
−
This was an answer that ( repeatedly get from my mother in response to my (usually hostile. ru admit) attempts to discuss with my parents the psy­chological abuse to which they had subjeetcd me. "No parents are perfect," she would say. conveniently ignoring the fact that some are much more imperfccr than others. And generally she would add that no c:hildren.are perfcet either, implying that my parents had as much to blame me for as [
 
−
had co blame them for. My mother never ezplained what imperfections of mine she was referring to, but I know her well enough to guess what she had in mind: rrefused to follow the prestigious career that she had dreamed offor me, I didn'tlove my parents, and I insulted them. But what could they ezpeet after the way they had treated me during my teens? Especially in view of the fact that they refused to apologize for the abuse or even acknowledge it explicitly.
 
−
Accually; my parents were not always mean to me during my teens. They never hesitated to:..!ieap insults on me when they were in a bad mood, but my mother was often warm and affectionate when she was in a good mood. and there were happy family times as well as bad ones to remember. Thus, if my parents had fully and frankly acknowledged and apologized for the way they had treated me. I probably would have forgiven them.s But my (admittedly hostile) attempts to get an apology from them were answered at first only with recriminations, =cuses, or evasions on the part of my mother. When I did eventually cmact an apology from h~ it was cold and grudging, and obviously given in order to placate me and not in a genuine spirit of remorse. My father ncver gave any answer at all to the letters in which I raised chese issues, acepc once, and then his answer was as self-righteous as it could possibly be. I will quote ic later (p. 68).
 
−
Probably around 1977 or 1978 my mother wrote:
 
−
Both dad and I arc searching for answers trying very hard to under­stand ourselves and our children. Who or what arc we? Who arc our chil­dren? What motivates them and us? Are we culture-bound? Have we hurt our children? Has the culture hurt them.6"
 
−
This extract is from a very messy. scrawled-over, and much-corrected document that my mother saved. It appears to be the first draft of a letter thac was intended for me. But I do not remember receiving such a letter, so it's not clear whether a final draftwas ever prepared and sent.
 
−
I next raised the issue of my parents' treatment of me in a hostile letter · that I senc them in the autumn of 1981. That letter apparently has not sur­vived. and I do not now remember what set off my anger against my par­ents in that instance. Nor has their reply to that letter been preserved; but I do remember that the reply consisted of a very brief note from my mother in which she coldly and stiffly apologized ( on behalf of my father as well as herself) for the fact that they'd been poor parents to me. In spite of the coldness and brevity of the apology I was somewhat mollified. and I answered as follows, some time around Christmas. 1982.:
 
−
As to your last letter, in which you said you were 'truly sorry to have been such failures as parents': Its [sic] a satisfaction to me to have you admit your faults for once, instead of trying co make excuses for them. The resentment I have toward you will always remain, but your last letter docs soften my attitude a little. Enough. anyway, so that I will take back what I said about hoping you drop dead on Christmas-cause it's true that you were always good to me on Christmas, and on the whole I have pleasant memories of Chrisonases. I trust you got the chrisanas card I sent you."7
 
−
My mother's note of apology was also mentioned in a letter that I sent my brother in March 1986:
 
−
(A]bout 3 years ago after I'd written them on the subject. mother did write back: 'We are truly sorry to have been such f.iilurcs as parents.· (But isn't there a hint there of something like. 'we are truly sorry you turned outso rotten?) But even then she tried to excuse iton the grounds of 'igno­rance.' (They can hardly have been ignorant of the &ct that it is extremely painful for a teenage kid to have his parents repeatedly tell him, in anger, that there is something wrong with him mentally.) Getting that much of an apology from her was somethinglike squeezing a nickel out of a miser. It was cold and curt, and afterward she seemed to just shove it under the carpet and forget about it. Certainly it ~dno sense of remorse; and very likely it was something she said mcrcly co get me to soften towards them ... "s
 
  
−
LB T ME o I G R :e s s for a moment to clear up yet another item of dism­fonnation from my brother. According to his interview as reported by the New York TimtS:
+
As the text will explain, dialectical materialism is a universal system of philosophy which can be utilized to grapple with any and every conceivable problem which we humans might encounter in this universe. In Vietnam, dialectical materialism has been used to delve into matters of art, ethics, military science, and countless other fields of inquiry and endeavor. It is my hope that this book will, likewise, lead to a wider and fuller understanding and (more importantly) application of dialectical materialism in the Western world.
−
The parents had visited [TcdJ several times at his cabin until the mid­198os. and each time they had come away pleased at his cordiality, only to find another angry letter in the mail soon after returning home.9
 
−
According to an FBI "302.. report, my brother told the interviewing agents:
 
−
TED's stormy relationship with his parcna reached an impasse in 1984. Prior to that year, TED Sr. and WANDA had visited TED in Montana for several consecutive summers. They stayed at a motel in Lincoln. and trav­eled to the cabin during daylight. ... DAVE recalled chat after their return from such a visit in the summer of 1984. his parents were elated at the suc­cess of that visit. ... One week later a letter arrived from TED breaking off relations with his parents, accusing them ofgross mistreatment. ...N 10
 
−
In reality, the last time I ever saw my parents was inJune of 1982.. The ..angry letter,. was not sent until several months later, in the autumn of 1982, and I did not tell my parents until the spring of 1983 that ( was break­ing off relations with them.
 
−
On Mayr,, 1982, I wrote my parents, ..sec you June nor 12,NJ1 and on May 25, 1982, I crust that this is the last communication chat will be neces· sary before you guys get here; so I will just assume that you will get here on June 11 or 12. •.•"" 11 This clearly dates their visit toJune. That my angry let­ter was not sent until late autumn of 1982 is shown by the lctter7 that I quoted above, from around Christmas time 1982, in which I referred to my parents' last letter as an answer to my angry letterand quoted my angry let· ter as saying that I hoped they would drop dead on Chrisanas; a dear indi­cation that the angry letter was written not too long before Christmas."
 
−
I was on reasonably amicable terms with my parents from around Christmas 1982. until the spring of 1983, at which time I broke off relations with them completely, for reasons that I will desaibe in due course. My parents visited me a few times becween 1971 and 1977, but my brother was wrong in telling the FBt that they had visited me ..for several consecutive summersN up to their last visit. In reality they visited me only twice after Im; once in 1980 or 198I and once, as already noted, in1982.13
 
−
My brother was also mistaken when he told the New Yorie Tuna (see pas­sage quoted above) that after their several visits to my cabin our parents "had come away pleased at[Ted's] cordiality. only to find another angry let· ter in the mail soon after reruming home." I sent my parents many letters in which I expressed more or less irritation at them (we will sec later some of the reasons for this irritation), but. prior to my brief correspondence with my mother in 199<>-91, there were only three angry letters-ones in which I complained of myparents' misttcaanent of me. These are the ones already dcsaibed. As we've seen, they were sent in early March 1974. early February1971, and about Christmas time I982. It's already been shown that this last letter was sent several months after my parents' visit. The March and February letters could only have been sent several months, at least, after -any visit by my parents, since naturally they didn't come to sec me during the months of cold and mow. My brotherhimselfdescribes the vis­its as occurringduringthe summers; though acrually some ofthem were in late spring Uune) orearly fall (October).
 
  
−
TH B. N ExT L BT TE R in the family correspondence that refers to the abuse issue is one that my mother wrote me on Christmas Eve 1984-This is the letter quoted in Chapter I in which she gives an cx:aggerated and mcla. dramatic account of my "hospital experience... Herc arc some further excerpts:
+
March, 2023
−
No word, no small word of greeting from you. How that hurts! ... Have you no memory ofourlove andcare?
 
−
All fiunilies haw their fights. That is inevitable. We arc imperfect humans in an imperfect world. But most of us arc able to forgive, forget, apologize and go on loving and caring. Some are unable to conttol hatred, to overcome it. Why?
 
−
(At this point my mother recites her embellished ~on of the hospi· tal experience."" After that:]"
 
−
Remember how you would react to anybody's correction or criticism of you? ... How (can \ve] convince you that we love you? How convince you that fighting and difference of opinion doesn't mean rejection. How can we be at lasta normal family? ... Surely, we have notbeenso bad as par· ents that we should be denied the minimum respect of a word of greeting at Christmas time. Whatis this unnatural satisfaction you take in makingus suffer so needlessly?14
 
−
These excerpts illustrate boch the self.pity that is characteristic of my mother and the evasive. euphemistic way of speaking chat is even more characteristic of her. Insults are dcsaibed as correction or criticism..." abuse is described as "fighting" or "difference ofopinion." Of course, when a parent heaps vicious insults on the head of his or her fourteen-year-old kid. it's not a "fight," it's justabuse. It's worth notingthat my mother never in any ofher letters denied thefaas that I alleged. She never denied that she frequently screamed at me, or that she and my father used to say that I had "the mind of a rwo-year old," that they called me "sick" and "a creep," or that when I talked back in response to their insults they often shouted at me, "Speak respectfully to your parents or we'll throw you out of the house." My mother merely evaded the issue by dcsaibing this treatment in euphemistic terms; or she would say that her and my father's behavior toward me was a "mistake," as if they didn't realize that it is extremely painful for a kid to have bis parents shout such things athim.
 
−
Of course, I don't claim that I took it all like a lamb. I would shout insults at my parents, too. For instance, I used to call my mothera "fat pig... But in the end I always lost the verbal battlesbecause my parents had all the power and I had none; and moreover a kid is far more vulnerable to insults from bis parents than vice versa. lt would have been easier if rd had a strong peer group to which to retreat, but, as we've already seen, I was an outcast amongmy schoolmates.
 
−
My mother's implication that I was unable to apologize (which by the way is not rrue) is ironic, to say the least. What I needed in order to forgive my parents was precisely an apology from dttm-a good. clean, heartfelt apology reflecting genuine remorse, with acknowledgment that theirtreat­ment of me was not due to "mistakes.. or "ignorance" but to the fact that they used me as a butt on which to take out their feelings of hostility or frustration. The longer they refused to give me such an apology. the more they built up my frustration and anger toward them. I made this clear to them, but they were just too self-centered and too self-righteous to apolo­gize fully and honestly.
 
−
What especially used to anger me were my mother's repeated attempts to portray my rcscn~cnt of my parents as the result of ''that hospital experience":
 
−
... Some arc unable to controlhatred, to overcome it. Why? "Yours, I think, I am convinced, has ics sourcein yourtraumatic hospital experience."14
 
−
This was one of the gimmicks that my motherusedover and over again in an effort to evade responsibility for hertreaanent of me, and (alongwith her usual tendency to exaggerate) it was her motive for dramatizing and distorting the "hospital experience .. outofallproportion.
 
  
−
I N D B c E M B B R I 9 8 5 orJanuary r986 my brother wrote me, "I know you arc estranged from our parents."11 Again in a letter of late January 1986, he referred briefly to my estrangement from our parcnts.16 On March r5, r986, I wrote to my brother as follows:
+
Emerican Johnson
−
I’d like to make some comments on my reasons for hating our parents. First. I'll quote some passages from a letter that mother sent me about Christmas time, r984,
 
−
J\.ll families have their fights.... But most of us are able to forgive. ...• ·• '[Your hatred] I think, I am convinced. has its source in your traumatic hospital experience in your first year of life.· ... '' 'Somehow you were never able to overcome thac embedded distrust of the people around you:
 
−
I could quote some other accusations from that letter, but the above I think is enough to make the point. Which is, that our parents will not accept any blame for the way they treated me during my teens. Any resent­ment I have toward them they attribute to there being something wrong with me. 'That hospital experience' that mother always likes to dredge up is very convenient for them because ic's something that was beyond their con­trol. Of course, if my resentment of them was caused by that apcricnce, then it remains to be explained why I never resented thcm·bcforc my teens.; (By the way. I don't know how severe 'that hospital apcrience' accually was. but it's a safe bet that mother's account of it is considerably exagger­ated-you know how she always does engg=-ate whenever she is emotion­ally involved in something. and Dad will generally back her up against any third party.}"
 
−
When she mentions 'fights' in the first passage quoted above she is referring to my complaints about their having applied to me such epithets as 'another Eugene P.,' 'a acep,' 'sick.' 'mind of a tw0-year old.' etc. The term 'fight' here is hardly appropriate, since it implies some sort of rough equality of power between the 2. combatants. If a 200-lb. bully bears up a c.o-pounder you don't call that a fight, it's just abuse. The same applies when parents shout the most cutting sort ofinsults at a I4 or 15-year old kid who is in their power. It is easy for t1ttm to talk about forgiveness-they don't have much to forgive, since they always won what they choose to call the 'fights'; they finished them by sending me up to the attic or by shouting 'speak respec:tfully to your parents or we'll throw you out of the house.' Mother's calling these things 'fights' is one of her typical evasions and an illustration of our parents' self.righteousness. They will admit to having 'made a mistake' and things of that sort, but they will never admit the real reasons for their behavior toward me: first, that they were too lazy to make the effort needed co exercise sclf·restrainc; second, they evidently had cer· rain frustrations or irritabilities. and I was a convenient target on which they could vent these. [n later years, if they had felt and expressed a real sense of remorse and regret about these things I probably would have for­given them. But as you can sec from the passages I quoted above, their sclf­righceousness is incorrigible. Far from having any sense of having been in the wrong, they attribute all problems to there being something wrong withme.17
 
−
At this point in the letter there follows the passage that I quoted above on p. ;;, beginning "[A]bouc 3 years ago...•" The letter then continues:
 
−
Certainly [mother's 1982. apology] conveyed no sense of remorse; and very likely it was something she said merely in order to get me to soften towards them, since her lacer letter, from which I quoted above, reveals the same old self-righteous attitude. A3 for Dad, from him I never had any shadow or hint of an apology.18
 
−
In his answer to this letter, my brother wrote, in lace March or early April 1986:
 
−
I am venturing to discuss our family and our childhood, focussing mainly on your relations with the parcncsl9.... [A]lthough I aclcnowlcdgc that Mom and Dad performed their role as parents in many respects very stupidly and poorly in relation co you, ncvmhelcss they were quite good parents co me2°.... I don't believe at this point that their motives for treat· ing you badly were the motives of a bully. ... I have also heard mother's interpretation of your childhood trauma, and ... I couldn't ·help feeling struck by the number of correspondences between the theory and some of the fiuniliar tendencies of your pcrsonalityl1 .••• (It's not dear what the· ory" my brother is referring to here. He is not learned in psychology.] Any­way-regarding the the.cry of your supposed trauma as a whole-I have felt for some years that it has, or might have some bearing on your feelings toward the parents. I have also cautioned them against using it as a moral escape hatch, since in some ways their treaancnt of you (for instance, threatening to throw you out of the house, i.e. to abandon you again) was the absolute worst they could have ~nc. At this they say. 'if only we had known!' and their eyes become sorrowful and a little scared. Ifyou have any doubts about their feelings of guilt, you should sec them then. ...22
 
−
This brings me to the point of acknowledging ... that I believe Mom and Dad's sins as parents toward you were real and not mel'C!y the products of your imagination. I confess that at first I didn't think so, and Ido still tend to think that some of your complaints are overstated. but I have also been searching my memory and I can recall some scenes that are painful to remember (how much more painful for you!) given my affection for them.23 ... I don't think a reconciliation can begin without a full and plain acknowledgment of the parents' errors-in other words, no more shoving things under the rug.24 .•• Their feelings of failure are mixed up with their feelings of resennnent toward you (since you have refused to acknowledge their good qualities along with the bad)2S .... Dad told me that once he wrote an apologetic letter to you ... and all he got back was a short reply which he interpreted as spuming his overture and apology-26.... I suspect your intelligence and emotional complc=ty made you a very difficult"· child-far moreso [sicJ than me-fora parent to deal with. ... You remem­ber primarily the humiliations and the threats, but I remember times when mother ... cried to give you sympathy and find out what was malting you unhappy. (Although. as must be admitted ... she would have refused to accept the a-uth. had you been able to tell her.)27 ... One of the most com­mon tendencies I have observed is for a parent to trJ to humiliate a child into behaving in what he considers to be the proper way. It's the last ugly resort of parental authority and I have seen it clutched at many times in families outside of our own.28 ••• The job is the parents' to apologize..But I. think you are a han:l man if you close your heart to forgiveness against the day when they may someday do so.29
 
−
... I hate to think that at times our family may have organized itself according to the pattern of 3 against I. [That is, mother. father, and Dave againstTcd.r3o
 
−
My brother's letter was quite well-intentioned and conciliatory. but it nevertheless made me very angry. My anger arose partly from certain pas­sages (not quoted above) of his letter and from certain aspects of his accus­tomed style of argument that will be dealt with later. But most of all my anger arose from bis partial acceptance of my mother's theory of the hos­pital experience,"" and especially from the fact that throughout his letter he followed my mother's procedure of portraying my parents' trcannenc of me as well-intentioned but mistaken; whereas it was obvious that their ver­bal cruelty arose notfrom good but misguided intentions, but from uncon­trolled anger. My own anger was of course intensified by frustration at the failure of my attempts to get other members of the family to acknowledge the trUth about the abuse."
 
−
Yee there was no doubt chat my brother's letter represented a kind­hearted etfort to make peace between my parents and me, and conscqucntly, while I e.'tprcsscd my anger to him, I kept it from getting out of hand. I wrote:
 
−
You son of a bitch. Your letter made me so mad that I was on the point of cutting off all communication with you forever. ... I got over being mad at you-or partly got over it-just in time.
 
−
Clearly you don't realize that every time I bring up that issue and someone says 'Oh, it's only cawe you were warped by ""that hospital experi­ence,""' all it does is make me more angry. ... 31"
 
−
OK, look. I'm still mad at you. I still haven't fully got over it. The only thingthat prevented me from sending you that letter cutting off all commu­nication for good was the fact that the night before I was going to send it I had a dream that brought to the surface my real feelings toward you­which arc soft and affectionate. Since I'm still mad, don't write to me for awhile (sic].... Later, when I get over being mad-say after a few montbs­I'll write to you again and then you can resume corresponding with me if you like. But don't ever argue with me about my relations with ourparents . . . . I flatly refuse to accept any contradiction on this point. No doubt this is unreasonable. But you'rejwtgoing to have to humor me ifyou want to get alongwith me.32.
 
−
Five days later I wrote my brother again:
 
−
I apologize for calling you a son of a bitch and other harsh language that I wed in my last letter. But, you know, I was mad. rm not mad any more.... But don't send me any letters for awhile [sic] yet. unless for some urgent reason cause ifyou start raking up all that old family scuff' you may justget me upset again. and havingjust got over being upset I don't feel like getting upset again for awhile [sic] yet. Later on we can discuss some of these things further if you want to.33 ..•
 
−
i'ou say Dad claims he once sent me an apology. I don't remember it.... [T]hac's not the kind of thing I would be likely to forget. ... [A]re you sure that you arc remembering correctly what [Dad] told you? .... I've noticed that from time to time you make errors of memory in your letters -unless it's my memory that's wrong. Example:
 
−
In your last letter you wrote 'When you saw the murdered babies in the Nazi camp ... you vowed to protect me at the expense of your own life .. .'"
 
−
As I remember it. I didn't refer to 'murdered' babies, but to kids who had been reduced to extreme emaciation through starvation. Also, I said that I decided to 'do anything I could to protect you'-1 don't think I said anything about 'at the expense of my own life.' Ifyou still have that letter you might look up the relevant passage and see which ofus is remembering more accurately.34
 
−
The letter in question has been preserved. and ic shows that my mem­ory was exactly right.3S It is typical of my brother to get his information garbled. We will sec other examples of this later.
 
−
That my father never gave me an apology is confirmed by a note that he sent me within a couple of weeks of the foregoing letter of mine to my brother. This note dealt with another matter that we will consider lacer. For the moment. let it suffice to say that he wrote:
 
−
The last couple of years have been painful. Your rejection of us. we feel. is unfair. uncalled for and at the least shows lack of understanding, tol· crance or a sense of family.36
 
−
The sclf..righteous attitude shown here by my father is hardly consistent with my brother's claim that he once apologized to me. My brother never repeated that claim. He had probably made it on the basis of a misunder­standingor misrememberingofsomething my father bad said.
 
−
After receiving my father's note I quoted it in a letter to my brother (April 30, 1986) and commentedas follows:
 
−
Their sclf..rightcousness is aaually funny! ... Note where the old son of a bitch accuses me of a lack of understanding and tolerance! When I was a kid. ifI annoyed him he would insult me in the most cutting way ... and now he accuses nu: of a 'lack of understanding and tolerance'!! ... Not that I claim to be understanding and tolerant. But it's like a thief who steals something from somebody and then accuses his victim ofdishonesty. . ..
 
−
Can you wonder at the fact that I won't forgive them? Ifthey had ever shown any remorse, any sense of having mistreated me and wanting to make up for it. I might have forgiven them. But ... itis quite dear that they will never change. So you might [as] well give up the idea that there will ever be reconciliation between me and them."
 
−
You claim to have seen 'guilt' expressed in their faces during discus­sions of this subjeet. I don·c believe it! How can you square it with the tone of that letter[my fathcr·s note] . . . r37
 
−
In yet another letter I commented again on my brother's letter of lace March or early April I986:
 
−
[Y]ou give a list of traits of mine that you imagine arc caused by my supposed 'trauma• in the hospital. The trouble with your theory is that you didn't know me till I was older and already affi:ctcd by our parents' mis· trcaancnt and by the badsituationin school after I skipped a grade. Most of those traits I did not have as a very young child. Of course, you can always speculate about delayed-action crauma-tbis psychoanalytic crap is flexible enough so that you canjustify anythingyou want to believe. Butsince thCl'C arc dear reasons in my later childhood for my developing such traits, these arc the more likely cause. You don•t realize that the atmosphere in our" home was quite different during the first few years of my life than it was later.... Also, after l skipped a grade. I was subjected to certain humilia­tions in school.38 .. .''
 
−
There was no further discussion in the family correspondence of my parents' creatment of me until shortly after my father's death on October 2, 1990. On October 13 of that year [wrote co my brother:
 
−
I haven't shed any tears over our father's death-you know how'1 felt about him. I must say, though. that r feel very sorry for our moth~ All this must be a severe blow to her. I never resented her quite as much as I resented Dad. I had to cake a lot of verbal abuse from both of them during my teens, but, while Dad was always rather cold to me during that period, Mother often made up for the abuse with warmth and affection at other timcs.39"
 
−
On the same date I wrote my mother a letterin which I said practically the same thing and added. '"If you'd like co be reconciled and resume corre­spondence with me, I am willing."'40 My mother and I did resume corre­spondence, but the abuse issue was not discussed untilJanuary 1991. About December I990, my mother had sent me an autobiography41 that covered her life up to age ten, together with a letter from my aunt Freda (my mother's sister)42 that substantiated her account of the gross physical abuse she had suffered. In a letter ofJanuary 15 I commented as follows:
 
−
1 read your family history with gteat interest. ... [O]n a number of occasions in the past when I've heard you recount incidents that I myself had wimessed, your stories were very in.accurate through beingovcrdrama­tizcd. Consequently I have no rational choice but to be skeptical about the accuracy of your history. I hasten to add that I don't doubt for a moment that your mother abused you very badly. and rm even prepared to assume that the abuse was, in a general way. as bad as you depicted it, since that seems to be confirmed by Freda's lecc~ But for me it necessarily remains an open question to what extent your account is accurate in detail Of course, quite apart from your_penchant for dramatization, a~~'s long·term memories may contain inaccuradcs.
 
−
One might possibly sec a connection between the physical abuse you suffered as a kid and the psychological abuse you inflicted on me during my teens. The psychologists claim that people who abuse their kids arc usually people who were abused themselves as kids. I don't know to what extent this is actually true-there is a lot of B.S. that gets peddled in the name of psychology. And Dad didn't fit that pattern-he inflicted as mU:ch verbal abuse on me as you did. 43 yet I never heard anything that would indicate he ever suffered any abuse himselt: rn fairness to you I should add that I always felt you were a good motherto me during my early years. Itwas when I was around 8 years old that your behavior and the family atmosphere began to deteriorate....
 
−
Actually, though, youjudge your mother too harshly. Bearin mind that thee at? no perfect pamits . . . 44 or perfect childmt, either. & you have reminded me several timcs:·4s
 
−
In reply to this letter my motherwrote:
 
−
I'm very sorry you have such bad memories of me during your teen years. I guess Ijustwasn'tthegoodparentlthoughtl couldbe. It's amazing chat you turned out so well in spite of those traumatic scars.46"
 
−
Obviously. my mother's description of me as "having turned out so well.. is inconsistentwith the crap thatshe and my brotherhave recently fed · the media to the effect that the f.unily always saw me as a distwbed sicko.
 
−
On January:22 I wrote to my mother:
 
−
I should acknowledge that your mother apparently treated you a lot worse than you treated me. (But that still doesn't excuse the way you treated me during my teens....)47
 
−
On30 my mother replied:
 
−
I flinch every time you remind me of your unhappy teen years. Was I that horrible? rm sorry. Can't you believe that we loved you very much even when we showed very angry amiow disapproval? I never realized how ourinsensitivity hurtyou.48
 
−
Observe that my mother persisted in descnbing their treatment of me in euphemistic terms ( .. disapprovalj, and still refused to face up to the fact that the abuse consisted of verbal aggression that was intendd to hurt. On June 5, I99I she wrote me:
 
−
Several times in your lettcrS during the winter you mentioned that you would later expand on the hum I inflicted on you during your teen·age years. I mentioned to you chat I winced ever,time you made this comment in your letters. After chat you no longer referred to your adolescent pain.
 
−
... If you feel the need to unburden yourself please do so.... What· ever scupid mistakes w~ made, Dad and I loved you very much.""49"
 
−
She still referred to the abuse as "mistakes." Maintaining her pretense that her mistreatment of me consisted in well-intentioned errors rather than in outbursts of angerand aggression. she wrote me onJune 2t:
 
−
I don·c like co make anybodyfeel bad: (Ezcept, ofcourse, my kids ...in the interest[mistakenly so] ofcorrcaion anddiscipline.)'0 The bracketed ''[mistakenly sor is in the original as written by my mother. OnJulys I wrote her a longletter about my grievance against the family:
 
−
Not long ago you invited me to write to you about my 'adolescent pain,' as you called it. I'm going to do so now. ...51
 
−
In your note ofJune 21 you wrote, 'I don't like to make anybody feel bad. (Except, of course, my kids when they were young in the interest [mis­takenly so] of correction and discipline.)'"
 
−
The more you resort to rationalizations and evasions to ercuse your trcaancnt of me, the more I hate you. The insults you heaped on me were not honest but mistaken attcmpa at discipline, they were just uncontrolled outbursts of anger. Often the anger was not even a response to my behav­ior, since in many cases you would scream at me on the most trivial provo­cations. You once wrote me that your trcaancnt of me was 'not malicious.' [t wasn't calculatedly malicious. But the things you said to me were certainly full of malice. You can't possibly claim that you didn't know that the things you said to me would be painful You said them because you knew they would be painful-your angry outbursts against me were aas of~ and were intfflded to cause pain. By no stretch of the imagination can it be supposed that you actually believed this sort of thing to constitute a ratio­nal system of discipline.
 
−
There is no evidence whacever that you attempted to restrain your temper toward me. 1 can remember no instance in which you ever apolo­gized for your behavior to me and only one instance in which Dad ever did so."
 
−
So quit trying to evade responsibility for your behavior by claiming chat what you did was the result of 'mistakes' or 'misunderstanding.' You were simply using me as a defenseless butt on which to take out your frustrations......,2
 
−
After extensive expressions of grief over my problems with social adjustment, and especially over my difficulty in making advances to women, I concluded:
 
−
In one of your letters you gave me a little lecture about how I should 1eam to forgivc.·53 It's..easy for you to preach, especially when you expea to be the beneficiary o(the forgiveness. But I don't notice that you arc par­ticularly anxious to forgive your own parents.'"" I hate you. and 1will n~ forgive you, because the harm you did me can neverbe undone. "":S:S"
 
−
I was worked up emotionally when I wrote the foregoing. It would ha~ been more accurate to say that the reason I wouldn't forgive her was that she had always refused to accept, fully and honestly. responsibility for the way she had treated me.
 
−
At any rate, my motheranswered me onJuly I2ina letter full ofself.jus­tification and attempts to throw on me the blame for my problems with social adjusnnent. As usual. she tried to explain everything as a conse­quence of "that hospital experience."
 
−
How can parenrs convince a child that they have always loved him­ncvcr. never rejected him? . . . Could your terrible feclings of insecurity stem from chose traumatic fears of abandonment when you had to be left ac the hospital at an emotionally critical stage in your infancy? I remember yelling in anger at Dave because he bad the bad habit of teasing you. I remember a couple of bad quarrels with Dave. but he seems to love us and not blame us for'shouting' at him.
 
−
... [Y]ou don't seem to remember how eagerly I welcomed any one" chat came over to visit you. But you rejected everyone who aicd to be your friend. Remember ... Loren [De] Young... ? •.• I could never convince you ­to be kinder and more tolerant of the many people who made ovcrrurcs to you. You always arrogantly pushed people away ..• t went back to school and embamd on a new career in my fifties. Why can't you? I am deeply sorry for whatever way I have hurt you. but I have always loved you ...
 
−
... [Y]ou would have to ... be a kinder, gentler person. less vengeful" whenever people don't measure up to your expectations. usti The foregoing letter was quickly followed by another in which my mother continued in the same vein: "[S]ec aside your tendency to arrogance and bossiness, which probably is a cover up for shyness and awkwardness. And don't push people away when they make overtures. Be patient! You get angry too easily at slights. Be gentle and kind. . . . Be Jcmd, be 1cmd, be 1rind, and you'll have plenty of friends.
 
−
I love you, dear son •... Aie you going to let memories of adolescent difficulties immobilize you?17
 
−
Certain pro fonna expressions of love and sympathy notwithstanding, the tone of my mother's letters was essentially cold and aitical. This was chc way she answered my a:y from the heart, and it was typical of the way in which, ever since my earliest adolescence. she had responded to every attempt I made to discuss any problems I might have. In.stead of sympathy I got cold and often unjust criticism.
 
−
Shortly after receiving these letters. I wrote a notc58 which I kept with the letters and in which I rebutted some of the irrationalities they contain, including the portrait that my mother painted of my personali~ I will not bore the reader by reproducing this rebuttal here, but will merely mention a few points as CDinples.
 
−
She claims they always loved me. Yes, they did love me-in the same way that a small child loves his teddy bear. When he's in a good mood he cuddles his teddy bear, but when he's in a bad mood he doesn't hesitate to kick his teddy bear around.59 …
 
−
(S]he argues that Dave does not resent ourparenrs for shouting at him. Bue while they occasionally vented their ill-temper at Dave, they vented it on meFquently. Moreover, I never heard them inflict on Dave the kind of cut­ting. vicious insulrs that they inflicted on me 60 ....
 
−
My mother asserts that I "rejected'' or "pushed away" various people. For the most part her assertions make no sense. For example, Loren DeY­oung (mentioned in my mother's letter) was one of the high-status boys among my high-school classmates; he was a decent fellow who tolerated me with little or no condescension, but he certainly never made any over­tures of friendship to me, nor did I ever in any sense reject him.61
 
−
My mother says she "went back to school and embarked on a new career" in her fifties. Indeed she did. But, characteristically, she didn't stay with it very long. She became a high-school English teacher but quit after two years because, she said, the job was too stressful. A media report describes her teaching as inadequate, 62 but I don't know whether it was or not, given the unreliability of the media.
 
−
My mother wrote, "I am deeply sorry for whatever way I hurtyou." She was still refusing to face up to the fact of the abuse: The word "whatever" indicates that the way she hurt me is something indefinite and unknown, and even casrs doubt on whether she hurt me at all
 
−
After receiving the foregoing letters from my mother, I wrote my brother an emotional letter63 in which I begged him to persuade my mother to stop writing to me because I could no longer endure the anger and frustration that she caused me. With the copy of this letter that I kept in the cabin I put a note in which I wrote:
 
−
Concerning the foregoing letter ... :
 
−
Quite intentionally. I grossly exaggerated my real feelings. I did this because Dave is so inert _and passive that I figured that in order to be sure of getting any action out of him I had best lay it on pretty thick."
 
−
Actually I was very upset after reading those two letters from my mother ....
 
−
I don't know how I ever got born into such a family of incapable, silly fools. When I broke off correspondence with my brother a couple of years ago, l felt so good to be rid of them! I felt dean and free! When, last Octo­ber, I resumed correspondence with my mother because I felt sorry for her after my father died, it gave me a kind ofsick feeling to be coming back into contact with that family again. I would compare it to a scene in the movie
 
−
African Quan. Humphrey Bogart gets out of the water and is horrified and disgusted to find himself covered with leeches. He sprinkles himself with salt and the leeches drop off. to his great relief. But after awhile [sic] he real­izes that he is goingto have to get backdown in the water again, among the leeches. Well, that's the kind of feeling I had about getting back into con­tact with my rotten family again. So I'm glad now to be breaking off with that family once and for all.64"
 
−
Having learned through long experience that my brother was inaccessible to reason, I had reluctantly decided to play on his emotions, and it worked. Dave did intervene with my mother. At first, however, he did not do so forcefully enough to stop her from writing to me. Within about three weeks she sent me a letter and three postcards, one of which said, "I am · deeply. deeply sorry for having hurt you,"65 and nothing more. For once, no evasions, excuses, or accusations. It was beginning to sound like a real and honest apology, but by that time it was too late. I wanted no more con­tact with my stinking family. I sent my brother a second emotional lettet66 in response to which he must have intervened more forcefully with my mother, because she did stop writing to me, apart from one or two minor relapses over the next couple of years.
 
−
tedious. It docs, however, establish clearly that my brother and mother understood the significance of the way my parents had treated me, and that they knew it was highly important to me to have that treatment acknowledged.67
 
  
−
Chapter 5
+
=== A Message From ''The International Magazine'' ===
  
−
Pressure to achieve; Harvard; how people saw me prior to my arrest
+
''The International Magazine'' began in 2020 to connect international socialist movements and to strengthen the voice of oppressed people across the globe. We have been following the work of Vietnamese communists in their unique path towards peace, prosperity, and the construction of socialist values with a keen eye and much interest. It is with this spirit of international solidarity and a deep desire to learn from and share wisdom from our comrades around the world that we celebrate the release of this First English Edition of The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism-Leninism Part 1: The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism-Leninism.
  
−
Ch ap t e r 5 I I H Av B At RB A o Y described in Chap­ter 3 (p. 44) how news of my high IQ score filled my motherwith grandiose fantasies of what I was goingto accomplish to the glory ofthe family. From that time until I left for Harvard she put me under considerable pressure to achieve academically. In this she was abetted by Lois Skillen, the guidance counselor at Evergreen Park Community High School. & I wrote in my I979 autobiography,
+
Ho Chi Minh once said: “In order to build socialism, first and foremost, we need to have socialist people who understand socialist ideology and have socialist values.”
−
[Skillen] was not very old, but too homely to hope for marriage. She developed a maternal crush on me. By that I mean that she became em<r tionally involved with me as a substitute for the son of her own that she would have liked to have. I hated her.
 
−
I believe she was the one who put my parents onto the idea that I should go to Harvard. and I think she impressed them with the high stan­dards I would have to U~ up to in orderto go there. I wouldget all this crap from my parents, 'Miss Skillen says this and that and the other.· A couple of times itwas, 'Miss Skillen says you're behaving too immaturely in the class­room. You won't get into Harvard if etc. etc. etc.' On a couple of other occasions, when Ibrought home a report card with all Ks except for one B,1 my parents sat me down in the living room and gave me a solemn little lec­ture (in which my mother tookthe lead]."
 
−
We don't wantyou to think thatwe feel this is abad report card. Actu­ally, it's a very good report card. We don'twantyou to feel that we're putting any pressure on you. It's just that we feel you're not working up to the level of your ability. We feel that you're capable of getting all Ks. If you want to get into Harvard, etc., etc.'
 
−
Actually, I didn't give a f.--k about whether I got into Harvard. But I had to pretend to be interested in all that aap just so as not to shock my parents. Acrually I did sometimes feel a half-hearted interest in it, but I never had any enthusiasm for it. ...
 
−
During my last couple of years of high-school, I became convinced (correctly] that my parents, Miss Skillen, and some of my teachers were pushing the idea of a scientific career for me not because they had ratio­nally concluded that this was best for me, but because this satisfied their own emotional needs. Either it would vicariously gratify their own craving ­for scholarly glory, or.it would gratify their egos to get their pupil or their son into a prestigious career. Of course, all these people had real affection for me, and they persuaded themselves that they were 'guiding' me for my own good. But their motives were essentially selfish ...."
 
−
J\ftcr rdbeen in college for a year, I happened to visit the high-school ... Mr. H_ci, the Assistant Supcrintendant [sic] ... said to me, 'You should come and sec Miss Skillen some time. It would mean a great deal to her.' He repeated this a couple of times. Therefore I took satisfaction in NOT coming co sec Miss Skillcn."2
 
−
Not only was I expected to be an academic achiever, I was expected never to show any faults or weaknesses in other areas either, because that would have interfered with the pride that my parcn~cially my mother-tookin me. rve already mentioned this in Chapter3 (p. so). Itwas my mother's craving for status that was behind the bigpush to get me into Harvard. I would have preferred to go to Oberlin.
 
−
Publicly my brother has denied this picture of my parents' exploitation of my talents. From the 60 Mimltu interview:
 
−
MIKE WALLACE: Let me just read a little bit from one letter that [Ted] sent ... 'SO, GENERALLY, IF I EXPERIENCED ANY FAILURE OR SHOWED ANY-WEAKNESS, I FOUND THAT I COULDN'T COME TO YOU FOR SYMPATHY. YOU WERE SIMPLY USING ME AS A DEFENSELESS BUTT ON WHICH TO TAKE OUT YOUR FRUSTRATIONS. I WAS SUPPOSED TO BE YOUR PERFECT LITTLE GENIUS.'
 
−
DAVID KACZ¥NSKI: Mike, this is not the fam-samc family that I grew up in, that he grew up in. This is not the same mother that he's describing here. This is-thisis a fiction or a fantasy.""3"
 
−
According to the New Yorle Times, my brother told interviewers that a certain letter from me was an "indictment of [our] parents, accusing them of being 'more interested in having a brilliant son than seeing that son happy and fulfilled.' " The article continues:
 
−
Was it a valid accusation? 'No', David said, 'I believe he may very well believe that. When he decided to end his career after they invested so much of themselves... .' 4
 
−
The three dots at the end arc in the original; if Dave ever finished his sentence, the New York Times did not report it.
 
−
Herc my brother's own words hint at his untruthfulness. What does he mean in saying that my parents "investedso much of themselves?" He can't be referring to financial investment; since I had a scholarship, putting me through Harvard placed no great strain on my parents' finances; and I earned my own way through graduate school. I certainly did all the acade­mic work myself. my parents didn't know enough to have assisted me with that even if they bad wanted to. Media reports that my mother helped me to undentand articles from the Scifflti.ftc Ammcan arc ludicrous-my mother doesn't know as much science as the average fifth-grader. So what did my parents "invest of themselves?" My brother can only be referringto their emotional investment in my achievements, and to the fact that they pushed me during my high-school years. Maybe the reason why he didn't finish his sentence was that he suddenly realized he was revealing what he didn't want to reveal. Earlier he had told the FBI:
 
−
TED was interested in attending Oberlin College in Ohio. TED's par­ents insisted that TED enroll in Harvard because of the prestige....Al far as DAVE could recall, his parents insisted thatTED attend Harvard, but did not pressure TED into majoring in math.5
 
−
In a 1986 letter to me my brother wrote:
 
−
The fact of your unhappiness was consistently shoved under the rug, consistently eclipsed (in [our parcnts1 own eyes and other's [sic]) by the glory of your intellectual achievements. In effect, they made their child carry the burden, ora good partoftheburden, of theirself-deceptions.H 6
 
−
Further along in the same letter my brother wrote, somewhat incon­sistently:
 
−
Once you said that many ofthe nice things the parents did for us were" attributable to the desire to fulfill their ambitions vicariously. but I doubt if this is true when you consider how little shit they gave us overdroppingout of the mainstream... .H
 
−
Actually. my mothergave me a greatdeal of "shit" overdroppingout of the mainstream, but my brother wasn't around to sec it. rn have more to say about that later.
 
−
One of my father's closest friends was Dr. Ralph K. Meister. They knew each other for more than fifty years. lnvestigators working on my case interviewed Dr. Meister concerning my family background, and I have before me a copy of a declaration that he signed for them on February 2, r997. It strongly supports my account of our family life as opposed to my brother's, but it is heavily affected by the phenomenon of "remembering later years" (see the Introduction, pp. 10, 13-14) and only with that reserva­tion can I quote from it.
 
−
Dr. Meister states:
 
−
Wanda put pressure on TeddyJohn to be an intellectual giant almost from the day he was born. She was obsessed with his intellectual develop­ment."8
 
−
My motherdid take an interest in my intellectual development from my birth, but in reality she was not obsessed with it, nor did she put any unusual pressure on me to achieve, until after Miss Frye foolishly told her that I had the potential to be "another Einstein ...
 
−
Wanda longed for the statw and the respect associated with the intel­lectual world. Maintaining an intellectual image for herself and for herfun. ily was paramount for Wanda."9
 
−
It was as if being a successful intellectual and a good student was all that Wanda wanted him to do. She seemed to have only an intellectual invesnnent in TeddyJohn.1°[True after contactwith Miss Frye.]
 
−
He was under intense pressure to meet Wanda's expeetations of intel­lectual achievement and was able to offer resistance to this pressure only to a very limited extent. Teddy John was also afraid to tell Wanda about emo­tional problems or difficulties he encountered with his peer group because that would have caused a rent in the picture she had of her son.11 (Again, this was true only after Miss Frye encouraged my mother to have a grandiose conception of my abilities.) ... times, Wanda lost control and verbally abused him."11
 
−
The fact that my mother had intellectual ambitions maylead the reader to assume that she was the studious, thoughtful, self-disciplined type of person that we associate with intellectualism. In reality. while she was always very careful to maintain a facade of respectability toward the out­side world, within the family her behavior during this period was coarse, unrestrained. and slatternly. She disgusted me. As I wrote in my r979 auto­biography:
 
−
[MJy parents allowed themselves to get considerably overweight. My mother's behind became really enormous.
 
−
My mother let herself go, not only physically. but psychologically. She" lost herdignity."13
 
−
AT AGE r 6 , in the fall of 1958, I went to Harvard. I had had no partic­ular enthusiasm for going there, but once I got there it was a tremendous thing for me. I got something that I had been needing all along without knowing it, namdy. hard work requiring self-discipline and strenuous exer­cise of my abilities. I threw myself into this with great enthusiasm.... I thrived on it.... Fedingthe strength of my own will, Ibecame enthusiastic about will-power....14
 
−
The foregoing is from my 1979 autobiography. Acrually. I think my favorable reaction to Harvard was due at least as much to the fact that it represented a liberation from the sordid environment of my home as to the intdlectual challenge that it provided. As long as I was living with my family I found it cxtremdy difficult to exercise any will-power, but when I escaped from that stultifying atmosphere I suddenly discovered, to my delight, that I had plenty of will-power. It is a remarkable fact that over the years-even twenty years later-whenever I returned to live for a time with my family. I felt that my will-power and self-discipline quickly drainedaway. and t did not recover them until I again removed myselffrom that environment.
 
−
ln view of my parents' theory that I had an abnormal fear ofbeingsep­arated from them, it is worth noting that I adjusted to being away from home more easily than many college freshmen do: I suffered from home­sickness for about the first two weeks, and then I recovered from it com­pletdy and permanently.1.5' ·
 
−
Thus Harvard was very good for me in c~ain ways; but in relation to my poor social adjustment it was one of the worst schools that could have been chosen for me. In a letterof May 16, 1991 to my mother I wrote:
 
−
There was a good deal of snobbery at Harvard. Of course there were people there from all walks oflife, but apparently the system there was run by people who came from the 'right' cultural background. This certainly seemed to be the case at:Eliot House, anyway. The house master.John Fin­ley. apparently was surrounded by an in-group or clique, and the people who got to participate in the Christmas play. for example, always seemed to be of the type who would fit in with the clique. The house master often treated me with insulting condescension. He seemed to have a particular dislike for me. I used to think that this was merely because I made no attempt to wear the 'right' clothes or to ape Harvard manners. but now I wonder whether plain old-fashioned class snobbery, in the strict sense of the word, might not have had something to do with it. Not long ago I read
 
−
FDR: a remembrance' [sic] byJoseph Alsop. Alsop had connections with the Harvard set, and he stated in that bookthatin r955 John F. Kennedy was not permitted to become a member of the Harvard Board of Overseers because he was an Irish Catholic. Since I entered Harvard 3 years later, in 1958, it seems probable that a good deal of class snobbery must still have existed at Harvard at that time.16"
 
−
(For whatever it may be worth, several classmates of mine who have been interviewed by my investigators have confirmed the prevalence of snobbery at Harvard.)17 My mother answered me as follows:
 
−
I was angry, so angry. when I read your account ofhow those ignorant bastards at Harvard snubbed you.... You must have been a very strong character indeed to put up with those characters, to be angry at your bungling parents, and stillbe able to do so well academically.18
 
−
In a later letter (July5, 1991) I wrote my mother:
 
−
Harvard of course was very good academically. very stimulating intel­lectually. and it would have been alright for a kid of working-class origin who had good social skills and social self-confidence to start out with. The actual snobs were only a minority. The majority of students were upper· middle-class types and they formed a social environment that was not con­genial to a kid of working-class origin, but they were not necessarily snobs, and a kid of working-class origin who had good social skills could have found friends both among the upper-middle-class types and among the minority who were not upper-middle-class. But I had experiencedso much rejection both at home and in school that I had very little social sclf-confi­dence. As a result, when my first attempts to make friends met with a cool reception, I just gave up and became solitary.19
 
−
My social difficulties were compounded by the fact that my parents had repeatedly told me that I was "sick." Of course, I rejected this assessment, but at some level I at least partly believed it, the more so since I was frus. trated and often unhappy. In our society unhappiness tends to be equated with sickness, and this _was even more trUe in the 1950s than itis today. Dur· ing my later teens and for several years afterward I used to worry that peo­ple would think I was abnormal;ZO in fact, I often tended to assume that they did sec me that way.11 It is therefore interesting that, in reviewing the records of my teens and twenties, I find very rew indications that anyone saw me as having psychological problems; though such indications are not entirely absent.
 
−
Let's review all of the records I've found that indicate how people out­side the family sawmy personality. First, the medical records. We've already seen (in Chapter 3) the com­menrs in my University of Chicago medical records that were based on information provided by my mother. Here are the doctors' impressions of me based on their personal observation, beginningin February 1949 ( all rel­evant earlier ones were quoted in Chapter1):22
 
−
February 18, I949 ... Average size andweight for his age.
 
−
May 18, 1950 ... Average measurements for his age. Well built, lithe, (illegible] muscle.
 
−
May 8, 1951 ... Husky. alert, youngboy-friendly and cooperative ...
 
−
April 24, 1952 ... Slightly gangly. wiryboywhose height and weight are close to average for his age. He is quiet, intelligent, controlled and very cooperative.... Hearing. acute .... Eyes normal orbetter. ·~pril r,, 1953 ... Average size, slender, cooperative boy who seems quite well."""
 
−
April 27, 1954 .•• Average size [illegible] boy. ... Good general health.
 
−
April 14, 1955 . . . slender, intelligent boy, quite cooperative . . . Good health generally. "April 20, 1956 . . . Pleasant, rather serious, intelligent boy well into puberty. ... Vision 20/20-2 in each eye.... Good health." "June [?] 1957 ... Average measurements, slender, muscular, (illegible] boy. ... Vision 20'20 in each eye." '"-pril 21, 1958 ... Average size, muscular[?] [illegible] boy. ... Vision 20/20." "September 10, 1959 [when I was hospitalized with mononucleosis] … alert but somewhat slow to respond, oriented, cooperative."
 
−
September15, 1959 ... patientis a well-developed, young male ....
 
−
I've made a point of noting my 20/ 20 vision because it was reported by the New York Tima that one of my high-school classmates, Jerry Pcligrano, described me as "bespectacled. "23 Kids with 20/20 vision don't wear specta­cles. It's clear that Pcligrano has me mixed up with someone else. We shall sec later that many of the other stories told about me have similarly been based on mistaken identity.
 
−
On entering college thad a physical examination at the Harvard Univer­sity Health Services. The doctor reported that I had good posture, "strong masculine component" (whatever that means), 2.0/20 vision in the right eye, and 20I 15-2. in the left.24 He also filled out a multiple-choice form indicating his assessment of my personality. His opinion must have been based on an interview with me, though I do not remember this. The form consistedof a list of nine different areas in which the doctor was to rate the student from A to E, A being best and E worst. Here are the ratings he gave me:
 
−
I. Appearance and Manner
 
−
B. Good impression created. Attractive, mature for age, relaxed.
 
−
2. Speech
 
−
B. Talks easily. fluently and pleasantly.
 
−
3. Social Relations
 
−
C. Likes people and gets on well with them. May have many acquain­tances but makes his friends carefully. Prefers to be by himself part of the time at least. May be slightly shy.
 
−
4, Athletic interests and Participation
 
−
D. Little ability in organized athletics. May prefer individual or non­ contact sports or have inferior physical coordination. At best, he is a spectator.
 
−
5. Practical Motivations and Life Attitudes
 
−
B. Essentially a practical and realistic planner and an efficient worker.
 
−
Affairs usually run smoothly.
 
−
6. Aesthetic and Cultural Motivations and Life Attitudes
 
−
C. Cultural or aesthetic activity present, but definitely of a hobby nature rather than a primary urge in life.
 
−
7. Basic Personality Integration
 
−
A. Exceedingly stable, well integrated and feels secure within himself.
 
−
Usually very adaptable. May have many achievements and satisfactions.
 
−
8. War Service Adjustment (Left Blank)
 
−
9. College Adjustment
 
−
B. Good prospects for doing successfully in college but may have some minor difficulty either in studies or otherwise.
 
−
On the opposite side of the sheet. in a space provided for "Impression of the student as a person," the doctor wrote:
 
−
Pleasant young man who is below usual college entrance age. Appar­ently a good mathematician but seems to be gifted in this direction only. Plans not crystalized yet but this is to be expected at his age. Is slightly shy and retiring but not to any abnormal extent. Should be steady worker.25
 
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Now let's turn to my academic records. Report cards for the three years I ,pent at Evergreen Park Central School have been preserved. The cards list several behavioral traits. to wit: "Maintains a frienclly. courteous, coop­erative attitude," 'J\.ccepts praise and criticism to improve," "Is neat and orderly." "Treats others and their ideas with respect and courtesy." "Respects law and order," "Recognizes and carries out his share of responsi­bility." 'Works without annoying others," "Respects property," "Shows growth in self-discipline," 'i\rrives at class promptly with necessary materi­als," "Begins work promptly." "Plans and completes work to best of bis ability." "Concentrates on the job at hand," "Expects only a fair amount of attention," "ls attentive to directions," "Uses time to good advantage." A checkmark in a box next to any one of these items denoted a deficiency in the trait indicated. I got one and only one checlanark in my three years at Evergreen Park Central. It was in the third grading period of fifth grade, and it appeared next to "Concentrates on the job at hand." This probably referred to a tendency on my part to daydream in class.26
 
−
If my high-school report cards have survived, I don't have them. I do have a transcript of my high-school record, and it includes a list of behav· ioral traits, with boxes marked "high," "medium," and '1ow" next to each item. The boxes have been left blank except for my senior year. For my senior year the evaluations are:27
 
−
Scholarship High 4, Mediumx, Lowo
 
−
Leadership Higho. Meclium2, Low3
 
−
Cooperation Highx, Medium 4, Lowo
 
−
Dependability High 2, Medium 3, Lowo
 
−
Effort Highx, Medium 4, Lowo
 
−
Initiative High 2, Medium 3, Lowo
 
−
Punctuality High 3. Medium 2, Lowo
 
−
Loyalty High 1., Medium 3, Lowa
 
−
Courtesy High 2, Medium 3, Lowo
 
−
Honesty High 4, Medium 1, Lowa
 
−
Health High 2, Medium 3, Lowa
 
−
Personal Appearance High 1, Medium 1, Low3
 
−
Emotional Adjustment Higho, Medium 3, Low2
 
−
I take it that the numerals refer to the number of teachers, out of five, who gave me each rating. For example, three teachers out of five rated me as medium on emotional adjustment and two rated me as low. It's surpris­ing that the ratings for emotional adjustment weren't worse, considering how unhappy and frustrated I was at the time.
 
−
In support of my application for admission to Harvard, my high-school counselor, Miss Skillen, filled out a form28 in which, among other things, she was asked to rate me with respectto seven traits on a scale ofI to 9, best being 9 and worst 1. Here is how she rated me:
 
−
In terms of his ability to do satisfactory academic work at Harvard, how wouldyou rate the candidate?
 
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8 (exceptionally able) Considering only the student's interests, work habits and life goals, what arc the chances that he will be motivated to take full advantage of the edu­cational opportunities available to him at Harvard?
 
−
9 (practically certain) In comparison with his classmates, how would you rate the candidate in terms of energy, vigor, enthusiasm ordrive?
 
−
9 (outstanding) What arc the chances that this student will have personal or social problems which will hinder him from doing college work in line with his capabilities?
 
−
8 (very unlikely) In comparison with his classmates, how would you rate the candidate in terms of warmth and attractiveness of personality?
 
−
8 ( outstanding) In comparison with his classmates, how would you rate the candidate in terms ofhis sense of responsibility and concern for others?
 
−
8 ( outstanding) In comparison with his classmates, what is the quality of the candidate's workin English composition?
 
−
9 (outstanding)."
 
−
The form also included the question, "Is there any evidence chat the applicant is emotionally unstable? Yes--No--.'' Miss Skillen checked
 
−
The form listed a number of "special circumstances" to be considered in evaluating a candidate, with a box to be checked next to each item. One of the items was, "He has experienced more than normal emotional difficulty in growing up." Miss Skillen did not check the box next co this item. Thus she indicated her opinion that I did not have such difficulties.
 
−
The form provided a space for comments, and here is what Miss Skillen wrote: "Ted Kaczynski is beginning his third year of high-school. We plan to graduate him in the spring of r958 even though he has only been enrolled here for a period of three years. We have accelerated his schedule, and have encouraged enrollment in summer school so that he would be able to enter college earlier than he had planned. Since elementary school, Ted has been marked by superior ability, extreme versatility. and an intel­lectual vigor and soundness. His teachers have found him keenly curious, deeply devoted to one vocational goal, but still able to excel in all subjects. We have found him to be first and foremost a scientist in his thinking and in his goals. However, we have also found him to ~c an accomplished musician, interested in composition and theory of music. He comes from a very modest home, where he is allowed to buy books before anything else, and these factors have been tremendously encouragingto his intellec­tual development. Of all the youngsters I have worked with at the college level, I believe Ted has one of the greatest contributions to make to society. He is reflective, sensitive, and deeply conscious of his responsibilities to society. He is willing to thinkoriginally. andis willing to express his convic­tions. His only drawback is a tendency to be rather quiet in his original meetings with people, but most adults on our staff, and many people in the community who are mature find him easy to talk to, and very chal­lenging intellectually. He has a number of friends among high-school students, and seems to influence them to think more seriously. He has long been interested in Astronomy and is accomplished in this particular phase of science.29 One of his problems in college will be the large one of channeling his energies and his versatile interests into one major field of interest. He is supported completely by his family as he enters college, and I believe is a person we can recommend most highly and with great enthusiasm for any school which he might wish to enter. He shouldprofit most from the school which can provide him with many subject areas so that he may explore and enjoy the intellectual challenge evident in such a curriculum.
 
−
October 16-1957, Lois Skillen, Director of Counseling.28
 
−
I wouldn't dream of suggesting that anyone should take the foregoing seriously as a truthful representation of my personality. I think Miss Skillen was rather unscrupulous about the methods that she used to get me into Harvard. But her comments do demonstrate that she didn't see me as the kind of disturbed sicko that my brother and mother have recently por­trayed in the media. If she had seen me that way she wouldn't have been so enthusiastically bent onsending me to Harvard. (See Appendix7 for further evaluations by my high-school teachers.)
 
−
In connection with my application for admission to Harvard. I was interviewed by a certain Rudy Ruggles on May I, 1958. His report included only one sentence that saidanythingabout my personality:
 
−
This boy is obviously young. but heis verywell poised, expressed him­self well and gave the impression of being a fine boy.30
 
−
The interview form also included a rating on "personal qualities." On a scale of xto 6 (I best, 6 worst), Ruggles rated me 3, "Good above-average boy."30
 
−
When I first got to Harvard I felt myself under an obligation to try to make friends, because my parents had often criticized me for not being more social. But I soon found that I didn't fit in with the prep-school types by whom t was surrounded, so I gave it up as a bad job and went my own way. a way thatwas fairly eccentric.by Harvardstandards. During my fresh. man year I used to come to my room after supper and, while taking offthe coat and tie that were required in the dininghall, I would mutter a string of curses about the mountain ofwork I had to do. Then I would force myself to stay up studying until at least 2.:00 AM. Fresh linen was delivered to my door each week, but often I neglected to put the sheets on the bed and slept on the bare mattress. My mother had provided me with a suit, tic, sport coat, dress pants, and the like, but she'd given me only two pairs of wash­able pants, one of which was baggy and the other dose-fitting. I didn't like the fancy stuff and (except in the dining hall) wore only casual clothes. I wore the close-fitting pants six days a week and the baggy pants on the other day, when I washed the close-fitting pants.31 I didn't buy another pair of pants because I was sixteen years old, had never bought clothes for myself (my mother took care of that), and didn't quite know how to go about it. Eventually, towani the end of my freshman year. the dose-fitting pants wore out and I was forced to embark on the adventure ofbuying my own pants for the first time in mylife.
 
−
During that first year I was in a small dormitory (8 Prescott Street) that was reserved for brighter students, and I was not the only eccentric there. One kid seemingly never washed his hands, since they were always visibly filthy, yet he invariably wore a suit and tic. Another kid habitually told lies, and yet another kid hadvarious problems that we needn't describe here.
 
−
At any rate, my parents wrote me that someone had sent them a brochure from the Harvard mental-health services describing counseling available to students.32 They took this as a hint that I needed counseling and they seemed a little concerned. I wrote them back telling them that I was doing fine, and they did not refer to the matter again. I used to think that the dorm proctor, Francis £.X. Murphy. had sent them the brochure,32 but this seems doubtful in view of the relatively favorable evaluation of me that he wrote, to which I have recently gained access. Possibly the brochure was sent to all parents of Harvard freshmen as a matter of routine. How­ever that may be, Murphy wrote the following "Resident Freshman Advisor Report" on March 17, 1959:
 
−
A very quiet and retiring young man, Ted works almost constantly on his science courses. He seems to have no interests other than his work and although not unsocial, or unpleasant, isolates himself completely from all his classmates. He is an excellent trombonist, but is reluctant to join any Harvard musical groups. He is very immature and perhaps because of his age (he is only sixteen) he may feel himself apart. He docs not seem to mind being alone, and is very independent and well organized. I do not imagine that the prospect of room-mates is pleasing to him. but people who are friendly and reasonably quiet should be good for him. His lack of interest in anything other than science is reflected in the relatively poor grades he received in Humanities and Social Sciences. 33
 
−
That's the entire rcporc.34
 
−
The statement that I isolated myself from my classmates is not quite correct. It would be more accurate to say that my classmates isolated me. They never invited me to go anywhere with them or do anything with them, they never invited me to their rooms, they showed little or no interest in having conversations with me. As already noted, I did at first try to make friends with them, but they appeared unresponsive; which was not surprising. since their cultural world seemed very different from the one I had come from. This was rrue even of those who have recently told investigators thatthey camefrom a "working<lass" or"middle<lass" back­ground. At the time, I assumed most of them were "preppies,.. Because theirspeech, manners, and dress were so much more "cultured" than mine. There are, of course, people of working-class origin who ape the manners of the upper classes as soon as they get the chance.
 
−
As for my being "reluctant to join any Harvard musical groups," on arriving at Harvard I did try out for the band, and was accepted. But before playing even a single note with them I was required to attend a drill session in which we practiced marching in formation for football games (some­thing l had never had to do in the high-school band). I hated it. Since I was also concerned about whether the band would demand too much of the time I needed for studying. I resigned from it. The onlyother musical group l knew of that l could have joined was the orchestra, and orchestral trombone parts generally are very uninteresting. My teacher, Cimera, had always said that playing in a symphony orchestra would ruin a good trombonist.
 
−
So much for my freshman year. During my three subsequent years at Harvard I lived at Eliot House. In connection with my applications ~r renewal of my scholarship, John Finley. Master of the house, wrote two brief evaluations, one at the end of my sophomore year and the other at the end of myjunioryear:
 
−
Beyond achieving his fairly good record of an A, two B's and a C at midyears (the first and last respectively in Math. 2.0 and Physics I2C), Kaczynski's chief activity is to have grown a wispish beard and to practice the trumpet. [Sic; it was a trombone, not a trumpet.] Heis fairly good at it, and the mournful strains float down from the rooms above our house where he lives. He is pretty lonely. I fear, despite efforts of roommates, to whom I have spoken of him. (I was not aware of anyefforts" on thepart of my roommates.] One may sechim occasionally in the comer of the Dining Hall sitting with his back to the room. He is a year younger than many of his classmates [sic; actually two years] and may yet show the talent that might justify such isolation. Meanwhile, he remains pretty sad. Perhaps his life is brighter to him tlian it seems to others-I devoudy hope so.
 
−
June 7, 1960 J. H. Finley.35
 
−
His midyear performance of three Ks and a B (the Ks in Mathematics and Quine's Logic) begin to justify the curious act of imagination that got him here. For some reason one no longer hears this year the strains of his trumphet[sic] from ourtop floor, and the wispish beardhas vanished. He is still pretty lonely butless friendless than he was a year ago. He turned nine­teen only at the end of May and has had to overcome both youth and sim­ple upbringing. His excellent and mounting marks argue high inner strength; he should begin to find himself fully in Graduate School. All very gallant, touching. and memorable.
 
−
June 6, 1961 J. H. Finley.""35"
 
−
During my junior year at Harvard my faculty advisor was Professor Andrew Gleason of the mathematics department. Unlike many other fac­ulty advisors he did not merely rubber-stamp my course selections, and I had two or three extended conversations with him about my program. When I applied for admission to graduate school during my senior year I asked him for a recommendation, and he wrote:
 
−
My acquaintance with Kaczynski has been ratherslight: I have been his advisor but have never had him in class••.• He has always struck me favor­ably at the personal level. 36
 
−
The rest of Gleason's note discussed only my mathematical abilities and made no further mention of my personal qualities, so there is no need to reproduce it here. I had recommendations also from two other profes­sors,37 but they dealt exclusively with my mathematical abilities.
 
−
During my sophomore year I was talked into becoming a participant (against my better judgment) in a psychological study directed by the late Professor Henry A. Murray. Along with a couple of dozen other Harvard students, over a period of almost three years I went through a series of interviews and filled out many questionnaires.38 My brief1959 autobiogra­phy was written for Murray's group. The assessment arrived at by the psy­chologists would be very useful in determining how people saw my personality. but up to the present (March 14, 1998) the Murray Center at Radcliffe College has refused to release any of the psychologists' conclu­sions to my attorneys; and most of the individual psychologists involved have declined to cooperate with the investigators, who to my knowledge have obtained no information concerning any conclusions that were drawn about me. One wonders whether the Murray Center has something to hide. Anyway. all l know at the moment about the psychologisrs' conclu­sions is that I was included in an "ideologically alienated" group that was discussed by Kenneth Keniston in his book~ Uncommitted.
 
−
A note of caution to people who might think they can get information about me by reading Kcniston's book: Statcmcnrs made by Keniston about his alienated group were evidently intended to describe the tendencies of the group as a whole, and werenotmeant to apply to each individual mem­ber of the group. Many of his statements arc not true when applied to me personally. I am speaking of factual statements, not of interpretations or of theories about unconscious motivations. For example, according to Kcniston, members of his alienated group reported a "strong sense of cosmic outcastncss ... (and] self-estrangcment."3!1 I have never had or reported any such feelings.
 
−
I wrote my motherin I991:
 
−
One of the psychologists who participated in [the Murray] study. and who interviewed me a few times, was a youngish insa-uctor who lived at Eliot House. He was a member of the house master's inner clique. Two or three times when I met him at Eliot Houser said 'hello'. In each case this psychologist answered my greeting in a low tone. looking off in another direction and hurrying away as ifhe didn't want to stop and talkto me. rve thought this over. and the only half:way plausible I explanation I can think of for this behavior] is that this man didn't want to be seen socializing with ­someone who wasn't dressed properly and wasn't acceptable co the clique of which he was a member.~
 
−
The psychologist referred to in this passage was Keniston. I told the same story in my 1979 autobiography.41 but there my speculative aplana­tion for Kcniston's behaviorwas that he disliked me.
 
−
The remaining concrete evidence that I have of the way my personality was viewed in those days comes from my University of Michigan records. I will quote those of my professors' comments that refer to my person­ality and omit those that dcsaibe only my marbemati.cal ability. How­ever. I will include those comments about my mathematical ability that have also a bearing on mypersonality; for cnmplc. the term ..o:rigmal" was applied to my mathematical work. but originality is in addition a per­sonality trait.
 
−
1962-63, report on my performance in Math 602., by Professor Duren: "Showed intcresc. independence, and originality. He is very much an abstract pruist [sic; "purist'' is mcant}-1 think it is a form of mathematical immaturity. He also seems a little too sure ofhimself."42
 
−
1962-63, report on my performance as a paper-grader for Math 336, by Professor Halpern: 'Very cooperative and efficient. "43 1963-64, report on my performance in Math 603, by Professor Piranian: "Has imagination. "42
 
−
1963-64, report on my performance in Math 604, by Professor Piranian:
 
−
... lacks fire.''42
 
−
December 2.3, 1963, recommendation· in support of application for renewal of teaching fellowship, by Professor Piranian: He can work inten­sively, and he has a fertile imagination. .•. Personally, he is modest and pleasant. "44
 
−
January 13, 1964, retommendation in support of application for renewal of teaching fellowship, by Professor Ouren: ..... he ... seemed to think about things in a mature way and to try to understand broad rdationships.... He seems to have some originality. too .... My main criti­cism is chat Mr. Kaczynski seems to have too high an opinion of himself. too much confidence in his own abilities. For a stUdent at his level. it is unnacural. Otherwise he is a pleasant fellow, easy to get along with. 4S"
 
−
1964-65, report on my performance in Math 7ox. by Professor Shields: " ... original work ..."42 1964-65. report on my performance in Math 702. by Professor Shields: "Meticulous work. often quite original."42 1965-66, report on my performance in Math 635, by ProfessorTitus: " ... thorough. confident, talented. "41 1965-66, report on my performance in Math 999 (research for doctoral ­thesis), by Professor Shields: " ... ver'f original man."4l
 
−
February 3, 1966, recommendation in support of application for finan­cial support, by Professor Shields: "Very independent in research~ find his own problems. Mr. Kaczynski is a ver'fpleasant person ...."46
 
−
Concerning Professor Durcn's characterization of me as overconfident: The year before I took Math 6ox and 602. from him. I'd taken Math 2J2a and b from Professor L.H. Loomis at Harvard, the best mathcmati.a course I ever took. I got only a Bin 2J2a because at the time I was snuggling to keep my head above water in Math 2.50, but the next semester I took no other mathematics course than m.b. I caught up OD what I'd mi.ssed in 212a, and learned the subject matter of :ml, so thoroughly that. apart from the reading-period assignment, I was able to clcvclop all of the material of the course OD my own, without reference to any books or notes and without hesitation.41
 
−
When I got to the University of Michigan, I received a document that told me I was to take Math 601 and 602. Since most of the material of these two courses had been covered in 2.I2a and b at Harvard. I asked some pro­fessor whether I could omit them. He referred me to Professor Halmes. Halmos was a very distinguished mathematician, author of the definitive text on measure theoiy. a subject which constituted a large part of the material of Math 601 and 602.. When I told him I'd taken Math 212 at Har­vard he asked me, "Who taught it?" I said. "Professor Loomis... "What grade did you get?" ..I got an A.'. Then he asked, "Arc you an expert?" What beginning graduate scudent, in the presence of the great P.R. Halmos, would have had the temerity to dcsaibe himself as an expert on measure theory? So of course I said "No." "Then," answered Halmos, "You·d better take 6oI and 602. "48
 
−
Duren had gotten his Ph.D. only two years earlier and was just starting at the University of Michigan, and he was teaching 601 and 6o2 for the first time. Since l very likely knew the material better than he did, it's not to be wondered at that he thought me CM!I'COnfident. In general. l probably tended to underestimate my own mathematical abilities, if anything. When I recently gained access to the confidential parts of my University of Michi· gan records, ( was distinctly surprised at how laudatory some of the com­mcncs were. ( hadn't thought I was thatgood.
 
−
On leaving the University of Michigan. I took a position as Assistant Professor at the University of California at Berkeley. After teaching there for two years, I resigned in orderto go live in the woods.
 
−
A personal letter from John W. Addison ( chairman of the mathematics department at Berkeley) to my former dissertation advisor. Allen Shields, has somehow found ics way into my University of Michigan records, ·. though itwas written two and a half~after I left Michigan.
 
−
Kaczynski did indeed resign cffi:am:June30, 1969.... He said he was goingto give up mathematics. ... He was very calm and rel.ucdaboutiton the outside....
 
−
Kaczynski seemed almost pathologically shy and as far as I know he made no close friends in the Department. Efforts to bring him more into theswing of things had failed.""-49"
 
−
It's not clear why Addison de.!aibed me as ..almostpathologically shy." I was shy. but not that shy. Perhaps he overestimated my shyness because of my failure to mixwith othermembers ofthe department. Howevu, I failed to mixnot only due to poorsocialadjumncnt, but also becausebythat time I had decided that I didn't want to be a mathematician. I was teaching at Berkeley only to get money to finance my project of going to live in the woods.so I considered mathematicians to be very uninteresting people, and I felt I had nothing in common with them. To them. mathematics was Important, with a capital I. whereas to me itwas only a game-agamewith which I hadbecome bored.
 
−
It is worth noting that none of the comments on my personality in my University of Michi~ records desaibe me as shy. Yet one professor at Michigan apparendy did notice that I was socially withdrawn. Piranian once told me that I ought to attend mathematical conferences because it would be "good for [me] psychologically and socially." To Piranian the remark may have been merely a casual one, bur. though I said nothing, I was mortally offended by it. Ever,since my teens I'd been acutely sensitive to any comment that seemed to reflect negatively on my personality. my psychology, or my social adjustment. It was many years before I forgave Piranian for that remark.n
 
  
−
O N E LA s T c o MME NT concerning my academic career. Newsweek wrote: ':.\t the University of Michigan, [Kaczynski] won a prize for his doc· toral thesis. But flouting the customs of academic collegiality. he made no acknowledgments-not to teachers orfellow srudcnts." S'Z
+
To this end, Vietnamese communists have expended tremendous resources building a curriculum on Marxist-Leninist philosophy and analysis which includes dialectical materialism, materialist dialectics, scientific socialism, historical materialism, and political economy. These topics are taught in primary and secondary schools and are mandatory subjects for all students attending public universities in Vietnam. Beyond that, Vietnam offers free degrees to students who wish to study Marxist theory and philosophy and Ho Chi Minh Thought (defined as the application of Marxist philosophy to the unique material conditions of Vietnam). In this manner, Vietnam has demonstrated a steadfast commitment to developing “socialist people” “with socialist values.”
−
I did not flout any eustoms of academic collegiality. Piranian had called my attention co the problem that got me started on my thesis topic and had encouraged me co work on it. I acknowledged this in a footnote to the paper in which I published my solution to the problem: "I would like to thank Professor G. Piranian for his encouragemcnt."53 Piranian gave me no help beyond encouragement; he didadvise me co take a certain approach in · attacking the problem, but I did not follow his advice; if I had followed it I would never have solved the problem. 54
 
−
I did not make any acknowledgments in my. doctoral thesis. There was no need for me to do so, since no one had helped me with the work. In his evaluation of the thesis, my thesis director, A.L Shields, wrote: ..Kaczynski has worked entirely on his own, with only a minimum of guidance from mc."SJ Actually. I don't recall getting any guidance at all from him.
 
  
 +
We are, therefore, extremely excited to have worked with Luna Nguyen on the translation and annotation of Part 1 of the Vietnamese university curriculum on the worldview and philosophical methodology of Marxism-Leninism into English, which will make this unique perspective of socialist theory available to comrades around the world for the first time.
  
−
Chapter 6
+
After having read through this volume, which outlines the fundamentals of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics, we find the most important lesson to be the relationship between theory and practice. According to the Vietnamese scholars who authored the original text, Marxist-Leninist philosophy must be considered a living, breathing philosophy which requires application in the real world — through practice — in order to be made fully manifest.
  
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How people saw me after my arrest; false reports about me
+
We hope that readers of this volume will carry forward this guidance through practice which suits your material conditions, wherever you are in the world.
  
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Chapter 6 | WE SAW in the 1ast chapter chat, while some people recognized chat I was socially withdrawn, the evidence shows that prior to my anm people did not sec me as the strange sicko that the media have portrayed. A3 for what has been reported since my am.st, peo­ple's memories and perceptions often are heavily influenced by what they sec and hear in the media. and there are many persons who will tell the media what they think is expected of them. The media report inaccurately much of the material they receive, and they probably select stories that sup­port the image that they want to project.
+
If you would like to learn the perspective of socialists from other nations around the world, we invite you to visit our website at InternationalMagz.com — the home of ''The International Magazine'' online. There, you will find articles written by comrades from a wide variety of backgrounds and nationalities with a clear bias towards anti-capitalism, anti-fascism, and anti-imperialism!
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During June 1996, investigators working on my case conducted a door­to-door survey of public opinion about me in Lincoln. Montana. One of their interviewees reported that "a lot of Lincoln people and maybe even some of the FBI were pulling the media leg[sic] by making up information and telling them lies to sec if they would be printed (which they werc)."1 According to another interviewee, ..a lot of ... people in Lincoln, pretend that they knew Ted when really they did not. 'You can no longer pick out the truths from the untruths.' N2 Needless to say. these fabrications were not confined to the Lincoln area.
 
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When people who have been nothings all their lives, who may have started out with high ambitions but ended. up essentially as failures in that they achieved little of what they had expected. suddenly find that they arc a focus of attention rhrough rhe accident of their association with someone who is in the news, they may let their imaginations run wild in orderto stay in the spotlight and feel important for a change. Often, no doubt, they believe sincerely in the truth of their own fantasies.
 
−
I once read a story titled "Pie in the Sky"-I think it may have been by William Styron, but rm not sure. Anyway, the story was about a bored employee of a majornews service who sent out aphotograph of a pie with a bite taken out of it. accompanied by a report that a gap had suddenly appeared in the moon and then disappeared a few moments later. As soon as the report hit the news, thowands of people all aver America began calling newspapers and radio stations to saythey, too, had seen the gap in the moon.
 
−
The story was fiction, but it was intended to illustrate a truth: When the media report anything that is highly unusual. there are many weak-minded people who will insist, "I saw it too1·• Thus. after the first reportS of "flying saucers" appeared back in the 195os, all sons of incompetents came crawl­ing out of the woodwork with tales of flying saucers that they had seen themselves, complete with interesting details such as rows of lighted win­dows or weird-looking aliens. So it is not surprising that after my arrest there were many people who swore they'd seen me in places where I'd never been.
 
−
One particularly grotesque cnmple was the story told by Professor Donald Saari of Northwestern Universicy. as reported by the New Yorie Times. According to the nme.s, "Investigators have expressed some doubts about Professor Saari' s account, ..J as well they might. since I've never seen Professor Saari in my life. Joel Shapiro, a professor ofmathematia at Michi­gan ~tate Universicy. told one of my investigators that he thought that Pro­fessor Saari's colleagues at the Northwestern math department were embarrassed about the tale he told the media.4
 
−
It would be impractical for me to try to refute, or even mention, all of the innumerable false reporcs that have been published about me, so I will have to confine myself ~o a few enmples.
 
−
Some egregious ones have been provided by Pat Mcintosh, a former suitemate of mine in Eliot N-43, where I lived during my sophomore. junior, and senior years at Harvard. The New Yori! Times quoted Mcintosh as saying that "in three years, 'I don't recall more than to words being spo­ken by [Kaczynski]' ... 'I never met anybody like him who was as extreme in avoiding socialization.' "S nme wrote: 'Ted had a special talent for avoiding relationships by moving quickly past groups of people and slam­mingthe door behind him.' says Patrick Mcintosh. •6
 
−
All a matter of face, I had a fair number of conversations with Mcintosh and the clique within the suite to which he belonged. I even played basket­ball with them, and I still have a bump on the side of my tongue co prove it. As Cwrote co my parents at the time:
 
−
I have decided to quit playing basketball because I keep hurting myself. First I bruised my hand very badly. next I got bad blisccrs on my feet. Now just the other day I collided with somebody just as he was bringing his arm up to shoot and I got knocked pretty hard under the chin-and the edge of my tongue got caught between my teeth so that I practically bit a piece off the side of it (a small piece) so eating is pretty uncomfurtable.7
 
−
The "somebody" with whom I collided was none other than Patrick Mcintosh.
 
−
I not only recall having a number of conversations with Mcintosh. I . remember the content of some those conversations. On one occasion the subject of flying saucers came up. l expressed disbelief in these alien space­ships, but Mcintosh was able to state definitely that they existed, because he had seen one. He and some friend or relative of his had once been out at night and had seen a row of lights some distance away. Since apparendy Mcintosh could think of no other explanation, he concluded that the lights were the windows of a flying saucer. He seemed dead certain sure ofit. On another occasion psychic phenomena were discussed, and I again expressed disbelief. Mcintosh countered by mcrting that his mother had telepathic powus-she always knew. without having been notified, when relatives were coming to visit. When he tookAntbropology Io, Human Evolution, he developed the ingenious theory that ..the Nigra .. (he was from Southern lllinois, and that was how he pronounced the word "Negro") was"an inter­mediate stage in evolution between the ape and man...
 
−
Some allowance has to be made for the limitations of Mcintosh's intelli­gence. He is a rather dim bulb. He once complained co me that his advisor at Harvard's astronomy dcpamncnt had told him, in rcfcrcnce to his C in advanced calculus. "If you want to be an astronomer, those Ks should just come naturally to you."
 
−
He doesn't understand, added Mcintosh, "that noc everyone is as smart as he is."8
 
−
By this time, perhaps, the reader will have concluded that the faa that I didn't care to socialize with Pat Mcintosh was not necessarily a symptom of abnormality. Mcintosh's buddies in N-43 were brighter than he was, but, like him, they were unimaginative, conventional, suit·and·tie·wcaring cypcs,9 and I found them uninteresting. not to say dull. There wm a couple of other fellows in the suite, Fred Ha. and B.Cr., whom I found more con· genial and with whom I spent more time.10 Butitis still crue that I was generally pretty solitary at Harvard and made no close friends there. Newswulc wrote:
 
−
(Kaczynski's] bedroom, a single, 'was the messiest room I'd ever seen.' Mcintosh says. 'It was a foot or two deep in trash. And it smelled, because there was spoiled milk and sandwiches underneath all that stuff.' 11
 
−
Time quoted Mcintosh to this effect:
 
−
Kaczynski's room was a swamp; the others finally called in the house­mastcr. the legendary Master of Eliot House john Finley. who was aghast. 'I swear it was one or two feet deep in trash.' Mcintosh says. 'It had an odor to it. Underneath it all were what smelled like unused cartons of milk.•6
 
−
In Chapter 5, I quoted in full the evaluations of me that John Finley wrote at the end of my sophomore and my junior year, respectively. It is interesting that he made no reference to the alleged condition of my room, despite the fact that, according to Mcintosh, he was "aghast" at it. Of course, one can hypothesize th.at my suitcmatcs did not call F'mley in until my senior year (no evaluation of me was written at the end of that year). but then one has to ask why they waited for more than two years to take action.
 
−
As a matter of fact, my room was fairly messy. but not beyond what is commonplace for bachelor housekeeping. My bed was often unmade, clothes were thrown over furniture rather than hung up, the desk was cov­ered with disordered books and papers. A3 a mathematician I consumed a great deal of scratch paper. I discamcd it by crumpling it into a ball and tossing it into the waste-basket. When the waste-basket overflowed I kept tossing the paper until one comer of the room was full of it. At muimum size the pile of paper might have covered ten percent of the floor space of the small room. The rest of the floor was dear of trash and other obstrUc· tions, except furniture and my foot-locker. There were no milk cartons, sandwiches, or other food remains under the paper. All my life I have been careful to dispose of food garbage properly, and have been careless only about the kind of rubbish that docs not breed bacteria or attract vermin. There were rooms at Harvard that were as filthy as Mcintosh dcsaibcs-I saw some-but mine was not one of them. If Master Finley was ever called to look at my room. he didn't do so when I was present and I never heard anything about it. (See Appendix 3.)
 
−
McIntosh's memory has shown itself wrong in a number of other cases. For instance, he told my investigators that "Harvardstudents were required to wear a coat and tic to class. If you wore a sweater rather than a coat, or forgot to wear a tic, you were sent back to your room...u False. Students were required to wear a coat and tic in the dining halls. but there was no drcs.s code of any kind for classes. (ought to know, because I almost never wore a coat or tie anywhere except at meals. I do not at the moment have documentaryproof chat coats and tieswere not requiredin Harvard classes during 1958~ but anyone who doubts my statement should be able to check it out.
 
−
The New York Timu refers to my "annoyingtrombone blasts in the dead of night"13 without acing any source. On the next page it dtes Pat Mcin­tosh's reference to my "trombone blasts."14 The book Unabomber states, apparently on Mcintosh's authority. that I was "lmown to play (my] ttom­bone late into the night."1" [n reality I was always careful to avoid playing my trombone at hours when it would be likely co annoy others. Once and only once I was asked co quiet down while playing the trombone. It was in . the afternoon; one ofmysuitemates, a German named Rudi something-or­othcr, explained that he was studying for a final CDD1; I apologized and stoppedplaying immediately. The readerwill please refer to the evaluations by Master Finley that Iquotedin Chapter5 and note that while he writes of my trombone-playing, he makes no mention of any "blasts" or of playing at inappropriate hours.
 
−
In Appendix 3, I show that Mcintosh erroneously portrayed me as play­ingthe trombone duringmy senioryear.
 
−
According to Newsweek:
 
−
McIntosh remembers an incident when Kaczynski. angry about some­thing, used soap to scrawl a pig and a rude tcmark on the bathroom mirror. ... 'He was one ofthe strangestpeople I met atHarvard.' Mcintosh says. 'He was so intent on not being in contact with people even then.'l l
 
−
Pat Mcintosh has me mixed up with someone ehc, and I can prove it by means of an old letterthat has survived. On March n, x962, I wrote my parents:
 
−
[R]emembcr that loony fascist character I told you about in the Suite? Looks like he's rcally cracking up-dtis morning he left a pictUre of a pig's head drawn in Soap on the bathroom mirror-and by it he left a note say­ing: 'Toe warlike little-pig is watching the fierce oncs'--the 'warlike little pig' obviously referring to himself. He loolcs like a little pig.16
 
−
I now apologize to this gentleman for dcsaibing him as a 1oony fas­cist". His political views were pretty far to the right. but it would not be accurate to dcsaibe them as fascistic; and I of all people should have avoided careless imputations of mental illness. My investigators have tracked this man down. He's had a successful career as a university profes­sorand he apparently is highlyproficient in his specialty. Verybrightpeople often arc oddballs.
 
−
Pat Mcintosh took a photograph of the pig's-head and later stuck it on the oddball's doorin orderto taunthim. I spotted the photo before the odd­ball did. so I removed it and left it on a shelf in the cloakroom. I was sur­prised at what seemed to me to be Mcintosh' s childishness; but the point here is chat Mcintosh knew at that time that it was the oddball who had drawn the pigon the mirror.
 
−
While Iwas cool towardMcintosh andhis clique and held conversations with them only occasionally. the oddball did go to an cm-emc in avoiding social contact with the others in the suite.17 So it's clear that Mcintosh's fuddled memory has got me mi%cd up with the oddball ( and maybe one or two others) until he doesn't knowwhere one begins and the other ends.
 
−
It's evident that many other stories that have been told about me also are based on mistaken identity. To givejustthree enmplcs: The New Yorlc nmu quotes Richard Adams. who was in Eliot Howe whenI lived there, as follows:
 
−
He was sallow, humorless, introvutcd, a guy who couldn't make con­versation. Kaczynski wore non-modish clothes: a kind of unpleasant plaid spores jacket and a tic that didn't go with it. He didn'tlookhappy.14
 
−
No one has ever dcsaibcdmy complexion as "sallow... Moreover, I ha!'= never owned a plaid spores jacket. Iwouldn't be likely to forget it if I had, since I've never owned but four spores jackets and three suits in mylife. It's apparentthat Mr. Adams has me confused with someone else.
 
−
Newsweek wrote:
 
−
Gerald Bums ... remembers Kaczynski from bull sessions at an all­night cafeteria with a group of math and philosophy majors. He had • ... cockatoo hair.' Bums says.... The late-night sessions, Burns says, often involved Immanuel Kant... .
 
−
Bums says he got a call last year •.• from a mutual friend who remem· bered Kaczynski's fondness for Kant. ""11"
 
−
I've never participated in bull sessions at a cafeteria. I've never had "cockatoo hair." I've neyer had the slightest interest in Immanuel Kant, and this can be documented:18 I've read nothing of Kant's workbeyond what I was required to read for the Humanities scourse at Harvard, and I regarded everythingI read in that course asjusta lot ofcrap. It's obvious that Gerald Burns, too, has confused me withsomeone c1sc.
 
−
The New Yorlc nm.es refers to my ..odd metronomic habit of rocking back and forth on a chair''13 as I scudicd. This apparently is another case of mistaken identity. When stUdying in my room (not in the library) I had a habit oftilting my chairback andbalancingin thatposition, controlling the angle of tiltwith light pressure of my feet on the legs of my desk. In a few cases r pushed my luck coo far and fell over backwards. Because I was bal­ancing, rswayed back and forth. My former suitemates have described this as ''rocking," but the term is not apt, because "rocking" implies a rhythmic movement and my swaying was an irregular, non-rhythmic, balancing motion thatwas anythingbut metronomic. {See Appendix3)
 
−
The reference to my alleged"odd metronomic habit" is almost certainly based on confusion between me and another student of mathematics who did not tilt his chair but rocked his body back and forth rhythmically as he studied. The motion was so rigidly timed. mechanical, and persistentthatit could indeed have been described as "metronomic," and it made this stu­dent conspicuousin the library.
 
−
Though I remembered only the first name ofthis man, we succeededin identifyinghim. Heis now a professorat one ofthe four orfive mostdistin­guished universities in the United States, and hehas confirmed to my inves­tigators that he did have the habit I've desaibcd.1'
 
  
−
ANOTHER SOURCE of tall tales about me has been Pat Morris, ahigh.­school classmate of mine with whom I was never more than slightly acquainted. I won't waste much time on Mr. Morris; it would be pointless to argue about charges that are either trivial (for enmple. that I tried to smear cake frosting on another kid's nose)13, or hopelessly vague (such as that I was "emotionally deficient,..13 whatever that means). But it will be worthwhile to discuss my alleged adolescent aploiuwith aplosives.
+
In solidarity,
−
According to the New York Times:
 
−
Mr. Morris recalled that Teddy once showed a school wrestler how to make a more powerful mini-bomb. It went off one dayin achemistry class, blowing out two windows and inflicting temporary hearing damage on a girl.... Teddy ... later set off blasts that echoed aaoss the neighborhood and sent garbage cans flying." 13
 
−
Newsweek reported;
 
−
“[A]ll the brains fooled around with homemade explosives.... Motris recalls an incident with a schoolboy bomb that broke a window in chem­istry class and left a girl with damaged hearing. 'Somebody asked [Ted]ZO how to put the chemicals together and he told him.' Morris says. 'The dumb kid. he went a.head and did it. Ted did not do this. He wasn't smart enough to say. This is not good to do... His personality was not robust. He often gotleft holding the bag."'11
 
−
This passage is so garbled that it isn't clear who is being referred to in the last three sentences. Anyhow, to set the record straight and summarize what really happened, as narrated in my 1979 autobiography and in an ear­lier accountZl that I wrote in the mid-197os.
 
−
Having some time to kill in the chemistry lab one day; I mixed a minute quantity of rwo chemicals, put half of the mixture on the tip of a spatula. and applied it to a bunsen-burncr flame. It made a tiny pop. My lab parmer. Rich Wi., having wimessed this operation, took the rest of the mixture, wrapped it in a scrap of paper, and dropped it into an empty crucible that was sitting over a bunsen-burncr flame on the lab table behind us which was occupied by L.N. and William Dewey r. There was another small pop.
 
−
William Dewey became quite excited and asked me what the ingredi­ents of the mixture were. Without stopping to think. I told him. He imme­diately dumped out his entire supply of the twO chemicals onto a piece of paper and began mixing them. The whole quantity might have amounted to a couple of tablespoonfuls. A few of us who were a bit wiser than William Dewey stood around urging him not to do anything like this in school and not to we such a large quantity of the chemicals. He simply ignored our warnings. I was quite worried by what he was doing. but it would have been a violation of the students' unwritten code (to be a "snitch" and tell the teacher), so I said, "t wash my hands of.it," and turned my back. A momentlater. the stuifwent ofE ' William Dewey received no significant injury, no windows were bro­ken.22 and I never heard that anyone's hearing was ~-and if any one's hearing had been damaged I undoubtedly would have heard plenty about it. The upshot was that William Deweywas kicked outofthe chem· istry course altogether, while my lab·partner and I were suspended from laboratory work (but not from classroom work) in Chemistry for two weeks.
 
−
Any information that Pat Morris has about this incident is hearsay; because he was not in that class. It should be possible to confirm this by referring to bis high-school records. ifbe allows access to them.
 
−
As for the statement that I "set off blasts that ... sent garbage cam fly­ing." it is hyperbole. Once and only once I helped set off an explosive charge in a garbage can. I one day suggested to Dale Eickelman that we should experiment withblackpowdc:.
 
−
He became quite excited. We made up a small charge of the stuif­about equivalent to a large firecracker-and, at Dale's insistence, we set it off in his parents' garbage can. The lid was thrown a few feet into the air. but the can itself didn't budge an inch.
 
  
−
I SIT HERE contemplating the sorry catalog of nonsense that the media have printed about me and I am overcome with discouragement. I itch to refute all of it point by point. but there is just too much of it. and in most cases no documentation is available. So I will conclude this chapter by discussing a couple of episodes that my mother and brother have desaibed with gross inaccuracy.
+
The Editorial Team of ''The International Magazine''
−
According to the Washington Post my mother reported:
 
−
Ted was so furious about medical treatment that once, when he and his father found an injured rabbit. he begged that they not take it to a nearby animal hospital. Afterfreshman year atHarvard, while he was home : for the summer, he contracted mononucleosis and developed a high fever. Apcd.iaaician urged Wanda to take Ted to the hospital.
 
−
Ted was furious at his mother. 'He was just so argumentative ... , ' Wanda said. 1'nd I told him, 1.ook, we have to find out what's wrong. You have to go to the doctor.•"" ..."
 
−
Ted did not speak to his parents again until the doctor said his health had improved and he could return to Harvard. 23
 
−
On April I2, 1996, my mother told Jnvestigator # x:
 
−
[Ted] spent that summer [after his first year at Harvard] at home, and contracted a severe case of mono. It took him a long time to get overit, and the family doctor was reluctant to allow Ted to return to school the first semester of his sophomore year. Ted begged and pleaded to be allowed to return, and their doctor finally relented...i.
 
−
I don't remember the rabbit incident, and I doubt that itever happened. I did have mononucleosis during the summer following my freshman year at Harvard. but rm not aware of any reason co dcsaibe the case as severe."" The medical records say that I did ""not appear to be in any acute distress,»zs and that I appeared ""mildly ill.""26 The case was not treated by the ""family doctor'' b~t by a Or. Tanzi27 who, as far as I know, had never treated any member of our family previously. De. Tanzi never expressed any reluctance to let me go back to college. There was no need for me to ""beg and plead .. -without any prompting from me he told me that I could return to school in time for the beginning of the semester. I was in the hos­pital for five days,28 from September 10 to September 15, 1959. On the 15th I was sent home with instructions to see Dr. Tanzi again in a week.zs, I returned on September 21, but apparently was cumined not by Tanzi but by a Dt Greenberg. who sent me back to Harvard with insauai.ons to take it easy for a while.30"
 
−
But the important points here arc that I was not "furious" about going to the hospital, and I was not "anxious about medical crcaanent." I don't remember having raised any objections about going to the hospital, but if I did so it would have been not because I was anxious about medical treat­ment but because I was afraid of starting my next semester at Harvard late. I am quite certain that I did not get "furious" over goingto the hospital. and chat I went at least semi-willingly. since I knew I was sick. Note that the hos· pital records describe me as "cooperative."25
 
−
I certainly did not refuse to speak co my parents while I was in the hospi· cal. In fact, they visited me, we had amicable conversation, and I even remember two books that they brought me-Ibsen's Peer Gynt, and another titled The Last Hurrah (I don't recall the author's name).
 
−
My medical records from this period show clearly that I had no unusual am:iecy about medical treatment. Prior to going to the University of Chicago's Billings Hospital, I bad already consulted a neighborhood doctor named Brant or Brandt31 about the indisposition that later turned out to be mononucleosis. My Harvard records show that I consulted the doctors at the Health Services several times ( obviously not under pressure from my parents, since they weren't around) about relatively minor complaints such as athlete's foot, a wart, and a sprained ankle.32 Moreover, I was hospital­ized (voluntarily. of course) from May 24 to May 26, 1961, in Harvard's Still­man Infirmary with some cype of respiratory infection that was not very serious.33 Clearly, therefore, I had no abnormal fear of docton and hospi­tals, and my mother's grossly distorted account of the mononucleosis episode is just part of her effort to portray me u having been warped by "that hospital experience."
 
−
At the age of 19 to 20 I had a girlfriend; the only one I ever bad, I regret to say. Her name was Doris B. She was an Evergreen Park resident, not someone I met in college. I went out with her a number of times during the summer following my junior year at Harvard. I saw her once the following summer; that meeting·!lent badly and she broke off the relationship. The breakup had Vertlittle to do with the fact that she was a Catholic. The story is told in my 1979 autobiography.34
 
−
My brother, as USl1al. bas got the facts garbled. "Just' after [high·school] graduation, David recalled. Teddy dated a girl once or twice, but ended the relationship by expressing cnspcration with her Catholic beliefs... (New Yorle Times)3S There's no chance that my brother is referring to anothergirl here, since Doris B. was the only girl I ever elated before my mid·thirties.
 
−
My aunt Josephine also has it wrong. since she refers to my "high-school girlfriend," which Doris B. was not.23
 
−
My mother was even further off when she told Investigator #I that I "did sec one girl named [Dorothy] several times in junior high-school. " 36
 
−
There is a stteak. of irrational stubbornness in my mother. Sometimes she gets an error or a misconception smck in her head. and no matter how many times she is corrected. she keeps repeating the error. For some reason she took a notion char Doris B.'s name was "Dorothy." I corrected her over and over again, but every time she mentioned Doris B. she would still call her "Dorothy." Aswe'vejustseen. she repeated the error to Investigator#I. She used co do the same thing with the word "cholesterol." Somehow she got the idea that it was "cholostcril", and she kept pronouncing it that way for years. though I corrected her innumerable times. Eventually I think she did get her pronunciation straightened out, probably because the word was used so much in the media.
 
−
This perverse streak in my mother has expressed itself in another way that is potentially more serious. This is a point mat I want to get cleared up now.
 
−
When we were in high-school Dale Eickelrnan once sent rne a joke let· ter, purportedly from Russia. I found his idea highly amusing. and I subse­quently sent '1ettcrs from Russia" to him and a few other friends of mine. The letters were intended to ridicule the Communist system. Dale also sent me some other joke letters. In one of them he enclosed some Christmas Seals or Easter Seals or the like; there wusome joke connected with them;. I don't remember now what it wu. In response I sent him a letter inwhich I enclosed some home-made "seals.. of my own that I produced by carving a crude representation of a skull on a bit of linoleum. which I used together with an inkpad to print skulls in a rectangular pattern on a piece of paper. I made perforations between the rows and columns ofskulls bypressing the cutting edge of a saw against the paper; thus the "stamps .. could be readily tom from the sheet. I even coated the back of the sheet with a water-based glue, so that the "stamps" could be licked and stUck on things.
 
−
These stamps made a big hit with Dale Eickelman and one or two of my other friends. so I made up some sickle-and-hammer stamps, which I used in conjunction with my '1ettcrs from Russia... Still later I made some swastika stamps. and others that bore the words "Down with Gd... Miss Gd. wis a geometry teacher who wu hated by many students, including me. Needless to say. neither the sickle-and-hammer stamps nor the swastika ones were expressions of political opinion or of sympathy with Commu­nism or Nazi$m. They were simply adolescent rnischic£
 
−
One day in gcomeay class I stuck a sickle-and-hammer stamp on the back of the kid sitting in front of me. Afew minutes later Miss Gd., walking down the aisle, noticed the stamp, peeled it off. and gave me a sour look.
 
−
I was never reprimanded for this incident, nor did I ever hear anything about it from my parents or teachers until a few years later my mother, in the course of some conversation, accused me of having "stuck a swastika on aJewish boy's back" in high-school I corrected her, telling her it was a sickle-and-hammer, not a swastika. (I might add that atthe time of the inci· dent I didn't know the kid was Jewish. His mother was Jewish. his father was not, and his name was Chalmers, which is not exactly a Jewish-sound­ing name.) My mother replied. "Miss Gd. said it was a swastika." I told her that whatever Miss Gd. bad said, it wasn't a swastika, it was a sickle-and­hammer. But my mother, with the stubborn stupidity that I've dcsaibed, kept insisting it was a swastika.. Over the years, for some unfathomable rea­son of her own, she brought up the incident several more times, always insisting that the stamp was a swastika no matter how many times I cor­rected her. She never gave any reason for adhering co this belief.
 
−
Mybrother must have picked this story up from my mother, because he told the FBI: "[In high-school on one] oca.sion, TED drew a swastika on a piece of paper and stuck it on the back of a Jewish student. Much later on in life
 
−
TED told DAVE that he resented the fact that everyone overreacted to the swastika incident. "37 This is absurd. Not only did no one overreact to the incident, they didn't
 
−
react at all. What irritated me was my mother's irrational insistence that the stamp was a swastika when in faa it was a sickle-and·hammer.
 
−
I want to nip in the bud any notion that I am, or ever have been, anti­semitic. My opinions arc not necessarily politically correct. It seems obvi­ous to me that there are statistical differences between the behavior of the members of different ethnic groups. Whether these differences are purely cultural or have also a genetic component is very much an open question, and I don't pretend to know the answer to it. But every rational person knows that any type of personality or behavior and any level of ability can occur in any ethnic group or race. and therefore I judge people as individu­als and not according to the ethnic group or race to which they belong.
 
  
 +
=== Notes on Translation ===
  
−
Chapter 7
+
Vietnamese is a very different language from English, which has presented many challenges in translating this book. Whenever possible, I have tried to let the “spirit” of the language guide me, without altering the structure, tone, and formatting of the book.
  
−
My relations with my parents in adulthood
+
One thing you will likely notice right away: this book is highly condensed! This is because most Vietnamese students are already familiar with these concepts. We have added annotations to try to make the book more digestible for those of you who are new to Marxism-Leninism, and these annotations are explained on the next page.
−
Chapter 7 | By This TIM s I was about 22. years old, verbal abuse from my &thcr bad ceased, though now and then he made a remark that was. at the least. tactless. My mother no longer was insulting me with imputations of mental illness or gross immaturity. and of course my parents could no longer intimidate me by threatening to "throw me out of the house... because I was earning enough as a teaching fellow at the University of Michigan so that I didn't need any help from thcm.1 In any case I spent only the summers, and sometimes Christmas vacations, at my parents' home.
 
−
But my mother was still abnormally irritable; much less so coward my &thcr and brother. When I came home to spend a summer with the family my mother would at fi:rsc be all sweetness coward me, but as the summer wore on she would have increasingly frequent and severe outbursts of irri· cation again.st me. until by the end of the summer her behavior was simply intolerable and I was glad to get away from her. As far as I can remember, the main reason why I spent the summers with my parents was so that I could use their car to visit nature areas.zOf course, staying with them also enabled me to save money.
 
−
By the time I got my Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 1967, I had definitely decided that I did not wane to spend my life as a mathemati­cian and that I was going co go live in the woods. I accepted a position at the
 
−
University of California at Berkeley only in order to earn some money for chis purpose.3 I didn't cell my parents what I intended to do until two or three months before I left Berkeley. When I did tell them, my mother didn't raise a stink about it (for a while, anyway) because by chat time she knew thac she couldn't bully me any more. Besides, as I discovered later, she imag· incd or had convinced herself that I would only live in the woods for a cou­ple of years and then rerum co my mathematical career.
 
−
I left Berkeley inJune 1969 and spent the summer travelling by car with my brother in Canada, looking for a place co settle.4 Finally I applied for permission co lease a small plot of government land about a mile from the nearest road in northern British Columbia.s Then my brother and I drove co Lombard. lllinois, where our parents now lived. The summer was pretty well exhausted, I didn't expect to do anything on the land I hoped co lease until the nae summer, and, at my parents' invitation,6 I planned to spend the winter livingwith them. I wasn't particularlyanxious to scay with them, but I needed co conserve my supply of money. My brother soon went back co Columbia Univcrsicy,7 where he was a student, to begin his senior year.
 
−
The British Columbia government cook more than a year co act on my application to lease land, and then they denied it.8 Meanwhile, I spent the summer of 1970 again looking for a suitable piece of land in Canada, though I must admit that by this time rwas getting discouraged and wasn't trying Vert hard.
 
−
My brother graduated from Columbia7 inJune 1970 and spent the sum­mer touring the West in a car with some of his college friends. Then he returned co Lombard, and after staying a shore time at our parents' house, he drove out to Montana in the white x965 Chevelle that they either gave him or sold him at a low price. He set himself up in a cheap apartment in Great Falls, and, following a period of unemployment, got a job at the Ana­comia Company smelter in BlackEagle, aaoss the river from Great Falls.
 
−
I spent another wine~ that of 1970·71, at the house in Lombard. The naespring. atmy brother's invitation, I drove to Montana. and together we bought our little patch ofbnd9 a few miles from Lincoln.
 
−
During the cwo winters I spent in Lombard my mother made herself insufferable. She was finally beginning to grasp the fact that my project of going to live in the woods wasn't co be just a two-or three-year vacation from my mathematical career-I was giving up all that high·Status crap for good. She nagged me incessantly, and often in insulting terms. She kept telling me that she was worried, worried, worried about me. but when I asked her why she was worrying she usually wouldgive me no comprehcn· sible answer. Occasionally, though. she would let out the real reason why she was worrying: She was afraid I wasn't going to have the high-prestige career on which she had set her heart. She began to resort again co the device that she and my father had used so often during my teens-she would threaten co "throw me out of the house." 10
 
−
##############
 
−
At this point the chreat was not entirely without weight. I had to con· serve my money. It was very difficult for me to find a job. If I were honest about my intentions, no one would hire me a.s a mathematician, because for that kind of position any company or university wants someone who will keep the job for years, not someone who is just looking for something to tide him over for a few months. I didn't mind doingunskilled work. but nobody will hire someone with a Ph.D. for that kind of job; they think you're "overqualified... I did apply for one or two unskilled jobs, but I soon gave chat up because the employers' reaction when they found out I had a Ph.D. was just too humiliating. Of course, I could have lied on the applica· tion forms, but I was unable to bring myself to do this because, for betteror for worse, I had been too well trained in early childhood in the principles of honesty. It wasn't until three or four years later that, from sheer necessity. I was able co overcome my inhibitions about lying to potential employers.
 
−
The New Yorle Times wrote:
 
−
Uving again at home, Mr. Kaczynski kept mostly to his bedroom. Awaiting word on his land application, he did nothing for more than a year. His parents urged him to get a job, not to make money but to give him something to do, to ease his mind. But the effort failed. . .. His arguments with his parents over his unwillingness to work intensified. 11
 
−
In the first place, I did not "'keep mostly to" my bedroom. In the second place, there was only one thing I needed to ease my mind. and that would have been for my mother to stop her unending. insulting nagging. In the third place, it was only my mother, not my father. who kept pestering me about a job. and she was concerned not so much that I should have some job as that I should have a higlt·stanu job. This is confirmed by a letter that I wrote my mother on qccober ;, 1970, under circumstances that would take too long to explain here:
 
−
Dear Ma;
 
−
I had the impression your feelings were hurt when I didn't want to talk further in that phone call yesterday. I do feel sorry for my poor old ma, so I want to say that all is forgiven. However, in order to dear the air and reduce the likelyhood [sic] of further disagreements, I would like to state some of my grievances and tell you some of the things that irritate me."
 
−
The reason t didn't talk to you yesterday was this: I knew you would ask questions like 'have you got a job.' 'what kind of job are you looking for,· 'what do you plan co do nat.· etc. ... I would have to listen co your ·suggestions· co the effeet that I should get some kind of a high·prcstigcjob. I don't like to be told I am wasting my mind. You have a way of asking, 'what kind of a job are you going to look for, dear?' that makes me squirm, because I know perfeetly well what is going on in your mind. even if you don't mean to express it. It was legitimate for you to suggest once or twice that I should get a high-class job, but over the past year you have raised the subjea repeatedly, even though I made it plain that I found it irritating....
 
−
If you follow the following suggestions it will help improve our relations: ... ""Don't make suggestions as to how I should run my life. If you must _" make such a suggestion, make it once and thend.n,p the subject-and I mean
 
−
Needless to say, this letter led to no abatement of my mother's nagging. Eventually I did get a job with a temporary agency called "Abbott Temps."13 It wasn't very remunerative, but at least it brought in some money. Yet my mother's nagging continued without let-up. I quote from a letter that I wrote to my brother in 1986:
 
−
In your letter14 you mentioned in [our parents1 favor that they took very quiedy our respective decisions not to follow respectable careers as they wanted. Ha! You weren't there most of the ti.me during the first couple of years after I quit my assistant professorship. You wouldn't believe how much shit I had to take from the old bitch. To take just one example: One evening I had to sit there and listen to a long and cxcrcmcly insulting tirade from her in which she accused me of causing her high blood pressure and ended by calling me 'a monster! A monster! An ungraceful monster!' I cook all that quietly and when she was done I went to Dad who was in the bath· room shaving or something and I asked him 'What do you think of that?' All he said was, 'Well. I think maybe you are contributing to her high blood prcssure.'lS
 
−
After I set myself up in my cabin in Montana my relations with my mother improved somewhat, probably because they were carried on mostly by letter. Yet there was continuing friction between us. One reason was that my mother, who is amiety-prone, kept pestering me to write her frcqucndy. because shesaidshegotworried jfa few weeks passed without a letter from me. This problem came to a head in the winter of 1973-74 when. as was explained in Chapter 4 (p. 55), my mother threatened to contact the authorities and have them check up on me jf I didn't write her prompdy. Thac led to a break in our relations that lasted for about a year, during which I didn't wrice my parents at all. Afterward she was less persistent in nagging me to write home.
 
−
Another reason for the friction between us was my mother's habit of sending me unwanted packages. Trouble on this score started between us dunng my time at Berkeley. My mother began sending me frequent pack­ages filled with candy and swcea. I didn't like to receive that stuff because it exposed me to a temptation that was injurious to the health, so I asked her politely to stop sending me such package!. She promised to do so, but she continued sending the packages anyway. Asecond time I asked her politely to stop sending me such stuff and again she promised. but the packages kept coming. The third time I asked her to stop sending the pack.ages. I used harsh language. She wrote back that she would stop sending packages. but she added. ''Why don't you just ask me nicely instead of being mean about it?"' I had asked her nicely. twice. but it hadn't done any good. After I spoke to her harshly, though. she did stop sending me packagcs-mr a while.
 
−
The problem arose again when I began living in Montana. and it was compounded by the face that the packages often were too big to fit in my roadside mailbox. so that either I had to walk four miles to Lincoln to pick them up, or else the mailman hung chem on the outside of the bm. with risk that they wouldbe stolen or damaged by rain. since it was inconvenient for me to visit the box more often than once a week or so. Of course, I could simply have ignored the packages and let them be lost. but the waste of perfectly good food or other items made me uncomfortable.
 
−
My conflicts with my parents, especially my mother. over the packages are recorded in many of my letters chat have survivedfrom this period. October r,, I~
 
−
... DON'T SEND ME ANY MORB MAGAZINES. I mean it ...16
 
−
Spring. 1973:
 
−
Ma: Do not send me anything addrwed ra 'Dr.' TJ. Kaaynski. [I wanted to avoid advertising my level of education.] Ifyou do, I will be very angry and Iwill call you very insulting names. I hate to have to threaten, but you know that in the past I have asked you time and again not to do ccmin things. and you still persist. so I hayc no choice but to be mean about it. For example, I have several times asked you not to send me those throw-awaysfrom Har­vard, but you still do it. So chat's another thing; don't send me any more Harvard throw-aways-if you do Iwill insult you. I mean it.... Also, don't send me any magazines. And don't send me any packages larger than 6 x 6" x a", because they won't fit in the box. Your permanent attention to these remarks will be appreciated. Thankyou."17
 
−
Marchtm:
 
−
You sent me a-Reader's Digest. Look. scupid. how many times must I tell you not to send me magazines? l have told you over and over not to send them, and you promise not to send them. and then you go and send them anyway! Many times in the past you have made promises about things like that. You keep chose promises for maybe 3 weeks and then forget chem. Obviously you arc incapable of the slightest self-control, even co the extent of simply refraining from sending me magazines. One is com­pelled to think seriously of pathology. The magazines are a minor point in themselves, but your insane. mindless persistence in sending them is cnremely irritating. l8"
 
−
My mother used to tell me that if I didn't want the magazines I could just burn them in my stove, but itwasn't so simple. In the first place, maga­zines burned very poorly in my stove; they tended to dog it with half. burned paper. In the second place, burning that kind of paper produces tone fumes.
 
−
April 9, 1975:
 
−
1 told you not to send me any packages, but you sent me onelast winter anyway at X-mas. Look. I only go down to my mailbox maybe once a wcck~r sometimes not for a much longer time. If a package like that is sent, it sits out on the road by the mailbox in the rain and/or snow for god knows how long. assuming nobody steals it in the mean time. & it hap­pened, my neighbor [G. Wi.] found that package and brought it up to me. But I don't care to encourage unnecessary visits &om him anyway. Appar­ently, however, you have an irtesistable [sic] comp~on to send me things. So-You can send me packages i~if you make chem strictly within the dimensions 4~" x 4 ~" x n". They will then fit in my mailbox. ... If you want to know what to put in the packages that (unlike magazines) will be appreciated. you can send dried fruit ... or UNSALTED nuts ...." 19
 
−
The mailbox was six inches wide. but I reduced the permissible width of packages to four and a half inches for a margin of safety. because I knew thatmy parents would not adhere saictly to the stated dimensions.
 
−
November 29, I975=
 
−
[P]lease don't send me so many packages, and please don't send smoked oysters.20 · December 8, 1975: ""Look, stupid-what in the name of god is wrong with you? I told" you I didn't want you sending me packages-I only made an aception for dried fruit and unsalted nuts in a package not 1arger than 4~" x 4~" x 12.". And I said such a package would be alright a~Now you are delug­ing me with this garbage. You sent me oysters and cheese. I don't like smokedoysters-I threw them out. The sunflower seeds you sent me were salted. ... Now you send me shoes and socks in a package that certainly exceeded 4~" x 4~" x u.11• That package could barely fitin the mailbox. ...
 
−
And it left no room for anything else in the box. Furthermore, in this tiny cabin I have no place to put all this aap. ... You srupid bitch. I've told you and told you I don't want you sending me crap like this. And as for publish­ers catalogs, all I asked was-where can· I write to get a publisher's catalog of paperbacks? I didn't ask you to send me anything. Now you are sending me package after package of catalogues that I only throw in the scove."21
 
−
December 24. I975=
 
−
As for my 'hair-trigger temper'.... The reason I get mad at you so much. ma, is mainly because you keep doing over and over again things that I keep asking you not to do. You promise not to do them, then a few weeks lateryou go right back to your old habits. It gets exasperating. "22
 
−
November 26, I976:
 
−
Package for Thanksgiving is OK, so is Xmas package. But DO NOT send my further packages without consulting me first. (Except one pack­age of books as listed below) .... B1't do not send me a package of books more than 4Yz inches thick (else it might not fit in·the box).... Do not send a second package of books without consulting me first. Thanks. 23
 
−
December I8, I976:
 
−
Christmas package received. Thank you. But look, you are starting to slip back into the habit of doing certain things that I've told you over and over again are annoying to me. You put some cookies in that package. Remember I said any food packages are supposed to contain only dried fruit and unsalted nuts, unless you get my permission to send something clse...24
 
−
November u, I'}'l7:
 
−
[I]f you want to send me a package you had better keep it down to the 4Yz"" width. ... Permissible items for package: Dried fruit, nuts, cheese. Anything else-ask me first.""25"
 
−
December r,, I'}'l7:
 
−
Thanks for telling me a package is on the way-rll no doubt enjoy the goodies. Haw~er: No~padu1.ges withma a.slcing mypmnwumfirst...z6 December30, 197r. Remember, no more packages without asking permission ......z7 The reader who has had an adequate mother may think I was unduly intolerant of my mother's habit of sending me unwanted packages. Ccr· tainly. tolerance of an eccentricity that is irritating but docs no serious harm is a return that one should make for the care ofa good moth~ But in my case, irritation over the packages was piled on top of an accumulation of rcsennnents from the past: the constant psychological abuse throughout my adolescence, the nagging and insults during my adult life, my mother's essential sclfuhncss that led her to r:ry to use me as a tool for the satisfaction of her own needs.
 
−
The package issue was ,he proximate cause of the break in relations between me and my parents that lasted from 1982 until my father's death in 1990. Though I'd told them at the end of 1977 that they should send me no more packages without asking me first, they slipped back into the habit of sending me dried fruit and nuts at Thanksgiving and Christmas. and I tolerated this as long as there were only those two packages a year. In the spring of 1982. { reminded them that they should send me no packages without asking first. yet later that year I accepted. by implication. their habit of sending me things at Thanksgiving and Christmas without specific . permission:
 
−
[Y]ou am:d whether co send me the Spanish booklet called 'Talacain [sic; should be Zalacain] el Aventurero EOFF and Ramirez-Araujo.' °'If you were planning to send me a Thanksgiving package as you usually do, you can include the booklet in that. ..zs
 
−
After Thanksgiving: I enjoy the nuts, dried fruit, and cheese that you sent for Thanksgiving...251"
 
−
The reader will recall from Chapter 4 (p. ;6) thatin the autumn of1982. I sent my parcncs an angry letter about the abuse they'd inflicted on me dur­ing my teens; my mother sent me an apology that, though cold and per­functory. softened my feelings somewhat; and I was on reasonably good terms with my parents until the spring of r983. Then on May 2.3 I received from them a package of nuts and dried fruit. I wrote them an irritated leccer3° about it, and in return they sent me a lettcr30 in which they claimed that they didn't remember my ever telling them not to send packages with­out asking me first. The self.righteousness of their lcttcr30 angered me; it seemed inconsistent with any sense of remorse concerning the way they had treated me during my teens, and this tended co confirm what I had expected anyway-that my mother's apology of the preceding autumn had been given only in ord~ co mollify me so that she could get from me the affection that she crave~
 
−
By this time I was so sick and tired of my parents that I broke ofF rela· tions with them. My mother, obsessed as usual with respectability. was so amious to conceal the truth about our fiunily life that after I broke off with her and my father she lied to her sister, telling her that the reason why she and my father no longer went co visit me was that I found it too painful to part from them when the visit was overl34
 
−
Since my policy as to what I would let them send me without permis­sion had varied to some extent aver the years, it was not so very unreason­ able for my parents co get confused and think that it was alright to send me dried fruit and nuts ac any time without permission. But my resentment was founded not only on the unwanted packages buc on the whole history of my relations with my parenrs. The packages and the self-righteous letter· were a trtggcr that released the anger against them that I had accumulated over the years.
 
−
I realize that the foregoing material will not show me in a creditable light. and I apologize to the reader for the coarse language of some of the letters rvc quoted. I felt I had to include these passages in order to provide a full and balanced piccure of my relations with my family. For whatever it's worth. I recall chat in one of my meetings with members of my defense team in the line-up room at the Sacramento Jail. I mentioned an incident in my mid-rwenties in which my mother drove me to such a pitch of irritation that I called her a bitch. One of the investigators at the meeting remarked. "If that's the first time you ever called your mother a bitch. I'd say you were doing pretty well."
 
−
Before we leave the subject of packages, I should note that the Washing· ton Post's report that I once "castigated [my] aunt for sending a package that would noc fie in [my] mailboxN3.S is false. Anyone who thinks it is true is invited to ask any of my aunts about it. Freda Tuominen is the only one of my aunts who ever sent me a package in Montana. She once sent me a pocket knife as a birthday present. I thanked her for it and expressed my appreciation of it; then I courteously requested that in the fucure she should ask me before sending any package, and I explained why.
 
  
−
l N a BF B asNC B To the year I978-79, which I spent living with my par­ents, the New York Times wrote: "[fed] went back to Lombard. back to his parents' home. This time, he did not resist their blandishments about work."36
+
I have worked hard to try to make the language in this book consistent with the language used in popular translations of works from Marx, Lenin, etc., that would be familiar to English-language students of Marxism-Leninism. That said, different translators have been translating these texts into English for over a century, such that different word choices have been used to relate the same concepts, and even Marx, Engels, and Lenin used different terms to describe the same concepts in many instances (not to mention the fact that Marx and Engels wrote primarily in German, whereas Lenin wrote primarily in Russian).
−
I suggest chat Rob_ert D. McFadden, who wrote this article, should check rus dictionary for the correct meaning of the word "blandishment." But it's clear that what McFadden meant was that I took a job at this time only under pressure from my parents. Accually I took the job on my own initiative, and the letters prove it. rd been playing with the idea of an exploring trip to northern Canada as preparation for a possible sojourn in the wilderness there. Prior to my return to Lombard I wrote my father on February r,, x978:
 
−
Do you thinkitlikely I could get a job in the spring at that foam-cutting place [where you work]? Then maybe I could save up some money and be in better position for northern trip. 37 And on March 8: ""When I asked about getting a job, I had in mind something of a longer" term. as an alternative to a trip [to Ontario] this summer, so I could get money for a better trip in a more promising region. However, ifyou can get me a job (at Foam Cutting Engineers] for 1. months, that is also something to consider."38
 
−
I did take a job at Foam Cutting Enginecrs.351 I worked there for a cou­ple of months and then left because of certain relations between me and the foreperson, Ellen Tarmichael, of which rwill speak later. Within a few days after leaving Foam Cutting Engineers I got a job with a firm that man­ufacrurcd restaurant equipment. Prince Castle, Inc., 351 and I worked there until the spring of I979, after which I returned to Montana with, I think, something like three thousand dollars that I'd saved. The Canadian wilder­ness trip never came off:
 
−
At about chis time my parents gave mybrother and me eachseveral gifts of money totalling (if I remember correctly) some three thousand dollars apiece.40 Thereafter they gave each of us a yearly stipend ofa thousand dol­lars, which theygradually increased until by1989 it was fifteen hundred dol­Iars.41 My mother always took saupulous care that every moneygift to me should be precisely equalled by a similar giftto my broth~ and vice versa. Her financial records should prove this, ifshe allows access to them.
 
−
It certainly was generous of my parents to gm: my brother and me these gifts, which saved me the annoyance of having to look for work at intervals, but, lest the reader conceive an exaggerated impression of my parents' generosity. I point out that they were not inconveniencing them­selves. Every member of my immediate family is instinctively parsimo­nious; we spend money cautiously; we don't like to spend it. Conscqucndy my parents had accumulated considerable sums distributed among several accounts in savings and_loan associations, from which they received a sub­stantial income in int~. I don't know how much they had. but I'd guess that by the time of my father's death their assets would have amounted to at least three hundred thousand dollars. My broth~ who was much more familiar with our parents' financial situation than I was, wrote me: 'lT]he parents ... have more than they can spcnd"41 (early r986); and: "When our inheritance comes due we'll boc& be fairly rich anyway. so a few thousand dollars now wouldn't make much diffcrcncc ......43 (late 1985 orearly r986). So the fact that my parents were pretty free-handed with their money dur­ing the r98os docs not prevent me from feeling that they both were esscn· tially selfish people.
 
  
−
Chapter 8
+
As such, I have made it my first priority to keep the language of this translation internally consistent to avoid confusion and, again, to match the spirit of the original text as much as possible. As a result, you may find differences between the translation choices made in this text and other translations, but it is my hope that the underlying meaning of each translation is properly conveyed.
  
−
My brother’s character
+
March, 2023
  
−
Chapter 8 j WHBN MY BROTHER Davidwasa lictle baby. less than a year old. my mother commented on a-difference between his personality and mine: Whereas I had been a relatively squally, cantankerous baby. David·s behavior was marked by pladdity.1 This is a difference that has set us apart all our lives. I have tended to show energy, initiative, and persistence, while my brother has been unusually passive. I have tended to confront conflicts. difficulties. or obstacles and sttuggle with them. while my brother has tended to retreat from them. I have always liked to assume responsibilities while my brother has preferred co avoid them.
+
Luna Nguyen
−
In Chapter :z. (pp. 39-41) rvc described the strong affection that I had for my brother during his ~cy. Butwithin a few years our relations began to grow more ambiguous and confliaed. In a letter that l sent my brother in t98:1., I wrote:
 
−
Throughout your childhood and CYCJ1 well up into your 2.0S you had a severe case of big-brother worship."Z
 
−
The cruth of this is confirmed by various statements of my brother's. The New Yorle nmu, on the basis of an interview with him, dcsaibcd him as an "admiring kid brother"3 who '"idolizcd..4 me. and quoted him as say­ing. '"I was very strongly influenced by my brother. "4
 
−
In the summer of 1982. Dave wrote me:
 
−
I don't remember finding it difficult as a youngster to admire you, and I don't think my will was consciously frustrated by coming under the influ­ence of your way of thinking, since I thought I came willingly; drawn by ics inainsic persuasion. I hope you will appreciate, in light of this, what a sig­nifi.cant being you must have represented to me.... On a personal lcvcl. however, I felt a problem arose insofar as it appeared to me I could appear in your world ... [only] by assuming a shape appropriate co this world, but not wholly expressive of my own experience and consciousness. In other words, what I thought of as the openness on my part which made your thought-process accessible to me, was so little reciprocated that I could abide there only by forsaking a certain freedom of spirit.'"
 
−
In brief. my brother was saying that he admired me but felt overawed and dominated by me. In I986 he wrote:
 
−
[Our parents] always encouraged me to look up to you, especially with regard to your intellect. ... One unhealthy side of this, as we've discussed before, is that I may have learned to look up to you too much. to cake your aitic:i.sms too much to heart, and to feel a little over-shadowed intellectu­ally. I think one reason I became ego-involved in our philosophical discus­sions a few years ago was because I was still crying to establish myself on a plane of intellectual equality with you.6
 
−
Rccendy my brother told Dr. K. that as a child he looked up to me, strove to emulate me, and as it were de.fined himself through his relation­ship to me.7
 
−
My brother's admiration for me was complicated by a marked strain of resentment, which seems to have had its origin in several factors, including his sense of inferiority to me, the fact that I often treated him badly when we were kids, and jealousy over the fact that 01,1r parents valued me more highly than they did mm. The conflict between his love and admiration, on the one hand, and his resentment. on the other, was shown in the inconsis­tency of his behavior toward me.
 
−
Once my brother was past his infancy; conflicts developed in my own feelings toward him. iJutially I think my resentment probably grew out of the way our parents handled our relationship. Whenevu any squabble arose between my brother and me, whenever anything went wrong when we were togcth~ I was automatically blamed for it. From my 1979 auto­biography:
 
−
When my brother was 4 years old and I was u (if I remember car· reedy),B my father gave each of us a glass bottle with a squirting attach­ment so that we could 'fight' by squirting each other. This was fine until my brother climbed up on a chair and then fell with the bottle in his hand. cutting himself very badly [when the bottle broke]. (It is still painful to me to remember chis incident.) Blood came gushing from my brother's hand at an amazing race. I screamed and howled for my parents, who came run­ning. They took my brother in the house, but quickly decided that he was bleeding so badly that they would have to rush him to the hospital. ... Because I had a strong affection for my brother, I was very upset about his injury. At one point, the doctors feared that two of his fingers might be permanently aippled.""' ([Footnote]: ""' But fortunately it nuncd out all right.), and at that time I offered to give my brother my coin collection, which was my most prized possession. ""... Since my brother climbed up on the chair on his own initiative, and since l was 10 feet away from him when he fell. there was no reason why I should be blamed for the incident. Nevertheless, the doctors told my par· cnts that my brother kept mumbling. 'Don't blame Teddy! Don't blame Teddy!'"
 
−
The reason is that he knew that whenever anything bad happened when he and I were together, I always got blamed for it. The same thing was true all through my earlier teens: Whenever I got into a screaming match with my brother. or any other conflict. my parents immediately blamed me. [fI tried to explain my side of the dispute, my parents would usually cut me shore by saying. 'It doesn't make any difference. You're older. You should be more mature.'* ([Footnote]:* Just as I often got into screaming matches with my brother, my parents often got into screaming matches with me. Apparently it never occurred to them that they should be more mature.') This was not the result of favoritism on their part­accually; I was always the favorite son. It was the result of simple laziness. To listen to both sides of a dispute between me and my brother, and attempt to make a fairjudgement, would have taken an effort. It was easier . to automatically blame the older child and throw on him the burden of keeping the peace."9 (The footnotes marked by an asterisk are in the original) _
 
−
My brother's effort to save me from blame shows the generous aspect of his feelings toward me. The resentful aspect is illustrated by the following incident. When I was thirteen years old and my brother was five, it was dis­c~that I had a cyst in my upper jaw thac would have to be removed surgically. and in preparation for that operation an oral swgeon extracted one of my upper indsors.10 AJ I reminded my mother in x991, "when I came home with my tooth pulled out, Davejeered at me for it."11
 
−
He also showed his resentment by teasing me frequently. For example, he would tell me some lie or tall tale, and then when he had me believing it he would laugh at me for having been taken in.12 His teasing aroused my own resentment, which led me to harass him verbally, and that in rum increased his resennnent. in a vicious circle. In addition. he had certain per­sonality ttaits that irritated me.13 He was an other-directed kid: He ran with a group of boys among whom he seemed to lose his own identity completely, imitating all their ways without holding back anything of him­self. Again. he sucked his thumb until he was eight years old. I used to get disgusted watching himat it, and I would rag him about it unmercifully. My mother would occasionally reprimand me for my harassment of my brother or him for his teasing of me. but neither of my parents ever made any serious or consistent effort to bring our constant quarrelling under concroL
 
−
The worse of it was that at this time I was suffering psychological abuse from my parents and from my schoolmates. and. being unable to retaliate against them. I probably took out much of my anger on my brother, who was a convenient object for that purpose. Of course, mybrotherwas not so defenseless against me as I was against our parents, since he could tum to them for support and protec:tion.13 In fact. my brother and my parents often tended to form a common front against me.14
 
−
Considering our conflias and the family situation in general. it's sur· prisingthat Dave and I retained as much affection for one another as we did. At the age of seventeen I wrote:
 
−
My brother and I quarrel a lot, but when we're not quarrelling we're prettyfriendly and considerate of each other. ts
 
−
And in r986 I wrote my brother:
 
−
(W]e had conflicts that resulted in resentment, but [on my side} that resentment was rclativcly superficial rather than deep and lasting.16
 
−
These passages only hint atthe strength and tenacity of my affection for Dave and the way it survived the sometimes bitter anger I felt toward him. But I trulybelieve that my resentment over our childhood conflicts had dis· sipated by the time I reached adulthood. and that it left little or no lasting residue in me. (With certain resentments that arose during our adult years it was a different matter.)
 
−
On my brother's side I think the resentment ran much deeper, but it did not interfere with the excessive adulation that led him to adopt me as a role· model and as a source of values and aspirations. A couple of times during my later teens my mother asked me in an ~voice, "Whatis this power you have over Dave?"' Iwasn't able to give her an answei; because itwasn't a power that I exercised consciously or intcntionally.17When my brother was maybe eleven or twelve years old. he used to show off by jumping up and touching the light on the kitchen ceiling. ( used to kid him by saying. "No, you can't do it! You won't make it!» And whenever he jumped after I bad said that. he would fail to touch the light. He used to attribute this to his own "suggestibility", and be seemed to take a masochistic satisfaction in it. Eventually. though, be did assert his will and show that he could touch the light even when I told him he couldn't.
 
−
This psychological subordination of my brother to me must have con­tributed in a very important way to his resentment, the more so since l was quite conscious of my own superiority in that respect, and, in those days, I probably did not do a very good job of concealingit. As I wrote in 1959:
 
−
I feel superior to my brother in intelleccual capacity, and very much in strength of will. even considering the age difference.Hl.5'
 
−
Another source of my brother's resentment against me was the fact that my parents valued me far more than they did him. In a psychological sense I was the most important member of the family. as is indicated, for enm­plc. by the fact that my parents saved more than two hundred of my letters but only two of my brother's; my brother saved a hundred or more of my letters to him, but no letters from our parents. (Sec Notes on Documents.) My brother and my mother both leaned on me heavily for the satisfaction of their psychological needs. and to some extent my father did so too: When I worked at Foam Cutting Engineers one of my co.workers, a woman named Dotty. said to me: 'Your father talks about you all the time. I thinkyou're the fim>ritc son. H"
 
−
As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. my brother tends to retreat from confliccs and problems rather than confronting them. I don't think he ever faced up to the contradiction between his affection for me and his resentment of me. Instead of resolving this conflict to his own satisfac­tion. he pushed the two upects of his relationship with me into two differ­ent and mutually inaccessible compartments of his mind, creating a division that deepened as the years went by.
 
−
At about the time I reached adulthood there was a great improvement in my relations with mr:brothcr. I wrote in my I979 autobiography:
 
−
I think it might have been when I was around 20 that we began to get along better. Instead of competing. each of us would freely acknowledge the other's areas of superiority. Since then I have always gotten along Vcr'f well with my brother. H 18
 
−
The always~ in the last sentence is not strictly accurate. since we still did have quarrels at times, but these were rather rare. and I fi:lt from I962, at least until I979 that I had basically a very good relationship with my brother. I had learned to cxcrc:i.se seltrcstraint toward him. and he toward me. I think it was from about 1962, to t96S that rfelt best about my relation­ship with Dave, but even at that time I think I remember feeling a little" regretful that he didn't seem to reciprocate the warm good-fellowship that I sometimes tried to show him.
 
−
In the later sinics a new element of resentment began to creep into my feelings toward my brother: I was disappointed in the way he was turning out. He seemed to me to be weak-lacking in initiative. energy. and persis­tence. This was not a good justification for resentinghim. but [felt a certain degree of low-keyed resentment all the same. This occasionally resulted in behavior on my part that must have been painful to my brother to a degree of which I had no conception at the time. Once in the late sinies we watched on television a movie titled Lhe Strange One.,. It was about a sadistic and Machiavellian student (called "Night Boy") in a military acad­emy who caused serious harm to various people through his cunning intrigues. Another character in the film was a repellent individual nick­named "Cockroach." an aspiring writer who chronicled N"ight Boy's exploits and gloated over chem. When the movie was over, my brother began to speak gloatingly of N"ight Boy. I was somewhat repelled. so I teased him by calling him "Coclcroach" and comparing him to that charac­ter. He got very upset and stormed out of the room. Ijust laughed at him. pleased that rd stung him, since I thought he deserved it. Only i:eccndy have I come to realize bow deeply I must have cut him with that remark.
 
  
−
ThE Ra A D a R Wt LL recall from Chapter7 that during the fall of I970 my brother set himself up in an apartment in Great Falls. Montana. He knew that I was still looking for land. and thatwinter he mentionedin a let­ter to our parents that he wouldbe interested in goingfifty-fifty with me on a piece of property if I cared to locate in his partof the coun~ My mother passed this information on to me. and, aboutJune I97I, I drove out to Great Falls and dropped in at my brother's apartment. He confirmed that he was interested in splitting ~th me the cost of a piece of land, and with charac· tcristic passivity he lcfbt up to me to find a suitable place. Within a few days a i:ealtor named RayJensen showed me a very attractive bit of land a few miles from Lincoln. It was not nearly as isolated as I would have liked. but by this time rd decided that I was going to have to settle for something that was less than ideal. I took my brother out to see the place, he liked it, and we each put in S1a50 to buy it.19 Dave expressed great satisfaction at having become a "landowner,'' as he put it.
+
=== Guide to Annotations ===
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I promptly began building a cabin on ourland. but Imade frequent trips back to Great Falls, during which I would spend one or more nights at my brother's apartment. On August I. 1971. I was so clumsy as to scald my foot with a pot of boiling soup. badly enough so that I was forced to become inactive for five weeks or more, and I spent that period at my brother's aparrmenr.zo Thus I became familiar with his way of life. I muse add that my brother was very considerate of me and very generous with his hospitality.
 
−
The mosc striking thing about my brother's life in Great Falls was the condition of his apartment. It was almost (though not quite) as bad as what Pac Mcintosh incorrectly dcsaibed in reference to my room atEliot House. The kitchen table and the greater part of the floor area were usually piled with crash. including food garbage. My brother would eat-for example­potato salad out of a can, and then, instead of getting up to throw the empty can into the trash receptacle, he would set it on the floor netto his chair. And there it would remain for weeks or months, along with other empty food containers that accumulated. From a March I972, letter to my parents:
 
−
... came back to Great Falls.... David got my mail out of a drawer for me, and said he 'thought' that that was all there was for me, but later he found three otherpieces ofmymail in various places amongst the litter (or, to be more accurate, garbage) in his apartment. r have been cleaning out some ofhis trash for him, butso far no more of my mail has turned up. At any rare, two important pieces of mail seem to be missing. ... One is my W-2 form from Abbot Temps.»z1
 
−
A couple ofdays later:
 
−
Dave and I have been cleaning out his apartment and he found, some­ where, my income-tustuff. ...»u InJune z973 r wrote my parents: ..I solicited Dave's assistance and we shovelled about a ton of trash out of his dump-but the sink and toilet still arc cesspools, and he doesn't dare open the refrigerator because when it went on the blink he neglected to take the food out, so that the thing is now filled with an unspeakable stench....
 
−
... Suggestion-tell Dave that unless he keeps his place clean. you will ask his landlord to make him clean the place up. I will give you a report, and if he is delinquent, [you] complain to his landlord.*' ([Footnote]:*' If the land­lord evicts him, it will be a lesson which will probably neaten him up for a longtime.)
 
−
It might help ifDad writes him a lecrwing letter on this scuff. .....23"
 
−
July 9, 1973:
 
−
Dave's apartment is still terrible. He docm•t seem to have done any­more cleaning up since I was here a couple of weeks ago. He must have been throwing out most of his fresh crash since then. but I notice that he has gotten careless and the trash is starting to accumulate again around bis chair. The toilet and sink arc still vile pits of corruption (and rm noc being facetious), and the refrigerator, as I told you, has been ruined by the stuff left to rot in ic. The place is pervaded by an odor of garbage-worse than before, I think.
 
−
In all seriousness, I think you should try that plan I mentioned to you about threatening to ask his land.lord to make him dean it up. I know it is a harsh thing co do, but I really chink he needs it. I am pretty certain that nothing less will get him to take any initiative at all in the matter. 24
 
−
My father did write Dave a lecturing letter, and I expostulated with him myself about the condition of his apartment. He answered, "Ted. I've tried and tried, but I just can't seem to help it ... Bue apparcndy my father and I did have some eff"ea onhim. for. as I wrote to my parents onJuly rs:
 
−
i have some good news: Dave actually started cleaning up his apart­ment on his own ·initiative. I helped, but the project was his own suggestion. Maybe I was wrong in assuming that nagging would do no good. ... [HJe says he cleaned out his refrigerator on his own initiative. but I haven't had the nerve co open it to see what kind of a job he did. He washed the sinks, toilet bowl, and table, and stove. but a good deal remains to be done: the counter and the floor, mainly. Whether he will do it or not I don't know, but anywaythere has been a big improvement already. He seems co have bright­ened up some......u
 
−
Despite the condition of his apartment. Dave seemed to be doing well in some ways. By the time of my arriv3l inJune I!m he'd made at least one good friend (Leon Ne. t). And over the next couple of years he made several ochers. The rugged physical work he was doing ac the smelter seemed to agree with him. I complimented him on the fact that he looked wiry and well-conditioned, and he said that he felt he was gaining something positive in a psychological sense from doing that kind of work. The smeltermen had a certain quota of work to do eac:h day, and once they had finished it they could stop working but had to stay at the smelter fur a full eight hours. They generally hurrie4 and finished their quota within about four hours and spent the other fuur hours at various recreations, especially c:hess. My brother read some books on c:hess strategy. and through constant practice at the smcltci:.he became a fairly good player. certainly muc:h better than I was. Whereas formerly I'd usually been able to beat him at chess. now the tables were turned and he could usually beat me. This seemed to be impor­tant to him.
 
−
In some other~ my brother was not doing so well. For some reason he seemed rather morose during this period. and he had become addicted to cigarettes. Both the smoking habit and the filthy condition of his apart­ment were expressions of a lack of will-power and an incapacity for effort that have affected my brotherall his life. but seemed co be particularly acute during this period. According to my letter of March :z.r, 1972,, co my parents:
 
−
Before I left for my cabin the last time, [Dave] very willingly promised to pay my [automobile insurance] bill and to get in couch with me if it did­n't arrive, etc. But it seems that when it did arrive he 'didn't notice' that it was from the insurance company until a couple of weeks after it was due. Actually, I don't resent this on his part-he is very obliging. helpful. and well-intentioned; he just seems to be incapable of doing anything that requires any effort at all, especially anything that requires attentiveness. ...
 
−
P. S. Don't say anything to Dave about my having mentioned his inabil­ity to make my effort. He is aware of his fililings. but it would hurt his feel­ings to know I had talked about them...26"
 
−
My brother had majored in English at Columbia and had ambitions to teach English at the high-school level. but he couldn't get a teaching job because, with his usual foresight, he had neglected to take the necessary education courses. So in the fall of I':171 he enrolled at the College of Great Falls. Because the zinc operation at the smelter closed down, he was laid offZ7 about June of 197,2.. but by the spring of 1973 he had completed the courses that he needed to get his certification as a teach~zs
 
−
In July 1973 I wrote my parents: 1l]tisn'tjust the filthy aparanent. re•sa general incapacity for cftort. For example, he hasn't done anything further about getting a teachingjob. He invents rationalizations about not beingsure he wants to make the commit­ment. etc. But on discussion he agrees that he ought to take the risk and make the effort. In principle, he says this. but in practice he docs nothing about it. And that is the general pattern of his cmtence. He is a kind ofveg­etable. S~hingought to be done to try to shake him out of it. .. 24
 
−
My mother generally defended my father and Dave whenever I aiticizcd either of them, but in a 1976 letter she did make some ackncwl­edgmcnt of my brother's failings: "Dave tends to be careless and for­getful. .. ,"25' . An important caveat has to be attached to these statements about my brother's incapacity for effort and self-discipline. What he lacked was per­haps not so much a capacity for effort as a will ofhis own. For example, he was a good student,30 and I believe that (except as a teacher) he always did a goodjob for his employers. which of course implies effort. But in those sit­uations he was exerting himself not on his own initiative but at the behest of someone (teacher or employer) whose authority he accepted and whO-:­so to speak-supplied-the will-power that he lacked.11 My brother has always needed to lean on someone stronger-willed than himself in order to find some direction in life. That is why he has been inclined to hero-worship and has tended to slip into dependence in his per­sonal relationships. Dave's worship of big brother. and his psychological dependence on him, have already been discussed. During his teens he fell for a time under the influence of Neil Ou., JZ a jazz musician from whom he took crumpet lessons. He fell much more deeply under the influence of Dirk West,32 a high-school English teacher of his, who was probably responsible for Dave's interest in literature and his aspiration to become a writer.
 
−
My brother also was very prone to idolize one public figure or another. As a kid he was constantly identifying himself with various baseball stars. . In 1971 when I joined him in Great Falls his hero was Joseph Conrad. He went so far as to assert that the only good stories ever written were chose ofConrad. A little later he read the superb shore story ..OfTms time, of That Place," by Lionel Trilling. and, forgetting Conrad for the moment. he maintained that that was the only good story ever written. He saw the protagonist, Ferdinand Tertan, as a hero. About that time also he idolized a country music singer name Johnny Bush. A few years later, in the late sev­enties, his hero was Willie Nelson,33 and after that the philosopher Martin Heidegger.32
 
−
In light of the direction that his life has taken since 1990 under the influ­ence of his wife, it is extremely interesting that Dave was unusually con­cerned with the concept of "selling out": rf an artist, or a hero orpotential hero came co terms with the system, Dave saw him as having betrayed his ideals. Thus he felt that Ferdinand Tertan was a hero because he badn•t sold out to the "banal .. (At that time "banal" was the word with which my brother labelled practically everything: that pertained to conventional mid­dle-class culture.) He theorized that "Of This Tune, of That Place.. was an expression ofguilt on Lionel Trilling's part for having sold out by following a comfortable career as a professor. In 1985 he expressed a similar hypothe­sis about Somerset Maugham. Referring co a storyby Horacio Quiroga. 'El Potro Salvaje' ('The W'tld Colt'),3'4 which cakes the position that financial success tends to spoil an artist, he wrote:
 
−
[T]he parable rings true co me, and I would be inclined co take Quiroga's side of the argument against Maugham. In fact. I have a sense about Maugham ... that he secured the very polished expression of things he knew well by relinquishing the more genuine artistic aspiration to ex­plore undiscovered territories. . . . [O]n a couple of occasions I have wit· nessed parables very similar to Quiroga's unfolding.... In my judgement, Willie Nelson, for instance, was once an artist of striking origmality and subtlety .... Now he does ducrs with Perry Como. Almost everything he is now seems to have no other meaning than to deny whac he was once....35'"
 
  
−
MY I! ROTH B R O I D eventually get moving and find a teaching job. After doing his student teaching in Montana he secured employment as a high-school English teacher at Lisbon, lowa. where we had lived for a short time with our parents. Knowing my brother as well as I did, I was able to guess what kind of teacher he would make. I quote one of the invcstigacor reports at length because its desaiption of Dave as a teacher agrees so closely with what I had imagined based on my knowledge of my brother's charaacr.
+
This book was written as a textbook for Vietnamese students who are not specializing in Marxism-Leninism, and so it is meant to be a simple and condensed survey of the most fundamental principles of dialectical materialism to be used in a classroom environment with the guide of an experienced lecturer. That said, a typical Vietnamese college student will already have been exposed to many of the concepts presented herein throughout twelve years of primary and secondary education. As such, in translating and preparing this book for a foreign audience who are likely to be reading it without the benefit of a lecturer’s in-person instruction, we realized that we would need to add a significant amount of annotations to the text.
−
Tim Be. was a student of Dave's at LisbonHighSchool in the mid-1970s, and according to what he told my investigators:
 
−
Dave was a crusting and naive teacher who behaved erratically. On one hand, Dave was a lax teacher who gave his students freedom believing that they would not take advantage ofhis trust, which they did. He did not con­vey authority and therefore he was incapable of controlling his class. On the other band, Dave occasionally disciplined students harshly for a minor infraction. For instance. Dave once sent Tim to the principal's office for putting his feet up on the chairin front of him. Being sent to the prindpal's office was a punishment reserved for serious offenses, such as beating up a fellow Student. It was not the appropriate punishment for what Tun did. ...
 
−
Tun saw how Dave struggled as a tcachee When the principal came into the class to evaluate Dave's teaching. Dave became nervous and his stu· dents did not cooperate. They talked over each other and over Dave. Dave seemed frustrated and overwhelmed. Dave also did not like the administra­tive bureaucracy. ... He did not like having to modify his curriculum and his teaching style so that it complied with the school's rigid guidelines. ...
 
−
Dave tried to be an innovative teacher. He tried to motivate his students to read literature and talk about ideas, but very few kids responded.""36"
 
−
After teaching for two years my brother left his position and went to stay with our parents again in Lombard, where, for a while, he devoted himself exclusively to creative writing. Needless to say. nothing he wrote during this period was~ published. Then he got a job at my father's place of employment, Foam Cutting Engineers, and was working there when I arrived in Lombard in 1978. A couple of months later. as a result of the trouble over Ellen Tarmichael (which will be discussed in Chapter 10) he left Foam Cutting Bnginecrs and took himself a long vacation aip (I think to the Big Bend area ofTexas, though rm noc sure ofit), after which he returned co Lombard and found a job driving a commuter bus. He kept this job full time.17 until 1981 or 1982.. About 1980 or r981 he bought a piece of property in desert country in Tczas,38 From 1981 or 1982 he spcnc the winters on his Texas property and the summers at his bus-drivingjob, until in 1987 he quit thejob in order to live full-time in the desert.39 Then in1989 he abruptly left Texas to shack up with Llnda Patrik in Schenectady, New York.40 He has been with Ms. Paaik ever since, working as a counselor of "croubledH youths.
 
−
It will be observed that my brother has had no stable direction in life, but has merely drifted. From now on, though. I expect that his life will be much more stable. since Ms. Paaik is dearly dominant aver him and will provide the direction and consistencythat he lacks.
 
−
Lest the reader form an enggcrated conception of my brother's weak­ness of character, I must report that he did eventually improve his house­keeping habits, and he didpermanently stop smoking.'1
 
−
Chapter 9 j MY BROTHER wasgiftcdwithexcellent athletic coordination thac enabled him to excel effortlessly at sports that depended primarily on skill rather than strength.1 For instance. he became ping-pong champion of the eighth grade ar Evergreen Parle CentralSchool. even though he had never.played ping-pong before he encered the tourna­mcnt!z. So it is not surprising that he feels at home and confident of himself on the playing-field or the tennis court. But in other contexts my brother tends to be distinctly lackingin self-confidence.
 
  
 +
These annotations will take the following forms:
  
 +
* Short annotations which we insert into the text itself [will be included in square brackets like these].
  
−
Chapter 9
+
-----
  
−
My brother’s ambivalent feelings toward me
+
Longer annotations which add further context and background information will be included in boxes like this.
−
This was shown. for aample, by his diffidence about building a cabin on his property in Tens. He was not interested in a strucrure chat would impress anyone by its fine workmanship; all he wanted was something that would protect him from the weather and provide a place co store his belongings. Anyone with normal physical and mental abilities can put together such a structure. yet my brother seemed to find it difficult to believe that he could carry out the project. In a letter to me in I983, he referred to "the off chance I should be successful" in building a cabin.3
 
−
In an answering letter I wrote: "t don't have the slightest doubt you could build a good cabm-if you once started the project. That's the only problem. You would be apt to be so pessimistic about the results beforehand. that you would never under­ take the project. "4 My brother wrote in reply: "I accept that your assessment of my defcatcst [sic] attitude is correctto an e%tcnt. especially when it comes to projeas involving some patient application of craftsmanship. I explain this combination of laziness and self. mistrust (which qualities seem to feed upon one another) in two ways to myself. (I) A lack of natural aptitude for building and handwork . . . s althougb I realize it doesn't take a whole lot of aptitude to throw up a rougbly serviceable cabin; and (2.) .•• ."6 (There follows an elaborate ratio­nalization of the type chac is characteristic of my brother.)
 
−
When he finally didbuild a cabin three years later, he wrote:
 
−
I just built a cabin for myself with help from the 1lJY who likes hcalth­food. ... I guess the main thing was that I felt terribly uncertain undertak­ing a project like that on my own.... [l]t may be hard for you to appreciate the sense of intimidation experienced by someone like me in the face of a proJea of that type .... 7
 
−
But it wasn't only in building or handwork that my brother lacked energy and persistence. Referring to projects of any kind I wrote him in 198;.
 
−
I find it rather tiresome that you make promising noises [about prc,. jca:s] and then do nothing. I'm aware of your little problem about procras­tination and so forth. but I must say I would find it more agreeable if you would refrain from speaking in promising terms unless, by some chance. you actually had a serious intention of carrying something through. "8
 
−
I believe that my brother was quite right in saying that his "laziness" and his "self.mistrust" fed upon one another. To put it more clcarlJ I suspect that an inbom lack of energy tended to prevent my brother from achieving good results in things that he undertook. the poor results weakened his sclf­confidcncc, and the lack of self-confidence further lowered his energy and persistence, in a vicious circle. In my 1985 lettcr I continued:
 
−
Please forgive mi.for offering unasked-for advise [sic], but it docs seem to me that your tendency to drop projects ... may be simply the result of a negative attitude about the possibility of success. Carrying one or two things through successfully might result in a more encouraged attitude on your part thereafter. But I apologize for putting my nose into what is none of my busincss.9
 
−
Also contributing to my brother's difficulties with his self-esteem was the fact that. as I wrote to him in 1982., "You have very high aspirations. For you it is not enough to just be as good as others. You have to be someone sped.aL"lO
 
−
I myself had always tended to have similarly high aspirations, and this might plausibly be attributed to the faa that our mother, with her excessive craving for status, had inculcated us with a feeling that we had to be out­standing; to be average represented failure. To one who has the necessary energy and persistence, such aspirations lead to achievement; but to one who lacks those qualities they lead to a sense of defeat.
 
−
Dave's self-esteem must have been damaged further by the inevitable comparison with his older brother: I had the energy and persistence that he lacked. Moreover, when we were kids, the mere faa that I was older enabled me to do many things that he could not do; our parents, especially our mother, made matters worse by exaggerating my abilities and holding me up as an example to my brother; and I made matters worse still through my verbal harassment of him. which generally took the form of denigration.11
 
−
Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that D;m: had an ego problem with respect to big brothcr.12 This was shown, for example, by the fact that in discussions with me he would never admit he was wrong, or concede a single point, even when in order to avoid making a concession he had to adopt a position that was dearly ridiculous.13 It wasn't that he didn't find my arguments persuasive. On the contrary. he found them all too per­suasive. Ashe wrote in 1982:
 
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You h.M:, I think you must know; an interpretation of the world which persuades by its very power and conviction .... I don't think my will was consciously frustrated by coming under the influence of your way of think­ing, since I thought I came willingly. drawn by its inainsic persuasion ...14
 
−
And according to chc FBl's reports:
 
−
DAVE ... noted that a particular characteristic of TED's debating style was chat he placed special emphasis on making his arguments com­pclling... u"
 
−
Which means, in effect, that my brother found them compelling. This is not an indication of the.rational force of my arguments; my brotherhas lit· de appreciation of rationality. He found my arguments compelling simply because he was overawed by big brother.
 
−
His sense of inferiority and helplessness vis-a-vis big brother led rum to consistently place himself in a position of subordination to me, even though he resented that position. Thus, when we wen: both learning Span­ish during the 1980s, he repeatedly applied to me for help and-on the sur­face-was grateful for it. He wrote me:
 
−
Thanks for correcting my crron [m Spanish].... Spanish has more cases of the subjunctive than Eoglish docs, isn't that so? Generally. I don't understand chem. . . . Please write to me again in Spanish, so that I will learn the language bettcr,16 (Translated from bad Spanish) ~[W]ould you like co spend part of our time speaking Spanish during your visit? I think. it would be a help co me.""t7"
 
−
[T]hanks for correcting my Spanish .... ts
 
−
Some questions about the Spanish language: Isn't lo used sometimes as a complement meaning him or even y1ll . . . [etc.]" 151 (Translated from Spanish)
 
−
Yet, under the surface, my brother apparently resented my help, even though he asked for it. One evening during bis visit to my cabin in 1986 at his request he spent some time reading co me out of a Spanish-language _ book while I corrected bis pronunciation. But according to the New Yorle Ti~:
 
−
Ted 'spent some time tutoring me in Spanish.' David said. 'He would have me read from some of the Spanish books. I had a sense that he really enjoyed doing that.' David said he did not relish the role, but went along with it because it seemed to please his brother.10
 
−
Accually, it did not please me. I found it tiresome. But the important point here is that Dave never apressed to me bis negative feelings about the help I gave him with Spanish. and I did not realize that he hadsuch feelings.
 
−
In other situations also my brother concealed his resentment over his ego conflict with me. In 1988 l sent him an affectionate letter in which I reminisced about his childhood and told him what an atcractivc little kid he'd becn.11
 
−
My brother answered:
 
−
Thank you for your affectionate letter. It meant aloe [sic] co me and I'll keep it always. as I have a few of your others. 12
 
−
But in his interview with the New Yorle TI~. Dave described the letter and then said. i had the sense that he wanted me to be the little brothcr."13 Of course, he was only projecting his own feeling of inferiority. According to the FBI:
 
−
He noted that TED seemed to think of him (DAVE) as an 'acolyte', and TED took for granted that DAVE would agree with and look up to him in all things.''14
 
−
Again my brother was projecting his own sense of inferiority. It was he who placed himself in a position ofpsytb.ological subordination to me. I by no means wanted him to occupy such a position. In met, his excessive adu­lation of me was one of the things thac disgusted me about him. But what matters here is the fact that my brother never expressed these complaints to me or in my presence. After I'd apologized for the way rd harassed him when we were kids, 2S he wrote in a I986 lctter:
 
−
~ far as your treannent of me as a child went, Ted, rdon't thinkit was as bad as you seem to remember. You tended to downgrade me in' some respects, but I imagine that's par for the course among siblings .... (Note in margin of letter:] (S]ince attaining adulthood, you seemed to have reversed this tendency. and have often been generous with yourpraise.26"
 
−
Yet I now suspect that even as an adult my brother felt bullied by me.27 Physically he was bigger than I was. Ido not remember ever having raised my voice to him after I was past my teens. certainly I nCVC" aied to give him an order, I was not conscious of any other behavior that could have been seen as bullying. and I had no overt power over him. Ifhe felt bullied. it can only be explained by his sense of psychological subordination to me-a subordination that I neitherdesired nor knowingly encouraged.
 
−
Except that in very rare cases he had outbursts of anger toward me (for which he later expressed. shame), my brother in ·adulthood seems to have found it very difficult to assert himself against me. A mere suggestion from me felt to him like an order; a mere czpressi.on of disagreement felt like a cutting aiticism. He was so sensitive in this respect that it would have been virtually impossible fur me to avoid wounding him: If I proposed. a course ofaction I was being bossy; ifI disagreedwithhim I was beingovcr·aitical. I had realized for a long time that my brother had some such feelings, but owing to his reticence in expressing them I had no idea of their intensity until after my arrest. To illustrate, the New Torie Tima wrote. on the basis of its interview with mybrother:
 
−
in adulthood, David remembered an overbearing brother . . . who could tum a conversation about David's term paper into a humiliating demolition of his ideas on Freudian analysis. ..."28
 
−
I remember this conversation. To me it was simply a discussion carried out on an equal basis. in which we agreed on some points and disagreed on others. It did not occur to me at the time chat my brother experienced itas a ''humiliating demolition ofhis ideas.''
 
−
Other indications ofmy brother's suppressed angertoward me: Accord· ing to the FBI. he stated that he felt angry when he read things written by me;29 and he wrote in 1982, ''No one makes me as angry as you do some· times ... I don't know why."30 (l'he three dots arc in the original.) Yee. as already noted. he rarely expressed. this anger.31
 
−
However, my brother often was excessively sensitive to aitidsm by me of any of his friends.32 and it is worth mentioning that he was more ready to c:zpress resentment of such aiticism than he was to express resentment of aiticism of himself. For instance, when I stayed with him at his apart­mcnt in Great Falls in 1971, we spent an evening with his new friend Leon Ne., and afterward I commented to Dave, "He seems like a nice fellow, but maybe a little bit of a blow-hard." My 'qrochcr flared up, obviously stung, but he cooled down very quickly~n the surface. at least. Lacer in 1971 a college friend of his, Denis Db., stopped at the apartment for an overnight visit. I had met Denis once before, and he muse have taken a strong dislike to me for some reason, because on this visit he made a series of nasty remarks. For instance, referring co my desire to live in the woods, he said, "Since you want to live like an animal ..... Each time he made one of these remarks my brother and l glanced at one another wonderingly. From con­sideration for my brother I refrained from saying anything unpleasant in reply co-Denis.
 
−
My brother never apologized co me for his friend's behavio~ though he was certainly aware of it. In fact, he must have mentioned it to ourparents, since they mentioned it to me without my having told them about it. rn about 1979, when I was in Lombard, in conversation with Dave I casually referred to Denis's offensive behavior toward me, and Dave snapped back in a challenging tone, '1 don't remember it!°' But clearly he did remember it, because ifhe hadn't remembered the incident he would have answered me in a wondering or questioning tone rather than a challenging one. 33 Of course, I dropped the subject.
 
−
When Dave began attending the College of Great Falls, he quickly made three new friends: Bill Wadham. George Plattt, and Luisa Mucllert. Luisa Mueller had never been married, nor was she in a monogamous rela­tionship, but she had a five-year-old boy and, by a different father. a pair of three-year-old twins. She lived on wel&rc. A few months or a year or two after my brother made her acquaintance. she got pregnant again. At that time she told Dave that she wasn't sure whether the father was Bill Wad­ham or George Platt, but later it was apparently decided that Bill Wadham was the probable father. My brother had been hanging around with her quite a bit, but had no·.scxual relationship with her. In my opinion, women liked my btother because of the easy-going softness of his character. but did not sec him as a potential lover: He was homely. he WU not muscular, and his personality was decidedly lacking in virility and energy.
 
−
Before Luisa Mueller's baby was born. my brother had returned to Lombard temporarily. When thebaby died at orshortly after birth, my par­ents wrote me34 that Luisa made a tcadul phone call to Dave and that he promptly flew out to Montana to comfort her. I began to worry that he might make an ass ofhimselfbygettinginvolved with and eventually mar­rying her. I felt sure that she was not aa:raacd to my brother as a male, butr was afraid that she might marry him simply in order to make her position respectable. or because he provided a good shoulder co cry on, and that she would subsequently make him a cuckold many times over. So I wrote my parents a letter in which I pointed cue chat Dave seemed to be getting dan­gerously close to Luisa Mueller and suggested that they should discourage the relationship. 3s I have to admit that my motive for writing the letter was less concern for my brother's wclf.lre than disgust at his weakness of char­acter; thus the motive was in considerable partselfish.36 Anyway. Dave acci­dentally found ouc about my letter and wrote me an c:mcmcly angry. insulting, and vituperative reply34 full of wild accusations. This was quickly followed by a second letter.34 in which he apologized and expressed a hope chat our relationship would not be permanently spoiled by the things he'd : said.37 Since I was somewhat ashamed of the selfish aspect of my motive for writing to our parents about him and Luisa Mueller, I gave him a very mild answer:
 
−
1 apologize for meddling and I promise to keep my nose out of your business in the future. On my side. at least, there are no hard feelings."38
 
−
In his first. angry letter, my brother denied that he had any sexual inter­est in Luisa Mueller and. insisted chat his motives with respect to her were purely altruistic. He also said chat what angered him most about what I wrote to our parents was the implication that he was ~and needed to be guided for his own good. In his second. apologetic lett= be said that what mainly angered him was the implication of dishonesty on his part in my suggestion that he was "lying" ( as be put it) about the natme ofhis feel­ings coward Luisa Mueller.
 
−
My brother and l discussed this episode nine years later. in an exchange of letters in I982. Dave wrote:
 
−
The angry letter I wrote you. Yes, I'm ashamed of it. But ... you didn't only suggest that I be discouraged from seeing the woman. You also said you thought I was lying when I said my relations with her were saictly non­scxuaL39
 
−
I wrote:
 
−
In the .first letter you said chat the main reason you were angry was because of the implication that you were weak and needed to be guided for your own good. In the second letter (and also in a recent letter on this sub­jea) you said that the main reason you were angry was that (as you claimed) I was accu.sing you of • dishonesty' or of 1ying' when I suggested that you were misrepresenting the nature of your incerest in [Luisa Mueller].
 
−
... I think it was fairly clear in the contmof myletter chat I was acc:us­ing you not oflying but of self-deception....
 
−
[Even if I had accused you of lying], you probably would have sent me a rebuke in an irritated tone, or perhaps even a moderately angry tone, but you would not have sent me the highly emotional, vituperative, and enraged letter that you did send.
 
−
Obviously then, my supposed questioning of your honesty was not what got you so terribly upset. The real reason is the one you permitted to slip out in your first letter. My letter did convey an implication of weakness on your part. Somewhere 'deep down inside' you.fed weak; consequently that implication touched a raw nerve and you became enraged. ""40"
 
−
Dave referred to this episode again four years later, in I986, and then he practically admitted that rd been right in thinking that he was attracted sex-­ually to Luisa Mueller.
 
−
When your interference vis-a-vis [Luisa Mueller] touched off an explo­sion, I believe this is how I aperienced everything ... I saw you acting as a sore of a surrogate super-ego in the matter of our parents' highly (though subtly) repressive attitudes toward scz. I suppose I felt that siblings ought to confederate in the snuggle with their parents co assert sexual indepen­dence.... [Note in margin of letter:] I acknowledge that this resembles your original account of the episode more closely than mine.41
 
−
Incidentally. the reason I was so contemptuous of Luisa Mueller was not just the fact that she got pregnant without b~married. If a woman chooses to have babies out of wedlock. then as &r as I'm conccmcd that's her business and I have no desire to censure her. What disgusted me about Luisa Mueller was that she seemed to me such a damned animal; she kept getting pregnant apparently without desiring to doso. Was she too improv­ident to take precautions? I don't think she had my religious convictions that would have prevented her from usingcontraceptives.
 
  
−
MY B Ro T H B R almost never tookmypart in any conflict that I had with anyone else. In such conflicts, rcgarcllcss of the faces of the situation, he usually seemed to see me as a tyrannical aggressor. Here is an aamplc.
+
-----
−
When we first met him in Great Falls, Dave's friend Bill Wadham was an admitted thief, though as far as t know his thefts were very trivial.42 In the summer of 1978, I, my father, Dave, Bill and his wife were all working at Foam Cutting Engineers in Lombard, Illinois; then Bill and his wife decided to move away. One day shortly before they left I cashed a paycheck. The next morning I bad to go to work and didn'twant to carryso much money with me, so I hastily hid about a hundred dollars somewhere in my room then took off. A few days later I wanted the money; but couldn't remember exactly where I'd hidden it. I minutely examined every comer and cranny of my room and took everything apart, but could find no money.
 
−
My mother told me that a day or two earlier Dave had left Bill and his wife alone in our house for a matter of hours. Under the circum.stanccs one could only suspect that Bill had taken the money; but Dave reacted quite emotionally to the suggestion that he had done so. He vehemently denied that such a thing was possible. Lat~ though. after he had cooled down. he admitted that Bill might have taken the money; and he volunteered to replace my hundred dollars. I declined his offer. and instead I wrote a note to Bill (who by this time had moved) that said: '1f I don't get my hundred dollars back pretty damn quick. Iwillget the police on your tail... I reasoned thatifBill had stolen the money he would probably send it back to me. and ifhe had not stolen it he would take my note as a joke.
 
−
A3 it turned out, he did take my note as a joke. He was quite amused by it and sent me a letter inwhich be enclosed a sand dollar, saying '"Here is the (sand) dollar we owe you." When Dave learned of Bill's letter and deduced from it what I'd done. he was very angry. because he feared that Bill's feel· ings would be hurt if he guessed that I suspected him ofstealing. Dave was going to confront me about it, but my mother talked him out of doing so.
 
−
About a year later I tried co put on a pair of gloves that rd had with me in Lombard but had not worn since then. { found that my thumb wouldn't go into one of the gloves. Investigating. I discovered x02 dollars rolled up and thrust into the thumb of the glove. I had a goodlaugh at myse1f
 
−
At some later time I cold my brother about finding the hundred dollars, and he C%pteSSed great relief, saying, HI really believed Bill had taken it. .. Thus, when Dave became angry over my letter to Bill, he evidently felt that ifone of his friends stole something from me it was an unjustifiable cruelty on my part to confront that friend about it. Yet it is certain that if Dave had ever suspected that I had stolen something from one of his friends, he would have been ~dat me.
 
−
Dave's tendency co sec me as a tyrannical aggressor is illustrated also by the way he instinctively turned against me in the Ellen Tarmichacl affair (to be discussed in Chapter 10) without bothering to inquire first about the faas.
 
−
There was an occasion in 1979 on which my brotherseemed at first to be taking my part in a conflict. then suddenly~himself and withdrew his support. What hurt me was not so much the fact that he withdrew his supportas the smug satisfaction with which he did it. It was like kicking me in the face when I was down. rm not going to recount the incident here because it's too painful. Of all che things my brother did prior to 1995 it's the only one for which I've never forgiven him. It rankles to this day.
 
−
My brother sometimes expressed his resentment of me in underhanded ways.43 When Dave and I both lived in Montana we jointly rented a safe· deposit boL By I975 my brother had left Montana. leaving his papers in the box. In that year I wrote my parents:
 
−
Last year I had to write Dave about 3 times to gee him to pay his share of the rent on our safe deposit box. This year I wrote him twice and he never did pay the S2..50 •••44
 
−
Was ic just because of my brother's laziness that he failed to pay me? Probably not: In the last two letters I told him that I was desperately hard up for money. so that literally ~penny was important. Yet he never answered.
 
−
... so I got tired of it, took my stuff out of the box. arranged to have the box put in his name only. and sent him some papers from the bank that he has to sign and return. He doesn't answer my letters-maybe he's mad ac me, though I can't imagine for what. Anyway. in case he didn't get the papers from the bank. make sure he knows he has to contact the bank ifhe doesn't want to lose his stuffin the box.44
 
−
Seven years later Dave wrote me:
 
−
The safe-deposit bOL I admit I was wrong. I have never complained to you about sticldng me with it. But you should keep in mind that you were the one who persuaded me to take ic out with you in the first place. And now I am paying for a box I never use. simply because it is inaccessible tome."4'
 
−
Of course, ifmy brother had answered my letters and asked me co send him his papers from the box. I would have done so, and he wouldn't have been "stuck." with it. I had been the one who suggested that we should rent the box. but as far as I can remember my brother accepted the suggestion readily. I didn't have to do any persuading.
 
−
One evening in I9].8 when my brother and I were both staying at our parents' house, Dave spent some hours drinking beer in his room. By and by he got tipsy enough so that be ame dancing out of his room and danced around the living room stark naked. in my mother's presence. She was embarrassed and said, "Dave! Go put some clothes on!" He danced back. into his room. wrapped a blanket around himself: danced back out and pranced around the living room for half a minute or so, then danced back. co his room and dosed the door: and that was the end of the ind.dent.
 
−
Some time later I recalled this episode in the presence of my brother and our parents. and mentioned the fact that Dave had been naked. Dave's
 
−
memory of the event, not surprisingly, was a bit fuzzy. and he said, "Didn't I have a blanket around me or somechingr' I said, "No, the first time you came out naked; you had the blanket on the second time you came out." Dave seemed to begin to accept this, but then suddenly andfor no apparent reason he hardened. It was as if a door had closed: He asserted positively and in an uncompromising tone that he had not come out naked. Since our parents, too, remembered the incident unclcarly, they weren't sure whether co believe me ormy brother.Theind.dentwas rcfcrrcd to several times over the next few weeks. and my brother continued to deny that he'd been naked. My parents found the situation amusing. I found it so too, but I was also irritated by the faa that mybrother persisted inbis denial when I knew that he believed I was right. Dave seemed neither amused, nor angry. nor embarrassed about the affair; his tone in stating his denials was hal'd and smug.
 
−
Then our parents' friends the Mcistcrs came to visit. During an evening of conversation with them I mentioned the nakcd~cing incident. Dave got careless and responded to my remark in a way that practically amounted to an admission that he had been naked. I was delighted. I jumped out of my chair, slapped the floor. and gleefully exclaimed, rie admitted it! He admitted it!.. Everyone was highly amuscd-accpt Dave. He appcarcd neither amused nor embarrassed. Without aac:king a smile, he said, '"Damn! I admitted it. .. He seemed seriously vexed with hbnself ·
 
−
I discussed mybrother's motive in a letter I wrote him in1982,:
 
−
(Y]ou refused to admit the truth of that anecdote I recounted about the time when you got drunk and came prancing out of your room stark naked. Have you thought about the motive for your d.enial1 Was it embar­rassment? That may have been aconaibuting faaor, but I don't think it's­the whole explanation. For one thing. the incident wasn't all that embar­rassing. For another thing, when you finally admitted the incident acciden­tally in front ofthe Mcistcrs, you didn't seem in the least embarrassed. You justseemed vcir:ed with-_yoursclf for having inadvertently spoiled your own little game. For a third thing, you could have just asked me not to remind people of the incident and you know I would have complied with any earnest request of that sort. Was your motive humor? That doesn't stand up either. It maybe humorous at first to pretend thatsuch an incidentnever occurred, but there is no further humor in persisting in the denial for weeks. Moreover, when you finally admitted the incident by accident, that was an occasion for humor, but instead oflaughing about it you were just vexedwith yourself
 
−
I suggest that what was happening here was the same thing that was happening when you used to tell me tall tales as a kid. You played that ttick simply because it felt good to be 'one up' on big brother for a change and in chis way also you were taking out your resentment over feeling second­bcst.... Of course, I could be wrong in this analysis of your motive.46
 
−
I was being over-cautious. I don't think there need be much doubt that my desaiption of his motive was about right. My brother never mentioned the naked-dancing incident in any subse­quent letter of his.
 
−
TH B CONT R. AST BB T W BB N my brother's deep-lying rcscnanent of. me and the marked generosity and affection that he showed me at other times is puzzling. Whereas his expressions ofrcscnancnt were covert,47 his expressions of affection and generosity were overt. so that no one is likely to dispute them. Hence I need not exert myself to prove the reality of his affection. I will only give one particularly marked cnmplc of it.
 
−
In a 1985 letter that has not been preserved, I told my brother that I was worried about my health. In his answering letter he wrote:
 
−
Im sorry ... to hear that you're having problems with your health. I hope it's nothing serious. Ifyou need money for medical expenses, I have a number of thousands of dollars saved up which I would be willing to give you if you bad no other recourse for obtaining proper aeaancnt. I know you are estranged from our parents. But I also know they wouldn't hesitate a second to send you money in case of any genuine necessity. But if you have reasons for preferring not to ask them-and I can certainly understand that, given the state ofyour relations-please tell me what you need and I'll try to come up with it...48
 
−
In a following letter:
 
−
H[I]t bothered me to think that you might be foregoing medical care because you were too·_proud to request or accept help.... our family ... is fairly prosperous . : . I hope you realize that help is available for the asking."49 .
 
−
I answered.:
 
−
HI think my heart is going bad. Question of mental stress. Used to be that I suffered from hardly any tension at all around here. But the area is so f-kcd up now that my old way oflifeisall shot to hell. .•. [T]hose Gehring jerks so are planningto log off the woods all around my cabin here.
 
−
...[Y]ou'll understand that with the way things arc around here now I often suffer from tension, anger, frustration, etc."51 I then explained that I was much troubled with irregular heartbeats. I continued:
 
−
I wouldn't be surprised ifIjust drop dead one of these days.
 
−
Actua.lly I'm not really all that concerned about it-We all gotta go some time anyway. so what the helL On the other hand, I'm not amious to die any sooner than I have to ....
 
−
P. S. I forgot to mention-I was touched by your extremely generous offer of money. But even ifit would have done any good, I wouldn't take it, not from you. When I took to the woods I made a decision to forgo (sic} 6nancial security. being fully aware of the consequences to be expected with the onset of old age and illness. It would obviously be unfair for me now to accept money from you, who have paid the price of earning finan­cial security.52 It would be different if I leeched off the welfare dept., since the society that provides welfare is the same one that has f-ked up my way of life in the woods-so why not screw them? ... Also it would be diff'crcnt if I took money from our parents. As you know, rhate them. so why not screw them? But from you I wouldn't take any money...n"
 
−
My brother replied:
 
−
i appreciate your sauples vis-a-vis my savings. But to balance money against life seems to me absurd. Also, I remember that when I was out ofa job you offered to saaificc your privacy (which I know is veryprecious to you) in order to help me out. 53 I would certainly grieve if you kicked-off prematurely but it would be far, far worse for me if I thought I could have done anything to help prevent it.
 
−
In my opinion. you ought to go to a heart specialist and have a thor­ough cnm. ...
 
−
Why don't you have me request enough money from the parents to pay for an exam? I assume you would hate to do it yourself. I don't think it would be 'sacwing' them anyway. since they have more than they can spend. ...""54 _"
 
−
I gave no answer to ·my brother's offer, except by remarking that I did not appreciate getting unasked-for advice concerning my health. 55 This was February IS, 1986.
 
−
During March and April t986, Dave and 1 excbangcd some letters con­cerning my resentment of our parents. passages from which have been quoted earlier in this book.S6 This correspondence inflamed my resent­ment, and I was particularly galled by the fact that my brother seemed to think that our parents would willingly and graciously give me money if I needed it badly. I felt that they probably woald give me money if I were in desperate straits, but I was sure that they would give it grudgingly and on terms that would be humiliatingfor me.
 
−
To prove my point, I sent them in April 1986 a note that read (in its entirety): "I need about .'S6,ooo for medical reasons."S'7 My purpose was to cause my parents pain and reveal their ungenerous nature. ralso had some thought of keeping the money to spend not especially for medical expenses but for whatever necessities might arise, but rabandoned that idea because I feared it might constitute fraud and be alegally prosecutable offense.
 
−
My pa.rents' response was curt. My mother's portion of the letter con­sisted of a terse demand for details; an inquiry about the possibility of vari­ous forms of public assistance, Medicaid. etc; a question about what savings or insurance I might have and whether a doctor would accept a payment plan. My father:
 
−
... Can you und~d our resentment that you totally disassociated yourself from us yet in time of need call for our assistance!!! .... Your rejec­tion ... shows lackof understanding. tolerance or a sense of family.
 
−
Right now we can give you an advance on what we have been sending you yearly. In the meantime, please respond to the above questions. S'I
 
−
Shortly after receiving this I wrote a letter to my brother in which I explained what I'd done. I included a complete copy of the letter from our parents that I've justquoted. and added:
 
−
The difference between this letter and JOKT very generous response when I merely mentioned that I had a health problem, is quite strikmg. All the more so considering that you have much less money than they do--as you s~d yourscl( they have more money than they can spend anyway.
 
−
Now. I want to make it clear that I do not consider that they owe it to me to send me money. What they owe me has nothing to do with money. and they couldn't pay it off with any amount of money. no matter how largc."S'9
 
−
In the same letter I told my brother:
 
−
[Y]ou might obje~ to [what I did] and with some justification. Not that I feel you have the riglit to intervene in any disputes between me and the parents. But its possible you might feel you were in some sense a party to this nasty trick I played on them: For one thing. I was of course relying on the assumption that you would tell them that my heart is prone to act funny; for another thing. you had suggested to me that I should ask them for money; and finally. it was your letter that got me stirred up against thcm.N60
 
−
l then told Dave that out of consideration for his feelings I was explain­ing the affilir to him so that, ifhe liked, he could explain it to our parents. I also told him that ifrhcy did send me money I would send it to him and he could do with it what he pleased. which I assumed would be to give it back to our parents. 61 .
 
−
My parents did send me a check for six thousand dollars (presumably befure my brother received my letter), and I did send it to him, as promised.62 Undoubtedly he then gave itback to ourparents.
 
  
 +
We have also added diagrams to our annotations, as well as a detailed glossary/index and appendices, which are located in the back of the book. We hope these will resources will also be of use in studying other texts which are rooted in dialectical materialist philosophy.<br />
  
 +
=== Original Vietnamese Publisher’s Note ===
  
−
Chapter 10
+
In 2004, under the direction of the Central Government, the Ministry of Education and Training, in collaboration with Sự Thật [Vietnamese for “The Truth,” the name of a National Political Publishing House], published a [political science and philosophy] curriculum for universities and colleges in Vietnam. This curriculum includes 5 subjects: Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Marxist-Leninist Political Economy, Scientific Socialism, Vietnamese Communist Party History, and Ho Chi Minh Thought. This curriculum has been an important contribution towards educating our students — the young intellectuals of the country — in political reasoning, so that the next generation will be able to successfully conduct national innovation.
  
−
The Ellen Tarmichael affair
+
With the new practice of education and training, in order to thoroughly grasp the reform of the Party’s ideological work and theory, and to advocate for reform in both teaching and learning at universities and colleges in general, on September 18<sup>th</sup>, 2008, the Minister of Education and Training, in collaboration with Sự Thật, have issued a new program and published a textbook of political theory subjects for university and college students who are not specialized in Marxism — Leninism with Associate Professor and Doctor of Philosophy Nguyen Viet Thong as chief editor. There are three subjects:
  
−
Chapter 10 I THIS CHAPTER originallycontaincd a full account of my relations with Ellen Tarmichael. but my publisher and Ihave decided to delete most of it due to ongoing legal proceedings.
+
Curriculum of the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism
−
My behavior toward Ellen Tarmichael was a good de&:1 less than chival· rous. But media accounts of the affair have been inaccurate and have omit· tcd certain facts that substantially mitigated my behavior. However. my purpose here will be simply to show the diffel'Cnce between what my brother has recently told the media and what he wrote earlier about the Ellen Tarmichacl affair in his letters to me.
 
−
IN I 9 7 8 MY PATH BR and brother were both working at a company called Foam Cutting "Engineers in Addison, Ulinois. According to the
 
−
Washington Post:
 
−
Sometime before June 2.3. 1978. Ted wrote saying he needed money. They told him to come work with Dad and David at the Foam Cutting Engineers Inc. plant...1
 
−
Herc is another of those seemingly minor distOrtions that the Washing· ton Post no doubt will claim is accidental; yet the slight misstatement scri· ously misrepresents what actUally happened. and, as is usual with the ment and played cuds with her and her sister and her [sister's] boyfriend.' LaterTed came home. 'He was obviously in a good mood,' David said. 'H~ told me he had gone to see Ellen. that they had spent the day to­ media's misstatements, it tends to show me in a negative light. Readers will of course interpret: the Washington Post's statement to mean that I wrote home asking for money and that my parents told me that if I wanted it I would have ro come and work for it. In fact, I did not write my parents ask­ing for money; I asked, on my own initiative, whether it was likely that I could get ajob at Foam CuttingEngineers. This is provedby the letters that I quoted in Chapter7, pp. III, 112..
 
−
Following a badly garbled account of how I came to work at Foam Cut­ting Engineers, the New York Times wrote:
 
−
[Ted's] supervisor was Ellen Tarmichael, a soft-spoken but no-non­sense. woman who is still a production manager with the company. One employee, RichardJohnson, c:alled her'a wonderful boss, the best I've ever had,' and added: 'She's always kind-hearted and nice to people. I can sec why somebody would get interested in her.'
 
−
Ted Kaczynski became interested in late July 1978.... [Actually it was mid-July or earlier.]"
 
−
It was Sunday. and he had gone for a walk. 'He happened to sec her car,' David recalled. 'She was filling the gas tank. [This is not quite accu­rate.] I don't know enctly what transpired. He actually went to her apart­ gether ... and that some gestures indicating affection had passed between them. I was very happy about that.'...
 
−
They had two dates, Ms. Tarmichael recalled. She said he seemed intel­ligent and-quiet, and she accepted a dinner invitation in late July. It was a French restaurant, David said, and Ted 'ordered wine and he smelled it, [False: no wine was ordered.] he made a big deal of it.' David added. 'He had a good time.'"
 
−
Two weeks later, they went apple-picking and afterward went to his parencs' home and baked a pie. That was when she told him she did not want co see him again. 1 felt we didn't have much in common besides our employment,• she said. [This is no doubt true as far as it goes, but it is only part of the auth and by no means the most important part.]
 
−
. . . [Ted] wrote an insulting limerick about Ms. Tarmichael, made copies and posted them in lavatories and on walls around the factory. He did not sign the limerick, but his relationship with the woman was known. (How? I never told anyone about it accpt my father, brother, and mother.]"
 
−
David confronted bis brother. 'I was very. very angry.' he said. 'Put of me was disappointed. He was so close to being integrated in the most pri­mal rice of integration. He had an interest in a member of the opposite se.'t, and to have him go back to this kind of angry, inappropriate behavior-co che family it was embarrassing, adolescent kind of behavior.'
 
−
David told him to cease the offensive condua. But Ted put the same limerick up the next day. above David's desk. [Accually, I put it on the machine he was using.] David told him to go home.""1 [That is. he fired me. which he could do because he had become a foreman by that time.]2"
 
−
The Washington Post wrote:
 
−
David had to fire his own brother, a predicament he now sees as 'fore­shadowing what I had to do later,· in turning Ted in to the FBI. Ted locked himself in his room for days.
 
−
The last sentence is at best misleading. All members of my family took· an angry and accusing attitude toward me after the incident. and conse­quently. for the next two or perhaps three days, when I was at home I spent most of my time in my room rather than with the family-as I'm sure the majority of people would have done under similar circumstances. Proba­bly within two days, and certainly within a week, I went out and got another job.
 
−
A few paragraphs further on. the Washington Post refers to a letter that I wrote Ellen Tarmichacl on August 25. 1978 (the letter is dated) and showed to my family by way ofexplanation either on the 25th or the 26th:
 
−
Ted came out of his room with several written pages in his hand, his attempt to explain himself. He wrote that Ellen had been intentionally aucl to him. None of them [the family] felt that was even remotely true. At the end of the missive, he repeated his insulting limerick. said David, 'like he wasn't going to take it back. No matter what.· 1
 
−
This is either another lie or another error on my brother's part. I saved a carbon copy of the letter, and the insulting limerickis repeated nowhere in it.3 By the way. it has been claimed2 that I never mailed this letter. In face. I did mail it, and also a second letter to Ellen Tarmichael. The second letter is reproduced in Appendix 8.
 
−
Now compare the foregoing remarks of my brother's with the follow­ing passages that he wrote to me in x981, some three years after the events:
 
−
I was wrong to fire you and threaten you. I did so in anger because you were behaving badly (which is your own business) and because you caused severe embarrassment to Dad and me. ... But I realized soon afterwards that rshould have taken into account how badly you were feeling at the timC.u4
 
−
I think if the manner of your takingrevenge against Ellen had arisen in its own isolation, I probably would have responded very differently though it would be impossible now co know for sure. I hope, at any rate, that I would have responded diffcrcntly."5
 
−
There follows a passage in which my brother argues that, during the months preceding the incident in question, I had been creating our parcntS badly. It is a passage that I am unable to understand, since it seems to me that during that period my relations with our parencs were better than at any other time since I was eleven or twelve years old.
 
−
My brother's letter continues:
 
−
When you brought trouble into the workplace (as t conceived it) I guess Ijust lost my head and my disaction completely. .. 6 I say again that I was wrong co do what I did, although I suppose I have learned (for what· ever good it will do me) how thoroughly t can be undone by my bad temper ...6 From my point of view, all of this is in the past, though of course I acknowledge the major injury was yours not mine. 7
 
−
These passages show that, while my condua in the Tarmicbael affair was not c:%actly noble and generous, my brother did realize that there were two sides to the story and that my behavior was at any rate understandable (which docs not imply that it was blameless). Yet, if the New York Tunes and the Wasltingtmt Pose have reported his remarks accurately. he gave them a one-sided version of the affairthat made it appear that there was no mitiga· tion for my behavior.
 
−
This provides further evidence that my brother's motive for talking to the media about me was not what he claimed, to "humanize" me and deacasc my risk of suffering the death penalty. If that had been bis motive he would have taken a softer approach. comparable co that of his 1981 let­ters, which recognized that there were two sides to the story. Instead. he took a hard line and portrayed me in a way that was certainly not calculated to win the sympathy of a judge ora jury.
 
  
 +
Curriculum of Ho Chi Minh Thought
  
 +
Curriculum of the Revolutionary Path of the Communist Party of Vietnam.
  
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Chapter 11
+
Curriculum of the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism was compiled by a collective of scientists and experienced lecturers from a number of universities, with Pham Van Sinh, Ph.D and Pham Quang Phan, Ph.D as co-editors. This curriculum has been designed to meet the practical educational requirements of students.
  
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I hurt my brother’s feelings cruelly
+
We hope this book will be of use to you.
  
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Ch apter 11 I IT wAs ARouNo 1978, 1think. that Dave's friend Bill Wadham recommended co him a book by the philosopher Martin Heidegger. Dave read Heidegger at first with a certain amused skepticism that may have been due in part co the fact that (Dave said) Heidegger had been a Nazi sympathizer. But within a few months he became a convert to Heidegger's philosophy.1 I think chat what led him co become a disciple of Heidegger was that it enabled him to feel that he was part of a special elite. In a conversation that I had with him or:i this subject in about 1979, he made it evident that he had come co regud himself as a member of a small minority of people who Hthink" (i.e., who read Heideg­ger), and on this basis he considered himself "supcrior."2 He sneered at democracy. which he said was. according to Heidegger. a failed or obsolete form of government.l-He therefore advocated the system of government that was first proposedby Plato and (Dave said) was favored by Heidegger. namely. ruleby a philosopher-king.
+
April, 2016
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I was disgusted. It is one thing to recognize that the majority of people do not think seriously about anything that is not of direct practical impor­tance to them, and it is another thing to aow about it so chat you can feel "superior." It is one thing to recognize that democracy (as that term is understood in the modem world) has failed to provide what it was sup­posed to provide &ccdom and equality-and it is another thing to sneer at democracy so chat you can replace it with an elitist philosophy. My brother, notwithstanding his claim to be a "thinker," had swallowed Heidegger's ideas uncritically. He had given no consideration to the question of whether rule by a philosopher-king would be workable as a practical sys· ccm of government. or to whether dcmoaacy might not be the least of the available evils in the modem world.
 
−
Not long after. still in 1979, I had another discussion with my brother, chis time about whether certain kinds of statements in philosophy were meaningful. My position was essentially that the meaning of verbal formu· lations required study and analysis. A verbal formulation might convey emotion (the word "emotion" being interpreted broadly) without having any other content. One could not assume that a formulation had any other meaning than its emotive content simply because one felt subjectively that it had such meaning. Many philosophers had little interest in analyzing their own verbal formulations in order to understand what, ifany, objective meaning they held, and were content if the formulations satisfied them merely on an emotional level Which would be fine if they were writing novels or poetry that pretended to do no more than satisfy the emotions. But the philosophers certainly believed their verbal formulations to have some meaningful content beyond mere emotional impact; yet, in the case of many of their formulations, they failed to establish what that content was or whether it cmted at all.
 
−
My brother found this point of view very threatening. because it called into question the validity of much of philosophy. and of related fields such as literary criticism; and it was on his interest in such fields that he founded his sense of being someone special. But he did not have enough self· confidence to meet my arguments head on; instead, he resorted to evasive tactics.
 
−
In our 1979 discussion of this subject I began by trying to stake out some common growid between us-statements on which we could both agree and on the basis of whi~ I could argue my point. But Dave was so afraid of being defeated by me that whenever I offered a premise that we might agree on. he would reject it automatically, even if under other circum­stances, he would certainly have accepted it. For instance, when I aied to introduce the concept of time, he flatly denied that any such thing as time clrisccd. (The next morning, as it happened, he asked me to glance at the dock and tell him what time it was. When I pointed out that he was being inconsistent, his only answer was an embarrassed little laugh.)
 
−
Dave"s evasive tactics drove me up the wall with frustration on this occa· sion. as on various others on which I aied to carey on rational discussions with him. (I have to confess at this point that I am excessively susceptible to frustration, possibly as a result of having experienced so many frustrations during my teen years and early adulthood.) My irritation was intensified by my brother's pretensions to superiority. A fool is irritating in any case, but a pretentious fool to me is simply insufferable, and consequently I particu· larly remembered those two conversations with my brother.
 
−
In the summer or autumn of1981, Dave and rrenewed the discussion in several letters that we exchanged. Some of these letters have not been pre· served. but enough have survived to show the character of the interchange.
 
−
My mother had been getting my brother and me to put our names on various savings certificates jointly with our parents, as a means of avoiding probate.4 Besides that. my brother still had a fifty percent interest in the land on which my cabin stood. Because recent events had made me aware that my brother's affection for me was mixed with a substantial element of resentment, I felt distinctly uncomfortable at havingmy affairs so tangled up with his. I remembered how difficult it had been to get him to pay his share of the rent on our safc~eposit box, and I was afraid his resentment might lead to similar difficulties in more important matters at some later time. So I wrote my mother a letter (now lost) in which I asked her not to put my name together with my brother's on any more savings certificates, and I mentioned that I wanted to buy out Dave's share ofour Montana property. I explained the reasons, and, since I didn't expect Dave to sec the letter, I freely expressed my contemptfor his ideas, describing them as "adolescent."
 
−
However, my brother was staying with our parents at the time, and it was he who opened the letter when it arrived. Did he have a right to open it? The answer isn't clear. I normally addressed my letters home simply to "Kaczynski," butif I wanted a letter to be opened only by a certain member of the family. then I addressed it specifically to that person. Since this letter was addressed to 'Wanda Kaczynski," my brother ought to have realized that she should have been the one to open it. On the other hand, Dave sub· sequently wrote to me.that our mother had often said he was free to open her mail, and that this time he had "decided to take her offer literally." with consequences my mother regretted.s
 
−
This note was in the nature of a postscript (sent in a different envelope) to another letter6 in which he responded to myletter to my mother. His let· ter6 was one of the very few in which he was fairly open in expressing resentment. Earlier I quoted from itseveral passages in which he referred to some of the incidents between us, such as that of the safc~cpositbox and that of my letter about Luisa Mueller. But the part of his letter that inter· csts us at the moment is the following:
 
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About my adolucent ideas. I suspect you use a mere perjorative (sic] out of your frustration to properly answer them...."7 I had used the term "adolescent" only in the letter to my mother, and had not used it or any other pejoratives in the discussions with my brother. (Though I did use pejoratives in some of my later discussions with him.)
 
−
Anyway, the positivist dogma you adhere to has been long ago dis­carded."8 What "dogma" was he referring to? The position I'd taken in our discus­sions was hardly dogmatic. I had pointed out two ways in which a verbal formulation could have meaning: (1) It might imply predictions that could be checked against experience; or (2) it might convey emotion (broadly int~rpreted). Then, if there was anotherway in which a verbal formulation could have meaning. I invited my brother to explam what it was. Ifhe had done so I would have considered his argument and perhaps accepted it.SI
 
−
But of course he didn't even try to respond to my in~cation, because he had never taken the trouble to try to analyze the meanings of sentences, and moreover he did not have enough confidence in himself to argue with me head on. So he evaded the issue by simply labeling my position as "dogma." When you can't answer someone's arguments and can't bear to admit he's right, then, to quote my brother's own words (suitably corrected), "you use a mere pejorative out of your frustration at being unable to properly answer." It is remarkable how often my brother attributes to me feelings andreactions that arc characteristic ofhimself.
 
−
My brother's letter continued:
 
−
From this position, you can't talk about much of anything unless you bring in the 'brain' -and since the positivistic explication of the brain is rudimentary, so the positivistic assumption ...10
 
−
But what assumption was mybrother talking about? Several times inhis letters he referred to my "positivistic" or "scientific" "assumptions," with· out ever explaining what "assumptions" he was referring to, and of course any attempt to pin him ~own on that subjectwas futile.
 
−
... the positivistic assumption becomes a black box into which you can stick anything too troublesome to think about, and which makes itself voracious toward any thoughts which don't meet the positivistic criteria is [sic] advance, which in turn it excretes as 'psychological' phenomena, unworthy of the name of thought. Can't you sec, though you mean to include all of experience. you're really working within a closed systcm?­Anyway. positivism has been discardedby pbilosophcrs.10
 
−
Hardly any of this is responsive to points I'd made, and all of it consists of vague accusations that completely sidestep the main issues that rd raised: How docs one assign meaning to verbal formulations? In particular, have the philosophers satisfactorily dealt with the problem of assigning meaning to metaphysical statements?
 
−
I had only the vaguest idea of what positivism was. so after my brother had called me a positivist several times I asked him to explain just what the word meant.11 He answered that he knew very little about positivism him­self,11 and after thathe stopped callingme a positivist. though he continued to accuse me of having unspecified "assumptions."
 
−
Needless to say. my purpose here has not been to prove any points about logic or language, but to give a sample of my brother's style of argu­ment. so that the reader will understand why I found it so frustrating to try co discuss anything with him.
 
  
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I N s P IT B o P the resentful tone of his letter. my brother was quite cooperative about selling me his share of our Montana property. which he did for the amount of money he'doriginallyput into it. $1050.12
+
NATIONAL POLITICAL PUBLISHING HOUSE — SỰ THẬT
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As for our philosophical argument, I soon wrote Dave a letter inwhich I renewed it from a different angle. Instead of attacking the ideas that he had borrowed (possibly in debased form) from Heidegger. orpursuingthc ques­tion of meaning, I addressed the issue of my brother's motivations. Herc arc several extracts from the letter. some of which rvc already quoted in earlier chapters:
 
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The point I want to coverin this letteris: yourhabirualself-deception.... [I gave several examples of his self-deception, including:]
 
−
When you took up teaching, you apparently did so under the illusion that you were going to change the lives of many students simply by expoundingyour ideas to them. Of course you soon learned better. You arc certainly intelligent enough to have realized that a teacher can consider himself fortunate if he exerts a decisive influence on the lives of just a few students in the course ~f his whole teaching career. Yet you gave up after 2 years because your rosy expectations of influencing students quickly and easily were not realized. Those expectations must have been the result of self-deception."
 
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You recall that letter in which I suggested to our parents that they should discourage you from getting close to [Luisa Mueller]. . . . Obvi­ously ... my supposed questioning of your honesty was not what got you so terribly upset. The real reason is the one you permitted to slip out in your first letter. My letter did convey an implication of weakness on your part. Somewhere 'deep down inside' you feel weak; consequently that implication touched a raw nerve and you became enraged. You invented that rationalization about ‘honesty' because co admitthatyou were highly sensi­tive about the implication of weakness would be to admit that somewhere 'deep down inside' you feel weak; and that is a highly uncomfortable admis­sion. This I thinkis a characteristic example of your type ofself-deception.
 
−
I don't mean to say you arcincapableof entertaining negative opinions about yourself. ..."
 
−
When it is no longer possible to believe that one is what one wants to beinsome aspect oflife, the easiest thingis to justgive up on that aspect of life, saying. Tm no good at this. This isn't an important thing anyway' .. .
 
−
You have very high aspirations....You have to be someone special ... . But you are unwilling or unable to go through the struggle that it takes to be or do something special. Every time you encounter real difficulties you retreat, saying, 'That's not the important thing anyway.' By this time you have retreated until you have just one thingleft ...13 Art, or Philosophy, or whatever you prefer to call it. In this area you can always maintain your illu­sion ofbeing superior to the common herd, because there arc no objective criteria. Whatever happens, you can always persuade yourself that you are moresensitive, orthoughtful, orinsightful ( orwhatever you want to call it) than the common herd...."
 
−
Well, I apologize for all this. All I can sayis that these arc my opinions, and I've been itchingto express them for a long time, and my motive is not to hurt your feelings, even though I realize that that will be the probable result,N 14 • Rereading this letter now, after a decade and a half, makes me acutely uncomfortable, because I realize how cruel it was. It probably was fairly accurate, but that only made it the more cruel. What made it worse still was the fact that I was not entirely telling the truth when I wrote, my motive is not to hurt yourfeelings."" In reality that was part of my motive, and I knew it at the time. It's true that I didn'~ realize how badly I was hurting my brother. In the first place, I wasn't awaxe of the full extentof his worship ofme. That was revealed only by statements he made to Or. K. after my arrest.15 In the sec­ond place, I thought he had by that time largely outgrown his big·brother worship. (Note that I spoke of it in the past tense: ""Throughoutyour child­hood and even well up into your 20S you had a severe case of big-brother worship.""16) I now suspectthat he had onlylearned to conceal it better. But it is still true that I knew I was hurting my brother, and I did so on purpose. I don't think the Ellen Tarmichacl affairwas animportant source of my resentment. Instead I was irritated and disgusted at the silliness and" pretentiousness of some of my brother's ideas, I was frustrated at his eva­sive style of argument, I resented the fact that he had not turned out to be the kind of person I would have wanted him to be, and I was still very sore about the incident that I mentioned in Chapter 9 (p. 134-5), but refrained from recounting because I find it too painful.
 
−
Dave gave me avery mild answer:
 
−
I read your letter, and l think it touches on an element of truth, although, as you might expect, there are some items I want to show in a dif­ferent light. However, I feel I need some time to collect my thoughts, in orderto accomplish the task properly. Hopefully. within a month or two I'll have a long letter to send to you. In the meantime, please be assured that
 
−
I'm not feeling angry or vengeful.••17 The mildness ofthis reply may have been part of what set me to think­ing about the way rd treated my brotherwhen we were kids, and led to my first note ofapology to him:
 
−
Dear Dave:"
 
−
I remember that when we were kids I sometimes would take advan­tage of my greater size and strength to dominate you physically. Also I sometimes harassed you verbally. l'vc thought about this sometimes and I now regret that I behaved that way. So I now offer you an apology for it; though I suppose this apology very likely is a matter ofindifference to you anyway. .. 18
 
−
Dave answered me with a letter of which the first halfnowstrim me as bcautiful.19 In that first half he spoke mainly of his personal relationship with me. In the second half of the letter he resorted again to the kind of argument that irritated me intolerably-vague, unsupported assertions that did not respond to my points. For example, he accused me of''holding to a rigid, objectifying system, ..zo yet he made no attempt to explain in what way what he called my system"" was ""rigid."" You can sec how frustrating it is to try to discuss something with someone who, whenever you disagree with him, answers only by asserting that you arc ""rigid"" or ""dogmatic."" ·"
 
−
It seems clear to me now, though, that what Dave was really asking for in this letter was simply acceptance of himself and his way of thinking. Not necessarily agreement, but simply a respectful, accepting attitude. I wasn't about to accept or respect his crap about philosopher-kings or his attempt to place himself on a superior plane as a member of a "thinking" minority. but I could have given respect and acceptance to his poetic oremotive style of thought. My only quarrel with him there was over the issue of whether certain verbal formulations characteristic of that style of thought had any meaningful content other than emotive content, given the absence of any explanation or analysis of how such formulations acquire meaning. And I would have been quite willing to abandon that quarrel if my brother had simply said. 'i\lright, I think this, you think that; let's just agree to disagree and drop the subject." Bue instead of doing so he kept irritating me with vaguely-relevant arguments in which he commonly amibuted to me atti­tudes that rd never held and statements that rd never made. 21
 
−
Yet bis letter was basically conciliatory; and reading it today I see it as a gentle and beautiful plea for acceptance. And in it he intimated that he had been wounded by my earlier letter, for he wrote: "[SJome of the things you said were painful to listen to and partially disrupted my complacency."22 And: "Your letter had a strong effect on me, in the emotional sense ...."23
 
−
In view of this, I am ashamed of the callousness of my reply. Herc arc some excerpts from it (FL #265):
 
−
I note ... that you have not denied any of the statements about your motivations that I made. Rather typically. you have sidestepped the issues and resorted to vague generalities which do not directly confront the points I made. But I suppose you will claim that it would be too 'rigid' and 'scien­tific' to expect you to confront the issues directly.
 
−
. . . I am not much interested in discussing further with you these philosophical questions, because by this time I am fairly confident thatyour psychological need for your self-deceptions is so strong that no amount of reasoning will ever get you away from them. Wh4kYa kind of reasonings might be presented to you attacking your position, 24 probablyyou will dis­miss them as 'rigid' or 'scientific' or by applying some other empty label to them, and you will claim they arc based on misunderstanding of your 'way ofthinking.' the validity ofwhich apparently has to be accepted on faith...."
 
−
... You said my letter had a 'strong effect on (you], in the emotional sense,' and that it 'partially disrupted [your] complacency.' This illustrates the fact thatyou arc notin the habit of re-examining your thinking critically; looking for flaws and oversights, and attempting to root out your self­deceptions. If you had been in that habit my letter would not have shaken you; you would have been accustomed to the idea that you might have self. deception in yourthinking. and the points I madewould have been far from entirely new to you; but perhaps you think it would be too 'rigid' and 'sci­entific' to critically re-examining your thinking. your motivations. and your possible self-deceptions.''25
 
−
Looking back. I wonder why I answered my brother so callously. The fact that he showed no anger led me to underestimate the extent to which I was hurtinghim; yet I did realizethat Iwas hurtinghim, and I lmew that the little things he'd done over the years to annoy me (and the one or two things that had caused me real pain) were offset by the generosity he'd shown me at other times. Probably my irritation against him was exacer· batedby the fund of unresolved anger that I'd built up as a result of various frustrations in my earlier and currentlife.
 
−
But I now think that my brother on his side must have been increasing his fund of anger against me, even though he did not show that anger out­wardly and may not have admitted even to himself that he felt it.
 
−
He answered my letter (FL #265) with a letter (now lost) that was less conciliatory than his earlier one, and I answered in rum with FL #266. The first part of this26 was as callous as the preceding letter, FL #265. But in the second haifl7 of FL #266 I revealed to my brother my love for him to an · extent that rd never done before, and at the same time I revealed a great deal about the nature of that love. I did this by recounting two dreams that I'dhad about him. One was the dream I'd hadatthe age ofseven oreight in which I saw him as emaciated and starving, as described in Chapter 2, p. 38­
 
−
39. The otherdream is too long and complicated to be recounted here. Suf­fice it to say that it showed that my love for mybrother was ofa paternal or condescendingkind-I did not see him as an equal but as one who needed guidance and protection; and I even gave partial expression to the element ofcontempt that was in my feelings toward him.
 
−
In his reply (which has not been preserved), DIM: expressed gratitude for the affection demonstrated by my dreams, and said that I cared about him more than anyone else ever had, which quite possibly was true. This was the letter in which he said that he had previously feared that I'd had a hatred for him so great that I could not acknowleclgc it. (Sec Chapter 2, p. 39.)
 
−
I was surprised at the degree of gratitude that my brother expressed, and also at the fact that he showed no resentment over the condescending and contemptuous aspects of my attitude toward him. I was softened, and felt badly about the harshness of some of the things I'd said. In later letters I tried to take some ofdie sting out of them. For example:
 
−
[I]n regard to the implication in my last letter that I see you as weak, I'd like to qualify that, since you might think the judgement is harsher than what I intend...."
 
−
I received your last letter and note that it shows your usual generosity of character. Instead of being sore over the negative parts of my attitude toward you, you were favorably impressedby the positive parts.28
 
−
And two-and-a-half years later:
 
−
By the way, as long as rm on this sort of subject, you'll recall that exchange of letters we had a few years ago in which I sharply criticized the motives behind your philosophical opinions .... I tend to get hot and angry in frustrating circumstances, and for chat reason my criticisms of you, though they did in a general way represent my real opinions and feelings, were harsher and more uncompromising than they would have been if rd written about them in a completely calm state. The things I wrote then should have been softened and qualified a gooddeal.29"
 
−
I also made a point of praising Dave when there was an opportunity to do so. For instance, when he described how he'd dug himself a hole to live in, I complimented him on his foresight in cutting the sides at a slant;30 and I praised a particularly eloquentpassage that he'dwritten about the religion of the African Pigmies: "I like this passageso well that I have copied it in my notebook. So there you stand amongst all kinds offamous writers whome (sic] I have quoted from time to time in mynotes."31
 
−
Later I wrote:
 
−
For the last couple of years you seem to have been much more com­municative in your letters than you used to be. Ofcourse I don't care for all your letters, but some of them I find quite interesting and enjoyable to read. That your last letter was one of the more interesting ones you can deduce from the length of the reply I've written to it.H32
 
−
But all this cannot have healed the wounds I inflicted on my brother with my cutting remarks, and, given his sense of psychological subordina­tion to me, I can easily understand now why he felt I was overbearing.
 
  
−
I N TH B LBTT RR (PL #266) in which I described the two dreams I'd had about him, I told my brother that I wanted to drop ourcorrespondence on philosophical issues because it was a waste of time.33 Actually I wanted to drop it not only because it was a waste of time, but also because trying to discuss anything with my brother was a source of irritation and frustration. For a while he cooperated by not raising those issues in his letters, but it proved very hard to avoid getting into similar wrangles with him on other subjects. I would write something with which he disagreed, he would reply with some vague, elaborate, interminable argument, and I would find it extremely difficult to resist the impulse to point out the flaws in his reason­ing, not because I was anxious to convince him of anything, but because to me a fallacious argument is like a stone in my shoe. Then he would answer with an elaborate rationalization that generally failed to address the points I'd raised and often misstated or misinterpreted what rd said. He tended to resort to accusations that I was being ..scientific or ""positivistic"" or" something along those lines. For example, in a discussion that we had in 1989, he said he suspeetcd that there was a "logical agenda behind [my] criticisms."34
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=== Original Vietnamese Preface ===
  
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I A M T Ru Ly A s H AM E D of the verbal cruelty I inflieted on my brother. Yet, given my personality traits and those of the members of.my family, and the relationships that existed between us, there was no way I could have gotten along comfortably with them, and ifI hadn't revealed to Dave my contempt for him in the way I did, I probably would have had to do so in some other way. But I could have avoided this by simply break­ing off communications with my whole family. I eventually did break off· with them, but it would have been better for all of us if I had done so twenty years earlier.
+
To implement the resolutions of the Communist Party of Vietnam, especially the 5<sup>th</sup>
  
 +
Central Resolution on ideological work, theory, and press, on September 18<sup>th</sup>, 2008, The Ministry of Education and Training has issued Decision Number 52/2008/QD-BGDDT, issuing the subject program: The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism for Students Non-Specialised in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought. In collaboration with Truth — the National Political Publishing House — we published the Curriculum of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism for Students Non-Specialised in MarxismLeninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought.
  
 +
The authors of this text have drawn from the contents of the Central Council’s previous programs (Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Marxist-Leninist Political Economy, and Scientific Socialism) and compiled them into national textbooks for Marxist-Leninist science subjects and Ho Chi Minh Thought, as well as other curriculums for the Ministry of Education and Training. The authors have received comments from many collectives, such as the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics and Administration, the Central Propaganda Department, as well as individual scientists and lecturers at universities and colleges throughout the country. Notably:
  
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Chapter 12
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Associate Professor To Huy Rua, Ph.D, Professor Phung Huu Phu, Ph.D, Professor Nguyen Duc Binh, Professor Le Huu Nghia, Ph.D, Professor Le Huu Tang, Ph.D,
  
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My brother’s inconsistent attitudes toward mental illness
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Professor Vo Dai Luoc, Ph.D, Professor Tran Phuc Thang, Ph.D, Professor Hoang
  
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Ch ap t e r 1 2 I RATHER INT BR BsTING Is the inconsistency ofmybrother's attitudes toward mental illness. Significant in this respect is a letter1 of his that I referred to in the Introduction, pp. 19, 20.
+
Chi Bao, Ph.D, Professor Tran Ngoc Hien, Ph.D, Professor Ho Van Thong, Associate
−
It is suggested that the reader review this letter now.
 
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The Washington Po5t, evidendy on the basis of information provided by my mother and/or my brother, wrote:
 
−
The family felt that Ted was projecting his own problems into his brutal critiques ofothers. He could talk of a madman in the hills in one let­ter, and Wanda wondered, 'Is this how he seeshimself?' In another letter he insisted one of David's friends was schizophrenic and sent letters detailing how David should help his friend2
 
−
The "madman in the hills" was one Al Pinkston (now deceased), an obvious paranoiac who believed that the Lincoln area was infested with KGB agents. My neighbor G.Wi. and I met him somewhere in the Dalton Mountain orSauerkraut Creek area about December1974-The story is told in a letter to my parents, which has survived 3 There is nothing in either account that suggests that I saw myself as a nmadman in the hills."
 
−
What is interestinghereis that when I told my brother this story. he said that he himself had long been trying to escape from reality. and he envied
 
−
Al Pinkston for having achieved such an escape. (!?) Don't ask me to explain it-all I know is that that's what my brother said!
 
−
As for the statement that I "insisted one of David's friends was schizo­phrenic," the friend in question was Joel Schwartz, and I did not "insist" that he was schizophrenic. I argued that there was a good chance that the problem of whichJoel complained was schizophrenia, or at least had some neurological basis. I did not "detail how David should help his friend," but merely suggested that my brother might consider advisingJoel (directly or through his father) to consult a neurologist or psychiatrist. The reader can judge for himself from the relevant letters, excerpts from which follow:
 
−
Dave to Ted:
 
−
... A couple years ago ... I loamed [sic] Ooel] an essay I had written ... [and] I didn't get it back for nearly two years, after repeated requests ... and ... he never did get around to reading it. ...
 
−
... Joel confesses to having a serious problem, which he traces back to the head injury inflicted on him by his mother:•s"
 
−
Dave had told me years before thatJoel had a silver plate in his skull because when he was a small child his mother went crazy and bashed him on the head with a hammer.
 
−
My brother's letter continues:
 
−
Apparently. he's been finding it difficult to function in many of the expected, conventional ways. The problem seems to be compounded by a curious sort ofobsession he appears to have with it~ending virtually all his extra money ... on a variety of dubious treatments, some at the bands of obvious quacks-for instance, a man ... who 'put crystals on . . . 6 (his) body'. Needless to say. I'm worried about him, moreso [sic] in that I've been unable to make alot [sic] ofsense out ofhis own description of his complaint, and am left instead only with a variety of peculiar symptoms to consider.''5
 
−
Ted to Dave:
 
−
l'm sorry to hear aboutJoel. I only met him once, but he seemed like a nice fellow. I wonder whether the head injury is really responsible for his problems, or whether he got a bad gene from his motherr'7"
 
−
Ted to Dave:
 
−
I just thought ofsomething. I recently read a book on schizophrenia. It seems that the disease is caused by a certain chemical abnormality in the brain. Apparently they now have drugs that can effectively control the dis­ease except in the most severe cases. You ought to send a copy of that book toJoel's father. As you know, I don't approve of all this fancy technology stuff, miracle drugs and so forth, but I hate to think of the poor guy going to creeps who 'put crystals on his body' and crap like that when there are drugs that would probably do the trick. ... The title [of the book] is 'The Schizophrenias-yours and mine'....8"
 
−
Ted to Dave:
 
−
I scribbled that note (about Joel's problem] at the last minute before sendingthe letter.... Of course, I don't know for a fact thatJoel's problem is schizophrenia, butit does seem rather likely. .. .9
 
−
Ted to Dave: "I read that a number of normal people, as part of an experiment, signed themselves into public and private mental institutions all over the
 
−
U.S. They later had some difficulty in getting released, and eventually were all released as 'schizophrenics in remission'!!lo, ...
 
−
As you know, I take a dim view of miracle drugs and all that technolog­ical crap, and I would respect someone who made an intelligent decision not to use that stuff-I might well make such a decision myself in such a case-butit is disgusting that people who maybein severe suffering arc vic­timized by crackpot psychoanalysts and people who 'put crystals on their body' and shit like that.... [Y]ou might think whether you can find some way of calling toJoel's father's attention these facts about schizos-if you think that may beJoel's problem." 11
 
−
Dave to Ted:
 
−
I looked for the bookyou recommended aboutscizophrcnia [sic] in the local library. but I couldn't find it. As you can imagine, I would be more prone to look for the causes of mental illness in skewered [sic] perceptions or thought processes (or even in the 'insanity' of society itself)ll than in brain chemistry. . . . I would point out that society has a vested interest in treating non-conformist behavior as if it revealed something wrong solely with the individual, rather than including the people or the society around him.... [S]ociety would be more interested in alleviating the symptoms of a 'problem' (to make the individual's behavior more manageable or to refuse coming to terms with the perceptionsit entails) than to treat it's [sic] causes, consequently the empirical methods of behavioral science are tai­lor-made for promotingsociety's interests .... [T]here is no sharp line divid­ing mental illness from sanity. Any precise diagno[s]tic tool would have to claim a nearly universal consensus for its implicit theory of reality-when as a matter of fact no such consensus clists.... What you might call the grounds of belief formation. is such a wide-open territory that it would be hard to say that any single peculiarity ofbelief could be used as evidence for mental illness. [My brother was overlooking the fact that I did not refer to any ofJoel's beliefs in suggestingthat he had schizophrenia.]
 
−
... After visiting (Joel] for a week ... I strongly doubt that even most of the hard-core brain theorists would recommend him for chemical therapy. To a large extent, I was relieved by what I found. He has no hallucinations. His emotions are fairly even. He is no longer taking crystal therapy (but he is spending a great deal of money on what sound to me like very controver­sial massage treatments. When I questioned him about them, his descrip­tions and explanations plunged quickly into a sort of metaphysical poetry that I found delightful and intellectually tantalizing-but without fully quashing my doubts about the efficacy ofthe treatment. Hisself-conscious­ness seemed to be pecking out at me from behind this nebulous cloud of theories, and I truly couldn't make up my mind whether he was badly deceiving himself or whether in fact his major need was for support and understanding from his friends and family to face an issue of incredible sub­tlety). When speaking about politics, philosophy. and religion his mind is very sharp and creative, and he has no difficulty expressing or receiving ideas in a way that is easily understandable to anyone who has staked out some similar intellectual ground. . . . But in some ways, he struck me far more oddly than ever before. His personal habits are grotesque. For instance, he seems to have a chronically runny nose, and when he isn't wip­ing itwith his hands, the snots often run down .... when he is distracted or becomes excited in discussions. He has also developed a chronic cough which he claims is somehow connected with his nebulous 'problem'. He claims his sense of time is very poor, but I saw no outward evidence of that .... In other, less-easily described ways he has behaved oddly as well, although not so oddly as to tempt me to descnbc him as crazy rather than simply eccentric ...."
 
−
... I confess I'm not hopeful. Maybe he will continue slowly deterio­rating as the years pass by. ... ... [O]o you still think I ought to pursue the possibility of getting chemical treatment for Joel at this time?"13
 
−
Ted to Dave:
 
−
The objective diagnostic tests mentioned in the book do not claim to determine whether anyone is sane or insane ( as far as I can remember, the word 'insanity' was never used in the book) ....
 
−
As for explaining mental illness on the basis of 'the ""insanity"" ofsociety itself.· this is certainly plausible in many cases, since our society often uses 'mental illness' as a label to pin on anything it disapp~ of.14 But this is not reasonable in the case of schizophrenia, or at least not in the more severe cases of schizophrenia. Example: some severely schizophrenic chil­dren walk awkwardly with their legs wide apart as if they had difficulty" keeping their balance; the reason is that to them, the floor appears to be heavingand pitching under their feet. Arc you going to argue that the floor really is heaving and pitching and that society is insane for regarding it as stationary?
 
−
... My knowledge is of course very limited, but on the basis of what you told me I'd say Joel is a likely candidate for schizophrenia .... In many cases schizophrenia gets worse with time. In such cases, if I remember correctly. the book said it was important to begin treatment early, because later the problem may be more difficult to control.
 
−
... On the other hand, specialists may be over-enthusiastic about the use of their own tools, and may exaggerate the benefits of the drugs and minimize the undesirable side-effects.
 
−
... Also, there are all kinds ofvalue-judgements involved in whetheror not one wants to use such drugs, even if one bas already concluded that they will benefit the individual patient in the purely medical sense. I won't discuss those here-you can make up yourown mind."
 
−
... [Y]ou can probably get [that book] through the interlibrary loan service... .
 
−
Okay. once you read that book. you'll know everything about schiz. that I do, so let's drop the subject. I get sick of these interminable discus­sions by letter....""lS"
 
−
My brother, however, seems to have been unwilling to drop the subject, for he responded with another long letter aboutJoel, from which I quote onlythe following:
 
−
I did as you suggested and through the inter-hbrary loan system, obtained and read the book you recommended. ...Joel ... claims to feel some time disorientation, and also to feel some dissociation of mind and body-butdoesn't display any otherofthe major symptoms ofschizophre­nia that I could tell; least of all does he seem alienated from human rela­tionships ( only from society. in a way that is quite explicable and probably justifiable), incapable of affection, self-destructive, hallucinatory. orhumor­less.... Perhaps ifJoel's 'problem' has some relation to a chemical imbal­ance, then his intellectual subtlety and brilliance may be one of the effects as well. Would the drugs serve to inhibit ... these positive qualities as well? . . . [Y]ou can appreciate the dramatic character of the responsibility I wouldbe assumingif I ledJoel into the hands of some doctors who had no way of appreciating the loss their treatment might occasion .... [W]hereas you would tend to rcgardjoel's abstruse philosophizing as belonging to the realm offantasy. possibly even to the symptoms ofa disease. my own view­ point inclines me to interpret them differently. even as signs of a richer, fuller inruition of reality, indeed, of 'health' itself.16"
 
−
I had never even mentioned Joel's philosophical opinions, much less suggested that they were symptoms of disease. My brother's letter continued:
 
−
He says he has a problem which he can't fully explain buc which is pre­venting him from using his talents in life.... He conveys the impression of someone laboring under a heavy but invisible burdcn.16 (Sec Appendix 5.)
 
−
In a letterofwhich only the first pagehas been preserved, I wrote:
 
−
I still think there's a good chance that [Joel's] problem is schizophrenia. Take his personal oddities like the snots running down his lip. Is there any way of explaining this in terms of emotional [nccds]l7 or problems, philo-· sophical attitudes, oranything ofthat sort? To me itsoundsjustsenseless.""18"
 
−
Dave to Ted:
 
−
Mou seem to be ignoring my strong disinclination to accept the con­cepts which undergird medicine's view of the brain-mind relationship to begin with, namely. that brain function has a strict causal relationship to thought-processes, and secondly. that brain functions can be described nor­matively. whether explicitly or not, with the effect that certain non-'com­mon-sense' points of view get to be labeled as invalid-are in effect regarded as symptoms orphenomena rather than points ofview at all.... [F]ailing a clear-cut syndrome, l'd feel reluctant to putOoel] in the hands of doctors whom I wouldn't trust for a minute to appreciate his'spiritual' side, and whose professional narrowness and presuppositions mightcause them to do some really dangerous tinkering. Suppose they said, 'Yeah, he's a mild schizophrenic.' So then they begintrying out difrcrcnt drugs onhim. Mean­while, Joel, who feels a great yearning for understanding and communica­tion, feels instead that he's being treated more like a physical object than a human being. Do you really trust doctors so much that you would feel con­fidence in their professional, let alone their human judgement when it came to a case as complicated as Joel's appears to be? Especially when you consider the utterly abysmal historical record of the medical profession in the field of 'mental health'-from lobotomies to shock treatments to the mostly unwholesome and misguided self-preoccupations that psychoanaly­sis appears to stimulate. Also, when you considerhowfully integrated these nerds are in the (to me) unwholesome value-and economic structures of ourpresent culture. [sic] ... I don't thinkJoel is suffering acutely. orat least not alot [sic] more than most of us arc, afflicted with the craziness and senselessness of this modern form oflife.l!J
 
−
Apparently referring to my earlier suggestion that he should communi­cate with Joel's father, Dave added, "At present, I fear 'going behind his back' might be a grave rnistake."l9
 
−
Ted to Dave:
 
−
In my last letter I hope I didn't give the impression that I was trying to persuade you to persuade Joel to get drug treatment ....
 
−
I agree that there is no clear-cut line dividing insanity from sanity, and that 'mental illness' often is a mere label pinned on those who don't act as society demands. Further, I would question whether 'mental illness' and 'insanity' arc even useful concepcs-acept that they arc useful as propa­ganda tools. On the other hand, when someone is tormented by strange visions and disagreeable feelings that pass through his head owing to a hereditary peculiarity of brain chemistry. it seems absurd to refrain from callinghis condition a disease. Many schizophrenics themselves regard their condition as a disease and would much prefer to be rid of it. Note that Joel himself considers that he has a 'problem'-severe enough so that he has spent a great deal of money on it. On the other hand, it is questionable whether the mildest forms of schizophrenia should be considered as disease, since if I remember correctly what I read, they may enhance cre­ativity and result only in minimal distortion of thought and perception. And, as you remarked, a great deal of irrationality is normal to human beings anyway."
 
−
to the use of drugs-you well know my feelings about the techno­logical invasion of human dignity. In principle one should resist any step toward interfering in the human mind by technological means. On the other hand, here is this poor guy with a problem, looking for help and get­ting taken for large sums of money by fakes and crackpots, and who could very possibly be helped quite effectively by a drug that would take a kink out of the chemistry of his brain-it seems almost heartless not to try to point him in the right direction.
 
−
Besides the forego~g, other questions could be raised about using or notusing drugs. Luckily; it's a decision that I don't have to make-I have the luxury ofbeing able to just dump the problem in yaur lap.20
 
−
lf I remember correctly; my brother answered me with a letter (now lost) in which he dismissed everything I'd said about Joel on the grounds that I had unspecified "science-based assumptions" or something along those lines. I was, as usual, irritated by my brother's rationalizations, but in this instance I kept my temper. Instead of pursuing the subject further, I simply suggested to Dave that he should talk to his friend Dirk West about Joel.21 (Dirk West had considerable influence over Dave, and at that time I thought he had more common sense than Dave did.)
 
−
In this series of letters, clearly. 1 wasn't trying to tell my brother what action (if any) to take in regard toJoel. I was simply trying to get him to face squarely the dilemma with which he was confronted: His friend was suffer· ing. was seeking help, and could possibly get it from drugtreatment; on the other hand, there were various philosophical, sociopolitical, and personal factors that argued against persuading him to seek such treatment. What irritated me was that, instead of facing the dilemma honestly and then making a decision one way or the other, my brother invented rationaliza­tions (some of which were quite irrelevant) for doing nothing.
 
−
I think what was really going on here was something like this: For obvi­ous reasons, mybrother would have found it difficult to approach his friend about goingto a psychiatrist ora neurologist. But at the same time he didn't want to feel that he was leaving a suffering friend in the lurch, so he invented rationalizations to justify his inaction. When I persisted in trying to get him to face the dilemma honestly. his ego conflict with big brother came into play. and, in order to avoid what he would have felt as adefeat at my bands, he plunged further into rationalization.
 
−
My brother visited me in Montana a few weeks after we had concluded our exchange of letters aboutJoel, and while he was with me we again dis­cussed his friend's problem. Dave attacked my supposed rationalist "assumptions," and in reference to schizophrenics who saw the floor heav­ing and pitching under them, he said, "Maybe the floor really is heaving." I resisted the temptation to argue with him about it, since I knew it was useless.22
 
−
During the same two-week visit, 23 my brother talked about a mutual acquaintance of ours whom I'll call Kellyt. He told me that he/she had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, and that he/she was taking drugs for it. He said that Kelly was "almost normal" as long as he/she was on the drugs, but that he/she "went crazy" when he/she tried to do without them. In reference to ct.ie fact that Kelly was genetically related to a family we knew, Dave added. "Gee, I hope (they haven't] got anything like that." When discussing Kelly's case my brother unhesitatingly assumed that schizophrenia was undesirable and raised no questions about the utility of the drugs; he did not say anything about mental illness being caused by the "insanity of society itself," nor did he suggest that the hallucinations of schizophrenics might be real.22
 
−
What is remarkable is that my brother seemed completely unaware of the inconsistency between his attitude toward mental illness when discussing Kelly's case and his attitude when discussing the case of his friend Joel. lt is not uncommon for my brother to express contradictory attitudes or opinions without apparently noticing the inconsistencies involved. l attribute this to his mental laziness. He is so little in the habit of thinking, that even the most obvious contradictions often escape his observation.
 
−
Thus it is entirely possible that until he reads this chapter, he will remain unaware of the inconsistency between his attitudes toward mental illness as expressed in his letters, and his recent attempts to portray me as mentally ill, as in his interviews with the New York Time.s24 and the Sacrammto Ba,25 and on 60 Mimaes.26 He showed there not only that he was ready to con­clude I was mentally ill on flimsy evidence, but that he wanted me to be subjected to presumably involuntary treatment"" under conditions of con­finement:"
 
−
MIKE WALLACE: The Kaczynski family ... want him locked away. and treated....27
 
−
Compare this with Dave's response to my suggestion thatJoel should be advised merely to investigate the possibility of taking treatment under vol­untary conditions.
 
−
Earlier, in 1991, Linda Panik took two of my letters to her psychiatrist, a certain Dr. Mitchell who (according to Linda) practices "primal therapy." whatever that may be.28 According to an FBI report, Dave told the FBI that Or. Mitchell said that I was "not psychotic, but definitely paranoid and pos­sibly dangerous. "29 Since my brother often gets his information garbled, it is not at all certain that Or. Mitchell actually said this, but if he did say it, then it seems to me that he was irresponsible in making such a statement on the basis of two letters that I wrote to my family. when he could not have had any knowledge of the history of my relations with my family (apart from what Dave and Linda may have told him, which he ought to have realized might be heavily biased).
 
−
To judge from the description of these letters given in the FBr reports, they must have been FL :#458, in which I argued in emotional terms that my parents' treatment of me had contributed to my lack of social self-confi­dence, and FL #46r, in which I asked my brother, also in emotional terms, to persuade my mother to cooperate with my need to break off relations with the family. These letters were discussed in Chapter4. pp. 67-68, 70. The reader will recall from p. 70 that I intentionally exaggerated my feelings in FL #461 in order to jolt my brother into taking the action I wanted. 30
 
−
After my letters had been shown to Dr. Mitchell, either Dave, or Linda acting with Dave's consent, scot copies of the letters to a physician in Mon­tana whom I had consulted once or twice, and even telephoned the doctor in an effort to have me referred to a psychiatrist. (The doctor, who appar­ently was sensible enough to realize that this was a case of intra-family vin­dictiveness and not of mental illness, was unresponsive to their request.)29
 
−
From the 60 Minutes interview: "LESLIE STAHL: Is it true that you had actually talked about having [Ted] committed? "LINDA PATRIK; We were advised that it was extremely difficult to get someone committed. "DAVE KACzyNSKI: We were told that he had to be a danger-a-a demonstrable danger to himself orto others ...."31
 
−
Again. the reader is invited to compare my brother's attitude here with the attitude toward mental illness that he expressed in his letters aboutJoel. Notice that all this happened several years before my arrest, so that Dave can't claim he was trying to portray me as mentally ill in order to save me from the death penalty.
 
−
Added March 20, 1999: Prior to 1989, neither mybrothernormy mother ever thought rwas mentally ill. A recent news item provides confirmation of what I've suspected for some time: that after Dave shacked up with Linda Panik in 1989, she persuaded him to believe that I was mentally ill. According to this news item:
 
−
The sister-in-law of Ted Kaczynski says she knew for years he was severely mentally ill.... In the joint interview, David Kaczynski, an upstate social worker, said, 'Our whole family was in denial about the extent of Ted's illness.' Only his wife, who said she never wanted Ted inside her home, pressed the issue. ("Unabomber Sister-in-Law Bares Ordeal of Fam­ily," by Andy Soltis, New York Post, Feb. 13, 1999.)
 
−
How was Linda able eventually to persuade my brother and mother that I was mentally il.I1 My brother would have been the more receptive to any negative idea about me because of his covert resentment of me. Much more important, he is in a state of abject psychological servitude to Linda. On this subject, sec C_~aptcr I4-My mother is dependent on Linda indi­rectly. through her dependence on my brother who is the only living person to whom she is still close. Moreover, as I explained at the end of Chapter 7, she has her own motives for accepting Linda's theory that I am mentally ill.
 
  
−
T H Is Is As G o o D a place as any to address the issue of the supposed "shutdowns" attributed to me by my brother and my mother. The issue is difficult to deal with, because, naturally. one can seldom find documenta­tion for the fact that somethingdid not occur, especially ifthe times of the supposed occurrences are unspecified orif the only living wimesses would have been the persons (in chis instance, my brother and mother) who are claiming that the events did occur. But the reader may perhaps be willing to accept my word over that of my brother and mother: I have already shown that they have made untruthful statements about me in a number of other instances; and my own honesty. as well as the excellence of my long-term memory, have been attested to in writing by the chief investigator in my case.32
+
Professor Duong Van Thinh, Ph.D, Associate Professor Nguyen Van Oanh, Ph.D,
−
In case the reader imagines that I don't remember the "shutdowns" because they were some sort of trance during which I was wiconscious, I point out that my brother and mother represented the shutdowns as occur­ring on numerous occasions, beginningin my childhood. If I had had such trances, it is simply incredible that no one would ever have told me about them and that my mother never told ourpediatrician about them. There is no mention of any such thing in the medical records.
 
−
For that matter, nowhere in the family correspondence, or in any other surviving document acatcd before my brother's contact with the FBI, is there any mention ofthe supposed shutdowns ( except myunresponsiveness after hospitalization at the age ofnine months. which wedealtwith in Chap­ter I, and certain adolescent sulks that we will mention below. which do not fit my family's description of most of the "shutdownsH.) On April 12, 1996, eight days after my arrest and well before her media interviews, my mother had an interview with Investigator #I that was devoted to an overview of my life. Investigator #I's report of this interview covers nine single-spaced pages, and nowhere in it is there any mention of anything resembling the alleged shutdowns ( except my reaction to the "hospital experienceff).33
 
−
Moreover, my brother's claims arc notself-consistent. According to the FBI, my brother told them that the shutdowns occurred on "four distinct occasions."34 Butby the time my motherand my brotherwere interviewed by the Washington Post, the number of shutdowns appeared to have greatly increased: "Though at times rred] seemed like a normal child ... every so often he would shut down, refusing to speak. ..."35 And, referring to my high-school years: "The family remembers fewer shut-downs during that stretch."35
 
−
In my brother's and mother's accounts of the shutdowns it is hard to separate the conscious lies from the self-deceptions, and these from the simple errors of memory. Some of the accounts are so far from anything that actually happened that it seems impossible that conscious lying is not involved; but on the other hand, my brotherand mother both arc so adept at persuading themselves to bell~ what they want to believe, and their memories arc so faulty, that it's possible that they did believe much oftheir own garbage. It would take more time and trouble than it's worth to review each of their statements about my supposed shutdowns, so I will mention only a few examples.
 
−
According to the FBI:
 
−
DAVE stated that on four distinct occasions, TBD has displayed a type of'almost catatonic' behavior .... The first washis withdrawal after a three­week [sic; actually five days] hospital stay when he was an infant. The sec­ond was during the journey to begin college at Harvard, when his father noted that TED became uncommunicative and withdrawn for a period of some hours.34
 
−
My father did not come with me on my njourncy to begin college." Before I was even admitted to Harvard, I made a trip there with my father to look the school over. On the way home, for some reason, I was in a grumpy mood for a few hours and, when spoken to, I gave curt, ill-tem­pered answers. I was particularly gruff to the stewardess on our plane-ride back to Chicago, because she was very attractive and I knew thatsince I was only a kid she could have no interest in me. To call this behavior ''almost catatonic" is silly.
 
−
According to the Washington Post,
 
−
One day. as they were planning to hand in their application [to lease a piece of land in British Columbia in 1969], Ted shut down, without reason. 'I wouldwalk up to him and say. Well, arc we goingto do anythingtodayr And there would be no answer,· David said"Z
 
−
My brother told the New York Times much the same story.36 and some­thing similar is perhaps hinted at in a rather confusing sentence of the FBI report.34
 
−
But no such thing ever happened. If Dave wasn't simply lying. then I can only explain his tale as follows. Because ofhis psychological dependence on me (sec Chapter 8, P.· 117), he was acutely sensitive to my moods and responses. If I were in·a grumpy or uncommunicative mood for a day or two (as happens to most people now and then), my sullen demeanor would take on disproportionate importance in my brother's eyes. Since he is prone to get his facts garbled anyway (See Appendix II), it wouldn't be surprising if, a quarter century after the event, he really believed that I had refused to answer when spoken to.
 
−
At most there may have been two or three occasions in my adult life when, for a brief period, I have refused to answer when spoken to, and those would have been times when I was extremely angry at members of my family; for example, following the Ellen Tarmichael affair. Refusing to speakis a very common way of showing anger. 37
 
−
On the basis ofirs interviews with my brother and mother, the Washing· ton Po.st reported: "[EJveryso often [Ted] would shut down, refusing to speakor make eye contact, staring downward, outof rcach."3S
 
−
This, again, is false. The closest it comes to reality is this: Many times during my earlier teens (age twelve to fifteen?) after a quarrel with my par­ents or some outburst of verbal abuse by them, I would go into a sulk and lie on the couch, oron a bed, with my face buriedin the cushions or the pil­low, perhaps for as long as an hour or two. I certainly could not have been "staring downward" with my face buried in cushions. Often my mother would come to comfort me and stroke my head, and in such case I would sometimes push her away;38 but sometimes I would voice some of my complaints about the way my parents were treating me, and my mother would promise improvement. But of course there was never any lasting change in her or my father's behavior.
 
−
If this kind of reaction on my part was abnormal, then I'm certainly not the only abnormal one in the family, because my mother, in middle age, would often go into sulks, lasting sometimes two or three days, during which she would spend most of her time lying on her bed. When spoken to, she would answer either not at all or with some self-pitying whining about howbadly the world was treating her.
 
  
−
APART PR o M the myth of the "shutdowns," my mother and brother have cold so many other lies in their effort to portray me as mentally ill that it would be impractical to reply to them all, so I will deal with only three examples.
+
Associate Professor Nguyen Van Hao, Ph.D, Associate Professor Nguyen Duc Bach, PhD. Pham Van Chin, Phung Thanh Thuy, M.A., and Nghiem Thi Chau Giang, M.A.
−
I. From the Washington Post= "When his father saw Theodore's violent reaction to a rabbit killed dur· ing a huntingtrip, he gave up the sport."3'°
 
−
To my knowledge, my father never hunted butonce in his life. Though I was very young at the time, I remember the occasion clearly. Ralph Meister had a friend who owned a farm and often hunted rabbits on it. The farmer once invited Ralph and my father to hunt with him. I went to the farm with my parents but, to my disappointment, I was not allowed to go outwith the hunters. Though Ralph and the farmer both had shotguns and my father had only his old .22, my father was the one who killed the rabbit. I was proud of him for it. I persuaded my mother to let me watch while the rab­bit was being skinned, and r expressed disappointment at the fact that I wouldn't get to eat any of it. (The farmer probably wanted to let the meat age for a few days.) My reaction to the death of the rabbit was in no sense violent or emotional, and my father didn't "give up" hunting. because he had never been in the habit ofhuntingin the first place.
 
−
2. According to the Sacramento Ba:
 
−
Ted preferred classical music by Vivaldi and Bach that 'had mathemati­cal perfection and symmetry,' his brother said. 'I can't ever recall him singing songs orlistening to lyrics.' 39
 
−
This has to be a conscious lie. because throughout my adolescence, through my twenties and into my thirties. one of my favorite pastimes was singing songs to contrapuntal guitar or zither accompaniments that I composed myself. Among the songs that I sang in the hearing of my brother (and I mean that I sang the lyria, I didn't just hum the tunes) were "The Wabash Cannonball," "Battle Hymn ofthe Republic," "Tramp, Tramp, Tramp," an obscene variant of "Billy Boy." various Christmas carols, etc., etc.
 
−
When my brother sang. he accompanied himself on the guitar only with chords, and more than once he complimented me on the ingenuity of my contrapuntal accompaniments. Then one evening in 1979 at our par­ents' home in Lombard, he came out of his room carrying our zither and walked into the living room, where I was reading. Without a word he sat down and sang a song, with a good contrapuntal accompaniment of his own devising. When he was finished I complimented him on the accompa­niment. Without acknowledging my compliment or saying anything else, he got up and marchedback to his room. Evidently it was important tohim to show that he, too, could compose clever accompaniments.
 
−
3, According to the New York Tima, after our friend Juan Sanchez Arreola was hurt in an accident,
 
−
David said Ted w~ted to do something for Mr. Sanchez, but his solu­tion 'reveals that in some ways he was out of touch.' 'He read about a millionaire who would receive requests for money and decide who to give it to. Ted decided this was the best way to get help for Juan, to pay his medical bills, and he drafted a letter that he sent to me. I was supposed to get an 0.1{. from Juan and send it to the millionaire. And of course, we never heard. For an intelligent person it seemed so . . . extremely naive.'''40
 
−
The millionaire in question was Percy Ross. who then had (and for all I know may still have) a column that appearedin certain newspapers. People would write him with requests for money. Some very small percentage of the letters were answeredin Ross's column, and the writers ofthose letters would receive gifts of money for the more-or-less worthy purposes they had described. I didn't decide this was the best way to get help for Juan."" I simplycouldn't think ofanythingelse, since I had little money myself. So of course I felt there was no harm in writing co Ross. I was well aware of the fact that the chances of success were very small, and my brotherknew that I was aware of it, because in the same envelope in which I sent a letter to Dave I enclosed a letter that I asked him to give to Juan, in which I wrote, amongother things:"
 
−
My brother or I will write to this rich man to find out if he will help you to pay your debt, but this millionaire receives thousands of requests and can grantonly a few. Still, itwill do no harm to write him. Who knows7 It's possible that he may help you.»41 (Translated from Spanish)
 
−
At the time, my brothergave no indication that he thought me out of touch"" or ""naive"" for writing to Percy Ross. In fact, he wrote me:"
 
−
Juan thanks you for your interest in his case. . . . Of course, I've explained to him that this isjust a wild chance, so he shouldn'tgethis hopes up. His case, however, is truly unique, since although poor, he is noteligible for public assistance or, apparently. Medi-caid while his application for resi­dency is pending. The millionaire mightwantto take into account thatJuan contributed to our society with his labor for more than thirty ycan at very low wages.... Enclosed is a page summarizing the debts. We can get more details if the millionaire shows interest inJuan's casc ... 42
 
−
So my reward for attempting to do a good deed (though admittedly at a very long shot) is that now my brother tries to use it to portray me as mentallyill.
 
  
 +
After a period of implementation, the contents of the textbooks have been supplemented and corrected on the basis of receiving appropriate suggestions from universities, colleges, the contingent of lecturers of political theory, and scientists. However, due to objective and subjective limitations, there are still contents that need to be added and modified, and we would love to receive more comments to make the next edition of the curriculum more complete.
  
−
Chapter 13
+
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING
  
−
My brother’s writing
+
=== Table of Contents ===
  
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Chapter 13 j DORIN o his high-school years my brother developed a strong interest in literature, which became a very important part of his life.1 In conjunction with this he aspired to become a creative writer. He wrote at least one novel and many shortstories, butover a span of two decades he was never able to get anything published.
+
'''Introduction to The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism'''
−
Now and then I still send my stories to small literary magazines. butthey always come back rejected ifthey come back at all. Itaffccts myconfidenceto a degree."" He then writes that hejustwants ""a nod of undcrstanding.""2"
 
−
Apart from two or three minor pieces between 1969 and 1971, my brother nevershowed me any ofhis writingprior to 1988, nor did I ask him to show me any of it. In 1985 I wrote him:
 
−
Something I've been meaningto say for some time . .. .
 
−
Maybe you wonder why I've never asked to read any of your stories or other writings. What I want to say here is that it isn't just a matter of dis­dainfulness. The reasons why I've never asked to readyour stuffarc, for one thing. the fact that our tastes and attitudes differ considerably reduces the likelihood that I would like your stuff, and increases the likelihood that I would find it irritating. Furthermore, if it turned out that I didn't like it or considered it to be poor writing. I would be faced with 3 choices: either to praise it dishonestly (which I don't like to do), or to criticize it more or less freely, which would mean saying things that you might find pretty cutting or to say nothingat all about it, which tends to imply a negative judgement.
 
−
If you ever wanted to send me any of your stuff, I'd read it, with the understanding that if I said anything at all about it I would give an honest opinion.... The point I wanted to make is that the fact that I've never asked to read any of your stuff isn't just the result of disdainfulness.3"
 
−
My brother answered that he recognized a writer is not likely to get a good reading from family and friends. but added thatwhen he had some­ thing that he was really satisfied with, he might show it to me with the express expectation that I "wouldspeak.[my] mind freely."4
 
−
Three years later my brother sent me one of his stories as a birthday present, with a letter that began:
 
−
Happy birthday!
 
−
This year you get a booby prize instead of a real present: one of my short storics.""5 In the course of reviewing the family correspondence while preparing this book, I've had occasion to read the foregoing sentence several times, and every time I do so, my heart aches for mybrother. I react the same way when I read his comment (quoted earlier) about wanting just ""a nod of" understanding."
 
−
Dave's letter continued:
 
−
Seriously, I was pleased with the way this one turned out and thought that you might enjoy it, or at least feel in sympathy with some of the ideas I try to express in it. . . . Please, though, feel under no obligation to comment. . . . Consider the story as offered strictly for your enjoyment, with the hope that it doesn't fail completely in that mission.5"
 
−
The story was called 'The Raid', and Ithought that parts ofit were very well written. AU of it was very well written in comparison with what one would expect from an individual chosen at random from the general popu­lation. But, in my opinion, the story as a whole was not of professional quality. My brother docs not have the instinct of careful craftsmanship, and 'The Raid' was marred by a number of small errors in the use of language. Apart from dialog, the story was written in literary English, and even used (or misused) such relatively uncommon words as "suzcraincy,"6 '"matuti­nal,"6 "smithy."7 and "privy"B (as an adjective). In such a context it makes the well-educated reader uncomfortable to see "like" where "as if" should be uscd.9 or to find such phrases as "Deborah Tolliver got a sour look on her facc"lO or "the women he'd been privy to observe in his lifc."8 I don't mean to suggest that a story written in literary English must never contain an "incorrcctly"-used word or an "awkward" -sounding sentence. There may be valid artistic reasons for introducing the "incorrect" or the awkward into a literary work. The point is that my brother did not use words incorrectly or awkwardly in order to achieve an effect; his errors were simply the result of carelessness, as is indicated by the fact that they merely annoy or distract the reader without contributing anything to the story.
 
−
Such defects could no doubt be patched up by a good editor; and by working for some time with a good editor I think my brother could have learned to keep the defects from getting into his stories in the first place. A more serious problem with 'The Raid' is that the reader is left wondering what the pointofthe storyis. Itis clearthat my brotherwanted to illustrate the difference between the Anglo attirudc toward life and that of the tradi­tionalMexican; but ifthis is the pointofthe story. then whybringin the girl who gets pregnant, the yams of the old frontiersman, or Sheriff Dan's thoughts about marriage? The storyjustseems to ramble aimlessly.
 
−
The Raid' was not without its merits. For instance, my brother gave one illustration of the difference between the Anglo and the Mexican atti­tude thathas stuckin my mind ever since as being particularly apt.11 I prob­ably would have enjoyed reading the story if only because it was a reflection of mybrother's personality-passive and directionless, yetobser­vant and frequently offering interesting comments. But 'The Raid' was spoiled for me by my brother's ambition to be a serious creative writer; since I assessed it as something that presumably aspired to be of professional quality. I was bothered by defects that I might otherwise have over­looked. Because Ihad toldmybrotherthat I would commenton his writing honestly if 1did so at all, and because I didn't want to tell him that he still seemed to be a longway from producing a professional-quality story. I said nothing to him about 'The Raid'.
 
−
I've seen only a very few of the many stories my brother has written, but judging from what I have seen I would say that he is much better at writ· ing letters than at writing stories. My brother does have a gift for verbal expression. In his letters he often describes experiences, scenes, people, and feelings quite vividly, sometimes even poetically. When writing a letter he doesn't have to weave a plot; the structure of the letter is provided by the experience that he is relating or the concern that he is trying to communi­cate. I think another reason why his letters arc better-written than his sto­ries is that in writing his letters he usually was not trying to write H creatively" but was merely making an un-self-conscious effort to express what was on his mind; hence he was less apt to be misled by artistic van­ity.lZ I'm not sure whether he makes fewer blunders in handling the details of language in his letters than he docs in his stories. I am much less conscious of such blunders in his letters than I am in his stories, but that may be only because his letters seem co flow along and hold my interest betterthan his stories do, so that I rend to overlook any imperfections of detail.
 
−
I occasionally praised Dave for his letters. Referring co a comment he'd made on the religion of the African pygmies, I wrote in 1983:
 
−
I especially liked the following passage from a recent letter of yours: '... the [molimo]13 ritual demanded something like an attitude of pre­tend" that was aware of itself as such. I think of modem religions as tend­ing to become confused in this area, so that the alternative to the empirical interpretation of reality, in drawing near co the empirical, is only usurped by it, so that the religious ideas are transformed as absurd empirical asser­tions, while losing theirpoeticlife and suggestiveness.'14
 
−
I like this passage so well that Ihave copied it in my notebook. So there you stand amongst all kinds of famous writers whomc (sic] I have quoted from time to time in my notes.lS'
 
−
In a 1985 letter16 that I quotedin Chapter11, p. 154. I told Dave howinter­esting and enjoyable I found some of his letters; and in 1987 when he sent me an account of a very interesting trip he'd made to Mexico, I praised him rather generously for the way he'd written it up, as we'll sec in a moment. Yet I wish now that I'd praised more of Dave's letters, because there were a number of ochers that did deserve praise, and I failed to give it.
 
−
About June 1987, my brother spent a week or two at the home of his friend. Juan Sanchez Arreola, in Magistral dcl Oro, state of Durango, Mex· ico.17 He sentme a long( eleven-page) account ofthe visit that I found fasci­nating.18 Since I thought he was much better at writing that sore of thing than he was at composing fiction, and since I knew he'd been trying unsuc­cessfully for many years to gee something published, I cold him in my next letter:
 
−
I read your account of your adventures with the greatest interest .... Your adventures seemed most wonderful to me-it must have been like steppinginto a different world.
 
−
I also thought your account was very well written. I assume you will make other visits to Mexico in the future, and after you have accumulated enough material I'll bet you could publish a book on your experiences. I thinkthere would be a much better market for a book like that than there is for fiction. Ifyou wrote the whole bookas well as you did that account that you sent to me, and if it were properly organized and so forth, I don't sec why you shouldn't be able to find a publisher for it. I thought you did a very good job of characterizing Rosa19 and some of the other people you described."
 
−
I do have a couple of minor criticisms. Fl.l'St, Iwonder if itwasn't unfair to compare Rosa to a child. A linle condescending, perhaps ....
 
−
Also, your last line, about 'a bestial dialectic which filled the earth with intense music while humanity slept,•20 struck. me as perhaps too lushly poetic to fit in with the tone of the rest of the material. But some people might differ with me on this point. And as I said, on the whole I thought your accountwas very good.21"
 
−
I now suspect that my brother thought his line about "bestial dialectic" was the best part of the letter and was disappointed that I didn't care for it. Anyway, he never responded to my suggestion that he should accumulate material for a book.
 
−
In February or March 1989, Dave sent me an account ofa story thatJuan Sanchez Arreola had told him.22
 
−
The original version ofthe manuscript of this book included the full text of the story, but it has been deleted because my brother has refused to allow irs publication here.
 
−
My brother's telling of this tale had a few defects of detail, but these could easily have been patched up, and it seemed to me that on the whole the account was very well done. I wrote Dave: 'Tve just received your letter that contains Juan's story. It's very inter· csting....
 
−
Yes, it would give me pleasure to receive more ofJuan's stories. You recounted this last one very well. If the other stories arc as good as the two23 that you've already told me, has it occurred to you to publish a collec­tion of such stories? ...
 
−
I've read again your rendering of the story. and it seems to me to be excellent. The tone and the language seem to me to be just right for such a story.""24 (Translated from Spanish)"
 
−
I concluded by pointingout(I hope tactfully) a few of the minor infelic­ities oflanguage that occurred in the story.25
 
−
A short while later my brother sent me, as a birthday present, his ren­dering of another ofJuan's tales-a considerably longer one that he called, 'The Conjurer's Stone'. This story l thought was really very good, even though it had imperfections of detail that I felt were more important than those of the preceding story.
 
−
In a letter that accompaniedthe story, my brother wrote:
 
−
....[FJor this and any future stories I send you. I'd appreciate any criti­cism that may occur to you. I doubt I'll sec every point your way. but mean­while I'm aware of how difficult it is to read one's own prose with fresh and objective eycs.26
 
−
In an answering letter (now lost), l praised 'The Conjurer's Stone' highly and, in compliance with Dave's request, I gave him an extensive cri­tique of its flaws. He answered:
 
−
I'm glad you enjoyed your birthday present.
 
−
Thanks for . . . your long analysis of the writing. which must have taken a good deal of time and effort to complete. I found several of the crit­icisms helpful, and plan to incorporate them in my revisions. I doubt if you'd enjoy reading the revised version. however, since I find myself unable to agree with you about the use of figurative language in this piece.27
 
−
My brother then launched himself into an elaborate series of rational­izations intended to justify his use of certain metaphors and similes that I had criticized. If he had simply said that he disagreed with me and was going to retain these figures of speech, l would have been a little disappointed. since I felt that they detracted from what was otherwise an excellent story. But I would not have been irritated. What did irritate me in this case, as in many earlier cases, was Dave's habit of pretentious rationalization.
 
−
Here is an example. 'The Conjurer's Stone' included this sentence:
 
−
Even Don Francisco's eyes sparkled and he showed his few teeth in a face like aacked mud. zB I aiticized this simile ("face like cracked mud") on the grounds that it wasn't clear what it was supposed to mean. My brother answered:
 
−
If you pay close attention to your reading. I think you'll notice that equivocal metaphors are used frequently in fiction. The 'cracked mud' sim­ilie [sic] works on the basis of three comparisons between the old man's face and cracked mud: the color (gray), the tenure (the aeases on an old man's face that would presumably deepen as he smiled); and a quality of opaqueness Quan finds the old man's expression opaque rather than trans· parent at a moment when he is confused. searching for some clue as to why the old men arc laughing; in effect, he comes up against his own ignorance in the old man's sphinx-like demeanor. until a moment later the truth-or at leastpart of it~wns onhim).29
 
−
The first two comparisons would have been fine if only my brother had rephrased his simile in such a way as to make it clear that itwas the texture of the man's skin that was being compared to cracked mud. The ''opaque­ness'' comparison is ludicrous, because no reader, no matter how sophisti­cated and attentive, wouldbe able to divine those meanings in the "cracked mud" simile.
 
−
Dave's letter finished off with somewhat of an air of wounded vanity:
 
−
If you don't mind my making a suggestion, Ted, it would be that you make an earnest effort to enter the consciousness and spirit of a story as it's written before making up your mind as to how you think it should be written....
 
−
I have another suggestion, since you' re clearly. and probably with justi­fication aloe [sic] more interested in Juan's stories than you are in mine. Why not come down and meet Juan ... ? You could hear his stories for yourself, and then consider writing them up in the rcportial [sic; ""reportor­ial"" is meant] fashion youjudge bcst.""30"
 
−
In this case I did a relatively goodjob of controlling my irritation at my brother's interminable rationalizations. In my reply I did point out the evi­dence of wounded vanity in his letter31 and I did maintain (not very tact­fully. rm afraid) my position that some of his metaphors and similes detracted from the story.32 but on the otherhand I toldhim that onre-read­ing 'The Conjurer's Stone' I felt less uncomfortable with these figures of speech33 and I conceded that other readers might respond to them more favonbly than I did.34 Moreover, I said that the story was "damn good"33 and that I liked it "very well indeed, in spite of my criticisms. "3S In answer to Dave's defeatist suggestion that it was Juan's stories rather than his (Dave's) rendering ofthem that interested me, I wrote:
 
−
I think there must be a great deal of 'you' in the stories.... Borrowed plots are common among great writers . . .. The effect of 'The Conjurer's Stone' must depend heavily on yourretelling. since it could hardly bejust a literal translation of Juan's words. If I or someone else told the story, it might have seemed pointless and uninteresting. As you tell it, the story is effective and the characters liw.'36
 
−
I was perhaps laying it on a bit thick here, but not to such an extentthat I felt I was breaking my promise tobe honestin commentingon my brother's writing. I did attack some of his rationalizations. (I knew it was futile, but it is my misfortune that I find it extremely difficult to refrain from pointing out the defects in a fallacious argument.) Among other things I said:
 
−
As for making an earnest effort to enter the consciousness and spirit of the story-it's your job to communicate that consciousness and spirit to the reader-you can't expect the reader to divine by magical insight what that consciousness and spirit' is supposed to be.'37"
 
−
Predicrably. my brother responded with an even more elaborate and defensive series of rationalizations, ofwhich some samples follow: "(In my last letter] I honestly believe I was defending an honest convic· tion more than my own ego....38
 
−
David went on to cite in his defense "the poet Rilke" and "the artist O'Keeffe" who, as David cold it, advised "courage" and "obstinacy" in young artists if they were to "advance beyond mediocrity and technical expertise." 39
 
−
But my brother did not need to advance beyond technical expertise; his problem was that he had not yetattained technical expertise. In the same letter, my brother went on to speculate on how Faulkner or Proust would have struck a creative teacher, though he is careful to disclaim membership in their "category of talent".40
 
−
Your observations suggest that you see a writer as a communicator in a fairly simple and straightforward way, so that an intelligent and educated reader needs only to sit backpassively. so to speak, and let himself be •communicated to.' ... I think you should know that the trend of mod­em thought is against depicting the artist as a straightforward communica­tor.... My own feelings tell me, 'Whybe spoon-fed when you can have the pleasure of freely participating in a work with your own imagina­tion? . .. 41
 
−
########
 
−
Further on in the letter, in an evident reference to my supposed "sci­ence-based assumptions," my brother expressed a suspicion that there was a "logical agenda" behind my aiticisms.42 But he concluded his letter on a generous note:
 
−
Please keep in mind, Ted, that in outlining these arguments and differ­ences, I by no means want to suggest that I don't value your criticisms and appreciate the effort they've costyou. In fact, I value them very higbly.43
 
−
Many readers will have noticed by this time that my brother is a fairly typical representative of a certain class of unsuccessful would-be artists, and shows the charactt;ristic symptoms: He emphasizes "originality" and neglects technical skill (technical skill requires talent and hard work. butthe concept of originality is vague enough so that anyone can convince himself that his work is original); he is touchy about criticism-rather than accept· ing it he invents rationalizations to place the blame on the critic for not appreciating his creations; he compares himself to great artists who were not accepted, or had difficulty being accepted, or might not have been acceptedbecause ofthe unconventionality and originality of their work.
 
−
Yet, as I noted earlier, my brother does have a tal~t for verbal expres­sion, and I think that what prevented him from becoming a good (i.e., pro­fcssional-quality) writer was simply his weakness of character; or, as a psy­chologist might put it, the fact that his ego was not well-developed. {Herc I use "ego" to mean not vanity, but the directing and organizing faculty of the mind.) Because of it he lacked the self-discipline to develop technical skill with the details of language, so that his writing was marred by expres­sions that were grammatically incorrect, awkward, or confusing; he was unable to look at his own work objectively enough to see its good points and its bad poincs, so as to be able to change what was bad and retain what was good; and I doubt that he could have organized intelligently a book­length piece of writing unless it consisted of a collection of shorter pieces each of which would stand more-or-less independently. Fmally. he was unwilling to acknowledge that he was not good at constructing stories of his own, and that, unless he retold stories he'd heard from someone else, he would have done betterto write about personal experiences.
 
  
 +
'''I. Brief History of Marxism Leninism'''
  
 +
1. Marxism and the Three Constituent Parts
  
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Chapter 14
+
2. Summary of the Birth and Development of Marxism-Leninism
  
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My brother’s relations with Linda Patrik; I break off with him
+
'''II. Objects, Purposes, and Requirements for Studying the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism'''
  
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c h ap t e r 1 4 I I N B v BR KN Bw my brother to have a girlfriend, or to go on dates, or to show any sema.1 interest in girls until, some time during his college years, my mother mentioned to me that he had a crush on a young woman named Linda Panik whom he'd known in high-school. I've already dcsaibed (in Chapter 9, pp. I3I-I33) how in the early seventies he was attracted to a woman named Luisa Mueller. But apart from Linda and Luisa I don't believe he ever took even the first step toward a sexual relationship with any female. He never did develop an overt sexual involvement with Luisa Mueller; nor was there any physical relation­ship between him and Linda Panik before he reached his late twenties.
+
1. Objects and Purposes of Study
−
Until 1986 my brother never said anything to me about his relations with women, and I never asked him about them. Intimate personal matters just were not discussed in our family. I won't attempt to explain his celibacy here, but will mention two facts.
 
−
First, my brother's high aspirations seem to have extended to women: From certain remarks that he made I gathered that he did not consider a female attractive unless she was quite good-looking; yet he himself had nei­ther the physical qualities nor the kind of personality that would have made him attractive to women (see Chapter 9, p. 131). Second, he apparently had a fairly serious hang-up about sex. I quote here in full a passage from one of his letters of which I quoted a part in Chapter 9:
 
−
When your interference vis-a-vis [Luisa Mueller] touched off an explo­sion, I believe this is how I expenenced everything (regardless of whatyour true motives might have been)-I saw you acting as a sort of surrogate super-ego in the matter of our parents' highly (though subtly) repressive attitudes coward sex. I suppose I felt that siblings ought co confederate in the struggle with their parents to assert semal independence, and in that light I probably considered your letter to them as a serious bettayal, cspe· cially serious in that I felt we had both already been damaged by their repressive attitudes, so you ought to have lmown what the pain was like. What made things worse and more humiliating for me, is that I had alrwly submitted to my conditioning-the inculcated repressions had already con­quered my desires (perhaps luckily. all in all) and consequently I experi-­cnced the repression as pertaining not only to behavior, but as arousing guilt over the mere occurrence [sic] of sexual feelings. l
 
−
I answered:
 
−
You assume that I, like you, have, or had, a major problem with guilt over sex. I was really astonished to find you misjudging me so badly. Of course l'm not free of shame over sex-I don't suppose anybody is in our society-but I never had enough shame over sex to feel that it was a serious problem. Actually, though I knew you were kinda prissy, I was surprized [sic] to learn that you had such a problem with sex guilt as you indicate in your letter. I never felt that our parents' attirudcs toward sex were particularly repressive, neither explicitly. nor 'subtly' as you put it.2"
 
−
However that might have been, my brother told me nothing whatever about Linda Patrik. He never so much as mentioned hername to me before 1986, probably because he was afraid that I would make some negative comment about his relations with her. The little I lmew about her I learned from my mother, from hearing my brother's end of a couple of brief tele­phone conversations that he'd had while we were both at our parents' house in 1978, and from some of Linda P.'s letters to him.
 
−
I found these letters one day during the early 1970s when, in my brother's absence, I was shoveling the garbage out of his dump in Great Falls. They were in a drawer, not lying out in the open, and I knew that he would not want me to read them, but I read them anyway. I do not like to have to confess to this, but I do confess to it. because I mean to tell the whole truth about the relations between mybrother and me. A3 far as I can remember, it is the only thing I've ever done in regard to him that was clearly and definitely not fair play, a violation of trust. a breach of the unspoken rules that governed ourrelationship. Why did I do it? I was full of contempt for him, and when you have contempt for someone you tend to be disregardful of his rights. But contempt was no excuse for violating my brother's privacy. and, ever since, I've been uncomfortable about having read chose letters.
 
−
The letters were not very informative, but they did make this much clearabout Dave's relationship with Linda Patrilc He had a long-term crush on her; his relationship to her was servile; she didn't appear to have any interestin him as a male, but she seemed to like usinghim as a shoulder to cry on, someone to unburden herself to. Meanwhile she carried on rela­tionships with ocher men, and my brother knew it, yet he kept mooning after her.
 
−
The next I heard of Linda Patrik was in 1978, when my brother and I were staying at our parents' house and he received a couple ofphone calls from her. From his endofthe conversation.itwas evident only chat she was inviting him to visit her and that he was accepting the invitation with alaaity. I asked no one any questions about Dave's relationship with Linda P., but my mother volunteered some very scanty information: It seemed that Linda was having some sort of trouble with her husband-a divorce may have been contemplated-andshe had turned to Dave for com.fort.
 
−
I heard not another word about Linda Patrik until my brother visited me in Montana in 1986. At that time I noticed a verylarge turquoise ring on his finger and asked him where he'd gotten it. He answered that Linda Patrikhadgiven it to him, and that wasthefirst time he ever mentioned her to me. He gave me no information about her, however, and from consider­ation for his privacy I did not ask for any. I heard no more about Ms. Patrik until three years later.
 
  
−
AT ABOUT THE SAMB TIME (September 1989) that my brother sent me his last exercisein rationalization in justification of 'TheConjurer's Stone' (FL #399), he sent me also his rewritten version of that story, and with it a letter in which, amongother things, he said:
+
2. Some Basic Requirements of the Studying Method
−
I'm returningtoSclienectadyonOa. 8to undertake the experimentof livingwith Linda. I've been inlove with herfor more than 20 years, so much so that no other woman has everseriously interested me .. . [T]his is a very happy time in my life. So wish meluck."3
 
−
At this point I decided rd had about enoughof myjackass of a brother, so I wrote him an irritable letter in which I told him I didn't want to hear from him any more-unless he ever found himself in serious aouble and needed my help, in which case I woulddo what I could for him. Hercis how mybrother has dcscnbed this letterto the media:
 
−
In 1989, David told his brother he had a relationship with Linda and had decided to go to Schenectady, N.Y. to be with her. He also said he expecred to marry her. [False. Neither FL #400 nor any other letter of my brother's in 1989 made any mention of a possible marriage with Linda Patrik.4]
 
−
At that time he decided to end his relationship with me, end commu­nicatingwith me,' David said. 'It was an extremely angry. total surprise to me. He tended to view me as someone who was easily manipulated by oth­ers and for some reason he had gotten the notion that Linda was a manipu· lating female who was using me.' The accusation seemed particularly bizarre, David said, because 'he has never met her to my knowledge.'"
 
−
One interpretation of his brother's letter, he said, might be that Ted was disappointed that he would give up the lifestyle they had shared. 'It may have been just terrible for him to think I would rejoin society,' David said. 'I thinkit goes deeper than that.'
 
−
David said the letter contained 'a long litany' of his presumed faults but it added that 'he did care about me' and said that 'I was throwing away my life.'"
 
−
By marrying? he was asked.
 
−
Sure.'"" (New York Time.s)s"
 
−
In 1989, Theodore Kaczynski reacted angrily when David wrote toTed and told him he was planning to marry Linda Patrik, a philosophy professor at Union College in Schenectady. ... Ted had never met Panik but said she was manipulative. (Washingtcm Post)6"
 
−
LESLIE STAHL: .. . And Ted blamed David for deserting him, by fallingfor Linda. MIKE WALLACE: He was devastated when he learned that you were happy with Linda, and that you, of all things, married Linda.
 
−
DAVID KACZ\'N~KI: It was entirely uncxpccred. He had never met Linda. And I got a letter that was pages and pages and pages long. full of criticisms of Linda, criticisms of me. It was as if I had somehow betrayed him.7
 
−
Nearly IO years ago (sic], Ted wrote his brother a venomous letter stat· ing. in capital letters, that he never wanted to sec or hear from David 'or any other member of our family' again. He was angry because his brother was gettingmarried. (Sacramento &e)a
 
−
Actually. the fact that my brother was going to live with Linda Panik was only one among several reasons why I broke off with him. My letter was nearly fourteen pages long, and only four of those pages dealt with Dave's relations with Linda Patrik. Also, the letter nowhere describes Linda as "manipulative".
 
−
Apparently Dave or (more likely) Linda destroyed my letter. But maybe my brother would have been more careful in describing this letter if he'd known that I'd kept a copy ofit. This was a carbon copy. so there is no ques­tion of any errors of transcription. Since the letter is significant, I reproduce all of it here. The first part refers to another story my brother had sent me that was loosely based on one ofJuan's talcs.
 
−
Dear Dave:
 
−
As for 'Ernesto and the Widow'9-This is a style of story-telling that I dislike. On the other hand, there mustbe a lot ofpeople who like that kind ofstory-telling, since that style is much in vogue nowadays [amongintellec­tuals]. I only read the story once, and while reading it I was in a state of irri­tation at you for reasons that will be explained below; moreover, I was continually interrupting my reading to write comments in the margins. Thus I was less able to judge how the story flows along than I would have been under other circumstances. Moreover I am, naturally. less sensitive to differences in a form of writingthat Idislike than I wouldbe in a form of writingin which I take an interest. So I'm not sure if I can judge the story well. But, for whatever it may be worth, my reaction to the story is as follows.
 
−
Here and there I noticed places where words were used amateurishly or not quite correctly. But apart from that I thought it was a good story­for those who like that type ofwriting, but not fo_r me. Ifthe little awkward places I mentioned were cleared up, I sec no particular reason why the story couldn't be published. But, while I felt pretty sure you ought to be able to find a publisher for the stories thatstuck closer to the material you had from Juan, I don't know whether you could find a publisher for stories like 'Ernesto and the Widow'. The. difference is that, while the stories that followed Juan's material had a note of authenticity-something on the orderoffolk­loric material-'Emcsto and the Widow' is obviously a made-up story. merely inspired by an incident you heard from Juan. Of course there arc thousands or millions of people in America who want to write fiction and they all think they have something original to say. so there is an abundance ofstories offered-farmore than anyone wants to read. But there arc not so many people who can offer authentic stories from a peasant culture. That's why I think your stories that stick closer toJuan's material-with theirnote of authenticity-have a much better chance of being published than"
 
−
Ernesto and the Widow', which jwtdoesn't fit into the same category.
 
−
As for the reason why you've never been able to get anything published,
 
−
I can only say this:
 
−
The story titled 'The Raid', which you sent me some time ago struck me as hopelessly amateurish-both in the details of language and the gen­eral outline of the story. If that story is typical of your previous writing. then it's obvious why no onewantsto publish your stuff-it'sjustplain bad, by anyone's standard. 'Ernesto and the Widow' is such a vast improvement over 'The Raid' that the difference seems incomprehensible. If your prev:i­ow writing resembles 'Ernesto and the Widow' rather than 'The Raid', then I suppose that your failure to get anything published is due either to the fact that, as I mentioned, there arc more would-be writers than there· arc readers, or else to the fact that here and there in your writing there appear little awkwardnesses oramateurish constructions. What you need is someone to criticize the details of your language (as I did with 'The Con­jurer's Stone') to induce you to develop literary craftsmanship.10
 
−
I now feel embarrassed at having spoken as favorably as I did of 'Ernesto and the Widow;. I don't have a copy of it now, butI rememberit as crap-it simply repelled me. However, it was of a genre-one might call it "modern"-that repels most readers anyway and is attractive only to a small minority of literary highbrows. Since I couldn't pretend to under­stand that kind ofliterature, I gave my brother the benefit ofthe doubt and assumed that the story was an adequate specimen of its type, apart from the defects ofdetail that I mentioned. I would have done better to tell Dave simply that I didn't understand the story and leave it at that, but I suppose my desire to make him feel good was competing with the contempt and irritation that led me to make very cutting remarks at various other places in the letter. Herc again my conflicting feelings toward my brother arc evident.
 
−
The letter continued:
 
−
The question is whether you are capable of profiting from such criti­cism. It seems doubtfui. It seems that your vanity prevents you from mak­ing any suggested changes except on inessential 1 l points-and sometimes even on minor points it prevents you from malting changes. Herc are two examples from your revised version of 'The Conjurer'sStone'. First, on p. I, the phrase 'descend to the street on strutting claws'. Leave aside the fact that I think the metaphorc [siclZJ is hackneyed. As I carefully explained in my last letter, the sentenceis illogical because the buzzards don't descend on their claws, they descend on their wings. This is justthe kind ofamateurish linguisticblunder that will discourage an editor from publishing your stuff.
 
−
[tis not an arguable point. The sentence is dearly and plainly illogical, there is no conceivable literary motive for introducing that kind of illogic at this point, and any competent editor would agree that it is simply an amateur­ish blunder. If you felt you had to retain the ·strutting' claws metaphor you could have done so by reconstructing the sentence to eliminate the illogic.13 I carefully explained in my last letter what was wrong with the sentence, yet you let it stand.
 
−
S«mtd. On the last page14 you have: 'some of the others began laugh­ing so hard it looked like they might hurt themselves'. !u I explained care­fully in a previous letter, 15 this sentenceis grammatically incorrect because 'like' is not a conjunction.16 To make the sentence correct you have to replace 'like' by 'as if'. There is no conceivable literary motive for using the incorrect 'like' instead of the correct 'as if'. Yet you let the sentence stand."
 
−
I can see no motive for your leaving these rwo incorrect sentences in their original form except stubborn vanity-vanity of the most puerile kind.17
 
−
This last remark was unnecessarily cruel. Many people would show as much vanity-motivated resistance to changing something they'd done as my brother did.
 
−
To argue about metaphors-whether they arc hackneyed or not, appropriate or not, etc.-is reasonable, since after all that is a matter of taste. But I suppose you can understand why I get frustrated and irritated when you ignore mycorrectionsofdear-cut and unarguable errors oflogic orgrammar.
 
−
Even when it comes to metaphors-your defense of your metaphors and similes (in an earlier letter) irritated me because-while one can rea­sonably argue about those metaphors-your arguments were simply silly. You explained all these meanings that these metaphors were supposed to convey-meanings that no one but you would ever guess at or even sense intuitively."
 
−
Of course, you have the right to write anything you damn well please. But I'm not going to criticize your work any more because, as I've just explained, I find your reactions frustrating and irritating. I do feel that you've got something good there in your re-tellings ofJuan's stories, and I would really be very pleased on your account if you could get them pub­lished. I would moreover be willing to spend considerable time criticizing the details of your style if it weren't for the fact that, when you ignore my corrections of clear-cut, unarguable flaws, itjust seems futile, and it's too irritating and frustrating.
 
−
More than that. This has been building up for a long time. It's notjust this business of the stories. I find you insufferably irritating in general. You're certainly not the type of personality I would choose for a friend-I just happened to get stuck with you as a brother. As you know, I have tender feelings toward you. but that's just because you're my brother and because of old tics going all the way backto childhood.
 
−
Some of your letters are a pleasure to read, but, just as often, they irri­tate me and make me conscious of an unbridgeable gulf between you and me. It's not so much a difference of attitudes or ideology-in some respects our attitudes are pretty similar-as a difference of personality. The ideolog· ical differences arc largely a reflection of the personality differences. You use verbal formulations to satisfy your emotional needs, very often to pro­tect your ego [here, ego =sclf-cstecmJ, and you frequently insist on verbal· formulations that arc meaningless (or at least, whose meanings you don't try to analyze) or contrary to reality. or simply ludicrous. I use verbal for­mulations in a reasonably honest attempt to dcsaibe reality. I am so consti­tuted that I find it difficult to listen to your nonsense without arguing against it. So when you write me some of your silly 'ideas' (as you choose to call them) I am faced with a choice: either I restrain myself and make no reply, which is frustrating. or, what is more frustrating. I permit myself to be drawn into writing you one of these interminable letters in which I explain my point of view in detail-though it is absolutely futile, because I know by this time that, wherever your ego is involved, you are absolutely impervious to reason and will resort to the most far-fetched rationaliza­tions to avoid having to make any concession.
 
−
~good example occurred a few years ago when I ventured to suggest that your friend Joel might have schizophrenia. I don't know whether that suggestion was right or wrong. but the point is that your reaction to it was irrational. You tend to take any criticism of your friends, from me, as an assault on your ego. In this case you also took my suggestions as an attack on your ideology; even though I was careful to frame my arguments as tact· fully as possible and in such a way as to avoid offending your ideology. Of course you got your back up and became absolutely insufferable. Later, when you came to visit me, in reference to schizophrenic children who sec the floor heaving and tossing under them, you said, • maybe the floor really is heaving'....ts Ofcourse you don't really believe this-youjust make that statement to confirm an ideology designed to satisfy your emotional needs. Where your ego and your ideology aren't at stake, you take an entirely dif. fcrent point of view. Thus, during that same visit, you mentioned [Kdly's] case. There-since no friend of yours was involved and your ego and ideol­ogy weren't at stake-you unhesitatingly accepted the existence of schizo­phrenia, the undesirability of it, and the fact that drugs can bring a schizo­phrenic back to perception of reality. You also added, 'Gee, I hope (no one in Kelly's family has] got anything like that'. If you really believed that the hallucinations of a schizophrenic were as real as the perceptions of a sane person, why would you 'hope (no one in Kelly's family had] got anything like that'?
 
−
l refrained from pointing out the obvious contradictions in your expressed views because by that time I knew that it was hopeless to try to reason with you on that subject-you would never under any circum· stances make any concession. I find that kind of thing thoroughly con­temptible and insufferably irritating-though in the majority of cases I refrain from showing my irritation, since it would accomplish nothing · anyway."
 
−
This has just happened too many times. If you don't irritate or disgust me in one way then you do so in another. I've justhad enough of it. My tol­erance for irritation was low to begin with, and the older I get, the less I can tolerate irritation.
 
−
And now, to top off my disgust, you' re going to leave the desert and shackupwith this woman who's been keeping you on a string for the last 20 years. You write, 'I've been in love with her for more than 20 years, so much so that no otherwoman has ever seriously interested me.' You forgot to add the qualification, 'except [Luisa Mueller].' But leaving that aside, I would say that love is one thing and grovelling servitude is another.Judging from the comparatively little that I know of the case, it seems clear that this woman has justbeen exploiting you. I recall that one time when I was help­ing you clean out your apartment in Great Falls, I picked a letter out of the garbage on your table and started reading aloud: 'Dear Linda, Of course it was a blow to learn that you maybe falling in love with someone....• ts You got mad and snatched the letter out of my hand""l9"
 
−
The reader will notice that I did not tell my brother here that I bad once read several of Linda P.'s letters that I had found in a drawer. I would have been ashamed to confess to that.
 
−
My letter continues:
 
−
But it's pretty clear what was going on there. She knew you were stuck on her and she knew that she wasn't much attracted to you as a male. Under the circumstances, the decent thing to do wouldhavebeen to simply cut off all relations with you. In that case you probably would have forgot· ten about her eventually and would have found someone else. But she found it more expedient to keep you on a string-to keep hold of your affections while her affections wandered elsewhere. Women like passive, gentle males-but they don't typically consider them desirable as lovers. Especially when they arc younger, women are attracted sexually by domi­nant, virile males. Bur they like to have a shoulder to cry on-some gentle, affectionate person to whom they can tum for emotional support. There's nothing evil in that-but in using you for that purpose, lmowing that you were in love with her and that her love was going to go elsewhere, Linda Panik was exploiting you. She must have realized that it would be painful and humiliating for you when she unburdened herself to you about her love affairs, yet apparently she did so anyway. tojudge from that letter.
 
−
When she got married, I can just imagine her husband's amusement when she told him about 'this poor sap who's been in love with me for years, and still is, even though I am marrying you'. Then when her mar­riage broke up, the first thing she did was run to you for a shoulder to cry on. And you accepted that. Don't you have any self-respect at all? Appar­ently not. It's just too despicable."
 
−
So now, after having kept you around as a kind of spare tire for the last 20 years, she's finally ready to shack up with you. Maybe because she's get­ting older and can't so readily find sex partners any more, maybe for some other reason. Does she love you? I venture to doubtit. I'll betyou're the one who is making all the concessions and saaifices. Thus you're going up to live with her in Schenectady and she's not going down to live with you in
 
−
Texas. It's safe to saythat you two will be adoptingher life-style andnotyour life-style. 20"
 
−
I was reasonably sure that Linda Patrik's life-style was more-or-less con­ventional middle class, since I recalled that my mother had told me in 1978 that Linda was a professional woman, though I didn't know what her pro­fession was. It turned out that I was right. Linda Patrik's life-style is essen­tially conventional middle-class, in spite of certain gestures toward nonconformity on her part (such as her Buddhist religion) a quirk that is easily accommodated by modem American middle-class values.
 
−
The letter continued:
 
−
If you want to find outwhether she loves you, try this: Ask herto make some major concessions to yourlife-style and preferences. For example, ask her to live with you in Alpine. This would be a reasonable compromise, because in Alpine she would have most ofthe urban conveniences to which she is presumably addicted, yet you would be close to the desert. Ifshe says yes, then probably she really cares about you. Ifshe refuses to consider the possibility of movingdown to Texas, orof maltingany other major conces­sions to your life-style, then clearly she doesn't love you but is merely using you as a convenience.
 
−
The idea here is not actually to extract concessions from her. For instance, if she agreed to live in Alpine, you could then, ifyou wanted to, be generous. change your mind. and say. 'No, let's live in Schenectady after an·. The idea of asking for concessions is simply to find out whether she really cares about you or whether she is just exploiting you and wants to have everything on her own terms."
 
−
But if I know you, you probably won't even have the nerve to ask her to live in Alpine. I can pretty well guess who the dominant member of that couple is going to be. It's just disgusting. Let me know your neck size-I'd like co get you a dog collar next Christmas. I recall your negative opinions about [Sally's] selfishness in her relationship with [Bill Wadham] and I won· der whether your own case is going to be any better. You thought [Sally] was selfish because [Bill] wanted to suy in Chicago, [Sally] wanted to [move], so of course it was a foregone conclusion that they would [move]. How does this differ from your case? At least [Sally] didn't keep [Bill] on a string for 20 years before marrying him.
 
−
The only thing I've really respected in you has been your Ufe in the desert. I especially remember how you returned that beautifully made spear·point to its original resting pl.ace out of respect for the people who made it. and how you crossed the Rio Grande with Juan and shared hisrisks and hardships. So now you're going co leave all chatjustbecause this female bas finally decided to permit you to become her personal property. and I presume that you will nowbe adopting a morc-or·lcss convmtional middle· class life-style. While you're at it, why don't you take a few courses and learn to be an accountant? Or better-why don't you go to law school? I've always felt chat if a thing is worth doing. then it's worth doing right. so as long as you're selling out you may as well go all the way and become alawytt
 
−
Be all that as it may. I've just been disgusted and irritated by you too damn many times. I just can't take all that crap any more. So from now on, I am just going to cease corresponding with you altogether, and I'll thank you not co send me any letters of any kind. There's no question of ill will hcrc-i.t's just that I can't any longer take the frequent irritations thatI have from you. You probably don't realize how often I've restrained myself in the face of your irritating traits. That's the reason for the present outburst of irritation in response to relatively minor irritants; as I said. it's been building up for a long time. T'une after time. after receiving a particularly asinine letter from you I've cold myself that I ought to cut off correspon­dcncc with you, but then I've always softened again. But now I just can'c cake any more. I realize that it's partly my fault. It's troc that you're a fatu­ous ass and that our personalities arc incompatible, but it's also true that my tolerance for irritation is unusually low. I suppose that one reason why you get me so upset may be the fact that I do care about you. When my neighbor down here chatters along idiotically like the jerk that he is, I just listen noncommittally to his nonsense and then forget it. But when you speak orace like a fool. I find it hard to be indifferent.
 
−
You're still my little brother (unworthy though you are of th.at honor) and you still have my loyalty. and rm ready to help you if I can whenever you may be in smow need. But. as I said, I'm not going co write you any more. and I don't want co receive any letters from you either. If you send· me any letters I'll justthrow them in the stove unread. &apt: ifsomething really important comes up, you can write to me and get my attention as fol­lows: On the envelope, draw a strt:ight. heavy li,u: wtda the st4mp (ar stamps). Ifyou send me a letter with this marking. I will know that it is something particularly important and will read the letter. But don't cry wolf by putting this marking on an envelope that contains an unimportant letter. Ifyou do so, then I will no longer regard the marking. and you'll have no way of get­ting in couch with me ifsomething important comes up. Ju co what I con­sider important: If you're seriously ill, that's important; if our parents aoak. that's important; if you're in any kind of serious trouble and need my help. that's important; and so forth. On the other hand, ifyou wane to justify to me your ideas about writing. that's not important; ifyou wane to explain your relations with Linda Paaik, that's not important; and so forth.
 
−
I realize that, not knowing very much about the case, I may possibly be wrong about your relations with Linda P. (though I'm probably right), and I don't doubt that you could be induced co withdraw your threat (contained in your lase letter) to send me some of your gcofball ideas on language and litcracurcZ1 (the lase thing I want to hear from you), but it wouldn't really matter, because if it's ~ot one thing then it's another. Ifyou don't irritate me in chis way then you irritate me in that way."
 
−
So let's just call it quits. for the indefinite future. But remember-you still have my love and loyalty. and ifyou're ever in strim&s need of my help. you can call on me.-Tcd"Zl The letter shows dearly the conflict between my contempt for my brother. on the one hand, and my affection for him, on the other.
 
−
Ju for Dave's claim that l broke off with him "for getting married," the letterspeaks for itscl£ I will only add that I had actually been hoping that he would get married-to someone who was not in tune with mainstream
 
−
middle-class values-so that I could have had a niece or nephew.
 
−
Did l predict accurately the kind of relationship that Dave would have with Linda? I was right on the nose. Well no, I wasn't right on the nose­the reality turned out to be even worse than rd expeaed.
 
−
Investigators who have conducted extensive interviews with Dave and Linda have found that she is unmistakably the dominant partner. In fact, at least one invcstigacor went so far as to say that Dave is "utterly dependent" on Linda psychologically. My brother himself told this investigator that ever since bis early teens he has regarded Linda as "sacred .. (his word). Linda stated that in high-school she and other girls had never thought of Dave as a potential lover-he was only a mend. She never thought of him as a poten­tial lover until he was about twenty-seven or twenty-eight years old.13 In January or February of 1998, I asked Investigator #2 to confirm in writing the information in the paragraph of this book to which the present foot­note refers. On February IS, 1998, he/she gave me pp. I-II of (Qc) Written Reports by Investigator #2., page I of which stated, '"Dave is dependent on Linda psychologically. Dave told this investigator that since his teens he had regarded Linda as 'sacred'. Linda stated that in high-school she and other girls had never thought of Dave as a potential lover. She never thought of him as a potential lover until he was about twenty-seven or twenty-eight years old... I pointed out to lmestigator #2 that he/she had written merely that Dave was dependent. whe?CaS he/she had earlier told me that Dave was utterly dependent. Investigator #2 agreed that the stronger statement was accurate, and inserted the word ..utterly", so that his/her written report now reads, "Dave is utterly dependent on Linda psychologically." That would correspond to 1977or 1978.
 
−
In Chapter r; we shall see that under Linda's influence Dave's attitudes and behavior have been completely transformed.
 
−
The worst of it is that everything I have learned about Linda Pattik brings me to the conclusion that she is completely self-centered, and proba­bly ruthless. While I had guessed correaly (more from my knowledge of my brother's character than from the little I knew about Linda) that Dave would fall under the domination of his wife, I had no idea that she would be as dominant as Linda Paaik seems to be. 24
 
−
Linda Patrik was a physically attractive woman who, as a professor of philosophy, occupied a position of &irly high status. Why would she take up with a man like my broth~ an unsuccessful would-be writer who had neither good looks, nor virility. nor status, nor, seemingly, anything else that would recommend him to a woman of that type? Itis easy to arrive at a plausible guess: She W2ntcd someone whom she could control completely, and from chat point of view my brother was ideal. (And. by the way. she doesn't have co be "manipulative" in order to control him. She can just tell him right out what she wanes.)
 
−
Why. on the other hand, did my brother choose co put himself in servi­tude to her? Clearly it was an expression of his lifelong tendency to place himself in a position of subordination, to seek someone to look up to and follow, to become dependent. It's easy to sec why he didn't find me satisfac­tory as an object for adulation: I didn't respect his dependence-I wanted him to be independent. Often during my teens. and occasionally in adult­hood when I lost my temper. I made my contempt for him all too obvious. Partly for that reason, partly because ourparents valued me more than they did him. and partly because of the difference between our respective per-· sonalities, he had been gnawed all his life by a resentful sense of inferiority to me. Perhaps equally important, he didn't choose his subordination to me. A3 his big brother. I had been imposed on him by chance.
 
−
In contrast, Linda Patrik was an object of adulation that my bro~er chose himself. Furthermore-and this would be very important for Dave's self.esteem-she probably has a certain degree of reciprocal dependence on him; in that she leans on him for a sense of physical security. as is sug­gested by the following emaccs from my mother's letters:
 
−
Lindais in Greece to teach philosophy. Howcvct; when war broke out. classes were cancelled at American University. and she was told to sray put by the American Embassy for the time being because it was too danFous for Americans to fly out at this time. Americans were asked not to go about much and not to congregate in groups for fear they would become targets for terrorists.''25
 
−
Dave says she sounds stressedin her phone calls to him. and he's think­ingof flying out to join her. (The college will pay his plane fare.)""26"
 
−
Dave . . . c· is] · m Greece n ght now .. .. ..27
 
−
Of course, if there had been a terrorist attack, Dave could have done nothing to protect Lin~-he has no fighting skills ofany kind-but it must have made him feel like a man for a change to have a woman lean on him for a sense ofsecurity.
 
−
It is easy to form a plausible hypothesis as to the reason why Linda and Dave showed my letters to their psychiatrist; why they tried to persuade a doctorin Missoula to refer me to a psychiatrist, and even discussed the pos­sibility of having me committed to an institution. Knowing Dave, I can be quite sure that he showed Linda my letter (FL #401) in which I argued that she was exploiting him. That letter must have aroused her rcsentment-d the more because what I wrote was true. The behind-my-back macbina­ tions about psychiatrists and mental institutions would have been her way of retaliating against me, and also of driving a wedge between my brother and me so as co eliminate me as a possible rival for his loyalty. Dave would have gone along with her schemes not only because of her dominance over him. but also because of his own deep rcscnancnt of me.
 
−
The truth is that. all his life, my brother's relationship with me has been bad for him. He probably would have had problems with his self-esteem in any case owing to the inconsistency between his high aspirations and his limited capacity for disciplined effort, but those problems must have been greatly czacerbated by the contrast between himself and his older brother-not to mention his older brother's cutting criticisms. It would have been better for us both if I had broken off my connection with him at the earliest possible date.
 
  
−
I s us PE c T it was Dave's relationship with Linda that enabled him to fulfill an ambition that he had nursed for two decades: He finally got one of his stories published. 'El Cibolo', by David Kaczynski. appeared in the Col­orado Writer's Forum28 in the fall of 1990. It seems to me to be a profes­sional-quality piece of work, free of any serious blunders of the kind that mar my brother's earlier stories-or those of them that I've seen. 1be most likely ~Imation that I can think of for this sudden improvement inhis lit­erary craftsmanship is that Linda criticized the writing for him. pointing out the flaws in his use of language and helping him to .correct them. He certainly would have been much more ready to accept such criticisms from her than from me. By helping my brother in this way to gee one of bis sto­ries published. she would have strengthened her hold over him.
+
3. Excerpt from ''Modifying the Working Style''
−
Personally I did not care for the plot of'El Cibolo', but I liked verymuch the way my brother described the protagonist's relationship with the wild country he lived in and with the people who inhabited it. So on the whole I thought it was a good ~ory. I wrote to my mother co that effect. and sug­gested that she might pass my favorable comments on to Dave.29
 
−
The story is interesting for what it perhaps suggests about my brother's psychology. I gather that it is based at least in part on real historical events. ("Other writers have described how El Cil,olo made bis escape. "30, Never­theless, an author's choice of subject, the way he handles it, and what he decides to emphasize cell us something about the way bis mind works.
 
−
El Cibolo' must have been written well before Fall. I990 (that is, at the latest. less than a year after my brother left the desert to live with Linda
 
−
Patrik), and it is consistently antagonistic toward civilization, especially in its modern form:
 
−
He couldn't ... rescue the wilderness .... Even without entertaining any precise image of the furore (spared. mercifully, the sight ofpaved roads, fences, and power Iines31 infinitely dissecting the miracle of space)....32
 
−
The story also includes a generous dose of bloody revenge and grue­some violence. which my brother treats sympathetically:
 
−
[T]hc Apaches let fly their war whoops and the massacre began. It was one of those occasions when a victimized people got the upper hand just long enough to earn notoriety as the aggressor •... [El Cibolo] cue down s~lives with bis own strong ann. His garments grew dark and shiny with blood. . . . El Cibolo found himself alone among the scattering of bloody and disfigured corpses. But his heart was tranquil. ...I# 33
 
−
My brother is a vegetarian. When my parents visited me in the early t98os. my father told me that Dave had become a vegetarian after a fishing trip during which he had gotten sick at the sight of a fish's death struggles. 34 Even before he became a vegetarian my brother was always squeamish about eating meat. He told me on several occasions that he thought his aversion to meat went back to an incident in which. as a small boy. he had been frightened at the sight of chickens being cut up. When he visited me in Montana in I986 he mentioned that he thought bis vegetarianism might have something to do with the fear of death.u Since I was busy with some­ thing ehe at the time, I did not pursue that conversational opening. Now I wish I had done so. It would have been interesting.
 
  
 +
'''Chapter I: Dialectical Materialism'''
  
 +
'''I. Materialism and Dialectical Materialism'''
  
−
Chapter 15
+
1. The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues
  
−
How my brother’s attitudes changed under Linda Patrik’s influence; why he denounced me to the FBI
+
2. Dialectical Materialism — the Most Advanced Form of Materialism
  
−
cha.p t e r 15 I LB T, s LO O K at some of my brother's attitudes over the years. Over and over again his letters-those written before 1989, when he shacked up with Linda Paaik~how his hostility to the c:xistiDg system of society and its underlying values. In filer, they express such hostility far more than my letters do.1 The reader has already seen examples of my brother's negative attitudes toward present-day society in some ofbis writ, ings that we've quoted earlier. Here I summarize a few more cnmples:
+
'''II. Dialectical Materialist Opinions About Matter, Consciousness, and the Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'''
−
At this point in the origµial manuscript of the book, I quoted ac length from a long series of my brother's letters to me. In view of my brother's objcc· tions to the publication of these letters, and consistent with the copyright law's "fair use doctrine, .. I have been obliged to make minimal use of my brother's letters throughout this book, and have reluctantly substituted summaries and paraphrases when feasible. The use of summaries makes it impracticable to convey my brother's ideaswith perfect accuracy, because it would be impossible to transmit those ideas enctly without using exactly. or almost exactly. the same words that my brother used. I have done the best that I can do.
 
−
In the early or mid-198os my brother wrote to me about a visit he had made to the border town of Ojinaga, Mexico. He favorably contrasted the relaxed aanosphere of chis town with Anglo hyperactivity. indicated his feeling that material wealth was shameful and "[his] disgust for meAmeri­can dollar", and then went on to imply that North American economic power probably was, in some metaphorical sense, criminal.z
 
−
In a letter that he wrote me in 1981, my brother stated that his ideas grew in large part out of my critique of modern technology, and he indi­cated his opinion that modem technology ..is not just machines. but a whole method oftaking on experience, and moreover, a methodwhich, for all intents and purposes, assumes a will of its own regardless of human ·choices'...."3
 
−
In a 1984 letter addressed co me, mybrotherdescribed anxiety aboutthe future as characteristic of modem city life. He indicated his opinion that this anxiety was a response not to real dangers but to the emptiness of the aspirations on which modern dty people base their~. and ..the essential nullity of the promises which draw them all their~ towardthe future."-4
 
−
In a letter of December 1984. my brother implied that urban life was highly distasteful. that the bad aspects of progress were inseparable from the good ones, and that he opposed pavingthe access road to the Terlingua Ranch. where he lived.J
 
−
ln a 1985 letter, my brother quoted the distinguished n~c Henry James describing electric lighting as "the white light of convenience that hehatcd".6
 
−
In another 1985 letter, my brother indicated his opinion that rural and small-town Mexico represented a "far less noxious manifestation of cul­ture" than NorthAmerican culture.7
 
−
In a letter that he wrote to me in che spring of r986, my brother implied that he rejected che assumption that the United States was a "free country". He indicated his opinion that the Soviet Union often served as a kind of "straw man'' that prevented Americans from thinking about the problems of their own society. He further suggested that there was little if any more freedom in the United States than in the Soviet Union, and that in this respect the American situation was perhaps worse than the Soviet one because "our oppressors are not so easily objectified and they aa with the subtlety of thought ratherthan the awkwardness and crudeness ofphysical forcc''.8
 
−
In a letter of August x986, my brother indicated his opinion that most people in the industrialized world "are afflicted with the craziness and senselessness of this modem form oflife''.9
 
−
In August of x987 mybrotherwrote to me thatin his opinion, ifthe eco­nomic development of Mexico were successful. the consequences for the culture and landscape of Mexico wouldbe highly negative.lo
 
−
In August of x988 (or possibly x989), my brother wrote a letter to the AlpwAvalandse arguing that the access road to the Tcrlingua Ranch Lodge should not be paved. He based hi, argument. in part, on the notion that genuine aff'ection for the desert presupposed acceptance ofits hardships.11
 
−
It would be nice to think the organization of our kind of society is gradu­ally breaking down, but I suppose that would be Pollyannaish.11
 
−
This last cmaccis from a letterthat my brotherwrote me inJune x988. E.ight­ and-a-half ~later he told the Sa.aamento Bee, ifthe government were to put mybrotherto death, myfaith in thesystem wouldbe shattered...13
 
−
Whence comes this "faith in the system?" My brother's attitudes seem co have changed agreat deal in eight years! But it doesn't surprise me. Dave has never had any fixed attitudes, beliefs, or principles. Wbatevc-beliefs or principles he may profess arc simply a matter of convenience; as his needs change, his beliefs and principles change with them. He will change his beliefs and principles in order to gain acceptance in a social milieu. to gratify his vanity. to avoid losing an argument, or to justify anything that he has done or wanes to do. According to Time:
 
−
David is a straight arrow, sensitive and moral ...' notes Father Melvin
 
−
La Follette. an Episcopal-priest and a friend.14"
 
−
Father La Follette would naturally think this. since my brother undoubtedly professed a morality consistent with that of the social milieu to which he belonged in Tcxas.1S At other times and places. his moral val­ues have not been exactly what would be acceptable to an Episcopal priest.
 
−
Back in Lombard in I978 or '79, my brother had to take a driver's test, or had to get his license renewed, or at any rate had to do something or other at a driver's-license facility. He came back fuming with anger and frustra. tion at the inefficiency of the facility and the long, unnecessary delays he'd had to put up with. As he was venting bis complaints, I said in jest, r-so let's go over there some night and throw a brick through their window."' "Okay,.. said my brother, apparently in all seriousness. "You wanna do chat?"' I declined. Needless to say. Dave had neither enough courage nor enough ini­tiative to do iton his own.
 
−
Once in the spring of I979, he remarked to me, 'Tm not going to worry about morality any more. I used to thinkthat morality was the most impor­tant thing in the world. but rm not going to worry about it any more." As to his having previously thought that "morality was the most important thing in the world, .. I suspect that that had only been some passing fad of his, since he had never talked to me about morality.
 
−
My brother had a little Dacsun car, and at about this same time (1978-79) he became very dissatisfied with the way his dealer was treating the service agreement-or something along those lines-anyway. whatever the source of his dissatisfaction was, he got angry enough at the dealer so that he said to me, "I would seriously consider going over there some night and vandal­izing the place." I mentioned this in a letter to him a couple of years later. "[Y]ou never committed that vandalism against that Dacsun dealer as you talked about doing."16 How did I know that my brother hadn't committed the vandalism? He hadn't told me-I just knew that he had neither enough initiative nor enough courage to do it. I'm referring not so much to physical courage as to the courage to overcome cramed-in inhibitions.
 
−
The inconsistencies in my brother's attitude toward morality don't nec­essarily imply conscious cynicism on his part. I think he believes more-or­less sincerely what he needs to believe ac any given moment. I mentioned earlier chat he seems to be unconscious of his own inconsistencies.
 
  
−
M Y aRo TH :a R ' s L .s TT BR s show that contact with nature was a very important source of fulfillment and satisfaction for him. I summarize some typical examples:
+
1. Matter
−
Herc again the original manusaipt contained extensive extracts from my brother's letters, and again I am obliged restrict the quotations orsubstirutc summaries because of my brother's objections.
 
−
In October of 1983 my brother wrote that in an urban environment he felt turned in on himscH: whereas in the desert he czperienccd ..a much greater capacity to feel engaged with things". He indicated that in urban life his energies were expended largcly in 'fending off nebulous disasters .., whereas in the desert, bis cff'orts yielded positive. rewarding results.17
 
−
For a time, my brother lived in a hole in the ground on bis property in
 
−
Texas. In 1983 or 1984 he wrote to me czprcssing his appreciation of this primitive dwellingand the closeness to nature that it afforded. He also indi­cated the satisfaction that he took in his ememcly simple life-style, and observed: "My present dwelling hardly mars the landscape at all, and is sur­rounded by bushes so that you can't even sec it from dose by. Nestled in a sort of burrow; I feel a closer kinship with the way the animals live...."18
 
−
In anocher letter of.1983 or 1984. my brother indicated his appreciation of "che welcoming silence" of the descrr.19
 
−
In 1985 my brother wrote to me dcsaibing a backpacking aip he had taken. The letter includes some very beautiful passages dcsaiptive of nature. It also expresses my brother's inccme distress on discovering that a campground he had once used had been enlarged co twice its original size and was now full of campers' vehicles.zo
 
−
When my brother came to visit me in Montana in October 1986, he was on his way back down to Texas after a summer of working as a bus-driver in Chicago. Soon after he arrived I remarked that he seemed unusually cheer­ful. He said that his cheerfulness was due to the fact char he was on his way back to the desert. He added. "If you think rm cheerful now, you should sec me when rm in the desert!"
 
−
There is no doubt in my mind that my brother's appreciation of nature was genuine, and that his times in the desert provided the richest and most fulfilling experiences of his life. Yet when he decided to shack up with Linda Patrik in order to satisfy whatever need of his own (sec Chapter 14. p. 203). he did not hesitate to sell out to the system and betray the wilderness by becoming part of the consumer society that. a short time before. he had abhorred. He had written me at some time between February and April of 1988:
 
−
I found myself drawing parallels to ourown society. The cycle of credit and consumption; the addiction to a lifestyle that hinders any fuller self­---· ---' · · 'tualb taliza · ..zt 1i;-.u=1non; a ~wtmg spin ru non ....
 
−
Less than two years lacer. Ralph Meister informed me by letter that Dave had bought himself a brand-new pickup truck.22 Ac the same time my brother began wearing forty-five-dollar shirts and other czpcnsm: clothing that Linda bought for him.23 Ac some point he had electricity installed-athis cabin so that Linda could use her computer there. and he put in a drive­ way.24 He cut off his beard and long • and a published photograph shows him with hair that appears to have been "done.. by a professional stylist.ZS
 
−
(I recall my brother making contemptuous remarks at some point between I978 and I98I about rebels of the 1960s who had later sold out and adopted abourgeois life-style. Sec Chapter 8, p. u.3.)
 
  
−
D Av E HA s To L o_ the media that he brought me to the attention of the FBI in order to protect human life:
+
2. Consciousness
−
[I1hc thought that a family member-our flesh and blood-may have been responsible for harming other people; destroying families. is-it-it brings such deep regret and sorrow. 26
 
−
iJ]( God forbid. I were in a position to prevent more lives from being lose. I couldn't do otherwise...z7 '"Ceminly myinterest from the beginning was to protect life."l3 '"Violence and the taking of human life is not a way co resolve human problems. It can't work." 13
 
−
Page~
 
−
As a matter of fact. history shows that it very often docs work. Be that as it may; my brother's explanations of his motive for going to the FBI come across as a string of stereotypical platitudes. It is a curious face that when my brother describes his feelings with complete sincerity. his speech and writing arc never trite or stereotyped; instead. his language is often vividly expressive. Bur when vanity interferes with sincerity in his "creative" writing. he sometimes uses hackneyed turns of speech. Much more marked is the ttitencss of his language when he is trying to deceive himself or others about bis own feelings; in such cases, his expression often, though nor always, becomes distinccly flat and stereotyped. Compare the passages we've seen with the extracts from my brother's letters that we've reproduced in this and earlier chapters.
 
−
In face·terface relations my brother is generally compassionate, and I indicated at the end of the last chapter that he has sometimes shown him· self ro be quite squeamish at the sight of suffering or gruesomeness. But I can't recall any instance in which he ever expressed concern aboutsuffi:ring that he didn't wimcss personally and that wasn't inflicted on anyone he knew. I don't remember him ever expressing regret at assassinations, disas· ters, or even the brutality of war. It is certain that through mast of bis life he has not had any principled opposition to violence.
 
−
For a brief time after the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy he expressed fervent admiration for Sirhan Sirhan: He said that he envied
 
−
Sirhan's fanatical commitment to a purpose for which he was prepared to sacrifice everything. One evening at his apartment in Great Palls he casually remarked. NI should become a aiminal-of the senseless kind. .. (Ibis. of course, was only a fantasy; I knew and I think my brother knew that he would never rake any practical steps toward putting it into effect.) After John Hincklcy's attempt to assassinate President Reagan. Dave wrote me:
 
−
Reagan has recovered, I regret to inform you .... Another bullet hit Reagan's secretary in the head. Naturally. he's alright.28 (Translated from bad Spanish) _
 
−
When he visited mc~in Montana in I986, my brother expressed satisf.ic­tion at the Challenger disaster, even though scwral astronauts bad been killed, because it was a blow to the pretensions of the space program. Knowing him as I do, I am certain that if Dave had known of the Unabombcr before 1989, he would have regarded him as a hero.
 
−
Dave's claim that he and Linda went to the FBI in order to ··save~.. is further undercut by the fact that the Unabomber had promised to stop the bombings if his conditions were mer. Dave and Linda must have known about the promise. since it was well publicized. In fact. the New York Times wrote:
 
−
Professor Patrik . . . read a surge of news accounts about the Unabomber. The articles told of ... the Unabomber's promise to cease the bombings ifthe manuscript was published. u29
 
−
Mybrother knew that Iam reliable about keeping promises andthat. ifI were the Unabomber, there would be no more bombings as long as the conditions were met. Since the Manifesto had already been published, the Unabomber was not to resume his attacks unless the mediarefused to pub­lish his three follow-up mcssagcs;lO which was unlikely given that they had published the manifesto. In any case, ifmy brotherwas worried aboutthat possibility, he could have sent me a message (an anonymous one, if he thought that necessary) stating that he suspected me of being the Unabombcr and thac he would give my name to the FBI if there were any more bombings. IfI were the Unabombcr, that would have been an cff'ec­tive deterrent.
 
−
So why did Dave and Linda denounce me to the FBI? (knowmybrother well enough to be fairly confident in guessing-to an apprmimation. any­way-whac his motives were. Since Dave's lack of initia~ is such cbac he doesn't take decisive action until prodded by someone else, the firstimpulse would have been provided by Linda. This is supportedby media reports, for whatever they may be worth.ll Linda's mo~ likelywouldhave been vin­dictive: she had probably hated me ever since reading what I wrote about herin my 1989 letterto Dave (FL #4or, reproduced in Chapter14).
 
−
Once well embarked on the course that Linda had set for him. Dave would have held to it tenaciously until-barring clear proof that I W3S not the Unabomber-he endedbybringing me to the attentionofthe FBL This is confirmed by a letter that Susan Swanson (Dave's and Linda's investiga­tor) sent to Newsweelc:
 
−
YOUR ARTICLE ON DAVID KAC2YNSK1 . . . conveyed the mistaken impression that he ha~ to be pushed into contacting the FBI regarding his suspicions about his brother, Ted. . . . I would like to set the record straight•... [H]e never waffled orstalled.""31"
 
−
Dave was motivatedby his tendency co see me as a tyrannical aggressor in any conflict in which I was involved (sec Chapter9, pp. 133-13s) andby the (probably unadmitted) hatred that he bore me because of his own sense of inferiority andbecause ofthe faa that. to my shame, I had many times said things that hurt him cruelly. Above all. I think he wanted to exert power overme and feel thathe was victorious ovcr me.
 
−
This docs not mean chat he had no conflicting feelings about his course of action. On the contrary; his resentful impulses had to overcome his very real aifcction for me and a strong sense of guilt over what he was doing. This guilt is indicated. for enmple,by his having tried to get the FBI to con­ceal permanently the fact that it was he who brought my name to their attention.33 Apparently he was ashamed of what he was doing.
 
−
Very likely Unda kept prodding him along, and this would have been important to him in that it provided him with support and enabled him to feel that he alone was not responsible for the action that was being taken. He also turned for support to his friend, Bill Wadham.34
 
−
But. in my opinion. even without any support from anyone, once Dave felt that a decisive victory over big brother was within his grasp, be would · have carried the affair rhrough to a conclusion--<hough without admitting to himself that he wu impelled by rcscnanent. Being an adept rationalizer, he would have had no difficulty in providing himself with an unselfish motive.
 
−
Of course, after the FBI had been contacted, the matter was out of his hands, and from char point on he was simply manipulated by the reds. His deposition shows how naive he was and how easily he swallowed the
 
−
FBI's lies.JJ Though I'm fairly sure that the foregoing rcconmuction of what.went on in my brother's mind is more orless correct. I have to admit that itis ro a degree speculative, so the reader is at liberty to remain skeptical about it.
 
−
But we have clearly established in the course of this book that my brother docs have a very real and strong (though perhaps unconscious} resenanent of me, and we showed a few pages back that a concern for humanlife was notlikely to be the major part of his motive for denouncing me to the FBI. He claims that his motive for representing me in the media as mentally ill is to save me from the death penalty. and the implication is that he is impelled by concern for my welfare, but here again his motives arc not cuctly what he pretends.
 
−
It's quite true that Oavc doesn't want me to get the death penalty. but the reason has little to do with concern for my welfare. He knows very well that imprisonment is to me an unspeakable humiliation and that I would unhesitatingly choose death over incarceration. In his story, 'El Cibolo', he shows that he understands and appreciates this point of view:
 
−
..So this, El Cibolo thought. was imprisonment: the denial of t:Ver'f gut. especially beauty and space. .....3, "[El Cibolo] would be czpccting death hourly. and even supposing the indictment intended cnc:tly what ic said, what were the probabilities he could survive the deliberations of a court that was notoriously ruthless in defending the interests of the empire? Ifjustice were a sham, perhaps it was just as well to abbreviate [with death] the inevitable misery and humilia· tion, for at least now he could be consoled that he went to his grave in the full flower of his dignity and manhood."37
 
−
Precisely what my brother wantS is to deprive me of my dignity and manhood, to humiliate me and bring me low, in revenge for his own feel· ings of inferiority and humiliation; feelings for which I was partly (but only partly) responsible through the way I had treated him when we were kids and through the cutting things I had said to him on certain occasions in adulthood.
 
−
He did not want me to die, but that was not from concern for me, it was simply because he is chicken·heartcd. As I pointed out at the end of Chap­ter I4. he is frightened of the crude and obvious cruelty of death. rn his statements to the media he repeatedly mentioned how tenible M would feel if I were put to death; he made no reference to my feelings on the sub· ject. Ir was his own pain and not mine that he was worrying abouc
 
−
N 'It would be very, very difficult to live with myself.• David said. 'Know· ing that I had delivered my injured, disturbed brother over to be killed.• •38 NDavid, for his part, said he would • suffer in the extreme· ifhis brother were given the death penalty.
 
−
I would be plunged into hell for the rest of my lifi:.' he said. 'and I don't think I deserve that.· "3SJ
 
−
But my brother's motive for lying about me to the media wu not only to save me from the death penalty. In fact. that motive was less important than his desire to inflict further humiliation on me. This can be shown in four ways.
 
−
Fint: Some of the things he said to the media could only have i~ed my risk of getting the death penalty. For instance, the fact that Iwas abused psychologically by my parents would win sympathy for me that prcsum· ably would decrease th_c likelihood of my being sentenced to death, yet we saw near the end of Chapter 3 that my brother went out of his way to deny that the abuse had occurred, even though he knew very well thatithad. Did he do this in order to protectour mother from public embarrassment? Ifso, then he was weighing our mother's mere entb4rr4S.mlfflt against my life or death. Since our mother had clearly wronged me, one would think that she ought to be apectcd to put up with the embarrassment of having the truth rc:vcalcd, especially since my life was at stake.
 
−
In addition, my brother denied our father's abuse of me, even though our father was dead. Ifhe thought it would be too cruel to our mother to have even our father's abusiveness revealed, he could at least have bad the grace to remain silent on the subject; but instead he described ourfather as always generous"40 and said that "Both parents were warm and nurrur­ing. '' 41 There is no way this could have been motivated by a desire either to save me from the death penalty or to protect our mother.
 
−
Besides denying the abuse. my brother made a number of sratcmcnts about me that made me look mean and therefore, one would suppose. inaeased my risk of receiving the death penalty. For example, according to the New Yorlc Tima, he described me as "overbcaring"40 and "incapable of sympathy. insight, or simple connection with people, "40 and he accused me of "imperious put-downs."42 And, as I showed in Chapter IO, be cook a "hard line" in portraying to the media my role in the Ellen Tarmichael " affair, rather than admitting (as he'd done earlier by implication) that there were circumstances chat mitigated my behavior. He claimed he was trying co "humanize" me, 43 but he said only a few things chat tended co do that; bis portrait of me was on balance rcpcllcnc and hardly likely co win the sympathy of a jury.
 
−
Scanul: After my brother's and mother's interviews with the New Yorlc Times and the Washin.gt011 Post. and on 6o Minutes, my attorneys made it quite dear to Dave that by giving media interviews he was not helping. but harming. my legal position: On October 24, z996, in Investigator #]'s office in San Francisco, with Or. K. present, Investigator '#3 cold Dave chat the kind of publicity he was creating was causing me emotional distress to such an extent that it was int~ring with my ability co cooperate with my lawyers in preparing my defense. Dave seemed to acknowl~ that he heard and understood. 44 Yet in January 1997, my brother gave another media interview of the same kind as the earlier ones. 4S At this point he could hardly have claimed that he didn't know he was harming me.
 
−
Th.int: Since agreeing co a plea bargain inJanuary, 1998, I have been out of danger of the dcath.,pcnalcy. On February 22, 1998 my brother gave an interview to the Sdten.tct:ad.y Swtday Gazette, according to which "David Kaczynski said his convictions about his brother's mental illncss ... havc alienatedhimfrom a brother whom he stillloves deeply. 'Itseems like every word I speakis a dagger to my brother's heart,' he said... Yet Dave has con­tinued to give inccrvicws in which he lies about me and talks about my alleged mental illness ( e.g., Ptopll! Magazine, August 10, 1998), evci though he no longer has the excuse that he is trying to save me from the death penalty.
 
−
Fmuth: In his media interviews, Dave desaibed events in language that seemed to have been chosen to make me appear guilty. In fact, the prose­ cueing attorneys in my case quoted his statements to the media several rimes in their brief opposing the Motion co Suppress Evidence chat my attorneys filed in my behalf.
 
−
The truthfulness of the affidavit and its supporting reports is strongly supported by David Kaczynski's post-search public statements. For cnm­ple. about two weeks [sic; actually it was twenty days, or nearly three weeks] before David executed his declaration in this case. the Sticramcnto B« quoted him as discussing the phrase 'cool-headed logician' as follows: 'I choughc. 'Who else have I ever heard use that expression but Ted r No one.... It's got co be him.' Sec Cynthia Hubert, Role in Captun: Haunts ICaczy,tslci'.s Brother, Sacramento B«, Jan. I9, 1997 at AI (attached as Emibit 33). During an interview with the New Yoric Times printed on May 26, 1996, David stated that when he first read the introductory section of the UNABOM manusaipt his 'jaw dropped,' and he =i>ericnced 'chills,' because 'it sounded enough like him that I wu really upset that it could be him.' Sec David Johnson BC Janny Scott, UNABOM Manifesto Horrified Broth.er, Sacramento Bee, May 26, 1996 (reprinted from the N. Y. Times). .....46
 
−
Thus it is clear that my brother did not give his media interviews in order to help"" me, but because merely bringing about my arrest was not a sufficient revcige for bim~e had to rub shit in my face by subjecting me to public humiliation."
 
−
Nevertheless-my brother cooperated with my attorneys by participat­ing in several interviews with them and with Dr. K., and he signed for them a declaration that they used with their Motion to Suppress Evidcn~. And after one of myattorneys had desaibcd to him the miseries of being injail, Dm: wrote me a letter (October 30, 1996) in which he said:
 
−
1 both fear and in a gut sense lmow the effect this must be having on you. I lmow that I am the immediate cause of this suff'cring. I've passed through periods of denial, in which I aied to convince myself that my actions might even have helped you. But all of that is over now. Ihave had to glimpse my own ~city. . .. I'm so, so sorry for what I've done and for how it hurts you."47 ­
 
−
My brother is a ship without a rudder, blown this way and that by the wind. His attitudes, beliefs, behavior, and professed principles change in accord with the emotions of the moment and the influence of the people he is among at any given time. After recovering from the paroxysm of guilt that was expressed in the foregoing letter. he gave the interview to the S4'T4fflfflt0 B« even though. as was noted earlier, he knew that by doing so he was harmingme emotionally and interferingwith the preparation ofmy defense. While he was with people who supported me, that is, my attor­neys. he was overcome with remorse, but when he got back to Unda,
 
−
Wanda, and their circle of friends in Schenectady-people who probably cold him he was a "hero" for denouncing his brother-he regained his nerve and treated himself to another round of rubbing shit in my face with the Bee interview.48
 
−
The fact that my brother both loves me and hates me is notVcr'f remark­able in itsel£ Itis not uncommon for people to have strongly conflicting feel­ings toward one another, or for relationships to alternate between hostility and affection. What is remark.able is the seeming lack of connection between the two aspects of my brother's personality; they do not seem to be integrated with one another. When be is being friendly with me or gen­erous toward me he speaks and acts as ifhis rcsenancnt did not exist, andit is possible that he is completely unconscious of that aspect of his feelings ·. toward me. Atany rate, it seems clear that he is unwillingto face up to it and think about it or talk about it. Though I mentioned in my letters the indica­tions of his resentment toward me.49 he never discussed the issue and never denied or clearly admitted that he had any such resentment. The nearest he ever came to admitting even that the issue existed was after my first apol­ogyS0 for having harassed him when we were kids. He then wrote:
 
−
i thank you for ... your sympathetic undcrstandmg of what may have surfaced at times as rcsenancnt on my part.NSl
 
−
And that was all he ever said about his resenanent.
 
−
It is possible that my brother's hatred is "dissociacedN in the psyt:biatric sense of the word.fl But, not being a shrink, I will speculate no further in that direction.
 
  
−
WHAT TH B N shall we make of David Kaczynski? Is he a hero or a vil­lain? To the convinced and committed bourgeois, terrified by cb.e social instability that threatens his comfortable servitude, Dave seems to be a hero. Many other people will feel equally strongly that he is a villain: Not only was he motivated by malice that grew in large part out of his own sense of inferiority to his brother, but his revenge was a despicable one that cost him neither risk nor effort. and be apparendy has not even bad the courage to face up to his own motive.
+
3. The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness
−
To me the issue is not so simple. In the first place. while covcrcJ3 malice was undoubtedly my brother's main. motive for lying about me in the media, it may have been only part of his motive for denouncing me to the FBL Since he readily absorbs the values of the people around him. itis pos· siblc that after living for several years in an essentially conventional milieu he was sinccrcly shocked by the suspicion that ( might be the Unabomber.
 
−
Moreover, my brother is for the most part a generous and kindly per· son. Statcmcncs and writings of his that I've quoted in this chapter and in Chapter I4 indicate that he has at times had fantasies of doing violence to people and to propeny, but in practice, as far as I know, he has never done harm of any kind to anyone but me.
 
−
And as for what he's done to me, I can't claim it is completely unjusti­fied. I suppose I ought to be excused for the way I abused him verbally dur­ing my adolescence, since I was too young to understand what I was doing. But the cruel things that I said to him on certain occasions in adulthood arc another matter. Even though I didn't know how badly I was hurting him, I did know that I was hurting him. (Sec Chapter 11.)
 
−
My brother's personality has its radically disparate aspects; when I think of him as the gentle, generous man who truly appreciated nature and wrote so beautifully in his letters about his experiences in the desert. I feel sharp_ regret at many of the things I said to him: my resentment is muted, and I feel that he had a right to retaliate against me. When I thmk about his ugly side, about the covertness ofhis resentment, about the way hehas sub­ordinated himself to a selfish, vindictive woman, about the lying, under­handed nature of his revenge, and about the fact that his resentment grew at lease in part out of his own self inflicted p$)1Chological subordination to me, I feel very bitter against him.
 
−
On balance I condemn him, because his revenge seems to me to be far out of proportion to my offense.
 
−
At the same time, I realize that I am not in a position to judge him objec­tively. Some people who arc sufficiently detached from the situation to be free of bias, and who understand the lasting pain and injury that can be inflicted by verbal cruelty. may well feel that my brother's retaliation has been no more than an eye for an C'JC·
 
  
−
BUT O AVE ' S PB a S O NA L B BT 1\ A YA L of me is much less impor­tant than his betrayal ~f an ideal, his selling out to an evil kind of society that is destroying. among other things. the wilderness that gave him the richest experiences of his life. A traitor is always hated far more than a straightforwani enemy, and is an object of contempt to everyone except those who expect their side to gain some advantage from his treason. I distinguish between a traitor and a dcfeaor. By a dcfeaor I understand one who changes his ideology and his loyalty as a result of an extended period of serious soul-searching. By a traitor r mean «:)CC who switches sides as a mere matter of convenience, or in order to gain some personal advantage, whether material or psychological. My brother is unquestion­ably a traitor. There is not the slightest evidence that he did any serious soul-searching before selling out. As soon as Linda Pamk offered him the opportunity. he unhesitatingly made himself her acolyte in order to satisfy his own peculiar psychological needs. In doing so he left the desert, promptly joined the consumer society. adopted its values, and even, as would appear from his Bee interview, acquired "faith in the sysccm."13 His denouncing me to the FBI was not only a personal betrayal of me, it was an act of commiancnt to the system, its values, and its power. To those of w who regard the syStem as evil, my brother is another Judas Iscariot, except that, unlike the original Judas, he doesn't even have enough courage to go and hanghimscl£S'4
+
4. Meaning of the methodology
  
−
DURING A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION withoneofmyinvesti­gators in spring 1998, Dave asked whether it was possible that I could ever forgive him. But he did not offer to retract publicly the lies he had told about me or to do anything else to make up for what he had done.
+
'''Chapter 2: Materialist Dialectics'''
−
Repentance is chca~ sincere repentance-if it is not accompa­nied by any difficult act of reparation.55 Some years ago I read the Spandau Diaries of the former Nazi Albert Specr.56 Speer's ruminations about his own guiltwere fairly impressive as evidence ofthoughtfulness andsensitiv­
 
−
ity. butI did notice thatthebookgave no indication thatSpeerhad done, or intendedto do, anything to make upfor his actions as a Nazi. Heapparently was in a comfortable position financially and he might, for ezample, have devoted large amounts of money or of personal effort to helping former victims of the Nazi regime, or their families, or victims oftyranny in some other part of the world. It seemed co me that it must have been rather easy for Speer to sit in his safe and comfortable study and write a book (for whichhe was probablywell paid) about his guilt.57
 
−
To answer my broth~'s question, yes, I could forgive him-under cer­tain conditions. Basically he would have to undo his treason by detaching himself permanently from the consumer society. from the sy5tem and everything that it represents. In order to do this he would have to break off all connection with Linda Patrik. because her dominance over him is such that he could ncvcr make a lasting change in himself as long as he main­tained a relationship with her.
 
−
Two possible courses ofactionwouldbe open to him. He could goback to his Taas desert, rip the electrical wiring out of his cabin, and return to his former way oflife; or he could join some group that is fighting the sys­tern-for example. some group of radical environmentalists of the Earth First! type. I think the second alternative would be the only safe one for him. My brother does not easily adhere to any consistent line of thought or action without support from other people. If he went back to Tu.as. it's more than possible that he would fall again under the influence of the peo· ple he knows there. such as the Episcopal priest. Or, if Linda Panik wanted him back, she could go down there to fi:tch him, and it's not likely that he would resist her. Bue if he immersed himself in a radical milieu. the influ· cncc of the people around him would help him to stay on a steady course. [n this way he would not only earn my personal forgivmess;SI whatis more important, he would be cleansed and redeemed of bis treason against the values that he once held in common with me and many other people. I know how to put him in touch with environmental radicals, and I believe they would accept him ifhe came to them repentant.
 
−
But, unfommatcly. I think it's unlikdy that my brother will break away from Unda Patri.k or from the consumer sod.cry. ( think his submerged hatredof me and his strange need for his servile relationship with Linda are too strong: and beyond that I think he is simply too lazy. If he does not redeem himself: then as far as I am concerned he is the lowest sort ofsewn and the sooner he dies, the better.
 
  
−
YET THE O P PO llTUN ITT for redemption is there ifhe wants to take it. The wild countryis waiting for him. and it always forgives those who are cruly repentant.
+
'''I. Dialectics and Materialist Dialectics'''
  
 +
1. Dialectics and Basic Forms of Dialectics
  
−
Chapter 16
+
2. Materialist Dialectics
  
−
The media
+
'''II. Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics'''
  
−
Every journalist who is not too stupid or too full of himself to notice what is going on knows that what he does is morally indefensible.¹
+
1. The Principle of General Relationships
−
―Janet Malcom
 
−
L.M. Singhvi ... relates the anecdote of an Eastern European journalist who said: " ... our newspapers, like those of the rest of the world, contain truths, half–truths, and lies. The truths are found on the sports pages, the half–truths are found in the weather forecasts, and the lies are found in everything else.”²
 
−
―La Jornada
 
−
It must be the very first thing you learn in journalism school: Why do research when you can make things up?³
 
−
―David Gelernter
 
−
Chapter 16 I AT THE BNOofChaptcrzwcsawhow Serge F. Kovaleski and Lorraine Adams of the Washington Post misquoted my mother's Baby Book. In bis New Yorle Times article of May 26, I996, Robert O. McFadden wrote that the Unabombcr was desaibedby a wimess as having "reddish-brown hair."4 But the desaiption that the FBI obtained from the witness in question stated that the Unabomber had reddish-bland hair,s and chis information had been massively publicized. So why did McFadden make it reddish-brown! Obviously it was inconvenient from the point of view of bis article that I didn't fit the desaiption of the
 
−
Unabomber. The reader can judge for himself whether McFadden's mis· statement was consciously dishonest or merely an inadvertent error.
 
−
In the very next paragraph McFadden makes another statement that seems to bear the earmarks of a conscious lie. He states that when the Unabombcr was spotted by the wimcss he "panicked" and "fled".• There was no basis for this statement. The Unabombcr's coolness in leaving the scene had alreadybeen publicized.6
 
−
For the benefit of people who find it incredible (as I once would have found it) that journalists employed by respectable news organizations would intentionally lie in their articles, I note that according to an Associ­ated Press report, 'The New Republic magazine and the Baston Globe acknowledged that writers made up quotes and people used in st0rics."7
 
−
Many journalists do not hesitate to mislead individuals in order to get material for stories. As an example I quote the following from a letter from Sherri Wood, librarian at Lincoln, Montana:
 
−
[OJne day a reporter came in (to the library] from the S4C1'rffllDlta Bee and asked for an interview and we told him no. Then he asked us for just some general information about you and the arrest, and the town, justfor background information. He said that it would be off the record. I said ok. and went to file books as we talked. Aftera while I heard Mary askhim why he was writingifthiswas all off' record andthen he saidhe hadchangedhis mind and decided to put it on record. We both immediately shut up and then asked him to leave, after we told him what a rat we thought he was. He did then go on to print an article and made it sound like I gave him an interview voluntarily. ...I do not trust thepress. •.•8"
 
−
Unmistakably conscious lies about concrete facts arc relatively infre. quent in the media. False statements are czcrcmcly common, butit is clear that many of them arc simply the result of negligence, and it is often impossible to distinguish the intentional falsehoods from the negligent ones.
 
−
In the May 26, I996-.New York Times articles about me, I counted at least 42 clear errors of fact. in addition co the two probable lies that we cited ear­lier. To give just a few examples: The Tunes states that my father "loved to go hunting."9 To my knowledge he hunted once, and only once, in his life. The Times states that my motherwas "familiarwithscience".9 In reality she doesn't know as much science as the average fifth-grader. The Tunu states that the car I bought in 1967 was used.10 In fact, it was new. The Tima has myfllthcr's ~ployment history badly garbled. I I Etc., etc., etc.
 
−
Other national news sources didn't do much better than the New York Times. Thus Time .Magazine wrote that I had "an outhouse out back" and a root cellar below my cabin, that I had volumes of Thackeray. that I some­ times stayed inside for weeks at a stretchl2 (all of which arc false) ... the errors just go on and on and on.
 
−
The errors we've ju.st been citing arc probably inadvertent ones that resulted merely from excessively sloppy reporting. since it isn't clear what motive the media would have for lying in these cases. But when false state­ments are made that tend to inaiminate me. or tend to make me seem repellent or despicable, itis often difficult to tell whether the falsehoods are accidental or malicious. For example, when Time reported that I had "bomb manuals" in my cabin13 (which is false), were they lying purposely or were they just relaying false information that they had received from some F'B( agent? When Newsweek wrote, "Ted continued to take handouts from his brother-a few thousand dollars in money orders over the years." was the falsehood intentional oronly the result ofsloppiness in collecting facrs?l4
 
−
Thus far I have been discussing only false assertions made by the media themselves concerning concrete faccual matters. But there also have been falsehoods of other types. One of these types I call the ..irresponsible quote." A newspaper or magazine protects itself from the accusation of falsehood by means of little phases like ·Jones said ..... or ..according to Smith. ..... For example, the New York Times wrote: "Burch Gehring . .. said he once heard (Ted] complain about his costs rising ro $300 from S200 a· ~"11 which is false. The Tuna also quoted a former neighbor of mine,
 
−
[LeJRoy Weinberg. to the eff'ect that as a kid I ..didn't play".14 a statement so implausible on its face that it should have aroused any reporter's suspi­cion. What is much more serious, the Times quoted irresponsible state­ments that tended to incriminate me: nStade Frederickson. a Greyhound agent in Butte, remembered ticketing Mr. Kaczynski-'a geeky-looking guy'-about I5 times on intercity buses south to Salt Lake City or west ro the coast."17 Frcdcrickson's statement is false. "At a Burger King restaurant next to the bus terminal in Sacramento, Mike Singh. the manager, remem­bered [Ted}. He was ~gwhat appeared to be an armful of books. He had a sandwich and a cup of coffee and left. ~Kaczynski rook a room at the Royal Hotel. next door to the bus station. A desk clerk, Frank Hensley. remembered him because he stayed there periodically in recent years. usu­ally in spring or summer, for three days to a week at a time. He used the name Conrad co sign the registration book. .. _-18 Singh's and Hensley's statements also arc false. IfFrederickson, Singh. and Hensley didn't simply invent their stories, then they have confused me with someone else. In car· lier chapters we discussed many other false statements about me that have been quoted in the New Ym Times or other national news sources. And-it must be emphasized-there have been so many others ( even in the New
 
−
York Times alone) that it would be impractical for me to tty to mention all ofthem. I haven't even tried to count them.
 
−
As experienced journalists, the New York Timu's reporters and staff writ­ers are well aware chat, especially in highly publicized cases, there arc a great many people who will make statements that arc false or grossly dis­torted, either because they arc stupid, or because they want to see their names in the paper, or for some ocher reason. Yet the New York Tinu:s and other national and local periodicals have quoted the uncorroborated words of any jerk who has taken it into his head to talk ro the media, and they have done so without warning their readers that the quoted material is highly unreliable.
 
−
Among the large numbers of WM:rified statements that arc available, do the media select for quotation diose that give a story the slant that the editors want? They probably do, though it is difficult to prove it. It is worth noting that almost all of the false statements that have been published about me in periodicals of national circulation have been negative or neu­tral; only a rare few have been positive.
 
−
There is yet another way in which die media purvey falsehood, and in this case there cannot be the sllghcest doubt that intentional slanting is involved.Journalists will make negative statements about an individual that are so vague that there is no way they can ever be definitely proved or dis­proved, yet by repeating such statements over and over again throughout an article they can give their readers a decidedly false impression of the individual in question.
 
−
Robert O. McFadden's article in the New York Tima provides an excel­lent example of this technique. The article appears under the headline, "The Tortured Genius of Theodore Kaczynski." 19 In reality I am neither tortured nor a genius. McFadden proceeds to assert that in my Montana cabin I "watched dying embers flicker visions of a wretched humanity.'°19 I did nothing of the kin~ The nae paragraph states that mathematics was the "sole passion of (my] life" and that it was "suddenly dead" .19 Actually; mathematics was nev\:r the sole passion of my life, and my interest in it declined not suddenly butgradually; over a period of years. McFadden then dcsaibcs my undergraduate days at Harvard as "humiliating".lP They had their bad points, certainly; but I never felt that they were humiliating. He dcsaibes the lines at the comers of my mouth as "obstinate",19 but there is no rational evidence that they have anything to do with obstinacy. In his fifth paragraph, McFadden speaks of my supposed "imtabilitics", ..obses· sions", and '"rigidities'"19 without presenting any rational evidence that I
 
−
(I) was unstable, obsessed, or rigid, and he goes on co say that I "deteriorated ... until my family"did not recognize" me,19 which is sheer fantasy. The ankle rambles along endlessly in the same vein.
 
−
Mose of these assertions are so indefinite that it would be virtually impossible ever to prove them false. How would one prove chat one has no "instabilities" or that one has not "deteriorated"? The won:fs are just too vague. It might be possible to disprove a few of the assertions ifone wanted ro tak.c the trouble; for example, I might be able to document that fact that mathematics was never the sole passion of my life. But I would have to devote several pages to this seemingly trivial point, and in doing so I would look ridiculous because I would appear to be making a mountain out of a molehill. I would look even more ridiculous ifI tried to prove that I am not NtortUred", since the word was never meant to be taken literally anyway; it was used only for its emotional impact. Yet emotional language and indefi· nice assertions of the kind used by McFadden, when repeated over and over, can quite successfully portray an individual as a repellent sicko.
 
−
Needless to say. the New Yorlc Times is not the only periodical that uses this technique. The method is applied quite generally in the news media.
 
−
Before my arrest-that is, before I had the opportunity to compare what I know to be the truth. with what the media say-u someone had told me how dishonest the media are I would neverhave believedit. Since my arrestI have calked with a number of lawyers. investigators. jail personnel, and law enforcement officers who in their daily work have seen the dilFercncc between what they have personally experienced and what the media report, and they have all told me that most journalists have little regard for truth and little hesitation about embroidering their stories. As one very able lawyer aprcssed ic to me, !hese people arc animals animals!" (See Appendix 6.)
 
−
Why do journalists stretch the truth as tar as they do? For one th.mg, the news media are supponed mainly by advertising. and to sell advertising space they need a large audience. They know that the public is more attracted by a dramatic .story that portrays someone as a hero or a villain than by a sober, careful, balanced account.
 
−
For another thing. the media are controlled by people who arc commit­ted to the system because it is from their position in the system that they get their power and their status. Consequently. the media constitute a kind of checrleading squad for the system and its values. Journalists who don't cooperate with the system's propaganda line arc not hired by major news outlets, and that is why the news media uniformly support the basic values of th.c system. It is also why they portray as a villain ora sicko anyone who appears to be a threat to those values.
 
−
£n my case. the FBI quickly succeeded in convincing the media (through dishonest tactics chat we will discuss later) that I was probably the Unabomber. Journalists must have realized that my identification as the Unabomber was unccrcain, since the FBI is known to have railroaded innocent people in the past, but they knew that they could attract a bigger audience by jumping on the bandwagon and crumpeting to the world the capture of the supposed Unabomber than by publishing a sober account chat retained rational skepticism. 20 Moreover. the Unabomber had attacked the basic values of the system in a strikingly effective way; hence, once they had accepted the assumption chat I was the Unabomber, the media bad to maintain the propaganda line by depicting me as a repellent sicko.
 
−
During the first months following my arrest I repeatedly asked my lawyers about the possibilicy of suing some of these people for libel, but they told me that it probably wouldn't be worth the trouble. because the very volume of publicity about me bad made me into a "public figure,.. and the libel laws concerning "public figures" made it very difficult for any such person co win a libel suit.
 
−
The m.tement I made earlier, that the major news media .uniformly support the basic values of the system. may be questioned by some readers who notice that it is not uncommon for the media to aiticize various aspects of the system. But there is a difi'crcnce between questioning aspects and questioning bd.Sicvalucs of the system. The media aiticize. for ezample corruption, police brutality. and racism whenever they appear in the sys­tem. but in doing so they arc not criticizing the system itself or its basic val­ues. they arc aiticizingdiseases of the sy3tem. Corruption, police brutality, and racism arc all bad for the system. and by aiticizing them the media arc helping to strengthen the system.
 
−
On infrequent occasions the major news media do allow cauti.ous aiti­cism of some of the syscem"s basic values. 21 But such criticism is expressed in more-or-less abstract terms that keep it remote from the sphere ofpracti­cal action. The attitude is always, "Isn't it too bad that such-and-such; but after all we just have co. accept it and live with it as best we can... No one is ever encouraged to do anything that might actually upset the workings of the system. "'Ifyou mean to tell me,' said an editor to me, 'that Esquire tries to have articles on important issues and treats theminsuch a way thatnoth­ing can come of it-who can deny ic?"'Zl Criticisms of the system that appear in the media constitute one of the safety valves that help to relieve the average man's resentment; and moreover they provide the illusion of independent-minded journalism. Thus they help to deaden the impulse to real, substantial. fundamental dissent.
 
  
−
APT E R MY ARREST on April 3, 1996, FBI agents and officials began disclosing to the media massive amounts of information concerning the alleged evidence found in my cabin, and other supposed evidence against mc--though much of the "information" was in fact false. Even if all of the information had been true, its release would have been unethical and con­trary to regulations. The government itself admitted this:
+
2. Principle of Development
−
The United States acknowledges that government personnel have dis­closed to members of the press certain details of the search of Kaczynski's cabin and of the government's investigation. Although there is no evidence that these disclosures were made with the intent to influence legal proceed­ings [ha!], such disclosures were improper and contrary to Department of Justice policy.23
 
−
FBI Director Louis Frech and Attorney General Janet Reno must have known about the massive disclosures to the press within a day or so after they began. In fact. Frech issued the following directive on April 4=
 
−
To protect the integrity of this investigation and prosecution, I am reminding you of our 'bright line' policy. and there is to be no discussion with the media regarding any aspect of this case. It is not only di.stressingto both me and the Attorney General. but to every person who has worked so tirelessly on this matter over the last several years, to read and hear inves­ tigative information in the press. It is destructive to provide that informa­tion and must not continue to happen (sic]...24
 
−
But the disclosures continued for s~ days. There cannot be the slightest doubt that Louis Frech and Janet Reno could have stopped most of the disclosures immediately ifthey had wanted to, because this was notjust a dribble of information leaking out covertly; the disclosures were on a massive scale.ZS The lawyer who was then representing me, Michael Dona· hoc, told me that FBI agents involved in the search were openly taking items of alleged cvidcnc;c from the cabin, showing them to representatives of the media, and aplaining (not necessarily truthfully} what they were.Z6 Yet Frech and Reno allowed the disclosures to go on until, on April r,, Frech issued a statcmcnc
 
−
I ordered an investigation early this month of whether any FBI employees have leaked. investigative information from the UNABOM case.... Unauthorized disclosure of investigative information orother con­fidential material will lead to immediate firing from the FBI and possible prosecution...z7"
 
−
By that time, my attorney Michael Donahoe had already filed a motion co dismiss the charges against me on the grounds that the publicity had irrevocably destroyed my right ro a fair trial.zs In denying this motion. Judge Charles C. Lovell relied in part on the statement of Louis Freeh that we have just quoted: 'Judge Freeh [Lovell wrote] has ordered an investigation, and he has promised dismissals and prosecution for any government officials releasing confidential information."2!J
 
−
On August 29, 1996, my attorney Quin Denvir wrote to Robert Cleary. Special Attorney to the U.S. Attorney General and chief prosecutor in my case:
 
−
Dear Mr. Cleary:
 
−
On April 4. 1996 [sic: should be April 17J, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh issued a directive stating. inrcr al, that the FBrs Office of Professional· Responsibility was conducting an investigation into the leakage of informa­tion regarding the Unabom case and that 'unauthorized disclosure of inves­tigative information or other confidential information will lead to immediate firing from the FBI and possible prosecution.• In denying Mr. Kaczynski's Montana motion regarding the leakage ofinformation, the dis­trict court relied upon that statement of Director Frech. (RT. p. 13.) I am writing to inquire as to whether the FBI Office of Professional Responsibil­ity has conducted its investigation in this regard and whether any FBI per­sonnel have been fired or otherwise disciplined as a result of that invcstigation.""30"
 
−
Mr. Dcnvir has told me that as of mid-October 1997, he has received no answer to chis letter. It's obviow thatJanet Reno and Louis Freeh neverseriously intended to prevent the unauthorized disclosures or punish the agents responsible for them. The disclosures were made with the acquiescence (if not the covert encouragement) of Reno and Frech, because theJustice Department knew that the warrant for the search of my cabin had been issued without probable cause. By trying me in the media and creating a public presump­tion of my guilt they hoped to make it difficult for a judge to suppress the alleged evidence seized from my cabin on the grounds that the warrant was invalid.
 
  
−
As Lo N G As we are on the subject ofthe FBI, I can'tresist passingalong an anecdote that was recounted to me by a police officer whom I believe to be intelligent and reliable. and who told me he was an eyewitness of the events.
+
'''III. Basic Pairs of Categories of Materialist Dialectics'''
−
A local police agency located a drugdealer in whom the FBI was partic­ularly interested and passed the information on to the Feds. The FBI and the local agency then set up a stake-out around the hotel where the suspect was living and waited for him to come out. After they'd waited for several hours, one of the FBI cars pulled away and drove off. Then another FBI car left and then another. The local police lieutenant who was in charge of the stake-out wondered what was happening. so he took off after the FBI cars, pulled one of them over, and asked what was going on. The FBI agents answered that it was five o'clock and they weren't allowed to work over­ time without permission from their supervisoi: So they had just taken off without bothering to notify the local police involved in the stake-out.
 
−
I am not, of course. in a position to vouch for the accuracy of this account, but I find it easy to believe in view of other evidence rvc seen of the incompetence of the FBL rm told that most local police forces that · have worked with the Feds are contemptuous of them. It seems that the FBI is good at just one thing. namely. propaganda. It has succeeded in acat­ing an image of itself as the world's most effi:ctm: law-enforcement organi­zation, and. considering the difference between the image and the reality. this constitutes a truly brilliant demonstration of the propagandist's arc.31
 
  
 +
1. Private and Common
  
−
Notes on the Referenced Documents
+
2. Reason and Result
  
−
Notes and Documents ITHE oocuMENTs on which this book relies will be stored in a suitable place and filed in an orderly way so that it will be possible to verify that I have cited them accu­rately when itis legally appropriate to do so. Each set of documents will be placed in an envelope bearing a letter designation: Aa. Ab, ... Ba, Ca, ... , etc. To make it easy to locate the documents referred to in footnotes. I give references in the form.
+
3. Obviousness and Randomness
−
(Letter designation of envelope)+ name of document (often abbrevi­ated) + page number or other information indicating the. relevant part of the document.
 
−
For example, "(Ab) Autobiog of 1JK 1959, p. 44" means page 44 of the autobiography that ~adore J. Kaczynski wrote in 1959, which is located in envelope Ab. Again. "(Fd) School Records of TJK, U. Mich., p. 52" means page 52,of TheodorcJ. Kaczynski's academic records from the University of Michigan, which are located in envelope Fd. The family letters are not in envelopes at all. butarc filed in a large cardboard bm. which bears the letter designation Ca.
 
−
Herc follows a list of the letter designations, with a description of the documents filed under each, and remarks on the reliability of the informa­tion given in the documents.
 
−
Aa. Autobiog of1JK1958. This is a very brief autobiographical sketch that I wrote as part of my application for admission to Harvard. Its trustworthiness is impaired by the fact that it was written under the close super­vision of my mother, and some of the language may even be hers.
 
−
Ab. Autobiog of 1JK1959. This is a brief autobiographical sketch that I wrote. probably in the fall of 1959, for Professor Henry A. Murray as part of a psychological study in which I participated. Its trustWorrhiness is impaired by the fact that I resented having been talked into participating in Murray's study and therefore aied to avoid revealing too much about my inner self. I tended to downplay problems rather than speaking about them frankly; specifically. I understated the problems I had during adolescence with my parents and my schoolmates. Also, sec Chapter 2, pp. 34. 3S,
 
−
Ac. Autobiog of 1JK 1979. This is a long autobiography that I wrote ' in the early months of I979. It is a first draft that was never revised; as a result it is rather disorganized and the language is often rough. It should be quite trustworthy, as I was completely honest in writing it, and, while errors of memory arc always possible, I believe that any such errors are inconsequential.
 
−
Ad. Autobiog of 1JK 1988. In 1988 I consulted a psychotherapist in Helena. Montana, not with the intention of taking therapy, burin search of practical advice and encouragement in an effort to find a woman for mysc1£ In preparation for the one interview I had with her, I sent her an autobiographical sketch that covered mainly my (always unsuccessful) rela­tions with women. This autobiography is inaccurate to the extent that it omits certain facts that ought to have been included in order to give a bal­anced picture (e.g.• my behavior on breaking off with Ellen Tarmichael), and it misrepresents the feelings I had during a certain period in my life. Bur statements of concrete facts in the 1988 autobiography arc rrustWOrthy excepts for orie error that I am about to mention.
 
−
The document exists in two versions. The first is a carbon copy of what I sent the therapist; the second is a version that I prepared a few months later. The second version differs from the first only in that certain details of language have been improved, and an error of memory ( concerning some­thing I had once read) has been corrected. In this book, the version that we cite is always the second.
 
−
The 1958 autobiography was sent to Harvard and I did nor see it again until after my arrest; the 1959 autobiographywas given to Professor Murray and I did not see it agam. until after my arrest; the 1979 autobiography was hidden away around 1980 or 1981 and I did not see it again until a few months before my arrest. Thus my four autobiographies arc completely independent of one another.
 
−
Ae. Autobiog of Wanda. This is an account of the first ten years of my mother's life that she wrote in r986. Its reliability is very questionable, because my mother is a person who often exaggerates and occasionally lies outright: and her memory of events is often garbled. But I have no doubt that this autobiography was truthful in portraying my mother's mother as alcoholic and abusive. This is confirmed by a letter from my mother's sister Preda (Cb) PL Supplementary Item #4-Also, on several occasions many years ago I heard my mother's brother. Benny Dombek. speak of their mother's alcoholism and abusiveness.
 
−
Ba. Baby Book. This is a journal kept by my mother, of the first nine­teen months of my life. I think it is reasonably reliable. In the first place, the entries were all made soon after the events. In the second place, the Baby Book contains no indication of my mother's characteristic cnggerations. In the third place. my mother seems to have been tryingto be objective and "scientific" in recording her observations. And in the fourth place. some­thing happened to my mother when I was about eight years old. I thinkthat before that time she had better control over herself and would have been more careful to be truthful than she was later.
 
−
Ca. Family letters. These arc labeled FL #I through FL #483, in chronological order. The chronological ordering is not perfect, however, because many of the letters are undated. and in a few cases it has not been possible to determine their cnct position in the chronological sequence.
 
−
The Family Letters are those between me. my brother, my parents, and my mother's sister Freda Tuomincn. Together with the ramily Letters, Sup­plementary Items," they include all of the letters between these parties that to my knowledge have survived.
 
−
The Family Letters comprise:
 
−
14 letters between some member of my immediate family and some unrelated party
 
−
4 letters between me and relatives outside my immediate family
 
−
I letter from my father to my mother
 
−
70 letters from one or both of my parents to me
 
−
77 letters from my brother to me
 
−
104 letters from me to my brother
 
−
2t3 letters from me addressed to one or both of my parents. or to my parents and my brother
 
−
:z. letters from my brother to my parents
 
−
o letters from my parents to my brother
 
−
(Though the letters are numbered I through 483, there are altogether
 
−
485 letters, because there are letters FL #45A. #458. #396A. #396B.)
 
−
Of the 317 surviving letters from me to members of my immediate fatn­ily; six or eight have been preserved only because I kept copies of them. Thus, significantly, my parcnrs and my brother saved about 3xo of my let­ters, but saved a total ofthree letters written by other members of the fatn­ily to one another. My parcnrs and my brother sent me about as many letters as I sent them, but only some 147 of them have been saved. I wish now that I'd saved them all. I saved the majority of the letters that my brother sent me during the 1980s and 9os, but I also threw many away. I saved practically all of the letters that my mother sent me between the fall of 1990 and July 1992; there were some 35 of these. Of the 35 other letters from my parents that have survived. I saved only a very ~intentionally. The others survived only by chance; mostly because I used to have a habit of answering my parcnrs' letters by writingon the reverse side of them and sending them back. Thus, in saving my letters, my parcnrs also saved some of their own.
 
−
I kept copies of nineteen or (more likely) twenty-one letters that I sent to members of my immediate family. (The reason for the doubt about the number is that I have photocopies of twO documents that I think were copies that I saved ofletters I mailed to my brother and my mother respec­tively; but I am not absolutely certain of this. These may possibly be [pho­tocopies of) the copies that were acrually mailed. For convenience, I will henceforth assume that these two documents. FL #407 and FL #408, were copies that I kept in my cabin.) In thirteen of the twenty-one cases my f.un­ily saved the copy that I sent them, so that tw0 copies of the letter are avail­able. However, in several of these thirteen cases I kept a copy of only a part of the letter, and in three of these last instances the copy of the letter that was mailed also is incomplete because pages arc missing from it. Or, at least, pages are missing from the photocopies that I have been given. In preparing this book I have not had access to the original letters nor to the copies that I kept in my cabin, but have had co work with photocopies of them.
 
−
What about the accuracy of the copies from the cabin? The nineteen copies that t made between September 1989 (FL #40I) and January 1995 (FL #478) were what I call "proper" copies; that is, they were made with the intention of attaining word-for-word accuracy. These copies arc carbon copies, photocopies, or manual transaiptions, or else arc first drafts that were modified with the intention of bringing them into conformity with the mailed copy of the letter. The caibon copies and photocopies ·can of course be assumed to be accurate. As for the manual cransaiptions and modified first drafts, rve compared the cabin copies with the mailed copies in all cases in which both copies of the letter have survived, and I've found only about ten discrepancies. Most of these arc inconsequential. For cum­ple, the cabin copy of FL #423 has ''except you felt" and "I do nor like receiving" where the mailed copy has "except that you felt" and "I do not like to receive." I found just three substantial discrepancies. (In FL #4-,S the mailed copy has 'January r9, 1995" where the cabin copy has "January _, r99;," with an empty space where the day of month should be. The cabin copy of FL #473 is the first draft of a note in which three dates are men­tioned, and only one of the three dates has been corrected to bring it into conformity with the corresponding date on the mailed copy of the note; the other two dates are wrong.) rn the cases in which only the cabin copy of a letter has survived, I believe the manual transaiptions to be as accurate as in the other cases of "proper" copies.
 
−
As mentioned above, scvcral of the cabin copies are incomplete, but in these cases the omissions are always noted on the copies. There is only one exception to this. FL #426 is a carbon copy. The mailed copy of the letter has a postscript that was added after the carbon copy was finished., and the omission of the postsaipr is not noted on the carbon copy.
 
−
Besides che nineteen "proper" copies of letters, there are-two "im­proper" copies that I never C%pected to have word-for-word accuracy. But, forcunately. in both· these cases che mailed copy of the letter has been pre­served. (The two cases are FL #248, che cabin copy of which is an uncor­rected first draft from t98t, and FL #483, the cabin copy of which was written down from memory the day after the original was mailed. In che case of FL #483, the copy differs somewhat from the original in language, but is practically identical to it in content. In the case of FL #248, between che cabin copy and the mailed copy cherc arc about thirty inconsequential discrepancies and three substantial ones: The mailed copy contains a pair of sentences and an unimportant postscript that are omitted from the cabin copy. and the cabin copy contains a long. important paragraph that does not appear in the mailed copy.)
 
−
Many of the photocopies that I have are unsatisfactory in that they are partly illegible or some of the tat has been "cut off' at the edge of the page. In some cases these copies have been doctored by the FBI in an cff'ort ro make them legible. With characteristic incompetence, the FBI has filled in many words incorreccly. When I cite the Family Letters in this book. the reference is always co (the photocopy of) the mailed copy of the letter unless otherwise noted.
 
−
Whenever ( make use of the cabin copy of a Family Letter, that fa.a is mentioned in a foomote, if not in the main text. Attention also is called to all cases in which the reading of a quoted passage is doubcful.
 
−
Cb. Family Letters, Supplementary Items. These are labeled FL Sup­plementary Item #I through FL Supplementary Item #I;. They comprise some letters that I would have included in the main series of family letters if I had received copies of them earlier, and others that do not fit very well into chc main series.
 
−
Cc. Notes on Family Letters. These are notes concerning certain let­ters that I sent to or received from members of my family. The notes were written at about the time the letters were sent or received, and were kept with the letters ( or copies thereof) in my cabin, where the FBf found them.
 
−
Cd. TJK-Juan Sanchez Correspondence. These letters are labeled TJK-JSA #t through TJK-JSA #;,. They include all of the letters that I received from Juan Sanchez Arreola. and copies of all the letters I sent to him with possibly one exception. A very few of the copies are incomplccc. and where this is the case the fact is noted on the copy. Some of the copies are cubon copies. some arc manual transcriptions, and some are first drafts modified to make them identical to the letter that was mailed. Because of my interest in the Spanish language, I made the manual transcriptions and modified the first drafts with greater care than in the case of the Family Let­ters, and I am confident that any errors are trivial and very few; except pos­
 
−
Cc. Letter from Quin Demirto Robert Cleary.
 
−
C.t: Letter from Quin Dcnvir to Michael Donahoe.
 
−
Cg. Note from Quin Denvir to Ted Kaczynski.
 
−
Ch. Letter from Quin Denvir and Judy Clarlcc to Ted Kaczynski, Sep­tember I, I998.
 
−
Da. Ralph Meister's Declaration. This is a declaration that my father's close friend Dr. Ralph Meister signed at the behest of investigators working on my case. The investigators helped him prepare the declaration. It is mostly accurate except in that it describes me as sutfering from certain social and family problems throughout my childhood, whereas, in fact, these problems developed after age eight to eleven, roughly.
 
−
Db. Dave's Deposition. This is a formally recorded conversation between my attorney Michael Donahoe and my brother David Kaczynski that took place on April a, 1996. Its reliability as to underlying facts is uncertain. since my brother often gets things gmblcd.
 
−
Ea. Med Records of TJK, U. Chi. I was born and grew up under the medical supervision of che University of Chicago teaching hospitals, and chcse are my medical records from those hospitals. [n many parts of these records there is a problem of illegibility.
 
−
Eb. Med Records of1JK. Dr. Coen. These are records ofmytwo visits to
 
−
Dr. Bruce Coen, of Helena Montana, an optometrist who enmined my eyes. Fa. School Records of1JK, E.P. Elementary. Fb. School Records of TJK, E.P. High School. Fe. School Records ofTJK, Harvard. Fd. School Records ofTJK, U. Mich. These are my records from Evergreen Park Central School, Evergreen Park Community High School (both in Evergreen Park, Dlinois), Harvard University. and the University of Michigan, respectively.
 
−
Fe. School Records of David Kaczynski. These are David Kaczynski's records from Evergreen Park Community High School. Columbia Univer­sity. and the College of Great Falls (Great Falls, Montana).
 
−
Ga. Deeds. These arc copies of deeds recanting tramfer of property to or from members of my immediate f.unily. They are numbered I through 6.
 
−
Gb. Employment-Related Records.
 
−
Ge. Marriage/Divorce Records.
 
−
Gd. Birth Records.
 
−
Ge. Death Records.
 
−
G£ Mixed Personal Records.
 
−
H. Media Articles and Transaipts. All information from the popular news media has to be considered highly unreliable. Ha. New Yorie Times, National Edition, April 26, 1995; May 26, 1996. Hb. Washington Post.June 16, 1996. He. Sacramatto Bu.January19, 1997. Hd. Missmdian, April 3, 1997. The Missmdian is the newspaper of Mis­soula, Montana.
 
−
He. 60 Mintttts. This is a cransaipt of the September 15, 1996 program of 60 Mintttts. My lawyers obtained both a tape of the program and a tran­saipt of it from the producers. The transaipt failed to include remarks by Leslie Stahl introducing Part Two. My lawyers' assistants reviewed the tape and added Ms. Stahl's remarks to the copy of the tran.saipt that is included with these documents.
 
−
H£ Newswedc;June 13, 1994; April 15, 1996; April 22, 1996; June3, 1996; March 3, 1997.
 
−
Hg. Time Magazine; August 28, 1995; April 15, 1996; April 2.2, 1996.
 
−
Hh. Peop~ Magazine; April 15, 1996; April 2.2, 1996.
 
−
Hi. U.S. N,:ws and World Report: April 15, 1996; April 2.2, 1996.
 
−
Hj. BlacJcfoot Valley Dispatch;January 29, 1998; February;, 1998; February 12, 1998. The Bliidcfooc Valley Dispacdi. is the newspaper of Lincoln, Montana. Hk. Scientific Ammcan. May 1997. Hm. San Francisco Chronicle, April 2.9, 1996. Hn. Chicago Tribune, April 14, 1996; April 16, 1996. Hp. Daily Oklahoman,June n, 1995. Hq. Boston Globe, April 4, 1996. Hr. ~Tennessean (Nashville, Tennessee), April II, 1996. Ja. Mad Genius. This is a book by Nancy Gibbs, Richard Lacayo, Lance Morrow, Jill Smolowc, and David Van BiCina, with the editorial staff of Time Magazine, Warner Books, 1996. This book is highly unreliable.
 
−
Jb. Unabomber. This is a book by John Douglas and Mark Olshaker, Pocket Books, a division of Simon and Schuster, 1996. This bookis not only highly unreliable as to facts, it is the cheapest of the cheap; and I'm not referring to the price.
 
−
Jc. L'Affaire Una.bomber. This is a book by Professor J.M. Apostolidcs, Editions du Rocher, Monaco, 1996. This book is bigb1y unreliable. At the moment (March II, 1998) I do not have a copy of it.
 
−
Jd. English Translation of Uc) L'Affaire Unabomber. This transla­tion, by Brian E. Hollis, was kindly provided to me by Professor Apos­tolidcs. As far as I know, it is unpublished. As a source of information, highly unreliable.
 
−
Ka. Interview of Wanda by Investigator #I. This is an account of an interview with my mother, Wanda Kaczynski, on April n, 1996, by an investigator employed by the Federal Defender's Office in Montana. I've been told by a very experienced investigator (Investigator #2.) that Investi­gator #1 is quite reliable. It can be assumed that this report gives a reason­ably accurate account of what my mother said. and I have quoted only what I believe has been accurately reported. My mother, however, gives an cmemclyinaccurate account of my life.
 
−
Kb. Lincoln Interviews. These are reports of interviews of residents of the Lincoln. Montana area during June 1996, by investigators attached to my defense team. Information reported by a great many of the informants was highly unreliable.
 
−
La. H.R. Schaffer and W. M. Callender, nPsychologic Bffects of Hospi­talization in Infancy,u published in the Paliatrics, Oaober I9S9, pp. s,.S-539.
 
−
Ma. Translations by 1JK. These are translations of Spanish-language stories that I made as birthday and Christmas presents for my brother.
 
−
Mb. 'Harold Snilly'. This is a humorous account that I wrote, proba­bly between 1975 and 1977, of an explosion in my high-school chemistry class for which I had some small share of responsibility. It gives an accurate account of what happened. but the name "HaroldSnilly" is fictitious.
 
−
Mc. Stories by David Kaczynski. These are stories written by my brother. Two of the three are unpublished. The third. 'El Cibolo', was pub­lished in the Writu's Forum of the University of Colorado-Colorado Springs, Volume 16, Fall, 1990, pp. 172-189.
 
−
Na. FBI forms 302. In conducting interviews, FBI agents take notes. Within a few days thereafter, these notes are used to prepare a report that is written up on a form called a "302.". These reports are by no means mere verbatim transcripts ofthe notes, and they are notoriously unreliable.. both becawc they contain many unintentional errors and because agents will often distort the information to make it suit their own purposes. A good enmple of this lase occucrcd in my case. However, as far as r can judge &om the dozen or so forms that I've bad occasion to study. where the FBI has no motive for distortion their 302. forms seem to be considerably less unreliable than media reports. Except where noted otherwise, I quote only portions of the 302. forms that I believe accurately report the substance of the interview in question.
 
−
After the 302. forms are prepared. the original notes often arc destroyed. The various 302. forms used in preparing this book will be cited as "FBI
 
−
302 number 1," "FBI 302. number2." etc.
 
−
FBI 302 number I reports interview with David It Kaczynski on 2/r,-18/ 96, date of transcription il,:s./96. interviewing agents Leroy W. Stark. Jr., Mary A. Flynn. James D. Willson, Jr.• rtle #I49A-sF-1062.o4 SUB S-2416.
 
−
FBI 302 number 2. reports interview with David Kaczynski on 2/18/96, date of transcription 2,/2:1/96, interviewing agents Kathleen M. Puckett, LeroyW. Stark. MaryA. Flynn.James D. Willson, File #I49A-SF-106204(+?).
 
−
FBI 302 number 3 reports interview with David Kaczymki on 2/24­2.5/96, date of transcription 2./28/96, incerviewing agents Kathleen M. Puckett. Leroy W. Stark.Jr.• TonyHenry, rtle #I49A-sF-1062o4-(illegible).
 
−
FBI 302 number 4 reports interview with David Kaczynski on 2./25/96, date of transcription 2./28/96. interviewing agents Leroy W. Stark. Jr., Kathleen M. Puckett. Ftle #I49A-SF-Io62.o4 SUB S-2416-{illegible).
 
−
FBI 302 numbers reports incerview with David Kaczynski on 3/10/96, date oftranscription 3/13/96, interviewing agent Kathleen M. Puckett, Ftle
 
−
#I49A-SF-106204 {+?).
 
−
FB[ 302 number 6 reports interview with David R. Kaczynski on 3/ 12J96, date of transcription 3/ r2/ 96, interviewing agents Leroy W. Stark. Jr., Kathleen M. Puckett, Mary A. Flynn. File #t49A-SF-1062o4 SUB S-2,416.
 
−
FBI 302 number 7 reports interview with David R. Kaczynski on 3/ 12/ 96, date of cranscription 3 / 13 I96, interviewing agents Kathleen M. Puckett, Leroy W. Stark. Jr.• Mary A. Flynn, File #I49A.sF-1062.o4(+?).
 
−
FBI 302. number 8 reports interview with David Kaczynski on 3/24/96, date of transcription 3/27/ 96, interviewing agents Kathleen M. Puckett, Leroy W. Stark.Jr., File #I49A-SF-106204-(illcgible) 84.
 
−
FBI 302. number 9 reports interview with David Kaczynski on 3/'Jfl/96, date of transcription 3/27 / 96, interviewing agent Kacb.lcen M. Puckett, File #t49A-SF-106204(+?).
 
−
FBI 302 number 10 reports interview with Wanda T. Kaczynski on 3/23/96, date of cransaiption 3 / 'Jfl I96, interviewing agents Leroy W. Stark. Jr., Kathleen M. Puckett, File #I49A-SF-106204 SUB S-2416.
 
−
FBI 302. number II rcporcs interview with Theodore J. Kaczynski on 4/3/96, dace of transcription 4/16/96, interviewing agents Paul Wtlhemus (Postal Inspector), Donald M. Noel, File #I49A-SF-1062a4(+?).
 
−
FBI 302. number 12 reports interview with Tammy Pluche on u./18/ 93, date of transcription u/24/ 93, intcrVicwing agents Donald M. Noel, Thomas G. Atteberry (Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fm:arms), Fde #I49A-SF­106204 Sub-o-7.
 
−
Nb. 'IJK's comments on FBI 302. II. These comments were written by me about the end ofJuly 1996, and they point out errors in the FBI 302. num­ber II. They arc reliable.
 
−
Ne. Police-FBI interview ofTammara Fluehe. This is an account of an interview of Tammara Dawn Fluche by FBI agent James D. Downey, Detective Ken C. Farnsworth of the Salt Lake City Police Department, and Postal Inspector Howard]. Matthews, on February 22, x987.
 
−
Nd. Memorandur!l of interview with Tammara Pluehc. This is a memorandum. bearing ·FBI insignia and dated a/20/93. that reports an interview with Tammara Dawn Pluehe on December 16, 1993 by Postal Inspector Robin Shipman and Alcohol. Tobacco, and Firearms Special Agent Nina Delgadillo. The memorandum is addressed to (Postal?) Inspec­tor George B. Clow, m.
 
−
Pa. Donahoe's motion to dismiss; and Donahoe's memorandum in support of motion to dismiss. These are: United States of America v. Theodore John Kaczynski, Crim No. MCR 96-6-H-CCL. Motion to Return Property. Dismiss Complaint, Stay Grand Jury Proceedings and Prohibit
 
−
Further Prosecution; and Memorandum in Support of Motion co Return Property. to Dismiss Complaint and to Prohibit Further Prosecution, both filed April I5, 1996 in the United States Distriet Court for the Distriet of Montana. Helena Division.
 
−
Pb. Government's opposition to Donahoe's motion. This is: United States of America v. TheodoreJohn Kaczynski. MCR 96-6-H-CCL, Opposi­tion of the United States to Motion to Return Property. Dismiss Complaint, Stay Grand Jury Proceedings, and Prohibit Further Prosecution, filed on April 18, I996 in the United States District Court for the District of Mon­tana. Helena Division.
 
−
Pc. Denial of Donahoe's motion. This is: United States of America v. TheodoreJohn Kaczynski. MCR 96-6-H-CCL. Opinion and Ordcrissuedby Judge Charles C. Lovell. filed on April n. 1996 in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, Helena Division.
 
−
Pd. Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant. This is the Applica­tion and Affidavit for Search Warrant filed on April 3, 1996 by FBI agent Terry Turchie in the United States District Court, Helena Division, District of Montana.
 
−
Pe. Motion to suppress evidence. This is: United States of America v. Theodore John Kaczynski, CR-S-96«59 GEB, Notice of Motion and Motion co Suppress Evidence; and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion co Suppress. filed on or about March 3, 1997, in the United States District Court for the Ea.stem District of Califor­nia. Includes Declarations and Appendices in Support of Defendant's Motion co Suppress.
 
−
p£ Government's opposition to motion to suppress. This is: United States of America v. Theodore John Kaczynski, CR No. S-96-o1.59 GEB. Government's Opposition co Defendant's Motion to Suppress, filed on or about April 14, 1997 in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis­trict of California.
 
−
Pg. Reply to ~cot'sopposition. This is: United States of Amer­ica v. Theodore John Kaczynski, CR-5-96-02,59 GEB, Defendant's Reply to the Government's Opposition to the Motion to Suppress; and Motion to Strike, filed on or about May u, 19w in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.
 
−
Qa. Oral Reports From Investigators. These are transaibed from dis· orderly notes that I have on assorted sheets of paper (which are to be found in Envelope X). The transcriptions are euct, word·for,word; and in most cases the original notes also have been preserved (Envelope X). Usually, but not always, I tookthese notes as I was receiving the oral information. Occa­sionally C jotted the information down later, from memory. If the informa­tion was not written down on the day that I received it, I indicated that facr on the note. I am confident chat my notes accurately record the informa­tion that I was given. but whether the information was given to me accu­rately is another matter. Sec the Introduction, p. 5 and Appendix 9.
 
−
These remarks apply also to the oral reports that I received from Or. K. See Ra. below.
 
−
Qb. Written Investigator Reports. These are written reports of inter­views conducted by investigators working for my defense team. They were prepared for the use of my lawyers. and were provided to me after my abortive trial by Investigator #2., who supervised most of the other investi­gators. It can be assumed that these reports give a reasonably accurate account of what the informants told the investigators, and unless specifi­cally noted otherwise, I have quoted only wliat I believe has been accurately reported by the investigator. The information provided to the investigators by the informants, however, tended to be highly unreliable. A significant part of it is sheer fantasy. For evaluation of these reports sec the Introduc­tion and Appendix 9.
 
−
Some informants were interviewed two or more times. In such cases the investigator report on the informant consists of two or more sections, each of which is labeled with the date on which the interview occurred. The sections arc paginated independently. so that, in order to refer to a spcdfic place in the report on the informant, it is necessary to cite the date of the interview. Thus, references to reports are given in the following form: "(Qb) Written Investigator Report #172,John Doe, Oanuary32, t999] p. 63( the dace being included only ifJohn Doc was interviewed on more than one date.
 
−
Qc:. Written Reporcs by Investigator#,.. (With list of items to be con­firmed by Investigator #2.) These arc written responses (prepared by Invcs· tigator #2 after the end of my abortive trial) to questions I'd asked or to my requests for confirmati~n of items of information. Many of the statements in these reports refer co· a list of items that I'd asked to have confirmed; a copy of this list is included. For evaluation see Appendix 9.
 
−
Qd. Note from Investigator#5. I believe these to be accurate.
 
−
Qe. Investigator Notes (Numbers I, 2, 3, 4, s). On September 3, 1996, between about 4 PM and 6 PM, Investigator #2 gave me orally a good deal of information. The following morning I wrote down the most important part of this information: this is Investigator Note #2..
 
−
On September 13, 1996. in the early afternoon. I again spoke with Inves­tigator #2., and he/she made two statements that I wrote down late in the afternoon of September14. r996; this is Investigator Note #4­
 
−
0n September 25, I997, I manually cransaibed Investigator Notes #2. and #4-I sent the cransaiption co Investigator #2 with a request that he/she confirm the information itcontained.
 
−
On October 8, 1997, Investigator #2 came co see me. bringing a photo­copy of my manual cransaiption of Investigator Notes #2 and #4-We went over the copy of Investigator Note #2, and Investigator #2 confirmed all of the information in it that I asked him/her about, except for one word that he/she asked me co change for clarification and one passage of which the meaning was questionable. H~ there was some information in Investigator Note #7. about which I did not ask Investigator#2.
 
−
On the photocopy of my manual transaiption of Investigator Note #2.. · the passages that were not confirmed because I did not ask Investigator #2 about them. and the passage of questionable meaning. arc marked in black ink; I made these markings immediately after the October 8 meeting with lnvestigator #2. The one word that Investigator #2 asked me to change is marked in blue ink. I circled in blue inkcertain passages that lnvestigator #'J. confirmed but asked me not to use publicly, and which I have not. because he/she had been given that information under promise of confidentiality. The markings in blue inkwere all made at the October 8 meeting under the instruction of Investigator #2. I did not ask Investigator #7. to confirm the information in Investigator Note #4 at the October 8 meeting. At some later time I noted on the photocopy of Investigator Note #4 that it had not been confirmed because I didn't ask.
 
−
The photocopy of my manual transaiption of fnvcstigator Notes #7. and #4. together with the markings on it. constitutes Investigator Note #I.
 
−
Investigator Note #J is a photocopy of a note that I sent to Investigator #7. asking him/her for the place and the date on which the information in Investigator Note #'J. was obtained. with a saibbled note by ~tor#2 indicating the date in question.
 
−
For evaluation. see Appendix 9.
 
−
Ra. Oral Reports from Dr. K. See Qa above for explanatory notes.
 
−
Rb. Written Information Confirmed by Dr. K. On February r,, 1998. I sent Dr. K. via the Federal Defenders a letter in which I asked her to con· firm certain information that she had earlier given me orally. The informa­tion consisted of three items that I had written down. and I told Dr. K. that she could confirm the respective iccms by simply initialing them. On April 2.. 1998. I got the information back with all three items initialed by Dt:. K.
 
−
Envelope X. This Cimlope contains the originals of the notes in which I recorded information given to me orallyby the investigators and by
 
−
Dr. K. It also contains a list giving the real names of the investigators whom I identify in this book as Investigator #t, #2. etc., and the real name of Dr. K. Also a list giving the real names of people whom I have identified in this book by first names, initials, fictitious names (initially accompanied by a dagger symbol) or abbreviations.
 
  
 +
4. Content and Form
  
 +
5. Essence and Phenomenon
  
−
Appendix 1
+
6. Possibility and Reality
  
−
Further examples of my mother’s unreliability
+
'''IV. Basic Laws of Materialist Dialectics'''
−
Appendix 1 j FURTHBR BXAMPLES OF my mother's unreliability.
 
−
In (Ca) FL #,.97, letter from my mother to me. December 2.4. 1984. my mother states that I screamed ..Mommy, Mommy" during .. that hospical experience." In {Ka) lnterview of Wanda by Investigator #I. p. I, my mother said that "Ted started screaming and crying. calling nonstop for his mother." This on March I, 1943, when I was about nine months old. cer­tainly not capable of screaming "Mommy, Mommy,.. and only doubtfully able to associate the word "ma-ma" with my mother. Herc are the relevant passages from (Be) Baby Book (pp. 99, 106, m., ILi. ll5, w):
 
−
THIRTY-FOURTH WEEK. Daus, from ]AN. 8. toJAN.15 (1943]
 
−
Baby says Ma-ma c;,nly to mother and sometimes to aunt. Usually says this when mother appears after not being seen for sometime [sic], or when child is sleeply (sic] or hungry. Will also say it when playing with mother. We think he associates 'Ma-ma' now with the proper object. ...
 
−
[From nine-month inventory of the baby's development:} Does he use any wont ar sarmdfor a d411ik prposd Yes Desc:ribc: Some. times says Ma-Ma and sometimes goes uh-uh. ... ""FORTY-THIRD WEEK [the week after my rcrum from the hospital]. Daus,fromJ/o. ta 3h9 (1943] ..... When asked, 'Where's Ma-Mat baby looks around at mother. ..."
 
−
FIFI7ETH WEEK. Dara,from 4-30 to 5-7 [1943}
 
−
... Repeated ma-ma, bye-bye after his mother ..."
 
−
FIFTY-SECOND WEEK. Dara,from 5·14 to 5-:u [1943]
 
−
... He understands: just a minute; come here; how pretty; milk ni, ni; don't do that; look; show ma-ma: nice; no, no ...."
 
−
[From the one-year inventory of the baby's development:]
 
−
Li.stthewonis ustdbythechildato~yearof age Ma-Ma, Da-da; We're not sure he understands their meaning. tho (sic] when aying he often says ma­ma and we think he's calling bis mother. Now, was I really screaming ""Mommy. Monuny"" at the age of nine months. or has my mother's overactive imagination run away with her" again?
 
−
From (Hb) Washington Post,June 16, 1996, pp. Ax, A2o:
 
−
The image still haunts Wanda Kaczynski. She can still sec the photo­graph of her baby son, pinned down on bis hospital bed. ...
 
−
He was terrified, spread-eagled .... His eyes. usually normal. were , crossed in fear."
 
−
A few years later, the family pediatrician showed her and Ted, then 4, the awful photograph the hospital had left in his record. Ted was pinned down so the physicians could photograph his hivc.1. 'Ted glanced at it and looked away.• she recalled. 'He rcfuscd to look at it any more. •..•..
 
−
My mother gave a similar story in (Ra) Oral report from Dr. K., Febru­ary n and 27, 1997.
 
−
I do not remember having seen the photograph. at age 4-When I was perhaps about ten years old my regular pediatrician, Or. Francis Wright (whom I remember with respect and affection), showed me the photograph (not in the presence of my mother) and remarked with a chuckle that I was quite a sight. And so I was. I clearly remember that in the piccure I was puffy-looking and blotched with hives, and that the expression of my face was glum and not tcrtjfied... I felt no particular emotional response and did not find the picture difficult to look at. I recall no indication that I was ""pinned down, .. but I do not remember enough to assert that there was no such indication. The photograph apparently has not survived, so there is no way of resolving the question now."
 
−
As for the claim that my eyes were "crossed in fear,.. Or. K. told me that my mother told her ((Ra), Oral Report from Dr. K., February I2. and 27, 1997) that my ~were crossed in the photograph and that~were iu:va c:roswl at "1lY otltatime. On February a. 1998, I asked Dr. K. to confirm this, and she said she did not remember it and could not find it in her notes. On
 
−
APPENO[X I I 1.37 February rs, r998, I asked Investigator #2. whether he/she remembered Or.
 
−
K.'s statement. Investigator #2. respondedaffirmatively and putitin writing for me: "Wanda reporred that Ted's eyes were never crossed otherthan in a photo of him taken during the hospitalization as a nine month old." (Qc) Written Reports by Investigator #7., p. 6.
 
−
Characteristically. my mother is remembering here only what it is con­venient for her to remember. [f my eyes were crossed in the photograph there is no particular reason to believe that fear had anything to do with it, since from earliest infancy I had a tendencyto aosscd eyes that I evencually outgrew, but not until I was at least six years old. Herc are the relevant pas­sages from the Baby Bookand the medical records.
 
−
May 1942,: ".•• Slight strabismus (aosscd eyes] ..... ({Ea) Med Records.
 
−
of1JK. U. Chi., p. 6.) (This entry is undated, but its contentmakes clearthat it refers to an examination made shortly after mybirth.)
 
−
THIRD WEEK. Data, frr,mJune 5 (1942,] toJune [illegible]
 
−
Eyes cross as he stares hard at lights or bright objects ... ((Be) Baby Book. p. 73.)
 
−
FOURTH WE.EK. Data,.framJune [illegible] to June 19 [1942]"
 
−
... His eyes seemed to jirk[sic] uncertainlyin the direction ofthe pen­cil. at the same time crossing and uncrossing...... ((Be) Baby Book, p. 7,4.) TWENTY-SIXTH WEElC. Dates,Jram Nov.13 to Nov. 20 (1942] " ... Neither we nor doctor can quite decide whetherornotbaby's eyes are slightly crossed." ((Be) Baby Book. p. 88.) "Dec r, 1948 ..• Eyes tum in? .•. Teacher has noted that his eyes cum in occasionally when he is reading. Motherhas not noted any such thing ...... ((Ea) Med Records of1jK, U. Chi., p. 46.)
 
  
−
I N Ao o IT I o N To my allergic reaction to eggs, I had cwo other med­ical emergencies in infancy: I fell with my tongue between my teeth. so that the tip of it was split;. and I pulled a pot of boiling water or coffee onto myself so that I was scalded. My mother always dcsaibed these injuries to me in such melodramatic terms that I assumed I had been hospitalized for them. At the age ofseventeen I wrote:
+
1. Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality
−
While Iwas still a baby. rve been told, Iwas hospitalized3.times. Once I pulled a kettle ofboiling waterovermyself. Another time I fell onmy chin with my tongue between my teeth, splitting it. ... At one time I became covered all over with swelling ... it was due to an allergy to eggs... (Ab) Autobiogof1JK.1959, p. 1.
 
−
In reality. the tongue injury and the scalding must have been much less serious than my mother represented them to be, since I was hospitalized for neither of them. For the tongue injury sec (Ea) Med Records of TJK. U. Chi. April 29, 1944, p. 25: Time ofarrivlll x:oo p.m. Seen by M.D. x:15 Sent home"
 
−
As for the scalding, (Be) Baby Book. p. u3, has: "FORTY-FIFTH WEEK. Daus, [ram 3/26 to 4/ 2 (1943]
 
−
... Teddy was scalded with hot coffee. After the physicians trcaanent baby quieted down & apparently felt no pain but during the next three or four days he showed signs of having had a shock. He slept a great deal Be was quieter than usual.
 
−
That is all that the Baby Book says about the scalding incident. I've been able to find no mention of it in the surviving medical records, so I was probably created not at the University of Chicago hospitals but by a neigh-· borhood physician (possibly a Dr. Polk whom I remember from my earliest childhood).
 
−
The following week, on April 6, 1943, I was taken to the University of Chicago hospitals for a diphtheria-tetanw injection. This could not have been more than eleven days after the scalding. yet the medical record ofthis visit makes no mention of the scalding or of any apparent injury co the skin. So the bums were probably only first degree. This shows how wildly my mother will cnggcrate and dramatize. (See (Ea) Med Records of 1JK,
 
−
U. Chi, April 6, 1943, p. c..)
 
  
 +
2. Law of Unification and Contradiction Between Opposites
  
 +
3. Law of Negation of Negation
  
−
Appendix 2
+
'''Chapter 3: Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism'''
  
−
Francis E. X. Murphy, PhD, and his recent statements about me
+
1. Praxis, Consciousness, and the Role of Praxis in Consciousness
  
−
Appendix 2 I FRANCIS E.X. MURPHYwasa kindly and very intelligent man, but he was unusually prissy. even by Har­vard standards. He was always meticulously groomed, and was so fastidi­ow that he asked each first-floor srudent individually to please flush the toilet while: urinating rather than afterward. The bathroom was separated from Murphy's sitting-room by only a thin wall. the coilet was against the wall. and the sound of urine tinkling into the bowl made Murphy feel squeamish. The flwhing was intended to cover the tickling.1
+
2. Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth
−
Gerald Burns was one of the two srudcnts who occupied the room next to mine at 8 Prescott Street, and he has told my investigators that Murphy was "an extremely feminine man" and • a little strange". 2 I would agree chat Murphy was noticeably feminine, and a little cccenaic.
 
−
The New York Timu stated that Murphy described me as Ha lonely boy with poor hygiene who befriended no one," and reported nothing else that he may have said about me.3
 
−
According to my investigators, Murphy told them the following:
 
−
In 1958, the dean of freshmen, Dean [Skiddy] Von Stade, decided chat as an experiment, all of the underage freshmen who were entering Harvard after only three years of high-school, in addition to any freshmen who were noted as being particularly gifted. should be housed by them­selves in 8 Prescott, away from all of the normal freshmen. [17] The house was made up of I5 boys. including Ted, and the dorm proctor, Dr. Murphy.
 
−
Dr. Murphy had formerly been srudying to be a Jesuit priest. Dean Von Stade chose Dr. Murphy to be the dorm proctor for 8 Prescott because he wanted the house to be run like a monastery. ... (!!??]
 
−
Most of the boys livingin 8 Prescott were fairly serious about their aca­demics. They were generally young, bright and eccenttic. Despite the fact that many of the boys had unusual qualities, they got along with each other and made friends easily. ... Ted was the one boy in 8 Prescott who did not have any friends...."
 
−
All of the boys from 8 Prescott ate in the Harvard Union along with all of the other Harvard freshmen. In the beginning of the spring semest~ someone who worlc.cd in the kitchen alerted Dean Von Stade that Ted always ate at a table by himsel£ Dean Von Stade then asked some of the other boys why they did not cat with Ted...4
 
−
At this point I find myself obliged to confess to a degree of skepticism. It hardly seems likely that the kitchen help would go to the dean about a srudcnt who usually ate by himself. And I doubt that Von Stade would personally have asked the boys about me; instead, he would have requested Murphy to ask them. Harvard deans in 1958 were not in the habit of fratcmizing with freshmen. If this talc has any truth in it at all, it's more probable that Murphy himself ta1k.cd about me to Von Stade and also to the boys. Why he tells the story in the form he docs is anybody's guess.
 
−
To continue with the investigator's report:
 
−
Theboys responded (to Dean Von Stade] that Ted was unkempt. They complained that Ted never changed his clothingor showered. The boys said that Ted smelled bad and they did not want to sit near him...J
 
−
This is implausible. My mother·had trained me thoroughly in certain simple principles of cleanliness: brushing my teeth and washing my face every day and showering or bathing perhaps two or three times a week. At the end of the two weeks that I spent at summer camp at the age of thir­teen, the counselors toia my father that I was the only kid in my group of maybe eight boys who consistently brushed his teeth and washed his face daily. While r was at Harvard I was still firmly under the sway of my mother's principles and abided by them strictly. I must have showered at least three times a week. because physical training was required that often for freshmen. For much of my first semester I took swimming. and, as if swimming itself wasn't enough of a wash, showering was •mi before entering and after leaving the pool Later I switched to wrestling and after that toa ..conditioning class... Though showering was not enforced. as &ras
 
−
I can remember I always did shower in the locker room after these activities, throughout my freshman year.6
 
−
During my senioryear I got co showering so often-almost every day­chat I broke out with red blotches on my skin. Not knowing what caused chem I went to the Health Service, where a dermatologist diagnosed the condition as eczema"" and said it was caused by my ""allergic capabilities"" and by ""ovcr·use of soap and water."" (An entry in my Harvard medical record for January ::u. 1962 states chat the. condition was ""eczema on a dry skin basis,"" and seems to refer co allergic capabilities, though chis last is doubtful due to poor legibility. It does not mention ovcr·use of soap and water.7)"
 
−
My investigators' report on the interview with Murphy continues: "Dean Von Stade was concerned thatTed was not takingproper care of himself and as a result, was becoming socially isolated." s
 
−
The implication, that my classmates were isolating me because of my "poor hygiene," is inconsistcrit with the evaluation of me that Murphy wrote on March r,, 1959, which we quoted in Chapter s: "although not unsocial. or unpleasant, [Ted] isolates himselfcompletely from all his class­mates."8 (emphasis added) The evaluation makes no mention of a "bad smell" or anythingofthe sort.
 
−
To remm to the investigators' report:
 
−
(Dean Von Stade] told Dr. Murphy that he mustspeak with Ted about the problem, and tell Ted to dean himself: . . • De Murphy wcit and knocked on Ted's door. Ted opened the door and when Or. Murphy entered, he was appalledbywhathe saw. Ted's clothes were filthy and there were no sheets on Ted's bed. ...
 
−
Dr. Murphy told Ted that he had to shower and change his clothing regularly. Or. Murphy said Ted should change his shirt everyday. ... After Dr. Murphy confronted Ted, he appeared to dean himself up slighdy.""9"
 
−
I do not recall any such incident. In any case, my clothes were not filthy. It is recorded in my 1979 autobiography that as a Harvard &e,bman I washed my pants every weck.10 The washing was done in coin-operated machines that were available in the basement of the house oen door (which was also used as a Harvard dormitory). and since I could wash sc:v· cral pieces of clothingjust as easily as I could wash one, it is hardly likely that I would have failed to do so. (Though I do noc actually remember whether I did so or not.) ·
 
−
It's crue that I did not change my shirt~day. At a guess fd say I changed it two or three times a week. It's cruc that I wore the same pants for six days in a row and that I often negleaed to put the sheets on the bed
 
−
(see Chapter5), It's true that I was negligent about clothes. ("I dressed slop· pily ...."11) Bue my clothes stayed pretty clean, since I didnothing rough or dirty in them, and by the standards of the background that I came from chey ccrcainly could nor have been desaibed as filthy.
 
−
Would they have been filthy according to Murphy's exceptionally prissy standard? It's easy to imagine that they might have been. But if the reader will refer to Murphy's Resident Freshman Advisor Report,8 which was reproduced in its entirety in Chapter 5, he will see that it contains not one word about "poor hygiene," dirty clothes, a bad smell, or anything of the sorr. IfMurphy had really ~ought that.I was as filthy and smelly as he now says I was. it seems incredible that he would make no mention of it in his report. (Note that he cold my investigators that the discussion with Von Stade about my isolation took place "in the beginning of the spring semes­ter," that is, about the beginning of February, so that Murphy would have entered my room and been "appalled" by my "filthy" clothes well before the March r, date ofhis rcporr. Also note that the two evaluations of me by John Finley. written near the end of my sophomore and junior years rcspec­~y-and reproduced in Chapter s-make no mention of "poor hygiene.")
 
−
The only sense I can make of this is as follows. My dress no doubt was shabby by Harvard standards, and especially by Murphy's personal stan­dard. Bue, at the time, Murphy probably did not regard my "hygiene" as bad enough to be a major issue or the principal cause of my social isolation. After my arrest he saw pictures of me in the filthy rag., Iwas accustomed to wear when alone in the woods; and he may have been ezposcd, for aam· pie, to Pat Mcintosh's tale of my "filthy" room at Eliot House. These acted through the phenomenon of "media planting" to exaggerate vastly his memory of me as rather shabby-looking. until he began to imagine that I was as filthy and smelly as he now says I was. Mistaken identity may be involved here too. In Chapter S, I mentioned a kid at 8 Prescott Street whose hands were always visibly filthy. and they could hardly have remained that way if he~ ever showered or bathed. This kid may well have had an aroma thac in Murphy's recollection has now become associated with me:
 
−
That Murphy's memory is in error here is rendered more plausible by the faa that the information he gave my investigators contains several other errors, one of which, at lease, can be clearly documented.
 
−
Murphy seated: inthose days scudcnts usually sent their clothing home in boxes to be laundered." 1.2 False. I never heard of anyone sending his clothes home. Students used either coin-operated machines or the student laundry service. Murphy told my investigators that "Gerald Burns was probably the clos­est to Ted. Gerald was outgoing and he tried the hard.est to include Ted."ll False. Titis is probably a case of media planting. In Chapter 6 we saw that Bums described to the media his supposed acquaintance with me; but he had me confused with someone else.
 
−
We find the following in the investigators' report:
 
−
Dr. Murphy remembers that Ted received a couple of C's during his first year. Ted's grades were lower than most of the other students in 8 Prescott. and given the large amount of time Ted spentscudying. his grades seemed unusual. Dr. Murphy met with Ted to discuss the grades. Ted did. notseem concernedby the C's and consideringth.atTed was young and his math and science courses were difficult, 0& Murphy let the issue drop.13
 
−
In assessing my Harvard grades one bas to take into account "grade inflation.H Over the years, grading has become more and more lenient in our universities.u Porty years ago an A meant a good deal more than it docs today. and a C was an acceptable grade.
 
−
As I remember it, shortly after the fall semester grades were released, Murphy complimented me on the fact that rd gotten two Ks. I grumbled that I was dissatisfied with the two C's th.at rd also gotten. (See the Intro­duction. p. 8.) Murphy replied, "Two Ks and two C's at Harvard, that's nothingto sniff at!" I partic:ulariyrememberthis incident because ofhis use of the old-fashioned C1'plession. .. nothing to sniff" at. .. And that was all that Murphy ever said to me about my grades. (For those readers who are unfa­miliar with the expression .. nothing to sniff at": it is complimentary. Also: Besides Ks in math and German and C'sin two "soft" courses, I got a B-in Gen Ed A; butgrades in Gen EdA were scarcely regarded.)
 
−
Whose memory is correct here, mine or Murphy's? Fortunately, the documents enable us to give a dear answer. In the first place, Master Finley ofEliot House rcferrc~ to my "fairly good record ofan A, two B's and a C" for the first semesterof my sophomore year.IS Ifa record of an A. two B's, and a C was considered "fairlygood," then two .Ks and two C's should have been so also, since the average is the samein both cases.
 
−
More important: Murphy's Resident Freshman Advisor Report on me was written on a form that included the following item: ''Is his academic record so far about right, below expectation. above expectation? (CirdJ! 01te)" None of the three alternatives were circled, but "above expectation" was underlined.8 Thus, at the time, Murphy felt my grades were better than he would have expected, which disproves his present claim that he discussed my grades with me because he thought they were lower than they should have been. Tilis shows the value of his recollections about me.
 
−
One other error can be documented, though in this case it is not certain that the error is Murphy's. Murphy told the investigators that there were fif. teen boys at.8 Prescott Street, and that most of the boys shared a room.16 But Phil Alman, who lived at 8 Prescott in 1958, stated that there were thir­teen rooms. 17 With fifteen boys disaibuted among thirteen rooms, only two rooms would have been shared, and eleven boys would have had rooms to themselves, which contradicts Murphy's statement that most of the boys shared a room. Murphy and Alman can't both be right. My guessis that Murphy is wrong. since thirteen sounds like a plausible estimate for · the number of rooms at 8 Prescott. The question could be resolved by find­ing out how many rooms 8 Prescott hadin 1958.
 
−
Ifit wasn't because of a '"bad smell .. and ..filthy" clothes, why were the other boys cool to my initial efforts to make friends? Some probable factors can be identified.
 
−
There is, of course, the fact that I was shy and socially awkward, and my attempts at friendliness must have been the less convincing because they were insincere: "I tried to be friendly with the fellows in my dormitory as a matter of duty. not because I liked them. uts I always felt that most of the people at Harvard were just not my kind of people. and I tried to make friends with chem mostly because my parents had made me feel guilty about not being more social.
 
−
Probably I was one or two years younger than most of the boys at 8 Prescott Street, and I looked even younger than I really was: ..when I was a Freshman at Harvard, the cop who stood outside the door of the Union once told me I looked 14 years old."19 I presumably was not made more attractive by the fact that I had a bad case of acne at the time. zo 1made no attempt t(? change my dress ormanners so as to fit in with the
 
−
Harvard environment; f wore my working<lass origin on my sleeve. as it were. '1 never had the slightest interest in fine clothes or anything of that sort."19 I think the boys at 8 Prescott Street felt that I wu not their kind of peoplejust as much as I felt that they were not my kind of people. This may have been as true of those who were of working-class orlower middle-class origin as it was of the others. It seems to me that most such people at Har­vard were trying co move into a higher social class. For CDD1ple, I was amazed to learn from my investigators that Gerald Burns said he was of working-class immigrant background. with a Polish father and a Dutch
 
−
mother.;:i From his speech, manners, and clothes I had always assumed he was an upper middle-class "prcppie.'' And "Bums" is obviously not a Polish name. Probably it is a shortened and angliazed version of something like "Burruck.i" or "Burynski." All of which suggests that Burns and his family may have wanted to detach themselves from their ethnic and working-class origin.
 
−
There may well have been additional factors that contributed to my cool reception by the others at 8 Prescott Street, but for the present I will refrain from speculating about them.
 
−
N.B. In case the question should arise whether Murphy's opinion on March r:,, 1959 that my academic record was "above expectation" was based on my midyear grades of two ~sand two C's or on the spring midterm· grades: In the first place, the spring midterm grades were not given out until March 2.7. 22 In the second place, it would have made little difference at what point during my freshman year Murphy evaluated my grades. since they scarcely changed prior co the release of the final grades at the end of the year. My freshman grades were:23
 
−
Fall Midterm MidYear SpringMidterm Mathia A A Math1b A GermanR A A Physi.a a.a Not Reported Hums c c Hums c SocSci7 c­c SocSci7 c+ GenEdA (halfcredit) Not Reported B· GenEdA {half credit) C+
 
−
Final A A c+ B· c
 
  
 +
'''Afterword'''
  
−
Appendix 3
+
'''Appendices'''
  
−
The N–43 clique
+
Appendix A: Basic Pairs of Categories Used in Materialist Dialectics
  
−
Appendix 3 I APTBR WRITING thefirstdraftof Chapter 6, I learned that two of Mcintosh's buddies in N-43, John Masters and Robert Applethwaite, in their interviews with investigators, supported his claim that my room was filthy and contained "rotting.. or "stale.. fcod.1 Phil Almansaid the floor was covered with piles of trash. but he was doubt­ful about the food: he said that there ..may have ... been old food and dirty dishcs."2 Mcintosh's a-girlfriend LK.Va. said that some of the suitematcs told her my room was "knee-deep" in ttash. with rotting food.3 But it just isn't true. I lived in that room day in and day out, and I know what was in it. There were never any dirty dishes or food remains left lying around, and the floor was never c~dwith crash c±ceptfor the crumpled paper inone comer, as dcsaibed in ·Chapter 6, p. 94. In this Appendix I will give the reader evidence that I hope will make him view the account of Mcintosh and company with a degree of skepticism.
+
Appendix B: The Two Basic Principles of Dialectical Materialism
−
The acdibility of Mcintosh and his buddies is undercut by the face that the accounts they gave the investigators and the media contain gross inaccuracies. Some of Mcintosh's errors were dealt with inChapter 6. Herc we lista few more of his and his buddies' mistakes.
 
−
(i) Mdncosh. while whming about how tough Harvard was academi­cally. cold the investigators: '~t Harvard the classes were graded on a curve, which meant that half the students failed."4 Harvard did not fail half its stu­dents. and the suggestion that it did so is so implausible that we needn't worry about documentation.
 
−
(ii) Mcintosh portrays me as playing the trombone during my senior year: "Senior year, Ted lived in the room next to Paaick and [Phil Alman].... Ted's room and Paaick and [Phil's] room shared a common wall Paaick often heard Ted playinghis trombone. . . . Sometimes Patrick just banged on the wall of Ted's room to get Ted to quiet down. Ted never complained or protested when Paaick made such a request. and Ted usu­ally stopped playing his trombone."S
 
−
Unfortunately for Mcintosh's credibili~ I sroppcd playing the crom-· bone alto~thcr after my sophomore year. From John F'mley's evaluation of me written at the end of my junior year. '"For some reason one no longer hears chis year the strains of bis trumphct [sic; trombone is meant] from our top floor......,
 
−
(ill) Mcintosh. Masters, Phil Alman. and Robert Applethwaitc through­out their interviews with the investigators depicted me as living in vimwly complete social isolation. 7 But in Chapter 6, pp. 92, 93, I showed that I did have some social interaction: pickup basketball is documented; so is social­ization with two suitcmatcs (not belonging to Mcintosh's clique). Also note that Finley wrote at the endof myjunioryear: "He is still pn:tty lonely but less friendless than he was a year ago,"6 which implies that F"mley had observed some signifiant degree ofsocial interaction on my part. probably with Fred Ha. and B. Cr.
 
−
(iv) Mcintosh's girlfriend L.K.Va. stated that I always wore a suit and tie.8 The reader will not find it difficult to believe me when I say that I almost never wore a suit and tic except when visiting the dining hall. where such dress was required. L.K.Va. certainly saw me without a suit and tie on various occasions. For example, I clearly remember one evening during my senioryear when I left my room naked from the waist up, walked down the hall of the suite, and unexpectedly encountered L.K.Va. She sarted visibly at the sight of my bare chest.
 
−
Incidentally. the man whom I referred to in Chapter 6 as "the oddball.. did always wear a coat and tie. Mistaken identity?
 
−
(v) Phil Alman stated that Radcllife women were not allowed in "the Harvard library."9 In fact. they were allowed in Harvud's main library; Widener Ubrary. Anyone who wants to take the trouble should be able to verify chis. As far as Iknow, the only orie of Harvud's sevual libraries from which women were excluded was the undergraduate men's library. Lamont Library.
 
−
(vi) In Appendix I we saw that there was an inconsistency between Phil Alman's scaccmcm: that there were thirteen rooms at 8 PrescottlO and cer­tain statements of F.E.X. Murphy. Herc, though. Alman was probably right and Murphy wrong.
 
−
Mcintosh and company made many other errors, but since these rest only on my word against that of one or another member of Mcintosh's clique, I won't take the trouble to review them.
 
−
(b) There is evidence of "media planting" of memories in the suite· mates.
 
−
(i) According to the investigators, "When Ted was arrestedJohn [Ma.s­eers] did notrememberwho he was even after he learned thatTed hadgone to Harvard and lived at Eliot House. Fmally [presumably after considerable exposure to the media]. John remembered that Ted was his former suite mate... 11 And, lo and behold, he remembered me just as I had been por· craycdby the media! Not exactlysurprising.
 
−
(li) This one is fun, because. we get co play Sherlock Holmesjust a little. Mcintosh. Phil Alman, and Robert Applethwaitc (but not Masters) all refer to my habit of tilting my chair back, and, as they call it, "rocking... (Sec Chapter 6, p. 96.) All three of them say that as ( "rocked.. my chair ( would make noise by knocking against the wallnow and agam.12
 
−
But I did not knock into the wall. Whathappened was that I wouldlose my balance and the chair would fall forward so that its front legs dunked against the floor. The reader doesn't have to rely on my word for this. Just stop and think. In a small room, maybe ten feet by ten feet, will the occu­pant place his desk out in the middle of the floor, where it will be an obstruction? Obviously nor. He will place it against a wall; probably under the window, where the lightingis best. That. in face. is just where my desk was. and my suitematcs musthave known it; because ifthey hadn'tseen the interior of my room then how would they know that it was-as they claim-a foot deep in trash? Everyone agrees that I spent my evenings at Harvard studying. Phil Alman states explicitly that I was "studying and reading" while I "rocked" my chairin the evenings, and "The few times that [Phil] ventured into Ted's room, Ted was always sitting at his desk holding a book in his hands."13 Robert Applethwaite says that I studied late into the nightand that it was at night that I knocked my chair into the wan.14 From chis we deduce what was accually the case, that my chair was in front of the desk when I .. rocked" it. Ergo, the desk was between my chair and the nearest wall.
 
−
Manifestly. therefore. the chair could not have knocked against the wall. and my suitematcs ( except possibly Mcintosh, on account of his limita· cions) must have realized this at the time.
 
−
It can hardly be coincidence that aU thru of these gentlemen make the same obvious mistake of thinking that my chair knocked against the wall rather than the floor. One can only conclude that their respective accounts arc not independent of one anoth~ Presumably Phil Alman and Robert Applcthwaite were exposed to Mcintosh's story in the media and subse· quently imagined that they themselves remembered what they bad really heard from Mcintosh. Elementary, Warson.
 
−
(Added March 25, 1998: I had already written this appendix when. on or about March ~· r998, I learned that Mcintosh and Phil Alman had both been quoted in the media on April 4. 1996, the day after my arresc.15 The account amibuted to Alman is interesting for twO reasons. F"irst, the article quotes Mcintosh about the allegedly filthy condition of my room, but does not quote Alman as saying anything at all about the condition of my room. Second and more important, the article quotes Alman as saying that I would 'bang the legs of [my] desk chair on the floor," is which is correct. Yee several months later, in December 1996, Phil Alman cold my investiga­tors chat it was against the wall that I banged my chair,16 which, as we've just shown, is obviously improbable. One can attribute this change in Ahnan's story only to his exposure to Mcintosh's version in the media. This is an interesting testimony to the power of media-planting. It can not only insert a new memory where no conscious memory was present. but replace an accurate. conscious memory with a new. false one that is intrinsi­cally improbable.)
 
−
(c) Mcintosh claims Master Finley came to the suite and cold me co clean up my room; 17 according to Time, Mcintosh said F"mley was "aghast" at the sight of the mcss. 18 John Masters mentions that F'mley told me to clean up my room but says nothing about his being agbast.11 As we pointed out in Chapter 6, in the evaluations that he wrote of me at the end of my sophomore and junior years, respeaivcly. F"mley made no mention of the condition of my room. No evaluation was written for the senior year, butif my roommates did not contact Finley until I was a senior, one wonders why they waited two years. I think. anyone who understood F"mley's role at Eliot House would agree that it is very unlikely that he would ever person­ally have come to inspect a scudent's room or told him to clean it up. He would have left that cask to the chiefjanitoc
 
−
As a matter of fact, Finley never said anything to me about my room. What did happen was that on two occasions I found a note from the chief janitor asking me politely to clean up the pile of aumplcd paperin the cor­ner because it wu a "fire ha.zam... I promptly complied in both cases, and after the second instance I did not again allow the paper to accumulate. I don't know whether my roommates had said something to the chiefjani­tor, or whether they had said something to Finley and he had passed it on to the chief janitor. or whether the pile of paper had been noticed during a routine inspection.
 
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(d) Pat Mcintosh. John Masters, Phil Alman, and Robert Applcthwaite formed a clique within N·43. They hung together because of the similarity of their values. attitudes, and habits. All four were status-conscious. e:ices­sivcly neat, narrow-minded, conformist types. The investigators' inter­views of these people were not intended co explore this issue, but they nevertheless offer some indications:
 
−
Robert Applcthwaitc said he gave up the idea ofdoing graduate workin astronomy because he thought that many of Harvard's graduate students in astronomy were "not well-adjusted...1,
 
−
John Masters thought C. Po. was "strange," in part because he studied insects.zo ·
 
−
Pat Macintosh whined about the fact that the "cheap" rooms he lived in lee everyone know that his family didn't have much money.21 He also cold the investigators chat "Harvard was full of strange people,"22 which I sup­pose means they were strange by the standards of Robinson, the small cown in southern Ulinois from which Mcintosh came. 23
 
−
When Phil Alman worked on dorm crew. he "was always resentful that he had to clean rooms that were so much nicer than his own."24
 
−
I held a couple of brief temporary jobs deaning scudcncs' room at Har­vard, and it never bothered me to clean the rich kids' rooms. If they could afford them they were welcome to them, as &r as I was concerned. I wasn't scarus-comcious, and my own room was good enough for me. The reader will not find it hard to understand why I didn't care co socialize with the members of the clique.
 
  
−
S o H BR E I s MY G u B s s as to how the clique came to portray me as completely isolated and my room as a garbage dump.
+
Appendix C: The Three Universal Laws of Materialist Dialectics
−
We showed in Chapter 6 chat Mcintosh had me mixed up with the gen­tleman whom I've called "the oddball." who truly was as unsocial as I've been portrayed. Once Mcintosh had told his tale to the.media, the &ct that I actually was relatively solitary (and had a particular distaste for the clique) would have made it easier for the other members of the clique to believe, through the phenomenon of "media planting." that I was as isolated as Mcintosh claimed.
 
−
Similarly with the condition of my room. Even though there was no "rottingfood" and the floor was clear of trash c:z:ccpc for the pile of paper in the comer, my room must have seemed distressingly messy by the narrow· minded. status-conscious standards of the clique. This would have made ir easier for them to believe as a result of "media planting" (based on Mcin­tosh's story) that my room was a veritable garbage-dump. How Mcintosh came by his story in the first place is another question. It may have been sug­gested to him by media photos of me in the filthy rags I wore when I was arrested; or it may be a case of mistaken identity: Mcintosh had me mixed up with the oddball. and for all I know the oddball's room may~been as filthy as Mcintosh says mine was.
 
−
In addition. the conformity of the clique-members would almost have compelled them to depict me in the same way that everyone else was depicting me; and according to the media everyone else was depicting me as a grotesque freak.
 
−
WHAT s v ER MAY B a the explanation for the story told by Mcintosh and his buddies, I know chat there was no "rotting" or '' old" food or dirty dishes in my room at Harvard. and I know that most of the floor was clear of trash. I offer the reader the following additional reasons for taking my word over that of the clique.
 
−
First, the members of the clique can claim to have seen the interior of my room only occasionally. whereas I lived in it all the time, so I ought to know much better than they did what itwas like.
 
−
Second, in the Introduction (pp. 7-9) I provided evidence of the excel­lence of my long-term memory.
 
−
Third, my chief investigator, Investigator #2. has attested in writing to my honesty in dcsaibing my past life. See Chapter u, Note 32.
 
−
N.B. Of the former occupants of N-43 locatcdby my investigators, apart from Mcintosh and his three buddies, only one was in the suite for more than one academic year of the time that I was there (he was there for three semesters), and none remembered enough to give any useful information (so far as I know). This doesn't mean that their memories arc worse than those of the clique-members. They may simply be less suggestible or more honest with themselves.
 
  
 +
Appendix D: Forms of Consciousness and Knowledge
  
 +
Appendix E: Properties of Truth
  
−
Appendix 4
+
Appendix F: Common Deviations from Dialectical Materialism
  
−
“The Wild Colt”
+
'''Glossary and Index'''
  
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Appendix 4 I T .H E p O L LO wING Is my transla­tion of 'El Potro Salvaje' by the Uruguayan writer Horacio Quiroga. with comments. Isentit to Dave as a birthday present in1985.
+
<br />
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THE WILD COLT
 
−
Horacio Quiroga
 
−
He was a colt, an ardent younghorse, who came from the back-country to the city to make his livingby ahibiting his speed.
 
−
To sec that animal run was indeed a spectacle. He ran with his mane fly­ing in the wind and with the wind in his dilated nostrils. He ran, he stretched himself out, _he stretched himself still more, and the thunder in his hooves was beyond measuring. He ran without rules or limits in any direction over the wild plains and at any hour of the day. There were no tracks laid out for the freedom of his run, nor was his display of energy constrainedby any norms. He p~cssed extraordinary speed and an ardent desire to run. Thus he puthis whole selfinto his wild dashes-and this was the strength of that horse.
 
−
As is usual with very swift creatures. the young horse was not much good as a draft-animal. He pulled badly, without heart or energy. with no taste for the work. And since in the back-country there was barely enough grass ro support the heavy draft-horses, the swift animal went to rhe cicy to live by his running.
 
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At first he showed the spectacle of his speed for nothing, for no one would have given a wisp of straW to see it-no one knew the kind of run­ner chat was in him. On fine afternoons, when the people thronged the fields on the outskirts of the city, and especially on Sundays. the young horse would trot out where everyone could see him. would take otf sud· denly. stop, trot forward again sniffing the wind, and finally throw himself forward at full speed, stretched out in a mad run that seemed impossible to surpass, and that he kept surpassing every moment, for that young horse. as we have said, put into his nostrils. into his hooves and into his run the whole ofhis ardent heart.
 
−
People were astonished by that spectacle that departed from everything chat they were accustomed to see, and they left without having appreciated the beauty of that run.
 
−
No matter, said the horse cheerfully. "I will go to sec an impresario of spectacles. and meanwhile I will earn enough to live on."
 
−
What he had lived on until then in the city he himself would hardly have been able to say. On his own hunger, certainly. and on waste thrown out at the gates of the stockyards. He went, therefore. to sec an organizer of festivals.
 
−
I an run before the public,,. said the horse. if I am paid for it. I don't know how much I may cam, but my way of running has pleased some men."
 
−
No doubt. no doubt. they answered. "There is always someone who takes an interest in such things .... But one must have no illusions. ... We may be able to otfcr you a little something as a sacrifice on our part ..."
 
−
The horse lowered his eyes to the man's hand and saw what he offered: It was a heap of scraw, a little dry. scorched grass.
 
−
It's the most we can do ... and besides ...
 
−
The young animal considered the handful of grass thac was the reward for his emaordinary gift of speed, and he remembered the faces that men made at the freedom of his run that cut zigzags across the beaten paths. "No matter.'' he told himself cheerfully. ..Some day I will catch their attention.l Meanwhile 1 will be able to gee along on this scorched grass."
 
−
And he accepted, satisfied, because what he wanted was to run.
 
−
He ran, therefore. that Sunday and on Sundays thereafter. for the same handful of grass. each time throwing himself heart and soul into bis running. Not for a single moment didhe thinkof holding back. of pretend­ing, or of following ornamental conventions to gratify the spectators, who didn't understand his freedom. He began his trot, as always, with his nos· crils on fire and his tail arched; he made the earth resound with his sudden dashes, to finally take off cross-country at full speed in a veritable whirl· wind of desire, dust, and thundering hooves. And his reward was a handful of dry grass that he ate happy and rested after the bath.
 
−
Sometimes, nevertheless, as he chewed the hard stalks with his young teeth. he thought of the bulging bags of oats that he saw in the shop win· dows, of the feast of maize and of fragrant alfalfa that overflowed from the mangers.
 
−
No matter he said to himself cheerfully. "I can content myself with this rich grass." And he kept on running with his belly pinched by hunger, as he had always run.
 
−
But gradually the Sunday strollers became accustomed to his free way of running. and they began to tell each. other that that spectacle of wild speed without rules or limits gave an impression of beauty.
 
−
He does not run along the tracks. as is customary. they said. "but he is very fast. Perhaps he has that acceleration because he feels freer off the beaten paths. And he uses every ounce of his strength...
 
−
In fact, the young horse, whose hunger was never satisfied and who barely obtained enough to liw on with his burning speed. gave every ounce of his strength for a handful of grass. as if each run wcxe the one that was to make his reputation. And after the bath he contentedly ate his ration­the coarse, minimal ration of the obscurest of the most anonymous horses.
 
−
No matter. he said cheerfully. "The day will soon come when l will catch their attention ...
 
−
Meanwhile, time passed. The words exchanged among the spectators spread through and beyond the city. and at last the day arrived when men's admiration was fixed blindly and trustingly on that running horse. The organizers of spectacles came in mobs to offi:r him contraas, and the horse, now of a mature age, who had run all his life for a handful of grass, now saw competing offers of bulging bundles of alfal&. massive sacks of oats and maize-all in incalculable quantity-for the mere spectacle of a single run.
 
−
Then for the first time a feeling ofbitterness passed through the horse's mind as he thought how happy he would have been in his youth if he had been offered the thousandth part of what they were now pouring glori­ously down his gullet.
 
−
In chose days,·• he said to himself sadly, a single handful of alfalfa as a stimulis [sic] when my heart was pounding with the desire to run would have made me the happiest ofbeings. Now I am tired."
 
−
He was in fact tired. Undoubtedly his speed was the same as ever, and so was the spectacle of his wild freedom. But he no longer possessed the will to run that he had had in earlier days. That vibrant desire to cxrend himself to the limit as he had once done cheeifully for a heap of srraw now was awakened only by tons of exquisite fodder. The victorious horse gave long thought to the various offers, calculated, engaged in fine speculations con­cerning his rest periods.2 And only when the organizers bad given in co his demands did he feel the urge to run. He ran then as only he was able; and came back to gloat over the magnificence of the fodder be bad earned.
 
−
But the horse became more and more difficult to satisfy. though the organizers made real sacrifices to adte, to flatter, to purchase that desire to run that was dyingunder the weight ofsuccess. And the horse began to fear for his prodigious speed. to worry that he might lose it if he put his full strength into every run. Then, for the first time in his life, he held back as he ran. cautiously taking advantage of the wind and of the long, regularpaths. No one noticed-or perhaps he was acclaimed more than ever for it-for there was blind belief in the wild freedom of his run.
 
−
Freedom . . . No, he no longer bad it. He had lost it from the first moment that he reserved his strength so as not to weaken on the nett run. He no longer ran cross-country. nor against the wind. He ran overthe easiest ofhis own tracks, following those zigzags that had aroused the greatestova­tions. And in the ~-growingfear of wearing himself·out, the hone arrived at a point where he learned to run with style, cheating. prancing foam-cov­crcd over the most beaten paths. And he was deified in a clamor of glory.
 
−
But two men who were contemplating that lamentable spectacle exchanged a few melancholy words seen him run in his youth," said the first, "and if one could cry for an animal. one would do so in memory of what this same horse did when he had nothing tcieat." it is not surprising that he used to do such things, .. said the second. ..Youth and hunger arc the most precious gifts that life can give to a strong heart."
 
−
Young horse: Stretch yourself to the limit in your run even if you hmlly get enough to eat. For if you arrive worthless at glory and acquire style in order to trade it fraudulently for succulent fodder, you will be saved by hav­ing once given your whole self for a handful of grass.
 
  
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-3.png|''“Great Victory for the People and Army of South Vietnam!”'']]
  
−
COMMENTS
+
<br />
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The idea of this story is not very original, but I think that Quiroga expresses it beautifully.
 
−
Somerset Maugham seems co have held a contrary pointofview to that of Quiroga's story. [n Of Human Bonditgt he has the experienced painter Foinet advise an aspiring young artist: "You will hear people say that . poverty is the best spur to the artist. They have never felt the iron of it in their flesh." With a lot more in the same vein; and this seems to have repre­sented Maugham's own attitude. Apparently Maugham hadsome disagree­able apcricnccs with poverty in his youth. But Quiroga coo seems to have known poverty. [n the introduction to the collection of his stories chat I have, one of the many occupations ascribed co him is chat of "penniless glo­betrotter," and he is quoted as having said in Paris: "I would ttade [literary] giory for the security ofbeing able to catthree days in succession...
 
−
I suppose there's no way of definitively resolving the conflict. What leads to creativity in one person is not necessarily whatleads to creativityin another.
 
  
 +
= Introduction to the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism =
  
 +
== I. Brief History of Marxism-Leninism ==
  
−
Appendix 5
+
=== 1. Marxism and the Three Constituent Parts ===
  
−
Interviews with Joel Schwartz
+
Marxism-Leninism is a system of scientific opinions and theories which were built by Karl Marx<ref>Karl Marx, 1818–1883 (German): Theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, political economist, founder of scientific socialism, leader of the international working class.</ref> and Friedrich Engels<ref>Friedrich Engels, 1820–1895 (German): Theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, leader of the international working class, co-founder of scientific socialism with Karl Marx.</ref>, and defended and developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin<ref>Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1870–1924 (Russian): Theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, defender and developer of Marxism in the era of imperialism, founder of the Communist Party and the government of the Soviet Union, leader of Russia and the international working class.</ref>. Marxism-Leninism was formed and developed by interpreting reality as well as building on preceding ideas. It provides the fundamental worldview* and methodology of scientific awareness and revolutionary practice. It is a science that concerns the work of liberating the proletariat from all exploitative regimes with the ambition of liberating all of humanity from all forms of oppression.
  
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lows in Ga) Mad Gfflius. pp. 124·125.
+
Marxism-Leninism is made up of three basic theories which have strong relationships with each other. They are: ''Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, Marxist-Leninist Political Economics,'' and ''Scientific Socialism''.
−
re was bis (Dave's] feeling that his brother mentally went over the edge,' said Schwartz, who even went with David to visit Ted in Montana in x974-David had warned that he might be a little ornery. But Joel didn't sec the rough edges. 'Ted seemed at case; Dave had warned me he might not be. My memory of him did not quite fit what we all came co see. He was very orderly, meticulous. He was ecccnaic. but he was engaging at the same time. We had some lively discussions. He was very much into ecology and very angry at the ~y the world was going.' But over the years, Joel said. David had come t-o realize something else. 'There was a madness there. His isolation opened him to madness. This is why Dave. I believe. felt chat Ted had to finally be brought back to the human com.munit}t It was bis hope anyway.'
 
−
Schwartz knew Davidhad aicd to keep reaching out co bis brother even as Ted slipped further away. Yet the relationship between the brothers grew more strained. particularly after David got married. 'I know Dave wrote many letters that were rebuffed in later years; Joel said. 'Sometimes. with family members. there can be a kind of distance you can't quite get ovu;'"
 
−
The following arc excerpts from (Qb) Written Investigator Report #rrz.. Joel Schwartz.
 
−
[One and a half pages redacted} TED
 
−
Joel heard about Ted before he met him. When Joel and Dave were in college, Dave talked reverently about Ted, who was at Michigan. Dave wor­shiped Ted and idealized him as the smart, gifted older brother. After Dave and Joel graduated in 1970, Dave kept Joel posted on Ted's progress. Joel knew about Ted's leaving Berkeley in 1972 and how Ted's family reacted to it. Although they were deeply troubled by Ted's behavior, they told every· one that Ted was just going to the wilderness for a short time to regroup before returning to Berkeley. On one hand, Dave painted a Thoreau-like . picrure of a strong figure who had the courage to abandon the trappings of civilization and retire to the wilderness. On the other band, Dave hoped Ted might return to civilization. ln the abstract. Dave admired Ted's courage and philosophy. The reality of Ted living in the wilderness made Dave uneasy. When Ted moved to Montana. where Dave was already liv­ing. Dave told his parents that he would look after Ted.
 
−
Joel and Dave visited Ted in 1974. soon after Dave moved from Montana. They were driving across the country together. Joel and Dave began their trip in Oregon and camped out along the way. They stayed at Ted's house one night and two days.
 
−
At that time, Dave still hoped Ted would return to civilization but he bad begun to have doubts. Dave warned Joel about Ted before Joel met him. He told Joel that Ted was afraid of people. He advised Joel that Ted rigidly defended his point of view during a debate and sharply ended the conversation when he did not agree with another person's point. Dave desaibed Ted as quirky and idiosyncratic. Dave told Joel not to talk about Berkeley because Ted was sensitive about the subject. Lastly, he advised Joel to give Ted space when Ted became agitated orfrustrated.
 
−
Although Joel could tell Ted was very strange, Ted was cordial. He did not get angry at Joel when he disagreed with him. For instance, Joel and Ted debated about the aistence of God. Ted argued God did not exist in a more atheist than agnostic way.Joel argued that God did exist as evincedby the existence of order and balance in nature. Ted told Joel that while he did not believe in Joel's premise. he thought Joel made a strong. logical argu· ment. Joel liked Ted. Ted treated him with respect. Ted was pleasant. Although Ted did not engage superficial discourse, he did talk.Joel rem.cm· hers being impn:3.1Cd with how well read Ted was.
 
−
Ted's cabin was small. but very neat. Joel thought Ted had meticulous control over the contents of his cabin. Ted was very proud that he was self· sufficient. He showed Dave and Joel his vegetable garden and talked about his growing techniques. He was protective of his land and pointed out the boundaries of his property. Ted told Dave and Joel that he liked Lincoln res­idenrs. but he liked to be left alone.
 
−
Ted was thin. and his beard was shorter than it was when he was arrested and neatly groomed. Joel and Dave hiked with Ted during the cwo days they were there. Ted pointed out plants and other natural phenomena. Joel and Dave slept outside, on Ted's property. in a tent. Joel and Dave had a bottle ofJim Beam bourbon with them. Ted didnot drink any.
 
−
Joel told Ted that he was undergoing ac:upuncrurc to relieve the pain caused by his head injury. Ted thought Joel was crazy. AfterJoel and Dave left Ted's cabin. Ted wrote Dave letters about Joel. He said Joel was schizo­phrenic. Ted told Dave to contact Joel's father so that Joel could get the psy­chological help he needed. At the time, Dave and Joel laughed about these letters. Joel was not offended by Ted's comments. In fact, he thought Ted was being very caring. To Joel, Ted's opinion, though misguided and ill­founded, was indicative of warm feelings and genuine concern. Since Ted's arrest, Joel and Dave have talked about those letters. In hindsight. Joel b~Ted's comments on Joel's mental health were really cries for help. Joel believes Ted projected his own mental illness onto Joel.
 
−
Ted began to unravel in the late I97QS. Dave became distressed thatTed was breaking down. He described Ted's-letters to Joel. Ted's letters sent warning bells off in Joel's head. Ted's mac.ion on wrongs he believed his parents perpetrated against him reminded Joel of his mother. I...ikc Joel's mother, Ted Sneed on an act or event and saw it as all-threatening. When Joel was four years old, Joel's mother repeatedly came into Joel's room, turned off all the lights, closed the shades and told Joel that the nuclear holocaust was coming. She obsessed about the threat of nuclearwaruntil it was like a black. hole inside her. It controlled how she perceived the world and she could not stop it or appreciate it. Her delusions ate at her. Ted was the same way. Tedwrotea letter to his parents describing in detail how they had permanently scarred him when they called him stupid as a youngsta. Most people could have forgotten such a comment. but Ted was not able to. It ate at him until ic represented everything that was wrong withhis life and the world. Joel realized that Ted was mentally ill.
 
−
Around the time Dave got married, Dave consulted Joel about how to getpsychological orpsyclliatric.hclp for Ted. Dave, TedSr. and Wanda were thinking about writing Ted's physician. They knew Ted was seeing a doctor rcganling heart problems he was having.
 
−
DAVE
 
−
Joel has known Dave for over 30 years. Dave is Joel's best friend. In col­lege. Dave was less outgoing than Joel. Jed was the head of the debate ccam, belonged to the chess club and was active in the student government. Dave did not participate in extra curricular activities except for the srudent newspaper. Dave was quiet and shy and liked to be alone. He was frugal. He saved his money and spent time alone reading. Dave is neater thanJod, bur Joel is not a neat person at all.
 
−
Dave talked a great deal about his ex-girlfriend, Linda Patrik. Dave never really got over Linda. He was prepared never to be married after breaking up with Linda. Joel was not surprised they got married given the way Dave had pined for her.
 
−
Dave called Joel when he bought the property in Terlingua. Dave told Joel he was going to become a hermit in the outback and write a book. Joel did not think this was strange. Dave had always liked to be alone. Dave also liked the outdoon. Joel understood why Dave wanted to live in Texas because he too found the stark beauty of the desert enticing.
 
−
WANDA AND Tso Sa.
 
−
Joel knows Wanda and knew Ted Sr. Ted Sr. was pleasant. He and Wanda both spoke about the importance of education. It was dear they valued education above all else. Wanda and Ted Sr. used to invite him to stay at their house in Lombard when, and if, he ever came through town. He stayed at their house a couple of times. Ted Sr. and Wanda were of a generation that held a prejudice against mental illness. Wanda has talked with Joel about Ted's psychological problems. Since Ted's arrest, she has asked Joel why he was able to survive his mother's attack while the hospital­ization Ted underwent at 9 months permanently scarred him. She thanked Joel for being Dave's mend. Wanda told him that he was like the big brother Dave never had.
 
−
He was sorry when Ted Sr. killed himself. He re.members that Ted Sr. had specifically invited Dave back home the weekend he killed himself.
 
−
[six pages redacted]
 
−
David's time living in the desert in Texas had a special effect on David. David was different when he was in Texas. David kept tcllingJoel that when he was in Texas the world felt pure and uncontaminated. David felt like he was part of the environment and at one with the earth.
 
−
[three lines redacted] ... David strictly avoided using and [sic] drugs, including alcohol Drugs were not something Wanda and Ted Sr. approved ofand David ttied to live in strict accordance with his parenrs' beliefs. Although Wanda and Ted Sr. were politically progressive. they were very conservative socially. Likewise. in college. David had liberal political beliefs but he rarely went out with friends. never dated and never drank or experimented with drugs.
 
−
From the first day Joel met David. David was obsessed with Linda Patrik. David told Joel that he had gone out with Linda in high-school, chat he was in love withher, and that she was the only woman he was ever going to love. David talked toJoel endlessly about Linda's virtues. David said she was different from any other woman. Linda was special and brilliant. David wrote her letters and much of David's time was consumedby thinking and talking about her.
 
−
David also idolized Ted. When David entered Columbia in r966, Ted was studying mathematics at the University of Michigan. David was very proud of Ted and often told Joel that Ted was a genius. Joel found David's worship of Ted strange and inappropriate. David also warned Joel that Ted was different and-did not relate to people well socially.
 
−
Since Joel had known David. David had always been extremely con­cerned about money. He is frugal and avoids spending money on anything he docs not deem absolutely necessary. When David was in college. he often avoided participating in social cvcnrs that cost money. He did not eat in restaurants orgo to shows.
 
−
The day that Joel and David moved into their freshman dorm at Colum­bia. Joel's father, Simon. invited David to come to lunch with him and Joel. They ate lunch at a moderately priced restaunnt and when the bill came, Simon paid. Later in the afternoon after Simon had left. David began obsessing over whether it was appropriate for Simon to have paid for his lunch. David kept tcllingjoel that he felt guilty. Joel did not. understand why David was so concerned with the matter and finally told David to stop worrying.
 
−
David was willing to go to one diner near Columbia because the food was cmcmely cheap. Frequently when they went out, David proposed a topic for discussion and Joel and David discussed the subject while they ate. David has always approached conversation in this manner. He likes to pre· senta topic and ifthe topic is agi:ecable to everyone present, it becomes the subject of conversation. David has six or seven conversation topics which he likes to recycle. David's topics include the question ofwhetheran artist's personal life affects his or her art, baseball, writers (specifically Cormac McCarthy). music. Heidegger. and Third World ~F'U'St World issues. When they were not togetb~ David and Joel spend a lot of time in collcge along[sic], rhinking and writing.
 
−
David came from a different background than Joel Joel grew up in a fairly affluent area of New Jersey. in a community that was conservative and religious. The Kaczynski family was lower middle class, intellectual and devout atheists. David seemed to embrace his parents' values fully.
 
−
[three paragraphs redacted}
 
−
David does not express C%tl'Cme emotion. When Ted Sr. committedsui­cide, David did not seem to be greatly affected. There was Vet'/ little change in David's demeanor. David said that he regretted what his father had done, but he understood him.
 
−
[ one paragraph redacted]
 
  
 +
''Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism'' studies the basic principles of the movement and development of nature, society and human thought. It provides the fundamental worldview and methodology of scientific awareness and revolutionary practice.
  
−
Appendix 6
+
Based on this philosophical worldview and methodology, ''Marxist-Leninist Political Economics'' studies the economic rules of society, especially the economic rules of the birth, development, and decay of the capitalist mode of production, as well as the birth and development of a new mode of production: the communist mode of production.
  
−
Books about the Unabom case
+
''Scientific Socialism''** is the inevitable result of applying the philosophical worldview and methodology of Marxism-Leninism, as well as Marxist-Leninist Political Economics, to reveal the objective rules of the socialist revolution process: the historical step from capitalism into socialism, and then communism.
  
−
Appendix 6 I vER y s O ON A p TE R my arrest, two quickie books about my case appeared: Ga) Mad GffliKS, by the staff of Time Mag=ine, and (Jb) Unabomber, by John Douglas and Mark QI.shaker. Everything that I've said about the news media applies to these two books, which are riddled with errors. To cake just a few enmples at random from Mad Gffliw: ''He came into town ... to stock up on flour and spam.. (p. 8). I bought spam maybe once in all my years in Lincoln, and hadn't bought any at all for several years prior to my arrest. "He walked with his head down. ... He didn't say ... 'yeah, right'; he'd say 'quite correct' .. (p. 8). I did not habitually walk with my head down; I often use expressions similar to "yeah, right," and I doubt chat I have ever in my life answered a question with "quite correct." "A Census worker ... actually got inside [Kaczynski's cabin]" (p. 8). No Census worker ever entered my cabin. "VLSitors knew bet­ter than to knock" (p. 9). I did not often have visitors, but when I did have them they commonly knocked (unless I was outdoors when they arrived), and I always greeted them courteously. On p. 9 the book refers to my "sad­dlebags... I had no saddlebags of any kind. "But days passed. and there was no sign of [Kaczynski] C%Cept an occasional foray to tend his garden" (p. 9). Are the authors stupid, or what? This was Mardt in the Northern Rockies. The ground was still frozen, and it was decidedly not the season for tending a garden. Besides, if it was from the FBI that the authors got the (mis)infor­mation that there "was no sign'' of me "except for an occasional foray;" then the statements on p. 7, co the effea that the FBr had the area of the cabin bugged and watched by " snipers" must be a lot of crap. On most days during March. and up to and including April 3, the day of my arrest, I spent several hours outdoors cutting firewood, hunting rabbits, doing other chores. or just enjoying the fresh air, so that if the FBI had had the area closely watched they would have seen plenty of "sign" of me. P. xo: The account of my arrest is badly garbled.
+
-----
−
The errors and distortions just go on and on throughout the book. Some of them are of no significance, but others combine to create a false idea of the kind of person that I am.
 
−
The Douglas and Olshakcr book is even worse:.
 
−
L'Affaire Unabomba, by Professor Jean-Marie Aposcolides, Editions du Rocher, Monaco, 1996, also is riddled with errors, but at least Professor Apostolides is honest enough to W3J'Il the reader in the first section of Chapter 4 that the book is based on unreliable material: "The reader is advised ... to consider the hypotheses I advance as based on information from limited or biased sources" (p. 65). I think, however, chat Professor Apostolides will be embarrassed when he learns just how wildly inaccurate his book really is. To take just a few examples of his errors: On p. 66 he states that my father occupied "by the end of his career, a position almost equivalent to that of an engine~" In reality my father never occupied any such position. Professor A. States that my father taught my brother and me "wilderness survival skills... My father could not have done this, because he knew almost nothing about ..wilderness survival skills" bimself. Contrary to what Professor A. states, my mother was not ..very active in the neigh­borhood." On p. 68, Professor A. states that my parents "never stopped working co help the poor." In reality. my parents never lifted a finger to help the poor. at least not from the time I was old enough to be aware of their activities. I recall a discussion I had with chem in 1979. They claimed that they would be willing to sacrifice the "high standatd of living" chat we have here in America in order to spread the wealth around and help the poor people of the ThirdWorld. I didn't doubt chat they believed this, but I knew my parents too well to believe it mysel£ With a sneer I told them that if it ever came down to making such a choice, they would find some excuse co oppose the sacrifice. By 1982, when they visited me in Montana, they appar­ently had become sufficiently concerned about illegal immigration from Mexico to feel it was a threat to their own security. and they expressed their indignation to me in quite self-righteous terms: "What right do these peo­ple think they have to come into someone else's country without pennis­sion?" or words to that effect. Evidently my parents were no longer willing to share America's wealth with the Third World.
 
−
On p. 69 Professor A. states that my parents "never hesitated to make their ideas known publicly, even when they knew themselves to be in the minority." ActUaily, my father was usually careful to express his socialistic opinions only to his best friends, at least during the years when I was close enough to my parents to have knowledge on this subject; and when I was a kid my mother was so fearful that people might find out we were atheists, that she repeatedly told me to say we were Unitarians whenever anyone might ask what our religion was. On p. 70, Professor A. writes: "Even though they themselves had no education past high-school. cbe older Kaczynskis were ambitious for their children... Actually my mother bad _ rwo years of college before I was born ((Be) Baby Book. p. 33). On p. 7I, Pro· fessor A. states: "Very early, in elementary school, [Ted] skipped a grade. He skipped another grade injunior high-school The teachers . . . ~pro­posed that he be allowed to skip a third grade-level . .... The truth is that I skipped sixth grade, my junior year in high-school. and no other grade. No proposal was ever made that I should skip a third grade. Such a proposal would have made no sense, because after: the s«ond time I skipped a grade I was already a high-school senior and there were no grades left for me to skip. On pp. 73·74. most of the (mis)information provided is fantasy. The errors go on and on. and more important than the individual errors is the
 
−
fact that the overall piccure of me and my family that Professor A. draws is grossly distorted.
 
−
The page citations given above refer not to the book as published in French, but to an unpublished English translation of which Professor Apostolides has kindly provided me with a copy, Ud) English Translation of L'Ajfaire Unabmnber.
 
−
Graysmith and the authors of MJJd. Gffliiu and Unabonther WCt"e oppor­tunists who justwanted to make a fast buckoutofother people's tragedies. Professor Apostolides was not an opportunist but was motivated by sincere interest in the case.
 
−
With the single ezception of Professor Michael Mcllo's recent book about my trial, not one of the published books about the Unabom case of which I have any knowledge even comes close to being accurate enough to serve as an acceptable source ofinformation.
 
  
 +
==== Annotation 1 ====
  
−
Appendix 7
+
<nowiki>*</nowiki> A ''worldview'' encompasses the whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about ourselves as human beings, and about life and the position of human beings in the world.
  
−
My high–school teachers’ reports on my personality
+
<nowiki>**</nowiki> The word “science,” and, by extension, “scientific” in Marxism-Leninism has specific meaning. Friedrich Engels was the first to describe the philosophy which he developed with Marx as “Scientific Socialism” in his book Socialism: Utopian and Scientific.  
−
Appendix 7 I ON APRIL 3, 1998, after the final draft of this book was finished. I came into possession of reports by three of my higb·school teachers that were part of my application for ~dmission to Harvard. These rcportS were part of my Harvard record and copies were in the possession of the government. but. despite at least two subpoenas by my defense team. Harvard failed to send us copies of them. and we didn't even know of their CJ:i.stence until late March 1998.
 
−
To save space I will omit the questions printed on the forms. but I repro· duce here in full all of the teachers' comments about me.
 
−
(Fe) School Records of TJK, Harvard. pp. 82. 83; report by R.M.R.:
 
−
I have known Ted for tw0 years and have had him in classes in Trigonometry. Physics.:.and Advanced Mathematics.
 
−
Ted has a sincere interest in his work. Ted needs no prodding. Ted's main concern is that his program and his work be challenging enough. His family are behind him. but do not push him. He is his own best pusher. He not only spends time onhis own doing ema class-related work, but intcrcts [sic] other students in making nips to nearby museums. He has organized several surveying parties in connections [sic] withTrigonometry. They have spent several whole days making rather encnsivc surveys of areas in some forest preserves nearby."""
 
−
I think that R.M.R. was trying much coo hard co get me into Harvard. I made exactly one surveying trip co the forest preserves with some other kids from the trigonometry class. I have only a vague memory of how the crip was organized. The teacher (R.M.R.) may have bestowed on me the (nominal) role of organizer, but I know for certain that I had in practice very little influence over the way the trip was conducted. We spent a few hours on one day surveying the boundary of one small pond. and that was all. rdidn't even participate in doing the calculations and drawing the map of the pond. All that was carried out by Terry L.
 
−
To continue with R.M.R.'s report:
 
−
[In intclleccual achievement and promise Ted is in the] Top ; of 950 [legibility doubtful] Could be the highest. Its (sic] a close race at the top.
 
−
Ted's performance in activities indicates a rapid comprehension of principles. a readiness to apply them, occasional impatience with details and a small degree of infl~ilitywhen under cmcme pressure. He is usu­ally poised and has an cmcmely stable personality. Evidence of leadership is indicated in item 2."
 
−
Ted is mature and is a scudcnt who can take responsibilities. I would feel confident that he would carry out any reasonable taskhe was assigned. I know of no difficulties he is eq,eriendng. His main strength is cmcme intelligence. He has completed four years of high-school in three. His main weakness is that he is advanced for bis age although he fits in well with bis classmates . ..October 18, 1957. [signed] R-M. R-..
 
−
(Fe) School Records of 'IJK. Harvard. pp. 84. s;; Report by R. Kn.: I have known Ted for two years. and taught himin English IL ""Ted's parents have never evidenced undue concern about grades, only" concern over whether he was working up to capacity. When he was in my class, which was suppos~d to include the superior students of bis age group, he did extra work of two kinds: an extemporaneous speech once a week on world problems, and a research paper on archaeology. His speeches showed a thorough grasp of the subject, but the vocabulary he used was over the heads of the other students and he was more interested in abstract princi­ples than in dramatizing his introduction to hold the attention of the other students. This intCICSC in pursuing a question into its inaicate depths showed a less emoverccd personality than those of the boys who scatter their energies among many extra--curricular activities. Ted's ema-curricu­lar work is in music,. where skill is required. His mind is original and inde­pendent, so far ahead and afield that he simply wasn't present mcnrally when we repeated routine material. Seating him by the magazine shelves enabled him to go on with his reading aboutworld affairs, and while he was absent due to illness or injury he asked for a book "The Bible as History" which he readbecawe he was interestedin archaeology.
 
−
His intellectual capacity was first among the 900 students in this school.
 
−
Ted's vocabulary is extensive; his mwical ability is high and he has taken college-level workin mwic although his schedule is already over-bur­dened. This class in composition meets after school and in addition he has sufficient leadership to give free lessons on the trombone to a younger member of the band, on Saturdays. He has a laboratory in the basement of_ his home where he, with other boys. ezperiments with 'missiles' to his mother's horror. Som,e of the bandmembers felt last year thatif'first ch.air' in band had not been elective he would have had it. He did well in his con· test solo, but had to saaificc band for science this [year]."
 
−
Ted is persistent; when his schedule ruled out band he made arrange­ meru[s] to comein part-time in order to continue playing at public appear­ances. I thinkthat his veryheavyschedule, combining two yearsin one, has solved all the difficulties he ever had, which involved inattention during reviewworkwith other students.
 
−
One of his fine qualities might be mentioned: intc:rcst in detail and abstraction, in the perfection of skills and the pursuit of questions. His grandfather was called in to plan picture frames for Chicago's artists; his aunt and uncle were acellcnt mwidans whose careers were cut short by tragedy. His parents arc alert and responsible members of this newcommu· nity. His mother has hung a pegboard in the livingroom. where she places interesting objects and modem art, changing the picrures often so that her boys can become familiar with many.
 
−
Ted is a pleasant sort, not eccentric in his appearance or mannerisms.
 
−
In a school where most srudencs are the children of factory foremen, his
 
−
vocabulary is his most identifyingcharacteristic.
 
−
Harvardor any other school will gain an e:teellent srudent in Ted; he is potentially an outstandingscientist and citizen."
 
−
I believe that his willingness to scudy enemporancous speaking in my class, when his first interest is science, shows that he has broad interest (sic] and the qualities of a goodworld citizen.
 
−
Oct. 28, I9S7 (signed] R-Kn-.."
 
−
I won't bother to identify all the errors in these two reports. Sufficeit to Paga )fl
 
  
 +
However, it should be noted that the English phrase “scientific socialism” comes from
  
 +
Engels’ use of the German phrase “wissenschaftlich sozialismus.”
  
−
Appendix 8
+
“Wissenschaft” is a word which can be directly translated as “knowledge craft” in German, and this word encompasses a much more broad and general concept than the word “science” as it’s usually used in English.
  
−
The Tarmichael letters
+
In common usage, the word “science” in English has a relatively narrow definition, referring to systematically acquired, objective knowledge pertaining to a particular subject. But “wissenschaft” refers to a systematic pursuit of knowledge, research, theory, and understanding. “Wissenschaft” is used in any study that involves systematic investigation. And so, “scientific socialism” is only an approximate translation of “wissenschaftlich sozialismus.” So, “scientific socialism” can be understood as a body of theory which analyzes and interprets the natural world to develop a body of knowledge, which must be constantly tested against reality, with the pursuit of changing the world to bring about socialism through the leadership of the proletariat.
−
Appe n di X 8 I TH B Po L Low I N G letter from me to Ellen Tarmichael constitutes (Cb) FL Supplementary Item #2.
 
−
Sept. 2, 1978
 
−
Dear Ellen,
 
−
I want to offer you my unqualified apology. I am no longer interested in deciding whether you were or were not insincere with me. Either way. I deeply regret that I insulted you, and I am emcmely sorry that I took an unpleasant tone in the first letter I sent you.
 
−
My only excuse for becoming so e:cssivdy upset is that, foolishly. I had come to feel much more strongly about you than I had any right to do. There is something in you to which I respond powerfully. in spite of all our differences. To me you were a ray of sunshine. I didn't realize myself how badly C wanted you until I was forced to abandon all hope in that direction; C find it much more difficult to get over than I had imagined I would.
 
−
IfIstill thought there were any chance that you could ever care for me, I would do almost anything to win your esteem. But you have made it clear that there is no such chance. To my sorrow. I apparently have nothing to offer that is of interest to you.
 
−
I hope that you find your new duties at Foam-Cutting more congenial now, and I wish you the best of luck generally. Again. I offer you my regret­ful apology.
 
−
TedJ. Kaczynski
 
  
 +
-----
  
 +
Even though these three basic theories of Marxism-Leninism deal with different subjects, they are all parts of a unified scientific theory system: the science of liberating the proletariat from exploitative regimes and moving toward human liberation.
  
−
Appendix 9
+
=== 2. Summary of the Birth and Development of Marxism-Leninism ===
  
−
Reliability of investigators’ reports
+
There have been two main stages of the birth and development of Marxism-Leninism:
−
Appendix 9 I As TO THE RELIABILITY of+ information provided by investigators: Investigators working for my defense team interviewed many people who had known me at various times in my life. Information reported to the investigators by the intervie­wees tended to be highly unreliable. But how reliable have the investigators been in reporting what the interviewees told them? Investigator #t is an investigator for the Federal Defenders in Montana. My guess is that her reports arc reasonably accurate. For what it may be worth. Investigator #2 told me that Investigator #1 was "an excellent inves­tigator," and that her reports could be assumed accurate. In this book I have used only written reports from lnvestigator #1. I have no way ofjudging the reliability of lnvestigator #4 or #7, but, as far as I know, only a minimal amount of the information I've used was obtained through them. Investigator #3 was not really an investigator but an attorney who worked with Investigator #2 and interviewed a few peo­ple. All other investigators (that I know of) were young people who worked under the supervision of Investigator #2. The chief of my defense team, Quin Denvir, gave me this opinion of Investigator #2: "In response to your inquiry. the mitigation investigator whom we retained for your case [Investigator #2], bas a very good reputation as an investigator, and Judy [Clarke] and I consider [his/her] work to be very reliable." (Cg) Nore from Quin Denvir to Ted Kaczynski, April 10, 1998.
 
−
I'm nor completely convinced by Mr. Denvir's assurance. In general, I was nor terribly impressed with the investigators who worked under Inves­tigator #2. The majority of them did not seem to be the kind of people who couldbe relied on for consistent accuracy. For example, a few of them were assigned the task of collating three versions of a document; ir was a straightforward and purely mechanical task, yet they made a hash of it. Investigator #2 him/herself seemed less reliable than the young investiga­tors who worked under him/ her. In several cases he/she gave me orally items of information that later turned out to be wrong. To take the worst example, Investigator #2 told me on September3, 1996, that Linda Patrik . had had at least two husbands before she married my brother. On October 8, 1997, Investigator #2 and I went over my written notes of this informa­tion, and he/she confirmed orally that Linda P. had had at least two hus­bands before she married Dave. See (Qe) Investigator Note #2.
 
−
Later I asked Investigator #2 to give me written confirmation of this item, andwhat he/she gave me was: "Since college, Linda bas been married once before her marriage with Dave...." (Qc) Written Reports by Investi­gator #2, pp. I, 2. That Linda was married only once before her marriage to Dave is supportedby their marriage certificate: (Ge) Marriage Certificate of David Kaczynski and Linda Pattik.
 
−
I assume that Investigator #2's written reports were prepared much more carefully than the oral ones, so they no doubt arc more reliable. I've found no errors in them.
 
−
I'm quite confident that Investigator #2's written reports are vastly more accurate and reliable than information from the media. At a guess, I'd say they are significantly more reliable than the FBI's 302's, but I doubt that they approach the standard of reliability that would be expected from workers in the hard sciences. This applies also to reports from the young people who worked under Investigator #2.
 
−
I'm sorry I can't tell the reader anything more definite about the accu­racy of these reports, but that's the best I can do.
 
−
Investigator #3 seemed to me to be much like Investigator #2 as far as reliability of oral reports is concerned. For example, he/she told me during March 1997, thar on February 27, 1997 my brother asked him/her the fol­lowing question:
 
−
Do our public comments hurt Ted even though he knows we know they arc not true [and] we arc doingit to help him? (Qa) Oral Report from Investigator #3, March[?], 1997.
 
−
I wrote this down at Investigator #fs dictation, and there can be no doubt that I recorded it with close to word-for-word accuracy.
 
−
The investigators knew since some time in I996 that I was planning to write a book like the present one, and that I wanted their information for use in such a book. For some technical legal reason, they insisted that they could give me no information in writing until my trial was over. When I expressed misgiving at the fact that I was getting only oral information with nothing in writing to confirm it, Investigator #3 told me at least twice, 'We will backyou up'' with regard to the oral information.
 
−
My brother's question that I quoted above was obviously important from my point of view, since it contained an explicit admission that my brother and my mother had lied about me. Yet, when I asked Investigator #3 after the trial to give me written confirmation of this item, he/ she gave me only a watered-down version that omitted the crucial words, "we know they are not true," which he/she claimed were not in his/her notes. One concludes either that Investigator #3's original report to me was wrong. or else that he/she neglected to record in his/her notes the most important part of Dave's question.
 
−
The very few reports from [nvestigator #3 that I use in this book are noted as coming from Investigator #3. Unless otherwise noted in the book, materials used that arc based on investigator reports arc materials in whose accuracy I have confidence.
 
  
−
AD o E o APRIL 2 8, 1998; modified July 19, 1998:
+
''1.'' ''Stage of formation and development of Marxism'', as developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.
−
But the question of investigator reliability has another dimension entirely different from the one we've been considering. At a time (April 1998) when I had finished writing this b!)Ok except for minor revisions and thepresent appendix, I received information that gave me a much fuller pic­ture of Investigator #2 than I'd had previously. It appears that he/she is an anti-death penalty zealot who has no sauplcs about manipulating clients and deceiving them in 'order to "save" them whether they like it or not. He/she is regarded as an expert in "managing" (i.e. manipulating) clients, and specializes in "proving" that they are mentally ill Before receiving this information I had of course realized that Investigator #2 had been less than honest with me, but I had not fully understood the extent to which he/she had deceived me orhow dishonest he/she was.
 
−
How docs Investigator #2's character affect the reliability of his/her reports? I can only guess. Since he/she has a very good reputation among lawyers (as is indicated by Quin Denvir's statement quoted earlier), he/she probably tries to make sure that the faces he/she reports to them arc accu­rate. But I would expect that he/she slants his/her reports: When I orally discussed Investigator #2.'s reliability with Quin Denvir, he told me that he was confident that the facts that Investigator #2 reported were accurate, but he added that possibly Investigator #2 might omit facts that would hurt the case he/she was trying to build.
 
−
In any event, given Investigator #1.'s agenda, it is certain that any slant­ing of the reports that he/she prepared for my lawyers must be in a direc­tion that would tend to exaggerate any indications of mental illness on my part. Anything in those reports (i.e., in (Qb) Written Investigator Reports) that argues for my sanity (such as self-discrediting information from "wit­nesses" to my "insanity"') can presumably be accepted at face value.
 
−
What about the accuracy of the oral and written reports that lnvestiga· . tor #2 prepared for me personally? (I.e., (Qa) Oral Reports from Investiga­tors, (Qc) Written Reports by Investigator #2., (Qe) Investigator Notes.) Those that deal with concrete facts arc probably honest, since Investigator #2 would not endanger his/her reputation by knowingly reporting facts incorrectly.
 
−
Investigator #2. played a double game with me, leading me to believe that he/she was going to help me to refute my brother's portrait of me as a madman, when in reality he/she was working to collect the tools that would enable my lawyers to represent me as insane-the crazier the better -inorder to ..save" me from the death penalty.
 
−
After I plead guilty. Investigator #2 continued to misrepresent to me his/her role, downplaying the part that he/she had played in the effort to portray me as severely mentally-ill, so that I never realized the extent to which he/she had helped to manipulate me until I received information from an outside source.
 
−
Let me repeat here what I have indicated elsewhere with regard to material in this book that were drawn from the investigator reports, I have used only those portions that I believe were accurately transcribed by the investigators.
 
  
−
EARLY IN February 1998 I asked Investigator #2 whether he/she could find out if my brother had been in contact with his friends between the time of my arrest (April 3, 1996) and the time when they were inter­viewed by the investigators (December 7-10, 1996; May u.June 10, andJune 25, 199;. see (Qb) Written Investigator Reports #32, Dirk West, #33, Bill Wadham and Sally Baker, #122., Joel Schwartz). In reply. Investigator #2 sent me a note that said, "Dave did not call... That was the entire note. Sec (Qe) Investigator Note #s.
+
''2.'' ''Stage of defense and developing Marxism into Marxism-Leninism'', as developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.
−
At the time, I had plenty of other things on my mind, so I just assumed that my brother had not been in contact with his mends before they were interviewed, and filed that information in the back of my mind. But after learning how dishonest Investigator #2 had been with me I took the trou­ble to reflect on this matter, and it seemed to me implausible that eight months or more could have passed without any written communication between my brother and these people who had been his close mends for many years. I would have expected them to contact him soon after they had learned of my arrest, and then certainly they would have talked about me with him.
 
−
Subsequently I noticed solid evidence that at least one of these people did indeed talk with my brother about me after my arrest but before being interviewed by the investigators. (Qb) Written Investigator Report #122, Joel Schwartz, May 11, 1997, p.4: "Ted wrote Dave letters about Joel. ... Since Ted's arrest.Joel and Dave have talked about those letters."
 
−
Joel Schwartz, Dirk West, Bill Wadham and Sally Baker all gave the investigators wildly inaccurate reports in which they portrayed me as suffering from severe mental illness. When I wrote the Introduction to this book I attributed their errors to such factors as "media planting." But another explanation now seems possible: My brother may have been in communication not only with Joel Schwartz but with the others as well, and may have asked them to help him "save" me by portraying me as men­tally ill.
 
−
It's also possible that Investigator #2 and his/her people may have used leading questions to elicit the kinds of answers they wanted from infor­mants. This is perhaps suggested by informants' responses that include the phrase "may have." (E.g., (Qb) Written Investigator Report #73, Phil . Alman, p.3): "There may have been times when Ted was unresponsive to questions." It doesn't seem likely that Phil Alman would have made this statement spontaneously. It's more plausible to suppose that be was asked, "were there times when Ted was unresponsive to questions, and answered, "There may have been."
 
−
Again, given the investigators' bias, when the investigators record statements by informants that would undermine their credibility as wit­nesses to my "sanity." those statements can be presumed to be accurately transcribed.
 
  
 +
==== a. Conditions and Premises of the Birth of Marxism ====
  
 +
-----
  
−
Appendix 10
+
==== Annotation 2 ====
  
−
A note on my memory
+
The following sections will explain the conditions which led to the birth of Marxism. First, we will examine the Social-Economic conditions which lead to the birth of Marxism, and then we will examine the theoretical premises upon which Marxism was built. Later, we will also discuss the impact which 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century advances in natural science had on the development of Marxism.
−
Appendix 10 | THE FOLLOWING IS (Cg) Note from Quin Dcnvir to Ted Kaczynski. April 30, 1998:
 
−
DearTed:
 
−
You have asked me my opinion regarding your long-term memory. We have been associated in the defense of your case for almost two years and have had many opportunities to discuss facts from the past. During that time I have been amazed by your long-term memory. I know no one who has a bettermemory for long-term details than you do. I discussed thiswith Judy Clarke, and she said that she thoroughly agrees with me.
 
−
Very truly yours, .
 
−
QuinDcnvir
 
  
 +
''- Social-Economical Conditions''
  
−
Appendix 11
+
Marxism was born in the 1840s. This was a time when the capitalist mode of production was developing strongly in Western Europe on the foundation of the industrial revolution which succeeded first in England at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Not only did this industrial revolution mark an important step forward in changing from handicraft cottage industry capitalism into a more greatly mechanized and industrialized capitalism, it also deeply changed society, and, above all, it caused the birth and development of the proletariat.
  
−
My Brother is prone to getting his facts garbled
+
-----
−
Appendix 11 | My Brother is prone to getting his facts garbled. Here are a few examples.
+
 
−
In one letter to Dave I mentioned Aztec poetry but did not quote any; I did quote some ancient Irish poetry. which I identified as Irish. But my brother got mixed up and thought I was quoting Aztec poetry. Sec (Ca) FL #2'75, letter from me to David Kaczynski, August 27, I983, p. 5.
+
==== Annotation 3 ====
−
My brother once told me-quite incorrectly-that Costa Rica was an English·speaking country. See (Ca) FL #220, letter from me to David Kaczynski, August 28, 1979, p. 1.
+
 
−
Through misunderstanding of something he'd read in a book, my brother believed that baking soda (sodium bicarbonate) underwent a chem­ical change during cooking that rendered it harm.less as far as any effect on blood-pressure was concerned-which of course is false. He also confused baking powder with baking soda. Sec (Ca) FL #288, letter from me to David Kaczynski, Summer 1984. p.3; FL #289, letter from David Kaczynski to me, Summer I984, pp. 1, 2.
+
Marx saw human society under capitalism divided into classes based on their relation to the means of production.
−
Dave told the FBI that our paternal grandfather, Jakub Kaczynski, had been a woodcarver by trade. It's possible that he may have done some wood-carving on the side, but he was by trade a gilder (a worker in gold ­leaf), not a woodcarver. See (Na) FBI 302 number 1, pp. 22; FBI 302 number 2. pp. 3, 4; (Be) Baby book, p. 35; (Qb) Written Investigator Report #74, Josephine Kaczynski Manney, September 8-10, 1996, p. 2.
+
 
 +
''Means of production'' are physical inputs and systems used in the production of goods and services, including machinery, factory buildings, tools, and anything else used in producing goods and services. ''Capitalism'' is a political economy defined by private ownership of the means of production.
 +
 
 +
Within the framework of Dialectical Materialism, all classes are defined by internal and external relationships [see ''The Principle of General Relationships'', p. 107]; chiefly, classes are defined by their relations to the means of production and to one another.
 +
 
 +
The ''proletariat'' are the working class — the people who provide labor under capitalism, but who do not own their own means of production, and must therefore sell their labor to those who ''do'' own means of production: the ''bourgeoisie''. As the owners of the means of production, the bourgeoisie are the ruling class under capitalism.
 +
 
 +
According to Marx and Engels, there are other classes within the capitalist political economy. Specifically, Marx named the ''petty'' ''bourgeoisie'' and the ''lumpenproletariat''. Marx defined the ''petty bourgeoisie'' as including semi-autonomous merchants, farmers, and so on who are self-employed, own small and limited means of production, or otherwise fall in between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.
 +
 
 +
In the ''Manifesto of the Communist Party,'' Marx described the petty bourgeoisie as:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
... fluctuating between proletariat and bourgeoisie, and ever renewing itself as a supplementary part of bourgeois society... The individual members of this class, however, are being constantly hurled down into the proletariat by the action of competition, and, as modern industry develops, they even see the moment approaching when they will completely disappear as an independent section of modern society, to be replaced in manufactures, agriculture and commerce, by overlookers, bailiffs and shopmen.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Vietnam’s Textbook of History for High School Students gives this definition of the petty bourgeoisie in the specific context of Vietnamese history:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The petty bourgeois class includes: intellectuals, scientists, and small business owners, handicraftsmen, doctors, lawyers, and civil servants. The vast majority of contemporary intellectuals before the August Revolution of 1945, including students, belonged to the petty bourgeoisie. In general, they were also oppressed by imperialism and feudalism, often unemployed and uneducated.
 +
 
 +
The petty bourgeoisie were intellectually and politically sensitive. They did not directly exploit labor. Therefore, they easily absorbed revolutionary education and went along with the workers and peasants.
 +
 
 +
However, the intelligentsia and students often suffer from great weaknesses, such as: theory not being coupled with practice, contempt for labor, vague ideas, unstable stances, and erratic behavior in political action.
 +
 
 +
Some other petty bourgeoisie (scientists and small businessmen, freelancers, etc.) were also exploited by imperialism and feudalism. Their economic circumstances were precarious, and they often found themselves unemployed and bankrupt. Therefore, the majority also participated in and supported the resistance war and revolution. They are also important allies of the working class.
 +
 
 +
In general, these members of the petty bourgeoisie had a number of weaknesses: self-interest, fragmentation, and a lack of determination. Therefore, the working class has a duty to agitate and spread propaganda to such members of the petty bourgeoisie, organize them, and help them to develop their strong points while correcting their weaknesses. It is necessary to skillfully lead them, make them determined to serve the people, reform their ideology, and unite with the workers and peasants in order to become one cohesive movement. Then, they will become a great asset for the public in resistance war and revolution.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Marx defined the “lumpenproletariat” as another class which includes the segments of society with the least privilege — most exploited by capitalism — such as thieves, houseless people, etc.
 +
 
 +
In the ''Manifesto of the Communist Party,'' Marx defined the lumpenproletariat as: “The ‘dangerous class’ (''lumpenproletariat''), the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of the old society.” Marx did not have much hope for the revolutionary potential of the lumpenproletariat, writing that they “may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.”
 +
 
 +
''Political Theories'', an official journal of the Ho Chi Minh National Institute of Politics, discussed the lumpenproletariat in the specific context of Vietnamese revolutionary history:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
It should be noted that Marxism-Leninism has never held that the historical mission of the working class is rooted in poverty and impoverishment. Poverty and low standards of living make workers hate the regime of capitalism, and causes disaster for workers, but the basic driving force behind the revolutionary struggle of the working class lies in the very nature of capitalist production and from the irreconcilable contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie.
 +
 
 +
Moreover, it should not be conceived that a class is capable of leading the revolution because it is the poorest class. In the old societies, there were classes that were extremely poor and had to go through many struggles against the ruling class, but they could never win and keep power, and did not become the ruling class of society.
 +
 
 +
History has proven that the class that represents newly emerging productive forces which are able to build a more advanced mode of production than the old ones can lead the revolution and organize society into the regime they represent. Fetishizing poverty and misery is a corruption of Marxism-Leninism...
 +
 
 +
The very existence of the lumpenproletariat is strong evidence of the inhumane nature of capitalist society, which regularly recreates a large class of outcasts at the bottom of society.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
In the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, millions of Vietnamese people were forced to leave their homes in rural farmlands to work for plantations and factories which were owned by French colonialists. These workers were functionally enslaved, being regularly physically abused by colonial masters, barred from any education whatsoever, and receiving only the bare minimum to survive. As a result, under French colonial rule, about 90% of Vietnamese were illiterate and the French aimed to indoctrinate Vietnamese people into believing that they were inferior to the French.
 +
 
 +
The French colonialists also worked with Vietnamese landlords to exploit peasants in rural areas. Those peasants received barely enough to survive and, like the plantation slaves, were prohibited from receiving education. Because Vietnamese peasants and colonial slaves composed the majority of workers while being so severely oppressed and living in conditions of such abject poverty, it was difficult to fully distinguish between the proletariat and the lumpenproletariat in Vietnam during the colonial era.
 +
 
 +
During this time, Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese communists developed the philosophy of “Proletarian Piety.” The word “piety,” here, is a translation of the Vietnamese word ''hiếu'', which originally comes from the Confucianist philosophy of “filial piety.” Filial piety demanded children to deeply respect, honor, and obey their parents. Through the concept of Proletarian Piety, Ho Chi Minh adapted this concept to proletarian revolution, calling for communists to deeply love, respect, and tirelessly serve the oppressed masses. This philosophical concept sought to unite the proletariat, lumpenproletariat, and petty bourgeoisie into one united revolutionary class. Even some feudal landlords and capitalists — who were, themselves, oppressed by the colonizing French — were willing to fight for communist revolution and were welcomed into the revolutionary movement if they were willing to adhere to the principle of proletarian piety. The working class and peasantry would lead the revolution, the more privileged classes would follow, and all communist revolutionists would serve the oppressed masses through sacrifice and struggle.
 +
 
 +
During this period, many novels were written and circulated widely which featured main characters who were members of the lumpenproletariat or enslaved by the French, such as ''Bỉ'' ''Vỏ,'' a story about a beautiful peasant girl who was forced to become a thief in the city, and ''Chí Phèo'', the story of a peasant who worked as a servant in a feudal landlord’s house who was sent to prison and became a destitute alcoholic after being released. The purpose of these stories was to show the cruelty of the colonialist-capitalist society of Vietnam in the 1930’s and to inspire proletarian piety, including empathy and respect for the extreme suffering and oppression of the lumpenproletariat, peasantry, and colonial slaves. These stories also presented sympathetic views of intellectuals and members of the petty bourgeoisie: for instance, in the novel ''Lão'' ''Hạc'', the son of a peasant leaves to work for a French plantation and the father never sees him again. The aged peasant becomes extremely poor and sick without the support of his son, and the only person in the village who helps him is a teacher, representing the intellectual segment of the petty bourgeoisie.
 +
 
 +
The writers of these novels were communists who wanted to promote the principles of proletarian piety. Rather than looking down on the most oppressed members of society, and rather than sewing distrust and contempt for the petty bourgeoisie, Vietnamese communists inspired solidarity and collaboration between all of the oppressed peoples of Vietnam to overthrow French colonialism, feudalism, and capitalism. Proletarian piety was crucial for uniting the divided and conquered masses of Vietnam and successfully overthrowing colonialism. Note that these strategies were developed specifically for colonial Vietnam. Every revolutionary struggle will take place in unique ''material conditions''<ref>Material conditions include the natural environment, the means of production and the economic base of human society, objective social relations, and other externalities and systems which affect human life and human society. See Annotation 79, p. 81.</ref>, and the composition and characteristics of each class will vary over time and from one place to another. It is important for revolutionists to carefully apply the principles of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics to accurately analyze class conditions in order to develop strategies and plans which will most suitably and efficiently lead to successful revolution.
 +
 
 +
The deep contradictions* between the socialized production force** and the capitalist relations of production*** were first revealed by the economic depression of 1825 and the series of struggles between workers and the capitalist class which followed.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 4 ====
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>*</nowiki> See: ''Definition of Contradiction and Common Characteristics of Contradiction'', p. 175.
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>**</nowiki> In Marxism, “socialization” is simply the idea that human society transforms labor and production from a solitary, individual act into a collective, social act. In other words, as human society progresses, people “socialize” labor into increasingly complex networks of social relations: from individuals making their own tools, to agricultural societies engaged in collective farming, to modern industrial societies with factories, logistical networks, etc.
 +
 
 +
The production force is the combination of the means of production and workers within any society. The “Socialized Production Force,” therefore, is a production force which has been socialized — that is to say, a production force which has been organized into collective social activity. Under capitalism, the “Socialized Production Force” consists of the proletariat, or the working class, as well as means of production which are owned by capitalists.
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>***</nowiki> Marx and Engels defined “relations of production” as the social relationships that human beings must accept in order to survive. Relations of production are, by definition, not voluntary, because human beings must enter into them in order to receive material needs in order to survive within a given society. Under capitalism, the relations of production require the working class to rent their labor to capitalists to receive wages which they need to procure material needs like food and shelter. This is an inherent contradiction because a small minority of society (the capitalist class) own the means of production while the vast majority of society (the working class) must submit to exploitation through wage servitude in order to survive.
 +
 
 +
Examples of such early struggles include: the resistance of workers in Lyon, France in 1831 and 1834; the Chartist movement in Britain from 1835 to 1848; the workers’ movement in Silesia (Germany) in 1844, etc. These events prove as historical evidence that the proletariat had become an independent political force which pioneered the fight for a democratic, equal, and progressive society.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 5 ====
 +
 
 +
Here are some brief descriptions of the early working class movements mentioned above:
 +
 
 +
'''Resistance of Workers in Lyon, France:'''
 +
 
 +
In 1831 in France, due to heavy exploitation and hardship, textile workers in Lyon revolted to demand higher wages and shorter working hours. The rebels took control of the city for ten days. Their determination to fight is reflected in the slogan: “Live working or die fighting!”
 +
 
 +
This resistance was brutally crushed by the government, which supported the factory owners. In 1834, silk mill workers in Lyon revolted again to demand the establishment of a republic. The fierce struggle went on for four days, but was extinguished in a bloody battle against the French army. About 10,000 insurgents were imprisoned or deported.
 +
 
 +
'''The Chartist Movement in Britain:'''
 +
 
 +
Chartism was a working class movement in the United Kingdom which rose up in response to anti-worker laws such as the Poor Law Amendment of 1834, which drove poor people into workhouses and removed other social programs for the working poor. Legislative failure to address the demands of the working poor led to a broadly popular mass movement which would go on to organize around the People’s Charter of 1838, which was a list of six demands which included extension of the vote and granting the working class the right to hold office in the House of Commons.
 +
 
 +
In 1845, Karl Marx visited Britain for the first time, along with Friedrich Engels, to meet with the leaders of the Chartist movement (with whom Engels had already established a close relationship). After various conflicts and struggles, Chartism ultimately began to decline in 1848 as more socialist-oriented movements rose up in prominence.
 +
 
 +
'''Workers’ Movement in Silesia, Germany:'''
 +
 
 +
In June, 1844, disturbances and riots occurred in the Prussian province of Silesia, a major center of textile manufacturing. In response, the Prussian army was called upon to restore order in the region. In a confrontation between the weavers and troops, shots were fired into the crowd, killing 11 protesters and wounding many others. The leaders of the disturbances were arrested, flogged, and imprisoned. This event has gained enormous significance in the history of the German labor movement.
 +
 
 +
In particular, Karl Marx regarded the uprising as evidence of the birth of a German workers’ movement. The weavers’ rebellion served as an important symbol for later generations concerned with poverty and oppression of the working class in German society.
 +
 
 +
It quickly became apparent that the revolutionary practice of the proletariat needed the guidance of scientific theories. The birth of Marxism was to meet that objective requirement; in the meantime, the revolutionary practice itself became the practical premise for Marxism to continuously develop.
 +
 
 +
''- Theoretical Premises''
 +
 
 +
The birth of Marxism not only resulted from the objective requirement of history, it was also the result of inheriting the ''quintessence''* of various previously established frameworks of human philosophical theory such as German classical philosophy, British classical political economics, and utopianism in France and Britain.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 6 ====
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>*</nowiki> In the original Vietnamese, the word ''tinh'' ''hoa'' is used, which we roughly translate to the word ''quintessence'' throughout this book. Literally, it means “the best, highest, most beautiful, defining characteristics” of a concept, and, unlike the English word ''quintessence'', it has an exclusively positive connotation. ''Quintessence'' should not be confused with the universal category of ''Essence'', which is discussed on p. 156.
 +
 
 +
German classical philosophy, especially the philosophies of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel<ref>Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 1770 — 1831 (German): Philosophy professor, an objective idealistic philosopher — representative of German classical philosophy.</ref> and Ludwig Feuerbach<ref>Ludwig Feuerbach, 1804 — 1872 (German): Philosophy professor, materialist philosopher.</ref>, had deeply influenced the formation of the Marxist worldview and philosophical methodology.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 7 ====
 +
 
 +
German classical philosophy was a movement of ''idealist'' philosophers of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Idealism is a philosophical position that holds that the only reliable experience of reality occurs within the human consciousness. Idealists believe that human reason is the best way to seek truth, and that consciousness is thus the only reliable source of knowledge and information.
 +
 
 +
One of Hegel’s important achievements was his critique of the metaphysical method.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 8 ====
 +
 
 +
Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy that attempts to explain the fundamental nature of reality by classifying things, phenomena, and ideas into various categories. Metaphysical philosophy has taken many forms through the centuries, but one common shortcoming of metaphysical thought is a tendency to view things and ideas in a static, abstract manner. Metaphysical positions view nature as a collection of objects and phenomena which are isolated from one another and fundamentally unchanging. Engels explained the problems of metaphysics in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The analysis of Nature into its individual parts, the grouping of the different natural processes and objects in definite classes, the study of the internal anatomy of organized bodies in their manifold forms — hese were the fundamental conditions of the gigantic strides in our knowledge of Nature that have been made during the last 400 years.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
But this method of work has also left us as legacy the habit of observing natural objects and processes in isolation, apart from their connection with the vast whole; of observing them in repose, not in motion; as constraints, not as essentially variables; in their death, not in their life. And when this way of looking at things was transferred by Bacon and Locke from natural science to philosophy, it begot the narrow, metaphysical mode of thought peculiar to the last century.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Francis Bacon (1561 — 1626) is considered the father of empiricism, which is the belief that knowledge can only be derived from human sensory experience [see Annotation 10, p. 10]. Bacon argued that scientific knowledge could only be derived through inductive reasoning in which specific observations are used to form general conclusions. John Locke (1632 — 1704) was another early empiricist, who was heavily influenced by Francis Bacon. Locke, too, was an empiricist, and is considered to be the “father of liberalism.”
 +
 
 +
Engels was highly critical of the application of metaphysical philosophy to natural science. As Engels continues in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:''
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes — ideas — are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses... For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other.
 +
 
 +
At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things, it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Dialectical Materialism stands in contrast to metaphysics in many ways. Rather than splitting the world into distinct, isolated categories, Dialectical Materialist philosophy seeks to view the world in terms of relationships, motion, and change. Dialectical Materialism also refutes the hard empiricism of Bacon and Locke by describing a dialectical relationship between the material world and consciousness [see: ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88].
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
For the first time in the history of human philosophy, Hegel expressed the content of dialectics in strict arguments with a system of rules and categories.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 9 ====
 +
 
 +
Dialectics is a philosophical methodology which searches for truth by examining contradictions and relationships between things, objects, and ideas. Ancient dialecticians such as Aristotle and Socrates explored dialectics primarily through rhetorical discourse between two or more different points of view about a subject with the intention of finding truth.
 +
 
 +
In this classical form of dialectics, a thesis is presented. This thesis is an opening argument about the subject at hand. An antithesis, or counter-argument, is then presented. Finally, the thesis and antithesis are combined into a synthesis, which is an improvement on both the thesis and antithesis which brings us closer to truth.
 +
 
 +
Hegel resurrected dialectics to the forefront of philosophical inquiry for the German Idealists. As Engels wrote in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Hegel’s work’s greatest merit was the taking up again of dialectics as the highest form of reasoning. The old Greek philosophers were all born natural dialecticians, and Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic of them, had already analyzed the most essential forms of dialectic thought.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Hegel’s great contribution to dialectics was to develop dialectics from a simple method of examining truth based on discourse into an organized, systematic model of nature and of history. Unfortunately, Hegel’s dialectics were idealist in nature. Hegel believed that the ideal served as the primary basis of reality. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels strongly rejected Hegel’s idealism, as well as the strong influences of Christian theology on Hegel’s work, but they also saw great potential in his system of dialectics, as Marx explained in ''Capital (Volume 1)'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Starting with a critique of the mysterious idealism of Hegel’s philosophy, Marx and Engels inherited the “rational kernel” of Hegelian dialectics and successfully built materialist dialectics.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 10 ====
 +
 
 +
In order to understand the ways in which the critique of Hegel’s philosophy by Marx and Engels led to the development of dialectical materialism, some background information on materialism — and the conflicts between idealist and materialist philosophy in the era of Marx and Engels — is needed.
 +
 
 +
Materialism is a philosophical position that holds that the material world exists outside of the mind, and that human ideas and thoughts stem from observation and sensory experience of this external world. Materialism rejects the idealist notion that truth can only be sought through reasoning and human consciousness. The history and development of both idealism and materialism are discussed more in the section ''The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues'' on page 48.
 +
 
 +
In the era of Marx and Engels, the leading philosophical school of materialism was known as ''empiricism''. Empiricism holds that we can ''only'' obtain knowledge through human sense perception. Marx and Engels were materialists, but they rejected empiricism (see Engels’ critique of empiricism in Annotation 8, p. 8).
 +
 
 +
One reason Marx and Engels opposed the strict empiricist view was that it made materialism vulnerable to attack from idealists, because it ignored objective relations and knowledge that went beyond sense data. The empiricist point of view also provided the basis for the ''subjective idealism'' of George Berkeley [see Annotation 32, p. 27] and the ''skepticism'' of David Hume. Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism is empiricist in that it supports the idea that humans can only discover knowledge through direct sense experience. Therefore, Berkeley argues, individuals are unable to obtain any real knowledge about abstract concepts such as “matter.”
 +
 
 +
Similarly, David Hume’s radical skepticism, which Engels called “agnosticism,” denied the possibility of possessing any concrete knowledge. As Hume wrote in ''A Treatise on Human Nature'': “I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another.” Hume’s radical skepticism lay in his empiricist belief that the only source of knowledge is sense experience; but Hume went a step further, doubting that even sense experience could be reliable, adding: “The essence and composition of external bodies are so obscure, that we mustnecessarily, in our reasonings, or rather conjectures concerning them, involveourselves in contradictions and absurdities.”
 +
 
 +
Later, in the appendix of the same text, Hume argues that conscious reasoning suffers from the same unreliability: “I had entertained some hopes (that) the intellectual world ... would be free from those contradictions, and absurdities, whichseem to attend every explication, that human reason can give of the material world.”
 +
 
 +
Engels dismissed radical skepticism as “scientifically a regression and practically merely a shamefaced way of surreptitiously accepting materialism, while denying it before the world.” Engels directly refutes radical skepticism in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:''
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
... how do we know that our senses give us correct representations of the objects we perceive through them? ... whenever we speak of objects, or their qualities, of which (we) cannot know anything for certain, but merely the impressions which they have produced on (our) senses. Now, this line of reasoning seems undoubtedly hard to beat by mere argumentation. But before there was argumentation, there was action... And human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we turn to our own use these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perception.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
This concept of determining the truth of knowledge and perception through practical experience is fundamental to dialectical materialist philosophy and the methodology of materialist dialectics, and is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3, p. 204.
 +
 
 +
Another weakness of empiricism is that it denies the objectiveness of ''social relations'', which cannot be fully and properly analyzed through sensory experience and observation alone. Marx saw that social relations are, indeed, objective in nature and can be understood despite their lack of sensory observability, and that doing so is vital in comprehending subjects such as political economy, as he observes in ''Capital Volume I'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
(The true) reality of the value of commodities contrasts with the gross material reality of these same commodities (the reality of which is perceived by our bodily senses) in that not an atom of matter enters into the reality of value. We may twist and turn a commodity this way and that — as a thing of value it still remains unappreciable by our bodily senses.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
In other words, Marx pointed out that no amount of sense data about a commodity will fully explain its value. One can know the size, weight, hardness, etc., of a commodity, but without analyzing the social relations and other aspects of the commodity which can’t be directly observed with the senses, one can never know or understand the true value of the commodity. The materialism of Marx and Engels acknowledges the physical, material world as the ''first basis'' for reality, but Marx and Engels also understood that it was vital to account for other aspects of rational knowledge (such as social relations). Marx and Engels believed that empiricist materialism had roughly the same flaw as idealism: a lack of a connection between the material and consciousness. While the idealists completely dismissed sense data and relied exclusively on reasoning and consciousness, the empiricists dismissed conscious thought to focus solely on what could be sensed.
 +
 
 +
It is important to note that, while Marx and Engels rejected ''empiricism,'' they did not reject ''empirical knowledge'' nor ''empirical data'' which is collected from scientific observation [see Annotation 216, p. 210]. On the contrary, empirical data was key to the works of Marx and Engels in developing dialectical materialism. As Lenin explained: “(Marx) took one of the economic formations of society – the system of commodity production – and on the basis of a vast mass of data which he studied for not less than twenty-five years gave a most detailed analysis of the laws governing this formation and its development.” And so, the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels served to bridge the gap between idealism and materialism. They believed that our conscious thoughts are derived from ''material'' processes, but that consciousness can also influence the material world. This is discussed in more detail in the section ''“Materialism and Dialectical Materialism”'' on page 48.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Marx and Engels also criticized many limitations of Feuerbach’s methodology and viewpoint* — especially Feuerbach’s prescriptions for how to deal with social problems — but they also highly appreciated the role of Feuerbach’s thought in the fight against idealism and religion to assert that nature comes first, and that nature is permanent and independent from human willpower.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 11 ====
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>*</nowiki> Viewpoint, point of view, or perspective, is the starting point of analysis which determines the direction of thinking from which problems are considered. Marx and Engels were critical of Feurbach’s hyper-focused ''humanist'' viewpoint.
 +
 
 +
Feuerbach’s atheism and materialism offered an important foundation for Marx and Engels to develop from an idealist worldview into a materialist worldview, which led them directly to developing the philosophical foundation of communism.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 12 ====
 +
 
 +
Ludwig Feuerbach was one of the “Young Hegelians” who adapted and developed the ideals of Hegel and other German Idealists. Feuerbach was a humanist materialist: he focused on humans and human nature and the role of humans in the material world. Like Marx and Engels, Feuerbach dismissed the religious mysticism of Hegel. Importantly, Feuerbach broke from Hegel’s religious-mystical belief that humans descended from supernatural origins, instead describing humans as originating from the natural, material world.
 +
 
 +
Feuerbach also distinguished between the objectivity of the material external world and the subjectivity of human conscious thought, and he drew a distinction between external reality as it really exists and external reality as humans perceive it. Feuerbach believed that human nature was rooted in specific, intrinsic human attributes and activities. As Feuerbach explains in ''The Essence of Christianity'': “What, then, is the nature of man, of which he is conscious, or what constitutes the specific distinction, the proper humanity of man? Reason, Will, Affection.”
 +
 
 +
Feuerbach explained that the actions of “thinking, willing, and loving,” which correspond to the essential characteristics of “reason, will, and love,” are what define humanity, continuing: “Reason, Will, Love, are not powers which man possesses, for he is nothing without them, he is what he is only by them; they are the constituent elements of his nature, which he neither has nor makes, the animating, determining, governing powers — divine, absolute powers — to which he can oppose no resistance.”
 +
 
 +
In his ''Collected Works'', Feuerbach further explains that materialism is supported by the fact that nature predates human consciousness:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Natural science, at least in its present state, necessarily leads us back to a point when the conditions for human existence were still absent, when nature, i.e., the earth, was not yet an object of the human eye and mind, when, consequently, nature was an absolutely non-human entity (''absolut'' ''unmenschliches Wesen''). Idealism may retort: but nature also is something thought of by you (''von dir gedachte''). Certainly, but from this it does not follow that this nature did not at one time actually exist, just as from the fact that Socrates and Plato do not exist for me if I do not think of them, it does not follow that Socrates and Plato did not actually at one time exist without me.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Marx and Engels were heavily influenced by Feuerbach’s materialism, but they took issue with Feuerbach’s sharp focus on human attributes and activities in isolation from the external material world. As Marx wrote in ''Theses on Feuerbach:'' “The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that... reality... is conceived only in the form of the object... but not as sensuous human activity.”
 +
 
 +
“Sensuous human activity” has a very specific meaning to Marx; it grew from two conflicting schools of thought:
 +
 
 +
The idealists believed the external world can only be understood through the ''active'' subjective thought processes of human beings, while the empiricist materialists believed that human beings are ''passive'' subjects of the material world. Marx synthesized these contradicting ideas into what he called “sensuous activity,” which balanced idealist and materialist philosophical concepts.
 +
 
 +
According to Marx, humans are simultaneously ''active'' in the world in the sense that our conscious activity can transform the world, and ''passive'' in the sense that all human thoughts fundamentally derive from observation and sense experience of the material world (see Chapter 2, p. 53). So, Marx and Engels believed that Feuerbach was misguided in defining human nature by our traits alone, portraying “the essence of man” as isolated from the material world and from social relations. In addition, Feuerbach’s humanism was based on an abstract, ideal version of human beings, whereas the humanism of Marx and Engels is firmly rooted in the reality of “real men living real lives.” As Engels wrote in ''Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
He (Feuerbach) clings fiercely to nature and man; but nature and man remain mere words with him. He is incapable of telling us anything definite either about real nature or real men. But from the abstract man of Feuerbach, one arrives at real living men only when one considers them as participants in history... The cult of abstract man, which formed the kernel of Feuerbach’s new religion, had to be replaced by the science of real men and of their historical development. This further development of Feuerbach’s standpoint beyond Feuerbach was inaugurated by Marx in 1845 in ''The Holy Family''.<ref>''The Holy Family'' is a book co-written by Marx and Engels which critiqued the Young Hegelians, including Feuerbach.</ref>
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Marx and Engels believed that human nature could only be understood by examining the reality of actual humans in the real world through our relationships with each other, with nature, and with the external material world. Importantly, it was Marx’s critique of Feuerbach which led him to define political action as the key pursuit of philosophy with these immortal words from ''Theses on Feuerbach:'' “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.”
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
The British classical political economics, represented by such economists as Adam Smith<ref>Adam Smith, 1723 — 1790 (British): Logic professor, moral philosophy professor, economist.</ref> and David Ricardo<ref>David Ricardo, 1772 — 1823 (British): Economist.</ref>, also contributed to the formation of Marxism’s historical materialist conception [see p. 23].
 +
 
 +
Smith and Ricardo were some of the first to form theories about labor value in the study of political economics. They made important conclusions about value and the origin of profit, and about the importance of material production and rules that govern economies. However, because there were still many limitations in the study methodology of Smith and Ricardo, these British classical political economists failed to recognise the historical characteristic of value*; the internal contradictions of commodity production**; and the duality of commodity production labor***.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 13 ====
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>*</nowiki> '''Historical Characteristic of Value'''
 +
 
 +
Marx generally admired the work of Smith and Ricardo, but saw major flaws which undermined the utility of their classical economic theories. Perhaps chief among these flaws, according to Marx, was a tendency for Smith and Ricardo to uphold an ''ahistoric'' view of society and capitalism. In other words, classical economists see capitalism as existing in harmony with the eternal and universal laws of nature, rather than seeing capitalism as a result of historical processes of development [see Annotation 114, p. 116]. Marx did not believe that the economic principles of capitalism resulted from nature, but rather, from historical conflict between different classes. He believed that the principles of political economies changed over time, and would continue to change into the future, whereas Smith and Ricardo saw economic principles as fixed, static concepts that were not subject to change over time. As Marx explains in ''The Poverty of Philosophy:''
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Economists express the relations of bourgeois production, the division of labour, credit, money, etc. as fixed, immutable, eternal categories... Economists explain how production takes place in the above mentioned relations, but what they do not explain is how these relations themselves are produced, that is, the historical movement that gave them birth... these categories are as little eternal as the relations they express. They are historical and transitory products.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>**</nowiki> '''Internal Contradictions of Commodity Production'''
 +
 
 +
In Marxist terms, a commodity is specifically something that has both a use value and a value-form (see Annotation 14, p. 16), but in simpler terms, a commodity is anything that can be bought or sold. Importantly, capitalism transforms human labor into a commodity, as workers must sell their labor to capitalists in exchange for wages. Marx pointed out that contradictions arise when commodities are produced under capitalism: because capitalists, who own the means of production, decide what to produce based solely on what they believe to be most profitable, the commodities that are being produced do not always meet the actual needs of society. Certain commodities are under-produced while others are over-produced, which leads to crisis and instability.
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>***</nowiki> Duality of Commodity Production Labor
 +
 
 +
In ''Capital'', Marx describes commodity production labor as existing in a duality — that is to say, it exists with two distinct aspects:
 +
 
 +
First, there is ''abstract labor'', which Marx describes as “labor-power expended without regard to the form of its expenditure.” This is simply the expenditure of human energy in the form of labor, without any regard to production or value of the labor output. Second, there is ''concrete labor'', which is the aspect of labor that refers to the production of a specific commodity with a specific value through labor.
 +
 
 +
Marx argues that human labor, therefore, is simultaneously, an activity which will produce some specific kind of product, and also an activity that generates value in the abstract. Marx and Engels were the first economists to discuss the duality of labor, and their observations on the duality of labor were closely tied to their theories of the different aspects of value (use value, exchange value, etc.), which was key to their analysis of capitalism.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Smith and Ricardo also failed to distinguish between simple commodity production and capitalist commodity production*, and could not accurately analyse the form of value** in capitalist commodity production.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 14 ====
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>*</nowiki> '''Commodity Production'''
 +
 
 +
''Simple commodity production'' (also known as ''petty commodity production'') is the production of commodities under the conditions which Marx called the “Simple Exchange” of commodities. ''Simple exchange'' occurs when individual producers trade the products they have made directly, themselves, for other commodities. Under simple exchange, workers directly own their own means of production and sell products which they have made with their own labor.
 +
 
 +
Simple commodity production and simple exchange use what Marx referred to as “C'''→'''M'''→'''C mode of circulation” [see Annotation 60, p. 59]. Circulation is simply the way in which commodities and money are exchanged for one another.
 +
 
 +
'''C→M→C stands for:'''
 +
 
 +
Commodity '''→''' Money '''→''' Commodity
 +
 
 +
So, with simple commodity production and simple exchange, workers produce commodities, which they then sell for money, which they use to buy other commodities which they need. For example, a brewer might make beer, which they sell for money, which they use to buy food, housing, and other commodities which they need to live.
 +
 
 +
In the C'''→'''M'''→'''C mode of circulation, the producers and consumers of commodities have a direct relationship to the commodities which are being bought and sold. The sellers have produced the commodities sold with their own labor, and they directly consume the commodities which they purchase with the money thus obtained.
 +
 
 +
''Capitalist commodity production'' and ''capitalist exchange'', on the other hand, are based on the M'''→'''C'''→'''M’ mode of circulation.
 +
 
 +
'''M→C→M’ stands for:'''
 +
 
 +
Money '''→''' Commodity '''→''' More Money
 +
 
 +
Under this mode of circulation, capitalists spend money to buy commodities (including the commodified labor of workers), with the intention of selling commodities for MORE MONEY than they began with. The capitalist has no direct relationship to the commodity being produced and sold, and the capitalist is solely interested in obtaining ''more money.''
 +
 
 +
Capitalist commodity production, therefore, uses the M'''→'''C'''→'''M’ mode of circulation, in which capitalists own the means of production and pay wages to workers in exchange for their labor, which is used to produce commodities. The capitalists then sell these commodities for profits which are not shared with the workers who provided the labor which produced the commodities.
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>**</nowiki> '''Value-Form'''
 +
 
 +
This is one of the most important, and potentially most confusing, concepts in all of Marx’s analysis of capitalism. Marx explains these principles at length in ''Appendix of the 1<sup>st</sup> German Edition of Capital, Volume 1'', but here are some of the fundamentals:
 +
 
 +
One of Marx’s key breakthroughs was understanding that commodities have many different properties which have different effects in political economies.
 +
 
 +
Just as Commodity Production Labor exists in a duality of Concrete Labor and Abstract Labor (see Annotation 13, p. 15), commodities themselves also exist in duality according to Marx:
 +
 
 +
Commodities have both “use-value” and “value.”
 +
 
 +
Use-Value (which corresponds to Concrete Labor) is the commodity’s ''tangible form'' of existence; it is what we can physically sense when we observe a commodity. By extension, use-value encompasses how a commodity can be used in the material world.
 +
 
 +
Value, or the Value-Form, is the ''social form'' of a commodity, which is to say, it represents the stable relationships intrinsic to the commodity [see ''Content and Form'', p. 147].
 +
 
 +
Note that this relates to the dialectical relationship between the material and the ideal [see ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88].
 +
 
 +
Value-forms represent relational equivalencies of commodities, i.e.: '''20 yards of linen = 10 pounds of tea'''
 +
 
 +
These relational equivalencies are tied to the equivalent labor value (see Annotation 15 below, and Annotation 26, p. 23) used to produce these commodities. The value-form of a commodity is the ''social form'' because it embodies relational equivalencies:
 +
 
 +
1. The value-form represents the relationship between the commodity and the labor which was used to produce the commodity.
 +
 
 +
2. The value-form represents the relationship between a commodity and one or more other commodities.
 +
 
 +
As Marx explains in ''Appendix to the 1<sup>st</sup> German Edition of Capital'': “Hence by virtue of its value-form the (commodity) now stands also in a social relation no longer to only a single other type of commodity, but to the world of commodities. As a commodity it is a citizen of this world.”
 +
 
 +
Understanding the social form of commodities — the value-form — was crucial for Marx to develop a deeper understanding of money and capitalism. Marx argued that classical economists like Ricardo and Smith conflated economic categories such as “exchange value,” “value,” “price,” “money,” etc., which meant that they could not possibly fully understand or analyze capitalist economies.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
British classical political economists like Ricardo and Smith outlined the scientific factors of the theories of labor value* and contributed many progressive thoughts which Marx adapted and further developed.
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 15 ====
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>*</nowiki> Adam Smith and David Ricardo revolutionized the labor theory of value, which held that the value of a good or service is determined by the amount of human labor required to produce it.
 +
 
 +
Thus, Marx was able to solve the contradictions that these economists could not solve and he was able to establish the theory of surplus value*, scientific evidence for the exploitative nature of capitalism, and the economic factors which will lead to the eventual fall of capitalism and the birth of socialism.
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 16 ====
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>*</nowiki> David Ricardo developed the concept of surplus value. Surplus value is the difference between the amount of income made from selling a product and the amount it costs to produce it. Marx would go on to expand on the concept of surplus value considerably.
 +
 
 +
Utopianism'''' had been developing for a long time and reached its peak in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century with famous thinkers such as Henri de Saint-Simon<ref>Claude Henri de Rouvroy Saint Simon, 1760 — 1825 (French): Philosopher, economist, utopianist activist.</ref>, François Marie Charles Fourier<ref>Charles Fourier, 1772 — 1837 (French): Philosopher, economist, utopianist activist.</ref> and Robert Owen<ref>Robert Owen, 1771 — 1858 (British): Utopianist activist, owner of a cotton factory.</ref>. Utopianism sought to elevate the humanitarian spirit and strongly criticised capitalism by calling attention to the misery of the working class under capitalism. It also offered many far-ranging opinions and analyses of the development of human history and laid out some basic foundational factors and principles for a new society. However, Utopianism could not scientifically address the nature of capitalism. It failed to detect the Law of Development of Capitalism<ref>The Law of Development of Capitalism referenced here is the Theory of Accumulation/Surplus Value, which holds that the capitalist class gains wealth by accumulating surplus value (i.e., profits) and then reinvesting it into more capital to gain even further wealth; thus the goal of the capitalist class is to accumulate more and more surplus value which leads to the development of capitalism. Over time, this deepens the contradictions of capitalism. This concept is related to the M'''→'''C'''→'''M mode of circulation, discussed in Annotation 14, p. 16, and is discussed in detail in Part 3 of the book this text is drawn from (Political Economy) which we hope to translate in the future.</ref> and also failed to recognise the roles and missions of the working class as a social force that can eliminate capitalism to build an equal, non-exploitative society.
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 17 ====
 +
 
 +
The early industrial working class existed in miserable conditions, and the political movement of utopianism was developed by people who believed that a better world could be built. The utopianists believed they could create “a New Moral World” of happiness, enlightenment, and prosperity through education, science, technology, and communal living. For instance, Robert Owen was a wealthy textile manufacturer who tried to build a better society for workers in New Harmony, Indiana, in the USA. Owen purchased the entire town of New Harmony in 1825 as a place to build an ideal society. Owen’s vision failed after two years for a variety of reasons, and many other wealthy capitalists in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century drew up similar plans which also failed.
 +
 
 +
Utopianism was one of the first political and industrial movements that criticized the conditions of capitalism by exposing the miserable situations of poor workers and offering a vision of a better society, and was one of the first movements to attempt to mitigate the faults of capitalism in practice.
 +
 
 +
Unfortunately, the utopianists were not ideologically prepared to replace capitalism, and all of their attempts to build a better alternative to capitalism failed. Marx and Engels admired the efforts of the utopianist movement, and studied their attempts and failures closely in developing their own political theories, concluding that the utopianists failed in large part because they did not understand how capitalism developed, nor the role of the working class in the revolution against capitalism.
 +
 
 +
As Engels wrote in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:''
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
(The) historical situation also dominated the founders of Socialism. To the crude conditions of capitalistic production and the crude class conditions correspond crude theories. The solution of the social problems, which as yet lay hidden in undeveloped economic conditions, the Utopians attempted to evolve out of the human brain. Society presented nothing but wrongs; to remove these was the task of reason. It was necessary, then, to discover a new and more perfect system of social order and to impose this upon society from without by propaganda, and, wherever it was possible, by the example of model experiments. These new social systems were foredoomed as Utopian; the more completely they were worked out in detail, the more they could not avoid drifting off into pure phantasies.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Engels is explaining, here, that — in a sense — the utopian socialists were victims of arriving ''too early''. Capitalism had not yet developed enough for its opponents to formulate plans based on actual material conditions, since capitalism was only just emerging into a stable form. Without a significant objective, material basis, the utopians were forced to rely upon reasoning alone to confront capitalism.
 +
 
 +
In this sense, the early historical utopianists fell into ''philosophical utopianism'' in its broader sense — defined by the mistaken assertion that the ideal can determine the material [see Annotation 95, p. 94]. In believing that they could build a perfect society based on ideals and “pure fantasy” alone without a material basis for development, the utopians were, in essence, idealists. As Engels explained: “from this nothing could come but a kind of eclectic, average Socialism.” Engels concluded that in order to successfully overthrow capitalism, revolution would need to be grounded in materialism: “To make a science of Socialism, it had first to be placed upon a real basis.”
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
The humanitarian spirit and compassionate analysis which the utopians embodied in their efforts to lay out concrete features of a better future society became important theory premises for the birth of the scientific theory of socialism in Marxism.
 +
 
 +
''- Natural Science Premise:''
 +
 
 +
Along with social-economic conditions and theory premises, the achievements of the natural sciences were also foundational to the development of arguments and evidence which assert the correctness of Marxism’s viewpoints and methodology.
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 18 ====
 +
 
 +
''Natural science'' is science which deals with the natural world, including chemistry, biology, physics, geology, etc.
 +
 
 +
Three major scientific breakthroughs which were important to the development of Marxism include:
 +
 
 +
''•'' ''The law of conservation and transformation of energy'' scientifically proved the inseparable relationships and the mutual transformation and conservation of all the forms of motion of matter in nature.
 +
 
 +
''•'' ''The theory of evolution'' offered a scientific basis for the development of diverse forms of life through natural selection.
 +
 
 +
''•'' ''Cell theory'' was a scientific basis proving unity in terms of origins, physical forms and material structures of living creatures. It also explained the development of life through those relationships.
 +
 
 +
These scientific discoveries led to the rejection of theological and metaphysical viewpoints which centered the role of the “creator” in the pursuit of truth.
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 19 ====
 +
 
 +
For centuries in Europe, natural science and philosophy had been heavily dominated by theological viewpoints which centered God in the pursuit of truth. Descartes, Kant, Spinoza, and many other metaphysical philosophers who developed the earliest theories of modern natural science centered their religious beliefs in their philosophies. These theological viewpoints varied in many ways, but all shared a characteristic of centering a “creator” in the pursuit of philosophical and scientific inquiry.
 +
 
 +
Together, the law of conservation and transformation of energy, the theory of evolution, and cell theory provided an alternative viewpoint which allowed scientists to remove the “creator” from the scientific equation. For the first time, natural scientists and philosophers had concrete theoretical explanations for the origin and development of the universe, life, and reality which did not rely on a supernatural creator.
 +
 
 +
Marx and Engels closely observed and studied the groundbreaking scientific progress of their era. They believed strongly in materialist scientific methods and the data which they produced, and based their analysis and philosophical doctrines on such observations. They recognized the importance and validity of the scientific achievements of their era, and they developed the philosophy of Dialectical Materialism into a system which would help humans study and understand the whole material world.
 +
 
 +
In ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'', Engels explained that ancient Greek dialecticians had correctly realized that the world is “an endless entanglement of relations and reactions, permutations and combinations, in which nothing remains what, where and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes away.”
 +
 
 +
Engels goes on to explain that it was understandable for early natural scientists to break their inquiries and analysis down into specialized fields and categories of science to focus on precise, specific, narrow subject matters so that they could build up a body of empirical data. However, as data accumulated, it became clear that all of these isolated, individual fields of study must somehow be unified back together coherently and cohesively in order to obtain a deeper and more useful understanding of reality.
 +
 
 +
As Engels wrote in ''On Dialectics:''
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Empirical natural science has accumulated such a tremendous mass of positive material for knowledge that the necessity of classifying it in each separate field of investigation systematically and in accordance with its inner inter-connection has become absolutely imperative. It is becoming equally imperative to bring the individual spheres of knowledge into the correct connection with one another. In doing so, however, natural science enters the field of theory and here the methods of empiricism will not work, here only theoretical ''thinking'' can be of assistance.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
As science grows increasingly complex, a necessity develops for a philosophical and cognitive framework which can be used to make sense of the influx of information from disparate fields. In ''Dialectics of Nature,'' Engels explains how dialectical materialism is the perfect philosophical foundation for unifying scientific fields into one cohesive framework'':''
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Dialectics divested of mysticism becomes an absolute necessity for natural science, which has forsaken the field where rigid categories sufficed, which represent as it were the lower mathematics of logic, its everyday weapons.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
So, Marx and Engels developed Dialectical Materialism not in opposition to science, but as a way to make better use of scientific data, and to analyze the complex, dynamic, constantly changing systems of the world in motion. While distinct scientific discoveries and empirical data are invaluable, each data point only provides a small amount of information within a single narrow, specific field of science. Dialectical Materialism allows humans to view reality — as a whole — in motion, and to examine the interconnections and mutual developments between different fields and categories of human knowledge.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
These scientific principles confirmed the correctness of the dialectical materialist view of the material world, with such features as: endlessness, self-existence, self-motivation, and self-transformation. They also confirmed the scientific nature of the dialectical materialist viewpoint in both material processes and thought processes.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 20 ====
 +
 
 +
''Endlessness'' refers to the infinite span of space and time in our universe. ''Self-existence'' means that our universe exists irrespective of human consciousness; it existed before human consciousness evolved and it will continue to exist after human consciousness becomes extinct. ''Self-motivation'' and ''Self-transformation'' refer to the fact that motion and transformation exist within the universe independent of human consciousness.
 +
 
 +
Engels wrote of the scientific nature of the dialectical materialist viewpoint in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Nature is the proof of dialectics, and it must be said for modern science that it has furnished this proof with very rich materials increasingly daily, and thus has shown that... Nature works dialectically and not metaphysically; that she does not move in the eternal oneness of a perpetually recurring circle, but goes through a real historical evolution.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
In conclusion, the birth of Marxism is a phenomenon which is compatible with scientific principles; it is the product of the social-economic conditions of its time of origin, of the human knowledge expressed in science at that time, and it is also the result of its founders’ creative thinking and humanitarian spirit.
 +
 
 +
==== b. The Birth and Development Stage of Marxism ====
 +
 
 +
Marx and Engels initiated the birth and development stage of Marxism from around 1842~1843 through around 1847~1848. Later, from 1849 to 1895, Marxism was developed to be more thorough and comprehensive, but in this early period of birth and development, Marx and Engels engaged in practical activities [Marx and Engels were not just theorists, but also actively supported and participated with various revolutionary and working class organizations including the Chartists, the League of the Just, the Communist League, the International Workingmen’s Association, etc.] and studied a wide range of human thought from ancient times on through to their contemporaries in order to methodically reinforce, complement and improve their ideas.
 +
 
 +
Many famous works such as ''The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts'' (Marx, 1844), ''The Holy Family'' (Marx and Engels, 1845), ''Thesis on Feuerbach'' (Marx, 1845), ''The German Ideology'' (Marx and Engels, 1845–1846), and so on, clearly showed that Marx and Engels inherited the quintessence [see Annotation 6, p. 8] of the dialectical and materialist methods which they received from many predecessors. This philosophical heritage led to the development of the dialectical materialist viewpoint and materialist dialectics.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 21 ====
 +
 
 +
There is a subtle, but important, distinction between Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics. This will be explained further in chapters I (p. 48) and II (p. 98).
 +
 
 +
With works such as ''The Poverty of Philosophy'' (Marx, 1847) and ''The Manifesto of the Communist Party'' (Marx and Engels, 1848), Marxism was presented as a complete system of fundamental views with three theoretical component parts.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 22 ====
 +
 
 +
According to Lenin, the three component parts of Marxism (and, by extension, of Marxism-Leninism) are:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
1. The Philosophy of Marxism: Including Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism
 +
 
 +
2. The Political Economy of Marxism: A system of knowledge and laws that define the production process and commodity exchange in human society.
 +
 
 +
3. Scientific Socialism: The system of thought pertaining to the establishment of the communist social economy form.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
These are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, p. 38.
 +
 
 +
In the book ''The Poverty of Philosophy'', Marx proposed the basic principles of Dialectical Materialism and Scientific Socialism,* and gave some initial thoughts about surplus value. ''The Manifesto of the Communist Party'' laid the first doctrinal foundation of communism. In this book, the philosophical basis was expressed through the organic unity between the economical viewpoint and socio-political viewpoint.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 23 ====
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>*</nowiki> Scientific Socialism is a series of socio-political-economic theories intended to build socialism on a foundation of science within society’s current ''material conditions'' [see Annotation 79, p. 81]. Scientific Socialism is the topic of Part 3 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.
 +
 
 +
''The Manifesto of the Communist Party'' outlined the laws of movement in history,* as well as the basic theory of socio-economic forms.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 24 ====
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>*</nowiki> The laws of movement in history are the core principles of ''historical materialism'', which is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.
 +
 
 +
The basic theory of socio-economic forms dictates that material production plays a decisive role in the existence and development of a society, and that the material production methods decide both the political and ''social consciousness'' of a society.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 25 ====
 +
 
 +
''Social consciousness'' refers to the collective experience of consciousness shared by members of a society, including ideological, cultural, spiritual, and legal beliefs and ideas which are shared within that society. This is related to the concept of base and superstructure, which is discussed later in this chapter.
 +
 
 +
''The Manifesto of the Communist Party'' also showed that for as long as classes have existed, the history of the development of human society is the history of class struggle. Through class struggle, the proletariat can liberate ourselves only if we simultaneously and forever liberate the whole of humanity. With these basic opinions, Marx and Engels founded Historical Materialism.
 +
 
 +
By applying Historical Materialism to the comprehensive study of the capitalist production method, Marx made an important discovery: separating workers from the ownership of the means of production through violence was the starting point of the establishment of the capitalist production method. Workers do not own the means of production to perform their labor activities for themselves, so, in order to make income and survive, workers have to sell their labor to capitalists. Labor thus becomes a special commodity, and the sellers of labor become workers for labor-buyers [the proletariat and capitalist class respectively]. The value that workers create through their labor is higher than their wage. And this is how surplus value* is formed. Importantly, this means that the surplus value belongs to people who own the means of production — the capitalists — instead of the workers who provide the labor.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 26 ====
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>*</nowiki> Surplus value is equal to labor value (the amount of value workers produce through labor) minus wages paid to workers. Under capitalism, this surplus value is appropriated as profit by capitalists after the products which workers created are sold.
 +
 
 +
So, in discovering the origin of surplus value, Marx pointed out the exploitative nature of capitalism [because capitalists essentially steal surplus labor value from workers which is then transformed into profits], though this exploitative nature is concealed by the money-commodity relationship.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 27 ====
 +
 
 +
Under capitalism, a worker’s labor is a commodity which capitalists pay for with money in the form of wages. Workers never know how much of their labor value is being withheld by employers, which conceals the nature of capitalist wage-theft.
 +
 
 +
The theory of surplus value was deeply and comprehensively researched and presented in ''Capital''<ref>''Das Kapital:'' Karl Marx’s most important contribution to political economy. It is composed of four volumes. It is the work of Marx’s whole career and an important part of Engels’ career, as well. Marx started writing ''Das Kapital'' in the 1840s and continued writing until he died (1883). ''Das Kapital I'' was published in 1867. After Marx’s death, Engels edited and published the second volume in 1885 and the third volume in 1894. The Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the USSR edited and published ''Das Kapital IV'', also known as ''Theories of Surplus-Value'', in the 1950s, long after the death of Marx and Engels.</ref> by Marx and Engels. This work not only paves the way to form a new political-economic theory system based on the working class’s viewpoint, it also firmly consolidates and develops the historical-materialist viewpoint through the theory of socio-economic forms.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 28 ====
 +
 
 +
Karl Marx explained that the goal of writing ''Capital'' was “to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society.” By “laws of motion,” Marx refers to the origins and motivations for change within human society. Historical materialism holds that human society develops based on internal and external relationships within and between aspects of society. Historical materialism is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.
 +
 
 +
According to the theory of socio-economic forms [which is the basis of historical materialism], the movements and developments of human society are natural-historical processes based on dialectical interactions between forces of production and relations of production; between infrastructure basis [commonly referred to as “base” in English] and superstructure.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 29 ====
 +
 
 +
The forces of production consist of the combination of means of production and workers within society. Under capitalism, the production force consists of the proletariat (working class) and means of production which are owned by the bourgeoisie (capitalist class).
 +
 
 +
Marx viewed society as composed of an ''economic base'' and a ''social superstructure''. The base of society includes the material relationships between humans and the means of productions and the material processes which humans undertake to survive and transform our environment. The superstructure of society includes all components of society not directly relating to production, such as media institutions, music, and art, as well as other cultural elements like religion, customs, moral standards, and everything else which manifests primarily through conscious activity and social relations.
 +
 
 +
In the preface to ''A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy'', Marx explained:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society — the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life determines the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
RELIGION GOVERNMENT EDUCATION
 +
 
 +
POLITICAL ECONOMY NATURE
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-4.png|''The base of society includes material-based elements and relations including political economy, means of production, class relations, etc. The superstructure includes human-consciousness-based elements and relations including government, culture, religion, etc.'']]
 +
 
 +
In other words, Marx argued that superstructure (which includes social consciousness) is shaped by the infrastructural basis, or base, of society. This reflects the more general dialectical relationship between matter and consciousness, in which the material, as the first basis of reality, determines consciousness, while consciousness mutually impacts the material [see ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88]. So, the base of society — being material in nature — ''determines'' the superstructure, while the superstructure ''impacts'' the base. It couldn’t possibly be the other way around, according to the dialectical materialist worldview, because the primary driving forces of conscious activity are rooted in material needs.
 +
 
 +
The theory of socio-economic forms proves that the materialist viewpoint of history is not just a hypothesis, but a scientifically-proven principle.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 30 ====
 +
 
 +
As Lenin explains in ''What the “Friends of the People” Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats:''
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Now — since the appearance of Capital — the materialist conception of history is no longer a hypothesis, but a scientifically proven proposition. And until we get some other attempt to give a scientific explanation of the functioning and development of some formation of society — formation of society, mind you, and not the way of life of some country or people, or even class, etc. — another attempt just as capable of introducing order into the “pertinent facts” as materialism is, that is just as capable of presenting a living picture of a definite formation, while giving it a strictly scientific explanation -until then the materialist conception of history will be a synonym for social science. Materialism is not ‘primarily a scientific conception of history’... but the only scientific conception of it.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
''Capital'' is Marx’s main work which presents Marxism as a social science by illuminating the inevitable processes of birth, development, and decay of capitalism; the replacement of capitalism with socialism; and the historical mission of the working class — the social force that can implement this replacement. Marx’s materialist conception of history and proletarian revolution continued to be developed in ''Critique of Gotha Programme'' (Marx, 1875). This book discusses the dictatorship of the proletariat, the transitional period from capitalism to socialism, and phases of the communism building process, and several other premises. Together, these premises formed the scientific basis for Marx’s theoretical guidance for the future revolutionary activity of the proletariat.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 31 ====
 +
 
 +
When Marx refers to a “dictatorship of the proletariat,” he does ''not'' mean “dictatorship” to mean “totalitarian” or “authoritarian.” Rather, here “dictatorship” simply refers to a situation in which political power is held by the working class (which constitutes the vast majority of society). “Dictatorship,” here, refers to full control of the means of production and government. This stands in contrast to capitalism, which is a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, in which capitalists (a small minority of society) have full control of the means of production and government.
 +
 
 +
==== c. The Defending and Developing Stage of Marxism ====
 +
 
 +
''- Historical Background and the Need for Defending and Developing Marxism''
 +
 
 +
In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, capitalism developed into a new stage, called imperialism. The dominant and exploitative nature of capitalism became increasingly obvious. Contradictions in capitalist societies became increasingly serious — especially the class struggles between the proletariat and capitalists. In many colonised countries, the resistance against imperialism created a unity between national liberation and proletarian revolution, uniting people in colonised countries with the working class in colonial countries. The core of such revolutionary struggles at this time was in Russia. The Russian proletariat and working class under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party became the leader of the whole international revolutionary movement.
 +
 
 +
During this time, both capitalist industry and natural sciences developed rapidly. Some natural scientists, especially physicists, lacked a grounding in materialist philosophical methodology and therefore fell into a viewpoint crisis. Idealist philosophers used this crisis to directly influence the perspective and activities of many revolutionary movements.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 32 ====
 +
 
 +
==== Imperialism ====
 +
 
 +
Lenin defined imperialism as “the monopoly stage of capitalism,” listing its essential characteristics as “finance capital (serving) a few very big monopolist banks, merged with the capital of the monopolist associations of industrialists” and “a colonial policy of monopolist possession of the territory of the world, which has been completely divided up.”
 +
 
 +
==== Subjective and Empiricist Idealism ====
 +
 
 +
In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, natural scientists were exploring various philosophical bases for scientific inquiry. One Austrian physicist, Ernst Mach, attempted to build a philosophy of natural science based on the works of German-Swiss philosopher Richard Avenarius known as “Empirio-Criticism.” Empirio-Criticism, which also came to be known as Machism, has many parallels with the philosophy of George Berkeley. Berkeley (1685 — 1753) was an Anglo-Irish philosopher whose main philosophical achievement was the formulation of a doctrine which he called “immaterialism,” and which later came to be known as “Subjective Idealism.” This doctrine was summed up by Berkeley’s maxim: “''Esse est percipi''” — “To be is to be perceived.” Subjective Idealism holds that individuals can only directly perceive and know about physical objects through direct sense experience. Therefore, individuals are unable to obtain any real knowledge about abstract concepts such as “matter”.
 +
 
 +
The philosophy of Empirio-Criticism, which was developed by Avenarius and Mach, also holds that the only reliable human knowledge we can hold comes from our sensations and experiences. Mach argued that the only source of knowledge is sense data and “experience,” but that we can’t develop any actual knowledge of the actual external world. In other words, Mach’s conception of empirio-criticism holds all knowledge as essentially subjective in nature, and limited to (and by) human sense experience. Mach’s development of Empirio-Criticism (which can also be referred to as ''empirical idealism'' or ''Machism'')'''' was therefore a continuation of Berkeley’s subjective idealism. Both Berkeley’s Immaterialism and Empirio-Criticism are considered to be ''subjective idealism'' because these philosophies deny that the external world exists — or otherwise assert that it is unknowable — and, as such, hold that all knowledge stems from experiences which are essentially ''subjective'' in nature.
 +
 
 +
Mach argued that reality can only be defined by our sensual experiences of reality, and that we can never concretely know anything about the objective external world due to the limitations of sense experience. This stands in direct contradiction to dialectical materialism, which holds that we can develop accurate knowledge of the material world through observation and practice. Whereas Berkeley developed subjective idealist theological arguments to defend the Christian faith, Mach employed subjective idealism for purely secular purposes as a basis for scientific inquiry.
 +
 
 +
''Note: all quotations below come from Lenin’s book:'' Materialism and Empirio-Criticism''.''
 +
 
 +
Vladimir Lenin strongly opposed Empirio-Criticism and, by extension, Machism, which was becoming popular among communist revolutionists in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, because it pushed forward idealist principles which directly opposed the core tenets of dialectical materialism.
 +
 
 +
Lenin believed that revolutionaries should be guided not by idealism, but by dialectical materialism. He believed that Empirio-Criticism and Machism consisted of mysticism which would mislead political revolutionaries.
 +
 
 +
Lenin outlined Machian arguments against materialism:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The materialists, we are told, recognise something unthinkable and unknowable — ’things-in-themselves’ — matter ‘outside of experience’ and outside of our knowledge [see: Annotation 72, p. 68]. They lapse into genuine mysticism by admitting the existence of something beyond, something transcending the bounds of ‘experience’... When they say that matter, by acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensations, the materialists take as their basis the ‘unknown,’ nothingness; for do they not themselves declare our sensations to be the only source of knowledge?
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Lenin argued that this new form of Machist subjective idealism was, in fact, simply a rehashing of “old errors of idealism,” disguised and dressed up with new terminology. As such, Lenin simply reiterated the longstanding, bedrock dialectical materialist arguments against idealism [see Annotation 10, p. 10]. He was especially upset that contemporary Marxists of his era were being swayed by Machist Empirio-Criticism because he found it to be in direct conflict with dialectical materialism, writing: “(These) would-be Marxists… try in every way to assure their readers that Machism is compatible with the historical materialism of Marx and Engels.”
 +
 
 +
Lenin goes on to describe the work of philosophers such as Franz Blei, who critiqued Marxism with Machist arguments, as “quasi-scientific tomfoolery decked out in the terminology of Avenarius.” He saw Empirio-Criticism as completely incompatible with communist revolution, since idealism had historically been used by the ruling class to deceive and control the lower classes. In particular, he believed that Machist idealism was being used by the capitalist class to preach bourgeois economics, writing that “the professors of economics are nothing but learned salesmen of the capitalist class.”
 +
 
 +
Lenin was deeply concerned that prominent Russian socialist philosophers were adopting Machist ideas and claiming them to be compatible with Marxism, writing:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The task of Marxists in both cases is to be able to master and adapt the achievements of these ‘salesmen’... and to be able to lop off their reactionary tendency, to pursue your own line and to combat the whole alignment of forces and classes hostile to us. And this is just what our Machians were unable to do, they slavishly follow the lead of the reactionary professorial philosophy.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Lenin further explains how Empirio-Criticism serves the interests of the capitalist class:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The empirio-criticists as a whole... claim to be non-partisan both in philosophy and in social science. They are neither for socialism nor for liberalism. They make no differentiation between the fundamental and irreconcilable trends of materialism and idealism in philosophy, but endeavor to rise above them. We have traced this tendency of Machism through a long series of problems of epistemology, and we ought not to be surprised when we encounter it in sociology.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
In the conclusion of the same text, Lenin explains why communists should reject Empirio-Criticism and Machism with four “standpoints,” summarized here:
 +
 
 +
1. The theoretical foundations of Empirio-Criticism can’t withstand comparison with those of dialectical materialism. Empirio-Criticism differs little from older forms of idealism, and the tired old errors of idealism clash directly with Marxist dialectical materialism. As Lenin puts it: “only utter ignorance of the nature of philosophical materialism generally and of the nature of Marx’s and Engels’ dialectical method can lead one to speak of ‘combining’ empirio-criticism and Marxism.”
 +
 
 +
2. The philosophical foundations of Empirio-Criticism are flawed. “Both Mach and Avenarius started with Kant (see: Annotation 72, p. 68) and, leaving him, proceeded not towards materialism, but in the opposite direction, towards Hume and Berkeley (see: Annotation 10, p. 10)... The whole school of Mach and Avenarius is moving more and more definitely towards idealism.”
 +
 
 +
3. Machism is little more than a relatively obscure trend which has not been adopted by most scientists; a “reactionary (and) transitory infatuation.” As Lenin puts it: “the vast majority of scientists, both generally and in this special branch of science... are invariably on the side of materialism.”
 +
 
 +
4. Empirio-Criticism and Machism reflect the “tendencies and ideology of the antagonistic classes in modern society.” Idealism represents the interests of the ruling class in modern society, and is used to subjugate the majority of society. Idealist philosophy “stands fully armed, commands vast organizations and steadily continues to exercise influence on the masses, turning the slightest vacillation in philosophical thought to its own advantage.” In other words, idealism is used by the ruling class to manipulate our understanding of the world, as opposed to materialism (and especially dialectical materialism) which illuminates the true nature of reality which would lead to the liberation of the working class.
 +
 
 +
At this time, Marxism was widely disseminating throughout Russia, which challenged the social positions and benefits of capitalists. In reaction to Marxism, many ideological movements such as empiricism, utilitarianism, revisionism, etc. [see: Appendix F, p. 252] rose up and claimed to renew Marxism, while in fact they misrepresented and denied Marxism.
 +
 
 +
In this context, new achievements of natural science needed to be analyzed and summarized in order to continue the authentic development of Marxist viewpoints and methodologies. Theoretical principles to fight against the misrepresentation of Marxism needed to be developed in order to bring Marxism into the new era. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin would fulfill this historical requirement with his theoretical developments.
 +
 
 +
''- The Role of Lenin in Defending and Developing Marxism.''
 +
 
 +
Lenin’s process of defending and developing Marxism can be separated into three periods: first, from 1893 to 1907; next, from 1907 to 1917; and finally from the success of the October socialist revolution in 1917 until Lenin’s death in 1924.
 +
 
 +
From 1893 to 1907, Lenin focused on fighting against populists<ref>Populist faction: A faction within the Russian revolution which upheld an idealist capitalist ideology with many representatives such as Mikhailovsky, Bakunin, and Plekhanov. Populists failed to recognise the important roles of the people, of the farmers and workers alliance, and of the proletariat. Instead, they completely centered the role of the individual in society. They considered the rural communes as the nucleus of “socialism.” They saw farmers under the leadership of intellectuals as the main force of the revolution. The populists advocated individual terrorism as the primary method of revolutionary struggle.</ref>. His book ''What the Friends of the People are and How They Fight Against the Social Democrats (1894)'' criticized the serious mistakes of this faction in regards to socio-historical issues and also exposed their scheme of distorting Marxism by erasing the boundaries between Marxism’s materialist dialectics and Hegel’s idealist dialectics. In the same book, Lenin also shared many thoughts about the important roles of theory, reality, and the relationship between the two.
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 33 ====
 +
 
 +
The ''populist'' philosophy was born in Russia in the 19<sup>th</sup> century with roots going back to the Narodnik agrarian socialist movement of the 1860s and 70s, composed of peasants who rose up in a failed campaign against the Czar. In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, a new political movement emerged rooted in Narodnik ideas and a new party called the Socialist Revolutionary Party was formed. The political philosophy of this movement, now commonly translated into English as “populism,” focused on an agrarian peasant revolution led by intellectuals with the ambition of going directly from a feudal society to a socialist society built from rural communes. This movement overtly opposed Marxism and dialectical materialism and was based on subjective idealist utopianism (see Annotation 95, p. 94).
 +
 
 +
With the book ''What is to be Done?'' (1902), Lenin developed Marxist viewpoints on the methods for the proletariat to take power. He discussed economic, political, and ideological struggles. In particular, he emphasized the ideological formation process of the proletariat.
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 34 ====
 +
 
 +
In ''What is to be Done?,'' Lenin argues that the working class will not spontaneously attain class consciousness and push for political revolution simply due to economic conflict with employers and spontaneous actions like demonstrations and workers’ strikes. He instead insists that a political party of dedicated revolutionaries is needed to educate workers in Marxist principles and to organize and push forward revolutionary activity. He also pushed back strongly against the ideas of what he called “economism,” as typified by the ideas of Eduard Bernstein, a German political theorist who rejected many of Marx’s theories.
 +
 
 +
Bernstein opposed a working class revolution and instead focused on reform and compromise. He believed that socialism could be achieved within the capitalist economy and the system of bourgeois democracy. Lenin argued that Bernstein and his economist philosophy was opportunistic, and accused economists of seeking positions within bourgeois democracies to further their own personal interests and to quell revolutionary tendencies. As Lenin explained in ''A Talk With Defenders of Economism:''
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The Economists limited the tasks of the working class to an economic struggle for higher wages and better working conditions, etc., asserting that the political struggle was the business of the liberal bourgeoisie. They denied the leading role of the party of the working class, considering that the party should merely observe the spontaneous process of the movement and register events. In their deference to spontaneity in the working-class movement, the Economists belittled the significance of revolutionary theory and class-consciousness, asserted that socialist ideology could emerge from the spontaneous movement, denied the need for a Marxist party to instill socialist consciousness into the working-class movement, and thereby cleared the way for bourgeois ideology. The Economists, who opposed the need to create a centralized working-class party, stood for the sporadic and amateurish character of individual circles. Economism threatened to divert the working class from the class revolutionary path and turn it into a political appendage of the bourgeoisie.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
''The Encyclopedic Dictionary of Vietnam'', published by the National Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, defines opportunism, in this context, as “a system of political opinions with no direction, no clear path, no coherent viewpoint, leaning on whatever is beneficial for the opportunist in the short term.”
 +
 
 +
Lenin critiques opportunist socialism — referring to it as a “critical” trend in socialism — in ''What is to be Done?:''
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
He who does not deliberately close his eyes cannot fail to see that the new “critical” trend in socialism is nothing more nor less than a new variety of opportunism. And if we judge people... by their actions and by what they actually advocate, it will be clear that “freedom of criticism” means “freedom for an opportunist trend in Social-Democracy, freedom to convert Social-Democracy into a democratic party of reform, freedom to introduce bourgeois ideas and bourgeois elements into socialism.”
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
The first revolution of the Russian working class, from 1905 to 1907, failed. Lenin summarized the reality of this revolution in the book ''Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution'' (1905). In this book, Lenin explains that the capitalist class in Russia was actively engaged in its own revolution against Czarist feudalism. In this context of this ongoing bourgeois revolution, Lenin deeply developed Marxist concepts related to revolutionary methodologies, objective and subjective factors that will affect the working class revolution, the role of the people, the role of political parties etc.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 35 ====
 +
 
 +
From 1905 to 1907, Russia was beset by political unrest and radical activity including workers’ strikes, military mutinies, and peasant uprisings. Russia had just suffered a humiliating defeat in the Russo-Japanese war which cost tens of thousands of Russian lives without any benefits to the Russian people. In addition, the economic and political systems of Czarist Russia placed a severe burden on industrial workers and peasant farmers.
 +
 
 +
In response, the Russian proletariat rose up in various uprisings, demonstrations, and clashes against government forces, landlords, and factory owners. In the end, this revolutionary activity failed to overthrow the Czar’s government, and the Czar remained firmly in power until the communist revolution of 1917.
 +
 
 +
Lenin wrote ''Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution'' in 1905 in
 +
 
 +
Geneva, Switzerland. In it, he argues forcefully against the political faction within the Russian socialist movement that came to be known as the “Mensheviks.” The Mensheviks, as well as the Bolsheviks (Lenin’s contemporary faction) emerged from a dispute within the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party which took place in 1903.
 +
 
 +
In the same text, Lenin argued that the Mensheviks misunderstood the forces that were driving revolutionary activity in Russia. While the Mensheviks believed that the situation in Russia would develop along similar lines to previous revolutionary activity in Western Europe, Lenin argued that Russia’s situation was unique and that Russian Marxists should therefore adopt different strategies and activities which reflected Russia’s unique circumstances and material conditions.
 +
 
 +
Specifically, the Mensheviks believed that the working class should ally with the bourgeoisie to overthrow the Czar’s feudalist regime, and then allow the bourgeoisie to build a fully functioning capitalist economy before workers should attempt their own revolution.
 +
 
 +
Lenin, on the other hand, presented a completely different analysis of class forces in Russia. He believed the bourgeoisie would seek a compromise with the Czar, as both feudal and bourgeois classes in Russia feared a proletarian revolution.
 +
 
 +
It’s important to note that Russia’s industrial workforce was very small at this time, and most Russians were peasant farmers. The Mensheviks believed Russian peasants would not be useful in a proletarian revolution, which is why they argued for allowing capitalism to be fully established in Russia before pushing for a working class revolution. They believed it was prudent to wait until the working class became larger and more dominant in Russia before attempting to overthrow capitalism. They believed that the peasant class would not be useful in any such revolution.
 +
 
 +
In contrast, Lenin believed that the peasants and industrial workers would have to work together to have any hope of a successful revolution. He further argued that an uprising of armed peasants and workers, fighting side by side, would be necessary for overthrowing the Czar.
 +
 
 +
From 1907 to 1917, there was a viewpoint crisis among many physicists. This strongly affected the birth of many idealist ideologies following Mach’s Positivism that attempted to negate Marxism [See: Annotation 32, p. 27]. Lenin summarized the achievements of natural science as well as historical events of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century in his book ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'' (1909). By giving the classical definitions of matter, proving the relationships between matter and consciousness and between social existence and social consciousness, and pointing out the basic rules of consciousness, etc., Lenin defended Marxism and carried it forward to a new level. Lenin clearly expressed his thoughts on the history, nature, and structure of Marxism in the book ''The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism'' (1913). He also talked about dialectics in ''Philosophical Notebooks'' (1914–1916) and expressed his thoughts about the proletarian dictatorship, the role of the Communist Party, and the path to socialism in his book ''The State and Revolution'' (1919).
 +
 
 +
The success of the October revolution in Russia in 1917 brought about a new era: the transitional period from capitalism to socialism on an international scale. This event presented new theoretical requirements that had not existed in the time of Marx and Engels’ time.
 +
 
 +
In a series of works including: “''Left-Wing” Communism: an Infantile Disorder'' (1920),
 +
 
 +
''Once Again on the Trade Unions'', ''The Current Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin'' (1921), ''The Tax in Kind'' (1921), etc., Lenin summarized the revolutionary practice of the people, continued defending Marxist dialectics, and uncompromisingly fought against eclecticism and sophistry.
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 36 ====
 +
 
 +
In ''Anti-Dühring'', Engels identifies the historical missions of the working class as:
 +
 
 +
1. Becoming the ruling class by establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat.
 +
 
 +
2. Seizing the means of production from the ruling class to end class society.
 +
 
 +
''Eclecticism'' is an incoherent approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject, applying different theories in different situations without any consistency in analysis and thought. Eclectic arguments are typically composed of various pieces of evidence that are cherry picked and pieced together to form a perspective that lacks clarity. By definition, because they draw from different systems of thought without seeking a clear and cohesive understanding of the totality of the subject and its internal and external relations and its development over time, eclectic arguments run counter to the ''comprehensive'' and ''historical'' viewpoints [see p. 116]. Eclecticism bears superficial resemblance to dialectical materialism in that it attempts to consider a subject from many different perspectives, and analyzes relationships pertaining to a subject, but the major flaw of eclecticism is a lack of clear and coherent systems and principles, which leads to a chaotic viewpoint and an inability to grasp the true nature of the subject at hand.
 +
 
 +
''Sophistry'' is the use of falsehoods and misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, and with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. This kind of bad faith argument has no place in materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics must, instead, be rooted in a true and accurate understanding of the subject, material conditions, and reality in general.
 +
 
 +
Simultaneously, Lenin also developed his Marxist viewpoint of the factors deciding the victory of a social regime, about class, about the two basic missions of the proletariat, about the strategies and tactics of proletarian parties in new historical conditions, about the transitional period, and about the plans of building socialism following the New Economic Policy (NEP), etc.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 37 ====
 +
 
 +
The early 1920s were a period of great internal conflict in revolutionary Russia, with various figures and factions wanting to take the revolution in different directions. As such, Lenin wrote extensively on the direction he believed the revolution should be carried forth to ensure lasting victory against both feudalism and capitalism. He believed that the October, 1917 revolution represented the complete defeat of the Czar, however he believed the proletarian victory over the bourgeoisie would take more time. Russia was a poor, agrarian society. The vast majority of Russians under the Czar were poor peasants. Industry — and thus, the proletariat — was highly undeveloped compared to Western Europe. According to Lenin, a full and lasting proletarian victory over the bourgeoisie could only be won after the means of production were properly developed. In ''Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution'', Lenin wrote:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
This first victory [the October, 1917 revolution] is not yet the final victory, and it was achieved by our October Revolution at the price of incredible difficulties and hardships... We have made the start... The important thing is that the ice has been broken; the road is open, the way has been shown.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
So, Lenin knew that the victory over the Czar and feudalism was only a partial victory, and that more work needed to be done to defeat the bourgeoisie entirely. He believed the key to this victory over the capitalist class would be economic development, since Russia was still a largely agrarian society with very little industrial or economic development compared to Western Europe:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Our last, but most important and most difficult task, the one we have done least about, is economic development, the laying of economic foundations for the new, socialist edifice on the site of the demolished feudal edifice and the semi-demolished capitalist edifice.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Lenin’s plan for rapidly developing the means of production was his New Economic Policy, or the NEP. The New Economic Policy was proposed to be a temporary economic system that would allow a market economy and capitalism to exist within Russia, alongside state-owned business ventures, all firmly under the control of the working-class-dominated state. As Lenin explains in ''Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
At this very moment we are, by our New Economic Policy, correcting a number of our mistakes. We are learning how to continue erecting the socialist edifice in a small-peasant country.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
He continues later in the text:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The proletarian state must become a cautious, assiduous and shrewd “businessman,” a punctilious wholesale merchant — otherwise it will never succeed in putting this small-peasant country economically on its feet. Under existing conditions, living as we are side by side with the capitalist (for the time being capitalist) West, there is no other way of progressing to communism. A wholesale merchant seems to be an economic type as remote from communism as heaven from earth. But that is one of the contradictions which, in actual life, lead from a small-peasant economy via state capitalism to socialism. Personal incentive will step up production; we must increase production first and foremost and at all costs. Wholesale trade economically unites millions of small peasants: it gives them a personal incentive, links them up and leads them to the next step, namely, to various forms of association and alliance in the process of production itself. We have already started the necessary changes in our economic policy and already have some successes to our credit; true, they are small and partial, but nonetheless they are successes. In this new field of “tuition” we are already finishing our preparatory class. By persistent and assiduous study, by making practical experience the test of every step we take, by not fearing to alter over and over again what we have already begun, by correcting our mistakes and most carefully analyzing their significance, we shall pass to the higher classes. We shall go through the whole “course,” although the present state of world economics and world politics has made that course much longer and much more difficult than we would have liked. No matter at what cost, no matter how severe the hardships of the transition period may be — despite disaster, famine and ruin — we shall not flinch; we shall triumphantly carry our cause to its goal.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
With these great works dedicated to the three component parts of Marxism [see Annotation 42, p. 38], the name Vladimir Ilyich Lenin became an important part of Marxism. It marked a comprehensive developing step from Marxism to Marxism-Leninism.
 +
 
 +
==== d. Marxism-Leninism and the Reality of the International Revolutionary Movement ====
 +
 
 +
The birth of Marxism greatly affected both the international worker movements and communist movements. The revolution in March 1871 in France could be considered as a great experiment of Marxism in the real world. For the first time in human history, a new kind of state — the dictatorship of the proletariat state (Paris Commune) was established.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 38 ====
 +
 
 +
The Paris Commune was an important but short-lived revolutionary victory of the working class which saw a revolutionary socialist government controlling Paris from March 18 to May 28, 1871.
 +
 
 +
During the brief existence of the Paris Commune, many important policies were set forth, including a separation of church and state, abolishment of rent, an end to child labor, and the right of employees to take over any business which had been abandoned by its owner. Unfortunately, the Paris Commune was brutally toppled by the French army, which killed between 6,000 and 7,000 revolutionaries in battle and by execution. The events of the Paris Commune heavily influenced many revolutionary thinkers and leaders, including Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and was referenced frequently in their works.
 +
 
 +
In August 1903, the very first Marxist proletariat party was established — the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. It was a true Marxist party that led the revolution in Russia in 1905. In October 1917, the victory of the socialist revolution of the proletariat in Russia opened a new era for human history.
 +
 
 +
In 1919, the Communist International* was held; in 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic was established. It marked the alliance of the proletariat of many countries. With the power of this alliance, the fight against Fascism not only protected the achievements of the proletariat’s revolution, but also spread socialism beyond the borders of Russia. Following the lead of the Soviet Union, a community of socialist countries was built, with revolutions leading to the establishment of socialism in the following countries [and years of establishment]: Mongolia [1921], Vietnam [1945], the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [1945], Yugoslavia [1945], Albania [1946], Romania [1947], Czechoslovakia [1948], East Germany [1949], China [1949], Hungary [1949], Poland [1956], and Cuba [1959].
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 39 ====
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>*</nowiki> The First International, also known as the International Workingmen’s Association, was founded in London and lasted from 1864–1876. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were key figures in the foundation and operation of this organization, which sought better conditions and the establishment of rights for workers.
 +
 
 +
The Second International was founded in Paris in 1889 to continue the work of the First International. It fell apart in 1916 because the members from different nations could not maintain solidarity through the outbreak of World War I.
 +
 
 +
The Third International, also known as the Communist International (or the ComIntern for short), was founded in Moscow in 1919 (though many nations didn’t join until later in the 1920s). Its goals were to overthrow capitalism, build socialism, and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. It was dissolved in 1943 in the midst of the German invasion of Russia in World War II.
 +
 
 +
These great historical events strongly enhanced the revolutionary movement of the working class all around the whole world. The people awakened and encouraged the liberation resistance of many colonised countries. The guiding role of Marxism-Leninism brought many great results for a world of peace, independence, democracy, and social progress.
 +
 
 +
However, because of many internal and external factors, in the late 1980s, the socialist alliance faced a crisis and fell into a recession period. Even though the socialist system fell into crisis and was weakened, the socialist ideology still survived internationally. The determination of successfully building socialism was still very strong in many countries and the desire to follow the socialist path still spread widely in South America.
 +
 
 +
Nowadays, the main feature of our modern society is fast and varied change in many social aspects caused by technology and scientific revolution. But, no matter how quickly and diversely our society changes, the nature of the capitalist production method never changes. So, in order to protect the socialist achievements earned by the flesh and blood of many previous generations; and in order to have a tremendous development step in the career of liberating human beings, it is very urgent to protect, inherit and develop Marxism-Leninism and also innovate the work of building socialism in both theory and practice.
 +
 
 +
The Communist Party of Vietnam declared: “Nowadays, capitalism still has potential for development, but in nature, it’s still an unjust, exploitative, and oppressive regime. The basic and inherent contradictions of capitalism, especially the contradictions between the increasing socialization of the production force and the capitalist private ownership regime, will never be solved and will even become increasingly serious. The feature of the current period of our modern society is: countries with different social regimes and different development levels co-exist, co-operate, struggle and compete fiercely for the interests of their own nations. The struggles for peace, independence, democracy, development, and social progress of many countries will still have to cope with hardship and challenges but we will achieve new progress. ''According to the principles of historical development, human beings will almost certainly go forward to socialism.”''<ref>''Delegate Document of the 11<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.''</ref>
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 40 ====
 +
 
 +
Historical materialism is the application of dialectical materialist philosophy and materialist dialectical methodology to the analysis of human history, society, and development. The principles of historical materialism, as developed by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, indicate that human society is moving towards socialism and will almost certainly — in time — develop into socialism, and then proceed towards a stateless, classless form of society (communism). These principles of historical materialism were initially formulated and discussed in several books by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, including:
 +
 
 +
''•'' ''The German Ideology'', by Marx and Engels
 +
 
 +
''•'' ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'', by Marx and Engels
 +
 
 +
''•'' ''Karl Marx'', by Lenin
 +
 
 +
The Communist Party of Vietnam has also declared:
 +
 
 +
“In the opinion of the Vietnam Communist Party, using Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought as the foundation for our ideology, the guideline for our actions is an important developmental step in cognition and logical thinking<ref>''Delegate document of the 9<sup>th</sup> national congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.''</ref>. Achievements that the Vietnamese people have gained in the war to gain our independence, in peace, and in the renovation era, are all rooted in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought. Therefore, we have to ‘creatively apply and develop Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought in the Party’s activities. We have to regularly summarise reality, complement and develop theory, and soundly solve the problems of our society.’”<ref>''Delegate document of the 10<sup>th</sup> national congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.''</ref>
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 41 ====
 +
 
 +
Ho Chi Minh Thought refers to a system of ideas developed by Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese communists which relate to the application of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and methodology to the specific material conditions of Vietnam during the revolutionary period.
 +
 
 +
There is no universal road map for applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism. How the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism should be applied will vary widely from one time and place to another. This is why Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese communists had to develop Ho Chi Minh Thought: so that scientific socialism could be developed within the unique context of Vietnam’s particular historical development and material conditions.
 +
 
 +
It is the duty of every revolutionary to study Marxism-Leninism as well as specific applied forms of Marxism-Leninism developed by revolutionaries for their own specific times and places, such as: Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam), Mao Zedong (China), Fidel Castro and Che Guevera (Cuba), etc. However, it must be recognized that the ideas, strategies, methodologies, and philosophies developed in such particular circumstances can’t be applied in exactly the same way in other times and places, such as our own contemporary material conditions.
 +
 
 +
''The Renovation Era'' refers to the period of time in Vietnam from the 1980s until the early 2000s during which the Đổi Mới (renovation) policies were implemented. These policies restructured the Vietnamese economy to end the previous subsidizing model (which was defined by state ownership of the entire economy). The goals of the Renovation Era were to open Vietnam economically and politically and to normalize relations with the rest of the world. The Đổi Mới policies were generally successful and paved the way to ''the'' ''Path to Socialism Era'' which Vietnam exists in today. The goals of the Path to Socialism Era are to develop Vietnam into a modern, developed country with a strong economy and wealthy people, which will allow us to transition towards the lower stage of communism, which Lenin called “socialism.”
 +
 
 +
And, finally: “We have to be consistent with Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought. We have to creatively apply and develop the ideology correspondingly with the reality in Vietnam. We have to firmly aim for national independence and socialism.”
 +
 
 +
== II. Objects, Purposes, and Requirements for Studying the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism ==
 +
 
 +
=== 1. Objects and Purposes of Study ===
 +
 
 +
The objects of study of this book, ''The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism,'' are the fundamental viewpoints of Marxism-Leninism in its three component parts.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 42 ====
 +
 
 +
Remember that a viewpoint is the starting point of analysis which determines the direction of thinking and the perspective from which problems are considered. Also remember that Marxism-Leninism has three component parts:
 +
 
 +
'''1. The Philosophy of Marxism:'''
 +
 
 +
Including Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism
 +
 
 +
'''2. The Political Economy of Marxism:'''
 +
 
 +
A system of knowledge and laws that define the production process and commodity exchange in human society.
 +
 
 +
'''3. Scientific Socialism'''
 +
 
 +
The system of thought pertaining to the establishment of the communist social economy form.
 +
 
 +
These objects of study stand as the viewpoints — the starting points of analysis — of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and the three component parts of which it’s composed.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
In the scope of '''Marxist-Leninist Philosophy''' [the first component part of Marxism-Leninism], these objects of study are:
 +
 
 +
* Dialectical Materialism — the fundamental and most universal worldview and methodologies which form the theoretical core of a scientific worldview*. [See Part 1, p. 44]
 +
* Materialist Dialectics — the science of development, of common relationships, and of the most common rules of motion and development of nature, society and human thought. [See Chapter 2, p. 98]
 +
* Historical Materialism — the application and development of Materialism and Dialectics in studying social aspects. [Historical materialism is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.]
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 43 ====
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>*</nowiki> Remember that ''Scientific'' in Marxism-Leninism refers to a systematic pursuit of knowledge, research, theory, and understanding [see Annotation 1, p. 1]. Note, also, that ''Worldview'' refers to the whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about humans ourselves, and about life and the position of human beings in the world. This is discussed in more detail on page 44.
 +
 
 +
Thus, a ''scientific worldview'' is a worldview that is expressed by a systematic pursuit of knowledge of definitions and categories that generally and correctly reflect the relationships of things, phenomena, and processes in the objective material world, including relationships between humans, as well as relationships between humans and the world.
 +
 
 +
In the scope of '''Marxist-Leninist Political Economics''' [the second component part of Marxism-Leninism], the objects of study are:
 +
 
 +
* The theory of value and the theory of surplus value.
 +
* Economic theory about monopolist capitalism and state monopolist capitalism.
 +
* General economic rules about capitalist production methods, from the stage of formation, to the stage of development, to the stage of perishing, which will be followed by the birth of a new production method: the communist production method.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 44 ====
 +
 
 +
Marxist-Leninist political economics is the topic of Part 3 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.
 +
 
 +
In the scope of '''Scientific Socialism''' [the third component part of Marxism-Leninism], the objects of study are:
 +
 
 +
* The historical mission of the working class and the progression of a socialist revolution.
 +
* Matters related to the future formation and development periods of the communist socio-economic form.
 +
* Guidelines for the working class in implementing our historical mission.
 +
 
 +
''The purposes'' of studying ''The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism'' are:'''' to master Marxist-Leninist viewpoints of science, revolution, and humanism*; to thoroughly understand the most important theoretical foundation of Ho Chi Minh Thought, the revolutionary path, and the ideological foundation of the Vietnam Communist Party. Based on that basis, we can build a scientific worldview and methodology and a revolutionary worldview; build our trust in our revolutionary ideals; creatively apply them in our cognitive and practical activities and in practicing and cultivating morality to meet the requirements of Vietnamese people in the cause of building a socialist Vietnam.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 45 ====
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>*</nowiki> The humanism of Marxism-Leninism differs greatly from the humanism of Feuerbach discussed in Annotation 12, p. 13. Marxist-Leninist humanism concerns itself with the liberation of all humans. As Marx and Engels wrote in ''The Communist Manifesto:'' “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”
 +
 
 +
=== 2. Some Basic Requirements of the Studying Method ===
 +
 
 +
There are some basic requirements for studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism:
 +
 
 +
First, Marxist-Leninist theses were conceptualized under many different circumstances in order to solve different problems, so the expressions of thought of Marxist-Leninists can vary. Therefore, students studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism must correctly understand its spirit and essence and avoid theoretical purism and dogmatism.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 46 ====
 +
 
 +
Marxism-Leninism should be understood as an applied science, and application of this science will vary based on material conditions. As Engels wrote in a personal letter in 1887, remarking on the socialist movement in the USA: “Our theory is a theory of evolution, not a dogma to be learned by heart and to be repeated mechanically. The less it is drilled into the Americans from outside and the more they test it with their own experience... the deeper will it pass into their flesh and blood.”
 +
 
 +
As an example, Lenin tailored his actions and ideas specifically to suit the material conditions of Russia under the Czar and in the early revolutionary period. Russia’s material conditions were somewhat unique during the time of Lenin’s revolutionary activity, since Russia was an agrarian monarchy with a large peasant population and a relatively undeveloped industrial sector. As such, Lenin had to develop strategies, tactics, and ideas which suited those specific material conditions, such as determining that the industrial working class and agricultural peasants should work together. As Lenin explained in ''The Proletariat and the Peasantry'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Thus the red banner of the class-conscious workers means, first, that we support with all our might, the peasants’ struggle for full freedom and all the land; secondly, it means that we do not stop at this, but go on further. We are waging, besides the struggle for freedom and land, a fight for socialism.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Obviously, this statement would not be specifically applicable to a society with highly developed industry and virtually no rural peasants (such as, for instance, the modern-day USA), just as Lenin’s remarks about the Czar would not be specifically applicable to any society that does not have an institution of monarchy.
 +
 
 +
As another example, take the works of Ho Chi Minh. Ho Chi Minh Thought is defined by the Communist Party of Vietnam as “a complete system of thought about the fundamental issues of the Vietnam revolution.” In other words, Ho Chi Minh Thought is a specific application of the principles of Marxism-Leninism to the material conditions of Vietnam.
 +
 
 +
One unique aspect of Vietnam’s revolution which Ho Chi Minh focused on was colonization. As a colonized country, Ho Chi Minh realized that Vietnam had unique challenges and circumstances that would need to be properly addressed through revolutionary struggle. Another unique aspect of Vietnam’s material conditions was the fact that the colonial administration of Vietnam changed hands throughout the revolution: from France, to Japan, back to France, then to the USA. Ho Chi Minh was able to dynamically and creatively apply Marxism-Leninism to these shifting material conditions. For instance, in ''Founding of the Indochinese Communist Party,'' written in 1930, Ho Chi Minh explains some of the unique problems faced by the colonized people of Indochina (modern day Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) and proposes solutions specific to these unique material conditions:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
On the one hand, they (the French) use the feudalists and comprador bourgeoisie (of Vietnam) to oppress and exploit our people. On the other, they terrorize, arrest, jail, deport, and kill a great number of Vietnamese revolutionaries. If the French imperialists think that they can suppress the Vietnamese revolution by means of terror, they are grossly mistaken. For one thing, the Vietnamese revolution is not isolated but enjoys the assistance of the world proletariat in general and that of the French working class in particular. Secondly, it is precisely at the very time when the French imperialists are frenziedly carrying out terrorist acts that the Vietnamese Communists, formerly working separately, have united into a single party, the Indochinese Communist Party, to lead the revolutionary struggle of our entire people.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
During this period, the nations of Indochina were predominantly agricultural, prompting Ho Chi Minh to suggest in the same text that it would be necessary “to establish a worker-peasant-soldier government” and “to confiscate all the plantations and property belonging to the imperialists and the Vietnamese reactionary bourgeoisie and distribute them to the poor peasants.” Obviously all of these considerations are specific to the material conditions of Indochina under French colonial rule in 1930.
 +
 
 +
By 1939, the situation was changing rapidly. Ho Chi Minh was operating from China, which was being invaded by fascist Japan. He knew that it was only a matter of time before the Japanese imperial army would come to threaten Vietnam and the rest of Indochina. As such, Ho Chi Minh wrote a letter to the Indochinese Communist Party outlining recommendations, strategies, and goals pertaining to the precipitating material conditions. At that time, France had not yet been invaded by Germany, but Ho Chi Minh was very aware of the looming threat of fascism both in Europe and in Asia. He realized that rising up in revolutionary civil war against the French colonial administration would give fascist Japan the opportunity to quickly conquer all of Indochina, which is why he made the following recommendations in a letter to the Communist Party of Indochina in 1939:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Our party should not strive for demands which are too high, such as total independence, or establishing a house of representatives. If we do that, we will fall into the trap of fascist Japan. For now, we should only ask for democracy, freedom to organize, freedom to hold meetings, freedom of speech, and for the release of political prisoners. We should also fight for our party to be organized and to operate legally.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Once France fell to Germany in 1940, Indochina was immediately handed over to Japanese colonial rule. The Japanese army was brutal in its occupation of Vietnam, and the French colonial administrators surrendered entirely to the Japanese empire and helped the Japanese to administer all of Indochina. Ho Chi Minh returned to Vietnam in January of 1941 and participated directly with the resistance struggle against Japan until 1945, when the situation once again changed dramatically due to the Japanese military’s surrender to allied forces and withdrawal from Vietnam. He immediately took advantage of this situation and held a successful revolution against both the Japanese and French administrators. In the Declaration of Independence for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh wrote:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
After the Japanese had surrendered to the Allies, our whole people rose to regain our national sovereignty and to found the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The truth is that we have wrested our independence from the Japanese and not from the French. The French have fled, the Japanese have capitulated, Emperor Bao Dai has abdicated. Our people have broken the chains which for nearly a century have fettered them and have won independence for the homeland.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
As France began to make their intentions clear that they would be resuming their colonialist claim to Indochina, Ho Chi Minh began preparing the country for a new chapter in revolutionary struggle. In his 1946 letter to the people of Vietnam, entitled ''A Nationwide Call for Resistance'', Ho Chi Minh wrote:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
We call everyone, man and woman, old and young, from every ethnic minority, from every religion, to stand up and fight to save our country. If you have guns, use guns. If you have swords, use swords. If you have nothing, use sticks. Everyone must stand up and fight.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
As these historical developments illustrate, Ho Chi Minh was able to creatively and dynamically apply the principles of Marxism-Leninism to suit the shifting material conditions of Vietnam, just as Lenin had to creatively and dynamically apply these principles to the emerging situation in Russia in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. So is the task of every student of Marxism-Leninism: to learn to apply these principles creatively and dynamically to the material conditions at hand.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Second, the birth and development of Marixst-Leninist theses is a process. In that process, all Marixst-Leninist theses have strong relationships with each other. They complement and support each other. Thus, students studying each Marxist-Leninist thesis need to put it in proper relation and context with other theses found within each different component part of Marxism-Leninism in order to understand the unity in diversity [see: Annotation 107, p. 110], the consistency of every thesis in particular, and the whole of Marxism-Leninism in general.
 +
 
 +
Third, an important goal of studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism is to understand clearly the most important theoretical basis of Ho Chi Minh Thought, of the Vietnam Communist Party and its revolutionary path. Therefore, we must attach Marxist-Leninist theses to Vietnam’s revolutionary practice and the world’s practice in order to see the creative application of Marxism-Leninism that President Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnam Communist Party implemented in each period of history.
 +
 
 +
Fourth, we must study the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism to meet the requirements for a new Vietnamese people in a new era. So, the process of studying is also the process of self-educating and practicing to improve ourselves step-by-step in both individual and social life.
 +
 
 +
Fifth, Marxism-Leninism is not a closed and immutable theoretical system. On the contrary, it is a theoretical system that continuously develops based on the development of reality. Therefore, the process of studying Marxism-Leninism is also a process of reflection: summarizing and reviewing your own practical experiences and sharing what you’ve learned from these experiences in order to contribute to the scientific and humanist development of Marxism-Leninism. In addition, when studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, we need to consider these principles in the proper context of the history of the ideological development of humanity. Such context is important because Marxism-Leninism is quintessentially<ref>See Annotation 6, p. 8.</ref> the product of that history.
 +
 
 +
These requirements have strong relationships with each other. They imbue the studying process with the quintessence of Marxism-Leninism. And more importantly, they help students apply that quintessence into cognitive and practical activities.
 +
 
 +
==== Part I: The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism — Leninism ====
 +
 
 +
''Worldview'' refers to the whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about humans ourselves, and about life and the position of human beings in that world. Our worldview directs and orientates our life, including our cognitive and practical activities, as well as our self-awareness. Our worldview defines our ideals, our value system, and our lifestyle. So, a proper and scientific worldview serves as a foundation to establish a constructive approach to life. One of the basic criteria to evaluate the growth and maturity of an individual or a whole society is the degree to which worldview has been developed.
 +
 
 +
''Methodology'' is a system of reasoning: the ideas and rules that guide humans to research, build, select, and apply the most suitable methods in both perception and practice. Methodologies can range from very specific to broadly general, with ''philosophical methodology'' being the most general scope of methodology.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 47 ====
 +
 
 +
Tran Thien Tu, the vice-dean of the Department of Marxist-Leninist Theoretical Studies at the Le Duan Political Science University in Quang Tri, Vietnam, defines three degrees of scopes of Methodology. They are, from most specific to most general:
 +
 
 +
'''1. Field Methodology'''
 +
 
 +
The most specific scope of methodology; a field methodology will apply only to a single specific scientific field.
 +
 
 +
'''2. General Methodology'''
 +
 
 +
A more general scope of methodology; a general methodology will be shared by various scientific fields.
 +
 
 +
'''3. Philosophical Methodology'''
 +
 
 +
The most general scope of methodology, encompassing the whole of the material world and human thought.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
''Worldview'' and ''philosophical methodology'' are the fundamental knowledge-systems* of Marxism-Leninism.
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 48 ====
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>*</nowiki> In the original Vietnamese, the word ''lý'' ''luận'' is used, which we roughly translate to the phrase “knowledge-system” throughout this book. Literally, ''lý luận'' is a combination of the words ''lý'' ''lẽ,'' which means “argument,” and ''bàn'' ''luận,'' which means “to infer.”
 +
 
 +
The full meaning of ''lý'' ''luận'' is: a system of ideas that reflect reality expressed in a system of knowledge that allows for a complete view of the fundamental laws and relationships of objective reality.
 +
 
 +
<br />
 +
 
 +
==== The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism-Leninism ====
 +
 
 +
Marxist-Leninist worldview and philosophical methodology emerge from the quintessence [see Annotation 6, p. 8] of dialectical materialism, which itself developed from other forms of dialectics, which in turn developed throughout the history of the ideological development of humanity.
 +
 
 +
Materialism is foundational to Marxism-Leninism in two important ways:
 +
 
 +
''Dialectical Materialism'' is the ideological core of a scientific worldview.
 +
 
 +
''Historical Materialism'' is a system of dialectical materialist opinions about the origin of, motivation of, and the most common rules that dominate the movement and development of human society.
 +
 
 +
Dialectics are also foundational to Marxism-Leninism, specifically in the form of ''Materialist Dialectics,'' which Lenin defined as “the doctrine of development in its fullest, deepest and most comprehensive form, the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge.”<ref>''The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1913.</ref> Lenin also defined Materialist Dialectics as “what is now called theory of knowledge or epistemology.”<ref>''Karl Marx'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.</ref> [Note: Epistemology is the theoretical study of knowledge; for more information see ''Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism'', p. 204.]
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 49 ====
 +
 
 +
For beginning students of Marxism-Leninism, distinguishing between ''Dialectical Materialism'' and ''Materialist Dialectics'' may at first be confusing. Here is an explanation of each concept and how they relate to one another:
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-5.png|''Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics.'']]
 +
 
 +
''Dialectical Materialism'' is a scientific understanding of matter, consciousness and the relationship between the two. Dialectical Materialism is used to understand the world by studying such relationships.
 +
 
 +
''Materialist Dialectics'' is a science studying the general laws of the movement, change, and development of nature, society and human thought.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-6.png|''Relationship between Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics.'']]
 +
 
 +
And so, we use Dialectical Materialism to understand the fundamental nature of reality. This understanding is used as a basis for changing the world, using Materialist Dialectics to guide our activities. We can then reflect on the results of our activities, using Dialectical Materialism, to further develop our understanding of the world.
 +
 
 +
As Marxist-Leninists, we utilize this continuous cycle between studying and understanding the world through Dialectical Materialism and affecting change in the world through Materialist Dialectics with the goal of bringing about socialism and freeing humanity.
 +
 
 +
It is also important to understand the nature of ''dialectical relationships.''
 +
 
 +
A dialectical relationship is a relationship in which two things mutually impact one another. Dialectical materialism perceives all things in ''motion'' [see ''Mode and Forms of Existence of Matter'', p. 59] and in a constant state of ''change'', and this motion and change originates from relationships in which all things mutually move and change each other through interaction, leading to development over time.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Thoroughly understanding the basic content of the worldview and methodology of Marxism-Leninism is the most important requirement in order to properly study the whole theory system of Marxism-Leninism and to creatively apply it into cognitive and practical activities in order to solve the problems that our society must cope with.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
=== 3. Excerpt From ''Modifying the Working Style'' By Ho Chi Minh ===
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-7.jpg|''Ho Chi Minh training cadres in 1959.'']]
 +
 
 +
Training is a must. There is a proverb: “without a teacher, you can never do well;” and the expression: “learn to eat, learn to speak, learn to pack, learn to unpack.”
 +
 
 +
Even many simple subjects require study, let alone revolutionary work and resistance work. How can you perform such tasks without any training?
 +
 
 +
But training materials must be aimed at the needs of the masses. We must ask: after people receive their training, can they apply their knowledge immediately? Is it possible to practice right away?
 +
 
 +
If training is not immediately practical, then years of training would be useless.
 +
 
 +
Unfortunately, many of our trainers do not understand this simple logic. That’s why there are cadres who train rural people in the uplands in the field of “economics!”
 +
 
 +
In short, our way of working, organizing, talking, propagandizing, setting slogans, writing newspapers, etc., must all take this sentence as a model:
 +
 
 +
“From within the masses, back into the masses.”
 +
 
 +
No matter how big or small our tasks are, we must clearly examine and modify them to match the culture, living habits, level of education, struggling experiences, desire, will, and material conditions of the masses. On that basis we will form our ways of working and organizing. Only then can we have the masses on our side.
 +
 
 +
Otherwise, if you just do as you want, following your own thoughts, your subjectivity, and then force your personal thoughts upon the masses, it is just like “cutting your feet to fit your shoes.” Feet are the masses. Shoes are our ways of organizing and working.
 +
 
 +
Shoes are made to fit people’s feet, not the other way around.
 +
 
 +
= Chapter 1: Dialectical Materialism =
 +
 
 +
Dialectical Materialism, one of the materialist foundations of Marxism-Leninism, uses the materialist worldview and dialectical methods to study fundamental philosophical issues. Dialectical Materialism is the most advanced form of Materialism, and serves as the ''theoretical core of a scientific worldview.'' Therefore, thoroughly understanding the basic content of Dialectical Materialism is the essential prerequisite to study both the component principles of Marxism-Leninism in particular, and the whole of Marxism-Leninism in general.
 +
 
 +
== I. Materialism and Dialectical Materialism ==
 +
 
 +
=== 1. The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues ===
 +
 
 +
''Philosophy is a system of the most general human theories and knowledge about our world, about ourselves, and our position in our world.''
 +
 
 +
Philosophy has existed for thousands of years. Philosophy has different objects of study depending on different periods of time. Summarizing the whole history of philosophy, Engels said: “The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of more modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being<ref>''Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'', Friedrich Engels, 1886.</ref>.”
 +
 
 +
So, philosophy studies the relations between consciousness and matter, and between humans and nature.
 +
 
 +
In philosophy, there are two main questions:
 +
 
 +
'''Question 1: The question of consciousness and matter: which came first; or, to put it another way, which one determines which one?'''
 +
 
 +
In attempting to answer this first question, philosophy has separated into two main schools: ''Materialism,'' and ''Idealism.''
 +
 
 +
'''Question 2: Do humans have the capacity to perceive the world as it truly exists?'''
 +
 
 +
In answer to this second question, two schools: ''Intelligibility'' — which admits the human cognitive capacity to truly perceive the world — and ''unintelligibility'' — which denies that capacity.
 +
 
 +
Materialism is the belief that the nature of the world is matter; that matter comes first; and that matter determines consciousness. People who uphold this belief are called materialists. Throughout human history, many different factions of materialists with various schools of materialist thought have evolved.
 +
 
 +
Idealism is the belief that the nature of the world is consciousness; consciousness precedes matter; consciousness decides matter. People who uphold this belief are called idealists. Like materialism, various factions of idealists with varying schools of idealist thought have also evolved throughout history.
 +
 
 +
<br />
 +
 
 +
Idealism has cognitive origins and social origins.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 50 ====
 +
 
 +
''Cognitive origin'' refers to origination from the human consciousness of individuals.
 +
 
 +
''Social origin'' refers to origination from social relations between human beings.
 +
 
 +
So, idealism originates from both the conscious activity of individual humans as well as social activity between human beings.
 +
 
 +
These origins are ''unilateral consideration'' and ''absolutization'' of only one aspect or one characteristic of the whole cognitive process.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 51 ====
 +
 
 +
''Unilateral consideration'' is the consideration of a subject from one side only.
 +
 
 +
''Absolutization'' occurs when one conceptualizes some belief or supposition as ''always'' true in ''all'' situations ''without'' exception.
 +
 
 +
Both unilateral consideration and absolutization fail to consider the dynamic, constantly changing, and interconnected relations of all things, phenomena, and ideas in our reality.
 +
 
 +
Idealism originates from unilateral consideration because idealists ignore the material world and consider reality ''only'' from the perspective of the human mind. It also originates from absolutism because idealists ''absolutize'' human reasoning as the ''only'' source of truth and knowledge about our world ''without exception.''
 +
 
 +
As Lenin wrote in ''On the Question of Dialectics'': “Philosophical idealism is a unilateral development, an overt development, of one out of many attributes, or one out of many aspects, of consciousness.”
 +
 
 +
Historically, idealism has typically benefitted the oppressive, exploitative class of society. Idealism and religions usually have a close relation with each other, and support each other to co-exist and co-develop.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 52 ====
 +
 
 +
Idealists, in absolutizing human consciousness, have a tendency to only give credence to the work of the mind and ignore the value of physical labor. This has been used to justify class structures in which religious and intellectual laborers are given authority and privilege over manual laborers.
 +
 
 +
This situation has also led to the idea that mental factors play a decisive role in the development of human society in particular and the whole world in general. This idealist view was supported by the ruling class and used to justify its own power and privilege in society. The dominant class has historically used such idealist philosophy as the justifying foundation for their political-social beliefs in order to maintain their ruling positions.
 +
 
 +
Marx discusses this tendency for rulers to idealistically justify their own rule in ''The German Ideology'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an ‘eternal law.’
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Marx goes on to explain how the idealist positions of the ruling class tend to get embedded in historical narratives:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Whilst in ordinary life every shopkeeper is very well able to distinguish between what somebody professes to be and what he really is, our historians have not yet won even this trivial insight. They take every epoch at its word and believe that everything it says and imagines about itself is true. This historical method which reigned in Germany, and especially the reason why, must be understood from its connection with the illusion of ideologists in general, e.g. the illusions of the jurist, politicians (of the practical statesmen among them, too), from the dogmatic dreamings and distortions of these fellows; this is explained perfectly easily from their practical position in life, their job, and the division of labour.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
In history, there are two main forms of idealism: ''subjective'' and ''objective''.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
''Subjective idealism'' asserts that ''consciousness'' is the primary existence. It asserts that all things and phenomena can only be experienced as subjective sensory perceptions while denying the objective existence of material reality altogether.
 +
 
 +
''Objective idealism'' also asserts the ideal and consciousness as the primary existence, but also posits that the ideal and consciousness are objective, and that they exist independently of nature and humans. This concept is given many names, such as “absolute concept”, “absolute spirit,” “rationality of the world,” etc.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 53 ====
 +
 
 +
''Primary existence'' is existence which precedes and determines other existences.
 +
 
 +
Idealists believe that consciousness has primary existence over matter, that the nature of the world is ideal, and that the ideal defines existence.
 +
 
 +
Materialists believe the opposite: that matter has primary existence over the ideal, and that matter precedes and determines consciousness.
 +
 
 +
Dialectical Materialism holds that matter and consciousness have a dialectical relationship, in which matter has primary existence over the ideal, though consciousness can impact the material world through willful conscious activity.
 +
 
 +
The primary existence of matter within Dialectical Materialism is discussed further in ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88.
 +
 
 +
Willful activity (''willpower'') is discussed in ''Nature and Structure of Consciousness'', p. 79.
 +
 
 +
The key difference between ''subjective'' and ''objective'' idealists is this:
 +
 
 +
Subjective idealists believe that there is no external material world whatsoever — that what we imagine as the material world is merely illusory — and that all reality is created by consciousness, whereas objective idealists believe that there ''is'' a material world outside of human consciousness, but it exists independently of human consciousness; therefore (according to objective idealists), since humans can only observe the world through conscious experience, the material world can never be truly known or observed by our consciousness.
 +
 
 +
In opposition to Idealism, Materialism originated through practical experience and the development of science. Through practical experience and systematic development of human knowledge, Materialism has come to serve as a universally applicable theoretical system which benefits progressive social forces and which also orients the activities of those forces in both perception and practice.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 54 ====
 +
 
 +
Materialism benefits progressive social forces by showing reality as it is, by dispelling the idealist positions of the ruling class, and by revealing that society and the world can be changed through willful activity.
 +
 
 +
Materialism guides progressive social forces by grounding thought and activity in material reality, enabling strategies and outcomes that line up with the realities of the material world. For instance, we must avoid utopianism [see Annotation 17, p. 18] in which emphasis is placed on working out ideal forms of society through debate, conjecture, and conscious activity alone. Revolution against capitalism must, instead, focus on affecting material relations and processes of development through willful activity.
 +
 
 +
As Engels pointed out in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'': “The final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men’s brains, not in men’s better insights into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange.”
 +
 
 +
=== 2. Dialectical Materialism — the Most Advanced Form of Materialism ===
 +
 
 +
In human history, as human society and scientific understanding have developed, materialism has also developed through three forms: ''Primitive Materialism, Metaphysical Materialism,'' and ''Dialectical Materialism.''
 +
 
 +
''Primitive Materialism'' is the primitive form of materialism. Primitive materialism recognizes that matter comes first, and holds that the world is composed of certain elements, and that these were the first objects, the origin, of the world, and that these elements are the essence of reality. These Primitive Materialist concepts can be found in many ancient materialist theories in such places as China, India, and Greece. [These Primitive Materialist elemental philosophies are discussed more in ''Matter'', p. 53] Although it has many shortcomings, Primitive Materialism is partially correct at the most fundamental level, because it uses the material of nature itself to explain nature.
 +
 
 +
''Metaphysical Materialism'' is the second basic form of Materialism. This form of materialism was widely discussed and developed in Western Europe in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. During this time, the metaphysical method of perceiving the world was applied to materialist philosophy. Although Metaphysical Materialism does not accurately reflect the world in terms of universal relations [see p. 108] and development, it was an important step forward in the fight against idealist and religious worldviews, especially during the transformational period from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance in many Western European countries.
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 55 ====
 +
 
 +
Metaphysical materialism was strongly influenced by ''mechanical philosophy'', a scientific and philosophical movement popular in the 17<sup>th</sup> century which explored mechanical machines and compared natural phenomena to mechanical devices. Mechanical philosophy led to a belief that all things — including living organisms — were built as (and could theoretically be built by humans as) mechanical devices. Influenced by this philosophy, metaphysical materialists came to see the world as a giant mechanical machine composed of parts, each of which exists in an essentially isolated and static state.
 +
 
 +
Metaphysical materialists believed that all change can exist only as an increase or decrease in quantity, brought about by external causes Metaphysical materialism contributed significantly to the struggle against idealistic and religious worldviews, especially during the historical transition period from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance in Western European countries. Metaphysical materialism also had severe limitations; especially in failing to understand many key aspects of reality, such as the nature of development through change/motion and relationships.
 +
 
 +
''Dialectical Materialism'' is the third basic form of materialism. It was founded by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and defended and developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin as well as many of his successors. By inheriting the quintessence of previous theories and thoroughly integrating contemporary scientific achievements, Dialectical Materialism immediately solved the shortcomings of the Primitive Materialism of ancient times as well as the Metaphysical Materialism of modern Western Europe. It reaches the highest development level of materialism so far in history.
 +
 
 +
By accurately reflecting objective reality with universal relations and development*, Dialectical Materialism offers humanity a great tool for scientific cognitive activities and revolutionary practice. The Dialectical Materialist system of thought was built on the basis of scientific explanations about matter, consciousness, and the relationship between the two.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 56 ====
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>*</nowiki> Materialist Dialectical methodology explains the world in terms of relationships and development. This is discussed in ''Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics'', p. 106.
 +
 
 +
== II. Dialectical Materialist Opinions About Matter, Consciousness, and the Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness ==
 +
 
 +
=== 1. Matter ===
 +
 
 +
==== a. Category of “Matter” ====
 +
 
 +
<br />
 +
''Matter'' is a philosophical subject which has been examined for more than 2,500 years. Since ancient times, there has been a relentless struggle between materialism and idealism around this subject. Idealism asserts that the world’s nature, the first basis of all existence, is consciousness, and that matter is only a product of that consciousness. Conversely, materialism asserts that nature, the entirety of the world, is composed of matter, that this material world exists indefinitely, and that all things and phenomena are composed of matter.
 +
 
 +
Before dialectical materialism was born, materialist philosophers generally believed that matter was composed of some self-contained element or elements; that is to say some underlying substance from which everything in the universe is ultimately derived. In ancient times, the five elements theory of Chinese philosophy held that those self-contained substances were ''metal — wood — water — fire — earth;'' in India, the Samkhya school believed that they were ''Pradhana'' or ''Prakriti''<ref>According to the Samkhya school, Pradhana is the original form of matter in an unmanifested,indifferentiated state; ''Prakriti'' is manifested matter, differentiated in form, which contains potential for motion.</ref>'';'' in Greece, the Milesian school believed they were ''water'' (Thales’s<ref>Thales, ~642 — ~547 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher, mathematician, astronomer, politician.</ref> conception) or ''air'' (Anaximene’s<ref>Anaximene, ~585 — ~525 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher.</ref> conception); Heraclitus<ref>Heraclitus, ~540 — ~480 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher, founder of ancient dialectics.</ref> believed the ultimate element was ''fire;'' Democritus<ref>Democritus, ~460 — ~370 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher, naturalist, a founder of atom theory.</ref> asserted that it was something called an “atom,”'''' etc. Even as recently as the 17<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> centuries, conceptions about matter belonging to modern philosophers such as Francis Bacon<ref>Francis Bacon, 1561 — 1626 (British): Philosopher, novelist, mathematician, political activist.</ref>, Renes Descartes<ref>Rene Descartes, 1596 — 1650 (Fench): Philosopher, mathematician, physicist.</ref>, Thomas Hobbes<ref>Thomas Hobbes, 1588 — 1679 (British): Political philosopher, political activist.</ref>, Denis Diderot<ref>Denis Diderot, 1713 — 1784 (French): Philosopher, novelist.</ref>, etc., still hadn’t changed much. They continued following the same philosophical tendency as ancient philosophers by focusing their studies of the material world through elemental phenomena.
 +
 
 +
These conceptions of matter which were developed by philosophers before Marx’s time laid a foundation for a tendency to use nature to explain nature itself, but that tendency still had many shortcomings, such as: oversimplification of matter into fictitious “elements;” failure to understand the nature of consciousness as well as the relationships between matter and consciousness; failure to recognize the significance of matter in human society, leading to a failure to solve social issues based on a materialist basis, etc.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 57 ====
 +
 
 +
Here are further explanations of these shortcomings of early materialists:
 +
 
 +
'''Oversimplification of matter into fictitious “elements”'''
 +
 
 +
Due to a lack of understanding and knowledge of matter, metaphysical materialists created erroneous conceptions of “elements” which do not accurately describe the nature of matter. By using such an erroneously conceived system of non-existing elements to describe nature, metaphysical materialists were prevented from gaining real insights into the material world which delayed and hindered scientific progress.
 +
 
 +
'''Failure to understand the nature of consciousness as well as the relationships between matter and consciousness'''
 +
 
 +
Many early materialists believed that consciousness was simply a mechanical byproduct of material processes, and that mental events (thoughts, consciousness) could not affect the material world, since these events were simply mechanically determined ''by'' the material world.
 +
 
 +
As a first principle, Dialectical Materialism does hold that consciousness is ''created by'' matter. However, Dialectical Materialism also holds that consciousness can ''influence'' the material world through conscious action. This constitutes a dialectical relationship.
 +
 
 +
As Lenin explains in ''Materialism and Empirio-criticism'': “Consciousness in general ''reflects'' being—that is a general principle of ''all'' materialism... social consciousness ''reflects'' social being.”
 +
 
 +
Whereas early materialists erroneously held that consciousness is simply an “accidental” byproduct of matter, Dialectical Materialism holds that consciousness is a characteristic of the ''nature'' of matter. As Engels wrote in the notation of ''Dialectics of Nature'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
That matter evolves out of itself the thinking human brain is for mechanism a pure accident, although necessarily determined, step by step, where it happens. But the truth is that it is the nature of matter to advance to the evolution of thinking beings, hence this always necessarily occurs wherever the conditions for it (not necessarily identical at all places and times) are present.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Dialectical materialism also breaks from early materialism by positing that consciousness has a dialectical relationship with matter. Consciousness arises from the material world, but can also influence the material world through conscious action. In other words, mental events can trigger physical actions which affect the material world.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
As Marx explains in ''Theses on Feuerbach'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of changed circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change [Selbstveränderung] can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice... Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Put more simply, we as humans are capable of “revolutionary practice” which can “change the world” because our consciousness allows us to “change circumstances.” This is discussed further in ''Nature and Structure of Consciousness'', p. 79.
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Failure to recognize the significance of matter in human society, leading to a failure to solve social issues based on a materialist basis
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Dialectical materialists believe that matter exists in many forms, and that human society is a special form of existence of matter. Lenin referred to the material existence of human society as ''social being'', which stood in contrast with human society’s ''social consciousness.'' Social being encompasses all of the material existence and processes of human society.
 +
 
 +
As Lenin wrote in ''Materialism and Empirio-criticism'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Social being is independent of the social consciousness of men. The fact that you live and conduct your business, beget children, produce products and exchange them, gives rise to an objectively necessary chain of events, a chain of development, which is independent of your social consciousness, and is never grasped by the latter completely. The highest task of humanity is to comprehend this objective logic of economic evolution (the evolution of social life) in its general and fundamental features, so that it may be possible to adapt to it one’s social consciousness and the consciousness of the advanced classes of all capitalist countries in as definite, clear and critical a fashion as possible.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Early materialists failed to recognise the relationship between matter and consciousness — as Lenin puts it, specifically, between ''social being'' and ''social consciousness''. Thus in contemplating social issues, these early materialists were unable to find proper materialist solutions.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
These shortcomings resulted in a non-thorough materialist viewpoint: when dealing with questions about nature, the early materialists had a strong materialist viewpoint but when dealing with social issues, they “slipped” into an idealist viewpoint.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 58 ====
 +
 
 +
Lenin explains this concept of “slipping into” idealism through a non-thorough materialist viewpoint in ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism:'' “Once you deny objective reality, given us in sensation, you have already lost every one of your weapons against fideism, for you have slipped into agnosticism or subjectivism — and that is all fideism wants.”
 +
 
 +
''Note: fideism is a form of idealism which holds that truth and knowledge are received through faith or revelation. Subjectivism is the centering of one’s own self in conscious activities and perspective; see Annotation 222, p. 218.''
 +
 
 +
In the same work, Lenin upholds that objective reality can be known through sense perception:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
We ask, is a man given objective reality when he sees something red or feels something hard, etc., or not? [...] If you hold that it is not given, you... inevitably sink to subjectivism... If you hold that it is given, a philosophical concept is needed for this objective reality, and this concept has been worked out long, long ago. This concept is matter. Matter is a philosophical category denoting the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Lenin also explains that proper materialism must recognize objective/absolute truth:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
To be a materialist is to acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind, is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
A failure to recognize the existence of such objective, absolute truth, according to Lenin, constitutes “relativism,” a position that all truth is relative and can never be absolutely, objectively knowable.
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
It is unconditionally true that to every scientific ideology (as distinct, for instance, from religious ideology), there corresponds an objective truth, absolute nature. You will say that this distinction between relative and absolute truth is indefinite. And I shall reply: yes, it is sufficiently ‘indefinite’ to prevent science from becoming a dogma in the bad sense of the term, from becoming something dead, frozen, ossified; but it is at the same time sufficiently ‘definite’ to enable us to dissociate ourselves in the most emphatic and irrevocable manner from fideism and agnosticism, from philosophical idealism and the sophistry of the followers of Hume and Kant. Here is a boundary which you have not noticed, and not having noticed it, you have fallen into the swamp of reactionary philosophy. It is the boundary between dialectical materialism and relativism.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
In other words, while proper materialism must contain a degree of relativistic thinking sufficient to challenge assumptions and reexamine perceived truth periodically, materialists must not fall into complete relativism (such as that espoused by Hume and Kant) lest they fall into idealist positions. Ultimately, Absolute Truth — according to Lenin — constitutes the alignment of conscious understanding with objective reality (not to be confused with Hegel’s notion of Absolute Truth; see Annotation 232, p. 228).
 +
 
 +
Lenin recognized the development of Marx and Engels as “''modern materialism'', which is immeasurably richer in content and in comparably more consistent than all preceding forms of materialism,” in large part because Marx and Engels were able to apply materialism properly to social sciences by taking the “direct materialist road as against idealism.” He goes on to describe would-be materialists who fall to idealist positions due to relativism and other philosophical inadequacies as “a contemptible ''middle party'' in philosophy, who confuse the materialist and idealist trends on every question.”
 +
 
 +
Lenin warned that a failure to hold a thoroughly materialist viewpoint leads philosophers to become “ensnared in idealism, that is, in a diluted and subtle fideism; they became ensnared from the moment they took ‘sensation’ not as an image of the external world but as a special ‘element.’ It is nobody’s sensation, nobody’s mind, nobody’s spirit, nobody’s will — this is what one inevitably comes to if one does not recognise the materialist theory that the human mind reflects an objectively real external world.”
 +
 
 +
In other words, idealist conceptions of sensation inject mysticism into philosophy by conceiving of sensation as otherworldly, supernatural, and detached from material human beings with material experiences in the material world.
 +
 
 +
The development of natural sciences in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries (especially the inventions of Roentgen<ref>Wilhelm Conrad Roentgen, 1845–1923 (German): Physicist.</ref>, Becquerel<ref>Henri Becquerel, 1852–1908 (French): Physicist.</ref>, Thomson<ref>Sir Joseph John Thomson, 1856–1940 (British): Physicist, professor at London Royal Institute.</ref> etc.), disproved the theories of “classical elements” such as fire, water, air, etc. [see ''Primitive Materialism'', p. 52]. These innovations led to a viewpoint crisis in the field of physical science. Many idealists used this opportunity to affirm the non-material nature of the world, ascribing the roles of supernatural forces to the birth of the world.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 59 ====
 +
 
 +
Lenin discussed this viewpoint crisis extensively in ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism''. Here Lenin discusses relativist reactions to new breakthroughs in natural science, which led even scientists (who proclaimed to be materialists) to take idealist positions:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
We are faced, says Poincaré [a French scientist], with the “ruins” of the old principles of physics, “a general debacle of principles.” It is true, he remarks, that all the mentioned departures from principles refer to infinitesimal magnitudes; it is possible that we are still ignorant of other infinitesimals counteracting the undermining of the old principles... But at any rate we have reached a “period of doubt.” We have already seen what epistemological deductions the author draws from this “period of doubt:” “it is not nature which imposes on [or dictates to] us the concepts of space and time, but we who impose them on nature;” “whatever is not thought, is pure nothing.” These deductions are idealist deductions. The breakdown of the most fundamental principles shows (such is Poincaré’s trend of thought) that these principles are not copies, photographs of nature, not images of something external in relation to man’s consciousness, but products of his consciousness. Poincaré does not develop these deductions consistently, nor is he essentially interested in the philosophical aspect of the question.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Lenin concludes by stating that the non-thorough materialist position has lead directly to these idealist positions of relativism:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The essence of the crisis in modern physics consists in the breakdown of the old laws and basic principles, in the rejection of an objective reality existing outside the mind, that is, in the replacement of materialism by idealism and agnosticism.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
With this historical background, in order to fight against the distortions of many idealists and to protect the development of the materialist viewpoint, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin simultaneously summarized all the natural scientific achievements in late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century and built upon Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ thought to develop this definition of matter:
 +
 
 +
''“Matter is a philosophical category denoting objective reality which is given to man in his sensations, and which is copied, photographed, and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them.”''
 +
 
 +
Lenin’s definition of matter shows that:
 +
 
 +
''First,'' we need to distinguish between the definition of “matter” as a philosophical category (the category that summarizes the most basic and common attributes of all material existence, and which was defined with the objective of solving the basic issues of philosophy) from the definition of “matter” that was used in specialized sciences (specific and sense-detectable substance).
 +
 
 +
''Second,'' the most basic, common attribute of all kinds of matter [and under both definitions listed in the previous paragraph] is ''objective existence,'' meaning matter exists outside of human consciousness, independently of human consciousness, no matter whether humans can perceive it with our senses or not.
 +
 
 +
''Third,'' matter, with its specific forms, can cause and affect mental events in humans when it directly or indirectly impacts the human senses; human consciousness is the reflection of matter; matter is the thing that is reflected by human consciousness.
 +
 
 +
Lenin’s definition of matter played an important role in the development of materialism and scientific consciousness.
 +
 
 +
''First,'' by pointing out that the most basic, common attribute of matter is objective existence, Lenin successfully distinguished the basic difference between the definition of matter as a philosophical category and the definition of matter as a category of specialized sciences. It helped solve the problems of defining matter in the previous forms of materialism; it offered scientific evidence to define what can be considered matter; it layed out a theoretical foundation for building a materialist viewpoint of history, and overcame the shortcomings of idealist conceptions of society.
 +
 
 +
''Second,'' by asserting that matter was ''“objective reality,” “given to man in his sensations,”'' and “''copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations,”'' Lenin not only confirmed the primary existence of matter and the secondary existence of consciousness [see ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88''] but he also affirmed that humans had the ability to be aware of objective reality through the “copying, photographing and reflection of our sensations” [in other words, sense perceptions].
 +
 
 +
==== b. Mode and Forms of Existence of Matter ====
 +
 
 +
According to the dialectical materialist viewpoint, ''motion'' is the mode of existence of matter; ''space'' and ''time'' are the forms of existence of matter.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 60 ====
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Mode refers to the way or manner in which something occurs or exists. You can think of mode as pertaining to the “how,” as opposed to the “what.” For example, the ''mode'' of circulation refers to ''how'' commodities circulate within society [see Annotation 14, p. 16]; ''mode'' of production refers to ''how'' commodities are produced in society. So, mode of existence of matter refers to ''how'' matter exists in our universe.
 +
 
 +
Form comes from the category pair [see ''Basic Pairs of Categories of Materialist Dialectics'', p. 126] of Content and Form [see p. 147]. Form refers to how we perceive objects, phenomena, and ideas. So, form of existence of matter refers to the ways in which we perceive the existence of matter [explained below] in our universe.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
''- Motion is the Mode of Existence of Matter''
 +
 
 +
As Friedrich Engels explained: ''“Motion, in the most general sense, conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute of matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe, from mere change of place right up to thinking.”''
 +
 
 +
According to Engels, motion encompasses more than just positional changes. Motion embodies “all the changes and processes happening in this universe;” matter is always associated with motion, and matter can only express its existence through motion.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 61 ====
 +
 
 +
In Dialectical Materialist philosophy, “motion” is also known as “change” and it refers to the changes which occur as a result of the mutual impacts which occur in or between subjects through the negation of contradictions. Motion is a constant attribute of all things, phenomena, and ideas (see Characteristics of Development, p. 124).
 +
 
 +
Because matter is inseparable from motion (and vice versa), Engels defined motion as the ''mode'' of matter — the way or manner in which matter exists. It is impossible for matter in our universe to exist in completely static and unchanging state, isolated from the rest of existence; thus matter exists in the ''mode'' of motion. Over time, motion leads to ''development'' as things, phenomena, and ideas transition through various stages of quality change [see Annotation 117, p. 119].
 +
 
 +
Matter exists objectively, therefore motion also exists objectively. The motion of matter is self-motion<ref>In the original Vietnamese, the word tự vận động is used here, which we roughly translate to the word ''self-motion'' throughout this book. Literally, tự vận động means: “it moves itself.”</ref>.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 62 ====
 +
 
 +
It is important to note that “matter,” in the philosophical sense as used in dialectical materialist phlosophy, includes all that is “objective” (external) to individual human cosnciousness. This includes objective phenomena which human senses are unable to detect, such as objective social relations, objective economic values, etc. Objectiveness is discussed more in Annotation 108, p. 112; objective social relations are discussed more in Annotation 10, p. 10.
 +
 
 +
In ''Dialectics of Nature'', Friedrich Engels discussed the properties of motion and explained that motion can neither be created nor destroyed. Therefore, motion can only change form or transfer from one object to another. In this sense, all objects are dynamically linked together through motion:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by bodies we understand here all material existence extending from stars to atoms... In the fact that these bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already becomes evident here that matter is unthinkable without motion. And if, in addition, matter confronts us as something given, equally uncreatable as indestructible, it follows that motion also is as uncreatable as indestructible. It became impossible to reject this conclusion as soon as it was recognised that the universe is a system, an interconnection of bodies.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
In other words, every body of matter is in motion relative to other bodies of matter, and thus matter is inseparable from motion. Motion results from the interaction of bodies of matter. Because motion and matter define each other, and because motion can only exist in relation to matter and matter can only exist in relation to motion, the motion of matter can be described as “self-motion,” because the motion is not created externally but exists only within and in relation to matter itself. Engels further explains that if this were not true — if motion were external to matter — then motion itself would have had to have been created external to matter, which is impossible:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
To say that matter during the whole unlimited time of its existence has only once, and for what is an infinitesimally short period in comparison to its eternity, found itself able to differentiate its motion and thereby to unfold the whole wealth of this motion, and that before and after this remains restricted for eternity to mere change of place — this is equivalent to maintaining that matter is mortal and motion transitory. The indestructibility of motion cannot be merely quantitative, it must also be conceived qualitatively; matter whose purely mechanical change of place includes indeed the possibility under favourable conditions of being transformed into heat, electricity, chemical action, or life, but which is not capable of producing these conditions from out of itself, such matter has forfeited motion; motion which has lost the capacity of being transformed into the various forms appropriate to it may indeed still have dynamis but no longer energeia, and so has become partially destroyed. Both, however, are unthinkable.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
So, motion can change forms and can transfer from one material body to another, but it can never be created externally from matter, and neither motion nor matter can be created or destroyed in our universe. Thus, matter exists in a state of “self-motion;” motion can never externally be created nor externally applied to matter.
 +
 
 +
To put it another way, motion results from the fact that all things, phenomena, and ideas exist as assemblages of relationships [see The Principle of General Relationships, p. 107], and these relationships contain opposing forces. As Lenin explained in his ''Philosophical Notebooks'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their ‘self-movement,’ in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the ‘struggle’ of opposites.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Based on the scientific achievements which occurred in his lifetime, Engels classified motion into 5 basic forms: ''mechanical motion'' (changes in positions of objects in space); ''physical motion'' (movements of molecules, electrons, fundamental particles, thermal processes, electricity…); ''chemical motion'' (changes of organic and inorganic substances in combination and separation processes…); ''biological motion'' (changes of living objects, or genetic structure…); ''social motion'' (changes in economy, politics, culture, and social life).
 +
 
 +
These basic forms of motion are arranged into levels of advancement based on the level of complexity of matter that is affected.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-8.png]]
 +
 
 +
The basic forms of motion each affect different forms of matter, but these forms of motion do not exist independently from each other; they actually have strong relationships with each other, in which the more advanced forms of motion develop from lower forms of motion; the more advanced forms of motion also internally include lower forms of motion. [I.e., biological motion contains chemical motion; chemical motion contains physical motion; etc.]
 +
 
 +
Every object exists with many forms of motion, but any given object is defined by its most advanced form of motion. [I.e., living creatures are defined in terms of biological motion, societies are defined in terms of social motion, etc.]
 +
 
 +
By classifying the basic forms of motion, Engels laid out the foundation for classification and synthesization of science. The basic forms of motion differ from one another, but they are also unified with each other into one continuous system of motion. Understanding this dialectical relationship between different forms of motion helped to overcome misunderstandings and confusion about motion.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 63 ====
 +
 
 +
In ''Dialectics of Nature'', Engels clears up a great deal of confusion and addresses many misconceptions about matter, motion, forces, energy, etc. which existed in both science and philosophy at the time by defining and explaining the dialectical nature of matter and motion.
 +
 
 +
When Dialectical Materialism affirmed that motion was the mode of existence — the natural attribute of matter — it also confirmed that motion is absolute and eternal. This does not mean that Dialectical Materialism denies that things can become ''frozen;'' however, according to the dialectical materialist viewpoint, ''freezing is a special form of motion, it is motion in equilibrium'' and ''freezing is relative and temporary.''
 +
 
 +
''Motion in equilibrium'' is motion that has not changed the positions, forms, and/or structures of things.
 +
 
 +
Freezing is a ''relative'' phenomenon because freezing only occurs in some forms of motion and in some specific relations, it does not occur in all forms of motion and all kinds of relations. Freezing is a temporary phenomenon because freezing only exists for a limited period of time, it cannot last forever.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 64 ====
 +
 
 +
Equilibrium can exist at any advancement of motion. Lenin discussed ''equilibrium'' as it pertains to the social form of motion in discussing an equilibrium of forces existing in Russia in 1905 in this article, ''An Equilibrium of Forces:''
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
1) The result to date (Monday, October 30) is an equilibrium of forces, as we already pointed out in Proletary, No. 23.
 +
 
 +
2) Tsarism is no longer strong enough, the revolution not yet strong enough, to win.
 +
 
 +
3) Hence the tremendous amount of vacillation. The terrific and enormous increase of revolutionary happenings (strikes, meetings, barricades, committees of public safety, complete paralysis of the government, etc.), on the other hand, the absence of resolute repressive measures. The troops are wavering.
 +
 
 +
4) The Tsar’s Court is wavering (The Times and the Daily Telegraph) between dictatorship and a constitution.
 +
 
 +
The Court is wavering and biding its time. Strictly speaking, these are its correct tactics: the equilibrium of forces compels it to bide its time, for power is in its hands.
 +
 
 +
The revolution has reached a stage at which it is disadvantageous for the counter-revolution to attack, to assume the offensive.
 +
 
 +
For us, for the proletariat, for consistent revolutionary democrats, this is not enough. If we do not rise to a higher level, if we do not manage to launch an independent offensive, if we do not smash the forces of Tsarism, do not destroy its actual power, then the revolution will stop half way, then the bourgeoisie will fool the workers.
 +
 
 +
5) Rumour has it that a constitution has been decided upon. If that is so, then it follows that the Tsar is heeding the lessons of 1848 and other revolutions: he wants to grant a constitution without a constituent assembly, before a constituent assembly, apart from a constituent assembly. What kind of constitution? At best (for ’the Tsar) a Constitutional-Democratic constitution.
 +
 
 +
This implies: achievement of the Constitutional-Democrats’ ideal, skipping the revolution; deceiving the people, for all the same there will be no complete and actual freedom of elections.
 +
 
 +
Should not the revolution skip this granted constitution?
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
''- Space and Time are Forms of Existence of Matter''
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Every form of matter exists in a specific position, with specific space particularity (height, width, length, etc.), in specific relation (in front or behind, above or under, to the left or right, etc.) with other forms of matter. These positional relations exist in what we call ''space.'' [Space is defined by positional relations of matter.]
 +
 
 +
On the other hand, the existence of matter is also expressed in the speed of change and the order in which changes occur. These changes occur in what we call ''time.'' As Engels wrote: “For the basic forms of all existence are space and time, and a being outside of time is as absurd as an existence outside space.” Matter, space, and time are not separable; there is no matter that exists outside of space and time; there is also no space and time that exist outside of matter’s motion.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 65 ====
 +
 
 +
Space and time, as the forms of matter, i.e.: the ways in which we perceive the existence of matter. We are only able to perceive and understand material objects as they exist within space and time.
 +
 
 +
Space and time, as forms of existence of matter, exist objectively [see Annotation 108,
 +
 
 +
p. 112], and are defined by matter. [Space is defined by the positional relations between material objects; time is defined by the speed of change of material objects and the order in which these changes occur.] Space has three dimensions: height, width, length; time has one direction: from the past to the future.
 +
 
 +
==== c. The Material Unity of the World ====
 +
 
 +
Dialectical Materialism affirms that the nature of the world is matter, and the world is unified in its material properties. [In other words: the entire universe, in all its diversity, is made of matter, and the properties of matter are the same throughout the known universe.]
 +
 
 +
The material nature of the world is proven on the following basis:
 +
 
 +
''First,'' there is only one world: the material world; the material world is the first existence [i.e., it existed before consciousness], it exists objectively, and independently, of human consciousness.
 +
 
 +
''Second,'' the material world exists eternally, endlessly, infinitely; it has no known beginning point and there is no evidence that it will ever disappear.
 +
 
 +
''Third,'' all known objects and phenomena of the material world have objective relations with each other and all objects and phenomena exist in unity with each other. All of them are specific forms and structures of matter, or have material origin which was born from matter, and all are governed by the objective rules of the material world. In the material world, there is nothing that exists outside of the changing and transforming processes of matter; all of these processes exist as causes and effects of each other.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 66 ====
 +
 
 +
The most important thing to understand here is that every object and phenomenon in the universe arises as matter, all material objects and phenomena are dynamically linked to one another in an infinite chain of causes and effects and changes and transformations, all governed by the material laws of our reality. This understanding is the material foundation of dialectical materialism.
 +
 
 +
=== 2. Consciousness ===
 +
 
 +
==== a. The Source of Consciousness ====
 +
 
 +
According to the materialist viewpoint, consciousness has natural and social sources.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 67 ====
 +
 
 +
Consciousness arises from ''nature'', and from ''social'' activities and relations.
 +
 
 +
''Natural'' refers to the material world. Without the material world of matter, material processes, and the evolution of material systems — up to and including the human brain — consciousness would never have formed.
 +
 
 +
''Social'' activities and relations also contributed to the development of consciousness. The social processes of labor and language were also prerequisites for the development of conscious activity in human beings.
 +
 
 +
''- Natural Source of Consciousness''
 +
 
 +
There are many factors that form the natural sources for consciousness, but the two most basic factors are ''human brains'' and ''the relationship between humans and'' ''the objective world which makes possible creative and dynamic reflection.''
 +
 
 +
''About human brains:'' consciousness is an attribute of a highly organized form of matter, which is the brain. Consciousness is the function and the result of the neurophysiological activities of human brains. As human brains evolved and developed over time, their neurophysiological activities became richer, and, as these activities progressed, consciousness developed further and further over time. This explains why the human evolution process is also a process of developing the capacity for perception and thinking. Whenever human neurophysiological activities don’t function normally because of damaged brains, our mental life is also disturbed.
 +
 
 +
''About the relationship between humans'' and ''the objective world which made possible creative and dynamic reflection:'' The relationship between humans and the objective world has been essential for as long as humans have existed. In this relationship, the objective world is reflected through human senses which interact with human brains and then form our consciousness.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-9.png|''Consciousness exists as a dynamic set of relationships between the external material world, human sense perception, and the functions of the human brain.'']]
 +
 
 +
''Reflection'' is the re-creation of the features of one form of matter in a different form of matter which occurs when they mutually impact each other through interaction. Reflection is a characteristic of all forms of matter.
 +
 
 +
There are many forms and levels of reflection such as [from more simple to more complex]: physical and chemical reflection, biological reflection, mental reflection, creative and dynamic reflection, etc.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 68 ====
 +
 
 +
Change is driven by mutual impacts between or within things, phenomena, and/or ideas. Any time two such subjects impact one another, ''traces'' of some form or another are left on both interacting subjects. This characteristic of change is called ''reflection''.
 +
 
 +
The concept of reflection, first proposed by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, has been advanced through the work of various Soviet psychologists, philosophers, and scientists (including Ivan Pavlov, Todor Pavlov, Aleksei Leontiev, Lev Vygotsky, Valentin Voloshinov, and others), and is used as a basis for scientific inquiry up to this day by mainstream researchers in Cuba, Vietnam, China, and Laos. The information provided below is somewhat simplified and generalized to give the reader a basic familiarity with the theory of reflection and the development of reflection in nature.
 +
 
 +
Dialectical materialist scientists have developed a theory of the development of evolution of forms of reflection, positing that forms of reflection have become increasingly complex as organic processes and life have evolved and grown more complex over time.
 +
 
 +
The chart below gives an idea of how different forms of reaction have evolved over time:
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-10.png|''This chart outlines the basic development tendency of Forms of Reflection in matter which lead from inorganic matter, to life, to human consciousness and society.'']]
 +
 
 +
Obviously, not all subjects develop completely along the path outlined above. Thus far, to our knowledge, only human beings have developed entirely to the level of consciousness and society. It is also unknown whether, or how, human society may develop into some future, as-yet-unknown, form.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
''Physical and chemical reflection'' is the simplest form of reflection, dealing with the ways in which inorganic matter is reflected in human consciousness. Physical and chemical reflection is the reflection of mechanical, physical, and chemical changes and reactions of inorganic matter (i.e., changes in structures, positions, physical-chemical properties, and the processes of combining and dissolving substances). Physical and chemical reactions are passive: when two objects interact with each other physically or chemically, they do not do so consciously.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 69 ====
 +
 
 +
Reflection occurs any time two material objects interact and the features of the object are transferred to each other. Below are some very simplified illustrations to relate the basic idea of the physical reflection of material objects.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-11.png]]
 +
 
 +
'''Reflection as Change in Position:'''
 +
 
 +
1. Round Object moves towards Square Object.
 +
 
 +
2. Round Object impacts Square Object.
 +
 
 +
3. Square Object changes position; Round Object “bounces” and reverses direction.
 +
 
 +
4.Thus, Square Object’s change in position ''reflects'' the motion of Round Object (and vice-versa). Traces of both contradicting objects are reflected in the respective motion and position of each object.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-12.png]]
 +
 
 +
'''Reflection as Change in Structure:'''
 +
 
 +
1. Round Object moves toward Square Object.
 +
 
 +
2. Round Object impacts Square Object.
 +
 
 +
3. Structural changes (traces) occur in both Round and Square Object as a result of impact.
 +
 
 +
4. These changes constitute structural, physical ''reflection''.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-13.png]]
 +
 
 +
'''Chemical Reflection:'''
 +
 
 +
1. Atom C is attached to Atom B.
 +
 
 +
2. Atom C detaches from Atom B and transfers to attach to Atom A.
 +
 
 +
3. This is a process of ''chemical reflection'', in which both molecules mutually reflect one another after A <sub>C</sub>B a process of chemical reaction (one molecule loses Atom C while the other gains Atom C).
 +
 
 +
As dialectical materialists, we must strive to develop our understanding of the reflections of physical and chemical changes and reactions so that our conceptions reflect the material world as accurately as possible. For example: we must not ascribe consciousness to physical processes. Example: a gambler who comes to believe that a pair of dice is “spiteful” or “cursed” is attributing conscious motivation to unconscious physical processes, which is an inaccurate ideological reflection of reality.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
''Biological reflection'' is a higher, more complex form of reflection [compared to physical reflection]. It deals with reflection of organic material in the natural world. As our observations of biological processes have become more sophisticated and complex [through developments in natural science, the development of better tools for observation such as microscopes and other technologies, and so on], our conscious reflections of the natural world have also become more complex.
 +
 
 +
Biological reflection is expressed through ''excitation, induction,'' and ''reflexes.''
 +
 
 +
''Excitation'' is the reaction of simple plant and animal life-forms which occurs when they change position or structure as a direct result of physical changes to their habitat [i.e., a plant which moves toward the sun throughout the day].
 +
 
 +
''Induction'' is the reaction of animals with simple nerve systems which can sense or feel their environments. Induction occurs through unconditioned reflex mechanisms.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 70 ====
 +
 
 +
''Unconditioned reflexes'' are characterized by permanent connections between sensory perceptions and reactions. Such reactions are not learned, but simply occur automatically based on physiological mechanisms occurring within the organism. An example of an unconditioned reflex response would be muscles in the leg twitching at the response of a tap on the knee. Such responses are purely physiological and are never learned (“conditioned” into us) — these reactions are simply ''induced'' physiologically.
 +
 
 +
''Mental reflections'' are reactions which occur in animals with central nervous systems. Mental reflections occur through conditioned reflex mechanisms.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 71 ====
 +
 
 +
''Conditioned reflexes'' are reactions which are learned by organisms. These responses are acquired as animals learn to associate previously unrelated neural stimuli to elicit a particular reaction. The Russian psychologist Ivan Pavlov famously developed our understanding of conditioned responses by ringing a dinner bell shortly before giving dogs food. After a few repetitions, dogs would begin to salivate upon hearing the dinner bell being rung, even before any food was offered. Any dog which did not receive this conditioning would not salivate upon hearing a dinner bell. This is what makes it a learned, conditioned response — a type of mental reflection.
 +
 
 +
''Dynamic and creative reflection'' is the most advanced form of reflection. It only occurs in matter that has the highest structural level, such as the human brain. Dynamic and creative reflection is done through the human brain’s nervous physiological activities whenever the objective world impacts human senses. This is a kind of reflection that actively selects and processes information to create new information and to understand the meaning of that information. This dynamic and creative reflection is called consciousness.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 72 ====
 +
 
 +
Remember Lenin’s definition of matter from ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'': “Matter is a philosophical category denoting objective reality which is given to man in his sensations, and which is copied, photographed, and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them.”
 +
 
 +
An intrinsic property of matter is that it can be sensed by human beings, and through this sensation, ''reflected'' in human consciousness. Thus, all forms of matter share the characteristic of being able to be reflected in the human mind.
 +
 
 +
Criticizing Karl Pearson, who said that it was not logical to maintain that all matter had the property of being conscious, Lenin wrote in brackets: “But it is logical to suppose that all matter possesses a property which is essentially kindred to sensation: the property to reflect.” Understanding the concept of dynamic and creative reflection is critical to understanding the role of consciousness and the ideal in Dialectical Materialism. In particular, reflection differentiates Dialectical Materialism from the idealist form of dialectics used by Hegel [see Annotation 9, p. 10]. As Marx famously wrote in ''Capital Volume I'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of ‘the Idea,’ he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos [craftsman/artisan/creator] of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea.’ With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
In other words, Hegelian idealism saw human consciousness as defining the material world. Dialectical Materialism inverts this relationship to recognize that what we conceive in our minds is only a reflection of the material world. As Marx explains in ''The German Ideology'', all conscious thought stems from life processes through reflection:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Marx and Engels argued that consciousness arose from the ''life-processes'' of human beings. Life-processes are processes of motion and change which occur within organisms to sustain life, and these processes have a dialectical relationship with consciousness: the processes of life, therefore, reflect consciousness, just as consciousness reflects human life-processes. Conscious activities (such as being able to hunt, gather, and cook food, build shelter, and so on) improve the life-processes of human beings (by improving our health, extending our life-spans, etc.); and as our life-processes improved, our consciousness was able to develop more fully. As a concrete example of the dialectic between life processes and consciousness, it is now widely believed by scientists that the advent of cooking and preparing food (conscious activity) improved the functioning of the human brain<ref>Source: “Food for Thought: Was Cooking a Pivotal Step in Human Evolution?” by Alexandra Rosati, ''Scientific American'', February 26, 2018.</ref> (a life process) which, in turn, developed human consciousness, and so on. Life-processes thus determine ''how'' consciousness reflects reality, while consciousness impacts back on life-processes, reflecting the dialectical relationship between matter and consciousness [see p. 88] and between practical activities and consciousness [see Annotation 230, p. 226].
 +
 
 +
Because consciousness arose from life-processes of human beings in the material world, we know that the material world is reflected in our consciousness. However, these reflections do not ''determine'' the material world, and do not mirror the material world exactly [see Annotation 77, p. 79]. It is also important to understand that, since life-processes in the material world predate and determine consciousness, consciousness can never be a first basis of seeking truth about our world. As Marx further explains in ''The German Ideology:''
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Since the Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, as the real chains of men (just as the Old Hegelians declared them the true bonds of human society) it is evident that the Young Hegelians have to fight only against these illusions of consciousness. Since, according to their fantasy, the relationships of men, all their doings, their chains and their limitations are products of their consciousness, the Young Hegelians logically put to men the moral postulate of exchanging their present consciousness for human, critical or egoistic consciousness, and thus of removing their limitations. This demand to change consciousness amounts to a demand to interpret reality in another way, i.e. to recognise it by means of another interpretation.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
In other words, Hegelian idealism makes the critical mistake of believing that the ideal — consciousness — is the first basis of reality, and that anything and everything can be achieved through mere conscious activity. Marx, on the other hand, argues that “life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life,” and that we must understand the ways in which reality is reflected in consciousness before we can hope to affect change in the material conditions of human beings:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here [in the materialist perspective] we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. In the first method of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; in the second method, which conforms to real life, it is the real living individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
So, the work of the Dialectical Materialist is not to try to develop Utopian conceptions of reality first, to then proceed to try and force such purely ideal conceptions onto reality (see Annotation 17, p. 18).
 +
 
 +
Rather, we must understand the material basis of reality, as well as the material processes of change and motion which govern reality, and only then can we search for ways in which human beings can influence material reality through conscious activity. As Marx explains, the revolutionary must not be fooled into believing we can simply conceive of an ideal world and then replicate it into reality through interpretation and conscious thought alone. Instead, we must start with a firm understanding of material conditions and, from that material basis, determine how to build our revolutionary movement through conscious impact of material relations and processes of development in the material world.
 +
 
 +
As Marx wrote in ''The German Ideology:'' “Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence.” This distinction may seem subtle at first, but it has massive implications for how Marx suggests we go about participating in revolutionary activity. For Marx, purely-idealist debates and criticisms are an unproductive waste of time:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The Young-Hegelian ideologists, in spite of their allegedly ‘world-shattering’ statements, are the staunchest conservatives. The most recent of them have found the correct expression for their activity when they declare they are only fighting against ‘phrases.’ They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world. The only results which this philosophic criticism could achieve were a few (and at that thoroughly one-sided) elucidations of Christianity from the point of view of religious history; all the rest of their assertions are only further embellishments of their claim to have furnished, in these unimportant elucidations, discoveries of universal importance.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Marx also discusses the uselessness of idealist conjecture:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Moreover, it is quite immaterial what consciousness starts to do on its own: out of all such muck we get only the one inference that these three moments, the forces of production, the state of society, and consciousness, can and must come into contradiction with one another, because the division of labour implies the possibility, nay the fact that intellectual and material activity — enjoyment and labour, production and consumption — devolve on different individuals, and that the only possibility of their not coming into contradiction lies in the negation in its turn of the division of labour. It is self-evident, moreover, that ‘spectres,’ ‘bonds,’ ‘the higher being,’ ‘concept,’ ‘scruple,’ [terms for idealist conceptions] are merely the idealistic, spiritual expression, the conception apparently of the isolated individual, the image of very empirical fetters and limitations, within which the mode of production of life and the form of intercourse coupled with it move.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
What Marx means by this is that we should focus on the material processes and conditions of society if we intend to change society, because idealist speculation, conjecture, critique, and thought alone, at the individual level, will never be capable of affecting revolutionary change in our material world.
 +
 
 +
Instead, we must focus on the material basis of reality, the material conditions of society, and seek revolutionary measures which are built upon materialist foundations. Only by understanding material processes of development, as well as the dialectical relationship between consciousness and matter, can we reliably and effectively begin to impact reality through conscious activity. This begins with the recognition that conscious thought itself is a ''reflection'' of material reality which developed and results from ''life-processes'' of material motion and processes of change within the human brain.
 +
 
 +
This concept of reflection, pioneered by Marx and Engels, was significantly developed by V. I. Lenin in his response to Machian positivists who posited that what we perceive is not truly reality [see Annotation 32, p. 27]. In his ''Philosophical Notebooks,'' Lenin wrote: “Life gives rise to the brain. Nature is reflected in the human brain.”
 +
 
 +
In ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'', Lenin further defined the relationship between matter and consciousness through reflection.
 +
 
 +
'''LENIN’S PROOF OF THE THEORY OF REFLECTION'''
 +
 
 +
In ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism,'' Lenin offered the following arguments to back up the theory of reflection.
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
1) Things exist independently of our consciousness, independently of our perceptions, outside of us, for it is beyond doubt that alizarin [a chemical substance which was newly discovered at time of writing] existed in coal tar yesterday and it is equally beyond doubt that yesterday we knew nothing of the existence of this alizarin and received no sensations from it.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Lenin is saying that the material world must exist outside of and independent from our consciousness. He cites as evidence the discovery of a chemical substance which until recently we had no sensory perception of, noting that this substance must have existed long before we became aware of it through sensory observation.
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
2) There is definitely no difference in principle between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there can be no such difference. The only difference is between what is known and what is not yet known. And philosophical inventions of specific boundaries between the one and the other, inventions to the effect that the thing-in-itself is “beyond” phenomena (Kant) or that we can or must fence ourselves off by some philosophical partition from the problem of a world which in one part or another is still unknown but which exists outside us (Hume) — all this is the sheerest nonsense, [unfounded belief], trick, invention.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Lenin is referencing a centuries-old debate about whether or not human beings are capable of having real knowledge of a “thing-in-itself,” or if we can only perceive ''phenomena'' of things (characteristics observable to our senses). The “thing-in-itself” refers to the actual material object which exists outside of our consciousness. So the question being posed is: can we REALLY have knowledge of material objects outside of our consciousness, or does consciousness itself act as a barrier to ever REALLY knowing anything about material objects and the material world outside of our consciousness?
 +
 
 +
Immanuel Kant argued that we can never know the true nature of the material world, writing: “we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing-in-itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.” This idea that the senses could not be trusted to deliver accurate knowledge — and thus, the “thing-in-itself” is essentially unknowable — was carried forward by later empiricists such as Bacon and Hume [see Annotation 10, p. 10]. In ''Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'', Marx and Engels refute this notion, arguing that ''practice'' allows us to discover truth about “things-in-themselves:”
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical crotchets is practice — namely, experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and making it serve our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end to the Kantian ungraspable “thing-in-itself”.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Lenin expanded on this argument, explaining that the phenomena of objects which we observe with our senses ''do'' accurately reflect material objects, even though we might not know everything about these objects at once. Over time, as we learn more and more about material objects and the material world through practice and repeated observation, we more fully and accurately come to understand “things-in-themselves, as he writes in ''Empirio-Criticism and Materialism:''
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
3) In the theory of knowledge, as in every other branch of science, we must think dialectically, that is, we must not regard our knowledge as readymade and unalterable, but must determine how knowledge emerges from ignorance, how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete and more exact.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Here, Lenin further elaborates on the dialectical nature of knowledge: we must simultaneously accept that our knowledge is never perfect and unchanging, but we must also recognize that we are capable of making our knowledge more exact and complete over time. To further defend his ideas about reflection, Lenin cited Czech philosopher Karl Kautsky’s argument against Kant:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
That I see green, red and white is grounded in my faculty of sight. But that green is something different from red testifies to something that lies outside of me, to real differences between the things... The relations and differences between the things themselves revealed to me by the individual space and time concepts are real relations and differences of the external world, not conditioned by the nature of my perceptive faculty... If this were really so [i.e., if Kant’s doctrine of the ideality of time and space were true], we could know nothing about the world outside us, not even that it exists.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Lenin followed from Marx and Engels that, in order to further develop our understanding and knowledge of the material world, it was necessary to engage in ''practice'' [see Annotation 211, p. 205]. Engels wrote in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we [use] these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perceptions. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is positive proof that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Notice that Engels is careful to use the words ''so far'': “its qualities, ''so far'', agree with reality outside ourselves.” Engels does not argue that human understanding of the material world is infallible: mistakes are often made. But over time, as such mistakes are discovered and our understanding improves, our knowledge of the material world develops. This is only possible if the phenomena of objects which we observe — the reflections within our consciousness — do actually and accurately represent material reality. Lenin elaborated on this necessity to constantly update and improve dialectical materialist philosophy as new information and knowledge became available:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Engels, for instance, assimilated the, to him, new term, energy, and began to employ it in 1885 (Preface to the 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. of Anti-Dühring) and in 1888 (Ludwig Feuerbach), but to employ it equally with the concepts of ‘force’ and ‘motion,’ and along with them. Engels was able to enrich his materialism by adopting a new terminology.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Engels provided further elaborations on how practical experience and mastery of the material world refutes the notion that it is impossible to have real knowledge of the material world in ''Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical fancies is practice, viz., experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and using it for our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end of the Kantian incomprehensible or ungraspable... The chemical substances produced in the bodies of plants and animals remained just such thingsin-themselves until organic chemistry began to produce them one after another, whereupon the thing-in-itself became a thing for us, as for instance, alizarin [a dye which was originally plant-based], which we no longer trouble to grow in in the field, but produce much more cheaply and simply from coal tar.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
So, dialectical materialism holds that there is a material world external from our consciousness; that conscious thoughts are reflections of this material world; that we can have real knowledge of the material world through sensory observation; and that our knowledge and understanding of the material world is best advanced through ''practice'' in the material world.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
''- Social Sources of Consciousness''
 +
 
 +
There are many factors that constitute the social sources of consciousness. The most basic and direct factors are ''labor'' and ''language.''
 +
 
 +
''Labor'' is the process by which humans interact with the natural world in order to make products for our needs of existing and developing. Labor is also the process that changes the human body’s structure [i.e., muscles developing through exercise].
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 73 ====
 +
 
 +
In ''Dialectics of Nature'', Engels describes the dialectical relationship between labor and human development:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Labour is the source of all wealth, the political economists assert. And it really is the source — next to nature, which supplies it with the material that it converts into wealth. But it is even infinitely more than this. It is the prime basic condition for all human existence, and this to such an extent that, in a sense, we have to say that labour created man himself.
 +
 
 +
Before the first flint could be fashioned into a knife by human hands, a period of time probably elapsed in comparison with which the historical period known to us appears insignificant. But the decisive step had been taken, the hand had become free and could henceforth attain ever greater dexterity; the greater flexibility thus acquired was inherited and increased from generation to generation.
 +
 
 +
Thus the hand is not only the organ of labour, it is also the product of labour. Only by labour, by adaptation to ever new operations, through the inheritance of muscles, ligaments, and, over longer periods of time, bones that had undergone special development and the ever-renewed employment of this inherited finesse in new, more and more complicated operations, have given the human hand the high degree of perfection required to conjure into being the pictures of a Raphael, the statues of a Thorwaldsen, the music of a Paganini.
 +
 
 +
But the hand did not exist alone, it was only one member of an integral, highly complex organism. And what benefited the hand, benefited also the whole body it served.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Labor also allows us to discover the attributes, structures, motion laws, etc., of the natural world, via observable phenomena.
 +
 
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 74 ====
 +
 
 +
We discover truth about the natural world through labor — through physical ''practice'' in the material world. See the discussion of ''practice'' in Annotation 211, p. 205.
 +
 
 +
All of these phenomena, through our human senses, impact our human brains. And through brain activity, knowledge and consciousness of the objective world are formed and developed.
 +
 
 +
''Language'' is a system of material signals that carries information with cognitive content. Without language, consciousness could not exist and develop.
 +
 
 +
The birth of language goes hand in hand with labor. From the beginning, labor was social. The relationships between people who perform labor processes require them to have means to communicate and exchange thoughts. This requirement caused language to arise and develop along with the working processes. With language, humans not only communicate, but also summarise reality and convey experience and thoughts from generation to generation.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 75 ====
 +
 
 +
From ''Dialectics of Nature'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
It has already been noted that our simian ancestors were gregarious; it is obviously impossible to seek the derivation of man, the most social of all animals, from non-gregarious immediate ancestors. Mastery over nature began with the development of the hand, with labour, and widened man’s horizon at every new advance. He was continually discovering new, hitherto unknown properties in natural objects. On the other hand, the development of labour necessarily helped to bring the members of society closer together by increasing cases of mutual support and joint activity, and by making clear the advantage of this joint activity to each individual. In short, men in the making arrived at the point where they had something to say to each other. Necessity created the organ; the undeveloped larynx of the ape was slowly but surely transformed by modulation to produce constantly more developed modulation, and the organs of the mouth gradually learned to pronounce one articulate sound after another.
 +
 
 +
Comparison with animals proves that this explanation of the origin of language from and in the process of labour is the only correct one. The little that even the most highly-developed animals need to communicate to each other does not require articulate speech. In its natural state, no animal feels handicapped by its inability to speak or to understand human speech. It is quite different when it has been tamed by man. The dog and the horse, by association with man, have developed such a good ear for articulate speech that they easily learn to understand any language within their range of concept. Moreover they have acquired the capacity for feelings such as affection for man, gratitude, etc., which were previously foreign to them. Anyone who has had much to do with such animals will hardly be able to escape the conviction that in many cases they now feel their inability to speak as a defect, although, unfortunately, it is one that can no longer be remedied because their vocal organs are too specialised in a definite direction. However, where vocal organs exist, within certain limits even this inability disappears. The buccal organs of birds are as different from those of man as they can be, yet birds are the only animals that can learn to speak; and it is the bird with the most hideous voice, the parrot, that speaks best of all. Let no one object that the parrot does not understand what it says. It is true that for the sheer pleasure of talking and associating with human beings, the parrot will chatter for hours at a stretch, continually repeating its whole vocabulary. But within the limits of its range of concepts it can also learn to understand what it is saying. Teach a parrot swear words in such a way that it gets an idea of their meaning (one of the great amusements of sailors returning from the tropics); tease it and you will soon discover that it knows how to use its swear words just as correctly as a Berlin costermonger. The same is true of begging for titbits.
 +
 
 +
First labour, after it and then with it speech — these were the two most essential stimuli under the influence of which the brain of the ape gradually changed into that of man, which, for all its similarity is far larger and more perfect. Hand in inevitably accompanied by a corresponding refinement of the organ of hearing, so the development of the brain as a whole is accompanied by a refinement of hand with the development of the brain went the development of its most immediate instruments — the senses. Just as the gradual development of speech is all the senses. The eagle sees much farther than man, but the human eye discerns considerably more in things than does the eye of the eagle. The dog has a far keener sense of smell than man, but it does not distinguish a hundredth part of the odours that for man are definite signs denoting different things. And the sense of touch, which the ape hardly possesses in its crudest initial form, has been developed only side by side with the development of the human hand itself, through the medium of labour.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
So, the most basic, direct and important source that decides the birth and development of language is labor. Language appeared later than labor but always goes with labor. Language and labor were the two main stimulations affecting the brains of the primates which evolved into humans, slowly changing their brains into human brains and transforming animal psychology into human consciousness.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-14.png|''This diagram is based on work from an article titled'' “Evidence in Hand: Recent Discoveries and the Early Evolution of Human Manual Manipulation<ref>Written by Professor Tracy L. Kivell and published in ''The Royal Society''.</ref>.”''Modern research has discovered strong evidence<ref>''Stone Tools Helped Shape Human Hands'' by Sara Reardon, published in New Scientist Magazine.</ref> that the human hand evolved along with tool use, in line with Engels’ analysis in'' Dialectics of Nature.]]
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 76 ====
 +
 
 +
It is also worth noting that, just as human consciousness derived from labor and language ''and'' social activity, so too did society itself arise from language and labor, as Engels explained in ''Dialectics of Nature'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The reaction on labour and speech of the development of the brain and its attendant senses, of the increasing clarity of consciousness, power of abstraction and of conclusion, gave both labour and speech an ever-renewed impulse to further development. This development did not reach its conclusion when man finally became distinct from the ape, but on the whole made further powerful progress, its degree and direction varying among different peoples and at different times, and here and there even being interrupted by local or temporary regression. This further development has been strongly urged forward, on the one hand, and guided along more definite directions, on the other, by a new element which came into play with the appearance of fully-fledged man, namely, society.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
In other words, these factors of human’s physical nature and human society have a dialectical relationship with one another. Elements of human nature — in particular labor and language — led to the development of human society, which in turned played a key role in the development of human language and labor.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-15.png|''Human language and human labor mutually develop one another through a dialectical process to develop human nature. Simultaneously, human nature and human society mutually develop one another through a dialectical process.'']]
 +
 
 +
Elements of human nature — in particular labor and language — led to the development of human society, which in turned played a key role in the development of human language and labor.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== b. Nature and Structure of Consciousness ====
 +
 
 +
''- Nature of Consciousness''
 +
 
 +
''Consciousness is the dynamic and creative reflection of the objective world in human brains; it is the subjective image of the objective world.'' [See discussion of dynamic and creative reflection on p. 68]
 +
 
 +
''The dynamic and creative nature'' of reflection is expressed in human psycho-physiological activities when we receive, select, process, and save data in our brains. Within the human brain, we are able to collect data from the external material world. Based on this information, our brain is capable of creating new information, and we are able to analyze, interpret, and understand all of this information collectively within our consciousness.
 +
 
 +
The dynamic and creative nature of reflection is also expressed in several human processes:
 +
 
 +
* The creation of ideas, hypotheses, stories, etc.
 +
* The ability to summarize nature and to comprehend the objective laws of nature.
 +
* The ability to construct models of ideas and systems of knowledge to guide our activities.
 +
 
 +
''Consciousness is the subjective image of the objective world.'' Consciousness is defined by the objective world in both Content and Form [see Annotation 150, p. 147]. However, consciousness does not perfectly reflect the objective world. It modifies information through the subjective lenses (thoughts, feelings, aspirations, experiences, knowledge, needs, etc.) of humans. According to Marx and Engels, ideas are simply “sublimates [transformations] of [the human brain’s]... material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises.”<ref>''The German Ideology'', Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 1846.</ref>
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 77 ====
 +
 
 +
In ''The German Ideology'', Marx and Engels refer to ideas somewhat poetically as “the phantoms formed in the human brain,” and explains that ideas arise directly from material human life processes [see Annotation 72, p. 68]. Lenin makes it very clear in ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'' that consciousness is not a ''mirror image'', or ''exact'' reproduction of reality, quoting Engels:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The great basic question of all philosophy,” Engels says, “especially of modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being,” of “spirit and nature.” Having divided the philosophers into “two great camps” on this basic question, Engels shows that there is “yet another side” to this basic philosophical question, viz., “in what relation do our thoughts about the world surrounding us stand to this world itself? Is our thinking capable of the cognition of the real world? Are we able in our ideas and notions of the real world to produce a correct reflection of reality?” “The overwhelming majority of philosophers give an affirmative answer to this question,” says Engels, “including under this head not only all materialists but also the most consistent idealists.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Of extra importance is Lenin’s footnote to the above passage, regarding what he purports to be Viktor Chernov’s mistranslation of Engels:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Fr. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, etc., 4<sup>th</sup> Germ. ed., S. 15. Russian translation, Geneva ed., 1905, p. 12–13. Mr. V. Chernov translates the word Spiegelbild literally (a mirror reflection) accusing Plekhanov of presenting the theory of Engels “in a very weakened form” by speaking in Russian simply of a “reflection” instead of a “mirror reflection”. This is mere cavilling. Spiegelbild [mirror reflection] in German is also used simply in the sense of Abbild [reflection, image].
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Here, Lenin reaffirms and clarifies Engels’ idea that consciousness is not a perfect, exact duplicate of reality; not a “mirror image.” This, however, does not contradict the fact that we can obtain real knowledge of the real world in our consciousness, and that this knowledge improves over time through practice and observation. Indeed, Lenin’s passage on practice cited first in this annotation directly follows the above passage in ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism''.
 +
 
 +
See: Natural Source of Consciousness, p. 64, and Annotation 32, 27.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
''Consciousness is a social phenomenon and has a social nature.'' Consciousness arose from real life activities. Consciousness is always ruled by natural law and by social law.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 78 ====
 +
 
 +
''Natural law'' includes the laws of physics, chemistry, and other natural phenomena which govern the material world. Consciousness itself can never violate natural law as it arises from the natural processes of the natural world.
 +
 
 +
''Social law'' includes the objective and universal relationships between social phenomena and social processes. Human society was created through labor, and this labor was performed in very specific material relations between humans and the natural world.
 +
 
 +
''Note: social law is a key concept of historical materialism, which is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.''
 +
 
 +
In ''A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy'', Marx explains how social existence and social laws govern the consciousness of individuals:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Consciousness is determined by the social communication needs of human beings as well as the material conditions of reality.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 79 ====
 +
 
 +
The term ''material conditions'' refers to the external environment which humans inhabit. Material conditions include the natural environment, the means of production and the economic base<ref>See Annotation 3, p. 2 and Annotation 29, p. 24.</ref> of human society, and other objective externalities and systems which affect human life and society. Note that material conditions don’t refer to physical matter alone, but also include objective social relations and phenomena. In ''A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy'', Marx argues that “neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, but that on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life.”
 +
 
 +
Consciousness is dynamic in nature, constantly learning and changing flexibly. Consciousness guides humans to transform the material world to suit our needs.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 80 ====
 +
 
 +
Consciousness and material conditions have a dialectical relationship with one other, just as the base of society and the superstructure have a dialectical relationship with one other [see Annotation 29, p. 24]. Consciousness arises from material conditions, though conscious activity can affect material conditions.
 +
 
 +
As Marx explains in ''Capital Volume I'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realises a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordination is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process demands that, during the whole operation, the workman’s will be steadily in consonance with his purpose.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
In ''A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy'', Marx explains how the development of material conditions eventually leads to conscious activity which will in turn lead to changes in society:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or — this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms — with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
As Marx further explains, material conditions must first be met before such revolutionary social changes can be made through conscious activity:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
''- Structure of Consciousness''
 +
 
 +
Consciousness has a very complicated structure, including many factors which have strong relationships with each other. The most basic factors are ''knowledge, sentiment'' and ''willpower.''
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 81 ====
 +
 
 +
As with the concept of reflection (see Annotation 68, p. 65), the analysis of the structure of consciousness which follows is rooted in ideas first proposed by Marx, Engels and Lenin, and later developed through the work of various Soviet psychologists, philosophers, and scientists including Ivan Pavlov, Todor Pavlov, Aleksei Leontiev, Lev Vygotsky, Valentin Voloshinov, and others, and is used as a basis for scientific inquiry and development up to this day. According to ''Where is Marx in the Work and Thought of Vygotsky?'' by Lucien Sève (2018), much of this work, such as the groundbreaking work of Lev Vygotsky, has been heavily “de-Marxized,” stripped of all aspects of Marxism and, by extension, dialectical materialism, in translation to English.
 +
 
 +
''Knowledge'' constitutes the understanding of human beings, and is the result of the cognitive process. Knowledge is the re-created image of perceived objects which takes the form of language. Knowledge is the mode of existence of consciousness and the condition for consciousness to develop.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 82 ====
 +
 
 +
Marx and Engels discussed the relationship between language and consciousness extensively in ''The German Ideology'', explaining that language — the form of knowledge which exists in human consciousness — evolved dialectically with and through social activity, and that consciousness also developed along with and through the material processes that gave rise to speech:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
From the start the ‘spirit’ is afflicted with the curse of being ‘burdened’ with matter, which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of language. Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness that exists also for other men, and for that reason alone it really exists for me personally as well; language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men.”So, language, physical speech organs, and human society all developed in dialectic relations with one another. Since language is the form of knowledge in human consciousness, this means that knowledge arose directly from these dialectical processes:
 +
 
 +
Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all. Consciousness is at first, of course, merely consciousness concerning the immediate sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with other persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
The fact that knowledge has a language-form in human consciousness is also important to understand because it shows that consciousness arose dialectically as, and through, social activity, and indeed, language and social activity gave rise to consciousness as a replacement for animal instinct in our relations with nature.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Man’s consciousness of the necessity of associating with the individuals around him is the beginning of the consciousness that he is living in society at all. This beginning is as animal as social life itself at this stage. It is mere herd-consciousness, and at this point man is only distinguished from sheep by the fact that with him consciousness takes the place of instinct or that his instinct is a conscious one.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
And, as language and social activity dialectically developed through one another, human society became complex enough to give rise to human societies and human economies:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
This sheep-like or tribal consciousness receives its further development and extension through increased productivity, the increase of needs, and, what is fundamental to both of these, the increase of population. With these there develops the division of labour…
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Knowledge can be separated into two broad categories: knowledge of nature, and knowledge of human society. Each of these categories of knowledge reflects its corresponding entity in the external world.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 83 ====
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-16.png|''Each category of knowledge reflects a corresponding entity in the external world.'']]
 +
 
 +
It’s also important to note that human society and nature have a dialectical relationship with each other and mutually impact one another, and, by extension, knowledge of nature and knowledge of human society also dialectically influence one another. So these categories of knowledge are not isolated from one another but rather dynamically shape and influence each other continuously through time.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Based on levels of cognitive development, we can also classify knowledge into categories of: daily life knowledge and scientific knowledge, experience knowledge and theory knowledge, emotional knowledge and rational knowledge.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 84 ====
 +
 
 +
The following information is from the ''Marxism-Leninism Textbook of Students Who Specialize in Marxism-Leninism'', released by Vietnam’s Ministry of Education and Training:
 +
 
 +
'''Daily Life and Scientific Knowledge'''
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-17.png]]
 +
 
 +
''Daily Life Knowledge'' is the knowledge we acquire in our daily lives to deal with our daily tasks. From our interactions with nature and human society, we cultivate life experience and our understanding of every aspect of our daily lives in relation to human society and nature.
 +
 
 +
''Scientific Knowledge'' arises from Daily Life Knowledge: as our daily lives become more complex, we develop a need to understand the material world and human society more deeply and comprehensively. Scientific Knowledge is thus a developed system of knowledge of nature and human society. Scientific Knowledge can be tested and can be applied to human life and activity in useful ways.
 +
 
 +
'''Experience and Theory Knowledge:'''
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-18.png]]
 +
 
 +
''Experience Knowledge'' is cultivated from direct observation of nature and human society. This kind of knowledge is extremely diverse, and we can apply this kind of knowledge to guide our daily activities.
 +
 
 +
''Theory Knowledge'' arises from Experience Knowledge. Theory Knowledge is composed of abstract generalizations of Experience Knowledge. Theory Knowledge is more profound, accurate, and systematically organized than Experience Knowledge and gives us an understanding of the laws and dynamics of nature and human society.
 +
 
 +
'''Emotional and Rational Knowledge:'''
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-19.png]]
 +
 
 +
Less Developed More Developed
 +
 
 +
''Emotional Knowledge'' is the earlier stage of cognitive processing. Emotional Knowledge comes directly to us from our human senses. We obtain emotional knowledge when we use our human senses to directly learn things about nature and human society. Emotional Knowledge is usually manifested as immediate cognitive responses such as pleasure, pain, and other such impulses.
 +
 
 +
''Rational Knowledge'' arises from Emotional Knowledge. It is a higher stage of cognitive processing, involving abstract thought and generalization of emotional knowledge.
 +
 
 +
Rational Knowledge is usually manifested as definitions, conjectures, judgments, etc.
 +
 
 +
''See also: Principle of Development, p. 119; Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism, p. 204.''
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
''Sentiment'' is the resonant manifestation of human emotions and feelings in our relationships. Sentiment is a special form of reality reflection [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. Whenever reality impacts human beings, we feel specific sensations and emotional reactions to those impacts. Over time, these specific sensations and emotions combine and dialectically develop into generalized human feelings, and we call these generalized feelings ''sentiment.'' Sentiment expresses and develops in every aspect of human life; it is a factor that improves and promotes cognitive and practical activities.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 85 ====
 +
 
 +
As Marx explains in ''Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844:'' “Man as an objective, sensuous being is therefore a suffering being — and because he feels that he suffers, a passionate being. Passion is the essential power of man energetically bent on its object.” Marx further elaborates that sentimental emotion is essential to human nature: “The domination of the objective essence within me, the sensuous eruption of my essential activity, is emotion which thereby becomes the activity of my nature.”
 +
 
 +
Depending on the subjects that are perceived, as well as our human emotions about them, sentiments can be manifested in many different forms such as: moral emotion, aesthetic emotion, religious emotion, etc.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 86 ====
 +
 
 +
''Moral Emotion'' is the basic manifestation of moral consciousness at an emotional level. For example: when we see people helping other people, we have positive emotional responses, yet when we see people harming other people, we have negative emotional responses. ''(Source: Nguyen Thi Khuyen of the National Institute of Administration of Vietnam)''
 +
 
 +
''Aesthetic Emotion'' refers to the the resonant feelings which arise from our interaction with beauty, sadness, comedy, etc., in life and in art. For example: when humans encounter beauty, we feel positive emotional responses. When humans encounter ugliness, we feel negative emotional responses. When we witness pain, we feel sympathetic feelings of pain and a desire to help. When we witness comedy, we feel humorous emotions ourselves. ''(Source: Textbook of General Aesthetic Studies from the Ministry of''
 +
 
 +
''Education and Training of Vietnam)''
 +
 
 +
''Religious Emotion'' is the human belief in supernatural or spiritual forces which can’t be tested or proved through material practice or observation. However, belief in these forces can give human beings emotional responses such as hope, love, etc. ''(Source: Pham Van Chuc, Doctor of Philosophy, Central Theoretical Council of the Communist Party of Vietnam)''
 +
 
 +
These are just a few illustrative examples; there are many other ways in which human emotion and sentiment can manifest.
 +
 
 +
''Willpower'' is the manifestation of one’s own strength used to overcome obstacles in the process of achieving goals. Willpower is a dynamic aspect of consciousness, a manifestation of human consciousness in the material world.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 87 ====
 +
 
 +
An unnamed poem by Ho Chi Minh, written in 1950 for the Revolutionary Youth Pioneers, addresses the phenomenon of willpower:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Nothing in this world must be difficult
 +
 
 +
The only thing that we should fear is having a waivering heart
 +
 
 +
We can dig up mountains and fill the sea
 +
 
 +
Once we’ve willfully made a firm decision
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Today, this poem serves as the lyrics for anthem of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union (formerly the Revolutionary Youth Pioneers).
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Willpower arises from human self-awareness and awareness of the purposes of our actions. Through this awareness and through willpower, we are able to struggle against ourselves and externalities to successfully achieve our goals. We can consider willpower to be the power of conscious human activity; willpower controls and regulates human behaviors in order to allow humans to move towards our goals voluntarily; willpower also allows humans to exercise self-restraint and self-control, and to be assertive in our actions according to our views and beliefs.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 88 ====
 +
 
 +
In ''Dialectics of Nature'', Engels explains how willpower developed in human beings as we separated from animals through the development of consciousness: “The further removed men are from animals, however, the more their effect on nature assumes the character of premeditated, planned action directed towards definite preconceived ends.”
 +
 
 +
In ''Capital Volume I'', Marx explains how willpower uniquely allows humans to consciously change our own material conditions to suit our needs according to pre-conceived plans:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material re-actions between himself and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature’s productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway. We are not now dealing with those primitive instinctive forms of labour that remind us of the mere animal. An immeasurable interval of time separates the state of things in which a man brings his labour-power to market for sale as a commodity, from that state in which human labour was still in its first instinctive stage. We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realises a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordination is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process demands that, during the whole operation, the workman’s will be steadily in consonance with his purpose. This means close attention. The less he is attracted by the nature of the work, and the mode in which it is carried on, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as something which gives play to his bodily and mental powers, the more close his attention is forced to be.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
The true value of willpower is not only manifested in strength or weakness, but is also expressed in the content and meaning of the goals that we try to achieve through our willpower. Lenin believed that willpower is one of the factors that will create revolutionary careers for millions of people in the fierce class struggles to liberate ourselves and mankind.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 89 ====
 +
 
 +
In “''Left-Wing” Communism: an Infantile Disorder'', Lenin explains how revolutions are born from the collective willpower of thousands of people:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
History as a whole, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more multiform, more lively and ingenious than is imagined by even the best parties, the most class-conscious vanguards of the most advanced classes. This can readily be understood, because even the finest of vanguards express the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagination of tens of thousands, whereas at moments of great upsurge and the exertion of all human capacities, revolutions are made by the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagination of tens of millions, spurred on by a most acute struggle of classes. Two very important practical conclusions follow from this: first, that in order to accomplish its task the revolutionary class must be able to master all forms or aspects of social activity without exception (completing after the capture of political power — sometimes at great risk and with very great danger — what it did not complete before the capture of power); second, that the revolutionary class must be prepared for the most rapid and brusque replacement of one form by another.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
All of these factors [knowledge, sentiment, and willpower] which, together, create consciousness, have dialectical relationships with each other. Of these factors, knowledge is the most important, because it is the mode of existence of consciousness, and also the factor which guides the development of all the other factors, and it also determines how the other factors manifest.
 +
 
 +
=== 3. The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness ===
 +
 
 +
The relationship between matter and consciousness is dialectical. In this relationship, ''matter comes first, and matter is the source of consciousness; it decides consciousness. However, consciousness is not totally passive, it can impact back to matter through the practical activities of human beings.''
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 90 ====
 +
 
 +
Engels explained in ''Dialectics of Nature'' that “matter evolves out of itself the thinking human brain,” which means that matter must necessarily come prior to consciousness.
 +
 
 +
As Marx explains in ''Capital Volume I'', matter determines conscious activity:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. – real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
However, it’s important to remember that the relationship between matter and consciousness is ''dialectical'', and that conscious activity — through the combination of willpower and labor — can also impact the material world; social change arises through the combined willpower of many human beings. See: Annotation 80, p. 81.
 +
 
 +
==== a. The Role of Matter in Consciousness ====
 +
 
 +
Dialectical Materialism affirms that:
 +
 
 +
'''• Matter is the first existence, and that consciousness comes after.'''
 +
 
 +
'''• Matter is the source of consciousness, it decides consciousness.'''
 +
 
 +
We know that matter determines consciousness because consciousness is the product of the high-level-structured matter such as the human brain. Consciousness itself can only exist after the development of the material structure of the human brain. Humans are the result of millions of years of development of the material world. We are, therefore, products of the material world. This conclusion has been firmly established through the development of natural science, which has given us great insight into the long history of the Earth and of the evolution of living organisms, including human beings.
 +
 
 +
All of this scientific evidence stands as the basis for the viewpoint: ''matter comes first, consciousness comes after'' [see Annotation 114, p. 116].
 +
 
 +
We have already discussed the factors which constitute the natural and social sources of consciousness:
 +
 
 +
'''•''' Human brains
 +
 
 +
'''•''' Impacts of the material world on human brains that cause reflections
 +
 
 +
'''•''' Labor
 +
 
 +
'''•''' Language
 +
 
 +
[See Annotation 72, p. 68 and Annotation 73, p. 75]
 +
 
 +
All of these factors also assert that ''matter is the origin of consciousness.''
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 91 ====
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-20.png]]
 +
 
 +
The material basis of consciousness is rooted in the following phenomena:
 +
 
 +
<ul>
 +
<li><ol style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;">
 +
<li><p>The material structure of the human brain.</p></li></ol>
 +
</li>
 +
<li><ol start="2" style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;">
 +
<li><p>Impacts from the material world cause reflections in human consciousness.</p></li></ol>
 +
</li>
 +
<li><ol start="100" style="list-style-type: upper-roman;">
 +
<li><p>Human Labor — physical process which dialectically develops consciousness.</p></li></ol>
 +
</li>
 +
<li><ol start="500" style="list-style-type: upper-roman;">
 +
<li><p>Human Speech — physical process which dialectically develops consciousness.</p></li></ol>
 +
</li>
 +
<li><ol start="5" style="list-style-type: upper-alpha;">
 +
<li><p>Evolution of human brains and consciousness through material processes of the material world.</p></li></ol>
 +
</li></ul>
 +
 
 +
For more information, see: Nature and Structure of Consciousness.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Consciousness is composed of reflections and subjective images of the material world, therefore ''the content of consciousness is decided by matter'' [see Annotation 68, p. 65]''.'' The development of consciousness is determined by natural laws and by social laws<ref>For a discussion of the material basis of social laws, see Annotation 10, p. 10, Annotation 78, p. 80, and Annotation 79, p. 81.</ref> as well as the material environment which we inhabit. All of these factors which determine consciousness are material in nature. Therefore, matter determines not only the content but also the development of consciousness.
 +
 
 +
==== b. The Role of Consciousness in Matter ====
 +
 
 +
In relation to matter, ''consciousness can impact matter through human activities.''
 +
 
 +
When we discuss consciousness we are discussing ''human'' consciousness. So, when we talk about the role of consciousness, we are talking about the role of human beings. Consciousness in and of itself cannot directly change anything in reality. In order to change reality, humans have to implement material activities. However, consciousness controls every human activity, so even though consciousness does not directly create or change the material world, it equips humans with knowledge about objective reality, and based on that foundation of knowledge, humans are able to identify goals, set directions, develop plans, and select methods, solutions, tools, and means to achieve our goals. So, consciousness manifests its ability to impact matter through human activities.
 +
 
 +
The impact of consciousness on matter can have positive or negative results.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 92 ====
 +
 
 +
“Positive” and “negative,” in this context, are subjective and relative terms which simply denote “moving towards a goal” and “moving away from a goal,” based on a specific perspective.
 +
 
 +
From the perspective of revolutionary communism, “positive” can be taken as moving towards the end goal of the liberation of the working class from capitalist oppression and the construction of a stateless, classless society. Likewise, “negative” can be taken as moving away from that goal. See: Annotation 114, p. 116.
 +
 
 +
Humans have the ability to overcome all challenges in the process of achieving our goals and improving our world, so long as our conscious activities meet the following criteria:
 +
 
 +
* We must perceive reality accurately.
 +
* We must properly apply scientific knowledge, revolutionary sentiments, and directed willpower.
 +
* We must avoid contradicting objective laws of nature and society.
 +
 
 +
Successfully achieving our goals and improving the world in this manner constitutes the ''positive'' outcome of human consciousness.
 +
 
 +
On the contrary, if human consciousness wrongly reflects objective reality, nature, and laws, then, right from the beginning, our actions will have negative results which will do harm to ourselves and our society.
 +
 
 +
Therefore, by directing the activities of humans, consciousness can determine whether the results of human activities are beneficial or harmful. Our consciousness thus determines whether our activities will succeed or fail and whether our efforts will be effective or ineffective.
 +
 
 +
By studying the matter, origin, and nature of consciousness, as well as the relationships between matter and consciousness, we can see that:
 +
 
 +
* Matter is the source of consciousness <ref>See: Annotation 72, p. 68.</ref>.
 +
* Matter determines the content and creative capacity of consciousness <ref>See: Annotation 90, p. 88.</ref>.
 +
* Matter is the prerequisite to form consciousness <ref>See: ''The Role of Matter in Consciousness,'' p. 89.</ref>.
 +
* Consciousness only has the ability to impact matter, and this impact is indirect, because it has to be done through human material activities within material reality <ref>See: ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness,'' p. 88.</ref>.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-21.png|''Matter determines consciousness while consciousness impacts matter indirectly through human activity.'']]
 +
 
 +
The strength with which consciousness can impact the material world depends on:
 +
 
 +
* The accuracy of reflection of the material world in consciousness <ref>See:Annotation 68, p. 65.</ref>.
 +
* Strength of willpower which transmits consciousness to human activity <ref>See: ''Nature and Structure of Consciousness,'' p. 79.</ref>.
 +
* The degree of organization of social activity <ref>See: Annotation 93, below.</ref>.
 +
* Material conditions in which human activity occurs <ref>See: Annotation 10, p. 10.</ref>.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 93 ====
 +
 
 +
The importance of organization in determining the outcomes of human social activity is one of the most important concepts of Marxism-Leninism and is discussed frequently by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and nearly every other important communist revolutionary in history. Marx explains the connections between social organization and conscious human activity in ''Capital Volume I'' [see Annotation 80, p. 81].
 +
 
 +
=== 4. Meaning of the methodology ===
 +
 
 +
Dialectical Materialism builds the most basic and common methodological<ref>For discussion of the meaning of methodology, see ''Methodology,'' p. 44.</ref> principles for human cognitive and practical activities on the following bases:
 +
 
 +
* The viewpoint of the material nature of the world [''matter comes first, consciousness comes after''].
 +
* The dynamic and creative nature of consciousness <ref>See: ''Nature of Consciousness,'' p. 79.</ref>.
 +
* The dialectical relationship between matter and consciousness <ref>See: ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness,'' p. 88.</ref>.
 +
 
 +
All cognitive and practical activities of humans ''originate from material reality'' and ''must observe objective natural and social laws,'' however, our activities are capable of ''impacting the material world through dynamic and creative conscious activity''. [See ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88].
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 94 ====
 +
 
 +
The above paragraph summarizes an important methodological concept which is critical for undestanding the philosophical framework of Dialectical Materialism. Dialectical Materialism, as a philosophy, synthesizes earlier materialist and idealist positions by recognizing the fact that the material determines consciousness, while consciousness can impact the material world through willful activity.
 +
 
 +
From this philosophical basis, the methodology of Materialist Dialectics has been developed to provide a deeper understanding of dialectical development, which is rooted in contradiction and negation within and between subjects. Materialist Dialectics is the subject of Chapter 2, p. 98.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
According to this methodological principle [i.e., the Principle of the Dialectic Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness], if we hope to succeed in accomplishing our goals in the material world, then we must ''simultaneously'' meet two criteria:
 +
 
 +
1. We must ensure that our knowledge reflects the objective material world as much as possible, respecting the objective natural and social laws of the material world.
 +
 
 +
2. We must simultaneously recognize the dynamic and creative nature of our conscious activity.
 +
 
 +
When we say that human activities ''originate from material reality'' and ''must observe objective natural and social laws'' we'''' mean that human knowledge must originate from the material world. This means that if we hope to be successful in our activities, we should respect the natural and social laws of the material world.
 +
 
 +
This means that in our human perception and activities, we must determine goals, and set strategies, policies, and plans which are rooted firmly in objective material reality. Humans have to take objective material reality as the foundation of our activities and plans, and all of our activities must be carried out in the material world. Humans have to examine and understand our material conditions and transform them in ways that will help us to accomplish our goals.
 +
 
 +
When we talk about ''impacting the material world through dynamic and creative conscious activity,'' we mean we must recognize the positive, dynamic, and creative roles of consciousness. We must recognize the role human consciousness plays in dynamically and creatively manifesting our will in the material world through labor. Impacting the material world through conscious activity at a revolutionary scale requires humans to respect and understand the role of scientific knowledge; to study laboriously to master such knowledge; and then to propagate such knowledge so to the masses to develop public knowledge and belief so as to guide the people’s action.
 +
 
 +
Moreover, we also have to voluntarily study and practice<ref>See: Annotation 211, p. 205.</ref> in order to form and improve our revolutionary viewpoint<ref>See: Annotation 114, p. 116.</ref> and willpower<ref>See: ''Nature and Structure of Consciousness'', p. 79.</ref> in order to have both scientific and humanitarian activity guidelines.
 +
 
 +
To implement this principle [i.e., the Principle of the Dialectic Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness], we have to avoid, fight against, and overcome the diseases of subjectivism<ref>See: Annotation 222, p. 218.</ref> and idealism<ref>See: ''The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues,'' p. 48.</ref> through such errors as:
 +
 
 +
* Attempting to impose idealist plans and principles [which are not rooted in material conditions] into reality.
 +
* Considering fantasy, illusion, and imagination instead of reality.
 +
* Basing policies and programs on subjective desires.
 +
* Using sentiment as the starting point for developing policies, strategies, etc.
 +
 
 +
On the other hand, in cognitive and practical activities, we also have to fight against empiricism<ref>See: Annotation 10, p. 10.</ref>, which disregards scientific knowledge and theories, and which is also very conservative, stagnant and passive.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 95 ====
 +
 
 +
Process of Developing Revolutionary Public Knowledge
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-22.png|''Developing revolutionary public knowledge must be preceded by mastery of knowledge and a firm grounding in the role and nature of knowledge.'']]
 +
 
 +
In ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'', Engels makes a scathing critique of idealist socialist revolutionary thought, writing:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
To all these [idealist socialists], Socialism is the expression of absolute truth<ref>See: Annotation 232 and ''The Properties of Truth,'' on p. 228.</ref>, reason and justice, and has only to be discovered to conquer all the world by virtue of its own power. And as an absolute truth is independent of time, space, and of the historical development of man, it is a mere accident when and where it is discovered. With all this, absolute truth, reason, and justice are different with the founder of each different school. And as each one’s special kind of absolute truth, reason, and justice is again conditioned by his subjective understanding, his conditions of existence, the measure of his knowledge and his intellectual training, there is no other ending possible in this conflict of absolute truths than that they shall be mutually exclusive of one another.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Here, Engels points out the absurdity of the idea that some abstract, purely ideal “truth” could liberate workers in the material world. Engels continues on, explaining how such idealist socialism could never lead to meaningful revolutionary change:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Hence, from this nothing could come but a kind of eclectic, average Socialism, which, as a matter of fact, has up to the present time dominated the minds of most of the socialist workers in France and England. Hence, a mish-mash allowing of the most manifold shades of opinion: a mish-mash of such critical statements, economic theories, pictures of future society by the founders of different sects, as excite a minimum of opposition; a mish-mash which is the more easily brewed the more definite sharp edges of the individual constituents are rubbed down in the stream of debate, like rounded pebbles in a brook.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
In other words, idealist revolutionary movements only tend to result in endless debate and meaningless theories which are divorced from objective reality and material conditions. Such theories and idealist constructions do not lead to effective action in the real world. Socialism must become ''real'' (i.e., based in objective material conditions and praxis<ref>See: ''Praxis, Consciousness, and the Role of Praxis in Consciousness,'' p. 204.</ref> in the real world) to affect change in the material world, as Engels explains elsewhere in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'' [see Annotation 17, p. 18].
 +
 
 +
In ''Critique of the Gotha Program'', Marx lays out an excellent case study of the failings of incoherent, idealist socialism. He begins by quoting the Gotha Program, which was an ideological program which the German Workers Party hoped to implement. In this text, Marx cites the Gotha Program line by line and offers his materialist critique of the idealist principles presented. In the following passage, Marx refutes some key errors caused by idealism and offers materialist correction:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Labor is not the source of all wealth. Nature is just as much the source of use values (and it is surely of such that material wealth consists!) as labor, which itself is only the manifestation of a force of nature, human labor power... But a socialist program cannot allow such bourgeois phrases to pass over in silence the conditions that lone give them meaning. And insofar as man from the beginning behaves toward nature, the primary source of all instruments and subjects of labor, as an owner, treats her as belonging to him, his labor becomes the source of use values, therefore also of wealth. The bourgeois have very good grounds for falsely ascribing supernatural creative power to labor; since precisely from the fact that labor depends on nature it follows that the man who possesses no other property than his labor power must, in all conditions of society and culture, be the slave of other men who have made themselves the owners of the material conditions of labor. He can only work with their permission, hence live only with their permission.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Here, Marx points out the importance of having a firm understanding of the material reality of ''labor'' and its relation to the material, natural world. Marx points out that the idea that labor, alone, is the source of all wealth is an idealist notion of the bourgeoisie, a false consciousness [see Annotation 235, p. 231] which prevents proper material analysis and props up the capitalist viewpoint. A failure to grasp the truth of the material basis of reality weakens the socialist position, and any movement built on such weak idealist foundations will lead to failure in trying to bring about revolutionary change.
 +
 
 +
We have already discussed the shortcomings of empiricism in Annotation 10, p. 10, but it might be helpful to see another case study, this time from Engels, pointing out the flaws of empiricist analysis in his text ''Anti-Dühring''. Engels begins by quoting the empiricist Eugen Dühring, who wrote:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Philosophy is the development of the highest form of consciousness of the world and of life, and in a wider sense embraces the principles of all knowledge and volition. Wherever a series of cognitions or stimuli or a group of forms of being come to be examined by human consciousness, the principles underlying these manifestations of necessity become an object of philosophy. These principles are the simple, or until now assumed to be simple, constituents of manifold knowledge and volition. Like the chemical composition of bodies, the general constitution of things can be reduced to basic forms and basic elements. These ultimate constituents or principles, once they have been discovered, are valid not only for what is immediately known and accessible, but also for the world which is unknown and inaccessible to us. Philosophical principles consequently provide the final supplement required by the sciences in order to become a uniform system by which nature and human life can be explained. Apart from the fundamental forms of all existence, philosophy has only two specific subjects of investigation — nature and the world of man. Accordingly, our material arranges itself quite naturally into three groups, namely, the general scheme of the universe, the science of the principles of nature, and finally the science of mankind. This succession at the same time contains an inner logical sequence, for the formal principles which are valid for all being take precedence, and the realms of the objects to which they are to be applied then follow in the degree of their subordination.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Engels then proceeds to critique this empiricist worldview, showing that it does not properly reflect the material world and amounts to idealism in its own right:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
What [Dühring] is dealing with are therefore principles, formal tenets derived from thought and not from the external world, which are to be applied to nature and the realm of man, and to which therefore nature and man have to conform. But whence does thought obtain these principles? From itself?
 +
 
 +
No, for Herr Dühring himself says: the realm of pure thought is limited to logical schemata and mathematical forms (the latter, moreover, as we shall see, is wrong). Logical schemata can only relate to forms of thought; but what we are dealing with here is solely forms of being, of the external world, and these forms can never be created and derived by thought out of itself, but only from the external world. But with this the whole relationship is inverted: the principles are not the starting-point of the investigation, but its final result; they are not applied to nature and human history, but abstracted from them, it is not nature and the realm of man which conform to these principles, but the principles are only valid in so far as they are in conformity with nature and history. That is the only materialist conception of the matter, and Herr Dühring’s contrary conception is idealistic, makes things stand completely on their heads, and fashions the real world out of ideas, out of schemata, schemes or categories existing somewhere before the world, from eternity — just like a Hegel.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Lenin also heavily criticized empiricism in his work ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'', which we discuss at length in Annotation 32, p. 27.
 +
 
 +
= Chapter 2: Materialist Dialectics =
 +
 
 +
Materialist dialectics is one of the basic theoretical parts that form the worldview and philosophical methodology of Marxism-Leninism. It is the “science of common relations” and also the “science of common rules of motion and development of nature, society, and human thoughts... Dialectics, as understood by Marx, and also in conformity with Hegel, includes what is now called the theory of knowledge, or epistemology.”<ref>''Karl Marx'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.</ref>
 +
 
 +
[Note: Epistemology is the theoretical study of knowledge; for more information see ''Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism'', p. 204.]
 +
 
 +
== I. Dialectics and Materialist Dialectics ==
 +
 
 +
=== 1. Dialectics and Basic Forms of Dialectics ===
 +
 
 +
==== a. Definitions of Dialectics and the Subjective Dialectic ====
 +
 
 +
In Marxism-Leninism, the term ''dialectic'' refers to regular relationships, interactions, transformations, motions, and developments of things, phenomena, and processes in nature, society and human thought.<ref>See Annotation 9, p. 10.</ref>
 +
 
 +
There are two forms of dialectic: the ''objective dialectic'' and the ''subjective dialectic.'' The objective dialectic is the dialectic of the material world, while the subjective dialectic is the reflection of objective dialectic in human consciousness. [See Annotation 68, p. 65].
 +
 
 +
According to Engels, “Dialectics, so-called ''objective'' dialectics, prevail throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics (dialectical thought), is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature.”<ref>''Dialectics of Nature'', Friedrich Engels, 1883.</ref>
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 96 ====
 +
 
 +
''Dialectics'' is an umbrella term which includes both forms of dialectical systems: ''subjective'' and ''objective'' dialectics.
 +
 
 +
''Objective dialectics'' are the dialectical processes which occur in the material world, including all motion, relationships, and dynamic changes which occur in space and time.
 +
 
 +
''Subjective dialectics'', or ''dialectical thought'', is a system of analysis and organized thinking which aims to reflect the objective dialectics of the material world within human consciousness. Dialectical thinking has two component forms: dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics [see Annotation 49, p. 45].
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
''Subjective dialectics'' is the theory that studies and summarises the [objective] dialectic of nature into a system with scientific principles and rules, in order to build a system of methodological principles of perception and practice. Dialectics is opposed to ''metaphysics'' — a system of thought which conceives of things and phenomena in the world in an isolated and unchanging state [See Annotation 8, p. 8].
 +
 
 +
==== b. Basic Forms of Dialectics ====
 +
 
 +
Dialectics has developed into three basic forms and levels: ancient primitive dialectics, German idealist dialectics, and the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism.
 +
 
 +
''Ancient primitive dialectics'' is the earliest form of dialectics. It has developed independently in many philosophical systems in ancient China, India and Greece.
 +
 
 +
Chinese philosophy has two major forms of ancient primitive dialectics:
 +
 
 +
* “Changing Theory” (a theory of common principles and rules pertaining to the changes in the universe)
 +
* The “Five Elements Theory” (a theory of the principles of mutual impact and transformation of the five elements of the universe) of the School of Yin-Yang. [See: ''Primitive Materialism'', p. 52]
 +
 
 +
In Indian philosophy, Buddhist philosophy is a quintessential [see Annotation 6, p. 8] form of ancient primitive dialectics, which includes such concepts as “selflessness,” “impermanence,” and “predestination.”
 +
 
 +
An ancient, primitive form of dialectics also developed in Ancient Greek philosophy.
 +
 
 +
Friedrich Engels wrote: “The old Greek philosophers were all born natural dialecticians, and Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic of them, had already analyzed the most essential forms of dialectic thought… This primitive, naive, but intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus: everything is and is not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away.”<ref>''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'', Friedrich Engels, 1880.</ref>
 +
 
 +
Engels also wrote of Greek dialectics: “Here, dialectical thought still appears in its pristine simplicity, as yet undisturbed by the charming obstacles which the metaphysicists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries — Bacon and Locke in England, Wolff in Germany — put in its own way... Among the Greeks — just because they were not yet advanced enough to dissect and analyse nature — nature is still viewed as a whole, in general. The universal connection of natural phenomena is not proved in regard to particular; to the Greeks it is the result of direct contemplation.”<ref>The Old Preface to ''Anti-Dühring'', Friedrich Engels, 1878.</ref>
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 97 ====
 +
 
 +
Engels, here, is explaining how the ancient Greek dialecticians were correct to view nature as a cohesive system, a “whole, in general,” which they determined through direct observation of the natural world. The major shortcoming of this ancient Greek form of dialectics was a lack of inquiry into the specific processes and principles of nature. Engels laments that seventeenth and eighteenth century metaphysicists took us backwards by disregarding this view of nature as a cohesive, general whole.
 +
 
 +
Ancient, primitive dialectics had an accurate awareness of the dialectical characteristic of the world but with its primitive and naive perspective, it still lacked evidence-based forms of natural scientific achievements.
 +
 
 +
Jumping forward to the late 16<sup>th</sup> century, natural sciences started developing rapidly in Europe. Scientists began deeply analysing and studying specific factors and phenomena of nature which led to the birth of modern European metaphysical analysis. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, metaphysics became the dominant methodology in philosophical thought and scientific study. However, when natural scientists moved from studying each subject separately to studying the unification of all those subjects in their relationships, the metaphysical method proved insufficient. Thus, European scientists and philosophers had to transition into a more advanced system of thought: dialectical thought.
 +
 
 +
''The classical German idealist dialectics'' were founded by Kant and completed by Hegel. According to Engels: ''“The second form of dialectics, which is the form that comes closest to the German naturalists [natural scientists], is classical German philosophy, from Kant to Hegel.”''<ref>The Old Preface to ''Anti-Dühring,'' Friedrich Engels, 1878.</ref>
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 98 ====
 +
 
 +
Engels discusses this history, and the shortcomings of the metaphysical philosophy of his era, in ''The Old Preface to Anti-Dühring.'' First, Engels explains why early modern natural scientists initially did not feel constrained by their adherence to metaphysics, since inquiries in the initial revolution of scientific study were limited to the narrow development of specific fields of inquiry by necessity:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Empirical natural science has accumulated such a tremendous mass of positive material for knowledge that the necessity of classifying it in each separate field of investigation systematically and in accordance with its inner inter-connection has become absolutely imperative.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Engels goes on to explain that at the time he was writing, enough knowledge had been accumulated within specific, distinct fields that it becomes necessary to begin studying the connections and overlaps between different fields, which called for theoretical and philosophical foundations:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
It is becoming equally imperative to bring the individual spheres of knowledge into the correct connection with one another. In doing so, however, natural science enters the field of theory and here the methods of empiricism will not work, here only theoretical thinking can be of assistance.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Unfortunately, natural scientists were held back by the existing metaphysical theoretical foundations which were dominant at the time as, according to Engels, “theoretical thinking is an innate quality only as regards natural capacity. This natural capacity must be developed, improved, and for its improvement there is as yet no other means than the study of previous philosophy.”
 +
 
 +
Metaphysical theory and formal logic were in common use by natural scientists at the time. As Engels explained in ''On Dialectics'' and ''Dialectics of Nature,'' metaphysics and formal logic could never be as useful as dialectical analysis for examining and unifying concepts from wide-ranging dynamic systems of overlapping fields of inquiry.
 +
 
 +
Unfortunately, dialectics had not yet been suitably developed for use in the natural sciences before the work of Marx and Engels in developing dialectical materialism, as Engels explained in ''On Dialectics:''
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Formal logic itself has been the arena of violent controversy from the time of Aristotle to the present day. And dialectics has so far been fairly closely investigated by only two thinkers, Aristotle and Hegel. But it is precisely dialectics that constitutes the most important form of thinking for present-day natural science, for it alone offers the analogue for, and thereby the method of explaining, the evolutionary processes occurring in nature, inter-connections in general, and transitions from one field of investigation to another.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
The Idealist Dialectics of Hegel [see Annotation 9, p. 10] constituted a major development of dialectics, but the idealist nature of Hegelian dialectics made them unsuitable for natural scientists, who therefore discarded “Old-Hegelian” dialectics and were thus left without a suitable dialectical framework. Again, from ''On Dialectics:''
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The year 1848, which otherwise brought nothing to a conclusion in Germany, accomplished a complete revolution there only in the sphere of philosophy [and] the nation resolutely turned its back on classical German philosophy that had lost itself in the sands of Berlin old-Hegelianism... But a nation that wants to climb the pinnacles of science cannot possibly manage without theoretical thought. Not only Hegelianism but dialectics too was thrown overboard — and that just at the moment when the dialectical character of natural processes irresistibly forced itself upon the mind, when therefore only dialectics could be of assistance to natural science in negotiating the mountain of theory — and so there was a helpless relapse into the old metaphysics.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Engels goes on to explain that, having rejected Hegel’s dialectics, natural scientists were set adrift, cobbling together theoretical frameworks from the works of philosophers which were plagued by idealism and metaphysics, and which were therefore not suitable for the task of unifying the disparate fields of natural sciences together:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
What prevailed among the public since then were, on the one hand, the vapid reflections of Schopenhauer, which were fashioned to fit the philistines, and later even those of Hartmann; and, on the other hand, the vulgar itinerant-preacher materialism of a Vogt and a Büchner. At the universities the most diverse varieties of eclecticism competed with one another and had only one thing in common, namely, that they were concocted from nothing but remnants of old philosophies and were all equally metaphysical. All that was saved from the remnants of classical philosophy was a certain neo-Kantianism, whose last word was the eternally unknowable thing-in-itself, that is, the bit of Kant [see Annotation 72, p. 68] that least merited preservation. The final result was the incoherence and confusion of theoretical thought now prevalent.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Engels explains that this lack of a proper dialectical materialist framework had frustrated natural scientists of his era:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
One can scarcely pick up a theoretical book on natural science without getting the impression that natural scientists themselves feel how much they are dominated by this incoherence and confusion, and that the so-called philosophy now current offers them absolutely no way out. And here there really is no other way out, no possibility of achieving clarity, than by a return, in one form or another, from metaphysical to dialectical thinking.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
After explaining that Hegel’s system of dialectics came closest to meeting the needs of contemporary science, Engels explains why Hegelian dialectics were ultimately rejected by the scientific community:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Just as little can it be a question of maintaining the dogmatic content of the Hegelian system as it was preached by the Berlin Hegelians of the older and younger line. Hence, with the fall of the idealist point of departure, the system built upon it, in particular Hegelian philosophy of nature, also falls. It must however be recalled that the natural scientists’ polemic against Hegel, in so far as they at all correctly understood him, was directed solely against these two points: viz., the idealist point of departure and the arbitrary, fact-defying construction of the system.”
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
In other words, it was the idealism and the unworkable structuring of Hegelian dialectics that prevented its adoption by natural scientists. Engels finally explains how Marx was able to modify Hegel’s idealist dialectics into a materialist form which is suitable for empirical scientific inquiry:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
It is the merit of Marx that... he was the first to have brought to the fore again the forgotten dialectical method, its connection with Hegelian dialectics and its distinction from the latter, and at the same time to have applied this method in Capital to the facts of an empirical science, political economy.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
These Classical German philosophers [Kant, Hegel, etc.<ref>Kant’s “transcendental dialectic” was used to critique rationalism and pure reason, but was not a fully developed dialectical system of thought. Hegel’s idealist dialectics were more universal in nature. See Annotation 9, p. 10.</ref>] systematically organized idealist dialectics into formal philosophies. Of particular note was Hegel’s belief that the dialectical process would eventually lead to an “absolute idea.” This foundational belief in an “absolute idea” is what chiefly defines Hegelian dialectics as idealist in nature [see Annotation 98, p. 100].
 +
 
 +
Hegel believed that the subjective dialectic is the basis of the objective dialectic. [In other words, Hegel believed that ''dialectical thought'' served as the ''objective dialectics'' of the material world.]
 +
 
 +
According to Hegel, the “absolute idea” was the starting point of all existence, and that this “absolute idea,” after creating the natural world, then came to exist within human consciousness.
 +
 
 +
Engels wrote that in Hegelian dialectics: “... spirit, mind, the idea, is primary and that the real world is only a copy of the idea.”<ref>''The Old Preface to Anti-Dühring, On Dialectics'', Friedrich Engels, 1878.</ref>
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 99 ====
 +
 
 +
In the above quoted passage, Engels was explaining why Hegelian dialectics were unsuitable for use in natural sciences. Here is a longer excerpt:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
First of all it must be established that here it is not at all a question of defending Hegel’s point of departure: that spirit, mind, the idea, is primary and that the real world is only a copy of the idea... We all agree that in every field of science, in natural as in historical science, one must proceed from the given facts, in natural science therefore from the various material forms and the various forms of motion of matter; that therefore in theoretical natural science, too, the inter-connections are not to be built into the facts, but to be discovered in them, and when discovered to be verified as far as possible by experiment.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
The German idealists (most notably Hegel) built an idealist system of dialectics organized into categories and common laws along with a strict logic of consciousness.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Lenin stated that: “Hegel brilliantly ''divined'' the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, ''nature'') in the dialectics of concepts.”<ref>''Conspectus of Hegel’s'' ''Science of Logic'', Vladimir Ilyich. Lenin, 1914.</ref>
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 100 ====
 +
 
 +
What Lenin means, here, is that Hegel inadvertently and unconsciously discovered the concept of reflection [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. Hegel intuitively understood that the material world was reflected in human consciousness, and, by extension, subjective dialectics (dialectical thought) reflected objective dialectics (of the material world). Hegel’s error was an inversion of the ideal and the material. As Marx later pointed out in the Afterword to the Second German Edition of ''Capital Volume I,'' it is the material which precedes the ideal, and not the other way around:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of ‘the Idea,’ he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos [craftsman/artisan/creator] of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea.’ With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Engels also quoted and emphasized Marx’s thoughts [in ''the Old Preface to Anti-Dühring'', citing another quote of Marx from the ''Afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital Volume I,'' further quoted in Annotation 100 above]: “The mystification which dialectics suffers in Hegel’s hands by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.”<ref>Afterword to the Second German Edition of ''Capital Volume I'', Karl Marx, 1873.</ref>
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 101 ====
 +
 
 +
In ''the Old Preface to Anti-Dühring,'' Engels explains some of the contemporary currents of science and philosophy of his era. Engels explains that Hegelian philosophy had been dismissed by a newer current of natural scientists who dismissed “the idealist point of departure and the arbitrary, fact-defying construction of the system.” In other words, the natural scientists rejected Hegelianism because it was both idealist and was not built on a foundation of objective facts.
 +
 
 +
Engels points out, however, that Marx “was the first to have brought to the fore again the forgotten dialectical method” of Hegel.
 +
 
 +
The dialectical method was forgotten in the sense that the natural scientists ignored and dismissed dialectics along with the rest of Hegel’s philosophy. So, Engels is pointing out that one of the great contributions of Marx was salvaging the dialectical method from Hegel while rejecting the idealist and non-fact-based characteristics of Hegelian philosophy.
 +
 
 +
Marx, according to Engels, proved that the dialectical method could be separated from idealism by “[applying the dialectical method] in ''Capital'' to the facts of an empirical science, political economy.” This was the origin of dialectical materialism: the resurrection of the dialectical method and the development of a dialectical method in a materialist and scientific form.
 +
 
 +
The idealist characteristics of classical German dialectics and Hegelian philosophy was a limitation that needed to be overcome [so that it could be utilized for scientific inquiry]. Marx and Engels overcame that limitation and in so doing developed ''materialist dialectics.'' This system of dialectics is the most advanced form of dialectics in the history of philosophy to date. It is the successor of previous systems of dialectics, and it arose as a critique of the classical German dialectics.
 +
 
 +
Engels said: “Marx and I were pretty well the only people to rescue conscious dialectics from German idealist philosophy and apply it in the materialist conception of nature and history.”<ref>''Anti-Dühring'', The 1885 Preface, Friedrich Engels, 1878.</ref>
 +
 
 +
=== 2. Materialist Dialectics ===
 +
 
 +
==== a. Definition of Materialist Dialectics ====
 +
 
 +
Materialist dialectics have been defined in various ways by many prominent Marxist-Leninist philosophers.
 +
 
 +
Engels defined materialist dialectics as: “nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society, and thought.”<ref>''Anti-Dühring'', Friedrich Engels, 1878.</ref>
 +
 
 +
Engels also emphasized the role of the principle of general relations.<ref>See p. 107.</ref> As John Burdon
 +
 
 +
Sanderson Haldane noted in the 1939 preface to ''Dialectics of Nature'': “In dialectics they
 +
 
 +
[Marx and Engels] saw the science of the general laws of change.”<ref>''Dialectics of Nature'', Friedrich Engels, 1883.</ref>
 +
 
 +
Lenin emphasized the important role of the principles of development<ref>See Annotation 117, p. 119.</ref> (including the theory of cognitive development) in the dialectics that Marx inherited from Hegelian philosophy.
 +
 
 +
Lenin wrote: “The main achievement was ''dialectics'', i.e., the doctrine of development in its fullest, deepest, and most comprehensive form, the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge that provides us with a reflection of eternally developing matter.”<ref>''The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1913.</ref>
 +
 
 +
==== b. Basic Features and Roles of Materialist Dialectics ====
 +
 
 +
There are two basic features of the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism:
 +
 
 +
''First, the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism is a system of dialectics that is based on the foundation of the scientific materialist viewpoint.''
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 102 ====
 +
 
 +
Remember that ''scientific'' in Marxism-Leninism refers broadly to a systematic pursuit of knowledge, research, theory, and understanding [see Objects and Purposes of Study, p. 38]. Remember also that ''materialism'' in Marxism-Leninism has specific meaning as well, which differentiates it from other forms of materialism [see ''Dialectical Materialism — the Most Advanced Form of Materialism'', p. 52]. Here, materialism includes an understanding that the material is the first basis of reality, meaning that the material determines the ideal (though human consciousness can impact the material world through willpower and labor [see ''Nature and Structure of Consciousness'', p. 79]). Materialism is also built upon scientific explanations (rooted in empirical data and practice, i.e. systematic experimentation and observation) of the world. And finally, remember that ''viewpoint'' is the starting point of inquiry [see Annotation 11, p. 12].
 +
 
 +
Thus, a ''scientific materialist viewpoint'' is a perspective which begins analysis of the world in a manner that is both scientifically systematic in pursuit of understanding and firmly rooted in a materialist conception of the world.
 +
 
 +
''Note:'' Materialist Dialectics contains ''Twelve Basic Pairs of Categories'', ''Two Basic Principles'' and ''Three Universal Laws''. These are summarized, respectively, in Appendix A (p. 246), Appendix B (p. 247), and Appendix C (p. 248), and explained in depth throughout the rest of this chapter.
 +
 
 +
In this way, materialist dialectics fundamentally differs from the classical German idealist dialectics, and especially differs from Hegelian dialectics<ref>See Annotation 98, p. 100.</ref> (as these dialectics were founded on idealist viewpoints).
 +
 
 +
Moreover, it also has a higher level of development compared to other dialectical systems of thought found in the history of philosophy going back to ancient times. Such previous forms of dialectics were fundamentally based on materialist stances, however the materialism of those ancient times was still naive, primitive and surface-level.
 +
 
 +
''Second, the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism unifies dialectical materialist viewpoints and materialist dialectical methodology, so it not only explains the world, but is also a tool humans can use to perceive and improve the world.''
 +
 
 +
Every principle and law of Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics is both:
 +
 
 +
1. An accurate explanation of the dialectical characteristics of the world.
 +
 
 +
2. A scientific methodology for perceiving and improving the world.
 +
 
 +
By summarizing the general interconnections and development of all things — every phenomenon in nature, society and human thought — Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics provides the most general methodological principles for the process of perceiving and improving the world. They are not just objective methodological principles; they are a comprehensive, constantly developing, and historical methodology.
 +
 
 +
This methodology can be used to analyze contradictions [see Annotation 119, p. 123] in order to find the basic origins and motivations of both motion and developmental processes. Therefore, materialist dialectics is a great scientific tool for the revolutionary class to perceive and improve the world.
 +
 
 +
With these basic features, materialist dialectics plays a very important role in the worldview and philosophical methodology of Marxism-Leninism. Materialist dialectics are the foundation of the scientific and revolutionary characteristics of Marxism-Leninism and also offer the most general worldview and methodology for creative activities in scientific study and practical activities.
 +
 
 +
== II. Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics ==
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 103 ====
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-23.png|''The Principle of General Relationships and the Principle of Development are the most basic principles of materialist dialectics. These two principles are dialectically related to one another.'']]
 +
 
 +
The following sections will outline the Principle of General Relationships and the Principle of Development, which are the most fundamental principles of materialist dialectics. These two concepts are closely (and dialectically) related:
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
=== 1. The Principle of General Relationships ===
 +
 
 +
''a. Definition of Relationship and Common Relationship''
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 104 ====
 +
 
 +
The ''Principle of General Relationships'' describes how all things, phenomena, and ideas are related to one another, and are defined by these internal and external relationships
 +
 
 +
The ''Principle of Development'' relates to the idea that motion, change, and development are driven by internal and external relationships.
 +
 
 +
These two principles are dialectically linked: any given subject is defined by its internal relationships, and these same relationships drive the development of every subject.
 +
 
 +
Note: The foundation of the principles of Materialist Dialectics were laid out by
 +
 
 +
Engels in ''Dialectics of Nature''. Engels began working on ''Dialectics of Nature'' in February, 1870 and had to stop in 1876 to work on ''Anti-Dühring''. He then restarted work on ''Dialectics of Nature'' in 1878 and continued working on it until 1883, when Karl Marx died. Engels felt that it was more important to try and put together Marx’s great unfinished works, ''Capital Volumes 2, 3, and 4'', and so stopped working on ''Dialectics of Nature'' once again. So, unfortunately, Engels died before this seminal work on Materialist Dialectics could be completed, and what we have instead is an unfinished assemblage of notes.
 +
 
 +
What follows in the rest of this book is a cohesive system of Materialist Dialectics which was built upon the foundations laid out by Engels in ''Dialectics of Nature'' and many other works of political and scholarly writing from various sources. This is the system of Materialist Dialectics studied by Vietnamese students and applied by Vietnamese communists today.
 +
 
 +
Because this text comes from predominantly Vietnamese scholarship and ideological development, we have had to translate some terms into English which are not derived from the “canon” of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. In some cases, various terms have been consolidated into one concept. For example: Engels used the term “interconnection” (German: ''innern'' ''Zusammenhang'', literally: “inner connections”) in ''Dialectics of Nature'', but Vietnamese political scientists use the term “relationship.” Where Engels uses the term “motion” (German: ''Bewegung'') modern Vietnamese communists tend to use the word “development.” Wherever this is the case, we have chosen to use the words in English which most closely match the language used in the original Vietnamese of this text.
 +
 
 +
In materialist dialectics, the word ''relationship'' refers to the regulating principles, mutual interactions, and mutual transformations which exist between things, phenomena, and ideas, as well as those existing between aspects and factors within things, phenomena, and ideas.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 105 ====
 +
 
 +
Throughout this book, ''phenomenon/phenomena'' simply refers to anything that is observable by the human senses.
 +
 
 +
Materialist dialectics examines relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas and ''within'' things, phenomena, and ideas. A relationship which occurs between two separate things or phenomena is referred to as an ''external relationship''. A relationship which occurs ''within'' a thing or phenomenon is referred to as an ''internal relationship''.
 +
 
 +
These terms are relative; sometimes a relationship may be internal in one context but external in a different context. For example, consider a solar system:
 +
 
 +
When considering a solar system as a whole, the orbit of a moon around a planet may be considered as an internal relationship of the solar system. But when considering the moon as an isolated subject, its orbit around a planet may be seen as an external relationship which the moon has with the planet.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-24.png]]
 +
 
 +
The diagram above illustrates different types of relationships:
 +
 
 +
Object 1 has its own internal relationships (A), and, from its own perspective, it also has external relationships with Object 2 (B). From a wider perspective, the relationship between Object 1 and Object 2 (B) may be viewed as an internal relationship.
 +
 
 +
This ''system of relationships'' (between Object 1 and Object 2) will also have external relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas (C).
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Relationships have a quality of ''generality'', which refers to how frequently they occur between and within things, phenomena, and ideas. When we refer to ''general relationships'', we are usually referring to relationships which exist broadly across many things, phenomena, and ideas. General relationships can exist both internally, ''within'' things, phenomena, and ideas, and externally, ''between'' things, phenomena, and ideas.
 +
 
 +
The most general relationships are ''universal relationships'': these are relationships that exist between and within ''everything'' and ''all phenomena'', and they are one of the two primary subjects of study of materialist dialectics. [The other primary subject of study is the ''Principle of Development''; see page 119.]
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 106 ====
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-25.png]]
 +
 
 +
The discussion of generality of relationships can seem confusing at first. What’s important to understand is that generality is a spectrum ranging from the least general relationships (''unique relationships'', which only occur between two ''specific'' things/phenomena/ideas) and the most general relationships (''universal relationships'', which occur between or within ''all'' things/phenomena/ideas).
 +
 
 +
Of particular importance in the study of materialist dialectics are ''universal'' relationships which exist within and between all things, phenomena, and ideas [see below].
 +
 
 +
''Translation Note'': In the original Vietnamese, the word “universal” is not used. Instead, the compound term “phổ biến nhất” is used, which literally means “most general.” In Vietnamese, this phrasing is commonly used to describe the concept of “universal” and it is thus not confusing to Vietnamese speakers. For this translation, we have opted to use the word “universal” because we feel it is less confusing and better explains the concept in English.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
The universal relationships include (but are not limited to):
 +
 
 +
* Relationships between basic philosophical category pairs (Private and Common, Essence and Phenomenon, etc.). <ref>See ''Private and Common'', p. 128; ''Essence and Phenomenon'', p. 156.</ref>
 +
* Relationships between quantity and quality. <ref>See Annotation 117, p. 119.</ref>
 +
* Relationships between opposites. <ref>See Annotation 190, p. 181.</ref>
 +
 
 +
Together, in all forms of relationships in nature, society and human thought (special, general, and universal) there is unity in diversity and diversity in unity.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 107 ====
 +
 
 +
==== Principle of General Relationships ====
 +
 
 +
According to ''Curriculum of the Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism For University and College Students Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought: “''Materialist dialectics upholds the position that all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in mutual relationships with each other, regulate each other, transform into each other, and that nothing exists in complete isolation. That is the core idea of the ''Principle of General Relationships''.”
 +
 
 +
From this Principle, we find the characteristics of ''Diversity in Unity'' and ''Unity in Diversity''; the basis of Diversity in Unity is the fact that every thing, phenomenon, or idea, contains many different relationships; the basis of Unity in Diversity is that many different relationships exist — unified — within each and every thing, phenomenon, and idea.
 +
 
 +
==== Diversity in Unity ====
 +
 
 +
There exist an infinite number of diverse relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas, but all of these relationships share the same foundation in the material world.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-26.png|''An infinite diversity of relationships exist within the unity of the material world.'']]
 +
 
 +
The material world is not a chaotic and random assortment of things, phenomena, and ideas. Rather, it is a system of relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas. Likewise, since the material world exists as the foundation of all things, phenomena, and ideas, the material world is thus the foundation for all relationships within and between things, phenomena, and ideas. Because all relationships share a foundation in the material world, they also exist in unity, even though all relationships are diversified and different from one another.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-27.png|''Universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas manifest in infinitely diverse ways.'']]
 +
 
 +
'''Unity in Diversity'''
 +
 
 +
When we examine the universal relationships that exist within and between all different things, phenomena, and ideas, we will find that each individual manifestation of any universal relationship will have its own different manifestations, aspects, features, etc. Thus even the universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in infinite diversity.
 +
 
 +
''Paraphrased From: Curriculum of the Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism For University and College Students Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought''
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== b. Characteristics of Relationships ====
 +
 
 +
Objectiveness, generality, and diversity are the three basic characteristics of relationships.
 +
 
 +
''-'' ''The Characteristic of Objectiveness of Relationships''
 +
 
 +
According to the materialist dialectical viewpoint, relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas have objective characteristics.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 108 ====
 +
 
 +
In materialist dialectics, objectiveness is an abstract concept that refers to the relative externality of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Every thing, phenomena and idea exists externally to every other thing, phenomena, and idea. This means that to each individual subject (i.e., each individual thing/phenomena/idea), all other things, phenomena, and ideas are external objects
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-28.png|''All things, phenomena, and ideas have the relative characteristic of objectiveness.'']]
 +
 
 +
All together, the collection of all things, phenomena, and ideas in the universe create the external reality of any given subject. So, objectiveness is relative. In the case of human beings, every individual person exists as an individual subject to which all other things, phenomena, and ideas (including other human beings) have ''objective characteristics.''
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-29.png|''Alice and Bob are external to one another; each is objective from the other’s perspective.'']]
 +
 
 +
Of course, objectiveness is always relative. Something might be external from a certain perspective but not from another perspective. For example, say there are two people: Bob and Alice. From Bob’s perspective, Alice has objective characteristics. But from Alice’s perspective, Bob would have objective characteristics.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-30.png|''The relationship between Alice and Bob has objective characteristics to both Alice and Bob.'']]
 +
 
 +
As all relationships are inherently external to any given subject (even subjects which are party to the relationship), relationships also have objective characteristics.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Whenever two things, phenomena, or ideas have a relationship with one another, they form a pair. The relationship is inherent to this pair and external to any subject which exists outside of the pair. The mutual interaction and mutual transformation which occurs to the things, phenomena, or objects within the pair as the result of the relationship are ''inherent'' and ''objective'' properties of the pair.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 109 Translation note: ====
 +
 
 +
In the original Vietnamese text, the word for “objective” is ''“khách quan.”'' This is a compound word in which ''“khách”'' means “guest,” and ''“quan”'' means “point of view.” Therefore, ''“khách quan”'' literally means “the guest’s (or outsider’s) point of view.”
 +
 
 +
Thus we translate this to “objectiveness/objective,” the characteristic of being viewed from the outside.
 +
 
 +
The word “inherent” in the original Vietnamese is ''“vốn có.”'' This is another compound word: ''“vốn”'' is a shortened form of the word ''“vốn dĩ,”'' which means “by or through nature,” “naturally,” and “intrinsically.” ''“Có”'' means “to have” or “to exist.” '''''“Vốn có”''''' thus means “already existing naturally” or “already there, through nature.”
 +
 
 +
So we use the word “inherent” to mean “existing intrinsically or naturally within, without external influence.”
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Human beings can’t change or impact external things and phenomena — and the relationships between them — through human will alone. Humans are limited to perceiving relationships between things and phenomena and then impacting or changing them through our practical activities.
 +
 
 +
''-'' ''The Characteristic of Generality of Relationships''
 +
 
 +
According to the dialectical viewpoint, there is no thing, phenomenon, nor idea that exists in absolute isolation from other things, phenomena and ideas.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 110 ====
 +
 
 +
Although all things, phenomena, and ideas have the characteristic of ''externality'' and ''objectiveness'' to all other things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 108, p. 112], this does not mean that they exist in ''isolation''. Isolation implies a complete lack of any relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas. On the contrary, according to the ''Principle of General Relationships'' [see p. 107], ''all'' things, phenomena, and ideas have relationships with ''all other'' things, phenomena, and ideas.
 +
 
 +
Simultaneously, there is also no known thing, phenomenon, nor idea that does not have a systematic structure, including component parts which in turn have their own internal relationships. This means that every existence is a system, and, moreso, is an ''open'' system that exists in relation with other systems. All systems interact and mutually transform one another.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 111 ====
 +
 
 +
As explained above, a ''systematic structure'' is a structure which includes within itself a system of ''component'' parts and relationships. It has been postulated by some scientific models that there may be some “fundamental base particle” (quarks, preons, etc.), which, if true, would mean that there is a certain basic material component which cannot be further broken down. However, this would not contradict the Principle of Materialist Dialectics of General Relationships (which states that all things, phenomena, and ideas interact with and mutually transform one another — see Annotation 107, p. 110).
 +
 
 +
''- The Characteristic of Diversity of Relationships''
 +
 
 +
In addition to affirming the objectiveness<ref>See Annotation 108, p. 112.</ref> and generality<ref>See p. 108.</ref> of relationships, the dialectical viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism also emphasizes the ''diversity'' of relationships. The characteristic of diversity is defined by the following features:
 +
 
 +
* All things, phenomena, and ideas have different relationships. Every relationship plays a distinct role in the existence and development of the things, phenomena, and ideas which are included within.
 +
* Any given relationship between things, phenomena, and ideas will have different characteristics and manifestations under different conditions and/or during different periods of motion and/or at different stages of development.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 112 ====
 +
 
 +
One of Marx’s most critical observations was that things are defined by their internal and external relationships, including human beings. For example, in ''Theses on Feuerbach,'' Marx wrote that “the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations.” It is only through relationships — through mutual impacts and transformations — that things, phenomena, and ideas (including human beings and human societies) change and develop over time. All of these relationships — which both define and transform all things, phenomena, and ideas in existence — exist in infinite diversity [see Annotation 107, p. 110].
 +
 
 +
Just as things, phenomena, and ideas change and transform through the course of relations with one another, the nature of the relationships themselves also change and develop over time.
 +
 
 +
''Characteristics'' refer to the features and attributes that exist ''internally'' within a given thing, phenomena, or idea.
 +
 
 +
''Manifestation'' refers to ''how'' a given thing, phenomena, or idea is expressed ''externally'' in the material world.
 +
 
 +
For example, a ball may have the ''characteristics'' of being made of rubber, having a mass of 100 grams, and having a melting point of 260℃. It may ''manifest'' by bouncing on the ground, having a spherical shape, and having a red appearance to human observers.
 +
 
 +
If ten such balls exist, they will all be slightly different. Even if they have the same mass and material composition, they will have slightly different variations in size, shape, etc. Even if each ball will melt at 260℃, the melting will manifest differently for each ball — they will melt into slightly different shapes, at slightly different speeds, etc.
 +
 
 +
Relationships also have characteristics and manifestations. For example, the moon’s orbit around the Earth is a relationship. It has characteristics such as the masses of each related body, forces of gravity, and other factors which produce and influence the orbit. The same orbital relationship also has manifestations such as the duration of the moon’s orbit around the Earth, the size of its ellipse, the orbit’s effects on the tides of the Earth’s ocean, etc.
 +
 
 +
''Characteristics'' and ''Manifestation'' correspond, respectively, to the philosophical category pair of ''Content'' and ''Form,'' which is discussed in section page 147.
 +
 
 +
Therefore, no two relationships are exactly the same, even if they exist between very similar things, phenomena, and ideas and/or in very similar situations.
 +
 
 +
It is also important to note that the characteristic of diversity also applies to things, phenomena, and ideas themselves. In other words, every individual thing, phenomenon, and idea in existence also manifests differently from every other thing, phenomenon, and idea in existence, even if they seem quite similar.
 +
 
 +
==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
 +
 
 +
Based on the objective and popular characteristics of relationships, we can see that in our cognitive and practical activities, we have to have a ''comprehensive viewpoint''.
 +
 
 +
Having a ''comprehensive viewpoint'' requires that in the process of perceiving and handling real life situations, humans have to consider the internal dialectical relationships between the component parts, factors, and aspects within a thing or phenomenon. We also need to consider the external mutual interactions they have with other things, phenomena, and ideas. Only on such a comprehensive basis can we properly understand things and phenomena and then effectively handle problems in real life. So, the comprehensive viewpoint is the opposite of a unilateral and/or metaphysical viewpoint [see Annotation 51, p. 49] in both perception and practice.
 +
 
 +
Lenin said: “If we are to have true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all of its facets, its connections, and ‘mediacies [indirect relationships].’”<ref>''Once Again On The Trade Unions'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921.</ref>
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 113 ====
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-31.png|''The comprehensive viewpoint sees the subject in terms of all of its internal and external relationships.'']]
 +
 
 +
Consider a factory. A factory exists as a collection of internal relationships (between the workers, between machines, between the workers and the machines, etc.) and external relationships (between the factory and its suppliers, between the factory and its customers, between the factory and the city, etc.). In order to have a comprehensive viewpoint when examining the factory, one must consider and understand all of the internal and external relationships which define it.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
The diversified characteristic of relationships [see Annotation 107, p. 110] shows that in human cognitive and practical activities, we have to simultaneously use a comprehensive viewpoint and a historical viewpoint.
 +
 
 +
Having a ''historical viewpoint'' requires that, in perceiving and handling real life situations, we need to consider the specific properties of subjects, including their current stage of motion and development. We also need to consider that the exact same methods can’t be used to deal with different situations in reality — our methods must be tailored to suit the exact situation based on material conditions.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 114 ====
 +
 
 +
While the ''comprehensive viewpoint'' focuses on internal and external ''relationships'' of subjects, the ''historical viewpoint'' focuses on the specific ''properties'' of subjects — especially the current stage of motion and development. In order to have a proper historical viewpoint, we must study and understand the way a subject has developed and transformed over time. To do this, we must examine the history of the subject’s changes over time, hence the term “historical viewpoint.” In addition, it’s important to understand that no two situations which we might encounter will ever be exactly the same. This is because the component parts and relationships that make up any given situation will manifest differently.
 +
 
 +
So, in order to properly deal with situations, we have to understand the component parts and relationships of examined subjects as well as their histories of development so that we can develop plans and strategies that are suitable to the unique circumstances at hand.
 +
 
 +
For example, it would be disastrous if communists today tried to employ the ''exact same'' methods which were used by the Communist Party of Vietnam in the 20<sup>th</sup> century to defeat Japan, France, and the USA. This is because the material conditions and relationships of Vietnam in the 20<sup>th</sup> century were very different from any material conditions existing on Earth today. It is possible to learn lessons from studying the methods of the Vietnamese revolution and to ''adapt'' some such methods to our modern circumstances, but it would be extremely ineffective to try to copy those methods and strategies — ''exactly'' as they manifested then and there — to the here and now.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
In order to come up with suitable and effective solutions to deal with real life problems, we must clearly define the roles and positions of each specific relationship that comes into play, and the specific time, place, and material conditions in which they exist.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 115 ====
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-32.png|''A historical viewpoint focuses on the roles and positions of relationships and properties of subjects as well as their development over time.'']]
 +
 
 +
The role of a relationship has to do with how it functions within a system of relationships and the position refers to its placement amongst other subjects and relationships.
 +
 
 +
Consider once again the example of the factory [see Annotation 113]. In addition to its internal and external relationships, the factory also has various roles — it functions within various systems and from various perspectives. For instance, the factory may have the role of financial asset for the corporation that owns it, it may have the role of place of employment for the surrounding community, it may have the role of supplier for various customers, etc.
 +
 
 +
The factory is also ''positioned'' among other subjects and relations. If it’s the only employer in town then it would have a position of great importance to the people of the community. If, on the other hand, if it’s just one of hundreds of factories in a heavily industrialized area, it may have a position of much less importance. It may have a position of great importance to an individual factory worker who lives in poverty in an economy where there are very few available jobs, but of less importance to a freelance subcontractor for whom the factory is just one of many customers, and so on.
 +
 
 +
These positions and roles will change over time. For example, the factory may initially exist as a small workshop with a small handful of workers, but it may grow into a massive factory with hundreds of employees. It is vital to understand this Principle of Development, which is discussed in more detail on the next page.
 +
 
 +
In summary, proper dialectical materialist analysis requires a ''comprehensive and historical viewpoint'' — we must consider subjects both ''comprehensively'' in terms of the internal and external relationships of the subject itself as well as ''historically'' in terms of roles and positions of subjects, as well as their relationships, material conditions, and development over time.
 +
 
 +
So, in both perception and practice, we have to avoid and overcome sophistry and eclectic viewpoints.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 116 ====
 +
 
 +
''Sophistry'' is the use of falsehoods and misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, and with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. This kind of bad faith argument has no place in materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics must, instead, be rooted in a true and accurate understanding of the subject, material conditions, and reality in general.
 +
 
 +
''Eclecticism'' is an incoherent approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject, applying different theories in different situations without any consistency in analysis and thought. Eclectic arguments are typically composed of various pieces of evidence that are cherry picked and pieced together to form a perspective that lacks clarity. By definition, because they draw from different systems of thought without seeking a clear and cohesive understanding of the totality of the subject and its internal and external relations and its development over time, eclectic arguments run counter to the comprehensive and historical viewpoints. Eclecticism is somewhat similar to dialectical materialism in that it attempts to consider a subject from many different perspectives, and analyzes relationships pertaining to a subject, but the major flaw of eclecticism is a lack of clear and coherent systems and principles, which leads to a chaotic viewpoint and an inability to grasp the true nature of the subject at hand.
 +
 
 +
=== 2. Principle of Development ===
 +
 
 +
==== a. Definition of Development ====
 +
 
 +
According to the metaphysical viewpoint, development is simply a ''quantitative'' increase or decrease; the metaphysical viewpoint does not account for ''qualitative'' changes of things and phenomena. Simultaneously, the metaphysical viewpoint also views development as a process of continuous progressions which follow a linear and straightforward path.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 117 ====
 +
 
 +
In materialist dialectics, it is important to distinguish between ''quantity'' and ''quality''.
 +
 
 +
''Quantity'' describes the total ''amount'' of component parts that compose a subject.
 +
 
 +
''Quality'' describes the unity of component parts, taken together, which defines the subject and distinguishes it from other subjects.
 +
 
 +
Both quantity and quality are dynamic attributes; over time, the quantity and quality of all things develop and change over time through the development of internal and external relationships. Quantity and quality itself form a dialectical relationship, and as quantity develops, quality will also develop. A given subject may be described by various quantity and quality relationships.
 +
 
 +
'''''Example 1:'''''
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-33.png|''In the process of development, Quantity Change leads to Quality Change'']]
 +
 
 +
A single football player, alone, has the quantity value of 1 football player and the quality of ''a football player''. Eleven football players on a field would have the quantity value of 1 and will develop the quality of ''a football team''. This subject, ''football'' ''team'', is composed of the same component parts as the subject ''football player'', but the quantity change and other properties (being on a field, playing a game or practicing, etc.) change the quality of the component parts into a different stable and unified form which we call a ''football team''.
 +
 
 +
The relationship between quantity and quality is dynamic:
 +
 
 +
If one of the players doesn’t show up for practice, and there are only ten players on the field, it might still have the quality of ''football team'', but in a live professional game there will be a certain threshold — a minimum number of players who must be present to officially be considered a ''team''. If this number of players can’t be fielded then they will not be considered a full ''team'' and thus won’t be allowed to play.
 +
 
 +
Likewise, if there are only one or two players practicing together in a park, they would probably not be considered a ''football team'' (though they might be described in terms of having the quality of being ''on the same team).''
 +
 
 +
'''''Example 2:'''''
 +
 
 +
Quantity: 1 O + 2 H atoms Quantity: Billions of H2O Molecules Quantity: ~5,000 Drops of Water Quality: Water Quality: Drop of Water Quality: Cup of Water
 +
 
 +
DEVELOPMENT: QUANTITY CHANGE LEADS TO QUALITY CHANGE
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-34.png|''All of these have the quality of water because of the molecular quantities of hydrogen and oxygen atoms, however, from the perspective of volume, quantity changes still lead to quality changes.'']]
 +
 
 +
The properties of quantity and quality are relative, depending on the viewpoint of analysis.
 +
 
 +
A single molecule of water has a quantity of one in terms of molecules, but it still retains the quality of “water” because of the ''quantities'' of one oxygen atom and two hydrogen atoms per molecule which, in this stable form, give it the ''quality'' of water.
 +
 
 +
A drop of water might have a quantity of many billions of molecules, but it would still have the quality of “water.” It would also now assume the quality of a “drop.”
 +
 
 +
When you combine enough drops of water, you will eventually have a quality shift where the “drops” of water combine to form another quality — i.e., a “cup” of water. The quantity change leads to a change in quantity; we would no longer think of the water in terms of “drops” after the quantity rises to a certain level.
 +
 
 +
In terms of ''temperature'' and physical properties, if the water is heated to a certain point it will boil and the water will become ''steam''. The quantity of water in terms of drops wouldn’t change, but the quantity-value of temperature would eventually lead to a quality value change from “water” to “steam.”
 +
 
 +
'''''Example 3:'''''
 +
 
 +
AS QUANTITY OF AGE INCREASES, QUALITY CHANGES
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-35.png|''The same human being will undergo various quality changes as age quantity increases over time.'']]
 +
 
 +
As humans age and the quantity of years we’ve lived builds up over time, our “quality” also changes, from baby, to child, to teenager, to young adult, to middle age, to old age, and eventually to death. The individual person is still the same human being, but the quality of the person will shift over time as the quantity-value of age increases.
 +
 
 +
'''Metaphysical vs. Dialectical Materialist Conceptions of Change'''
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-36.png|''Metaphysics only consider linear properties of'' quantity''change; Materialist Dialectics takes'' quantity changes ''and'' quality shifts ''into consideration when considering change over time.'']]
 +
 
 +
Because the metaphysical perspective tries to define the world in terms of static, isolated subjects, only ''quantity'' is considered and ''quality shifts'' are not taken into account. Thus, metaphysical logic sees development as linear, simple, and straightforward. Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, sees development as a more complicated, fluid, and dynamic process involving multiple internal and external relationships changing in quantity and quality over time.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
In contrast to the metaphysical viewpoint, in materialist dialectics, ''development'' refers to the ''motion'' of things and phenomena with a forward tendency: from less advanced to more advanced, from a less complete to a more complete level.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 118 ====
 +
 
 +
In materialist dialectics, ''motion (also known as change)'' is the result of mutual impacts between or within things, phenomena, and ideas, and all motion and change results from mutual impacts which themselves result from internal and external relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas. Any given ''motion/change'' leads to quantity changes, and these quantity changes cumulatively lead to quality changes [see Annotation 117, p. 119]. Grasping this concept — that development is driven by relations — is critically important for understanding materialist dialectics.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-37.png|''The concept of “change” in materialist dialectics centers on internal and external relationships causing mutual impacts which lead to quantity changes which build into quality shifts.'']]
 +
 
 +
This process, taken in total, is referred to as ''development''. Development represents the entire process in which internal and external change/motion leads to changes in quantity which in turn lead to changes in quality over time. The process of development can be fast or slow, complex or simple, and can even move backwards, and all of these properties are relative. Development has a ''tendency'' to develop from less advanced to more advanced forms. The word ''tendency'' is used to denote phenomena, development, and motion which inclines in a particular direction. There may be exceptional cases which contradict such tendencies, but the general motion will incline towards one specific manner. Thus, it is important to note that “development” is not necessarily “good” nor “bad.” In some cases, “development” might well be considered “bad,” or unwanted. For example, rust developing on a car is typically not desired. So, the tendency of development from lower to higher levels of advancement implies a “forward motion,” though this motion can take an infinite number of forms, depending on the relative perspective. Development can also (temporarily) halt in a state of equilibrium [see Annotation 64, p. 62] or it can shift direction; though it can never “reverse,” just as time itself can never be “reversed.”
 +
 
 +
For example, during a flood, water may “develop” over the land, and as the floodwaters recede this may alternatively be viewed as another “forward” development process of ''recession'' — a development of the overall “flooding and receding” process. The flood is not actually “reversing” — the development is not being “undone.” Flood water may recede but it will leave behind many traces and impacts; thus it is not a true “reversal” of development.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-38.png|''Both flooding and flood recession are development processes with the same forward tendency. Flood recession may appear to be a “reversal,” but it is in fact forward development.'']]
 +
 
 +
The false belief that development can be reversed is the root of conservative and reactionary positions [see Annotation 208].
 +
 
 +
Development can be considered positive or negative, depending on perspective. Some ecosystems have natural flood patterns which are vital for sustaining life. For a person living in a flood zone, however, the flood would most likely be considered an unwanted development, whereas flood recession would be a welcomed development.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
It is important to note that the definition of development is not identical to the concept of “motion” (change) in general. It is not merely a simple quantitative increase or decrease, nor a repetitive cyclic change in quantity. Instead, in materialist dialectics, development is defined in terms of ''qualitative'' changes with the direction of advancing towards higher and more advanced levels. [See diagram ''Relationship Between Motion,''
 +
 
 +
''Quantity/Quality Shifts, and Dialectical Development'', Annotation 119, below]
 +
 
 +
Development is also the process of creating and solving objective ''contradictions'' within and between things and phenomena. Development is thus the unified process of negating negative factors while retaining and advancing positive factors from old things and phenomena as they transform into new things and phenomena.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 119 ====
 +
 
 +
A ''contradiction'' is a relationship in which two forces oppose one another. Although a contradiction might exist in ''equilibrium'' for some amount of time [see Annotation 64, p. 62], eventually, one force will overcome the other, resulting in a change of ''quality''. This process of overcoming is called ''negation''. In short, ''development'' is a process of change in a subject’s quantity as well as negation of contradictions within and between subjects, leading to quality shifts over time.
 +
 
 +
==== b. Characteristics of Development ====
 +
 
 +
Every development has the characteristics of objectiveness,<ref>See: Annotation 108, p. 112.</ref> generality,<ref>See: Annotation 106, p. 109.</ref> and diversity.<ref>See: Annotation 107, p. 110.</ref>''The characteristic of objectiveness of development'' stems from the origin of motion.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 120 ====
 +
 
 +
Remember that, in materialist dialectics, objectiveness is the relative characteristic that every subject has of existing and developing externally to all other subjects [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. Since motion originates from mutual impacts which occur between external things, objects, and relationships, the motions themselves also occur externally (relative to all other things, phenomena, and objects). This gives motion itself objective characteristics.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-39.png|''Dialectical Development consists of Quantity and Quality Shifts, which in turn derive from motion.'']]
 +
 
 +
Development is derived from motion as a process of quality shifting which arise from quantity changes which arise from motion [see Annotation 117, p. 119]. Since development is essentially an accumulation of motion, and motion is objective, development itself must also be objective.
 +
 
 +
The ''Principle of Development'' states that development is a process that comes from within the thing-in-itself; the process of solving the contradictions within things and phenomena. Therefore, development is inevitable, objective, and occurs without dependence on human will.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 121 ====
 +
 
 +
The “thing-in-itself” refers to the actual material object which exists outside of our consciousness [see Annotation 72, p. 68]. Development arises from motion and self-motion [see Annotation 62, p. 59] with objective characteristics. Although human will can impact motion and development through conscious activity in the material world [see ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88], motion and development can and does occur without being dependent on human will. Human will is neither a requirement nor prerequisite for motion and development to occur.
 +
 
 +
Development has the ''characteristic of generality'' because development occurs in every process that exists in every field of nature, society, and human thought; in every thing, every phenomenon, and every idea and at every stage* of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Every transformation process contains the possibility that it might lead to the birth of a new thing, phenomenon, or idea [through a change in quality, i.e. development].
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 122 ====
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>*</nowiki> In materialist dialectics, “stage” (or “stage of development”) refers to the current quantity and quality characteristics which a thing, phenomenon, or object possesses. Every time a quality change occurs, a new stage of development is entered into.
 +
 
 +
---------
 +
 
 +
Development has the ''characteristic of diversity'' because every thing, phenomenon, and idea has its own process of development that is not totally identical to the process of development of any other thing, phenomenon, or idea. Things and phenomena will develop differently in different spaces and times. Simultaneously, within their own processes of development, things, phenomena, and ideas are impacted by other things, phenomena, and ideas, as well as by many other factors and historical conditions. Such impacts can change the direction of development of things, phenomena, and ideas. They can even temporarily set development back, and/or can lead to growth in one aspect but degeneration in another.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 123 ====
 +
 
 +
Because development has the characteristic of generality and the characteristic of diversity, the principle of diversity in unity and unity in diversity also applies to development [see: Annotation 107, p. 110].
 +
 
 +
==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
 +
 
 +
Materialist dialectics upholds that the principle of development is the scientific theoretical basis that we must use to guide our perception of the world and to improve the world. Therefore, in our perception and reality, we have to have a ''development viewpoint''.
 +
 
 +
According to Lenin: “dialectical logic requires that an object should be considered in development, in change, in ‘self-movement.”<ref>''Once Again On The Trade Unions,'' Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921. See also: ''Mode and Forms of Matter'', p. 59.</ref>
 +
 
 +
This development viewpoint [which holds that all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly developing, and that development is thus unavoidable] requires us to overcome conservatism, stagnation<ref>See Annotation 62, p. 59.</ref>, and prejudice, which are all opposed to development.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 124 ====
 +
 
 +
Conservatism and prejudice are mindsets which seek to prevent and stifle development and to hold humanity in a static position. Not only is this detrimental to humanity, it is also ultimately a wasted effort, because development is inevitable in human society, as in all things, phenomena, and ideas. Therefore, we must avoid and fight against such stagnant mindsets.
 +
 
 +
According to this development viewpoint, in order to perceive or solve any problem in real life, we must consider all things, phenomena, and ideas with their own forward tendency of development taken in mind. On the other hand, the path of development is a dialectical process that is reversible and full of contradictions. Therefore, we must be aware of this complexity in our analysis and planning. This means we need to have a ''historical viewpoint'' [see Annotation 114, p. 116] which accounts for the diversity and complexity of development in perceiving and solving issues in reality.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 125 ====
 +
 
 +
Materialist dialectics requires us to consider the complexity and constant motion of reality. By comparison, the metaphysical viewpoint (which considers all things, phenomena, and ideas as static, isolated entities which have linear and simple processes of development) stands as a barrier to understanding this complexity and incorporating it into our worldview. Thus, it is vital that we develop comprehensive and historical viewpoints which acknowledge the diversity and complexity of reality.
 +
 
 +
In summary, as a science of common relations and development, Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics serve a very important role in perception and practice. Engels affirmed the role of materialist dialectics in this passage:
 +
 
 +
“An exact representation of the universe, of its evolution, of the development of mankind, and of the reflection of this evolution in the minds of men, can therefore only be obtained by the methods of dialectics, with its constant regard to the innumerable actions and reactions of life and death, of progressive or retrogressive changes.”
 +
 
 +
Lenin also said: “Dialectics requires an all-round consideration of relationships in their concrete development, but not a patchwork of bits and pieces.”<ref>''Once Again On The Trade Unions'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921.</ref>
 +
 
 +
== III. Basic Pairs of Categories of Materialist Dialectics ==
 +
 
 +
''Category*'' is the most general grouping of aspects, attributes, and relations of things, phenomena, and ideas. Different specific fields of inquiry may categorize things, phenomena, and/or ideas differently from one another.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 126 ====
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>*</nowiki> ''Translation note:'' In Vietnamese, the word “phạm trù” is used here, which translates in this context more closely to the English philosophical term “category of being,” which means “the most general, fundamental, or broadest class of entities.” “Category of being” is sometimes simplified in English-language philosophical discourse to “category,” which we have chosen to do here for ease of reading and to better reflect the way it reads in the original Vietnamese.
 +
 
 +
Every science has its own systems of categories that reflect the aspects, attributes, and basic relations that fall within its scope of study. For example, mathematics contains the categories “arithmetic,” “geometry,” “point,” “plane,” and “constant.” Physics contains the categories of “mass,” “speed,” “acceleration,” and “force,” and so on. Economics includes “commodity,” “value,” “price,” “monetary,” and “profit” categories.
 +
 
 +
Every such category reflects only the common relations found within the specific fields that fall within the scope of study of a specific science.
 +
 
 +
''Categories of materialist dialectics'', on the other hand, such as “matter,” “consciousness,” “motion,” “contradiction,” “quality,” “quantity,” “reason,” and “result,” are different. Categories of materialist dialectics reflect the most general aspects and attributes, as well as the most basic and general relations, of not just some specific fields of study, but of the whole of reality, including all of nature, society and human thought.
 +
 
 +
Every thing, phenomenon, and idea has many properties, including: a reason for existing in its current form, a process of motion and change, contradictions, content, form, and so on. These properties are aspects, attributes, and relations that are reflected in the categories of materialist dialectics. Therefore, the relationship between the categories of specific sciences and categories of materialist dialectics is a dialectical relationship between the Private and the Common [see ''Private and Common,'' p. 128].
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 127 ====
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-40.png|''The categories of specific sciences are limited to the scope of study, while the categories of materialist dialectics encompass all things, phenomena, and ideas.'']]
 +
 
 +
Unlike the categories contained within specific scientific fields, the philosophical categories of materialist dialectics can be used to analyze and define all things, phenomena, and ideas. The categories of specific scientific fields and the materialist dialectical categories have a Private/Common dialectical relationship [discussed on the next page].
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
As a science of general relations and development, materialist dialectics summarizes the most general relations of every field of nature, society, and human thought into basic category pairs: ''Private and Common, Reason and Result, Obviousness and Randomness, Content and Form, Essence and Phenomenon, Possibility and Reality.''
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 128 ====
 +
 
 +
Every individual materialist dialectical category has a dialectical relationship with another materialist dialectical category. Thus, all categories in materialist dialectics are presented as ''category pairs.'' So, a ''category pair'' is simply a pair of categories within materialist dialectics which have a dialectical relationship with one another.
 +
 
 +
Note that the this formalized system of category pairs reflects many decades of work by Vietnamese philosophical and political scientists based on the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other socialist thinkers. Also note that these are not the only category pairs that can be discussed; there are potentially an infinite number of categories which can be used in materialist dialectical analysis. However, universal category pairs, which can be applied to analyze any and all things, phenomena, and ideas, are much fewer and farther between. That said, the universal category pairs discussed in this book are the ones which have most often been used by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other prominent materialist dialecticians.
 +
 
 +
=== 1. Private and Common ===
 +
 
 +
==== a. Categories of Private and Common ====
 +
 
 +
The ''Private Category'' encompasses specific things, phenomena, and ideas; the ''Common Category'' defines the common aspects, attributes, factors, and relations that exist in many things and phenomena.
 +
 
 +
Within every Private thing, phenomenon, and idea, there exists the Common, and also the Unique. The Unique encompasses the attributes and characteristics that exist in only one specific thing, phenomenon, or idea, and does not repeat in any other things, phenomena, or ideas.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 129 ====
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-41.png]]
 +
 
 +
The ''Private'' category includes specific individual things, phenomena and ideas.
 +
 
 +
The ''Common'' category includes aspects, factors, and relations that exist in many things, phenomena, and ideas. For example, say there are two apples: Apple A and Apple B. Apple A is a specific individual object. Apple B is another distinct, separate object. In that sense, both apples are ''private'' apples, and fall within the ''Private'' category.
 +
 
 +
However, both Apple A and Apple B share common attributes. For instance, they are both fruits of the same type: “apple.” They may have other attributes in common: they may be the same color, they may have the same basic shape, they may be of similar size, etc. These are ''common'' attributes which they share. Thus, Apple A and Apple B will also fall within the ''common'' category, based on these common attributes.
 +
 
 +
Apple A and Apple B will also have ''unique'' attributes. Only Apple A has the exact molecules in the exact place and time which compose Apple A. There is no other object in the world which has those same molecules in that same place and time. This means that Apple A also has ''unique'' properties.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-42.png|''All private subjects have attributes in common with other private subjects.'']]
 +
 
 +
The Common and Private categories have a dialectical relationship. The Common contains the Private, and the Private contains the Common. Every private subject has some attributes in common with other private subjects, and common attributes can only exist among private subjects. Thus every thing, phenomenon, and idea in existence contains internally within itself dialectical relationships between the Private and the Common, and has dialectical Private/Common relationships externally within other things, phenomena, and ideas.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-43.png|''All private subjects have attributes in common with other private subjects.'']]
 +
 
 +
It is also true that every private subject contains within itself ''Unique'' attributes which it does ''not'' share with any other thing, phenomenon, or idea. For example, Mount Everest is unique in that it is 8,850 meters tall. No other mountain on Earth has that exact same height. Therefore, the private subject “Mount Everest” has unique properties which it does not share with any other subject, even though it has other attributes in common with countless other private entities.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-44.png|''All things, phenomena, and ideas contain the unique, the private, and the common.'']]
 +
 
 +
Whenever two individual subjects have a relationship with one another, that relationship is a ''unique relationship'' in the sense that it is a relationship that is shared only by those two specific subjects; however, there will also be common attributes and properties which any such relationship will share with other relationships in existence. This recalls the ''principle of Unity in Diversity and Diversity in Unity'' [see Annotation 107, p. 110]. So, every thing, phenomenon, and idea contains the Common ''and'' the Unique and has unique ''and'' common relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas.
 +
 
 +
This category pair is very useful in developing a comprehensive viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116]. Remember that a comprehensive viewpoint indicates an understanding of the internal and external relations of a given subject. This means that in order to develop a comprehensive viewpoint, you must know the private aspects of each individual relation, component, and aspect of the subject, and you must also study the commonalities of the subject as well. It’s also important to study a variety of ''private'' information sources or data points to look for ''commonalities'' between them. In other words, if you want to have a proper comprehensive viewpoint [see Annotation 113, p. 116] about any subject, you have to find and analyze as many ''private'' data points and pieces of evidence as possible.
 +
 
 +
For example: If a person only ever saw one apple, a green apple, then that person might believe that “all apples are green.” This conclusion would be premature: the person is attempting to make an assumption about the ''Common'' without examining enough ''Privates''. This is a failure of mistaking mistaking the ''Private'' for the ''Common'' which stems from a lack of a comprehensive viewpoint.
 +
 
 +
Now, let’s take a look at an example of how the “Unique” can become “Common,” and vice-versa: 1947 TODAY
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-45.png]]
 +
 
 +
''“Unique” things, phenomena, and ideas can become “common” through development processes (and vice-versa).''
 +
 
 +
In 1941, a Soviet soldier named Mikhail Kalashnikov was in the hospital after being wounded in the Battle of Bryansk. Another soldier in the hospital said to Kalashnikov, “why do our soldiers only have one rifle for two or three of our men, while the Germans have automatics?” To solve this problem, Kalashnikov designed the AK-47 machine gun. When he finished making the first prototype, it was the only AK-47 in the world.
 +
 
 +
At this precise moment, the AK-47 was simultaneously ''Unique'', ''Private'', and ''Common.''
 +
 
 +
It was ''Unique'' because it was the first and only AK-47 in the world, and no other object in the world had those properties. It was ''Private'' because it was a specific object with its own individual existence. It was ''Common'' — even though it was the only existing prototype — because it shared Common features with other rifles, and with other prototypes. It was the only AK-47 in existence.
 +
 
 +
Soon, however, the Soviet Union began manufacturing them, and they became very common. Now there are millions of AK-47s in the world. So, today, that prototype machine gun remains simultaneously ''Unique, Private,'' and ''Common,'' with some slight developments:
 +
 
 +
It remains ''Private'' because it is a specific object with its own individual existence. Even though it is no longer the only AK-47 in existence, it remains ''Unique'' because it is still the very first AK-47 that was ever made, and even though there are now many other AK-47s, there is no other rifle in the universe that shares that same unique property. It remains ''Common'' because it still shares common features with other rifles and other prototypes, but it now also shares ''commonality'' with many other AK-47 rifles. It is no longer ''Unique'' for having the properties of an AK-47 in and of itself.
 +
 
 +
If someone were to destroy Kalashnikov’s prototype AK-47, the ''Private'' of that ''object'' would no longer exist — it would remain only as an ''idea'', and the Private would transform to whatever becomes of the material components of the rifle. The ''Unique'' would also no longer remain specifically as it was before being destroyed. However, there would still be many other AK-47s which would share common features related to that prototype; for instance, that they were all designed based on the prototype’s design.
 +
 
 +
''Translator’s Note:'' The words “Private,” “Common,” and “Unique” may seem unusual because they are direct translations from the Vietnamese words used to describe these concepts in the original text. Various other words have been used by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other materialist dialecticians when discussing the underlying concepts of these philosophical categories. For instance, in most translations of Lenin, his discussion of such topics is typically translated into English using words such as “universal,” “general,” “special,” “particular,” etc.
 +
 
 +
Example (from Lenin’s ''Philosophical Notebooks''): “Language in essence expresses only the universal; what is meant, however, is the special, the particular. Hence what is meant cannot be said in speech.” Here, “universal” refers to that which is ''Common'' in all things, phenomena, and ideas, and “special/particular” refers to the ''Private — s''pecific individual things, phenomena, and ideas — along with their ''Unique'' properties.
 +
 
 +
Here are excerpts from Lenin’s ''Philosophical Notebooks'' discussing these concepts:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
(‘It?’ The most universal word of all.) Who is it? I. Every person is an I.
 +
 
 +
Das Sinnliche? It is a universal, etc., etc. ‘This??’ Everyone is ‘this.’
 +
 
 +
Why can the particular not be named? One of the objects of a given kind (tables) is distinguished by something from the rest...
 +
 
 +
Leaves of a tree are green; John is a man; Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have dialectics (as Hegel’s genius recognised): the individual is the universal... And a naïve confusion, a helplessly pitiful confusion in the dialectics of the universal and the particular — of the concept and the sensuously perceptible reality of individual objects, things, phenomena.
 +
 
 +
Further, the ‘subsumption’ under logical categories of ‘sensibility’ (Sensibilität), ‘irritability’ (irritabilität) — this is said to be the particular in contrast to the universal!! — and ‘reproduction’ is an idle game.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Marx, too, discussed these concepts using words which are commonly translated into English using different terms. For example, in ''Capital'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The general form of relative value, embracing the whole world of commodities, converts the single commodity that is excluded from the rest, and made to play the part of equivalent – here the linen – into the universal equivalent.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Here, “general form” refers to the ''commonalities'' of form that exist between all commodities. The “single commodity” refers to a private commodity; a specific commodity that exists separately from all other commodities. And when referring to a “universal equivalent,” Marx is referring to equivalence which such a commodity has in ''common'' with every other commodity.
 +
 
 +
The rest of this passage continues as a materialist dialectical analysis of the ''Private, Common,'' and ''Unique'' features and aspects of commodities:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The bodily form of the linen is now the form assumed in common by the values of all commodities; it therefore becomes directly exchangeable with all and every of them. The substance linen becomes the visible incarnation, the social chrysalis state of every kind of human labour. Weaving, which is the labour of certain private individuals producing a particular article, linen, acquires in consequence a social character, the character of equality with all other kinds of labour. The innumerable equations of which the general form of value is composed, equate in turn the labour embodied in the linen to that embodied in every other commodity, and they thus convert weaving into the general form of manifestation of undifferentiated human labour. In this manner the labour realised in the values of commodities is presented not only under its negative aspect, under which abstraction is made from every concrete form and useful property of actual work, but its own positive nature is made to reveal itself expressly. The general value form is the reduction of all kinds of actual labour to their common character of being human labour generally, of being the expenditure of human labour power. The general value form, which represents all products of labour as mere congelations of undifferentiated human labour, shows by its very structure that it is the social resumé of the world of commodities. That form consequently makes it indisputably evident that in the world of commodities the character possessed by all labour of being human labour constitutes its specific social character.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
We have chosen to use the terms “Private,” “Common,” and “Unique” in the translation of this text because they most closely match the words used in the original Vietnamese. In summary, it is important to realize that you may encounter the underlying ''concepts'' which are related by these words using various phrasings in the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, etc.
 +
 
 +
==== b. Dialectical Relationship Between Private and Common ====
 +
 
 +
According to the materialist dialectical viewpoint: the Private, the Common and the Unique exist objectively [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. The Common only exists within the Private. It expresses its existence through the Private.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 130 ====
 +
 
 +
The ''Common'' can’t exist as a specific thing, phenomenon, or idea. However, every specific thing, phenomenon, or idea exists as a ''private'' subject which has various features in ''common'' with other ''private'' things, phenomena, and ideas. We can therefore only understand the ''Common'' through observation and study of various ''private'' things, phenomena, and ideas. For example, a human can’t perceive with our senses alone the ''Common'' of apples. Only by observing many ''private'' apples can begin to derive an understanding of what all ''private'' apples have in ''common''.
 +
 
 +
The Common does not exist in isolation from the Private. Therefore, commonality is inseparable from things, phenomena, and ideas. The Private only exists in relation to the Common. Likewise, there is no Private that exists in complete isolation from the Common.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 131 ====
 +
 
 +
No commonality can possibly exist outside of private things, phenomena, and ideas because commonality describes features which different things, phenomena, and ideas share. No private thing, phenomenon, or idea can possibly exist ''absolutely without'' commonality because there is no thing, phenomenon, or idea that shares ''absolutely no features'' with ''any other'' thing, phenomenon, or idea.
 +
 
 +
The Private category is more all-encompassing and diverse than the Common category; Common is a part of Private but it is more profound and more “essential” than the Private. This is because Private is the synthesis of the Common and the Unique; the Common expresses generality and the regular predictability of many Privates.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 132 ====
 +
 
 +
The Private encompasses all aspects of a specific, individual thing, phenomenon, or idea; thus it encompasses all aspects, features, and attributes of a given subject, including both the Common and the Unique. In this way, the Private is the synthesis of the Common and the Unique.
 +
 
 +
Common attributes require more consideration, effort, and study to properly determine, because multiple private subjects must be considered and analyzed before common attributes can be confidently discovered and understood. They offer us a more profound understanding of the essence [see ''Essence and Phenomenon,'' p. 156] and nature of things, phenomena, and ideas because they offer insights into the ''relationships'' between and within different things, phenomena, and ideas. As we discover more commonalities, and understand them more deeply, we begin to develop a more comprehensive perspective of reality. We begin to develop an understanding of the laws and principles which govern relations between and within things, phenomena, and ideas, and this gives us the power to more accurately predict how processes will develop and how things, phenomena, and ideas will change and mutually impact one another over time.
 +
 
 +
Under specific conditions, the Common and the Unique can transform into each other [See Annotation 129, p. 128].
 +
 
 +
The dialectical relationship between Private and Common was summarised by Lenin:
 +
 
 +
“Consequently, the opposites (the individual as opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other '''kinds''' of individuals (things, phenomena, ideas) etc.”<ref>''On the Question of Dialectics'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.</ref> [Note: “individual and universal” here refer the same underlying concepts of “Private and Common” (respectively); see translator’s note on p. 132].
 +
 
 +
==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
 +
 
 +
We must acknowledge and recognize the Common in order to study the Private in our cognitive and practical activities. If we fail to acknowledge the Common, then whenever we attempt to understand and comprehend any Private thing, phenomenon or idea, we will make mistakes and become disoriented. To understand the Common we have to study and observe the Private because the Common does not exist abstractly outside of the Private.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 133 ====
 +
 
 +
Our understanding of Common attributes arise from the observation and study of private things, phenomena, and ideas. At the same time, developing our understanding of Commonalities between and within Private subjects deepens our understanding of their essential nature [see: Essence and Phenomenon].
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-46.png|''Dialectical analysis of private and common characteristics involves observing private subjects to determine common attributes and considering common attributes to gain insights about private subjects.'']]
 +
 
 +
It is impossible to know anything at all about the Common without observing Private subjects, and attempting to understand Private subjects without taking into consideration the attributes and features which they have in Common with other Private subjects will lead to incomplete and erroneous analysis.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
In addition, we must identify the Common features and attributes of every specific Private subject we study. We must avoid being dogmatic, metaphysical, and inflexible in applying our knowledge of commonalities to solve problems and interpret the world.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 134 ====
 +
 
 +
==== Dogmatism and Revisionism in Relation to the Private and Common ====
 +
 
 +
''Dogmatism'' is the inflexible adherence to ideals as incontrovertibly true while refusing to take any contradictory evidence into consideration. Dogmatism stands in direct opposition to materialist dialectics, which seeks to form opinions and conclusions only after careful consideration of all observable evidence.
 +
 
 +
Dogmatism typically arises when the Common is overemphasized without due consideration of the Private. A dogmatic position is one which adheres to ideals about commonalities without taking Private subjects into consideration.
 +
 
 +
Dogmatism can be avoided by continuously studying and observing and analyzing
 +
 
 +
Private subjects and taking any evidence which contradicts erroneous perceptions of “false commonalities” into consideration. This will simultaneously deepen our understanding of the Private while improving our understanding of the Common. For example: Sally might observe a few red apples and arrive at the conclusion: “all apples are red.” If Sally is then presented with a green apple, yet refuses to acknowledge it by continuing to insist that “all apples are red,” then Sally is engaging in dogmatism.
 +
 
 +
According to Vietnam’s ''Curriculum of the Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism For University and College Students Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought,'' the opposite of Dogmatism is ''Revisionism''. Revisionism occurs when we overestimate the Private and fail to recognize commonalities. In failing to recognize common attributes and features between and within things, phenomena, and ideas, the Revisionist faces confusion and disorientation whenever they encounter any new things, phenomena, and ideas, because they lack any insight into essential characteristics of the subject and its relations with other subjects.
 +
 
 +
For example: if Sally has spent a lot of time studying a red apple, she may start to become confident that she understands everything there is to know about apples. If she is then presented with a green apple, she might become confused and disoriented and draw the conclusion that she has to start all over again with her analysis, from scratch, thinking: “this can’t possibly be an apple because it’s not red. It must be something else entirely.” Sally can avoid this revisionist confusion by examining the other common features which the red and green apples share before making any conclusions.
 +
 
 +
==== Metaphysical Perception of the Private and Common ====
 +
 
 +
The ''metaphysical'' position attempts to categorize things, phenomena, and ideas into static categories which are isolated and distinct from one another [see Annotation 8,
 +
 
 +
p. 8]. In this way, the metaphysical perception ultimately fails to properly understand the role of both the Private ''and'' the Common. Categories may be arranged in taxonomic configurations based on shared features, but ultimately every category is seen as distinct and isolated from every other category. This perspective severs the dialectical relationship between the Private, the Common, and the Unique, and thus leads to a distorted perception of reality. As Engels wrote in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The analysis of Nature into its individual parts, the grouping of the different natural processes and objects in definite classes, the study of the internal anatomy of organized bodies in their manifold forms — these were the fundamental conditions of the gigantic strides in our knowledge of Nature that have been made during the last 400 years. But this method of work has also left us as legacy the habit of observing natural objects and processes in isolation, apart from their connection with the vast whole; of observing them in repose, not in motion; as constraints, not as essentially variables; in their death, not in their life. And when this way of looking at things was transferred by Bacon and Locke from natural science to philosophy, it begot the narrow, metaphysical mode of thought peculiar to the last century.”
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
In other words, Engels points out that separating and dividing Private subjects into distinct and isolated categories without acknowledging the dialectical nature of the Private and the Common leads to severe limitations on what we can learn about the world. Instead, we have to examine things, phenomena, and ideas ''in relation to one another'', which must include the analysis of Commonalities.
 +
 
 +
Rather than divide subjects into distinct, separate categories, materialist dialectics seek to examine Private subjects as they really exist: as a synthesis of Unique and Common attributes; and simultaneously to examine commonalities as they really exist: as properties which emerge from the relations of Private objects.
 +
 
 +
In our cognitive and practical activities, we must be able to take advantage of suitable conditions that will enable transformations from the Unique and the Common (and vice versa) for our specific purposes.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 135 ====
 +
 
 +
In advancing the cause of socialism, revolutionaries must work to transform our Unique positions into common positions. For instance, the process of developing revolutionary public knowledge [see Annotation 94, p. 93] begins with studying and understanding revolutionary knowledge. Initially, this knowledge will be ''unique'' to the socialist movement. By disseminating the knowledge to the public, we hope to transform this knowledge into ''common knowledge''.
 +
 
 +
Likewise, we hope to transform other common things, phenomena, and ideas back towards the Unique. For instance, the capitalist mode of production is currently the most common mode of production on Earth. In order to advance humanity towards communism, we must transition the capitalist mode of production from the Common towards the Unique, with the ambition of eventually eliminating this mode of production altogether.
 +
 
 +
=== 2. Reason and Result ===
 +
 
 +
==== a. Categories of Reason and Result ====
 +
 
 +
The ''Reason'' category is used to define the mutual impacts between internal aspects of a thing, phenomenon or idea, or between things, phenomena, or ideas, that bring about changes.
 +
 
 +
The ''Result'' category defines the changes that were caused by mutual impacts which occur between aspects and factors ''within'' a thing, phenomenon, or idea, or ''externally'' between different things, phenomena, or ideas.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 136 ====
 +
 
 +
''Translation note:'' the Vietnamese words for “reason and result” can also be translated as “cause and effect.” We have chosen to use the words “reason and result” to distinguish materialist dialectical categories from metaphysical conceptions of development.
 +
 
 +
In metaphysics [see Annotation 8, p. 8], any given ''effect'' is seen to have a single ''cause''. In materialist dialectics, we instead examine the ''mutual impacts'' which occur within and between subjects through motion and development processes.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-47.png|''Metaphysical vs. Materialist Dialectical conceptions of development.'']]
 +
 
 +
In the metaphysical conception of cause and effect, (A) causes effect (B), then effect (B) causes effect (C), and so on. Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, uses the model of ''development'' (see Annotation 117, p. 119), wherein objects (A) and (B) mutually impact one another, resulting in development (C). (C) will then have relations with other things, phenomena, and/or ideas, and the mutual impacts from these new relations will become the reasons for future results. Consider the following example:
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-48.png|''Metaphysical vs. Materialist Dialectical conceptions of frying and eating an egg.'']]
 +
 
 +
In the metaphysical “cause and effect” model, putting an egg in a hot pan is the cause which results in the effect of producing a fried egg. The egg being fried has the effect of the egg now being suitable for eating, which is the cause of the egg being eaten by a hungry person.
 +
 
 +
This is a simplification of the metaphysical conception of causes and effects, since metaphysics does recognize that one cause can have branches of multiple effects, but the essential characteristic of the metaphysical conception of causality is to break down all activity and change in the universe into static and distinct episodes of one distinct event causing one or more other distinct events.
 +
 
 +
In contrast, the materialist dialectical model of development holds that every result stems from mutual impacts which occur relationally between things, phenomena, and ideas, and that the resulting synthesis — the newly developed result of mutual impacts — will then have new relations with other things, phenomena, and ideas, and that these ''relations'' will become new reasons for new results through ''mutual impact''.
 +
 
 +
In this example, the egg and the hot pan will mutually impact each other. The frying pan will become dirty and need to be washed (the result of putting an egg in the frying pan); meanwhile, the egg will become a fried egg, which is fit for human consumption (the result of being cooked in the frying pan). The fried egg will then have a relationship with a hungry human, and this relationship will be a new reason which will lead to further results (i.e., the human eating and digesting the egg).
 +
 
 +
So, the key difference between the classical metaphysical conception of causality and the materialist dialectical model of development is that metaphysics focus more on individual events in time whereas materialist dialectics focus on the relations and mutual impacts between things, phenomena, and ideas over time.
 +
 
 +
==== b. Dialectical relationship between Reason and Result ====
 +
 
 +
The relationship between Reason and Result is objective, and it contains inevitability: there is no Reason that does not lead to a Result; and likewise, there is no Result without any Reason.
 +
 
 +
Reasons cause Results, which is why Reason always comes before Result, and Result always comes after Reason.
 +
 
 +
A Reason can cause one or many Results and a Result can be caused by one or many Reasons.
 +
 
 +
When many Reasons lead to a single Result, the impacts which lead to the Result are mutual between all things, phenomena, and ideas at hand. These mutual impacts can have many relational positions or roles, including: direct reasons, indirect reasons, internal reasons, external reasons, etc.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 137 ====
 +
 
 +
As stated in the previous annotation, Reasons which lead to Results stem from mutually impacting relations between things, phenomena, and ideas. There is no way for one subject to affect another subject without also being affected itself in some way.
 +
 
 +
Reasons can take many forms, including (but not limited to):
 +
 
 +
'''Types of Reasons and Results'''
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-49.png|''Direct Reasons stem from immediate relations.'']]
 +
 
 +
'''Direct Reasons''' are Reasons which stem from immediate relations, with no intervening relations standing between the Reason and Result.
 +
 
 +
For example, dropping a coffee cup causes an immediate relationship between the cup and the ground, and that relation leads directly to the Result of the coffee cup breaking to pieces.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-50.png|''Indirect Reasons have an intervening relationship between the Reason and the Result.'']]
 +
 
 +
'''Indirect Reasons''' are Reasons which have intervening relations between a Reason and a Result.
 +
 
 +
For example, the dropped coffee cup above may have smashed into pieces directly because it hit the ground, but it may also have indirect Reasons. The person holding the cup may have been frightened because she heard a loud noise, and the loud noise was caused by a car backfiring, and the car backfiring was caused by the driver not maintaining his car engine.
 +
 
 +
In materialist dialectical terms, the driver’s relationship with his car would be an indirect Reason for the car backfiring; the relationship between the car (which backfired) and the person holding the coffee cup would be the direct Reason for dropping the cup; and the cup’s relationship with the ground would be the direct reason for the cup smashing. At the same time, the driver’s relationship with his car would be an indirect Reason for the Result of the coffee cup smashing to pieces.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-51.png|''Internal Reasons stem from internal relationships.'']]
 +
 
 +
'''Internal Reasons''' are Reasons which stem from internal relations that occur between aspects and factors ''within'' a subject.
 +
 
 +
For example, if a building collapses because the steel structure ''within'' the building rusts and fails, then that could be viewed as an ''internal Reason'' for the collapse.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-52.png|''External Reasons stem from external relations.'']]
 +
 
 +
'''External Reasons''' are reasons which stem from external relations that occur between different things, phenomena, and ideas.
 +
 
 +
For example, if a building collapses because it is smashed by a wrecking ball, then that could be viewed as an ''external Reason'' for the collapse.
 +
 
 +
All of these roles and positions can be viewed ''relatively''. From one viewpoint, a Reason may be seen as internal, but from another viewpoint, it might be viewed as external. For example, if a couple has a disagreement which leads to an argument, the disagreement may be seen as an external Reason from the perspective of each individual within the couple. But to a relationship counselor viewing the situation from the outside, the disagreement may be seen as an internal Reason which leads to ''the couple'' (a subject defined by the internal relationship between the husband and wife) arguing.
 +
 
 +
From one perspective, a government official ordering a building to be torn down may be seen as the direct Reason for the Result of the building being torn down. But from a different perspective, one can see many intervening relations: complaints from local residents may have led to the government official making the order, the order would be delivered to a demolition crew, the demolition crew would assign a crew member to operate a wrecking ball, the crew member would operate the wrecking ball, the wrecking ball would smash the building. All of these can be seen as intervening relations which constitute indirect reasons leading up to the direct Reason of the wrecking ball smashing the building. Choosing the right viewpoint during analysis is critical to make sure that Reason and Result relations are viewed properly and productively, and care must also be taken to ensure that the correct Reasons are attributed to Results (see ''Reason and Result'', p. 138).
 +
 
 +
Likewise, a Reason can cause many Results, including primary and secondary Results.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 138 ====
 +
 
 +
'''Primary''' Results are Results which are more direct and predictable.
 +
 
 +
'''Secondary''' Results are Results which are indirect and less predictable.
 +
 
 +
For example, an earthquake may have ''primary'' Results such as the ground shaking, buildings being destroyed, etc. ''Secondary'' Results from the earthquake might include flights being rerouted from local airports, shortages at grocery stores, etc.
 +
 
 +
In the motion of the material world, there is no known “first Reason” or “final Result.”
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 139 ====
 +
 
 +
With our current understanding of the universe, it is uncertain what might have caused the creation of all existence. Was it the Big Bang? If so, did the Big Bang have some underlying reason? There is also no way to know if there will ever be a “final Result.” Will the heat death of the universe occur, and if so, will that end all transpiring of relations which would end the cycle of development — of Reasons and Results?
 +
 
 +
As of now, we do not have solid answers to these questions. If and when answers arise, it is possible that the materialist dialectical framework will need to be updated to reflect new scientific knowledge, just as Marx, Engels, and Lenin have updated materialist dialectics in the past [see Annotation 72, p. 68]. What’s important to understand in the meantime is that within our realm of human experience and understanding, for all practical purposes, every Result which we live through and observe has some underlying Reason, and will itself lead to one or more Results.
 +
 
 +
Engels said: “we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis [see Annotation 200, p. 192], positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed, and that despite all their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate [are mixed together]. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa.”<ref>''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'', Friedrich Engels, 1880.</ref>
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 140 ====
 +
 
 +
In the above passage, Engels is simply explaining that since all things, phenomena, and ideas are relationally linked and inter-related [see ''Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics'', p. 106], the mutual impacts and processes of change which lead to development (the reasons and results which transpire between all things, phenomena, and ideas) are also all linked and inter-related. What might be viewed as a Reason is also a Result of one or more prior Reasons, just as every Result is also a Reason for future Results.
 +
 
 +
==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
 +
 
 +
Because the relationship between Reason and Result is objective and inevitable, we can’t ignore the relationship between Reason and Result in our perception and practice. In reality, there is no thing, phenomenon or idea that can exist without any underlying Reason or Reasons; and vice versa, there is no Reason that does not lead to any Result.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 141 ====
 +
 
 +
In political activity, it is important to remember that ''every'' interaction within every relationship will lead to mutual impacts which will cause change and development; in other words, everything we choose to do will be the Reason for one or more Results. We must be aware of unintended or unpredicted Results from our activities.
 +
 
 +
Reason-Result relationships are very complicated and diverse. Therefore, we must accurately identify the types of Reasons [direct, indirect, internal, external, etc.] so that we can come up with proper solutions which are suitable for the specific situation in both perception and practice. A Reason can lead to many results and, likewise, a Result can be caused by many Reasons, which is why we must have a comprehensive viewpoint and a historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116] in our perception of reality so we can properly analyse, solve and apply Reason-Result relationships.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 142 ====
 +
 
 +
It is critical to understand that there may be many events or relationships which might be falsely ascribed as Reasons for a given Result (and vice-versa).
 +
 
 +
For example: in 1965, the United States of America officially declared war on North Vietnam after the so-called “Gulf of Tonkin Incident,” in which Vietnamese forces supposedly fired on a United States Navy ship in the Gulf of Tonkin. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident is often described as the “cause” or the “Reason” that the Vietnam War began.
 +
 
 +
However, the real “Reason” why the USA declared war on North Vietnam had to do with the underlying contradiction between capitalist imperialism and communism in Vietnam. This contradiction had to be resolved one way or another. The United States of America willfully decided to try to negate this contradiction by instigating war, and this was the true reason the war began. In fact, the so-called “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” never even occurred as described — the attack on the USA’s ship never really occurred. A document released by the Pentagon in 2005 revealed that the incident was completely fabricated. So, saying that the “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” was the Reason for the war is nonsensical, since it’s an event which never even occurred in reality.
 +
 
 +
Understanding the true nature of Reason and Result is very important for making decisions and choosing a path forward in political action. Attributing the wrong Reason to a Result, or misunderstanding the Results which stem from a Reason, can lead to serious setbacks and failures. Therefore, it is vital for revolutionaries to properly identify and understand the ''actual'' Reasons and Results which drive development.
 +
 
 +
=== 3. Obviousness and Randomness ===
 +
 
 +
==== a. Categories of Obviousness and Randomness ====
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 143 ====
 +
 
 +
In Vietnamese, the words for these categories are “tất nhiên” and “ngẫu nhiên,” which respectively translate to “obvious” and “random.” In socialist literature, various words have been used by different authors to convey the underlying meaning of these categories (Engels, for instance, used the terms “necessary” and “accidental” to mean “obvious” and “random,” respectively). We have chosen to use words which closely match the Vietnamese used in the original text, but the reader should be aware that these same concepts may be described using many different words in various English translations of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Ho Chi Minh, etc.
 +
 
 +
The ''Obviousness'' category refers to events that occur because of the essential [see ''Essence and Phenomenon'', p. 156] internal aspects of the material structure of a subject. These essential internal characteristics become reasons for certain results under certain conditions: the Obvious ''has'' to happen in a certain way, it ''can’t'' happen any other way.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 144 ====
 +
 
 +
''Obviousness'' can only apply to material subjects in the material world and results which are certain to happen based on the material laws of nature. Obviousness arises from the internal aspects, features, and relations of physical objects. Paper ''will'' burn under certain specific conditions, due its internal material structure. If those conditions (i.e., temperature, the presence of oxygen, etc.) exist, then paper ''will'' catch fire predictably. In other words, paper will ''obviously'' burn under certain circumstances due to its internal composition,.
 +
 
 +
The ''Randomness'' category refers to things that happen because of external reasons: things that happen, essentially, by chance, due to impacts from many external relations. A Random outcome ''may'' occur or it ''may not'' occur; a Random outcome could happen ''this'' way or it could happen ''that'' way.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 145 ====
 +
 
 +
As we discussed above, paper ''will'' burn if it reaches a certain temperature — that much is ''obvious''. If your friend holds paper over the flame of the lighter, the paper ''will'' burn — that’s ''obvious''. But you can’t be certain whether your friend will actually hold the paper to the flame or not. This demonstrates ''Randomness''. Whether your friend will ultimately hold the paper to the flame or not depends on an external relation which is not defined by the internal structure of the paper, and which can’t be predicted with the same predictability as obvious events which are rooted in internal material aspects.
 +
 
 +
==== b. Dialectical relationship between Obviousness and Randomness ====
 +
 
 +
Obviousness and Randomness both exist objectively and play an important role in the motion and development of things and phenomena. Obviousness plays the decisive role.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 146 ====
 +
 
 +
Obviousness plays the decisive role simply because Obviousness is far more predictable and the laws which govern material phenomena are essentially fixed. We can’t change the laws of physics, the nature of chemical reactions, etc.
 +
 
 +
Obviousness and Randomness exist in dialectical unity; there is no pure Obviousness, nor pure Randomness. It is obvious that Randomness shall occur in our universe, however Obviousness clears a path through this Randomness.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 147 ====
 +
 
 +
Our universe is incredibly complex and there are many different potential external relations which could impact any given situation, such that some degree of Randomness is always present in any situation; in other words, the presence of Randomness can be seen as Obvious.
 +
 
 +
In 1922, Ho Chi Minh identified objective internal characteristics of the working class of France and its colonies. He wrote: “The mutual ignorance of the two proletariats gives rise to prejudices. The French workers look upon the native as an inferior and negligible human being, incapable of understanding and still less of taking action. The natives regard all the French as wicked exploiters. Imperialism and capitalism do not fail to take advantage of this mutual suspicion and this artificial racial hierarchy to frustrate propaganda and divide forces which ought to unite.”
 +
 
 +
In this example, Ho Chi Minh identifies prejudice as an obvious outcome of mutual ignorance. The prejudice arises as a matter of course from internal objective aspects of the two proletarian groups. As long as French and native workers remain ignorant of one another, prejudice will arise. The specific forms which this prejudice will take, however, and their resulting impacts and developments, will be more or less Random because there are many external factors (including the external impacts of the capitalist class, which seeks to take advantage of these prejudices) which can’t be predicted. Therefore, it is necessary for political revolutionaries to account for both random and obvious factors in confronting such prejudice. Ho Chi Minh’s suggestion for overcoming these difficulties was concise and to-the-point: “Intensify propaganda to overcome them.” Only by negating the internal aspects of mutual ignorance through education and propaganda could communists hope to negate the resulting prejudice.
 +
 
 +
As Engels said: “One knows that what is maintained to be necessary [''obvious''] is composed of sheer accidents, and that the so-called accidental [''random''] is the form behind which necessity hides itself — and so on.”<ref>''Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'', Friedrich Engels, 1886.</ref>
 +
 
 +
Obviousness and Randomness are not static properties: Randomness and Obviousness continuously change and develop over time. Under specific conditions, Obviousness and Randomness can transform into each other: Obviousness can become Random and Randomness can become obvious.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 148 ====
 +
 
 +
Randomness can be introduced to an obvious situation: it may be obvious that a mineshaft will collapse, until human beings come along and intervene by repairing the structural integrity of the mineshaft. It may seem Random whether a city’s economy will grow or shrink, until a volcano erupts and buries the city in lava and ash, making it obvious that the economy will not grow because the city no longer exists.
 +
 
 +
Most situations are in a flux, as Obviousness and Randomness dialectically develop and change over time, with outcomes becoming more or less obvious or Random over time. It is vital that we, as political revolutionaries, are able to distinguish between Obviousness and Randomness and to leverage this understanding to our advantage.
 +
 
 +
==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
 +
 
 +
Basically, in our perception and reality, we have to base our plans, strategies, and actions as much as possible on the Obvious, not the Random. However, we must not ignore Randomness, nor try to separate the Obvious from the Random. When faced with situations which seem very Random, we must find ways to develop Obviousness. When faced with what seems obvious, we must keep an eye out for Randomness. Obviousness and Randomness can mutually transform, so we need to create suitable conditions to hinder or promote such transformation to suit our purposes.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 149 ====
 +
 
 +
We must always remember that no situation is purely obvious, nor purely Random, and to take this into account in all of our planning and activity.
 +
 
 +
A skyscraper made from heavy steel beams may seem quite sturdy and stable; it may appear obvious that the structure will remain stable and sound for decades. However, it is still important for engineers to periodically ''confirm'' that the steel is still sound through testing and observation. Engineers must also be prepared for Random events like lightning, earthquakes, storms, etc., which may affect the seemingly obvious structural integrity of the building.
 +
 
 +
Likewise, when faced with extremely complex situations which seem completely Random, we must seek out (or bring about) the obvious. Wildfires are extremely chaotic and difficult to predict. However, firefighters can rely on certain obvious patterns and natural laws which govern the spread of fire. By digging trenches, lighting counter-fires, spraying water, and other such actions, firefighters can bring wildfires under control. This illustrates how humans are able to make situations less Random by bringing about an increasing amount of Obviousness over time through practical activity.
 +
 
 +
=== 4. Content and Form ===
 +
 
 +
==== a. Categories of Content and Form ====
 +
 
 +
The ''Content'' category refers to the sum of all aspects, attributes, and processes that a thing, phenomenon, or idea is made from.
 +
 
 +
The ''Form'' category refers to the mode of existence and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. ''Form'' thus describes the system of relatively stable relationships which exist internally within things, phenomena, and ideas.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 150 ====
 +
 
 +
Content and Form can be difficult to comprehend at first because the ways in which Content and Form manifest and interact can vary wildly depending on the subject being discussed and the viewpoint from which the subject is being considered.
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Content represents the component things, materials, attributes, features, etc., which, together, make up a thing, phenomenon, or idea. You can think of it as the “ingredients” from which a subject is made.
 +
 
 +
Form refers to a stable system of internal relationships which compose a thing, phenomenon, or idea, as well as the mode of existence and development [see Annotation 60, p. 59] of those relations.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Remember that from a dialectical materialist perspective, everything in our universe is defined by internal and external relations. If a thing, phenomenon, or idea has internal relations which are ''relatively'' stable, then it has a Form.
 +
 
 +
We would not call all of the assorted ingredients which are used to make a cake “a cake” unless they have been assembled together and baked into the stable form which we interpret as “a cake.” Once a portion is removed from the cake, the portion itself assumes a new stable form which we call “a slice of cake.” The slice of cake will maintain its relatively stable form until being eaten, discarded, or otherwise transitioning into some other form. It is only considered a “slice of cake” for as long as it maintains its own specific stable form.
 +
 
 +
Stability itself is also ''relative'': a “spray” of water may only last for a few seconds but we can still conceive of it as having Form. On the other hand, a mountain has a set of stable internal relations (a Form) which might last for millions of years.
 +
 
 +
We can think of Form as having two aspects: inner Form and outer Form.
 +
 
 +
''Inner form'' refers to the internal stable relations which we have already discussed.
 +
 
 +
''Outer form'' is how an object “appears” to human senses.
 +
 
 +
In this book, we are primarily concerned with the ''inner Form'' of subjects, however, in other contexts (such as art and design), the ''outer Form'' plays a more prominent role.
 +
 
 +
Now, let’s identify some of the common viewpoints from which Content and Form might be considered.
 +
 
 +
'''Material vs. Ideal'''
 +
 
 +
When discussing the ''material'' — i.e., ''objective'' systems and objects<ref>See Annotation 10, p. 10 and Annotation 108, p. 112.</ref> — discussion of Content and Form is more straightforward.
 +
 
 +
'''Material'''
 +
 
 +
With material things and phenomena, the ''Content'' is what the thing is made out of: the physical parts, aspects, attributes, and processes that compose the subject. For example, the Content of a wooden chair might be the wood, nails, paint, and other materials which are used to create the chair.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-53.png|''A material object can be described in terms of content, inner form, and outer form.'']]
 +
 
 +
The ''inner Form'' of a material object refers to ''stable internal relations'' which compose the object. The stable relationship between the wood and the nails — the nails bind the wood together, the wood is cut in certain patterns, the paint adheres to the wood through physical and chemical bonds, etc. ''Stability'' is, again, relative — over time, the paint will chip and flake, the wood will rot, the nails will rust, etc. Dialectical processes of change will eventually reduce the chair into something other than a chair (i.e., through rotting, burning, disassembly, etc.), but as long as the internal relations maintain the Form of a chair we conceive of it as a chair.
 +
 
 +
The ''outer Form'' of a material object refers to the way it appears to human consciousness. Its shape, aesthetics, etc.
 +
 
 +
==== Ideal ====
 +
 
 +
With the ideal — i.e., ''abstract'' ideas and concepts — discussion of Content and Form becomes more complicated. As Vietnam’s ''Marxism-Leninism Textbook for Students Who Specialize in Marxism-Leninism'' explains:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Many times, human consciousness has difficulty in trying to clearly define the Content of a subject — especially when the subject is an abstract idea. We often mistake Content with inner Form. Usually, in this situation, there is a strong combination and intertwining between both Content and Form. In such a situation, the Form can be referred to as the “inner Form,” or the “Content-Form.”
 +
 
 +
With physical things and phenomena, this type of Form usually belongs to a very specific Private, it doesn’t exist in any other Private, it is the Unique [see Annotation 129, p. 128].
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
The reason the inner Form of physical objects usually exists in ''Private'' as the ''Unique'' is because the stable internal relations of any given physical object are equivalent to the specific material components which distinguish one physical object from all other physical objects. In other words, if you have two chairs which are exact copies of each other, made from the same kind of wood, cut into the same shape, using the same type and configuration of fasteners, etc., they are still not the exact same object. The internal relations of one chair are what make it ''that'' chair and distinguish it from all other objects in the universe. The ''outer Form'' of these chairs may have many commonalities (they look similar, they have the same color, etc.), but the ''inner Form'' is what distinguishes one chair from the other.
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
However, within the realm of abstract ideas, there are also Forms which many abstract Privates share. In the context of abstract ideas, we call this kind of Form the “outer Form,” the “form-Form,” or the “common Form.”
 +
 
 +
When we try to define the Content of a subject which is an abstract idea, our consciousness usually tries to answer the question: “what is the subject?”
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
This is usually a simple matter. Take, for example, the abstract idea of “freedom.” When we try to think of the Content of ''freedom'' we can answer it pretty easily. What is the subject of ''freedom''? It is the condition which allows humans to follow their own will, it is the absence of external coercion, etc., etc.
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
But, when we try to define the Form of an abstract idea, our consciousness tries to answer the question: “how is the subject?” — this is when we have to define the mode of existence (the Form) of that subject.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
This is where things get more complicated. The mode of existence of an abstract idea can usually be considered to be language, since our ideas are usually expressed through language, but it can take on other modes of existence as well, such as visual media (paintings, photographs), physical motions of the human body (body language, dance), etc. This is how the field of art studies is concerned with the philosophical categories of Content and Form.
 +
 
 +
==== Content and Form in Art ====
 +
 
 +
Many readers may already be familiar with the subject of Content and Form from studying art, design, communications, and related fields. At first glance, the definitions of Content and Form may seem different from what we’ve been discussing so far.
 +
 
 +
This is because art concerns itself with ''abstract ideas'' expressed through various Forms of ''physical representations.''
 +
 
 +
These physical representations may include physical objects (photographs, paintings, sculptures), performed and/or recorded physical activities (dance, music, theater, film), human language recorded in stable physical Forms of written language (novels, poems, stories) or spontaneously performed oral language (storytelling, impromptu spoken-word poetry).
 +
 
 +
Because the study of art is primarily concerned with interpreting and understanding ideas expressed through these physical manifestations, art is concerned with the ''stable inner relations'' of the ''ideas'' which artists imbue within their works of art — much more than the stable inner relations of the physical components of the object.
 +
 
 +
According to the Vietnamese art textbook ''Curriculum of General Aesthetics'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
What is the Form of a work of art? Form is the way to express the Content of an artwork. Form and Content within a work of art have a strong unity with each other and they regulate each other. Form is the organization, the inner structure of the Content of an artwork. Therefore, Form is the way that the Content expresses itself, and that way is described by two features. We must ask:
 +
 
 +
First: what expresses the Content of a work of art?
 +
 
 +
Second: how is it expressed?
 +
 
 +
Art exists when two conditions are met: first, there must be a subject with an outer Form. Second, an artist must convey aesthetic meaning, or humanization, of that subject. This aesthetic meaning is the Content.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
So, in studying works of art, we are less concerned with the ''physical content'' of the artwork (the canvas, paint, etc.) than we are with the ''abstract content'' of the artwork (the ideas which the artist imbues within the artwork).
 +
 
 +
As for Form, the ''inner Form'' of art represents the stable internal relations which compose the art (both ideal, i.e., the stable internal relations of the abstract ideas imbued within the art by the artist, as well as physical, i.e., the stable internal relations of the physical media of the art).
 +
 
 +
The ''outer Form'' of art represents how our human senses perceive the art, such as composition techniques, the use of color, etc.
 +
 
 +
The chart below breaks down the differences in a general, non-artistic viewpoint of physical objects and processes in materialist dialectical terms (i.e., the viewpoint an engineer might have), as compared with the artistic viewpoint of physical objects and processes (which an art critic might have). Some fields, such as designing products for human use, might draw from both viewpoints.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-54.png]]
 +
 
 +
==== Content and Form in Specific Artistic Media ====
 +
 
 +
Every medium of art will interpret Content and Form in its own way. For example:
 +
 
 +
'''Literature''' is a specific art discipline which deals with recorded human language in the Form of writing. In written literature, the Content would be the ideas expressed in a piece of writing; what the words say. The inner Form would be the way the ideas relate to each other — i.e., story structure, pacing, character development, etc. The outer form would be the physical format of the writing — i.e., manuscript, magazine article, paperback book, ebook, etc.
 +
 
 +
'''Painting''' is a specific art discipline in which pigments are applied to objects to create images which convey ideas and emotions. In painting, the Content would be the meaning which an artist embodies in a work of art. The inner Form would include the stable internal relations within the artwork (i.e., the bonds and mixtures between the pigments, the canvas, etc.), while the outer Form would be how the artwork appears to human senses (composition, aesthetics, etc.). Generally speaking, the creator of the art will have to make decisions about the inner Form (i.e., selection of oil vs. acrylic vs. watercolor, selection of shade, tint, and hue, physical brush strokes, etc.) so as to produce the desired outer Form (the way the finished artwork will appear to viewers).
 +
 
 +
'''Theater''' is a specific art discipline in which human beings perform physical actions and use their voices to convey ideas to an audience. In theater, the Content includes the ideas which are being presented, such as the script, the musical score, the story, the performance choices of actors, costumes, props, etc. The inner Form would include the stable relations between the members of the cast, the director, the physical stage, the lighting, etc., and the outer Form would be the way the play appears to the audience.
 +
 
 +
These are just some examples. Each medium of expression will have its own variations in how Content and Form are considered.
 +
 
 +
Engels described the manifestation of Content and Form in ''Dialectics of Nature:''
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The whole of organic nature is one continuous proof of the identity or inseparability of form and content. Morphological and physiological phenomena, form and function, mutually determine one another. The differentiation of form (the cell) determines differentiation of substance into muscle, skin, bone, epithelium, etc., and the differentiation of substance in turn determines difference of form.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Content and Form are discussed frequently in analysis of human social systems and objective relations which occur within society. For example, Marx made many criticial insights into economics by analyzing and explaining the form of value [see Annotation 14, p. 16] under capitalism.
 +
 
 +
Indeed, the entire capitalist system can be viewed in terms of content and form. The current form of human civilization is capitalism. That is to say, capitalism is the stable set of relations and characteristis of the current political economy which dominates the planet. The content of capitalism includes all the components of the base and superstructure, including the various classes (capitalists, working class, etc.), the means of production, government institutions, corporate institutions, etc. All of these elements are configured together into the relatively stable form which we call “capitalism.”
 +
 
 +
==== Other Viewpoints of Content and Form ====
 +
 
 +
Of course, there are many other viewpoints for discussing Content and Form of abstract ideas. Every philosophical field will have its own unique ways of utilizing Content and Form analysis. One example is the concept of Content and Form in legal philosophy. Vietnamese legal expert Dinh Thuy Dung writes:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The law has internal and external forms:
 +
 
 +
The inner Form is the internal structure of the law, the relationships and the connections between the elements constituting the law. The inner Form of the law is called the legal structure, which includes the constituent parts of the legal system such as the branch of law, legal institutions, and legal norms.
 +
 
 +
The outer Form is the manifestation, or mode of existence, of the law. In other words, the outer Form of the law is how we view and understand the law [i.e., who enforces the law and what repercussions will occur if we violate the law]. Based on the outer Form of the law, one can know how it exists in reality, and where and to whom it applies. The external Form of the law is also approached in relation to its Content.
 +
 
 +
According to this understanding, the Content of the law includes all the elements that make up the law, while the Form of the law is understood as the elements which contain or express the Content.
 +
 
 +
If you understand that the Content of the law is the will of the state, then the legal Form is the way of expressing the will of the state.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
There are countless other ways in which Content and Form can be used to analyze and understand things, phenomena, and ideas. We hope that these examples have given you a better idea of the various ways in which Content and Form can be used to understand the world. In general, socialist texts deal with the ''inner Form'' of things, phenomena, and ideas. That is to say, the inner relations which compose the subject being considered. The outer form — how things appear to our senses — tends to be less relevant in analysis of human social systems, though it is often important in consideration of specialized fields of revolutionary activity such as aesthetics, propaganda, etc.
 +
 
 +
==== b. Dialectical relationship between Content and Form ====
 +
 
 +
Content and Form have a strong dialectical relationship with one other. There is no Form that does not contain any Content. Simultaneously, there is no Content that does not exist in a specific Form. The same Content can manifest in many Forms and a Form can contain many Contents.
 +
 
 +
The relationship between Content and Form is a dialectical relationship in which Content decides Form and Form can impact Content.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 151 ====
 +
 
 +
For example, if you want to make a table, and all you have available are wood and nails, then that Content (the wood and the nails) will determine the Form the table ends up taking. You are going to end up with a wooden table, and it will therefore have to have certain characteristics of Form.
 +
 
 +
When Content changes, the Form must change accordingly. If, instead of wood, you have iron, then the table you end up building will have a much different Form. Form can also ''influence'' the Content, but not nearly as much as Content ''determines'' Form. For instance, if you have wood and nails, but you develop a technique for building a table that doesn’t need any nails, then the result (a wooden table without any nails) would be an example of a development in Form reflecting as a change in Content.
 +
 
 +
The main tendency of Content is change. On the other hand, Form is relatively stable in every thing and phenomenon. As Content changes, Form must change accordingly. However, Content and Form are not always perfectly aligned.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 152 ====
 +
 
 +
Since all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly changing, it stands to reason that the internal components (things, phenomena, and ideas, and their relations) which compose the Content of a subject will constantly be undergoing processes of change and development. Thus, we say that the tendency of Content is change. Since the Form is based on the ''internal relations'' of the components of Content, it stands to reason that a change in Content will lead to change in Form. These kinds of changes in Content and Form also occur through the dialectical process: changes in quantity lead to changes in quality [see Annotation 117, p. 119].
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-55.png|''Quantity changes in Content lead to quality shifts in Form.'']]
 +
 
 +
As soon as a wooden chair is finished being built, the paint is already beginning to degrade. The wood is already beginning to rot. The iron nails are already beginning to rust. These changes may be imperceptibly slow — they may even take centuries to occur, if the chair is kept in a hospitable environment — but the changes are occurring, quantitatively, over time, none-the-less.
 +
 
 +
Eventually, changes in quantity will lead to changes in quality. At some point, the chair might weaken and begin to wobble whenever it’s sat in. Human beings might recognize this quality and begin to think of it as a “wobbly chair.” The chair might degrade to the point where it can’t be safely used at all, in which case it will have quality shifted into a “broken chair.” If the chair is repaired, that would represent another quality shift. If it is used for firewood, that would be another quality shift.
 +
 
 +
Keep in mind that changes in Form do not directly cause changes in Content. If you disassemble a wooden chair into the constituent wood and nails, the wood and nails remain more or less unchanged. But if you burn a wooden chair, it’s the ''change in Content'' which leads to the change in Form from “chair” to “pile of ash.”
 +
 
 +
Form simply represents the stable relationships between the component parts of the subject’s Content. The only way to change Form is to change those inner relations, or to change the components which are relating. There is no way to change Form without changing the Content, and changing the Content changes the Form by definition.
 +
 
 +
Content determines Form, but Form is not ''fully'' decided by Content, and Form can impact back on Content. If a Form is suitable with its Content, it can improve the development of its Content. If a Form is not suitable with its Content, it can constrain the development of its Content.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 153 ====
 +
 
 +
The dialectical relationship between Content and Form is somewhat similar to the dialectical relationship between the material and the ideal (see ''Matter and Consciousness'',
 +
 
 +
p. 88). Just as the material world ''determines'' consciousness while consciousness ''impacts'' the material world, the Content of a subject ''determines'' the Form while the Form ''impacts'' the Content.
 +
 
 +
''Suitability'' describes the applicability of a subject for a specific application or role. Whether or not something is “suitable” or not can be highly subjective (i.e., which music would be “suitable” to play at a party), or it can be more objective (i.e., what kind of batteries to use with an electronic device).
 +
 
 +
We might say that hardwood is “suitable” Content for the Form of a chair because it is durable, strong, relatively inexpensive, and long-lasting. It might be “unsuitable” to have a chair made of hardwood if it is to be used as an office chair, because the hard surfaces might cause strain and discomfort. However, we can utilize conscious activity to adjust and develop suitability between Content and Form. Changing the Content by adding cushioning or padding might make the Content and Form more suitable with each other. Similarly, changing the Form by designing contours and adding adjustability to the chair might make the Content and Form more suitable with each other for their intended application as an office chair.
 +
 
 +
If a Form is not suitable with the Content, it restrains the development of the Content. Just think of a shovel (Form) made of wood (Content), which will degrade very rapidly over time, vs. a shovel (Form) made of steel (Content) which will last much longer. This works in both directions. Consider the Content of drinking cups: a porcelain cup might last for a long time and even develop positively over time (by acquiring a desirable patina), while a cup made out of mild steel would not be desirable, as it would be highly prone to rust from extended use containing liquids.
 +
 
 +
==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
 +
 
 +
Content and Form always have a dialectical relationship with each other. Therefore, in our perception and practice, we must not try to separate Content and Form, nor should we solely focus on one and ignore the other.
 +
 
 +
Because Content determines Form, whenever we are considering a thing, phenomenon, or idea, we must base our consideration first on its Content. If we want to change a thing or phenomenon, we have to change its Content first.
 +
 
 +
In reality, we must promote the positive impact of Form on Content by making the Form fit the Content. Likewise, we must also change the Form that is no longer suitable with its Content and therefore constrains the development of its Content.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 154 ====
 +
 
 +
In any analysis, it is very important that we carefully consider whether or not Content and Form are suitable with each other in our own projects and activities. We can learn a lot about suitability from observation and practice (see ''Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism'', p. 204) and improve suitability through conscious activity.
 +
 
 +
Marx believed that it is vital to consider Content and Form when analyzing human society and political economy. One of his core critiques of political economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo was a failure to consider Content and Form when it comes to value, commodities, and money. He discusses this extensively in ''Capital Volume 1'', as in this excerpt:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The value-form, whose fully developed shape is the money-form, is very elementary and simple. Nevertheless, the human mind has for more than 2,000 years sought in vain to get to the bottom of it all, whilst on the other hand, to the successful analysis of much more composite and complex forms, there has been at least an approximation. Why? Because the body, as an organic whole, is more easy of study than are the cells of that body. In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Marx, here, is saying that studying the economy is more difficult than studying the human body because it can’t be physically observed and dissected. Rather, we have to rely on abstraction, which leaves us prone to making many more mistakes in analyzing Content and Form.
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
But in bourgeois society, the commodity-form of the product of labour – or value-form of the commodity – is the economic cell-form. To the superficial observer, the analysis of these forms seems to turn upon minutiae. It does in fact deal with minutiae, but they are of the same order as those dealt with in microscopic anatomy.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Marx’s analysis of capitalism relies to great extent upon recognizing the commodity-form of the product (Content) of labor. Labor existed long before capitalism. Labor has existed for as long as humans have worked to change our own material conditions. But under capitalism, labor specifically takes on the Form of a ''commodity'' which is bought by capitalists. This becomes the basis for Marx’s entire critique of capitalism.
 +
 
 +
Obviously, there is much more to Marx’s use of Content and Form in analyzing capitalism and human society, but this should hopefully give you some idea of the importance of Content and Form in analysis of human society and revolutionary activity.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
=== 5. Essence and Phenomenon ===
 +
 
 +
==== a. Categories of Essence and Phenomenon ====
 +
 
 +
The ''Essence'' category refers to the synthesis of all the internal aspects as well as the obvious and stable relations that define the existence, motion and development of things, phenomena, and ideas.
 +
 
 +
The ''Phenomenon'' category refers to the external manifestation of those internal aspects and relations in specific conditions.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 155 ====
 +
 
 +
Understanding Essence and Phenomena can be challenging at first, but it is very important for materialist dialectical analysis.
 +
 
 +
Essence should not be confused with ''Form''. Form represents the stable internal relations of the component content of a subject, whereas Essence represents the ''synthesis'' of all internal aspects as well as all obvious and stable attributes which ''define the existence, motion, and development'' of a subject.
 +
 
 +
Phenomena are simply external manifestations of a subject which occur ''in specific conditions''.
 +
 
 +
The Essence of a subject is not dependent on conditions, whereas in different conditions, the same subject will exhibit different Phenomena. For example, COVID-19 is, ''essentially'', a specific virus strain. That is to say, all of the internal aspects and stable relations that define the existence, motion, and development of COVID-19 are synthesized as a virus which we call COVID-19.
 +
 
 +
The ''Phenomena'' of COVID-19 which we can observe in patients would include symptoms such as fever, coughing, trouble breathing, etc.
 +
 
 +
The Essence of a cloud is water vapor in the atmosphere: that is the synthesis, the coming-together, of all the internal stable relations and aspects which will determine how a cloud exists, moves, and develops over time.
 +
 
 +
The Phenomena of clouds are all the things we can sense: the appearance of big fluffy white things in the air, shadows on the ground, and, sometimes, rain.
 +
 
 +
Essence defines Phenomenon: the internal attributes and stable relations will produce the Phenomena which we can observe. A cloud is not ''essentially defined'' as a fluffy white thing in the air; that is just the appearance a cloud has to our human senses in certain specific conditions.
 +
 
 +
==== b. Dialectical relationship between Essence and Phenomenon ====
 +
 
 +
Essence and Phenomenon both exist objectively as two unified but opposing sides.
 +
 
 +
''The unity between Essence and Phenomenon:'' Essence always manifests through Phenomena, and every Phenomenon is always the manifestation of a specific Essence. There is no pure Essence that exists separately from Phenomena and there is no Phenomenon that does not manifest from any kind of Essence.
 +
 
 +
When Essence changes, Phenomena also change accordingly. When Essence appears, Phenomena also appear, and when Essence disappears, Phenomena also disappear. Therefore, Lenin said: “The Essence appears. The appearance is essential.”<ref>''Philosophical Notebooks'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914–16.</ref>
 +
 
 +
''The Opposition of Essence and Phenomenon'': Essence is that which defines a thing, Phenomenon, or idea, while Phenomena are diversified and conditional. Essence is internal, while Phenomena are external. Essence is relatively stable, while Phenomena continuously change.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 156 ====
 +
 
 +
Essence and Phenomenon are simultaneously unified and opposite because neither can exist without the other, yet they have completely opposite features from one another.
 +
 
 +
Discussing the Essence and Phenomena of physical objects is relatively straight-forward. The Essence will typically encompass the physical object or system itself. For example, a car engine is ''essentially'' a machine; that is to say, the synthesis of all the internal aspects (the engine parts) as well as the obvious and stable relations (the relations between the parts of the engine; how they are assembled and work together in the engine system) that define the existence, motion and development of the engine (the way it works) are what ''essentially make it'' a car engine. All of these essential characteristics are internal, relatively stable, and remain the same regardless of the condition of the engine (i.e., they continue to exist whether the engine is turned on, turned off, inoperable, etc.).
 +
 
 +
The Phenomena of the car engine are all the things that we can sense from it, but this can vary a great deal depending on conditions. When the car engine is turned off, it will be silent. It may be cool to the touch. It will be at rest. If the engine is turned on, the parts will move, it will become hot, it will make noise. In some situations it might smoke or even catch on fire. All of these Phenomena are conditional, unstable, and external to the engine itself.
 +
 
 +
With ''ideas'' and abstract thought, Essence and Phenomenon becomes more difficult to determine and analyze. Lenin discussed this in his ''Philosophical Notebooks'', beginning with a quote from Hegel:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Dialectics in general is “the pure movement of thought in Notions“ (i.e., putting it without the mysticism of idealism: human concepts are not fixed but are eternally in movement, they pass into one another, they flow into one another, otherwise they do not reflect living life.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Knowing that Hegel was an idealist, Lenin wanted to strip all idealism from his conception of dialectics, and thus made it clear that “the pure movement of thought” simply refers to the fact that human thoughts are constantly changing, always in motion, within the living human mind, writing:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The analysis of concepts, the study of them, the “art of operating with them” (Engels) always demands study of the movement of concepts, of their interconnection, of their mutual transitions).
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
This is a description of materialist dialectical analysis of human thought. We must understand that human thoughts are always in motion, always developing, and always mutually impacting other thoughts.
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
In particular, dialectics is the study of the opposition of the Thing-in-itself, of the essence, substratum, substance — from the appearance, from “Being-for-Others.” (Here, too, we see a transition, a flow from the one to the other: the essence appears. The appearance is essential.) Human thought goes endlessly deeper from appearance to essence, from essence of the first order, as it were, to essence of the second order, and so on without end.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
This is where Lenin introduces the concept of Essence and Phenomenon (or “appearance,” as Lenin puts it) as simultaneously oppositional and in unity. Essence refers to the qualities and nature of the “thing-in-itself” (its internal components, relations, etc.) while Phenomena represents “being-for-others” (that which external observers can sense or witness of a subject). However, as Lenin notes, Essence and Phenomena have a dialectical relationship with each other — a “flow from the one to the other.” The Essence “appears” by exuding Phenomena which we can sense.
 +
 
 +
Conscious thoughts also have Essence and Phenomena of their own. With thought, the development from Essence to Phenomena is constant and inevitable. The Essence of each thought leads to thought-Phenomena which develop in turn into the Essence of new thoughts in a constant flow.
 +
 
 +
In this sense, Essence and Phenomenon of abstract thought is somewhat different from Essence and Phenomenon of physical objects, but physical objects can have this same dialectical pattern of development. For example, the emissions from the engine of a car can be considered Phenomena of the engine, but as these Phenomena build up in the air (along with the emissions from many other cars), they can develop into a physical subject with a new Essence of its own, which we call “air pollution.”
 +
 
 +
We can also think of the light which comes from the sun. The light itself can be thought of as Phenomena of the sun, but the light energy can be captured by a solar panel and converted into energy, creating a new subject with its own Essence which we would describe as “solar energy.” In this sense, it is possible for Phenomena to have Phenomena. If you witness light waves in the desert which cause an optical illusion, then the illusion is a Phenomenon of the light waves (the light waves being the Essence which exuded the Phenomenon of illusion), and the light waves are the Phenomena of the sun (the essential subject which exudes the Phenomena of the light waves).
 +
 
 +
Essence and Phenomena can also be contextual. In some contexts, physical objects which have their own Essence (and Phenomena) may be the Phenomena of some other entity. For example, archaeologists can’t observe prehistoric civilizations directly. They can only study the things which are left behind. In this sense, we can think of an archaeological artifact, like a stone tool, as a Phenomenon of a prehistoric civilization. The tool has its own Essence and Phenomena, but it is also itself a Phenomenon. A single stone tool can’t tell archaeologists much about an ancient civilization, however, archaeologists can gather many Phenomena (tools, structural ruins, nearby animal bones and seeds, human remains, etc.) to look for patterns which reveal more insights about the Essence of the prehistoric civilization which exuded those Phenomena.
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Dialectics in the proper sense is the study of contradiction in the very essence of objects: not only are appearances transitory, mobile, fluid, demarcated only by conventional boundaries, but the essence of things is so as well.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Lenin, here, points out that proper analysis hinges on understanding the ''Essence'' of a subject, since the Phenomena are fleeting and subject to change. Most notably, we should look for ''contradictions'' within the subject (see ''Definition of Contradiction and Common Characteristics of Contradiction'', p. 175), because contradictions are what drive dialectical development of a subject over time.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
 +
 
 +
If we want to be accurately aware of things, phenomena, and ideas, we must not just stop at studying their Phenomena, we have to study their Essence. Only through examining many Phenomena of a subject can we fully and correctly understand the Essence of said subject.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 157 ====
 +
 
 +
With physical objects, we must study the Phenomena to know anything about a subject, since Phenomena is, by definition, that which we can observe. Only through systematic, repeated observations can we come to understand the Essence of the object which exudes the Phenomena. Because Phenomena can change based on conditions, we must observe Phenomena under various conditions in a systematic way. This is the basis of all scientific inquiry.
 +
 
 +
This is also true for analyzing aspects of human society. To understand a social system, we must observe its Phenomena systematically over time and look for patterns which form under various conditions. We must also keep in mind that social systems develop and change over time, and so the Essence might develop with or without changes in certain Phenomena. For example, the phenomena of the United States of America have changed significantly over the years. The national flag, military uniforms, seals, and other iconography have changed throughout the history of the USA. Similarly, there have been many presidents, and the government and constitution have also been through many changes. That said, the essential nature of the USA’s political economy has not changed significantly since its foundation; the USA has been a capitalist bourgeois democracy since the beginning and remains so to this day. Regardless of which bourgeois-dominated political party holds power in the white house and congress — Whig, Republican, Democrat, or otherwise — the essential nature of the USA as a capitalist bourgeois democracy has remained the same.
 +
 
 +
According to Lenin: “Human thought goes endlessly deeper from appearance to essence, from essence of the first order, as it were, to essence of the second order, and so on, ''without end.''”<ref>''Philosophical Notebooks'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914–16.</ref> On the other hand, Essence is what defines a thing, phenomenon, or idea. Therefore, in our perception and practice, we must recognize a thing, phenomenon, or idea based on its Essence, not its Phenomena, to evaluate it correctly, and after that, we can make fundamental improvements.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 158 ====
 +
 
 +
For example: Thousands of years ago, people observed that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west everyday. Based on these Phenomena, many human civilizations developed the belief that the Essence of our solar system was that the earth was the center of the universe and the sun rotated around it. Today, thanks to scientific observation and practice, we have proven that the sun is the center of the solar system and that the earth is rotating around it, which is totally opposite to what many believed hundreds of years ago. In this case, the initially observed Phenomena were misleading, and it was only by getting a better grasp of the essential nature of the solar system that we could better comprehend its functioning.
 +
 
 +
It is usually easy to observe Phenomena (since they are defined by being observable) but it’s also easy to misunderstand relationships between Essence and Phenomena. Sometimes people get a false perception of Essence from real Phenomena, such as believing the Sun revolves around the Earth. Sometimes people attribute the wrong Phenomena to Essences as well, such as believing that all poor people are lazy.
 +
 
 +
Phenomena can easily be mistaken for essence. For example, bourgeois liberal political parties often portray themselves as being pro-worker and therefore exhibit phenomena such as rhetoric, slogans, propaganda, and even platform positions which appeal to workers. These phenomena may confuse many into believing that they are workers’ parties when, in reality, they are essentially dominated by the capitalist class. The reverse can also occur. For example, workers may be fooled into believing that a ruthless capitalist politician or celebrity is “working class at heart,” falsely believing that the capitalist’s class position is merely a phenomenon when in fact it is essential.
 +
 
 +
Understanding true Essence based on real Phenomena is one of the most important aspects of analysis. It is the primary realm of science. In politics, misunderstanding or mischaracterizing Essence and Phenomena can reinforce false beliefs about the way society works which can lead to promulgation of dangerous and reactionary ideologies like neoliberalism and fascism amidst the working class. For this reason, we must avoid examining Phenomena alone. We have to dive deep to discover and understand the essential nature of things, phenomena, and ideas in our analysis.
 +
 
 +
=== 6. Possibility and Reality ===
 +
 
 +
==== a. Categories of Possibility and Reality ====
 +
 
 +
The ''Possibility'' category refers to things that have not happened nor existed in reality yet, but that would happen, or would exist given necessary conditions.
 +
 
 +
The ''Reality'' category refers to things that exist or have existed in reality and in human thought.
 +
 
 +
==== b. Dialectical Relationship Between Possibility and Reality ====
 +
 
 +
Possibility and Reality have a unified and inseparable relationship: Possibility can transform into Reality and Reality contains new Possibility; any given Possibility, under specific conditions, can transform into Reality.
 +
 
 +
Given specific conditions, there could be one or many possibilities for the development of any given thing, phenomenon, or idea: practical Possibility, random Possibility, obvious Possibility, abstract Possibility, near Possibility, far Possibility, etc.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 159 ====
 +
 
 +
'''Excerpt From Marxism-Leninism Textbook of Students Who Specialize in Marxism-Leninism'''
 +
 
 +
''Editor’s notes in [brackets]''
 +
 
 +
Reality has many aspects. It also has many tendencies of development. These aspects and tendencies of Reality have different roles and positions in the development process of Reality. For example, manifesting any given Possibility into Reality requires us to change a specific subject from one status to a different status. Some subjects are easier to transform and others are more difficult to transform. Some require us to change quality, others only require quantity changes [see Annotation 117, p. 119].
 +
 
 +
Because Reality has many aspects and tendencies of development, it is useful to classify Possibility. There are at least four types of Possibility, in two separate categories.
 +
 
 +
[The categorization below draws a distinction between the ''obvious'' and the ''practical.''
 +
 
 +
The ''obvious'' is that which will ''certainly'' occur. If you drop an object, it will ''obviously'' fall. The ''practical'' is that which we ''certainly could make occur'' through human will. If you are holding an object, you could ''practically'' drop it.]
 +
 
 +
'''Obvious Possibility and Random Possibility''' [see: Obviousness and Randomness, p. 144].
 +
 
 +
''Obvious Possibility'' refers to Possibility that ''will'' happen, because conditions to make it happen are set in place so that the Possibility developing into Reality is unavoidable.
 +
 
 +
[If the conditions arise for a hurricane to form, it eventually becomes ''obvious'' that a hurricane will form.]
 +
 
 +
''Random Possibility'' is Possibility which may or may not happen depending on how external factors develop, our actions, the actions of others, etc. [Whether or not a hurricane may develop on any given day is, from our human perspective, random, since we do not have any technology to cause or prevent the development of hurricanes. Other events may be more or less random. We can, for instance, ''prepare'' for an incoming hurricane to minimize the risk of harm to human communities.]
 +
 
 +
Second, based on the practical relationships between subjects, we have:
 +
 
 +
'''Practical Possibility vs. Abstract Possibility:'''
 +
 
 +
''Practical Possibility'' means that conditions in Reality which ''could'' make something happen are already in place. [If you have all the ingredients, knowledge, and equipment needed to make a pie, you ''could'' make a pie. The material conditions are in place.]
 +
 
 +
''Abstract Possibility'' is Possibility which may become Reality in the future but the conditions which would make this Possibility become Reality have not yet developed.
 +
 
 +
[It is an abstract Possibility that you ''could'' make a pie, even if you don’t have the tools, ingredients, or knowledge. It is possible, in the abstract, that you could buy the ingredients and equipment and learn the necessary skills to make a pie. ''Near Possibility'' simply refers to Possibility which may become Reality in the shorter term, ''far Possibility'' refers to things which may happen in a more distant future, relative to the subject being discussed.]
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
In social life, in order to transform a Possibility into Reality, there must be objective conditions and subjective factors. Subjective factors include the ability of humans to change Possibility into Reality. Objective conditions refer to the situations needed to make such a change occur. [In other words, humans are able to ''subjectively'' change possibility into reality, but only when the ''objective'' circumstances exist in the external world.]
 +
 
 +
==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
 +
 
 +
We must base our perception and practice on Reality.
 +
 
 +
Lenin said: “Marxism takes its stand on the facts, and not on possibilities. A Marxist must, as the foundation of his policy, put [forth] ''only'' precisely and unquestionably demonstrated ''facts''.”<ref>''To N. D. Kiknadze'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, written after November 5, 1916.</ref>
 +
 
 +
However, in our perception and practice, we also need to comprehensively recognize possibilities which could arise from Reality. This will allow us to develop methods of practical operation which are suitable to changes and developments which might occur. We must actively make use of subjective factors in perception and practice to turn Possibility into Reality whenever it would serve our purposes.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 160 ====
 +
 
 +
This idea is perhaps best exemplified in the traditional Vietnamese proverb: “you can’t just open your mouth and wait for fruit to drop into your mouth.” We have to actively apply our will, through practice and labor, to develop the best possibilities into manifested Reality. See more about subjective factors in Annotation 207, p. 202.
 +
 
 +
== IV. Basic Laws of Materialist Dialectics ==
 +
 
 +
''Laws'' are the regular, common, obvious, natural, and objective relations between internal aspects, factors, and attributes of a thing or phenomenon or between things and phenomena.
 +
 
 +
There are many types of laws in this world and they all have different prevalence, reach, characteristics, and roles in regard to the motion and development processes of things and phenomena in nature, society, and human thought. So, it is necessary to classify different laws for humans to understand and apply them effectively into practical activities. Classifying laws based on prevalence, we have: private laws, common laws, and universal laws [see: ''Private and Common'', p. 128].
 +
 
 +
''Private laws'' are laws that only apply to a specific range of things and phenomena. For example: laws of mechanical motion, laws of chemical motion, laws of biological motion, etc.
 +
 
 +
''Common laws'' are laws that apply to a broader range of subjects than ''private laws,'' and they impact many different subjects. For instance: the law of preservation of mass, the law of preservation of energy, etc.
 +
 
 +
''Universal laws'' are laws that impact every aspect of nature, society, and human thought. Materialist dialectics is the study of these universal laws.
 +
 
 +
If we classify laws based on the ''reach of impact'', we will have three main groups: laws of nature, laws of society, and laws of human thought.
 +
 
 +
''Laws of nature'' are laws that arise in the natural world, including within the human body. They are not products of human conscious activities.
 +
 
 +
''Laws of society'' are the laws of human activity in social relations; these laws only apply to the conscious activities of humans, yet they are still objective.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 161 ====
 +
 
 +
We have already discussed how relations between human beings are objective [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. By extension, the human relations which compose human societies are objective, and thus, any laws which govern objective human relations must also be objective.
 +
 
 +
Marx’s assertion that human social relations are objective is critical to understanding his work. Marx pointed out that social relations may not be “physical,” in the sense that they can’t be observed directly with human senses, but that they still have an ''objective character'' — they exist externally to a given subject, and they have objective impacts on reality. For instance, the class relations between the capitalist class and the working class result in objective manifestations in reality, such as wealth accumulation, modes of circulation, etc.
 +
 
 +
''Laws of human thought'' are laws of the intrinsic relationships between concepts, categories, judgments, inference, and the development process of human rational awareness.
 +
 
 +
As the science of common relations and development, materialist dialectics studies the ''universal laws'' that influence the entire natural world, human society, and human thought, all together as a whole.
 +
 
 +
These universal laws are:
 +
 
 +
* The law of transformation between quantity and quality.
 +
* The law of unification and contradiction between opposites.
 +
* The law of negation of negation.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 162 ====
 +
 
 +
Each of these laws is considered ''universal'' because they apply to all things, phenomena, and ideas, and all the internal and external relations thereof, in human perception and practice. All things, phenomena, and ideas change and develop as a result of mutual impacts and relationships in accordance with these universal laws. On a fundamental level, materialist dialectics is the study of these universal laws and their utility.
 +
 
 +
=== 1. Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality ===
 +
 
 +
The law of transformation between quantity and quality is a universal law which concerns the universal mode of motion and development processes of nature, society, and human thought.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 163 ====
 +
 
 +
Remember that mode refers to ''how'' something exists, functions, and develops [see Annotation 60, p. 59]. The universal mode of motion and development processes thus refers to ''how'' all things, ideas, and phenomena move, change, and develop.
 +
 
 +
Friedrich Engels defined the law of transformation between quantity and quality in ''Dialectics of Nature'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy).
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
In other words, ''quantitative'' changes of things, phenomena, and ideas lead to ''quality'' shifts.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
The universal mode of motion and development processes follows the law of transformation between quantity and quality, which states:
 +
 
 +
Qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of the quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and, ideas; and, vice versa: quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 164 ====
 +
 
 +
Put simply: quantity changes develop into quality changes, and quality changes lead to quantity changes [see Annotation 117, p. 119]. We say that these changes to quantity and quality occur on the “inevitable basis” of one another because quality changes always, invariably, arise from quantity changes, and, likewise, quantity changes always, invariably, arise from quality changes.
 +
 
 +
Just as quantity shifts lead to quality shifts, it is also true that quality shifts lead to quantity shifts. For example, if you have 11 donuts, then add 1 donut, you now have ''1 dozen'' donuts. If you add 12 more donuts, you would then have ''2 dozen''.
 +
 
 +
Another example of quality shift leading to quantity shift would be a pond filling with rain water. Once enough drops of water collect and the pond is considered full — that is to say, once it is considered to be “a pond” of water — we will no longer think of the pond in terms of “drops.” We would think of the pond as “filled,” “overfilled,” “underfilled,” etc.
 +
 
 +
Note that both of these examples are related to our human perceptions and understanding of the material world. The material world does not change based on our perceptions, nor how we classify the quantity or quality of a given subject. There are also objective aspects related to quality shifts leading to quantity shifts. For example, if we adjust the quantity of the temperature of a sheet of paper to the point of burning, and the paper burns, then the quantity of paper would be reduced from one sheet to zero sheets. In other words, the quality shift arising from temperature quantity increase (i.e., the paper burning into ash) results in a quantity shift in how many pieces of paper exist (from one sheet to zero sheets). However, even this is ultimately a subjective assessment rooted in human consciousness, since we subjectively think in terms of “sheets of paper,” and the concept of a “sheet of paper” is essentially a classification rooted in human consciousness. It is merely an abstract way of perceiving and considering the quantity and quality of the material subject which we think of as “paper.”
 +
 
 +
The law of transformation between quantity and quality is an inevitable, objective, and universal relationship that repeats in every motion and development process of all things, phenomena, and ideas in nature, human society, and human thought.
 +
 
 +
==== a. Definitions of Quality and Quantity ====
 +
 
 +
''- Definition of Quality''
 +
 
 +
''Quality'' refers to the organic unity which exists amongst the component parts of a thing, phenomenon, or idea that distinguishes it from other things, phenomena, and ideas.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 165 ====
 +
 
 +
Note: we have already given basic definitions of quantity and quality in Annotation 117, p. 119. What follows are more comprehensive philosophical definitions of quality and quantity. Our world exists as one continuity of matter. All things and phenomena in our universe exist essentially as one unified system — namely, the entity which we call “the universe.” This unified nature of existence is extremely difficult for human beings to comprehend. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel pointed out that, in this sense, the unity of “pure being” is indistinguishable from “nothingness.” In ''Science of Logic'', Hegel noted that if we try to comprehend pure material existence, as a whole, without distinguishing any component thing or phenomenon from any other, then all is incomprehensible. Human consciousness needs to delineate and distinguish the component parts of this unified system from each other in order to make sense of it all.
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Pure light and pure darkness are two voids which are the same thing. Something can be distinguished only in determinate light or darkness... [F]or this reason, it is only darkened light and illuminated darkness which have within themselves the moment of difference and are, therefore, determinate being.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
The human mind has evolved to perceive various things, phenomena, and ideas as ''differentiated''. Quality is the basis on which we perceive subjects as distinct from one another. Every thing, phenomenon, and idea is composed of internal components and relations. The unity of these internal components and relations is what we refer to as ''quality''. For example, a human being’s ''quality'' refers to the unity of all the internal components and relationships of which the human being is composed (i.e., the cells, organs, blood, etc., as well as the thoughts, memories, etc., which make the human) ''in unity''. Quality is also a subjective phenomenon: a ''reflection'' of the material world in human consciousness [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. Therefore we may conceive of various qualities for the same subject. We can think of 12 donuts as “a box of donuts,” “a dozen donuts,” or as 12 individual donuts. We could consider a building as “one apartment building” or “forty apartments,” depending on the viewpoint of analysis.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
So, objective and inherent attributes form the quality of things, phenomena, and ideas, but we must not confuse quality and attribute with one another. Every thing, phenomenon, and idea has both fundamental and non-fundamental attributes. Only fundamental attributes constitute the quality of things, phenomena and ideas. When the fundamental attributes change, the quality also changes. The distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental attributes of things, phenomena, and ideas must depend on the purpose of the analysis; the same attribute may be fundamental when analyzing with one purpose but non-fundamental when analyzing with another purpose.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 166 ====
 +
 
 +
Whether or not an attribute is considered “fundamental” depends entirely on conscious perspective. For example, one baker may consider chocolate chips to be “fundamental” for baking cookies while another baker may not. This subjective characteristic of what might be considered “fundamental” or not is reflected in how we consider quality. If you are trying to determine how much water you need to fill a swimming pool, you may think of a pool in terms of size (i.e., “this is an Olympic sized pool”), but if you just want to go for a swim, you are likely to just think in terms of the water level (i.e., “the pool is empty, we can’t swim”).
 +
 
 +
If you are planning the construction of a school and want to know how many classrooms it will need, you might think in terms of “classrooms of students.” But if you are considering funding for a school year, you might consider the ''total number of students''.
 +
 
 +
The quality of a thing, phenomenon, or idea is determined by the qualities of its component parts.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 167 ====
 +
 
 +
Qualities are composed of qualities, combined, in unity. “A swimming pool” may consist of a certain amount of concrete in a specific configuration combined with 5,000 gallons of water. A car may be composed of a body, an engine, four tires, etc. Each individual component exists as a quality — a unity of component attributes — in and of itself.
 +
 
 +
Quality is also determined by the structures and connections between component parts which manifest in specific relations. Therefore, distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental attributes is also relative.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 168 ====
 +
 
 +
It’s not just the component parts of a subject which define its quality, but also the relations of those component parts. For instance, a quantity of wood and nails configured in one set of structural relations may have the quality of a chair, whereas the same component parts arranged with different structures and relations may have the quality of a table. In this sense, quality can be thought of as a synthesis of the Content and Form [see ''Content and Form'', p. 147] of a thing, phenomenon, or idea from a certain perspective.
 +
 
 +
For example, if we see two shoes, we may think of each shoe as an individual qualitative object (two shoes). On the other hand, we may think of the shoes, together, as a single qualitative “object” in terms of its utility and in terms of synthesis of content and form (“a pair of shoes”), so much so that if one shoe is lost then the remaining shoe is considered useless and discarded as trash.
 +
 
 +
Because there are countless ways in which quality — the configuration and relations and composition of constituent parts of any given subject — can manifest, we must recognize that quality itself, based on the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental attributes, is a relative and subjective phenomenon of human consciousness.
 +
 
 +
Any given subject will have multiple qualities, depending on the relations which exist between and within that subject and other subjects.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 169 ====
 +
 
 +
Any thing, phenomenon, or idea may be perceived from various different perspectives which would cause us to consider it as having different qualities. A single shoe may be considered as: a shoe, 3 pounds of leather, half of a pair, etc., depending on its internal and external relations and the perspective of the person considering the shoe.
 +
 
 +
We can’t consider things, phenomena, and ideas apart from quality. Quality exhibits a subject’s relative stability.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 170 ====
 +
 
 +
Remember that ''quality'' is the way in which the human mind conceives of the world as a collection of distinct things, phenomena, and ideas. These perceptions of quality are purely relative, but they are important, because they are what allow us to develop an understanding of the complicated system of things, phenomena, and ideas which make up our universe. In our perception, quality represents the relative stability of a thing, phenomenon, or idea which makes it a subject that we can consider and analyze in and of itself. Understanding how we distinguish between different subjects is crucial in developing a scientific understanding of the world which is rooted in observation and practice.
 +
 
 +
''- Definition of Quantity''
 +
 
 +
''Quantity'' refers to the amount or extent of specific attributes of a thing, phenomenon, or idea, including but not limited to:
 +
 
 +
* The amount of component parts.
 +
* Scale or size.
 +
* Speed or rhythm of motion.
 +
 
 +
A thing, phenomenon, or idea can have many quantities, with each quantity determined by different criteria. [i.e., a car may be measured by many criteria of quantity, such as: length in meters, weight in kilograms, speed in kilometers per hour, etc.]
 +
 
 +
Quality and quantity embody two different aspects of the same subject. Both quality and quantity exist objectively [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. However, the distinction between “quality” and “quantity” in the process of perceiving things, phenomena, and ideas has only relative significance: an attribute may be considered “quantity” from one perspective but “quality” from another perspective.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 171 ====
 +
 
 +
If you are filling a box with a dozen donuts, then once you add the 12<sup>th</sup> donut, one “dozen” may represent the ''quality'' which you seek. From the perspective of a customer buying donuts for a party, “dozen” may represent the “quantity.” In other words, you need to make an ''order'' (quality) of ''three dozen donuts'' (quantity). And the manager of the store, at the end of the day, may tally ''twenty'' ''orders'' (quantity) as the day’s ''sales goal'' (quality). Quantity and quality, therefore, are both considered ''relatively'', based on perspective and the purpose of analysis at hand.
 +
 
 +
==== b. Dialectical Relationship Between Quantity and Quality ====
 +
 
 +
Every thing, phenomenon, and idea exists as a unity of two aspects: quality and quantity. Quantity and quality do not exist separate from one another. Quantity and quality dialectically and mutually impact one other. Changes in quantity lead to changes in quality. However, not every change in quantity will cause a change in quality.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 172 ====
 +
 
 +
In order for quantity change to lead to quality change, a certain amount must be met.
 +
 
 +
This amount is called the ''threshold'', which is explained further below in this section. A threshold may be exact and known (i.e., it takes exactly 12 donuts to make a dozen donuts) or it may be relative and unknown (i.e., a certain quantity of air inflated into a balloon may cause it to burst, but the exact, specific quantity of air may be relative to other factors such as air temperature and may be unknown to the observer until the balloon actually bursts).
 +
 
 +
With any given subject, there will be a range of quantity changes which can accumulate without leading to change in quality. This range is called the ''quantity range''.
 +
 
 +
''Quantity range'' is defined as a relationship between quantity and quality: the range of intervals in which the change in quantity does not substantially change the quality of a given subject. Within the limits of a quantity range, the subject retains the same quality.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 173 ====
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-56.png|''The quantity range is a range of quantities between quality shifts.'']]
 +
 
 +
Quantity range can be thought of as the range of quantities which exists between thresholds. For instance, between the qualities of “''one donut''” and “''one dozen donuts'',” there is a quantity range of 10 donuts (2 donuts through 11 donuts) which can be added before the quality shifts to “''one dozen donuts''.” You can keep adding additional donuts, up to the quantity of 11 donuts, without reaching the threshold of quality shift to “one dozen donuts.” This is the ''quantity range'' between the qualities of ''donut'' and ''one dozen donuts''. Again, the quantity range is relative to the perspective and the nature of analysis. One person may only be concerned with “dozens of donuts,” while another may consider the quality of “half dozens,” which would consider a quality shift to “one half-dozen donuts” to occur once the sixth donut (quantity) is added.
 +
 
 +
Motion and change usually begins with a change in quantity. When changes in quantity reach a certain amount, quality will also change. The amount, or degree, of quantity change at which quality change occurs is called the ''threshold.''
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 174 ====
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-57.png]]
 +
 
 +
Note that the threshold is an approximate range. At a certain quantity, a glass may be considered “half full” and at another certain quantity, after passing the threshold, the glass will be considered “full,” though there may be a wide range of quantities at which the glass would be considered to have the quality of being “full,” depending on perspective and purpose of analysis.
 +
 
 +
When quantity change meets a threshold, within necessary and specific conditions, quality will change. This change in quality, which takes place in the motion and development process of things, phenomena, and ideas, is called a ''quality shift''.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-58.png|''A quality shift occurs when a quantity changes beyond a threshold, leading to a change in quality.'']]
 +
 
 +
''Quality shifts'' inevitably occur as transformations in the development processes of things, phenomena, and ideas. Qualitative changes can be expressed or manifested through many forms of quality shifts which are determined by the contradictions, characteristics and conditions of a given subject, including such characteristics as: fast or slow, big or small, partial or entire, spontaneous or intentional.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 175 ====
 +
 
 +
Quality shifts are ''inevitable'' because there is no thing, phenomenon, nor idea which can exist statically, forever, without ever undergoing change. Eventually, any given subject will undergo quality shifts, even if such transformation may take millions of years to occur.
 +
 
 +
Quality shifts can take various forms, depending on the nature of internal and external relationships, contradictions, and mutual impacts. For instance, a river may dry up or it may flood depending on internal and external relations and characteristics, but it will not simply flow at the same level forever without ever undergoing any quality shifts.
 +
 
 +
The rate and degree of quality shifts can vary considerably based on such internal and external factors, and may be “spontaneous,” that is to say, without human intervention, or may be the result of the intentional, conscious action of human beings.
 +
 
 +
''Quality shifts'' mark the end of one motion period and the start of a new motion period.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 176 ====
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-59.png|''The Quantity Range (A) refers to the range of quantities between two qualities in the process of development. The Quality Shift (B) refers to the point at which quantity accumulates to the point of changing the Quality of the developing subject. The Period of Motion (C) includes both the quantity range and the quality shifts themselves.'']]
 +
 
 +
''Period of motion'' refers to the development which occurs between two quality shifts, including the quality shifts themselves.
 +
 
 +
''Period of motion'' differs from ''quantity range'' because quantity range only includes the range of quantity change which can occur ''between'' quality shifts, without including the quality shifts themselves.
 +
 
 +
For example, a ''period of motion'' for a cup filling with water from a half cup would include all of the change which occurs from the cup being half full to the cup becoming entirely full. The ''quantity range'' of this same process would only include the quantities of water that stand between half-full and full, where the cup is neither considered to be “half full” or “full” but somewhere in between, i.e., between quality shifts.
 +
 
 +
Quality shift represents ''discontinuity'' within the continuous development process of things and phenomena. In the material world, all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly undergoing continuous sequences of quantitative changes leading to quality shifts, creating an endless line of nodes, showing how all things, phenomena, and ideas move and develop to increasingly advanced degrees [see illustration on p. 121 for a visualization of this “endless line of nodes”].
 +
 
 +
As Friedrich Engels summarised: “merely quantitative changes beyond a certain point pass into qualitative differences.”<ref>''Anti-Dühring'', Friedrich Engels, 1878.</ref>
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 177 ====
 +
 
 +
Processes of change and development in our universe are continuously ongoing. Whenever a quality shift occurs, it represents a brief ''discontinuity'' in the sense that we perceive a definite and ''distinct'' transformation from one thing, phenomenon, or idea into another; in other words, we can ''distinguish'' between the mode of existence of the thing, phenomenon, or idea before and after the quality shift.
 +
 
 +
Take, for example, the “lifespan” of a house. A human being could easily distinguish between the empty land which exists before the house is built, the construction site which exists as it’s being built, and the house itself once construction is completed. In reality, this process of change is continuous, but to our human perception, each quality shift represents a definite and distinct period of change and discontinuity in terms of our perception of the “thing” which is the house.
 +
 
 +
This is related to the ''historic perspective'' of things, phenomena, and ideas, in which we recognize the continuity of existence between different stages of development of things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 201, p. 195].
 +
 
 +
When a quality shift occurs, there is an impact on the quantity. Quality impacts quantity in a number of ways, including [but not limited to]:
 +
 
 +
* Changing the structure, scale, or level of the subject.
 +
* Changing the rhythm or speed of the motion and development of the subject.
 +
 
 +
''In summary,'' dialectical unity between quantity and quality exists in every thing, phenomenon, and idea. A gradual quantitative change [through the ''quantity range''] will eventually meet the ''threshold'', which will inevitably lead to a qualitative change through ''quality shift''. Simultaneously, the new quality will mutually impact the quantity, causing new quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas. This process takes place continuously, forming the fundamental and universal mode of movement and development processes of all things, phenomena, and ideas.
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 178 ====
 +
 
 +
Transformation between quantity and quality is the mode of movement and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas, because it reflects the way in which human consciousness perceives movement and development.
 +
 
 +
So, it is important to understand that there is no ''material manifestation'' of quantity and quality. They are simply mental constructs which reflect the ways in which we observe and understand change, motion, and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. Transformation processes in the material world are fully fluid and continuous, but our consciousness perceives change in ''stages of development''. Quality simply reflects how we distinguish one subject from another subject, as well as how we recognize the transformation process (and stages of development) of a single subject over time.
 +
 
 +
There is no specific point, metaphysically distinct point at which a “puppy” becomes an “adult dog,” but human beings will distinguish between a puppy and an adult dog, or recognize at a certain point that a puppy has “become” an adult dog, based on observation of quality.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-60.png|''Quality refers to the differences which are distinguished in human consciousness between one subject and another, or changes in a subject’s form over time.'']]
 +
 
 +
There is no metaphysically distinct point at which a “puppy” becomes an “adult dog,” but human beings will distinguish between a puppy and an adult dog, or recognize at a certain point that a puppy has “become” an adult dog, based on observation of quality. We create categories which reflect quality to organize and systematically understand the world around us, and to distinguish between different subjects, and to distinguish between different stages of development of a given subject.
 +
 
 +
We can also distinguish differences of quality between different subjects: we can distinguish a cat from a dog, and we can distinguish one dog from another dog. These distinguishing attributes constitute differences in quality. Note that this conception of differentiation of things, phenomena, and ideas into qualities which constantly change and develop over time is fundamentally distinct from ''metaphysical'' categorization, which seeks to divide all things, phenomena, and ideas into static, perpetually unchanging categories (see Annotation 8, p. 8).
 +
 
 +
Distinction within the human mind is reflected in the concept of quantity and quality. If we do not observe quality differences between subjects, then we would not be able to distinguish between different subjects at all. If we could not recognize the quality shifts of any given subject, then we would not be aware of change or motion at all.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
 +
 
 +
Every thing, phenomenon and idea has characteristics of quality and quantity which mutually impact and transform one another. Therefore, in perception and practice, we need to understand and take into account the law of transformation between quantity and quality in order to have a comprehensive viewpoint of things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 114, p. 116].
 +
 
 +
Quantitative changes of things, phenomena and ideas inevitably lead to qualitative changes in all things, phenomena, and ideas. Therefore, in our perception and practice, as we plan and enact change in our world and in human society, it is necessary to gradually accumulate changes in quantity in order to make changes in quality. At the same time, we must recognize and make use of the fact that quality shifts also lead to changes in quantity.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 179 ====
 +
 
 +
We have to understand and utilize the law of transformation between quantity and quality in our activities. For instance, if a group of activists hopes to address hunger in their community, they have to realize that they can’t immediately enact a quality shift which solves the entire problem of hunger across the city instantaneously. Instead, the activists must recognize that quantity shifts lead to quality shifts through stages of development. In planning and acting, they may need to set certain development targets, predict thresholds at which quality shifts will occur, etc.
 +
 
 +
For instance, the first goal for these activists may be to provide free lunches to houseless people in a particular park every weekend. If they can accomplish this, then they will not have completely eliminated hunger in the city, but they will have reached a threshold — a quality shift — in that nobody in that specific park will be hungry at lunch time on weekends. From there, they can continue to build quality shifts through accumulation of changes in quantity, one stage of development at a time.
 +
 
 +
Quality shifts leading to quantity shifts must also be recognized and utilized in our planning and activities. For example, once an effective strategy is developed for eliminating hunger in one park through quantity changes leading to quality shifts, this strategy can then be implemented in other parks. Thus the quality shift of “eliminating hunger in one park” can lead to a quantity shift: “eliminating hunger in two parks, three parks, etc.,” until the quantity shift of “eliminating hunger in parks” leads to the quality shift of “eliminating hunger in all the parks in the city.” This entire process of enacting quantity changes to lead to quality shifts, and accumulating quality shifts to change quantity, are all focused toward the ultimate goal of achieving the quality shift of “eliminating hunger in the entire city.”
 +
 
 +
In short, it’s vital for us to understand the ways in which quantity and quality mutually impact each other so that we can formulate plans and activities which will lead to motion and development which accomplish our goals, step by step, through one stage of development at a time.
 +
 
 +
Changes in quantity can only lead to changes in quality provided the quantity accumulates to a certain threshold. Therefore, in practice, we need to overcome impatient, left-sided thought. Left-sided thinking refers to thinking which is overly subjective, idealistic, ignorant of the laws which govern material reality. Left-sided thinking neglects to acknowledge the necessity of quantity accumulation which precedes shifts in quality, focusing instead on attempting to perform continuous shifts in quality.
 +
 
 +
On the other hand, we must also recognize that once change in quantity has reached a threshold, it is ''inevitable'' that a quality shift will take place. Therefore, we need to overcome conservative and right-sided thought in practical work. Right-sided thinking is the expression of conservative, stagnant thought that resists or refuses to recognize quality shifts even as changes in quantity come to meet the threshold of quality shift.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 180 ====
 +
 
 +
“Right-sided thinking” and “left-sided thinking” are Vietnamese political concepts which are rooted in the ideas of Lenin’s book: ''Leftwing Communism: an Infantile Disorder''. In Vietnamese political philosophy, “left-sided thinking” is a form of dogmatic idealism which upholds unrealistic conceptions of change and development. Left-sided thinkers don’t have the patience for quantity accumulation which are prerequisite to quality shifts, or expect to skip entire stages of development which are necessary to precipitate change in the real world. An example of left-sided thinking would be believing that a capitalist society can ''instantly'' transition into a stateless, classless, communist society, skipping over the transitions in quantity and quality which are required to bring such a massive transformation in human society to fruition.
 +
 
 +
“Right-sided thinking,” on the other hand, is conservate resistance to change. Right-sided thinkers resist quality changes to human society; they either want to preserve society as it exists right now, or reverse development to some previous (real or imagined) stage of development. Right-sided thinkers also refuse to acknowledge quality shifts once they’ve occurred, idealistically pretending that changes in material conditions have not occurred. For example, right-sided thinkers may refuse to recognize advances which have been made in the liberation of women, or even attempt to reverse those advances in hopes of returning to previous stages of development when women had fewer freedoms. Here is a practical example of these concepts in use, from the ''Vietnam Encyclopedia'', published by the Ministry of Culture and Information of Vietnam:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Opportunism is a system of political views that do not follow a clear direction nor a clear line, do not have a definite stance, and are inclined toward the immediate personal gain of the opportunist. In the proletarian revolutionary movement, opportunism is a politics of compromise, reform, and unprincipled collaboration with the enemy which run contrary to the basic interests of the working class and the working people. In practice, opportunism has two main trends, stemming from right-sided thinking and from left-sided thinking, respectively:
 +
 
 +
Right-wing opportunism is reformist, favors undue compromise, and aims to peacefully “convert” capitalism into socialism while abandoning the struggle for meaningful victory of the working class. Right-wing opportunism, typified by Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky, has its origins in the Workers’ Parties of the Second International era and exists to this day.
 +
 
 +
Left-wing opportunism is a mixture of extremism and adventurism, dogmatism, arrogance, subjectivity, cults of violence, and disregard for the objective situation.
 +
 
 +
Both “right” and “left” opportunism push the workers’ movement to futile sacrifice and failure.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Quality shifts are diverse and plentiful, so we need to promote and apply quality shifts creatively and flexibly to suit the specific material conditions we face in a given situation. This is especially true in changing human society, as social development processes depend not only on objective conditions but also on subjective human factors. Therefore, we need to be active and take the initiative to promote the process of converting between quantity and quality in the most effective way.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 181 ====
 +
 
 +
Put simply, we have to use our human will and labor to actively promote quantity changes which lead to quality changes, and quality changes which lead to quantity changes, which move us towards our goal of ending all forms of oppression in human society. This will involve not just objective factors<ref>See Annotation 108, p. 112.</ref> (i.e., material conditions which are necessary to accomplish something), but subjective factors<ref>See Annotation 207, p. 202.</ref> as well (factors which we, as a subject, are capable of impacting directly).
 +
 
 +
=== 2. Law of Unification and Contradiction Between Opposites ===
 +
 
 +
The law of unification and contradiction between opposites is the ''Essence'' of dialectics [see: ''Essence and Phenomenon'', p. 156]. According to Lenin: “In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the Essence of dialectics, but it requires explanations and development.”<ref>''Summary of Dialectics'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.</ref> According to the law of unification and contradiction between opposites, the fundamental, originating, and universal driving force of all motion and development processes is the inherent and objective contradiction which exists in all things, phenomena, and ideas.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 182 ====
 +
 
 +
In other words, ''contradiction'' (defined further in the next section) is the force which serves as the fundamental, originating, and universal force which drives all motion and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas.
 +
 
 +
Contradiction is a ''fundamental driving force'' because it is the most basic driving force which all other forms of motion and development are based upon.
 +
 
 +
Contradiction is the ''originating driving force'' because all motion and development arises from contradiction.
 +
 
 +
Contradiction is the ''universal driving force'' because ''all'' things, phenomena, and ideas — without exception — are driven to motion and development by contradiction.
 +
 
 +
==== a. Definition of Contradiction and Common Characteristics of Contradiction ====
 +
 
 +
''- Definition of Contradiction''
 +
 
 +
In dialectics, the concept of contradiction is used to refer to the relationship, opposition, and transformation between opposites which takes place ''within'' all things, phenomena, and ideas, as well as ''between'' all things, phenomena, and ideas. This dialectical concept of contradiction is fundamentally different from the metaphysical concept of contradiction. The metaphysical concept of contradiction is an illogical conception of opposition without unity and without dialectical transformation between opposites.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 183 ====
 +
 
 +
A contradiction is, fundamentally, just a type of relationship. In a contradictory relationship, two things, phenomena, and/or ideas mutually impact one another, resulting in the eventual ''negation'' of one subject and the ''synthesis'' of the negator and the negated into some new form.
 +
 
 +
The metaphysical concept of contradiction is considered illogical because it establishes no connection between that which is negated and the resulting synthesis.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-61.png|''In the metaphysical conception of contradiction, the negated “disappears” and is not represented in the resulting synthesis.'']]
 +
 
 +
Metaphysical contradiction presents contradicting subjects as isolated from one another and completely distinct, when in reality the relationship between the negated and the negator essentially defines the contradiction. The negated subject is seen as completely negated; that is to say, it is conceived of as essentially “disappearing” into the synthesized result of the contradiction. In this sense, this metaphysical conception of negation is inaccurate in that it is represented as a complete, terminating process.
 +
 
 +
In the above example, once the fox eats the rabbit, the rabbit is considered “gone” after a terminal negation process (see Annotation 196, p. 188) ends the contradiction.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-62.png|''The materialist dialectical conception of contradiction recognizes that contradicting subjects are defined by their relationship and that the synthesis of the contradiction carries forward attributes and characteristics from both the negator and the negated.'']]
 +
 
 +
Materialist dialectical contradiction recognizes that every contradiction is defined by the relationship between the negated and the negator. Materialist dialectics also recognizes that attributes and characteristics of the negated subject are carried forward into the synthesized subject [see Annotation 203, p. 198]. Materialist dialectics also recognizes that contradiction continues indefinitely, as the negated becomes negated again, and so on, continuously, forever [see ''Negation of Negation'', p. 185].
 +
 
 +
In the example on the previous page, the fox consuming the rabbit constitutes a negation process in which the fox takes on characteristics from the rabbit (i.e., nutritional and energy content, any diseases which may be carried forward to the fox, etc.).
 +
 
 +
Contradiction arises from opposition which exists within or between things, phenomena, and ideas. The concept of opposing “sides” refers to such aspects, properties, and tendencies of motion which oppose one another, yet are, simultaneously, conditions and premises of the existence of one another. Examples include:
 +
 
 +
* Negative charge and positive charge within atoms.
 +
* Anabolism and catabolism within living organisms [anabolism refers to the growth and building up of molecules within an organism, while catabolism refers to the digestion and breaking down of molecules within an organism].
 +
* Production and consumption as socioeconomic activities.
 +
* Trial and error which leads to cognitive development.
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 184 ====
 +
 
 +
All of the above forms of contradiction ''drive motion and development''. These processes exist in ''unity and opposition''. For example, in political economics, production is driven by consumption and consumption is facilitated by production. Even though these are fundamentally opposite forces (production adds to the total quantity of products, while consumption reduces the total quantity of products), they can’t exist without one another, and they drive each other forward. This is the dialectical nature of contradiction as the driving force of all motion and development as defined in materialist dialectics.
 +
 
 +
''- The General Properties of Contradictions''
 +
 
 +
Contradiction is objective and universal. According to Friedrich Engels: “If simple mechanical change of position contains a contradiction, this is even more true of the higher forms of motion of matter, and especially of organic life and its development. We saw above that life consists precisely and primarily in this — that a being is at each moment itself and yet something else. Life is therefore also a contradiction which is present in things and processes themselves, and which constantly originates and resolves itself; and as soon as the contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to an end, and death steps in. We likewise saw that also, in the sphere of thought, we could not escape contradictions, and that, for example, the contradiction between man’s inherently unlimited capacity for knowledge and its actual presence only in men who are externally limited and possess limited cognition finds its solution in what is — at least practically, for us — an endless succession of generations, in infinite progress.”<ref>''Anti-Dühring'', Friedrich Engels, 1877.</ref>
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 185 ====
 +
 
 +
Here, Engels is explaining how contradiction is the driving force in both material and conscious processes of motion and development. The process of life is a process of contradiction — all organic life forms must consume organic matter so that they can produce growth and offspring, must produce certain molecules and metabolic processes so that they can consume nutrients, and so on. Once these contradictory processes stop, as Engels says, “death steps in” (though even death is a transition forward).
 +
 
 +
Conscious motion and development are also rooted in contradictory forces. Engels points out the contradiction between humanity’s seemingly infinite capacity for learning with the seemingly infinite amount of knowledge which can be obtained in the world. This great contradiction drives a seemingly endless process of expanding human knowledge, collectively, over countless generations.
 +
 
 +
Contradictions are not only objective and universal, but also diverse and plentiful. The diverse nature of contradictions is evident in the fact that every subject can include many different contradictions and that contradictions manifest differently depending upon specific conditions. Contradictions can hold different positions and roles in the existence, motion, and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. These positions and roles include [but are not limited to]:
 +
 
 +
* Internal and external contradictions
 +
* Fundamental and non-fundamental contradictions
 +
* Primary and secondary contradictions
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 186 ====
 +
 
 +
''Internal'' contradictions are contradictions which exist in the ''internal relations'' of a subject, while ''external'' contradictions exist ''between'' two or more subjects as external relations.
 +
 
 +
For example: a sports team might have ''internal contradictions'' between players, between the players and the coach, between the coach and management, etc. External contradictions might exist between the team and other teams, between the team and league officials, between the team and the landlords who own the team’s practice space, etc.
 +
 
 +
A ''fundamental'' contradiction is a contradiction which defines the Essence of a relationship [see ''Essence and Phenomenon'', p. 156]. Fundamental contradictions exist throughout the entire development process of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea. A ''non-fundamental'' contradiction exists in only one aspect or attribute of a thing, phenomenon, or idea. A non-fundamental contradiction can ''impact'' a subject, but it will not control or decide the essential development of the subject. Whether or not a contradiction is fundamental is relative to the point of view.
 +
 
 +
For example: the ''fundamental contradiction'' of one nation engaged in war against one another might be the war itself. There will exist many other contradictions; one nation at war might have a trade dispute with a third nation which is not participating in the war. From the “war perspective,” this contradiction is ''non-fundamental'', as it does not define the essential characteristic of the nation at war (though from the perspective of a diplomat charged with ending the trade dispute, the war may be seen as a non-fundamental contradiction while the dispute would be seen as fundamental).
 +
 
 +
In the development of things, phenomena, and ideas, there are many development stages. In each stage of development, there will be one contradiction which drives the development process. This is what we call the ''primary'' contradiction. ''Secondary'' contradictions include all the other contradictions which exist during that stage of development. Determining whether a contradiction is primary or secondary is relative: it depends heavily upon the material conditions and the situation.
 +
 
 +
For example: when restoring an old car that doesn’t run any more, a mechanic may consider the ''primary contradiction'' to be the non-functioning engine. There may be many ''secondary contradictions'' which contribute to the problems with the car’s engine problems. The battery may be dead, the spark plugs may need to be bad, the tires may need replacement, the timing belt may be loose, etc. Those are all ''secondary contradictions'' which do not define the stage of development which is “repairing the engine.” Some of these secondary contradictions may need to be resolved (such as replacing the spark plugs) before the primary contradiction can be fully addressed; others, such as a cracked windshield, may not need to be addressed before the primary contradiction can be dealt with.
 +
 
 +
On the other hand, a secondary contradiction may become the primary contradiction: if a mechanic resolves every problem with the engine ''except'' for one bad spark plug, then the bad spark plug will shift from being a secondary contradiction to being the primary contradiction: the bad spark plug is now the primary reason the car won’t start and this stage of development can’t be completed.
 +
 
 +
Within all the various fields of inquiry, there exist contradictions which have a diverse range of different properties and characteristics.
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 187 ====
 +
 
 +
Different fields of study will focus on different forms of contradictions, and any given thing, phenomenon, or idea may contain countless contradictions which can be analyzed and considered for different purposes. For example, consider a large city, which might contain far too many contradictions to count. Civil engineers may focus primarily on contradictions in traffic patterns, the structural integrity of bridges and roads, ensuring that buildings are safe and healthy for inhabitants, etc. Utilities departments will focus on contradictions related to sewage, electrical, and sanitation systems. The education system will focus on contradictions which prevent students from achieving success in schools.
 +
 
 +
All of these various methods of analysis may focus on specific forms of contradictions, though there will also be overlap. For instance, designing a school bus system will require the education system and civil engineers to discover and grapple with contradictions which might be hindrances for transporting students safely to school.
 +
 
 +
==== b. Motion Process of Contradictions ====
 +
 
 +
In every contradiction, the opposing sides are united with each other and opposed to each other at the same time. The concept of “unity between opposites” refers to the fact that a contradiction is a binding, inseparable, and mutually impacting relationship which exists between opposites.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 188 ====
 +
 
 +
Contradictions are ''binding'' and ''inseparable'' because they hold a relationship together. If two opposing things, phenomena, or ideas simply ''separate'', then contradiction, by definition, no longer exists. For example, an economy is bound together by the contradiction of production and consumption; if production exists without consumption (or vice-versa), it can’t be considered to be an economy.
 +
 
 +
Contradictions are said to be ''mutually impacting'' because any time a contradiction exists between two opposing sides, both sides are mutually impacted for as long as the contradiction exists and develops. Of course, it is possible for two opposing sides to separate from one another; for example, a factory which produced buggy whips may have failed to find consumers after the invention of the car. Thus, there would exist a situation in which production exists without consumption. In this situation, the termination of the contradiction between production and consumption leads to a new contradiction: the factory will now be in the midst of a crisis which will require it to either provide a different product or go out of business.
 +
 
 +
Thus we see that production and consumption can’t be separated from one another without leading to a change in the essential nature of the relationship and the opposing subjects, and we see that the opposing sides mutually impact one another (a change in consumption will affect production, and vice-versa).
 +
 
 +
In any given contradictory relationship, each oppositional side is the premise for the other’s existence. Unity among opposites also defines the identity of each opposing side. Lenin wrote: “The identity of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their ‘unity,’—although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense, both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society).”<ref>''On the Questions of Dialectics'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.</ref>
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 189 ====
 +
 
 +
Here, Lenin is explaining that ''identity'' and ''unity'' are (more or less) the same concept when it comes to understanding the nature of contradiction between opposites. In material processes of nature, social processes, and processes of consciousness, we perceive and define oppositional forces by recognizing mutually exclusive and contradictory tendencies within and between things, phenomena, and ideas. In other words, whenever we think of an oppositional relationship, we ''define it'' in terms of the opposition.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-63.png|''War, disease, and economy are all examples of unity in contradiction.'']]
 +
 
 +
When we think of a war, we think of the contradictions which exist ''between'' the opposing nations. When we think of a disease, we define it by the oppositional forces ''between'' the ailment and the human body. When we think of an economy, we think of the oppositional forces of production and consumption ''within'' the economy.
 +
 
 +
In other words, the identity of contradictory relationships is ''defined'' by the ''unity'' of the opposing sides with one another.
 +
 
 +
The concept ''struggle of opposites'' refers to the tendency of opposites to eliminate and negate each other. There exist many diverse forms of struggle between opposites. Struggle can manifest in various forms based on:
 +
 
 +
* The nature of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea.
 +
* Relationships within a thing, phenomenon, or idea (or between things, phenomena, and ideas).
 +
* Specific material conditions [see Annotation 10, p. 10].
 +
 
 +
The process of unity and struggle of opposites inevitably leads to a ''transformation between them''. The transformation between opposites takes place with rich diversity, and such transformations can vary depending on the properties of the opposite sides as well as specific material conditions.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 190 ====
 +
 
 +
Opposing sides, by definition, ''oppose'' one another. If forces or characteristics which exist within or between things, phenomena, or ideas do ''not'' oppose one another, then they are not, by definition, ''opposites''. Thus, it can be understood that opposing sides have a tendency to ''struggle against'' one another. It is this very struggle which defines two sides as opposites, and as contradictory.
 +
 
 +
Lenin explained that some contradicting opposite sides can exist in what he described as ''equilibrium'', but that this is only ever a temporary state of affairs, as exemplified in his article ''An Equilibrium of Forces.''
 +
 
 +
[See Annotation 64, p. 62 for relevant text and more info on equilibrium.]
 +
 
 +
Clearly, Lenin sees that this equilibrium of contradictory forces is not permanently sustainable. Indeed, ''no'' equilibrium of contradictory forces can be permanent. Eventually, one opposing side will overtake the other, and eventually, any given contradiction will result in one opposing side overcoming the other.
 +
 
 +
According to the law of unification and contradiction between opposites, the struggle between two opposing sides is absolute, while the unity between them is relative, conditional, and temporary; in unity there is a struggle: a struggle in unity. According to Lenin: “The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.”<ref>''On the Questions of Dialectics'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.</ref>
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 191 ====
 +
 
 +
“Absolute” and “Relative” are philosophical classifications which refer to interdependence. That which is ''absolute'' exists independently and with permanence. That which is ''relative'' is temporary, and dependent on other conditions or circumstances in order to exist.
 +
 
 +
So Lenin’s point is that ''unity'' exists temporarily in any given pair of opposing sides, as the unity only exists as long as the opposing sides are opposing one another. As soon as one side eliminates or negates the other, the unity subsides. However, ''opposition'' is considered absolute, because it is opposition which drives motion and change in all things, phenomena, and ideas through contradictory processes of opposing sides.
 +
 
 +
In the same text quoted in the passage above, ''On the Questions of Dialectics,'' Lenin notes:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The distinction between subjectivism (skepticism, sophistry, etc.) and dialectics, incidentally, is that in (objective) dialectics the difference between the relative and the absolute is itself relative. For objective dialectics there is an absolute within the relative. For subjectivism and sophistry the relative is only relative and excludes the absolute...
 +
 
 +
Such must also be the method of exposition (i.e., study) of dialectics in general... To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., with any proposition: the leaves of a tree are green; John is a man: Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have dialectics (as Hegel’s genius recognised): the individual is the universal.
 +
 
 +
The individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes) etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs, the concepts of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say: John is a man, Fido is a dog, this is a leaf of a tree, etc., we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
In other words, we must understand that in materialist dialectics, the absolute and the relative exist within one another; in other words, the absolute and the relative have a ''dialectical relationship'' with one another in all things, phenomena, and ideas.
 +
 
 +
''Relative unity'' refers to the nature of ''unity'' between contradictory subjects. Contradictory subjects are ''unified'' in the sense that any given contradiction is essentially defined by the contradiction between two subjects. Thus, the two subjects are ''unified'' in contradiction. However, this unity is ''relative'' in the sense that this unification is temporary (the unity will end upon negation and synthesis) and relative (i.e., defined by the relationship between the two contradicting subjects).
 +
 
 +
''Absolute struggle'' refers to the fact that contradiction, negation, and synthesis will go on forever; in this sense, contradictory processes are ''absolute'' because such struggle exists ''permanently;'' struggle has no set beginning or end point, and exists independently of any specific thing, phenomenon, or idea.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-64.png|''Relative Unity refers to the temporary and relative nature of specific relationships which define and unify specific contradictions; Absolute Struggle refers to the permanent, constant nature of development through contradiction.'']]
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-65.png|''The relationship between relative unity and absolute struggle defines and drives change, motion, and development through contradiction.'']]
 +
 
 +
This applies to contradictions. The ''relative unity'' and the ''absolute struggle'' between opposing sides have a dialectical relationship with one another. The permanent absoluteness of struggle — the fact that all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly undergoing processes of change through contradictory forces — can only manifest in the relative unity of opposing sides, which can only exist through the temporary existence of conditional relations between opposing sides.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
The interaction that leads to the transformation between opposites is a process. At the beginning, contradictions manifest as differences and then develop into two opposing sides. When the two contradictions are fiercely matched and when the conditions are ripe, they will transform each other, and finally, the conflict will be resolved. As old contradictions disappear, new contradictions are formed and the process of mutual impact and transformation between opposites continues, which drives the motion and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas. The relationship, impact and transformation between opposites are the source and driving force of all movement and development in the world. Lenin affirmed: “Development is the ‘struggle’ of opposites.”<ref>''On the Questions of Dialectics'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.</ref>
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 192 ====
 +
 
 +
Any given process of development — that is to say, of transformation or motion — can be seen as a struggle between opposites. Various forms of struggle can exist simultaneously for any given subject, and the way we interpret struggle can depend on our point of view.
 +
 
 +
For an engineer, a car moving along a road might be seen as a struggle between the power generated by the engine against the mass of the car itself and the friction of the tires on the ground. The driver of the car might see the process in terms of the struggle between the driver and the environment as they navigate across town avoiding accidents and following traffic laws.
 +
 
 +
An organism’s life can be seen as a struggle between the organism’s life processes and its environment, or it might be seen as a struggle of contradictory forces within the organism itself (i.e., forces of consumption of nutrition vs. forces of expending energy to survive, forces of disease vs. forces of the organism’s immune system, etc.).
 +
 
 +
Materialist dialectics requires us to identify, examine, and understand the opposing forces which drive all development in our universe. Only through understanding such contradictions can we intercede and affect changes in the world which suit our purposes.
 +
 
 +
For example, in order to fight against capitalism and other forms of oppression, we must first understand the contradictory forces which exist within and between those oppressive social structures. Only then can we determine how we might best apply our will, through labor processes, to dismantle such oppressive structures. We might do this by exacerbating existing contradictions within oppressive structures, by introducing new contradictions, by negating contradictions which inhibit our own progress, etc.
 +
 
 +
==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
 +
 
 +
Given that contradictions are objective and universal, and that they are the source and driving force of movement and development, it is therefore necessary to detect, recognize, and understand contradictions, to fully analyze opposing sides, and to grasp the nature, origin and tendencies of motion and development in our awareness and practice.
 +
 
 +
Lenin said: “The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts… is the ''essence…'' of dialectics.”<ref>''On the Questions of Dialectics'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.</ref>
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 193 ====
 +
 
 +
In other words, materialist dialectics is simply a system of understanding the world around us by viewing all things, phenomena, and ideas as collections of relationships and contradictions which exist within and between all things, phenomena, and ideas.
 +
 
 +
Since contradictions exist with such rich diversity, it is necessary to have a historical point of view [see Annotation 114, p. 116] — that is, to know how to analyze each specific type of contradiction and have appropriate methods for resolving them. In our perception and practice, it is necessary to properly distinguish the roles and positions of different types of contradictions in each situation and condition; we must also distinguish between different characteristics which contradictions might have in order to find the best method of resolving them.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 194 ====
 +
 
 +
The historical viewpoint is vital because in order to fully understand any given contradiction, we must understand the process of development which led to its formation.
 +
 
 +
For example, before a car engine can be repaired, we must first find out what caused the engine to stop working to begin with. If the car is out of fuel, we must determine what caused it to run out of fuel. Did the driver simply drive until the fuel tank was empty, or is there a hole or leak in a fuel line, in the tank, etc.?
 +
 
 +
It is vital to know the history of development of a given pair of opposing sides, as well as the characteristics and other properties of both opposing sides, to fully understand the contradiction. Since all conscious activity (like all processes of motion and change) ultimately derives from the driving force of contradiction, it is vital for us to develop a historical and comprehensive perspective of any contradictions we hope to affect through our conscious activities.
 +
 
 +
=== 3. Law of Negation of Negation ===
 +
 
 +
The law of negation of negation describes the fundamental and universal tendency of movement and development to occur through ''dialectical negation'', forming a cyclical form of development through what is termed “''negation of negation''.”
 +
 
 +
==== a. Definition of Negation and Dialectical Negation ====
 +
 
 +
The world continuously and endlessly changes and develops. Things, phenomena, and ideas that arise, exist, develop and perish, are replaced by other things, phenomena, and ideas; one form of existence is replaced with another form of existence, again and again, continuously, through this development process. This procedure is called ''negation''.
 +
 
 +
All processes of movement and development take place through negation. From certain perspectives, negations can be seen as end points to the development (and thus, existence) of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea [which we can think of as “terminal negations;” see Annotation below]. But from other perspectives, negations can also create the conditions and premises for new developments. Such negations, which create such conditions and premises for the development of things and phenomena, are called ''dialectical negation''.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 195 ====
 +
 
 +
''Negation'' refers to any act of motion or transformation which arises from contradiction. Specifically, negation is what occurs when one opposing side completely overcomes the other. Nothing in our universe can transform or move all by itself, without any contradiction. Thus, negation drives all development and motion of all things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 119, p. 123]. There are various forms of negation, and the same negation process may be seen to take different forms depending on viewpoint of analysis [see Annotation 11, p. 12, and Annotation 114, p. 116], as depicted in the diagram below.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-66.png|''An overview of various forms of negation as they relate to dialectical development.'']]
 +
 
 +
''Dialectical negation'' occurs when the end of development leads directly to some new development process. Dialectical negation occurs through quality shifts [see Annotation 117, p. 119], which, themselves, occur through negation of opposite sides.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-67.png|''Replacement negation refers to the replacement of one thing, phenomenon, or idea with another through dialectical negation.'']]
 +
 
 +
'''Translation Note:''' ''The terms “terminal negation” and “replacement negation” do not appear in the original Vietnamese text. We chose to assign terms to these concepts for clarity.''
 +
 
 +
''Replacement negation'' occurs when one thing, phenomenon, or idea takes the place of another. Replacement negation is always a dialectical process, where one subject is replaced gradually by another. Replacement may be relatively fast or slow, but it is never instantaneous — nothing can pop in and out of existence instantaneously. For example: swords were gradually replaced by firearms as the primary weapons of war over the course of many centuries. Today, swords have been completely replaced by firearms on the battlefield. This was a process of ''replacement negation'' — weapons are still used in war, but the type of weapon used has been completely replaced. Development continues, even though development of swords as battle weapons has essentially ended.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-68.png|''Terminal negation refers to the end of a specific cycle of development.'']]
 +
 
 +
''Terminal negation'' is what happens when development completely ends for a given thing, phenomenon, or idea. For example, from one viewpoint, the development of swords as weapons of war can be seen as having ended — having been ''terminally negated'' — due to the innovation of firearms. In essence, swords are no longer developed, nor implemented, in modern warfare.
 +
 
 +
Replacement negation and terminal negation must be considered in relative terms. From one viewpoint, we can see the rise of firearms as the underlying reason for the ''terminal negation'' of military use of swords. Today, no army on Earth uses swords as primary battlefield weapons and militaries no longer develop sword technology for battlefield use. However, from another viewpoint, the development of battlefield weapons has continued on long after the end of the primacy of swords, and it could be said that firearms have ''replaced'' swords as the primary battlefield weapon.
 +
 
 +
Consider the death of a human being. From one perspective, death is a ''terminal negation'' — the person’s consciousness has ended, and no further development of consciousness will occur for that individual. From other perspectives, development continues. The individual may have had children who will continue their familial lineage, they may have contributed ideas which will continue to impact other people for centuries to come, and so on. In that sense, replacement negation may be viewed as dialectical negation. For example, someone studying modes of transportation in the history of the USA may see the process of steam locomotives replacing horses, and then cars replacing steam locomotives, as processes of dialectical negation from the overarching perspective of the transportation system.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Materialist dialectics is concerned with all forms of negation, but focuses primarily on dialectical negation. Therefore, materialist dialectics is not just a theory of transformation in general, but fundamentally a theory of development
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 196 ====
 +
 
 +
All transformation is driven by negation. Development is a process, specifically, of ''dialectical'' negation, which is a specific form of transformation in which an end of development creates the conditions for new development, either through internal quality shifts or through replacement by some external subject.
 +
 
 +
Materialist dialectics is primarily concerned with dialectical negation (which drives development) because it is ''development'' which brings forth continuous change in our world. Terminal negations and other forms of transformation which do not drive further development are of limited utility, and can only represent certain limited viewpoints [i.e., the viewpoint of that which is terminated].
 +
 
 +
From a broader perspective, nearly all “terminations” are replaced in some way or another by some other form of development. For instance, even when a person dies, although the consciousness of that person may terminate, there will be continuous impacts which will be carried forward from the deceased person’s lifetime of consciousness, as well as from the developments which arise from the death itself.
 +
 
 +
This dialectical definition of negation differs greatly from metaphysical conceptions of development [see Annotation 201, p. 195], which are essentially viewed as terminal. From the metaphysical perspective, all things, phenomena, and ideas are viewed as separate from one another; therefore negations are viewed as terminal processes which bring development processes to their ends.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-69.png|''The metaphysical perspective of terminal negation views negation as an essentially terminal process representing the end point of the existence of a static and isolated thing, phenomenon, or idea.'']]
 +
 
 +
In the above example, the metaphysical framework would present smashing a vase with a hammer as a terminal negation from the perspective of the observer. Once the vase is smashed, the vase is considered to no longer exist, and the broken shards are not considered to be “a vase” any more. Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, view “the shards” as merely a developed form of the vase; a transition to a new stage of development; the negation was only terminal from the perspective of the vase itself.
 +
 
 +
'''''Excerpt From'' Vietnam’s High School Freshman Civic Education textbook:'''
 +
 
 +
Metaphysical and dialectical negation share one commonality: they both see development as the replacement of an old subject with a new subject. However, metaphysical negation happens when outside forces impact on a subject, deleting completely the existence of the old subject. According to this metaphysical perspective, the old subject and the new subject which replaces it do not have any connection.
 +
 
 +
Dialectical negation fundamentally differs from metaphysical negation because it views development as a process of internal development. Dialectical negation does not view complete erasure or deletion of any former subject; instead, dialectical development sees the older subject, which is replaced (negated), as the premise or basis of existence for the new subject.
 +
 
 +
'''Comparison Examples:'''
 +
 
 +
{|
 +
| | '''Metaphysical Negation'''
 +
| '''Dialectical Negation'''
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | The earthquake destroyed the house.
 +
| The house was impacted by the external force of an earthquake, which caused it to collapse, due to internal characteristics of the house itself (which could not withstand the forces of the earthquake). The debris from the collapsed house will be cleared away, and will continue to develop. The space where the house stood will also continue to develop in some way, with the earthquake and the resulting collapse serving as the basis for this further development.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | Water eroded the mountain.
 +
| The external force of water caused erosion by transferring material away from the mountain, due to the internal characteristics of the mountain’s composite material. The water, the material which was washed away, and the mountain will all continue to develop. The erosion process will be the basis for this further development.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | The car has a new tire because it ran over a nail.
 +
| The external force of the nail caused the tire to permanently deflate, due to the internal characteristics of the tire, which could not withstand running over a nail. This served as the basis for further development: the old tire was removed and will be disposed of, which will serve as the basis for further development (i.e., the tire may be recycled or sent to a landfill); the removal of the tire serves as the basis for the further development of a new tire being installed.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | When you add water, sunlight, and nutrition to a seed, it will grow into a plant.
 +
| The seed went through a process of negation as a sprout grew, through various stages of development, into a plant, facilitated by outside forces (such as water, nutrition, sunlight, etc. — the seed would not grow in isolation) as well as the internal characteristics of the seed itself; the seed served as the basis of the sprout’s development. The sprout then served as the basis for the growth of a seedling, and the seedling served as the basis for the growth of a fully grown plant. All of this development was driven by negation processes as quantity shifts gradually led to quality shifts through those various stages of development.
 +
|
 +
|}
 +
 
 +
As you can see from the examples above, the metaphysical perspective focuses on external forces affecting a given subject and views every development process as terminal, with a beginning, middle, and end. The metaphysical perspective thus views negation as a termination of the subject (and, by extension, of development).
 +
 
 +
Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, views development as a continuous and never-ending process of mutual impact, negation, and further negation of each negation. A comprehensive and historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116] must thus be sought to fully comprehend development and negation processeses.
 +
 
 +
Dialectical negation has two basic characteristics: ''objectivity'' and ''inheritance''.
 +
 
 +
Dialectical negation is ''objective'' because negation arises from contradictions which exist between two opposite sides. These opposing sides may exist within a thing, phenomenon, or idea, but the opposing sides are still, by definition, externally opposed to one another from the perspective of either side.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 197 ====
 +
 
 +
Though any given negation may be viewed as terminal from a certain perspective, materialist dialectics is most concerned with processes of development wherein the end of one stage of development creates the conditions for further development [see Annotation 117, p. 119].
 +
 
 +
Therefore, every development is simultaneously an ''internal'' and an ''external process,'' depending on perspective. Development processes may, from certain perspectives, be seen to take place ''within'' a subject or ''between'' two subjects, but they are always ''external'' (and, therefore, objective — see Annotation 108, p. 112) from the perspective of either opposing side while simultaneously ''internal'' to the relationship.
 +
 
 +
For example: The relationship between a husband and wife may be seen as an ''internal process of development'' of “the marriage” from the perspective of a marriage counselor. However, from their own perspectives, each “opposing side” (i.e., the husband and the wife) see one another as external to each other.
 +
 
 +
Therefore, the development of a marriage may be seen as an internal process, but the mutual impacts and negations which occur within the relationship are objective and external forces from the perspective of either opposing side.
 +
 
 +
This is important because it means that all development and all negation are essentially objective processes; therefore no entity has complete, omniscient control over any development process. We must, therefore, understand the nature of development and negation in order to be able to properly plan and affect change in our world.
 +
 
 +
Dialectical negation is, therefore, the result of the process of resolving inevitable contradictions within a subject [i.e., a relationship] itself. Dialectical negation allows for the old to be replaced by the new, thereby creating trends of development. Therefore, dialectical negation is also self-negation.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 198 ====
 +
 
 +
To reiterate: from the perspective of either opposing side, development is an ''external, objective'' process. From the perspective of the contradictory ''relationship'', processes of development are ''internal'' processes of ''self-negation''. Thus, dialectical negation is both an objective process which no entity can completely control, while, simultaneously, an internal process of self-negation and self-development.
 +
 
 +
If two nations go to war, either nation may view the war as an objective, external development process, but from a wider perspective, the war is an internal development process of the diplomatic relationship between the two warring nations. This is drastically different from the metaphysical perspective, which views any negation process as a purely external process of development wherein one subject is permanently deleted from existence, then replaced by another subject [see Annotation 196, p. 188]. From the metaphysical perspective, a war is simply a conflict between two distinct and separate nations, and the conclusion of the war is a terminal negation which ends development of the war. From the materialist dialectical perspective, on the other hand, the end of the war would be seen as the basis of future development of the relationship between the two formerly warring nations.
 +
 
 +
Dialectical negation also has an ''inheritance'' characteristic: when one opposing side negates another, the remaining side inherits factors from the negated side which are suitable with present conditions.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 199 ====
 +
 
 +
Every negation process arises from contradictions between two opposing sides. Within any such negation process, we can think of one side as the “negator” and the other side as the “negated.” Negation, like all relational processes, leads to mutual impact between both sides [see Annotation 136, p. 138]. Therefore, the negated will impact the negator; in other words, the negated side will be somehow ''reflected'' in the negator [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. This means that the negator will inherit and carry forward certain attributes, factors, and characteristics which it receives from the negated side.
 +
 
 +
Again, consider a war between two nations. Even if one nation completely conquers and subjugates the other in total victory, the victorious nation will still inherit certain factors from the defeated nation. Which factors are inherited will depend on the conditions. The victorious nation may pick up some cultural aspects from the defeated nation, such as cuisine, fashion, etc., they may incorporate tactics and strategies which they observed the defeated enemy using on the battlefield, and so on. The point is that the victorious nation will be impacted in some way by the defeated nation.
 +
 
 +
The factors which are adopted will be ''suitable with the present conditions''. Take, for example, a car breaking down due to engine failure. This can be seen as an opposing relationship between the car itself and the car’s owner. If the present conditions are suitable [i.e., the owner has the funds and resources available, and the desire to repair the car], then the car may be repaired and continue operating for years to come. If, on the other hand, conditions aren’t suitable [i.e., the owner does not have the funds or resources or the owner no longer wants the car], then the car may be sent to the scrapyard.
 +
 
 +
As another example, if a fox eats a rabbit, it will inherit certain characteristics from the rabbit. It will inherit nutrition from the rabbit’s body. It may also inherit other characteristics, such as a disease the rabbit was carrying, if the conditions of the fox’s biological composition are suitable [i.e., if the disease can be transferred from the rabbit to the fox].
 +
 
 +
Dialectical negation is not a complete negation [i.e., deletion] of the old. Rather, dialectical negation is a continuity of growth in which the old develops into the new. In processes of dialectical negation, “the new” forms and develops on its own [see Annotation 62, p. 59], through the process of filtering out unsuitable factors, while retaining suitable content. Vladimir Lenin described dialectical negation as:
 +
 
 +
“Not empty negation, not futile negation, not skeptical negation, vacillation and doubt is characteristic and essential in dialectics — which undoubtedly contains the element of negation and indeed as its most important element — no, but negation as a moment of connection, as a moment of development, retaining the positive, i.e., without any vacillations, without any eclecticism.”<ref>''Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic,'' Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.</ref>
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 200 ====
 +
 
 +
The passage from Lenin above comes from Clemence Dutt’s popular English translation of one of Lenin’s notebooks. Below is our translation from the Vietnamese version of this text from the original text of this book, which we hope might be somewhat easier to understand:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Dialectical negation is not empty negation, it’s not negation without any thoughts, it’s not skeptical negation, it’s not hesitation. Skepticism is not a feature of the essence of the dialectic — of course, dialectics include the negative, it even plays as one of the important factors of a given subject — no, it is negation as the moment of development. Dialectical negation retains the positive, meaning there is no hesitation, there is no eclecticism.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
In order to understand what Lenin is saying here, we should first understand what Lenin is responding to. The above notes are referring to the chapter titled “The Absolute Ideal” within Hegel’s ''Science of Logic [see note at the end of this Annotation]''. In this chapter, Hegel recounts various critiques of dialectics and counters them.
 +
 
 +
''Skepticism'', here, refers to the tendency to address all human knowledge with doubt.
 +
 
 +
Philosophical skepticism never moves past two questions: 1. “Is this knowledge true?” 2. “Will human beings ever obtain true knowledge?” Skeptics of this nature engage in a sort of metaphysical inquisition in which every thesis that is ever encountered is immediately and utterly refuted and thus “negated” in the metaphysical sense of termination [see Annotation 196, p. 188].
 +
 
 +
''Eclecticism'' refers to philosophical and ideological conceptions which draw from a variety of theories, styles, and ideas in an unsystematic manner. Lenin contends that dialectical negation is non-eclecticist because it rises above mere rhetorical combativeness and “total negation.” [This concept is explained more below within this annotation.]
 +
 
 +
With all this in mind, we see that Lenin is refuting the notion that dialectics are and can only be ''negative'' in nature. The metaphysical-skeptic conception of dialectics holds that negation takes the form of rhetorical arguing and refutation, in which one idea is presented, and a second idea is offered to counter the first idea, which completely and totally negates the first idea. According to this argument, dialectics is, therefore, a ''totally negative process''.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-71.png|''A common misperception of dialectical development is that it is “fully negative,” insomuch as the initial thesis (initial subject) is completely negated by the antithesis (impacting subject). In fact, characteristics from both the thesis and antithesis are carried forward into the synthesis.'']]
 +
 
 +
In the chapter from ''Science of Logic'' which Lenin is responding to in the referenced text, Hegel is arguing that the conception of dialectics as ''only negative'' — i.e., a system of thinking in which counter-arguments are presented to completely negate initial arguments — is inaccurate. Hegel explains that when one opposing side negates another, it thereafter “contains in general the determination of the first [opposing side] within itself.” In other words, after one opposing side negates another, it retains features and aspects from the opposing side which was negated. Lenin found this particular point to be so important that he wrote “this is very important for understanding dialectics” in the margin of his notebook.
 +
 
 +
The reason both Hegel and Lenin found this idea, that the “negator” contains elements of the “negated” after negation [see Annotation 231, p. 227], is that this counters the accusation that dialectics are “only negative.” This is why Lenin’s notes highlight the importance of the negator “retaining the positive” after negation. Lenin is pointing out the importance of the retention of features of the negated in the negator because it is this retention which prevents dialectical development from becoming a purely negative process.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-72.png|''In materialist dialectics, it is understood that negation is a process of retention: characteristics from both the thesis (initial subject) and antithesis (impacting subject) are retained in the resulting synthesis'']]
 +
 
 +
We must also understand what Lenin means when he refers to “skepticism” in his notes. Lenin, here, is referring to the philosophical view that we can never know whether or not our beliefs are true. This belief was popularly known as Machism, or Empirio-Criticism, in Lenin’s time (see Annotation 32, p. 27).
 +
 
 +
A common critique of dialectics is that it is an inherently skeptical system of thought, since dialectics is seen as a process of presenting counter-arguments to suppositional arguments. Lenin, in his notes, presents the idea that such skepticism is “not a feature of dialectics” precisely because nothing is ever completely, totally, and entirely negated. In other words, the accusation that dialectical analysis is essentially skeptical is rooted in the mistaken notion that one opposing side (i.e., a counter-argument) ''completely negates'' the original supposition. In fact, according to materialist dialectics, the negator ''always'' retains features and aspects from the negated side, which counters this critique. Thus, dialectical development, which occurs through dialectical negation, is a process of forward motion — not a process of “vacillating” back and forth from one position to another — and there is no skeptical “hesitation” preventing forward progress.
 +
 
 +
This same idea (that the negator retains features from the negated) also counters another common critique of materialist dialectics: that dialectical analysis is simply a system of rhetorical sophistry [see Annotation 36, p. 33] and eclecticism.
 +
 
 +
''Eclecticism'' is a conceptual approach that is completely unsystematic, drawing from a variety of theories, styles, and ideas without any cohesive and all-encompassing philosophical framework.
 +
 
 +
Some critics claim that dialectics must be eclecticist and sophistic in nature. These critics claim that dialectics is simply rhetorical disputation in which any given supposition is counter-argued, and that this counter-argument is negation. But materialist dialectics defines negation as one contradicting side overtaking the other while retaining traces and characteristics from the negated side — it is in no way simply an act of rhetorical dispute or refutation.
 +
 
 +
In summary, materialist dialectics upholds that nothing is ever completely and utterly deleted or erased from existence through negation. Instead, any time one opposing side negates another, aspects of the negated side are ''inherited'' by the negating side.
 +
 
 +
''Note:'' For reference, here is Hegel’s passage which Lenin is referring to from ''Science and Logic'' in the cited notes above:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
...a universal first, considered in and for itself, shows itself to be the other of itself. Taken quite generally, this determination can be taken to mean that what is at first immediate now appears as mediated, related to an other, or that the universal appears as a particular. Hence the second term that has thereby come into being is the negative of the first, and if we anticipate the subsequent progress, the first negative. The immediate, from this negative side, has been extinguished in the other, but the other is essentially not the empty negative, the nothing, that is taken to be the usual result of dialectic; rather is it the other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is therefore determined as the mediated — contains in general the determination of the first within itself. Consequently the first is essentially preserved and retained even in the other. To hold fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition; also only the simplest reflection is needed to furnish conviction of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement, while with regard to the examples of proofs, the whole of Logic consists of these.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Therefore, dialectical negation is the inevitable tendency of progression of the inner relationship between the old and the new. It is the self-driving assertive force of all motion and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas.
 +
 
 +
==== b. Negation of Negation ====
 +
 
 +
In the perpetual movement of the material world, dialectical negation is an inexhaustible process. It creates a development tendency of things from lower level to higher level, taking place in a cyclical manner in the form of a “spiral.”
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 201 ====
 +
 
 +
The concept of the “spiral” form of development in dialectical materialist philosophy stands in contrast to the metaphysical conception of “linear” development.
 +
 
 +
==== Metaphysical Conception of Linear Development ====
 +
 
 +
The metaphysical viewpoint holds that development is more or less a straight line: as one subject is negated, it is replaced by another. This subject will then be negated by another, and so on, in what is essentially conceived of as a straight line of development [see Annotation 196, p. 188].
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-73.png|''The metaphysical “line development” model sees an initial form as being “replaced” or entirely negated into a completely distinct entity.'']]
 +
 
 +
In the above example, metaphysical line development simply sees raw aluminum as being negated and “replaced” in the real world. Once the aluminum can is created, the “raw aluminum” as a metaphysical entity is considered no longer to exist. Likewise, when the soda can is transformed into recycled aluminum, the can is considered “replaced,” and is no longer considered to have a metaphysical existence.
 +
 
 +
This conception of metaphysical line development directly contradicts the materialist dialectical concept of ''historical viewpoint'' [see Annotation 114, p. 116].
 +
 
 +
==== Dialectical Materialist Conception of Development ====
 +
 
 +
The dialectical materialist conception of cyclical development stems from essential attributes of dialectical negation processes:
 +
 
 +
1. In every dialectical negation, the negating side inherits features and characteristics from the negated side.
 +
 
 +
2. When the negating side is, itself, negated (i.e., ''negation of the negation''), the new negating side will retain features and aspects of the old negator.
 +
 
 +
3. This development process will continue indefinitely, so that negation is not simply a straight line of complete negation, but rather takes the shape of a “spiral” of negations of negations which always inherit features from previous forms.
 +
 
 +
Note that this conception of development as a spiral is simply an abstraction to help understand the essential characteristics of dialectical development and to distinguish this form of development from metaphysical conceptions of “linear development.”
 +
 
 +
In the example below, we see a depiction of the spiral development of aluminum through various stages of development. After raw aluminum is mined from the Earth, it begins a repeating spiral development process of being refined into usable goods, then recycled into raw material.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-74.png|''The “Spiral Development” model of materialist dialectics sees every stage of development as a higher form of the previous stage which carries forward characteristics from previous stages.'']]
 +
 
 +
The illustrated example on the previous page plots the spiral development of aluminum as it cycles between stages defined as raw materials and refined products. Another perspective might depict development differently. For example, if we are examining development in terms of external relations between aluminum other elements, the development pattern would look different. In reality, all subjects have countless internal and external relations and development processes which can be examined.
 +
 
 +
The “raw aluminum” stage of development pictured in the illustration is not truly the beginning of this development process; there were millions of years of development which occurred before it was first discovered by humans. Similarly, the landfill will not be the end of this development process; there will be continued development forever for as long as motion in the universe continues.
 +
 
 +
This is a simplified and abstract model of development of aluminum. A more accurate representation might show any number of interim steps between each step depicted in the graphic above. For example: it must also be recognized that in reality the molecules of aluminum which the development process began with will be scattered and mixed with other subjects throughout the development process, and various other complexities exist in terms of the mutual impacts of internal and external relationships.
 +
 
 +
Determining the amount of detail to include or exclude in materialist dialectical analysis is crucial: too much detail and analysis might become unwieldy; too little detail and analysis might become too abstract and idealized to be useful in the real world. So, the idea of development as a spiral should not be taken literally; it is simply a way of conceptualizing the differences between dialectical negation and development as opposed to “straight-line” development upheld by metaphysical conceptions of negation and development, always carrying forward traces of previous stages of development.
 +
 
 +
In the chain of negations that make up the development processes of things, phenomena, and ideas, each dialectical negation creates the conditions and premises for subsequent developments. Through many iterations of negation, i.e., “negations of negations,” dialectical negation will inevitably lead to a ''forward tendency of motion''.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 202 ====
 +
 
 +
The ''forward tendency of motion'' describes the tendency for things, phenomena, and ideas to move from less advanced to more advanced forms through processes of motion and development.
 +
 
 +
As a reminder, “lower level” and “higher level,” i.e., “less advanced” and “more advanced,” should not be taken to have any connotations of “good” and “bad,” nor of “desirable” and “undesirable,” nor even of “less complex” and “more complex.”
 +
 
 +
Development from “lower levels” to “higher levels” is simply a shorthand for understanding the fact that development processes always move “forward,” that is to say, development can never happen in reverse, just as time itself can never be reversed. For example, society in Italy will never go back to the civilization of the Roman empire. It is conceivable that Italian society could develop to be ''more similar'' to Ancient Rome, but it would be impossible for Roman society to ever take on the ''exact characteristics'' of the Roman Empire ever again.
 +
 
 +
Cyclicality of development processes usually takes place in the form of a spiral, which is another result of “negation of negation.” Negations of negations lead to a development cycle in which things, phenomena, and ideas often undergo two fundamental negations carried through three basic forms. Through this negation pattern, basic features of the initial form are ultimately inherited by the “third form,” but at a higher level of development.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 203 ====
 +
 
 +
Dialectical development tends to take place through a cyclical pattern in which development is carried through a triad of forms which develop through a pair of dialectical negation processes:
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-75.png|''The cyclical pattern of development is an abstract pattern of dialectical change over time.'']]
 +
 
 +
The graphic above illustrates this cyclical pattern, in which:
 +
 
 +
1. The initial form (the Assertion) begins the pattern. Contradiction within the initial subject or between it and another subject leads to the first negation.
 +
 
 +
2. The first negation leads to a second form (the Negation). This second form inherits some features or characteristics from the initial form.
 +
 
 +
3. The second form then encounters opposition, which leads to a second negation.
 +
 
 +
4. The second negation leads to a third form (Unity), which retains the features or characteristics of the second form, but now more closely resembles the first, initial form, only at a higher level of development.
 +
 
 +
Imagine a new car (initial form) crashes into another car (contradicting subject). The new car is dialectically developed (negated) into a second form: a wrecked car. This second form is now contradicted by a new subject — a recycling center — and negated into a third form: new steel. The third form possesses characteristics of the first form, but in a more developed form: after being recycled, the resulting steel it is newly made, in good condition for sale, etc., similarly to the first form of the new car.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-76.png|''In this example, a new car goes through a cyclical pattern of development in which the third form (new steel) possesses characteristics of the first form (a new car).'']]
 +
 
 +
Keep in mind that this is relative to one’s perspective. If you consider the wrecked car to be the first form, then the steel would be the second form. The new steel will then need to be developed in some way (melted, hammered, cut, etc.) in order to be processed into some new product. From this perspective, the third form (i.e., molten steel) will have characteristics of the first form (i.e.: “unrefined”).
 +
 
 +
According to Marx and Engels, the development of capitalism from feudalism assumed this cyclical pattern:
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-77.png|''The development of class structure is a dialectical process in which different classes synthesize to form the next era of class society. For example, the capitalist class emerged primarily as a synthesis of the feudal lords and peasants of the medieval era.'']]
 +
 
 +
Note that this is only an abstract description of a tendency of dialectical development; exceptions can and do occur. Presumably, the development of communism as a stateless, classless society would constitute the negation of the “Class Society” form of human civilization. The Post-Class stage of development which follows would, itself, be a higher form — a unity — of pre-class human civilization, carrying forward traces from the Class Society stage of development.
 +
 
 +
Also note that determining which form is the “first” or “initial” pattern is entirely relative. Using the example of the development of class society: from one perspective, the Patricians may be seen as the initial form, but from another perspective the Plebeians might be considered the initial form. This depends entirely on the viewpoint and purpose of analysis. These conceptions of “spirals of development” and the pattern of “three forms through two negations” are, in essence, models which describe general tendencies and patterns of development and which help us understand the basic characteristics of dialectical negation and development.
 +
 
 +
Lenin describes this cycle of dialectical development as going “[f]rom assertion to negation — from negation to ‘unity’ with the asserted — without this, dialectics becomes empty negation, a game, skepsis [examination, observation, consideration].”<ref>''Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic,'' Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.</ref>
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 204 ====
 +
 
 +
Here, “assertion” simply refers to the initial form of a dialectical development cycle. The negation is the second form, and the “unity” is the third form, which resembles the first form (the assertion) at a higher stage of development. So, in this quotation, Lenin is simply recounting the “three steps” of a typical dialectical development cycle, and indicating that it is necessary to recognize this process, which is rooted in the inheritance of properties of prior forms through development into ever-higher forms, to prevent dialectics from becoming “empty negation,” or otherwise falling prey to the critiques that dialectics are purely negative, skeptical, and eclectic in nature [see Annotation 200, p. 192 and Annotation 36, p. 33].
 +
 
 +
The law of negation of negation generalizes the pervasive nature of development: dialectical development does not take the form of a straight path, but rather in the form of a spiral path. Lenin summarised that this path is “[a] development that repeats, as it were, stages that have already been passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher basis (‘the negation of the negation’), a development, so to speak, that proceeds in spirals, not in a straight line…”<ref>''Karl Marx'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.</ref> The tendency to develop in a spiral curve demonstrates the dialectical nature of development; i.e., the cycle of inheritance, repetition, and progression. Each new round of the spiral appears to be repeating, but at a higher level. The continuation of the loops in a spiral reflects an endless progression from lower levels to higher levels of things, phenomena, and ideas.
 +
 
 +
In short, the law of negation of negation in materialist dialectics reflects the dialectical relationship between the negative and the assertion [i.e., the second and first forms of a dialectical development cycle; see Annotation 203, p. 198] in the development process of things, phenomena and ideas. Dialectical development is driven by dialectical negation; in the development of all things, phenomena, and ideas, the new is the result of inheriting characteristics from prior forms. This process of inheritance, repetition, and progression through negation leads to cyclical development. Engels wrote: “what is the negation of the negation? An extremely general — and for this reason extremely far-reaching and important — law of development of nature, history, and thought.”<ref>''Anti-Dühring'', Friedrich Engels, 1878.</ref>
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 205 ====
 +
 
 +
In the same text quoted above, Engels elaborates that dialectical development is composed of “processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation.”
 +
 
 +
==== c. Meaning of the Methodology ====
 +
 
 +
The law of negation of negation is the basis for correct perception of the tendency of motion and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. Development and motion processes do not take place in a straight line; rather, it is a winding, complex road, consisting of many stages, and each process can be broken down into many different sub-processes. However, it must be understood that this complexity of development is only the manifestation of the general tendency to move forward [see Annotation 118, p. 122]. It is important to understand the nature of motion and development so that we can systematically change the world according to our revolutionary viewpoint. In order to consciously impact the development of things, phenomena, and ideas, we need to know their characteristics, nature, and relationships so that we can influence their motion and development in the direction that suits our purposes. We must comprehend and leverage the tendency of forward movement — in accordance with a scientific and revolutionary worldview — in order to effectively and systematically change the world.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 206 ====
 +
 
 +
Understanding the forward tendency of motion is vital for cultivating a worldview which is both ''scientific'' and ''revolutionary.'' Such a worldview is ''scientific'' because it recognizes the material reality that all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly undergoing change and development. Nothing in our universe is static, and all things are connected and defined by internal and external relationships (which are also constantly developing). Furthermore, this development progresses with a ''forward tendency'', meaning that no process can be completely “reversed.” For example, you can clean rust from a car [which would be forward progress], but you can’t reverse the temporal process of rust.
 +
 
 +
Once we understand that all things, phenomena, and ideas in our universe are constantly developing and moving forward, we can then begin to find ways to ''impact'' motion and development systematically to consciously change the world around us. This is the foundation of a ''revolutionary'' worldview, since revolutionary change requires us to leverage and influence development processes to suit our needs and revolutionary ambitions. Thus, materialist dialectics are an applied system of observation and practice through which we seek to understand development processes and consciously impact them to suit our needs.
 +
 
 +
According to the rule of negation of negation, in the objective world, the new must inevitably come to replace the old. In nature, the new develops according to objective laws. In social life, new things arise from the purposeful, self-conscious, and creative actions of human beings. Therefore, it is necessary to leverage ''subjective factors'' as we seek to consciously impact the development of things, phenomena, and ideas.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 207 ====
 +
 
 +
Subjective factors are factors which we, as a subject, are capable of impacting. This may seem confusing, since we have previously established that all external things, phenomena, and ideas have ''objective'' relationships with all other things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 108, p. 112], meaning that any given subject is ''external'' to every other subject, and thus no subject can directly and completely control the motion and development of any other subject.
 +
 
 +
However, from the perspective of any given individual, there are certain things, phenomena, and ideas [as well as processes of motion and development] which we can ''impact''. For example, if I see an apple on a table, the apple is ''objective'' to me. I can’t simply will the apple to move with my consciousness alone. However, I can ''impact'' the apple through conscious activity — I can consciously will my hand to pick up the apple and move it to another location.
 +
 
 +
Thus, factors which an individual can consciously impact are ''subjective factors''. As revolutionists, we must focus on subjective factors. In other words, we must concentrate on ''that which we are capable of changing'', since our purpose is to change the world. Focusing on factors which we can’t impact is a waste of time; we must simply determine what ''can be changed'' and then determine the most efficient and effective ways of impacting development processes and changing the world.
 +
 
 +
As revolutionists, we must have faith that we can introduce the “new,” faith in the success of the “new,” we must support the “new,” and fight for the victory of the “new.” Therefore, it is necessary to overcome conservative, stagnant, and dogmatic thoughts which restrain the development of the “new” and resist the law of negation of negation.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 208 ====
 +
 
 +
Change is inevitable. All things, phenomena, and ideas undergo processes of motion and development. Any philosophy, ideology, or strategy which attempts to restrain motion and development is doomed to failure because change can neither be halted nor restrained. Thus, our strategies and actions must align with the material reality that change is inevitable, and we must seek to change the world by ''impacting'' processes of development and motion rather than attempting to reverse, restrain, or halt such processes.
 +
 
 +
Ideologies which erroneously strive to restrict change and development include ''rigidity'' (see Annotation 222, p. 218) and ''conservativism'' (see Annotation 236, p. 233).
 +
 
 +
In the process of negating the old we must leverage the principle of inheritance with discretion: we must encourage the inheritance of factors that are beneficial to our goals as we simultaneously attempt to filter out, overcome, and reform factors which would negatively impact our goals.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 209 ====
 +
 
 +
If we understand the principle of inheritance, we can impact inheritance processes which derive from negation. For example, when repairing a car, we can seek out parts of the car which do not function properly or which do not suit the use-case of the car and add or replace parts which are more suitable.
 +
 
 +
In the same way, we can impact inheritence processes in our revolutionary political activities. We can seek to inherit characteristics from previous stages of development of our political organizations, social institutions, culture, etc., while simultaneously seeking to prevent the inheritence of traits and characteristics which are unsuitable for our revolutionary purposes. Over time, we can attempt to impact the inheritance of traits and aspects which are more conducive to our purposes while limiting and filtering out traits and aspects which are hindrances.
 +
 
 +
In an article titled “New Life” written in 1947, Ho Chi Minh wrote about the dialectical relationship between the new and the old in building a new society, writing:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Not everything old must be abandoned. We do not have to reinvent everything. What is old but bad must be abandoned. What is old but troublesome must be corrected appropriately. What is old but good must be further developed. What is new but good must be done.
 +
 
 +
... Growing up in the old society, we all carry within us more-or-less bad traces of the old society in terms of our ideas and habits... Habits are hard to change. That which is good and new is likely to be considered bad by the people because it is strange to them. On the contrary, that which is evil yet familiar is easily mistaken as normal and acceptable.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Ho Chi Minh understood the principles of development very well, as well as the difficulties we will face as revolutionaries as we try to change ourselves and our society. We must strive to develop a similar understanding as we move forward and attempt to affect the development of our world through practice and struggle.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
= Chapter 3: Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism =
 +
 
 +
In Marxism, epistemological reasoning (or epistemology) is the foundation of dialectics. Dialectical materialist epistemology is a theory of applying human cognitive ability to the objective world through practical activities. It explains the nature, path and general laws of the human process of perceiving truth and objective reality to serve human practical activities.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 210 ====
 +
 
 +
Epistemology is the theoretical study of knowledge. It also deals with the philosophical question of: “how do we know what is true?”
 +
 
 +
Throughout history, philosophers have tried to determine the nature of truth and knowledge. In the era of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, there was an ongoing dispute between the materialists, who believed that truth could only be sought through sense experience of the material world, and the idealists, who believed that truth could only be sought through reasoning within the human mind.
 +
 
 +
Marx and Engels developed the philosophical system of dialectical materialism to resolve this dispute. Dialectical materialism upholds that the material and the ideal have a dialectical relationship with one another: the material ''determines'' the ideal, while the ideal ''impacts'' the material [see ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88].
 +
 
 +
However, it’s important to understand that Marx and Engels didn’t develop the system of dialectical materialism simply to understand the world. As Marx wrote in ''Theses on Feuerbach:''
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
So, Marxist dialectical materialist epistemology is developed specifically to enable human beings to not only perceive truth and objective reality, but to then be able to apply our conscious thought, through practical activity, in order to bring about change in the world.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
== 1. Praxis, Consciousness, and the Role of Praxis in Consciousness ==
 +
 
 +
=== a. Praxis and Basic Forms of Praxis ===
 +
 
 +
''Praxis'' includes all human material activities which have purpose and historical-social characteristics and which transform nature and society. Unlike other activities, praxis is activity in which humans attempt to materially impact the world to suit our purposes. Praxis activities define the nature of human beings and distinguish human beings from other animals. Praxis is objective activity, and praxis has been constantly developed by humans through the ages.
 +
 
 +
<br />
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 211 ====
 +
 
 +
In English, the words “practice” and “praxis” are often distinguished from one another. “Practice” is often used to refer to human activity which provides more information about the world around us and improves our knowledge and understanding, whereas “praxis” often refers to conscious human activity which is intended to change the world in some manner. In their original German, Marx and Engels used the same German word — ''Praxis'' — to refer to both concepts. Similarly, in the original Vietnamese text of this book, the same word — ''thực tiễn'' — is used for both “practice” and “praxis.”
 +
 
 +
One reason that these concepts are so closely related is that all conscious activity serves both rolls by simultaneously telling us more about reality ''and'' consciously changing reality in some way. For example, by pushing a heavy stone, you may be able to move the stone a small amount — constituting praxis — while simultaneously learning how heavy the stone is and how difficult it is to move — constituting practice. The main point of distinction, therefore, is ''intention''. Virtually all conscious activity is practice, but only activity which has ''purpose'' and ''historical-social characteristics'' might be considered praxis:
 +
 
 +
''Purpose'' simply describes a goal or desired outcome; specifically: a desired change in nature or human society. Activities with ''historical-social characteristics'' are activities which contribute in some way to the development of human society.
 +
 
 +
In this translation, we use “practice” and “praxis” interchangably to mean “conscious activity which improves our understanding, and which has purpose and historical-social characteristics.” You are likely to find these words used differently (as described above, or in other ways) in other texts. Engels explains the importance of practice/praxis in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we [use] these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perceptions. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is positive proof that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Marx wrote in ''Theses on Feuerbach'' that “the coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice [German: ''revolutionäre Praxis''].” Engels further expounds upon this concept in ''Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'', writing:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical fancies is practice [original German: Praxis], viz., experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and using it for our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end of the Kantian incomprehensible or ungraspable.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Praxis defines the nature of human beings because human beings are (to our present knowledge) the only beings which undertake actions with conscious awareness of our desired outcomes and comprehension of the historical development of our own society, which distinguishes human beings from all other animals. Praxis is ''objective'' activity, meaning that all praxis activities are performed in relation to external things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 108, p. 112].
 +
 
 +
Praxis has been constantly developed by humans through the ages, meaning that as we learn more about the nature of reality, of human society, and the laws of nature, we are able to develop our praxis to become more efficient and effective.
 +
 
 +
Praxis activities are very diverse, manifesting with ever-increasing variety, but there are only three basic forms: material production activities, socio-political activities, and scientific experimental activities.
 +
 
 +
''Material production activity'' is the first and most basic form of praxis. In this form of praxis activity, humans use tools through labor processes to influence the natural world in order to create wealth and material resources and to develop the conditions necessary to maintain our existence and development.
 +
 
 +
''Socio-political activity'' includes praxis activity utilized by various communities and organizations in human society to transform political-social relations in order to promote social development.
 +
 
 +
''Scientific experimental activity'' is a special form of praxis activity. This includes human activities that resemble or replicate states of nature and society in order to determine the laws of change and development of subjects of study. This form of activity plays an important role in the development of society, especially in the current historical period of modern science and technological revolution.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 212 ====
 +
 
 +
The three basic forms of praxis activities listed above obviously do not include all forms of human activity, as praxis only includes activities which have ''purpose'' and ''historical-social characteristics''.
 +
 
 +
''Material production activity'' has a very clear purpose: to improve the material conditions of an individual human being or a group of human beings. Material production activity has historical-social characteristics because developing material conditions for human beings leads directly to the development of human society. For example, as food production increases in terms of yield and efficiency, society can support a larger number of human beings and a wider range of human activities, which leads to the development of human society.
 +
 
 +
''Socio-political activity'' has the purpose of promoting social development, which is obviously inherently historical-social in nature. An example of socio-political activity would include any sort of political campaign, liberation struggle, political revolutionary activity, etc.
 +
 
 +
''Scientific experimental activity'' has the purpose of expanding our understanding of nature and human society, which leads directly to historical-social development in a variety of ways. For example, improving our scientific understanding of medicine through scientific experimental activity leads to longer lives and improved quality of life. Improving our scientific understanding of chemistry through scientific experimental activity leads to all sorts of materials which improve the quality of life and enable human beings to solve a variety of social problems.
 +
 
 +
In order to qualify as praxis activity, a given human activity must have a purpose and it must have historical-social characteristics. For instance, drawing is not always praxis in the sense of the word used in this text, but it would be praxis if it would qualify as material production activity (i.e., making art in order to sell, so as to make a living) or if the art is made with the intention of invoking social change.
 +
 
 +
Every basic praxis activity form has an important function, and these functions are not interchangeable with each other. However, they have close relationships with each other and different praxis activity forms often interact with each other. In these relationships, material production is the most important form of praxis activity, playing a decisive role in determining other praxis activities because material production is the most primitive activity and exists most commonly in human life. Material production creates the most essential, decisive material conditions for human survival and development. Without material production there cannot be other praxis activities. After all, all other praxis activities arise from material production praxis and all praxis activities ultimately aim to serve material production praxis.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 213 ====
 +
 
 +
Without material production activity, human beings would not be able to live at all.
 +
 
 +
Thus, material production activities make all other forms of human activities possible. In addition, the primary reason we participate in socio-political activity is to ensure material security (food, water, shelter, etc.) for members of society, which ultimately relies on material production activity. Therefore, the primary reason we engage in scientific experimental activity is to improve material production activities in terms of efficiency, yield, effectiveness, etc
 +
 
 +
Of course, we engage in scientific experimental activity and material production activity for other reasons (art, entertainment, recreation, etc.), but these activities require that material security be secured first for those participating in the production and consumption of such products. In other words, material production activity is a prerequisite for all other forms of activity, since without some measure of material security humans cannot survive.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-78.png|''Material production activity has a dialectical relationship with all other praxis activity, with material production activity determining, while being impacted by, all other forms of praxis activity.'']]
 +
 
 +
Thus, material production activity has a dialectical relationship with other forms of praxis activities, in which material production activity determines both socio-political and scientific experimental activity while socio-political and scientific experimental activity impact material production activity.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
=== b. Consciousness and Levels of Consciousness ===
 +
 
 +
The dialectical materialist perspective sees consciousness as a process of reflecting the objective world within the human brain on a practical basis to create knowledge about the objective world. Consciousness is a self-aware process that is productive and creative.
 +
 
 +
This view stems from the following basic principles:
 +
 
 +
* The dialectical materialist worldview acknowledges that the material world exists objectively and independently of human consciousness.
 +
* The dialectical materialist worldview recognizes the following human abilities:
 +
** To perceive the objective world.
 +
** To reflect the objective world into the human mind, which enables human subjects to learn about external objects. [see Annotation 66, p. 64]
 +
** To admit that there are no material things nor phenomena which are unrecognizable, but only material things and phenomena that humans have not yet recognised. [see ''The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues,'' p. 48]
 +
 
 +
The dialectical materialist worldview affirms that conscious reflection [see Annotation 67, p. 64] of the objective world is a dialectical, productive, self-aware, and creative process. This reflection process develops from the unknown to the known, from knowing less to knowing more, from knowing less profoundly and less comprehensively to knowing more profoundly and more comprehensively.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 214 ====
 +
 
 +
The above principle (that human knowledge develops from less, and less comprehensive, to more, and more comprehensive states) stands in contrast to various other philosophical systems of belief, including:
 +
 
 +
Hegel’s ''Absolute Idealism'' upholds a belief in an “absolute ideal” which constitutes an ultimate limit or “end point” of knowledge which humanity is moving towards. Dialectical materialism upholds that there is no such absolute ideal and thus no such terminal end point of human understanding. [See Annotation 234, p. 230] As Engels wrote in ''Anti-Dühring'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
If mankind ever reached the stage at which it should work only with eternal truths, with results of thought which possess sovereign validity and an unconditional claim to truth, it would then have reached the point where the infinity of the intellectual world both in its actuality and in its potentiality had been exhausted, and thus the famous miracle of the counted uncountable would have been performed.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
''Fideism'', which is the belief that knowledge is received from some higher power [i.e., God]. Fideism upholds that all knowledge is pre-existing, and that humanity simply receives it from on high. Dialectical materialism, on the other hand, argues that knowledge is developed over time through dialectical processes of consciousness and human activity.
 +
 
 +
''Positivism, or empiricist materialism'', which holds that there are hard limits to human knowledge, or that human knowledge — which can only be obtained from sense data — can’t be trusted. Dialectical materialism upholds that all things and phenomena can be known and understood, and that sense data can be trusted as an objective reflection of reality. For more information about skepticism about human sense data as well as positive and empiricist materialism, see Annotation 10, p. 10, and Annotation 58, p. 56].
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
The dialectical materialist worldview considers praxis as the primary and most direct basis of consciousness, and as the motive and the purpose of consciousness, and as the criterion for testing truth. [See: ''The Relationship Between Praxis and Consciousness'', p. 216]
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 215 ====
 +
 
 +
Given the above principles — that human consciousness exists independently from the material world yet is capable of accurately perceiving and reflecting the material world, and that knowledge develops over time through a synthesis of consciousness and practical activity — we can conclude that consciousness is a self-aware process which is productive and creative.
 +
 
 +
Consciousness is productive and creative in the sense that conscious processes, in conjunction with practical experience and activity in the material world, leads to the development of knowledge and practical experience which allows humans to develop our understanding of the world as well as our own material conditions through the application of knowledge to our own labor activities.
 +
 
 +
Next, we will examine different ways of categorizing conscious activities as they pertain to developing knowledge and practical understanding of our world.
 +
 
 +
From the dialectical materialist point of view, consciousness is a process of development. Consciousness develops from ''empirical consciousness'' to ''theoretical consciousness''; and from ''ordinary consciousness'' to ''scientific consciousness''.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 216 ====
 +
 
 +
In dialectical materialist philosophy, all systems of relation exist as processes of development in motion [see Annotation 120, p. 124]. Thus, consciousness can be defined as a system of relations between human brain activity and two forms of data input:
 +
 
 +
''•'' ''Sense experience'': observations of the external world detected by our senses.
 +
 
 +
''•'' ''Knowledge'': information which exists in the human mind as memories and ideas.
 +
 
 +
Consciousness is thus a process of the development of knowledge through a combination of human brain activity and human practical activity in the physical world (i.e., labor).
 +
 
 +
In the section below, we will explore different forms of consciousness, the development of consciousness, and the relationship between consciousness and knowledge. Note that these are ''abstractions'' of consciousness and knowledge, meant to help us understand how knowledge and consciousness develop over time. Thought processes are extremely complex, so we seek to develop a fundamental understanding of how consciousness develops and how knowledge develops because these processes are fundamental to the development of human beings and human societies.
 +
 
 +
Just as consciousness is a process of developing knowledge through brain activity, consciousness itself also develops over time. The development of consciousness can be considered based on the criteria of ''concrete/abstract'' and of ''passive/active''.
 +
 
 +
Consciousness develops from a state of direct and immediate observation of the world which results in concrete knowledge to a higher stage which constitutes a more abstract and general understanding of the world. We call consciousness which is focused on direct, immediate, concrete, empirical observation of the world ''empirical consciousness'', and we call consciousness which is focused on forming abstract generalizations about the world ''theoretical consciousness''.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-79.png]]
 +
 
 +
Empirical consciousness is a process of collecting data about the world, which we call knowledge. We can gather two forms of knowledge through empirical consciousness: ordinary knowledge, and scientific knowledge.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-80.png]]
 +
 
 +
Ordinary knowledge is the knowledge we accumulate through our everyday experiences in the world. Scientific knowledge is gathered through more systematic scientific observations and experiments. Scientific knowledge usually develops from ordinary knowledge, as we begin to seek a more formal and systematic understanding of the things we witness in our daily lives.
 +
 
 +
According to ''Themes in Soviet Marxist Philosophy,'' edited by T. J. Blakely:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Ordinary knowledge notes what lies on the very surface, what happens during a certain event. Scientific knowledge wants to know why it happens in just this way. The essence of scientific knowledge lies in the confirmed generalization of facts, where it becomes necessary rather than contingent, universal instead of particular, law-bound, and can serve as a basis for predicting various phenomena, events and objects...
 +
 
 +
The whole progress of scientific knowledge is bound up with growth in the force and volume of scientific prediction. Prediction makes it possible to control processes and to direct them. Scientific knowledge opens up the possibility not only of predicting the future but also of consciously forming it. The vital meaning of every science can be expressed as follows: to know in order to predict and to predict in order to act.
 +
 
 +
An essential characteristic of scientific knowledge is that it is systematic, i.e., it is a set of information which is ordered according to certain theoretical principles. A collection of unsystematized knowledge is not yet science. Certain basic premises are fundamental to scientific knowledge, i.e., the laws which make it possible to systematize the knowledge. Knowledge becomes scientific when the collection of facts and their descriptions reach the level where they are included in a theory.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Theoretical consciousness arises from conscious reflection on accumulated knowledge, as human beings seek to develop general and abstract understanding of the underlying principles of processes we experience in the world. Once general principles of natural and social law are established, human beings then test those general conclusions against empirical reality through further observation (i.e., through empirical consciousness).
 +
 
 +
Thus, there is a dialectical relationship between empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness, as one form leads to another, back and forth, again and again, continuously.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-81.png|''Empirical and theoretical consciousness have a dialectical relationship in which empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness lead to and mutually develop one another.'']]
 +
 
 +
Consciousness also develops from passive and surface-level observation and understanding of the world (i.e., simply considering what, where, and when things happen) to more active pursuit of the underlying meaning of the world (i.e., trying to understand how and why things happen).
 +
 
 +
Consciousness which passively observes the world, directly, in daily life is referred to as ''ordinary consciousness''. Ordinary consciousness often develops into more active consciousness. This active pursuit of understanding through systematic observation and indirect experiences (i.e., experiences that do not occur in daily activity — such as scientific experimentation) is referred to as ''scientific consciousness''.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-82.png]]
 +
 
 +
These concepts will be discussed in further detail below.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
''Empirical consciousness'' is the stage of development of consciousness in which perceptions are formed via direct observations of things and phenomena in the natural world, or of society, or through scientific experimentation and systematic observation. Empirical consciousness results in ''empirical knowledge''.
 +
 
 +
''Empirical knowledge'' has two types: ''ordinary empirical knowledge'' (knowledge obtained through direct observation and in productive labor) and ''scientific empirical knowledge'' (knowledge obtained by conducting scientific experiments). These two types of knowledge can be complementary, and can enrich one other.
 +
 
 +
''Theoretical consciousness'' is the indirect, abstract, systematic level of perception in which the nature and laws of things and phenomena are generalized and abstracted.
 +
 
 +
Empirical consciousness and Theoretical consciousness are two different cognitive stages but they have a dialectical relationship with each other. In this dialectical relationship, empirical consciousness is the basis of theoretical consciousness; it provides theoretical consciousness with specific, rich material [i.e., knowledge]. Empirical consciousness is linked closely to practical activities [since practical activity in the material world is the chief method of gathering knowledge through empirical consciousness], and forms the basis for checking, correcting, and supplementing existing theories and summarizing, and generalizing them into new theories. However, empirical consciousness is still limited in that empirical consciousness stops at the description and classification of data obtained from direct observation and experimentation. Therefore, empirical consciousness only brings understanding about the separate, superficial, discrete aspects of observed subjects, without yet reflecting the essence of those subjects nor the underlying principles or laws which regulate those subjects.
 +
 
 +
Therefore, empirical consciousness, alone, is not sufficient for determining the scientific laws of nature and society. To determine such laws and abstractions, theoretical consciousness must be applied. So, theoretical consciousness does not form spontaneously, nor directly from experience, although it is formed from the summation of experiences.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 217 ====
 +
 
 +
The knowledge we gain from our daily activity often inspires scientific inquiry and more systematic observation, which can yield scientific knowledge which will enrich and improve our daily practice and allow us to experience daily life with a deeper understanding of what we’re experiencing. Thus, the ordinary knowledge we gain through daily practice can enrich and yield scientific knowledge (and vice versa).
 +
 
 +
Empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness have a dialectical relationship with each other in which empirical consciousness provides the basis for theoretical consciousness. Theoretical consciousness attempts to derive general abstractions and governing principles from empirical knowledge which is gained through empirical consciousness. Once theoretical principles, generalities, and abstractions are determined, they are then tested against reality through empirical consciousness (i.e., practical observation and systematic experimentation) to determine if the theory is sound.
 +
 
 +
''Empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness have a dialectical relationship with one another. Our observations of the material world lead to conscious activity which we then test in reality through conscious activity, and so on, in a never-ending cycle of dialectical development.''
 +
 
 +
For example, a farmer may notice that plants grow better in locations where manure has been discarded — an act of empirical consciousness. The farmer might then form the theory that adding manure to the soil will help plants grow — an act of theoretical consciousness. This theory could then be tested against reality by mixing manure into the soil and observing the results, which would be another act of empirical consciousness. The farmer may then theorize that ''more'' manure will help plants grow ''even more'' — another act of theoretical consciousness — continuing the cycle of testing and observing.
 +
 
 +
This dialectical relationship between ordinary and theoretical consciousness is what allows human beings to develop and improve knowledge through practical experience, observation, and theoretical abstraction and generalization of knowledge.
 +
 
 +
Theoretical consciousness is relatively independent from empirical consciousness. Therefore, theories can precede expectations and guide the formation of valuable empirical knowledge. Theoretical consciousness is what allows human beings to sort and filter knowledge so as to best serve practical activities and contribute to the transformation of human life. Through this process, knowledge is organized and therefore enhanced, and develops from the level of specific, individual, and solitary knowledge to a higher form of generalized and abstract knowledge [what we might call ''theoretical knowledge''].
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 218 ====
 +
 
 +
Knowledge which comes from empirical observations (empirical consciousness) is ''empirical knowledge.'' ''Theoretical knowledge'' is a product of theoretical consciousness. Over time, as repeated and varied observations are made through theoretical consciousness activities, knowledge becomes more generalized and abstract; this general and abstract knowledge is what we call ''theoretical knowledge''.
 +
 
 +
Note that empirical and theoretical knowledge can be ''ordinary'' or ''scientific'' in nature; if the knowledge arises passively from daily life activities, it will be ordinary knowledge, regardless of whether or not it is empirical or theoretical in nature. If, on the other hand, the knowledge arises from methodological measurement and/or systematic observation, then it is scientific knowledge.vSo far, we have discussed ways of understanding consciousness based on the criteria of directness vs. abstractness. Next, we will discuss another way of looking at consciousness, based on the criteria of passiveness vs. activeness.
 +
 
 +
''Ordinary consciousness'' refers to perception that is formed ''passively'' and ''directly'' from the daily activities of humans. Ordinary consciousness is a reflection of things, phenomena, and ideas, with all their observed characteristics, specific details, and nuances. Therefore, ordinary consciousness is rich, multifaceted, and associated with daily life. Therefore, ordinary consciousness has a regular and pervasive role in governing the activities of each person in society.
 +
 
 +
''Scientific consciousness'' refers to perception formed ''actively'' and ''indirectly'' from the reflection of the characteristics, nature, and inherent relationships of research subjects. This reflection takes place in the form of logical abstraction. These logical abstractions include scientific concepts, categories, and laws. Scientific consciousness is objective, abstract, general, and systematic, and must be grounded in evidence.
 +
 
 +
Scientific consciousness utilizes systematic methodologies to profoundly describe the nature of studied subjects as well as the principles which govern them. Therefore, scientific consciousness plays an increasingly important role in practical activities, especially in the modern age of science and technology.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 219 ====
 +
 
 +
Logical abstraction refers to an understanding of the underlying rules which govern things, phenomena, and ideas which underly objective processes, relationships, and characteristics. Logical abstraction is the result of scientific inquiry. Over time, our understanding of the rules which govern the things, phenomena, and ideas in our lives become more reliable and applicable in practical activities. This attainment of understanding and practical ability through scientific practice is ''scientific consciousness''.
 +
 
 +
Ordinary and scientific consciousness are two different qualitative steps of cognitive processes which, together, allow humans to discover truth about our world. Ordinary and scientific consciousness have a strong dialectical relationship with each other. In this relationship, ordinary consciousness precedes scientific consciousness, as ordinary consciousness is a source of material for the development of scientific consciousness.
 +
 
 +
Although it contains the seeds of scientific knowledge, ordinary consciousness mainly stops at the reflection of superficial details, seemingly random events, and non-essential phenomena [see ''Essence and Phenomenon'', p. 156]. Ordinary consciousness, therefore, cannot transform effortlessly into scientific consciousness. To develop ordinary consciousness into scientific consciousness, we must go through the process of accurate summarizing, abstracting, and generalization using scientific methods. Likewise, once scientific consciousness has been developed, it impacts and pervades ordinary consciousness, and therefore develops ordinary consciousness. Scientific consciousness therefore enhances our everyday passive perception of the world.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-83.png|''Ordinary consciousness refers to the passive observation of reality which takes place in our daily lives. Scientific consciousness refers to the systematic application of consciousness to solve specific problems in a methodological manner.'']]
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 220 ====
 +
 
 +
For example, before developing scientific consciousness of farming, a farmer might go through daily life having no idea what makes plants grow to be larger and more healthy and might have no idea how to avoid common problems such as pests. After developing scientific consciousness of farming through scientific experimentation and other systematic methodologies, the farmer will look at things differently in daily life activities. They may see signs of pest infestation and immediately recognize it for what it is, and they may see other indications that plants are unhealthy and know exactly what to do to remedy the situation.
 +
 
 +
In this way, scientific consciousness enhances ordinary consciousness. Meanwhile, ordinary consciousness — passive observation of the world during daily activities — will lead to scientific consciousness by inspiring us to actively seek understanding of the world through scientific consciousness.
 +
 
 +
=== c. The Relationship Between Praxis and Consciousness ===
 +
 
 +
Praxis serves as the ''basis, driving force,'' and ''purpose'' of consciousness. Praxis serves as the criterion of truth by testing the truthfulness of our thoughts. [See Annotation 230, p. 226]
 +
 
 +
Praxis is able to serve these roles because reality is the direct starting point of consciousness; it sets out the requirements, tasks, and modes of consciousness, as well as the movement and development tendencies of consciousness. Humans have an objective and inherent need to explain the world and to transform it.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 221 ====
 +
 
 +
Remember that the material world defines consciousness while consciousness allows us to impact the material world through conscious activity [see ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88]. Consciousness itself arose from the physical needs of the material world [see ''The Source of Consciousness'', p. 64], and these physical needs continue to serve as the basis and driving force for all conscious activities, as we must act consciously to survive.
 +
 
 +
Our inherent need to explain the world and to transform it arises from our material needs to eat, seek shelter, cure and prevent disease, and so on. These physical needs, which stem from the material world, drive conscious activity and lead to the development of consciousness and knowledge.
 +
 
 +
Therefore, humans must necessarily impact things in the material world through our practical activities in order to survive. The impacts of our practical activities on the world cause things and phenomena to reveal their different properties, including their internal and external relationships [for example, hitting a rock will tell you properties about the rock; attempting to build something out of wood will provide data about the wood, etc.]. In this manner, praxis produces data for consciousness to process, and also helps consciousness to comprehend nature and the laws of movement and development which govern the world.
 +
 
 +
Scientific theories are formed on the basis of the dialectical relationship between practical activity and consciousness. For example: mathematics developed to allow us to count and measure things for practical activities such as agriculture, navigation, and building structures. Marxism also arose in the 1840’s from the practical activities of the struggles of the working class against the capitalist class at that time. Even recent scientific achievements arise from practical needs and activities. For example, the discovery and decoding of the human genome map was born from practical activities and needs, such as the need to develop treatments for incurable diseases. In the end, there is no field of knowledge that is not derived from reality. Ultimately, all knowledge arises from and serves practice. Therefore, if we were to break from reality or stop relying on reality, consciousness would break from the basis of reality that nurtures our growth, existence and development. Also, the cognitive subject cannot have true and profound knowledge about the world if it does not follow reality.
 +
 
 +
Practice also serves as the basis, driving force, and purpose of consciousness because, thanks to practical activities, our human ability to measure and observe reality improves increasingly over time; our logical thinking ability is constantly strengthened and developed; cognitive means become increasingly developed. All of these developments “extend” the human senses in perceiving the world [for example, by developing new tools to measure, perceive, and sense the world such as telescopes, radar, microscopes, etc.].
 +
 
 +
Reality is not only the basis, the driving force, and the purpose of discovering truth but also serves as the ''standard of truth.'' Reality also serves as the basis for ''examining the truthfulness of the cognitive process'' [i.e., we can test whether our thoughts match material reality through experimentation and practice in the real world]. This means that practice is the measure of the value of the knowledge we gain through perception. At the same time, practice is constantly supplementing, adjusting, correcting, developing, and improving human consciousness. Marx said: “The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice.”<ref>''Theses On Feuerbach'', Karl Marx, 1845.</ref>
 +
 
 +
Thus, practice is not only the starting point of consciousness and a decisive factor for the formation and development of consciousness, it is also a target where consciousness must always aim to test the truth. To emphasize this role which practice plays, Lenin said: “The standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge.”<ref>''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1908.</ref>
 +
 
 +
The role of practice in consciousness requires that we always grasp the practical point of view. This point of view requires that we derive our ideas from practice, our ideas must be based on practice, and our ideas must deeply explore practice. In our conscious activities, we must attach a lot of importance to the summarization of practice [i.e., developing theoretical knowledge through theoretical consciousness which reflects practical experience]. Theoretical research must be related to practice, and learning must go hand in hand with practicing. If we diverge from practice, it will lead to mistakes of subjectivism, idealism, dogmatism, rigidity, and bureaucracy.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 222 ====
 +
 
 +
''Subjectivism'' occurs when one centers one’s own self and conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test one’s own perceptions against material and social reality. Subjectivists tend to believe that they can independently reason their way to truth in their own minds without practical experience and activity in the material world. Related to subjectivism is ''solipsism'', a form of idealism in which one believes that the self is the only basis for truth. As Marxist ethicist Howard Selsam wrote in ''Ethics and Progress: New Values in a Revolutionary World'': “If I believe that I alone exist and that you and all your arguments exist only in my mind and are my own creations then all possible arguments will not shake me one iota. No logic can possibly convince [the] solipsist.”
 +
 
 +
''Idealism'' has a strong connection with a failure to incorporate practical activity into theoretical consciousness, since idealism holds that conscious activity is the sole basis of discovering truth.
 +
 
 +
''Dogmatism'' occurs when one only accounts for commonalities and considers theory itself as the sole basis of truth rather than practice [see Annotation 239, p. 235]. Dogmatists ignore practical experience and considering pre-established theory, alone, as unalterable truth. This results in a breakdown of the dialectical relationship between theoretical consciousness and empirical consciousness, which arrests the development process of knowledge and consciousness.
 +
 
 +
''Rigidity'' is an unwillingness to alter one’s thoughts, holding too stiffly to established consciousness and knowledge, and ignoring practical experience and observation, which leads to stagnation of both knowledge and consciousness.
 +
 
 +
''Bureaucracy'' arises when theory becomes overly codified and formalized, to the extent that practical considerations are ignored in favor of codified theory. Bureaucracy can be avoided by incorporating practical experience and observations continuously into the development of practical systems and methodologies so that theory and practice become increasingly aligned over time to continuously improve efficiency and effectiveness of practical activities in the material world.
 +
 
 +
On the contrary, if the role of practice is absolutized [to the exclusion of conscious activity], it will fall into pragmatism and empiricism.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 223 ====
 +
 
 +
In this context, ''pragmatism'' refers to a form of subjectivism [see Annotation 222, above] in which one centers one’s own immediate material concerns over all other considerations. For example, workers may place their own immediate needs and desires above the concerns of their fellow workers as a whole. This may offer some temporary gains, but in the long run their lack of solidarity and class consciousness will be detrimental as workers collectively suffer from division, making all workers more vulnerable to exploitation and ill treatment by the capitalist class.
 +
 
 +
''Empiricism'' is a faulty form of materialism in which ''only'' sense experience and practical experience are considered sources of truth. This is opposed to the dialectical materialist position that the material ''determines'' consciousness, while consciousness ''impacts'' the material world through conscious labor activity. [See ''The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness'', p. 88]
 +
 
 +
Thus, the principle of the ''unification'' of practice and theory must be the basic principle in practical and theoretical activities. Theory without practice as its basis and criterion for determining its truthfulness is useless. Vice versa, practice without scientific and revolutionary theory will inevitably turn into blind practice. [As Ho Chi Minh once said: “Study and practice must always go together. Study without practice is useless. Practice without study leads to folly.”]
 +
 
 +
== 2. Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth ==
 +
 
 +
=== a. Opinions of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin about the Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth ===
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 224 ====
 +
 
 +
The section below outlines and explains ''the Universal Law of Consciousness'', which holds that consciousness is a process of dialectical development in which practical activity leads to conscious activity, which then leads back to practical activity, in a continuous and never-ending cycle, with a tendency to develop both practical and conscious activity to increasingly higher levels.
 +
 
 +
In his ''Philosophical Notebook'', Lenin generalized the dialectical path towards the realization of truth as development from vivid visualization to abstract thinking, and then from abstraction back to practice. This process, according to Lenin, is the dialectical path towards the realization of truth, and the realization of objective reality.
 +
 
 +
According to this generalization, the dialectical path towards the realization of truth (“truth,” here, referring to a correct and accurate reflection of objective reality) is a process. It is a process that starts from “vivid visualization” (emotional consciousness) to “abstract thinking” (rational consciousness).
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 225 ====
 +
 
 +
Given that consciousness has a material basis, and that practical activities are the driving force of consciousness [see Annotation 230, p. 226], it follows that we must strive to align our conscious thoughts and ideas with the material world. The more accurately we can reflect reality in our consciousness, the more effectively and efficiently our practical activities can become.
 +
 
 +
For example, through learning more about the mechanical, material, and physical processes which take place inside of an automobile engine, the more we can improve engines to make them more efficient and effective for practical applications.
 +
 
 +
Lenin explained that consciousness develops from “emotional consciousness” to “rational consciousness.” Thought about a subject begins at a base level of consciousness that is rooted in emotional and sense-oriented conscious activity, i.e, “vivid visualization,” which then leads to rational, abstract reflection.
 +
 
 +
By “vivid visualization,” Lenin is referring to the active, real-time experience of seeing (and hearing, smelling, and otherwise sensing) things and phenomena in the world.
 +
 
 +
When a person experiences something through practical activity, the first conscious activity will tend to occur at the emotional and sensory level — in other words, the conscious activities which occur simultaneously along with practical activities. Only after this initial period of emotional consciousness will one be able to reflect on the experience on a more rational and abstract level.
 +
 
 +
For example, if a zoologist in the field sees a species of bird they have never encountered before, their first conscious activity will be at the sensory-emotional level: they will observe the shape, coloration, and motion of the bird. They may feel excitement, happiness, and other emotions. This is emotional conscious activity.
 +
 
 +
This emotional conscious activity will then develop into rational conscious activity, as the zoologist may begin to consider things more abstractly, attempting to interpret and understand this experience through reason and rational reflection, asking such questions as: “Where does this bird nest? What does it feed on? Is this a new discovery?” and so on.
 +
 
 +
Such abstractions are not the end point of a cognitive cycle, because consciousness must then continue to develop through practice. It is through practice that perception tests and proves its own correctness so that it can then continue on to repeat the cycle.
 +
 
 +
This is also the general rule of the human perception of objective reality.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 226 ====
 +
 
 +
Thus there is a dialectical relationship between emotional consciousness (linked to practical activity) and rational consciousness (linked to purely conscious activity).
 +
 
 +
This dialectical relationship is a cycle, in which one engages in practical activity, which leads to emotional consciousness, which leads to rational consciousness, which then leads back to practical activity to test the correctness of the conclusions of rational conscious activity.
 +
 
 +
We call this cycle of development of consciousness the cognitive process.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-84.png|''The cognitive process is a continuous cycle which describes the dialectical development of consciousness and practical activity.'']]
 +
 
 +
The cognitive process is explained in more detail below.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
'''- Development From Emotional Consciousness to Rational Consciousness'''
 +
 
 +
''Emotional consciousness is the lower stage of the cognitive process.'' In this stage of cognitive development, humans use — through practical activity — use our senses to reflect objective things and phenomena (with all their perceived specific characteristics and rich manifestations) in human consciousness. During this period, consciousness only reflects the phenomena [i.e, ''phenomena'', as opposed to ''essence'' — see ''Essence and Phenomenon'', p. 156] — the external manifestations — of the perceived subject. At this stage, consciousness has not yet reflected the ''essence'' — the nature, and/or the regulating principles — of the subject. Therefore, this is the lowest stage of development of the cognitive process. In this stage, consciousness is carried out through three basic phases: ''sensation'', ''conception'', and ''symbolization''.
 +
 
 +
Human ''sensation'' of an objective thing or phenomenon is the simplest, most primitive phase of the emotional consciousness stage of the cognitive processes, but without it there would not be any perception of objective things or phenomena. Every human sensation of objective things and phenomena contains objective content [see Content and Form, p. 147], even though it arises as subjective human conscious reflection. Sensation is the subjective imagining of the objective world. It is the basis from which the next phase of emotional consciousness — ''conception'' — is formed.
 +
 
 +
''Conception'' is a relatively complete reflection within human consciousness of objective things and phenomena. Conception is formed on the basis of linking and synthesizing sensational experiences of things and phenomena [i.e., ''sensation'']. Compared with sensation, conception is a higher, fuller, richer form of consciousness, but it is still a reflection of the outward manifestations of objects. Conception does not yet reflect the essence, nature, and regulating principles of the perceived subject.
 +
 
 +
''Symbolization'' is the representation of an objective thing or phenomenon that has been reflected by sensation and conception. It is the most advanced and most complex phase of the stage of emotional consciousness. At the same time, it also serves as the transitional step between emotional consciousness and rational consciousness. The defining characteristic of symbolism is the ability to reproduce symbolic ideas of objective things and phenomena within human consciousness. Symbolization describes the act of recreating the outward appearances of material things and phenomena within human consciousness, which is the first step of abstraction, and thus the first step towards rational consciousness.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 227 ====
 +
 
 +
Here is an example of the three phases of the emotional consciousness stage of the cognitive process:
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-85.png]]
 +
 
 +
''1.'' ''Sensation'': Jessica ''senses'' a cake in the window of a bakery. She ''sees'' the frosting, the shape of the cake, and the decorations which adorn the cake. She ''smells'' the cake. During this phase, objective data about the cake is received into her consciousness, developing into an immediate and subjective sense perception of the cake. The beginnings of this cognitive activity will be purely sensory in nature; she may have been thinking of other things as she walked by the bakery, but the sight and smell of the cake, upon registering in her mind, will lead to the beginning of a new cognitive process cycle.
 +
 
 +
''2.'' ''Conception'': Jessica begins to ''conceive'' of the cake in her mind more fully. She will associate the immediate sense experiences of seeing and smelling the cake with other experiences she has had with cake, and a complete mental image and concept of the cake will form in her mind.
 +
 
 +
''3.'' ''Symbolization'': The word “cake” may now form in her mind, and she may begin thinking of the cake more abstractly, as “food,” as a “temptation,” and in other ways. This is the beginning of abstraction in Jessica’s mind, which will then lead to rational conscious activities.
 +
 
 +
Note that all of these phases of emotional consciousness activity may take place very quickly, perhaps in a fraction of a second, and may coincide with other conscious activity (i.e., Jessica may simultaneously be thinking of a meeting she’s running late to and any number of other things). At this point, Jessica will transition to the ''rational consciousness'' stage of the cognitive process'','' which is explained in more detail below.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
By the end of the emotional stage of the cognitive process, consciousness has not yet reflected the essence — the nature, regulating principles, etc. — of the perceived subject. Therefore, at the emotional stage, consciousness is not yet able to properly ''interpret'' the reflected subject. That is to say, emotional conscious activity does not meet the cognitive requirements to serve practical activities, including the need to creatively transform the objective world. To meet these requirements, emotional consciousness must develop into ''rational consciousness''.
 +
 
 +
''Rational consciousness is the higher stage of the cognitive process.'' It includes the indirect, abstract, and generalized reflection of the essential properties and characteristics of things and phenomena. This stage of consciousness performs the most important function of comprehending and interpreting the ''essence'' of the perceived subject. Rational consciousness is implemented through three basic phases: ''definition'', ''judgment'', and ''reasoning''.
 +
 
 +
''Definition'' is the first phase of rational consciousness. During this phase, the mind begins to interpret, organize, and process the basic properties of things and phenomena at a rational level into a conceptual whole. The formation of definition is the result of the summarization and synthesis of all the different characteristics and properties of the subject, and how the subject fits into the organized structure of knowledge which exists in the mind. Definition is the basis for forming judgments in the cognitive process.
 +
 
 +
''Judgment'' is the next phase of rational consciousness, which arises from the definition of the subject — the linking of concepts and properties together — which leads to affirmative or negative ideation of certain characteristics or attributes of the perceived subject.
 +
 
 +
According to the level of development of consciousness, judgment may take one of three forms: unique judgment, general judgment, and universal judgment [see Annotation 105, p. 107]. Universal judgment is the form of judgement that expresses the broadest conception of objective reality.
 +
 
 +
''Reasoning'' is the final phase of rational consciousness, formed on the basis of synthesizing judgments so as to extrapolate new knowledge about the perceived subject. Before reasoning can take place, judgments must be transformed into knowledge. A judgment can be transformed into knowledge through one of two logical mechanisms: deductive inference (which extrapolates the general from the specific), and inductive inference (which extrapolates the specific from the general).
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 228 ====
 +
 
 +
Here is an example of the three phases of the rational consciousness stage of the cognitive process, continuing from our previous example of the emotional consciousness stage [see Annotation 227, p. 222].
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-86.png]]
 +
 
 +
''1.'' ''Definition'': Jessica’s conception of the cake will transition into the rational conscious activity of ''definition''. Jessica will begin to define the concept of the cake more wholly and concretely, summarizing and synthesizing all of the features and characteristics of the cake into a cohesive mental reflection of the cake. The word “cake” may become more pronounced and defined in Jessica’s consciousness, prompting her to think of the object which she defines as a “cake” more fully and rationally.
 +
 
 +
''2.'' ''Judgment'': Jessica will begin to form basic judgments about the cake. “That cake looks good,” “that cake smells good,” and so on. Next, these judgments will begin to transform into knowledge through inductive or deductive inferences. An inductive inference might be: “I generally enjoy eating cakes, therefore, I might enjoy eating this cake!” An example of a deductive inference might be: “This cake looks very delicious, therefore, there might be other delicious things in this bakery!”
 +
 
 +
''3.'' ''Reasoning'': Processes of inductive and/or deductive inference will begin to transform Jessica’s judgments into the form of knowledge. For instance, she may now possess such knowledge as: “This bakery has delicious looking cakes, this is a cake I would like to eat,” and so on. With this newly acquired knowledge, Jessica can begin reasoning; that is to say, she can begin making rational conclusions and decisions. She might conclude: “I will go into this bakery and buy that cake.”
 +
 
 +
Note that this is not the “end” of the cognitive process, because the final phase of the reasoning stage of the cognitive process (reasoning) will lead directly into a new cycle of the cognitive process. In this example, Jessica might engage in the practical activity of checking her watch to see the time, which will begin a new cycle of cognitive process, beginning with the ''sensation'' phase of the emotional stage as the visual sense data of her watch and carrying through to the final ''reasoning'' phase of the rational stage, and so on.
 +
 
 +
It should also be noted that this is merely an abstraction of the cognitive process; in reality, the human mind is incredibly complex, capable of carrying out a variety of cognitive processes simultaneously. At any given moment, a person might be considering various different subjects, and each different subject might be at a different stage of the cognitive process. This abstract model of the cognitive process is presented to help us comprehend the component functions of consciousness more easily in the wider context of dialectical materialist philosophy.
 +
 
 +
Specifically, this model of the cognitive process is intended to help us understand how human consciousness leads to “truth.” And “truth,” here, refers to the alignment of human consciousness with the material world, so that our perceptions and understanding of the world is accurate and representative of actual reality.
 +
 
 +
''- The Relationship Between Emotional Consciousness, Rational Consciousness, and Reality''
 +
 
 +
Emotional consciousness and rational consciousness are stages that make up the cognitive cycle. In reality, they are often intertwined within the cognitive process, but they have different functions. If ''emotional consciousness'' is associated with reality, and with the impact of sense data received from observing the material world, and is the basis for cognitive reason, then ''rational consciousness'', based on higher cognitive understanding and abstraction, allows us to understand the essence, nature, regulating principles, and development processes of things and phenomena. Rational consciousness helps direct emotional consciousness in a more efficient and effective direction and leads to more profound and accurate emotional consciousness.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 229 ====
 +
 
 +
In other words, considering a subject at the level of rational consciousness allows us to then view the same subject, at an emotional consciousness level, with more depth and awareness.
 +
 
 +
For example, the more time we have spent rationally considering something like a bicycle, the more quickly and accurately we can examine a bicycle at the level of emotional consciousness. If someone is looking at a bicycle for the first time, they might not be able to distinguish its component parts or functions. On the other hand, if someone has spent more time considering bicycles at the level of rational consciousness, they may be able to immediately and rapidly understand and process a bicycle at the emotional conscious level, so that they can perceive and comprehend the different parts of a bicycle, as well as their functions, immediately and at the emotional-sensory level.
 +
 
 +
However, if we stop at rational consciousness, we will only have knowledge about the subjects we perceive, but we still won’t really know if that knowledge is truly accurate or not. In order to be useful in practical activity, we must consciously determine whether knowledge is ''truth'' [i.e., whether the knowledge accurately reflects reality]. In order to determine the truth of knowledge, consciousness must necessarily return to reality. Consciousness must use reality as a criterion — a measurement — of the authenticity of knowledge gained through purely cognitive processes. In other words, all consciousness is ultimately derived from practical needs, and must also return to serve practical activities.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 230 ====
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-87.png|''The dialectical relationship between consciousness and practical activities means that conscious activities develop practical activities, and vice versa, in a continuous feedback loop.'']]
 +
 
 +
One of the fundamental principles of dialectical materialism is that the material determines the ideal, and the ideal impacts the material [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness]. The fact that the material determines consciousness is reflected in the fact that material needs led to the development of consciousness, and conscious activity stems from material needs [see Social Sources of Consciousness].
 +
 
 +
The fact that the ideal impacts the material is reflected in the fact that consciousness must always return to the service of practical activities; as our consciousness develops (along with knowledge), our ability to impact and transform the material world becomes more efficient and effective.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-88.png|''The dialectical relationship between consciousness and practical activity is what drives the development of humanity. We imagine better ways of doing things, then test those ideas against reality through practical activity.'']]
 +
 
 +
This dialectical relationship between consciousness and practical activity is thus cyclical. Conscious activity arises from practical activity, and returns to practical activity, in an endless process of developing both conscious ability as well as practical ability.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Therefore, it can be seen that the general, cyclical nature of the process of movement and development of consciousness develops from practice to consciousness — from consciousness to practice — from practical activity to the continued process of cognitive development, and so on. This process is repeated continuously, without end. The development level of consciousness and practice in the next cycle are often higher than in the previous cycle, and the cognitive process gradually develops more and more accuracy, as well as fuller and deeper knowledge about objective reality.
 +
 
 +
The universal law of consciousness [see Annotation 224, p. 219] is also a concrete and vivid manifestation of the universal laws of materialist dialectics, including: the law of negation of negation, the law of transformation between quantity and quality and the law of unity and contradiction between opposites. The process of cognitive motion and development, governed by these general laws, is the process of human progress towards absolute truth [see Annotation 232, p. 228].
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 231 ====
 +
 
 +
The universal law of consciousness is governed by the three universal laws of materialist dialectics:
 +
 
 +
''The Law of Negation of Negation'' dictates that the new will arise from the old, but will carry forward characteristics from the old. This is reflected in the universal law of consciousness in that conscious activity arises from practical activity. This conscious activity then develops into improved practical activity, and so on, in a never-ending cycle of development. Throughout this development process, characteristics of previous cycles of cognitive and practical activities are carried forward and transferred on to newer cycles of cognitive and practical activities.
 +
 
 +
''The Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality'' recognizes that quantity changes develop into changes in quality, and vice versa. This is reflected in the universal law of consciousness in the development of both conscious and practical activities. Conscious development also develops from quantitative changes to quality changes, and vice versa. For example, once a person accumulates a certain quantity of knowledge, the quality of their knowledge will change. For example, once a person has learned the function of every component part of a car engine, they will have a ''quality shift'' in their understanding of car engines — they will now have competency of the functioning of the engine as a whole. This is also true of practical activities. A quantity of practical experience will lead to quality shifts in practical ability. For example, once a person has practiced riding a bicycle enough that they can reliably ride the bicycle without falling, we would say that the person “knows how to ride a bicycle,” which represents a quality shift from the state of “learning how to ride a bicycle.”
 +
 
 +
''The Law of Unity and Contradiction Between Opposites'' states that all things, phenomena, and ideas are defined by internal and external contradictions. This is reflected in the universal law of consciousness by the fact that practical needs serve as the basis for conscious activity, and that cognitive processes serve, in essence, to negate contradictions between consciousness and material reality through practical experience. In other words, the cognitive process is defined by a never-ending process of contradiction between the material and the ideal, as human beings seek to negate contradictions between our conscious understanding of the world and our practical experiences in search of ''truth -'' the accurate alignment of consciousness with the material world.
 +
 
 +
=== b. Truth, and the Relationship Between Truth and Reality ===
 +
 
 +
''- Definition of Truth''
 +
 
 +
All cognitive processes lead to the creation of ''knowledge'', which is what we call human understanding of objective reality. But not all knowledge has content consistent with objective reality, because consciousness exists as the subjective reflection of objective reality in the human mind. The collective cognitive practice of all of humanity throughout history, as well as the cognitive practice of each individual human being, has demonstrated that the knowledge which people have gained and are gaining is not always consistent with objective reality. On the contrary, there are many cases of misalignment between consciousness and reality, and even complete contradiction between human thought and objective reality.
 +
 
 +
Within the theoretical scope of Marxism-Leninism, the concept of ''truth'' is used to refer to knowledge which is aligned with objective reality. This alignment is tested and proven through practice. In this sense, the concept of truth is not identical with the concept of “knowledge,” nor with the concept of “hypothesis.” According to Lenin: “The coincidence of thought with the object is a '''process''': thought (= man) must not imagine truth in the form of dead repose, in the form of a bare picture (image), pale (matte), without impulse, without motion…”<ref>''Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic,'' Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.</ref>
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 232 ====
 +
 
 +
Here, Lenin is dispelling Hegel’s conception of “absolute truth,” which is not to be confused with Lenin’s concept of “absolute truth” as “objective truth” which aligns consciousness with objective reality [see Annotation 58, p. 56]. For Hegel, “absolute truth” was the idea that there will eventually be some end point to the process of rational consciousness at which we will finally arrive at some final stage of knowledge and consciousness. This rational end point of consciousness, at which the dialectic ends and all contradictions are negated, is Hegel’s “absolute truth.”
 +
 
 +
Lenin is also pushing back against the metaphysical conception that all “truths” exist as static categories of information which do not change. Instead, Lenin points out that seeking truth — i.e., aligning consciousness with material reality — is a never-ending process, in particular because reality is constantly developing and changing. Thus, the alignment of consciousness with reality — the pursuit of truth — is a living and dynamic process which will never end, since the development of reality will never end.
 +
 
 +
''- The Properties of Truth''
 +
 
 +
All truths are ''objective, relative, absolute,'' and ''concrete.''
 +
 
 +
The ''objectivity'' of truth is the independence of its content from the subjective will of human beings. The content of knowledge must be aligned with objective reality, not vice versa. This means that the content of accurate knowledge is not a product of pure subjective reasoning. Truth is not an arbitrary human construct, nor is truth inherent in consciousness. On the contrary, truth belongs to the objective world, and is determined by the objective world. The affirmation of the objectivity of truth is one of the fundamental points that distinguishes the concept of absolute truth of dialectical materialism from the concept of absolute truth of idealism and skepticism — the doctrines that deny the objective existence of the physical world and deny the possibility that humans are able to perceive the world.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 233 ====
 +
 
 +
The Dialectical Materialist conception of objective truth stands in contrast to ''idealism'', which states that conscious reasoning alone leads to truth, and that the subjective ideal determines material reality [see Annotation 7, p. 8].
 +
 
 +
This objectivity of truth also refutes ''skepticism'', which states that truth is essentially undiscoverable, because human consciousness is ultimately unreliable and incapable of accurately reflecting material reality [see Annotation 32, p. 27].
 +
 
 +
Distinction must also be drawn between the concept of absolute truth as it is understood in dialectical materialist philosophy and the conception of absolute truth in Hegel’s idealist dialectics. Dialectical materialism defines absolute truth as “objective truth;” that is to say: a complete alignment between objective reality and human consciousness (as compared to relative truth, which is a partial alignment between consciousness and objective reality).
 +
 
 +
Hegel, on the other hand, views absolute truth as a final point at which human consciousness will have achieved absolute, complete, and final understanding of our universe (see Annotation 232, p. 228) with the ideal serving as the first basis and primary mechanism for bringing absolute truth to fruition.
 +
 
 +
Truth is not only objective, but also ''absolute'' and ''relative''. Absolute truth [see Annotation 58, p. 56] refers to truth which reflects a full and complete alignment of consciousness and reality. Theoretically, we can reach absolute truth. This is because, in the objective world, there exists no thing nor phenomenon which human beings are completely incapable of accurately perceiving. The possibility of acquiring absolute truth in the process of the development of conscious understanding is theoretically limitless. However, in reality, our conscious ability to reflect reality is limited by the specific material conditions of each generation of humanity, of practical limitations, and by the spatial and temporal conditions of reflected subjects. Therefore, truth is also ''relative''.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 234 ====
 +
 
 +
Dialectical materialist philosophy recognizes that it must be theoretically possible to know everything there is to know about a given subject, since we are theoretically capable of accurately perceiving, sensing, and measuring all data which pertains to a subject. However, dialectical materialism also recognizes the practical limitations of human beings. As Engels writes in ''Anti-Dühring'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
If mankind ever reached the stage at which it should work only with eternal truths, with results of thought which possess sovereign validity and an unconditional claim to truth, it would then have reached the point where the infinity of the intellectual world both in its actuality and in its potentiality had been exhausted, and thus the famous miracle of the counted uncountable would have been performed.
 +
 
 +
But are there any truths which are so securely based that any doubt of them seems to us to be tantamount to insanity? That twice two makes four, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, that Paris is in France, that a man who gets no food dies of hunger, and so forth? Are there then nevertheless eternal truths, final and ultimate truths.
 +
 
 +
Certainly there are. We can divide the whole realm of knowledge in the traditional way into three great departments. The first includes all sciences that deal with inanimate nature and are to a greater or lesser degree susceptible of mathematical treatment: mathematics, astronomy, mechanics, physics, chemistry. If it gives anyone any pleasure to use mighty words for very simple things, it can be asserted that certain results obtained by these sciences are eternal truths, final and ultimate truths; for which reason these sciences are known as the exact sciences. But very far from all their results have this validity. With the introduction of variable magnitudes and the extension of their variability to the infinitely small and infinitely large, mathematics, usually so strictly ethical, fell from grace; it ate of the tree of knowledge, which opened up to it a career of most colossal achievements, but at the same time a path of error. The virgin state of absolute validity and irrefutable proof of everything mathematical was gone forever; the realm of controversy was inaugurated, and we have reached the point where most people differentiate and integrate not because they understand what they are doing but from pure faith, because up to now it has always come out right. Things are even worse with astronomy and mechanics, and in physics and chemistry we are swamped by hypotheses as if attacked by a swarm of bees. And it must of necessity be so. In physics we are dealing with the motion of molecules, in chemistry with the formation of molecules out of atoms, and if the interference of light waves is not a myth, we have absolutely no prospect of ever seeing these interesting objects with our own eyes. As time goes on, final and ultimate truths become remarkably rare in this field.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Relative truth is truth which has developed alignment with reality without yet having reached ''complete'' alignment between human knowledge and the reality which it reflects. To put it another way, relative truth represents knowledge which incompletely reflects material subjects without complete accuracy. In relative truth, there is only partial alignment — in some (but not all) aspects — between consciousness and the material world.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 235 ====
 +
 
 +
''False consciousness'' is consciousness which is incorrect and misaligned from reality. Discovering and rooting out false consciousness is one of the primary concerns of dialectical materialism, as false consciousness can be a serious impediment to human progress. The term “false consciousness” was first used by Friedrich Engels in a personal letter to Franz Mehring in 1893 (a decade after the death of Karl Marx), and in this letter Engels uses the term interchangeably with the word “ideology”* to describe conscious thought processes which do not align with reality:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, indeed, but with a false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown to him, otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all. Hence he imagines false or apparent motives. Because it is a process of thought he derives both its form and its content from pure thought, either his own or that of his predecessors. He works with mere thought material which he accepts without examination as the product of thought, he does not investigate further for a more remote process independent of thought; indeed its origin seems obvious to him, because as all action is produced through the medium of thought it also appears to him to be ultimately based upon thought. The ideologist who deals with history (history is here simply meant to comprise all the spheres – political, juridical, philosophical, theological – belonging to society and not only to nature), the ideologist dealing with history then, possesses in every sphere of science material which has formed itself independently out of the thought of previous generations and has gone through an independent series of developments in the brains of these successive generations. True, external facts belonging to its own or other spheres may have exercised a co-determining influence on this development, but the tacit pre-supposition is that these facts themselves are also only the fruits of a process of thought, and so we still remain within that realm of pure thought which has successfully digested the hardest facts.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Although the ''term'' “false consciousness” is not found in writing until after Marx’s death, the ''concept'' underlying the term “false consciousness” is found often in the works of Marx and Engels. For instance, in ''The Holy Family,'' Marx and Engels explain how communist, class conscious workers have been able to break free of false consciousness of capitalist society:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
They (the communist workers) are most painfully aware of the difference between being and thinking, between consciousness and life. They know that property, capital, money, wage-labor and the like are no ideal figments of the brain but very practical, very objective products of their self-estrangement.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
This allusion to “the difference between being and thinking” recurs again and again in the works of Marx and Engels.
 +
 
 +
<nowiki>*</nowiki> Lenin also discussed the concept of false consciousness extensively, and argued that dialectical materialism was the key to negating the false consciousness of the working class, writing in ''What the “Friends of the People” Are'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
It never has been the case, nor is it so now, that the members of society conceive the sum-total of the social relations in which they live as something definite, integral, pervaded by some principle; on the contrary, the mass of people adapt themselves to these relations unconsciously, and have so little conception of them as specific historical social relations that, for instance, an explanation of the exchange relations under which people have lived for centuries was found only in very recent times. Materialism removed this contradiction by carrying the analysis deeper, to the origin of man’s social ideas themselves; and its conclusion that the course of ideas depends on the course of things is the only one compatible with scientific psychology. Further, and from yet another aspect, this hypothesis was the first to elevate sociology to the level of a science.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Note that this convention of using the word “ideology” to mean “false consciousness” has never been common, and Marx and Engels both used the word “ideology” more often in its more usual sense of “a system of ideas,” but it is still occasionally encountered in socialist literature, as Joseph McCarney explains in ''Marx Myths and Legends'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Marx never calls ideology ‘false consciousness’. Indeed, he never calls anything ‘false consciousness’, a phrase that does not occur in his work... The noun is almost always accompanied by an epithet such as ‘German’, ‘republican’, ‘political’ or ‘Hegelian’, or by a qualifying phrase, as in ‘the ideology of the bourgeoisie’ or ‘the ideology of the political economist’. More typical in any case is the adjectival usage in which such varied items as ‘forms’, ‘expressions’, ‘phrases’, ’conceptions’, ‘deception’, and ‘distortion’ are said to have an ‘ideological’ character. Even more distinctive is the frequency, amounting to approximately half of all references in the relevant range, of invocations of the ‘ideologists’, the creators and purveyors of the ideological forms.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
“Relative truth” and “absolute truth” do not exist separately, but have dialectical unity with each other. On the one hand, “absolute truth” is the sum of all “relative truths.” On the other hand, in all relative truths there are always elements of absolute truth.
 +
 
 +
Lenin wrote that “absolute truth results from the sum-total of relative truths in the course of their development; [...] relative truths represent relatively faithful reflections of an object existing independently of man; [...] these reflections become more and more faithful; [...] every scientific truth, notwithstanding its relative nature, contains an element of absolute truth.”<ref>''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'', Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1908.</ref>
 +
 
 +
Correct realization of the dialectical relationship between relative and absolute truth plays a very important role in criticizing and overcoming extremism and false consciousness in perception and in action. If we exaggerate the absoluteness of the truth of knowledge which we possess, or downplay its relativity, we will fall into the false consciousness of metaphysics, dogmatism, conservativism, and stagnation.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 236 ====
 +
 
 +
Intentional or unintentional exaggeration of the absoluteness of truth — i.e., considering our knowledge to be more complete and/or aligned with reality than it actually is — leads to incorrect viewpoints and mindsets, including:
 +
 
 +
''Metaphysics'' is a philosophical system which seeks truth through the systematic categorization of knowledge [see Annotation 8, p. 8]. This is a flawed method of seeking knowledge because it considers truth to be essentially static and unchanging, and upholds the erroneous notion that truth can be systematically broken down into discrete, isolated categories. In addition to being fundamentally incorrect about the nature of truth and knowledge, it leads to the incorrect presumption that such static categorization of knowledge can lead to truth ''at all''. Metaphysics fails to see truth and consciousness as a ''process'', and instead sees truth as a static assembly of categorized facts and data.
 +
 
 +
''Dogmatism'' occurs when one only accounts for commonalities and considers theory itself as the sole basis of truth. Dogmatism inherently overstates the absoluteness of knowledge, as dogmatic positions uphold certain theoretical principles as complete, inviolable, and completely developed. This explicitly denies the continuously developing process of advancing knowledge and consciousness.
 +
 
 +
''Conservativism'' includes any position that seeks to prevent change, or to undo change to return to an earlier state of development. Such positions deny the continuous development of consciousness, knowledge, and practice, and incorrectly assert incorrect positions; or mistake relative truth for absolute truth.
 +
 
 +
''Stagnation'' is an inability or unwillingness to change and adapt consciousness and practice in accordance with developing material conditions. Stagnation can stem from, or cause, overstatement of absolute truth in theory and forestall necessary development of both consciousness and practical ability.
 +
 
 +
On the contrary, if we exaggerate the relativity of the truth of knowledge which we possess, or downplay its absoluteness, we will fall into relativism, thereby leading to subjectivism, revisionism, sophistry, and skepticism.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 237 ====
 +
 
 +
''Relativism'' is the belief that human consciousness can ''only'' achieve relative understanding of the world, and that truth can therefore never be objectively discovered. Relativism is, thus, the overstatement of the relative nature of truth and the denial of the existence of absolute truth. Relativism leads to such incorrect viewpoints and mindsets as:
 +
 
 +
''Subjectivism'': which occurs when one centers one’s own self and one’s own conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test their own perceptions against material and social reality [see Annotation 211, p. 205]. This position denies that truth can be discovered in the external material world, falsely believing that absolute truth stems only from conscious activity.
 +
 
 +
''Revisionism'': a failure to recognize and accept commonalities in conscious activity, focusing only on the private [see ''Private and Common'', p. 128]. Revisionism leads to constant and unnecessary reassessment and reevaluation of both knowledge and practice. Revisionism, thus, is a position which overstates the relativity of truth and ignores truths which are more fully developed towards absoluteness.
 +
 
 +
''Sophistry:'' the use of falsehoods and fallacious arguments to deceive [see Annotation 116, p. 118]. Sophistry is, thus, the intentional denial of truth and the intentional mischaracterization of truths as either overly relative or as not truths at all.
 +
 
 +
''Skepticism:'' the belief that truth is essentially undiscoverable, because human consciousness is ultimately unreliable and incapable of accurately reflecting material reality [see Annotation 200, p. 192]. By denying that truth is discoverable at all, skepticism explicitly rejects absolute truth and declares that all truth is relative and unreliable.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
In addition to objectivity, absoluteness, and relativity, truth also has ''concreteness.'' The concreteness of truth refers to the degree to which a truth is attached to specific objects, in specific conditions, at a specific point in time. This means that all accurate knowledge always refers to a specific situation which involves specific subjects which exist in a specific place and time. The content of truth cannot be pure abstraction, disconnected from reality, but it is always associated with certain, specific objects and phenomena which exist in a specific space, time, and arrangement, with specific internal and external relationships. Therefore, truth is associated with specific historical conditions. This specificity to time, place, relations, etc., is what we call ''concreteness''.
 +
 
 +
Knowledge, if detached from specific historical conditions, will fall into pure abstraction. Therefore, it will not be accurate — it will not align with reality — and such knowledge cannot be considered truth. When emphasizing this property, Lenin wrote: “Truth is always concrete, never abstract.”<ref>''Once Again On The Trade Unions,'' Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921.</ref> Mastering the principle of the concreteness of truth has an important methodological significance in cognitive and practical activities. It is required that consideration and evaluation of all things and phenomena must be based on a historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116]. In developing and applying theory, we must be conscious of specific historical conditions. According to Lenin, Marxism’s nature, its essence, lies in the concrete analysis of specific situations; Marx’s method is, above all, to consider the objective content of the historical process in a specific time.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 238 ====
 +
 
 +
In other words, Marxism is rooted in seeking truth by examining reality from a historical and comprehensive viewpoint. For more information, see Annotation 114, p. 116.
 +
 
 +
''- The Role of Truth in Reality.''
 +
 
 +
In order to survive and develop, humans must conduct practical activities. These activities involve transforming the environment, nature, and human society. At the same time, through these activities, humans perform — knowingly or unknowingly — the process of perfecting and developing our conscious and practical abilities. It is this process that helps human cognitive activities develop. Practical activities can only be successful and effective once humans apply accurate knowledge of objective reality to our practical activities. Therefore, truth is one of the prerequisites that ensure success and efficiency in practical activities.
 +
 
 +
The relationship between truth and practical activities is a dialectical relationship which serves as the basis for the movement and development of both truth and practical activity: truth develops through practice, and practice develops through the correct application of truth which people have gained through practical activities.
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
==== Annotation 239 ====
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-89.png|''Truth and Practical Activities have a dialectical relationship in which truth develops through practice, and practice develops through the correct application of truth.'']]
 +
 
 +
Practice only develops when truth about the universe is consciously applied to practical activities. For example, farm output increases as we learn more truth about the way crops grow and how land can be properly managed. Simultaneously, truth can only be developed through practical activity, as all ideas and knowledge must be tested through methodological observation, experimentation, and other forms of practical activity.
 +
 
 +
A ''theory'' is an idea or system of ideas intended to explain an aspect, characteristic, or tendency of objective reality. Theories are not inherently truthful; holding incorrect theories constitutes ''false consciousness''. ''Practice'' (or ''praxis'') is purposeful conscious activity which improves our understanding of the world. Theory and practice have a dialectical relationship with one another which, if understood, helps us to discover truth.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-90.png|''Truth and practical activities mutually develop one another over time.'']]
 +
 
 +
This dialectical relationship between theory and practical activities means that we must never favor theory over practice, nor practice over theory, but that we must rather balance development of theoretical understanding as we engage in practical activities to test our knowledge against reality and to develop our practice with ever-advancing understanding of the world. As practice and theory develop one another, our understanding of objective reality comes closer and closer to truth.
 +
 
 +
In ''Theses on Feuerbach'', Marx summarizes the relationship between theory and practice, writing:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The problem of the external world is here put as the problem of its transformation: the problem of the cognition of the external world as an integral part of the problem of transformation: the problem of theory as a practical problem.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Here, Marx explains that theory is concerned with solving the “problem” of transforming the external world through practice, and that “cognition of the external world” is required to solve the “problem of transformation. In other words, we must improve our theory in order to improve our practical ability to transform our world, and we learn about the world (thus improving our theory) through those practical activities.
 +
 
 +
Marx also writes in ''Theses on Feuerbach'' that:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory, but it is a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power... of his thinking.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
This point is key for understanding the dialectical relationship between practice and theory: in order to be useful, theory must be ''proven through practice''. Thus, we must seek to develop our practice through theory, and our theory through practice.
 +
 
 +
Engels summarizes these ideas a bit more colorfully in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Before there was argument there was action... In the beginning was the deed ... And human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
 
 +
-----
 +
 
 +
Engels wrote in ''Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'' of the uselessness of what might be called “pure theory,” divorced from practice, and the sort of radical skepticism which refutes that any practical knowledge can ever really be obtained by human beings:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
There is yet a set of different philosophers — those who question the possibility of any cognition, or at least of an exhaustive cognition of the world... The most telling refutation of this (scepticism and agnosticism) as of all other philosophical crotchets, is praxis, namely experiment and industry.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
It is ''practice'', according to Engels, which proves the merit and utility of theory.
 +
 
 +
Through experiment and industry — through practical activities in the material world — we can test our ideas and dialectically develop both theory and practice. Lenin built upon these ideas in his own work, writing in ''Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The materialist theory, the theory of the reflection of objects by our mind, is here presented with absolute clarity: things exist outside us. Our perceptions and ideas are their images. Verification of these images, differentiation between true and false images, is given by practice.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Here, Lenin explains how only a proper understanding and application of the dialectical relationship between theory and practice can lead to the negation of false consciousness [see Annotation 235, p. 231] and the dialectical development of both practice and theory. Simply arguing and debating about ideas without relating them directly to practice will never lead to truth, nor will such pure-theory argumentation develop theory or practice in any meaningful way.
 +
 
 +
This brings to mind another line from Marx’s ''Theses on Feuerbach'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
The philosophy of dialectical materialism and the system of materialist dialectics are designed specifically to produce ''action'' and to avoid such “scholastic questions” and “pure-theory argumentation.”
 +
 
 +
Ho Chi Minh summarized these ideas perhaps most clearly and precisely of all in the very title of his article: ''Practice Generates Knowledge, Understanding Advances Theory, Theory Leads to Practice:''
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Knowledge comes from practice. And through practice, knowledge becomes theory. That theory, again, has to be put into practice. Knowledge advances not just from thought to theory, but, above all, from applying theory to revolutionary practice. Once the world’s law is fully grasped as theory, it is critical to put that theory into practice by changing the world, by increasing production, and by practicing class struggle and struggling for national self-determination. This is a continuous process of obtaining knowledge.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-91.png|''“If Uncle Ho says we will win, we will win!” — Propaganda poster from the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1984).'']]
 +
 
 +
= Afterword =
 +
 
 +
If it seems that this book has come to an end somewhat abruptly, it’s because this is really just the first of four major sections of the full volume from which this text is drawn. If you are reading this afterword after reading the entirety of the preceding contents, then congratulations, you have completed the equivalent to a full semester’s coursework for a class on dialectical materialist philosophy which all Vietnamese college students are required to take!
 +
 
 +
The next sections in this curriculum, each covered in the original full volume, include:
 +
 
 +
=== Part 2: Historical Materialism ===
 +
 
 +
This section covers the definition and basic principles of historical materialism, which is the field of work dedicated to applying dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics to human history and human society. In the West, historical materialism and dialectical materialism are often conflated, but this is in error. Historical materialism is an ''applied field'' of dialectical materialist philosophy and materialist dialectical methodology which is used in the pursuit of understanding and interpreting human history.
 +
 
 +
=== Part 3: Political Economy ===
 +
 
 +
This section condenses the three cardinal volumes of ''Capital'' by Karl Marx and covers three primary doctrines:
 +
 
 +
1. The doctrine of value.
 +
 
 +
2. The doctrine of surplus value.
 +
 
 +
3. The doctrines of monopolist capitalism and state monopolist capitalism.
 +
 
 +
Political Economy, in this course, can be considered the application of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics to the analysis and understanding of the capitalist mode of production from the perspective of the socialist revolutionary movement.
 +
 
 +
=== Part 4: Scientific Socialism ===
 +
 
 +
This section relies on an established understanding of dialectical materialism, historical materialism, and political economy as a foundation for developing socialist revolution. The three chapters of this section on Scientific Socialism are:
 +
 
 +
1. The Historical Mission of the Working Class and the Socialist Revolution
 +
 
 +
2. The Primary Social-Political Issues of the Process of Building a Socialist Revolution 3. Realistic Socialism and Potential Socialism
 +
 
 +
=== Moving Forward ===
 +
 
 +
We are already working on the translation of Part 2 of this curriculum, and we hope to complete it as quickly as possible. In the meantime, we believe this book provides the reader with enough of a foundation to continue studying and to begin applying the principles of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics in political struggle.
 +
 
 +
We highly discourage readers from self-study in isolation, just as we discourage individual political action. The best way to study socialism is ''alongside other socialists''.
 +
 
 +
Depending on where you live, you may be able to find political education resources provided by communist parties, socialist book clubs, or other organizations. If such resources aren’t available, it should be fairly easy to find study groups, workshops, and affinity groups online where you can study with like-minded comrades. Of course, socialist revolution requires more than just study, as we hope this book has thoroughly explained. Theory ''must'' be coupled with practice. As Ho Chi Minh wrote: “If you read a thousand books, but you fail to apply theory into practice, you are nothing but a bookshelf.”
 +
 
 +
To avoid atrophying into the proverbial bookshelf, we encourage you to go out into the world and apply these ideas creatively and collectively with other socialists. Dialectical materialism is a philosophy that was developed from the ground up for ''application in the real world''. Dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics provide a functional model of reality, a way of looking at highly complicated systems, with all their dynamic internal and external relations. Dialectical materialist philosophy demands that we see human systems as processes in motion. In order to fully comprehend such dynamic processes, we must engage with them, which is why Ho Chi Minh taught that “we are not afraid to make mistakes; we would only be afraid of making mistakes if we were not determined to correct them.”<ref>''Revolutionary Ethics,'' Ho Chi Minh, December 1958.</ref>
 +
 
 +
As we mentioned in the foreword, many socialists in the West suffer from a lack of practical ''engagement''. Far too many socialists fall into utopianism, idealism, and social chauvinism and we believe this largely stems from failures to test ideas against reality through ''praxis''. We hope that this book has impressed upon the reader that simply arguing about pure theory is a useless and futile pursuit. Indeed, sparring verbally over such “scholastic questions,” as Marx described them, is counter-productive. Marx and Engels defined such failure to engage in theory as “critical criticism” — that is to say, criticism for the sake of criticism. As Marx and Engels wrote in ''The Holy Family,'' such critical criticism is futile, as we will never ''think'' our way to revolution:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
According to Critical Criticism, the whole evil lies only in the workers’ “thinking”. It is true that the English and French workers have formed associations in which they exchange opinions not only on their immediate needs as workers, but on their needs as human beings. In their associations, moreover, they show a very thorough and comprehensive consciousness of the “enormous” and “immeasurable” power which arises from their co-operation. But these mass-minded, communist workers, employed, for instance, in the Manchester or Lyons workshops, do not believe that by “pure thinking” they will be able to argue away their industrial masters and their own practical debasement. They are most painfully aware of the difference between being and thinking, between consciousness and life. They know that property, capital, money, wage-labour and the like are no ideal figments of the brain but very practical, very objective products of their self-estrangement and that therefore they must be abolished in a practical, objective way for man to become man not only in thinking, in consciousness, but in mass being, in life. Critical Criticism, on the contrary, teaches them that they cease in reality to be wage-workers if in thinking they abolish the thought of wage-labour; if in thinking they cease to regard themselves as wage-workers and, in accordance with that extravagant notion, no longer let themselves be paid for their person. As absolute idealists, as ethereal beings, they will then naturally be able to live on the ether of pure thought.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Engels expressed his frustration with such endless, utopian, idealist debates in ''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Hence, from this nothing could come but a kind of eclectic, average Socialism, which, as a matter of fact, has up to the present time dominated the minds of most of the socialist workers in France and England. Hence, a mish-mash allowing of the most manifold shades of opinion: a mish-mash of such critical statements, economic theories, pictures of future society by the founders of different sects, as excite a minimum of opposition; a mish-mash which is the more easily brewed the more definite sharp edges of the individual constituents are rubbed down in the stream of debate, like rounded pebbles in a brook.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Engels concludes by punctuating ''why'' he and Marx had developed dialectical materialism as a praxis-oriented philosophical foundation for scientific socialism: “To make a science of Socialism, it had first to be placed upon a real basis.” We hope that the readers of this text will seek out real bases for your development in theory and praxis, and we trust that you will quickly discover that developing practice develops theory, and vice-versa.
 +
 
 +
Remember that Marx and Engels, themselves, were not just theorists who scribbled down their thoughts in an “scholarly” vacuum. They were revolutionists themselves, highly engaged in political struggle and, in so struggling, they risked their lives and freedom over the course of many decades. This struggle is what led to the change and development of their ideas over time. The same can be said for every other successful socialist revolutionary in history.
 +
 
 +
Vo Nguyen Giap, the great general who led Vietnam’s military forces through resistance wars against fascist Japan, colonialist France, and the imperialist USA, describes how he applied such principles on the battlefield in his book ''People’s War, People’s Army'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
During the Resistance War, owing to constant fighting, the training of our troops could not be carried out continuously for a lengthy period but only between battles or campaigns. We actively implemented the guiding principles ‘To train and to learn while we fight.’ After the difficult years at the beginning of the Resistance War, we succeeded in giving good training to our army. The practical viewpoint in this training deserves to be highlighted. The content of training became most practical and rich. Training was in touch with practical fighting: the troops were trained in accordance with the next day’s fighting, and victory or defeat in the fighting was the best gauge for the control and assessment of the result of the training. On the basis of gradual unification of the organisation and its equipment, the content of training in the various units of the regular army was also systematised step by step.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Here, Vo Nguyen Giap has provided a concrete example of the dialectical relationship between theory and practice, and their inseparability. This fundamental aspect of dialectical materialist philosophy demands that we think and act like ''scientists'' to change the world, rather than simply speculating and imagining ineffectually like armchair philosophers. As Marx wrote in ''Theses on Feuerbach'' “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.” We encourage you to apply what you learn in this and other books to ''change the world.''
 +
 
 +
=== Advice on Further Study ===
 +
 
 +
As you advance in your studies of socialist literature and theory, we offer the following advice:
 +
 
 +
First, you must recognize that the specific language used by revolutionary leaders and thinkers may vary widely across time and around the world. Fashions in language develop over time, and many contributions — like the text you’ve just read — come to us through translation from countless languages. This is why we believe it critical to develop an understanding of the ''spirit'' of the ideas of any particular text, and not to get bogged down in semantics and terminology. Liberal ideologists have done much to distract and divert intellectual energy with endless metaphysical altercation over the “proper” usage of this or that word. We caution strongly against this attitude, which makes us susceptible to sophistry, opportunism, and the sewing of undue conflict and division amidst the working class. We have pointed out various instances where Marx, Engels, and Lenin used different language to describe the same concepts. We also offer the reminder that Marx, Engels, and Lenin were writing in different languages at different times, just as socialists around the world have different linguistic and cultural backgrounds. As socialism is an international movement, we must stress the importance of avoiding linguistic barriers by engaging with one another in good faith and testing conflicting ideas and interpretations of theory against one another through practice instead of getting bogged down with “critical criticism.”
 +
 
 +
Next, we encourage students of socialist philosophy to always keep in mind that the doctrines and philosophies of revolutionary figures are products of the times and places in which they were conceived. It would be a mistake to view the works of any revolutionary figure as a road map or a set of instructions to follow by rote. Even Marx and Engels changed and developed their own ideas over the decades they were active, as they addressed in the 1872 preface to ''The Communist Manifesto'':
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
The practical application of the principles will depend, as the Manifesto itself states, everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being existing, and, for that reason, no special stress is laid on the revolutionary measures proposed at the end of Section II. That passage would, in many respects, be very differently worded today. In view of the gigantic strides of Modern Industry since 1848, and of the accompanying improved and extended organization of the working class, in view of the practical experience gained, first in the February Revolution, and then, still more, in the Paris Commune, where the proletariat for the first time held political power for two whole months, this programme has in some details been antiquated. One thing especially was proved by the Commune, viz., that “the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.” (See The Civil War in France: Address of the General Council of the International Working Men’ s Association, 1871, where this point is further developed.) Further, it is self-evident that the criticism of socialist literature is deficient in relation to the present time, because it comes down only to 1847; also that the remarks on the relation of the Communists to the various opposition parties (Section IV), although, in principle still correct, yet in practice are antiquated, because the political situation has been entirely changed, and the progress of history has swept from off the earth the greater portion of the political parties there enumerated.”
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and Ho Chi Minh also frequently took pains to point out that their revolutionary theories were devised specifically to suit the particular objective conditions of their own respective times and places. For example, in ''What is to be Done'', Lenin discusses the question of secrecy in revolutionary activity. Lenin recognizes that secrecy is not always necessary, such as in the more liberal social democracies which existed in Europe in his era. In Russia, however — with its autocratic monarchy — material conditions called for more covert activity:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
In countries where political liberty exists the distinction between a trade union and a political organisation is clear enough, as is the distinction between trade unions and Social-Democracy. The relations between the latter and the former will naturally vary in each country according to historical, legal, and other conditions; they may be more or less close, complex, etc. (in our opinion they should be as close and as little complicated as possible); but there can be no question in free countries of the organisation of trade unions coinciding with the organisation of the Social-Democratic Party. In Russia, however, the yoke of the autocracy appears at first glance to obliterate all distinctions between the Social-Democratic organisation and the workers’ associations, since all workers’ associations and all study circles are prohibited, and since the principal manifestation and weapon of the workers’ economic struggle — the strike — is regarded as a criminal (and sometimes even as a political!) offence.”
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
Ho Chi Minh was even more explicit about the requirement to tailor theory to current and local material conditions in a speech to the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1950:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Studying Marxism-Leninism is not just a matter of repeating the slogan ‘workers of the world, unite’ like a parrot. We must unify Marxism-Leninism with the reality of Vietnam’s revolution. Talking about Marxism-Leninism in Vietnam is talking about the specific guidelines and policies of the Communist Party of Vietnam. For example, our priority now is: great solidarity!
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
In a 2001 document, the Communist Party of Vietnam explained how Ho Chi Minh tailored lessons learned from prior revolutionaries to the specific material conditions of revolutionary Vietnam:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
Ho Chi Minh’s thought is... the creative application and development of Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of our country. Ho Chi Minh learned profound lessons from Lenin and the Russian October Revolution, but he did not simply use those lessons as a template, nor did he just copy that foundation. Instead, he absorbed the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. Lenin’s thesis allowed Ho Chi Minh to see what was necessary for the Vietnamese people — the path of national liberation. Ho Chi Minh had creative arguments that contributed to enriching Marxism-Leninism in the issue of national liberation revolution, building a new democratic regime and the transitional path to socialism in an Eastern, semi-feudal colony which was still very backward: Vietnam.
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
As you find your own revolutionary path, you must carefully examine the objective conditions of your own time and place, and work collectively and collaboratively with your fellow revolutionists to decide how theory and lessons gleaned from history apply to your own circumstances. And, of course, you must test the validity of your conclusions against reality through ''practice''.
 +
 
 +
=== Creative Application of Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics ===
 +
 
 +
Finally, we implore you to apply dialectical materialism ''creatively''. Don’t look at this (or any other) book as a set of static instructions. Dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics are living, breathing systems of thought which benefit from the ideas and imagination of comrades working and struggling together. Seek the ''spirit'' of these ideas, study revolutionary theory and history, then ''apply'' what you learn in your daily life. Combat dogmatism and avoid arguments over pure theory. Determine what works and what doesn’t through activity in the real world, and apply what you learn from practical experience to your theoretical development. Over time, you will begin to see how practice and theory impact and develop one another. When you are struggling with a particular problem in revolutionary practice, you will find yourself reading theory in a new light, discovering information and ideas which might be applicable to your immediate circumstances. And as you study theory, you will find that it also impacts your practice, giving you tools and perspective and methodologies for action which you might never have imagined on your own.
 +
 
 +
We have tried to make this book a useful companion for further study. We have also made the digital version available for free online. If you have found it useful, we hope you will share it freely and widely.
 +
 
 +
=== In Closing ===
 +
 
 +
One last time we would like to thank Dr. Vijay Prashad and Dr. Taimur Rahman for their wonderful insights on our translation, and to acknowledge the monumental work of the Vietnamese scholars who wrote and revised the original text from which this volume is drawn. We also want to recognize once more the donors and supporters who have given us the precious resource of time to translate and annotate this work. Finally, we want to thank the teams at the Iskra Books and The International Magazine, who have provided invaluable editing and peer review services, promotion, and guidance. You can find all their publications, respectively, at:
 +
 
 +
IskraBooks.org
 +
 
 +
InternationalMagz.com
 +
 
 +
If you would like to download the free digital version of this book, support future translation work, or if you would like to get in touch, you can visit our website:
 +
 
 +
BanyanHouse.org
 +
 
 +
We will leave you, now, with the immortal words of the Manifesto:
 +
 
 +
'''Workers of the world, unite!'''
 +
 
 +
You have nothing to lose but your chains.
 +
 
 +
=== In Solidarity, ===
 +
 
 +
''-'' ''Luna Nguyen, Translator &amp; Annotations''
 +
 
 +
''-'' ''Emerican Johnson, Editor, Illustrator, &amp; Annotations''
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-92.jpg|''“Marxism-Leninism — Long Live the Victories” — a demonstration to welcome the liberation army in the South of Vietnam on April 30, 1975.'']]
 +
 
 +
<br />
 +
 
 +
= [Appendices] =
 +
 
 +
== Appendix A: Basic Pairs of Categories Used in Materialist Dialectics ==
 +
 
 +
This is a summary of the basic pairs of universal categories and their characteristics which are discussed in depth starting on p. 126.
 +
 
 +
{|
 +
| | '''Private'''
 +
| '''Common'''
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | A specific item, event, or process.
 +
| The properties that are shared between Private things, phenomena, and ideas.
 +
|
 +
|}
 +
 
 +
''Private'' is commonly referred to in literature as ''Special/Specific'' while ''Common'' is commonly called ''General''. ''Note:'' When an aspect or characteristic is not held in common with anything else in existence, it is considered ''Unique''. The Unique can become Common, just as the Common can become Unique. Example: a Unique design for an object may be replicated, making it Common. A type of item that is Common may gradually disappear until there is only one example left, making it Unique. ''See p. 128.''
 +
 
 +
{|
 +
| | '''Reason'''
 +
| '''Result'''
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | Mutual impact between things, phenomena, or ideas which causes each to change.
 +
| The change caused by a Reason.
 +
|
 +
|}
 +
 
 +
''Reason'' and ''Result'' may be referred to as ''Cause'' and ''Effect'', respectively, though this should lead to confusion with metaphysical conceptions of cause and effect. ''Note:'' Reasons can be Direct or Indirect. ''See p. 138''
 +
 
 +
{|
 +
| | '''Obviousness'''
 +
| '''Randomness'''
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | Refers to events that always and predictably happen due to factors of internal material structure.
 +
| Events caused by external impacts and interactions which are thus not completely predictable.
 +
|
 +
|}
 +
 
 +
''Obvious'' may be referred to as ''Necessary,'' while ''Randomness'' may be referred to as ''Accidental. See p. 145.''
 +
 
 +
{|
 +
| | '''Content'''
 +
| '''Form'''
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | What something is made of.
 +
| The shape that contains content.
 +
|
 +
|}
 +
 
 +
Ways in which Content and Form are discussed and perceived can can vary wildly depending on the subject being discussed and the viewpoint from which the subject is being considered. ''See p. 145.''
 +
 
 +
{|
 +
| | '''Essence'''
 +
| '''Phenomena'''
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | Features that make something develop a certain way.
 +
| The expression of the essence in certain conditions.
 +
|
 +
|}
 +
 
 +
''See p. 156.''
 +
 
 +
{|
 +
| | '''Possibility'''
 +
| '''Reality'''
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | What may happen, or might exist, in the future, if certain developments take place.
 +
| What is happening, or what exists, at the present moment.
 +
|
 +
|}
 +
 
 +
''See p. 160.''
 +
 
 +
== Appendix B: the Two Basic Principles of Dialectical Materialism ==
 +
 
 +
'''The Principle of General Relationships''' This principle states that:
 +
 
 +
“Materialist dialectics upholds the position that all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in mutual relationships with each other, regulate each other, transform into each other, and that nothing exists in complete isolation.”
 +
 
 +
From this Principle, we find the characteristics of ''Diversity in Unity'' and ''Unity in Diversity''; the basis of Diversity in Unity is the fact that every thing, phenomenon, and idea contains many different relationships; the basis of Unity in Diversity is that many different relationships exist — unified — within each and every thing, phenomenon, and idea.
 +
 
 +
'''''The Characteristic of Diversity in Unity''''' is derived from the fact that there exist an infinite number of diverse relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas, but all of these relationships share the same foundation in the material world.
 +
 
 +
'''''The Characteristic of Unity in Diversity''''' is derived from the fact that when we examine the universal relationships that exist within and between all different things, phenomena, and ideas, we will find that each individual manifestation of any universal relationship will have its own different manifestations, aspects, features, etc. Thus even the universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in infinite diversity.
 +
 
 +
'''The Principle of Development''' This principle states that:
 +
 
 +
'''“'''Development is a process that comes from within the thing-in-itself; the process of solving the contradictions within things and phenomena. Therefore, development is inevitable, objective, and occurs without dependence on human will.”
 +
 
 +
'''''The Characteristic of Objectiveness of Development''''' stems from the origin of motion. Since motion originates from mutual impacts which occur between external things, objects, and relationships, the motions themselves also occur externally (relative to all other things, phenomena, and objects). This gives motion itself objective characteristics.
 +
 
 +
'''''The Characteristic of Generality of Development''''' stems from the fact that development occurs in every process that exists in every field of nature, society, and human thought; in every thing, every phenomenon, and every process and stage of these things and phenomena.
 +
 
 +
'''''The Characteristic of Diversity of Development''''' stems from the fact that every thing, phenomenon, and idea has its own process of development that is not totally identical to the process of development of any other thing, phenomenon, or idea.
 +
 
 +
== Appendix C: the Three Universal Laws of Materialist Dialectics ==
 +
 
 +
=== The Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality ===
 +
 
 +
The law of transformation between quantity and quality is a universal law which concerns the universal mode of motion and development processes of nature, society, and human thought. The law was formulated by Friedrich Engels in ''Dialectics of Nature'', and states that:
 +
 
 +
“In nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion.” ''See more on p. 163.''
 +
 
 +
=== The Law of Unification and Contradiction Between Opposites ===
 +
 
 +
The law of unification and contradiction between opposites is the essence of dialectics. It states, as formulated by V. I. Lenin in ''Summary of Dialectics'':
 +
 
 +
“The fundamental, originating, and universal driving force of all motion and development processes is the inherent and objective contradiction which exists in all things, phenomena, and ideas.” ''See more on p. 175.''
 +
 
 +
=== The Law of Negation of Negation ===
 +
 
 +
The law of negation of negation describes the fundamental and universal tendency of movement and development to occur through a cyclical form of development through what is termed “negation of negation.” Formulated by Friedrich Engels in ''Anti-Dühring,'' it states:
 +
 
 +
“The true, natural, historical, and dialectical negation is (formally) the moving source of all development--the division into opposites, their struggle and resolution, and what is more, on the basis of experience gained, the original point is achieved again (partly in history, fully in thought), but at a higher stage.” ''See more on p. 185.''
 +
 
 +
== Appendix D: Forms of Consciousness and Knowledge ==
 +
 
 +
''Consciousness'' refers to the self-aware, productive, and creative motion and activity of the human brain. Practical activity is the most direct basis, motive, and purpose of consciousness, and is the criterion for testing truth. See: ''The Relationship Between Praxis and Consciousness'', p. 216.
 +
 
 +
''Knowledge'' is the content of consciousness. Knowledge includes data about the world, such as ideas, memories, and other thoughts which are derived by direct observation and practical activities in the material world, through scientific experiments, or through abstract reflection of practical and scientific activities which occur within consciousness.
 +
 
 +
Consciousness and Knowledge have a dialectical relationship with one another: knowledge is developed within consciousness, and consciousness develops to higher levels as knowledge is accumulated and tested against reality (which also develops knowledge itself). In this manner, consciousness and knowledge develop into higher forms over time in individual consciousness and human society. Thus, consciousness and knowledge can be considered as existing in various forms which represent stages of development in dialectical processes of development.
 +
 
 +
Note that the development processes of knowledge and consciousness are dialectical in nature, not linear. For example, after empirical consciousness develops into theoretical consciousness, theoretical consciousness will then impact empirical consciousness, developing empirical consciousness into a higher stage of development. This is true for all development processes related to empirical and theoretical consciousness. These development processes and forms of consciousness and knowledge are explained in more detail in Chapter 3: Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism, starting on page 204.
 +
 
 +
=== Forms of Consciousness ===
 +
 
 +
Consciousness is a process of the development of knowledge through a combination of human brain activity and human practical activity in the physical world (i.e., labor). The development of consciousness can be considered on the criteria of ''concrete/abstract'' and of ''passive/active''. For more information, see Annotation 216, p. 210.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-99.png]]
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-100.png]]
 +
 
 +
=== The Cognitive Process ===
 +
 
 +
The Cognitive Process is a model developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin which represents the dialectical path of consciousness to truth. For more information, see ''Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth'' on page 219.
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-101.png]]
 +
 
 +
=== Forms of Knowledge ===
 +
 
 +
''For more information see Annotation 218, p. 214.''
 +
 
 +
[[File:t-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-102.png]]
 +
 
 +
== Appendix E: Properties of Truth ==
 +
 
 +
Truth is the alignment of consciousness with objective reality. All truths are objective, relative, absolute, and concrete. Truths also have characteristics of concreteness and abstractness.
 +
 
 +
'''Objectivity:''' The content of truth is external to the subjective will of human beings. The content of knowledge must be aligned with objective reality, not vice versa. This means that the content of accurate knowledge is not a product of pure subjective reasoning but is objective in nature.
 +
 
 +
'''Absoluteness:''' Absolute truth<ref>Note: Absolute Truth in dialectical materialist philosophy should not be confused with Hegel’s conception of Absolute Truth as a final point at which human consciousness will have achieved absolute, complete, and final understanding of our universe.</ref> is derived from the complete alignment between objective reality and human consciousness. The possibility of acquiring absolute truth in the process of the development of conscious understanding is theoretically limitless. However, in reality, our conscious ability to reflect reality is limited by the specific material conditions of each generation of humanity, of practical limitations, and by the spatial and temporal conditions of reflected subjects. Therefore, truth is also ''relative''.
 +
 
 +
'''Relativity:''' Relative truth is truth which has developed alignment with reality without yet having reached ''complete'' alignment. To put it another way, relative truth represents knowledge which incompletely reflects material subjects without complete accuracy. In relative truth, there is only partial alignment — in some (but not all) aspects — between consciousness and the material world.
 +
 
 +
'''Dialectical Relationship Between Absolute and Relative Truth:''' Relative truth and absolute truth do not exist separately, but have dialectical unity with each other. On the one hand, “absolute truth” is the sum of all “relative truths.” On the other hand, in all relative truths there are always elements of absolute truth.
 +
 
 +
'''Concreteness:''' The concreteness of truth refers to the degree to which a truth is attached to specific objects, in specific conditions, at a specific point in time. This means that all accurate knowledge always refers to a specific situation which involves specific subjects which exist in a specific place and time. The content of truth cannot be pure abstraction, disconnected from reality, but it is always associated with certain, specific objects and phenomena which exist in a specific space, time, and arrangement, with specific internal and external relationships. Therefore, truth is associated with specific historical conditions. This specificity to time, place, relations, etc., is ''concreteness''.
 +
 
 +
'''Abstractness:''' Abstract knowledge is knowledge which is not attached (or less attached) to specific times, places, relations, etc. Some degree of abstraction is necessary to develop theoretical understanding of general laws and the nature of objective reality, but care should be taken knowledge does not become completely detached from specific historical conditions, as this will result in ''pure abstraction''. Knowledge which is purely abstract will not align with reality, and such knowledge cannot be considered truth.
 +
 
 +
== Appendix F: Common Deviations From Dialectical Materialism ==
 +
 
 +
Throughout the history of the development of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics, there have been many philosophical and methodological deviations which have derived from incorrect analysis, interpretation, and a failure to properly link theory and practice. Below are descriptions of some of the more common deviations which the reader should be aware of.
 +
 
 +
'''Bureaucracy:''' An expression of ''dogmatism'' which arises when theory becomes overly formalized, to the extent that practical considerations are ignored in favor of codified theory.
 +
 
 +
'''Conservativism:''' A mindset which seeks to prevent and stifle development and to hold humanity in a static position. Not only is this detrimental to humanity, it is also ultimately a wasted effort, because development is inevitable in human society, as in all things, phenomena, and ideas.
 +
 
 +
'''Dogmatism:''' A breakdown of the dialectical relationship between theoretical consciousness and empirical consciousness, which arrests the development process of knowledge and consciousness. Usually the result of: failure to seek commonalities; considering theory itself as the sole basis of truth rather than practice; ignoring practical experience and considering pre-established theory, alone, as unalterable truth.
 +
 
 +
'''Eclecticism:''' An approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject; the philosophical error of inconsistently applying different theories and principles in different situations. Empiricism: A broad philosophical position which holds that only experience (including internal experience) can be held as a source of knowledge or truth. Though nominally opposed to idealism, it is considered a faulty (or naive) form of materialism, since it sees the world as only unconnected, static appearances and ignores the reality of dialectical (changing) relationships between objects.
 +
 
 +
'''Idealism:''' A philosophical position which holds that the only reliable experience of reality occurs within human consciousness. Idealists believe that relying on human reason exclusively or as a first basis is the best way to seek truth. Various forms of idealism exist, broadly broken down into subjective idealism, which denies the existence of an external objective world, and objective idealism, which accepts that an external objective world exists, but denies that knowledge can be reliably gained about it through sense perception.
 +
 
 +
'''Opportunism:''' A system of political opinions with no direction, no clear path, no coherent viewpoint, leaning on whatever is beneficial for the opportunist in the short term.
 +
 
 +
'''Revisionism:''' A failure to recognize and accept commonalities in conscious activity, focusing only on the private. Revisionism leads to constant and unnecessary reassessment and reevaluation of both knowledge and practice. Revisionism, thus, is a position which overstates the relativity of truth and ignores truths which are more fully developed towards absoluteness.
 +
 
 +
'''Rigidity:''' An unwillingness to alter one’s thoughts, holding too stiffly to established consciousness and knowledge, and ignoring practical experience and observation, which leads to stagnation of both knowledge and consciousness.
 +
 
 +
'''Skepticism:''' The belief truth is essentially undiscoverable, because human consciousness is ultimately unreliable and incapable of accurately reflecting material reality. By denying that truth is discoverable at all, skepticism explicitly rejects absolute truth and declares that all truth is relative and unreliable. Solipsism: A form of idealism in which one believes that the self is the only basis for truth. As Marxist ethicist Howard Selsam wrote in ''Ethics and Progress: New Values in a Revolutionary World'': “If I believe that I alone exist and that you and all your arguments exist only in my mind and are my own creations then all possible arguments will not shake me one iota. No logic can possibly convince [the] solipsist.”
 +
 
 +
'''Sophistry:''' The use of falsehoods and misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, and with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. This kind of bad faith argument has no place in materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics must, instead, be rooted in a true and accurate understanding of the subject, material conditions, and reality in general.
 +
 
 +
'''Subjectivism:''' The centering of one’s own self and conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test one’s own perceptions against material and social reality. Subjectivists tend to believe that they can independently reason their way to truth in their own minds without practical experience and activity in the material world.
 +
 
 +
'''Utilitarianism:''' An ethical philosophical theory founded by Jeremy Bentham which seeks to maximize “utility,” which is considered to be a metaphysical property embodying “benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness.” Karl Marx dismissed utilitarianism as overly abstract, in that it reduces all social relationships to the single characteristic of “utility.” He also viewed utilitarianism as metaphysically static and tied to the status quo of current society, since utilitarianism does not address class dynamics and views all relations in the current status quo of society, making utilitarianism an essentially conservative theory. Marx also pointed out that Utilitarianism essentially views individuals as private individuals, not as social individuals, and seeks to work out solutions to the practical problems of human society through reasoning alone without examining material conditions and processes, and without taking into consideration practice and development, writing:
 +
 
 +
<blockquote>
 +
“The whole criticism of the existing world by the utility theory was... restricted within a narrow range. Remaining within the confines of bourgeois conditions, it could criticise only those relations which had been handed down from a past epoch and were an obstacle to the development of the bourgeoisie... the economic content gradually turned the utility theory into a mere apologia for the existing state of affairs, an attempt to prove that under existing conditions the mutual relations of people today are the most advantageous and generally useful.”
 +
</blockquote>
 +
 
 +
 
 +
= [Back Matter] =
 +
 
 +
== Glossary &amp; Index ==
 +
 
 +
{|
 +
| | '''Absolute Truth'''
 +
| Absolute Truth can refer to:<br />
 +
<br />
 +
1. The recognition that objective and accurate truth can be drawn from sense perception of the material world along with labor and practice activities in the material world. The opposite of this position is Relativism. See p. 56, 94, 194, 228–229, 232–234.<br />
 +
<br />
 +
2. Hegel’s notion of Absolute Truth: that there will eventually be some end point of to the process of rational consciousness at which point humanity will arrive at a final stage of knowledge and consciousness. See p. 228.<br />
 +
<br />
 +
See also: Relative Truth, Relativism, Stagnation, Truth.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Absolutization'''
 +
| To hold a belief or supposition as always true in all situations and without exception. See p. 49.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Abstract Labor'''
 +
| The abstract conception of expenditure of human energy in the form of labor, without taking into account the value of labor output. When the value of labor output ''is'' taken into consideration, it is referred to as ''concrete labor''. See p. 15, 17.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Adam Smith'''
 +
| (1723–1790) British logic professor, moral philosophy professor, and economist. Along with David Ricardo, Adam Smith was one of the founders of ''political economy'', which Marx both drew from and critiqued in his analysis and critique of capitalism. See p. 14, 155.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Ahistoric Perspective'''
 +
| A perspective which considers aspects of human society without due consideration of historical processes of development. For example, Adam Smith and David Ricardo viewed political economy ahistorically, viewing capitalism as a static, universal, and eternal product of natural law rather than seeing capitalism as a product of historical processes of development which would change and develop over time. See p. 116.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Base'''
 +
| Also known as: Economic Base; Economic Basis. The material processes which humans undertake to survive and transform our environment to support our ways of living. In the dialectical relationship between base and ''superstructure'', the base refers to the relationship which humans have with the means of production, including the ownership of the means of production and the organization of labor. See p. 23. See also: Superstructure.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Biological Motion'''
 +
| One of the five basic forms of motion described by Engels in ''Dialectics of Nature''. Biological motion refers to changes and development within living objects and their genetic structure. See p. 61.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Biological Reflection'''
 +
| A complex form of reflection found within organic subjects in the natural world and expressed by ''excitation'', ''induction'', and ''reflexes''. See p. 65.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Bourgeoisie'''
 +
| The owners of the means of production and the ruling class under capitalism; also known as the capitalist class. See p. 3, 23, 30, 41, 50, 63, 96. See also:<br />
 +
<br />
 +
Proletariat, Petty Bourgeoisie.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Bureaucracy'''
 +
| An expression of dogmatism which arises when theory becomes overly formalized, to the extent that practical considerations are ignored in favor of codified theory. See p. 217–218.<br />
 +
C→→M→→C C = A Commodity<br />
 +
M = The Money Commodity<br />
 +
The mode of circulation described by Marx as occurring under pre-capitalist economies of simple exchange, in which the producers and consumers of commodities have a direct relationship to the commodities which are being bought and sold. The sellers have produced the commodities with their own labor, and they directly consume the commodities which they purchase. See also: M→C→M’<br />
 +
Marx called this mode of circulation “simple commodity production.” See p. 16.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Capitalism'''
 +
| The current stage of human political economy, defined by private ownership of the means of production. ''Referenced throughout.''
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Capitalist Class'''
 +
| See: Bourgeoisie
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Capitalist Commodity Production'''
 +
| The capitalist mode of production which utilizes the M→C→M’ mode of circulation, in which capitalists own the means of production and pay wages to workers in exchange for their labor, which is used to produce commodities. Capitalists then sell these commodities for profits which are not shared with the workers who provided the labor. See p. 15.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Category'''
 +
| The most general grouping of aspects, attributes, and relations of things, phenomena, and ideas. Different specific fields of inquiry may categorize things, phenomena, and/or ideas differently from one another. See p. 126.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Category Pair'''
 +
| A pair of philosophical categories within materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics tend to focus on ''universal category pairs'' which can be used to examine the characteristics, relations, and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Examples of category pairs include: private and common; content and form; reason and result; essence and phenomena. See p. 127.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Characteristics'''
 +
| The features and attributes that exist internally — within — a given thing, phenomena, or idea. See p. 115.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Chemical Motion'''
 +
| Changes of organic and inorganic substances in processes of combination and separation. See p. 61.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Chemical Reflection'''
 +
| The reflection of mechanical, physical, and chemical changes and reactions of inorganic matter (i.e., changes in structures, position, physical-chemical properties, and the processes of combining and dissolving substances). See p. 65–66.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Circulation'''
 +
| The way in which commodities and money are exchanged for one another. See p. 16.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Commodity'''
 +
| In Marxist political economy, commodities include anything which can be bought and sold, with both a use value (i.e. it satisfies a need of any kind) and a value-form (aka. ‘Exchange value’ and understood as the average socially necessary labour time needed to produce this object). Under capitalism, more and more human activity and production is ‘commodified’ (mediated through market exchange). See p. 15, 87, 133.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Common'''
 +
| See: Private and Common
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Common Laws'''
 +
| Laws (of nature and/or human society) that are applicable to a broader range of subjects than ''private laws'', and which impact many different subjects. For instance: the law of preservation of mass, the law of preservation of energy, etc. See p. 162.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Comprehensive Viewpoint'''
 +
| A ''viewpoint'' which seeks to consider the internal dialectical relationships between the component parts, factors, and aspects within a thing or phenomenon, and which considers external mutual interactions with with other things, phenomena, and ideas. Dialectical materialist philosophy demands a comprehensive basis in order to fully and properly understand things and phenomena in order to effectively solve problems in real life and develop humanity towards communism. See p. 115, 172, 235.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Conception'''
 +
| A relatively complete ''reflection'' within human consciousness of objective things and phenomena. See p. 221–22.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Concrete Labor'''
 +
| The production of a specific commodity with a specific value through labor. When labor is considered without the consideration of output value, it is referred to as ''abstract labor''. See p. 15, 17.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Conditioned Reflex'''
 +
| Conditioned reflexes are reactions which are learned by organisms. These responses are acquired as animals associate previously unrelated neural stimuli with a particular reaction. See p. 66, 68.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Consciousness'''
 +
| The dynamic and creative reflection of the objective world in human brains; the subjective image of the objective world which is produced by the human brain. See p. 68–69, 70.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Content'''
 +
| See: Content and Form.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Content and Form (Category Pair)'''
 +
| Content is the philosophical category which refers to the sum of all aspects, attributes, and processes that a thing, phenomenon, or idea is made from. The Form category refers to the mode of existence and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. Form thus describes the system of relatively stable relationships which exist internally within things, phenomena, and ideas.<br />
 +
<br />
 +
Content and Form have a dialectical relationship with one another, in which content determines form and form impacts back on content. See p. 115, 147155, 166.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Contradiction'''
 +
| A contradiction is a relationship in which two forces oppose one another, leading to mutual development. See p. 123, 159, 163, 169, 175–191.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Consciousness'''
 +
| The self-aware, productive, creative motion and activity of the human brain. See p. 216, 249.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Conservativism'''
 +
| Also referred to as Prejudice; a mindset which seeks to prevent and stifle development and to hold humanity in a static position. Not only is this detrimental to humanity, it is also ultimately a wasted effort, because development is inevitable in human society, as in all things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 125, 233.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''David Hume'''
 +
| (1711 — 1776) Scottish philosopher who developed radical skepticism as a philosophy of empiricist rejection of human knowledge. See p. 11, 29, 56, 7273.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''David Ricardo'''
 +
| (1772 — 1823) British economist who, along with Adam Smith, was one of the key figures in the development of Political Economy which was a basis for much of the work of Marx and Engels. See p. 14, 18, 155.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Deductive Inference'''
 +
| Logical inference which extrapolates from the general to the specific. See p. 224.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Definition'''
 +
| The first phase of rational consciousness. During this phase, the mind begins to interpret, organize, and process the basic properties of things and phenomena at a rational level into a conceptual whole. See p. 224.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Development'''
 +
| The change and motion of things, phenomena, and ideas with a forward tendency: from less advanced to more advanced; and/or from a less complete to a more complete level. See p. 38, 45–46, 52, 55, 61, 65, 76–96, 105–107, 114118, 119–127, 131–132, 138–140, 143, 147, 154, 155–165, 169–175, 177–181, 183–207, 210, 213, 216–223, 225–229, 233, 235–237.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Development Viewpoint'''
 +
| A viewpoint which considers that, in order to perceive or solve any problem in real life, we must consider all things, phenomena, and ideas with their own forward tendency of development taken in mind.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Dialectic; Dialectical; Dialectics'''
 +
| In Marxism-Leninism, the term dialectic (adjective: dialectical) refers to regular and mutual relationships, interactions, transformations, motions, and developments of things, phenomena, and processes in nature, society and human thought. “Dialectics” refers to a dialectical system. See p. 3, 9–11, 47.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Dialectical Materialism'''
 +
| A universal philosophical and methodological system which forms the theoretical core of a scientific worldview. Dialectical Materialism was first developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels with the express goal of achieving communism. Dialectical Materialism has since been defended and developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin as well as many others. See: p. 3, 6, 1011, 19–21, 27–30, 33, 38, 45–47, 48–97, 101, 104, 204, 209, 226, 228, 230–232, 237.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Dialectical Negation'''
 +
| A stage of development in which a new subject arises from a contradiction between two previous subjects; dialectical negation is never an endpoint of development, as every dialectical negation creates conditions for further development and negation. See p. 123, 175–176, 183, 185–195, 197–202, 227.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Dialectical Relationship'''
 +
| A relationship in which two things, phenomena, or ideas mutually impact one another, leading to development and negation. See p. 47, 51, 62.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''(Characteristic of) Diversity'''
 +
| The characteristic which all things, phenomena, and ideas share, dictating that no two subjects (and no two relationships between any two subjects) are exactly the same, even if they exist between very similar things, phenomena, and ideas and/or in very similar situations. See p. 114–115, 125.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Diversity in Unity'''
 +
| The universal principle which states that even though all relationships are diverse and different from one another, they also exist in unity, because all relationships share a foundation in the material world. See p. 109–110, 125, 130.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Dogmatism'''
 +
| An inflexible adherence to ideals as incontrovertibly true while refusing to take any contradictory evidence into consideration. Dogmatism stands in direct opposition to materialist dialectics, which seeks to form opinions and conclusions only after careful consideration of all observable evidence. See p. 136–137, 174, 217–218, 233.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Duality of Labor'''
 +
| The Marxist economic concept which recognizes labor as having two intrinsic and inseparable aspects: abstract labor and concrete labor. See p. 15.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Dynamic and Creative Reflection'''
 +
| The most advanced form of reflection, which only occurs in matter that has the highest (known) level of structural complexity, such as the human brain. See p. 68–69, 79.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Eclecticism'''
 +
| An approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject; the philosophical error of inconsistently applying different theories and principles in different situations. See p. 32–33, 101, 118, 192, 194.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Economic Base'''
 +
| See: Base
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Economism'''
 +
| Economism is a style of political activism, typified by the ideas of German political theorist Eduard Bernstein, which stresses directing the struggle towards short-term political/economic goals (such as higher wages for workers) at the expense of the larger socialist revolutionary project. See p. 30.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Eduard Bernstein'''
 +
| (1850 — 1932) German political theorist who rejected many of Marx’s theories. See p. 30, 174.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Emotional Consciousness'''
 +
| The lower stage of the cognitive process. In this stage of cognitive development, humans, through practical activities, use our senses to reflect objective things and phenomena (with all their perceived specific characteristics and rich manifestations) in human consciousness. See p. 219224.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Empirical Consciousness'''
 +
| Empirical consciousness is the stage of development of consciousness in which perceptions are formed via direct observations of things and phenomena in the natural world, or of society, or through scientific experimentation and systematic observation. Empirical Consciousness results in Empirical Knowledge. See p. 210–214.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Empirical Knowledge'''
 +
| Knowledge which results from processes of empirical consciousness and which is characterised by rich and detailed, but still incomplete, understanding of phenomena. It can be utilized for practical ends, but still falls short of full theoretical analysis and comprehension. See p. 212–214.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Empiricism'''
 +
| A broad philosophical position which holds that only experience (including internal experience) can be held as a source of knowledge or truth. Though nominally opposed to idealism, it is considered a faulty (or naive) form of materialism, since it sees the world as only unconnected, static appearances and ignores the reality of dialectical (changing) relationships between objects. See p. 9–12, 29, 94, 96–97, 100, 218.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Empirio-criticism'''
 +
| A more developed form of empiricism, proposed by Ernst Mach, which holds that sense data and experience are the sole sources of knowledge and that no concrete knowledge of the external material world can ever be obtained due to the limitations of human senses. See p. 26–29, 32, 54, 55–57, 68.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Epistemology'''
 +
| The theoretical study of knowledge. It primarily deals with the philosophical question of: “how do we know what we know?” See p. 45, 98, 204.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Ernst Mach'''
 +
| (1838 — 1916) Austrian physicist who attempted to build a philosophy of natural science based on the works of German philosopher Richard Avenarius’ philosophical system of Empirio-Criticism. See p. 27–29, 32, 52, 72, 193.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Equilibrium'''
 +
| A state of motion in which one or more subjects are not undergoing changes in position, form, and/or structure. Equilibrium is only ever a temporary stasis of development which will eventually yield to motion, development, and/or negation. See p. 62–63, 122–123, 181.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Essence'''
 +
| See: Essence and Phenomena
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Essence and Phenomena (Category Pair)'''
 +
| The Essence category refers to the synthesis of all the internal aspects as well as the obvious and stable relations that define the existence, motion and development of things and ideas. The Phenomena category refers to the external manifestation of those internal aspects and relations in specific conditions. Essence always determines which phenomena appear, but phenomena do not always accurately reflect essence in human perception; in other words, it is possible to misinterpret phenomena, leading to a misunderstanding of essence, or to mistake phenomena for essence. See p. 156–160.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Exchange Value'''
 +
| A quantity relationship which describes the ratios of exchangeability between different commodities, with Marx’s famous example of 20 yards of linen being equivalent in exchange value to one coat. Through analysis Marx shows that in reality the thing being compared is the amount of socially necessary labour required to make the commodities being compared. See p. 15, 18.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Excitation'''
 +
| Reactions of simple plant and animal life-forms which occur when they change position or structure as a direct result of physical changes in their habitat. See p. 66, 68.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''External Contradictions'''
 +
| See: Internal and External Contradictions.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''False consciousness'''
 +
| Forms of consciousness (ideas, thoughts, concepts, etc.) which are incorrect and misaligned from reality. Equated with ‘ideology’ by Engels, it refers to an idealistic, dogmatic perspective which will inevitably result in errors of analysis and therefore practice. See p. 231–233, 237.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''First International'''
 +
| Also known as the International Workingmen’s Association; was founded in London and lasted from 1864–1876. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were key figures in the foundation and operation of this organization, which sought better conditions and the establishment of rights for workers. See p. 35
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''(Basic) Forms of Motion'''
 +
| Engels broke motion down into five basic forms which are dialectically linked; the different forms of motion differ from one another, but they are also unified with each other into one continuous system of motion. Understanding this dialectical relationship between different forms of motion helped to overcome misunderstandings and confusion about motion and development. See p. 61–62.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Form'''
 +
| See: Content and Form.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Form of existence of matter'''
 +
| The ways in which we perceive the existence of matter in our universe; specifically, matter in our universe has the form of existing in space and time. See p. 59.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Form of Value'''
 +
| See: Value-Form
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Forward Tendency of Motion'''
 +
| The tendency for things, phenomena, and ideas to move from less advanced to more advanced forms through processes of motion and development. See p. 197.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Friedrich Engels'''
 +
| (1820–1895) a German theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, leader of the international working class, &amp; co-founder of scientific socialism with Karl Marx. ''Referenced throughout.''
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Fundamental and Non-Fundamental Contradictions'''
 +
| A fundamental contradiction defines the essence of a relationship. Fundamental contradictions exist throughout the entire development process of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea. A non-fundamental contradiction exists in only one aspect or attribute of a thing, phenomenon, or idea. A nonfundamental contradiction can impact a subject, but it will not control or decide the essential development of the subject. See p. 178–179.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''(Characteristic of) Generality'''
 +
| A universal characteristic which holds that all things, phenomena, and ideas interact and mutually transform one another. See p. 108–109, 111, 114, 124125.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''General Relationship'''
 +
| Relationships which exist broadly across many things, phenomena, and ideas. General relationships can exist both internally, within things, phenomena, and ideas, and externally, between things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 106–110, 114.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Generality (of relationships)'''
 +
| Relationships can exist with across a spectrum of generality; this spectrum ranges from the least general relationships (''unique relationships'' — which only occur between two specific things/phenomena/ideas) to the most general relationships (''universal relationships'' — which occur between or within all things/phenomena/ideas). See p. 109.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''George Berkeley'''
 +
| (1685 — 1753) An Anglo-Irish philosopher whose main philosophical achievement was the formulation of a doctrine which he called “immaterialism,” and which later came to be known as “Subjective Idealism.” This doctrine was summed up by Berkeley’s maxim: “''Esse est percipi''” — “To be is to be perceived.” See p. 11, 27, 29.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel'''
 +
| (1770 — 1831) German philosophy professor &amp; objective idealistic philosopher; developed the system of idealist dialectics which Marx and Engels used as a basis for developing materialist dialectics. See p. 8–11, 29, 69–71, 97, 98, 100–105, 132, 157, 165, 182, 192, 193–194, 209, 228.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Historical Materialism'''
 +
| The application of materialist dialectics and dialectical materialism to the study of human history. See p. 21–23, 27, 36, 38, 45, 80.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Historical Viewpoint'''
 +
| A viewpoint which demands that subjects be considered in their current stage of motion and development, while also taking into consideration the development and transformation of the subject over time. See p. 116–118, 125–126, 143, 185, 234.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Idealism'''
 +
| A philosophical position which holds that the only reliable experience of reality occurs within human consciousness. Idealists believe that human reason exclusively or as a first basis is the best way to seek truth. See p. 8–12, 26–29, 48–51, 53, 56–58, 69–70, 96, 101–102, 104, 157, 174, 209, 218, 228.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Immanuel Kant'''
 +
| (1724 — 1804) German philosopher who developed a system of idealist dialectics which were later completed by Hegel and whose metaphysical philosophies of epistemology and rationalism served as the basis for later empiricists such as Bacon and Hume. See p. 20, 29, 56, 72–74, 100–102, 205.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Induction'''
 +
| The reaction of animals with simple nervous systems which can sense or feel their environments. Induction occurs through unconditioned reflex mechanisms. See p. 66, 68.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Inductive Inference'''
 +
| Logical inference which extrapolates from specific observations to general conclusions. See p. 223–224.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Intelligibility'''
 +
| The human cognitive capacity to accurately perceive the external material world. See p. 48.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Internal Contradictions'''
 +
| See: Internal and External Contradictions.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Internal and External Contradictions'''
 +
| Internal contradictions are contradictions which exist within the internal relations of a subject, while external contradictions exist between two or more subjects as external relations. See p. 178–179.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Judgment'''
 +
| The phase of rational consciousness which arises from the definition of the subject — the linking of concepts and properties together — which leads to affirmative or negative ideation of certain characteristics or attributes of the perceived subject. See p. 223.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Karl Marx'''
 +
| (1818–1883) German theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, political economist, founder of scientific socialism, and leader of the international working class. ''Referenced throughout''.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Knowledge'''
 +
| The content of consciousness; data about the world, such as: ideas, memories, and other thoughts which are derived through direct observation and practical activities in the material world, through scientific experiments, or through abstract reflection of practical and scientific activities which occur within consciousness.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Labor Value'''
 +
| The amount of value which workers produce through labor. See p. 14, 17–18, 23.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Law of Negation of Negation'''
 +
| A universal law of materialist dialectics which states that the fundamental and universal tendency of motion and development occurs through a cycle of dialectical negation, wherein each and every negation is, in turn, negated once more. See p. 163, 185, 195, 198, 200, 201, 202, 227.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality'''
 +
| The universal law of dialectical materialism which concerns the universal mode of motion and development processes of nature, society, and human thought, which states that qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of the quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and, ideas, and, vice versa, quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 163–165, 172–173, 227.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Law of Unification Contradiction Between Opposites'''
 +
| and The universal law of dialectical materialism which states that the fundamental, originating, and universal driving force of all motion and development processes is the inherent and objective contradictions which exists in all things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 163, 175, 181.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Law of Development of Capitalism'''
 +
| Also known as Theory of Accumulation and Theory of Surplus Value. The dynamic through which the capitalist class gains wealth by accumulating surplus value (i.e., profits) and then reinvesting it into more capital to gain even further wealth; thus the goal of the capitalist class is to accumulate more and more surplus value which leads to the development of capitalism. See p. 18.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Laws'''
 +
| In dialectical materialism, laws are the regular, common, obvious, natural, objective relations between internal aspects, factors, and attributes of a thing or phenomenon or between things and phenomena. See p. 162.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Laws of Nature'''
 +
| Laws that arise in the natural world, including within the human body (and are never products of human conscious activities). Such law includes the laws of physics, chemistry, and other natural phenomena which govern the material world. See p. 162, 213.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Laws of Society'''
 +
| Laws of human activity in social relations; such laws are unable to manifest beyond the conscious activities of humans, but they are still objective. See p. 162–163.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Laws of Human Thought'''
 +
| Laws which govern the intrinsic relationships between concepts, categories, judgments, inference, and the development process of human rational awareness. See p. 163.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Life-Process'''
 +
| Processes of motion and change which occur within organisms to sustain life. See p. 69–72, 79, 88.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Ludwig Feuerbach'''
 +
| (1804 — 1872) German philosophy professor, materialist philosopher; Marx and Engels drew many of their ideas from the works of Feuerbach (whom they also criticized). See p. 8, 11–13, 21, 55, 74, 80, 114, 205, 237.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''M→→C→→M’'''
 +
| The mode of circulation described by Marx as existing under capitalism, in which capitalists spend money to buy commodities (including the commodified labor of workers), with the intention of selling those commodities for ''more money'' than they began with. The capitalist has no direct relationship to the commodity being produced and sold, and the capitalist is solely interested in obtaining more money. See p. 16. See also: C→M→C
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Machism'''
 +
| See: Empirio-Criticism.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Manifestation'''
 +
| How a given thing, phenomenon, or idea is expressed externally in the material world. See p. 115.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Marxism-Leninism'''
 +
| A system of scientific opinions and theories focused on liberating the working class from capitalism and achieving a stateless, classless, communist society. The core ideas of this system were first developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, then defended and further developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. See. p. 1.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Material Conditions'''
 +
| The material external environment in which humans live, including the natural environment, the means of production and the economic base of human society, objective social relations, and other externalities and systems which affect human life and human society. See p. 6, 22, 40–42, 70–72, 80–81, 87, 92–95, 116–118, 161, 174, 179, 181, 206–207, 210, 229.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Material Production Activity'''
 +
| Material production activity is the first and most basic form of ''praxis''. In this form of praxis activity, humans use tools through labor processes to influence the natural world in order to create wealth and material resources and to develop the conditions necessary to maintain our existence and development. See p. 206–208.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Materialism'''
 +
| A philosophical position that holds that the material world exists outside of the mind, and that human ideas and thoughts stem from observation and sense experience of this external world. Materialism rejects the idealist notion that truth can only be sought solely through reasoning and human consciousness. See p. 10–13, 48.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Materialist Dialectics'''
 +
| A scientific system of philosophy concerned with motion, development, and common relationships, and with the most common rules of motion and development of nature, society, and human thought. See p. 10, 21, 45–47, 98202, 227, 237.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Matter'''
 +
| A philosophical category denoting things and phenomena, existing in objective external reality, which human beings access through our sense perceptions. See p. 26, 27, 32, 48, 51–52, 53–69, 72, 88–95, 97, 103, 164–165.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Means of Production'''
 +
| Physical inputs and systems used in the production of goods and services, including: machinery, factory buildings, tools, equipment, and anything else used in producing goods and services. See p. 2–3, 7, 14–16.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Mechanical Motion'''
 +
| Changes in positions of objects in space. See p. 61.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Mechanical Philosophy'''
 +
| A scientific and philosophical movement popular in the 17<sup>th</sup> century which explored mechanical machines and compared natural phenomena to mechanical devices, resulting in a belief that all things — including living organisms — were built as (and could theoretically be built by humans as) mechanical devices.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Mental Reflection'''
 +
| Reactions which occur in animals with central nervous systems. Mental reflections occur through conditioned reflex mechanisms through learning. See p. 65, 68, 224.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Metaphysical Materialism'''
 +
| Metaphysical materialism was strongly influenced by the metaphysical, mechanical thinking of ''mechanical philosophy'', which was a scientific and philosophical movement which explored mechanical machines and compared natural phenomena to mechanical devices. Metaphysical materialists believed that all change can exist only as an increase or decrease in quantity, brought about by external causes.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Metaphysics'''
 +
| A branch of philosophy that attempts to explain the fundamental nature of reality. Metaphysical philosophy has taken many forms through the centuries, but one common shortcoming of metaphysical thought is a tendency to view things and ideas in a static, abstract manner. Generally speaking, metaphysics presents nature as a collection of objects and phenomena which are isolated from one another and fundamentally unchanging. See p. 52.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Methodology'''
 +
| A system of reasoning: the ideas and rules that guide humans to research, build, select, and apply the most suitable methods in both perception and practice. Methodologies can range from very specific to broadly general, with philosophical methodology being the most general scope of methodology. See p. 44.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Mode'''
 +
| The way or manner in which something occurs or exists. See p. 19–20.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Mode of Existence of Matter'''
 +
| Refers to how matter exists in our universe; specifically, matter exists in our motion in a mode of ''motion.'' See p. 59.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Motion'''
 +
| Also known as “change;” motion/change occurs as a result of the mutual impacts which occur between two things, phenomena, or ideas in relation with one another. See p. 23, 47, 59–63. 74, 106–107, 122–127, 145, 163–165, 169-173-186, 197, 201–202.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Motion in Equilibrium'''
 +
| Motion in equilibrium is motion that has not changed the positions, forms, and/or structures of things. Motion in Equlibrium is only ever temporary in nature; all motion will ''eventually'' lead to changes in position, form, and/or structure. See p. 62.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Narodnik'''
 +
| Agrarian socialist movement of the 1860s and 70s in the Russian Empire, composed of peasants who rose up in a failed campaign against the Czar. See p. 29–30.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Natural law'''
 +
| See: Laws of Nature.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Natural Science'''
 +
| Science which deals with the natural world, including chemistry, biology, physics, geology, etc. See p. 13, 19, 26, 103.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Negation'''
 +
| The development process through which two contradicting objects mutually develop one another until one is overtaken by the other. In dialectical materialism, negation takes the form of ''dialectical negation''. See p. 123, 175176, 183, 185–202.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''New Economic Policy'''
 +
| Also known as the NEP; this early Soviet policy was devised as Vladimir Illyich Lenin to be a temporary economic system that would allow a market economy and capitalism to exist within Russia, alongside state-owned business ventures, all firmly under the control of the working-classdominated state. See p. 33–34.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Objective Dialectics'''
 +
| The dialectical processes which occur in the material world, including all of the motion, relationships, and dynamic changes which occur in space and time. See p. 98, 102–103, 182.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Objective Existence'''
 +
| Existence which manifests outside of and independently of human consciousness, whether humans can perceive it or not. See p. 50, 58, 228.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Objective Idealism'''
 +
| A form of idealism which asserts that the ideal and consciousness are the primary existence, while also positing that the ideal and consciousness are objective, and that they exist independently of nature and humans. See p. 50.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Objectiveness'''
 +
| An abstract concept that refers to the relative externality of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Every thing, phenomena and idea exists externally to every other thing, phenomena, and idea. This means that to each individual subject, all other subjects exist as external objects. See p. 111–114, 124.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Obviousness'''
 +
| See: Obviousness and Randomness
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Obviousness and Randomness (Category Pair)'''
 +
| The philosophical category of Obviousness refers to events that occur because of the essential internal aspects of a subject which become reasons for certain results in certain conditions: the obvious has to happen in a certain way, it can’t happen any other way. The Randomness category refers to things that happen because of external reasons: things that happen, essentially, by chance, due to impacts from many external relations. A random outcome may occur or it may not occur, and may occur in many different ways. Obviousness and Randomness have a dialectical relationship with one another. See p. 144–146.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Opportunism'''
 +
| A system of political opinions with no direction, no clear path, and/or no coherent viewpoint, focusing on whatever actions or decisions might be beneficial for the opportunist in the short term. See p. 174.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Opposites'''
 +
| Such aspects, properties and tendencies of motion which oppose one another, yet are, simultaneously, conditions and premises of the existence of one another. See p. 61, 175–179, 181, 184, 190, 227.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Ordinary Consciousness'''
 +
| Perception that is formed passively, stemming from the daily activities of humans. See p. 210–216.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Period of Motion'''
 +
| Development which occurs between two quality shifts, including the quality shifts themselves. See p. 170.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Perspective'''
 +
| See: Viewpoint.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Petty Bourgeoisie'''
 +
| Semi-autonomous merchants, farmers, and so on who are self-employed, own small and limited means of production, or otherwise fall in between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Also called the petite bourgeoisie. See p. 3–6.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Petty Commodity Production'''
 +
| See: Simple Commodity Production.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Phenomena'''
 +
| Anything that is observable by the human senses. See p. 156. See also: Essence and Phenomena.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Physical Motion'''
 +
| Motion of molecules, electrons, fundamental particles, thermal processes, electricity, etc., in time and space. See p. 61.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Physical Reflection'''
 +
| Reflection which occurs any time two material objects interact and the features of the objects are transferred to one other. See p. 67–68.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Point of View'''
 +
| See: Viewpoint.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Populism'''
 +
| The political philosophy of the Narodnik movement; this political philosophy was focused on bringing about an agrarian peasant revolution led by intellectuals with the ambition of going directly from a feudal society to a socialist society built from rural communes. Populism overtly opposed Marxism and dialectical materialism and was based on subjective idealist utopianism. See p. 30.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Positivism'''
 +
| The belief that we can test scientific knowledge through scientific methods, and through logic, math, etc.; positivism tends to overlap significantly with ''empiricism'' in theory and practice. See p. 32, 209.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Possibility'''
 +
| See: Possibility and Reality.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Possibility and Reality (Category Pair)'''
 +
| The philosophical category of Possibility refers to things that have not happened nor existed in reality yet, but that would happen, or would exist given necessary conditions. The philosophical category of Reality refers to things that exist or have existed in reality and in human thought. See p. 160–162.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Practice'''
 +
| See: Praxis.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Pragmatism'''
 +
| Pragmatism refers to a form of subjectivism in which one centers one’s own immediate material concerns over all other considerations. See p. 218.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Praxis'''
 +
| Conscious activity which improves our understanding, and which has purpose and historical-social characteristics. Used interchangeably with the word “practice” in this text. See p. 205–206, 235.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Prejudice'''
 +
| See: Conservatism.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Primary and Secondary Contradictions'''
 +
| In the development of things, phenomena, and ideas, there are many development stages. In each stage of development, there will be one contradiction which drives the development process. This is what we call the primary contradiction. Secondary contradictions include all the other contradictions which exist during that stage of development. Determining whether a contradiction is primary or secondary is relative, and it depends heavily upon the material conditions and the situation being analyzed. See p. 178–179.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Primary Existence'''
 +
| Existence which precedes and determines other existences; materialists believe that the external material world is the primary existence which determines the ideal, while idealists believe that human consciousness (“the ideal”) is the primary existence from which truth is ultimately derived. See p. 50–51.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Primitive Materialism'''
 +
| An early form of materialism which recognizes that matter is the primary existence, and holds that the world is composed of certain elements, and that these were the first objects — the origin — of the world, and that these elements are the essence of reality. This was later developed into Metaphysical Materialism and, later, Dialectical Materialism. See p. 52.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Principle of General Relationships'''
 +
| A principle of dialectical materialism which states that all things, phenomena, and ideas are related to one another, and are defined by these internal and external relationships. See p. 106–107, 110, 114.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Private'''
 +
| See: Private and Common
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Private and Common (Category Pair)'''
 +
| The Private philosophical category encompasses specific things, phenomena, and ideas; the Common philosophical category defines the common aspects, attributes, factors, and relations that exist in many things and phenomena. Private and Common are relative in nature and have a dialectical relationship with one another. See p. 128–138.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Private Laws'''
 +
| Laws which apply only to a specific range of things and phenomena, i.e.: laws of mechanical motion, laws of chemical motion, laws of biological motion, etc. See p. 162.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Production Force'''
 +
| The combination of the means of production and workers within human society. See p. 6, 23, 36.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Proletariat'''
 +
| The people who provide labor under capitalism; the proletariat do not own their own means of production, and must therefore sell their labor to those who do own means of production; also called the Working Class. See also: Bourgeoisie, Petty Bourgeoisie. See p. 1–8, 22–23, 25–26, 29–31, 33–35, 40–41, 63, 231.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Quality'''
 +
| The unity of component parts, taken together, which defines a subject and distinguishes it from other subjects. See p. 119–121.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Quality Shift'''
 +
| A change in quality which takes place in the motion and development process of things, phenomena, and ideas, occurring when quantity change meets a certain perceived threshold. See p. 124, 153, 164, 168–174.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Quantity'''
 +
| The total amount of component parts that compose a subject. See p. 119–121.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Quantity range'''
 +
| The range of quantity changes which can accumulate without leading to change in quality related to any given thing, phenomenon, or idea. See p. 168–171.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Quintessence'''
 +
| Original Vietnamese word: ''tinh hoa''. Literally, it means “the best, highest, most beautiful, defining characteristics” of a concept, and, unlike the English word quintessence, it has an exclusively positive connotation. See p. 8, 21, 43, 45, 52.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Randomness'''
 +
| See: Obviousness and Randomness.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Rational Consciousness'''
 +
| The higher stage of the cognitive process, which includes the indirect, abstract, and generalized reflection of the essential properties and characteristics of things and phenomena. This stage of consciousness performs the most important function of comprehending and interpreting the essence of the perceived subject. See p. 219–225.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Reason'''
 +
| See: Reason and Result
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Reality'''
 +
| See: Possibility and Reality.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Reason and Result (Category Pair)'''
 +
| The Reason philosophical category is used to define the mutual impacts between internal aspects of a thing, phenomenon or idea, or between things, phenomena, or ideas, that bring about changes. The Result philosophical category defines the changes that were caused by mutual impacts which occur between aspects and factors within a thing, phenomenon, or idea, or externally between different things, phenomena, or ideas. Not to be confused with the metaphysical concept of “cause and effect,” which attributes a single cause to any given effect. See p. 138–144.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Reasoning'''
 +
| The final phase of rational consciousness, formed on the basis of synthesizing judgments so as to extrapolate new knowledge about the perceived subject. See p. 223–225, 228–229.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Reflection'''
 +
| The re-creation of the features of one form of matter in a different form of matter which occurs when they mutually impact each other through interaction. See p. 64–75, 79–80, 90–92, 103, 165, 208–211, 214–215, 219–224, 228, 232, 237.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Relative and Absolute'''
 +
| “Absolute” and “Relative” are philosophical classifications which refer to interdependence: That which is ''absolute'' exists independently and with permanence. That which is ''relative'' is temporary, and dependent on other conditions or circumstances in order to exist. See p. 56, 233. See also: Absolute Truth, Relative Truth, Relativism, Truth.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Relative Truth'''
 +
| Truth which has developed alignment with reality without yet having reached complete alignment between human knowledge and the reality which it reflects; knowledge which incompletely reflects material subjects without complete accuracy. See p. 230, 232. See also: Absolute Truth, Relative and Absolute, Relativism, Truth.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Relativism'''
 +
| A position that all truth is relative and that nothing can ever be absolutely, objectively known; that only Relative Truth can be found in our existence. See p. 56–58, 233–234. See also: Absolute Truth, Relative and Absolute, Relative Truth, Truth.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''René Descartes'''
 +
| (1596 — 1650) French metaphysical philosopher who developed early methods of scientific inquiry. See p. 20, 53.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Result'''
 +
| See: Reason and Result.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Richard Avenarius'''
 +
| (1843 — 1896) German-Swiss philosopher who developed a system of subjective idealism known as “Empirio-Criticism.” See p. 27–29.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Rigidity'''
 +
| An unwillingness to alter one’s thoughts, holding too stiffly to established consciousness and knowledge, and ignoring practical experience and observation, which leads to stagnation of both knowledge and consciousness. See p. 217–218.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Robert Owen'''
 +
| (1771 — 1858) Wealthy Welsh textile manufacturer who tried to build a better society for workers in New Hampshire, Indiana, in the USA by purchasing the town of New Harmony in 1825. Owen’s vision failed after two years, though many other wealthy capitalists in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century were inspired by Owen to try similar plans, which also failed.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Scientific'''
 +
| An adjective which describes methodologies, approaches, and practices of gaining knowledge and insight which are methodological and/or systematic in nature. See p. 1–2.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Scientific Consciousness'''
 +
| Conscious activities which actively gather information from the methodological and/or systematic observations of the characteristics, nature, and inherent relationships of research subjects. Scientific consciousness is considered ''indirect'' because it takes place outside of the course of ordinary daily activities. See p. 58, 210, 212, 215–216.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Scientific'''
 +
| Experimental Human activities that resemble or replicate states of nature and society
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Activity'''
 +
| in order to determine the laws of change and development of subjects of study. This form of activity plays an important role in the development of society, especially in the current historical period of modern science and technological revolution. See p. 206–208.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Scientific Materialist Viewpoint'''
 +
| A perspective which begins analysis of the world in a manner that is both scientifically systematic in pursuit of understanding and firmly rooted in a materialist conception of the world. See p. 105.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Scientific Socialism'''
 +
| A body of theory and knowledge (which must be constantly tested against reality) focused on the practical pursuit of changing the world to bring about socialism through the leadership of the proletariat. See p. 1–2, 21, 37–39.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Scientific Worldview'''
 +
| A worldview that is expressed by a systematic pursuit of knowledge that generally and correctly reflects the relationships of things, phenomena, and processes in the objective material world, including relationships between humans, as well as relationships between humans and the world. See p. 3839, 44–45, 48.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Second International'''
 +
| Founded in Paris in 1889 to continue the work of the First International; it fell apart in 1916 because members from different nations could not maintain solidarity through the outbreak of World War I. See p. 35, 174.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Self-motion'''
 +
| In the original Vietnamese, the word “''tự vận động''.” Literally meaning: “it moves itself.” See p. 59–60, 124.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Sensation'''
 +
| The subjective reflection of the objective world in human consciousness as perceived through human senses. See p. 27, 56–58, 68–69, 72, 85, 221–222.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Sensuous Human Activity; Sensuous Activity'''
 +
| A description of human activity developed by Marx which acknowledges that all human activity is simultaneously ''active'' in the sense that our conscious activity can transform the world, as well as ''passive'' in the sense in that all human thoughts fundamentally derive from observation and sense experience of the material world. See p. 13.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Simple Commodity Production'''
 +
| What Marx called the “C→M→C” mode of circulation. See p. 16–18.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Simple Exchange'''
 +
| When individual producers trade the products they have made directly, themselves, for other commodities. See p. 16–17.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Social Being'''
 +
| The material existence of human society, as opposed to ''social consciousness''. See also: Base. See p. 24, 54–55.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Social Consciousness'''
 +
| The collective experience of consciousness shared by members of a society, including ideological, cultural, spiritual, and legal beliefs and ideas which are shared within that society, as opposed to ''social being''. See p. 22, 24, 32, 54–55, 80. See also: Superstructure.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Social Motion'''
 +
| Changes in the economy, politics, culture, and social life of human beings. See p. 61–62.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Socialization'''
 +
| The idea that human society transforms labor and production from a solitary, individual act into a collective, social act. In other words, as human society progresses, people “socialize” labor into increasingly complex networks of social relations: from individuals making their own tools, to agricultural societies engaged in collective farming, to modern industrial societies with factories, logistical networks, etc. See p. 6, 36.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Socialized Production Force'''
 +
| A production force which has been socialized — that is to say, a production force which has been organized into collective social activity. See p. 6.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Socio-Political Activity'''
 +
| Praxis activity utilized by various communities and organizations in human society to transform political-social relations in order to promote social development. See p. 206–208.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Solipsism'''
 +
| A form of idealism in which one believes that the self is the only basis for truth. See p. 218.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Sophistry'''
 +
| The use of misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s’ dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. See p. 32–33, 56, 118, 182, 194.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Stage of Development'''
 +
| The current quantity and quality characteristics which a thing, phenomenon, or object possesses. Every time a quality change occurs, a new stage of development is entered into. See p. 24, 39, 125, 173–174, 179, 190, 196–197, 200, 212, 221.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Stagnation'''
 +
| An inability or unwillingness to change and adapt consciousness and practice in accordance with developing material conditions. Stagnation can stem from, or cause, overstatement of absolute truth in theory and forestall necessary development of both consciousness and practical ability. See p. 125, 218, 233. See also: Rigidity.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Struggle of Opposites'''
 +
| The tendency of opposites to eliminate and negate each other. See p. 61, 181, 184.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Subjective Factors'''
 +
| Factors which, from the perspective of a given subject, that same subject is capable of impacting. See p. 162–163, 175, 202.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Subjective Dialectics; Dialectical Thought'''
 +
| A system of analysis and organized thinking which aims to reflect the objective dialectics of the material world within human consciousness. Dialectical thinking has two component forms: dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics. See: p. 98–99, 103.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Subjective Idealism'''
 +
| Subjective idealism asserts that consciousness is the primary existence and that truth can be obtained only or primarily through conscious activity and reasoning. Subjective idealism asserts that all things and phenomena can only be experienced as subjective sensory perceptions, with some forms of subjective idealism even explicitly denying the objective existence of material reality altogether. See also: Empirio-Criticism, Objective Idealism. See p. 26–27, 50.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Subjectivism'''
 +
| A philosophical position in which one centers one’s own self and conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test their own perceptions against material and social reality. See p. 56, 182, 217–218, 233–234.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Suitability'''
 +
| The applicability of a subject for a specific application or role. See p. 154.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Superstructure'''
 +
| The ideal (non-material) components of human society, including: media institutions, music, and art, as well as other cultural elements like religion, customs, moral standards, and everything else which manifests primarily through conscious activity and social relations. See p. 23. See also: Base.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Surplus Value'''
 +
| The extra amount of value a capitalist is able to secure by exploiting wagelabourers (by paying workers less than the full value of their labour). Workers will spend part of their workday reproducing their own labourpower (through earning enough to eat, secure shelter and other cultural needs) and the rest of the time will be spent producing surplus value which is then appropriated by the capitalist as profit. See p. 18, 22–23, 39.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Symbolization'''
 +
| The representation of an objective thing or phenomenon in human consciousness which has been reflected by sensation and conception. See p. 221–222.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Systematic Structure'''
 +
| A structure which includes within itself a system of component parts and relationships. See p. 114.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Theoretical Consciousness'''
 +
| The indirect, abstract, systematic level of perception in which the nature and laws of things and phenomena are generalized and abstracted. See p. 210–214, 217–218.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Theoretical Knowledge'''
 +
| Knowledge which is abstract and generalized, resulting from theoretical conscious activities which include repeated and varied observations. See p. 214, 217.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Theory'''
 +
| An idea or system of ideas intended to explain an aspect, characteristic, or tendency of objective reality. See p. 235.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Theory of Accumulation/Surplus Value'''
 +
| See: Law of Development of Capitalism.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Thing-in-Itself'''
 +
| The actual material object which exists outside of our consciousness, ''as it exists outside of our consciousness''. See p. 72–74, 101, 158.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Third International'''
 +
| Also known as the Communist International (or the ComIntern for short); founded in Moscow in 1919, its goals were to overthrow capitalism, build socialism, and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. It was dissolved in 1943 in the midst of the German invasion of Russia in World War II. See p. 35.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Three Component Parts'''
 +
| The three essential elements of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, first identified of Marxism-Leninism by Lenin in ''The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism''. 1. The Philosophy of Marxism. 2. The Political Economy of Marxism. 3. Scientific Socialism.See p. 21, 32, 34, 38.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Threshold'''
 +
| The amount, or degree, of quantity change at which quality change occurs. Truth is primarily discovered through labor and practice in the physical world. See p. 120, 168–169, 171, 173.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Truth'''
 +
| A correct and accurate conscious reflection of objective reality. See p. 9–10, 49, 56, 70, 75, 94–96, 194, 204, 209, 215–219, 225–237. See also: Labor, Practice.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Unconditioned Reflex'''
 +
| Reactions which are not learned, but simply occur automatically based on physiological mechanisms occurring within an organism, characterized by permanent connections between sensory perceptions and reactions. See p. 66, 68.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Unilateral Consideration'''
 +
| The consideration of a subject from one side only. See p. 49.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Unintelligibility'''
 +
| A philosophical position which denies the human cognitive capacity to accurately perceive the external material world. See p. 48.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Unique Relationship'''
 +
| The least general form of relationship, which only occur between two specific things/phenomena/ideas. See p. 109, 130.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Unity in Diversity'''
 +
| A concept in materialist dialectics which holds that within universal relationships exist within and between all different things, phenomena, and ideas, we will find that each individual manifestation of any universal relationship will have its own different manifestations, aspects, features, etc. Thus even the universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in infinite diversity. See p. 42, 110–111, 114, 125, 130.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Universal Law of Consciousness'''
 +
| A universal law which holds that consciousness is a process of dialectical development in which practical activity leads to conscious activity, which then leads back to practical activity, in a continuous and never-ending cycle, with a tendency to develop both practical and conscious activity to increasingly higher levels. See p. 219.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Universal Laws'''
 +
| Laws that impact every aspect of nature, society, and human thought. Materialist dialectics is the study of these universal laws. See p. 15, 162–163, 227.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Universal Relationship'''
 +
| The most general kind of relationship; relationships that exist between and within every thing and all phenomena; along with ''development'', universal relationships are one of the two primary subjects of study of materialist dialectics. See p. 80, 108, 109, 111, 165.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Use Value'''
 +
| A concept in classical political economy and Marxist economics which refers to tangible features of a commodity (a tradable object) that can fulfill some human requirement or desire, or which serve a useful purpose. See p. 15–18, 95.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Utopianism'''
 +
| 1. A political and philosophical movement which held the belief that “a New Moral World” of happiness, enlightenment, and prosperity could be created through education, science, technology, and communal living. See p. 18. 2. The idealist philosophical concept which mistakenly asserts that the ideal can determine the material, and that ideal forms of society can be brought about without regard for material conditions and development processes. See p. 8, 17–18, 30, 94.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Value-Form'''
 +
| Also known as “form of value;” the social form of a commodity. Under capitalism, through the exchange of qualitatively different commodities, the money form of value is established as the general equivalent which can functionally be exchanged for all other values; money is therefore the most universal value-form under capitalism. See p. 15, 17, 155.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Viewpoint'''
 +
| Also known as point of view or perspective; the starting point of analysis which determines the direction of thinking from which phenomena and problems are considered. See p. 12, 20–21, 23, 25, 26, 30, 32–33, 38–39, 5559, 62, 64, 89, 93–94, 105, 111, 114–120, 122, 125–126, 130, 143, 147, 150, 172, 185–188, 195, 200–201, 233–235. See also: Comprehensive Viewpoint, Historical Viewpoint.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Viewpoint Crisis'''
 +
| A situation in which a specific viewpoint can’t be settled on, found, or agreed upon. See p. 26, 32–33.
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Vladimir Ilyich Lenin'''
 +
| (1870 -1924) A Russian theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, defender and developer of Marxism in the era of imperialism, founder of the Bolsheviks, the Communist Party and the government of the Soviet Union, leader of Russia and the international working class. ''Referenced throughout.''
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Working Class'''
 +
| See: Proletariat
 +
|
 +
|-
 +
| | '''Worldview'''
 +
| The whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about humans ourselves, and about life and the position of human beings in the world. See p. 1, 11, 37–39, 44–45, 48, 52, 96, 138, 201, 208–209, 218, 234. See also: Scientific Worldview.
 +
|
 +
|}
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''For centuries, the banyan tree has been the symbol of communal life in Vietnam.''
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''Traditionally, the entrance to a village is graced by a large and ancient banyan tree. It is in the shade of these trees that villagers gather to socialize, draw water from wells, and make collective decisions together. The drooping accessory trunks represent the longevity of villagers — and of the village itself — while the arching canopy represents the safety and protection of the village. The shape of the banyan tree is seen in the full moon, which casts peaceful light across the Earth to guide travelers in the dark of night.''
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''Vietnam’s revolution against Japanese fascism and French colonialism began in 1945 beneath the cover of the Tân Trào Banyan Tree, which still stands in the city of Tuyên Quang.''
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''It is in this deep-rooted, humanistic spirit of collective action that we founded Banyan House Publishing. We hope to deliver volumes which will inspire action and change throughout the village that is our world.''
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''BanyanHouse.org''
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Latest revision as of 20:57, 17 July 2025

CURRICULUM OF
THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF MARXISM-LENINISM
PART 1

THE WORLDVIEW AND PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY OF MARXISM-LENINISM

For University and College Students

Not Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought

FIRST ENGLISH EDITION

Translated and Annotated by Luna Nguyen

Foreword by Dr. Vijay Prashad

Introduction by Dr. Taimur Rahman

Edited, Annotated, and Illustrated by Emerican Johnson

Proofread by David Peat

Additional Contributions and Editorial Support by Iskra Books

Published in association with The International Magazine

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-2.png

Contents

License

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The full text of this license is available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/


“Step by step, along the struggle, by studying Marxism-Leninism parallel with participation in practical activities, I gradually came upon the fact that only socialism and communism can liberate the oppressed nations and the working people throughout the world from slavery.”

- Ho Chi Minh

Support for This Work

Translating, annotating, and typesetting this book has taken three years, which would not have been possible without the support of our supporters on GoFundMe. GoFundMe is also the reason we are able to make the digital version of this entire text available for free online. We would therefore like to recognize all of our supporters:

Zach L. Jake B. Katia S. Jimi C.
Kathryn S. Matthew S. Manuel V. Luiza S.
Timothy P. Joshua E. Sarah K. Sarah F.
De’Vonte T. Corey K. Aidan M. Danion S.
Douglas H. Justin F. Blake P. Liam H.
Ayodele E. Jesse T. Patrick O. Mendel A.
Stephanie P. Christopher R. Daniel H. Marcos F. T.
Bryan D. Helios A. C. Ryan P. Peter L.-D.
Jeff H. Michael M. Matthew P. Abby L.
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Jason G. A., Jr. Melinda K. Jillian R. Jacob N.
Richard H. Shane F. Derric A. Robyn M.
Lachlainn H. Marc G. Blaine H. The Slopstache

There is still plenty of work to be done to complete the translation of this entire curriculum. If you would like to financially support our efforts, you can support us at:

BanyanHouse.org

Dedication and Gratitude

This book is dedicated to all the backers of the GoFundMe campaign that raised the funds to allow me to translate this text. What I initially believed would be a straightforward three-month process of translating ended up taking over three years of not just translation but also research, study, review, annotation, editing, proofreading, peer review, and more — with the incredible support of a full team of talented comrades — in order to make sure that everything would be digestible and intelligible for audiences outside of Vietnam. So, sincerely, thank you to everyone who backed this project for your patience, support, and encouragement.

Thank you to my husband and comrade, Emerican Johnson, who helped me throughout the translation process, and who did such a fantastic job editing, annotating, and illustrating this text. He was my constant dialectical companion as we grappled together with the spirit and meaning of the writings of Marx, Lenin, and Engels that are the bedrock of this text.

Thank you, also, to Iskra Books for the absolutely vital work they have done in helping us to edit this book and hold it to a high standard. We literally could not have done it without you. In particular, thank you to Ben Stahnke for organizing and cheerleading us through to the end, and to David Peat, for the painstaking, meticulous, and no-doubt frustrating work of proofreading our very, very, very imperfect writing!

Thanks also to The International Magazine, who have provided guidance and suggestions throughout the process of developing this translation. I have had the opportunity to work with The International Magazine on various projects and I can recommend no better monthly periodical for internationalist communists to learn about socialist movements around the world.

We owe a great deal of gratitude to Dr. Vijay Prashad and Dr. Taimur Rahman for taking the time to read through our translation and, in addition to providing their feedback and encouragement, also taking the time to write the foreword and introduction to the text. I know that you are both extremely busy with your own important literary, academic, and political work, so this assistance is so very much appreciated.

Finally, I would like to thank the Vietnamese intellectuals and experts who have done such an amazing job at taking hundreds of texts and distilling them down into the original volume which I have translated here. The elegance and precision with which they have been able to capture the essence of Marxism-Leninism is a monumental contribution to the workers of the world, and I only hope my translation does their work justice.

March, 2023
Luna Nguyen

Foreword

In December 1998, Fidel Castro addressed the Young Communist League’s 7th Congress in Havana, Cuba. The Soviet Union and the Communist state system in Eastern Europe had collapsed, which greatly weakened the cause of socialism. Not only was Cuba hit hard by the loss of its major trading partners and political ally, but socialists in general were penalised by the lethal argument made by the imperialist sections that “socialism had been defeated.” After 1991, Fidel revived the phrase “Battle of Ideas,” which was had been used in The German Ideology by Marx and Engels. To the Young Communists, Fidel said:

We must meet, in the heat of the battle, with the leading cadres to discuss, analyse, expand on, and draft plans and strategies to take up issues and elaborate ideas, as when an army’s general staff meets. We must use solid arguments to talk to members and non-members, to speak to those who may be confused or even to discuss and debate with those holding positions contrary to those of the Revolution or who are influenced by imperialist ideology in this great battle of ideas we have been waging for years now, precisely in order to carry out the heroic deed of resisting against the most politically, militarily, economically, technologically and culturally powerful empire that has ever existed. Young cadres must be well prepared for this task.

Bourgeois ideology had tried to sweep aside its most fundamental critique – namely Marxism – by saying that “socialism had been defeated” and that Marxism was now obsolete. Marxist criticisms of the “casino of capitalism” – as Fidel called it – were being set aside both inside and outside the academy, with neoliberal policy confident enough to ignore each and every criticism. Fidel argued that young communists must learn the fundamentals of Marxism – including both dialectical and historical materialism – and must learn this in a way that was not religious thinking but would allow them to become “new intellectuals” of the movement, not those who repeat dogma but who learn to understand the conjuncture and become “permanent persuaders” for socialism (the two phrases in quotations are from Gramsci’s prison notebooks). The general ideological confidence of the cadre was not clear, and that confidence and their clarity needed to be developed in a project that Fidel called the Battle of Ideas.

During this period, communists around the world conceded that the demise of the Soviet Union had created a serious dilemma for the left. Not only were we penalised by the argument that “socialism has been defeated,” but our own arguments to explain the turbo-charged drive toward globalisation and neoliberalism and to make the case for a socialist alternative were not strong enough. One indication of that weakness was the 2001 World Social Forum meeting held in Brazil, which promoted the slogan – Another World is Possible, a weak slogan in comparison to a more precise slogan, such as – Socialism is Necessary. Young people drifted into our ranks in this decade, angered by the wretched social conditions created by the permanent austerity of neoliberalism, but bewildered about how to transform the political environment. The lack of Marxist political education was felt by socialist forces across the world, which is why many parties around the world began to revive a conversation about internal political education for cadre and active engagement with other social forces regarding the pressing issues of our time. Fidel called these two processes – internal education for the Party and external engagement on the dilemmas of humanity – the Battle of Ideas.

In line with this broad direction, the government of Vietnam worked with the national publishing house Sự Thật (The Truth) to develop a curriculum for universities and colleges in the country. They developed this order of study along five subject areas: Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Marxist-Leninist Political Economy, Scientific Socialism, Vietnamese Communist Party History, and Ho Chi Minh Thought. This project worked to educate an entire population that would be able to understand the world in a rational and factual manner, outside the illusions of bourgeois ideology. Four years later, Communist Party of Vietnam adopted a resolution to take this work forward, and – under the leadership of Professor Nguyễn Viết Thông – produced this textbook that brought together the many themes of Marxism into focus for the introductory student and cadre. A book such as this is never easy to create, since it must introduce a form of thought that is critical of the foundations of bourgeois ideology – so it is a critique – but at the same time it provides a worldview to understand the actual world in which we live – so it is a science. The text must, therefore, show how bourgeois thought is partial and at the same time how socialist thought, creatively applied, will allow one to have a firmer grip of reality and be able to participate in fighting to transcend the obstinate facts of human indignity that are reproduced by capitalism. No manual such as this is without its flaws and without its limitations, but no education can start without a manual such as this one. The Vietnamese comrades have done a great service to the left movement by producing a text such as this, which can be used for study and then used as a model to develop similar texts in different parts of the world.

Ho Chi Minh, whose interpretation of Marxism and whose ideas about the Vietnamese Revolution, are all over this text once said: “Study and practice must always go together. Study without practice is useless. Practice without study leads to folly.” There can be no better injunction to get to work, to study and develop one’s theoretical armour and to use that theory as the guide to one’s work in the Battle of Ideas and in the battle for the streets, because this unity between theory and action is indeed praxis (thực tiễn), not just practice, but conscious human activity. That is what Fidel encouraged in his lectures on the Battle of Ideas.

Dr. Vijay Prashad.
5 March 2023
Caracas, Venezuela.

Preface to the First English Edition

The text of this book constitutes part one of a four-part curriculum on Marxism-Leninism developed and published by the Ministry of Education and Training of Vietnam. This curriculum is intended for students who are not specializing in the study of Marxism-Leninism, and is intended to give every Vietnamese student a firm grounding in the political philosophy of scientific socialism.

The entire curriculum consists of:

Part 1: Dialectical Materialism (this text)

Part 2: Historical Materialism

Part 3: Political Economy

Part 4: Scientific Socialism

In Vietnam, each part of the curriculum encompasses one full semester of mandatory study for all college students. Each part builds upon the previous, meaning that this text is the foundation for all political theory education for most college students in Vietnam.

However, it is important to note that this is not the first encounter with dialectical materialism which Vietnamese students wil have had with these ideas, because Vietnamese students also study dialectical materialism, historical materialism, political economy, and scientific socialism from primary school all the way through high school.

As such, the text of this book — in and of itself — would probably seem overwhelmingly condensed to most foreign readers who are new to studying dialectical materialism. Therefore, we have decided to extensively annotate and illustrate this text with the information which would have been previously obtained in a basic Vietnamese high school education and/or provided by college lecturers in the classroom.

It is our desire that these annotations will be helpful for students who hope to learn these principles for application in political activity, but we should also make it clear to academic researchers and the like that our annotations and illustrations are not present in the original Vietnamese work.

We hope that this book will be useful in at least three ways:

  • As a comprehensive introductory textbook on dialectical materialism and for selfstudy, group study, classroom use, cadre training, etc.
  • As a quick and easy to reference handbook for reviewing the basic concepts of dialectical materialism for students of theory who are already familiar with dialectical materialism.
  • As a companion book for further reading of theory and political texts rooted in dialectical materialist philosophy.

Also, please note: because this book is intended to be used as a quick reference and handbook for further study, there are many instances where we duplicate references, quotations, and other such information. We hope that this repetition may be an aid for study by reinforcing important concepts and quotations.

This book — Part 1 of the curriculum, which focuses on the universal philosophical system of dialectical materialism — serves as the foundation of all political theory and practice in the Vietnamese educational system as well as in the Communist Party of Vietnam and other organizations such as the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, the Women’s Union, the Farmer’s Union, the Worker’s Union, etc. Dialectical materialism is the framework for theory and practice as well as the common lens through which Vietnamese socialists relate, communicate, and work together.

This book focuses almost exclusively on the written works of three historical figures:

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels... who initially developed the universal philosophy of dialectical materialism by synthesizing various pre-existing philosophical, political, economic, and historical tendencies including the idealist dialectical system of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the political economics of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the materialist positions of Ludwig Feuerbach, and countless others.

...and Vladimir Illyich Lenin, who further developed and defended dialectical materialism, expanded the analysis of imperialism, demonstrated how to apply dialectical materialism to local material conditions specific to Russia at the turn of the 20th century, and made many other important contributions to dialectical materialist theory and practice.

Obviously, there are countless other writers, revolutionaries, philosophers, and scientists who have contributed to dialectical materialism and scientific socialism. This book focuses primarily on Marx, Engels, and Lenin, because these figures laid the foundations and formulated the basic principles of the philosophy of dialectical materialism and the methodology of materialist dialectics which are most universally applicable in all endeavors.

It is our desire that translating this important work into English will lead to further study, understanding, and appreciation of dialectical materialism as an applied philosophy which socialists can find value in returning to periodically. At the end of the book, we offer a glossary of terms which doubles as an index, appendices with summaries of important concepts and principles, and an afterword, in which we offer advice for further study and application of dialectical materialism.

At the time of publication, we are already in the process of translating and annotating Part 2 of this curriculum, which focuses on historical materialism, with the hopes of eventually releasing the full curriculum. Once it is complete, it will also be made available at BanyanHouse.org — where we also invite questions, constructive feedback, and suggestions.

Introduction

Just a generation ago, Vietnam was the site of the most brutal war of the 20th century. More tonnage of bombs were dropped on the Vietnamese people than were dropped by all sides combined throughout the Second World War. In addition, countless acts of cruelty were used to scorch the very soil of the nation. By the end of Vietnam’s Resistance War Against Imperialist USA (known to the world as “the Vietnam War”), Agent Orange, napalm, and unexploded munitions had left a land deeply scarred and a people traumatised by decades of death and murder. The impression one had was that although Vietnam had won the war, it was so badly devastated that it could not hope to win the peace. But, miraculously, Vietnam is winning this war today, as the Vietnamese economy has become one of the fastest growing in the world and quality of life for the people is improving at a pace which could scarcely have been predicted in 1975.

No one could have imagined that Vietnam would turn around so dynamically and rapidly. How did they achieve this economic miracle? How could this nation — so recently devastated by imperialism and war — possibly be able to reconstruct, revive, rejuvenate, and rebuild? That story is now unfolding before our eyes.

Vietnam’s development has not come without hardship, struggle, setbacks, and mistakes. The people of Vietnam have had to learn hard lessons through struggle and practice to develop and strengthen ideological and theoretical positions. In this manner, the philosophical development of Vietnam deserves study and attention from socialists around the world. To outsiders, Vietnam can appear to be rife with contradictions. As depicted by Western journalists, Vietnam is simultaneously a success story driven by capitalist markets and a failing socialist state. Every victory is chalked up to private enterprise, while every setback is attributed to socialism. In this sense, the media has failed to understand the essential character of the core contradictions which drive the development of Vietnam politically, socially, and economically.

Luna Nguyen has used social media and played an incredibly important role in helping the English speaking world understand the complexities of such contradictions that beguile so many academics and experts. She has helped to give an insider’s perspective on her own country’s path of development towards socialism.

Nguyen’s translation of Part 1 of this influential work, Introduction to the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism, a textbook studied by university and college students across Vietnam, is yet another big step in the direction of making Vietnam’s understanding of their own country’s development available to the English reading world.

For me, as an outsider, it is fascinating not only to see how deeply Vietnamese society takes an interest in European philosophical development (referencing Hume, Hegel, Descartes, Marx, Engels, and so many other Europeans, almost as if they are figures seated in some ancient monastery in Fansipan), but, even more importantly, how they have assimilated that knowledge into the wider context of their own history, society, and culture. The textbook truly comes alive in all the parts where these ideas are shown to be relevant to Vietnam itself. For instance, the textbook stands out with discussions of Ho Chi Minh’s concept of “proletarian piety,” which artfully blends elements of Vietnamese culture with Marxist concepts of class consciousness, or the story of Chi Pheo, who stands as a sympathetic stand-in for the interpretation of the unique characteristics of the Vietnamese Lumpenproletariat. The book itself is an instance of the dialectic of the universal and the particular, the abstract and the concrete.

Just as importantly, it shows that, in Vietnam, Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought are not mere perfunctory rituals that are repeated like a learnt formula for this or that exam; but that although the Vietnamese political economy in its current form certainly contains contradictions which must be negated in the process of building the lower stage of socialism, the government remains seriously committed to the goals, theory, and practice of Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought.

Hence, I highly recommend this book, not merely because it is a well-illustrated and easy-to-read book on the principles of dialectical materialism, but more importantly because it offers an insight into how the Vietnamese government collects and synthesises the philosophical developments that are, on the one hand, the collective legacy of all of humanity, and, on the other hand, the concrete manifestations of a revolutionary theory of (and for the oppressed yearning for) freedom in every corner of the world.

March, 2023

Dr. Taimur Rahman

Editor’s Note

Working on this project has been one of the most illuminating experiences of my life. In translating this work, Luna has opened a door for English speakers into the wide world of Vietnamese scholarship and pedagogy as it relates to socialist theory and philosophy.

Luna and I have done our best to capture the original meaning and spirit of the text. Furthermore, as we have mentioned elsewhere, our annotations and illustrations are intended only to contextualize and expand on the core information of the original text similarly to the class/lecture setting for which the curriculum is intended.

In their lives, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were never able to finish clarifying and systematically describing the philosophy of dialectical materialism which their work was built upon. Engels attempted to structurally define the philosophy in Dialectics of Nature, but unfortunately that work was never completed since he decided to prioritize publishing the unfinished works of Marx after his untimely death.

I believe that this text is a great step forward in that work of systematically describing the philosophical system of dialectical materialism and the methodological system of materialist dialectics. I also believe it’s worth noting how the Vietnamese scholars who crafted this curriculum have embedded the urgent necessity of action — of creative application of these ideas — throughout the text in a way that I find refreshing and reflective of the works of Marx and Engels themselves.

As the text will explain, dialectical materialism is a universal system of philosophy which can be utilized to grapple with any and every conceivable problem which we humans might encounter in this universe. In Vietnam, dialectical materialism has been used to delve into matters of art, ethics, military science, and countless other fields of inquiry and endeavor. It is my hope that this book will, likewise, lead to a wider and fuller understanding and (more importantly) application of dialectical materialism in the Western world.

March, 2023

Emerican Johnson

A Message From The International Magazine

The International Magazine began in 2020 to connect international socialist movements and to strengthen the voice of oppressed people across the globe. We have been following the work of Vietnamese communists in their unique path towards peace, prosperity, and the construction of socialist values with a keen eye and much interest. It is with this spirit of international solidarity and a deep desire to learn from and share wisdom from our comrades around the world that we celebrate the release of this First English Edition of The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism-Leninism Part 1: The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism-Leninism.

Ho Chi Minh once said: “In order to build socialism, first and foremost, we need to have socialist people who understand socialist ideology and have socialist values.”

To this end, Vietnamese communists have expended tremendous resources building a curriculum on Marxist-Leninist philosophy and analysis which includes dialectical materialism, materialist dialectics, scientific socialism, historical materialism, and political economy. These topics are taught in primary and secondary schools and are mandatory subjects for all students attending public universities in Vietnam. Beyond that, Vietnam offers free degrees to students who wish to study Marxist theory and philosophy and Ho Chi Minh Thought (defined as the application of Marxist philosophy to the unique material conditions of Vietnam). In this manner, Vietnam has demonstrated a steadfast commitment to developing “socialist people” “with socialist values.”

We are, therefore, extremely excited to have worked with Luna Nguyen on the translation and annotation of Part 1 of the Vietnamese university curriculum on the worldview and philosophical methodology of Marxism-Leninism into English, which will make this unique perspective of socialist theory available to comrades around the world for the first time.

After having read through this volume, which outlines the fundamentals of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics, we find the most important lesson to be the relationship between theory and practice. According to the Vietnamese scholars who authored the original text, Marxist-Leninist philosophy must be considered a living, breathing philosophy which requires application in the real world — through practice — in order to be made fully manifest.

We hope that readers of this volume will carry forward this guidance through practice which suits your material conditions, wherever you are in the world.

If you would like to learn the perspective of socialists from other nations around the world, we invite you to visit our website at InternationalMagz.com — the home of The International Magazine online. There, you will find articles written by comrades from a wide variety of backgrounds and nationalities with a clear bias towards anti-capitalism, anti-fascism, and anti-imperialism!

In solidarity,

The Editorial Team of The International Magazine

Notes on Translation

Vietnamese is a very different language from English, which has presented many challenges in translating this book. Whenever possible, I have tried to let the “spirit” of the language guide me, without altering the structure, tone, and formatting of the book.

One thing you will likely notice right away: this book is highly condensed! This is because most Vietnamese students are already familiar with these concepts. We have added annotations to try to make the book more digestible for those of you who are new to Marxism-Leninism, and these annotations are explained on the next page.

I have worked hard to try to make the language in this book consistent with the language used in popular translations of works from Marx, Lenin, etc., that would be familiar to English-language students of Marxism-Leninism. That said, different translators have been translating these texts into English for over a century, such that different word choices have been used to relate the same concepts, and even Marx, Engels, and Lenin used different terms to describe the same concepts in many instances (not to mention the fact that Marx and Engels wrote primarily in German, whereas Lenin wrote primarily in Russian).

As such, I have made it my first priority to keep the language of this translation internally consistent to avoid confusion and, again, to match the spirit of the original text as much as possible. As a result, you may find differences between the translation choices made in this text and other translations, but it is my hope that the underlying meaning of each translation is properly conveyed.

March, 2023

Luna Nguyen

Guide to Annotations

This book was written as a textbook for Vietnamese students who are not specializing in Marxism-Leninism, and so it is meant to be a simple and condensed survey of the most fundamental principles of dialectical materialism to be used in a classroom environment with the guide of an experienced lecturer. That said, a typical Vietnamese college student will already have been exposed to many of the concepts presented herein throughout twelve years of primary and secondary education. As such, in translating and preparing this book for a foreign audience who are likely to be reading it without the benefit of a lecturer’s in-person instruction, we realized that we would need to add a significant amount of annotations to the text.

These annotations will take the following forms:

  • Short annotations which we insert into the text itself [will be included in square brackets like these].

Longer annotations which add further context and background information will be included in boxes like this.

We have also added diagrams to our annotations, as well as a detailed glossary/index and appendices, which are located in the back of the book. We hope these will resources will also be of use in studying other texts which are rooted in dialectical materialist philosophy.

Original Vietnamese Publisher’s Note

In 2004, under the direction of the Central Government, the Ministry of Education and Training, in collaboration with Sự Thật [Vietnamese for “The Truth,” the name of a National Political Publishing House], published a [political science and philosophy] curriculum for universities and colleges in Vietnam. This curriculum includes 5 subjects: Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Marxist-Leninist Political Economy, Scientific Socialism, Vietnamese Communist Party History, and Ho Chi Minh Thought. This curriculum has been an important contribution towards educating our students — the young intellectuals of the country — in political reasoning, so that the next generation will be able to successfully conduct national innovation.

With the new practice of education and training, in order to thoroughly grasp the reform of the Party’s ideological work and theory, and to advocate for reform in both teaching and learning at universities and colleges in general, on September 18th, 2008, the Minister of Education and Training, in collaboration with Sự Thật, have issued a new program and published a textbook of political theory subjects for university and college students who are not specialized in Marxism — Leninism with Associate Professor and Doctor of Philosophy Nguyen Viet Thong as chief editor. There are three subjects:

Curriculum of the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism

Curriculum of Ho Chi Minh Thought

Curriculum of the Revolutionary Path of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

Curriculum of the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism was compiled by a collective of scientists and experienced lecturers from a number of universities, with Pham Van Sinh, Ph.D and Pham Quang Phan, Ph.D as co-editors. This curriculum has been designed to meet the practical educational requirements of students.

We hope this book will be of use to you.

April, 2016

NATIONAL POLITICAL PUBLISHING HOUSE — SỰ THẬT

Original Vietnamese Preface

To implement the resolutions of the Communist Party of Vietnam, especially the 5th

Central Resolution on ideological work, theory, and press, on September 18th, 2008, The Ministry of Education and Training has issued Decision Number 52/2008/QD-BGDDT, issuing the subject program: The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism for Students Non-Specialised in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought. In collaboration with Truth — the National Political Publishing House — we published the Curriculum of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism for Students Non-Specialised in MarxismLeninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought.

The authors of this text have drawn from the contents of the Central Council’s previous programs (Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Marxist-Leninist Political Economy, and Scientific Socialism) and compiled them into national textbooks for Marxist-Leninist science subjects and Ho Chi Minh Thought, as well as other curriculums for the Ministry of Education and Training. The authors have received comments from many collectives, such as the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics and Administration, the Central Propaganda Department, as well as individual scientists and lecturers at universities and colleges throughout the country. Notably:

Associate Professor To Huy Rua, Ph.D, Professor Phung Huu Phu, Ph.D, Professor Nguyen Duc Binh, Professor Le Huu Nghia, Ph.D, Professor Le Huu Tang, Ph.D,

Professor Vo Dai Luoc, Ph.D, Professor Tran Phuc Thang, Ph.D, Professor Hoang

Chi Bao, Ph.D, Professor Tran Ngoc Hien, Ph.D, Professor Ho Van Thong, Associate

Professor Duong Van Thinh, Ph.D, Associate Professor Nguyen Van Oanh, Ph.D,

Associate Professor Nguyen Van Hao, Ph.D, Associate Professor Nguyen Duc Bach, PhD. Pham Van Chin, Phung Thanh Thuy, M.A., and Nghiem Thi Chau Giang, M.A.

After a period of implementation, the contents of the textbooks have been supplemented and corrected on the basis of receiving appropriate suggestions from universities, colleges, the contingent of lecturers of political theory, and scientists. However, due to objective and subjective limitations, there are still contents that need to be added and modified, and we would love to receive more comments to make the next edition of the curriculum more complete.

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Table of Contents

Introduction to The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism

I. Brief History of Marxism Leninism

1. Marxism and the Three Constituent Parts

2. Summary of the Birth and Development of Marxism-Leninism

II. Objects, Purposes, and Requirements for Studying the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism

1. Objects and Purposes of Study

2. Some Basic Requirements of the Studying Method

3. Excerpt from Modifying the Working Style

Chapter I: Dialectical Materialism

I. Materialism and Dialectical Materialism

1. The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues

2. Dialectical Materialism — the Most Advanced Form of Materialism

II. Dialectical Materialist Opinions About Matter, Consciousness, and the Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness

1. Matter

2. Consciousness

3. The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness

4. Meaning of the methodology

Chapter 2: Materialist Dialectics

I. Dialectics and Materialist Dialectics

1. Dialectics and Basic Forms of Dialectics

2. Materialist Dialectics

II. Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics

1. The Principle of General Relationships

2. Principle of Development

III. Basic Pairs of Categories of Materialist Dialectics

1. Private and Common

2. Reason and Result

3. Obviousness and Randomness

4. Content and Form

5. Essence and Phenomenon

6. Possibility and Reality

IV. Basic Laws of Materialist Dialectics

1. Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality

2. Law of Unification and Contradiction Between Opposites

3. Law of Negation of Negation

Chapter 3: Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism

1. Praxis, Consciousness, and the Role of Praxis in Consciousness

2. Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth

Afterword

Appendices

Appendix A: Basic Pairs of Categories Used in Materialist Dialectics

Appendix B: The Two Basic Principles of Dialectical Materialism

Appendix C: The Three Universal Laws of Materialist Dialectics

Appendix D: Forms of Consciousness and Knowledge

Appendix E: Properties of Truth

Appendix F: Common Deviations from Dialectical Materialism

Glossary and Index


“Great Victory for the People and Army of South Vietnam!”


Introduction to the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism

I. Brief History of Marxism-Leninism

1. Marxism and the Three Constituent Parts

Marxism-Leninism is a system of scientific opinions and theories which were built by Karl Marx[1] and Friedrich Engels[2], and defended and developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin[3]. Marxism-Leninism was formed and developed by interpreting reality as well as building on preceding ideas. It provides the fundamental worldview* and methodology of scientific awareness and revolutionary practice. It is a science that concerns the work of liberating the proletariat from all exploitative regimes with the ambition of liberating all of humanity from all forms of oppression.

Marxism-Leninism is made up of three basic theories which have strong relationships with each other. They are: Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, Marxist-Leninist Political Economics, and Scientific Socialism.

Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism studies the basic principles of the movement and development of nature, society and human thought. It provides the fundamental worldview and methodology of scientific awareness and revolutionary practice.

Based on this philosophical worldview and methodology, Marxist-Leninist Political Economics studies the economic rules of society, especially the economic rules of the birth, development, and decay of the capitalist mode of production, as well as the birth and development of a new mode of production: the communist mode of production.

Scientific Socialism** is the inevitable result of applying the philosophical worldview and methodology of Marxism-Leninism, as well as Marxist-Leninist Political Economics, to reveal the objective rules of the socialist revolution process: the historical step from capitalism into socialism, and then communism.

Annotation 1

* A worldview encompasses the whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about ourselves as human beings, and about life and the position of human beings in the world.

** The word “science,” and, by extension, “scientific” in Marxism-Leninism has specific meaning. Friedrich Engels was the first to describe the philosophy which he developed with Marx as “Scientific Socialism” in his book Socialism: Utopian and Scientific.

However, it should be noted that the English phrase “scientific socialism” comes from

Engels’ use of the German phrase “wissenschaftlich sozialismus.”

“Wissenschaft” is a word which can be directly translated as “knowledge craft” in German, and this word encompasses a much more broad and general concept than the word “science” as it’s usually used in English.

In common usage, the word “science” in English has a relatively narrow definition, referring to systematically acquired, objective knowledge pertaining to a particular subject. But “wissenschaft” refers to a systematic pursuit of knowledge, research, theory, and understanding. “Wissenschaft” is used in any study that involves systematic investigation. And so, “scientific socialism” is only an approximate translation of “wissenschaftlich sozialismus.” So, “scientific socialism” can be understood as a body of theory which analyzes and interprets the natural world to develop a body of knowledge, which must be constantly tested against reality, with the pursuit of changing the world to bring about socialism through the leadership of the proletariat.

Even though these three basic theories of Marxism-Leninism deal with different subjects, they are all parts of a unified scientific theory system: the science of liberating the proletariat from exploitative regimes and moving toward human liberation.

2. Summary of the Birth and Development of Marxism-Leninism

There have been two main stages of the birth and development of Marxism-Leninism:

1. Stage of formation and development of Marxism, as developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.

2. Stage of defense and developing Marxism into Marxism-Leninism, as developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

a. Conditions and Premises of the Birth of Marxism

Annotation 2

The following sections will explain the conditions which led to the birth of Marxism. First, we will examine the Social-Economic conditions which lead to the birth of Marxism, and then we will examine the theoretical premises upon which Marxism was built. Later, we will also discuss the impact which 18th and 19th century advances in natural science had on the development of Marxism.

- Social-Economical Conditions

Marxism was born in the 1840s. This was a time when the capitalist mode of production was developing strongly in Western Europe on the foundation of the industrial revolution which succeeded first in England at the end of the 18th century. Not only did this industrial revolution mark an important step forward in changing from handicraft cottage industry capitalism into a more greatly mechanized and industrialized capitalism, it also deeply changed society, and, above all, it caused the birth and development of the proletariat.

Annotation 3

Marx saw human society under capitalism divided into classes based on their relation to the means of production.

Means of production are physical inputs and systems used in the production of goods and services, including machinery, factory buildings, tools, and anything else used in producing goods and services. Capitalism is a political economy defined by private ownership of the means of production.

Within the framework of Dialectical Materialism, all classes are defined by internal and external relationships [see The Principle of General Relationships, p. 107]; chiefly, classes are defined by their relations to the means of production and to one another.

The proletariat are the working class — the people who provide labor under capitalism, but who do not own their own means of production, and must therefore sell their labor to those who do own means of production: the bourgeoisie. As the owners of the means of production, the bourgeoisie are the ruling class under capitalism.

According to Marx and Engels, there are other classes within the capitalist political economy. Specifically, Marx named the petty bourgeoisie and the lumpenproletariat. Marx defined the petty bourgeoisie as including semi-autonomous merchants, farmers, and so on who are self-employed, own small and limited means of production, or otherwise fall in between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

In the Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx described the petty bourgeoisie as:

... fluctuating between proletariat and bourgeoisie, and ever renewing itself as a supplementary part of bourgeois society... The individual members of this class, however, are being constantly hurled down into the proletariat by the action of competition, and, as modern industry develops, they even see the moment approaching when they will completely disappear as an independent section of modern society, to be replaced in manufactures, agriculture and commerce, by overlookers, bailiffs and shopmen.

Vietnam’s Textbook of History for High School Students gives this definition of the petty bourgeoisie in the specific context of Vietnamese history:

The petty bourgeois class includes: intellectuals, scientists, and small business owners, handicraftsmen, doctors, lawyers, and civil servants. The vast majority of contemporary intellectuals before the August Revolution of 1945, including students, belonged to the petty bourgeoisie. In general, they were also oppressed by imperialism and feudalism, often unemployed and uneducated.

The petty bourgeoisie were intellectually and politically sensitive. They did not directly exploit labor. Therefore, they easily absorbed revolutionary education and went along with the workers and peasants.

However, the intelligentsia and students often suffer from great weaknesses, such as: theory not being coupled with practice, contempt for labor, vague ideas, unstable stances, and erratic behavior in political action.

Some other petty bourgeoisie (scientists and small businessmen, freelancers, etc.) were also exploited by imperialism and feudalism. Their economic circumstances were precarious, and they often found themselves unemployed and bankrupt. Therefore, the majority also participated in and supported the resistance war and revolution. They are also important allies of the working class.

In general, these members of the petty bourgeoisie had a number of weaknesses: self-interest, fragmentation, and a lack of determination. Therefore, the working class has a duty to agitate and spread propaganda to such members of the petty bourgeoisie, organize them, and help them to develop their strong points while correcting their weaknesses. It is necessary to skillfully lead them, make them determined to serve the people, reform their ideology, and unite with the workers and peasants in order to become one cohesive movement. Then, they will become a great asset for the public in resistance war and revolution.

Marx defined the “lumpenproletariat” as another class which includes the segments of society with the least privilege — most exploited by capitalism — such as thieves, houseless people, etc.

In the Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx defined the lumpenproletariat as: “The ‘dangerous class’ (lumpenproletariat), the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of the old society.” Marx did not have much hope for the revolutionary potential of the lumpenproletariat, writing that they “may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.”

Political Theories, an official journal of the Ho Chi Minh National Institute of Politics, discussed the lumpenproletariat in the specific context of Vietnamese revolutionary history:

It should be noted that Marxism-Leninism has never held that the historical mission of the working class is rooted in poverty and impoverishment. Poverty and low standards of living make workers hate the regime of capitalism, and causes disaster for workers, but the basic driving force behind the revolutionary struggle of the working class lies in the very nature of capitalist production and from the irreconcilable contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie.

Moreover, it should not be conceived that a class is capable of leading the revolution because it is the poorest class. In the old societies, there were classes that were extremely poor and had to go through many struggles against the ruling class, but they could never win and keep power, and did not become the ruling class of society.

History has proven that the class that represents newly emerging productive forces which are able to build a more advanced mode of production than the old ones can lead the revolution and organize society into the regime they represent. Fetishizing poverty and misery is a corruption of Marxism-Leninism...

The very existence of the lumpenproletariat is strong evidence of the inhumane nature of capitalist society, which regularly recreates a large class of outcasts at the bottom of society.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, millions of Vietnamese people were forced to leave their homes in rural farmlands to work for plantations and factories which were owned by French colonialists. These workers were functionally enslaved, being regularly physically abused by colonial masters, barred from any education whatsoever, and receiving only the bare minimum to survive. As a result, under French colonial rule, about 90% of Vietnamese were illiterate and the French aimed to indoctrinate Vietnamese people into believing that they were inferior to the French.

The French colonialists also worked with Vietnamese landlords to exploit peasants in rural areas. Those peasants received barely enough to survive and, like the plantation slaves, were prohibited from receiving education. Because Vietnamese peasants and colonial slaves composed the majority of workers while being so severely oppressed and living in conditions of such abject poverty, it was difficult to fully distinguish between the proletariat and the lumpenproletariat in Vietnam during the colonial era.

During this time, Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese communists developed the philosophy of “Proletarian Piety.” The word “piety,” here, is a translation of the Vietnamese word hiếu, which originally comes from the Confucianist philosophy of “filial piety.” Filial piety demanded children to deeply respect, honor, and obey their parents. Through the concept of Proletarian Piety, Ho Chi Minh adapted this concept to proletarian revolution, calling for communists to deeply love, respect, and tirelessly serve the oppressed masses. This philosophical concept sought to unite the proletariat, lumpenproletariat, and petty bourgeoisie into one united revolutionary class. Even some feudal landlords and capitalists — who were, themselves, oppressed by the colonizing French — were willing to fight for communist revolution and were welcomed into the revolutionary movement if they were willing to adhere to the principle of proletarian piety. The working class and peasantry would lead the revolution, the more privileged classes would follow, and all communist revolutionists would serve the oppressed masses through sacrifice and struggle.

During this period, many novels were written and circulated widely which featured main characters who were members of the lumpenproletariat or enslaved by the French, such as Bỉ Vỏ, a story about a beautiful peasant girl who was forced to become a thief in the city, and Chí Phèo, the story of a peasant who worked as a servant in a feudal landlord’s house who was sent to prison and became a destitute alcoholic after being released. The purpose of these stories was to show the cruelty of the colonialist-capitalist society of Vietnam in the 1930’s and to inspire proletarian piety, including empathy and respect for the extreme suffering and oppression of the lumpenproletariat, peasantry, and colonial slaves. These stories also presented sympathetic views of intellectuals and members of the petty bourgeoisie: for instance, in the novel Lão Hạc, the son of a peasant leaves to work for a French plantation and the father never sees him again. The aged peasant becomes extremely poor and sick without the support of his son, and the only person in the village who helps him is a teacher, representing the intellectual segment of the petty bourgeoisie.

The writers of these novels were communists who wanted to promote the principles of proletarian piety. Rather than looking down on the most oppressed members of society, and rather than sewing distrust and contempt for the petty bourgeoisie, Vietnamese communists inspired solidarity and collaboration between all of the oppressed peoples of Vietnam to overthrow French colonialism, feudalism, and capitalism. Proletarian piety was crucial for uniting the divided and conquered masses of Vietnam and successfully overthrowing colonialism. Note that these strategies were developed specifically for colonial Vietnam. Every revolutionary struggle will take place in unique material conditions[4], and the composition and characteristics of each class will vary over time and from one place to another. It is important for revolutionists to carefully apply the principles of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics to accurately analyze class conditions in order to develop strategies and plans which will most suitably and efficiently lead to successful revolution.

The deep contradictions* between the socialized production force** and the capitalist relations of production*** were first revealed by the economic depression of 1825 and the series of struggles between workers and the capitalist class which followed.

Annotation 4

* See: Definition of Contradiction and Common Characteristics of Contradiction, p. 175.

** In Marxism, “socialization” is simply the idea that human society transforms labor and production from a solitary, individual act into a collective, social act. In other words, as human society progresses, people “socialize” labor into increasingly complex networks of social relations: from individuals making their own tools, to agricultural societies engaged in collective farming, to modern industrial societies with factories, logistical networks, etc.

The production force is the combination of the means of production and workers within any society. The “Socialized Production Force,” therefore, is a production force which has been socialized — that is to say, a production force which has been organized into collective social activity. Under capitalism, the “Socialized Production Force” consists of the proletariat, or the working class, as well as means of production which are owned by capitalists.

*** Marx and Engels defined “relations of production” as the social relationships that human beings must accept in order to survive. Relations of production are, by definition, not voluntary, because human beings must enter into them in order to receive material needs in order to survive within a given society. Under capitalism, the relations of production require the working class to rent their labor to capitalists to receive wages which they need to procure material needs like food and shelter. This is an inherent contradiction because a small minority of society (the capitalist class) own the means of production while the vast majority of society (the working class) must submit to exploitation through wage servitude in order to survive.

Examples of such early struggles include: the resistance of workers in Lyon, France in 1831 and 1834; the Chartist movement in Britain from 1835 to 1848; the workers’ movement in Silesia (Germany) in 1844, etc. These events prove as historical evidence that the proletariat had become an independent political force which pioneered the fight for a democratic, equal, and progressive society.

Annotation 5

Here are some brief descriptions of the early working class movements mentioned above:

Resistance of Workers in Lyon, France:

In 1831 in France, due to heavy exploitation and hardship, textile workers in Lyon revolted to demand higher wages and shorter working hours. The rebels took control of the city for ten days. Their determination to fight is reflected in the slogan: “Live working or die fighting!”

This resistance was brutally crushed by the government, which supported the factory owners. In 1834, silk mill workers in Lyon revolted again to demand the establishment of a republic. The fierce struggle went on for four days, but was extinguished in a bloody battle against the French army. About 10,000 insurgents were imprisoned or deported.

The Chartist Movement in Britain:

Chartism was a working class movement in the United Kingdom which rose up in response to anti-worker laws such as the Poor Law Amendment of 1834, which drove poor people into workhouses and removed other social programs for the working poor. Legislative failure to address the demands of the working poor led to a broadly popular mass movement which would go on to organize around the People’s Charter of 1838, which was a list of six demands which included extension of the vote and granting the working class the right to hold office in the House of Commons.

In 1845, Karl Marx visited Britain for the first time, along with Friedrich Engels, to meet with the leaders of the Chartist movement (with whom Engels had already established a close relationship). After various conflicts and struggles, Chartism ultimately began to decline in 1848 as more socialist-oriented movements rose up in prominence.

Workers’ Movement in Silesia, Germany:

In June, 1844, disturbances and riots occurred in the Prussian province of Silesia, a major center of textile manufacturing. In response, the Prussian army was called upon to restore order in the region. In a confrontation between the weavers and troops, shots were fired into the crowd, killing 11 protesters and wounding many others. The leaders of the disturbances were arrested, flogged, and imprisoned. This event has gained enormous significance in the history of the German labor movement.

In particular, Karl Marx regarded the uprising as evidence of the birth of a German workers’ movement. The weavers’ rebellion served as an important symbol for later generations concerned with poverty and oppression of the working class in German society.

It quickly became apparent that the revolutionary practice of the proletariat needed the guidance of scientific theories. The birth of Marxism was to meet that objective requirement; in the meantime, the revolutionary practice itself became the practical premise for Marxism to continuously develop.

- Theoretical Premises

The birth of Marxism not only resulted from the objective requirement of history, it was also the result of inheriting the quintessence* of various previously established frameworks of human philosophical theory such as German classical philosophy, British classical political economics, and utopianism in France and Britain.

Annotation 6

* In the original Vietnamese, the word tinh hoa is used, which we roughly translate to the word quintessence throughout this book. Literally, it means “the best, highest, most beautiful, defining characteristics” of a concept, and, unlike the English word quintessence, it has an exclusively positive connotation. Quintessence should not be confused with the universal category of Essence, which is discussed on p. 156.

German classical philosophy, especially the philosophies of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel[5] and Ludwig Feuerbach[6], had deeply influenced the formation of the Marxist worldview and philosophical methodology.

Annotation 7

German classical philosophy was a movement of idealist philosophers of the 18th and 19th centuries. Idealism is a philosophical position that holds that the only reliable experience of reality occurs within the human consciousness. Idealists believe that human reason is the best way to seek truth, and that consciousness is thus the only reliable source of knowledge and information.

One of Hegel’s important achievements was his critique of the metaphysical method.

Annotation 8

Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy that attempts to explain the fundamental nature of reality by classifying things, phenomena, and ideas into various categories. Metaphysical philosophy has taken many forms through the centuries, but one common shortcoming of metaphysical thought is a tendency to view things and ideas in a static, abstract manner. Metaphysical positions view nature as a collection of objects and phenomena which are isolated from one another and fundamentally unchanging. Engels explained the problems of metaphysics in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

The analysis of Nature into its individual parts, the grouping of the different natural processes and objects in definite classes, the study of the internal anatomy of organized bodies in their manifold forms — hese were the fundamental conditions of the gigantic strides in our knowledge of Nature that have been made during the last 400 years.

But this method of work has also left us as legacy the habit of observing natural objects and processes in isolation, apart from their connection with the vast whole; of observing them in repose, not in motion; as constraints, not as essentially variables; in their death, not in their life. And when this way of looking at things was transferred by Bacon and Locke from natural science to philosophy, it begot the narrow, metaphysical mode of thought peculiar to the last century.

Francis Bacon (1561 — 1626) is considered the father of empiricism, which is the belief that knowledge can only be derived from human sensory experience [see Annotation 10, p. 10]. Bacon argued that scientific knowledge could only be derived through inductive reasoning in which specific observations are used to form general conclusions. John Locke (1632 — 1704) was another early empiricist, who was heavily influenced by Francis Bacon. Locke, too, was an empiricist, and is considered to be the “father of liberalism.”

Engels was highly critical of the application of metaphysical philosophy to natural science. As Engels continues in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes — ideas — are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses... For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other.

At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things, it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees.

Dialectical Materialism stands in contrast to metaphysics in many ways. Rather than splitting the world into distinct, isolated categories, Dialectical Materialist philosophy seeks to view the world in terms of relationships, motion, and change. Dialectical Materialism also refutes the hard empiricism of Bacon and Locke by describing a dialectical relationship between the material world and consciousness [see: The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88].

For the first time in the history of human philosophy, Hegel expressed the content of dialectics in strict arguments with a system of rules and categories.

Annotation 9

Dialectics is a philosophical methodology which searches for truth by examining contradictions and relationships between things, objects, and ideas. Ancient dialecticians such as Aristotle and Socrates explored dialectics primarily through rhetorical discourse between two or more different points of view about a subject with the intention of finding truth.

In this classical form of dialectics, a thesis is presented. This thesis is an opening argument about the subject at hand. An antithesis, or counter-argument, is then presented. Finally, the thesis and antithesis are combined into a synthesis, which is an improvement on both the thesis and antithesis which brings us closer to truth.

Hegel resurrected dialectics to the forefront of philosophical inquiry for the German Idealists. As Engels wrote in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

Hegel’s work’s greatest merit was the taking up again of dialectics as the highest form of reasoning. The old Greek philosophers were all born natural dialecticians, and Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic of them, had already analyzed the most essential forms of dialectic thought.

Hegel’s great contribution to dialectics was to develop dialectics from a simple method of examining truth based on discourse into an organized, systematic model of nature and of history. Unfortunately, Hegel’s dialectics were idealist in nature. Hegel believed that the ideal served as the primary basis of reality. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels strongly rejected Hegel’s idealism, as well as the strong influences of Christian theology on Hegel’s work, but they also saw great potential in his system of dialectics, as Marx explained in Capital (Volume 1):

The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.


Starting with a critique of the mysterious idealism of Hegel’s philosophy, Marx and Engels inherited the “rational kernel” of Hegelian dialectics and successfully built materialist dialectics.

Annotation 10

In order to understand the ways in which the critique of Hegel’s philosophy by Marx and Engels led to the development of dialectical materialism, some background information on materialism — and the conflicts between idealist and materialist philosophy in the era of Marx and Engels — is needed.

Materialism is a philosophical position that holds that the material world exists outside of the mind, and that human ideas and thoughts stem from observation and sensory experience of this external world. Materialism rejects the idealist notion that truth can only be sought through reasoning and human consciousness. The history and development of both idealism and materialism are discussed more in the section The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues on page 48.

In the era of Marx and Engels, the leading philosophical school of materialism was known as empiricism. Empiricism holds that we can only obtain knowledge through human sense perception. Marx and Engels were materialists, but they rejected empiricism (see Engels’ critique of empiricism in Annotation 8, p. 8).

One reason Marx and Engels opposed the strict empiricist view was that it made materialism vulnerable to attack from idealists, because it ignored objective relations and knowledge that went beyond sense data. The empiricist point of view also provided the basis for the subjective idealism of George Berkeley [see Annotation 32, p. 27] and the skepticism of David Hume. Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism is empiricist in that it supports the idea that humans can only discover knowledge through direct sense experience. Therefore, Berkeley argues, individuals are unable to obtain any real knowledge about abstract concepts such as “matter.”

Similarly, David Hume’s radical skepticism, which Engels called “agnosticism,” denied the possibility of possessing any concrete knowledge. As Hume wrote in A Treatise on Human Nature: “I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another.” Hume’s radical skepticism lay in his empiricist belief that the only source of knowledge is sense experience; but Hume went a step further, doubting that even sense experience could be reliable, adding: “The essence and composition of external bodies are so obscure, that we mustnecessarily, in our reasonings, or rather conjectures concerning them, involveourselves in contradictions and absurdities.”

Later, in the appendix of the same text, Hume argues that conscious reasoning suffers from the same unreliability: “I had entertained some hopes (that) the intellectual world ... would be free from those contradictions, and absurdities, whichseem to attend every explication, that human reason can give of the material world.”

Engels dismissed radical skepticism as “scientifically a regression and practically merely a shamefaced way of surreptitiously accepting materialism, while denying it before the world.” Engels directly refutes radical skepticism in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

... how do we know that our senses give us correct representations of the objects we perceive through them? ... whenever we speak of objects, or their qualities, of which (we) cannot know anything for certain, but merely the impressions which they have produced on (our) senses. Now, this line of reasoning seems undoubtedly hard to beat by mere argumentation. But before there was argumentation, there was action... And human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we turn to our own use these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perception.

This concept of determining the truth of knowledge and perception through practical experience is fundamental to dialectical materialist philosophy and the methodology of materialist dialectics, and is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3, p. 204.

Another weakness of empiricism is that it denies the objectiveness of social relations, which cannot be fully and properly analyzed through sensory experience and observation alone. Marx saw that social relations are, indeed, objective in nature and can be understood despite their lack of sensory observability, and that doing so is vital in comprehending subjects such as political economy, as he observes in Capital Volume I:

(The true) reality of the value of commodities contrasts with the gross material reality of these same commodities (the reality of which is perceived by our bodily senses) in that not an atom of matter enters into the reality of value. We may twist and turn a commodity this way and that — as a thing of value it still remains unappreciable by our bodily senses.

In other words, Marx pointed out that no amount of sense data about a commodity will fully explain its value. One can know the size, weight, hardness, etc., of a commodity, but without analyzing the social relations and other aspects of the commodity which can’t be directly observed with the senses, one can never know or understand the true value of the commodity. The materialism of Marx and Engels acknowledges the physical, material world as the first basis for reality, but Marx and Engels also understood that it was vital to account for other aspects of rational knowledge (such as social relations). Marx and Engels believed that empiricist materialism had roughly the same flaw as idealism: a lack of a connection between the material and consciousness. While the idealists completely dismissed sense data and relied exclusively on reasoning and consciousness, the empiricists dismissed conscious thought to focus solely on what could be sensed.

It is important to note that, while Marx and Engels rejected empiricism, they did not reject empirical knowledge nor empirical data which is collected from scientific observation [see Annotation 216, p. 210]. On the contrary, empirical data was key to the works of Marx and Engels in developing dialectical materialism. As Lenin explained: “(Marx) took one of the economic formations of society – the system of commodity production – and on the basis of a vast mass of data which he studied for not less than twenty-five years gave a most detailed analysis of the laws governing this formation and its development.” And so, the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels served to bridge the gap between idealism and materialism. They believed that our conscious thoughts are derived from material processes, but that consciousness can also influence the material world. This is discussed in more detail in the section “Materialism and Dialectical Materialism” on page 48.

Marx and Engels also criticized many limitations of Feuerbach’s methodology and viewpoint* — especially Feuerbach’s prescriptions for how to deal with social problems — but they also highly appreciated the role of Feuerbach’s thought in the fight against idealism and religion to assert that nature comes first, and that nature is permanent and independent from human willpower.

Annotation 11

* Viewpoint, point of view, or perspective, is the starting point of analysis which determines the direction of thinking from which problems are considered. Marx and Engels were critical of Feurbach’s hyper-focused humanist viewpoint.

Feuerbach’s atheism and materialism offered an important foundation for Marx and Engels to develop from an idealist worldview into a materialist worldview, which led them directly to developing the philosophical foundation of communism.

Annotation 12

Ludwig Feuerbach was one of the “Young Hegelians” who adapted and developed the ideals of Hegel and other German Idealists. Feuerbach was a humanist materialist: he focused on humans and human nature and the role of humans in the material world. Like Marx and Engels, Feuerbach dismissed the religious mysticism of Hegel. Importantly, Feuerbach broke from Hegel’s religious-mystical belief that humans descended from supernatural origins, instead describing humans as originating from the natural, material world.

Feuerbach also distinguished between the objectivity of the material external world and the subjectivity of human conscious thought, and he drew a distinction between external reality as it really exists and external reality as humans perceive it. Feuerbach believed that human nature was rooted in specific, intrinsic human attributes and activities. As Feuerbach explains in The Essence of Christianity: “What, then, is the nature of man, of which he is conscious, or what constitutes the specific distinction, the proper humanity of man? Reason, Will, Affection.”

Feuerbach explained that the actions of “thinking, willing, and loving,” which correspond to the essential characteristics of “reason, will, and love,” are what define humanity, continuing: “Reason, Will, Love, are not powers which man possesses, for he is nothing without them, he is what he is only by them; they are the constituent elements of his nature, which he neither has nor makes, the animating, determining, governing powers — divine, absolute powers — to which he can oppose no resistance.”

In his Collected Works, Feuerbach further explains that materialism is supported by the fact that nature predates human consciousness:

Natural science, at least in its present state, necessarily leads us back to a point when the conditions for human existence were still absent, when nature, i.e., the earth, was not yet an object of the human eye and mind, when, consequently, nature was an absolutely non-human entity (absolut unmenschliches Wesen). Idealism may retort: but nature also is something thought of by you (von dir gedachte). Certainly, but from this it does not follow that this nature did not at one time actually exist, just as from the fact that Socrates and Plato do not exist for me if I do not think of them, it does not follow that Socrates and Plato did not actually at one time exist without me.

Marx and Engels were heavily influenced by Feuerbach’s materialism, but they took issue with Feuerbach’s sharp focus on human attributes and activities in isolation from the external material world. As Marx wrote in Theses on Feuerbach: “The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that... reality... is conceived only in the form of the object... but not as sensuous human activity.”

“Sensuous human activity” has a very specific meaning to Marx; it grew from two conflicting schools of thought:

The idealists believed the external world can only be understood through the active subjective thought processes of human beings, while the empiricist materialists believed that human beings are passive subjects of the material world. Marx synthesized these contradicting ideas into what he called “sensuous activity,” which balanced idealist and materialist philosophical concepts.

According to Marx, humans are simultaneously active in the world in the sense that our conscious activity can transform the world, and passive in the sense that all human thoughts fundamentally derive from observation and sense experience of the material world (see Chapter 2, p. 53). So, Marx and Engels believed that Feuerbach was misguided in defining human nature by our traits alone, portraying “the essence of man” as isolated from the material world and from social relations. In addition, Feuerbach’s humanism was based on an abstract, ideal version of human beings, whereas the humanism of Marx and Engels is firmly rooted in the reality of “real men living real lives.” As Engels wrote in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy:

He (Feuerbach) clings fiercely to nature and man; but nature and man remain mere words with him. He is incapable of telling us anything definite either about real nature or real men. But from the abstract man of Feuerbach, one arrives at real living men only when one considers them as participants in history... The cult of abstract man, which formed the kernel of Feuerbach’s new religion, had to be replaced by the science of real men and of their historical development. This further development of Feuerbach’s standpoint beyond Feuerbach was inaugurated by Marx in 1845 in The Holy Family.[7]

Marx and Engels believed that human nature could only be understood by examining the reality of actual humans in the real world through our relationships with each other, with nature, and with the external material world. Importantly, it was Marx’s critique of Feuerbach which led him to define political action as the key pursuit of philosophy with these immortal words from Theses on Feuerbach: “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.”

The British classical political economics, represented by such economists as Adam Smith[8] and David Ricardo[9], also contributed to the formation of Marxism’s historical materialist conception [see p. 23].

Smith and Ricardo were some of the first to form theories about labor value in the study of political economics. They made important conclusions about value and the origin of profit, and about the importance of material production and rules that govern economies. However, because there were still many limitations in the study methodology of Smith and Ricardo, these British classical political economists failed to recognise the historical characteristic of value*; the internal contradictions of commodity production**; and the duality of commodity production labor***.

Annotation 13

* Historical Characteristic of Value

Marx generally admired the work of Smith and Ricardo, but saw major flaws which undermined the utility of their classical economic theories. Perhaps chief among these flaws, according to Marx, was a tendency for Smith and Ricardo to uphold an ahistoric view of society and capitalism. In other words, classical economists see capitalism as existing in harmony with the eternal and universal laws of nature, rather than seeing capitalism as a result of historical processes of development [see Annotation 114, p. 116]. Marx did not believe that the economic principles of capitalism resulted from nature, but rather, from historical conflict between different classes. He believed that the principles of political economies changed over time, and would continue to change into the future, whereas Smith and Ricardo saw economic principles as fixed, static concepts that were not subject to change over time. As Marx explains in The Poverty of Philosophy:

Economists express the relations of bourgeois production, the division of labour, credit, money, etc. as fixed, immutable, eternal categories... Economists explain how production takes place in the above mentioned relations, but what they do not explain is how these relations themselves are produced, that is, the historical movement that gave them birth... these categories are as little eternal as the relations they express. They are historical and transitory products.

** Internal Contradictions of Commodity Production

In Marxist terms, a commodity is specifically something that has both a use value and a value-form (see Annotation 14, p. 16), but in simpler terms, a commodity is anything that can be bought or sold. Importantly, capitalism transforms human labor into a commodity, as workers must sell their labor to capitalists in exchange for wages. Marx pointed out that contradictions arise when commodities are produced under capitalism: because capitalists, who own the means of production, decide what to produce based solely on what they believe to be most profitable, the commodities that are being produced do not always meet the actual needs of society. Certain commodities are under-produced while others are over-produced, which leads to crisis and instability.

*** Duality of Commodity Production Labor

In Capital, Marx describes commodity production labor as existing in a duality — that is to say, it exists with two distinct aspects:

First, there is abstract labor, which Marx describes as “labor-power expended without regard to the form of its expenditure.” This is simply the expenditure of human energy in the form of labor, without any regard to production or value of the labor output. Second, there is concrete labor, which is the aspect of labor that refers to the production of a specific commodity with a specific value through labor.

Marx argues that human labor, therefore, is simultaneously, an activity which will produce some specific kind of product, and also an activity that generates value in the abstract. Marx and Engels were the first economists to discuss the duality of labor, and their observations on the duality of labor were closely tied to their theories of the different aspects of value (use value, exchange value, etc.), which was key to their analysis of capitalism.

Smith and Ricardo also failed to distinguish between simple commodity production and capitalist commodity production*, and could not accurately analyse the form of value** in capitalist commodity production.

Annotation 14

* Commodity Production

Simple commodity production (also known as petty commodity production) is the production of commodities under the conditions which Marx called the “Simple Exchange” of commodities. Simple exchange occurs when individual producers trade the products they have made directly, themselves, for other commodities. Under simple exchange, workers directly own their own means of production and sell products which they have made with their own labor.

Simple commodity production and simple exchange use what Marx referred to as “C→M→C mode of circulation” [see Annotation 60, p. 59]. Circulation is simply the way in which commodities and money are exchanged for one another.

C→M→C stands for:

Commodity → Money → Commodity

So, with simple commodity production and simple exchange, workers produce commodities, which they then sell for money, which they use to buy other commodities which they need. For example, a brewer might make beer, which they sell for money, which they use to buy food, housing, and other commodities which they need to live.

In the C→M→C mode of circulation, the producers and consumers of commodities have a direct relationship to the commodities which are being bought and sold. The sellers have produced the commodities sold with their own labor, and they directly consume the commodities which they purchase with the money thus obtained.

Capitalist commodity production and capitalist exchange, on the other hand, are based on the M→C→M’ mode of circulation.

M→C→M’ stands for:

Money → Commodity → More Money

Under this mode of circulation, capitalists spend money to buy commodities (including the commodified labor of workers), with the intention of selling commodities for MORE MONEY than they began with. The capitalist has no direct relationship to the commodity being produced and sold, and the capitalist is solely interested in obtaining more money.

Capitalist commodity production, therefore, uses the M→C→M’ mode of circulation, in which capitalists own the means of production and pay wages to workers in exchange for their labor, which is used to produce commodities. The capitalists then sell these commodities for profits which are not shared with the workers who provided the labor which produced the commodities.

** Value-Form

This is one of the most important, and potentially most confusing, concepts in all of Marx’s analysis of capitalism. Marx explains these principles at length in Appendix of the 1st German Edition of Capital, Volume 1, but here are some of the fundamentals:

One of Marx’s key breakthroughs was understanding that commodities have many different properties which have different effects in political economies.

Just as Commodity Production Labor exists in a duality of Concrete Labor and Abstract Labor (see Annotation 13, p. 15), commodities themselves also exist in duality according to Marx:

Commodities have both “use-value” and “value.”

Use-Value (which corresponds to Concrete Labor) is the commodity’s tangible form of existence; it is what we can physically sense when we observe a commodity. By extension, use-value encompasses how a commodity can be used in the material world.

Value, or the Value-Form, is the social form of a commodity, which is to say, it represents the stable relationships intrinsic to the commodity [see Content and Form, p. 147].

Note that this relates to the dialectical relationship between the material and the ideal [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88].

Value-forms represent relational equivalencies of commodities, i.e.: 20 yards of linen = 10 pounds of tea

These relational equivalencies are tied to the equivalent labor value (see Annotation 15 below, and Annotation 26, p. 23) used to produce these commodities. The value-form of a commodity is the social form because it embodies relational equivalencies:

1. The value-form represents the relationship between the commodity and the labor which was used to produce the commodity.

2. The value-form represents the relationship between a commodity and one or more other commodities.

As Marx explains in Appendix to the 1st German Edition of Capital: “Hence by virtue of its value-form the (commodity) now stands also in a social relation no longer to only a single other type of commodity, but to the world of commodities. As a commodity it is a citizen of this world.”

Understanding the social form of commodities — the value-form — was crucial for Marx to develop a deeper understanding of money and capitalism. Marx argued that classical economists like Ricardo and Smith conflated economic categories such as “exchange value,” “value,” “price,” “money,” etc., which meant that they could not possibly fully understand or analyze capitalist economies.

British classical political economists like Ricardo and Smith outlined the scientific factors of the theories of labor value* and contributed many progressive thoughts which Marx adapted and further developed.

Annotation 15

* Adam Smith and David Ricardo revolutionized the labor theory of value, which held that the value of a good or service is determined by the amount of human labor required to produce it.

Thus, Marx was able to solve the contradictions that these economists could not solve and he was able to establish the theory of surplus value*, scientific evidence for the exploitative nature of capitalism, and the economic factors which will lead to the eventual fall of capitalism and the birth of socialism.

Annotation 16

* David Ricardo developed the concept of surplus value. Surplus value is the difference between the amount of income made from selling a product and the amount it costs to produce it. Marx would go on to expand on the concept of surplus value considerably.

Utopianism' had been developing for a long time and reached its peak in the late 18th century with famous thinkers such as Henri de Saint-Simon[10], François Marie Charles Fourier[11] and Robert Owen[12]. Utopianism sought to elevate the humanitarian spirit and strongly criticised capitalism by calling attention to the misery of the working class under capitalism. It also offered many far-ranging opinions and analyses of the development of human history and laid out some basic foundational factors and principles for a new society. However, Utopianism could not scientifically address the nature of capitalism. It failed to detect the Law of Development of Capitalism[13] and also failed to recognise the roles and missions of the working class as a social force that can eliminate capitalism to build an equal, non-exploitative society.

Annotation 17

The early industrial working class existed in miserable conditions, and the political movement of utopianism was developed by people who believed that a better world could be built. The utopianists believed they could create “a New Moral World” of happiness, enlightenment, and prosperity through education, science, technology, and communal living. For instance, Robert Owen was a wealthy textile manufacturer who tried to build a better society for workers in New Harmony, Indiana, in the USA. Owen purchased the entire town of New Harmony in 1825 as a place to build an ideal society. Owen’s vision failed after two years for a variety of reasons, and many other wealthy capitalists in the early 19th century drew up similar plans which also failed.

Utopianism was one of the first political and industrial movements that criticized the conditions of capitalism by exposing the miserable situations of poor workers and offering a vision of a better society, and was one of the first movements to attempt to mitigate the faults of capitalism in practice.

Unfortunately, the utopianists were not ideologically prepared to replace capitalism, and all of their attempts to build a better alternative to capitalism failed. Marx and Engels admired the efforts of the utopianist movement, and studied their attempts and failures closely in developing their own political theories, concluding that the utopianists failed in large part because they did not understand how capitalism developed, nor the role of the working class in the revolution against capitalism.

As Engels wrote in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

(The) historical situation also dominated the founders of Socialism. To the crude conditions of capitalistic production and the crude class conditions correspond crude theories. The solution of the social problems, which as yet lay hidden in undeveloped economic conditions, the Utopians attempted to evolve out of the human brain. Society presented nothing but wrongs; to remove these was the task of reason. It was necessary, then, to discover a new and more perfect system of social order and to impose this upon society from without by propaganda, and, wherever it was possible, by the example of model experiments. These new social systems were foredoomed as Utopian; the more completely they were worked out in detail, the more they could not avoid drifting off into pure phantasies.

Engels is explaining, here, that — in a sense — the utopian socialists were victims of arriving too early. Capitalism had not yet developed enough for its opponents to formulate plans based on actual material conditions, since capitalism was only just emerging into a stable form. Without a significant objective, material basis, the utopians were forced to rely upon reasoning alone to confront capitalism.

In this sense, the early historical utopianists fell into philosophical utopianism in its broader sense — defined by the mistaken assertion that the ideal can determine the material [see Annotation 95, p. 94]. In believing that they could build a perfect society based on ideals and “pure fantasy” alone without a material basis for development, the utopians were, in essence, idealists. As Engels explained: “from this nothing could come but a kind of eclectic, average Socialism.” Engels concluded that in order to successfully overthrow capitalism, revolution would need to be grounded in materialism: “To make a science of Socialism, it had first to be placed upon a real basis.”

The humanitarian spirit and compassionate analysis which the utopians embodied in their efforts to lay out concrete features of a better future society became important theory premises for the birth of the scientific theory of socialism in Marxism.

- Natural Science Premise:

Along with social-economic conditions and theory premises, the achievements of the natural sciences were also foundational to the development of arguments and evidence which assert the correctness of Marxism’s viewpoints and methodology.

Annotation 18

Natural science is science which deals with the natural world, including chemistry, biology, physics, geology, etc.

Three major scientific breakthroughs which were important to the development of Marxism include:

• The law of conservation and transformation of energy scientifically proved the inseparable relationships and the mutual transformation and conservation of all the forms of motion of matter in nature.

• The theory of evolution offered a scientific basis for the development of diverse forms of life through natural selection.

• Cell theory was a scientific basis proving unity in terms of origins, physical forms and material structures of living creatures. It also explained the development of life through those relationships.

These scientific discoveries led to the rejection of theological and metaphysical viewpoints which centered the role of the “creator” in the pursuit of truth.

Annotation 19

For centuries in Europe, natural science and philosophy had been heavily dominated by theological viewpoints which centered God in the pursuit of truth. Descartes, Kant, Spinoza, and many other metaphysical philosophers who developed the earliest theories of modern natural science centered their religious beliefs in their philosophies. These theological viewpoints varied in many ways, but all shared a characteristic of centering a “creator” in the pursuit of philosophical and scientific inquiry.

Together, the law of conservation and transformation of energy, the theory of evolution, and cell theory provided an alternative viewpoint which allowed scientists to remove the “creator” from the scientific equation. For the first time, natural scientists and philosophers had concrete theoretical explanations for the origin and development of the universe, life, and reality which did not rely on a supernatural creator.

Marx and Engels closely observed and studied the groundbreaking scientific progress of their era. They believed strongly in materialist scientific methods and the data which they produced, and based their analysis and philosophical doctrines on such observations. They recognized the importance and validity of the scientific achievements of their era, and they developed the philosophy of Dialectical Materialism into a system which would help humans study and understand the whole material world.

In Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Engels explained that ancient Greek dialecticians had correctly realized that the world is “an endless entanglement of relations and reactions, permutations and combinations, in which nothing remains what, where and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being and passes away.”

Engels goes on to explain that it was understandable for early natural scientists to break their inquiries and analysis down into specialized fields and categories of science to focus on precise, specific, narrow subject matters so that they could build up a body of empirical data. However, as data accumulated, it became clear that all of these isolated, individual fields of study must somehow be unified back together coherently and cohesively in order to obtain a deeper and more useful understanding of reality.

As Engels wrote in On Dialectics:

Empirical natural science has accumulated such a tremendous mass of positive material for knowledge that the necessity of classifying it in each separate field of investigation systematically and in accordance with its inner inter-connection has become absolutely imperative. It is becoming equally imperative to bring the individual spheres of knowledge into the correct connection with one another. In doing so, however, natural science enters the field of theory and here the methods of empiricism will not work, here only theoretical thinking can be of assistance.

As science grows increasingly complex, a necessity develops for a philosophical and cognitive framework which can be used to make sense of the influx of information from disparate fields. In Dialectics of Nature, Engels explains how dialectical materialism is the perfect philosophical foundation for unifying scientific fields into one cohesive framework:

Dialectics divested of mysticism becomes an absolute necessity for natural science, which has forsaken the field where rigid categories sufficed, which represent as it were the lower mathematics of logic, its everyday weapons.

So, Marx and Engels developed Dialectical Materialism not in opposition to science, but as a way to make better use of scientific data, and to analyze the complex, dynamic, constantly changing systems of the world in motion. While distinct scientific discoveries and empirical data are invaluable, each data point only provides a small amount of information within a single narrow, specific field of science. Dialectical Materialism allows humans to view reality — as a whole — in motion, and to examine the interconnections and mutual developments between different fields and categories of human knowledge.

These scientific principles confirmed the correctness of the dialectical materialist view of the material world, with such features as: endlessness, self-existence, self-motivation, and self-transformation. They also confirmed the scientific nature of the dialectical materialist viewpoint in both material processes and thought processes.

Annotation 20

Endlessness refers to the infinite span of space and time in our universe. Self-existence means that our universe exists irrespective of human consciousness; it existed before human consciousness evolved and it will continue to exist after human consciousness becomes extinct. Self-motivation and Self-transformation refer to the fact that motion and transformation exist within the universe independent of human consciousness.

Engels wrote of the scientific nature of the dialectical materialist viewpoint in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

Nature is the proof of dialectics, and it must be said for modern science that it has furnished this proof with very rich materials increasingly daily, and thus has shown that... Nature works dialectically and not metaphysically; that she does not move in the eternal oneness of a perpetually recurring circle, but goes through a real historical evolution.


In conclusion, the birth of Marxism is a phenomenon which is compatible with scientific principles; it is the product of the social-economic conditions of its time of origin, of the human knowledge expressed in science at that time, and it is also the result of its founders’ creative thinking and humanitarian spirit.

b. The Birth and Development Stage of Marxism

Marx and Engels initiated the birth and development stage of Marxism from around 1842~1843 through around 1847~1848. Later, from 1849 to 1895, Marxism was developed to be more thorough and comprehensive, but in this early period of birth and development, Marx and Engels engaged in practical activities [Marx and Engels were not just theorists, but also actively supported and participated with various revolutionary and working class organizations including the Chartists, the League of the Just, the Communist League, the International Workingmen’s Association, etc.] and studied a wide range of human thought from ancient times on through to their contemporaries in order to methodically reinforce, complement and improve their ideas.

Many famous works such as The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (Marx, 1844), The Holy Family (Marx and Engels, 1845), Thesis on Feuerbach (Marx, 1845), The German Ideology (Marx and Engels, 1845–1846), and so on, clearly showed that Marx and Engels inherited the quintessence [see Annotation 6, p. 8] of the dialectical and materialist methods which they received from many predecessors. This philosophical heritage led to the development of the dialectical materialist viewpoint and materialist dialectics.

Annotation 21

There is a subtle, but important, distinction between Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics. This will be explained further in chapters I (p. 48) and II (p. 98).

With works such as The Poverty of Philosophy (Marx, 1847) and The Manifesto of the Communist Party (Marx and Engels, 1848), Marxism was presented as a complete system of fundamental views with three theoretical component parts.

Annotation 22

According to Lenin, the three component parts of Marxism (and, by extension, of Marxism-Leninism) are:

1. The Philosophy of Marxism: Including Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism

2. The Political Economy of Marxism: A system of knowledge and laws that define the production process and commodity exchange in human society.

3. Scientific Socialism: The system of thought pertaining to the establishment of the communist social economy form.

These are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, p. 38.

In the book The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx proposed the basic principles of Dialectical Materialism and Scientific Socialism,* and gave some initial thoughts about surplus value. The Manifesto of the Communist Party laid the first doctrinal foundation of communism. In this book, the philosophical basis was expressed through the organic unity between the economical viewpoint and socio-political viewpoint.

Annotation 23

* Scientific Socialism is a series of socio-political-economic theories intended to build socialism on a foundation of science within society’s current material conditions [see Annotation 79, p. 81]. Scientific Socialism is the topic of Part 3 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.

The Manifesto of the Communist Party outlined the laws of movement in history,* as well as the basic theory of socio-economic forms.

Annotation 24

* The laws of movement in history are the core principles of historical materialism, which is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.

The basic theory of socio-economic forms dictates that material production plays a decisive role in the existence and development of a society, and that the material production methods decide both the political and social consciousness of a society.

Annotation 25

Social consciousness refers to the collective experience of consciousness shared by members of a society, including ideological, cultural, spiritual, and legal beliefs and ideas which are shared within that society. This is related to the concept of base and superstructure, which is discussed later in this chapter.

The Manifesto of the Communist Party also showed that for as long as classes have existed, the history of the development of human society is the history of class struggle. Through class struggle, the proletariat can liberate ourselves only if we simultaneously and forever liberate the whole of humanity. With these basic opinions, Marx and Engels founded Historical Materialism.

By applying Historical Materialism to the comprehensive study of the capitalist production method, Marx made an important discovery: separating workers from the ownership of the means of production through violence was the starting point of the establishment of the capitalist production method. Workers do not own the means of production to perform their labor activities for themselves, so, in order to make income and survive, workers have to sell their labor to capitalists. Labor thus becomes a special commodity, and the sellers of labor become workers for labor-buyers [the proletariat and capitalist class respectively]. The value that workers create through their labor is higher than their wage. And this is how surplus value* is formed. Importantly, this means that the surplus value belongs to people who own the means of production — the capitalists — instead of the workers who provide the labor.

Annotation 26

* Surplus value is equal to labor value (the amount of value workers produce through labor) minus wages paid to workers. Under capitalism, this surplus value is appropriated as profit by capitalists after the products which workers created are sold.

So, in discovering the origin of surplus value, Marx pointed out the exploitative nature of capitalism [because capitalists essentially steal surplus labor value from workers which is then transformed into profits], though this exploitative nature is concealed by the money-commodity relationship.

Annotation 27

Under capitalism, a worker’s labor is a commodity which capitalists pay for with money in the form of wages. Workers never know how much of their labor value is being withheld by employers, which conceals the nature of capitalist wage-theft.

The theory of surplus value was deeply and comprehensively researched and presented in Capital[14] by Marx and Engels. This work not only paves the way to form a new political-economic theory system based on the working class’s viewpoint, it also firmly consolidates and develops the historical-materialist viewpoint through the theory of socio-economic forms.

Annotation 28

Karl Marx explained that the goal of writing Capital was “to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society.” By “laws of motion,” Marx refers to the origins and motivations for change within human society. Historical materialism holds that human society develops based on internal and external relationships within and between aspects of society. Historical materialism is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.

According to the theory of socio-economic forms [which is the basis of historical materialism], the movements and developments of human society are natural-historical processes based on dialectical interactions between forces of production and relations of production; between infrastructure basis [commonly referred to as “base” in English] and superstructure.

Annotation 29

The forces of production consist of the combination of means of production and workers within society. Under capitalism, the production force consists of the proletariat (working class) and means of production which are owned by the bourgeoisie (capitalist class).

Marx viewed society as composed of an economic base and a social superstructure. The base of society includes the material relationships between humans and the means of productions and the material processes which humans undertake to survive and transform our environment. The superstructure of society includes all components of society not directly relating to production, such as media institutions, music, and art, as well as other cultural elements like religion, customs, moral standards, and everything else which manifests primarily through conscious activity and social relations.

In the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx explained:

In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society — the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life determines the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.

RELIGION GOVERNMENT EDUCATION

POLITICAL ECONOMY NATURE

The base of society includes material-based elements and relations including political economy, means of production, class relations, etc. The superstructure includes human-consciousness-based elements and relations including government, culture, religion, etc.

In other words, Marx argued that superstructure (which includes social consciousness) is shaped by the infrastructural basis, or base, of society. This reflects the more general dialectical relationship between matter and consciousness, in which the material, as the first basis of reality, determines consciousness, while consciousness mutually impacts the material [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88]. So, the base of society — being material in nature — determines the superstructure, while the superstructure impacts the base. It couldn’t possibly be the other way around, according to the dialectical materialist worldview, because the primary driving forces of conscious activity are rooted in material needs.

The theory of socio-economic forms proves that the materialist viewpoint of history is not just a hypothesis, but a scientifically-proven principle.

Annotation 30

As Lenin explains in What the “Friends of the People” Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats:

Now — since the appearance of Capital — the materialist conception of history is no longer a hypothesis, but a scientifically proven proposition. And until we get some other attempt to give a scientific explanation of the functioning and development of some formation of society — formation of society, mind you, and not the way of life of some country or people, or even class, etc. — another attempt just as capable of introducing order into the “pertinent facts” as materialism is, that is just as capable of presenting a living picture of a definite formation, while giving it a strictly scientific explanation -until then the materialist conception of history will be a synonym for social science. Materialism is not ‘primarily a scientific conception of history’... but the only scientific conception of it.

Capital is Marx’s main work which presents Marxism as a social science by illuminating the inevitable processes of birth, development, and decay of capitalism; the replacement of capitalism with socialism; and the historical mission of the working class — the social force that can implement this replacement. Marx’s materialist conception of history and proletarian revolution continued to be developed in Critique of Gotha Programme (Marx, 1875). This book discusses the dictatorship of the proletariat, the transitional period from capitalism to socialism, and phases of the communism building process, and several other premises. Together, these premises formed the scientific basis for Marx’s theoretical guidance for the future revolutionary activity of the proletariat.


Annotation 31

When Marx refers to a “dictatorship of the proletariat,” he does not mean “dictatorship” to mean “totalitarian” or “authoritarian.” Rather, here “dictatorship” simply refers to a situation in which political power is held by the working class (which constitutes the vast majority of society). “Dictatorship,” here, refers to full control of the means of production and government. This stands in contrast to capitalism, which is a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, in which capitalists (a small minority of society) have full control of the means of production and government.

c. The Defending and Developing Stage of Marxism

- Historical Background and the Need for Defending and Developing Marxism

In the late 19th century and early 20th century, capitalism developed into a new stage, called imperialism. The dominant and exploitative nature of capitalism became increasingly obvious. Contradictions in capitalist societies became increasingly serious — especially the class struggles between the proletariat and capitalists. In many colonised countries, the resistance against imperialism created a unity between national liberation and proletarian revolution, uniting people in colonised countries with the working class in colonial countries. The core of such revolutionary struggles at this time was in Russia. The Russian proletariat and working class under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party became the leader of the whole international revolutionary movement.

During this time, both capitalist industry and natural sciences developed rapidly. Some natural scientists, especially physicists, lacked a grounding in materialist philosophical methodology and therefore fell into a viewpoint crisis. Idealist philosophers used this crisis to directly influence the perspective and activities of many revolutionary movements.

Annotation 32

Imperialism

Lenin defined imperialism as “the monopoly stage of capitalism,” listing its essential characteristics as “finance capital (serving) a few very big monopolist banks, merged with the capital of the monopolist associations of industrialists” and “a colonial policy of monopolist possession of the territory of the world, which has been completely divided up.”

Subjective and Empiricist Idealism

In the late 19th century, natural scientists were exploring various philosophical bases for scientific inquiry. One Austrian physicist, Ernst Mach, attempted to build a philosophy of natural science based on the works of German-Swiss philosopher Richard Avenarius known as “Empirio-Criticism.” Empirio-Criticism, which also came to be known as Machism, has many parallels with the philosophy of George Berkeley. Berkeley (1685 — 1753) was an Anglo-Irish philosopher whose main philosophical achievement was the formulation of a doctrine which he called “immaterialism,” and which later came to be known as “Subjective Idealism.” This doctrine was summed up by Berkeley’s maxim: “Esse est percipi” — “To be is to be perceived.” Subjective Idealism holds that individuals can only directly perceive and know about physical objects through direct sense experience. Therefore, individuals are unable to obtain any real knowledge about abstract concepts such as “matter”.

The philosophy of Empirio-Criticism, which was developed by Avenarius and Mach, also holds that the only reliable human knowledge we can hold comes from our sensations and experiences. Mach argued that the only source of knowledge is sense data and “experience,” but that we can’t develop any actual knowledge of the actual external world. In other words, Mach’s conception of empirio-criticism holds all knowledge as essentially subjective in nature, and limited to (and by) human sense experience. Mach’s development of Empirio-Criticism (which can also be referred to as empirical idealism or Machism)' was therefore a continuation of Berkeley’s subjective idealism. Both Berkeley’s Immaterialism and Empirio-Criticism are considered to be subjective idealism because these philosophies deny that the external world exists — or otherwise assert that it is unknowable — and, as such, hold that all knowledge stems from experiences which are essentially subjective in nature.

Mach argued that reality can only be defined by our sensual experiences of reality, and that we can never concretely know anything about the objective external world due to the limitations of sense experience. This stands in direct contradiction to dialectical materialism, which holds that we can develop accurate knowledge of the material world through observation and practice. Whereas Berkeley developed subjective idealist theological arguments to defend the Christian faith, Mach employed subjective idealism for purely secular purposes as a basis for scientific inquiry.

Note: all quotations below come from Lenin’s book: Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.

Vladimir Lenin strongly opposed Empirio-Criticism and, by extension, Machism, which was becoming popular among communist revolutionists in the late 19th century, because it pushed forward idealist principles which directly opposed the core tenets of dialectical materialism.

Lenin believed that revolutionaries should be guided not by idealism, but by dialectical materialism. He believed that Empirio-Criticism and Machism consisted of mysticism which would mislead political revolutionaries.

Lenin outlined Machian arguments against materialism:

The materialists, we are told, recognise something unthinkable and unknowable — ’things-in-themselves’ — matter ‘outside of experience’ and outside of our knowledge [see: Annotation 72, p. 68]. They lapse into genuine mysticism by admitting the existence of something beyond, something transcending the bounds of ‘experience’... When they say that matter, by acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensations, the materialists take as their basis the ‘unknown,’ nothingness; for do they not themselves declare our sensations to be the only source of knowledge?

Lenin argued that this new form of Machist subjective idealism was, in fact, simply a rehashing of “old errors of idealism,” disguised and dressed up with new terminology. As such, Lenin simply reiterated the longstanding, bedrock dialectical materialist arguments against idealism [see Annotation 10, p. 10]. He was especially upset that contemporary Marxists of his era were being swayed by Machist Empirio-Criticism because he found it to be in direct conflict with dialectical materialism, writing: “(These) would-be Marxists… try in every way to assure their readers that Machism is compatible with the historical materialism of Marx and Engels.”

Lenin goes on to describe the work of philosophers such as Franz Blei, who critiqued Marxism with Machist arguments, as “quasi-scientific tomfoolery decked out in the terminology of Avenarius.” He saw Empirio-Criticism as completely incompatible with communist revolution, since idealism had historically been used by the ruling class to deceive and control the lower classes. In particular, he believed that Machist idealism was being used by the capitalist class to preach bourgeois economics, writing that “the professors of economics are nothing but learned salesmen of the capitalist class.”

Lenin was deeply concerned that prominent Russian socialist philosophers were adopting Machist ideas and claiming them to be compatible with Marxism, writing:

The task of Marxists in both cases is to be able to master and adapt the achievements of these ‘salesmen’... and to be able to lop off their reactionary tendency, to pursue your own line and to combat the whole alignment of forces and classes hostile to us. And this is just what our Machians were unable to do, they slavishly follow the lead of the reactionary professorial philosophy.

Lenin further explains how Empirio-Criticism serves the interests of the capitalist class:

The empirio-criticists as a whole... claim to be non-partisan both in philosophy and in social science. They are neither for socialism nor for liberalism. They make no differentiation between the fundamental and irreconcilable trends of materialism and idealism in philosophy, but endeavor to rise above them. We have traced this tendency of Machism through a long series of problems of epistemology, and we ought not to be surprised when we encounter it in sociology.

In the conclusion of the same text, Lenin explains why communists should reject Empirio-Criticism and Machism with four “standpoints,” summarized here:

1. The theoretical foundations of Empirio-Criticism can’t withstand comparison with those of dialectical materialism. Empirio-Criticism differs little from older forms of idealism, and the tired old errors of idealism clash directly with Marxist dialectical materialism. As Lenin puts it: “only utter ignorance of the nature of philosophical materialism generally and of the nature of Marx’s and Engels’ dialectical method can lead one to speak of ‘combining’ empirio-criticism and Marxism.”

2. The philosophical foundations of Empirio-Criticism are flawed. “Both Mach and Avenarius started with Kant (see: Annotation 72, p. 68) and, leaving him, proceeded not towards materialism, but in the opposite direction, towards Hume and Berkeley (see: Annotation 10, p. 10)... The whole school of Mach and Avenarius is moving more and more definitely towards idealism.”

3. Machism is little more than a relatively obscure trend which has not been adopted by most scientists; a “reactionary (and) transitory infatuation.” As Lenin puts it: “the vast majority of scientists, both generally and in this special branch of science... are invariably on the side of materialism.”

4. Empirio-Criticism and Machism reflect the “tendencies and ideology of the antagonistic classes in modern society.” Idealism represents the interests of the ruling class in modern society, and is used to subjugate the majority of society. Idealist philosophy “stands fully armed, commands vast organizations and steadily continues to exercise influence on the masses, turning the slightest vacillation in philosophical thought to its own advantage.” In other words, idealism is used by the ruling class to manipulate our understanding of the world, as opposed to materialism (and especially dialectical materialism) which illuminates the true nature of reality which would lead to the liberation of the working class.

At this time, Marxism was widely disseminating throughout Russia, which challenged the social positions and benefits of capitalists. In reaction to Marxism, many ideological movements such as empiricism, utilitarianism, revisionism, etc. [see: Appendix F, p. 252] rose up and claimed to renew Marxism, while in fact they misrepresented and denied Marxism.

In this context, new achievements of natural science needed to be analyzed and summarized in order to continue the authentic development of Marxist viewpoints and methodologies. Theoretical principles to fight against the misrepresentation of Marxism needed to be developed in order to bring Marxism into the new era. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin would fulfill this historical requirement with his theoretical developments.

- The Role of Lenin in Defending and Developing Marxism.

Lenin’s process of defending and developing Marxism can be separated into three periods: first, from 1893 to 1907; next, from 1907 to 1917; and finally from the success of the October socialist revolution in 1917 until Lenin’s death in 1924.

From 1893 to 1907, Lenin focused on fighting against populists[15]. His book What the Friends of the People are and How They Fight Against the Social Democrats (1894) criticized the serious mistakes of this faction in regards to socio-historical issues and also exposed their scheme of distorting Marxism by erasing the boundaries between Marxism’s materialist dialectics and Hegel’s idealist dialectics. In the same book, Lenin also shared many thoughts about the important roles of theory, reality, and the relationship between the two.

Annotation 33

The populist philosophy was born in Russia in the 19th century with roots going back to the Narodnik agrarian socialist movement of the 1860s and 70s, composed of peasants who rose up in a failed campaign against the Czar. In the late 19th century, a new political movement emerged rooted in Narodnik ideas and a new party called the Socialist Revolutionary Party was formed. The political philosophy of this movement, now commonly translated into English as “populism,” focused on an agrarian peasant revolution led by intellectuals with the ambition of going directly from a feudal society to a socialist society built from rural communes. This movement overtly opposed Marxism and dialectical materialism and was based on subjective idealist utopianism (see Annotation 95, p. 94).

With the book What is to be Done? (1902), Lenin developed Marxist viewpoints on the methods for the proletariat to take power. He discussed economic, political, and ideological struggles. In particular, he emphasized the ideological formation process of the proletariat.

Annotation 34

In What is to be Done?, Lenin argues that the working class will not spontaneously attain class consciousness and push for political revolution simply due to economic conflict with employers and spontaneous actions like demonstrations and workers’ strikes. He instead insists that a political party of dedicated revolutionaries is needed to educate workers in Marxist principles and to organize and push forward revolutionary activity. He also pushed back strongly against the ideas of what he called “economism,” as typified by the ideas of Eduard Bernstein, a German political theorist who rejected many of Marx’s theories.

Bernstein opposed a working class revolution and instead focused on reform and compromise. He believed that socialism could be achieved within the capitalist economy and the system of bourgeois democracy. Lenin argued that Bernstein and his economist philosophy was opportunistic, and accused economists of seeking positions within bourgeois democracies to further their own personal interests and to quell revolutionary tendencies. As Lenin explained in A Talk With Defenders of Economism:

The Economists limited the tasks of the working class to an economic struggle for higher wages and better working conditions, etc., asserting that the political struggle was the business of the liberal bourgeoisie. They denied the leading role of the party of the working class, considering that the party should merely observe the spontaneous process of the movement and register events. In their deference to spontaneity in the working-class movement, the Economists belittled the significance of revolutionary theory and class-consciousness, asserted that socialist ideology could emerge from the spontaneous movement, denied the need for a Marxist party to instill socialist consciousness into the working-class movement, and thereby cleared the way for bourgeois ideology. The Economists, who opposed the need to create a centralized working-class party, stood for the sporadic and amateurish character of individual circles. Economism threatened to divert the working class from the class revolutionary path and turn it into a political appendage of the bourgeoisie.

The Encyclopedic Dictionary of Vietnam, published by the National Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, defines opportunism, in this context, as “a system of political opinions with no direction, no clear path, no coherent viewpoint, leaning on whatever is beneficial for the opportunist in the short term.”

Lenin critiques opportunist socialism — referring to it as a “critical” trend in socialism — in What is to be Done?:

He who does not deliberately close his eyes cannot fail to see that the new “critical” trend in socialism is nothing more nor less than a new variety of opportunism. And if we judge people... by their actions and by what they actually advocate, it will be clear that “freedom of criticism” means “freedom for an opportunist trend in Social-Democracy, freedom to convert Social-Democracy into a democratic party of reform, freedom to introduce bourgeois ideas and bourgeois elements into socialism.”

The first revolution of the Russian working class, from 1905 to 1907, failed. Lenin summarized the reality of this revolution in the book Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution (1905). In this book, Lenin explains that the capitalist class in Russia was actively engaged in its own revolution against Czarist feudalism. In this context of this ongoing bourgeois revolution, Lenin deeply developed Marxist concepts related to revolutionary methodologies, objective and subjective factors that will affect the working class revolution, the role of the people, the role of political parties etc.

Annotation 35

From 1905 to 1907, Russia was beset by political unrest and radical activity including workers’ strikes, military mutinies, and peasant uprisings. Russia had just suffered a humiliating defeat in the Russo-Japanese war which cost tens of thousands of Russian lives without any benefits to the Russian people. In addition, the economic and political systems of Czarist Russia placed a severe burden on industrial workers and peasant farmers.

In response, the Russian proletariat rose up in various uprisings, demonstrations, and clashes against government forces, landlords, and factory owners. In the end, this revolutionary activity failed to overthrow the Czar’s government, and the Czar remained firmly in power until the communist revolution of 1917.

Lenin wrote Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution in 1905 in

Geneva, Switzerland. In it, he argues forcefully against the political faction within the Russian socialist movement that came to be known as the “Mensheviks.” The Mensheviks, as well as the Bolsheviks (Lenin’s contemporary faction) emerged from a dispute within the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party which took place in 1903.

In the same text, Lenin argued that the Mensheviks misunderstood the forces that were driving revolutionary activity in Russia. While the Mensheviks believed that the situation in Russia would develop along similar lines to previous revolutionary activity in Western Europe, Lenin argued that Russia’s situation was unique and that Russian Marxists should therefore adopt different strategies and activities which reflected Russia’s unique circumstances and material conditions.

Specifically, the Mensheviks believed that the working class should ally with the bourgeoisie to overthrow the Czar’s feudalist regime, and then allow the bourgeoisie to build a fully functioning capitalist economy before workers should attempt their own revolution.

Lenin, on the other hand, presented a completely different analysis of class forces in Russia. He believed the bourgeoisie would seek a compromise with the Czar, as both feudal and bourgeois classes in Russia feared a proletarian revolution.

It’s important to note that Russia’s industrial workforce was very small at this time, and most Russians were peasant farmers. The Mensheviks believed Russian peasants would not be useful in a proletarian revolution, which is why they argued for allowing capitalism to be fully established in Russia before pushing for a working class revolution. They believed it was prudent to wait until the working class became larger and more dominant in Russia before attempting to overthrow capitalism. They believed that the peasant class would not be useful in any such revolution.

In contrast, Lenin believed that the peasants and industrial workers would have to work together to have any hope of a successful revolution. He further argued that an uprising of armed peasants and workers, fighting side by side, would be necessary for overthrowing the Czar.

From 1907 to 1917, there was a viewpoint crisis among many physicists. This strongly affected the birth of many idealist ideologies following Mach’s Positivism that attempted to negate Marxism [See: Annotation 32, p. 27]. Lenin summarized the achievements of natural science as well as historical events of the late 19th century and early 20th century in his book Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1909). By giving the classical definitions of matter, proving the relationships between matter and consciousness and between social existence and social consciousness, and pointing out the basic rules of consciousness, etc., Lenin defended Marxism and carried it forward to a new level. Lenin clearly expressed his thoughts on the history, nature, and structure of Marxism in the book The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism (1913). He also talked about dialectics in Philosophical Notebooks (1914–1916) and expressed his thoughts about the proletarian dictatorship, the role of the Communist Party, and the path to socialism in his book The State and Revolution (1919).

The success of the October revolution in Russia in 1917 brought about a new era: the transitional period from capitalism to socialism on an international scale. This event presented new theoretical requirements that had not existed in the time of Marx and Engels’ time.

In a series of works including: “Left-Wing” Communism: an Infantile Disorder (1920),

Once Again on the Trade Unions, The Current Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin (1921), The Tax in Kind (1921), etc., Lenin summarized the revolutionary practice of the people, continued defending Marxist dialectics, and uncompromisingly fought against eclecticism and sophistry.

Annotation 36

In Anti-Dühring, Engels identifies the historical missions of the working class as:

1. Becoming the ruling class by establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat.

2. Seizing the means of production from the ruling class to end class society.

Eclecticism is an incoherent approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject, applying different theories in different situations without any consistency in analysis and thought. Eclectic arguments are typically composed of various pieces of evidence that are cherry picked and pieced together to form a perspective that lacks clarity. By definition, because they draw from different systems of thought without seeking a clear and cohesive understanding of the totality of the subject and its internal and external relations and its development over time, eclectic arguments run counter to the comprehensive and historical viewpoints [see p. 116]. Eclecticism bears superficial resemblance to dialectical materialism in that it attempts to consider a subject from many different perspectives, and analyzes relationships pertaining to a subject, but the major flaw of eclecticism is a lack of clear and coherent systems and principles, which leads to a chaotic viewpoint and an inability to grasp the true nature of the subject at hand.

Sophistry is the use of falsehoods and misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, and with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. This kind of bad faith argument has no place in materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics must, instead, be rooted in a true and accurate understanding of the subject, material conditions, and reality in general.

Simultaneously, Lenin also developed his Marxist viewpoint of the factors deciding the victory of a social regime, about class, about the two basic missions of the proletariat, about the strategies and tactics of proletarian parties in new historical conditions, about the transitional period, and about the plans of building socialism following the New Economic Policy (NEP), etc.

Annotation 37

The early 1920s were a period of great internal conflict in revolutionary Russia, with various figures and factions wanting to take the revolution in different directions. As such, Lenin wrote extensively on the direction he believed the revolution should be carried forth to ensure lasting victory against both feudalism and capitalism. He believed that the October, 1917 revolution represented the complete defeat of the Czar, however he believed the proletarian victory over the bourgeoisie would take more time. Russia was a poor, agrarian society. The vast majority of Russians under the Czar were poor peasants. Industry — and thus, the proletariat — was highly undeveloped compared to Western Europe. According to Lenin, a full and lasting proletarian victory over the bourgeoisie could only be won after the means of production were properly developed. In Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution, Lenin wrote:

This first victory [the October, 1917 revolution] is not yet the final victory, and it was achieved by our October Revolution at the price of incredible difficulties and hardships... We have made the start... The important thing is that the ice has been broken; the road is open, the way has been shown.

So, Lenin knew that the victory over the Czar and feudalism was only a partial victory, and that more work needed to be done to defeat the bourgeoisie entirely. He believed the key to this victory over the capitalist class would be economic development, since Russia was still a largely agrarian society with very little industrial or economic development compared to Western Europe:

Our last, but most important and most difficult task, the one we have done least about, is economic development, the laying of economic foundations for the new, socialist edifice on the site of the demolished feudal edifice and the semi-demolished capitalist edifice.

Lenin’s plan for rapidly developing the means of production was his New Economic Policy, or the NEP. The New Economic Policy was proposed to be a temporary economic system that would allow a market economy and capitalism to exist within Russia, alongside state-owned business ventures, all firmly under the control of the working-class-dominated state. As Lenin explains in Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution:

At this very moment we are, by our New Economic Policy, correcting a number of our mistakes. We are learning how to continue erecting the socialist edifice in a small-peasant country.

He continues later in the text:

The proletarian state must become a cautious, assiduous and shrewd “businessman,” a punctilious wholesale merchant — otherwise it will never succeed in putting this small-peasant country economically on its feet. Under existing conditions, living as we are side by side with the capitalist (for the time being capitalist) West, there is no other way of progressing to communism. A wholesale merchant seems to be an economic type as remote from communism as heaven from earth. But that is one of the contradictions which, in actual life, lead from a small-peasant economy via state capitalism to socialism. Personal incentive will step up production; we must increase production first and foremost and at all costs. Wholesale trade economically unites millions of small peasants: it gives them a personal incentive, links them up and leads them to the next step, namely, to various forms of association and alliance in the process of production itself. We have already started the necessary changes in our economic policy and already have some successes to our credit; true, they are small and partial, but nonetheless they are successes. In this new field of “tuition” we are already finishing our preparatory class. By persistent and assiduous study, by making practical experience the test of every step we take, by not fearing to alter over and over again what we have already begun, by correcting our mistakes and most carefully analyzing their significance, we shall pass to the higher classes. We shall go through the whole “course,” although the present state of world economics and world politics has made that course much longer and much more difficult than we would have liked. No matter at what cost, no matter how severe the hardships of the transition period may be — despite disaster, famine and ruin — we shall not flinch; we shall triumphantly carry our cause to its goal.

With these great works dedicated to the three component parts of Marxism [see Annotation 42, p. 38], the name Vladimir Ilyich Lenin became an important part of Marxism. It marked a comprehensive developing step from Marxism to Marxism-Leninism.

d. Marxism-Leninism and the Reality of the International Revolutionary Movement

The birth of Marxism greatly affected both the international worker movements and communist movements. The revolution in March 1871 in France could be considered as a great experiment of Marxism in the real world. For the first time in human history, a new kind of state — the dictatorship of the proletariat state (Paris Commune) was established.

Annotation 38

The Paris Commune was an important but short-lived revolutionary victory of the working class which saw a revolutionary socialist government controlling Paris from March 18 to May 28, 1871.

During the brief existence of the Paris Commune, many important policies were set forth, including a separation of church and state, abolishment of rent, an end to child labor, and the right of employees to take over any business which had been abandoned by its owner. Unfortunately, the Paris Commune was brutally toppled by the French army, which killed between 6,000 and 7,000 revolutionaries in battle and by execution. The events of the Paris Commune heavily influenced many revolutionary thinkers and leaders, including Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and was referenced frequently in their works.

In August 1903, the very first Marxist proletariat party was established — the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. It was a true Marxist party that led the revolution in Russia in 1905. In October 1917, the victory of the socialist revolution of the proletariat in Russia opened a new era for human history.

In 1919, the Communist International* was held; in 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic was established. It marked the alliance of the proletariat of many countries. With the power of this alliance, the fight against Fascism not only protected the achievements of the proletariat’s revolution, but also spread socialism beyond the borders of Russia. Following the lead of the Soviet Union, a community of socialist countries was built, with revolutions leading to the establishment of socialism in the following countries [and years of establishment]: Mongolia [1921], Vietnam [1945], the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [1945], Yugoslavia [1945], Albania [1946], Romania [1947], Czechoslovakia [1948], East Germany [1949], China [1949], Hungary [1949], Poland [1956], and Cuba [1959].

Annotation 39

* The First International, also known as the International Workingmen’s Association, was founded in London and lasted from 1864–1876. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were key figures in the foundation and operation of this organization, which sought better conditions and the establishment of rights for workers.

The Second International was founded in Paris in 1889 to continue the work of the First International. It fell apart in 1916 because the members from different nations could not maintain solidarity through the outbreak of World War I.

The Third International, also known as the Communist International (or the ComIntern for short), was founded in Moscow in 1919 (though many nations didn’t join until later in the 1920s). Its goals were to overthrow capitalism, build socialism, and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. It was dissolved in 1943 in the midst of the German invasion of Russia in World War II.

These great historical events strongly enhanced the revolutionary movement of the working class all around the whole world. The people awakened and encouraged the liberation resistance of many colonised countries. The guiding role of Marxism-Leninism brought many great results for a world of peace, independence, democracy, and social progress.

However, because of many internal and external factors, in the late 1980s, the socialist alliance faced a crisis and fell into a recession period. Even though the socialist system fell into crisis and was weakened, the socialist ideology still survived internationally. The determination of successfully building socialism was still very strong in many countries and the desire to follow the socialist path still spread widely in South America.

Nowadays, the main feature of our modern society is fast and varied change in many social aspects caused by technology and scientific revolution. But, no matter how quickly and diversely our society changes, the nature of the capitalist production method never changes. So, in order to protect the socialist achievements earned by the flesh and blood of many previous generations; and in order to have a tremendous development step in the career of liberating human beings, it is very urgent to protect, inherit and develop Marxism-Leninism and also innovate the work of building socialism in both theory and practice.

The Communist Party of Vietnam declared: “Nowadays, capitalism still has potential for development, but in nature, it’s still an unjust, exploitative, and oppressive regime. The basic and inherent contradictions of capitalism, especially the contradictions between the increasing socialization of the production force and the capitalist private ownership regime, will never be solved and will even become increasingly serious. The feature of the current period of our modern society is: countries with different social regimes and different development levels co-exist, co-operate, struggle and compete fiercely for the interests of their own nations. The struggles for peace, independence, democracy, development, and social progress of many countries will still have to cope with hardship and challenges but we will achieve new progress. According to the principles of historical development, human beings will almost certainly go forward to socialism.”[16]

Annotation 40

Historical materialism is the application of dialectical materialist philosophy and materialist dialectical methodology to the analysis of human history, society, and development. The principles of historical materialism, as developed by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, indicate that human society is moving towards socialism and will almost certainly — in time — develop into socialism, and then proceed towards a stateless, classless form of society (communism). These principles of historical materialism were initially formulated and discussed in several books by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, including:

• The German Ideology, by Marx and Engels

• Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, by Marx and Engels

• Karl Marx, by Lenin

The Communist Party of Vietnam has also declared:

“In the opinion of the Vietnam Communist Party, using Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought as the foundation for our ideology, the guideline for our actions is an important developmental step in cognition and logical thinking[17]. Achievements that the Vietnamese people have gained in the war to gain our independence, in peace, and in the renovation era, are all rooted in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought. Therefore, we have to ‘creatively apply and develop Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought in the Party’s activities. We have to regularly summarise reality, complement and develop theory, and soundly solve the problems of our society.’”[18]

Annotation 41

Ho Chi Minh Thought refers to a system of ideas developed by Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese communists which relate to the application of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and methodology to the specific material conditions of Vietnam during the revolutionary period.

There is no universal road map for applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism. How the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism should be applied will vary widely from one time and place to another. This is why Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese communists had to develop Ho Chi Minh Thought: so that scientific socialism could be developed within the unique context of Vietnam’s particular historical development and material conditions.

It is the duty of every revolutionary to study Marxism-Leninism as well as specific applied forms of Marxism-Leninism developed by revolutionaries for their own specific times and places, such as: Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam), Mao Zedong (China), Fidel Castro and Che Guevera (Cuba), etc. However, it must be recognized that the ideas, strategies, methodologies, and philosophies developed in such particular circumstances can’t be applied in exactly the same way in other times and places, such as our own contemporary material conditions.

The Renovation Era refers to the period of time in Vietnam from the 1980s until the early 2000s during which the Đổi Mới (renovation) policies were implemented. These policies restructured the Vietnamese economy to end the previous subsidizing model (which was defined by state ownership of the entire economy). The goals of the Renovation Era were to open Vietnam economically and politically and to normalize relations with the rest of the world. The Đổi Mới policies were generally successful and paved the way to the Path to Socialism Era which Vietnam exists in today. The goals of the Path to Socialism Era are to develop Vietnam into a modern, developed country with a strong economy and wealthy people, which will allow us to transition towards the lower stage of communism, which Lenin called “socialism.”

And, finally: “We have to be consistent with Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought. We have to creatively apply and develop the ideology correspondingly with the reality in Vietnam. We have to firmly aim for national independence and socialism.”

II. Objects, Purposes, and Requirements for Studying the Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism

1. Objects and Purposes of Study

The objects of study of this book, The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism, are the fundamental viewpoints of Marxism-Leninism in its three component parts.

Annotation 42

Remember that a viewpoint is the starting point of analysis which determines the direction of thinking and the perspective from which problems are considered. Also remember that Marxism-Leninism has three component parts:

1. The Philosophy of Marxism:

Including Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism

2. The Political Economy of Marxism:

A system of knowledge and laws that define the production process and commodity exchange in human society.

3. Scientific Socialism

The system of thought pertaining to the establishment of the communist social economy form.

These objects of study stand as the viewpoints — the starting points of analysis — of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and the three component parts of which it’s composed.

In the scope of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy [the first component part of Marxism-Leninism], these objects of study are:

  • Dialectical Materialism — the fundamental and most universal worldview and methodologies which form the theoretical core of a scientific worldview*. [See Part 1, p. 44]
  • Materialist Dialectics — the science of development, of common relationships, and of the most common rules of motion and development of nature, society and human thought. [See Chapter 2, p. 98]
  • Historical Materialism — the application and development of Materialism and Dialectics in studying social aspects. [Historical materialism is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.]

Annotation 43

* Remember that Scientific in Marxism-Leninism refers to a systematic pursuit of knowledge, research, theory, and understanding [see Annotation 1, p. 1]. Note, also, that Worldview refers to the whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about humans ourselves, and about life and the position of human beings in the world. This is discussed in more detail on page 44.

Thus, a scientific worldview is a worldview that is expressed by a systematic pursuit of knowledge of definitions and categories that generally and correctly reflect the relationships of things, phenomena, and processes in the objective material world, including relationships between humans, as well as relationships between humans and the world.

In the scope of Marxist-Leninist Political Economics [the second component part of Marxism-Leninism], the objects of study are:

  • The theory of value and the theory of surplus value.
  • Economic theory about monopolist capitalism and state monopolist capitalism.
  • General economic rules about capitalist production methods, from the stage of formation, to the stage of development, to the stage of perishing, which will be followed by the birth of a new production method: the communist production method.

Annotation 44

Marxist-Leninist political economics is the topic of Part 3 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.

In the scope of Scientific Socialism [the third component part of Marxism-Leninism], the objects of study are:

  • The historical mission of the working class and the progression of a socialist revolution.
  • Matters related to the future formation and development periods of the communist socio-economic form.
  • Guidelines for the working class in implementing our historical mission.

The purposes of studying The Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism are:' to master Marxist-Leninist viewpoints of science, revolution, and humanism*; to thoroughly understand the most important theoretical foundation of Ho Chi Minh Thought, the revolutionary path, and the ideological foundation of the Vietnam Communist Party. Based on that basis, we can build a scientific worldview and methodology and a revolutionary worldview; build our trust in our revolutionary ideals; creatively apply them in our cognitive and practical activities and in practicing and cultivating morality to meet the requirements of Vietnamese people in the cause of building a socialist Vietnam.

Annotation 45

* The humanism of Marxism-Leninism differs greatly from the humanism of Feuerbach discussed in Annotation 12, p. 13. Marxist-Leninist humanism concerns itself with the liberation of all humans. As Marx and Engels wrote in The Communist Manifesto: “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”

2. Some Basic Requirements of the Studying Method

There are some basic requirements for studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism:

First, Marxist-Leninist theses were conceptualized under many different circumstances in order to solve different problems, so the expressions of thought of Marxist-Leninists can vary. Therefore, students studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism must correctly understand its spirit and essence and avoid theoretical purism and dogmatism.

Annotation 46

Marxism-Leninism should be understood as an applied science, and application of this science will vary based on material conditions. As Engels wrote in a personal letter in 1887, remarking on the socialist movement in the USA: “Our theory is a theory of evolution, not a dogma to be learned by heart and to be repeated mechanically. The less it is drilled into the Americans from outside and the more they test it with their own experience... the deeper will it pass into their flesh and blood.”

As an example, Lenin tailored his actions and ideas specifically to suit the material conditions of Russia under the Czar and in the early revolutionary period. Russia’s material conditions were somewhat unique during the time of Lenin’s revolutionary activity, since Russia was an agrarian monarchy with a large peasant population and a relatively undeveloped industrial sector. As such, Lenin had to develop strategies, tactics, and ideas which suited those specific material conditions, such as determining that the industrial working class and agricultural peasants should work together. As Lenin explained in The Proletariat and the Peasantry:

Thus the red banner of the class-conscious workers means, first, that we support with all our might, the peasants’ struggle for full freedom and all the land; secondly, it means that we do not stop at this, but go on further. We are waging, besides the struggle for freedom and land, a fight for socialism.

Obviously, this statement would not be specifically applicable to a society with highly developed industry and virtually no rural peasants (such as, for instance, the modern-day USA), just as Lenin’s remarks about the Czar would not be specifically applicable to any society that does not have an institution of monarchy.

As another example, take the works of Ho Chi Minh. Ho Chi Minh Thought is defined by the Communist Party of Vietnam as “a complete system of thought about the fundamental issues of the Vietnam revolution.” In other words, Ho Chi Minh Thought is a specific application of the principles of Marxism-Leninism to the material conditions of Vietnam.

One unique aspect of Vietnam’s revolution which Ho Chi Minh focused on was colonization. As a colonized country, Ho Chi Minh realized that Vietnam had unique challenges and circumstances that would need to be properly addressed through revolutionary struggle. Another unique aspect of Vietnam’s material conditions was the fact that the colonial administration of Vietnam changed hands throughout the revolution: from France, to Japan, back to France, then to the USA. Ho Chi Minh was able to dynamically and creatively apply Marxism-Leninism to these shifting material conditions. For instance, in Founding of the Indochinese Communist Party, written in 1930, Ho Chi Minh explains some of the unique problems faced by the colonized people of Indochina (modern day Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) and proposes solutions specific to these unique material conditions:

On the one hand, they (the French) use the feudalists and comprador bourgeoisie (of Vietnam) to oppress and exploit our people. On the other, they terrorize, arrest, jail, deport, and kill a great number of Vietnamese revolutionaries. If the French imperialists think that they can suppress the Vietnamese revolution by means of terror, they are grossly mistaken. For one thing, the Vietnamese revolution is not isolated but enjoys the assistance of the world proletariat in general and that of the French working class in particular. Secondly, it is precisely at the very time when the French imperialists are frenziedly carrying out terrorist acts that the Vietnamese Communists, formerly working separately, have united into a single party, the Indochinese Communist Party, to lead the revolutionary struggle of our entire people.

During this period, the nations of Indochina were predominantly agricultural, prompting Ho Chi Minh to suggest in the same text that it would be necessary “to establish a worker-peasant-soldier government” and “to confiscate all the plantations and property belonging to the imperialists and the Vietnamese reactionary bourgeoisie and distribute them to the poor peasants.” Obviously all of these considerations are specific to the material conditions of Indochina under French colonial rule in 1930.

By 1939, the situation was changing rapidly. Ho Chi Minh was operating from China, which was being invaded by fascist Japan. He knew that it was only a matter of time before the Japanese imperial army would come to threaten Vietnam and the rest of Indochina. As such, Ho Chi Minh wrote a letter to the Indochinese Communist Party outlining recommendations, strategies, and goals pertaining to the precipitating material conditions. At that time, France had not yet been invaded by Germany, but Ho Chi Minh was very aware of the looming threat of fascism both in Europe and in Asia. He realized that rising up in revolutionary civil war against the French colonial administration would give fascist Japan the opportunity to quickly conquer all of Indochina, which is why he made the following recommendations in a letter to the Communist Party of Indochina in 1939:

Our party should not strive for demands which are too high, such as total independence, or establishing a house of representatives. If we do that, we will fall into the trap of fascist Japan. For now, we should only ask for democracy, freedom to organize, freedom to hold meetings, freedom of speech, and for the release of political prisoners. We should also fight for our party to be organized and to operate legally.

Once France fell to Germany in 1940, Indochina was immediately handed over to Japanese colonial rule. The Japanese army was brutal in its occupation of Vietnam, and the French colonial administrators surrendered entirely to the Japanese empire and helped the Japanese to administer all of Indochina. Ho Chi Minh returned to Vietnam in January of 1941 and participated directly with the resistance struggle against Japan until 1945, when the situation once again changed dramatically due to the Japanese military’s surrender to allied forces and withdrawal from Vietnam. He immediately took advantage of this situation and held a successful revolution against both the Japanese and French administrators. In the Declaration of Independence for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh wrote:

After the Japanese had surrendered to the Allies, our whole people rose to regain our national sovereignty and to found the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The truth is that we have wrested our independence from the Japanese and not from the French. The French have fled, the Japanese have capitulated, Emperor Bao Dai has abdicated. Our people have broken the chains which for nearly a century have fettered them and have won independence for the homeland.

As France began to make their intentions clear that they would be resuming their colonialist claim to Indochina, Ho Chi Minh began preparing the country for a new chapter in revolutionary struggle. In his 1946 letter to the people of Vietnam, entitled A Nationwide Call for Resistance, Ho Chi Minh wrote:

We call everyone, man and woman, old and young, from every ethnic minority, from every religion, to stand up and fight to save our country. If you have guns, use guns. If you have swords, use swords. If you have nothing, use sticks. Everyone must stand up and fight.

As these historical developments illustrate, Ho Chi Minh was able to creatively and dynamically apply the principles of Marxism-Leninism to suit the shifting material conditions of Vietnam, just as Lenin had to creatively and dynamically apply these principles to the emerging situation in Russia in the early 20th century. So is the task of every student of Marxism-Leninism: to learn to apply these principles creatively and dynamically to the material conditions at hand.

Second, the birth and development of Marixst-Leninist theses is a process. In that process, all Marixst-Leninist theses have strong relationships with each other. They complement and support each other. Thus, students studying each Marxist-Leninist thesis need to put it in proper relation and context with other theses found within each different component part of Marxism-Leninism in order to understand the unity in diversity [see: Annotation 107, p. 110], the consistency of every thesis in particular, and the whole of Marxism-Leninism in general.

Third, an important goal of studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism is to understand clearly the most important theoretical basis of Ho Chi Minh Thought, of the Vietnam Communist Party and its revolutionary path. Therefore, we must attach Marxist-Leninist theses to Vietnam’s revolutionary practice and the world’s practice in order to see the creative application of Marxism-Leninism that President Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnam Communist Party implemented in each period of history.

Fourth, we must study the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism to meet the requirements for a new Vietnamese people in a new era. So, the process of studying is also the process of self-educating and practicing to improve ourselves step-by-step in both individual and social life.

Fifth, Marxism-Leninism is not a closed and immutable theoretical system. On the contrary, it is a theoretical system that continuously develops based on the development of reality. Therefore, the process of studying Marxism-Leninism is also a process of reflection: summarizing and reviewing your own practical experiences and sharing what you’ve learned from these experiences in order to contribute to the scientific and humanist development of Marxism-Leninism. In addition, when studying the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, we need to consider these principles in the proper context of the history of the ideological development of humanity. Such context is important because Marxism-Leninism is quintessentially[19] the product of that history.

These requirements have strong relationships with each other. They imbue the studying process with the quintessence of Marxism-Leninism. And more importantly, they help students apply that quintessence into cognitive and practical activities.

Part I: The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism — Leninism

Worldview refers to the whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about humans ourselves, and about life and the position of human beings in that world. Our worldview directs and orientates our life, including our cognitive and practical activities, as well as our self-awareness. Our worldview defines our ideals, our value system, and our lifestyle. So, a proper and scientific worldview serves as a foundation to establish a constructive approach to life. One of the basic criteria to evaluate the growth and maturity of an individual or a whole society is the degree to which worldview has been developed.

Methodology is a system of reasoning: the ideas and rules that guide humans to research, build, select, and apply the most suitable methods in both perception and practice. Methodologies can range from very specific to broadly general, with philosophical methodology being the most general scope of methodology.

Annotation 47

Tran Thien Tu, the vice-dean of the Department of Marxist-Leninist Theoretical Studies at the Le Duan Political Science University in Quang Tri, Vietnam, defines three degrees of scopes of Methodology. They are, from most specific to most general:

1. Field Methodology

The most specific scope of methodology; a field methodology will apply only to a single specific scientific field.

2. General Methodology

A more general scope of methodology; a general methodology will be shared by various scientific fields.

3. Philosophical Methodology

The most general scope of methodology, encompassing the whole of the material world and human thought.

Worldview and philosophical methodology are the fundamental knowledge-systems* of Marxism-Leninism.

Annotation 48

* In the original Vietnamese, the word lý luận is used, which we roughly translate to the phrase “knowledge-system” throughout this book. Literally, lý luận is a combination of the words lý lẽ, which means “argument,” and bàn luận, which means “to infer.”

The full meaning of lý luận is: a system of ideas that reflect reality expressed in a system of knowledge that allows for a complete view of the fundamental laws and relationships of objective reality.


The Worldview and Philosophical Methodology of Marxism-Leninism

Marxist-Leninist worldview and philosophical methodology emerge from the quintessence [see Annotation 6, p. 8] of dialectical materialism, which itself developed from other forms of dialectics, which in turn developed throughout the history of the ideological development of humanity.

Materialism is foundational to Marxism-Leninism in two important ways:

Dialectical Materialism is the ideological core of a scientific worldview.

Historical Materialism is a system of dialectical materialist opinions about the origin of, motivation of, and the most common rules that dominate the movement and development of human society.

Dialectics are also foundational to Marxism-Leninism, specifically in the form of Materialist Dialectics, which Lenin defined as “the doctrine of development in its fullest, deepest and most comprehensive form, the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge.”[20] Lenin also defined Materialist Dialectics as “what is now called theory of knowledge or epistemology.”[21] [Note: Epistemology is the theoretical study of knowledge; for more information see Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism, p. 204.]

Annotation 49

For beginning students of Marxism-Leninism, distinguishing between Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics may at first be confusing. Here is an explanation of each concept and how they relate to one another:

Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics.

Dialectical Materialism is a scientific understanding of matter, consciousness and the relationship between the two. Dialectical Materialism is used to understand the world by studying such relationships.

Materialist Dialectics is a science studying the general laws of the movement, change, and development of nature, society and human thought.

Relationship between Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics.

And so, we use Dialectical Materialism to understand the fundamental nature of reality. This understanding is used as a basis for changing the world, using Materialist Dialectics to guide our activities. We can then reflect on the results of our activities, using Dialectical Materialism, to further develop our understanding of the world.

As Marxist-Leninists, we utilize this continuous cycle between studying and understanding the world through Dialectical Materialism and affecting change in the world through Materialist Dialectics with the goal of bringing about socialism and freeing humanity.

It is also important to understand the nature of dialectical relationships.

A dialectical relationship is a relationship in which two things mutually impact one another. Dialectical materialism perceives all things in motion [see Mode and Forms of Existence of Matter, p. 59] and in a constant state of change, and this motion and change originates from relationships in which all things mutually move and change each other through interaction, leading to development over time.

Thoroughly understanding the basic content of the worldview and methodology of Marxism-Leninism is the most important requirement in order to properly study the whole theory system of Marxism-Leninism and to creatively apply it into cognitive and practical activities in order to solve the problems that our society must cope with.

3. Excerpt From Modifying the Working Style By Ho Chi Minh

Ho Chi Minh training cadres in 1959.

Training is a must. There is a proverb: “without a teacher, you can never do well;” and the expression: “learn to eat, learn to speak, learn to pack, learn to unpack.”

Even many simple subjects require study, let alone revolutionary work and resistance work. How can you perform such tasks without any training?

But training materials must be aimed at the needs of the masses. We must ask: after people receive their training, can they apply their knowledge immediately? Is it possible to practice right away?

If training is not immediately practical, then years of training would be useless.

Unfortunately, many of our trainers do not understand this simple logic. That’s why there are cadres who train rural people in the uplands in the field of “economics!”

In short, our way of working, organizing, talking, propagandizing, setting slogans, writing newspapers, etc., must all take this sentence as a model:

“From within the masses, back into the masses.”

No matter how big or small our tasks are, we must clearly examine and modify them to match the culture, living habits, level of education, struggling experiences, desire, will, and material conditions of the masses. On that basis we will form our ways of working and organizing. Only then can we have the masses on our side.

Otherwise, if you just do as you want, following your own thoughts, your subjectivity, and then force your personal thoughts upon the masses, it is just like “cutting your feet to fit your shoes.” Feet are the masses. Shoes are our ways of organizing and working.

Shoes are made to fit people’s feet, not the other way around.

Chapter 1: Dialectical Materialism

Dialectical Materialism, one of the materialist foundations of Marxism-Leninism, uses the materialist worldview and dialectical methods to study fundamental philosophical issues. Dialectical Materialism is the most advanced form of Materialism, and serves as the theoretical core of a scientific worldview. Therefore, thoroughly understanding the basic content of Dialectical Materialism is the essential prerequisite to study both the component principles of Marxism-Leninism in particular, and the whole of Marxism-Leninism in general.

I. Materialism and Dialectical Materialism

1. The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues

Philosophy is a system of the most general human theories and knowledge about our world, about ourselves, and our position in our world.

Philosophy has existed for thousands of years. Philosophy has different objects of study depending on different periods of time. Summarizing the whole history of philosophy, Engels said: “The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of more modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being[22].”

So, philosophy studies the relations between consciousness and matter, and between humans and nature.

In philosophy, there are two main questions:

Question 1: The question of consciousness and matter: which came first; or, to put it another way, which one determines which one?

In attempting to answer this first question, philosophy has separated into two main schools: Materialism, and Idealism.

Question 2: Do humans have the capacity to perceive the world as it truly exists?

In answer to this second question, two schools: Intelligibility — which admits the human cognitive capacity to truly perceive the world — and unintelligibility — which denies that capacity.

Materialism is the belief that the nature of the world is matter; that matter comes first; and that matter determines consciousness. People who uphold this belief are called materialists. Throughout human history, many different factions of materialists with various schools of materialist thought have evolved.

Idealism is the belief that the nature of the world is consciousness; consciousness precedes matter; consciousness decides matter. People who uphold this belief are called idealists. Like materialism, various factions of idealists with varying schools of idealist thought have also evolved throughout history.


Idealism has cognitive origins and social origins.

Annotation 50

Cognitive origin refers to origination from the human consciousness of individuals.

Social origin refers to origination from social relations between human beings.

So, idealism originates from both the conscious activity of individual humans as well as social activity between human beings.

These origins are unilateral consideration and absolutization of only one aspect or one characteristic of the whole cognitive process.

Annotation 51

Unilateral consideration is the consideration of a subject from one side only.

Absolutization occurs when one conceptualizes some belief or supposition as always true in all situations without exception.

Both unilateral consideration and absolutization fail to consider the dynamic, constantly changing, and interconnected relations of all things, phenomena, and ideas in our reality.

Idealism originates from unilateral consideration because idealists ignore the material world and consider reality only from the perspective of the human mind. It also originates from absolutism because idealists absolutize human reasoning as the only source of truth and knowledge about our world without exception.

As Lenin wrote in On the Question of Dialectics: “Philosophical idealism is a unilateral development, an overt development, of one out of many attributes, or one out of many aspects, of consciousness.”

Historically, idealism has typically benefitted the oppressive, exploitative class of society. Idealism and religions usually have a close relation with each other, and support each other to co-exist and co-develop.

Annotation 52

Idealists, in absolutizing human consciousness, have a tendency to only give credence to the work of the mind and ignore the value of physical labor. This has been used to justify class structures in which religious and intellectual laborers are given authority and privilege over manual laborers.

This situation has also led to the idea that mental factors play a decisive role in the development of human society in particular and the whole world in general. This idealist view was supported by the ruling class and used to justify its own power and privilege in society. The dominant class has historically used such idealist philosophy as the justifying foundation for their political-social beliefs in order to maintain their ruling positions.

Marx discusses this tendency for rulers to idealistically justify their own rule in The German Ideology:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an ‘eternal law.’

Marx goes on to explain how the idealist positions of the ruling class tend to get embedded in historical narratives:

Whilst in ordinary life every shopkeeper is very well able to distinguish between what somebody professes to be and what he really is, our historians have not yet won even this trivial insight. They take every epoch at its word and believe that everything it says and imagines about itself is true. This historical method which reigned in Germany, and especially the reason why, must be understood from its connection with the illusion of ideologists in general, e.g. the illusions of the jurist, politicians (of the practical statesmen among them, too), from the dogmatic dreamings and distortions of these fellows; this is explained perfectly easily from their practical position in life, their job, and the division of labour.

In history, there are two main forms of idealism: subjective and objective.

Subjective idealism asserts that consciousness is the primary existence. It asserts that all things and phenomena can only be experienced as subjective sensory perceptions while denying the objective existence of material reality altogether.

Objective idealism also asserts the ideal and consciousness as the primary existence, but also posits that the ideal and consciousness are objective, and that they exist independently of nature and humans. This concept is given many names, such as “absolute concept”, “absolute spirit,” “rationality of the world,” etc.

Annotation 53

Primary existence is existence which precedes and determines other existences.

Idealists believe that consciousness has primary existence over matter, that the nature of the world is ideal, and that the ideal defines existence.

Materialists believe the opposite: that matter has primary existence over the ideal, and that matter precedes and determines consciousness.

Dialectical Materialism holds that matter and consciousness have a dialectical relationship, in which matter has primary existence over the ideal, though consciousness can impact the material world through willful conscious activity.

The primary existence of matter within Dialectical Materialism is discussed further in The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88.

Willful activity (willpower) is discussed in Nature and Structure of Consciousness, p. 79.

The key difference between subjective and objective idealists is this:

Subjective idealists believe that there is no external material world whatsoever — that what we imagine as the material world is merely illusory — and that all reality is created by consciousness, whereas objective idealists believe that there is a material world outside of human consciousness, but it exists independently of human consciousness; therefore (according to objective idealists), since humans can only observe the world through conscious experience, the material world can never be truly known or observed by our consciousness.

In opposition to Idealism, Materialism originated through practical experience and the development of science. Through practical experience and systematic development of human knowledge, Materialism has come to serve as a universally applicable theoretical system which benefits progressive social forces and which also orients the activities of those forces in both perception and practice.

Annotation 54

Materialism benefits progressive social forces by showing reality as it is, by dispelling the idealist positions of the ruling class, and by revealing that society and the world can be changed through willful activity.

Materialism guides progressive social forces by grounding thought and activity in material reality, enabling strategies and outcomes that line up with the realities of the material world. For instance, we must avoid utopianism [see Annotation 17, p. 18] in which emphasis is placed on working out ideal forms of society through debate, conjecture, and conscious activity alone. Revolution against capitalism must, instead, focus on affecting material relations and processes of development through willful activity.

As Engels pointed out in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific: “The final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men’s brains, not in men’s better insights into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange.”

2. Dialectical Materialism — the Most Advanced Form of Materialism

In human history, as human society and scientific understanding have developed, materialism has also developed through three forms: Primitive Materialism, Metaphysical Materialism, and Dialectical Materialism.

Primitive Materialism is the primitive form of materialism. Primitive materialism recognizes that matter comes first, and holds that the world is composed of certain elements, and that these were the first objects, the origin, of the world, and that these elements are the essence of reality. These Primitive Materialist concepts can be found in many ancient materialist theories in such places as China, India, and Greece. [These Primitive Materialist elemental philosophies are discussed more in Matter, p. 53] Although it has many shortcomings, Primitive Materialism is partially correct at the most fundamental level, because it uses the material of nature itself to explain nature.

Metaphysical Materialism is the second basic form of Materialism. This form of materialism was widely discussed and developed in Western Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries. During this time, the metaphysical method of perceiving the world was applied to materialist philosophy. Although Metaphysical Materialism does not accurately reflect the world in terms of universal relations [see p. 108] and development, it was an important step forward in the fight against idealist and religious worldviews, especially during the transformational period from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance in many Western European countries.

Annotation 55

Metaphysical materialism was strongly influenced by mechanical philosophy, a scientific and philosophical movement popular in the 17th century which explored mechanical machines and compared natural phenomena to mechanical devices. Mechanical philosophy led to a belief that all things — including living organisms — were built as (and could theoretically be built by humans as) mechanical devices. Influenced by this philosophy, metaphysical materialists came to see the world as a giant mechanical machine composed of parts, each of which exists in an essentially isolated and static state.

Metaphysical materialists believed that all change can exist only as an increase or decrease in quantity, brought about by external causes Metaphysical materialism contributed significantly to the struggle against idealistic and religious worldviews, especially during the historical transition period from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance in Western European countries. Metaphysical materialism also had severe limitations; especially in failing to understand many key aspects of reality, such as the nature of development through change/motion and relationships.

Dialectical Materialism is the third basic form of materialism. It was founded by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and defended and developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin as well as many of his successors. By inheriting the quintessence of previous theories and thoroughly integrating contemporary scientific achievements, Dialectical Materialism immediately solved the shortcomings of the Primitive Materialism of ancient times as well as the Metaphysical Materialism of modern Western Europe. It reaches the highest development level of materialism so far in history.

By accurately reflecting objective reality with universal relations and development*, Dialectical Materialism offers humanity a great tool for scientific cognitive activities and revolutionary practice. The Dialectical Materialist system of thought was built on the basis of scientific explanations about matter, consciousness, and the relationship between the two.

Annotation 56

* Materialist Dialectical methodology explains the world in terms of relationships and development. This is discussed in Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics, p. 106.

II. Dialectical Materialist Opinions About Matter, Consciousness, and the Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness

1. Matter

a. Category of “Matter”


Matter is a philosophical subject which has been examined for more than 2,500 years. Since ancient times, there has been a relentless struggle between materialism and idealism around this subject. Idealism asserts that the world’s nature, the first basis of all existence, is consciousness, and that matter is only a product of that consciousness. Conversely, materialism asserts that nature, the entirety of the world, is composed of matter, that this material world exists indefinitely, and that all things and phenomena are composed of matter.

Before dialectical materialism was born, materialist philosophers generally believed that matter was composed of some self-contained element or elements; that is to say some underlying substance from which everything in the universe is ultimately derived. In ancient times, the five elements theory of Chinese philosophy held that those self-contained substances were metal — wood — water — fire — earth; in India, the Samkhya school believed that they were Pradhana or Prakriti[23]; in Greece, the Milesian school believed they were water (Thales’s[24] conception) or air (Anaximene’s[25] conception); Heraclitus[26] believed the ultimate element was fire; Democritus[27] asserted that it was something called an “atom,”' etc. Even as recently as the 17th-18th centuries, conceptions about matter belonging to modern philosophers such as Francis Bacon[28], Renes Descartes[29], Thomas Hobbes[30], Denis Diderot[31], etc., still hadn’t changed much. They continued following the same philosophical tendency as ancient philosophers by focusing their studies of the material world through elemental phenomena.

These conceptions of matter which were developed by philosophers before Marx’s time laid a foundation for a tendency to use nature to explain nature itself, but that tendency still had many shortcomings, such as: oversimplification of matter into fictitious “elements;” failure to understand the nature of consciousness as well as the relationships between matter and consciousness; failure to recognize the significance of matter in human society, leading to a failure to solve social issues based on a materialist basis, etc.

Annotation 57

Here are further explanations of these shortcomings of early materialists:

Oversimplification of matter into fictitious “elements”

Due to a lack of understanding and knowledge of matter, metaphysical materialists created erroneous conceptions of “elements” which do not accurately describe the nature of matter. By using such an erroneously conceived system of non-existing elements to describe nature, metaphysical materialists were prevented from gaining real insights into the material world which delayed and hindered scientific progress.

Failure to understand the nature of consciousness as well as the relationships between matter and consciousness

Many early materialists believed that consciousness was simply a mechanical byproduct of material processes, and that mental events (thoughts, consciousness) could not affect the material world, since these events were simply mechanically determined by the material world.

As a first principle, Dialectical Materialism does hold that consciousness is created by matter. However, Dialectical Materialism also holds that consciousness can influence the material world through conscious action. This constitutes a dialectical relationship.

As Lenin explains in Materialism and Empirio-criticism: “Consciousness in general reflects being—that is a general principle of all materialism... social consciousness reflects social being.”

Whereas early materialists erroneously held that consciousness is simply an “accidental” byproduct of matter, Dialectical Materialism holds that consciousness is a characteristic of the nature of matter. As Engels wrote in the notation of Dialectics of Nature:

That matter evolves out of itself the thinking human brain is for mechanism a pure accident, although necessarily determined, step by step, where it happens. But the truth is that it is the nature of matter to advance to the evolution of thinking beings, hence this always necessarily occurs wherever the conditions for it (not necessarily identical at all places and times) are present.

Dialectical materialism also breaks from early materialism by positing that consciousness has a dialectical relationship with matter. Consciousness arises from the material world, but can also influence the material world through conscious action. In other words, mental events can trigger physical actions which affect the material world.

As Marx explains in Theses on Feuerbach:

The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of changed circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change [Selbstveränderung] can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice... Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.

Put more simply, we as humans are capable of “revolutionary practice” which can “change the world” because our consciousness allows us to “change circumstances.” This is discussed further in Nature and Structure of Consciousness, p. 79.

Failure to recognize the significance of matter in human society, leading to a failure to solve social issues based on a materialist basis

Dialectical materialists believe that matter exists in many forms, and that human society is a special form of existence of matter. Lenin referred to the material existence of human society as social being, which stood in contrast with human society’s social consciousness. Social being encompasses all of the material existence and processes of human society.

As Lenin wrote in Materialism and Empirio-criticism:

Social being is independent of the social consciousness of men. The fact that you live and conduct your business, beget children, produce products and exchange them, gives rise to an objectively necessary chain of events, a chain of development, which is independent of your social consciousness, and is never grasped by the latter completely. The highest task of humanity is to comprehend this objective logic of economic evolution (the evolution of social life) in its general and fundamental features, so that it may be possible to adapt to it one’s social consciousness and the consciousness of the advanced classes of all capitalist countries in as definite, clear and critical a fashion as possible.

Early materialists failed to recognise the relationship between matter and consciousness — as Lenin puts it, specifically, between social being and social consciousness. Thus in contemplating social issues, these early materialists were unable to find proper materialist solutions.

These shortcomings resulted in a non-thorough materialist viewpoint: when dealing with questions about nature, the early materialists had a strong materialist viewpoint but when dealing with social issues, they “slipped” into an idealist viewpoint.

Annotation 58

Lenin explains this concept of “slipping into” idealism through a non-thorough materialist viewpoint in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism: “Once you deny objective reality, given us in sensation, you have already lost every one of your weapons against fideism, for you have slipped into agnosticism or subjectivism — and that is all fideism wants.”

Note: fideism is a form of idealism which holds that truth and knowledge are received through faith or revelation. Subjectivism is the centering of one’s own self in conscious activities and perspective; see Annotation 222, p. 218.

In the same work, Lenin upholds that objective reality can be known through sense perception:

We ask, is a man given objective reality when he sees something red or feels something hard, etc., or not? [...] If you hold that it is not given, you... inevitably sink to subjectivism... If you hold that it is given, a philosophical concept is needed for this objective reality, and this concept has been worked out long, long ago. This concept is matter. Matter is a philosophical category denoting the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them.

Lenin also explains that proper materialism must recognize objective/absolute truth:

To be a materialist is to acknowledge objective truth, which is revealed to us by our sense-organs. To acknowledge objective truth, i.e., truth not dependent upon man and mankind, is, in one way or another, to recognise absolute truth.

A failure to recognize the existence of such objective, absolute truth, according to Lenin, constitutes “relativism,” a position that all truth is relative and can never be absolutely, objectively knowable.

It is unconditionally true that to every scientific ideology (as distinct, for instance, from religious ideology), there corresponds an objective truth, absolute nature. You will say that this distinction between relative and absolute truth is indefinite. And I shall reply: yes, it is sufficiently ‘indefinite’ to prevent science from becoming a dogma in the bad sense of the term, from becoming something dead, frozen, ossified; but it is at the same time sufficiently ‘definite’ to enable us to dissociate ourselves in the most emphatic and irrevocable manner from fideism and agnosticism, from philosophical idealism and the sophistry of the followers of Hume and Kant. Here is a boundary which you have not noticed, and not having noticed it, you have fallen into the swamp of reactionary philosophy. It is the boundary between dialectical materialism and relativism.

In other words, while proper materialism must contain a degree of relativistic thinking sufficient to challenge assumptions and reexamine perceived truth periodically, materialists must not fall into complete relativism (such as that espoused by Hume and Kant) lest they fall into idealist positions. Ultimately, Absolute Truth — according to Lenin — constitutes the alignment of conscious understanding with objective reality (not to be confused with Hegel’s notion of Absolute Truth; see Annotation 232, p. 228).

Lenin recognized the development of Marx and Engels as “modern materialism, which is immeasurably richer in content and in comparably more consistent than all preceding forms of materialism,” in large part because Marx and Engels were able to apply materialism properly to social sciences by taking the “direct materialist road as against idealism.” He goes on to describe would-be materialists who fall to idealist positions due to relativism and other philosophical inadequacies as “a contemptible middle party in philosophy, who confuse the materialist and idealist trends on every question.”

Lenin warned that a failure to hold a thoroughly materialist viewpoint leads philosophers to become “ensnared in idealism, that is, in a diluted and subtle fideism; they became ensnared from the moment they took ‘sensation’ not as an image of the external world but as a special ‘element.’ It is nobody’s sensation, nobody’s mind, nobody’s spirit, nobody’s will — this is what one inevitably comes to if one does not recognise the materialist theory that the human mind reflects an objectively real external world.”

In other words, idealist conceptions of sensation inject mysticism into philosophy by conceiving of sensation as otherworldly, supernatural, and detached from material human beings with material experiences in the material world.

The development of natural sciences in the late 19th century and early 20th centuries (especially the inventions of Roentgen[32], Becquerel[33], Thomson[34] etc.), disproved the theories of “classical elements” such as fire, water, air, etc. [see Primitive Materialism, p. 52]. These innovations led to a viewpoint crisis in the field of physical science. Many idealists used this opportunity to affirm the non-material nature of the world, ascribing the roles of supernatural forces to the birth of the world.

Annotation 59

Lenin discussed this viewpoint crisis extensively in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Here Lenin discusses relativist reactions to new breakthroughs in natural science, which led even scientists (who proclaimed to be materialists) to take idealist positions:

We are faced, says Poincaré [a French scientist], with the “ruins” of the old principles of physics, “a general debacle of principles.” It is true, he remarks, that all the mentioned departures from principles refer to infinitesimal magnitudes; it is possible that we are still ignorant of other infinitesimals counteracting the undermining of the old principles... But at any rate we have reached a “period of doubt.” We have already seen what epistemological deductions the author draws from this “period of doubt:” “it is not nature which imposes on [or dictates to] us the concepts of space and time, but we who impose them on nature;” “whatever is not thought, is pure nothing.” These deductions are idealist deductions. The breakdown of the most fundamental principles shows (such is Poincaré’s trend of thought) that these principles are not copies, photographs of nature, not images of something external in relation to man’s consciousness, but products of his consciousness. Poincaré does not develop these deductions consistently, nor is he essentially interested in the philosophical aspect of the question.

Lenin concludes by stating that the non-thorough materialist position has lead directly to these idealist positions of relativism:

The essence of the crisis in modern physics consists in the breakdown of the old laws and basic principles, in the rejection of an objective reality existing outside the mind, that is, in the replacement of materialism by idealism and agnosticism.

With this historical background, in order to fight against the distortions of many idealists and to protect the development of the materialist viewpoint, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin simultaneously summarized all the natural scientific achievements in late 19th and early 20th century and built upon Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’ thought to develop this definition of matter:

“Matter is a philosophical category denoting objective reality which is given to man in his sensations, and which is copied, photographed, and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them.”

Lenin’s definition of matter shows that:

First, we need to distinguish between the definition of “matter” as a philosophical category (the category that summarizes the most basic and common attributes of all material existence, and which was defined with the objective of solving the basic issues of philosophy) from the definition of “matter” that was used in specialized sciences (specific and sense-detectable substance).

Second, the most basic, common attribute of all kinds of matter [and under both definitions listed in the previous paragraph] is objective existence, meaning matter exists outside of human consciousness, independently of human consciousness, no matter whether humans can perceive it with our senses or not.

Third, matter, with its specific forms, can cause and affect mental events in humans when it directly or indirectly impacts the human senses; human consciousness is the reflection of matter; matter is the thing that is reflected by human consciousness.

Lenin’s definition of matter played an important role in the development of materialism and scientific consciousness.

First, by pointing out that the most basic, common attribute of matter is objective existence, Lenin successfully distinguished the basic difference between the definition of matter as a philosophical category and the definition of matter as a category of specialized sciences. It helped solve the problems of defining matter in the previous forms of materialism; it offered scientific evidence to define what can be considered matter; it layed out a theoretical foundation for building a materialist viewpoint of history, and overcame the shortcomings of idealist conceptions of society.

Second, by asserting that matter was “objective reality,” “given to man in his sensations,” and “copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations,” Lenin not only confirmed the primary existence of matter and the secondary existence of consciousness [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88] but he also affirmed that humans had the ability to be aware of objective reality through the “copying, photographing and reflection of our sensations” [in other words, sense perceptions].

b. Mode and Forms of Existence of Matter

According to the dialectical materialist viewpoint, motion is the mode of existence of matter; space and time are the forms of existence of matter.

Annotation 60

Mode refers to the way or manner in which something occurs or exists. You can think of mode as pertaining to the “how,” as opposed to the “what.” For example, the mode of circulation refers to how commodities circulate within society [see Annotation 14, p. 16]; mode of production refers to how commodities are produced in society. So, mode of existence of matter refers to how matter exists in our universe.

Form comes from the category pair [see Basic Pairs of Categories of Materialist Dialectics, p. 126] of Content and Form [see p. 147]. Form refers to how we perceive objects, phenomena, and ideas. So, form of existence of matter refers to the ways in which we perceive the existence of matter [explained below] in our universe.

- Motion is the Mode of Existence of Matter

As Friedrich Engels explained: “Motion, in the most general sense, conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute of matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe, from mere change of place right up to thinking.”

According to Engels, motion encompasses more than just positional changes. Motion embodies “all the changes and processes happening in this universe;” matter is always associated with motion, and matter can only express its existence through motion.

Annotation 61

In Dialectical Materialist philosophy, “motion” is also known as “change” and it refers to the changes which occur as a result of the mutual impacts which occur in or between subjects through the negation of contradictions. Motion is a constant attribute of all things, phenomena, and ideas (see Characteristics of Development, p. 124).

Because matter is inseparable from motion (and vice versa), Engels defined motion as the mode of matter — the way or manner in which matter exists. It is impossible for matter in our universe to exist in completely static and unchanging state, isolated from the rest of existence; thus matter exists in the mode of motion. Over time, motion leads to development as things, phenomena, and ideas transition through various stages of quality change [see Annotation 117, p. 119].

Matter exists objectively, therefore motion also exists objectively. The motion of matter is self-motion[35].

Annotation 62

It is important to note that “matter,” in the philosophical sense as used in dialectical materialist phlosophy, includes all that is “objective” (external) to individual human cosnciousness. This includes objective phenomena which human senses are unable to detect, such as objective social relations, objective economic values, etc. Objectiveness is discussed more in Annotation 108, p. 112; objective social relations are discussed more in Annotation 10, p. 10.

In Dialectics of Nature, Friedrich Engels discussed the properties of motion and explained that motion can neither be created nor destroyed. Therefore, motion can only change form or transfer from one object to another. In this sense, all objects are dynamically linked together through motion:

The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies, and by bodies we understand here all material existence extending from stars to atoms... In the fact that these bodies are interconnected is already included that they react on one another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion. It already becomes evident here that matter is unthinkable without motion. And if, in addition, matter confronts us as something given, equally uncreatable as indestructible, it follows that motion also is as uncreatable as indestructible. It became impossible to reject this conclusion as soon as it was recognised that the universe is a system, an interconnection of bodies.

In other words, every body of matter is in motion relative to other bodies of matter, and thus matter is inseparable from motion. Motion results from the interaction of bodies of matter. Because motion and matter define each other, and because motion can only exist in relation to matter and matter can only exist in relation to motion, the motion of matter can be described as “self-motion,” because the motion is not created externally but exists only within and in relation to matter itself. Engels further explains that if this were not true — if motion were external to matter — then motion itself would have had to have been created external to matter, which is impossible:

To say that matter during the whole unlimited time of its existence has only once, and for what is an infinitesimally short period in comparison to its eternity, found itself able to differentiate its motion and thereby to unfold the whole wealth of this motion, and that before and after this remains restricted for eternity to mere change of place — this is equivalent to maintaining that matter is mortal and motion transitory. The indestructibility of motion cannot be merely quantitative, it must also be conceived qualitatively; matter whose purely mechanical change of place includes indeed the possibility under favourable conditions of being transformed into heat, electricity, chemical action, or life, but which is not capable of producing these conditions from out of itself, such matter has forfeited motion; motion which has lost the capacity of being transformed into the various forms appropriate to it may indeed still have dynamis but no longer energeia, and so has become partially destroyed. Both, however, are unthinkable.

So, motion can change forms and can transfer from one material body to another, but it can never be created externally from matter, and neither motion nor matter can be created or destroyed in our universe. Thus, matter exists in a state of “self-motion;” motion can never externally be created nor externally applied to matter.

To put it another way, motion results from the fact that all things, phenomena, and ideas exist as assemblages of relationships [see The Principle of General Relationships, p. 107], and these relationships contain opposing forces. As Lenin explained in his Philosophical Notebooks:

The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their ‘self-movement,’ in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the ‘struggle’ of opposites.


Based on the scientific achievements which occurred in his lifetime, Engels classified motion into 5 basic forms: mechanical motion (changes in positions of objects in space); physical motion (movements of molecules, electrons, fundamental particles, thermal processes, electricity…); chemical motion (changes of organic and inorganic substances in combination and separation processes…); biological motion (changes of living objects, or genetic structure…); social motion (changes in economy, politics, culture, and social life).

These basic forms of motion are arranged into levels of advancement based on the level of complexity of matter that is affected.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-8.png

The basic forms of motion each affect different forms of matter, but these forms of motion do not exist independently from each other; they actually have strong relationships with each other, in which the more advanced forms of motion develop from lower forms of motion; the more advanced forms of motion also internally include lower forms of motion. [I.e., biological motion contains chemical motion; chemical motion contains physical motion; etc.]

Every object exists with many forms of motion, but any given object is defined by its most advanced form of motion. [I.e., living creatures are defined in terms of biological motion, societies are defined in terms of social motion, etc.]

By classifying the basic forms of motion, Engels laid out the foundation for classification and synthesization of science. The basic forms of motion differ from one another, but they are also unified with each other into one continuous system of motion. Understanding this dialectical relationship between different forms of motion helped to overcome misunderstandings and confusion about motion.

Annotation 63

In Dialectics of Nature, Engels clears up a great deal of confusion and addresses many misconceptions about matter, motion, forces, energy, etc. which existed in both science and philosophy at the time by defining and explaining the dialectical nature of matter and motion.

When Dialectical Materialism affirmed that motion was the mode of existence — the natural attribute of matter — it also confirmed that motion is absolute and eternal. This does not mean that Dialectical Materialism denies that things can become frozen; however, according to the dialectical materialist viewpoint, freezing is a special form of motion, it is motion in equilibrium and freezing is relative and temporary.

Motion in equilibrium is motion that has not changed the positions, forms, and/or structures of things.

Freezing is a relative phenomenon because freezing only occurs in some forms of motion and in some specific relations, it does not occur in all forms of motion and all kinds of relations. Freezing is a temporary phenomenon because freezing only exists for a limited period of time, it cannot last forever.

Annotation 64

Equilibrium can exist at any advancement of motion. Lenin discussed equilibrium as it pertains to the social form of motion in discussing an equilibrium of forces existing in Russia in 1905 in this article, An Equilibrium of Forces:

1) The result to date (Monday, October 30) is an equilibrium of forces, as we already pointed out in Proletary, No. 23.

2) Tsarism is no longer strong enough, the revolution not yet strong enough, to win.

3) Hence the tremendous amount of vacillation. The terrific and enormous increase of revolutionary happenings (strikes, meetings, barricades, committees of public safety, complete paralysis of the government, etc.), on the other hand, the absence of resolute repressive measures. The troops are wavering.

4) The Tsar’s Court is wavering (The Times and the Daily Telegraph) between dictatorship and a constitution.

The Court is wavering and biding its time. Strictly speaking, these are its correct tactics: the equilibrium of forces compels it to bide its time, for power is in its hands.

The revolution has reached a stage at which it is disadvantageous for the counter-revolution to attack, to assume the offensive.

For us, for the proletariat, for consistent revolutionary democrats, this is not enough. If we do not rise to a higher level, if we do not manage to launch an independent offensive, if we do not smash the forces of Tsarism, do not destroy its actual power, then the revolution will stop half way, then the bourgeoisie will fool the workers.

5) Rumour has it that a constitution has been decided upon. If that is so, then it follows that the Tsar is heeding the lessons of 1848 and other revolutions: he wants to grant a constitution without a constituent assembly, before a constituent assembly, apart from a constituent assembly. What kind of constitution? At best (for ’the Tsar) a Constitutional-Democratic constitution.

This implies: achievement of the Constitutional-Democrats’ ideal, skipping the revolution; deceiving the people, for all the same there will be no complete and actual freedom of elections.

Should not the revolution skip this granted constitution?

- Space and Time are Forms of Existence of Matter

Every form of matter exists in a specific position, with specific space particularity (height, width, length, etc.), in specific relation (in front or behind, above or under, to the left or right, etc.) with other forms of matter. These positional relations exist in what we call space. [Space is defined by positional relations of matter.]

On the other hand, the existence of matter is also expressed in the speed of change and the order in which changes occur. These changes occur in what we call time. As Engels wrote: “For the basic forms of all existence are space and time, and a being outside of time is as absurd as an existence outside space.” Matter, space, and time are not separable; there is no matter that exists outside of space and time; there is also no space and time that exist outside of matter’s motion.

Annotation 65

Space and time, as the forms of matter, i.e.: the ways in which we perceive the existence of matter. We are only able to perceive and understand material objects as they exist within space and time.

Space and time, as forms of existence of matter, exist objectively [see Annotation 108,

p. 112], and are defined by matter. [Space is defined by the positional relations between material objects; time is defined by the speed of change of material objects and the order in which these changes occur.] Space has three dimensions: height, width, length; time has one direction: from the past to the future.

c. The Material Unity of the World

Dialectical Materialism affirms that the nature of the world is matter, and the world is unified in its material properties. [In other words: the entire universe, in all its diversity, is made of matter, and the properties of matter are the same throughout the known universe.]

The material nature of the world is proven on the following basis:

First, there is only one world: the material world; the material world is the first existence [i.e., it existed before consciousness], it exists objectively, and independently, of human consciousness.

Second, the material world exists eternally, endlessly, infinitely; it has no known beginning point and there is no evidence that it will ever disappear.

Third, all known objects and phenomena of the material world have objective relations with each other and all objects and phenomena exist in unity with each other. All of them are specific forms and structures of matter, or have material origin which was born from matter, and all are governed by the objective rules of the material world. In the material world, there is nothing that exists outside of the changing and transforming processes of matter; all of these processes exist as causes and effects of each other.

Annotation 66

The most important thing to understand here is that every object and phenomenon in the universe arises as matter, all material objects and phenomena are dynamically linked to one another in an infinite chain of causes and effects and changes and transformations, all governed by the material laws of our reality. This understanding is the material foundation of dialectical materialism.

2. Consciousness

a. The Source of Consciousness

According to the materialist viewpoint, consciousness has natural and social sources.

Annotation 67

Consciousness arises from nature, and from social activities and relations.

Natural refers to the material world. Without the material world of matter, material processes, and the evolution of material systems — up to and including the human brain — consciousness would never have formed.

Social activities and relations also contributed to the development of consciousness. The social processes of labor and language were also prerequisites for the development of conscious activity in human beings.

- Natural Source of Consciousness

There are many factors that form the natural sources for consciousness, but the two most basic factors are human brains and the relationship between humans and the objective world which makes possible creative and dynamic reflection.

About human brains: consciousness is an attribute of a highly organized form of matter, which is the brain. Consciousness is the function and the result of the neurophysiological activities of human brains. As human brains evolved and developed over time, their neurophysiological activities became richer, and, as these activities progressed, consciousness developed further and further over time. This explains why the human evolution process is also a process of developing the capacity for perception and thinking. Whenever human neurophysiological activities don’t function normally because of damaged brains, our mental life is also disturbed.

About the relationship between humans and the objective world which made possible creative and dynamic reflection: The relationship between humans and the objective world has been essential for as long as humans have existed. In this relationship, the objective world is reflected through human senses which interact with human brains and then form our consciousness.

Consciousness exists as a dynamic set of relationships between the external material world, human sense perception, and the functions of the human brain.

Reflection is the re-creation of the features of one form of matter in a different form of matter which occurs when they mutually impact each other through interaction. Reflection is a characteristic of all forms of matter.

There are many forms and levels of reflection such as [from more simple to more complex]: physical and chemical reflection, biological reflection, mental reflection, creative and dynamic reflection, etc.

Annotation 68

Change is driven by mutual impacts between or within things, phenomena, and/or ideas. Any time two such subjects impact one another, traces of some form or another are left on both interacting subjects. This characteristic of change is called reflection.

The concept of reflection, first proposed by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, has been advanced through the work of various Soviet psychologists, philosophers, and scientists (including Ivan Pavlov, Todor Pavlov, Aleksei Leontiev, Lev Vygotsky, Valentin Voloshinov, and others), and is used as a basis for scientific inquiry up to this day by mainstream researchers in Cuba, Vietnam, China, and Laos. The information provided below is somewhat simplified and generalized to give the reader a basic familiarity with the theory of reflection and the development of reflection in nature.

Dialectical materialist scientists have developed a theory of the development of evolution of forms of reflection, positing that forms of reflection have become increasingly complex as organic processes and life have evolved and grown more complex over time.

The chart below gives an idea of how different forms of reaction have evolved over time:

This chart outlines the basic development tendency of Forms of Reflection in matter which lead from inorganic matter, to life, to human consciousness and society.

Obviously, not all subjects develop completely along the path outlined above. Thus far, to our knowledge, only human beings have developed entirely to the level of consciousness and society. It is also unknown whether, or how, human society may develop into some future, as-yet-unknown, form.

Physical and chemical reflection is the simplest form of reflection, dealing with the ways in which inorganic matter is reflected in human consciousness. Physical and chemical reflection is the reflection of mechanical, physical, and chemical changes and reactions of inorganic matter (i.e., changes in structures, positions, physical-chemical properties, and the processes of combining and dissolving substances). Physical and chemical reactions are passive: when two objects interact with each other physically or chemically, they do not do so consciously.

Annotation 69

Reflection occurs any time two material objects interact and the features of the object are transferred to each other. Below are some very simplified illustrations to relate the basic idea of the physical reflection of material objects.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-11.png

Reflection as Change in Position:

1. Round Object moves towards Square Object.

2. Round Object impacts Square Object.

3. Square Object changes position; Round Object “bounces” and reverses direction.

4.Thus, Square Object’s change in position reflects the motion of Round Object (and vice-versa). Traces of both contradicting objects are reflected in the respective motion and position of each object.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-12.png

Reflection as Change in Structure:

1. Round Object moves toward Square Object.

2. Round Object impacts Square Object.

3. Structural changes (traces) occur in both Round and Square Object as a result of impact.

4. These changes constitute structural, physical reflection.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-13.png

Chemical Reflection:

1. Atom C is attached to Atom B.

2. Atom C detaches from Atom B and transfers to attach to Atom A.

3. This is a process of chemical reflection, in which both molecules mutually reflect one another after A CB a process of chemical reaction (one molecule loses Atom C while the other gains Atom C).

As dialectical materialists, we must strive to develop our understanding of the reflections of physical and chemical changes and reactions so that our conceptions reflect the material world as accurately as possible. For example: we must not ascribe consciousness to physical processes. Example: a gambler who comes to believe that a pair of dice is “spiteful” or “cursed” is attributing conscious motivation to unconscious physical processes, which is an inaccurate ideological reflection of reality.

Biological reflection is a higher, more complex form of reflection [compared to physical reflection]. It deals with reflection of organic material in the natural world. As our observations of biological processes have become more sophisticated and complex [through developments in natural science, the development of better tools for observation such as microscopes and other technologies, and so on], our conscious reflections of the natural world have also become more complex.

Biological reflection is expressed through excitation, induction, and reflexes.

Excitation is the reaction of simple plant and animal life-forms which occurs when they change position or structure as a direct result of physical changes to their habitat [i.e., a plant which moves toward the sun throughout the day].

Induction is the reaction of animals with simple nerve systems which can sense or feel their environments. Induction occurs through unconditioned reflex mechanisms.

Annotation 70

Unconditioned reflexes are characterized by permanent connections between sensory perceptions and reactions. Such reactions are not learned, but simply occur automatically based on physiological mechanisms occurring within the organism. An example of an unconditioned reflex response would be muscles in the leg twitching at the response of a tap on the knee. Such responses are purely physiological and are never learned (“conditioned” into us) — these reactions are simply induced physiologically.

Mental reflections are reactions which occur in animals with central nervous systems. Mental reflections occur through conditioned reflex mechanisms.

Annotation 71

Conditioned reflexes are reactions which are learned by organisms. These responses are acquired as animals learn to associate previously unrelated neural stimuli to elicit a particular reaction. The Russian psychologist Ivan Pavlov famously developed our understanding of conditioned responses by ringing a dinner bell shortly before giving dogs food. After a few repetitions, dogs would begin to salivate upon hearing the dinner bell being rung, even before any food was offered. Any dog which did not receive this conditioning would not salivate upon hearing a dinner bell. This is what makes it a learned, conditioned response — a type of mental reflection.

Dynamic and creative reflection is the most advanced form of reflection. It only occurs in matter that has the highest structural level, such as the human brain. Dynamic and creative reflection is done through the human brain’s nervous physiological activities whenever the objective world impacts human senses. This is a kind of reflection that actively selects and processes information to create new information and to understand the meaning of that information. This dynamic and creative reflection is called consciousness.

Annotation 72

Remember Lenin’s definition of matter from Materialism and Empirio-Criticism: “Matter is a philosophical category denoting objective reality which is given to man in his sensations, and which is copied, photographed, and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them.”

An intrinsic property of matter is that it can be sensed by human beings, and through this sensation, reflected in human consciousness. Thus, all forms of matter share the characteristic of being able to be reflected in the human mind.

Criticizing Karl Pearson, who said that it was not logical to maintain that all matter had the property of being conscious, Lenin wrote in brackets: “But it is logical to suppose that all matter possesses a property which is essentially kindred to sensation: the property to reflect.” Understanding the concept of dynamic and creative reflection is critical to understanding the role of consciousness and the ideal in Dialectical Materialism. In particular, reflection differentiates Dialectical Materialism from the idealist form of dialectics used by Hegel [see Annotation 9, p. 10]. As Marx famously wrote in Capital Volume I:

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of ‘the Idea,’ he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos [craftsman/artisan/creator] of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea.’ With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.

In other words, Hegelian idealism saw human consciousness as defining the material world. Dialectical Materialism inverts this relationship to recognize that what we conceive in our minds is only a reflection of the material world. As Marx explains in The German Ideology, all conscious thought stems from life processes through reflection:

Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.

Marx and Engels argued that consciousness arose from the life-processes of human beings. Life-processes are processes of motion and change which occur within organisms to sustain life, and these processes have a dialectical relationship with consciousness: the processes of life, therefore, reflect consciousness, just as consciousness reflects human life-processes. Conscious activities (such as being able to hunt, gather, and cook food, build shelter, and so on) improve the life-processes of human beings (by improving our health, extending our life-spans, etc.); and as our life-processes improved, our consciousness was able to develop more fully. As a concrete example of the dialectic between life processes and consciousness, it is now widely believed by scientists that the advent of cooking and preparing food (conscious activity) improved the functioning of the human brain[36] (a life process) which, in turn, developed human consciousness, and so on. Life-processes thus determine how consciousness reflects reality, while consciousness impacts back on life-processes, reflecting the dialectical relationship between matter and consciousness [see p. 88] and between practical activities and consciousness [see Annotation 230, p. 226].

Because consciousness arose from life-processes of human beings in the material world, we know that the material world is reflected in our consciousness. However, these reflections do not determine the material world, and do not mirror the material world exactly [see Annotation 77, p. 79]. It is also important to understand that, since life-processes in the material world predate and determine consciousness, consciousness can never be a first basis of seeking truth about our world. As Marx further explains in The German Ideology:

Since the Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, as the real chains of men (just as the Old Hegelians declared them the true bonds of human society) it is evident that the Young Hegelians have to fight only against these illusions of consciousness. Since, according to their fantasy, the relationships of men, all their doings, their chains and their limitations are products of their consciousness, the Young Hegelians logically put to men the moral postulate of exchanging their present consciousness for human, critical or egoistic consciousness, and thus of removing their limitations. This demand to change consciousness amounts to a demand to interpret reality in another way, i.e. to recognise it by means of another interpretation.

In other words, Hegelian idealism makes the critical mistake of believing that the ideal — consciousness — is the first basis of reality, and that anything and everything can be achieved through mere conscious activity. Marx, on the other hand, argues that “life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life,” and that we must understand the ways in which reality is reflected in consciousness before we can hope to affect change in the material conditions of human beings:

In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here [in the materialist perspective] we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. In the first method of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; in the second method, which conforms to real life, it is the real living individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness.

So, the work of the Dialectical Materialist is not to try to develop Utopian conceptions of reality first, to then proceed to try and force such purely ideal conceptions onto reality (see Annotation 17, p. 18).

Rather, we must understand the material basis of reality, as well as the material processes of change and motion which govern reality, and only then can we search for ways in which human beings can influence material reality through conscious activity. As Marx explains, the revolutionary must not be fooled into believing we can simply conceive of an ideal world and then replicate it into reality through interpretation and conscious thought alone. Instead, we must start with a firm understanding of material conditions and, from that material basis, determine how to build our revolutionary movement through conscious impact of material relations and processes of development in the material world.

As Marx wrote in The German Ideology: “Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence.” This distinction may seem subtle at first, but it has massive implications for how Marx suggests we go about participating in revolutionary activity. For Marx, purely-idealist debates and criticisms are an unproductive waste of time:

The Young-Hegelian ideologists, in spite of their allegedly ‘world-shattering’ statements, are the staunchest conservatives. The most recent of them have found the correct expression for their activity when they declare they are only fighting against ‘phrases.’ They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world. The only results which this philosophic criticism could achieve were a few (and at that thoroughly one-sided) elucidations of Christianity from the point of view of religious history; all the rest of their assertions are only further embellishments of their claim to have furnished, in these unimportant elucidations, discoveries of universal importance.

Marx also discusses the uselessness of idealist conjecture:

Moreover, it is quite immaterial what consciousness starts to do on its own: out of all such muck we get only the one inference that these three moments, the forces of production, the state of society, and consciousness, can and must come into contradiction with one another, because the division of labour implies the possibility, nay the fact that intellectual and material activity — enjoyment and labour, production and consumption — devolve on different individuals, and that the only possibility of their not coming into contradiction lies in the negation in its turn of the division of labour. It is self-evident, moreover, that ‘spectres,’ ‘bonds,’ ‘the higher being,’ ‘concept,’ ‘scruple,’ [terms for idealist conceptions] are merely the idealistic, spiritual expression, the conception apparently of the isolated individual, the image of very empirical fetters and limitations, within which the mode of production of life and the form of intercourse coupled with it move.

What Marx means by this is that we should focus on the material processes and conditions of society if we intend to change society, because idealist speculation, conjecture, critique, and thought alone, at the individual level, will never be capable of affecting revolutionary change in our material world.

Instead, we must focus on the material basis of reality, the material conditions of society, and seek revolutionary measures which are built upon materialist foundations. Only by understanding material processes of development, as well as the dialectical relationship between consciousness and matter, can we reliably and effectively begin to impact reality through conscious activity. This begins with the recognition that conscious thought itself is a reflection of material reality which developed and results from life-processes of material motion and processes of change within the human brain.

This concept of reflection, pioneered by Marx and Engels, was significantly developed by V. I. Lenin in his response to Machian positivists who posited that what we perceive is not truly reality [see Annotation 32, p. 27]. In his Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin wrote: “Life gives rise to the brain. Nature is reflected in the human brain.”

In Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Lenin further defined the relationship between matter and consciousness through reflection.

LENIN’S PROOF OF THE THEORY OF REFLECTION

In Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Lenin offered the following arguments to back up the theory of reflection.

1) Things exist independently of our consciousness, independently of our perceptions, outside of us, for it is beyond doubt that alizarin [a chemical substance which was newly discovered at time of writing] existed in coal tar yesterday and it is equally beyond doubt that yesterday we knew nothing of the existence of this alizarin and received no sensations from it.

Lenin is saying that the material world must exist outside of and independent from our consciousness. He cites as evidence the discovery of a chemical substance which until recently we had no sensory perception of, noting that this substance must have existed long before we became aware of it through sensory observation.

2) There is definitely no difference in principle between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, and there can be no such difference. The only difference is between what is known and what is not yet known. And philosophical inventions of specific boundaries between the one and the other, inventions to the effect that the thing-in-itself is “beyond” phenomena (Kant) or that we can or must fence ourselves off by some philosophical partition from the problem of a world which in one part or another is still unknown but which exists outside us (Hume) — all this is the sheerest nonsense, [unfounded belief], trick, invention.

Lenin is referencing a centuries-old debate about whether or not human beings are capable of having real knowledge of a “thing-in-itself,” or if we can only perceive phenomena of things (characteristics observable to our senses). The “thing-in-itself” refers to the actual material object which exists outside of our consciousness. So the question being posed is: can we REALLY have knowledge of material objects outside of our consciousness, or does consciousness itself act as a barrier to ever REALLY knowing anything about material objects and the material world outside of our consciousness?

Immanuel Kant argued that we can never know the true nature of the material world, writing: “we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing-in-itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.” This idea that the senses could not be trusted to deliver accurate knowledge — and thus, the “thing-in-itself” is essentially unknowable — was carried forward by later empiricists such as Bacon and Hume [see Annotation 10, p. 10]. In Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Marx and Engels refute this notion, arguing that practice allows us to discover truth about “things-in-themselves:”

The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical crotchets is practice — namely, experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and making it serve our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end to the Kantian ungraspable “thing-in-itself”.

Lenin expanded on this argument, explaining that the phenomena of objects which we observe with our senses do accurately reflect material objects, even though we might not know everything about these objects at once. Over time, as we learn more and more about material objects and the material world through practice and repeated observation, we more fully and accurately come to understand “things-in-themselves, as he writes in Empirio-Criticism and Materialism:

3) In the theory of knowledge, as in every other branch of science, we must think dialectically, that is, we must not regard our knowledge as readymade and unalterable, but must determine how knowledge emerges from ignorance, how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more complete and more exact.

Here, Lenin further elaborates on the dialectical nature of knowledge: we must simultaneously accept that our knowledge is never perfect and unchanging, but we must also recognize that we are capable of making our knowledge more exact and complete over time. To further defend his ideas about reflection, Lenin cited Czech philosopher Karl Kautsky’s argument against Kant:

That I see green, red and white is grounded in my faculty of sight. But that green is something different from red testifies to something that lies outside of me, to real differences between the things... The relations and differences between the things themselves revealed to me by the individual space and time concepts are real relations and differences of the external world, not conditioned by the nature of my perceptive faculty... If this were really so [i.e., if Kant’s doctrine of the ideality of time and space were true], we could know nothing about the world outside us, not even that it exists.

Lenin followed from Marx and Engels that, in order to further develop our understanding and knowledge of the material world, it was necessary to engage in practice [see Annotation 211, p. 205]. Engels wrote in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we [use] these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perceptions. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is positive proof that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves.

Notice that Engels is careful to use the words so far: “its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves.” Engels does not argue that human understanding of the material world is infallible: mistakes are often made. But over time, as such mistakes are discovered and our understanding improves, our knowledge of the material world develops. This is only possible if the phenomena of objects which we observe — the reflections within our consciousness — do actually and accurately represent material reality. Lenin elaborated on this necessity to constantly update and improve dialectical materialist philosophy as new information and knowledge became available:

Engels, for instance, assimilated the, to him, new term, energy, and began to employ it in 1885 (Preface to the 2nd ed. of Anti-Dühring) and in 1888 (Ludwig Feuerbach), but to employ it equally with the concepts of ‘force’ and ‘motion,’ and along with them. Engels was able to enrich his materialism by adopting a new terminology.

Engels provided further elaborations on how practical experience and mastery of the material world refutes the notion that it is impossible to have real knowledge of the material world in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy:

The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical fancies is practice, viz., experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and using it for our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end of the Kantian incomprehensible or ungraspable... The chemical substances produced in the bodies of plants and animals remained just such thingsin-themselves until organic chemistry began to produce them one after another, whereupon the thing-in-itself became a thing for us, as for instance, alizarin [a dye which was originally plant-based], which we no longer trouble to grow in in the field, but produce much more cheaply and simply from coal tar.

So, dialectical materialism holds that there is a material world external from our consciousness; that conscious thoughts are reflections of this material world; that we can have real knowledge of the material world through sensory observation; and that our knowledge and understanding of the material world is best advanced through practice in the material world.

- Social Sources of Consciousness

There are many factors that constitute the social sources of consciousness. The most basic and direct factors are labor and language.

Labor is the process by which humans interact with the natural world in order to make products for our needs of existing and developing. Labor is also the process that changes the human body’s structure [i.e., muscles developing through exercise].

Annotation 73

In Dialectics of Nature, Engels describes the dialectical relationship between labor and human development:

Labour is the source of all wealth, the political economists assert. And it really is the source — next to nature, which supplies it with the material that it converts into wealth. But it is even infinitely more than this. It is the prime basic condition for all human existence, and this to such an extent that, in a sense, we have to say that labour created man himself.

Before the first flint could be fashioned into a knife by human hands, a period of time probably elapsed in comparison with which the historical period known to us appears insignificant. But the decisive step had been taken, the hand had become free and could henceforth attain ever greater dexterity; the greater flexibility thus acquired was inherited and increased from generation to generation.

Thus the hand is not only the organ of labour, it is also the product of labour. Only by labour, by adaptation to ever new operations, through the inheritance of muscles, ligaments, and, over longer periods of time, bones that had undergone special development and the ever-renewed employment of this inherited finesse in new, more and more complicated operations, have given the human hand the high degree of perfection required to conjure into being the pictures of a Raphael, the statues of a Thorwaldsen, the music of a Paganini.

But the hand did not exist alone, it was only one member of an integral, highly complex organism. And what benefited the hand, benefited also the whole body it served.

Labor also allows us to discover the attributes, structures, motion laws, etc., of the natural world, via observable phenomena.


Annotation 74

We discover truth about the natural world through labor — through physical practice in the material world. See the discussion of practice in Annotation 211, p. 205.

All of these phenomena, through our human senses, impact our human brains. And through brain activity, knowledge and consciousness of the objective world are formed and developed.

Language is a system of material signals that carries information with cognitive content. Without language, consciousness could not exist and develop.

The birth of language goes hand in hand with labor. From the beginning, labor was social. The relationships between people who perform labor processes require them to have means to communicate and exchange thoughts. This requirement caused language to arise and develop along with the working processes. With language, humans not only communicate, but also summarise reality and convey experience and thoughts from generation to generation.

Annotation 75

From Dialectics of Nature:

It has already been noted that our simian ancestors were gregarious; it is obviously impossible to seek the derivation of man, the most social of all animals, from non-gregarious immediate ancestors. Mastery over nature began with the development of the hand, with labour, and widened man’s horizon at every new advance. He was continually discovering new, hitherto unknown properties in natural objects. On the other hand, the development of labour necessarily helped to bring the members of society closer together by increasing cases of mutual support and joint activity, and by making clear the advantage of this joint activity to each individual. In short, men in the making arrived at the point where they had something to say to each other. Necessity created the organ; the undeveloped larynx of the ape was slowly but surely transformed by modulation to produce constantly more developed modulation, and the organs of the mouth gradually learned to pronounce one articulate sound after another.

Comparison with animals proves that this explanation of the origin of language from and in the process of labour is the only correct one. The little that even the most highly-developed animals need to communicate to each other does not require articulate speech. In its natural state, no animal feels handicapped by its inability to speak or to understand human speech. It is quite different when it has been tamed by man. The dog and the horse, by association with man, have developed such a good ear for articulate speech that they easily learn to understand any language within their range of concept. Moreover they have acquired the capacity for feelings such as affection for man, gratitude, etc., which were previously foreign to them. Anyone who has had much to do with such animals will hardly be able to escape the conviction that in many cases they now feel their inability to speak as a defect, although, unfortunately, it is one that can no longer be remedied because their vocal organs are too specialised in a definite direction. However, where vocal organs exist, within certain limits even this inability disappears. The buccal organs of birds are as different from those of man as they can be, yet birds are the only animals that can learn to speak; and it is the bird with the most hideous voice, the parrot, that speaks best of all. Let no one object that the parrot does not understand what it says. It is true that for the sheer pleasure of talking and associating with human beings, the parrot will chatter for hours at a stretch, continually repeating its whole vocabulary. But within the limits of its range of concepts it can also learn to understand what it is saying. Teach a parrot swear words in such a way that it gets an idea of their meaning (one of the great amusements of sailors returning from the tropics); tease it and you will soon discover that it knows how to use its swear words just as correctly as a Berlin costermonger. The same is true of begging for titbits.

First labour, after it and then with it speech — these were the two most essential stimuli under the influence of which the brain of the ape gradually changed into that of man, which, for all its similarity is far larger and more perfect. Hand in inevitably accompanied by a corresponding refinement of the organ of hearing, so the development of the brain as a whole is accompanied by a refinement of hand with the development of the brain went the development of its most immediate instruments — the senses. Just as the gradual development of speech is all the senses. The eagle sees much farther than man, but the human eye discerns considerably more in things than does the eye of the eagle. The dog has a far keener sense of smell than man, but it does not distinguish a hundredth part of the odours that for man are definite signs denoting different things. And the sense of touch, which the ape hardly possesses in its crudest initial form, has been developed only side by side with the development of the human hand itself, through the medium of labour.

So, the most basic, direct and important source that decides the birth and development of language is labor. Language appeared later than labor but always goes with labor. Language and labor were the two main stimulations affecting the brains of the primates which evolved into humans, slowly changing their brains into human brains and transforming animal psychology into human consciousness.

This diagram is based on work from an article titled “Evidence in Hand: Recent Discoveries and the Early Evolution of Human Manual Manipulation[37].”Modern research has discovered strong evidence[38] that the human hand evolved along with tool use, in line with Engels’ analysis in Dialectics of Nature.

Annotation 76

It is also worth noting that, just as human consciousness derived from labor and language and social activity, so too did society itself arise from language and labor, as Engels explained in Dialectics of Nature:

The reaction on labour and speech of the development of the brain and its attendant senses, of the increasing clarity of consciousness, power of abstraction and of conclusion, gave both labour and speech an ever-renewed impulse to further development. This development did not reach its conclusion when man finally became distinct from the ape, but on the whole made further powerful progress, its degree and direction varying among different peoples and at different times, and here and there even being interrupted by local or temporary regression. This further development has been strongly urged forward, on the one hand, and guided along more definite directions, on the other, by a new element which came into play with the appearance of fully-fledged man, namely, society.

In other words, these factors of human’s physical nature and human society have a dialectical relationship with one another. Elements of human nature — in particular labor and language — led to the development of human society, which in turned played a key role in the development of human language and labor.

Human language and human labor mutually develop one another through a dialectical process to develop human nature. Simultaneously, human nature and human society mutually develop one another through a dialectical process.

Elements of human nature — in particular labor and language — led to the development of human society, which in turned played a key role in the development of human language and labor.

b. Nature and Structure of Consciousness

- Nature of Consciousness

Consciousness is the dynamic and creative reflection of the objective world in human brains; it is the subjective image of the objective world. [See discussion of dynamic and creative reflection on p. 68]

The dynamic and creative nature of reflection is expressed in human psycho-physiological activities when we receive, select, process, and save data in our brains. Within the human brain, we are able to collect data from the external material world. Based on this information, our brain is capable of creating new information, and we are able to analyze, interpret, and understand all of this information collectively within our consciousness.

The dynamic and creative nature of reflection is also expressed in several human processes:

  • The creation of ideas, hypotheses, stories, etc.
  • The ability to summarize nature and to comprehend the objective laws of nature.
  • The ability to construct models of ideas and systems of knowledge to guide our activities.

Consciousness is the subjective image of the objective world. Consciousness is defined by the objective world in both Content and Form [see Annotation 150, p. 147]. However, consciousness does not perfectly reflect the objective world. It modifies information through the subjective lenses (thoughts, feelings, aspirations, experiences, knowledge, needs, etc.) of humans. According to Marx and Engels, ideas are simply “sublimates [transformations] of [the human brain’s]... material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises.”[39]

Annotation 77

In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels refer to ideas somewhat poetically as “the phantoms formed in the human brain,” and explains that ideas arise directly from material human life processes [see Annotation 72, p. 68]. Lenin makes it very clear in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism that consciousness is not a mirror image, or exact reproduction of reality, quoting Engels:

The great basic question of all philosophy,” Engels says, “especially of modern philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being,” of “spirit and nature.” Having divided the philosophers into “two great camps” on this basic question, Engels shows that there is “yet another side” to this basic philosophical question, viz., “in what relation do our thoughts about the world surrounding us stand to this world itself? Is our thinking capable of the cognition of the real world? Are we able in our ideas and notions of the real world to produce a correct reflection of reality?” “The overwhelming majority of philosophers give an affirmative answer to this question,” says Engels, “including under this head not only all materialists but also the most consistent idealists.


Of extra importance is Lenin’s footnote to the above passage, regarding what he purports to be Viktor Chernov’s mistranslation of Engels:

Fr. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, etc., 4th Germ. ed., S. 15. Russian translation, Geneva ed., 1905, p. 12–13. Mr. V. Chernov translates the word Spiegelbild literally (a mirror reflection) accusing Plekhanov of presenting the theory of Engels “in a very weakened form” by speaking in Russian simply of a “reflection” instead of a “mirror reflection”. This is mere cavilling. Spiegelbild [mirror reflection] in German is also used simply in the sense of Abbild [reflection, image].

Here, Lenin reaffirms and clarifies Engels’ idea that consciousness is not a perfect, exact duplicate of reality; not a “mirror image.” This, however, does not contradict the fact that we can obtain real knowledge of the real world in our consciousness, and that this knowledge improves over time through practice and observation. Indeed, Lenin’s passage on practice cited first in this annotation directly follows the above passage in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.

See: Natural Source of Consciousness, p. 64, and Annotation 32, 27.

Consciousness is a social phenomenon and has a social nature. Consciousness arose from real life activities. Consciousness is always ruled by natural law and by social law.

Annotation 78

Natural law includes the laws of physics, chemistry, and other natural phenomena which govern the material world. Consciousness itself can never violate natural law as it arises from the natural processes of the natural world.

Social law includes the objective and universal relationships between social phenomena and social processes. Human society was created through labor, and this labor was performed in very specific material relations between humans and the natural world.

Note: social law is a key concept of historical materialism, which is the topic of Part 2 of the textbook from which this entire text has been translated, which we hope to translate in the future.

In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx explains how social existence and social laws govern the consciousness of individuals:

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.


Consciousness is determined by the social communication needs of human beings as well as the material conditions of reality.

Annotation 79

The term material conditions refers to the external environment which humans inhabit. Material conditions include the natural environment, the means of production and the economic base[40] of human society, and other objective externalities and systems which affect human life and society. Note that material conditions don’t refer to physical matter alone, but also include objective social relations and phenomena. In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx argues that “neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, but that on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life.”

Consciousness is dynamic in nature, constantly learning and changing flexibly. Consciousness guides humans to transform the material world to suit our needs.

Annotation 80

Consciousness and material conditions have a dialectical relationship with one other, just as the base of society and the superstructure have a dialectical relationship with one other [see Annotation 29, p. 24]. Consciousness arises from material conditions, though conscious activity can affect material conditions.

As Marx explains in Capital Volume I:

At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realises a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordination is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process demands that, during the whole operation, the workman’s will be steadily in consonance with his purpose.

In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx explains how the development of material conditions eventually leads to conscious activity which will in turn lead to changes in society:

At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or — this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms — with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.

As Marx further explains, material conditions must first be met before such revolutionary social changes can be made through conscious activity:

No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.


- Structure of Consciousness

Consciousness has a very complicated structure, including many factors which have strong relationships with each other. The most basic factors are knowledge, sentiment and willpower.

Annotation 81

As with the concept of reflection (see Annotation 68, p. 65), the analysis of the structure of consciousness which follows is rooted in ideas first proposed by Marx, Engels and Lenin, and later developed through the work of various Soviet psychologists, philosophers, and scientists including Ivan Pavlov, Todor Pavlov, Aleksei Leontiev, Lev Vygotsky, Valentin Voloshinov, and others, and is used as a basis for scientific inquiry and development up to this day. According to Where is Marx in the Work and Thought of Vygotsky? by Lucien Sève (2018), much of this work, such as the groundbreaking work of Lev Vygotsky, has been heavily “de-Marxized,” stripped of all aspects of Marxism and, by extension, dialectical materialism, in translation to English.

Knowledge constitutes the understanding of human beings, and is the result of the cognitive process. Knowledge is the re-created image of perceived objects which takes the form of language. Knowledge is the mode of existence of consciousness and the condition for consciousness to develop.

Annotation 82

Marx and Engels discussed the relationship between language and consciousness extensively in The German Ideology, explaining that language — the form of knowledge which exists in human consciousness — evolved dialectically with and through social activity, and that consciousness also developed along with and through the material processes that gave rise to speech:

From the start the ‘spirit’ is afflicted with the curse of being ‘burdened’ with matter, which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of language. Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness that exists also for other men, and for that reason alone it really exists for me personally as well; language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men.”So, language, physical speech organs, and human society all developed in dialectic relations with one another. Since language is the form of knowledge in human consciousness, this means that knowledge arose directly from these dialectical processes:

Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all. Consciousness is at first, of course, merely consciousness concerning the immediate sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with other persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious.

The fact that knowledge has a language-form in human consciousness is also important to understand because it shows that consciousness arose dialectically as, and through, social activity, and indeed, language and social activity gave rise to consciousness as a replacement for animal instinct in our relations with nature.

Man’s consciousness of the necessity of associating with the individuals around him is the beginning of the consciousness that he is living in society at all. This beginning is as animal as social life itself at this stage. It is mere herd-consciousness, and at this point man is only distinguished from sheep by the fact that with him consciousness takes the place of instinct or that his instinct is a conscious one.

And, as language and social activity dialectically developed through one another, human society became complex enough to give rise to human societies and human economies:

This sheep-like or tribal consciousness receives its further development and extension through increased productivity, the increase of needs, and, what is fundamental to both of these, the increase of population. With these there develops the division of labour…


Knowledge can be separated into two broad categories: knowledge of nature, and knowledge of human society. Each of these categories of knowledge reflects its corresponding entity in the external world.

Annotation 83

Each category of knowledge reflects a corresponding entity in the external world.

It’s also important to note that human society and nature have a dialectical relationship with each other and mutually impact one another, and, by extension, knowledge of nature and knowledge of human society also dialectically influence one another. So these categories of knowledge are not isolated from one another but rather dynamically shape and influence each other continuously through time.

Based on levels of cognitive development, we can also classify knowledge into categories of: daily life knowledge and scientific knowledge, experience knowledge and theory knowledge, emotional knowledge and rational knowledge.

Annotation 84

The following information is from the Marxism-Leninism Textbook of Students Who Specialize in Marxism-Leninism, released by Vietnam’s Ministry of Education and Training:

Daily Life and Scientific Knowledge

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-17.png

Daily Life Knowledge is the knowledge we acquire in our daily lives to deal with our daily tasks. From our interactions with nature and human society, we cultivate life experience and our understanding of every aspect of our daily lives in relation to human society and nature.

Scientific Knowledge arises from Daily Life Knowledge: as our daily lives become more complex, we develop a need to understand the material world and human society more deeply and comprehensively. Scientific Knowledge is thus a developed system of knowledge of nature and human society. Scientific Knowledge can be tested and can be applied to human life and activity in useful ways.

Experience and Theory Knowledge:

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-18.png

Experience Knowledge is cultivated from direct observation of nature and human society. This kind of knowledge is extremely diverse, and we can apply this kind of knowledge to guide our daily activities.

Theory Knowledge arises from Experience Knowledge. Theory Knowledge is composed of abstract generalizations of Experience Knowledge. Theory Knowledge is more profound, accurate, and systematically organized than Experience Knowledge and gives us an understanding of the laws and dynamics of nature and human society.

Emotional and Rational Knowledge:

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-19.png

Less Developed More Developed

Emotional Knowledge is the earlier stage of cognitive processing. Emotional Knowledge comes directly to us from our human senses. We obtain emotional knowledge when we use our human senses to directly learn things about nature and human society. Emotional Knowledge is usually manifested as immediate cognitive responses such as pleasure, pain, and other such impulses.

Rational Knowledge arises from Emotional Knowledge. It is a higher stage of cognitive processing, involving abstract thought and generalization of emotional knowledge.

Rational Knowledge is usually manifested as definitions, conjectures, judgments, etc.

See also: Principle of Development, p. 119; Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism, p. 204.

Sentiment is the resonant manifestation of human emotions and feelings in our relationships. Sentiment is a special form of reality reflection [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. Whenever reality impacts human beings, we feel specific sensations and emotional reactions to those impacts. Over time, these specific sensations and emotions combine and dialectically develop into generalized human feelings, and we call these generalized feelings sentiment. Sentiment expresses and develops in every aspect of human life; it is a factor that improves and promotes cognitive and practical activities.

Annotation 85

As Marx explains in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844: “Man as an objective, sensuous being is therefore a suffering being — and because he feels that he suffers, a passionate being. Passion is the essential power of man energetically bent on its object.” Marx further elaborates that sentimental emotion is essential to human nature: “The domination of the objective essence within me, the sensuous eruption of my essential activity, is emotion which thereby becomes the activity of my nature.”

Depending on the subjects that are perceived, as well as our human emotions about them, sentiments can be manifested in many different forms such as: moral emotion, aesthetic emotion, religious emotion, etc.

Annotation 86

Moral Emotion is the basic manifestation of moral consciousness at an emotional level. For example: when we see people helping other people, we have positive emotional responses, yet when we see people harming other people, we have negative emotional responses. (Source: Nguyen Thi Khuyen of the National Institute of Administration of Vietnam)

Aesthetic Emotion refers to the the resonant feelings which arise from our interaction with beauty, sadness, comedy, etc., in life and in art. For example: when humans encounter beauty, we feel positive emotional responses. When humans encounter ugliness, we feel negative emotional responses. When we witness pain, we feel sympathetic feelings of pain and a desire to help. When we witness comedy, we feel humorous emotions ourselves. (Source: Textbook of General Aesthetic Studies from the Ministry of

Education and Training of Vietnam)

Religious Emotion is the human belief in supernatural or spiritual forces which can’t be tested or proved through material practice or observation. However, belief in these forces can give human beings emotional responses such as hope, love, etc. (Source: Pham Van Chuc, Doctor of Philosophy, Central Theoretical Council of the Communist Party of Vietnam)

These are just a few illustrative examples; there are many other ways in which human emotion and sentiment can manifest.

Willpower is the manifestation of one’s own strength used to overcome obstacles in the process of achieving goals. Willpower is a dynamic aspect of consciousness, a manifestation of human consciousness in the material world.

Annotation 87

An unnamed poem by Ho Chi Minh, written in 1950 for the Revolutionary Youth Pioneers, addresses the phenomenon of willpower:

Nothing in this world must be difficult

The only thing that we should fear is having a waivering heart

We can dig up mountains and fill the sea

Once we’ve willfully made a firm decision

Today, this poem serves as the lyrics for anthem of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union (formerly the Revolutionary Youth Pioneers).

Willpower arises from human self-awareness and awareness of the purposes of our actions. Through this awareness and through willpower, we are able to struggle against ourselves and externalities to successfully achieve our goals. We can consider willpower to be the power of conscious human activity; willpower controls and regulates human behaviors in order to allow humans to move towards our goals voluntarily; willpower also allows humans to exercise self-restraint and self-control, and to be assertive in our actions according to our views and beliefs.

Annotation 88

In Dialectics of Nature, Engels explains how willpower developed in human beings as we separated from animals through the development of consciousness: “The further removed men are from animals, however, the more their effect on nature assumes the character of premeditated, planned action directed towards definite preconceived ends.”

In Capital Volume I, Marx explains how willpower uniquely allows humans to consciously change our own material conditions to suit our needs according to pre-conceived plans:

Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material re-actions between himself and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature’s productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway. We are not now dealing with those primitive instinctive forms of labour that remind us of the mere animal. An immeasurable interval of time separates the state of things in which a man brings his labour-power to market for sale as a commodity, from that state in which human labour was still in its first instinctive stage. We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realises a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordination is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process demands that, during the whole operation, the workman’s will be steadily in consonance with his purpose. This means close attention. The less he is attracted by the nature of the work, and the mode in which it is carried on, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as something which gives play to his bodily and mental powers, the more close his attention is forced to be.


The true value of willpower is not only manifested in strength or weakness, but is also expressed in the content and meaning of the goals that we try to achieve through our willpower. Lenin believed that willpower is one of the factors that will create revolutionary careers for millions of people in the fierce class struggles to liberate ourselves and mankind.

Annotation 89

In “Left-Wing” Communism: an Infantile Disorder, Lenin explains how revolutions are born from the collective willpower of thousands of people:

History as a whole, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more multiform, more lively and ingenious than is imagined by even the best parties, the most class-conscious vanguards of the most advanced classes. This can readily be understood, because even the finest of vanguards express the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagination of tens of thousands, whereas at moments of great upsurge and the exertion of all human capacities, revolutions are made by the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagination of tens of millions, spurred on by a most acute struggle of classes. Two very important practical conclusions follow from this: first, that in order to accomplish its task the revolutionary class must be able to master all forms or aspects of social activity without exception (completing after the capture of political power — sometimes at great risk and with very great danger — what it did not complete before the capture of power); second, that the revolutionary class must be prepared for the most rapid and brusque replacement of one form by another.


All of these factors [knowledge, sentiment, and willpower] which, together, create consciousness, have dialectical relationships with each other. Of these factors, knowledge is the most important, because it is the mode of existence of consciousness, and also the factor which guides the development of all the other factors, and it also determines how the other factors manifest.

3. The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness

The relationship between matter and consciousness is dialectical. In this relationship, matter comes first, and matter is the source of consciousness; it decides consciousness. However, consciousness is not totally passive, it can impact back to matter through the practical activities of human beings.

Annotation 90

Engels explained in Dialectics of Nature that “matter evolves out of itself the thinking human brain,” which means that matter must necessarily come prior to consciousness.

As Marx explains in Capital Volume I, matter determines conscious activity:

The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. – real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.

However, it’s important to remember that the relationship between matter and consciousness is dialectical, and that conscious activity — through the combination of willpower and labor — can also impact the material world; social change arises through the combined willpower of many human beings. See: Annotation 80, p. 81.

a. The Role of Matter in Consciousness

Dialectical Materialism affirms that:

• Matter is the first existence, and that consciousness comes after.

• Matter is the source of consciousness, it decides consciousness.

We know that matter determines consciousness because consciousness is the product of the high-level-structured matter such as the human brain. Consciousness itself can only exist after the development of the material structure of the human brain. Humans are the result of millions of years of development of the material world. We are, therefore, products of the material world. This conclusion has been firmly established through the development of natural science, which has given us great insight into the long history of the Earth and of the evolution of living organisms, including human beings.

All of this scientific evidence stands as the basis for the viewpoint: matter comes first, consciousness comes after [see Annotation 114, p. 116].

We have already discussed the factors which constitute the natural and social sources of consciousness:

• Human brains

• Impacts of the material world on human brains that cause reflections

• Labor

• Language

[See Annotation 72, p. 68 and Annotation 73, p. 75]

All of these factors also assert that matter is the origin of consciousness.

Annotation 91

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-20.png

The material basis of consciousness is rooted in the following phenomena:

    1. The material structure of the human brain.

    1. Impacts from the material world cause reflections in human consciousness.

    1. Human Labor — physical process which dialectically develops consciousness.

    1. Human Speech — physical process which dialectically develops consciousness.

    1. Evolution of human brains and consciousness through material processes of the material world.

For more information, see: Nature and Structure of Consciousness.

Consciousness is composed of reflections and subjective images of the material world, therefore the content of consciousness is decided by matter [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. The development of consciousness is determined by natural laws and by social laws[41] as well as the material environment which we inhabit. All of these factors which determine consciousness are material in nature. Therefore, matter determines not only the content but also the development of consciousness.

b. The Role of Consciousness in Matter

In relation to matter, consciousness can impact matter through human activities.

When we discuss consciousness we are discussing human consciousness. So, when we talk about the role of consciousness, we are talking about the role of human beings. Consciousness in and of itself cannot directly change anything in reality. In order to change reality, humans have to implement material activities. However, consciousness controls every human activity, so even though consciousness does not directly create or change the material world, it equips humans with knowledge about objective reality, and based on that foundation of knowledge, humans are able to identify goals, set directions, develop plans, and select methods, solutions, tools, and means to achieve our goals. So, consciousness manifests its ability to impact matter through human activities.

The impact of consciousness on matter can have positive or negative results.

Annotation 92

“Positive” and “negative,” in this context, are subjective and relative terms which simply denote “moving towards a goal” and “moving away from a goal,” based on a specific perspective.

From the perspective of revolutionary communism, “positive” can be taken as moving towards the end goal of the liberation of the working class from capitalist oppression and the construction of a stateless, classless society. Likewise, “negative” can be taken as moving away from that goal. See: Annotation 114, p. 116.

Humans have the ability to overcome all challenges in the process of achieving our goals and improving our world, so long as our conscious activities meet the following criteria:

  • We must perceive reality accurately.
  • We must properly apply scientific knowledge, revolutionary sentiments, and directed willpower.
  • We must avoid contradicting objective laws of nature and society.

Successfully achieving our goals and improving the world in this manner constitutes the positive outcome of human consciousness.

On the contrary, if human consciousness wrongly reflects objective reality, nature, and laws, then, right from the beginning, our actions will have negative results which will do harm to ourselves and our society.

Therefore, by directing the activities of humans, consciousness can determine whether the results of human activities are beneficial or harmful. Our consciousness thus determines whether our activities will succeed or fail and whether our efforts will be effective or ineffective.

By studying the matter, origin, and nature of consciousness, as well as the relationships between matter and consciousness, we can see that:

  • Matter is the source of consciousness [42].
  • Matter determines the content and creative capacity of consciousness [43].
  • Matter is the prerequisite to form consciousness [44].
  • Consciousness only has the ability to impact matter, and this impact is indirect, because it has to be done through human material activities within material reality [45].

Matter determines consciousness while consciousness impacts matter indirectly through human activity.

The strength with which consciousness can impact the material world depends on:

  • The accuracy of reflection of the material world in consciousness [46].
  • Strength of willpower which transmits consciousness to human activity [47].
  • The degree of organization of social activity [48].
  • Material conditions in which human activity occurs [49].

Annotation 93

The importance of organization in determining the outcomes of human social activity is one of the most important concepts of Marxism-Leninism and is discussed frequently by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and nearly every other important communist revolutionary in history. Marx explains the connections between social organization and conscious human activity in Capital Volume I [see Annotation 80, p. 81].

4. Meaning of the methodology

Dialectical Materialism builds the most basic and common methodological[50] principles for human cognitive and practical activities on the following bases:

  • The viewpoint of the material nature of the world [matter comes first, consciousness comes after].
  • The dynamic and creative nature of consciousness [51].
  • The dialectical relationship between matter and consciousness [52].

All cognitive and practical activities of humans originate from material reality and must observe objective natural and social laws, however, our activities are capable of impacting the material world through dynamic and creative conscious activity. [See The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88].

Annotation 94

The above paragraph summarizes an important methodological concept which is critical for undestanding the philosophical framework of Dialectical Materialism. Dialectical Materialism, as a philosophy, synthesizes earlier materialist and idealist positions by recognizing the fact that the material determines consciousness, while consciousness can impact the material world through willful activity.

From this philosophical basis, the methodology of Materialist Dialectics has been developed to provide a deeper understanding of dialectical development, which is rooted in contradiction and negation within and between subjects. Materialist Dialectics is the subject of Chapter 2, p. 98.

According to this methodological principle [i.e., the Principle of the Dialectic Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness], if we hope to succeed in accomplishing our goals in the material world, then we must simultaneously meet two criteria:

1. We must ensure that our knowledge reflects the objective material world as much as possible, respecting the objective natural and social laws of the material world.

2. We must simultaneously recognize the dynamic and creative nature of our conscious activity.

When we say that human activities originate from material reality and must observe objective natural and social laws we' mean that human knowledge must originate from the material world. This means that if we hope to be successful in our activities, we should respect the natural and social laws of the material world.

This means that in our human perception and activities, we must determine goals, and set strategies, policies, and plans which are rooted firmly in objective material reality. Humans have to take objective material reality as the foundation of our activities and plans, and all of our activities must be carried out in the material world. Humans have to examine and understand our material conditions and transform them in ways that will help us to accomplish our goals.

When we talk about impacting the material world through dynamic and creative conscious activity, we mean we must recognize the positive, dynamic, and creative roles of consciousness. We must recognize the role human consciousness plays in dynamically and creatively manifesting our will in the material world through labor. Impacting the material world through conscious activity at a revolutionary scale requires humans to respect and understand the role of scientific knowledge; to study laboriously to master such knowledge; and then to propagate such knowledge so to the masses to develop public knowledge and belief so as to guide the people’s action.

Moreover, we also have to voluntarily study and practice[53] in order to form and improve our revolutionary viewpoint[54] and willpower[55] in order to have both scientific and humanitarian activity guidelines.

To implement this principle [i.e., the Principle of the Dialectic Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness], we have to avoid, fight against, and overcome the diseases of subjectivism[56] and idealism[57] through such errors as:

  • Attempting to impose idealist plans and principles [which are not rooted in material conditions] into reality.
  • Considering fantasy, illusion, and imagination instead of reality.
  • Basing policies and programs on subjective desires.
  • Using sentiment as the starting point for developing policies, strategies, etc.

On the other hand, in cognitive and practical activities, we also have to fight against empiricism[58], which disregards scientific knowledge and theories, and which is also very conservative, stagnant and passive.

Annotation 95

Process of Developing Revolutionary Public Knowledge

Developing revolutionary public knowledge must be preceded by mastery of knowledge and a firm grounding in the role and nature of knowledge.

In Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Engels makes a scathing critique of idealist socialist revolutionary thought, writing:

To all these [idealist socialists], Socialism is the expression of absolute truth[59], reason and justice, and has only to be discovered to conquer all the world by virtue of its own power. And as an absolute truth is independent of time, space, and of the historical development of man, it is a mere accident when and where it is discovered. With all this, absolute truth, reason, and justice are different with the founder of each different school. And as each one’s special kind of absolute truth, reason, and justice is again conditioned by his subjective understanding, his conditions of existence, the measure of his knowledge and his intellectual training, there is no other ending possible in this conflict of absolute truths than that they shall be mutually exclusive of one another.


Here, Engels points out the absurdity of the idea that some abstract, purely ideal “truth” could liberate workers in the material world. Engels continues on, explaining how such idealist socialism could never lead to meaningful revolutionary change:

Hence, from this nothing could come but a kind of eclectic, average Socialism, which, as a matter of fact, has up to the present time dominated the minds of most of the socialist workers in France and England. Hence, a mish-mash allowing of the most manifold shades of opinion: a mish-mash of such critical statements, economic theories, pictures of future society by the founders of different sects, as excite a minimum of opposition; a mish-mash which is the more easily brewed the more definite sharp edges of the individual constituents are rubbed down in the stream of debate, like rounded pebbles in a brook.

In other words, idealist revolutionary movements only tend to result in endless debate and meaningless theories which are divorced from objective reality and material conditions. Such theories and idealist constructions do not lead to effective action in the real world. Socialism must become real (i.e., based in objective material conditions and praxis[60] in the real world) to affect change in the material world, as Engels explains elsewhere in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific [see Annotation 17, p. 18].

In Critique of the Gotha Program, Marx lays out an excellent case study of the failings of incoherent, idealist socialism. He begins by quoting the Gotha Program, which was an ideological program which the German Workers Party hoped to implement. In this text, Marx cites the Gotha Program line by line and offers his materialist critique of the idealist principles presented. In the following passage, Marx refutes some key errors caused by idealism and offers materialist correction:

Labor is not the source of all wealth. Nature is just as much the source of use values (and it is surely of such that material wealth consists!) as labor, which itself is only the manifestation of a force of nature, human labor power... But a socialist program cannot allow such bourgeois phrases to pass over in silence the conditions that lone give them meaning. And insofar as man from the beginning behaves toward nature, the primary source of all instruments and subjects of labor, as an owner, treats her as belonging to him, his labor becomes the source of use values, therefore also of wealth. The bourgeois have very good grounds for falsely ascribing supernatural creative power to labor; since precisely from the fact that labor depends on nature it follows that the man who possesses no other property than his labor power must, in all conditions of society and culture, be the slave of other men who have made themselves the owners of the material conditions of labor. He can only work with their permission, hence live only with their permission.

Here, Marx points out the importance of having a firm understanding of the material reality of labor and its relation to the material, natural world. Marx points out that the idea that labor, alone, is the source of all wealth is an idealist notion of the bourgeoisie, a false consciousness [see Annotation 235, p. 231] which prevents proper material analysis and props up the capitalist viewpoint. A failure to grasp the truth of the material basis of reality weakens the socialist position, and any movement built on such weak idealist foundations will lead to failure in trying to bring about revolutionary change.

We have already discussed the shortcomings of empiricism in Annotation 10, p. 10, but it might be helpful to see another case study, this time from Engels, pointing out the flaws of empiricist analysis in his text Anti-Dühring. Engels begins by quoting the empiricist Eugen Dühring, who wrote:

Philosophy is the development of the highest form of consciousness of the world and of life, and in a wider sense embraces the principles of all knowledge and volition. Wherever a series of cognitions or stimuli or a group of forms of being come to be examined by human consciousness, the principles underlying these manifestations of necessity become an object of philosophy. These principles are the simple, or until now assumed to be simple, constituents of manifold knowledge and volition. Like the chemical composition of bodies, the general constitution of things can be reduced to basic forms and basic elements. These ultimate constituents or principles, once they have been discovered, are valid not only for what is immediately known and accessible, but also for the world which is unknown and inaccessible to us. Philosophical principles consequently provide the final supplement required by the sciences in order to become a uniform system by which nature and human life can be explained. Apart from the fundamental forms of all existence, philosophy has only two specific subjects of investigation — nature and the world of man. Accordingly, our material arranges itself quite naturally into three groups, namely, the general scheme of the universe, the science of the principles of nature, and finally the science of mankind. This succession at the same time contains an inner logical sequence, for the formal principles which are valid for all being take precedence, and the realms of the objects to which they are to be applied then follow in the degree of their subordination.

Engels then proceeds to critique this empiricist worldview, showing that it does not properly reflect the material world and amounts to idealism in its own right:

What [Dühring] is dealing with are therefore principles, formal tenets derived from thought and not from the external world, which are to be applied to nature and the realm of man, and to which therefore nature and man have to conform. But whence does thought obtain these principles? From itself?

No, for Herr Dühring himself says: the realm of pure thought is limited to logical schemata and mathematical forms (the latter, moreover, as we shall see, is wrong). Logical schemata can only relate to forms of thought; but what we are dealing with here is solely forms of being, of the external world, and these forms can never be created and derived by thought out of itself, but only from the external world. But with this the whole relationship is inverted: the principles are not the starting-point of the investigation, but its final result; they are not applied to nature and human history, but abstracted from them, it is not nature and the realm of man which conform to these principles, but the principles are only valid in so far as they are in conformity with nature and history. That is the only materialist conception of the matter, and Herr Dühring’s contrary conception is idealistic, makes things stand completely on their heads, and fashions the real world out of ideas, out of schemata, schemes or categories existing somewhere before the world, from eternity — just like a Hegel.

Lenin also heavily criticized empiricism in his work Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, which we discuss at length in Annotation 32, p. 27.

Chapter 2: Materialist Dialectics

Materialist dialectics is one of the basic theoretical parts that form the worldview and philosophical methodology of Marxism-Leninism. It is the “science of common relations” and also the “science of common rules of motion and development of nature, society, and human thoughts... Dialectics, as understood by Marx, and also in conformity with Hegel, includes what is now called the theory of knowledge, or epistemology.”[61]

[Note: Epistemology is the theoretical study of knowledge; for more information see Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism, p. 204.]

I. Dialectics and Materialist Dialectics

1. Dialectics and Basic Forms of Dialectics

a. Definitions of Dialectics and the Subjective Dialectic

In Marxism-Leninism, the term dialectic refers to regular relationships, interactions, transformations, motions, and developments of things, phenomena, and processes in nature, society and human thought.[62]

There are two forms of dialectic: the objective dialectic and the subjective dialectic. The objective dialectic is the dialectic of the material world, while the subjective dialectic is the reflection of objective dialectic in human consciousness. [See Annotation 68, p. 65].

According to Engels, “Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevail throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics (dialectical thought), is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature.”[63]

Annotation 96

Dialectics is an umbrella term which includes both forms of dialectical systems: subjective and objective dialectics.

Objective dialectics are the dialectical processes which occur in the material world, including all motion, relationships, and dynamic changes which occur in space and time.

Subjective dialectics, or dialectical thought, is a system of analysis and organized thinking which aims to reflect the objective dialectics of the material world within human consciousness. Dialectical thinking has two component forms: dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics [see Annotation 49, p. 45].

Subjective dialectics is the theory that studies and summarises the [objective] dialectic of nature into a system with scientific principles and rules, in order to build a system of methodological principles of perception and practice. Dialectics is opposed to metaphysics — a system of thought which conceives of things and phenomena in the world in an isolated and unchanging state [See Annotation 8, p. 8].

b. Basic Forms of Dialectics

Dialectics has developed into three basic forms and levels: ancient primitive dialectics, German idealist dialectics, and the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism.

Ancient primitive dialectics is the earliest form of dialectics. It has developed independently in many philosophical systems in ancient China, India and Greece.

Chinese philosophy has two major forms of ancient primitive dialectics:

  • “Changing Theory” (a theory of common principles and rules pertaining to the changes in the universe)
  • The “Five Elements Theory” (a theory of the principles of mutual impact and transformation of the five elements of the universe) of the School of Yin-Yang. [See: Primitive Materialism, p. 52]

In Indian philosophy, Buddhist philosophy is a quintessential [see Annotation 6, p. 8] form of ancient primitive dialectics, which includes such concepts as “selflessness,” “impermanence,” and “predestination.”

An ancient, primitive form of dialectics also developed in Ancient Greek philosophy.

Friedrich Engels wrote: “The old Greek philosophers were all born natural dialecticians, and Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic of them, had already analyzed the most essential forms of dialectic thought… This primitive, naive, but intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus: everything is and is not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away.”[64]

Engels also wrote of Greek dialectics: “Here, dialectical thought still appears in its pristine simplicity, as yet undisturbed by the charming obstacles which the metaphysicists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries — Bacon and Locke in England, Wolff in Germany — put in its own way... Among the Greeks — just because they were not yet advanced enough to dissect and analyse nature — nature is still viewed as a whole, in general. The universal connection of natural phenomena is not proved in regard to particular; to the Greeks it is the result of direct contemplation.”[65]

Annotation 97

Engels, here, is explaining how the ancient Greek dialecticians were correct to view nature as a cohesive system, a “whole, in general,” which they determined through direct observation of the natural world. The major shortcoming of this ancient Greek form of dialectics was a lack of inquiry into the specific processes and principles of nature. Engels laments that seventeenth and eighteenth century metaphysicists took us backwards by disregarding this view of nature as a cohesive, general whole.

Ancient, primitive dialectics had an accurate awareness of the dialectical characteristic of the world but with its primitive and naive perspective, it still lacked evidence-based forms of natural scientific achievements.

Jumping forward to the late 16th century, natural sciences started developing rapidly in Europe. Scientists began deeply analysing and studying specific factors and phenomena of nature which led to the birth of modern European metaphysical analysis. In the 18th century, metaphysics became the dominant methodology in philosophical thought and scientific study. However, when natural scientists moved from studying each subject separately to studying the unification of all those subjects in their relationships, the metaphysical method proved insufficient. Thus, European scientists and philosophers had to transition into a more advanced system of thought: dialectical thought.

The classical German idealist dialectics were founded by Kant and completed by Hegel. According to Engels: “The second form of dialectics, which is the form that comes closest to the German naturalists [natural scientists], is classical German philosophy, from Kant to Hegel.”[66]

Annotation 98

Engels discusses this history, and the shortcomings of the metaphysical philosophy of his era, in The Old Preface to Anti-Dühring. First, Engels explains why early modern natural scientists initially did not feel constrained by their adherence to metaphysics, since inquiries in the initial revolution of scientific study were limited to the narrow development of specific fields of inquiry by necessity:

Empirical natural science has accumulated such a tremendous mass of positive material for knowledge that the necessity of classifying it in each separate field of investigation systematically and in accordance with its inner inter-connection has become absolutely imperative.

Engels goes on to explain that at the time he was writing, enough knowledge had been accumulated within specific, distinct fields that it becomes necessary to begin studying the connections and overlaps between different fields, which called for theoretical and philosophical foundations:

It is becoming equally imperative to bring the individual spheres of knowledge into the correct connection with one another. In doing so, however, natural science enters the field of theory and here the methods of empiricism will not work, here only theoretical thinking can be of assistance.

Unfortunately, natural scientists were held back by the existing metaphysical theoretical foundations which were dominant at the time as, according to Engels, “theoretical thinking is an innate quality only as regards natural capacity. This natural capacity must be developed, improved, and for its improvement there is as yet no other means than the study of previous philosophy.”

Metaphysical theory and formal logic were in common use by natural scientists at the time. As Engels explained in On Dialectics and Dialectics of Nature, metaphysics and formal logic could never be as useful as dialectical analysis for examining and unifying concepts from wide-ranging dynamic systems of overlapping fields of inquiry.

Unfortunately, dialectics had not yet been suitably developed for use in the natural sciences before the work of Marx and Engels in developing dialectical materialism, as Engels explained in On Dialectics:

Formal logic itself has been the arena of violent controversy from the time of Aristotle to the present day. And dialectics has so far been fairly closely investigated by only two thinkers, Aristotle and Hegel. But it is precisely dialectics that constitutes the most important form of thinking for present-day natural science, for it alone offers the analogue for, and thereby the method of explaining, the evolutionary processes occurring in nature, inter-connections in general, and transitions from one field of investigation to another.

The Idealist Dialectics of Hegel [see Annotation 9, p. 10] constituted a major development of dialectics, but the idealist nature of Hegelian dialectics made them unsuitable for natural scientists, who therefore discarded “Old-Hegelian” dialectics and were thus left without a suitable dialectical framework. Again, from On Dialectics:

The year 1848, which otherwise brought nothing to a conclusion in Germany, accomplished a complete revolution there only in the sphere of philosophy [and] the nation resolutely turned its back on classical German philosophy that had lost itself in the sands of Berlin old-Hegelianism... But a nation that wants to climb the pinnacles of science cannot possibly manage without theoretical thought. Not only Hegelianism but dialectics too was thrown overboard — and that just at the moment when the dialectical character of natural processes irresistibly forced itself upon the mind, when therefore only dialectics could be of assistance to natural science in negotiating the mountain of theory — and so there was a helpless relapse into the old metaphysics.

Engels goes on to explain that, having rejected Hegel’s dialectics, natural scientists were set adrift, cobbling together theoretical frameworks from the works of philosophers which were plagued by idealism and metaphysics, and which were therefore not suitable for the task of unifying the disparate fields of natural sciences together:

What prevailed among the public since then were, on the one hand, the vapid reflections of Schopenhauer, which were fashioned to fit the philistines, and later even those of Hartmann; and, on the other hand, the vulgar itinerant-preacher materialism of a Vogt and a Büchner. At the universities the most diverse varieties of eclecticism competed with one another and had only one thing in common, namely, that they were concocted from nothing but remnants of old philosophies and were all equally metaphysical. All that was saved from the remnants of classical philosophy was a certain neo-Kantianism, whose last word was the eternally unknowable thing-in-itself, that is, the bit of Kant [see Annotation 72, p. 68] that least merited preservation. The final result was the incoherence and confusion of theoretical thought now prevalent.

Engels explains that this lack of a proper dialectical materialist framework had frustrated natural scientists of his era:

One can scarcely pick up a theoretical book on natural science without getting the impression that natural scientists themselves feel how much they are dominated by this incoherence and confusion, and that the so-called philosophy now current offers them absolutely no way out. And here there really is no other way out, no possibility of achieving clarity, than by a return, in one form or another, from metaphysical to dialectical thinking.

After explaining that Hegel’s system of dialectics came closest to meeting the needs of contemporary science, Engels explains why Hegelian dialectics were ultimately rejected by the scientific community:

Just as little can it be a question of maintaining the dogmatic content of the Hegelian system as it was preached by the Berlin Hegelians of the older and younger line. Hence, with the fall of the idealist point of departure, the system built upon it, in particular Hegelian philosophy of nature, also falls. It must however be recalled that the natural scientists’ polemic against Hegel, in so far as they at all correctly understood him, was directed solely against these two points: viz., the idealist point of departure and the arbitrary, fact-defying construction of the system.”

In other words, it was the idealism and the unworkable structuring of Hegelian dialectics that prevented its adoption by natural scientists. Engels finally explains how Marx was able to modify Hegel’s idealist dialectics into a materialist form which is suitable for empirical scientific inquiry:

It is the merit of Marx that... he was the first to have brought to the fore again the forgotten dialectical method, its connection with Hegelian dialectics and its distinction from the latter, and at the same time to have applied this method in Capital to the facts of an empirical science, political economy.


These Classical German philosophers [Kant, Hegel, etc.[67]] systematically organized idealist dialectics into formal philosophies. Of particular note was Hegel’s belief that the dialectical process would eventually lead to an “absolute idea.” This foundational belief in an “absolute idea” is what chiefly defines Hegelian dialectics as idealist in nature [see Annotation 98, p. 100].

Hegel believed that the subjective dialectic is the basis of the objective dialectic. [In other words, Hegel believed that dialectical thought served as the objective dialectics of the material world.]

According to Hegel, the “absolute idea” was the starting point of all existence, and that this “absolute idea,” after creating the natural world, then came to exist within human consciousness.

Engels wrote that in Hegelian dialectics: “... spirit, mind, the idea, is primary and that the real world is only a copy of the idea.”[68]

Annotation 99

In the above quoted passage, Engels was explaining why Hegelian dialectics were unsuitable for use in natural sciences. Here is a longer excerpt:

First of all it must be established that here it is not at all a question of defending Hegel’s point of departure: that spirit, mind, the idea, is primary and that the real world is only a copy of the idea... We all agree that in every field of science, in natural as in historical science, one must proceed from the given facts, in natural science therefore from the various material forms and the various forms of motion of matter; that therefore in theoretical natural science, too, the inter-connections are not to be built into the facts, but to be discovered in them, and when discovered to be verified as far as possible by experiment.

The German idealists (most notably Hegel) built an idealist system of dialectics organized into categories and common laws along with a strict logic of consciousness.

Lenin stated that: “Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts.”[69]

Annotation 100

What Lenin means, here, is that Hegel inadvertently and unconsciously discovered the concept of reflection [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. Hegel intuitively understood that the material world was reflected in human consciousness, and, by extension, subjective dialectics (dialectical thought) reflected objective dialectics (of the material world). Hegel’s error was an inversion of the ideal and the material. As Marx later pointed out in the Afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital Volume I, it is the material which precedes the ideal, and not the other way around:

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of ‘the Idea,’ he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos [craftsman/artisan/creator] of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea.’ With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.

Engels also quoted and emphasized Marx’s thoughts [in the Old Preface to Anti-Dühring, citing another quote of Marx from the Afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital Volume I, further quoted in Annotation 100 above]: “The mystification which dialectics suffers in Hegel’s hands by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.”[70]


Annotation 101

In the Old Preface to Anti-Dühring, Engels explains some of the contemporary currents of science and philosophy of his era. Engels explains that Hegelian philosophy had been dismissed by a newer current of natural scientists who dismissed “the idealist point of departure and the arbitrary, fact-defying construction of the system.” In other words, the natural scientists rejected Hegelianism because it was both idealist and was not built on a foundation of objective facts.

Engels points out, however, that Marx “was the first to have brought to the fore again the forgotten dialectical method” of Hegel.

The dialectical method was forgotten in the sense that the natural scientists ignored and dismissed dialectics along with the rest of Hegel’s philosophy. So, Engels is pointing out that one of the great contributions of Marx was salvaging the dialectical method from Hegel while rejecting the idealist and non-fact-based characteristics of Hegelian philosophy.

Marx, according to Engels, proved that the dialectical method could be separated from idealism by “[applying the dialectical method] in Capital to the facts of an empirical science, political economy.” This was the origin of dialectical materialism: the resurrection of the dialectical method and the development of a dialectical method in a materialist and scientific form.

The idealist characteristics of classical German dialectics and Hegelian philosophy was a limitation that needed to be overcome [so that it could be utilized for scientific inquiry]. Marx and Engels overcame that limitation and in so doing developed materialist dialectics. This system of dialectics is the most advanced form of dialectics in the history of philosophy to date. It is the successor of previous systems of dialectics, and it arose as a critique of the classical German dialectics.

Engels said: “Marx and I were pretty well the only people to rescue conscious dialectics from German idealist philosophy and apply it in the materialist conception of nature and history.”[71]

2. Materialist Dialectics

a. Definition of Materialist Dialectics

Materialist dialectics have been defined in various ways by many prominent Marxist-Leninist philosophers.

Engels defined materialist dialectics as: “nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society, and thought.”[72]

Engels also emphasized the role of the principle of general relations.[73] As John Burdon

Sanderson Haldane noted in the 1939 preface to Dialectics of Nature: “In dialectics they

[Marx and Engels] saw the science of the general laws of change.”[74]

Lenin emphasized the important role of the principles of development[75] (including the theory of cognitive development) in the dialectics that Marx inherited from Hegelian philosophy.

Lenin wrote: “The main achievement was dialectics, i.e., the doctrine of development in its fullest, deepest, and most comprehensive form, the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge that provides us with a reflection of eternally developing matter.”[76]

b. Basic Features and Roles of Materialist Dialectics

There are two basic features of the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism:

First, the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism is a system of dialectics that is based on the foundation of the scientific materialist viewpoint.

Annotation 102

Remember that scientific in Marxism-Leninism refers broadly to a systematic pursuit of knowledge, research, theory, and understanding [see Objects and Purposes of Study, p. 38]. Remember also that materialism in Marxism-Leninism has specific meaning as well, which differentiates it from other forms of materialism [see Dialectical Materialism — the Most Advanced Form of Materialism, p. 52]. Here, materialism includes an understanding that the material is the first basis of reality, meaning that the material determines the ideal (though human consciousness can impact the material world through willpower and labor [see Nature and Structure of Consciousness, p. 79]). Materialism is also built upon scientific explanations (rooted in empirical data and practice, i.e. systematic experimentation and observation) of the world. And finally, remember that viewpoint is the starting point of inquiry [see Annotation 11, p. 12].

Thus, a scientific materialist viewpoint is a perspective which begins analysis of the world in a manner that is both scientifically systematic in pursuit of understanding and firmly rooted in a materialist conception of the world.

Note: Materialist Dialectics contains Twelve Basic Pairs of Categories, Two Basic Principles and Three Universal Laws. These are summarized, respectively, in Appendix A (p. 246), Appendix B (p. 247), and Appendix C (p. 248), and explained in depth throughout the rest of this chapter.

In this way, materialist dialectics fundamentally differs from the classical German idealist dialectics, and especially differs from Hegelian dialectics[77] (as these dialectics were founded on idealist viewpoints).

Moreover, it also has a higher level of development compared to other dialectical systems of thought found in the history of philosophy going back to ancient times. Such previous forms of dialectics were fundamentally based on materialist stances, however the materialism of those ancient times was still naive, primitive and surface-level.

Second, the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism unifies dialectical materialist viewpoints and materialist dialectical methodology, so it not only explains the world, but is also a tool humans can use to perceive and improve the world.

Every principle and law of Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics is both:

1. An accurate explanation of the dialectical characteristics of the world.

2. A scientific methodology for perceiving and improving the world.

By summarizing the general interconnections and development of all things — every phenomenon in nature, society and human thought — Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics provides the most general methodological principles for the process of perceiving and improving the world. They are not just objective methodological principles; they are a comprehensive, constantly developing, and historical methodology.

This methodology can be used to analyze contradictions [see Annotation 119, p. 123] in order to find the basic origins and motivations of both motion and developmental processes. Therefore, materialist dialectics is a great scientific tool for the revolutionary class to perceive and improve the world.

With these basic features, materialist dialectics plays a very important role in the worldview and philosophical methodology of Marxism-Leninism. Materialist dialectics are the foundation of the scientific and revolutionary characteristics of Marxism-Leninism and also offer the most general worldview and methodology for creative activities in scientific study and practical activities.

II. Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics

Annotation 103

The Principle of General Relationships and the Principle of Development are the most basic principles of materialist dialectics. These two principles are dialectically related to one another.

The following sections will outline the Principle of General Relationships and the Principle of Development, which are the most fundamental principles of materialist dialectics. These two concepts are closely (and dialectically) related:

1. The Principle of General Relationships

a. Definition of Relationship and Common Relationship

Annotation 104

The Principle of General Relationships describes how all things, phenomena, and ideas are related to one another, and are defined by these internal and external relationships

The Principle of Development relates to the idea that motion, change, and development are driven by internal and external relationships.

These two principles are dialectically linked: any given subject is defined by its internal relationships, and these same relationships drive the development of every subject.

Note: The foundation of the principles of Materialist Dialectics were laid out by

Engels in Dialectics of Nature. Engels began working on Dialectics of Nature in February, 1870 and had to stop in 1876 to work on Anti-Dühring. He then restarted work on Dialectics of Nature in 1878 and continued working on it until 1883, when Karl Marx died. Engels felt that it was more important to try and put together Marx’s great unfinished works, Capital Volumes 2, 3, and 4, and so stopped working on Dialectics of Nature once again. So, unfortunately, Engels died before this seminal work on Materialist Dialectics could be completed, and what we have instead is an unfinished assemblage of notes.

What follows in the rest of this book is a cohesive system of Materialist Dialectics which was built upon the foundations laid out by Engels in Dialectics of Nature and many other works of political and scholarly writing from various sources. This is the system of Materialist Dialectics studied by Vietnamese students and applied by Vietnamese communists today.

Because this text comes from predominantly Vietnamese scholarship and ideological development, we have had to translate some terms into English which are not derived from the “canon” of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. In some cases, various terms have been consolidated into one concept. For example: Engels used the term “interconnection” (German: innern Zusammenhang, literally: “inner connections”) in Dialectics of Nature, but Vietnamese political scientists use the term “relationship.” Where Engels uses the term “motion” (German: Bewegung) modern Vietnamese communists tend to use the word “development.” Wherever this is the case, we have chosen to use the words in English which most closely match the language used in the original Vietnamese of this text.

In materialist dialectics, the word relationship refers to the regulating principles, mutual interactions, and mutual transformations which exist between things, phenomena, and ideas, as well as those existing between aspects and factors within things, phenomena, and ideas.

Annotation 105

Throughout this book, phenomenon/phenomena simply refers to anything that is observable by the human senses.

Materialist dialectics examines relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas and within things, phenomena, and ideas. A relationship which occurs between two separate things or phenomena is referred to as an external relationship. A relationship which occurs within a thing or phenomenon is referred to as an internal relationship.

These terms are relative; sometimes a relationship may be internal in one context but external in a different context. For example, consider a solar system:

When considering a solar system as a whole, the orbit of a moon around a planet may be considered as an internal relationship of the solar system. But when considering the moon as an isolated subject, its orbit around a planet may be seen as an external relationship which the moon has with the planet.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-24.png

The diagram above illustrates different types of relationships:

Object 1 has its own internal relationships (A), and, from its own perspective, it also has external relationships with Object 2 (B). From a wider perspective, the relationship between Object 1 and Object 2 (B) may be viewed as an internal relationship.

This system of relationships (between Object 1 and Object 2) will also have external relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas (C).

Relationships have a quality of generality, which refers to how frequently they occur between and within things, phenomena, and ideas. When we refer to general relationships, we are usually referring to relationships which exist broadly across many things, phenomena, and ideas. General relationships can exist both internally, within things, phenomena, and ideas, and externally, between things, phenomena, and ideas.

The most general relationships are universal relationships: these are relationships that exist between and within everything and all phenomena, and they are one of the two primary subjects of study of materialist dialectics. [The other primary subject of study is the Principle of Development; see page 119.]

Annotation 106

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-25.png

The discussion of generality of relationships can seem confusing at first. What’s important to understand is that generality is a spectrum ranging from the least general relationships (unique relationships, which only occur between two specific things/phenomena/ideas) and the most general relationships (universal relationships, which occur between or within all things/phenomena/ideas).

Of particular importance in the study of materialist dialectics are universal relationships which exist within and between all things, phenomena, and ideas [see below].

Translation Note: In the original Vietnamese, the word “universal” is not used. Instead, the compound term “phổ biến nhất” is used, which literally means “most general.” In Vietnamese, this phrasing is commonly used to describe the concept of “universal” and it is thus not confusing to Vietnamese speakers. For this translation, we have opted to use the word “universal” because we feel it is less confusing and better explains the concept in English.

The universal relationships include (but are not limited to):

  • Relationships between basic philosophical category pairs (Private and Common, Essence and Phenomenon, etc.). [78]
  • Relationships between quantity and quality. [79]
  • Relationships between opposites. [80]

Together, in all forms of relationships in nature, society and human thought (special, general, and universal) there is unity in diversity and diversity in unity.

Annotation 107

Principle of General Relationships

According to Curriculum of the Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism For University and College Students Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought: “Materialist dialectics upholds the position that all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in mutual relationships with each other, regulate each other, transform into each other, and that nothing exists in complete isolation. That is the core idea of the Principle of General Relationships.”

From this Principle, we find the characteristics of Diversity in Unity and Unity in Diversity; the basis of Diversity in Unity is the fact that every thing, phenomenon, or idea, contains many different relationships; the basis of Unity in Diversity is that many different relationships exist — unified — within each and every thing, phenomenon, and idea.

Diversity in Unity

There exist an infinite number of diverse relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas, but all of these relationships share the same foundation in the material world.

An infinite diversity of relationships exist within the unity of the material world.

The material world is not a chaotic and random assortment of things, phenomena, and ideas. Rather, it is a system of relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas. Likewise, since the material world exists as the foundation of all things, phenomena, and ideas, the material world is thus the foundation for all relationships within and between things, phenomena, and ideas. Because all relationships share a foundation in the material world, they also exist in unity, even though all relationships are diversified and different from one another.

Universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas manifest in infinitely diverse ways.

Unity in Diversity

When we examine the universal relationships that exist within and between all different things, phenomena, and ideas, we will find that each individual manifestation of any universal relationship will have its own different manifestations, aspects, features, etc. Thus even the universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in infinite diversity.

Paraphrased From: Curriculum of the Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism For University and College Students Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought

b. Characteristics of Relationships

Objectiveness, generality, and diversity are the three basic characteristics of relationships.

- The Characteristic of Objectiveness of Relationships

According to the materialist dialectical viewpoint, relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas have objective characteristics.

Annotation 108

In materialist dialectics, objectiveness is an abstract concept that refers to the relative externality of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Every thing, phenomena and idea exists externally to every other thing, phenomena, and idea. This means that to each individual subject (i.e., each individual thing/phenomena/idea), all other things, phenomena, and ideas are external objects

All things, phenomena, and ideas have the relative characteristic of objectiveness.

All together, the collection of all things, phenomena, and ideas in the universe create the external reality of any given subject. So, objectiveness is relative. In the case of human beings, every individual person exists as an individual subject to which all other things, phenomena, and ideas (including other human beings) have objective characteristics.

Alice and Bob are external to one another; each is objective from the other’s perspective.

Of course, objectiveness is always relative. Something might be external from a certain perspective but not from another perspective. For example, say there are two people: Bob and Alice. From Bob’s perspective, Alice has objective characteristics. But from Alice’s perspective, Bob would have objective characteristics.

The relationship between Alice and Bob has objective characteristics to both Alice and Bob.

As all relationships are inherently external to any given subject (even subjects which are party to the relationship), relationships also have objective characteristics.

Whenever two things, phenomena, or ideas have a relationship with one another, they form a pair. The relationship is inherent to this pair and external to any subject which exists outside of the pair. The mutual interaction and mutual transformation which occurs to the things, phenomena, or objects within the pair as the result of the relationship are inherent and objective properties of the pair.

Annotation 109 Translation note:

In the original Vietnamese text, the word for “objective” is “khách quan.” This is a compound word in which “khách” means “guest,” and “quan” means “point of view.” Therefore, “khách quan” literally means “the guest’s (or outsider’s) point of view.”

Thus we translate this to “objectiveness/objective,” the characteristic of being viewed from the outside.

The word “inherent” in the original Vietnamese is “vốn có.” This is another compound word: “vốn” is a shortened form of the word “vốn dĩ,” which means “by or through nature,” “naturally,” and “intrinsically.” “Có” means “to have” or “to exist.” “Vốn có” thus means “already existing naturally” or “already there, through nature.”

So we use the word “inherent” to mean “existing intrinsically or naturally within, without external influence.”

Human beings can’t change or impact external things and phenomena — and the relationships between them — through human will alone. Humans are limited to perceiving relationships between things and phenomena and then impacting or changing them through our practical activities.

- The Characteristic of Generality of Relationships

According to the dialectical viewpoint, there is no thing, phenomenon, nor idea that exists in absolute isolation from other things, phenomena and ideas.

Annotation 110

Although all things, phenomena, and ideas have the characteristic of externality and objectiveness to all other things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 108, p. 112], this does not mean that they exist in isolation. Isolation implies a complete lack of any relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas. On the contrary, according to the Principle of General Relationships [see p. 107], all things, phenomena, and ideas have relationships with all other things, phenomena, and ideas.

Simultaneously, there is also no known thing, phenomenon, nor idea that does not have a systematic structure, including component parts which in turn have their own internal relationships. This means that every existence is a system, and, moreso, is an open system that exists in relation with other systems. All systems interact and mutually transform one another.

Annotation 111

As explained above, a systematic structure is a structure which includes within itself a system of component parts and relationships. It has been postulated by some scientific models that there may be some “fundamental base particle” (quarks, preons, etc.), which, if true, would mean that there is a certain basic material component which cannot be further broken down. However, this would not contradict the Principle of Materialist Dialectics of General Relationships (which states that all things, phenomena, and ideas interact with and mutually transform one another — see Annotation 107, p. 110).

- The Characteristic of Diversity of Relationships

In addition to affirming the objectiveness[81] and generality[82] of relationships, the dialectical viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism also emphasizes the diversity of relationships. The characteristic of diversity is defined by the following features:

  • All things, phenomena, and ideas have different relationships. Every relationship plays a distinct role in the existence and development of the things, phenomena, and ideas which are included within.
  • Any given relationship between things, phenomena, and ideas will have different characteristics and manifestations under different conditions and/or during different periods of motion and/or at different stages of development.

Annotation 112

One of Marx’s most critical observations was that things are defined by their internal and external relationships, including human beings. For example, in Theses on Feuerbach, Marx wrote that “the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations.” It is only through relationships — through mutual impacts and transformations — that things, phenomena, and ideas (including human beings and human societies) change and develop over time. All of these relationships — which both define and transform all things, phenomena, and ideas in existence — exist in infinite diversity [see Annotation 107, p. 110].

Just as things, phenomena, and ideas change and transform through the course of relations with one another, the nature of the relationships themselves also change and develop over time.

Characteristics refer to the features and attributes that exist internally within a given thing, phenomena, or idea.

Manifestation refers to how a given thing, phenomena, or idea is expressed externally in the material world.

For example, a ball may have the characteristics of being made of rubber, having a mass of 100 grams, and having a melting point of 260℃. It may manifest by bouncing on the ground, having a spherical shape, and having a red appearance to human observers.

If ten such balls exist, they will all be slightly different. Even if they have the same mass and material composition, they will have slightly different variations in size, shape, etc. Even if each ball will melt at 260℃, the melting will manifest differently for each ball — they will melt into slightly different shapes, at slightly different speeds, etc.

Relationships also have characteristics and manifestations. For example, the moon’s orbit around the Earth is a relationship. It has characteristics such as the masses of each related body, forces of gravity, and other factors which produce and influence the orbit. The same orbital relationship also has manifestations such as the duration of the moon’s orbit around the Earth, the size of its ellipse, the orbit’s effects on the tides of the Earth’s ocean, etc.

Characteristics and Manifestation correspond, respectively, to the philosophical category pair of Content and Form, which is discussed in section page 147.

Therefore, no two relationships are exactly the same, even if they exist between very similar things, phenomena, and ideas and/or in very similar situations.

It is also important to note that the characteristic of diversity also applies to things, phenomena, and ideas themselves. In other words, every individual thing, phenomenon, and idea in existence also manifests differently from every other thing, phenomenon, and idea in existence, even if they seem quite similar.

c. Meaning of the Methodology

Based on the objective and popular characteristics of relationships, we can see that in our cognitive and practical activities, we have to have a comprehensive viewpoint.

Having a comprehensive viewpoint requires that in the process of perceiving and handling real life situations, humans have to consider the internal dialectical relationships between the component parts, factors, and aspects within a thing or phenomenon. We also need to consider the external mutual interactions they have with other things, phenomena, and ideas. Only on such a comprehensive basis can we properly understand things and phenomena and then effectively handle problems in real life. So, the comprehensive viewpoint is the opposite of a unilateral and/or metaphysical viewpoint [see Annotation 51, p. 49] in both perception and practice.

Lenin said: “If we are to have true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all of its facets, its connections, and ‘mediacies [indirect relationships].’”[83]

Annotation 113

The comprehensive viewpoint sees the subject in terms of all of its internal and external relationships.

Consider a factory. A factory exists as a collection of internal relationships (between the workers, between machines, between the workers and the machines, etc.) and external relationships (between the factory and its suppliers, between the factory and its customers, between the factory and the city, etc.). In order to have a comprehensive viewpoint when examining the factory, one must consider and understand all of the internal and external relationships which define it.

The diversified characteristic of relationships [see Annotation 107, p. 110] shows that in human cognitive and practical activities, we have to simultaneously use a comprehensive viewpoint and a historical viewpoint.

Having a historical viewpoint requires that, in perceiving and handling real life situations, we need to consider the specific properties of subjects, including their current stage of motion and development. We also need to consider that the exact same methods can’t be used to deal with different situations in reality — our methods must be tailored to suit the exact situation based on material conditions.

Annotation 114

While the comprehensive viewpoint focuses on internal and external relationships of subjects, the historical viewpoint focuses on the specific properties of subjects — especially the current stage of motion and development. In order to have a proper historical viewpoint, we must study and understand the way a subject has developed and transformed over time. To do this, we must examine the history of the subject’s changes over time, hence the term “historical viewpoint.” In addition, it’s important to understand that no two situations which we might encounter will ever be exactly the same. This is because the component parts and relationships that make up any given situation will manifest differently.

So, in order to properly deal with situations, we have to understand the component parts and relationships of examined subjects as well as their histories of development so that we can develop plans and strategies that are suitable to the unique circumstances at hand.

For example, it would be disastrous if communists today tried to employ the exact same methods which were used by the Communist Party of Vietnam in the 20th century to defeat Japan, France, and the USA. This is because the material conditions and relationships of Vietnam in the 20th century were very different from any material conditions existing on Earth today. It is possible to learn lessons from studying the methods of the Vietnamese revolution and to adapt some such methods to our modern circumstances, but it would be extremely ineffective to try to copy those methods and strategies — exactly as they manifested then and there — to the here and now.

In order to come up with suitable and effective solutions to deal with real life problems, we must clearly define the roles and positions of each specific relationship that comes into play, and the specific time, place, and material conditions in which they exist.

Annotation 115

A historical viewpoint focuses on the roles and positions of relationships and properties of subjects as well as their development over time.

The role of a relationship has to do with how it functions within a system of relationships and the position refers to its placement amongst other subjects and relationships.

Consider once again the example of the factory [see Annotation 113]. In addition to its internal and external relationships, the factory also has various roles — it functions within various systems and from various perspectives. For instance, the factory may have the role of financial asset for the corporation that owns it, it may have the role of place of employment for the surrounding community, it may have the role of supplier for various customers, etc.

The factory is also positioned among other subjects and relations. If it’s the only employer in town then it would have a position of great importance to the people of the community. If, on the other hand, if it’s just one of hundreds of factories in a heavily industrialized area, it may have a position of much less importance. It may have a position of great importance to an individual factory worker who lives in poverty in an economy where there are very few available jobs, but of less importance to a freelance subcontractor for whom the factory is just one of many customers, and so on.

These positions and roles will change over time. For example, the factory may initially exist as a small workshop with a small handful of workers, but it may grow into a massive factory with hundreds of employees. It is vital to understand this Principle of Development, which is discussed in more detail on the next page.

In summary, proper dialectical materialist analysis requires a comprehensive and historical viewpoint — we must consider subjects both comprehensively in terms of the internal and external relationships of the subject itself as well as historically in terms of roles and positions of subjects, as well as their relationships, material conditions, and development over time.

So, in both perception and practice, we have to avoid and overcome sophistry and eclectic viewpoints.

Annotation 116

Sophistry is the use of falsehoods and misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, and with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. This kind of bad faith argument has no place in materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics must, instead, be rooted in a true and accurate understanding of the subject, material conditions, and reality in general.

Eclecticism is an incoherent approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject, applying different theories in different situations without any consistency in analysis and thought. Eclectic arguments are typically composed of various pieces of evidence that are cherry picked and pieced together to form a perspective that lacks clarity. By definition, because they draw from different systems of thought without seeking a clear and cohesive understanding of the totality of the subject and its internal and external relations and its development over time, eclectic arguments run counter to the comprehensive and historical viewpoints. Eclecticism is somewhat similar to dialectical materialism in that it attempts to consider a subject from many different perspectives, and analyzes relationships pertaining to a subject, but the major flaw of eclecticism is a lack of clear and coherent systems and principles, which leads to a chaotic viewpoint and an inability to grasp the true nature of the subject at hand.

2. Principle of Development

a. Definition of Development

According to the metaphysical viewpoint, development is simply a quantitative increase or decrease; the metaphysical viewpoint does not account for qualitative changes of things and phenomena. Simultaneously, the metaphysical viewpoint also views development as a process of continuous progressions which follow a linear and straightforward path.

Annotation 117

In materialist dialectics, it is important to distinguish between quantity and quality.

Quantity describes the total amount of component parts that compose a subject.

Quality describes the unity of component parts, taken together, which defines the subject and distinguishes it from other subjects.

Both quantity and quality are dynamic attributes; over time, the quantity and quality of all things develop and change over time through the development of internal and external relationships. Quantity and quality itself form a dialectical relationship, and as quantity develops, quality will also develop. A given subject may be described by various quantity and quality relationships.

Example 1:

In the process of development, Quantity Change leads to Quality Change

A single football player, alone, has the quantity value of 1 football player and the quality of a football player. Eleven football players on a field would have the quantity value of 1 and will develop the quality of a football team. This subject, football team, is composed of the same component parts as the subject football player, but the quantity change and other properties (being on a field, playing a game or practicing, etc.) change the quality of the component parts into a different stable and unified form which we call a football team.

The relationship between quantity and quality is dynamic:

If one of the players doesn’t show up for practice, and there are only ten players on the field, it might still have the quality of football team, but in a live professional game there will be a certain threshold — a minimum number of players who must be present to officially be considered a team. If this number of players can’t be fielded then they will not be considered a full team and thus won’t be allowed to play.

Likewise, if there are only one or two players practicing together in a park, they would probably not be considered a football team (though they might be described in terms of having the quality of being on the same team).

Example 2:

Quantity: 1 O + 2 H atoms Quantity: Billions of H2O Molecules Quantity: ~5,000 Drops of Water Quality: Water Quality: Drop of Water Quality: Cup of Water

DEVELOPMENT: QUANTITY CHANGE LEADS TO QUALITY CHANGE

All of these have the quality of water because of the molecular quantities of hydrogen and oxygen atoms, however, from the perspective of volume, quantity changes still lead to quality changes.

The properties of quantity and quality are relative, depending on the viewpoint of analysis.

A single molecule of water has a quantity of one in terms of molecules, but it still retains the quality of “water” because of the quantities of one oxygen atom and two hydrogen atoms per molecule which, in this stable form, give it the quality of water.

A drop of water might have a quantity of many billions of molecules, but it would still have the quality of “water.” It would also now assume the quality of a “drop.”

When you combine enough drops of water, you will eventually have a quality shift where the “drops” of water combine to form another quality — i.e., a “cup” of water. The quantity change leads to a change in quantity; we would no longer think of the water in terms of “drops” after the quantity rises to a certain level.

In terms of temperature and physical properties, if the water is heated to a certain point it will boil and the water will become steam. The quantity of water in terms of drops wouldn’t change, but the quantity-value of temperature would eventually lead to a quality value change from “water” to “steam.”

Example 3:

AS QUANTITY OF AGE INCREASES, QUALITY CHANGES

The same human being will undergo various quality changes as age quantity increases over time.

As humans age and the quantity of years we’ve lived builds up over time, our “quality” also changes, from baby, to child, to teenager, to young adult, to middle age, to old age, and eventually to death. The individual person is still the same human being, but the quality of the person will shift over time as the quantity-value of age increases.

Metaphysical vs. Dialectical Materialist Conceptions of Change

Metaphysics only consider linear properties of quantitychange; Materialist Dialectics takes quantity changes and quality shifts into consideration when considering change over time.

Because the metaphysical perspective tries to define the world in terms of static, isolated subjects, only quantity is considered and quality shifts are not taken into account. Thus, metaphysical logic sees development as linear, simple, and straightforward. Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, sees development as a more complicated, fluid, and dynamic process involving multiple internal and external relationships changing in quantity and quality over time.

In contrast to the metaphysical viewpoint, in materialist dialectics, development refers to the motion of things and phenomena with a forward tendency: from less advanced to more advanced, from a less complete to a more complete level.

Annotation 118

In materialist dialectics, motion (also known as change) is the result of mutual impacts between or within things, phenomena, and ideas, and all motion and change results from mutual impacts which themselves result from internal and external relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas. Any given motion/change leads to quantity changes, and these quantity changes cumulatively lead to quality changes [see Annotation 117, p. 119]. Grasping this concept — that development is driven by relations — is critically important for understanding materialist dialectics.

The concept of “change” in materialist dialectics centers on internal and external relationships causing mutual impacts which lead to quantity changes which build into quality shifts.

This process, taken in total, is referred to as development. Development represents the entire process in which internal and external change/motion leads to changes in quantity which in turn lead to changes in quality over time. The process of development can be fast or slow, complex or simple, and can even move backwards, and all of these properties are relative. Development has a tendency to develop from less advanced to more advanced forms. The word tendency is used to denote phenomena, development, and motion which inclines in a particular direction. There may be exceptional cases which contradict such tendencies, but the general motion will incline towards one specific manner. Thus, it is important to note that “development” is not necessarily “good” nor “bad.” In some cases, “development” might well be considered “bad,” or unwanted. For example, rust developing on a car is typically not desired. So, the tendency of development from lower to higher levels of advancement implies a “forward motion,” though this motion can take an infinite number of forms, depending on the relative perspective. Development can also (temporarily) halt in a state of equilibrium [see Annotation 64, p. 62] or it can shift direction; though it can never “reverse,” just as time itself can never be “reversed.”

For example, during a flood, water may “develop” over the land, and as the floodwaters recede this may alternatively be viewed as another “forward” development process of recession — a development of the overall “flooding and receding” process. The flood is not actually “reversing” — the development is not being “undone.” Flood water may recede but it will leave behind many traces and impacts; thus it is not a true “reversal” of development.

Both flooding and flood recession are development processes with the same forward tendency. Flood recession may appear to be a “reversal,” but it is in fact forward development.

The false belief that development can be reversed is the root of conservative and reactionary positions [see Annotation 208].

Development can be considered positive or negative, depending on perspective. Some ecosystems have natural flood patterns which are vital for sustaining life. For a person living in a flood zone, however, the flood would most likely be considered an unwanted development, whereas flood recession would be a welcomed development.

It is important to note that the definition of development is not identical to the concept of “motion” (change) in general. It is not merely a simple quantitative increase or decrease, nor a repetitive cyclic change in quantity. Instead, in materialist dialectics, development is defined in terms of qualitative changes with the direction of advancing towards higher and more advanced levels. [See diagram Relationship Between Motion,

Quantity/Quality Shifts, and Dialectical Development, Annotation 119, below]

Development is also the process of creating and solving objective contradictions within and between things and phenomena. Development is thus the unified process of negating negative factors while retaining and advancing positive factors from old things and phenomena as they transform into new things and phenomena.

Annotation 119

A contradiction is a relationship in which two forces oppose one another. Although a contradiction might exist in equilibrium for some amount of time [see Annotation 64, p. 62], eventually, one force will overcome the other, resulting in a change of quality. This process of overcoming is called negation. In short, development is a process of change in a subject’s quantity as well as negation of contradictions within and between subjects, leading to quality shifts over time.

b. Characteristics of Development

Every development has the characteristics of objectiveness,[84] generality,[85] and diversity.[86]The characteristic of objectiveness of development stems from the origin of motion.

Annotation 120

Remember that, in materialist dialectics, objectiveness is the relative characteristic that every subject has of existing and developing externally to all other subjects [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. Since motion originates from mutual impacts which occur between external things, objects, and relationships, the motions themselves also occur externally (relative to all other things, phenomena, and objects). This gives motion itself objective characteristics.

Dialectical Development consists of Quantity and Quality Shifts, which in turn derive from motion.

Development is derived from motion as a process of quality shifting which arise from quantity changes which arise from motion [see Annotation 117, p. 119]. Since development is essentially an accumulation of motion, and motion is objective, development itself must also be objective.

The Principle of Development states that development is a process that comes from within the thing-in-itself; the process of solving the contradictions within things and phenomena. Therefore, development is inevitable, objective, and occurs without dependence on human will.

Annotation 121

The “thing-in-itself” refers to the actual material object which exists outside of our consciousness [see Annotation 72, p. 68]. Development arises from motion and self-motion [see Annotation 62, p. 59] with objective characteristics. Although human will can impact motion and development through conscious activity in the material world [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88], motion and development can and does occur without being dependent on human will. Human will is neither a requirement nor prerequisite for motion and development to occur.

Development has the characteristic of generality because development occurs in every process that exists in every field of nature, society, and human thought; in every thing, every phenomenon, and every idea and at every stage* of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Every transformation process contains the possibility that it might lead to the birth of a new thing, phenomenon, or idea [through a change in quality, i.e. development].

Annotation 122

* In materialist dialectics, “stage” (or “stage of development”) refers to the current quantity and quality characteristics which a thing, phenomenon, or object possesses. Every time a quality change occurs, a new stage of development is entered into.

Development has the characteristic of diversity because every thing, phenomenon, and idea has its own process of development that is not totally identical to the process of development of any other thing, phenomenon, or idea. Things and phenomena will develop differently in different spaces and times. Simultaneously, within their own processes of development, things, phenomena, and ideas are impacted by other things, phenomena, and ideas, as well as by many other factors and historical conditions. Such impacts can change the direction of development of things, phenomena, and ideas. They can even temporarily set development back, and/or can lead to growth in one aspect but degeneration in another.

Annotation 123

Because development has the characteristic of generality and the characteristic of diversity, the principle of diversity in unity and unity in diversity also applies to development [see: Annotation 107, p. 110].

c. Meaning of the Methodology

Materialist dialectics upholds that the principle of development is the scientific theoretical basis that we must use to guide our perception of the world and to improve the world. Therefore, in our perception and reality, we have to have a development viewpoint.

According to Lenin: “dialectical logic requires that an object should be considered in development, in change, in ‘self-movement.”[87]

This development viewpoint [which holds that all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly developing, and that development is thus unavoidable] requires us to overcome conservatism, stagnation[88], and prejudice, which are all opposed to development.

Annotation 124

Conservatism and prejudice are mindsets which seek to prevent and stifle development and to hold humanity in a static position. Not only is this detrimental to humanity, it is also ultimately a wasted effort, because development is inevitable in human society, as in all things, phenomena, and ideas. Therefore, we must avoid and fight against such stagnant mindsets.

According to this development viewpoint, in order to perceive or solve any problem in real life, we must consider all things, phenomena, and ideas with their own forward tendency of development taken in mind. On the other hand, the path of development is a dialectical process that is reversible and full of contradictions. Therefore, we must be aware of this complexity in our analysis and planning. This means we need to have a historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116] which accounts for the diversity and complexity of development in perceiving and solving issues in reality.

Annotation 125

Materialist dialectics requires us to consider the complexity and constant motion of reality. By comparison, the metaphysical viewpoint (which considers all things, phenomena, and ideas as static, isolated entities which have linear and simple processes of development) stands as a barrier to understanding this complexity and incorporating it into our worldview. Thus, it is vital that we develop comprehensive and historical viewpoints which acknowledge the diversity and complexity of reality.

In summary, as a science of common relations and development, Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics serve a very important role in perception and practice. Engels affirmed the role of materialist dialectics in this passage:

“An exact representation of the universe, of its evolution, of the development of mankind, and of the reflection of this evolution in the minds of men, can therefore only be obtained by the methods of dialectics, with its constant regard to the innumerable actions and reactions of life and death, of progressive or retrogressive changes.”

Lenin also said: “Dialectics requires an all-round consideration of relationships in their concrete development, but not a patchwork of bits and pieces.”[89]

III. Basic Pairs of Categories of Materialist Dialectics

Category* is the most general grouping of aspects, attributes, and relations of things, phenomena, and ideas. Different specific fields of inquiry may categorize things, phenomena, and/or ideas differently from one another.

Annotation 126

* Translation note: In Vietnamese, the word “phạm trù” is used here, which translates in this context more closely to the English philosophical term “category of being,” which means “the most general, fundamental, or broadest class of entities.” “Category of being” is sometimes simplified in English-language philosophical discourse to “category,” which we have chosen to do here for ease of reading and to better reflect the way it reads in the original Vietnamese.

Every science has its own systems of categories that reflect the aspects, attributes, and basic relations that fall within its scope of study. For example, mathematics contains the categories “arithmetic,” “geometry,” “point,” “plane,” and “constant.” Physics contains the categories of “mass,” “speed,” “acceleration,” and “force,” and so on. Economics includes “commodity,” “value,” “price,” “monetary,” and “profit” categories.

Every such category reflects only the common relations found within the specific fields that fall within the scope of study of a specific science.

Categories of materialist dialectics, on the other hand, such as “matter,” “consciousness,” “motion,” “contradiction,” “quality,” “quantity,” “reason,” and “result,” are different. Categories of materialist dialectics reflect the most general aspects and attributes, as well as the most basic and general relations, of not just some specific fields of study, but of the whole of reality, including all of nature, society and human thought.

Every thing, phenomenon, and idea has many properties, including: a reason for existing in its current form, a process of motion and change, contradictions, content, form, and so on. These properties are aspects, attributes, and relations that are reflected in the categories of materialist dialectics. Therefore, the relationship between the categories of specific sciences and categories of materialist dialectics is a dialectical relationship between the Private and the Common [see Private and Common, p. 128].

Annotation 127

The categories of specific sciences are limited to the scope of study, while the categories of materialist dialectics encompass all things, phenomena, and ideas.

Unlike the categories contained within specific scientific fields, the philosophical categories of materialist dialectics can be used to analyze and define all things, phenomena, and ideas. The categories of specific scientific fields and the materialist dialectical categories have a Private/Common dialectical relationship [discussed on the next page].

As a science of general relations and development, materialist dialectics summarizes the most general relations of every field of nature, society, and human thought into basic category pairs: Private and Common, Reason and Result, Obviousness and Randomness, Content and Form, Essence and Phenomenon, Possibility and Reality.

Annotation 128

Every individual materialist dialectical category has a dialectical relationship with another materialist dialectical category. Thus, all categories in materialist dialectics are presented as category pairs. So, a category pair is simply a pair of categories within materialist dialectics which have a dialectical relationship with one another.

Note that the this formalized system of category pairs reflects many decades of work by Vietnamese philosophical and political scientists based on the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other socialist thinkers. Also note that these are not the only category pairs that can be discussed; there are potentially an infinite number of categories which can be used in materialist dialectical analysis. However, universal category pairs, which can be applied to analyze any and all things, phenomena, and ideas, are much fewer and farther between. That said, the universal category pairs discussed in this book are the ones which have most often been used by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other prominent materialist dialecticians.

1. Private and Common

a. Categories of Private and Common

The Private Category encompasses specific things, phenomena, and ideas; the Common Category defines the common aspects, attributes, factors, and relations that exist in many things and phenomena.

Within every Private thing, phenomenon, and idea, there exists the Common, and also the Unique. The Unique encompasses the attributes and characteristics that exist in only one specific thing, phenomenon, or idea, and does not repeat in any other things, phenomena, or ideas.

Annotation 129

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-41.png

The Private category includes specific individual things, phenomena and ideas.

The Common category includes aspects, factors, and relations that exist in many things, phenomena, and ideas. For example, say there are two apples: Apple A and Apple B. Apple A is a specific individual object. Apple B is another distinct, separate object. In that sense, both apples are private apples, and fall within the Private category.

However, both Apple A and Apple B share common attributes. For instance, they are both fruits of the same type: “apple.” They may have other attributes in common: they may be the same color, they may have the same basic shape, they may be of similar size, etc. These are common attributes which they share. Thus, Apple A and Apple B will also fall within the common category, based on these common attributes.

Apple A and Apple B will also have unique attributes. Only Apple A has the exact molecules in the exact place and time which compose Apple A. There is no other object in the world which has those same molecules in that same place and time. This means that Apple A also has unique properties.

All private subjects have attributes in common with other private subjects.

The Common and Private categories have a dialectical relationship. The Common contains the Private, and the Private contains the Common. Every private subject has some attributes in common with other private subjects, and common attributes can only exist among private subjects. Thus every thing, phenomenon, and idea in existence contains internally within itself dialectical relationships between the Private and the Common, and has dialectical Private/Common relationships externally within other things, phenomena, and ideas.

All private subjects have attributes in common with other private subjects.

It is also true that every private subject contains within itself Unique attributes which it does not share with any other thing, phenomenon, or idea. For example, Mount Everest is unique in that it is 8,850 meters tall. No other mountain on Earth has that exact same height. Therefore, the private subject “Mount Everest” has unique properties which it does not share with any other subject, even though it has other attributes in common with countless other private entities.

All things, phenomena, and ideas contain the unique, the private, and the common.

Whenever two individual subjects have a relationship with one another, that relationship is a unique relationship in the sense that it is a relationship that is shared only by those two specific subjects; however, there will also be common attributes and properties which any such relationship will share with other relationships in existence. This recalls the principle of Unity in Diversity and Diversity in Unity [see Annotation 107, p. 110]. So, every thing, phenomenon, and idea contains the Common and the Unique and has unique and common relationships with other things, phenomena, and ideas.

This category pair is very useful in developing a comprehensive viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116]. Remember that a comprehensive viewpoint indicates an understanding of the internal and external relations of a given subject. This means that in order to develop a comprehensive viewpoint, you must know the private aspects of each individual relation, component, and aspect of the subject, and you must also study the commonalities of the subject as well. It’s also important to study a variety of private information sources or data points to look for commonalities between them. In other words, if you want to have a proper comprehensive viewpoint [see Annotation 113, p. 116] about any subject, you have to find and analyze as many private data points and pieces of evidence as possible.

For example: If a person only ever saw one apple, a green apple, then that person might believe that “all apples are green.” This conclusion would be premature: the person is attempting to make an assumption about the Common without examining enough Privates. This is a failure of mistaking mistaking the Private for the Common which stems from a lack of a comprehensive viewpoint.

Now, let’s take a look at an example of how the “Unique” can become “Common,” and vice-versa: 1947 TODAY

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-45.png

“Unique” things, phenomena, and ideas can become “common” through development processes (and vice-versa).

In 1941, a Soviet soldier named Mikhail Kalashnikov was in the hospital after being wounded in the Battle of Bryansk. Another soldier in the hospital said to Kalashnikov, “why do our soldiers only have one rifle for two or three of our men, while the Germans have automatics?” To solve this problem, Kalashnikov designed the AK-47 machine gun. When he finished making the first prototype, it was the only AK-47 in the world.

At this precise moment, the AK-47 was simultaneously Unique, Private, and Common.

It was Unique because it was the first and only AK-47 in the world, and no other object in the world had those properties. It was Private because it was a specific object with its own individual existence. It was Common — even though it was the only existing prototype — because it shared Common features with other rifles, and with other prototypes. It was the only AK-47 in existence.

Soon, however, the Soviet Union began manufacturing them, and they became very common. Now there are millions of AK-47s in the world. So, today, that prototype machine gun remains simultaneously Unique, Private, and Common, with some slight developments:

It remains Private because it is a specific object with its own individual existence. Even though it is no longer the only AK-47 in existence, it remains Unique because it is still the very first AK-47 that was ever made, and even though there are now many other AK-47s, there is no other rifle in the universe that shares that same unique property. It remains Common because it still shares common features with other rifles and other prototypes, but it now also shares commonality with many other AK-47 rifles. It is no longer Unique for having the properties of an AK-47 in and of itself.

If someone were to destroy Kalashnikov’s prototype AK-47, the Private of that object would no longer exist — it would remain only as an idea, and the Private would transform to whatever becomes of the material components of the rifle. The Unique would also no longer remain specifically as it was before being destroyed. However, there would still be many other AK-47s which would share common features related to that prototype; for instance, that they were all designed based on the prototype’s design.

Translator’s Note: The words “Private,” “Common,” and “Unique” may seem unusual because they are direct translations from the Vietnamese words used to describe these concepts in the original text. Various other words have been used by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other materialist dialecticians when discussing the underlying concepts of these philosophical categories. For instance, in most translations of Lenin, his discussion of such topics is typically translated into English using words such as “universal,” “general,” “special,” “particular,” etc.

Example (from Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks): “Language in essence expresses only the universal; what is meant, however, is the special, the particular. Hence what is meant cannot be said in speech.” Here, “universal” refers to that which is Common in all things, phenomena, and ideas, and “special/particular” refers to the Private — specific individual things, phenomena, and ideas — along with their Unique properties.

Here are excerpts from Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks discussing these concepts:

(‘It?’ The most universal word of all.) Who is it? I. Every person is an I.

Das Sinnliche? It is a universal, etc., etc. ‘This??’ Everyone is ‘this.’

Why can the particular not be named? One of the objects of a given kind (tables) is distinguished by something from the rest...

Leaves of a tree are green; John is a man; Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have dialectics (as Hegel’s genius recognised): the individual is the universal... And a naïve confusion, a helplessly pitiful confusion in the dialectics of the universal and the particular — of the concept and the sensuously perceptible reality of individual objects, things, phenomena.

Further, the ‘subsumption’ under logical categories of ‘sensibility’ (Sensibilität), ‘irritability’ (irritabilität) — this is said to be the particular in contrast to the universal!! — and ‘reproduction’ is an idle game.

Marx, too, discussed these concepts using words which are commonly translated into English using different terms. For example, in Capital:

The general form of relative value, embracing the whole world of commodities, converts the single commodity that is excluded from the rest, and made to play the part of equivalent – here the linen – into the universal equivalent.

Here, “general form” refers to the commonalities of form that exist between all commodities. The “single commodity” refers to a private commodity; a specific commodity that exists separately from all other commodities. And when referring to a “universal equivalent,” Marx is referring to equivalence which such a commodity has in common with every other commodity.

The rest of this passage continues as a materialist dialectical analysis of the Private, Common, and Unique features and aspects of commodities:

The bodily form of the linen is now the form assumed in common by the values of all commodities; it therefore becomes directly exchangeable with all and every of them. The substance linen becomes the visible incarnation, the social chrysalis state of every kind of human labour. Weaving, which is the labour of certain private individuals producing a particular article, linen, acquires in consequence a social character, the character of equality with all other kinds of labour. The innumerable equations of which the general form of value is composed, equate in turn the labour embodied in the linen to that embodied in every other commodity, and they thus convert weaving into the general form of manifestation of undifferentiated human labour. In this manner the labour realised in the values of commodities is presented not only under its negative aspect, under which abstraction is made from every concrete form and useful property of actual work, but its own positive nature is made to reveal itself expressly. The general value form is the reduction of all kinds of actual labour to their common character of being human labour generally, of being the expenditure of human labour power. The general value form, which represents all products of labour as mere congelations of undifferentiated human labour, shows by its very structure that it is the social resumé of the world of commodities. That form consequently makes it indisputably evident that in the world of commodities the character possessed by all labour of being human labour constitutes its specific social character.

We have chosen to use the terms “Private,” “Common,” and “Unique” in the translation of this text because they most closely match the words used in the original Vietnamese. In summary, it is important to realize that you may encounter the underlying concepts which are related by these words using various phrasings in the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, etc.

b. Dialectical Relationship Between Private and Common

According to the materialist dialectical viewpoint: the Private, the Common and the Unique exist objectively [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. The Common only exists within the Private. It expresses its existence through the Private.

Annotation 130

The Common can’t exist as a specific thing, phenomenon, or idea. However, every specific thing, phenomenon, or idea exists as a private subject which has various features in common with other private things, phenomena, and ideas. We can therefore only understand the Common through observation and study of various private things, phenomena, and ideas. For example, a human can’t perceive with our senses alone the Common of apples. Only by observing many private apples can begin to derive an understanding of what all private apples have in common.

The Common does not exist in isolation from the Private. Therefore, commonality is inseparable from things, phenomena, and ideas. The Private only exists in relation to the Common. Likewise, there is no Private that exists in complete isolation from the Common.

Annotation 131

No commonality can possibly exist outside of private things, phenomena, and ideas because commonality describes features which different things, phenomena, and ideas share. No private thing, phenomenon, or idea can possibly exist absolutely without commonality because there is no thing, phenomenon, or idea that shares absolutely no features with any other thing, phenomenon, or idea.

The Private category is more all-encompassing and diverse than the Common category; Common is a part of Private but it is more profound and more “essential” than the Private. This is because Private is the synthesis of the Common and the Unique; the Common expresses generality and the regular predictability of many Privates.

Annotation 132

The Private encompasses all aspects of a specific, individual thing, phenomenon, or idea; thus it encompasses all aspects, features, and attributes of a given subject, including both the Common and the Unique. In this way, the Private is the synthesis of the Common and the Unique.

Common attributes require more consideration, effort, and study to properly determine, because multiple private subjects must be considered and analyzed before common attributes can be confidently discovered and understood. They offer us a more profound understanding of the essence [see Essence and Phenomenon, p. 156] and nature of things, phenomena, and ideas because they offer insights into the relationships between and within different things, phenomena, and ideas. As we discover more commonalities, and understand them more deeply, we begin to develop a more comprehensive perspective of reality. We begin to develop an understanding of the laws and principles which govern relations between and within things, phenomena, and ideas, and this gives us the power to more accurately predict how processes will develop and how things, phenomena, and ideas will change and mutually impact one another over time.

Under specific conditions, the Common and the Unique can transform into each other [See Annotation 129, p. 128].

The dialectical relationship between Private and Common was summarised by Lenin:

“Consequently, the opposites (the individual as opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, ideas) etc.”[90] [Note: “individual and universal” here refer the same underlying concepts of “Private and Common” (respectively); see translator’s note on p. 132].

c. Meaning of the Methodology

We must acknowledge and recognize the Common in order to study the Private in our cognitive and practical activities. If we fail to acknowledge the Common, then whenever we attempt to understand and comprehend any Private thing, phenomenon or idea, we will make mistakes and become disoriented. To understand the Common we have to study and observe the Private because the Common does not exist abstractly outside of the Private.

Annotation 133

Our understanding of Common attributes arise from the observation and study of private things, phenomena, and ideas. At the same time, developing our understanding of Commonalities between and within Private subjects deepens our understanding of their essential nature [see: Essence and Phenomenon].

Dialectical analysis of private and common characteristics involves observing private subjects to determine common attributes and considering common attributes to gain insights about private subjects.

It is impossible to know anything at all about the Common without observing Private subjects, and attempting to understand Private subjects without taking into consideration the attributes and features which they have in Common with other Private subjects will lead to incomplete and erroneous analysis.

In addition, we must identify the Common features and attributes of every specific Private subject we study. We must avoid being dogmatic, metaphysical, and inflexible in applying our knowledge of commonalities to solve problems and interpret the world.

Annotation 134

Dogmatism and Revisionism in Relation to the Private and Common

Dogmatism is the inflexible adherence to ideals as incontrovertibly true while refusing to take any contradictory evidence into consideration. Dogmatism stands in direct opposition to materialist dialectics, which seeks to form opinions and conclusions only after careful consideration of all observable evidence.

Dogmatism typically arises when the Common is overemphasized without due consideration of the Private. A dogmatic position is one which adheres to ideals about commonalities without taking Private subjects into consideration.

Dogmatism can be avoided by continuously studying and observing and analyzing

Private subjects and taking any evidence which contradicts erroneous perceptions of “false commonalities” into consideration. This will simultaneously deepen our understanding of the Private while improving our understanding of the Common. For example: Sally might observe a few red apples and arrive at the conclusion: “all apples are red.” If Sally is then presented with a green apple, yet refuses to acknowledge it by continuing to insist that “all apples are red,” then Sally is engaging in dogmatism.

According to Vietnam’s Curriculum of the Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism For University and College Students Specializing in Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought, the opposite of Dogmatism is Revisionism. Revisionism occurs when we overestimate the Private and fail to recognize commonalities. In failing to recognize common attributes and features between and within things, phenomena, and ideas, the Revisionist faces confusion and disorientation whenever they encounter any new things, phenomena, and ideas, because they lack any insight into essential characteristics of the subject and its relations with other subjects.

For example: if Sally has spent a lot of time studying a red apple, she may start to become confident that she understands everything there is to know about apples. If she is then presented with a green apple, she might become confused and disoriented and draw the conclusion that she has to start all over again with her analysis, from scratch, thinking: “this can’t possibly be an apple because it’s not red. It must be something else entirely.” Sally can avoid this revisionist confusion by examining the other common features which the red and green apples share before making any conclusions.

Metaphysical Perception of the Private and Common

The metaphysical position attempts to categorize things, phenomena, and ideas into static categories which are isolated and distinct from one another [see Annotation 8,

p. 8]. In this way, the metaphysical perception ultimately fails to properly understand the role of both the Private and the Common. Categories may be arranged in taxonomic configurations based on shared features, but ultimately every category is seen as distinct and isolated from every other category. This perspective severs the dialectical relationship between the Private, the Common, and the Unique, and thus leads to a distorted perception of reality. As Engels wrote in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

The analysis of Nature into its individual parts, the grouping of the different natural processes and objects in definite classes, the study of the internal anatomy of organized bodies in their manifold forms — these were the fundamental conditions of the gigantic strides in our knowledge of Nature that have been made during the last 400 years. But this method of work has also left us as legacy the habit of observing natural objects and processes in isolation, apart from their connection with the vast whole; of observing them in repose, not in motion; as constraints, not as essentially variables; in their death, not in their life. And when this way of looking at things was transferred by Bacon and Locke from natural science to philosophy, it begot the narrow, metaphysical mode of thought peculiar to the last century.”

In other words, Engels points out that separating and dividing Private subjects into distinct and isolated categories without acknowledging the dialectical nature of the Private and the Common leads to severe limitations on what we can learn about the world. Instead, we have to examine things, phenomena, and ideas in relation to one another, which must include the analysis of Commonalities.

Rather than divide subjects into distinct, separate categories, materialist dialectics seek to examine Private subjects as they really exist: as a synthesis of Unique and Common attributes; and simultaneously to examine commonalities as they really exist: as properties which emerge from the relations of Private objects.

In our cognitive and practical activities, we must be able to take advantage of suitable conditions that will enable transformations from the Unique and the Common (and vice versa) for our specific purposes.

Annotation 135

In advancing the cause of socialism, revolutionaries must work to transform our Unique positions into common positions. For instance, the process of developing revolutionary public knowledge [see Annotation 94, p. 93] begins with studying and understanding revolutionary knowledge. Initially, this knowledge will be unique to the socialist movement. By disseminating the knowledge to the public, we hope to transform this knowledge into common knowledge.

Likewise, we hope to transform other common things, phenomena, and ideas back towards the Unique. For instance, the capitalist mode of production is currently the most common mode of production on Earth. In order to advance humanity towards communism, we must transition the capitalist mode of production from the Common towards the Unique, with the ambition of eventually eliminating this mode of production altogether.

2. Reason and Result

a. Categories of Reason and Result

The Reason category is used to define the mutual impacts between internal aspects of a thing, phenomenon or idea, or between things, phenomena, or ideas, that bring about changes.

The Result category defines the changes that were caused by mutual impacts which occur between aspects and factors within a thing, phenomenon, or idea, or externally between different things, phenomena, or ideas.

Annotation 136

Translation note: the Vietnamese words for “reason and result” can also be translated as “cause and effect.” We have chosen to use the words “reason and result” to distinguish materialist dialectical categories from metaphysical conceptions of development.

In metaphysics [see Annotation 8, p. 8], any given effect is seen to have a single cause. In materialist dialectics, we instead examine the mutual impacts which occur within and between subjects through motion and development processes.

Metaphysical vs. Materialist Dialectical conceptions of development.

In the metaphysical conception of cause and effect, (A) causes effect (B), then effect (B) causes effect (C), and so on. Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, uses the model of development (see Annotation 117, p. 119), wherein objects (A) and (B) mutually impact one another, resulting in development (C). (C) will then have relations with other things, phenomena, and/or ideas, and the mutual impacts from these new relations will become the reasons for future results. Consider the following example:

Metaphysical vs. Materialist Dialectical conceptions of frying and eating an egg.

In the metaphysical “cause and effect” model, putting an egg in a hot pan is the cause which results in the effect of producing a fried egg. The egg being fried has the effect of the egg now being suitable for eating, which is the cause of the egg being eaten by a hungry person.

This is a simplification of the metaphysical conception of causes and effects, since metaphysics does recognize that one cause can have branches of multiple effects, but the essential characteristic of the metaphysical conception of causality is to break down all activity and change in the universe into static and distinct episodes of one distinct event causing one or more other distinct events.

In contrast, the materialist dialectical model of development holds that every result stems from mutual impacts which occur relationally between things, phenomena, and ideas, and that the resulting synthesis — the newly developed result of mutual impacts — will then have new relations with other things, phenomena, and ideas, and that these relations will become new reasons for new results through mutual impact.

In this example, the egg and the hot pan will mutually impact each other. The frying pan will become dirty and need to be washed (the result of putting an egg in the frying pan); meanwhile, the egg will become a fried egg, which is fit for human consumption (the result of being cooked in the frying pan). The fried egg will then have a relationship with a hungry human, and this relationship will be a new reason which will lead to further results (i.e., the human eating and digesting the egg).

So, the key difference between the classical metaphysical conception of causality and the materialist dialectical model of development is that metaphysics focus more on individual events in time whereas materialist dialectics focus on the relations and mutual impacts between things, phenomena, and ideas over time.

b. Dialectical relationship between Reason and Result

The relationship between Reason and Result is objective, and it contains inevitability: there is no Reason that does not lead to a Result; and likewise, there is no Result without any Reason.

Reasons cause Results, which is why Reason always comes before Result, and Result always comes after Reason.

A Reason can cause one or many Results and a Result can be caused by one or many Reasons.

When many Reasons lead to a single Result, the impacts which lead to the Result are mutual between all things, phenomena, and ideas at hand. These mutual impacts can have many relational positions or roles, including: direct reasons, indirect reasons, internal reasons, external reasons, etc.

Annotation 137

As stated in the previous annotation, Reasons which lead to Results stem from mutually impacting relations between things, phenomena, and ideas. There is no way for one subject to affect another subject without also being affected itself in some way.

Reasons can take many forms, including (but not limited to):

Types of Reasons and Results

Direct Reasons stem from immediate relations.

Direct Reasons are Reasons which stem from immediate relations, with no intervening relations standing between the Reason and Result.

For example, dropping a coffee cup causes an immediate relationship between the cup and the ground, and that relation leads directly to the Result of the coffee cup breaking to pieces.

Indirect Reasons have an intervening relationship between the Reason and the Result.

Indirect Reasons are Reasons which have intervening relations between a Reason and a Result.

For example, the dropped coffee cup above may have smashed into pieces directly because it hit the ground, but it may also have indirect Reasons. The person holding the cup may have been frightened because she heard a loud noise, and the loud noise was caused by a car backfiring, and the car backfiring was caused by the driver not maintaining his car engine.

In materialist dialectical terms, the driver’s relationship with his car would be an indirect Reason for the car backfiring; the relationship between the car (which backfired) and the person holding the coffee cup would be the direct Reason for dropping the cup; and the cup’s relationship with the ground would be the direct reason for the cup smashing. At the same time, the driver’s relationship with his car would be an indirect Reason for the Result of the coffee cup smashing to pieces.

Internal Reasons stem from internal relationships.

Internal Reasons are Reasons which stem from internal relations that occur between aspects and factors within a subject.

For example, if a building collapses because the steel structure within the building rusts and fails, then that could be viewed as an internal Reason for the collapse.

External Reasons stem from external relations.

External Reasons are reasons which stem from external relations that occur between different things, phenomena, and ideas.

For example, if a building collapses because it is smashed by a wrecking ball, then that could be viewed as an external Reason for the collapse.

All of these roles and positions can be viewed relatively. From one viewpoint, a Reason may be seen as internal, but from another viewpoint, it might be viewed as external. For example, if a couple has a disagreement which leads to an argument, the disagreement may be seen as an external Reason from the perspective of each individual within the couple. But to a relationship counselor viewing the situation from the outside, the disagreement may be seen as an internal Reason which leads to the couple (a subject defined by the internal relationship between the husband and wife) arguing.

From one perspective, a government official ordering a building to be torn down may be seen as the direct Reason for the Result of the building being torn down. But from a different perspective, one can see many intervening relations: complaints from local residents may have led to the government official making the order, the order would be delivered to a demolition crew, the demolition crew would assign a crew member to operate a wrecking ball, the crew member would operate the wrecking ball, the wrecking ball would smash the building. All of these can be seen as intervening relations which constitute indirect reasons leading up to the direct Reason of the wrecking ball smashing the building. Choosing the right viewpoint during analysis is critical to make sure that Reason and Result relations are viewed properly and productively, and care must also be taken to ensure that the correct Reasons are attributed to Results (see Reason and Result, p. 138).

Likewise, a Reason can cause many Results, including primary and secondary Results.

Annotation 138

Primary Results are Results which are more direct and predictable.

Secondary Results are Results which are indirect and less predictable.

For example, an earthquake may have primary Results such as the ground shaking, buildings being destroyed, etc. Secondary Results from the earthquake might include flights being rerouted from local airports, shortages at grocery stores, etc.

In the motion of the material world, there is no known “first Reason” or “final Result.”

Annotation 139

With our current understanding of the universe, it is uncertain what might have caused the creation of all existence. Was it the Big Bang? If so, did the Big Bang have some underlying reason? There is also no way to know if there will ever be a “final Result.” Will the heat death of the universe occur, and if so, will that end all transpiring of relations which would end the cycle of development — of Reasons and Results?

As of now, we do not have solid answers to these questions. If and when answers arise, it is possible that the materialist dialectical framework will need to be updated to reflect new scientific knowledge, just as Marx, Engels, and Lenin have updated materialist dialectics in the past [see Annotation 72, p. 68]. What’s important to understand in the meantime is that within our realm of human experience and understanding, for all practical purposes, every Result which we live through and observe has some underlying Reason, and will itself lead to one or more Results.

Engels said: “we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis [see Annotation 200, p. 192], positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed, and that despite all their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate [are mixed together]. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa.”[91]

Annotation 140

In the above passage, Engels is simply explaining that since all things, phenomena, and ideas are relationally linked and inter-related [see Basic Principles of Materialist Dialectics, p. 106], the mutual impacts and processes of change which lead to development (the reasons and results which transpire between all things, phenomena, and ideas) are also all linked and inter-related. What might be viewed as a Reason is also a Result of one or more prior Reasons, just as every Result is also a Reason for future Results.

c. Meaning of the Methodology

Because the relationship between Reason and Result is objective and inevitable, we can’t ignore the relationship between Reason and Result in our perception and practice. In reality, there is no thing, phenomenon or idea that can exist without any underlying Reason or Reasons; and vice versa, there is no Reason that does not lead to any Result.

Annotation 141

In political activity, it is important to remember that every interaction within every relationship will lead to mutual impacts which will cause change and development; in other words, everything we choose to do will be the Reason for one or more Results. We must be aware of unintended or unpredicted Results from our activities.

Reason-Result relationships are very complicated and diverse. Therefore, we must accurately identify the types of Reasons [direct, indirect, internal, external, etc.] so that we can come up with proper solutions which are suitable for the specific situation in both perception and practice. A Reason can lead to many results and, likewise, a Result can be caused by many Reasons, which is why we must have a comprehensive viewpoint and a historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116] in our perception of reality so we can properly analyse, solve and apply Reason-Result relationships.

Annotation 142

It is critical to understand that there may be many events or relationships which might be falsely ascribed as Reasons for a given Result (and vice-versa).

For example: in 1965, the United States of America officially declared war on North Vietnam after the so-called “Gulf of Tonkin Incident,” in which Vietnamese forces supposedly fired on a United States Navy ship in the Gulf of Tonkin. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident is often described as the “cause” or the “Reason” that the Vietnam War began.

However, the real “Reason” why the USA declared war on North Vietnam had to do with the underlying contradiction between capitalist imperialism and communism in Vietnam. This contradiction had to be resolved one way or another. The United States of America willfully decided to try to negate this contradiction by instigating war, and this was the true reason the war began. In fact, the so-called “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” never even occurred as described — the attack on the USA’s ship never really occurred. A document released by the Pentagon in 2005 revealed that the incident was completely fabricated. So, saying that the “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” was the Reason for the war is nonsensical, since it’s an event which never even occurred in reality.

Understanding the true nature of Reason and Result is very important for making decisions and choosing a path forward in political action. Attributing the wrong Reason to a Result, or misunderstanding the Results which stem from a Reason, can lead to serious setbacks and failures. Therefore, it is vital for revolutionaries to properly identify and understand the actual Reasons and Results which drive development.

3. Obviousness and Randomness

a. Categories of Obviousness and Randomness

Annotation 143

In Vietnamese, the words for these categories are “tất nhiên” and “ngẫu nhiên,” which respectively translate to “obvious” and “random.” In socialist literature, various words have been used by different authors to convey the underlying meaning of these categories (Engels, for instance, used the terms “necessary” and “accidental” to mean “obvious” and “random,” respectively). We have chosen to use words which closely match the Vietnamese used in the original text, but the reader should be aware that these same concepts may be described using many different words in various English translations of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Ho Chi Minh, etc.

The Obviousness category refers to events that occur because of the essential [see Essence and Phenomenon, p. 156] internal aspects of the material structure of a subject. These essential internal characteristics become reasons for certain results under certain conditions: the Obvious has to happen in a certain way, it can’t happen any other way.

Annotation 144

Obviousness can only apply to material subjects in the material world and results which are certain to happen based on the material laws of nature. Obviousness arises from the internal aspects, features, and relations of physical objects. Paper will burn under certain specific conditions, due its internal material structure. If those conditions (i.e., temperature, the presence of oxygen, etc.) exist, then paper will catch fire predictably. In other words, paper will obviously burn under certain circumstances due to its internal composition,.

The Randomness category refers to things that happen because of external reasons: things that happen, essentially, by chance, due to impacts from many external relations. A Random outcome may occur or it may not occur; a Random outcome could happen this way or it could happen that way.

Annotation 145

As we discussed above, paper will burn if it reaches a certain temperature — that much is obvious. If your friend holds paper over the flame of the lighter, the paper will burn — that’s obvious. But you can’t be certain whether your friend will actually hold the paper to the flame or not. This demonstrates Randomness. Whether your friend will ultimately hold the paper to the flame or not depends on an external relation which is not defined by the internal structure of the paper, and which can’t be predicted with the same predictability as obvious events which are rooted in internal material aspects.

b. Dialectical relationship between Obviousness and Randomness

Obviousness and Randomness both exist objectively and play an important role in the motion and development of things and phenomena. Obviousness plays the decisive role.

Annotation 146

Obviousness plays the decisive role simply because Obviousness is far more predictable and the laws which govern material phenomena are essentially fixed. We can’t change the laws of physics, the nature of chemical reactions, etc.

Obviousness and Randomness exist in dialectical unity; there is no pure Obviousness, nor pure Randomness. It is obvious that Randomness shall occur in our universe, however Obviousness clears a path through this Randomness.

Annotation 147

Our universe is incredibly complex and there are many different potential external relations which could impact any given situation, such that some degree of Randomness is always present in any situation; in other words, the presence of Randomness can be seen as Obvious.

In 1922, Ho Chi Minh identified objective internal characteristics of the working class of France and its colonies. He wrote: “The mutual ignorance of the two proletariats gives rise to prejudices. The French workers look upon the native as an inferior and negligible human being, incapable of understanding and still less of taking action. The natives regard all the French as wicked exploiters. Imperialism and capitalism do not fail to take advantage of this mutual suspicion and this artificial racial hierarchy to frustrate propaganda and divide forces which ought to unite.”

In this example, Ho Chi Minh identifies prejudice as an obvious outcome of mutual ignorance. The prejudice arises as a matter of course from internal objective aspects of the two proletarian groups. As long as French and native workers remain ignorant of one another, prejudice will arise. The specific forms which this prejudice will take, however, and their resulting impacts and developments, will be more or less Random because there are many external factors (including the external impacts of the capitalist class, which seeks to take advantage of these prejudices) which can’t be predicted. Therefore, it is necessary for political revolutionaries to account for both random and obvious factors in confronting such prejudice. Ho Chi Minh’s suggestion for overcoming these difficulties was concise and to-the-point: “Intensify propaganda to overcome them.” Only by negating the internal aspects of mutual ignorance through education and propaganda could communists hope to negate the resulting prejudice.

As Engels said: “One knows that what is maintained to be necessary [obvious] is composed of sheer accidents, and that the so-called accidental [random] is the form behind which necessity hides itself — and so on.”[92]

Obviousness and Randomness are not static properties: Randomness and Obviousness continuously change and develop over time. Under specific conditions, Obviousness and Randomness can transform into each other: Obviousness can become Random and Randomness can become obvious.

Annotation 148

Randomness can be introduced to an obvious situation: it may be obvious that a mineshaft will collapse, until human beings come along and intervene by repairing the structural integrity of the mineshaft. It may seem Random whether a city’s economy will grow or shrink, until a volcano erupts and buries the city in lava and ash, making it obvious that the economy will not grow because the city no longer exists.

Most situations are in a flux, as Obviousness and Randomness dialectically develop and change over time, with outcomes becoming more or less obvious or Random over time. It is vital that we, as political revolutionaries, are able to distinguish between Obviousness and Randomness and to leverage this understanding to our advantage.

c. Meaning of the Methodology

Basically, in our perception and reality, we have to base our plans, strategies, and actions as much as possible on the Obvious, not the Random. However, we must not ignore Randomness, nor try to separate the Obvious from the Random. When faced with situations which seem very Random, we must find ways to develop Obviousness. When faced with what seems obvious, we must keep an eye out for Randomness. Obviousness and Randomness can mutually transform, so we need to create suitable conditions to hinder or promote such transformation to suit our purposes.

Annotation 149

We must always remember that no situation is purely obvious, nor purely Random, and to take this into account in all of our planning and activity.

A skyscraper made from heavy steel beams may seem quite sturdy and stable; it may appear obvious that the structure will remain stable and sound for decades. However, it is still important for engineers to periodically confirm that the steel is still sound through testing and observation. Engineers must also be prepared for Random events like lightning, earthquakes, storms, etc., which may affect the seemingly obvious structural integrity of the building.

Likewise, when faced with extremely complex situations which seem completely Random, we must seek out (or bring about) the obvious. Wildfires are extremely chaotic and difficult to predict. However, firefighters can rely on certain obvious patterns and natural laws which govern the spread of fire. By digging trenches, lighting counter-fires, spraying water, and other such actions, firefighters can bring wildfires under control. This illustrates how humans are able to make situations less Random by bringing about an increasing amount of Obviousness over time through practical activity.

4. Content and Form

a. Categories of Content and Form

The Content category refers to the sum of all aspects, attributes, and processes that a thing, phenomenon, or idea is made from.

The Form category refers to the mode of existence and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. Form thus describes the system of relatively stable relationships which exist internally within things, phenomena, and ideas.

Annotation 150

Content and Form can be difficult to comprehend at first because the ways in which Content and Form manifest and interact can vary wildly depending on the subject being discussed and the viewpoint from which the subject is being considered.

Content represents the component things, materials, attributes, features, etc., which, together, make up a thing, phenomenon, or idea. You can think of it as the “ingredients” from which a subject is made.

Form refers to a stable system of internal relationships which compose a thing, phenomenon, or idea, as well as the mode of existence and development [see Annotation 60, p. 59] of those relations.

Remember that from a dialectical materialist perspective, everything in our universe is defined by internal and external relations. If a thing, phenomenon, or idea has internal relations which are relatively stable, then it has a Form.

We would not call all of the assorted ingredients which are used to make a cake “a cake” unless they have been assembled together and baked into the stable form which we interpret as “a cake.” Once a portion is removed from the cake, the portion itself assumes a new stable form which we call “a slice of cake.” The slice of cake will maintain its relatively stable form until being eaten, discarded, or otherwise transitioning into some other form. It is only considered a “slice of cake” for as long as it maintains its own specific stable form.

Stability itself is also relative: a “spray” of water may only last for a few seconds but we can still conceive of it as having Form. On the other hand, a mountain has a set of stable internal relations (a Form) which might last for millions of years.

We can think of Form as having two aspects: inner Form and outer Form.

Inner form refers to the internal stable relations which we have already discussed.

Outer form is how an object “appears” to human senses.

In this book, we are primarily concerned with the inner Form of subjects, however, in other contexts (such as art and design), the outer Form plays a more prominent role.

Now, let’s identify some of the common viewpoints from which Content and Form might be considered.

Material vs. Ideal

When discussing the material — i.e., objective systems and objects[93] — discussion of Content and Form is more straightforward.

Material

With material things and phenomena, the Content is what the thing is made out of: the physical parts, aspects, attributes, and processes that compose the subject. For example, the Content of a wooden chair might be the wood, nails, paint, and other materials which are used to create the chair.

A material object can be described in terms of content, inner form, and outer form.

The inner Form of a material object refers to stable internal relations which compose the object. The stable relationship between the wood and the nails — the nails bind the wood together, the wood is cut in certain patterns, the paint adheres to the wood through physical and chemical bonds, etc. Stability is, again, relative — over time, the paint will chip and flake, the wood will rot, the nails will rust, etc. Dialectical processes of change will eventually reduce the chair into something other than a chair (i.e., through rotting, burning, disassembly, etc.), but as long as the internal relations maintain the Form of a chair we conceive of it as a chair.

The outer Form of a material object refers to the way it appears to human consciousness. Its shape, aesthetics, etc.

Ideal

With the ideal — i.e., abstract ideas and concepts — discussion of Content and Form becomes more complicated. As Vietnam’s Marxism-Leninism Textbook for Students Who Specialize in Marxism-Leninism explains:

Many times, human consciousness has difficulty in trying to clearly define the Content of a subject — especially when the subject is an abstract idea. We often mistake Content with inner Form. Usually, in this situation, there is a strong combination and intertwining between both Content and Form. In such a situation, the Form can be referred to as the “inner Form,” or the “Content-Form.”

With physical things and phenomena, this type of Form usually belongs to a very specific Private, it doesn’t exist in any other Private, it is the Unique [see Annotation 129, p. 128].


The reason the inner Form of physical objects usually exists in Private as the Unique is because the stable internal relations of any given physical object are equivalent to the specific material components which distinguish one physical object from all other physical objects. In other words, if you have two chairs which are exact copies of each other, made from the same kind of wood, cut into the same shape, using the same type and configuration of fasteners, etc., they are still not the exact same object. The internal relations of one chair are what make it that chair and distinguish it from all other objects in the universe. The outer Form of these chairs may have many commonalities (they look similar, they have the same color, etc.), but the inner Form is what distinguishes one chair from the other.

However, within the realm of abstract ideas, there are also Forms which many abstract Privates share. In the context of abstract ideas, we call this kind of Form the “outer Form,” the “form-Form,” or the “common Form.”

When we try to define the Content of a subject which is an abstract idea, our consciousness usually tries to answer the question: “what is the subject?”

This is usually a simple matter. Take, for example, the abstract idea of “freedom.” When we try to think of the Content of freedom we can answer it pretty easily. What is the subject of freedom? It is the condition which allows humans to follow their own will, it is the absence of external coercion, etc., etc.

But, when we try to define the Form of an abstract idea, our consciousness tries to answer the question: “how is the subject?” — this is when we have to define the mode of existence (the Form) of that subject.

This is where things get more complicated. The mode of existence of an abstract idea can usually be considered to be language, since our ideas are usually expressed through language, but it can take on other modes of existence as well, such as visual media (paintings, photographs), physical motions of the human body (body language, dance), etc. This is how the field of art studies is concerned with the philosophical categories of Content and Form.

Content and Form in Art

Many readers may already be familiar with the subject of Content and Form from studying art, design, communications, and related fields. At first glance, the definitions of Content and Form may seem different from what we’ve been discussing so far.

This is because art concerns itself with abstract ideas expressed through various Forms of physical representations.

These physical representations may include physical objects (photographs, paintings, sculptures), performed and/or recorded physical activities (dance, music, theater, film), human language recorded in stable physical Forms of written language (novels, poems, stories) or spontaneously performed oral language (storytelling, impromptu spoken-word poetry).

Because the study of art is primarily concerned with interpreting and understanding ideas expressed through these physical manifestations, art is concerned with the stable inner relations of the ideas which artists imbue within their works of art — much more than the stable inner relations of the physical components of the object.

According to the Vietnamese art textbook Curriculum of General Aesthetics:

What is the Form of a work of art? Form is the way to express the Content of an artwork. Form and Content within a work of art have a strong unity with each other and they regulate each other. Form is the organization, the inner structure of the Content of an artwork. Therefore, Form is the way that the Content expresses itself, and that way is described by two features. We must ask:

First: what expresses the Content of a work of art?

Second: how is it expressed?

Art exists when two conditions are met: first, there must be a subject with an outer Form. Second, an artist must convey aesthetic meaning, or humanization, of that subject. This aesthetic meaning is the Content.

So, in studying works of art, we are less concerned with the physical content of the artwork (the canvas, paint, etc.) than we are with the abstract content of the artwork (the ideas which the artist imbues within the artwork).

As for Form, the inner Form of art represents the stable internal relations which compose the art (both ideal, i.e., the stable internal relations of the abstract ideas imbued within the art by the artist, as well as physical, i.e., the stable internal relations of the physical media of the art).

The outer Form of art represents how our human senses perceive the art, such as composition techniques, the use of color, etc.

The chart below breaks down the differences in a general, non-artistic viewpoint of physical objects and processes in materialist dialectical terms (i.e., the viewpoint an engineer might have), as compared with the artistic viewpoint of physical objects and processes (which an art critic might have). Some fields, such as designing products for human use, might draw from both viewpoints.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-54.png

Content and Form in Specific Artistic Media

Every medium of art will interpret Content and Form in its own way. For example:

Literature is a specific art discipline which deals with recorded human language in the Form of writing. In written literature, the Content would be the ideas expressed in a piece of writing; what the words say. The inner Form would be the way the ideas relate to each other — i.e., story structure, pacing, character development, etc. The outer form would be the physical format of the writing — i.e., manuscript, magazine article, paperback book, ebook, etc.

Painting is a specific art discipline in which pigments are applied to objects to create images which convey ideas and emotions. In painting, the Content would be the meaning which an artist embodies in a work of art. The inner Form would include the stable internal relations within the artwork (i.e., the bonds and mixtures between the pigments, the canvas, etc.), while the outer Form would be how the artwork appears to human senses (composition, aesthetics, etc.). Generally speaking, the creator of the art will have to make decisions about the inner Form (i.e., selection of oil vs. acrylic vs. watercolor, selection of shade, tint, and hue, physical brush strokes, etc.) so as to produce the desired outer Form (the way the finished artwork will appear to viewers).

Theater is a specific art discipline in which human beings perform physical actions and use their voices to convey ideas to an audience. In theater, the Content includes the ideas which are being presented, such as the script, the musical score, the story, the performance choices of actors, costumes, props, etc. The inner Form would include the stable relations between the members of the cast, the director, the physical stage, the lighting, etc., and the outer Form would be the way the play appears to the audience.

These are just some examples. Each medium of expression will have its own variations in how Content and Form are considered.

Engels described the manifestation of Content and Form in Dialectics of Nature:

The whole of organic nature is one continuous proof of the identity or inseparability of form and content. Morphological and physiological phenomena, form and function, mutually determine one another. The differentiation of form (the cell) determines differentiation of substance into muscle, skin, bone, epithelium, etc., and the differentiation of substance in turn determines difference of form.

Content and Form are discussed frequently in analysis of human social systems and objective relations which occur within society. For example, Marx made many criticial insights into economics by analyzing and explaining the form of value [see Annotation 14, p. 16] under capitalism.

Indeed, the entire capitalist system can be viewed in terms of content and form. The current form of human civilization is capitalism. That is to say, capitalism is the stable set of relations and characteristis of the current political economy which dominates the planet. The content of capitalism includes all the components of the base and superstructure, including the various classes (capitalists, working class, etc.), the means of production, government institutions, corporate institutions, etc. All of these elements are configured together into the relatively stable form which we call “capitalism.”

Other Viewpoints of Content and Form

Of course, there are many other viewpoints for discussing Content and Form of abstract ideas. Every philosophical field will have its own unique ways of utilizing Content and Form analysis. One example is the concept of Content and Form in legal philosophy. Vietnamese legal expert Dinh Thuy Dung writes:

The law has internal and external forms:

The inner Form is the internal structure of the law, the relationships and the connections between the elements constituting the law. The inner Form of the law is called the legal structure, which includes the constituent parts of the legal system such as the branch of law, legal institutions, and legal norms.

The outer Form is the manifestation, or mode of existence, of the law. In other words, the outer Form of the law is how we view and understand the law [i.e., who enforces the law and what repercussions will occur if we violate the law]. Based on the outer Form of the law, one can know how it exists in reality, and where and to whom it applies. The external Form of the law is also approached in relation to its Content.

According to this understanding, the Content of the law includes all the elements that make up the law, while the Form of the law is understood as the elements which contain or express the Content.

If you understand that the Content of the law is the will of the state, then the legal Form is the way of expressing the will of the state.

There are countless other ways in which Content and Form can be used to analyze and understand things, phenomena, and ideas. We hope that these examples have given you a better idea of the various ways in which Content and Form can be used to understand the world. In general, socialist texts deal with the inner Form of things, phenomena, and ideas. That is to say, the inner relations which compose the subject being considered. The outer form — how things appear to our senses — tends to be less relevant in analysis of human social systems, though it is often important in consideration of specialized fields of revolutionary activity such as aesthetics, propaganda, etc.

b. Dialectical relationship between Content and Form

Content and Form have a strong dialectical relationship with one other. There is no Form that does not contain any Content. Simultaneously, there is no Content that does not exist in a specific Form. The same Content can manifest in many Forms and a Form can contain many Contents.

The relationship between Content and Form is a dialectical relationship in which Content decides Form and Form can impact Content.

Annotation 151

For example, if you want to make a table, and all you have available are wood and nails, then that Content (the wood and the nails) will determine the Form the table ends up taking. You are going to end up with a wooden table, and it will therefore have to have certain characteristics of Form.

When Content changes, the Form must change accordingly. If, instead of wood, you have iron, then the table you end up building will have a much different Form. Form can also influence the Content, but not nearly as much as Content determines Form. For instance, if you have wood and nails, but you develop a technique for building a table that doesn’t need any nails, then the result (a wooden table without any nails) would be an example of a development in Form reflecting as a change in Content.

The main tendency of Content is change. On the other hand, Form is relatively stable in every thing and phenomenon. As Content changes, Form must change accordingly. However, Content and Form are not always perfectly aligned.

Annotation 152

Since all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly changing, it stands to reason that the internal components (things, phenomena, and ideas, and their relations) which compose the Content of a subject will constantly be undergoing processes of change and development. Thus, we say that the tendency of Content is change. Since the Form is based on the internal relations of the components of Content, it stands to reason that a change in Content will lead to change in Form. These kinds of changes in Content and Form also occur through the dialectical process: changes in quantity lead to changes in quality [see Annotation 117, p. 119].

Quantity changes in Content lead to quality shifts in Form.

As soon as a wooden chair is finished being built, the paint is already beginning to degrade. The wood is already beginning to rot. The iron nails are already beginning to rust. These changes may be imperceptibly slow — they may even take centuries to occur, if the chair is kept in a hospitable environment — but the changes are occurring, quantitatively, over time, none-the-less.

Eventually, changes in quantity will lead to changes in quality. At some point, the chair might weaken and begin to wobble whenever it’s sat in. Human beings might recognize this quality and begin to think of it as a “wobbly chair.” The chair might degrade to the point where it can’t be safely used at all, in which case it will have quality shifted into a “broken chair.” If the chair is repaired, that would represent another quality shift. If it is used for firewood, that would be another quality shift.

Keep in mind that changes in Form do not directly cause changes in Content. If you disassemble a wooden chair into the constituent wood and nails, the wood and nails remain more or less unchanged. But if you burn a wooden chair, it’s the change in Content which leads to the change in Form from “chair” to “pile of ash.”

Form simply represents the stable relationships between the component parts of the subject’s Content. The only way to change Form is to change those inner relations, or to change the components which are relating. There is no way to change Form without changing the Content, and changing the Content changes the Form by definition.

Content determines Form, but Form is not fully decided by Content, and Form can impact back on Content. If a Form is suitable with its Content, it can improve the development of its Content. If a Form is not suitable with its Content, it can constrain the development of its Content.

Annotation 153

The dialectical relationship between Content and Form is somewhat similar to the dialectical relationship between the material and the ideal (see Matter and Consciousness,

p. 88). Just as the material world determines consciousness while consciousness impacts the material world, the Content of a subject determines the Form while the Form impacts the Content.

Suitability describes the applicability of a subject for a specific application or role. Whether or not something is “suitable” or not can be highly subjective (i.e., which music would be “suitable” to play at a party), or it can be more objective (i.e., what kind of batteries to use with an electronic device).

We might say that hardwood is “suitable” Content for the Form of a chair because it is durable, strong, relatively inexpensive, and long-lasting. It might be “unsuitable” to have a chair made of hardwood if it is to be used as an office chair, because the hard surfaces might cause strain and discomfort. However, we can utilize conscious activity to adjust and develop suitability between Content and Form. Changing the Content by adding cushioning or padding might make the Content and Form more suitable with each other. Similarly, changing the Form by designing contours and adding adjustability to the chair might make the Content and Form more suitable with each other for their intended application as an office chair.

If a Form is not suitable with the Content, it restrains the development of the Content. Just think of a shovel (Form) made of wood (Content), which will degrade very rapidly over time, vs. a shovel (Form) made of steel (Content) which will last much longer. This works in both directions. Consider the Content of drinking cups: a porcelain cup might last for a long time and even develop positively over time (by acquiring a desirable patina), while a cup made out of mild steel would not be desirable, as it would be highly prone to rust from extended use containing liquids.

c. Meaning of the Methodology

Content and Form always have a dialectical relationship with each other. Therefore, in our perception and practice, we must not try to separate Content and Form, nor should we solely focus on one and ignore the other.

Because Content determines Form, whenever we are considering a thing, phenomenon, or idea, we must base our consideration first on its Content. If we want to change a thing or phenomenon, we have to change its Content first.

In reality, we must promote the positive impact of Form on Content by making the Form fit the Content. Likewise, we must also change the Form that is no longer suitable with its Content and therefore constrains the development of its Content.

Annotation 154

In any analysis, it is very important that we carefully consider whether or not Content and Form are suitable with each other in our own projects and activities. We can learn a lot about suitability from observation and practice (see Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism, p. 204) and improve suitability through conscious activity.

Marx believed that it is vital to consider Content and Form when analyzing human society and political economy. One of his core critiques of political economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo was a failure to consider Content and Form when it comes to value, commodities, and money. He discusses this extensively in Capital Volume 1, as in this excerpt:

The value-form, whose fully developed shape is the money-form, is very elementary and simple. Nevertheless, the human mind has for more than 2,000 years sought in vain to get to the bottom of it all, whilst on the other hand, to the successful analysis of much more composite and complex forms, there has been at least an approximation. Why? Because the body, as an organic whole, is more easy of study than are the cells of that body. In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both.

Marx, here, is saying that studying the economy is more difficult than studying the human body because it can’t be physically observed and dissected. Rather, we have to rely on abstraction, which leaves us prone to making many more mistakes in analyzing Content and Form.

But in bourgeois society, the commodity-form of the product of labour – or value-form of the commodity – is the economic cell-form. To the superficial observer, the analysis of these forms seems to turn upon minutiae. It does in fact deal with minutiae, but they are of the same order as those dealt with in microscopic anatomy.

Marx’s analysis of capitalism relies to great extent upon recognizing the commodity-form of the product (Content) of labor. Labor existed long before capitalism. Labor has existed for as long as humans have worked to change our own material conditions. But under capitalism, labor specifically takes on the Form of a commodity which is bought by capitalists. This becomes the basis for Marx’s entire critique of capitalism.

Obviously, there is much more to Marx’s use of Content and Form in analyzing capitalism and human society, but this should hopefully give you some idea of the importance of Content and Form in analysis of human society and revolutionary activity.

5. Essence and Phenomenon

a. Categories of Essence and Phenomenon

The Essence category refers to the synthesis of all the internal aspects as well as the obvious and stable relations that define the existence, motion and development of things, phenomena, and ideas.

The Phenomenon category refers to the external manifestation of those internal aspects and relations in specific conditions.

Annotation 155

Understanding Essence and Phenomena can be challenging at first, but it is very important for materialist dialectical analysis.

Essence should not be confused with Form. Form represents the stable internal relations of the component content of a subject, whereas Essence represents the synthesis of all internal aspects as well as all obvious and stable attributes which define the existence, motion, and development of a subject.

Phenomena are simply external manifestations of a subject which occur in specific conditions.

The Essence of a subject is not dependent on conditions, whereas in different conditions, the same subject will exhibit different Phenomena. For example, COVID-19 is, essentially, a specific virus strain. That is to say, all of the internal aspects and stable relations that define the existence, motion, and development of COVID-19 are synthesized as a virus which we call COVID-19.

The Phenomena of COVID-19 which we can observe in patients would include symptoms such as fever, coughing, trouble breathing, etc.

The Essence of a cloud is water vapor in the atmosphere: that is the synthesis, the coming-together, of all the internal stable relations and aspects which will determine how a cloud exists, moves, and develops over time.

The Phenomena of clouds are all the things we can sense: the appearance of big fluffy white things in the air, shadows on the ground, and, sometimes, rain.

Essence defines Phenomenon: the internal attributes and stable relations will produce the Phenomena which we can observe. A cloud is not essentially defined as a fluffy white thing in the air; that is just the appearance a cloud has to our human senses in certain specific conditions.

b. Dialectical relationship between Essence and Phenomenon

Essence and Phenomenon both exist objectively as two unified but opposing sides.

The unity between Essence and Phenomenon: Essence always manifests through Phenomena, and every Phenomenon is always the manifestation of a specific Essence. There is no pure Essence that exists separately from Phenomena and there is no Phenomenon that does not manifest from any kind of Essence.

When Essence changes, Phenomena also change accordingly. When Essence appears, Phenomena also appear, and when Essence disappears, Phenomena also disappear. Therefore, Lenin said: “The Essence appears. The appearance is essential.”[94]

The Opposition of Essence and Phenomenon: Essence is that which defines a thing, Phenomenon, or idea, while Phenomena are diversified and conditional. Essence is internal, while Phenomena are external. Essence is relatively stable, while Phenomena continuously change.

Annotation 156

Essence and Phenomenon are simultaneously unified and opposite because neither can exist without the other, yet they have completely opposite features from one another.

Discussing the Essence and Phenomena of physical objects is relatively straight-forward. The Essence will typically encompass the physical object or system itself. For example, a car engine is essentially a machine; that is to say, the synthesis of all the internal aspects (the engine parts) as well as the obvious and stable relations (the relations between the parts of the engine; how they are assembled and work together in the engine system) that define the existence, motion and development of the engine (the way it works) are what essentially make it a car engine. All of these essential characteristics are internal, relatively stable, and remain the same regardless of the condition of the engine (i.e., they continue to exist whether the engine is turned on, turned off, inoperable, etc.).

The Phenomena of the car engine are all the things that we can sense from it, but this can vary a great deal depending on conditions. When the car engine is turned off, it will be silent. It may be cool to the touch. It will be at rest. If the engine is turned on, the parts will move, it will become hot, it will make noise. In some situations it might smoke or even catch on fire. All of these Phenomena are conditional, unstable, and external to the engine itself.

With ideas and abstract thought, Essence and Phenomenon becomes more difficult to determine and analyze. Lenin discussed this in his Philosophical Notebooks, beginning with a quote from Hegel:

Dialectics in general is “the pure movement of thought in Notions“ (i.e., putting it without the mysticism of idealism: human concepts are not fixed but are eternally in movement, they pass into one another, they flow into one another, otherwise they do not reflect living life.

Knowing that Hegel was an idealist, Lenin wanted to strip all idealism from his conception of dialectics, and thus made it clear that “the pure movement of thought” simply refers to the fact that human thoughts are constantly changing, always in motion, within the living human mind, writing:

The analysis of concepts, the study of them, the “art of operating with them” (Engels) always demands study of the movement of concepts, of their interconnection, of their mutual transitions).

This is a description of materialist dialectical analysis of human thought. We must understand that human thoughts are always in motion, always developing, and always mutually impacting other thoughts.

In particular, dialectics is the study of the opposition of the Thing-in-itself, of the essence, substratum, substance — from the appearance, from “Being-for-Others.” (Here, too, we see a transition, a flow from the one to the other: the essence appears. The appearance is essential.) Human thought goes endlessly deeper from appearance to essence, from essence of the first order, as it were, to essence of the second order, and so on without end.

This is where Lenin introduces the concept of Essence and Phenomenon (or “appearance,” as Lenin puts it) as simultaneously oppositional and in unity. Essence refers to the qualities and nature of the “thing-in-itself” (its internal components, relations, etc.) while Phenomena represents “being-for-others” (that which external observers can sense or witness of a subject). However, as Lenin notes, Essence and Phenomena have a dialectical relationship with each other — a “flow from the one to the other.” The Essence “appears” by exuding Phenomena which we can sense.

Conscious thoughts also have Essence and Phenomena of their own. With thought, the development from Essence to Phenomena is constant and inevitable. The Essence of each thought leads to thought-Phenomena which develop in turn into the Essence of new thoughts in a constant flow.

In this sense, Essence and Phenomenon of abstract thought is somewhat different from Essence and Phenomenon of physical objects, but physical objects can have this same dialectical pattern of development. For example, the emissions from the engine of a car can be considered Phenomena of the engine, but as these Phenomena build up in the air (along with the emissions from many other cars), they can develop into a physical subject with a new Essence of its own, which we call “air pollution.”

We can also think of the light which comes from the sun. The light itself can be thought of as Phenomena of the sun, but the light energy can be captured by a solar panel and converted into energy, creating a new subject with its own Essence which we would describe as “solar energy.” In this sense, it is possible for Phenomena to have Phenomena. If you witness light waves in the desert which cause an optical illusion, then the illusion is a Phenomenon of the light waves (the light waves being the Essence which exuded the Phenomenon of illusion), and the light waves are the Phenomena of the sun (the essential subject which exudes the Phenomena of the light waves).

Essence and Phenomena can also be contextual. In some contexts, physical objects which have their own Essence (and Phenomena) may be the Phenomena of some other entity. For example, archaeologists can’t observe prehistoric civilizations directly. They can only study the things which are left behind. In this sense, we can think of an archaeological artifact, like a stone tool, as a Phenomenon of a prehistoric civilization. The tool has its own Essence and Phenomena, but it is also itself a Phenomenon. A single stone tool can’t tell archaeologists much about an ancient civilization, however, archaeologists can gather many Phenomena (tools, structural ruins, nearby animal bones and seeds, human remains, etc.) to look for patterns which reveal more insights about the Essence of the prehistoric civilization which exuded those Phenomena.

Dialectics in the proper sense is the study of contradiction in the very essence of objects: not only are appearances transitory, mobile, fluid, demarcated only by conventional boundaries, but the essence of things is so as well.

Lenin, here, points out that proper analysis hinges on understanding the Essence of a subject, since the Phenomena are fleeting and subject to change. Most notably, we should look for contradictions within the subject (see Definition of Contradiction and Common Characteristics of Contradiction, p. 175), because contradictions are what drive dialectical development of a subject over time.

c. Meaning of the Methodology

If we want to be accurately aware of things, phenomena, and ideas, we must not just stop at studying their Phenomena, we have to study their Essence. Only through examining many Phenomena of a subject can we fully and correctly understand the Essence of said subject.

Annotation 157

With physical objects, we must study the Phenomena to know anything about a subject, since Phenomena is, by definition, that which we can observe. Only through systematic, repeated observations can we come to understand the Essence of the object which exudes the Phenomena. Because Phenomena can change based on conditions, we must observe Phenomena under various conditions in a systematic way. This is the basis of all scientific inquiry.

This is also true for analyzing aspects of human society. To understand a social system, we must observe its Phenomena systematically over time and look for patterns which form under various conditions. We must also keep in mind that social systems develop and change over time, and so the Essence might develop with or without changes in certain Phenomena. For example, the phenomena of the United States of America have changed significantly over the years. The national flag, military uniforms, seals, and other iconography have changed throughout the history of the USA. Similarly, there have been many presidents, and the government and constitution have also been through many changes. That said, the essential nature of the USA’s political economy has not changed significantly since its foundation; the USA has been a capitalist bourgeois democracy since the beginning and remains so to this day. Regardless of which bourgeois-dominated political party holds power in the white house and congress — Whig, Republican, Democrat, or otherwise — the essential nature of the USA as a capitalist bourgeois democracy has remained the same.

According to Lenin: “Human thought goes endlessly deeper from appearance to essence, from essence of the first order, as it were, to essence of the second order, and so on, without end.”[95] On the other hand, Essence is what defines a thing, phenomenon, or idea. Therefore, in our perception and practice, we must recognize a thing, phenomenon, or idea based on its Essence, not its Phenomena, to evaluate it correctly, and after that, we can make fundamental improvements.

Annotation 158

For example: Thousands of years ago, people observed that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west everyday. Based on these Phenomena, many human civilizations developed the belief that the Essence of our solar system was that the earth was the center of the universe and the sun rotated around it. Today, thanks to scientific observation and practice, we have proven that the sun is the center of the solar system and that the earth is rotating around it, which is totally opposite to what many believed hundreds of years ago. In this case, the initially observed Phenomena were misleading, and it was only by getting a better grasp of the essential nature of the solar system that we could better comprehend its functioning.

It is usually easy to observe Phenomena (since they are defined by being observable) but it’s also easy to misunderstand relationships between Essence and Phenomena. Sometimes people get a false perception of Essence from real Phenomena, such as believing the Sun revolves around the Earth. Sometimes people attribute the wrong Phenomena to Essences as well, such as believing that all poor people are lazy.

Phenomena can easily be mistaken for essence. For example, bourgeois liberal political parties often portray themselves as being pro-worker and therefore exhibit phenomena such as rhetoric, slogans, propaganda, and even platform positions which appeal to workers. These phenomena may confuse many into believing that they are workers’ parties when, in reality, they are essentially dominated by the capitalist class. The reverse can also occur. For example, workers may be fooled into believing that a ruthless capitalist politician or celebrity is “working class at heart,” falsely believing that the capitalist’s class position is merely a phenomenon when in fact it is essential.

Understanding true Essence based on real Phenomena is one of the most important aspects of analysis. It is the primary realm of science. In politics, misunderstanding or mischaracterizing Essence and Phenomena can reinforce false beliefs about the way society works which can lead to promulgation of dangerous and reactionary ideologies like neoliberalism and fascism amidst the working class. For this reason, we must avoid examining Phenomena alone. We have to dive deep to discover and understand the essential nature of things, phenomena, and ideas in our analysis.

6. Possibility and Reality

a. Categories of Possibility and Reality

The Possibility category refers to things that have not happened nor existed in reality yet, but that would happen, or would exist given necessary conditions.

The Reality category refers to things that exist or have existed in reality and in human thought.

b. Dialectical Relationship Between Possibility and Reality

Possibility and Reality have a unified and inseparable relationship: Possibility can transform into Reality and Reality contains new Possibility; any given Possibility, under specific conditions, can transform into Reality.

Given specific conditions, there could be one or many possibilities for the development of any given thing, phenomenon, or idea: practical Possibility, random Possibility, obvious Possibility, abstract Possibility, near Possibility, far Possibility, etc.

Annotation 159

Excerpt From Marxism-Leninism Textbook of Students Who Specialize in Marxism-Leninism

Editor’s notes in [brackets]

Reality has many aspects. It also has many tendencies of development. These aspects and tendencies of Reality have different roles and positions in the development process of Reality. For example, manifesting any given Possibility into Reality requires us to change a specific subject from one status to a different status. Some subjects are easier to transform and others are more difficult to transform. Some require us to change quality, others only require quantity changes [see Annotation 117, p. 119].

Because Reality has many aspects and tendencies of development, it is useful to classify Possibility. There are at least four types of Possibility, in two separate categories.

[The categorization below draws a distinction between the obvious and the practical.

The obvious is that which will certainly occur. If you drop an object, it will obviously fall. The practical is that which we certainly could make occur through human will. If you are holding an object, you could practically drop it.]

Obvious Possibility and Random Possibility [see: Obviousness and Randomness, p. 144].

Obvious Possibility refers to Possibility that will happen, because conditions to make it happen are set in place so that the Possibility developing into Reality is unavoidable.

[If the conditions arise for a hurricane to form, it eventually becomes obvious that a hurricane will form.]

Random Possibility is Possibility which may or may not happen depending on how external factors develop, our actions, the actions of others, etc. [Whether or not a hurricane may develop on any given day is, from our human perspective, random, since we do not have any technology to cause or prevent the development of hurricanes. Other events may be more or less random. We can, for instance, prepare for an incoming hurricane to minimize the risk of harm to human communities.]

Second, based on the practical relationships between subjects, we have:

Practical Possibility vs. Abstract Possibility:

Practical Possibility means that conditions in Reality which could make something happen are already in place. [If you have all the ingredients, knowledge, and equipment needed to make a pie, you could make a pie. The material conditions are in place.]

Abstract Possibility is Possibility which may become Reality in the future but the conditions which would make this Possibility become Reality have not yet developed.

[It is an abstract Possibility that you could make a pie, even if you don’t have the tools, ingredients, or knowledge. It is possible, in the abstract, that you could buy the ingredients and equipment and learn the necessary skills to make a pie. Near Possibility simply refers to Possibility which may become Reality in the shorter term, far Possibility refers to things which may happen in a more distant future, relative to the subject being discussed.]

In social life, in order to transform a Possibility into Reality, there must be objective conditions and subjective factors. Subjective factors include the ability of humans to change Possibility into Reality. Objective conditions refer to the situations needed to make such a change occur. [In other words, humans are able to subjectively change possibility into reality, but only when the objective circumstances exist in the external world.]

c. Meaning of the Methodology

We must base our perception and practice on Reality.

Lenin said: “Marxism takes its stand on the facts, and not on possibilities. A Marxist must, as the foundation of his policy, put [forth] only precisely and unquestionably demonstrated facts.”[96]

However, in our perception and practice, we also need to comprehensively recognize possibilities which could arise from Reality. This will allow us to develop methods of practical operation which are suitable to changes and developments which might occur. We must actively make use of subjective factors in perception and practice to turn Possibility into Reality whenever it would serve our purposes.

Annotation 160

This idea is perhaps best exemplified in the traditional Vietnamese proverb: “you can’t just open your mouth and wait for fruit to drop into your mouth.” We have to actively apply our will, through practice and labor, to develop the best possibilities into manifested Reality. See more about subjective factors in Annotation 207, p. 202.

IV. Basic Laws of Materialist Dialectics

Laws are the regular, common, obvious, natural, and objective relations between internal aspects, factors, and attributes of a thing or phenomenon or between things and phenomena.

There are many types of laws in this world and they all have different prevalence, reach, characteristics, and roles in regard to the motion and development processes of things and phenomena in nature, society, and human thought. So, it is necessary to classify different laws for humans to understand and apply them effectively into practical activities. Classifying laws based on prevalence, we have: private laws, common laws, and universal laws [see: Private and Common, p. 128].

Private laws are laws that only apply to a specific range of things and phenomena. For example: laws of mechanical motion, laws of chemical motion, laws of biological motion, etc.

Common laws are laws that apply to a broader range of subjects than private laws, and they impact many different subjects. For instance: the law of preservation of mass, the law of preservation of energy, etc.

Universal laws are laws that impact every aspect of nature, society, and human thought. Materialist dialectics is the study of these universal laws.

If we classify laws based on the reach of impact, we will have three main groups: laws of nature, laws of society, and laws of human thought.

Laws of nature are laws that arise in the natural world, including within the human body. They are not products of human conscious activities.

Laws of society are the laws of human activity in social relations; these laws only apply to the conscious activities of humans, yet they are still objective.

Annotation 161

We have already discussed how relations between human beings are objective [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. By extension, the human relations which compose human societies are objective, and thus, any laws which govern objective human relations must also be objective.

Marx’s assertion that human social relations are objective is critical to understanding his work. Marx pointed out that social relations may not be “physical,” in the sense that they can’t be observed directly with human senses, but that they still have an objective character — they exist externally to a given subject, and they have objective impacts on reality. For instance, the class relations between the capitalist class and the working class result in objective manifestations in reality, such as wealth accumulation, modes of circulation, etc.

Laws of human thought are laws of the intrinsic relationships between concepts, categories, judgments, inference, and the development process of human rational awareness.

As the science of common relations and development, materialist dialectics studies the universal laws that influence the entire natural world, human society, and human thought, all together as a whole.

These universal laws are:

  • The law of transformation between quantity and quality.
  • The law of unification and contradiction between opposites.
  • The law of negation of negation.

Annotation 162

Each of these laws is considered universal because they apply to all things, phenomena, and ideas, and all the internal and external relations thereof, in human perception and practice. All things, phenomena, and ideas change and develop as a result of mutual impacts and relationships in accordance with these universal laws. On a fundamental level, materialist dialectics is the study of these universal laws and their utility.

1. Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality

The law of transformation between quantity and quality is a universal law which concerns the universal mode of motion and development processes of nature, society, and human thought.

Annotation 163

Remember that mode refers to how something exists, functions, and develops [see Annotation 60, p. 59]. The universal mode of motion and development processes thus refers to how all things, ideas, and phenomena move, change, and develop.

Friedrich Engels defined the law of transformation between quantity and quality in Dialectics of Nature:

The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy).

In other words, quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas lead to quality shifts.

The universal mode of motion and development processes follows the law of transformation between quantity and quality, which states:

Qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of the quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and, ideas; and, vice versa: quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas.

Annotation 164

Put simply: quantity changes develop into quality changes, and quality changes lead to quantity changes [see Annotation 117, p. 119]. We say that these changes to quantity and quality occur on the “inevitable basis” of one another because quality changes always, invariably, arise from quantity changes, and, likewise, quantity changes always, invariably, arise from quality changes.

Just as quantity shifts lead to quality shifts, it is also true that quality shifts lead to quantity shifts. For example, if you have 11 donuts, then add 1 donut, you now have 1 dozen donuts. If you add 12 more donuts, you would then have 2 dozen.

Another example of quality shift leading to quantity shift would be a pond filling with rain water. Once enough drops of water collect and the pond is considered full — that is to say, once it is considered to be “a pond” of water — we will no longer think of the pond in terms of “drops.” We would think of the pond as “filled,” “overfilled,” “underfilled,” etc.

Note that both of these examples are related to our human perceptions and understanding of the material world. The material world does not change based on our perceptions, nor how we classify the quantity or quality of a given subject. There are also objective aspects related to quality shifts leading to quantity shifts. For example, if we adjust the quantity of the temperature of a sheet of paper to the point of burning, and the paper burns, then the quantity of paper would be reduced from one sheet to zero sheets. In other words, the quality shift arising from temperature quantity increase (i.e., the paper burning into ash) results in a quantity shift in how many pieces of paper exist (from one sheet to zero sheets). However, even this is ultimately a subjective assessment rooted in human consciousness, since we subjectively think in terms of “sheets of paper,” and the concept of a “sheet of paper” is essentially a classification rooted in human consciousness. It is merely an abstract way of perceiving and considering the quantity and quality of the material subject which we think of as “paper.”

The law of transformation between quantity and quality is an inevitable, objective, and universal relationship that repeats in every motion and development process of all things, phenomena, and ideas in nature, human society, and human thought.

a. Definitions of Quality and Quantity

- Definition of Quality

Quality refers to the organic unity which exists amongst the component parts of a thing, phenomenon, or idea that distinguishes it from other things, phenomena, and ideas.

Annotation 165

Note: we have already given basic definitions of quantity and quality in Annotation 117, p. 119. What follows are more comprehensive philosophical definitions of quality and quantity. Our world exists as one continuity of matter. All things and phenomena in our universe exist essentially as one unified system — namely, the entity which we call “the universe.” This unified nature of existence is extremely difficult for human beings to comprehend. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel pointed out that, in this sense, the unity of “pure being” is indistinguishable from “nothingness.” In Science of Logic, Hegel noted that if we try to comprehend pure material existence, as a whole, without distinguishing any component thing or phenomenon from any other, then all is incomprehensible. Human consciousness needs to delineate and distinguish the component parts of this unified system from each other in order to make sense of it all.

Pure light and pure darkness are two voids which are the same thing. Something can be distinguished only in determinate light or darkness... [F]or this reason, it is only darkened light and illuminated darkness which have within themselves the moment of difference and are, therefore, determinate being.

The human mind has evolved to perceive various things, phenomena, and ideas as differentiated. Quality is the basis on which we perceive subjects as distinct from one another. Every thing, phenomenon, and idea is composed of internal components and relations. The unity of these internal components and relations is what we refer to as quality. For example, a human being’s quality refers to the unity of all the internal components and relationships of which the human being is composed (i.e., the cells, organs, blood, etc., as well as the thoughts, memories, etc., which make the human) in unity. Quality is also a subjective phenomenon: a reflection of the material world in human consciousness [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. Therefore we may conceive of various qualities for the same subject. We can think of 12 donuts as “a box of donuts,” “a dozen donuts,” or as 12 individual donuts. We could consider a building as “one apartment building” or “forty apartments,” depending on the viewpoint of analysis.

So, objective and inherent attributes form the quality of things, phenomena, and ideas, but we must not confuse quality and attribute with one another. Every thing, phenomenon, and idea has both fundamental and non-fundamental attributes. Only fundamental attributes constitute the quality of things, phenomena and ideas. When the fundamental attributes change, the quality also changes. The distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental attributes of things, phenomena, and ideas must depend on the purpose of the analysis; the same attribute may be fundamental when analyzing with one purpose but non-fundamental when analyzing with another purpose.

Annotation 166

Whether or not an attribute is considered “fundamental” depends entirely on conscious perspective. For example, one baker may consider chocolate chips to be “fundamental” for baking cookies while another baker may not. This subjective characteristic of what might be considered “fundamental” or not is reflected in how we consider quality. If you are trying to determine how much water you need to fill a swimming pool, you may think of a pool in terms of size (i.e., “this is an Olympic sized pool”), but if you just want to go for a swim, you are likely to just think in terms of the water level (i.e., “the pool is empty, we can’t swim”).

If you are planning the construction of a school and want to know how many classrooms it will need, you might think in terms of “classrooms of students.” But if you are considering funding for a school year, you might consider the total number of students.

The quality of a thing, phenomenon, or idea is determined by the qualities of its component parts.

Annotation 167

Qualities are composed of qualities, combined, in unity. “A swimming pool” may consist of a certain amount of concrete in a specific configuration combined with 5,000 gallons of water. A car may be composed of a body, an engine, four tires, etc. Each individual component exists as a quality — a unity of component attributes — in and of itself.

Quality is also determined by the structures and connections between component parts which manifest in specific relations. Therefore, distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental attributes is also relative.

Annotation 168

It’s not just the component parts of a subject which define its quality, but also the relations of those component parts. For instance, a quantity of wood and nails configured in one set of structural relations may have the quality of a chair, whereas the same component parts arranged with different structures and relations may have the quality of a table. In this sense, quality can be thought of as a synthesis of the Content and Form [see Content and Form, p. 147] of a thing, phenomenon, or idea from a certain perspective.

For example, if we see two shoes, we may think of each shoe as an individual qualitative object (two shoes). On the other hand, we may think of the shoes, together, as a single qualitative “object” in terms of its utility and in terms of synthesis of content and form (“a pair of shoes”), so much so that if one shoe is lost then the remaining shoe is considered useless and discarded as trash.

Because there are countless ways in which quality — the configuration and relations and composition of constituent parts of any given subject — can manifest, we must recognize that quality itself, based on the distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental attributes, is a relative and subjective phenomenon of human consciousness.

Any given subject will have multiple qualities, depending on the relations which exist between and within that subject and other subjects.

Annotation 169

Any thing, phenomenon, or idea may be perceived from various different perspectives which would cause us to consider it as having different qualities. A single shoe may be considered as: a shoe, 3 pounds of leather, half of a pair, etc., depending on its internal and external relations and the perspective of the person considering the shoe.

We can’t consider things, phenomena, and ideas apart from quality. Quality exhibits a subject’s relative stability.

Annotation 170

Remember that quality is the way in which the human mind conceives of the world as a collection of distinct things, phenomena, and ideas. These perceptions of quality are purely relative, but they are important, because they are what allow us to develop an understanding of the complicated system of things, phenomena, and ideas which make up our universe. In our perception, quality represents the relative stability of a thing, phenomenon, or idea which makes it a subject that we can consider and analyze in and of itself. Understanding how we distinguish between different subjects is crucial in developing a scientific understanding of the world which is rooted in observation and practice.

- Definition of Quantity

Quantity refers to the amount or extent of specific attributes of a thing, phenomenon, or idea, including but not limited to:

  • The amount of component parts.
  • Scale or size.
  • Speed or rhythm of motion.

A thing, phenomenon, or idea can have many quantities, with each quantity determined by different criteria. [i.e., a car may be measured by many criteria of quantity, such as: length in meters, weight in kilograms, speed in kilometers per hour, etc.]

Quality and quantity embody two different aspects of the same subject. Both quality and quantity exist objectively [see Annotation 108, p. 112]. However, the distinction between “quality” and “quantity” in the process of perceiving things, phenomena, and ideas has only relative significance: an attribute may be considered “quantity” from one perspective but “quality” from another perspective.

Annotation 171

If you are filling a box with a dozen donuts, then once you add the 12th donut, one “dozen” may represent the quality which you seek. From the perspective of a customer buying donuts for a party, “dozen” may represent the “quantity.” In other words, you need to make an order (quality) of three dozen donuts (quantity). And the manager of the store, at the end of the day, may tally twenty orders (quantity) as the day’s sales goal (quality). Quantity and quality, therefore, are both considered relatively, based on perspective and the purpose of analysis at hand.

b. Dialectical Relationship Between Quantity and Quality

Every thing, phenomenon, and idea exists as a unity of two aspects: quality and quantity. Quantity and quality do not exist separate from one another. Quantity and quality dialectically and mutually impact one other. Changes in quantity lead to changes in quality. However, not every change in quantity will cause a change in quality.

Annotation 172

In order for quantity change to lead to quality change, a certain amount must be met.

This amount is called the threshold, which is explained further below in this section. A threshold may be exact and known (i.e., it takes exactly 12 donuts to make a dozen donuts) or it may be relative and unknown (i.e., a certain quantity of air inflated into a balloon may cause it to burst, but the exact, specific quantity of air may be relative to other factors such as air temperature and may be unknown to the observer until the balloon actually bursts).

With any given subject, there will be a range of quantity changes which can accumulate without leading to change in quality. This range is called the quantity range.

Quantity range is defined as a relationship between quantity and quality: the range of intervals in which the change in quantity does not substantially change the quality of a given subject. Within the limits of a quantity range, the subject retains the same quality.

Annotation 173

The quantity range is a range of quantities between quality shifts.

Quantity range can be thought of as the range of quantities which exists between thresholds. For instance, between the qualities of “one donut” and “one dozen donuts,” there is a quantity range of 10 donuts (2 donuts through 11 donuts) which can be added before the quality shifts to “one dozen donuts.” You can keep adding additional donuts, up to the quantity of 11 donuts, without reaching the threshold of quality shift to “one dozen donuts.” This is the quantity range between the qualities of donut and one dozen donuts. Again, the quantity range is relative to the perspective and the nature of analysis. One person may only be concerned with “dozens of donuts,” while another may consider the quality of “half dozens,” which would consider a quality shift to “one half-dozen donuts” to occur once the sixth donut (quantity) is added.

Motion and change usually begins with a change in quantity. When changes in quantity reach a certain amount, quality will also change. The amount, or degree, of quantity change at which quality change occurs is called the threshold.

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Note that the threshold is an approximate range. At a certain quantity, a glass may be considered “half full” and at another certain quantity, after passing the threshold, the glass will be considered “full,” though there may be a wide range of quantities at which the glass would be considered to have the quality of being “full,” depending on perspective and purpose of analysis.

When quantity change meets a threshold, within necessary and specific conditions, quality will change. This change in quality, which takes place in the motion and development process of things, phenomena, and ideas, is called a quality shift.

A quality shift occurs when a quantity changes beyond a threshold, leading to a change in quality.

Quality shifts inevitably occur as transformations in the development processes of things, phenomena, and ideas. Qualitative changes can be expressed or manifested through many forms of quality shifts which are determined by the contradictions, characteristics and conditions of a given subject, including such characteristics as: fast or slow, big or small, partial or entire, spontaneous or intentional.

Annotation 175

Quality shifts are inevitable because there is no thing, phenomenon, nor idea which can exist statically, forever, without ever undergoing change. Eventually, any given subject will undergo quality shifts, even if such transformation may take millions of years to occur.

Quality shifts can take various forms, depending on the nature of internal and external relationships, contradictions, and mutual impacts. For instance, a river may dry up or it may flood depending on internal and external relations and characteristics, but it will not simply flow at the same level forever without ever undergoing any quality shifts.

The rate and degree of quality shifts can vary considerably based on such internal and external factors, and may be “spontaneous,” that is to say, without human intervention, or may be the result of the intentional, conscious action of human beings.

Quality shifts mark the end of one motion period and the start of a new motion period.

Annotation 176

The Quantity Range (A) refers to the range of quantities between two qualities in the process of development. The Quality Shift (B) refers to the point at which quantity accumulates to the point of changing the Quality of the developing subject. The Period of Motion (C) includes both the quantity range and the quality shifts themselves.

Period of motion refers to the development which occurs between two quality shifts, including the quality shifts themselves.

Period of motion differs from quantity range because quantity range only includes the range of quantity change which can occur between quality shifts, without including the quality shifts themselves.

For example, a period of motion for a cup filling with water from a half cup would include all of the change which occurs from the cup being half full to the cup becoming entirely full. The quantity range of this same process would only include the quantities of water that stand between half-full and full, where the cup is neither considered to be “half full” or “full” but somewhere in between, i.e., between quality shifts.

Quality shift represents discontinuity within the continuous development process of things and phenomena. In the material world, all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly undergoing continuous sequences of quantitative changes leading to quality shifts, creating an endless line of nodes, showing how all things, phenomena, and ideas move and develop to increasingly advanced degrees [see illustration on p. 121 for a visualization of this “endless line of nodes”].

As Friedrich Engels summarised: “merely quantitative changes beyond a certain point pass into qualitative differences.”[97]

Annotation 177

Processes of change and development in our universe are continuously ongoing. Whenever a quality shift occurs, it represents a brief discontinuity in the sense that we perceive a definite and distinct transformation from one thing, phenomenon, or idea into another; in other words, we can distinguish between the mode of existence of the thing, phenomenon, or idea before and after the quality shift.

Take, for example, the “lifespan” of a house. A human being could easily distinguish between the empty land which exists before the house is built, the construction site which exists as it’s being built, and the house itself once construction is completed. In reality, this process of change is continuous, but to our human perception, each quality shift represents a definite and distinct period of change and discontinuity in terms of our perception of the “thing” which is the house.

This is related to the historic perspective of things, phenomena, and ideas, in which we recognize the continuity of existence between different stages of development of things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 201, p. 195].

When a quality shift occurs, there is an impact on the quantity. Quality impacts quantity in a number of ways, including [but not limited to]:

  • Changing the structure, scale, or level of the subject.
  • Changing the rhythm or speed of the motion and development of the subject.

In summary, dialectical unity between quantity and quality exists in every thing, phenomenon, and idea. A gradual quantitative change [through the quantity range] will eventually meet the threshold, which will inevitably lead to a qualitative change through quality shift. Simultaneously, the new quality will mutually impact the quantity, causing new quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas. This process takes place continuously, forming the fundamental and universal mode of movement and development processes of all things, phenomena, and ideas.

Annotation 178

Transformation between quantity and quality is the mode of movement and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas, because it reflects the way in which human consciousness perceives movement and development.

So, it is important to understand that there is no material manifestation of quantity and quality. They are simply mental constructs which reflect the ways in which we observe and understand change, motion, and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. Transformation processes in the material world are fully fluid and continuous, but our consciousness perceives change in stages of development. Quality simply reflects how we distinguish one subject from another subject, as well as how we recognize the transformation process (and stages of development) of a single subject over time.

There is no specific point, metaphysically distinct point at which a “puppy” becomes an “adult dog,” but human beings will distinguish between a puppy and an adult dog, or recognize at a certain point that a puppy has “become” an adult dog, based on observation of quality.

Quality refers to the differences which are distinguished in human consciousness between one subject and another, or changes in a subject’s form over time.

There is no metaphysically distinct point at which a “puppy” becomes an “adult dog,” but human beings will distinguish between a puppy and an adult dog, or recognize at a certain point that a puppy has “become” an adult dog, based on observation of quality. We create categories which reflect quality to organize and systematically understand the world around us, and to distinguish between different subjects, and to distinguish between different stages of development of a given subject.

We can also distinguish differences of quality between different subjects: we can distinguish a cat from a dog, and we can distinguish one dog from another dog. These distinguishing attributes constitute differences in quality. Note that this conception of differentiation of things, phenomena, and ideas into qualities which constantly change and develop over time is fundamentally distinct from metaphysical categorization, which seeks to divide all things, phenomena, and ideas into static, perpetually unchanging categories (see Annotation 8, p. 8).

Distinction within the human mind is reflected in the concept of quantity and quality. If we do not observe quality differences between subjects, then we would not be able to distinguish between different subjects at all. If we could not recognize the quality shifts of any given subject, then we would not be aware of change or motion at all.

c. Meaning of the Methodology

Every thing, phenomenon and idea has characteristics of quality and quantity which mutually impact and transform one another. Therefore, in perception and practice, we need to understand and take into account the law of transformation between quantity and quality in order to have a comprehensive viewpoint of things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 114, p. 116].

Quantitative changes of things, phenomena and ideas inevitably lead to qualitative changes in all things, phenomena, and ideas. Therefore, in our perception and practice, as we plan and enact change in our world and in human society, it is necessary to gradually accumulate changes in quantity in order to make changes in quality. At the same time, we must recognize and make use of the fact that quality shifts also lead to changes in quantity.

Annotation 179

We have to understand and utilize the law of transformation between quantity and quality in our activities. For instance, if a group of activists hopes to address hunger in their community, they have to realize that they can’t immediately enact a quality shift which solves the entire problem of hunger across the city instantaneously. Instead, the activists must recognize that quantity shifts lead to quality shifts through stages of development. In planning and acting, they may need to set certain development targets, predict thresholds at which quality shifts will occur, etc.

For instance, the first goal for these activists may be to provide free lunches to houseless people in a particular park every weekend. If they can accomplish this, then they will not have completely eliminated hunger in the city, but they will have reached a threshold — a quality shift — in that nobody in that specific park will be hungry at lunch time on weekends. From there, they can continue to build quality shifts through accumulation of changes in quantity, one stage of development at a time.

Quality shifts leading to quantity shifts must also be recognized and utilized in our planning and activities. For example, once an effective strategy is developed for eliminating hunger in one park through quantity changes leading to quality shifts, this strategy can then be implemented in other parks. Thus the quality shift of “eliminating hunger in one park” can lead to a quantity shift: “eliminating hunger in two parks, three parks, etc.,” until the quantity shift of “eliminating hunger in parks” leads to the quality shift of “eliminating hunger in all the parks in the city.” This entire process of enacting quantity changes to lead to quality shifts, and accumulating quality shifts to change quantity, are all focused toward the ultimate goal of achieving the quality shift of “eliminating hunger in the entire city.”

In short, it’s vital for us to understand the ways in which quantity and quality mutually impact each other so that we can formulate plans and activities which will lead to motion and development which accomplish our goals, step by step, through one stage of development at a time.

Changes in quantity can only lead to changes in quality provided the quantity accumulates to a certain threshold. Therefore, in practice, we need to overcome impatient, left-sided thought. Left-sided thinking refers to thinking which is overly subjective, idealistic, ignorant of the laws which govern material reality. Left-sided thinking neglects to acknowledge the necessity of quantity accumulation which precedes shifts in quality, focusing instead on attempting to perform continuous shifts in quality.

On the other hand, we must also recognize that once change in quantity has reached a threshold, it is inevitable that a quality shift will take place. Therefore, we need to overcome conservative and right-sided thought in practical work. Right-sided thinking is the expression of conservative, stagnant thought that resists or refuses to recognize quality shifts even as changes in quantity come to meet the threshold of quality shift.

Annotation 180

“Right-sided thinking” and “left-sided thinking” are Vietnamese political concepts which are rooted in the ideas of Lenin’s book: Leftwing Communism: an Infantile Disorder. In Vietnamese political philosophy, “left-sided thinking” is a form of dogmatic idealism which upholds unrealistic conceptions of change and development. Left-sided thinkers don’t have the patience for quantity accumulation which are prerequisite to quality shifts, or expect to skip entire stages of development which are necessary to precipitate change in the real world. An example of left-sided thinking would be believing that a capitalist society can instantly transition into a stateless, classless, communist society, skipping over the transitions in quantity and quality which are required to bring such a massive transformation in human society to fruition.

“Right-sided thinking,” on the other hand, is conservate resistance to change. Right-sided thinkers resist quality changes to human society; they either want to preserve society as it exists right now, or reverse development to some previous (real or imagined) stage of development. Right-sided thinkers also refuse to acknowledge quality shifts once they’ve occurred, idealistically pretending that changes in material conditions have not occurred. For example, right-sided thinkers may refuse to recognize advances which have been made in the liberation of women, or even attempt to reverse those advances in hopes of returning to previous stages of development when women had fewer freedoms. Here is a practical example of these concepts in use, from the Vietnam Encyclopedia, published by the Ministry of Culture and Information of Vietnam:

Opportunism is a system of political views that do not follow a clear direction nor a clear line, do not have a definite stance, and are inclined toward the immediate personal gain of the opportunist. In the proletarian revolutionary movement, opportunism is a politics of compromise, reform, and unprincipled collaboration with the enemy which run contrary to the basic interests of the working class and the working people. In practice, opportunism has two main trends, stemming from right-sided thinking and from left-sided thinking, respectively:

Right-wing opportunism is reformist, favors undue compromise, and aims to peacefully “convert” capitalism into socialism while abandoning the struggle for meaningful victory of the working class. Right-wing opportunism, typified by Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky, has its origins in the Workers’ Parties of the Second International era and exists to this day.

Left-wing opportunism is a mixture of extremism and adventurism, dogmatism, arrogance, subjectivity, cults of violence, and disregard for the objective situation.

Both “right” and “left” opportunism push the workers’ movement to futile sacrifice and failure.


Quality shifts are diverse and plentiful, so we need to promote and apply quality shifts creatively and flexibly to suit the specific material conditions we face in a given situation. This is especially true in changing human society, as social development processes depend not only on objective conditions but also on subjective human factors. Therefore, we need to be active and take the initiative to promote the process of converting between quantity and quality in the most effective way.

Annotation 181

Put simply, we have to use our human will and labor to actively promote quantity changes which lead to quality changes, and quality changes which lead to quantity changes, which move us towards our goal of ending all forms of oppression in human society. This will involve not just objective factors[98] (i.e., material conditions which are necessary to accomplish something), but subjective factors[99] as well (factors which we, as a subject, are capable of impacting directly).

2. Law of Unification and Contradiction Between Opposites

The law of unification and contradiction between opposites is the Essence of dialectics [see: Essence and Phenomenon, p. 156]. According to Lenin: “In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the Essence of dialectics, but it requires explanations and development.”[100] According to the law of unification and contradiction between opposites, the fundamental, originating, and universal driving force of all motion and development processes is the inherent and objective contradiction which exists in all things, phenomena, and ideas.

Annotation 182

In other words, contradiction (defined further in the next section) is the force which serves as the fundamental, originating, and universal force which drives all motion and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas.

Contradiction is a fundamental driving force because it is the most basic driving force which all other forms of motion and development are based upon.

Contradiction is the originating driving force because all motion and development arises from contradiction.

Contradiction is the universal driving force because all things, phenomena, and ideas — without exception — are driven to motion and development by contradiction.

a. Definition of Contradiction and Common Characteristics of Contradiction

- Definition of Contradiction

In dialectics, the concept of contradiction is used to refer to the relationship, opposition, and transformation between opposites which takes place within all things, phenomena, and ideas, as well as between all things, phenomena, and ideas. This dialectical concept of contradiction is fundamentally different from the metaphysical concept of contradiction. The metaphysical concept of contradiction is an illogical conception of opposition without unity and without dialectical transformation between opposites.

Annotation 183

A contradiction is, fundamentally, just a type of relationship. In a contradictory relationship, two things, phenomena, and/or ideas mutually impact one another, resulting in the eventual negation of one subject and the synthesis of the negator and the negated into some new form.

The metaphysical concept of contradiction is considered illogical because it establishes no connection between that which is negated and the resulting synthesis.

In the metaphysical conception of contradiction, the negated “disappears” and is not represented in the resulting synthesis.

Metaphysical contradiction presents contradicting subjects as isolated from one another and completely distinct, when in reality the relationship between the negated and the negator essentially defines the contradiction. The negated subject is seen as completely negated; that is to say, it is conceived of as essentially “disappearing” into the synthesized result of the contradiction. In this sense, this metaphysical conception of negation is inaccurate in that it is represented as a complete, terminating process.

In the above example, once the fox eats the rabbit, the rabbit is considered “gone” after a terminal negation process (see Annotation 196, p. 188) ends the contradiction.

The materialist dialectical conception of contradiction recognizes that contradicting subjects are defined by their relationship and that the synthesis of the contradiction carries forward attributes and characteristics from both the negator and the negated.

Materialist dialectical contradiction recognizes that every contradiction is defined by the relationship between the negated and the negator. Materialist dialectics also recognizes that attributes and characteristics of the negated subject are carried forward into the synthesized subject [see Annotation 203, p. 198]. Materialist dialectics also recognizes that contradiction continues indefinitely, as the negated becomes negated again, and so on, continuously, forever [see Negation of Negation, p. 185].

In the example on the previous page, the fox consuming the rabbit constitutes a negation process in which the fox takes on characteristics from the rabbit (i.e., nutritional and energy content, any diseases which may be carried forward to the fox, etc.).

Contradiction arises from opposition which exists within or between things, phenomena, and ideas. The concept of opposing “sides” refers to such aspects, properties, and tendencies of motion which oppose one another, yet are, simultaneously, conditions and premises of the existence of one another. Examples include:

  • Negative charge and positive charge within atoms.
  • Anabolism and catabolism within living organisms [anabolism refers to the growth and building up of molecules within an organism, while catabolism refers to the digestion and breaking down of molecules within an organism].
  • Production and consumption as socioeconomic activities.
  • Trial and error which leads to cognitive development.

Annotation 184

All of the above forms of contradiction drive motion and development. These processes exist in unity and opposition. For example, in political economics, production is driven by consumption and consumption is facilitated by production. Even though these are fundamentally opposite forces (production adds to the total quantity of products, while consumption reduces the total quantity of products), they can’t exist without one another, and they drive each other forward. This is the dialectical nature of contradiction as the driving force of all motion and development as defined in materialist dialectics.

- The General Properties of Contradictions

Contradiction is objective and universal. According to Friedrich Engels: “If simple mechanical change of position contains a contradiction, this is even more true of the higher forms of motion of matter, and especially of organic life and its development. We saw above that life consists precisely and primarily in this — that a being is at each moment itself and yet something else. Life is therefore also a contradiction which is present in things and processes themselves, and which constantly originates and resolves itself; and as soon as the contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to an end, and death steps in. We likewise saw that also, in the sphere of thought, we could not escape contradictions, and that, for example, the contradiction between man’s inherently unlimited capacity for knowledge and its actual presence only in men who are externally limited and possess limited cognition finds its solution in what is — at least practically, for us — an endless succession of generations, in infinite progress.”[101]

Annotation 185

Here, Engels is explaining how contradiction is the driving force in both material and conscious processes of motion and development. The process of life is a process of contradiction — all organic life forms must consume organic matter so that they can produce growth and offspring, must produce certain molecules and metabolic processes so that they can consume nutrients, and so on. Once these contradictory processes stop, as Engels says, “death steps in” (though even death is a transition forward).

Conscious motion and development are also rooted in contradictory forces. Engels points out the contradiction between humanity’s seemingly infinite capacity for learning with the seemingly infinite amount of knowledge which can be obtained in the world. This great contradiction drives a seemingly endless process of expanding human knowledge, collectively, over countless generations.

Contradictions are not only objective and universal, but also diverse and plentiful. The diverse nature of contradictions is evident in the fact that every subject can include many different contradictions and that contradictions manifest differently depending upon specific conditions. Contradictions can hold different positions and roles in the existence, motion, and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. These positions and roles include [but are not limited to]:

  • Internal and external contradictions
  • Fundamental and non-fundamental contradictions
  • Primary and secondary contradictions

Annotation 186

Internal contradictions are contradictions which exist in the internal relations of a subject, while external contradictions exist between two or more subjects as external relations.

For example: a sports team might have internal contradictions between players, between the players and the coach, between the coach and management, etc. External contradictions might exist between the team and other teams, between the team and league officials, between the team and the landlords who own the team’s practice space, etc.

A fundamental contradiction is a contradiction which defines the Essence of a relationship [see Essence and Phenomenon, p. 156]. Fundamental contradictions exist throughout the entire development process of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea. A non-fundamental contradiction exists in only one aspect or attribute of a thing, phenomenon, or idea. A non-fundamental contradiction can impact a subject, but it will not control or decide the essential development of the subject. Whether or not a contradiction is fundamental is relative to the point of view.

For example: the fundamental contradiction of one nation engaged in war against one another might be the war itself. There will exist many other contradictions; one nation at war might have a trade dispute with a third nation which is not participating in the war. From the “war perspective,” this contradiction is non-fundamental, as it does not define the essential characteristic of the nation at war (though from the perspective of a diplomat charged with ending the trade dispute, the war may be seen as a non-fundamental contradiction while the dispute would be seen as fundamental).

In the development of things, phenomena, and ideas, there are many development stages. In each stage of development, there will be one contradiction which drives the development process. This is what we call the primary contradiction. Secondary contradictions include all the other contradictions which exist during that stage of development. Determining whether a contradiction is primary or secondary is relative: it depends heavily upon the material conditions and the situation.

For example: when restoring an old car that doesn’t run any more, a mechanic may consider the primary contradiction to be the non-functioning engine. There may be many secondary contradictions which contribute to the problems with the car’s engine problems. The battery may be dead, the spark plugs may need to be bad, the tires may need replacement, the timing belt may be loose, etc. Those are all secondary contradictions which do not define the stage of development which is “repairing the engine.” Some of these secondary contradictions may need to be resolved (such as replacing the spark plugs) before the primary contradiction can be fully addressed; others, such as a cracked windshield, may not need to be addressed before the primary contradiction can be dealt with.

On the other hand, a secondary contradiction may become the primary contradiction: if a mechanic resolves every problem with the engine except for one bad spark plug, then the bad spark plug will shift from being a secondary contradiction to being the primary contradiction: the bad spark plug is now the primary reason the car won’t start and this stage of development can’t be completed.

Within all the various fields of inquiry, there exist contradictions which have a diverse range of different properties and characteristics.

Annotation 187

Different fields of study will focus on different forms of contradictions, and any given thing, phenomenon, or idea may contain countless contradictions which can be analyzed and considered for different purposes. For example, consider a large city, which might contain far too many contradictions to count. Civil engineers may focus primarily on contradictions in traffic patterns, the structural integrity of bridges and roads, ensuring that buildings are safe and healthy for inhabitants, etc. Utilities departments will focus on contradictions related to sewage, electrical, and sanitation systems. The education system will focus on contradictions which prevent students from achieving success in schools.

All of these various methods of analysis may focus on specific forms of contradictions, though there will also be overlap. For instance, designing a school bus system will require the education system and civil engineers to discover and grapple with contradictions which might be hindrances for transporting students safely to school.

b. Motion Process of Contradictions

In every contradiction, the opposing sides are united with each other and opposed to each other at the same time. The concept of “unity between opposites” refers to the fact that a contradiction is a binding, inseparable, and mutually impacting relationship which exists between opposites.

Annotation 188

Contradictions are binding and inseparable because they hold a relationship together. If two opposing things, phenomena, or ideas simply separate, then contradiction, by definition, no longer exists. For example, an economy is bound together by the contradiction of production and consumption; if production exists without consumption (or vice-versa), it can’t be considered to be an economy.

Contradictions are said to be mutually impacting because any time a contradiction exists between two opposing sides, both sides are mutually impacted for as long as the contradiction exists and develops. Of course, it is possible for two opposing sides to separate from one another; for example, a factory which produced buggy whips may have failed to find consumers after the invention of the car. Thus, there would exist a situation in which production exists without consumption. In this situation, the termination of the contradiction between production and consumption leads to a new contradiction: the factory will now be in the midst of a crisis which will require it to either provide a different product or go out of business.

Thus we see that production and consumption can’t be separated from one another without leading to a change in the essential nature of the relationship and the opposing subjects, and we see that the opposing sides mutually impact one another (a change in consumption will affect production, and vice-versa).

In any given contradictory relationship, each oppositional side is the premise for the other’s existence. Unity among opposites also defines the identity of each opposing side. Lenin wrote: “The identity of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their ‘unity,’—although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense, both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society).”[102]

Annotation 189

Here, Lenin is explaining that identity and unity are (more or less) the same concept when it comes to understanding the nature of contradiction between opposites. In material processes of nature, social processes, and processes of consciousness, we perceive and define oppositional forces by recognizing mutually exclusive and contradictory tendencies within and between things, phenomena, and ideas. In other words, whenever we think of an oppositional relationship, we define it in terms of the opposition.

War, disease, and economy are all examples of unity in contradiction.

When we think of a war, we think of the contradictions which exist between the opposing nations. When we think of a disease, we define it by the oppositional forces between the ailment and the human body. When we think of an economy, we think of the oppositional forces of production and consumption within the economy.

In other words, the identity of contradictory relationships is defined by the unity of the opposing sides with one another.

The concept struggle of opposites refers to the tendency of opposites to eliminate and negate each other. There exist many diverse forms of struggle between opposites. Struggle can manifest in various forms based on:

  • The nature of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea.
  • Relationships within a thing, phenomenon, or idea (or between things, phenomena, and ideas).
  • Specific material conditions [see Annotation 10, p. 10].

The process of unity and struggle of opposites inevitably leads to a transformation between them. The transformation between opposites takes place with rich diversity, and such transformations can vary depending on the properties of the opposite sides as well as specific material conditions.

Annotation 190

Opposing sides, by definition, oppose one another. If forces or characteristics which exist within or between things, phenomena, or ideas do not oppose one another, then they are not, by definition, opposites. Thus, it can be understood that opposing sides have a tendency to struggle against one another. It is this very struggle which defines two sides as opposites, and as contradictory.

Lenin explained that some contradicting opposite sides can exist in what he described as equilibrium, but that this is only ever a temporary state of affairs, as exemplified in his article An Equilibrium of Forces.

[See Annotation 64, p. 62 for relevant text and more info on equilibrium.]

Clearly, Lenin sees that this equilibrium of contradictory forces is not permanently sustainable. Indeed, no equilibrium of contradictory forces can be permanent. Eventually, one opposing side will overtake the other, and eventually, any given contradiction will result in one opposing side overcoming the other.

According to the law of unification and contradiction between opposites, the struggle between two opposing sides is absolute, while the unity between them is relative, conditional, and temporary; in unity there is a struggle: a struggle in unity. According to Lenin: “The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.”[103]

Annotation 191

“Absolute” and “Relative” are philosophical classifications which refer to interdependence. That which is absolute exists independently and with permanence. That which is relative is temporary, and dependent on other conditions or circumstances in order to exist.

So Lenin’s point is that unity exists temporarily in any given pair of opposing sides, as the unity only exists as long as the opposing sides are opposing one another. As soon as one side eliminates or negates the other, the unity subsides. However, opposition is considered absolute, because it is opposition which drives motion and change in all things, phenomena, and ideas through contradictory processes of opposing sides.

In the same text quoted in the passage above, On the Questions of Dialectics, Lenin notes:

The distinction between subjectivism (skepticism, sophistry, etc.) and dialectics, incidentally, is that in (objective) dialectics the difference between the relative and the absolute is itself relative. For objective dialectics there is an absolute within the relative. For subjectivism and sophistry the relative is only relative and excludes the absolute...

Such must also be the method of exposition (i.e., study) of dialectics in general... To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., with any proposition: the leaves of a tree are green; John is a man: Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have dialectics (as Hegel’s genius recognised): the individual is the universal.

The individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes) etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs, the concepts of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say: John is a man, Fido is a dog, this is a leaf of a tree, etc., we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other.

In other words, we must understand that in materialist dialectics, the absolute and the relative exist within one another; in other words, the absolute and the relative have a dialectical relationship with one another in all things, phenomena, and ideas.

Relative unity refers to the nature of unity between contradictory subjects. Contradictory subjects are unified in the sense that any given contradiction is essentially defined by the contradiction between two subjects. Thus, the two subjects are unified in contradiction. However, this unity is relative in the sense that this unification is temporary (the unity will end upon negation and synthesis) and relative (i.e., defined by the relationship between the two contradicting subjects).

Absolute struggle refers to the fact that contradiction, negation, and synthesis will go on forever; in this sense, contradictory processes are absolute because such struggle exists permanently; struggle has no set beginning or end point, and exists independently of any specific thing, phenomenon, or idea.

Relative Unity refers to the temporary and relative nature of specific relationships which define and unify specific contradictions; Absolute Struggle refers to the permanent, constant nature of development through contradiction.

The relationship between relative unity and absolute struggle defines and drives change, motion, and development through contradiction.

This applies to contradictions. The relative unity and the absolute struggle between opposing sides have a dialectical relationship with one another. The permanent absoluteness of struggle — the fact that all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly undergoing processes of change through contradictory forces — can only manifest in the relative unity of opposing sides, which can only exist through the temporary existence of conditional relations between opposing sides.

The interaction that leads to the transformation between opposites is a process. At the beginning, contradictions manifest as differences and then develop into two opposing sides. When the two contradictions are fiercely matched and when the conditions are ripe, they will transform each other, and finally, the conflict will be resolved. As old contradictions disappear, new contradictions are formed and the process of mutual impact and transformation between opposites continues, which drives the motion and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas. The relationship, impact and transformation between opposites are the source and driving force of all movement and development in the world. Lenin affirmed: “Development is the ‘struggle’ of opposites.”[104]

Annotation 192

Any given process of development — that is to say, of transformation or motion — can be seen as a struggle between opposites. Various forms of struggle can exist simultaneously for any given subject, and the way we interpret struggle can depend on our point of view.

For an engineer, a car moving along a road might be seen as a struggle between the power generated by the engine against the mass of the car itself and the friction of the tires on the ground. The driver of the car might see the process in terms of the struggle between the driver and the environment as they navigate across town avoiding accidents and following traffic laws.

An organism’s life can be seen as a struggle between the organism’s life processes and its environment, or it might be seen as a struggle of contradictory forces within the organism itself (i.e., forces of consumption of nutrition vs. forces of expending energy to survive, forces of disease vs. forces of the organism’s immune system, etc.).

Materialist dialectics requires us to identify, examine, and understand the opposing forces which drive all development in our universe. Only through understanding such contradictions can we intercede and affect changes in the world which suit our purposes.

For example, in order to fight against capitalism and other forms of oppression, we must first understand the contradictory forces which exist within and between those oppressive social structures. Only then can we determine how we might best apply our will, through labor processes, to dismantle such oppressive structures. We might do this by exacerbating existing contradictions within oppressive structures, by introducing new contradictions, by negating contradictions which inhibit our own progress, etc.

c. Meaning of the Methodology

Given that contradictions are objective and universal, and that they are the source and driving force of movement and development, it is therefore necessary to detect, recognize, and understand contradictions, to fully analyze opposing sides, and to grasp the nature, origin and tendencies of motion and development in our awareness and practice.

Lenin said: “The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts… is the essence… of dialectics.”[105]

Annotation 193

In other words, materialist dialectics is simply a system of understanding the world around us by viewing all things, phenomena, and ideas as collections of relationships and contradictions which exist within and between all things, phenomena, and ideas.

Since contradictions exist with such rich diversity, it is necessary to have a historical point of view [see Annotation 114, p. 116] — that is, to know how to analyze each specific type of contradiction and have appropriate methods for resolving them. In our perception and practice, it is necessary to properly distinguish the roles and positions of different types of contradictions in each situation and condition; we must also distinguish between different characteristics which contradictions might have in order to find the best method of resolving them.

Annotation 194

The historical viewpoint is vital because in order to fully understand any given contradiction, we must understand the process of development which led to its formation.

For example, before a car engine can be repaired, we must first find out what caused the engine to stop working to begin with. If the car is out of fuel, we must determine what caused it to run out of fuel. Did the driver simply drive until the fuel tank was empty, or is there a hole or leak in a fuel line, in the tank, etc.?

It is vital to know the history of development of a given pair of opposing sides, as well as the characteristics and other properties of both opposing sides, to fully understand the contradiction. Since all conscious activity (like all processes of motion and change) ultimately derives from the driving force of contradiction, it is vital for us to develop a historical and comprehensive perspective of any contradictions we hope to affect through our conscious activities.

3. Law of Negation of Negation

The law of negation of negation describes the fundamental and universal tendency of movement and development to occur through dialectical negation, forming a cyclical form of development through what is termed “negation of negation.”

a. Definition of Negation and Dialectical Negation

The world continuously and endlessly changes and develops. Things, phenomena, and ideas that arise, exist, develop and perish, are replaced by other things, phenomena, and ideas; one form of existence is replaced with another form of existence, again and again, continuously, through this development process. This procedure is called negation.

All processes of movement and development take place through negation. From certain perspectives, negations can be seen as end points to the development (and thus, existence) of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea [which we can think of as “terminal negations;” see Annotation below]. But from other perspectives, negations can also create the conditions and premises for new developments. Such negations, which create such conditions and premises for the development of things and phenomena, are called dialectical negation.

Annotation 195

Negation refers to any act of motion or transformation which arises from contradiction. Specifically, negation is what occurs when one opposing side completely overcomes the other. Nothing in our universe can transform or move all by itself, without any contradiction. Thus, negation drives all development and motion of all things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 119, p. 123]. There are various forms of negation, and the same negation process may be seen to take different forms depending on viewpoint of analysis [see Annotation 11, p. 12, and Annotation 114, p. 116], as depicted in the diagram below.

An overview of various forms of negation as they relate to dialectical development.

Dialectical negation occurs when the end of development leads directly to some new development process. Dialectical negation occurs through quality shifts [see Annotation 117, p. 119], which, themselves, occur through negation of opposite sides.

Replacement negation refers to the replacement of one thing, phenomenon, or idea with another through dialectical negation.

Translation Note: The terms “terminal negation” and “replacement negation” do not appear in the original Vietnamese text. We chose to assign terms to these concepts for clarity.

Replacement negation occurs when one thing, phenomenon, or idea takes the place of another. Replacement negation is always a dialectical process, where one subject is replaced gradually by another. Replacement may be relatively fast or slow, but it is never instantaneous — nothing can pop in and out of existence instantaneously. For example: swords were gradually replaced by firearms as the primary weapons of war over the course of many centuries. Today, swords have been completely replaced by firearms on the battlefield. This was a process of replacement negation — weapons are still used in war, but the type of weapon used has been completely replaced. Development continues, even though development of swords as battle weapons has essentially ended.

Terminal negation refers to the end of a specific cycle of development.

Terminal negation is what happens when development completely ends for a given thing, phenomenon, or idea. For example, from one viewpoint, the development of swords as weapons of war can be seen as having ended — having been terminally negated — due to the innovation of firearms. In essence, swords are no longer developed, nor implemented, in modern warfare.

Replacement negation and terminal negation must be considered in relative terms. From one viewpoint, we can see the rise of firearms as the underlying reason for the terminal negation of military use of swords. Today, no army on Earth uses swords as primary battlefield weapons and militaries no longer develop sword technology for battlefield use. However, from another viewpoint, the development of battlefield weapons has continued on long after the end of the primacy of swords, and it could be said that firearms have replaced swords as the primary battlefield weapon.

Consider the death of a human being. From one perspective, death is a terminal negation — the person’s consciousness has ended, and no further development of consciousness will occur for that individual. From other perspectives, development continues. The individual may have had children who will continue their familial lineage, they may have contributed ideas which will continue to impact other people for centuries to come, and so on. In that sense, replacement negation may be viewed as dialectical negation. For example, someone studying modes of transportation in the history of the USA may see the process of steam locomotives replacing horses, and then cars replacing steam locomotives, as processes of dialectical negation from the overarching perspective of the transportation system.

Materialist dialectics is concerned with all forms of negation, but focuses primarily on dialectical negation. Therefore, materialist dialectics is not just a theory of transformation in general, but fundamentally a theory of development

Annotation 196

All transformation is driven by negation. Development is a process, specifically, of dialectical negation, which is a specific form of transformation in which an end of development creates the conditions for new development, either through internal quality shifts or through replacement by some external subject.

Materialist dialectics is primarily concerned with dialectical negation (which drives development) because it is development which brings forth continuous change in our world. Terminal negations and other forms of transformation which do not drive further development are of limited utility, and can only represent certain limited viewpoints [i.e., the viewpoint of that which is terminated].

From a broader perspective, nearly all “terminations” are replaced in some way or another by some other form of development. For instance, even when a person dies, although the consciousness of that person may terminate, there will be continuous impacts which will be carried forward from the deceased person’s lifetime of consciousness, as well as from the developments which arise from the death itself.

This dialectical definition of negation differs greatly from metaphysical conceptions of development [see Annotation 201, p. 195], which are essentially viewed as terminal. From the metaphysical perspective, all things, phenomena, and ideas are viewed as separate from one another; therefore negations are viewed as terminal processes which bring development processes to their ends.

The metaphysical perspective of terminal negation views negation as an essentially terminal process representing the end point of the existence of a static and isolated thing, phenomenon, or idea.

In the above example, the metaphysical framework would present smashing a vase with a hammer as a terminal negation from the perspective of the observer. Once the vase is smashed, the vase is considered to no longer exist, and the broken shards are not considered to be “a vase” any more. Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, view “the shards” as merely a developed form of the vase; a transition to a new stage of development; the negation was only terminal from the perspective of the vase itself.

Excerpt From Vietnam’s High School Freshman Civic Education textbook:

Metaphysical and dialectical negation share one commonality: they both see development as the replacement of an old subject with a new subject. However, metaphysical negation happens when outside forces impact on a subject, deleting completely the existence of the old subject. According to this metaphysical perspective, the old subject and the new subject which replaces it do not have any connection.

Dialectical negation fundamentally differs from metaphysical negation because it views development as a process of internal development. Dialectical negation does not view complete erasure or deletion of any former subject; instead, dialectical development sees the older subject, which is replaced (negated), as the premise or basis of existence for the new subject.

Comparison Examples:

Metaphysical Negation Dialectical Negation
The earthquake destroyed the house. The house was impacted by the external force of an earthquake, which caused it to collapse, due to internal characteristics of the house itself (which could not withstand the forces of the earthquake). The debris from the collapsed house will be cleared away, and will continue to develop. The space where the house stood will also continue to develop in some way, with the earthquake and the resulting collapse serving as the basis for this further development.
Water eroded the mountain. The external force of water caused erosion by transferring material away from the mountain, due to the internal characteristics of the mountain’s composite material. The water, the material which was washed away, and the mountain will all continue to develop. The erosion process will be the basis for this further development.
The car has a new tire because it ran over a nail. The external force of the nail caused the tire to permanently deflate, due to the internal characteristics of the tire, which could not withstand running over a nail. This served as the basis for further development: the old tire was removed and will be disposed of, which will serve as the basis for further development (i.e., the tire may be recycled or sent to a landfill); the removal of the tire serves as the basis for the further development of a new tire being installed.
When you add water, sunlight, and nutrition to a seed, it will grow into a plant. The seed went through a process of negation as a sprout grew, through various stages of development, into a plant, facilitated by outside forces (such as water, nutrition, sunlight, etc. — the seed would not grow in isolation) as well as the internal characteristics of the seed itself; the seed served as the basis of the sprout’s development. The sprout then served as the basis for the growth of a seedling, and the seedling served as the basis for the growth of a fully grown plant. All of this development was driven by negation processes as quantity shifts gradually led to quality shifts through those various stages of development.

As you can see from the examples above, the metaphysical perspective focuses on external forces affecting a given subject and views every development process as terminal, with a beginning, middle, and end. The metaphysical perspective thus views negation as a termination of the subject (and, by extension, of development).

Materialist dialectics, on the other hand, views development as a continuous and never-ending process of mutual impact, negation, and further negation of each negation. A comprehensive and historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116] must thus be sought to fully comprehend development and negation processeses.

Dialectical negation has two basic characteristics: objectivity and inheritance.

Dialectical negation is objective because negation arises from contradictions which exist between two opposite sides. These opposing sides may exist within a thing, phenomenon, or idea, but the opposing sides are still, by definition, externally opposed to one another from the perspective of either side.

Annotation 197

Though any given negation may be viewed as terminal from a certain perspective, materialist dialectics is most concerned with processes of development wherein the end of one stage of development creates the conditions for further development [see Annotation 117, p. 119].

Therefore, every development is simultaneously an internal and an external process, depending on perspective. Development processes may, from certain perspectives, be seen to take place within a subject or between two subjects, but they are always external (and, therefore, objective — see Annotation 108, p. 112) from the perspective of either opposing side while simultaneously internal to the relationship.

For example: The relationship between a husband and wife may be seen as an internal process of development of “the marriage” from the perspective of a marriage counselor. However, from their own perspectives, each “opposing side” (i.e., the husband and the wife) see one another as external to each other.

Therefore, the development of a marriage may be seen as an internal process, but the mutual impacts and negations which occur within the relationship are objective and external forces from the perspective of either opposing side.

This is important because it means that all development and all negation are essentially objective processes; therefore no entity has complete, omniscient control over any development process. We must, therefore, understand the nature of development and negation in order to be able to properly plan and affect change in our world.

Dialectical negation is, therefore, the result of the process of resolving inevitable contradictions within a subject [i.e., a relationship] itself. Dialectical negation allows for the old to be replaced by the new, thereby creating trends of development. Therefore, dialectical negation is also self-negation.

Annotation 198

To reiterate: from the perspective of either opposing side, development is an external, objective process. From the perspective of the contradictory relationship, processes of development are internal processes of self-negation. Thus, dialectical negation is both an objective process which no entity can completely control, while, simultaneously, an internal process of self-negation and self-development.

If two nations go to war, either nation may view the war as an objective, external development process, but from a wider perspective, the war is an internal development process of the diplomatic relationship between the two warring nations. This is drastically different from the metaphysical perspective, which views any negation process as a purely external process of development wherein one subject is permanently deleted from existence, then replaced by another subject [see Annotation 196, p. 188]. From the metaphysical perspective, a war is simply a conflict between two distinct and separate nations, and the conclusion of the war is a terminal negation which ends development of the war. From the materialist dialectical perspective, on the other hand, the end of the war would be seen as the basis of future development of the relationship between the two formerly warring nations.

Dialectical negation also has an inheritance characteristic: when one opposing side negates another, the remaining side inherits factors from the negated side which are suitable with present conditions.

Annotation 199

Every negation process arises from contradictions between two opposing sides. Within any such negation process, we can think of one side as the “negator” and the other side as the “negated.” Negation, like all relational processes, leads to mutual impact between both sides [see Annotation 136, p. 138]. Therefore, the negated will impact the negator; in other words, the negated side will be somehow reflected in the negator [see Annotation 68, p. 65]. This means that the negator will inherit and carry forward certain attributes, factors, and characteristics which it receives from the negated side.

Again, consider a war between two nations. Even if one nation completely conquers and subjugates the other in total victory, the victorious nation will still inherit certain factors from the defeated nation. Which factors are inherited will depend on the conditions. The victorious nation may pick up some cultural aspects from the defeated nation, such as cuisine, fashion, etc., they may incorporate tactics and strategies which they observed the defeated enemy using on the battlefield, and so on. The point is that the victorious nation will be impacted in some way by the defeated nation.

The factors which are adopted will be suitable with the present conditions. Take, for example, a car breaking down due to engine failure. This can be seen as an opposing relationship between the car itself and the car’s owner. If the present conditions are suitable [i.e., the owner has the funds and resources available, and the desire to repair the car], then the car may be repaired and continue operating for years to come. If, on the other hand, conditions aren’t suitable [i.e., the owner does not have the funds or resources or the owner no longer wants the car], then the car may be sent to the scrapyard.

As another example, if a fox eats a rabbit, it will inherit certain characteristics from the rabbit. It will inherit nutrition from the rabbit’s body. It may also inherit other characteristics, such as a disease the rabbit was carrying, if the conditions of the fox’s biological composition are suitable [i.e., if the disease can be transferred from the rabbit to the fox].

Dialectical negation is not a complete negation [i.e., deletion] of the old. Rather, dialectical negation is a continuity of growth in which the old develops into the new. In processes of dialectical negation, “the new” forms and develops on its own [see Annotation 62, p. 59], through the process of filtering out unsuitable factors, while retaining suitable content. Vladimir Lenin described dialectical negation as:

“Not empty negation, not futile negation, not skeptical negation, vacillation and doubt is characteristic and essential in dialectics — which undoubtedly contains the element of negation and indeed as its most important element — no, but negation as a moment of connection, as a moment of development, retaining the positive, i.e., without any vacillations, without any eclecticism.”[106]

Annotation 200

The passage from Lenin above comes from Clemence Dutt’s popular English translation of one of Lenin’s notebooks. Below is our translation from the Vietnamese version of this text from the original text of this book, which we hope might be somewhat easier to understand:

Dialectical negation is not empty negation, it’s not negation without any thoughts, it’s not skeptical negation, it’s not hesitation. Skepticism is not a feature of the essence of the dialectic — of course, dialectics include the negative, it even plays as one of the important factors of a given subject — no, it is negation as the moment of development. Dialectical negation retains the positive, meaning there is no hesitation, there is no eclecticism.

In order to understand what Lenin is saying here, we should first understand what Lenin is responding to. The above notes are referring to the chapter titled “The Absolute Ideal” within Hegel’s Science of Logic [see note at the end of this Annotation]. In this chapter, Hegel recounts various critiques of dialectics and counters them.

Skepticism, here, refers to the tendency to address all human knowledge with doubt.

Philosophical skepticism never moves past two questions: 1. “Is this knowledge true?” 2. “Will human beings ever obtain true knowledge?” Skeptics of this nature engage in a sort of metaphysical inquisition in which every thesis that is ever encountered is immediately and utterly refuted and thus “negated” in the metaphysical sense of termination [see Annotation 196, p. 188].

Eclecticism refers to philosophical and ideological conceptions which draw from a variety of theories, styles, and ideas in an unsystematic manner. Lenin contends that dialectical negation is non-eclecticist because it rises above mere rhetorical combativeness and “total negation.” [This concept is explained more below within this annotation.]

With all this in mind, we see that Lenin is refuting the notion that dialectics are and can only be negative in nature. The metaphysical-skeptic conception of dialectics holds that negation takes the form of rhetorical arguing and refutation, in which one idea is presented, and a second idea is offered to counter the first idea, which completely and totally negates the first idea. According to this argument, dialectics is, therefore, a totally negative process.

A common misperception of dialectical development is that it is “fully negative,” insomuch as the initial thesis (initial subject) is completely negated by the antithesis (impacting subject). In fact, characteristics from both the thesis and antithesis are carried forward into the synthesis.

In the chapter from Science of Logic which Lenin is responding to in the referenced text, Hegel is arguing that the conception of dialectics as only negative — i.e., a system of thinking in which counter-arguments are presented to completely negate initial arguments — is inaccurate. Hegel explains that when one opposing side negates another, it thereafter “contains in general the determination of the first [opposing side] within itself.” In other words, after one opposing side negates another, it retains features and aspects from the opposing side which was negated. Lenin found this particular point to be so important that he wrote “this is very important for understanding dialectics” in the margin of his notebook.

The reason both Hegel and Lenin found this idea, that the “negator” contains elements of the “negated” after negation [see Annotation 231, p. 227], is that this counters the accusation that dialectics are “only negative.” This is why Lenin’s notes highlight the importance of the negator “retaining the positive” after negation. Lenin is pointing out the importance of the retention of features of the negated in the negator because it is this retention which prevents dialectical development from becoming a purely negative process.

In materialist dialectics, it is understood that negation is a process of retention: characteristics from both the thesis (initial subject) and antithesis (impacting subject) are retained in the resulting synthesis

We must also understand what Lenin means when he refers to “skepticism” in his notes. Lenin, here, is referring to the philosophical view that we can never know whether or not our beliefs are true. This belief was popularly known as Machism, or Empirio-Criticism, in Lenin’s time (see Annotation 32, p. 27).

A common critique of dialectics is that it is an inherently skeptical system of thought, since dialectics is seen as a process of presenting counter-arguments to suppositional arguments. Lenin, in his notes, presents the idea that such skepticism is “not a feature of dialectics” precisely because nothing is ever completely, totally, and entirely negated. In other words, the accusation that dialectical analysis is essentially skeptical is rooted in the mistaken notion that one opposing side (i.e., a counter-argument) completely negates the original supposition. In fact, according to materialist dialectics, the negator always retains features and aspects from the negated side, which counters this critique. Thus, dialectical development, which occurs through dialectical negation, is a process of forward motion — not a process of “vacillating” back and forth from one position to another — and there is no skeptical “hesitation” preventing forward progress.

This same idea (that the negator retains features from the negated) also counters another common critique of materialist dialectics: that dialectical analysis is simply a system of rhetorical sophistry [see Annotation 36, p. 33] and eclecticism.

Eclecticism is a conceptual approach that is completely unsystematic, drawing from a variety of theories, styles, and ideas without any cohesive and all-encompassing philosophical framework.

Some critics claim that dialectics must be eclecticist and sophistic in nature. These critics claim that dialectics is simply rhetorical disputation in which any given supposition is counter-argued, and that this counter-argument is negation. But materialist dialectics defines negation as one contradicting side overtaking the other while retaining traces and characteristics from the negated side — it is in no way simply an act of rhetorical dispute or refutation.

In summary, materialist dialectics upholds that nothing is ever completely and utterly deleted or erased from existence through negation. Instead, any time one opposing side negates another, aspects of the negated side are inherited by the negating side.

Note: For reference, here is Hegel’s passage which Lenin is referring to from Science and Logic in the cited notes above:

...a universal first, considered in and for itself, shows itself to be the other of itself. Taken quite generally, this determination can be taken to mean that what is at first immediate now appears as mediated, related to an other, or that the universal appears as a particular. Hence the second term that has thereby come into being is the negative of the first, and if we anticipate the subsequent progress, the first negative. The immediate, from this negative side, has been extinguished in the other, but the other is essentially not the empty negative, the nothing, that is taken to be the usual result of dialectic; rather is it the other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is therefore determined as the mediated — contains in general the determination of the first within itself. Consequently the first is essentially preserved and retained even in the other. To hold fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition; also only the simplest reflection is needed to furnish conviction of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement, while with regard to the examples of proofs, the whole of Logic consists of these.


Therefore, dialectical negation is the inevitable tendency of progression of the inner relationship between the old and the new. It is the self-driving assertive force of all motion and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas.

b. Negation of Negation

In the perpetual movement of the material world, dialectical negation is an inexhaustible process. It creates a development tendency of things from lower level to higher level, taking place in a cyclical manner in the form of a “spiral.”

Annotation 201

The concept of the “spiral” form of development in dialectical materialist philosophy stands in contrast to the metaphysical conception of “linear” development.

Metaphysical Conception of Linear Development

The metaphysical viewpoint holds that development is more or less a straight line: as one subject is negated, it is replaced by another. This subject will then be negated by another, and so on, in what is essentially conceived of as a straight line of development [see Annotation 196, p. 188].

The metaphysical “line development” model sees an initial form as being “replaced” or entirely negated into a completely distinct entity.

In the above example, metaphysical line development simply sees raw aluminum as being negated and “replaced” in the real world. Once the aluminum can is created, the “raw aluminum” as a metaphysical entity is considered no longer to exist. Likewise, when the soda can is transformed into recycled aluminum, the can is considered “replaced,” and is no longer considered to have a metaphysical existence.

This conception of metaphysical line development directly contradicts the materialist dialectical concept of historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116].

Dialectical Materialist Conception of Development

The dialectical materialist conception of cyclical development stems from essential attributes of dialectical negation processes:

1. In every dialectical negation, the negating side inherits features and characteristics from the negated side.

2. When the negating side is, itself, negated (i.e., negation of the negation), the new negating side will retain features and aspects of the old negator.

3. This development process will continue indefinitely, so that negation is not simply a straight line of complete negation, but rather takes the shape of a “spiral” of negations of negations which always inherit features from previous forms.

Note that this conception of development as a spiral is simply an abstraction to help understand the essential characteristics of dialectical development and to distinguish this form of development from metaphysical conceptions of “linear development.”

In the example below, we see a depiction of the spiral development of aluminum through various stages of development. After raw aluminum is mined from the Earth, it begins a repeating spiral development process of being refined into usable goods, then recycled into raw material.

The “Spiral Development” model of materialist dialectics sees every stage of development as a higher form of the previous stage which carries forward characteristics from previous stages.

The illustrated example on the previous page plots the spiral development of aluminum as it cycles between stages defined as raw materials and refined products. Another perspective might depict development differently. For example, if we are examining development in terms of external relations between aluminum other elements, the development pattern would look different. In reality, all subjects have countless internal and external relations and development processes which can be examined.

The “raw aluminum” stage of development pictured in the illustration is not truly the beginning of this development process; there were millions of years of development which occurred before it was first discovered by humans. Similarly, the landfill will not be the end of this development process; there will be continued development forever for as long as motion in the universe continues.

This is a simplified and abstract model of development of aluminum. A more accurate representation might show any number of interim steps between each step depicted in the graphic above. For example: it must also be recognized that in reality the molecules of aluminum which the development process began with will be scattered and mixed with other subjects throughout the development process, and various other complexities exist in terms of the mutual impacts of internal and external relationships.

Determining the amount of detail to include or exclude in materialist dialectical analysis is crucial: too much detail and analysis might become unwieldy; too little detail and analysis might become too abstract and idealized to be useful in the real world. So, the idea of development as a spiral should not be taken literally; it is simply a way of conceptualizing the differences between dialectical negation and development as opposed to “straight-line” development upheld by metaphysical conceptions of negation and development, always carrying forward traces of previous stages of development.

In the chain of negations that make up the development processes of things, phenomena, and ideas, each dialectical negation creates the conditions and premises for subsequent developments. Through many iterations of negation, i.e., “negations of negations,” dialectical negation will inevitably lead to a forward tendency of motion.

Annotation 202

The forward tendency of motion describes the tendency for things, phenomena, and ideas to move from less advanced to more advanced forms through processes of motion and development.

As a reminder, “lower level” and “higher level,” i.e., “less advanced” and “more advanced,” should not be taken to have any connotations of “good” and “bad,” nor of “desirable” and “undesirable,” nor even of “less complex” and “more complex.”

Development from “lower levels” to “higher levels” is simply a shorthand for understanding the fact that development processes always move “forward,” that is to say, development can never happen in reverse, just as time itself can never be reversed. For example, society in Italy will never go back to the civilization of the Roman empire. It is conceivable that Italian society could develop to be more similar to Ancient Rome, but it would be impossible for Roman society to ever take on the exact characteristics of the Roman Empire ever again.

Cyclicality of development processes usually takes place in the form of a spiral, which is another result of “negation of negation.” Negations of negations lead to a development cycle in which things, phenomena, and ideas often undergo two fundamental negations carried through three basic forms. Through this negation pattern, basic features of the initial form are ultimately inherited by the “third form,” but at a higher level of development.

Annotation 203

Dialectical development tends to take place through a cyclical pattern in which development is carried through a triad of forms which develop through a pair of dialectical negation processes:

The cyclical pattern of development is an abstract pattern of dialectical change over time.

The graphic above illustrates this cyclical pattern, in which:

1. The initial form (the Assertion) begins the pattern. Contradiction within the initial subject or between it and another subject leads to the first negation.

2. The first negation leads to a second form (the Negation). This second form inherits some features or characteristics from the initial form.

3. The second form then encounters opposition, which leads to a second negation.

4. The second negation leads to a third form (Unity), which retains the features or characteristics of the second form, but now more closely resembles the first, initial form, only at a higher level of development.

Imagine a new car (initial form) crashes into another car (contradicting subject). The new car is dialectically developed (negated) into a second form: a wrecked car. This second form is now contradicted by a new subject — a recycling center — and negated into a third form: new steel. The third form possesses characteristics of the first form, but in a more developed form: after being recycled, the resulting steel it is newly made, in good condition for sale, etc., similarly to the first form of the new car.

In this example, a new car goes through a cyclical pattern of development in which the third form (new steel) possesses characteristics of the first form (a new car).

Keep in mind that this is relative to one’s perspective. If you consider the wrecked car to be the first form, then the steel would be the second form. The new steel will then need to be developed in some way (melted, hammered, cut, etc.) in order to be processed into some new product. From this perspective, the third form (i.e., molten steel) will have characteristics of the first form (i.e.: “unrefined”).

According to Marx and Engels, the development of capitalism from feudalism assumed this cyclical pattern:

The development of class structure is a dialectical process in which different classes synthesize to form the next era of class society. For example, the capitalist class emerged primarily as a synthesis of the feudal lords and peasants of the medieval era.

Note that this is only an abstract description of a tendency of dialectical development; exceptions can and do occur. Presumably, the development of communism as a stateless, classless society would constitute the negation of the “Class Society” form of human civilization. The Post-Class stage of development which follows would, itself, be a higher form — a unity — of pre-class human civilization, carrying forward traces from the Class Society stage of development.

Also note that determining which form is the “first” or “initial” pattern is entirely relative. Using the example of the development of class society: from one perspective, the Patricians may be seen as the initial form, but from another perspective the Plebeians might be considered the initial form. This depends entirely on the viewpoint and purpose of analysis. These conceptions of “spirals of development” and the pattern of “three forms through two negations” are, in essence, models which describe general tendencies and patterns of development and which help us understand the basic characteristics of dialectical negation and development.

Lenin describes this cycle of dialectical development as going “[f]rom assertion to negation — from negation to ‘unity’ with the asserted — without this, dialectics becomes empty negation, a game, skepsis [examination, observation, consideration].”[107]

Annotation 204

Here, “assertion” simply refers to the initial form of a dialectical development cycle. The negation is the second form, and the “unity” is the third form, which resembles the first form (the assertion) at a higher stage of development. So, in this quotation, Lenin is simply recounting the “three steps” of a typical dialectical development cycle, and indicating that it is necessary to recognize this process, which is rooted in the inheritance of properties of prior forms through development into ever-higher forms, to prevent dialectics from becoming “empty negation,” or otherwise falling prey to the critiques that dialectics are purely negative, skeptical, and eclectic in nature [see Annotation 200, p. 192 and Annotation 36, p. 33].

The law of negation of negation generalizes the pervasive nature of development: dialectical development does not take the form of a straight path, but rather in the form of a spiral path. Lenin summarised that this path is “[a] development that repeats, as it were, stages that have already been passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher basis (‘the negation of the negation’), a development, so to speak, that proceeds in spirals, not in a straight line…”[108] The tendency to develop in a spiral curve demonstrates the dialectical nature of development; i.e., the cycle of inheritance, repetition, and progression. Each new round of the spiral appears to be repeating, but at a higher level. The continuation of the loops in a spiral reflects an endless progression from lower levels to higher levels of things, phenomena, and ideas.

In short, the law of negation of negation in materialist dialectics reflects the dialectical relationship between the negative and the assertion [i.e., the second and first forms of a dialectical development cycle; see Annotation 203, p. 198] in the development process of things, phenomena and ideas. Dialectical development is driven by dialectical negation; in the development of all things, phenomena, and ideas, the new is the result of inheriting characteristics from prior forms. This process of inheritance, repetition, and progression through negation leads to cyclical development. Engels wrote: “what is the negation of the negation? An extremely general — and for this reason extremely far-reaching and important — law of development of nature, history, and thought.”[109]

Annotation 205

In the same text quoted above, Engels elaborates that dialectical development is composed of “processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation.”

c. Meaning of the Methodology

The law of negation of negation is the basis for correct perception of the tendency of motion and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. Development and motion processes do not take place in a straight line; rather, it is a winding, complex road, consisting of many stages, and each process can be broken down into many different sub-processes. However, it must be understood that this complexity of development is only the manifestation of the general tendency to move forward [see Annotation 118, p. 122]. It is important to understand the nature of motion and development so that we can systematically change the world according to our revolutionary viewpoint. In order to consciously impact the development of things, phenomena, and ideas, we need to know their characteristics, nature, and relationships so that we can influence their motion and development in the direction that suits our purposes. We must comprehend and leverage the tendency of forward movement — in accordance with a scientific and revolutionary worldview — in order to effectively and systematically change the world.

Annotation 206

Understanding the forward tendency of motion is vital for cultivating a worldview which is both scientific and revolutionary. Such a worldview is scientific because it recognizes the material reality that all things, phenomena, and ideas are constantly undergoing change and development. Nothing in our universe is static, and all things are connected and defined by internal and external relationships (which are also constantly developing). Furthermore, this development progresses with a forward tendency, meaning that no process can be completely “reversed.” For example, you can clean rust from a car [which would be forward progress], but you can’t reverse the temporal process of rust.

Once we understand that all things, phenomena, and ideas in our universe are constantly developing and moving forward, we can then begin to find ways to impact motion and development systematically to consciously change the world around us. This is the foundation of a revolutionary worldview, since revolutionary change requires us to leverage and influence development processes to suit our needs and revolutionary ambitions. Thus, materialist dialectics are an applied system of observation and practice through which we seek to understand development processes and consciously impact them to suit our needs.

According to the rule of negation of negation, in the objective world, the new must inevitably come to replace the old. In nature, the new develops according to objective laws. In social life, new things arise from the purposeful, self-conscious, and creative actions of human beings. Therefore, it is necessary to leverage subjective factors as we seek to consciously impact the development of things, phenomena, and ideas.

Annotation 207

Subjective factors are factors which we, as a subject, are capable of impacting. This may seem confusing, since we have previously established that all external things, phenomena, and ideas have objective relationships with all other things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 108, p. 112], meaning that any given subject is external to every other subject, and thus no subject can directly and completely control the motion and development of any other subject.

However, from the perspective of any given individual, there are certain things, phenomena, and ideas [as well as processes of motion and development] which we can impact. For example, if I see an apple on a table, the apple is objective to me. I can’t simply will the apple to move with my consciousness alone. However, I can impact the apple through conscious activity — I can consciously will my hand to pick up the apple and move it to another location.

Thus, factors which an individual can consciously impact are subjective factors. As revolutionists, we must focus on subjective factors. In other words, we must concentrate on that which we are capable of changing, since our purpose is to change the world. Focusing on factors which we can’t impact is a waste of time; we must simply determine what can be changed and then determine the most efficient and effective ways of impacting development processes and changing the world.

As revolutionists, we must have faith that we can introduce the “new,” faith in the success of the “new,” we must support the “new,” and fight for the victory of the “new.” Therefore, it is necessary to overcome conservative, stagnant, and dogmatic thoughts which restrain the development of the “new” and resist the law of negation of negation.

Annotation 208

Change is inevitable. All things, phenomena, and ideas undergo processes of motion and development. Any philosophy, ideology, or strategy which attempts to restrain motion and development is doomed to failure because change can neither be halted nor restrained. Thus, our strategies and actions must align with the material reality that change is inevitable, and we must seek to change the world by impacting processes of development and motion rather than attempting to reverse, restrain, or halt such processes.

Ideologies which erroneously strive to restrict change and development include rigidity (see Annotation 222, p. 218) and conservativism (see Annotation 236, p. 233).

In the process of negating the old we must leverage the principle of inheritance with discretion: we must encourage the inheritance of factors that are beneficial to our goals as we simultaneously attempt to filter out, overcome, and reform factors which would negatively impact our goals.

Annotation 209

If we understand the principle of inheritance, we can impact inheritance processes which derive from negation. For example, when repairing a car, we can seek out parts of the car which do not function properly or which do not suit the use-case of the car and add or replace parts which are more suitable.

In the same way, we can impact inheritence processes in our revolutionary political activities. We can seek to inherit characteristics from previous stages of development of our political organizations, social institutions, culture, etc., while simultaneously seeking to prevent the inheritence of traits and characteristics which are unsuitable for our revolutionary purposes. Over time, we can attempt to impact the inheritance of traits and aspects which are more conducive to our purposes while limiting and filtering out traits and aspects which are hindrances.

In an article titled “New Life” written in 1947, Ho Chi Minh wrote about the dialectical relationship between the new and the old in building a new society, writing:

Not everything old must be abandoned. We do not have to reinvent everything. What is old but bad must be abandoned. What is old but troublesome must be corrected appropriately. What is old but good must be further developed. What is new but good must be done.

... Growing up in the old society, we all carry within us more-or-less bad traces of the old society in terms of our ideas and habits... Habits are hard to change. That which is good and new is likely to be considered bad by the people because it is strange to them. On the contrary, that which is evil yet familiar is easily mistaken as normal and acceptable.

Ho Chi Minh understood the principles of development very well, as well as the difficulties we will face as revolutionaries as we try to change ourselves and our society. We must strive to develop a similar understanding as we move forward and attempt to affect the development of our world through practice and struggle.

Chapter 3: Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism

In Marxism, epistemological reasoning (or epistemology) is the foundation of dialectics. Dialectical materialist epistemology is a theory of applying human cognitive ability to the objective world through practical activities. It explains the nature, path and general laws of the human process of perceiving truth and objective reality to serve human practical activities.

Annotation 210

Epistemology is the theoretical study of knowledge. It also deals with the philosophical question of: “how do we know what is true?”

Throughout history, philosophers have tried to determine the nature of truth and knowledge. In the era of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, there was an ongoing dispute between the materialists, who believed that truth could only be sought through sense experience of the material world, and the idealists, who believed that truth could only be sought through reasoning within the human mind.

Marx and Engels developed the philosophical system of dialectical materialism to resolve this dispute. Dialectical materialism upholds that the material and the ideal have a dialectical relationship with one another: the material determines the ideal, while the ideal impacts the material [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88].

However, it’s important to understand that Marx and Engels didn’t develop the system of dialectical materialism simply to understand the world. As Marx wrote in Theses on Feuerbach:

The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.

So, Marxist dialectical materialist epistemology is developed specifically to enable human beings to not only perceive truth and objective reality, but to then be able to apply our conscious thought, through practical activity, in order to bring about change in the world.

1. Praxis, Consciousness, and the Role of Praxis in Consciousness

a. Praxis and Basic Forms of Praxis

Praxis includes all human material activities which have purpose and historical-social characteristics and which transform nature and society. Unlike other activities, praxis is activity in which humans attempt to materially impact the world to suit our purposes. Praxis activities define the nature of human beings and distinguish human beings from other animals. Praxis is objective activity, and praxis has been constantly developed by humans through the ages.


Annotation 211

In English, the words “practice” and “praxis” are often distinguished from one another. “Practice” is often used to refer to human activity which provides more information about the world around us and improves our knowledge and understanding, whereas “praxis” often refers to conscious human activity which is intended to change the world in some manner. In their original German, Marx and Engels used the same German word — Praxis — to refer to both concepts. Similarly, in the original Vietnamese text of this book, the same word — thực tiễn — is used for both “practice” and “praxis.”

One reason that these concepts are so closely related is that all conscious activity serves both rolls by simultaneously telling us more about reality and consciously changing reality in some way. For example, by pushing a heavy stone, you may be able to move the stone a small amount — constituting praxis — while simultaneously learning how heavy the stone is and how difficult it is to move — constituting practice. The main point of distinction, therefore, is intention. Virtually all conscious activity is practice, but only activity which has purpose and historical-social characteristics might be considered praxis:

Purpose simply describes a goal or desired outcome; specifically: a desired change in nature or human society. Activities with historical-social characteristics are activities which contribute in some way to the development of human society.

In this translation, we use “practice” and “praxis” interchangably to mean “conscious activity which improves our understanding, and which has purpose and historical-social characteristics.” You are likely to find these words used differently (as described above, or in other ways) in other texts. Engels explains the importance of practice/praxis in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we [use] these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perceptions. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is positive proof that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves.

Marx wrote in Theses on Feuerbach that “the coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice [German: revolutionäre Praxis].” Engels further expounds upon this concept in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, writing:

The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical fancies is practice [original German: Praxis], viz., experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and using it for our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end of the Kantian incomprehensible or ungraspable.

Praxis defines the nature of human beings because human beings are (to our present knowledge) the only beings which undertake actions with conscious awareness of our desired outcomes and comprehension of the historical development of our own society, which distinguishes human beings from all other animals. Praxis is objective activity, meaning that all praxis activities are performed in relation to external things, phenomena, and ideas [see Annotation 108, p. 112].

Praxis has been constantly developed by humans through the ages, meaning that as we learn more about the nature of reality, of human society, and the laws of nature, we are able to develop our praxis to become more efficient and effective.

Praxis activities are very diverse, manifesting with ever-increasing variety, but there are only three basic forms: material production activities, socio-political activities, and scientific experimental activities.

Material production activity is the first and most basic form of praxis. In this form of praxis activity, humans use tools through labor processes to influence the natural world in order to create wealth and material resources and to develop the conditions necessary to maintain our existence and development.

Socio-political activity includes praxis activity utilized by various communities and organizations in human society to transform political-social relations in order to promote social development.

Scientific experimental activity is a special form of praxis activity. This includes human activities that resemble or replicate states of nature and society in order to determine the laws of change and development of subjects of study. This form of activity plays an important role in the development of society, especially in the current historical period of modern science and technological revolution.

Annotation 212

The three basic forms of praxis activities listed above obviously do not include all forms of human activity, as praxis only includes activities which have purpose and historical-social characteristics.

Material production activity has a very clear purpose: to improve the material conditions of an individual human being or a group of human beings. Material production activity has historical-social characteristics because developing material conditions for human beings leads directly to the development of human society. For example, as food production increases in terms of yield and efficiency, society can support a larger number of human beings and a wider range of human activities, which leads to the development of human society.

Socio-political activity has the purpose of promoting social development, which is obviously inherently historical-social in nature. An example of socio-political activity would include any sort of political campaign, liberation struggle, political revolutionary activity, etc.

Scientific experimental activity has the purpose of expanding our understanding of nature and human society, which leads directly to historical-social development in a variety of ways. For example, improving our scientific understanding of medicine through scientific experimental activity leads to longer lives and improved quality of life. Improving our scientific understanding of chemistry through scientific experimental activity leads to all sorts of materials which improve the quality of life and enable human beings to solve a variety of social problems.

In order to qualify as praxis activity, a given human activity must have a purpose and it must have historical-social characteristics. For instance, drawing is not always praxis in the sense of the word used in this text, but it would be praxis if it would qualify as material production activity (i.e., making art in order to sell, so as to make a living) or if the art is made with the intention of invoking social change.

Every basic praxis activity form has an important function, and these functions are not interchangeable with each other. However, they have close relationships with each other and different praxis activity forms often interact with each other. In these relationships, material production is the most important form of praxis activity, playing a decisive role in determining other praxis activities because material production is the most primitive activity and exists most commonly in human life. Material production creates the most essential, decisive material conditions for human survival and development. Without material production there cannot be other praxis activities. After all, all other praxis activities arise from material production praxis and all praxis activities ultimately aim to serve material production praxis.

Annotation 213

Without material production activity, human beings would not be able to live at all.

Thus, material production activities make all other forms of human activities possible. In addition, the primary reason we participate in socio-political activity is to ensure material security (food, water, shelter, etc.) for members of society, which ultimately relies on material production activity. Therefore, the primary reason we engage in scientific experimental activity is to improve material production activities in terms of efficiency, yield, effectiveness, etc

Of course, we engage in scientific experimental activity and material production activity for other reasons (art, entertainment, recreation, etc.), but these activities require that material security be secured first for those participating in the production and consumption of such products. In other words, material production activity is a prerequisite for all other forms of activity, since without some measure of material security humans cannot survive.

Material production activity has a dialectical relationship with all other praxis activity, with material production activity determining, while being impacted by, all other forms of praxis activity.

Thus, material production activity has a dialectical relationship with other forms of praxis activities, in which material production activity determines both socio-political and scientific experimental activity while socio-political and scientific experimental activity impact material production activity.

b. Consciousness and Levels of Consciousness

The dialectical materialist perspective sees consciousness as a process of reflecting the objective world within the human brain on a practical basis to create knowledge about the objective world. Consciousness is a self-aware process that is productive and creative.

This view stems from the following basic principles:

  • The dialectical materialist worldview acknowledges that the material world exists objectively and independently of human consciousness.
  • The dialectical materialist worldview recognizes the following human abilities:
    • To perceive the objective world.
    • To reflect the objective world into the human mind, which enables human subjects to learn about external objects. [see Annotation 66, p. 64]
    • To admit that there are no material things nor phenomena which are unrecognizable, but only material things and phenomena that humans have not yet recognised. [see The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues, p. 48]

The dialectical materialist worldview affirms that conscious reflection [see Annotation 67, p. 64] of the objective world is a dialectical, productive, self-aware, and creative process. This reflection process develops from the unknown to the known, from knowing less to knowing more, from knowing less profoundly and less comprehensively to knowing more profoundly and more comprehensively.

Annotation 214

The above principle (that human knowledge develops from less, and less comprehensive, to more, and more comprehensive states) stands in contrast to various other philosophical systems of belief, including:

Hegel’s Absolute Idealism upholds a belief in an “absolute ideal” which constitutes an ultimate limit or “end point” of knowledge which humanity is moving towards. Dialectical materialism upholds that there is no such absolute ideal and thus no such terminal end point of human understanding. [See Annotation 234, p. 230] As Engels wrote in Anti-Dühring:

If mankind ever reached the stage at which it should work only with eternal truths, with results of thought which possess sovereign validity and an unconditional claim to truth, it would then have reached the point where the infinity of the intellectual world both in its actuality and in its potentiality had been exhausted, and thus the famous miracle of the counted uncountable would have been performed.

Fideism, which is the belief that knowledge is received from some higher power [i.e., God]. Fideism upholds that all knowledge is pre-existing, and that humanity simply receives it from on high. Dialectical materialism, on the other hand, argues that knowledge is developed over time through dialectical processes of consciousness and human activity.

Positivism, or empiricist materialism, which holds that there are hard limits to human knowledge, or that human knowledge — which can only be obtained from sense data — can’t be trusted. Dialectical materialism upholds that all things and phenomena can be known and understood, and that sense data can be trusted as an objective reflection of reality. For more information about skepticism about human sense data as well as positive and empiricist materialism, see Annotation 10, p. 10, and Annotation 58, p. 56].

The dialectical materialist worldview considers praxis as the primary and most direct basis of consciousness, and as the motive and the purpose of consciousness, and as the criterion for testing truth. [See: The Relationship Between Praxis and Consciousness, p. 216]

Annotation 215

Given the above principles — that human consciousness exists independently from the material world yet is capable of accurately perceiving and reflecting the material world, and that knowledge develops over time through a synthesis of consciousness and practical activity — we can conclude that consciousness is a self-aware process which is productive and creative.

Consciousness is productive and creative in the sense that conscious processes, in conjunction with practical experience and activity in the material world, leads to the development of knowledge and practical experience which allows humans to develop our understanding of the world as well as our own material conditions through the application of knowledge to our own labor activities.

Next, we will examine different ways of categorizing conscious activities as they pertain to developing knowledge and practical understanding of our world.

From the dialectical materialist point of view, consciousness is a process of development. Consciousness develops from empirical consciousness to theoretical consciousness; and from ordinary consciousness to scientific consciousness.

Annotation 216

In dialectical materialist philosophy, all systems of relation exist as processes of development in motion [see Annotation 120, p. 124]. Thus, consciousness can be defined as a system of relations between human brain activity and two forms of data input:

• Sense experience: observations of the external world detected by our senses.

• Knowledge: information which exists in the human mind as memories and ideas.

Consciousness is thus a process of the development of knowledge through a combination of human brain activity and human practical activity in the physical world (i.e., labor).

In the section below, we will explore different forms of consciousness, the development of consciousness, and the relationship between consciousness and knowledge. Note that these are abstractions of consciousness and knowledge, meant to help us understand how knowledge and consciousness develop over time. Thought processes are extremely complex, so we seek to develop a fundamental understanding of how consciousness develops and how knowledge develops because these processes are fundamental to the development of human beings and human societies.

Just as consciousness is a process of developing knowledge through brain activity, consciousness itself also develops over time. The development of consciousness can be considered based on the criteria of concrete/abstract and of passive/active.

Consciousness develops from a state of direct and immediate observation of the world which results in concrete knowledge to a higher stage which constitutes a more abstract and general understanding of the world. We call consciousness which is focused on direct, immediate, concrete, empirical observation of the world empirical consciousness, and we call consciousness which is focused on forming abstract generalizations about the world theoretical consciousness.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-79.png

Empirical consciousness is a process of collecting data about the world, which we call knowledge. We can gather two forms of knowledge through empirical consciousness: ordinary knowledge, and scientific knowledge.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-80.png

Ordinary knowledge is the knowledge we accumulate through our everyday experiences in the world. Scientific knowledge is gathered through more systematic scientific observations and experiments. Scientific knowledge usually develops from ordinary knowledge, as we begin to seek a more formal and systematic understanding of the things we witness in our daily lives.

According to Themes in Soviet Marxist Philosophy, edited by T. J. Blakely:

Ordinary knowledge notes what lies on the very surface, what happens during a certain event. Scientific knowledge wants to know why it happens in just this way. The essence of scientific knowledge lies in the confirmed generalization of facts, where it becomes necessary rather than contingent, universal instead of particular, law-bound, and can serve as a basis for predicting various phenomena, events and objects...

The whole progress of scientific knowledge is bound up with growth in the force and volume of scientific prediction. Prediction makes it possible to control processes and to direct them. Scientific knowledge opens up the possibility not only of predicting the future but also of consciously forming it. The vital meaning of every science can be expressed as follows: to know in order to predict and to predict in order to act.

An essential characteristic of scientific knowledge is that it is systematic, i.e., it is a set of information which is ordered according to certain theoretical principles. A collection of unsystematized knowledge is not yet science. Certain basic premises are fundamental to scientific knowledge, i.e., the laws which make it possible to systematize the knowledge. Knowledge becomes scientific when the collection of facts and their descriptions reach the level where they are included in a theory.

Theoretical consciousness arises from conscious reflection on accumulated knowledge, as human beings seek to develop general and abstract understanding of the underlying principles of processes we experience in the world. Once general principles of natural and social law are established, human beings then test those general conclusions against empirical reality through further observation (i.e., through empirical consciousness).

Thus, there is a dialectical relationship between empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness, as one form leads to another, back and forth, again and again, continuously.

Empirical and theoretical consciousness have a dialectical relationship in which empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness lead to and mutually develop one another.

Consciousness also develops from passive and surface-level observation and understanding of the world (i.e., simply considering what, where, and when things happen) to more active pursuit of the underlying meaning of the world (i.e., trying to understand how and why things happen).

Consciousness which passively observes the world, directly, in daily life is referred to as ordinary consciousness. Ordinary consciousness often develops into more active consciousness. This active pursuit of understanding through systematic observation and indirect experiences (i.e., experiences that do not occur in daily activity — such as scientific experimentation) is referred to as scientific consciousness.

File:T-w-the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-82.png

These concepts will be discussed in further detail below.

Empirical consciousness is the stage of development of consciousness in which perceptions are formed via direct observations of things and phenomena in the natural world, or of society, or through scientific experimentation and systematic observation. Empirical consciousness results in empirical knowledge.

Empirical knowledge has two types: ordinary empirical knowledge (knowledge obtained through direct observation and in productive labor) and scientific empirical knowledge (knowledge obtained by conducting scientific experiments). These two types of knowledge can be complementary, and can enrich one other.

Theoretical consciousness is the indirect, abstract, systematic level of perception in which the nature and laws of things and phenomena are generalized and abstracted.

Empirical consciousness and Theoretical consciousness are two different cognitive stages but they have a dialectical relationship with each other. In this dialectical relationship, empirical consciousness is the basis of theoretical consciousness; it provides theoretical consciousness with specific, rich material [i.e., knowledge]. Empirical consciousness is linked closely to practical activities [since practical activity in the material world is the chief method of gathering knowledge through empirical consciousness], and forms the basis for checking, correcting, and supplementing existing theories and summarizing, and generalizing them into new theories. However, empirical consciousness is still limited in that empirical consciousness stops at the description and classification of data obtained from direct observation and experimentation. Therefore, empirical consciousness only brings understanding about the separate, superficial, discrete aspects of observed subjects, without yet reflecting the essence of those subjects nor the underlying principles or laws which regulate those subjects.

Therefore, empirical consciousness, alone, is not sufficient for determining the scientific laws of nature and society. To determine such laws and abstractions, theoretical consciousness must be applied. So, theoretical consciousness does not form spontaneously, nor directly from experience, although it is formed from the summation of experiences.

Annotation 217

The knowledge we gain from our daily activity often inspires scientific inquiry and more systematic observation, which can yield scientific knowledge which will enrich and improve our daily practice and allow us to experience daily life with a deeper understanding of what we’re experiencing. Thus, the ordinary knowledge we gain through daily practice can enrich and yield scientific knowledge (and vice versa).

Empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness have a dialectical relationship with each other in which empirical consciousness provides the basis for theoretical consciousness. Theoretical consciousness attempts to derive general abstractions and governing principles from empirical knowledge which is gained through empirical consciousness. Once theoretical principles, generalities, and abstractions are determined, they are then tested against reality through empirical consciousness (i.e., practical observation and systematic experimentation) to determine if the theory is sound.

Empirical consciousness and theoretical consciousness have a dialectical relationship with one another. Our observations of the material world lead to conscious activity which we then test in reality through conscious activity, and so on, in a never-ending cycle of dialectical development.

For example, a farmer may notice that plants grow better in locations where manure has been discarded — an act of empirical consciousness. The farmer might then form the theory that adding manure to the soil will help plants grow — an act of theoretical consciousness. This theory could then be tested against reality by mixing manure into the soil and observing the results, which would be another act of empirical consciousness. The farmer may then theorize that more manure will help plants grow even more — another act of theoretical consciousness — continuing the cycle of testing and observing.

This dialectical relationship between ordinary and theoretical consciousness is what allows human beings to develop and improve knowledge through practical experience, observation, and theoretical abstraction and generalization of knowledge.

Theoretical consciousness is relatively independent from empirical consciousness. Therefore, theories can precede expectations and guide the formation of valuable empirical knowledge. Theoretical consciousness is what allows human beings to sort and filter knowledge so as to best serve practical activities and contribute to the transformation of human life. Through this process, knowledge is organized and therefore enhanced, and develops from the level of specific, individual, and solitary knowledge to a higher form of generalized and abstract knowledge [what we might call theoretical knowledge].

Annotation 218

Knowledge which comes from empirical observations (empirical consciousness) is empirical knowledge. Theoretical knowledge is a product of theoretical consciousness. Over time, as repeated and varied observations are made through theoretical consciousness activities, knowledge becomes more generalized and abstract; this general and abstract knowledge is what we call theoretical knowledge.

Note that empirical and theoretical knowledge can be ordinary or scientific in nature; if the knowledge arises passively from daily life activities, it will be ordinary knowledge, regardless of whether or not it is empirical or theoretical in nature. If, on the other hand, the knowledge arises from methodological measurement and/or systematic observation, then it is scientific knowledge.vSo far, we have discussed ways of understanding consciousness based on the criteria of directness vs. abstractness. Next, we will discuss another way of looking at consciousness, based on the criteria of passiveness vs. activeness.

Ordinary consciousness refers to perception that is formed passively and directly from the daily activities of humans. Ordinary consciousness is a reflection of things, phenomena, and ideas, with all their observed characteristics, specific details, and nuances. Therefore, ordinary consciousness is rich, multifaceted, and associated with daily life. Therefore, ordinary consciousness has a regular and pervasive role in governing the activities of each person in society.

Scientific consciousness refers to perception formed actively and indirectly from the reflection of the characteristics, nature, and inherent relationships of research subjects. This reflection takes place in the form of logical abstraction. These logical abstractions include scientific concepts, categories, and laws. Scientific consciousness is objective, abstract, general, and systematic, and must be grounded in evidence.

Scientific consciousness utilizes systematic methodologies to profoundly describe the nature of studied subjects as well as the principles which govern them. Therefore, scientific consciousness plays an increasingly important role in practical activities, especially in the modern age of science and technology.

Annotation 219

Logical abstraction refers to an understanding of the underlying rules which govern things, phenomena, and ideas which underly objective processes, relationships, and characteristics. Logical abstraction is the result of scientific inquiry. Over time, our understanding of the rules which govern the things, phenomena, and ideas in our lives become more reliable and applicable in practical activities. This attainment of understanding and practical ability through scientific practice is scientific consciousness.

Ordinary and scientific consciousness are two different qualitative steps of cognitive processes which, together, allow humans to discover truth about our world. Ordinary and scientific consciousness have a strong dialectical relationship with each other. In this relationship, ordinary consciousness precedes scientific consciousness, as ordinary consciousness is a source of material for the development of scientific consciousness.

Although it contains the seeds of scientific knowledge, ordinary consciousness mainly stops at the reflection of superficial details, seemingly random events, and non-essential phenomena [see Essence and Phenomenon, p. 156]. Ordinary consciousness, therefore, cannot transform effortlessly into scientific consciousness. To develop ordinary consciousness into scientific consciousness, we must go through the process of accurate summarizing, abstracting, and generalization using scientific methods. Likewise, once scientific consciousness has been developed, it impacts and pervades ordinary consciousness, and therefore develops ordinary consciousness. Scientific consciousness therefore enhances our everyday passive perception of the world.

Ordinary consciousness refers to the passive observation of reality which takes place in our daily lives. Scientific consciousness refers to the systematic application of consciousness to solve specific problems in a methodological manner.

Annotation 220

For example, before developing scientific consciousness of farming, a farmer might go through daily life having no idea what makes plants grow to be larger and more healthy and might have no idea how to avoid common problems such as pests. After developing scientific consciousness of farming through scientific experimentation and other systematic methodologies, the farmer will look at things differently in daily life activities. They may see signs of pest infestation and immediately recognize it for what it is, and they may see other indications that plants are unhealthy and know exactly what to do to remedy the situation.

In this way, scientific consciousness enhances ordinary consciousness. Meanwhile, ordinary consciousness — passive observation of the world during daily activities — will lead to scientific consciousness by inspiring us to actively seek understanding of the world through scientific consciousness.

c. The Relationship Between Praxis and Consciousness

Praxis serves as the basis, driving force, and purpose of consciousness. Praxis serves as the criterion of truth by testing the truthfulness of our thoughts. [See Annotation 230, p. 226]

Praxis is able to serve these roles because reality is the direct starting point of consciousness; it sets out the requirements, tasks, and modes of consciousness, as well as the movement and development tendencies of consciousness. Humans have an objective and inherent need to explain the world and to transform it.

Annotation 221

Remember that the material world defines consciousness while consciousness allows us to impact the material world through conscious activity [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88]. Consciousness itself arose from the physical needs of the material world [see The Source of Consciousness, p. 64], and these physical needs continue to serve as the basis and driving force for all conscious activities, as we must act consciously to survive.

Our inherent need to explain the world and to transform it arises from our material needs to eat, seek shelter, cure and prevent disease, and so on. These physical needs, which stem from the material world, drive conscious activity and lead to the development of consciousness and knowledge.

Therefore, humans must necessarily impact things in the material world through our practical activities in order to survive. The impacts of our practical activities on the world cause things and phenomena to reveal their different properties, including their internal and external relationships [for example, hitting a rock will tell you properties about the rock; attempting to build something out of wood will provide data about the wood, etc.]. In this manner, praxis produces data for consciousness to process, and also helps consciousness to comprehend nature and the laws of movement and development which govern the world.

Scientific theories are formed on the basis of the dialectical relationship between practical activity and consciousness. For example: mathematics developed to allow us to count and measure things for practical activities such as agriculture, navigation, and building structures. Marxism also arose in the 1840’s from the practical activities of the struggles of the working class against the capitalist class at that time. Even recent scientific achievements arise from practical needs and activities. For example, the discovery and decoding of the human genome map was born from practical activities and needs, such as the need to develop treatments for incurable diseases. In the end, there is no field of knowledge that is not derived from reality. Ultimately, all knowledge arises from and serves practice. Therefore, if we were to break from reality or stop relying on reality, consciousness would break from the basis of reality that nurtures our growth, existence and development. Also, the cognitive subject cannot have true and profound knowledge about the world if it does not follow reality.

Practice also serves as the basis, driving force, and purpose of consciousness because, thanks to practical activities, our human ability to measure and observe reality improves increasingly over time; our logical thinking ability is constantly strengthened and developed; cognitive means become increasingly developed. All of these developments “extend” the human senses in perceiving the world [for example, by developing new tools to measure, perceive, and sense the world such as telescopes, radar, microscopes, etc.].

Reality is not only the basis, the driving force, and the purpose of discovering truth but also serves as the standard of truth. Reality also serves as the basis for examining the truthfulness of the cognitive process [i.e., we can test whether our thoughts match material reality through experimentation and practice in the real world]. This means that practice is the measure of the value of the knowledge we gain through perception. At the same time, practice is constantly supplementing, adjusting, correcting, developing, and improving human consciousness. Marx said: “The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice.”[110]

Thus, practice is not only the starting point of consciousness and a decisive factor for the formation and development of consciousness, it is also a target where consciousness must always aim to test the truth. To emphasize this role which practice plays, Lenin said: “The standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge.”[111]

The role of practice in consciousness requires that we always grasp the practical point of view. This point of view requires that we derive our ideas from practice, our ideas must be based on practice, and our ideas must deeply explore practice. In our conscious activities, we must attach a lot of importance to the summarization of practice [i.e., developing theoretical knowledge through theoretical consciousness which reflects practical experience]. Theoretical research must be related to practice, and learning must go hand in hand with practicing. If we diverge from practice, it will lead to mistakes of subjectivism, idealism, dogmatism, rigidity, and bureaucracy.

Annotation 222

Subjectivism occurs when one centers one’s own self and conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test one’s own perceptions against material and social reality. Subjectivists tend to believe that they can independently reason their way to truth in their own minds without practical experience and activity in the material world. Related to subjectivism is solipsism, a form of idealism in which one believes that the self is the only basis for truth. As Marxist ethicist Howard Selsam wrote in Ethics and Progress: New Values in a Revolutionary World: “If I believe that I alone exist and that you and all your arguments exist only in my mind and are my own creations then all possible arguments will not shake me one iota. No logic can possibly convince [the] solipsist.”

Idealism has a strong connection with a failure to incorporate practical activity into theoretical consciousness, since idealism holds that conscious activity is the sole basis of discovering truth.

Dogmatism occurs when one only accounts for commonalities and considers theory itself as the sole basis of truth rather than practice [see Annotation 239, p. 235]. Dogmatists ignore practical experience and considering pre-established theory, alone, as unalterable truth. This results in a breakdown of the dialectical relationship between theoretical consciousness and empirical consciousness, which arrests the development process of knowledge and consciousness.

Rigidity is an unwillingness to alter one’s thoughts, holding too stiffly to established consciousness and knowledge, and ignoring practical experience and observation, which leads to stagnation of both knowledge and consciousness.

Bureaucracy arises when theory becomes overly codified and formalized, to the extent that practical considerations are ignored in favor of codified theory. Bureaucracy can be avoided by incorporating practical experience and observations continuously into the development of practical systems and methodologies so that theory and practice become increasingly aligned over time to continuously improve efficiency and effectiveness of practical activities in the material world.

On the contrary, if the role of practice is absolutized [to the exclusion of conscious activity], it will fall into pragmatism and empiricism.

Annotation 223

In this context, pragmatism refers to a form of subjectivism [see Annotation 222, above] in which one centers one’s own immediate material concerns over all other considerations. For example, workers may place their own immediate needs and desires above the concerns of their fellow workers as a whole. This may offer some temporary gains, but in the long run their lack of solidarity and class consciousness will be detrimental as workers collectively suffer from division, making all workers more vulnerable to exploitation and ill treatment by the capitalist class.

Empiricism is a faulty form of materialism in which only sense experience and practical experience are considered sources of truth. This is opposed to the dialectical materialist position that the material determines consciousness, while consciousness impacts the material world through conscious labor activity. [See The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88]

Thus, the principle of the unification of practice and theory must be the basic principle in practical and theoretical activities. Theory without practice as its basis and criterion for determining its truthfulness is useless. Vice versa, practice without scientific and revolutionary theory will inevitably turn into blind practice. [As Ho Chi Minh once said: “Study and practice must always go together. Study without practice is useless. Practice without study leads to folly.”]

2. Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth

a. Opinions of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin about the Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth

Annotation 224

The section below outlines and explains the Universal Law of Consciousness, which holds that consciousness is a process of dialectical development in which practical activity leads to conscious activity, which then leads back to practical activity, in a continuous and never-ending cycle, with a tendency to develop both practical and conscious activity to increasingly higher levels.

In his Philosophical Notebook, Lenin generalized the dialectical path towards the realization of truth as development from vivid visualization to abstract thinking, and then from abstraction back to practice. This process, according to Lenin, is the dialectical path towards the realization of truth, and the realization of objective reality.

According to this generalization, the dialectical path towards the realization of truth (“truth,” here, referring to a correct and accurate reflection of objective reality) is a process. It is a process that starts from “vivid visualization” (emotional consciousness) to “abstract thinking” (rational consciousness).

Annotation 225

Given that consciousness has a material basis, and that practical activities are the driving force of consciousness [see Annotation 230, p. 226], it follows that we must strive to align our conscious thoughts and ideas with the material world. The more accurately we can reflect reality in our consciousness, the more effectively and efficiently our practical activities can become.

For example, through learning more about the mechanical, material, and physical processes which take place inside of an automobile engine, the more we can improve engines to make them more efficient and effective for practical applications.

Lenin explained that consciousness develops from “emotional consciousness” to “rational consciousness.” Thought about a subject begins at a base level of consciousness that is rooted in emotional and sense-oriented conscious activity, i.e, “vivid visualization,” which then leads to rational, abstract reflection.

By “vivid visualization,” Lenin is referring to the active, real-time experience of seeing (and hearing, smelling, and otherwise sensing) things and phenomena in the world.

When a person experiences something through practical activity, the first conscious activity will tend to occur at the emotional and sensory level — in other words, the conscious activities which occur simultaneously along with practical activities. Only after this initial period of emotional consciousness will one be able to reflect on the experience on a more rational and abstract level.

For example, if a zoologist in the field sees a species of bird they have never encountered before, their first conscious activity will be at the sensory-emotional level: they will observe the shape, coloration, and motion of the bird. They may feel excitement, happiness, and other emotions. This is emotional conscious activity.

This emotional conscious activity will then develop into rational conscious activity, as the zoologist may begin to consider things more abstractly, attempting to interpret and understand this experience through reason and rational reflection, asking such questions as: “Where does this bird nest? What does it feed on? Is this a new discovery?” and so on.

Such abstractions are not the end point of a cognitive cycle, because consciousness must then continue to develop through practice. It is through practice that perception tests and proves its own correctness so that it can then continue on to repeat the cycle.

This is also the general rule of the human perception of objective reality.

Annotation 226

Thus there is a dialectical relationship between emotional consciousness (linked to practical activity) and rational consciousness (linked to purely conscious activity).

This dialectical relationship is a cycle, in which one engages in practical activity, which leads to emotional consciousness, which leads to rational consciousness, which then leads back to practical activity to test the correctness of the conclusions of rational conscious activity.

We call this cycle of development of consciousness the cognitive process.

The cognitive process is a continuous cycle which describes the dialectical development of consciousness and practical activity.

The cognitive process is explained in more detail below.

- Development From Emotional Consciousness to Rational Consciousness

Emotional consciousness is the lower stage of the cognitive process. In this stage of cognitive development, humans use — through practical activity — use our senses to reflect objective things and phenomena (with all their perceived specific characteristics and rich manifestations) in human consciousness. During this period, consciousness only reflects the phenomena [i.e, phenomena, as opposed to essence — see Essence and Phenomenon, p. 156] — the external manifestations — of the perceived subject. At this stage, consciousness has not yet reflected the essence — the nature, and/or the regulating principles — of the subject. Therefore, this is the lowest stage of development of the cognitive process. In this stage, consciousness is carried out through three basic phases: sensation, conception, and symbolization.

Human sensation of an objective thing or phenomenon is the simplest, most primitive phase of the emotional consciousness stage of the cognitive processes, but without it there would not be any perception of objective things or phenomena. Every human sensation of objective things and phenomena contains objective content [see Content and Form, p. 147], even though it arises as subjective human conscious reflection. Sensation is the subjective imagining of the objective world. It is the basis from which the next phase of emotional consciousness — conception — is formed.

Conception is a relatively complete reflection within human consciousness of objective things and phenomena. Conception is formed on the basis of linking and synthesizing sensational experiences of things and phenomena [i.e., sensation]. Compared with sensation, conception is a higher, fuller, richer form of consciousness, but it is still a reflection of the outward manifestations of objects. Conception does not yet reflect the essence, nature, and regulating principles of the perceived subject.

Symbolization is the representation of an objective thing or phenomenon that has been reflected by sensation and conception. It is the most advanced and most complex phase of the stage of emotional consciousness. At the same time, it also serves as the transitional step between emotional consciousness and rational consciousness. The defining characteristic of symbolism is the ability to reproduce symbolic ideas of objective things and phenomena within human consciousness. Symbolization describes the act of recreating the outward appearances of material things and phenomena within human consciousness, which is the first step of abstraction, and thus the first step towards rational consciousness.

Annotation 227

Here is an example of the three phases of the emotional consciousness stage of the cognitive process:

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1. Sensation: Jessica senses a cake in the window of a bakery. She sees the frosting, the shape of the cake, and the decorations which adorn the cake. She smells the cake. During this phase, objective data about the cake is received into her consciousness, developing into an immediate and subjective sense perception of the cake. The beginnings of this cognitive activity will be purely sensory in nature; she may have been thinking of other things as she walked by the bakery, but the sight and smell of the cake, upon registering in her mind, will lead to the beginning of a new cognitive process cycle.

2. Conception: Jessica begins to conceive of the cake in her mind more fully. She will associate the immediate sense experiences of seeing and smelling the cake with other experiences she has had with cake, and a complete mental image and concept of the cake will form in her mind.

3. Symbolization: The word “cake” may now form in her mind, and she may begin thinking of the cake more abstractly, as “food,” as a “temptation,” and in other ways. This is the beginning of abstraction in Jessica’s mind, which will then lead to rational conscious activities.

Note that all of these phases of emotional consciousness activity may take place very quickly, perhaps in a fraction of a second, and may coincide with other conscious activity (i.e., Jessica may simultaneously be thinking of a meeting she’s running late to and any number of other things). At this point, Jessica will transition to the rational consciousness stage of the cognitive process, which is explained in more detail below.

By the end of the emotional stage of the cognitive process, consciousness has not yet reflected the essence — the nature, regulating principles, etc. — of the perceived subject. Therefore, at the emotional stage, consciousness is not yet able to properly interpret the reflected subject. That is to say, emotional conscious activity does not meet the cognitive requirements to serve practical activities, including the need to creatively transform the objective world. To meet these requirements, emotional consciousness must develop into rational consciousness.

Rational consciousness is the higher stage of the cognitive process. It includes the indirect, abstract, and generalized reflection of the essential properties and characteristics of things and phenomena. This stage of consciousness performs the most important function of comprehending and interpreting the essence of the perceived subject. Rational consciousness is implemented through three basic phases: definition, judgment, and reasoning.

Definition is the first phase of rational consciousness. During this phase, the mind begins to interpret, organize, and process the basic properties of things and phenomena at a rational level into a conceptual whole. The formation of definition is the result of the summarization and synthesis of all the different characteristics and properties of the subject, and how the subject fits into the organized structure of knowledge which exists in the mind. Definition is the basis for forming judgments in the cognitive process.

Judgment is the next phase of rational consciousness, which arises from the definition of the subject — the linking of concepts and properties together — which leads to affirmative or negative ideation of certain characteristics or attributes of the perceived subject.

According to the level of development of consciousness, judgment may take one of three forms: unique judgment, general judgment, and universal judgment [see Annotation 105, p. 107]. Universal judgment is the form of judgement that expresses the broadest conception of objective reality.

Reasoning is the final phase of rational consciousness, formed on the basis of synthesizing judgments so as to extrapolate new knowledge about the perceived subject. Before reasoning can take place, judgments must be transformed into knowledge. A judgment can be transformed into knowledge through one of two logical mechanisms: deductive inference (which extrapolates the general from the specific), and inductive inference (which extrapolates the specific from the general).

Annotation 228

Here is an example of the three phases of the rational consciousness stage of the cognitive process, continuing from our previous example of the emotional consciousness stage [see Annotation 227, p. 222].

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1. Definition: Jessica’s conception of the cake will transition into the rational conscious activity of definition. Jessica will begin to define the concept of the cake more wholly and concretely, summarizing and synthesizing all of the features and characteristics of the cake into a cohesive mental reflection of the cake. The word “cake” may become more pronounced and defined in Jessica’s consciousness, prompting her to think of the object which she defines as a “cake” more fully and rationally.

2. Judgment: Jessica will begin to form basic judgments about the cake. “That cake looks good,” “that cake smells good,” and so on. Next, these judgments will begin to transform into knowledge through inductive or deductive inferences. An inductive inference might be: “I generally enjoy eating cakes, therefore, I might enjoy eating this cake!” An example of a deductive inference might be: “This cake looks very delicious, therefore, there might be other delicious things in this bakery!”

3. Reasoning: Processes of inductive and/or deductive inference will begin to transform Jessica’s judgments into the form of knowledge. For instance, she may now possess such knowledge as: “This bakery has delicious looking cakes, this is a cake I would like to eat,” and so on. With this newly acquired knowledge, Jessica can begin reasoning; that is to say, she can begin making rational conclusions and decisions. She might conclude: “I will go into this bakery and buy that cake.”

Note that this is not the “end” of the cognitive process, because the final phase of the reasoning stage of the cognitive process (reasoning) will lead directly into a new cycle of the cognitive process. In this example, Jessica might engage in the practical activity of checking her watch to see the time, which will begin a new cycle of cognitive process, beginning with the sensation phase of the emotional stage as the visual sense data of her watch and carrying through to the final reasoning phase of the rational stage, and so on.

It should also be noted that this is merely an abstraction of the cognitive process; in reality, the human mind is incredibly complex, capable of carrying out a variety of cognitive processes simultaneously. At any given moment, a person might be considering various different subjects, and each different subject might be at a different stage of the cognitive process. This abstract model of the cognitive process is presented to help us comprehend the component functions of consciousness more easily in the wider context of dialectical materialist philosophy.

Specifically, this model of the cognitive process is intended to help us understand how human consciousness leads to “truth.” And “truth,” here, refers to the alignment of human consciousness with the material world, so that our perceptions and understanding of the world is accurate and representative of actual reality.

- The Relationship Between Emotional Consciousness, Rational Consciousness, and Reality

Emotional consciousness and rational consciousness are stages that make up the cognitive cycle. In reality, they are often intertwined within the cognitive process, but they have different functions. If emotional consciousness is associated with reality, and with the impact of sense data received from observing the material world, and is the basis for cognitive reason, then rational consciousness, based on higher cognitive understanding and abstraction, allows us to understand the essence, nature, regulating principles, and development processes of things and phenomena. Rational consciousness helps direct emotional consciousness in a more efficient and effective direction and leads to more profound and accurate emotional consciousness.

Annotation 229

In other words, considering a subject at the level of rational consciousness allows us to then view the same subject, at an emotional consciousness level, with more depth and awareness.

For example, the more time we have spent rationally considering something like a bicycle, the more quickly and accurately we can examine a bicycle at the level of emotional consciousness. If someone is looking at a bicycle for the first time, they might not be able to distinguish its component parts or functions. On the other hand, if someone has spent more time considering bicycles at the level of rational consciousness, they may be able to immediately and rapidly understand and process a bicycle at the emotional conscious level, so that they can perceive and comprehend the different parts of a bicycle, as well as their functions, immediately and at the emotional-sensory level.

However, if we stop at rational consciousness, we will only have knowledge about the subjects we perceive, but we still won’t really know if that knowledge is truly accurate or not. In order to be useful in practical activity, we must consciously determine whether knowledge is truth [i.e., whether the knowledge accurately reflects reality]. In order to determine the truth of knowledge, consciousness must necessarily return to reality. Consciousness must use reality as a criterion — a measurement — of the authenticity of knowledge gained through purely cognitive processes. In other words, all consciousness is ultimately derived from practical needs, and must also return to serve practical activities.

Annotation 230

The dialectical relationship between consciousness and practical activities means that conscious activities develop practical activities, and vice versa, in a continuous feedback loop.

One of the fundamental principles of dialectical materialism is that the material determines the ideal, and the ideal impacts the material [see The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness]. The fact that the material determines consciousness is reflected in the fact that material needs led to the development of consciousness, and conscious activity stems from material needs [see Social Sources of Consciousness].

The fact that the ideal impacts the material is reflected in the fact that consciousness must always return to the service of practical activities; as our consciousness develops (along with knowledge), our ability to impact and transform the material world becomes more efficient and effective.

The dialectical relationship between consciousness and practical activity is what drives the development of humanity. We imagine better ways of doing things, then test those ideas against reality through practical activity.

This dialectical relationship between consciousness and practical activity is thus cyclical. Conscious activity arises from practical activity, and returns to practical activity, in an endless process of developing both conscious ability as well as practical ability.

Therefore, it can be seen that the general, cyclical nature of the process of movement and development of consciousness develops from practice to consciousness — from consciousness to practice — from practical activity to the continued process of cognitive development, and so on. This process is repeated continuously, without end. The development level of consciousness and practice in the next cycle are often higher than in the previous cycle, and the cognitive process gradually develops more and more accuracy, as well as fuller and deeper knowledge about objective reality.

The universal law of consciousness [see Annotation 224, p. 219] is also a concrete and vivid manifestation of the universal laws of materialist dialectics, including: the law of negation of negation, the law of transformation between quantity and quality and the law of unity and contradiction between opposites. The process of cognitive motion and development, governed by these general laws, is the process of human progress towards absolute truth [see Annotation 232, p. 228].

Annotation 231

The universal law of consciousness is governed by the three universal laws of materialist dialectics:

The Law of Negation of Negation dictates that the new will arise from the old, but will carry forward characteristics from the old. This is reflected in the universal law of consciousness in that conscious activity arises from practical activity. This conscious activity then develops into improved practical activity, and so on, in a never-ending cycle of development. Throughout this development process, characteristics of previous cycles of cognitive and practical activities are carried forward and transferred on to newer cycles of cognitive and practical activities.

The Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality recognizes that quantity changes develop into changes in quality, and vice versa. This is reflected in the universal law of consciousness in the development of both conscious and practical activities. Conscious development also develops from quantitative changes to quality changes, and vice versa. For example, once a person accumulates a certain quantity of knowledge, the quality of their knowledge will change. For example, once a person has learned the function of every component part of a car engine, they will have a quality shift in their understanding of car engines — they will now have competency of the functioning of the engine as a whole. This is also true of practical activities. A quantity of practical experience will lead to quality shifts in practical ability. For example, once a person has practiced riding a bicycle enough that they can reliably ride the bicycle without falling, we would say that the person “knows how to ride a bicycle,” which represents a quality shift from the state of “learning how to ride a bicycle.”

The Law of Unity and Contradiction Between Opposites states that all things, phenomena, and ideas are defined by internal and external contradictions. This is reflected in the universal law of consciousness by the fact that practical needs serve as the basis for conscious activity, and that cognitive processes serve, in essence, to negate contradictions between consciousness and material reality through practical experience. In other words, the cognitive process is defined by a never-ending process of contradiction between the material and the ideal, as human beings seek to negate contradictions between our conscious understanding of the world and our practical experiences in search of truth - the accurate alignment of consciousness with the material world.

b. Truth, and the Relationship Between Truth and Reality

- Definition of Truth

All cognitive processes lead to the creation of knowledge, which is what we call human understanding of objective reality. But not all knowledge has content consistent with objective reality, because consciousness exists as the subjective reflection of objective reality in the human mind. The collective cognitive practice of all of humanity throughout history, as well as the cognitive practice of each individual human being, has demonstrated that the knowledge which people have gained and are gaining is not always consistent with objective reality. On the contrary, there are many cases of misalignment between consciousness and reality, and even complete contradiction between human thought and objective reality.

Within the theoretical scope of Marxism-Leninism, the concept of truth is used to refer to knowledge which is aligned with objective reality. This alignment is tested and proven through practice. In this sense, the concept of truth is not identical with the concept of “knowledge,” nor with the concept of “hypothesis.” According to Lenin: “The coincidence of thought with the object is a process: thought (= man) must not imagine truth in the form of dead repose, in the form of a bare picture (image), pale (matte), without impulse, without motion…”[112]

Annotation 232

Here, Lenin is dispelling Hegel’s conception of “absolute truth,” which is not to be confused with Lenin’s concept of “absolute truth” as “objective truth” which aligns consciousness with objective reality [see Annotation 58, p. 56]. For Hegel, “absolute truth” was the idea that there will eventually be some end point to the process of rational consciousness at which we will finally arrive at some final stage of knowledge and consciousness. This rational end point of consciousness, at which the dialectic ends and all contradictions are negated, is Hegel’s “absolute truth.”

Lenin is also pushing back against the metaphysical conception that all “truths” exist as static categories of information which do not change. Instead, Lenin points out that seeking truth — i.e., aligning consciousness with material reality — is a never-ending process, in particular because reality is constantly developing and changing. Thus, the alignment of consciousness with reality — the pursuit of truth — is a living and dynamic process which will never end, since the development of reality will never end.

- The Properties of Truth

All truths are objective, relative, absolute, and concrete.

The objectivity of truth is the independence of its content from the subjective will of human beings. The content of knowledge must be aligned with objective reality, not vice versa. This means that the content of accurate knowledge is not a product of pure subjective reasoning. Truth is not an arbitrary human construct, nor is truth inherent in consciousness. On the contrary, truth belongs to the objective world, and is determined by the objective world. The affirmation of the objectivity of truth is one of the fundamental points that distinguishes the concept of absolute truth of dialectical materialism from the concept of absolute truth of idealism and skepticism — the doctrines that deny the objective existence of the physical world and deny the possibility that humans are able to perceive the world.

Annotation 233

The Dialectical Materialist conception of objective truth stands in contrast to idealism, which states that conscious reasoning alone leads to truth, and that the subjective ideal determines material reality [see Annotation 7, p. 8].

This objectivity of truth also refutes skepticism, which states that truth is essentially undiscoverable, because human consciousness is ultimately unreliable and incapable of accurately reflecting material reality [see Annotation 32, p. 27].

Distinction must also be drawn between the concept of absolute truth as it is understood in dialectical materialist philosophy and the conception of absolute truth in Hegel’s idealist dialectics. Dialectical materialism defines absolute truth as “objective truth;” that is to say: a complete alignment between objective reality and human consciousness (as compared to relative truth, which is a partial alignment between consciousness and objective reality).

Hegel, on the other hand, views absolute truth as a final point at which human consciousness will have achieved absolute, complete, and final understanding of our universe (see Annotation 232, p. 228) with the ideal serving as the first basis and primary mechanism for bringing absolute truth to fruition.

Truth is not only objective, but also absolute and relative. Absolute truth [see Annotation 58, p. 56] refers to truth which reflects a full and complete alignment of consciousness and reality. Theoretically, we can reach absolute truth. This is because, in the objective world, there exists no thing nor phenomenon which human beings are completely incapable of accurately perceiving. The possibility of acquiring absolute truth in the process of the development of conscious understanding is theoretically limitless. However, in reality, our conscious ability to reflect reality is limited by the specific material conditions of each generation of humanity, of practical limitations, and by the spatial and temporal conditions of reflected subjects. Therefore, truth is also relative.

Annotation 234

Dialectical materialist philosophy recognizes that it must be theoretically possible to know everything there is to know about a given subject, since we are theoretically capable of accurately perceiving, sensing, and measuring all data which pertains to a subject. However, dialectical materialism also recognizes the practical limitations of human beings. As Engels writes in Anti-Dühring:

If mankind ever reached the stage at which it should work only with eternal truths, with results of thought which possess sovereign validity and an unconditional claim to truth, it would then have reached the point where the infinity of the intellectual world both in its actuality and in its potentiality had been exhausted, and thus the famous miracle of the counted uncountable would have been performed.

But are there any truths which are so securely based that any doubt of them seems to us to be tantamount to insanity? That twice two makes four, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, that Paris is in France, that a man who gets no food dies of hunger, and so forth? Are there then nevertheless eternal truths, final and ultimate truths.

Certainly there are. We can divide the whole realm of knowledge in the traditional way into three great departments. The first includes all sciences that deal with inanimate nature and are to a greater or lesser degree susceptible of mathematical treatment: mathematics, astronomy, mechanics, physics, chemistry. If it gives anyone any pleasure to use mighty words for very simple things, it can be asserted that certain results obtained by these sciences are eternal truths, final and ultimate truths; for which reason these sciences are known as the exact sciences. But very far from all their results have this validity. With the introduction of variable magnitudes and the extension of their variability to the infinitely small and infinitely large, mathematics, usually so strictly ethical, fell from grace; it ate of the tree of knowledge, which opened up to it a career of most colossal achievements, but at the same time a path of error. The virgin state of absolute validity and irrefutable proof of everything mathematical was gone forever; the realm of controversy was inaugurated, and we have reached the point where most people differentiate and integrate not because they understand what they are doing but from pure faith, because up to now it has always come out right. Things are even worse with astronomy and mechanics, and in physics and chemistry we are swamped by hypotheses as if attacked by a swarm of bees. And it must of necessity be so. In physics we are dealing with the motion of molecules, in chemistry with the formation of molecules out of atoms, and if the interference of light waves is not a myth, we have absolutely no prospect of ever seeing these interesting objects with our own eyes. As time goes on, final and ultimate truths become remarkably rare in this field.


Relative truth is truth which has developed alignment with reality without yet having reached complete alignment between human knowledge and the reality which it reflects. To put it another way, relative truth represents knowledge which incompletely reflects material subjects without complete accuracy. In relative truth, there is only partial alignment — in some (but not all) aspects — between consciousness and the material world.

Annotation 235

False consciousness is consciousness which is incorrect and misaligned from reality. Discovering and rooting out false consciousness is one of the primary concerns of dialectical materialism, as false consciousness can be a serious impediment to human progress. The term “false consciousness” was first used by Friedrich Engels in a personal letter to Franz Mehring in 1893 (a decade after the death of Karl Marx), and in this letter Engels uses the term interchangeably with the word “ideology”* to describe conscious thought processes which do not align with reality:

Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, indeed, but with a false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain unknown to him, otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all. Hence he imagines false or apparent motives. Because it is a process of thought he derives both its form and its content from pure thought, either his own or that of his predecessors. He works with mere thought material which he accepts without examination as the product of thought, he does not investigate further for a more remote process independent of thought; indeed its origin seems obvious to him, because as all action is produced through the medium of thought it also appears to him to be ultimately based upon thought. The ideologist who deals with history (history is here simply meant to comprise all the spheres – political, juridical, philosophical, theological – belonging to society and not only to nature), the ideologist dealing with history then, possesses in every sphere of science material which has formed itself independently out of the thought of previous generations and has gone through an independent series of developments in the brains of these successive generations. True, external facts belonging to its own or other spheres may have exercised a co-determining influence on this development, but the tacit pre-supposition is that these facts themselves are also only the fruits of a process of thought, and so we still remain within that realm of pure thought which has successfully digested the hardest facts.

Although the term “false consciousness” is not found in writing until after Marx’s death, the concept underlying the term “false consciousness” is found often in the works of Marx and Engels. For instance, in The Holy Family, Marx and Engels explain how communist, class conscious workers have been able to break free of false consciousness of capitalist society:

They (the communist workers) are most painfully aware of the difference between being and thinking, between consciousness and life. They know that property, capital, money, wage-labor and the like are no ideal figments of the brain but very practical, very objective products of their self-estrangement.

This allusion to “the difference between being and thinking” recurs again and again in the works of Marx and Engels.

* Lenin also discussed the concept of false consciousness extensively, and argued that dialectical materialism was the key to negating the false consciousness of the working class, writing in What the “Friends of the People” Are:

It never has been the case, nor is it so now, that the members of society conceive the sum-total of the social relations in which they live as something definite, integral, pervaded by some principle; on the contrary, the mass of people adapt themselves to these relations unconsciously, and have so little conception of them as specific historical social relations that, for instance, an explanation of the exchange relations under which people have lived for centuries was found only in very recent times. Materialism removed this contradiction by carrying the analysis deeper, to the origin of man’s social ideas themselves; and its conclusion that the course of ideas depends on the course of things is the only one compatible with scientific psychology. Further, and from yet another aspect, this hypothesis was the first to elevate sociology to the level of a science.

Note that this convention of using the word “ideology” to mean “false consciousness” has never been common, and Marx and Engels both used the word “ideology” more often in its more usual sense of “a system of ideas,” but it is still occasionally encountered in socialist literature, as Joseph McCarney explains in Marx Myths and Legends:

Marx never calls ideology ‘false consciousness’. Indeed, he never calls anything ‘false consciousness’, a phrase that does not occur in his work... The noun is almost always accompanied by an epithet such as ‘German’, ‘republican’, ‘political’ or ‘Hegelian’, or by a qualifying phrase, as in ‘the ideology of the bourgeoisie’ or ‘the ideology of the political economist’. More typical in any case is the adjectival usage in which such varied items as ‘forms’, ‘expressions’, ‘phrases’, ’conceptions’, ‘deception’, and ‘distortion’ are said to have an ‘ideological’ character. Even more distinctive is the frequency, amounting to approximately half of all references in the relevant range, of invocations of the ‘ideologists’, the creators and purveyors of the ideological forms.


“Relative truth” and “absolute truth” do not exist separately, but have dialectical unity with each other. On the one hand, “absolute truth” is the sum of all “relative truths.” On the other hand, in all relative truths there are always elements of absolute truth.

Lenin wrote that “absolute truth results from the sum-total of relative truths in the course of their development; [...] relative truths represent relatively faithful reflections of an object existing independently of man; [...] these reflections become more and more faithful; [...] every scientific truth, notwithstanding its relative nature, contains an element of absolute truth.”[113]

Correct realization of the dialectical relationship between relative and absolute truth plays a very important role in criticizing and overcoming extremism and false consciousness in perception and in action. If we exaggerate the absoluteness of the truth of knowledge which we possess, or downplay its relativity, we will fall into the false consciousness of metaphysics, dogmatism, conservativism, and stagnation.

Annotation 236

Intentional or unintentional exaggeration of the absoluteness of truth — i.e., considering our knowledge to be more complete and/or aligned with reality than it actually is — leads to incorrect viewpoints and mindsets, including:

Metaphysics is a philosophical system which seeks truth through the systematic categorization of knowledge [see Annotation 8, p. 8]. This is a flawed method of seeking knowledge because it considers truth to be essentially static and unchanging, and upholds the erroneous notion that truth can be systematically broken down into discrete, isolated categories. In addition to being fundamentally incorrect about the nature of truth and knowledge, it leads to the incorrect presumption that such static categorization of knowledge can lead to truth at all. Metaphysics fails to see truth and consciousness as a process, and instead sees truth as a static assembly of categorized facts and data.

Dogmatism occurs when one only accounts for commonalities and considers theory itself as the sole basis of truth. Dogmatism inherently overstates the absoluteness of knowledge, as dogmatic positions uphold certain theoretical principles as complete, inviolable, and completely developed. This explicitly denies the continuously developing process of advancing knowledge and consciousness.

Conservativism includes any position that seeks to prevent change, or to undo change to return to an earlier state of development. Such positions deny the continuous development of consciousness, knowledge, and practice, and incorrectly assert incorrect positions; or mistake relative truth for absolute truth.

Stagnation is an inability or unwillingness to change and adapt consciousness and practice in accordance with developing material conditions. Stagnation can stem from, or cause, overstatement of absolute truth in theory and forestall necessary development of both consciousness and practical ability.

On the contrary, if we exaggerate the relativity of the truth of knowledge which we possess, or downplay its absoluteness, we will fall into relativism, thereby leading to subjectivism, revisionism, sophistry, and skepticism.

Annotation 237

Relativism is the belief that human consciousness can only achieve relative understanding of the world, and that truth can therefore never be objectively discovered. Relativism is, thus, the overstatement of the relative nature of truth and the denial of the existence of absolute truth. Relativism leads to such incorrect viewpoints and mindsets as:

Subjectivism: which occurs when one centers one’s own self and one’s own conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test their own perceptions against material and social reality [see Annotation 211, p. 205]. This position denies that truth can be discovered in the external material world, falsely believing that absolute truth stems only from conscious activity.

Revisionism: a failure to recognize and accept commonalities in conscious activity, focusing only on the private [see Private and Common, p. 128]. Revisionism leads to constant and unnecessary reassessment and reevaluation of both knowledge and practice. Revisionism, thus, is a position which overstates the relativity of truth and ignores truths which are more fully developed towards absoluteness.

Sophistry: the use of falsehoods and fallacious arguments to deceive [see Annotation 116, p. 118]. Sophistry is, thus, the intentional denial of truth and the intentional mischaracterization of truths as either overly relative or as not truths at all.

Skepticism: the belief that truth is essentially undiscoverable, because human consciousness is ultimately unreliable and incapable of accurately reflecting material reality [see Annotation 200, p. 192]. By denying that truth is discoverable at all, skepticism explicitly rejects absolute truth and declares that all truth is relative and unreliable.

In addition to objectivity, absoluteness, and relativity, truth also has concreteness. The concreteness of truth refers to the degree to which a truth is attached to specific objects, in specific conditions, at a specific point in time. This means that all accurate knowledge always refers to a specific situation which involves specific subjects which exist in a specific place and time. The content of truth cannot be pure abstraction, disconnected from reality, but it is always associated with certain, specific objects and phenomena which exist in a specific space, time, and arrangement, with specific internal and external relationships. Therefore, truth is associated with specific historical conditions. This specificity to time, place, relations, etc., is what we call concreteness.

Knowledge, if detached from specific historical conditions, will fall into pure abstraction. Therefore, it will not be accurate — it will not align with reality — and such knowledge cannot be considered truth. When emphasizing this property, Lenin wrote: “Truth is always concrete, never abstract.”[114] Mastering the principle of the concreteness of truth has an important methodological significance in cognitive and practical activities. It is required that consideration and evaluation of all things and phenomena must be based on a historical viewpoint [see Annotation 114, p. 116]. In developing and applying theory, we must be conscious of specific historical conditions. According to Lenin, Marxism’s nature, its essence, lies in the concrete analysis of specific situations; Marx’s method is, above all, to consider the objective content of the historical process in a specific time.

Annotation 238

In other words, Marxism is rooted in seeking truth by examining reality from a historical and comprehensive viewpoint. For more information, see Annotation 114, p. 116.

- The Role of Truth in Reality.

In order to survive and develop, humans must conduct practical activities. These activities involve transforming the environment, nature, and human society. At the same time, through these activities, humans perform — knowingly or unknowingly — the process of perfecting and developing our conscious and practical abilities. It is this process that helps human cognitive activities develop. Practical activities can only be successful and effective once humans apply accurate knowledge of objective reality to our practical activities. Therefore, truth is one of the prerequisites that ensure success and efficiency in practical activities.

The relationship between truth and practical activities is a dialectical relationship which serves as the basis for the movement and development of both truth and practical activity: truth develops through practice, and practice develops through the correct application of truth which people have gained through practical activities.

Annotation 239

Truth and Practical Activities have a dialectical relationship in which truth develops through practice, and practice develops through the correct application of truth.

Practice only develops when truth about the universe is consciously applied to practical activities. For example, farm output increases as we learn more truth about the way crops grow and how land can be properly managed. Simultaneously, truth can only be developed through practical activity, as all ideas and knowledge must be tested through methodological observation, experimentation, and other forms of practical activity.

A theory is an idea or system of ideas intended to explain an aspect, characteristic, or tendency of objective reality. Theories are not inherently truthful; holding incorrect theories constitutes false consciousness. Practice (or praxis) is purposeful conscious activity which improves our understanding of the world. Theory and practice have a dialectical relationship with one another which, if understood, helps us to discover truth.

Truth and practical activities mutually develop one another over time.

This dialectical relationship between theory and practical activities means that we must never favor theory over practice, nor practice over theory, but that we must rather balance development of theoretical understanding as we engage in practical activities to test our knowledge against reality and to develop our practice with ever-advancing understanding of the world. As practice and theory develop one another, our understanding of objective reality comes closer and closer to truth.

In Theses on Feuerbach, Marx summarizes the relationship between theory and practice, writing:

The problem of the external world is here put as the problem of its transformation: the problem of the cognition of the external world as an integral part of the problem of transformation: the problem of theory as a practical problem.

Here, Marx explains that theory is concerned with solving the “problem” of transforming the external world through practice, and that “cognition of the external world” is required to solve the “problem of transformation. In other words, we must improve our theory in order to improve our practical ability to transform our world, and we learn about the world (thus improving our theory) through those practical activities.

Marx also writes in Theses on Feuerbach that:

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory, but it is a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power... of his thinking.

This point is key for understanding the dialectical relationship between practice and theory: in order to be useful, theory must be proven through practice. Thus, we must seek to develop our practice through theory, and our theory through practice.

Engels summarizes these ideas a bit more colorfully in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

Before there was argument there was action... In the beginning was the deed ... And human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating.


Engels wrote in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy of the uselessness of what might be called “pure theory,” divorced from practice, and the sort of radical skepticism which refutes that any practical knowledge can ever really be obtained by human beings:

There is yet a set of different philosophers — those who question the possibility of any cognition, or at least of an exhaustive cognition of the world... The most telling refutation of this (scepticism and agnosticism) as of all other philosophical crotchets, is praxis, namely experiment and industry.

It is practice, according to Engels, which proves the merit and utility of theory.

Through experiment and industry — through practical activities in the material world — we can test our ideas and dialectically develop both theory and practice. Lenin built upon these ideas in his own work, writing in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism:

The materialist theory, the theory of the reflection of objects by our mind, is here presented with absolute clarity: things exist outside us. Our perceptions and ideas are their images. Verification of these images, differentiation between true and false images, is given by practice.

Here, Lenin explains how only a proper understanding and application of the dialectical relationship between theory and practice can lead to the negation of false consciousness [see Annotation 235, p. 231] and the dialectical development of both practice and theory. Simply arguing and debating about ideas without relating them directly to practice will never lead to truth, nor will such pure-theory argumentation develop theory or practice in any meaningful way.

This brings to mind another line from Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach:

The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.

The philosophy of dialectical materialism and the system of materialist dialectics are designed specifically to produce action and to avoid such “scholastic questions” and “pure-theory argumentation.”

Ho Chi Minh summarized these ideas perhaps most clearly and precisely of all in the very title of his article: Practice Generates Knowledge, Understanding Advances Theory, Theory Leads to Practice:

Knowledge comes from practice. And through practice, knowledge becomes theory. That theory, again, has to be put into practice. Knowledge advances not just from thought to theory, but, above all, from applying theory to revolutionary practice. Once the world’s law is fully grasped as theory, it is critical to put that theory into practice by changing the world, by increasing production, and by practicing class struggle and struggling for national self-determination. This is a continuous process of obtaining knowledge.

“If Uncle Ho says we will win, we will win!” — Propaganda poster from the 30th anniversary of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1984).

Afterword

If it seems that this book has come to an end somewhat abruptly, it’s because this is really just the first of four major sections of the full volume from which this text is drawn. If you are reading this afterword after reading the entirety of the preceding contents, then congratulations, you have completed the equivalent to a full semester’s coursework for a class on dialectical materialist philosophy which all Vietnamese college students are required to take!

The next sections in this curriculum, each covered in the original full volume, include:

Part 2: Historical Materialism

This section covers the definition and basic principles of historical materialism, which is the field of work dedicated to applying dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics to human history and human society. In the West, historical materialism and dialectical materialism are often conflated, but this is in error. Historical materialism is an applied field of dialectical materialist philosophy and materialist dialectical methodology which is used in the pursuit of understanding and interpreting human history.

Part 3: Political Economy

This section condenses the three cardinal volumes of Capital by Karl Marx and covers three primary doctrines:

1. The doctrine of value.

2. The doctrine of surplus value.

3. The doctrines of monopolist capitalism and state monopolist capitalism.

Political Economy, in this course, can be considered the application of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics to the analysis and understanding of the capitalist mode of production from the perspective of the socialist revolutionary movement.

Part 4: Scientific Socialism

This section relies on an established understanding of dialectical materialism, historical materialism, and political economy as a foundation for developing socialist revolution. The three chapters of this section on Scientific Socialism are:

1. The Historical Mission of the Working Class and the Socialist Revolution

2. The Primary Social-Political Issues of the Process of Building a Socialist Revolution 3. Realistic Socialism and Potential Socialism

Moving Forward

We are already working on the translation of Part 2 of this curriculum, and we hope to complete it as quickly as possible. In the meantime, we believe this book provides the reader with enough of a foundation to continue studying and to begin applying the principles of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics in political struggle.

We highly discourage readers from self-study in isolation, just as we discourage individual political action. The best way to study socialism is alongside other socialists.

Depending on where you live, you may be able to find political education resources provided by communist parties, socialist book clubs, or other organizations. If such resources aren’t available, it should be fairly easy to find study groups, workshops, and affinity groups online where you can study with like-minded comrades. Of course, socialist revolution requires more than just study, as we hope this book has thoroughly explained. Theory must be coupled with practice. As Ho Chi Minh wrote: “If you read a thousand books, but you fail to apply theory into practice, you are nothing but a bookshelf.”

To avoid atrophying into the proverbial bookshelf, we encourage you to go out into the world and apply these ideas creatively and collectively with other socialists. Dialectical materialism is a philosophy that was developed from the ground up for application in the real world. Dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics provide a functional model of reality, a way of looking at highly complicated systems, with all their dynamic internal and external relations. Dialectical materialist philosophy demands that we see human systems as processes in motion. In order to fully comprehend such dynamic processes, we must engage with them, which is why Ho Chi Minh taught that “we are not afraid to make mistakes; we would only be afraid of making mistakes if we were not determined to correct them.”[115]

As we mentioned in the foreword, many socialists in the West suffer from a lack of practical engagement. Far too many socialists fall into utopianism, idealism, and social chauvinism and we believe this largely stems from failures to test ideas against reality through praxis. We hope that this book has impressed upon the reader that simply arguing about pure theory is a useless and futile pursuit. Indeed, sparring verbally over such “scholastic questions,” as Marx described them, is counter-productive. Marx and Engels defined such failure to engage in theory as “critical criticism” — that is to say, criticism for the sake of criticism. As Marx and Engels wrote in The Holy Family, such critical criticism is futile, as we will never think our way to revolution:

According to Critical Criticism, the whole evil lies only in the workers’ “thinking”. It is true that the English and French workers have formed associations in which they exchange opinions not only on their immediate needs as workers, but on their needs as human beings. In their associations, moreover, they show a very thorough and comprehensive consciousness of the “enormous” and “immeasurable” power which arises from their co-operation. But these mass-minded, communist workers, employed, for instance, in the Manchester or Lyons workshops, do not believe that by “pure thinking” they will be able to argue away their industrial masters and their own practical debasement. They are most painfully aware of the difference between being and thinking, between consciousness and life. They know that property, capital, money, wage-labour and the like are no ideal figments of the brain but very practical, very objective products of their self-estrangement and that therefore they must be abolished in a practical, objective way for man to become man not only in thinking, in consciousness, but in mass being, in life. Critical Criticism, on the contrary, teaches them that they cease in reality to be wage-workers if in thinking they abolish the thought of wage-labour; if in thinking they cease to regard themselves as wage-workers and, in accordance with that extravagant notion, no longer let themselves be paid for their person. As absolute idealists, as ethereal beings, they will then naturally be able to live on the ether of pure thought.

Engels expressed his frustration with such endless, utopian, idealist debates in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

Hence, from this nothing could come but a kind of eclectic, average Socialism, which, as a matter of fact, has up to the present time dominated the minds of most of the socialist workers in France and England. Hence, a mish-mash allowing of the most manifold shades of opinion: a mish-mash of such critical statements, economic theories, pictures of future society by the founders of different sects, as excite a minimum of opposition; a mish-mash which is the more easily brewed the more definite sharp edges of the individual constituents are rubbed down in the stream of debate, like rounded pebbles in a brook.

Engels concludes by punctuating why he and Marx had developed dialectical materialism as a praxis-oriented philosophical foundation for scientific socialism: “To make a science of Socialism, it had first to be placed upon a real basis.” We hope that the readers of this text will seek out real bases for your development in theory and praxis, and we trust that you will quickly discover that developing practice develops theory, and vice-versa.

Remember that Marx and Engels, themselves, were not just theorists who scribbled down their thoughts in an “scholarly” vacuum. They were revolutionists themselves, highly engaged in political struggle and, in so struggling, they risked their lives and freedom over the course of many decades. This struggle is what led to the change and development of their ideas over time. The same can be said for every other successful socialist revolutionary in history.

Vo Nguyen Giap, the great general who led Vietnam’s military forces through resistance wars against fascist Japan, colonialist France, and the imperialist USA, describes how he applied such principles on the battlefield in his book People’s War, People’s Army:

During the Resistance War, owing to constant fighting, the training of our troops could not be carried out continuously for a lengthy period but only between battles or campaigns. We actively implemented the guiding principles ‘To train and to learn while we fight.’ After the difficult years at the beginning of the Resistance War, we succeeded in giving good training to our army. The practical viewpoint in this training deserves to be highlighted. The content of training became most practical and rich. Training was in touch with practical fighting: the troops were trained in accordance with the next day’s fighting, and victory or defeat in the fighting was the best gauge for the control and assessment of the result of the training. On the basis of gradual unification of the organisation and its equipment, the content of training in the various units of the regular army was also systematised step by step.

Here, Vo Nguyen Giap has provided a concrete example of the dialectical relationship between theory and practice, and their inseparability. This fundamental aspect of dialectical materialist philosophy demands that we think and act like scientists to change the world, rather than simply speculating and imagining ineffectually like armchair philosophers. As Marx wrote in Theses on Feuerbach “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.” We encourage you to apply what you learn in this and other books to change the world.

Advice on Further Study

As you advance in your studies of socialist literature and theory, we offer the following advice:

First, you must recognize that the specific language used by revolutionary leaders and thinkers may vary widely across time and around the world. Fashions in language develop over time, and many contributions — like the text you’ve just read — come to us through translation from countless languages. This is why we believe it critical to develop an understanding of the spirit of the ideas of any particular text, and not to get bogged down in semantics and terminology. Liberal ideologists have done much to distract and divert intellectual energy with endless metaphysical altercation over the “proper” usage of this or that word. We caution strongly against this attitude, which makes us susceptible to sophistry, opportunism, and the sewing of undue conflict and division amidst the working class. We have pointed out various instances where Marx, Engels, and Lenin used different language to describe the same concepts. We also offer the reminder that Marx, Engels, and Lenin were writing in different languages at different times, just as socialists around the world have different linguistic and cultural backgrounds. As socialism is an international movement, we must stress the importance of avoiding linguistic barriers by engaging with one another in good faith and testing conflicting ideas and interpretations of theory against one another through practice instead of getting bogged down with “critical criticism.”

Next, we encourage students of socialist philosophy to always keep in mind that the doctrines and philosophies of revolutionary figures are products of the times and places in which they were conceived. It would be a mistake to view the works of any revolutionary figure as a road map or a set of instructions to follow by rote. Even Marx and Engels changed and developed their own ideas over the decades they were active, as they addressed in the 1872 preface to The Communist Manifesto:

The practical application of the principles will depend, as the Manifesto itself states, everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being existing, and, for that reason, no special stress is laid on the revolutionary measures proposed at the end of Section II. That passage would, in many respects, be very differently worded today. In view of the gigantic strides of Modern Industry since 1848, and of the accompanying improved and extended organization of the working class, in view of the practical experience gained, first in the February Revolution, and then, still more, in the Paris Commune, where the proletariat for the first time held political power for two whole months, this programme has in some details been antiquated. One thing especially was proved by the Commune, viz., that “the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.” (See The Civil War in France: Address of the General Council of the International Working Men’ s Association, 1871, where this point is further developed.) Further, it is self-evident that the criticism of socialist literature is deficient in relation to the present time, because it comes down only to 1847; also that the remarks on the relation of the Communists to the various opposition parties (Section IV), although, in principle still correct, yet in practice are antiquated, because the political situation has been entirely changed, and the progress of history has swept from off the earth the greater portion of the political parties there enumerated.”

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and Ho Chi Minh also frequently took pains to point out that their revolutionary theories were devised specifically to suit the particular objective conditions of their own respective times and places. For example, in What is to be Done, Lenin discusses the question of secrecy in revolutionary activity. Lenin recognizes that secrecy is not always necessary, such as in the more liberal social democracies which existed in Europe in his era. In Russia, however — with its autocratic monarchy — material conditions called for more covert activity:

In countries where political liberty exists the distinction between a trade union and a political organisation is clear enough, as is the distinction between trade unions and Social-Democracy. The relations between the latter and the former will naturally vary in each country according to historical, legal, and other conditions; they may be more or less close, complex, etc. (in our opinion they should be as close and as little complicated as possible); but there can be no question in free countries of the organisation of trade unions coinciding with the organisation of the Social-Democratic Party. In Russia, however, the yoke of the autocracy appears at first glance to obliterate all distinctions between the Social-Democratic organisation and the workers’ associations, since all workers’ associations and all study circles are prohibited, and since the principal manifestation and weapon of the workers’ economic struggle — the strike — is regarded as a criminal (and sometimes even as a political!) offence.”

Ho Chi Minh was even more explicit about the requirement to tailor theory to current and local material conditions in a speech to the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1950:

Studying Marxism-Leninism is not just a matter of repeating the slogan ‘workers of the world, unite’ like a parrot. We must unify Marxism-Leninism with the reality of Vietnam’s revolution. Talking about Marxism-Leninism in Vietnam is talking about the specific guidelines and policies of the Communist Party of Vietnam. For example, our priority now is: great solidarity!

In a 2001 document, the Communist Party of Vietnam explained how Ho Chi Minh tailored lessons learned from prior revolutionaries to the specific material conditions of revolutionary Vietnam:

Ho Chi Minh’s thought is... the creative application and development of Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of our country. Ho Chi Minh learned profound lessons from Lenin and the Russian October Revolution, but he did not simply use those lessons as a template, nor did he just copy that foundation. Instead, he absorbed the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. Lenin’s thesis allowed Ho Chi Minh to see what was necessary for the Vietnamese people — the path of national liberation. Ho Chi Minh had creative arguments that contributed to enriching Marxism-Leninism in the issue of national liberation revolution, building a new democratic regime and the transitional path to socialism in an Eastern, semi-feudal colony which was still very backward: Vietnam.

As you find your own revolutionary path, you must carefully examine the objective conditions of your own time and place, and work collectively and collaboratively with your fellow revolutionists to decide how theory and lessons gleaned from history apply to your own circumstances. And, of course, you must test the validity of your conclusions against reality through practice.

Creative Application of Dialectical Materialism and Materialist Dialectics

Finally, we implore you to apply dialectical materialism creatively. Don’t look at this (or any other) book as a set of static instructions. Dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics are living, breathing systems of thought which benefit from the ideas and imagination of comrades working and struggling together. Seek the spirit of these ideas, study revolutionary theory and history, then apply what you learn in your daily life. Combat dogmatism and avoid arguments over pure theory. Determine what works and what doesn’t through activity in the real world, and apply what you learn from practical experience to your theoretical development. Over time, you will begin to see how practice and theory impact and develop one another. When you are struggling with a particular problem in revolutionary practice, you will find yourself reading theory in a new light, discovering information and ideas which might be applicable to your immediate circumstances. And as you study theory, you will find that it also impacts your practice, giving you tools and perspective and methodologies for action which you might never have imagined on your own.

We have tried to make this book a useful companion for further study. We have also made the digital version available for free online. If you have found it useful, we hope you will share it freely and widely.

In Closing

One last time we would like to thank Dr. Vijay Prashad and Dr. Taimur Rahman for their wonderful insights on our translation, and to acknowledge the monumental work of the Vietnamese scholars who wrote and revised the original text from which this volume is drawn. We also want to recognize once more the donors and supporters who have given us the precious resource of time to translate and annotate this work. Finally, we want to thank the teams at the Iskra Books and The International Magazine, who have provided invaluable editing and peer review services, promotion, and guidance. You can find all their publications, respectively, at:

IskraBooks.org

InternationalMagz.com

If you would like to download the free digital version of this book, support future translation work, or if you would like to get in touch, you can visit our website:

BanyanHouse.org

We will leave you, now, with the immortal words of the Manifesto:

Workers of the world, unite!

You have nothing to lose but your chains.

In Solidarity,

- Luna Nguyen, Translator & Annotations

- Emerican Johnson, Editor, Illustrator, & Annotations

“Marxism-Leninism — Long Live the Victories” — a demonstration to welcome the liberation army in the South of Vietnam on April 30, 1975.


[Appendices]

Appendix A: Basic Pairs of Categories Used in Materialist Dialectics

This is a summary of the basic pairs of universal categories and their characteristics which are discussed in depth starting on p. 126.

Private Common
A specific item, event, or process. The properties that are shared between Private things, phenomena, and ideas.

Private is commonly referred to in literature as Special/Specific while Common is commonly called General. Note: When an aspect or characteristic is not held in common with anything else in existence, it is considered Unique. The Unique can become Common, just as the Common can become Unique. Example: a Unique design for an object may be replicated, making it Common. A type of item that is Common may gradually disappear until there is only one example left, making it Unique. See p. 128.

Reason Result
Mutual impact between things, phenomena, or ideas which causes each to change. The change caused by a Reason.

Reason and Result may be referred to as Cause and Effect, respectively, though this should lead to confusion with metaphysical conceptions of cause and effect. Note: Reasons can be Direct or Indirect. See p. 138

Obviousness Randomness
Refers to events that always and predictably happen due to factors of internal material structure. Events caused by external impacts and interactions which are thus not completely predictable.

Obvious may be referred to as Necessary, while Randomness may be referred to as Accidental. See p. 145.

Content Form
What something is made of. The shape that contains content.

Ways in which Content and Form are discussed and perceived can can vary wildly depending on the subject being discussed and the viewpoint from which the subject is being considered. See p. 145.

Essence Phenomena
Features that make something develop a certain way. The expression of the essence in certain conditions.

See p. 156.

Possibility Reality
What may happen, or might exist, in the future, if certain developments take place. What is happening, or what exists, at the present moment.

See p. 160.

Appendix B: the Two Basic Principles of Dialectical Materialism

The Principle of General Relationships This principle states that:

“Materialist dialectics upholds the position that all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in mutual relationships with each other, regulate each other, transform into each other, and that nothing exists in complete isolation.”

From this Principle, we find the characteristics of Diversity in Unity and Unity in Diversity; the basis of Diversity in Unity is the fact that every thing, phenomenon, and idea contains many different relationships; the basis of Unity in Diversity is that many different relationships exist — unified — within each and every thing, phenomenon, and idea.

The Characteristic of Diversity in Unity is derived from the fact that there exist an infinite number of diverse relationships between things, phenomena, and ideas, but all of these relationships share the same foundation in the material world.

The Characteristic of Unity in Diversity is derived from the fact that when we examine the universal relationships that exist within and between all different things, phenomena, and ideas, we will find that each individual manifestation of any universal relationship will have its own different manifestations, aspects, features, etc. Thus even the universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in infinite diversity.

The Principle of Development This principle states that:

“Development is a process that comes from within the thing-in-itself; the process of solving the contradictions within things and phenomena. Therefore, development is inevitable, objective, and occurs without dependence on human will.”

The Characteristic of Objectiveness of Development stems from the origin of motion. Since motion originates from mutual impacts which occur between external things, objects, and relationships, the motions themselves also occur externally (relative to all other things, phenomena, and objects). This gives motion itself objective characteristics.

The Characteristic of Generality of Development stems from the fact that development occurs in every process that exists in every field of nature, society, and human thought; in every thing, every phenomenon, and every process and stage of these things and phenomena.

The Characteristic of Diversity of Development stems from the fact that every thing, phenomenon, and idea has its own process of development that is not totally identical to the process of development of any other thing, phenomenon, or idea.

Appendix C: the Three Universal Laws of Materialist Dialectics

The Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality

The law of transformation between quantity and quality is a universal law which concerns the universal mode of motion and development processes of nature, society, and human thought. The law was formulated by Friedrich Engels in Dialectics of Nature, and states that:

“In nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion.” See more on p. 163.

The Law of Unification and Contradiction Between Opposites

The law of unification and contradiction between opposites is the essence of dialectics. It states, as formulated by V. I. Lenin in Summary of Dialectics:

“The fundamental, originating, and universal driving force of all motion and development processes is the inherent and objective contradiction which exists in all things, phenomena, and ideas.” See more on p. 175.

The Law of Negation of Negation

The law of negation of negation describes the fundamental and universal tendency of movement and development to occur through a cyclical form of development through what is termed “negation of negation.” Formulated by Friedrich Engels in Anti-Dühring, it states:

“The true, natural, historical, and dialectical negation is (formally) the moving source of all development--the division into opposites, their struggle and resolution, and what is more, on the basis of experience gained, the original point is achieved again (partly in history, fully in thought), but at a higher stage.” See more on p. 185.

Appendix D: Forms of Consciousness and Knowledge

Consciousness refers to the self-aware, productive, and creative motion and activity of the human brain. Practical activity is the most direct basis, motive, and purpose of consciousness, and is the criterion for testing truth. See: The Relationship Between Praxis and Consciousness, p. 216.

Knowledge is the content of consciousness. Knowledge includes data about the world, such as ideas, memories, and other thoughts which are derived by direct observation and practical activities in the material world, through scientific experiments, or through abstract reflection of practical and scientific activities which occur within consciousness.

Consciousness and Knowledge have a dialectical relationship with one another: knowledge is developed within consciousness, and consciousness develops to higher levels as knowledge is accumulated and tested against reality (which also develops knowledge itself). In this manner, consciousness and knowledge develop into higher forms over time in individual consciousness and human society. Thus, consciousness and knowledge can be considered as existing in various forms which represent stages of development in dialectical processes of development.

Note that the development processes of knowledge and consciousness are dialectical in nature, not linear. For example, after empirical consciousness develops into theoretical consciousness, theoretical consciousness will then impact empirical consciousness, developing empirical consciousness into a higher stage of development. This is true for all development processes related to empirical and theoretical consciousness. These development processes and forms of consciousness and knowledge are explained in more detail in Chapter 3: Cognitive Theory of Dialectical Materialism, starting on page 204.

Forms of Consciousness

Consciousness is a process of the development of knowledge through a combination of human brain activity and human practical activity in the physical world (i.e., labor). The development of consciousness can be considered on the criteria of concrete/abstract and of passive/active. For more information, see Annotation 216, p. 210.

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The Cognitive Process

The Cognitive Process is a model developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin which represents the dialectical path of consciousness to truth. For more information, see Dialectical Path of Consciousness to Truth on page 219.

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Forms of Knowledge

For more information see Annotation 218, p. 214.

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Appendix E: Properties of Truth

Truth is the alignment of consciousness with objective reality. All truths are objective, relative, absolute, and concrete. Truths also have characteristics of concreteness and abstractness.

Objectivity: The content of truth is external to the subjective will of human beings. The content of knowledge must be aligned with objective reality, not vice versa. This means that the content of accurate knowledge is not a product of pure subjective reasoning but is objective in nature.

Absoluteness: Absolute truth[116] is derived from the complete alignment between objective reality and human consciousness. The possibility of acquiring absolute truth in the process of the development of conscious understanding is theoretically limitless. However, in reality, our conscious ability to reflect reality is limited by the specific material conditions of each generation of humanity, of practical limitations, and by the spatial and temporal conditions of reflected subjects. Therefore, truth is also relative.

Relativity: Relative truth is truth which has developed alignment with reality without yet having reached complete alignment. To put it another way, relative truth represents knowledge which incompletely reflects material subjects without complete accuracy. In relative truth, there is only partial alignment — in some (but not all) aspects — between consciousness and the material world.

Dialectical Relationship Between Absolute and Relative Truth: Relative truth and absolute truth do not exist separately, but have dialectical unity with each other. On the one hand, “absolute truth” is the sum of all “relative truths.” On the other hand, in all relative truths there are always elements of absolute truth.

Concreteness: The concreteness of truth refers to the degree to which a truth is attached to specific objects, in specific conditions, at a specific point in time. This means that all accurate knowledge always refers to a specific situation which involves specific subjects which exist in a specific place and time. The content of truth cannot be pure abstraction, disconnected from reality, but it is always associated with certain, specific objects and phenomena which exist in a specific space, time, and arrangement, with specific internal and external relationships. Therefore, truth is associated with specific historical conditions. This specificity to time, place, relations, etc., is concreteness.

Abstractness: Abstract knowledge is knowledge which is not attached (or less attached) to specific times, places, relations, etc. Some degree of abstraction is necessary to develop theoretical understanding of general laws and the nature of objective reality, but care should be taken knowledge does not become completely detached from specific historical conditions, as this will result in pure abstraction. Knowledge which is purely abstract will not align with reality, and such knowledge cannot be considered truth.

Appendix F: Common Deviations From Dialectical Materialism

Throughout the history of the development of dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics, there have been many philosophical and methodological deviations which have derived from incorrect analysis, interpretation, and a failure to properly link theory and practice. Below are descriptions of some of the more common deviations which the reader should be aware of.

Bureaucracy: An expression of dogmatism which arises when theory becomes overly formalized, to the extent that practical considerations are ignored in favor of codified theory.

Conservativism: A mindset which seeks to prevent and stifle development and to hold humanity in a static position. Not only is this detrimental to humanity, it is also ultimately a wasted effort, because development is inevitable in human society, as in all things, phenomena, and ideas.

Dogmatism: A breakdown of the dialectical relationship between theoretical consciousness and empirical consciousness, which arrests the development process of knowledge and consciousness. Usually the result of: failure to seek commonalities; considering theory itself as the sole basis of truth rather than practice; ignoring practical experience and considering pre-established theory, alone, as unalterable truth.

Eclecticism: An approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject; the philosophical error of inconsistently applying different theories and principles in different situations. Empiricism: A broad philosophical position which holds that only experience (including internal experience) can be held as a source of knowledge or truth. Though nominally opposed to idealism, it is considered a faulty (or naive) form of materialism, since it sees the world as only unconnected, static appearances and ignores the reality of dialectical (changing) relationships between objects.

Idealism: A philosophical position which holds that the only reliable experience of reality occurs within human consciousness. Idealists believe that relying on human reason exclusively or as a first basis is the best way to seek truth. Various forms of idealism exist, broadly broken down into subjective idealism, which denies the existence of an external objective world, and objective idealism, which accepts that an external objective world exists, but denies that knowledge can be reliably gained about it through sense perception.

Opportunism: A system of political opinions with no direction, no clear path, no coherent viewpoint, leaning on whatever is beneficial for the opportunist in the short term.

Revisionism: A failure to recognize and accept commonalities in conscious activity, focusing only on the private. Revisionism leads to constant and unnecessary reassessment and reevaluation of both knowledge and practice. Revisionism, thus, is a position which overstates the relativity of truth and ignores truths which are more fully developed towards absoluteness.

Rigidity: An unwillingness to alter one’s thoughts, holding too stiffly to established consciousness and knowledge, and ignoring practical experience and observation, which leads to stagnation of both knowledge and consciousness.

Skepticism: The belief truth is essentially undiscoverable, because human consciousness is ultimately unreliable and incapable of accurately reflecting material reality. By denying that truth is discoverable at all, skepticism explicitly rejects absolute truth and declares that all truth is relative and unreliable. Solipsism: A form of idealism in which one believes that the self is the only basis for truth. As Marxist ethicist Howard Selsam wrote in Ethics and Progress: New Values in a Revolutionary World: “If I believe that I alone exist and that you and all your arguments exist only in my mind and are my own creations then all possible arguments will not shake me one iota. No logic can possibly convince [the] solipsist.”

Sophistry: The use of falsehoods and misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, and with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. This kind of bad faith argument has no place in materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics must, instead, be rooted in a true and accurate understanding of the subject, material conditions, and reality in general.

Subjectivism: The centering of one’s own self and conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test one’s own perceptions against material and social reality. Subjectivists tend to believe that they can independently reason their way to truth in their own minds without practical experience and activity in the material world.

Utilitarianism: An ethical philosophical theory founded by Jeremy Bentham which seeks to maximize “utility,” which is considered to be a metaphysical property embodying “benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness.” Karl Marx dismissed utilitarianism as overly abstract, in that it reduces all social relationships to the single characteristic of “utility.” He also viewed utilitarianism as metaphysically static and tied to the status quo of current society, since utilitarianism does not address class dynamics and views all relations in the current status quo of society, making utilitarianism an essentially conservative theory. Marx also pointed out that Utilitarianism essentially views individuals as private individuals, not as social individuals, and seeks to work out solutions to the practical problems of human society through reasoning alone without examining material conditions and processes, and without taking into consideration practice and development, writing:

“The whole criticism of the existing world by the utility theory was... restricted within a narrow range. Remaining within the confines of bourgeois conditions, it could criticise only those relations which had been handed down from a past epoch and were an obstacle to the development of the bourgeoisie... the economic content gradually turned the utility theory into a mere apologia for the existing state of affairs, an attempt to prove that under existing conditions the mutual relations of people today are the most advantageous and generally useful.”


[Back Matter]

Glossary & Index

Absolute Truth Absolute Truth can refer to:


1. The recognition that objective and accurate truth can be drawn from sense perception of the material world along with labor and practice activities in the material world. The opposite of this position is Relativism. See p. 56, 94, 194, 228–229, 232–234.

2. Hegel’s notion of Absolute Truth: that there will eventually be some end point of to the process of rational consciousness at which point humanity will arrive at a final stage of knowledge and consciousness. See p. 228.

See also: Relative Truth, Relativism, Stagnation, Truth.

Absolutization To hold a belief or supposition as always true in all situations and without exception. See p. 49.
Abstract Labor The abstract conception of expenditure of human energy in the form of labor, without taking into account the value of labor output. When the value of labor output is taken into consideration, it is referred to as concrete labor. See p. 15, 17.
Adam Smith (1723–1790) British logic professor, moral philosophy professor, and economist. Along with David Ricardo, Adam Smith was one of the founders of political economy, which Marx both drew from and critiqued in his analysis and critique of capitalism. See p. 14, 155.
Ahistoric Perspective A perspective which considers aspects of human society without due consideration of historical processes of development. For example, Adam Smith and David Ricardo viewed political economy ahistorically, viewing capitalism as a static, universal, and eternal product of natural law rather than seeing capitalism as a product of historical processes of development which would change and develop over time. See p. 116.
Base Also known as: Economic Base; Economic Basis. The material processes which humans undertake to survive and transform our environment to support our ways of living. In the dialectical relationship between base and superstructure, the base refers to the relationship which humans have with the means of production, including the ownership of the means of production and the organization of labor. See p. 23. See also: Superstructure.
Biological Motion One of the five basic forms of motion described by Engels in Dialectics of Nature. Biological motion refers to changes and development within living objects and their genetic structure. See p. 61.
Biological Reflection A complex form of reflection found within organic subjects in the natural world and expressed by excitation, induction, and reflexes. See p. 65.
Bourgeoisie The owners of the means of production and the ruling class under capitalism; also known as the capitalist class. See p. 3, 23, 30, 41, 50, 63, 96. See also:


Proletariat, Petty Bourgeoisie.

Bureaucracy An expression of dogmatism which arises when theory becomes overly formalized, to the extent that practical considerations are ignored in favor of codified theory. See p. 217–218.

C→→M→→C C = A Commodity
M = The Money Commodity
The mode of circulation described by Marx as occurring under pre-capitalist economies of simple exchange, in which the producers and consumers of commodities have a direct relationship to the commodities which are being bought and sold. The sellers have produced the commodities with their own labor, and they directly consume the commodities which they purchase. See also: M→C→M’
Marx called this mode of circulation “simple commodity production.” See p. 16.

Capitalism The current stage of human political economy, defined by private ownership of the means of production. Referenced throughout.
Capitalist Class See: Bourgeoisie
Capitalist Commodity Production The capitalist mode of production which utilizes the M→C→M’ mode of circulation, in which capitalists own the means of production and pay wages to workers in exchange for their labor, which is used to produce commodities. Capitalists then sell these commodities for profits which are not shared with the workers who provided the labor. See p. 15.
Category The most general grouping of aspects, attributes, and relations of things, phenomena, and ideas. Different specific fields of inquiry may categorize things, phenomena, and/or ideas differently from one another. See p. 126.
Category Pair A pair of philosophical categories within materialist dialectics. Materialist dialectics tend to focus on universal category pairs which can be used to examine the characteristics, relations, and development of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Examples of category pairs include: private and common; content and form; reason and result; essence and phenomena. See p. 127.
Characteristics The features and attributes that exist internally — within — a given thing, phenomena, or idea. See p. 115.
Chemical Motion Changes of organic and inorganic substances in processes of combination and separation. See p. 61.
Chemical Reflection The reflection of mechanical, physical, and chemical changes and reactions of inorganic matter (i.e., changes in structures, position, physical-chemical properties, and the processes of combining and dissolving substances). See p. 65–66.
Circulation The way in which commodities and money are exchanged for one another. See p. 16.
Commodity In Marxist political economy, commodities include anything which can be bought and sold, with both a use value (i.e. it satisfies a need of any kind) and a value-form (aka. ‘Exchange value’ and understood as the average socially necessary labour time needed to produce this object). Under capitalism, more and more human activity and production is ‘commodified’ (mediated through market exchange). See p. 15, 87, 133.
Common See: Private and Common
Common Laws Laws (of nature and/or human society) that are applicable to a broader range of subjects than private laws, and which impact many different subjects. For instance: the law of preservation of mass, the law of preservation of energy, etc. See p. 162.
Comprehensive Viewpoint A viewpoint which seeks to consider the internal dialectical relationships between the component parts, factors, and aspects within a thing or phenomenon, and which considers external mutual interactions with with other things, phenomena, and ideas. Dialectical materialist philosophy demands a comprehensive basis in order to fully and properly understand things and phenomena in order to effectively solve problems in real life and develop humanity towards communism. See p. 115, 172, 235.
Conception A relatively complete reflection within human consciousness of objective things and phenomena. See p. 221–22.
Concrete Labor The production of a specific commodity with a specific value through labor. When labor is considered without the consideration of output value, it is referred to as abstract labor. See p. 15, 17.
Conditioned Reflex Conditioned reflexes are reactions which are learned by organisms. These responses are acquired as animals associate previously unrelated neural stimuli with a particular reaction. See p. 66, 68.
Consciousness The dynamic and creative reflection of the objective world in human brains; the subjective image of the objective world which is produced by the human brain. See p. 68–69, 70.
Content See: Content and Form.
Content and Form (Category Pair) Content is the philosophical category which refers to the sum of all aspects, attributes, and processes that a thing, phenomenon, or idea is made from. The Form category refers to the mode of existence and development of things, phenomena, and ideas. Form thus describes the system of relatively stable relationships which exist internally within things, phenomena, and ideas.


Content and Form have a dialectical relationship with one another, in which content determines form and form impacts back on content. See p. 115, 147155, 166.

Contradiction A contradiction is a relationship in which two forces oppose one another, leading to mutual development. See p. 123, 159, 163, 169, 175–191.
Consciousness The self-aware, productive, creative motion and activity of the human brain. See p. 216, 249.
Conservativism Also referred to as Prejudice; a mindset which seeks to prevent and stifle development and to hold humanity in a static position. Not only is this detrimental to humanity, it is also ultimately a wasted effort, because development is inevitable in human society, as in all things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 125, 233.
David Hume (1711 — 1776) Scottish philosopher who developed radical skepticism as a philosophy of empiricist rejection of human knowledge. See p. 11, 29, 56, 7273.
David Ricardo (1772 — 1823) British economist who, along with Adam Smith, was one of the key figures in the development of Political Economy which was a basis for much of the work of Marx and Engels. See p. 14, 18, 155.
Deductive Inference Logical inference which extrapolates from the general to the specific. See p. 224.
Definition The first phase of rational consciousness. During this phase, the mind begins to interpret, organize, and process the basic properties of things and phenomena at a rational level into a conceptual whole. See p. 224.
Development The change and motion of things, phenomena, and ideas with a forward tendency: from less advanced to more advanced; and/or from a less complete to a more complete level. See p. 38, 45–46, 52, 55, 61, 65, 76–96, 105–107, 114118, 119–127, 131–132, 138–140, 143, 147, 154, 155–165, 169–175, 177–181, 183–207, 210, 213, 216–223, 225–229, 233, 235–237.
Development Viewpoint A viewpoint which considers that, in order to perceive or solve any problem in real life, we must consider all things, phenomena, and ideas with their own forward tendency of development taken in mind.
Dialectic; Dialectical; Dialectics In Marxism-Leninism, the term dialectic (adjective: dialectical) refers to regular and mutual relationships, interactions, transformations, motions, and developments of things, phenomena, and processes in nature, society and human thought. “Dialectics” refers to a dialectical system. See p. 3, 9–11, 47.
Dialectical Materialism A universal philosophical and methodological system which forms the theoretical core of a scientific worldview. Dialectical Materialism was first developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels with the express goal of achieving communism. Dialectical Materialism has since been defended and developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin as well as many others. See: p. 3, 6, 1011, 19–21, 27–30, 33, 38, 45–47, 48–97, 101, 104, 204, 209, 226, 228, 230–232, 237.
Dialectical Negation A stage of development in which a new subject arises from a contradiction between two previous subjects; dialectical negation is never an endpoint of development, as every dialectical negation creates conditions for further development and negation. See p. 123, 175–176, 183, 185–195, 197–202, 227.
Dialectical Relationship A relationship in which two things, phenomena, or ideas mutually impact one another, leading to development and negation. See p. 47, 51, 62.
(Characteristic of) Diversity The characteristic which all things, phenomena, and ideas share, dictating that no two subjects (and no two relationships between any two subjects) are exactly the same, even if they exist between very similar things, phenomena, and ideas and/or in very similar situations. See p. 114–115, 125.
Diversity in Unity The universal principle which states that even though all relationships are diverse and different from one another, they also exist in unity, because all relationships share a foundation in the material world. See p. 109–110, 125, 130.
Dogmatism An inflexible adherence to ideals as incontrovertibly true while refusing to take any contradictory evidence into consideration. Dogmatism stands in direct opposition to materialist dialectics, which seeks to form opinions and conclusions only after careful consideration of all observable evidence. See p. 136–137, 174, 217–218, 233.
Duality of Labor The Marxist economic concept which recognizes labor as having two intrinsic and inseparable aspects: abstract labor and concrete labor. See p. 15.
Dynamic and Creative Reflection The most advanced form of reflection, which only occurs in matter that has the highest (known) level of structural complexity, such as the human brain. See p. 68–69, 79.
Eclecticism An approach to philosophical inquiry which attempts to draw from various different theories, frameworks, and ideas to attempt to understand a subject; the philosophical error of inconsistently applying different theories and principles in different situations. See p. 32–33, 101, 118, 192, 194.
Economic Base See: Base
Economism Economism is a style of political activism, typified by the ideas of German political theorist Eduard Bernstein, which stresses directing the struggle towards short-term political/economic goals (such as higher wages for workers) at the expense of the larger socialist revolutionary project. See p. 30.
Eduard Bernstein (1850 — 1932) German political theorist who rejected many of Marx’s theories. See p. 30, 174.
Emotional Consciousness The lower stage of the cognitive process. In this stage of cognitive development, humans, through practical activities, use our senses to reflect objective things and phenomena (with all their perceived specific characteristics and rich manifestations) in human consciousness. See p. 219224.
Empirical Consciousness Empirical consciousness is the stage of development of consciousness in which perceptions are formed via direct observations of things and phenomena in the natural world, or of society, or through scientific experimentation and systematic observation. Empirical Consciousness results in Empirical Knowledge. See p. 210–214.
Empirical Knowledge Knowledge which results from processes of empirical consciousness and which is characterised by rich and detailed, but still incomplete, understanding of phenomena. It can be utilized for practical ends, but still falls short of full theoretical analysis and comprehension. See p. 212–214.
Empiricism A broad philosophical position which holds that only experience (including internal experience) can be held as a source of knowledge or truth. Though nominally opposed to idealism, it is considered a faulty (or naive) form of materialism, since it sees the world as only unconnected, static appearances and ignores the reality of dialectical (changing) relationships between objects. See p. 9–12, 29, 94, 96–97, 100, 218.
Empirio-criticism A more developed form of empiricism, proposed by Ernst Mach, which holds that sense data and experience are the sole sources of knowledge and that no concrete knowledge of the external material world can ever be obtained due to the limitations of human senses. See p. 26–29, 32, 54, 55–57, 68.
Epistemology The theoretical study of knowledge. It primarily deals with the philosophical question of: “how do we know what we know?” See p. 45, 98, 204.
Ernst Mach (1838 — 1916) Austrian physicist who attempted to build a philosophy of natural science based on the works of German philosopher Richard Avenarius’ philosophical system of Empirio-Criticism. See p. 27–29, 32, 52, 72, 193.
Equilibrium A state of motion in which one or more subjects are not undergoing changes in position, form, and/or structure. Equilibrium is only ever a temporary stasis of development which will eventually yield to motion, development, and/or negation. See p. 62–63, 122–123, 181.
Essence See: Essence and Phenomena
Essence and Phenomena (Category Pair) The Essence category refers to the synthesis of all the internal aspects as well as the obvious and stable relations that define the existence, motion and development of things and ideas. The Phenomena category refers to the external manifestation of those internal aspects and relations in specific conditions. Essence always determines which phenomena appear, but phenomena do not always accurately reflect essence in human perception; in other words, it is possible to misinterpret phenomena, leading to a misunderstanding of essence, or to mistake phenomena for essence. See p. 156–160.
Exchange Value A quantity relationship which describes the ratios of exchangeability between different commodities, with Marx’s famous example of 20 yards of linen being equivalent in exchange value to one coat. Through analysis Marx shows that in reality the thing being compared is the amount of socially necessary labour required to make the commodities being compared. See p. 15, 18.
Excitation Reactions of simple plant and animal life-forms which occur when they change position or structure as a direct result of physical changes in their habitat. See p. 66, 68.
External Contradictions See: Internal and External Contradictions.
False consciousness Forms of consciousness (ideas, thoughts, concepts, etc.) which are incorrect and misaligned from reality. Equated with ‘ideology’ by Engels, it refers to an idealistic, dogmatic perspective which will inevitably result in errors of analysis and therefore practice. See p. 231–233, 237.
First International Also known as the International Workingmen’s Association; was founded in London and lasted from 1864–1876. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were key figures in the foundation and operation of this organization, which sought better conditions and the establishment of rights for workers. See p. 35
(Basic) Forms of Motion Engels broke motion down into five basic forms which are dialectically linked; the different forms of motion differ from one another, but they are also unified with each other into one continuous system of motion. Understanding this dialectical relationship between different forms of motion helped to overcome misunderstandings and confusion about motion and development. See p. 61–62.
Form See: Content and Form.
Form of existence of matter The ways in which we perceive the existence of matter in our universe; specifically, matter in our universe has the form of existing in space and time. See p. 59.
Form of Value See: Value-Form
Forward Tendency of Motion The tendency for things, phenomena, and ideas to move from less advanced to more advanced forms through processes of motion and development. See p. 197.
Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) a German theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, leader of the international working class, & co-founder of scientific socialism with Karl Marx. Referenced throughout.
Fundamental and Non-Fundamental Contradictions A fundamental contradiction defines the essence of a relationship. Fundamental contradictions exist throughout the entire development process of a given thing, phenomenon, or idea. A non-fundamental contradiction exists in only one aspect or attribute of a thing, phenomenon, or idea. A nonfundamental contradiction can impact a subject, but it will not control or decide the essential development of the subject. See p. 178–179.
(Characteristic of) Generality A universal characteristic which holds that all things, phenomena, and ideas interact and mutually transform one another. See p. 108–109, 111, 114, 124125.
General Relationship Relationships which exist broadly across many things, phenomena, and ideas. General relationships can exist both internally, within things, phenomena, and ideas, and externally, between things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 106–110, 114.
Generality (of relationships) Relationships can exist with across a spectrum of generality; this spectrum ranges from the least general relationships (unique relationships — which only occur between two specific things/phenomena/ideas) to the most general relationships (universal relationships — which occur between or within all things/phenomena/ideas). See p. 109.
George Berkeley (1685 — 1753) An Anglo-Irish philosopher whose main philosophical achievement was the formulation of a doctrine which he called “immaterialism,” and which later came to be known as “Subjective Idealism.” This doctrine was summed up by Berkeley’s maxim: “Esse est percipi” — “To be is to be perceived.” See p. 11, 27, 29.
George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 — 1831) German philosophy professor & objective idealistic philosopher; developed the system of idealist dialectics which Marx and Engels used as a basis for developing materialist dialectics. See p. 8–11, 29, 69–71, 97, 98, 100–105, 132, 157, 165, 182, 192, 193–194, 209, 228.
Historical Materialism The application of materialist dialectics and dialectical materialism to the study of human history. See p. 21–23, 27, 36, 38, 45, 80.
Historical Viewpoint A viewpoint which demands that subjects be considered in their current stage of motion and development, while also taking into consideration the development and transformation of the subject over time. See p. 116–118, 125–126, 143, 185, 234.
Idealism A philosophical position which holds that the only reliable experience of reality occurs within human consciousness. Idealists believe that human reason exclusively or as a first basis is the best way to seek truth. See p. 8–12, 26–29, 48–51, 53, 56–58, 69–70, 96, 101–102, 104, 157, 174, 209, 218, 228.
Immanuel Kant (1724 — 1804) German philosopher who developed a system of idealist dialectics which were later completed by Hegel and whose metaphysical philosophies of epistemology and rationalism served as the basis for later empiricists such as Bacon and Hume. See p. 20, 29, 56, 72–74, 100–102, 205.
Induction The reaction of animals with simple nervous systems which can sense or feel their environments. Induction occurs through unconditioned reflex mechanisms. See p. 66, 68.
Inductive Inference Logical inference which extrapolates from specific observations to general conclusions. See p. 223–224.
Intelligibility The human cognitive capacity to accurately perceive the external material world. See p. 48.
Internal Contradictions See: Internal and External Contradictions.
Internal and External Contradictions Internal contradictions are contradictions which exist within the internal relations of a subject, while external contradictions exist between two or more subjects as external relations. See p. 178–179.
Judgment The phase of rational consciousness which arises from the definition of the subject — the linking of concepts and properties together — which leads to affirmative or negative ideation of certain characteristics or attributes of the perceived subject. See p. 223.
Karl Marx (1818–1883) German theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, political economist, founder of scientific socialism, and leader of the international working class. Referenced throughout.
Knowledge The content of consciousness; data about the world, such as: ideas, memories, and other thoughts which are derived through direct observation and practical activities in the material world, through scientific experiments, or through abstract reflection of practical and scientific activities which occur within consciousness.
Labor Value The amount of value which workers produce through labor. See p. 14, 17–18, 23.
Law of Negation of Negation A universal law of materialist dialectics which states that the fundamental and universal tendency of motion and development occurs through a cycle of dialectical negation, wherein each and every negation is, in turn, negated once more. See p. 163, 185, 195, 198, 200, 201, 202, 227.
Law of Transformation Between Quantity and Quality The universal law of dialectical materialism which concerns the universal mode of motion and development processes of nature, society, and human thought, which states that qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of the quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and, ideas, and, vice versa, quantitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas arise from the inevitable basis of qualitative changes of things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 163–165, 172–173, 227.
Law of Unification Contradiction Between Opposites and The universal law of dialectical materialism which states that the fundamental, originating, and universal driving force of all motion and development processes is the inherent and objective contradictions which exists in all things, phenomena, and ideas. See p. 163, 175, 181.
Law of Development of Capitalism Also known as Theory of Accumulation and Theory of Surplus Value. The dynamic through which the capitalist class gains wealth by accumulating surplus value (i.e., profits) and then reinvesting it into more capital to gain even further wealth; thus the goal of the capitalist class is to accumulate more and more surplus value which leads to the development of capitalism. See p. 18.
Laws In dialectical materialism, laws are the regular, common, obvious, natural, objective relations between internal aspects, factors, and attributes of a thing or phenomenon or between things and phenomena. See p. 162.
Laws of Nature Laws that arise in the natural world, including within the human body (and are never products of human conscious activities). Such law includes the laws of physics, chemistry, and other natural phenomena which govern the material world. See p. 162, 213.
Laws of Society Laws of human activity in social relations; such laws are unable to manifest beyond the conscious activities of humans, but they are still objective. See p. 162–163.
Laws of Human Thought Laws which govern the intrinsic relationships between concepts, categories, judgments, inference, and the development process of human rational awareness. See p. 163.
Life-Process Processes of motion and change which occur within organisms to sustain life. See p. 69–72, 79, 88.
Ludwig Feuerbach (1804 — 1872) German philosophy professor, materialist philosopher; Marx and Engels drew many of their ideas from the works of Feuerbach (whom they also criticized). See p. 8, 11–13, 21, 55, 74, 80, 114, 205, 237.
M→→C→→M’ The mode of circulation described by Marx as existing under capitalism, in which capitalists spend money to buy commodities (including the commodified labor of workers), with the intention of selling those commodities for more money than they began with. The capitalist has no direct relationship to the commodity being produced and sold, and the capitalist is solely interested in obtaining more money. See p. 16. See also: C→M→C
Machism See: Empirio-Criticism.
Manifestation How a given thing, phenomenon, or idea is expressed externally in the material world. See p. 115.
Marxism-Leninism A system of scientific opinions and theories focused on liberating the working class from capitalism and achieving a stateless, classless, communist society. The core ideas of this system were first developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, then defended and further developed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. See. p. 1.
Material Conditions The material external environment in which humans live, including the natural environment, the means of production and the economic base of human society, objective social relations, and other externalities and systems which affect human life and human society. See p. 6, 22, 40–42, 70–72, 80–81, 87, 92–95, 116–118, 161, 174, 179, 181, 206–207, 210, 229.
Material Production Activity Material production activity is the first and most basic form of praxis. In this form of praxis activity, humans use tools through labor processes to influence the natural world in order to create wealth and material resources and to develop the conditions necessary to maintain our existence and development. See p. 206–208.
Materialism A philosophical position that holds that the material world exists outside of the mind, and that human ideas and thoughts stem from observation and sense experience of this external world. Materialism rejects the idealist notion that truth can only be sought solely through reasoning and human consciousness. See p. 10–13, 48.
Materialist Dialectics A scientific system of philosophy concerned with motion, development, and common relationships, and with the most common rules of motion and development of nature, society, and human thought. See p. 10, 21, 45–47, 98202, 227, 237.
Matter A philosophical category denoting things and phenomena, existing in objective external reality, which human beings access through our sense perceptions. See p. 26, 27, 32, 48, 51–52, 53–69, 72, 88–95, 97, 103, 164–165.
Means of Production Physical inputs and systems used in the production of goods and services, including: machinery, factory buildings, tools, equipment, and anything else used in producing goods and services. See p. 2–3, 7, 14–16.
Mechanical Motion Changes in positions of objects in space. See p. 61.
Mechanical Philosophy A scientific and philosophical movement popular in the 17th century which explored mechanical machines and compared natural phenomena to mechanical devices, resulting in a belief that all things — including living organisms — were built as (and could theoretically be built by humans as) mechanical devices.
Mental Reflection Reactions which occur in animals with central nervous systems. Mental reflections occur through conditioned reflex mechanisms through learning. See p. 65, 68, 224.
Metaphysical Materialism Metaphysical materialism was strongly influenced by the metaphysical, mechanical thinking of mechanical philosophy, which was a scientific and philosophical movement which explored mechanical machines and compared natural phenomena to mechanical devices. Metaphysical materialists believed that all change can exist only as an increase or decrease in quantity, brought about by external causes.
Metaphysics A branch of philosophy that attempts to explain the fundamental nature of reality. Metaphysical philosophy has taken many forms through the centuries, but one common shortcoming of metaphysical thought is a tendency to view things and ideas in a static, abstract manner. Generally speaking, metaphysics presents nature as a collection of objects and phenomena which are isolated from one another and fundamentally unchanging. See p. 52.
Methodology A system of reasoning: the ideas and rules that guide humans to research, build, select, and apply the most suitable methods in both perception and practice. Methodologies can range from very specific to broadly general, with philosophical methodology being the most general scope of methodology. See p. 44.
Mode The way or manner in which something occurs or exists. See p. 19–20.
Mode of Existence of Matter Refers to how matter exists in our universe; specifically, matter exists in our motion in a mode of motion. See p. 59.
Motion Also known as “change;” motion/change occurs as a result of the mutual impacts which occur between two things, phenomena, or ideas in relation with one another. See p. 23, 47, 59–63. 74, 106–107, 122–127, 145, 163–165, 169-173-186, 197, 201–202.
Motion in Equilibrium Motion in equilibrium is motion that has not changed the positions, forms, and/or structures of things. Motion in Equlibrium is only ever temporary in nature; all motion will eventually lead to changes in position, form, and/or structure. See p. 62.
Narodnik Agrarian socialist movement of the 1860s and 70s in the Russian Empire, composed of peasants who rose up in a failed campaign against the Czar. See p. 29–30.
Natural law See: Laws of Nature.
Natural Science Science which deals with the natural world, including chemistry, biology, physics, geology, etc. See p. 13, 19, 26, 103.
Negation The development process through which two contradicting objects mutually develop one another until one is overtaken by the other. In dialectical materialism, negation takes the form of dialectical negation. See p. 123, 175176, 183, 185–202.
New Economic Policy Also known as the NEP; this early Soviet policy was devised as Vladimir Illyich Lenin to be a temporary economic system that would allow a market economy and capitalism to exist within Russia, alongside state-owned business ventures, all firmly under the control of the working-classdominated state. See p. 33–34.
Objective Dialectics The dialectical processes which occur in the material world, including all of the motion, relationships, and dynamic changes which occur in space and time. See p. 98, 102–103, 182.
Objective Existence Existence which manifests outside of and independently of human consciousness, whether humans can perceive it or not. See p. 50, 58, 228.
Objective Idealism A form of idealism which asserts that the ideal and consciousness are the primary existence, while also positing that the ideal and consciousness are objective, and that they exist independently of nature and humans. See p. 50.
Objectiveness An abstract concept that refers to the relative externality of all things, phenomena, and ideas. Every thing, phenomena and idea exists externally to every other thing, phenomena, and idea. This means that to each individual subject, all other subjects exist as external objects. See p. 111–114, 124.
Obviousness See: Obviousness and Randomness
Obviousness and Randomness (Category Pair) The philosophical category of Obviousness refers to events that occur because of the essential internal aspects of a subject which become reasons for certain results in certain conditions: the obvious has to happen in a certain way, it can’t happen any other way. The Randomness category refers to things that happen because of external reasons: things that happen, essentially, by chance, due to impacts from many external relations. A random outcome may occur or it may not occur, and may occur in many different ways. Obviousness and Randomness have a dialectical relationship with one another. See p. 144–146.
Opportunism A system of political opinions with no direction, no clear path, and/or no coherent viewpoint, focusing on whatever actions or decisions might be beneficial for the opportunist in the short term. See p. 174.
Opposites Such aspects, properties and tendencies of motion which oppose one another, yet are, simultaneously, conditions and premises of the existence of one another. See p. 61, 175–179, 181, 184, 190, 227.
Ordinary Consciousness Perception that is formed passively, stemming from the daily activities of humans. See p. 210–216.
Period of Motion Development which occurs between two quality shifts, including the quality shifts themselves. See p. 170.
Perspective See: Viewpoint.
Petty Bourgeoisie Semi-autonomous merchants, farmers, and so on who are self-employed, own small and limited means of production, or otherwise fall in between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Also called the petite bourgeoisie. See p. 3–6.
Petty Commodity Production See: Simple Commodity Production.
Phenomena Anything that is observable by the human senses. See p. 156. See also: Essence and Phenomena.
Physical Motion Motion of molecules, electrons, fundamental particles, thermal processes, electricity, etc., in time and space. See p. 61.
Physical Reflection Reflection which occurs any time two material objects interact and the features of the objects are transferred to one other. See p. 67–68.
Point of View See: Viewpoint.
Populism The political philosophy of the Narodnik movement; this political philosophy was focused on bringing about an agrarian peasant revolution led by intellectuals with the ambition of going directly from a feudal society to a socialist society built from rural communes. Populism overtly opposed Marxism and dialectical materialism and was based on subjective idealist utopianism. See p. 30.
Positivism The belief that we can test scientific knowledge through scientific methods, and through logic, math, etc.; positivism tends to overlap significantly with empiricism in theory and practice. See p. 32, 209.
Possibility See: Possibility and Reality.
Possibility and Reality (Category Pair) The philosophical category of Possibility refers to things that have not happened nor existed in reality yet, but that would happen, or would exist given necessary conditions. The philosophical category of Reality refers to things that exist or have existed in reality and in human thought. See p. 160–162.
Practice See: Praxis.
Pragmatism Pragmatism refers to a form of subjectivism in which one centers one’s own immediate material concerns over all other considerations. See p. 218.
Praxis Conscious activity which improves our understanding, and which has purpose and historical-social characteristics. Used interchangeably with the word “practice” in this text. See p. 205–206, 235.
Prejudice See: Conservatism.
Primary and Secondary Contradictions In the development of things, phenomena, and ideas, there are many development stages. In each stage of development, there will be one contradiction which drives the development process. This is what we call the primary contradiction. Secondary contradictions include all the other contradictions which exist during that stage of development. Determining whether a contradiction is primary or secondary is relative, and it depends heavily upon the material conditions and the situation being analyzed. See p. 178–179.
Primary Existence Existence which precedes and determines other existences; materialists believe that the external material world is the primary existence which determines the ideal, while idealists believe that human consciousness (“the ideal”) is the primary existence from which truth is ultimately derived. See p. 50–51.
Primitive Materialism An early form of materialism which recognizes that matter is the primary existence, and holds that the world is composed of certain elements, and that these were the first objects — the origin — of the world, and that these elements are the essence of reality. This was later developed into Metaphysical Materialism and, later, Dialectical Materialism. See p. 52.
Principle of General Relationships A principle of dialectical materialism which states that all things, phenomena, and ideas are related to one another, and are defined by these internal and external relationships. See p. 106–107, 110, 114.
Private See: Private and Common
Private and Common (Category Pair) The Private philosophical category encompasses specific things, phenomena, and ideas; the Common philosophical category defines the common aspects, attributes, factors, and relations that exist in many things and phenomena. Private and Common are relative in nature and have a dialectical relationship with one another. See p. 128–138.
Private Laws Laws which apply only to a specific range of things and phenomena, i.e.: laws of mechanical motion, laws of chemical motion, laws of biological motion, etc. See p. 162.
Production Force The combination of the means of production and workers within human society. See p. 6, 23, 36.
Proletariat The people who provide labor under capitalism; the proletariat do not own their own means of production, and must therefore sell their labor to those who do own means of production; also called the Working Class. See also: Bourgeoisie, Petty Bourgeoisie. See p. 1–8, 22–23, 25–26, 29–31, 33–35, 40–41, 63, 231.
Quality The unity of component parts, taken together, which defines a subject and distinguishes it from other subjects. See p. 119–121.
Quality Shift A change in quality which takes place in the motion and development process of things, phenomena, and ideas, occurring when quantity change meets a certain perceived threshold. See p. 124, 153, 164, 168–174.
Quantity The total amount of component parts that compose a subject. See p. 119–121.
Quantity range The range of quantity changes which can accumulate without leading to change in quality related to any given thing, phenomenon, or idea. See p. 168–171.
Quintessence Original Vietnamese word: tinh hoa. Literally, it means “the best, highest, most beautiful, defining characteristics” of a concept, and, unlike the English word quintessence, it has an exclusively positive connotation. See p. 8, 21, 43, 45, 52.
Randomness See: Obviousness and Randomness.
Rational Consciousness The higher stage of the cognitive process, which includes the indirect, abstract, and generalized reflection of the essential properties and characteristics of things and phenomena. This stage of consciousness performs the most important function of comprehending and interpreting the essence of the perceived subject. See p. 219–225.
Reason See: Reason and Result
Reality See: Possibility and Reality.
Reason and Result (Category Pair) The Reason philosophical category is used to define the mutual impacts between internal aspects of a thing, phenomenon or idea, or between things, phenomena, or ideas, that bring about changes. The Result philosophical category defines the changes that were caused by mutual impacts which occur between aspects and factors within a thing, phenomenon, or idea, or externally between different things, phenomena, or ideas. Not to be confused with the metaphysical concept of “cause and effect,” which attributes a single cause to any given effect. See p. 138–144.
Reasoning The final phase of rational consciousness, formed on the basis of synthesizing judgments so as to extrapolate new knowledge about the perceived subject. See p. 223–225, 228–229.
Reflection The re-creation of the features of one form of matter in a different form of matter which occurs when they mutually impact each other through interaction. See p. 64–75, 79–80, 90–92, 103, 165, 208–211, 214–215, 219–224, 228, 232, 237.
Relative and Absolute “Absolute” and “Relative” are philosophical classifications which refer to interdependence: That which is absolute exists independently and with permanence. That which is relative is temporary, and dependent on other conditions or circumstances in order to exist. See p. 56, 233. See also: Absolute Truth, Relative Truth, Relativism, Truth.
Relative Truth Truth which has developed alignment with reality without yet having reached complete alignment between human knowledge and the reality which it reflects; knowledge which incompletely reflects material subjects without complete accuracy. See p. 230, 232. See also: Absolute Truth, Relative and Absolute, Relativism, Truth.
Relativism A position that all truth is relative and that nothing can ever be absolutely, objectively known; that only Relative Truth can be found in our existence. See p. 56–58, 233–234. See also: Absolute Truth, Relative and Absolute, Relative Truth, Truth.
René Descartes (1596 — 1650) French metaphysical philosopher who developed early methods of scientific inquiry. See p. 20, 53.
Result See: Reason and Result.
Richard Avenarius (1843 — 1896) German-Swiss philosopher who developed a system of subjective idealism known as “Empirio-Criticism.” See p. 27–29.
Rigidity An unwillingness to alter one’s thoughts, holding too stiffly to established consciousness and knowledge, and ignoring practical experience and observation, which leads to stagnation of both knowledge and consciousness. See p. 217–218.
Robert Owen (1771 — 1858) Wealthy Welsh textile manufacturer who tried to build a better society for workers in New Hampshire, Indiana, in the USA by purchasing the town of New Harmony in 1825. Owen’s vision failed after two years, though many other wealthy capitalists in the early 19th century were inspired by Owen to try similar plans, which also failed.
Scientific An adjective which describes methodologies, approaches, and practices of gaining knowledge and insight which are methodological and/or systematic in nature. See p. 1–2.
Scientific Consciousness Conscious activities which actively gather information from the methodological and/or systematic observations of the characteristics, nature, and inherent relationships of research subjects. Scientific consciousness is considered indirect because it takes place outside of the course of ordinary daily activities. See p. 58, 210, 212, 215–216.
Scientific Experimental Human activities that resemble or replicate states of nature and society
Activity in order to determine the laws of change and development of subjects of study. This form of activity plays an important role in the development of society, especially in the current historical period of modern science and technological revolution. See p. 206–208.
Scientific Materialist Viewpoint A perspective which begins analysis of the world in a manner that is both scientifically systematic in pursuit of understanding and firmly rooted in a materialist conception of the world. See p. 105.
Scientific Socialism A body of theory and knowledge (which must be constantly tested against reality) focused on the practical pursuit of changing the world to bring about socialism through the leadership of the proletariat. See p. 1–2, 21, 37–39.
Scientific Worldview A worldview that is expressed by a systematic pursuit of knowledge that generally and correctly reflects the relationships of things, phenomena, and processes in the objective material world, including relationships between humans, as well as relationships between humans and the world. See p. 3839, 44–45, 48.
Second International Founded in Paris in 1889 to continue the work of the First International; it fell apart in 1916 because members from different nations could not maintain solidarity through the outbreak of World War I. See p. 35, 174.
Self-motion In the original Vietnamese, the word “tự vận động.” Literally meaning: “it moves itself.” See p. 59–60, 124.
Sensation The subjective reflection of the objective world in human consciousness as perceived through human senses. See p. 27, 56–58, 68–69, 72, 85, 221–222.
Sensuous Human Activity; Sensuous Activity A description of human activity developed by Marx which acknowledges that all human activity is simultaneously active in the sense that our conscious activity can transform the world, as well as passive in the sense in that all human thoughts fundamentally derive from observation and sense experience of the material world. See p. 13.
Simple Commodity Production What Marx called the “C→M→C” mode of circulation. See p. 16–18.
Simple Exchange When individual producers trade the products they have made directly, themselves, for other commodities. See p. 16–17.
Social Being The material existence of human society, as opposed to social consciousness. See also: Base. See p. 24, 54–55.
Social Consciousness The collective experience of consciousness shared by members of a society, including ideological, cultural, spiritual, and legal beliefs and ideas which are shared within that society, as opposed to social being. See p. 22, 24, 32, 54–55, 80. See also: Superstructure.
Social Motion Changes in the economy, politics, culture, and social life of human beings. See p. 61–62.
Socialization The idea that human society transforms labor and production from a solitary, individual act into a collective, social act. In other words, as human society progresses, people “socialize” labor into increasingly complex networks of social relations: from individuals making their own tools, to agricultural societies engaged in collective farming, to modern industrial societies with factories, logistical networks, etc. See p. 6, 36.
Socialized Production Force A production force which has been socialized — that is to say, a production force which has been organized into collective social activity. See p. 6.
Socio-Political Activity Praxis activity utilized by various communities and organizations in human society to transform political-social relations in order to promote social development. See p. 206–208.
Solipsism A form of idealism in which one believes that the self is the only basis for truth. See p. 218.
Sophistry The use of misleading arguments, usually with the intention of deception, with a tendency of presenting non-critical aspects of a subject matter as critical, to serve a particular agenda. The word comes from the Sophists, a group of professional teachers in Ancient Greece, who were criticized by Socrates (in Plato’s’ dialogues) for being shrewd and deceptive rhetoricians. See p. 32–33, 56, 118, 182, 194.
Stage of Development The current quantity and quality characteristics which a thing, phenomenon, or object possesses. Every time a quality change occurs, a new stage of development is entered into. See p. 24, 39, 125, 173–174, 179, 190, 196–197, 200, 212, 221.
Stagnation An inability or unwillingness to change and adapt consciousness and practice in accordance with developing material conditions. Stagnation can stem from, or cause, overstatement of absolute truth in theory and forestall necessary development of both consciousness and practical ability. See p. 125, 218, 233. See also: Rigidity.
Struggle of Opposites The tendency of opposites to eliminate and negate each other. See p. 61, 181, 184.
Subjective Factors Factors which, from the perspective of a given subject, that same subject is capable of impacting. See p. 162–163, 175, 202.
Subjective Dialectics; Dialectical Thought A system of analysis and organized thinking which aims to reflect the objective dialectics of the material world within human consciousness. Dialectical thinking has two component forms: dialectical materialism and materialist dialectics. See: p. 98–99, 103.
Subjective Idealism Subjective idealism asserts that consciousness is the primary existence and that truth can be obtained only or primarily through conscious activity and reasoning. Subjective idealism asserts that all things and phenomena can only be experienced as subjective sensory perceptions, with some forms of subjective idealism even explicitly denying the objective existence of material reality altogether. See also: Empirio-Criticism, Objective Idealism. See p. 26–27, 50.
Subjectivism A philosophical position in which one centers one’s own self and conscious activities in perspective and worldview, failing to test their own perceptions against material and social reality. See p. 56, 182, 217–218, 233–234.
Suitability The applicability of a subject for a specific application or role. See p. 154.
Superstructure The ideal (non-material) components of human society, including: media institutions, music, and art, as well as other cultural elements like religion, customs, moral standards, and everything else which manifests primarily through conscious activity and social relations. See p. 23. See also: Base.
Surplus Value The extra amount of value a capitalist is able to secure by exploiting wagelabourers (by paying workers less than the full value of their labour). Workers will spend part of their workday reproducing their own labourpower (through earning enough to eat, secure shelter and other cultural needs) and the rest of the time will be spent producing surplus value which is then appropriated by the capitalist as profit. See p. 18, 22–23, 39.
Symbolization The representation of an objective thing or phenomenon in human consciousness which has been reflected by sensation and conception. See p. 221–222.
Systematic Structure A structure which includes within itself a system of component parts and relationships. See p. 114.
Theoretical Consciousness The indirect, abstract, systematic level of perception in which the nature and laws of things and phenomena are generalized and abstracted. See p. 210–214, 217–218.
Theoretical Knowledge Knowledge which is abstract and generalized, resulting from theoretical conscious activities which include repeated and varied observations. See p. 214, 217.
Theory An idea or system of ideas intended to explain an aspect, characteristic, or tendency of objective reality. See p. 235.
Theory of Accumulation/Surplus Value See: Law of Development of Capitalism.
Thing-in-Itself The actual material object which exists outside of our consciousness, as it exists outside of our consciousness. See p. 72–74, 101, 158.
Third International Also known as the Communist International (or the ComIntern for short); founded in Moscow in 1919, its goals were to overthrow capitalism, build socialism, and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. It was dissolved in 1943 in the midst of the German invasion of Russia in World War II. See p. 35.
Three Component Parts The three essential elements of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, first identified of Marxism-Leninism by Lenin in The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism. 1. The Philosophy of Marxism. 2. The Political Economy of Marxism. 3. Scientific Socialism.See p. 21, 32, 34, 38.
Threshold The amount, or degree, of quantity change at which quality change occurs. Truth is primarily discovered through labor and practice in the physical world. See p. 120, 168–169, 171, 173.
Truth A correct and accurate conscious reflection of objective reality. See p. 9–10, 49, 56, 70, 75, 94–96, 194, 204, 209, 215–219, 225–237. See also: Labor, Practice.
Unconditioned Reflex Reactions which are not learned, but simply occur automatically based on physiological mechanisms occurring within an organism, characterized by permanent connections between sensory perceptions and reactions. See p. 66, 68.
Unilateral Consideration The consideration of a subject from one side only. See p. 49.
Unintelligibility A philosophical position which denies the human cognitive capacity to accurately perceive the external material world. See p. 48.
Unique Relationship The least general form of relationship, which only occur between two specific things/phenomena/ideas. See p. 109, 130.
Unity in Diversity A concept in materialist dialectics which holds that within universal relationships exist within and between all different things, phenomena, and ideas, we will find that each individual manifestation of any universal relationship will have its own different manifestations, aspects, features, etc. Thus even the universal relationships which unite all things, phenomena, and ideas exist in infinite diversity. See p. 42, 110–111, 114, 125, 130.
Universal Law of Consciousness A universal law which holds that consciousness is a process of dialectical development in which practical activity leads to conscious activity, which then leads back to practical activity, in a continuous and never-ending cycle, with a tendency to develop both practical and conscious activity to increasingly higher levels. See p. 219.
Universal Laws Laws that impact every aspect of nature, society, and human thought. Materialist dialectics is the study of these universal laws. See p. 15, 162–163, 227.
Universal Relationship The most general kind of relationship; relationships that exist between and within every thing and all phenomena; along with development, universal relationships are one of the two primary subjects of study of materialist dialectics. See p. 80, 108, 109, 111, 165.
Use Value A concept in classical political economy and Marxist economics which refers to tangible features of a commodity (a tradable object) that can fulfill some human requirement or desire, or which serve a useful purpose. See p. 15–18, 95.
Utopianism 1. A political and philosophical movement which held the belief that “a New Moral World” of happiness, enlightenment, and prosperity could be created through education, science, technology, and communal living. See p. 18. 2. The idealist philosophical concept which mistakenly asserts that the ideal can determine the material, and that ideal forms of society can be brought about without regard for material conditions and development processes. See p. 8, 17–18, 30, 94.
Value-Form Also known as “form of value;” the social form of a commodity. Under capitalism, through the exchange of qualitatively different commodities, the money form of value is established as the general equivalent which can functionally be exchanged for all other values; money is therefore the most universal value-form under capitalism. See p. 15, 17, 155.
Viewpoint Also known as point of view or perspective; the starting point of analysis which determines the direction of thinking from which phenomena and problems are considered. See p. 12, 20–21, 23, 25, 26, 30, 32–33, 38–39, 5559, 62, 64, 89, 93–94, 105, 111, 114–120, 122, 125–126, 130, 143, 147, 150, 172, 185–188, 195, 200–201, 233–235. See also: Comprehensive Viewpoint, Historical Viewpoint.
Viewpoint Crisis A situation in which a specific viewpoint can’t be settled on, found, or agreed upon. See p. 26, 32–33.
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870 -1924) A Russian theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, defender and developer of Marxism in the era of imperialism, founder of the Bolsheviks, the Communist Party and the government of the Soviet Union, leader of Russia and the international working class. Referenced throughout.
Working Class See: Proletariat
Worldview The whole of an individual’s or society’s opinions and conceptions about the world, about humans ourselves, and about life and the position of human beings in the world. See p. 1, 11, 37–39, 44–45, 48, 52, 96, 138, 201, 208–209, 218, 234. See also: Scientific Worldview.


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  1. ↑ Karl Marx, 1818–1883 (German): Theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, political economist, founder of scientific socialism, leader of the international working class.
  2. ↑ Friedrich Engels, 1820–1895 (German): Theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, leader of the international working class, co-founder of scientific socialism with Karl Marx.
  3. ↑ Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1870–1924 (Russian): Theorist, politician, dialectical materialist philosopher, defender and developer of Marxism in the era of imperialism, founder of the Communist Party and the government of the Soviet Union, leader of Russia and the international working class.
  4. ↑ Material conditions include the natural environment, the means of production and the economic base of human society, objective social relations, and other externalities and systems which affect human life and human society. See Annotation 79, p. 81.
  5. ↑ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 1770 — 1831 (German): Philosophy professor, an objective idealistic philosopher — representative of German classical philosophy.
  6. ↑ Ludwig Feuerbach, 1804 — 1872 (German): Philosophy professor, materialist philosopher.
  7. ↑ The Holy Family is a book co-written by Marx and Engels which critiqued the Young Hegelians, including Feuerbach.
  8. ↑ Adam Smith, 1723 — 1790 (British): Logic professor, moral philosophy professor, economist.
  9. ↑ David Ricardo, 1772 — 1823 (British): Economist.
  10. ↑ Claude Henri de Rouvroy Saint Simon, 1760 — 1825 (French): Philosopher, economist, utopianist activist.
  11. ↑ Charles Fourier, 1772 — 1837 (French): Philosopher, economist, utopianist activist.
  12. ↑ Robert Owen, 1771 — 1858 (British): Utopianist activist, owner of a cotton factory.
  13. ↑ The Law of Development of Capitalism referenced here is the Theory of Accumulation/Surplus Value, which holds that the capitalist class gains wealth by accumulating surplus value (i.e., profits) and then reinvesting it into more capital to gain even further wealth; thus the goal of the capitalist class is to accumulate more and more surplus value which leads to the development of capitalism. Over time, this deepens the contradictions of capitalism. This concept is related to the M→C→M mode of circulation, discussed in Annotation 14, p. 16, and is discussed in detail in Part 3 of the book this text is drawn from (Political Economy) which we hope to translate in the future.
  14. ↑ Das Kapital: Karl Marx’s most important contribution to political economy. It is composed of four volumes. It is the work of Marx’s whole career and an important part of Engels’ career, as well. Marx started writing Das Kapital in the 1840s and continued writing until he died (1883). Das Kapital I was published in 1867. After Marx’s death, Engels edited and published the second volume in 1885 and the third volume in 1894. The Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the USSR edited and published Das Kapital IV, also known as Theories of Surplus-Value, in the 1950s, long after the death of Marx and Engels.
  15. ↑ Populist faction: A faction within the Russian revolution which upheld an idealist capitalist ideology with many representatives such as Mikhailovsky, Bakunin, and Plekhanov. Populists failed to recognise the important roles of the people, of the farmers and workers alliance, and of the proletariat. Instead, they completely centered the role of the individual in society. They considered the rural communes as the nucleus of “socialism.” They saw farmers under the leadership of intellectuals as the main force of the revolution. The populists advocated individual terrorism as the primary method of revolutionary struggle.
  16. ↑ Delegate Document of the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.
  17. ↑ Delegate document of the 9th national congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.
  18. ↑ Delegate document of the 10th national congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.
  19. ↑ See Annotation 6, p. 8.
  20. ↑ The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1913.
  21. ↑ Karl Marx, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.
  22. ↑ Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Friedrich Engels, 1886.
  23. ↑ According to the Samkhya school, Pradhana is the original form of matter in an unmanifested,indifferentiated state; Prakriti is manifested matter, differentiated in form, which contains potential for motion.
  24. ↑ Thales, ~642 — ~547 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher, mathematician, astronomer, politician.
  25. ↑ Anaximene, ~585 — ~525 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher.
  26. ↑ Heraclitus, ~540 — ~480 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher, founder of ancient dialectics.
  27. ↑ Democritus, ~460 — ~370 B.C. (Greek): Philosopher, naturalist, a founder of atom theory.
  28. ↑ Francis Bacon, 1561 — 1626 (British): Philosopher, novelist, mathematician, political activist.
  29. ↑ Rene Descartes, 1596 — 1650 (Fench): Philosopher, mathematician, physicist.
  30. ↑ Thomas Hobbes, 1588 — 1679 (British): Political philosopher, political activist.
  31. ↑ Denis Diderot, 1713 — 1784 (French): Philosopher, novelist.
  32. ↑ Wilhelm Conrad Roentgen, 1845–1923 (German): Physicist.
  33. ↑ Henri Becquerel, 1852–1908 (French): Physicist.
  34. ↑ Sir Joseph John Thomson, 1856–1940 (British): Physicist, professor at London Royal Institute.
  35. ↑ In the original Vietnamese, the word tự vận động is used here, which we roughly translate to the word self-motion throughout this book. Literally, tự vận động means: “it moves itself.”
  36. ↑ Source: “Food for Thought: Was Cooking a Pivotal Step in Human Evolution?” by Alexandra Rosati, Scientific American, February 26, 2018.
  37. ↑ Written by Professor Tracy L. Kivell and published in The Royal Society.
  38. ↑ Stone Tools Helped Shape Human Hands by Sara Reardon, published in New Scientist Magazine.
  39. ↑ The German Ideology, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 1846.
  40. ↑ See Annotation 3, p. 2 and Annotation 29, p. 24.
  41. ↑ For a discussion of the material basis of social laws, see Annotation 10, p. 10, Annotation 78, p. 80, and Annotation 79, p. 81.
  42. ↑ See: Annotation 72, p. 68.
  43. ↑ See: Annotation 90, p. 88.
  44. ↑ See: The Role of Matter in Consciousness, p. 89.
  45. ↑ See: The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88.
  46. ↑ See:Annotation 68, p. 65.
  47. ↑ See: Nature and Structure of Consciousness, p. 79.
  48. ↑ See: Annotation 93, below.
  49. ↑ See: Annotation 10, p. 10.
  50. ↑ For discussion of the meaning of methodology, see Methodology, p. 44.
  51. ↑ See: Nature of Consciousness, p. 79.
  52. ↑ See: The Relationship Between Matter and Consciousness, p. 88.
  53. ↑ See: Annotation 211, p. 205.
  54. ↑ See: Annotation 114, p. 116.
  55. ↑ See: Nature and Structure of Consciousness, p. 79.
  56. ↑ See: Annotation 222, p. 218.
  57. ↑ See: The Opposition of Materialism and Idealism in Solving Basic Philosophical Issues, p. 48.
  58. ↑ See: Annotation 10, p. 10.
  59. ↑ See: Annotation 232 and The Properties of Truth, on p. 228.
  60. ↑ See: Praxis, Consciousness, and the Role of Praxis in Consciousness, p. 204.
  61. ↑ Karl Marx, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.
  62. ↑ See Annotation 9, p. 10.
  63. ↑ Dialectics of Nature, Friedrich Engels, 1883.
  64. ↑ Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Friedrich Engels, 1880.
  65. ↑ The Old Preface to Anti-Dühring, Friedrich Engels, 1878.
  66. ↑ The Old Preface to Anti-Dühring, Friedrich Engels, 1878.
  67. ↑ Kant’s “transcendental dialectic” was used to critique rationalism and pure reason, but was not a fully developed dialectical system of thought. Hegel’s idealist dialectics were more universal in nature. See Annotation 9, p. 10.
  68. ↑ The Old Preface to Anti-Dühring, On Dialectics, Friedrich Engels, 1878.
  69. ↑ Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic, Vladimir Ilyich. Lenin, 1914.
  70. ↑ Afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital Volume I, Karl Marx, 1873.
  71. ↑ Anti-Dühring, The 1885 Preface, Friedrich Engels, 1878.
  72. ↑ Anti-Dühring, Friedrich Engels, 1878.
  73. ↑ See p. 107.
  74. ↑ Dialectics of Nature, Friedrich Engels, 1883.
  75. ↑ See Annotation 117, p. 119.
  76. ↑ The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1913.
  77. ↑ See Annotation 98, p. 100.
  78. ↑ See Private and Common, p. 128; Essence and Phenomenon, p. 156.
  79. ↑ See Annotation 117, p. 119.
  80. ↑ See Annotation 190, p. 181.
  81. ↑ See Annotation 108, p. 112.
  82. ↑ See p. 108.
  83. ↑ Once Again On The Trade Unions, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921.
  84. ↑ See: Annotation 108, p. 112.
  85. ↑ See: Annotation 106, p. 109.
  86. ↑ See: Annotation 107, p. 110.
  87. ↑ Once Again On The Trade Unions, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921. See also: Mode and Forms of Matter, p. 59.
  88. ↑ See Annotation 62, p. 59.
  89. ↑ Once Again On The Trade Unions, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921.
  90. ↑ On the Question of Dialectics, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.
  91. ↑ Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Friedrich Engels, 1880.
  92. ↑ Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Friedrich Engels, 1886.
  93. ↑ See Annotation 10, p. 10 and Annotation 108, p. 112.
  94. ↑ Philosophical Notebooks, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914–16.
  95. ↑ Philosophical Notebooks, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914–16.
  96. ↑ To N. D. Kiknadze, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, written after November 5, 1916.
  97. ↑ Anti-Dühring, Friedrich Engels, 1878.
  98. ↑ See Annotation 108, p. 112.
  99. ↑ See Annotation 207, p. 202.
  100. ↑ Summary of Dialectics, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.
  101. ↑ Anti-Dühring, Friedrich Engels, 1877.
  102. ↑ On the Questions of Dialectics, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.
  103. ↑ On the Questions of Dialectics, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.
  104. ↑ On the Questions of Dialectics, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.
  105. ↑ On the Questions of Dialectics, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1915.
  106. ↑ Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.
  107. ↑ Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.
  108. ↑ Karl Marx, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.
  109. ↑ Anti-Dühring, Friedrich Engels, 1878.
  110. ↑ Theses On Feuerbach, Karl Marx, 1845.
  111. ↑ Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1908.
  112. ↑ Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1914.
  113. ↑ Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1908.
  114. ↑ Once Again On The Trade Unions, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 1921.
  115. ↑ Revolutionary Ethics, Ho Chi Minh, December 1958.
  116. ↑ Note: Absolute Truth in dialectical materialist philosophy should not be confused with Hegel’s conception of Absolute Truth as a final point at which human consciousness will have achieved absolute, complete, and final understanding of our universe.
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